

DACIA UNDER TRAJAN. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON ROMAN TACTICS AND STRATEGY

1. The pattern of the Roman advancement during the first Dacian war.

Many scenes on Trajan's Column in Rome do not depict battles or highly narrative episodes, but show the Roman troops advancing into the enemy's territory, clearing roads, building bridges and marching camps. It is most likely that Trajan himself had dealt a lot with these matters in his unfortunately lost commentaries on the Dacian wars, which are most probably illustrated by the reliefs of the Column in Rome (*Claridge* 1993). Some authors before or after Trajan [e.g. Flavius Josephus (*Bel. Jud.*, III, 8 (p. 766—767) who gives a detailed account of the march of Vespasian from Ptolemais to Jotapata, through Galilee, and. V, 6 (p. 838—839), where he describes the march of Titus on Jerusalem], or Arrianos (on his marching order against the Allani see the recent translation and commentary of *Ruscu and Ruscu* 1996), not to mention Vegetius, *Epit. rei milit.*, III, 6 (where he states that more dangers are to be expected during a march than in the middle of a battle). They all share the same concern about marches which are considered one of the most important part of warfare (cf. *Le Bohec* 1989 a, p. 135—141). Probably like Caesar who was insisting in his commentaries on the „celeritas“ (rapidity) of his marches (cf. *Chevallier* 1988, p. 251), Trajan was largely describing the tactics used by him to advance in the foreign territory. No doubt as a result of his skills as a commander a special road and camp network was established in the occupied territory after the first war operations. At this point it is worth recalling one particular scene on the column of Trajan (*Fig. 1*) depicting the march of the first legion Minervia which urges to the front after the first campaign (from 101 A.D.) in order to support the resuming of the Roman offensive. Besides the usual marching column the relief shows a zigzagged line and some rhombi placed at the turning points of it. This curious figure has been, in my opinion, correctly interpreted as a map depicting the itinerary of the legion from one summer camp to the other (*Koepfel* 1980, p. 301 sqq.; cf. *Strobel* 1984, p. 194, note 223). Probably the artist, trying to illustrate some comment of the emperor on the march of *legio I Minervia*, felt the need to depict it as a map (*itinerarium*).

In order to reconstruct the Trajanic marching tactic and the road system attached to it, which is one of the aims of this paper, we can appeal to later itineraries rendering the road network of the province of Dacia, like *tabula Peutingeriana*. That these provincial roads were already established and built under Trajan it is proved by the mile stone from Aiton (*CIL* III, 1627), in the North of the province (between Po-taissa and Napoca), which dates from 108 A.D. (no longer than two

years after the final defeat of the Dacians). The inscription records that by then coh I Hispanorum had completed the road leading to Napoca, which implies that the road segments laying further South must have been already built. By the same time the troupes belonging to the army of the Roman province of Dacia are attested in their permanent residences which will be later occupied for more decades (*Gudea-Garbsch* 1990—91, p. 72, note 57).

So far the deductions are hardly questionable, but the main point of our conclusions relies on the fact that these military roads follow almost precisely the trails used by the marching columns of the Romans during the Dacian wars and thus the camps and stations built immediately after the conquest should overlie the ones during the military campaigns. Basically such an assumption has been unanimously accepted (e.g. the military operations of Agricola in South Scotland which are reflected by the roads and camps surrounding the Pennine mountains (*Frere* 1974, p. 123 sqq, Figs. 3 and 4). In the case of Dacia we have more than that: the only surviving passage from „*Traiani imperatoris comentarii de bello Dacico*“ is the phrase depicting the march from Bersobis to Azizis („*inde Bersobim, deinde Aizi processimus*“ (cf. *Strobel* 1984, p. 171). And indeed on „*tabula Peutingeriana*“ there is a segment of road of 12000 *passus* from Bersobis to the next station Azizis. So, we might conclude that in the case of Dacia, the generally accepted idea that Roman road and camp systems are rendering the main directions of the troops' advancement is sustained by direct evidence.

Tabula Peutingeriana gives a fairly accurate account of the roads in the province (*Weber* 1976, Segment VI), but if confronted with the reality in the fields, some of the distances recorded by it need a reassessment. (Fig. 2 and 3). Thus, if we are to take into consideration the main imperial road leading from Lederata to Porolissum, while for some of the segments the figures need no adjustment, in other cases we must deal with probable mistakes made by several copyists (cf. *Weber* 1976, p. 11 and 20). For instance the *tabula* records for the sector between Tibiscum and Sarmizegetusa a distance of 37 Roman miles, i.e. 54.8 km, which fits perfectly the distance measured on the road today. But from Bersobis to Tibiscum (today a little more than 50 km) the *tabula* records only 25 Roman miles, which is obviously unrealistic. If we accept between Azizis and Caput Bubali 13 miles instead of only 3, which is an uncommonly small distance between two stations, we come to an overall distance of 35 miles, i. e. 51.7 km between Bersobis and Tibiscum, which is more than reasonable. The same goes for the distance between Sarmizegetusa and Petrae (Simeria) which should be 37 000 *passus* (54.8 km), as measured today, and not 27 000 *passus* as recorded on the map. And indeed, the distance from the capital of the province, Sarmizegetusa, to *pagus Aquensis* (surely identifiable with today's Călan) is 24 000 paces (35.5 km) and not 14 000 as given in the *tabula Peutingeriana*. It is thus obvious that in both cases some copyist missed an X before XIII. The same mistake must have been made for the distance between Germisara and Blandiana, on the road segment Petrae-Apulum, which must be of 18 000 instead of 8 000 *passus*. If we make the necessary correction by adding here an X, we come to the real

distance between Petrae and Apulum, which is XXXVII *millia passuum* (54.8 km). An even bigger mistake was made by the copyist between Apulum and Salinae (around 50 km today), where he must have missed a station before Brucla. In this case if we add the medium distance between two stations in Dacia, 12 Roman miles (see below), we come to the figure of 36 miles (53.3 km), which is very close to the real distance between Alba Iulia (Apulum) and Războieni (Salinae). On the other hand the copyist made no mistake between Salinae and Napoca, giving a distance of 36 miles which corresponds to the one measured today. Thus the overall distance between Apulum and Napoca would be 72 miles (106.7 km) on the recalibrated *tabula Peutingeriana*, which fits well the distance of around 100 km registered today on the national road between Alba Iulia (Apulum) and Cluj (Napoca). My conclusion is that as far as the Dacian roads are concerned some copyist, or copyists, must have missed three times an X, and once one whole road segment from the original Roman map.

If we take into consideration the recalibrated itinerary proposed here (see *Figs. 2—3*), we are stroked by the fact that distances are almost the same between the main places in Dacia. Thus the provincial capital, *colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa*, lies 72 Roman miles away from the two legionary fortresses under Trajan, Bersobis (*Benea* 1983, p. 153—154) and Apulum (*Moga* 1985, p. 34—40; *Moga* 1987, p. 54—75), and the latter lies 72 miles away from Napoca, which is also a strategically significant point. Under Hadrian, probably as soon as the province of Dacia Porolissensis was instituted (118—120 a. D.) Napoca became a *municipium*, and then under Marcus Aurelius a *colonia*, thus being the most important urban center here. [Real archeological excavations have just begun in the area of the Roman town and it is impossible to say for the moment which was its situation under Trajan, but besides a civil settlement, a military camp is always possible here. In the few points where the earliest layers have been reached (there are three timber phases of a building dating from the first half of the 2nd century), no clear evidence for a military occupation could be produced, but the situation is still circumstantial (see *Cociș et alii* 1995, p. 635 sq)]. All these places are main crossroads, and between them there is always a secondary meeting point at 36 miles from both places (such as Tibiscum between Bersobis and Sarmizegetusa, Petrae between Sarmizegetusa and Apulum, Salinae between Apulum and Napoca). All this secondary meeting points will be important strategical places in the province of Dacia (at Tibiscum several auxiliary units were camped together, at Salinae was placed the only *ala milliaria* of the province, and Petrae was replaced by the near by point Micia, where also more auxiliary units were simultaneously camped). By consequence Fig. 3 shows the Roman road system in Dacia after the recalibrated *tabula Peutingeriana*, with the places arranged after a real geographical map (cf. *Fig. 4*).

Further on, if we take into consideration the stations between these important points, another pattern arises. So, for instance on the first Dacian road segment, between Apus Flumen and Bersobiae there are two stops, Arcidava and Centum Putea, which are XII *millia passuum* away from each other and also XII *millia passuum* away from the two

important meeting points. Almost the same road pattern can be identified between Bersobis and Tibiscum, where most of the distances between two places is 12 Roman miles, and a fairly similar one in the rest (some times one station was omitted on later maps and the pattern becomes 24—12). Bigger differences concerning the distance between two stations can be detected only in the sectors where the relief is more hilly (like Tibiscum-Sarmizegetusa, and Salinae-Napoca), but it is clear that the overall distance between the meeting points was generally kept the same: 3 times 12 miles. By consequence one could easily imagine the Romans marching three days from a strategic point to the other, before taking a longer rest. Such a march was considered appropriated by ancient sources. For instance S. Ambrosius (*In Psalmum 118 sermo*, V, 2) states that usually an army marches for three days and in the forth takes a rest (*triduo ambulat exercitus, quarto requiescit die*). Flavius Josephus (*Bel. Jud.*, III, 95 p. 133), mentions a three days' ratio of food provided for the soldiers. Of course strong food could be assigned for a longer period, e.g. two weeks, as recorded by Cicero (*Tusculanes*, II, XVI, 37) but the normal ratio is for three days.

It is thus possible to deduce from the disposition of the stations on *tabula Peutingeriana* that Trajan would regularly advance with the main body of his army some 12 Roman miles (around 18 km) per day. This is a little more than a "*iustum iter*" of 10 000 *passus*, but consistently less than the 20—24 000 paces given by Vegetius in case of a rush march. As a matter of fact this author in *Epit. rei milit.*, I, 9, (p. 24—25) when mentioning the rush march refers to the training of new recruits which should be taught to cover between 20 and 24 miles within five Roman hours, which is almost a half summer day of good nowadays 7 hours. In this respect the Agricola's advance in Scotland must have been very similar to the Trajanic one, since between his camps there is a distance of 10 000—12 500 paces (Peddie 1994, p. 74). Carl von Clausewitz (Clausewitz 1982, p. 305), based on 18th and 19th century experience, states that an army of 40 000 people would cover in 13 hours of march a distance of 22.5 km, even on mediocre roads. It seems that at the end of the 1st century, beginning of the 2nd century A. D., the Roman generals had chosen to march less (only 18 km per day), but it must be emphasised that they were advancing in an enemy territory where they had to take the precaution of building daily.

A good example of how things must have happened is provided by J. Peddie (Peddie 1994, p. 72—76) when analyzing, with his experience of a retired infantry soldier, the 10 miles march of Caesar before the battle on the river Sambre (*flumen Sabim*) [*Bel. Gal.*, II, 17—28, (p. 59—67)]. Caesar had by then 8 legions and only a few auxiliaries (around 45 000 men and 16 000 animals), which is an army not much bigger than the one taken into consideration by von Clausewitz [and similar to the three legions army of Flavius Josephus and Hyginus (see below)]. The Romans advanced with a vanguard of probably 2 000 cavalrymen and some archers and slinger, followed by six of the legions (the rest of the cavalry was protecting the flanks). The first column would have occupied in length some 5.7 miles and, if the artillery and other supporting arms like engineers or ambulance carts were added,

the whole fighting column would have reached 9 miles in length. The rear guard comprising two legions and the whole baggage train would have had a length of 13.5 miles, which makes a total length of 22.5 miles for Caesar's army. To a similar length, around 33 km, has reached also Gichon (*Gichon 1989*, Tab. 14, 1—2), in the case of the army described by Flavius Josephus (*Bell. Jud.*, III, 115—126 p. 136—137), which was composed of three legions, 13 *cohortes quingenariae*, 8 *cohortes milliariae*, one *ala quingenaria*, 2 *alae milliariae*, plus the allies who were equal to 22 *cohortes quingenariae* and a *coh. milliaria*, 8 *alae quing.*, one *ala milliaria*, and plus the *equites* and *pedites singulares* (a total of almost 50 000 people). The army given as standard by Hyginus, *De munit. castr.*, 30, was composed of three legions (18 000 men), plus other 1 600 *vexillarii* from different legions, 7 *coh. quing.*, 5 *coh. mil.*, 5 *alae quing.*, 3 *alae mil.*, 700 sailors, 400 pretorians, 450 *equites singulares*, 200 scouts, 300 *Mauri equites*, 500 *Pannonii veredarii*, and 1 800 allies (*Palmyreni, Gaetae, Daci, Brittani, Cantabrigi*), a total of 40 000 men, must have had a length of around 30 km.

Coming back to Caesar's advance, it is obvious that when the first rows were reaching the site of the new camp and started settling down, most of Caesar's army would have still been in the old camp, so that in the case described by Caesar the barbarians started their attack only when they saw the first rows of the baggage train entering the new camp, which was a sign that any withdraw in the old one had become impossible. With an average speed of 3 miles an hour Peddie has estimated that the new camp site would have reached by the vanguard in 3 and a half hours, and only by then the head of the baggage train would have departed the old camp. After 7 and a half hours the building of the new camp would be completed and only after around 12 hours the whole army would be entirely settled in it (see *Peddie 1994*, Table 3, p. 75). As is the case of Trajan in Dacia, Caesar would expect to enjoy in Gaul during the summer some 16 hours of daylight. J. Peddie assumes that an hour for breakfast, packing and saddling-up in the morning must be awarded, and then further 4 to 5 hours during which grazing the animals upon arrival in the evening must also be taken into consideration in the case of Caesar. So the whole day could be covered only with a 10 miles' march. But since the vanguard arrived at the site of the new camp after 3 and a half hours, the cavalrymen could start earlier to feed their animals. At the same time the cattle still kept behind in the old camp could feed themselves the whole morning. The problem is that the 10 miles march of Caesar is a particular case since his advancement was clearly stopped by the Nervii and their allies which made him camp on a hill before crossing the river Sambre. But with a 12 miles march as shown by the itineraries of Agricola and Trajan the whole summer day would be well covered. Although Agricola's forces hardly expended 20 000 people, in the case of Trajan we can assume that in good conditions the 12 miles march would be a fair advancement for a 40—50 000 men strong army (as given by Caesar, Flavius Josephus, Hyginus, Vegetius and von Clausewitz). With more soldiers the length of the column would become inap-

propiate and the rear guard would have to wait too long before starting (see also below).

The very regular pattern of Trajan's marching in Dacia, at least as far as the main imperial road is concerned, illustrates the advancement of the troops when not confronted with guerrilla fighters, skirmishes, or other problems disturbing the original plan. This does not mean that even then the movements of the troops could have been executed as easily as in a provincial territory, provided with good roads. On the other hand one must not think that the Romans would have advanced into the enemy's territory without preparing the trail, or without knowing precisely where they were heading to. Moving the troops from one point to another was such a delicate thing that a commander could sometimes wait more days before making such a step. For instance Josephus (*Bell. Jud.*, III, 64—160 p. 129—141) relates that when Vespasianus was marching from Ptolemais to Galilee, with three legions and many auxiliaries, and decided to attack Jotapata, the main fort of the country, he had to stop his troops for several days in order to build a proper road. Jotapata could be reached only across the mountains and the trail was full of stones, very difficult for the infantry and quite inaccessible to the cavalry. So Vespasian sent ahead a corps with many pioneers that managed fitting up the road in four days. In the fifth day Josephus went from Tiberiada to Jotapata to raise the moral of the defenders and thus offered to the Romans the opportunity to capture him as well. Being aware of this imprudent movement of his enemy Vespasian sent immediately Placidius with 1 000 raiders together with Ebutius, one of the most valuable officers in order to block Jotapata. But only the next day he started to march with the whole army and till the evening he got at 7 stadia (1.3 km) to Jotapata where he camped. The other day the fortress was completely encircled and the siege began.

In the case of the first Dacian war, Trajan had the opportunity to build roads and camps as shown by the first part of the reliefs on the Column in Rome. As Hyginus states such roads and bridges were built by the sailors (*De munit. castr.*, 24, p. 10—11) probably because they had a special ability in working the wood. They were protected by the Maurish horsemen and by the Pannonian hunters. After Hyginus together with these in the *praetentura* were usually camped the scouts also (... *Mauri equites*, *Pannonii veredarii*, *classici omnes ideo praetendunt quod ad vias muniendas primi exeunt et quo sint tutiores*, *a Mauris equitibus et a Pannoniis veredariis operantes protegentur*; *qui a cohortibus primis proximi tendere debent vexillarii legionum*; *item exploratores in striga cohortis primae*). Again in his list of troops (*De munit. castr.*, 30, p. 13) he quotes first the horsemen selected from Mauretanian *alae* (*Mauri equites*), who were in charge of guarding the vanguard, then the Pannonian hunters (*veredarii*), which could ensure a quick contact with the rest of the troops, then the sailors (*classici*), who were actually doing the work, and finally the scouts (*exploratores*), who were cleaning the trail before the others: "... *Mauri equites DC, Pannonii veredarii DCCC, classici Misenates D, Ravennates DCCC, exploratores CC*...". As M. Speidel (*Speidel 1974*, p.

206) has rightly remarked this list is similar to the one which appears in an equestrian career from Diana Veteranorum, which is to be dated under Marcus Aurelius (AE 1956, 124): "... *praepos(itus) vexillationum clas(sis) praetor(icis) Misenatis item Ravennatis item clas(is) Brittanica(is) item equit(um) Afror(um) et Mauror(um) elector(um) ad curam explorationis Pannoniae, ...*".

Actually in 101 A.D. Trajan had advanced fairly deep into Dacian territory before meeting any serious resistance. The first battle scene depicted on the Column is only no. XVIII—XVIII (?)! As a matter of fact the Dacian king, Decebalus, seems to have had a very shrewd plan and immediately after the first battle, which took place probably at Tapae, near the former *colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa*, the Dacians broke into Moesia Inferior and the war operations were moved there, till the final defeat of the barbarians at Tropaeum Traiani (Adamclissi). Only the next year, in 102, the Romans took over the offensive and penetrated without major resistance in „the mountains of the Dacians“, where the capital, Sarmizegetusa, was located (the colony of Trajan, in the county of Hateg, some 100 km away from the Dacian capital was also called Sarmizegetusa. To avoid any confusion in this article it is always referred to as *colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa*) (see a fair account of the events by Strobel 1984, p. 162 sqq).

It is unanimously accepted that in the first war Trajan advanced at the beginning with almost all his troops on one trail towards the Dacian capital, and probably only after the Moesian diversion a second column led by the governor of Moesia Inferior, Laberius Maximus, advanced from South East on the same capital, Sarmizegetusa (more subtle Strobel 1984, p. 173 who is accepting a secondary army corps from Moesia Superior through the Timiş-Cerna defile). Thus the war planned by Trajan would resemble in a way the punishing campaigns of Fuscus or Tetius Iulianus, under Domitian. Such a view is due to the fact that on the Column in Rome almost all the scenes depict the emperor as if the whole war took place only where he was. But if the plan of Trajan was to concentrate all the troops in Moesia Superior, at Viminacium, he would have been then unable to move them at once on the future imperial road (Lederata, Bersobis, Tibiscum, Sarmizegetusa etc). In the first war Trajan must have had 8 legions, more than 45 000 people and as many auxiliaries, a total of over 90 000 men — if the troops of Moesia Inferior are not considered. K. Strobel (Strobel 1984, p. 153—154) has calculated for the first war 66 000 legionnaires, and for the second 84 000. With the auxiliaries the figure would reach 175 000 active soldiers involved in the Dacian wars, to whom the Roman allies must be added. So he comes close to the 200 000 men calculated by Ritterling (Ritterling 1924/25, p. 1282). As von Clausewitz (Clausewitz 1982, p. 303) clearly pointed out, if we try to move a 100 000 strong army at once, the end of our column would never reach the camping place of the detachments in the same day. From here there can be deduced the necessity of dividing the army (the ideal division would be for him 8 000 men strong, and the best column for a march would comprise 4 divisions = 40 000 men (*ibidem*, p. 305). Vegetius, (*Epit. rei milit.*, II, 1 p. 122—123), pleads in similar terms against a huge army:

"The extent of (an army) was determined by teachers of warfare. For when examples are reread of Xerxes, Darius, Mithridates and other kings, who have equipped innumerable peoples for battle, it appears evident that exceedingly large armies were suppressed more because of their own multitude than because of the courage of the enemy. For too great a multitude is subject to many misfortunes; it is always slower on marches in proportion to its own mass of men; indeed on longer lines of march it is liable to suffer sudden attack even from a few men; moreover, in crossing difficult places or rivers, it is often caught off guard on account of the delay caused by the baggage; furthermore, food for numerous animals and horses is gathered with great effort." (translation L. F. Stelten).

Also in other cases Roman commanders were using the same strategy of moving more legions on different roads in order to encircle the enemy. Thus Titus marching on Jerusalem had at his disposal four legions and numerous auxiliaries and allies which he did not concentrate at the same place, in Caesarea. He ordered the V legion to march on Emaus and from there to Jerusalem. The X legion was moved to Jerichon and from there it was to meet the main column at Gaba-de-Saul (the colony of Saul), at one day's march from Jerusalem. Other 3000 people were advancing along the Euphrates and were followed by Tiberius Alexander. Titus started from Caesarea with two legions and many auxiliaries and marched to Gopha (at this point Josephus gives a detailed description of the order of march followed by Titus). The next day they went to Gaba-de-Saul, 30 stadia (5.5 km) from Jerusalem, where the troops rested a day, waiting for the V legion. Meanwhile Titus went in a recognition to Jerusalem and he merely got caught. The next night the V legion arrived from Emaus and the next day the whole army marched 23 stadia (4.25 km) to Scopos (7 stadia = 1.3 km from Jerusalem), where from one has a good view of the holy town of the Jews. The first two legions and the auxiliaries were camped here, while the V legion, which was exhausted after the previous march, was ordered to camp 3 stadia (0.5 km) behind. They have just started laying out the camps when the X legion arrived from Jerusalem and was ordered by Titus to camp 6 stadia (1.1 km) to the East of the town. This way the Jewish capital was encircled [Josephus, *Bell. Jud.*², V, 6 (p. 838—839)].

So it seems obvious to me that Trajan must have thought to a similar strategy, advancing from several directions towards the capital of the Dacians.

2. The strategy of Trajan in the first Dacian war.

The road pattern in Dacia does not indicate only a well planned marching tactic, but also an exquisite war strategy. Three days' march was always followed by a stop in a meeting point with a secondary road where new troops were joining the main column. At the same time garrisons were left behind to ensure the permanent supply of the troops in the first line. This would diminish in time the force if new

contingents were not added. After other three days' march the next stop was a major junction point with another column. Thus the advancement of Trajan in the first war could be reconstructed as a well planned campaign aiming to encircle the enemy's capital, Sarmizegetusa (Fig. 5).

Trajan must have started in Viminacium with more legions and almost as many auxilia. After crossing the Danube at Lederata the main column concentrated at Apus Flumen and then marched for three days through Arcidava and Centum Putea to Bersobis. Each day a distance of 12 miles was covered. At Bersobis other troops were probably met, most likely auxiliaries in charge of exploring the plain of Banat. It is possible that some troops were concentrated in the same province of Moesia Superior at Singidunum and they could have crossed the Danube in another point and then join the main column at Bersobis.

More reliable is the fact that after crossing the river at Viminacium a secondary column advanced along the Danube using the newly made road on the Djerdap. If not, the whole effort of cutting this road into the cliff would have been pointless. This secondary column after reaching Dierna, penetrated into the enemy's territory through the Timiş—Cerna pass, heading towards Tibiscum. Here they were to meet the main column which went from Bersobis to Azizis (as Trajan himself states, see above), and then through Centum Putea to Tibiscum. From here the road advances through the „Iron Gates of Transylvania“ to the county of Haţeg, where later *colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa* was to be founded. Before reaching this second major junction point, Trajan had to face the first serious battle, the one at Tapae, a few miles west Sarmizegetusa, just before the edge of the valley (Strobel 1984, p. 176 sq.). This particular event is depicted on the column (scenes XVI—XVIII(?) where the Roman auxiliaries are shown charging up the slope the Dacian position, while the legionaries waited in the second line, as a reserve and a defensive force (Fig. 6). The strategy recalls the almost contemporary battle of Agricola at Mons Graupius [Tacitus, *Agricola*, XXXV—XXXVII (p. 28—31); Frere 1974, p. 131 sq.; Le Bohec 1989, p. 153 sq. Specially for the tactic problems involved here, see Wheeler 1979, p. 310 sq.]. The effectives engaged there by Agricola were two legions, 8 000 infantry auxiliaries and 3 500 horsemen, a total of almost 24 000 people, much less than Trajan.

After the victory at Tapae, Trajan did not advance further East of the future *colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa* in order to meet the other troops at Haţeg for instance, which is clearly a better junction point than the above mentioned *colonia* (see Fig. 7), but waited there, at 36 miles from Tibiscum (72 miles from Bersobis). This example makes it clear that the general strategic system was more important than the solutions imposed by micro regional factors.

The troops coming from Drobeta represented an important force charging “the mountains of the Dacians” from the South. After crossing the Vulcan pass they had to conquer the Dacian fort at Băniţa, which was defending the entrance to the county of Haţeg from the East. After the meeting with the imperial column at the place of the future *colonia Dacia Sarmizegetusa* the whole South flank of the

Dacian defence was blocked. It is not clear how far did Trajan advance after the battle of Tapae. The Column shows the Roman soldiers setting fire to some Dacian village in the proximity of a fort which has not been identified in the field. But probably before any further consistent operation could be fulfilled, the Eastern Dacians and the Roxolani broke into Moesia Inferior. The Column shows the event as a result of the Roman penetration in the mountains which caused some civilians to surrender and others to run away, crossing the Danube. But such movements of population into the Empire are not to be expected before the Marcomanic wars, so it is most probable that this was the official version dissimulating the fact that Trajan was surprised by this Dacian attack South of the Danube.

After solving this diversion which could lead to the abandonment of the positions previously reached, Trajan started in the next year the general offensive on the Dacian capital. The main purpose of the troop movements was to encircle the mountains where the Dacian forts were located and to isolate the capital from the rest, providing that a second attack on Moesia Inferior becomes impossible. The governor of this province, Laberius Maximus, probably with two of his legions marched upstream the river Alutus (Olt) and penetrated into Transylvania at Caput Stenarum. From here he could attack "the Dacian mountains" from the East and North-east, starting with the siege of the Dacian forts at Tilișca and Căpâlna. Probably in this region he captured the sister of Decebalus (Strobel 1984, p. 193). In the meanwhile the Dacian capital was menaced from the South by small columns advancing through Cioclovina-Ponorici and Boșorod to the fort of Piatra Roșie. Some other small diversion groups could from South East (Bănița) and climb to higher mountain points than the Dacian capital, threatening it from there. The Maurs of Lusius Quietus must have been one of these special commandos (Strobel 1984, p. 195 sq.).

But the main column with Trajan was following the Strei valley towards Petrae, where it was to meet another column coming from Pannonia. Till now the general assumption is that the Pannonian legions and auxilia were concentrated in Moesia Superior and marched along with the main column on the „imperial road“. But, since the governor of Moesia Inferior had his own operation sector, it is by no means absurd to think that Pannonian troops advanced on their own road too (from Lugio to Partiscum, and up on Mureș river till Petrae, where they would meet the main column). We have already stated that to many troops which eventually would have been all moved on the same trail could not have been concentrated in Moesia Superior. On the other hand the Roman road from Lugio/Florentia to Partiscum is well documented by air photographs as well as the *statio portorii* from Partiscum (Mocsy 1974, p. 110 and Fig. 59; Visy 1988, p. 124; IDR III/1, p. 255). The Mureș (*Maris*) is the most important river of Transylvania and was later largely used by the Romans for navigation. But the strongest reason to suppose an independent Pannonian corps is a strategic one. The Dacian fortified settlements and citadels on both banks of the river Mureș, like Pecica, Vărădia, Săvârșin, Câmpuri-Surdac, Bretea Mureșeană, Cozia and Deva (Glodariu 1982, p. 25—26), should have been

annihilated by the Romans before penetrating in the core of Transylvania (no commander could risk to bring his troops between the main forces of the enemy, the Dacians from the mountains around the capital and those from the inferior course of Mureş). Another argument for a separate Pannonian force acting on Mureş just as the one from Moesia Inferior was acting on Olt, is that after the Dacian wars the two Pannonian legions (XIII Gemina and I Adiutrix) are recorded together at Apulum, on the middle course of Mureş (see below), and XIII Gemina will remain there for the next 150 years. Apulum is the next major junction point, 72 miles from *colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa* and the most important crossroads of the province of Dacia (Diaconescu—Piso 1993). Here the road which ran along the Olt, coming from Moesia Inferior was meeting the main imperial road from Dacia. By holding this position the „Dacian mountains“ would have been completely encircled (see Fig. 8).

From *Petrae* the main column of Trajan followed the line of Mureş river only till *Germisara* and then turned left and penetrated into the „Dacian mountains“ through the main way, the valley of *Grădiştea*. In the first war the important forts at *Costeşti* and *Blidariu* were conquered. A destruction layer dating from the first Dacian war was identified also at *Fetele Albe*, only 2—3 miles from *Sarmizegetusa*. The capital itself had no defence, with the exception of a small — military insignificant — *acropolis*, probably because the Dacians never imagined that someone could penetrate as deep in the mountains. So, they had to give up resistance and ask for peace. It is a common place in some authors that Trajan accepted the peace and did not attack the capital because his troops were exhausted. But since the Dacians surrendered, it would have been absurd for him to burn down a defenceless capital. And, as already mentioned above, it should be remembered that the excavations have established that the dwelling at *Fetele Albe*, in the immediate vicinity of the capital *Sarmizegetusa*, had been destroyed already in the first war. By consequence it is clear that nothing could stop the victorious Romans to destroy the Dacian capital if they felt like doing it.

This scenario of the first war indicates that the main purpose of Trajan was to encircle „the mountains of the Dacians“ where the capital *Sarmizegetusa* was located. In the first meeting points (*Bersobis*, *Tibiscum* and *Sarmizegetusa*) Trajan joined troops which had been concentrated in *Moesia Superior*, then at *Petrae* he would meet the troops from *Pannonia*, and finally at *Apulum* the contact with the troops of *Laberius Maximus* from *Moesia Inferior* was established. This pattern is at the same time very rational but also very rigid. The most striking example is *colonia Dacica Sarmizegetusa* lying in the western part of the county of *Hateg*, in a position which could be easily improved if the Romans moved some 18 km further (near *Hateg*), where the climate is much better and contacts with other regions are easier to achieve. But, to a better position within the region was preferred the precise place in the strategic network, the capital of the Roman province of Dacia [and siege of the governor under Trajan (Piso 1993, p. 9)] being equally distanced from the two legion fortresses at *Bersobis* and *Apulum* (72 miles), as already mentioned before.

Against the deductions and the theory presented here it could be inferred that Trajan could not have planned everything so well, with meeting points so far away in the enemy's territory, and even if it is undeniable that he marched regularly, the road system must have been created by the time and thus it would render more likely the situation at the end of the second Dacian war than the strategy intended by the emperor. To the argument of the identity between the later road from Bersobis to Azizis and the text of Trajan describing the march in the first war, it might be added that by the time Trajan was planning the war against Decebalus, Dacia was not any more an unknown territory to the Romans, as it had been a few decades earlier. After the peace of Domitian, Decebalus became a client king, receiving subsidies and technicians from Rome. One major point in the conditions of peace imposed after the first war to Decebalus was to hand over the weapons, the specialists and the refugees he was sheltering in his kingdom. Under the circumstances the main ways leading to Sarmizegetusa and the general display of the Dacian forts within the mountains around the capital must have been well known in Rome, at least throw merchants circulating back and forth and all around the trails of Dacia, if not by specialised explorers. A special case is that of the rhetor Dion Cocceianus (Chrysostomos) from Prusa, who was exiled in the "Getic lands" which he has visited between 87 and 97. He even wrote a book about the Getae (Dacians), which was later used by Cassiodorus and Jordanes, but which is unfortunately lost.

Preparing a campaign by providing good maps was a common place with the Romans. Vegetius (*Epit. rei milit.*, III, 6 p. 138—141) gives the following advices: "First of all he (the commander) ought to have thoroughly detailed maps of all the regions (*itineraria omnium regionum*) in which the war is waged, so that he might learn the distance between places, not only in numbers of miles, but also in regard to the condition of the roads, so that he might be aware of the short cuts, the by-paths, the mountains, the rivers, which are all accurately described; even to the extent that the more conscientious leaders are said to have had itineraries, not only annotated but even painted (*itineraria provinciarum, . . . , non tantum annotata sed etiam picta*), of the provinces in which the need (for travel) was being arranged, so that (the army), about to set out, might choose the road, not only with a plan in mind, but with an actual picture before its eyes (*ut non solum consilio mentis verum aspectu oculorum viam profecturus eligeret*)". That Trajan was one of these most conscientious leaders who would want more than a good plan, even a picture indicating the height of the obstacles to face, is proved by a fragment from one of his *ensores*, Balbus, recording the "great deeds" to which he was a witness, i.e. the campaigns in Dacia and Parthia (*Gromatici veteres*, I, p. 92; *FHDR* I, p. 474—475). Thanks to the improvements made by Celsus, to whom the author had dedicated the text, Balbus could for instance indicate the width of a river across which a bridge was to be built without measuring it directly, if his crew was menaced by the enemy. According to the "divine" mathematical principles Balbus could indicate the height of the mountains to be conquered (*„Expugnandorum deinde montium altitudinem ut sci-*

remus, venerabilis diis ratio monstrabat"). Such detailed maps were far more sophisticated than the simple itineraries that have survived. The good, "strategic" maps must have been kept secret and so they must have got lost earlier than the others which were copied in the Middle Ages (for the antique maps see *Chevalier 1988*, p. 239—268).

3. The peace and the circumstances of the second Dacian war.

The defeated Dacians had to accept the humiliating conditions of peace offered by Trajan, like handing over the Roman fugitives sheltered by Decebalus or destroying the forts all over the country. It is clear that the land was organised like an occupied territory and that *Cn. Pinarius Aemilius Cicatricula Pompeius Longinus*, which was left at the head of the troops here, had an independent command in regard to his colleague, the governor of Moesia Superior. Due to his proconsular rank he must have had at least two legions under his command besides the many auxiliaries (*Piso 1993*, p. 1 sqq). How serious the intentions of the Romans were it is shown by the decision to build the great bridge over the Danube at Drobeta. Under the circumstances it is less probable that the capital Sarmizegetusa was left without a Roman garrison and that the Romans would retreat to the county of Hateg, holding still the Banat and Oltenia, but giving up the rest of the conquered territory in favour of Decebalus, as it is almost unanimously accepted (*Strobel 1984*, p. 199, Note 267).

It has been even inferred that the passage of Dio Cassius (68, 9, 7), which is in connection with these events does not refer to Sarmizegetusa, the capital of Decebalus, but to *colonia Dacica*, which was bearing the name of Sarmizegetusa in the 3rd century, when *Dio Cassius* was writing his works. Due to this confusion the legion *III Flavia Felix* which would have been camped on the place of the future colony would have been the στρατόπεδον from the passage of Dio Cassius (see the critics of this position and the whole literature by *Piso 1993*, p. 2, note 8). This hypothesis relies on an inaccurate translation of the following text: ταῦτα συνθέμενος καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐν Ζερμιξεγεθούσῃ καταλιπών, τήν τε ἄλλην Χώραν Φουραῖς διαλαβών, ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀνεκομί (*Cassius Dio*, 68. 9. 7). The proposition of H. Daicoviciu was to translate στρατόπεδον by legion, and in this case the meaning would have been that Trajan left a legion in Sarmizegetusa and auxiliary garrisons ("froua") in the rest of the country. So this passage would refer to the legion *III Flavia Felix* which would have been camped on the place later occupied by *colonia Dacica*. In *FHDR*, p. 691 the translation is also ambiguous because to "stratopedon" is given the equivalent "army" and not "camp" (as normally, cf. *Mason 1974*, p. 5): "After having done all these arrangements Trajan left an army at Sarmizegetusa, and after having established guards all over the country, he went back to Italy". The authors of *FHDR* think that Sarmizegetusa is the future Roman colony and not the capital of the Dacian kingdom, and that the "guards", were left behind only to watch if the Dacians do respect the terms of the treaty, later to be withdrawn from here (*FHDR*, p. 691, notes 132—133). But in fact Dio Cassius

never uses the term *στρατόπεδου* alone, which normally means camp, to designate a legion. As any Greek writer he uses a variety of literary terms (like *stratopedon*, *strateuma* and *teichos*), instead of the technical ones [like "legion" which is a latinism appearing in administrative documents, or *tagma*, *taxis* and *telos* (Mason 1974, p. 163 sq.)]. But in order to avoid any confusion, when speaking euphemistically about a legion, Dion. always gives its number or adds a qualifying phrase (Mason 1974, p. 163). Thus in the two cases when he uses the word *στρατοπεδου* in connection with a legion the phrase is *το δεκατου στρατοπεδου* (Dio Cassius 38. 43. 3) and *πολιτικα στρατοπεδου* (Dio Cassius, 55. 23. 2), so that no confusion with the normal meaning "camp" could be made (cf. Mason 1974, p. 87 s.v. *στρατόπεδου*). There is also a third passage where H. J. Mason (like the authors of the translation in *FHDR*) considers that the meaning of *στρατόπεδου* could be that of "legion". But in this case I would translate the phrase *στρατόπεδου Ρωμαικου* (Cassius Dio, 71. 2. 1 = *FHDR* 68. 12. 1) by "Roman army" and not by "legion". In this passage Cassius Dio says that Longinus was *εξηγουμενος στρατοπεδου Ρωμαικου* (commander of the Roman army) and in this case the epithet "Roman" applied to *στρατόπεδου* could not indicate a legion, since all legions were Roman, but was referring to the Dacian one. As already mentioned Longinus was a "*vir consularis*" (cf. *Fronto* II, p. 214 = *FHDR*, p. 532 sq) and was in charge of a whole occupation army comprising more legions and *auxilia* (Piso 1993, p. 1 sq).

So, coming back to the *στρατόπεδου* from Sarmizegetusa, I think that in this passage the intention of Cassius Dio was to emphasize that a garrison was left in the capital itself and other troops all over the country. The alternative use of *στρατόπεδου* and *Φρουρά* would not be intended to mean legionary fortress in opposition to smaller *praesidia*, but would just avoid the repetition of a term expressing the military occupation, like "garrison" for instance (For the meaning of *Φρουρά* — *praesidium* see Mason 1974, p. 78 and 98 s.v. *Φρουρά* and Le Bohec 1989 b, p. 112). In my opinion the meaning of the passage would thus be: "After making all these arrangements, Trajan left behind a fortress in Sarmizegetusa and other garrisons in the rest of the country, and went back to Italy". The text gives no indication about the nature of the troop left at Sarmizegetusa, but it is clear that it was referring to the capital of the Dacian kingdom which received a garrison like the rest of the country.

And indeed, in the Dacian capital, a Roman fortress was recently identified, which has produced some epigraphical material supporting in my opinion the idea that we have to deal here with a Roman occupation already after the first Dacian war. The plan of the fortress (earlier considered as Dacian) is irregular, due to the nature of the place and the precinct of reused stones incloses a surface of only 3 ha, which would fit a legionary maniple or a *cohors milliaria* (Le Bohec 1989 a, p. 172). Inside the rempart, some timber military barracks were recorded, and outside it, a bath house. The precinct wall was built after the second Dacian war, when the capital of Decebalus was completely destroyed. Near its West gate a Dacian dwelling was found, which had

been burnt probably in the second Dacian war; under the wall, a Roman forge was found and in a layer beyond it a Dacian mint (see Glodariu 1995, p. 125). In the outer parament of the wall, in a visible position, there were two blocks with the inscriptions of *legio IIII Flavia Felix* and two of *legio I Adiutrix* (Glodariu 1989/93, p. 24). The two blocks of limestone with the name of *legio IIII Flavia Felix* are in good condition (Glodariu 1965, p. 128—129, nr. 2—3; IDR III/3, 269, b—c). They are similar to a marble one found many years ago in the same place (Glodariu 1965, *loc.cit.*, nr. 1; IDR III/3, 269 a). The two other blocks of limestone have no text (on one of them still a P and a PN can be identified), but they bear a heraldic relief depicting two capricorns (Glodariu 1965, p. 130, Glodariu 1989/93, p. 23; IDR III/3, 271) (see Fig. 9a). From the beginning it has been supposed that they represent the symbols of *legio I Adiutrix* (Glodariu 1965, p. 130, note 41), but since the evidence that could be produced consisted only in some coins of Gallienus (IDR III/3, p. 271) some doubts were still persisting (Glodariu 1989/93, p. 23). The newly published block from Carnuntum (fig. 9b) with an almost identical relief and the inscription *LEG I AD P F* removes any doubt in this respect (Kandler 1991). The analogy is important also for the function of these inscribed blocks. Like the ones from Hadrian's wall and from Carnuntum, those from Sarmizegetusa are building inscriptions stating that two of the legions from the newly founded province of Dacia have built the fortress. *Legio IIII Flavia Felix* had its permanent camp at Bersobis and left the province in 114, for the Parthian war, or in connection with the strategic movements preceding it (Benea 1983, p. 157—158 sqq), or — more likely in 118 — when Dacia was reorganised (Strobel 1984, p. 90, note 35; Piso 1993, p. 8—9, note 47). *Legio I Adiutrix* is attested by some inscriptions of a centurion and of two veterans and by tile stamps together with *leg. XIII Gemina* in Apulum (Piso 1993, p. 6—8). The tile stamp with the text *LEG I AD/LEG XIII GEM* found by Cloșca Băluță from the Museum of Alba Iulia (and published by I. I. Russu in IDR III/4, at 1) proves without any doubt the presence of the two legions in Apulum (see Piso 1993, p. 8, note 41). Thus CIL III 1628 has been vainly contested (see Strobel 1984, p. 86, Note 7). *Legio I Adiutrix* must have been withdrawn earlier (114, before the Parthian war), since this legion has produced in Dacia but scarce traces by comparison with *IIII Flavia Felix*. So it is reasonable to suppose that the two legions have built the wall immediately after the victory against Decebalus in 106, and not some years later when they were engaged in other activities.

But besides these general assumptions more direct data support the early dating of the rampart built in the Dacian capital by the two legions. Since *legio I Adiutrix* was camped before 114 together with *XIII Gemina* at Apulum, as proved by the tile stamp with the name of both legions mentioned above, it should have been associated with *IIII Flavia Felix* a bit earlier. And indeed, during the second Dacian war these two legions were placed under the unique command of T. Iulius Maximus Manlianus Brocchus Servilianus A. Quadronius (Verus?) L. Servilius Vatia Cassius Cam(ars?), as proved by CIL XII 3167 = ILS 1016 = Dobó 1975, nr. 760). His exceptional command could be dated

between 103/104 and 107/108 A. D. (see *Strobel 1984*, p. 85, Note 5). So, not later than 108, under the unique command of this polyonymous senator, *legio IIII Flavia Felix* and *legio I Adiutrix* should have built together in the conquered Dacian capital the camp for a 10000 men strong vexillation.

But the relevant discovery made by the archaeologists working in Dacian Sarmizegetusa is that in the core, "emplecton", of this wall two other blocks with building inscriptions were found, one belonging to *legio II Adiutrix* (IDR III/3, 268; AE 1983, 824) and the other to a *vexillatio legionis VI Ferratae* (IDR III/3, 270; AE 1983, 825; for the circumstances of the find (see *Glodariu 89/93*, p. 24). It is clear that these two blocks were reused when the rampart wall was built and that the two troops mentioned by the inscriptions must have built an earlier wall in Sarmizegetusa. That building was destroyed probably by the Dacians at the veil of the second war and after that the Dacians might have built hastily another defensive wall. It seems that this wall was later rebuilt by *IIII Flavia Felix* and *I Adiutrix*. It is pointless to suppose that only after 106 A. D. *VI Ferrata* and *II Adiutrix* have built a wall which collapsed in one or two years in such a degree of destruction that the other two legions had to rebuild it entirely (not later than 108 A. D.), throwing in its core the blocks bearing the building inscriptions recently dedicated by their comrades. On the other hand any violent destruction of the Roman garrison in Sarmizegetusa after the death of Decebalus and the complete defeat of the Dacians is equally absurd. So the two building inscriptions of *II Adiutrix* and *VI Ferrata* must come, together with other reused blocks, from an earlier building, probably a similar defensive wall, belonging to the garrison left here by Trajan after the first Dacian war, as the text of Dio Cassius clearly states.

The presence of a vexillation of *VI Ferrata* from Syria in the first Dacian war is thus very probable. It should have been brought with other troops, like the legion *IIII Scythica* and some *auxilia* from Syria, the whole army corps being probably led by Quadratus Bassus (*Strobel 1984*, p. 102 sq.). For instance a military diploma for the army of Pannonia in 110 (CIL XVI 164) attests some "*vexillation(e)s equitum ex Syria*" which should have come a decade earlier in connection with the first Dacian war. The hypothesis that the Syrian vexillations were conducted by C. Iulius Quadratus Bassus himself is based on the fragmentary inscription from Pergamon, rendering the career of this important character, and which is listing the legions that served under his command (AE 1933, 268; 1934, 176; Dobó 1975, 805; Piso 1993, p. 24, nr. 4). First, as *vir praetorius*, he could be simultaneously *legatus* of *legio XI Claudia* and *praepositus legionis IIII Scythicae* from Syria during the first Dacian war (Piso 1993, p. 26 sq, note 18, but who finds the whole issue "höchst unsicher"). It is more likely that he had the command of *XI Claudia* in 99—100/101 and then the one of *IIII Scythica* in 101—102 A. D., as Strobel supposes (*Strobel 1984*, p. 65, and note 24). In this case, after being previously the legate of *XI Claudia* in peace time, he could have been during the war "*praepositus legionis IIII Scythicae et vexillationis VI Ferratae ex Syria*", which would be a

special command for a man of his rank comprising more than a legion, but not two entire legions (which could be led only by a *vir consularis*). In the fragmentary inscription from Pergamon the first legion listed is *XI Claudia*, then comes *III Scythica*, and then an unknown one, which should be *VI Ferrata* in my opinion (Strobel 1984, p. 65 supposes that in the first Dacian war he had a special command over 3 vexillations from different eastern legions. But in this case the rest of the list with legions would be too poor for the rest of tasks of Bassus). Then follows the *XII Fulminata* from Cappadocia, *III Gallica* from Syria and another unknown legion. In the last positions are recorded the legions from Dacia, *XIII Gemina* and probably *III Flavia Felix*, which he commanded in the fatal war for him, against the *iazzyges*. In this case the legions quoted by the Pergamene inscription would not be just those from the provinces governed by Bassus and which would have been abusively listed only to impress the public (Piso 1993, p. 29 and note 36), but those which served directly under his command as von Premerstein (Premerstein 1934, p. 67 sqq) was supposing. I do not think that all the other legions from the provinces governed by Bassus, like *X Fretensis* from Judaea, *XVI Flavia* from Cappadocia, or those from Armenia Minor, Pontus, Syria and Dacia could fit in the missing parts of the inscription in Pergamon, but those serving under his command in the two Dacian, then in the Parthian war, and in the one against the *iazzyges*, would be a convenient, solution for the free space in the above mentioned text.

Coming back to the vexillation of *VI Ferrata*, I would like to emphasize that it should have participated to the first Dacian war and could not have been dislocated from the army of Syria only in 105, when the second Dacian war broke up, because by then all the forces in the province were needed for the planned annexation of the Nabatean kingdom. The old king Rabbel II could die at any moment without heirs and the legate of Syria, A. Cornelius Palma Frontonianus was thus preparing to occupy the Arabian kingdom on behalf of Rome. It has little relevance for our problem if the first garrison of the new province of Arabia was *leg VI Ferrata* or *leg III Cyrenaica* (Freeman 1996, p. 95 sqq). As the military diploma from 24. 09. 105 A. D. (RMD, 9) clearly shows, two cohorts from the Egyptian army (*I Pannoniorum* and *I Flavia Cilicum*) were already transferred „in Judaeam“ at the end of the summer of 105 A. D. (the same Strobel 1984, p. 103). Together with them *legio III Cyrenaica* was brought from Egypt as well (Kennedy 1980). So in 105 A. D. the Romans were strengthening the garrison of Judaea and preparing the legions from Syria for the annexation of the Nabatean kingdom and at any rate they would not dislocate by then troops for the Dacian front (cf. Strobel 1988). Even if the annexation of the Nabatean kingdom had not been planned long before and was more a Roman response to conjectural factors as Ph. Freeman has recently shown, it is evident that in 105 A.D., when the Dacian revolt broke out, we can not expect the Romans to have transferred any unit from Syria, specially *legio VI Ferrata* which was garrisoned at Raphanaea and was thus the best candidate for the intervention in Arabia. Of course, such a movement could not have been foreseen in 100/101, when the Syrian

troops were sent in the first Dacian war and put probably under the command of Quadratus Bassus.

The vexillation of *VI Ferrata* could be withdrawn from Dacia in 103 or even 104, when the situation in Syria required its presence there. Together with *II Adiutrix*, the vexillation of *VI Ferrata* could as well have just supervised the demolition of the Dacian fortresses as agreed in the peace treaty, and have built for this purpose from reused materials a first defensive wall of a camp at Sarmizegetusa (The block with the inscription of *II Adiutrix* belongs surely to an earlier Dacian structure since it bears the typical traces of the Dacian building system). On the other hand it must be emphasized that we do not know the position and the dimensions of this first Roman fortress at Sarmizegetusa. In this case the vexillation of *VI Ferrata* could have been sent back immediately to Syria with *legio IIII Scythica*. In the fortress of Sarmizegetusa could then be located a maniple of *legio II Adiutrix*, which would have remained longer there. At the same time it can not be completely rejected the possibility that the vexillation was still here when the Dacian revolt broke out and thus could not have been recalled back to Syria at all, as in the case of the *vexillationes equitum* attested in 110 in Pannonia. But for our argumenation this has little relevance, the point being that *VI Ferrata* came to Dacia in 101 for the first war and not in 105 for the second one, and that the block with its name was reused in a wall of a fortress built already in the first years after the second Dacian war.

However it is not clear whether the Romans were still having a garrison in Sarmizegetusa by 105 as it seems logical to me, or if it was retired from there in 103 or 104, after the Dacian defensive buildings have been demolished, as suggested by C. Patsch (who knew only about the inscriptions of *IIII Flavia Felix*) and accepted by Glodariu (*Glodariu 1989/93*, p. 22), who states that all the data collected during the excavations between 1985 and 1992 seem to confirm such a hypothesis. But like Patsch he considers that *legio IV Flavia Felix*, or a detachment of it, was the occupation troop of Sarmizegetusa after the first war (*Glodariu 1995*, p. 126), while now it seems more likely to me that the best candidates for the garrison after the first war are *legio II Adiutrix* and the vexillation of *VI Ferrata*.

4. Some observations on the strategy of Trajan in the second war and on the limits of the Roman province of Dacia.

We can only guess how the second war started, but a fact is that the *consularis Cicatricula Longinus* was made prisoner by *Decebalus* and that the Dacians attacked the Roman garrisons all over the country. The column depicts this general attack (scenes LXXI—LXII) which took place after the Dacians had reoccupied their ancient fortresses. The pattern of a local revolt following a first roman occupation (without the plain provincialisation of the country) can be met in Gaul, Britain or Pannonia. The French-Romanian excavations at the forum of *colonia*

Dacica Sarmizegetusa, directed, by Professor Robert Étienne, Prof. Ioan Piso and myself, have identified a destruction layer, with the material originating somewhere outside the territory of the future town, and which was used for the levelling of the forum piazza. It consisted of burnt military items, coming from legionaries and auxiliaries as well, which contained among other things 98 coins ending before the second Dacian war and a fragment of a *signum*, testifying the force of the Dacian attack (Étienne-Piso-Diaconescu 1994, p. 159, layer no. 9, note 49, and with more details Piso, Diaconescu in the forthcoming Limescongress from Zalău). Whether Longinus had his headquarters here or elsewhere it is hard to say, but I would not give too much credit to the Roman official version found by Dio Cassius, that Longinus was captured because he had fallen in the trap of Decebalus who first offered to negotiate. It was said that after capturing him the Dacian king wanted to exchange Longinus against the territories occupied by Trajan in the first war, but the Roman commander committed suicide and thus gave free hand to Trajan to deal with the Dacian revolt. But it is also possible that the Roman garrisons were surprised by the Dacian attack from 105 A.D. and in some cases even annihilated. In such an ambush Longinus himself could have been caught. So, Trajan who was just about to inaugurate the bridge of Apollodorus over the Danube, must have refused to submit to the Dacian blackmail and thus started the great offensive on the second war, leaving Longinus at the mercy of the barbarian king. The gesture of Decebalus was a desperate one since he had no chance against the Roman forces, but probably the natives could not submit any longer to the permanent vexations of the occupation army. Thus the second Dacian war, which started as a native revolt, consisted from the Roman point of view first of all in the dramatic siege of Sarmizegetusa (the Column shows no other previous Dacian resistance, implying that the rest of the surrounding region remained in the hands of the Romans). Only after the fall of Sarmizegetusa the Romans pacified the territories which had not been previously occupied, like central and North territories which had not been previously occupied, like central and North Moldavia, North Transylvania, Crișana and Maramureș, reaching even South-west Ukraine. Decebalus himself after the first Dacian war must have withdrawn his court towards North and started there plotting against the Romans. The territory which he occupied in this period from the *iaziges* must lie in North-west and not in the South-west (Banat), which was controlled by then by the Romans (the same opinion by Strobel 1989, p. 205, note 3).

So, the second Dacian expedition meant the submission of the whole country, as shown in the career of C. Caelius Martialis from Corith (AE 1934, 2): „*secunda expeditione in qua universa Dacia devicta est*“. For most of the scholars this means that the former „*regnum Decibali*“ became as a whole the Roman province of Dacia. As Glodariu 1982 has pointed out the effective authority of Decebalus was restricted to Transylvania. This country, surrounded by mountains, was actually defended by stone Dacian fortresses built in the second half of the 1st century by the central authority. And in fact, Roman Dacia was above all Transylvania and the territories relating it to the Danube (Piso 1993, p. 5–6). But this assumption is correct only starting with Hadrian, be-

cause Trajan had occupied a far bigger territory than Transylvania and on the other hand a good part of it was confined to Lower Moesia.

As already mentioned above in the second campaign of the first Dacian war an expeditionary corps of the army from Moesia Inferior under the command of Laberius Maximus took part with great success at the encircling of „the Dacian mountains“. At the same time the troops from this province crossed the Danube probably in more places and occupied Wallachia and South Moldavia, South Basarabia included. (Officially the country calls itself „Republic of Moldavia“, although its original name is Basarabia). The measure was a reaction to the Dacian attack on Lower Moesia and the aim of placing legionary and auxiliary fortresses in the hills in front of the mountains was to block the passes across the Carpatians, and thus obliging the barbarians to remain in Transylvania (*Strobel 1984*, p. 187). The Romans advanced fairly deep into Moldavia in order to surround the East Carpatians as well [after the first war they had for instance a permanent garrison, *praesidium*, at Piroboridava, on the Siret, as attested by the Hunt papyrus (*Fink 1971*, nr. 63, Col ii, line 27; cf. *Piso 1993*, p. 3, note 12 for further literature)]. In the same campaign, in order to avoid the Roxolanian threat, the Romans had to occupy at least South Basarabia and the North coast of the Black sea as far as *Tyras* and *Olbia*.

That the North-west coast of the Black sea was under Roman control and belonged in the 2nd-3rd centuries to *Moesia Inferior* is evident (see *Sarnowski 1989*), but for the 1st century A. D. no undeniable arguments for a Roman occupation could be produced. In the case of *Tyras* some have ventured that the change of the local calendar in 57 A. D. was a measure connected to a treaty with the Romans, others saw in the presence of the portrait of Vespasian on Tyrian coins, the sign of closer relations with the Empire (as a matter of fact it was more an attempt of flattering the emperor as a counteraction to the hard politics of Vespasian towards the Greeks, and finally some have interpreted the issues of the same town bearing the head of Domitian as commemorating the division of the province of Moesia (*Son 1993*, p. 23—30, with the old literature). But the first clear proof that the town belonged to the Roman province of Moesia Inferior is a building inscription dedicated here to Trajan in 116—117 A. D. by a vexillation of *legio V Macedonica* together with some auxiliaries (*Nicorescu 1944*; *Sarnowski 1989*, p. 71, nr. 8 and recently *Son 1993*, p. 31). Almost the same goes for *Olbia* where a first Roman presence can be epigraphically recorded under the Flavians, when the first coins with imperial portrait were minted, but only starting with Trajan, Roman coins really penetrate here and the first imperial inscriptions are recorded. The most significant of them is *IOSPE*, I², no. 687, recording an auxiliary corps sent here between 111 and 116 (cf. *Krapivina 1993*, p. 148; I would like to thank to my young colleague Vitalie Bărcă who has brought to my attention the Ukrainian literature concerning *Tyras* and *Olbya* and who helped me with the translation). After *T. Sarnowski* (*Sarnowski 1989*, p. 87) the Roman military presence at *Tyras*, and by extension in other places of the North Black Sea coast, should be connected to the crisis of the years 117—119, when at the death of Trajan the Ro-

roxolani broke the peace with the Romans and were threatening the Roman East European front. As a matter of fact the inscription of *legio V Macedonica* and of its auxilia from *Tyras* (see above) had been raised earlier, so that the Roman occupation of the place must be connected with the Dacian wars of Trajan and not with later events (under Hadrian), which led to territorial losses and not to an extension of the province of Lower Moesia.

In the second Dacian war Lower Moesian troops advanced further North in Moldavia at least as far as the Dacian fortresses of Bâta Doamnei, Cozla and Piatra Șoimului (Glodariu 1982, p. 25—26) which were violently destroyed and also crossed the Carpathians into Transylvania. As a result of this extraordinary extension new strategic and commercial trails were opened. Thus the Geographer of Ravenna (IV, p. 547) records a Roman road starting at *Tyras* and ending in North Dacia at *Porolissum* (FHDR, II, p. 578—581). Besides *Porolissum* and *Certiae* (the station in front of *Porolissum*) the list contains a series of unknown place names from Dacia, like *Congri*, *Sutrium* and *Urgum*, so that this road must have been running along the North and East line of border fortresses of the province, whose names are not attested by any other source. The road certainly did not exit Dacia at *Angustia* (Brețcu), and did not pass through *Piroboridava*, which are not mentioned, so that it must be placed further North (see map at Fig. 10). Such a connection between *Tyras* and *Porolissum* could be established only under Trajan when the Roman occupation reached both central Moldavia and Basarabia. Starting with Hadrian the Romans will withdraw from most of these territories allowing the *Roxolani* to bring back their cattle in the steppe pastures East and South-east of Dacia.

But coming back to the operations of the Lower Moesian army during the second Dacian war, the most interesting strategic feature is that these troops did not operate only outside the Carpathians, including this region to Moesia Inferior, but penetrated along the river of Olt to Transylvania. That despite any historical and geographical reason the South-east corner of Transylvania belonged under Trajan to Moesia Inferior and not to Dacia, was demonstrated by B. Gerov in 1959 based on the military diploma from Palamarca (cf. Gerov 1980, p. 41 sqq). Actually under Hadrian, when the Roman troops were withdrawn from South Moldavia and a part of Wallachia, those stationed along the river Olt were assigned to the newly formed province of Dacia Inferior, and the province of Moesia Inferior was restricted to the South of the Danube. So, all the troops which are later attested in Dacia Inferior belonged under Trajan to the Lower Moesian army (Piso 1993, p. 5—6 and note 34).

But in East Transylvania other troops, belonging after Hadrian to Dacia Superior originate also in the army of Moesia Inferior. Thus *Cohors I Ubiorum* was stationed at Odorheiul Secuiesc where it left a lot of tile stamps [other stamps of the same troop are recorded only in the vicinity, at Ozd (Piso—Benea 1984, p. 285)], and is attested in the army of Dacia Superior by the diplomas of 144 A. D. (CIL XVI 890), from 157 A. D. (CIL XVI 107) (Strobel 1989, p. 145), and from 179 A. D. (Piso—Benea 1984, p. 285; cf. Petolescu 1995 b, p. 272, nr. 59). But in

99 A. D. it was a part of the army from Moesia Inferior as attested by CIL XVI, 44 and by CIL X 6015. The fact that an ancient signifer of the troop was buried at Capidava indicates that the troop had been probably stationed here before the Dacian wars [Aricescu 1977, p. 64 (p. 27)]. A similar case is the one of *ala numeri Illyricorum* from Brâncovenesti (Protase—Zrinyi 1975, p. 57 sqq, Protase 1977; Protase—Zrinyi 1992, p. 97), which was probably organized from a *numerus equitum Illyricorum*, which, at its turn, must be connected with a special formation under Trajan, made from the best riders selected from different units of the Balkan provinces, called „*vexillatio equitum Illyricorum*“ (Strobel 1989, p. 147 sq; Petolescu 1996, p. 24—26, nr. 65). The *ala I numeri Illyricorum* is the only unit attested at Brâncovenesti. The fort has 2,5 ha and fits an *ala milliaria*, or more likely two twin *alae quingenariae*, as seems to indicate the numeral I in the title of *ala I (prima) numeri Illyricorum*, and in *ala I Illyricorum* from CIL VI 3234. In Dacia Inferior, at Hoghiz, was located a „*vexillatio equitum Illyricorum*“, attested by the diplomas from 129 A. D. (CIL XVI 75) and 140 A. D. (IDR, I, Dipl. D XIII), which must differ from the troop at Brâncovenesti (the same Petolescu 1996, p. 26), but which must originate in the same formation of Illyrian riders selected under Trajan and placed under the authority of the governor of Moesia Inferior. Other units in East Transylvania like *coh I Alpinorum equitata* (Strobel 1989, p. 119 sq.; Petolescu 1995 b, p. 238, nr. 16), attested by tile stamps at Inlăceni, Călugăreni and Sărățeni, must have come here later (under Trajan it is not attested by military diplomas as belonging to the Dacian army), and *numerus Maurorum S...*, from Sânpaul, was formed under Antoninus Pius from *Mauri gentiles*, after the defeat of the Maurish revolt from 145—150 A.D. (Speidel 1974, p. 209; evasive Petolescu 1996, p. 26 sqq, nr. 66—71). [Also *coh. VIII Raetorum c. R. equitata* attested at 129 A. D. in Inlăceni by a dedication to Hadrian (Strobel 1989, p. 142; Petolescu 1995 b, p. 268, nr. 52) is not necessary the troop from here under Trajan]. So it is very probable that under Trajan the troops of Moesia Inferior had conquered also the territories North of the river Olt. May be the whole East Transylvania was under the control of the governor of Moesia Inferior. In this case if on the map we trace to the North the meridian line separating Moesia Superior from Moesia Inferior it looks like under Trajan all the Dacian territories East of it were occupied by troops belonging to the Lower Moesian army (Fig. 16). If so, another very regular and rational pattern can be deduced: in the second Dacian war the troops of Moesia Inferior were ordered, despite any geographic and political particularities, to conquer the Dacian territories laying in front of their province. They were thus operating East of the meridian separating their province from Moesia Superior.

In the second war the Roman troops also had to operate west of the Apuseni mountains, i.e. in areas which were probably not incorporated in the province of Dacia, but where they had to destroy several Dacian fortresses like Berindia, Clit, Șoimi, Tășnad, Șușurogi, Sacalasa-Nou, Marca and Șimleu Silvaniei (Glodariu 1982, p. 25—26; cf. here Figs. 4 and 9). Some artifacts even suggest that under Trajan the Ro-

man influence was very strong North of lower Mureş (see the papers presented by C. Opreanu at the latest Roman Frontier Congress). It has been since long accepted that under Trajan the whole Banat was under Roman control, but South Alföld, between Danube and Theiss was considered to be occupied by the Iaziges (Protase 1996, p. 136—137). I have already shown above that during the first Dacian war Pannonian troops had to operate by advancing on the road from Lugio to Partiscum, and then upstream on Mureş river. I have also shown that the territory occupied between the wars by Decebalus and then required back by the Iaziges was laying in North-west Dacia and not in Banat or Alföld. In this case it is logical to think that under Trajan the Romans were controlling the territory South of the road from Lugio to Partiscum. Thus that two provinces of Dacia and Pannonia Inferior must had been connected and Moesia Superior was not any more a frontier province facing the barbarians. I can not say whether South Alföld was under the authority of the governor of Pannonia or Dacia, but I think it is reasonable to consider that the water way on Theiss and Mureş was controlled by the governor of Dacia and that his Pannonian colleague was administering the territory West of the Theiss. In order to sustain these hypotheses I have more arguments:

When, at the end of Trajan's reign, the Iaziges started a war, pretending to regain some territories from Dacia, at the head of the Roman troops was appointed Marcius Turbo. He did not govern only Dacia but also Pannonia (S.H.A., Vita Hadriani: „*Marcium Turbonem post. Mauretaniam praefecturae infulis ornatum Pannoniae Daciaeque ad tempus praefecit*“). (Cf. Piso 1993, p. 30 sqq.). Still no word was said about Moesia Superior. This fact indicates first that this province was not affected by the war and second that the communication between Lower Pannonia and Dacia was effective and under Roman control. If the provinces of Dacia and Pannonia were not connected (but separated by territories belonging to Moesia Superior) the coordination of the war operations by Turbo would not have been possible. Probably by 118 A.D. the South Alföld was given away by the Romans, since later, in 170 A. D., Claudius Fronto was appointed governor of Dacia Apulensis and Moesia Superior in order to fight the Iaziges (Piso 1993, p. 94 sqq.). By then governing simultaneously Dacia and Pannonia was out of the question.

The Danube way South of the road from Lugio/Florentia to Partiscum and then on the Mureş river was thus not anymore considered a frontier. The position of the Pannonian troops under Trajan South of Alisca and Ad Statuas is not clear, suggesting that a typical *limes* was not organised here, while in the rest of the Pannonian border both the camps and their garrisons can be easily traced back (Visy 1988, p. 126 sqq; Visy 1986). Thus the fort at Ad Latus was built and occupied till the marcomanic wars by *coh. I Noricorum* (for short under Hadrian by *coh. II miliaria Brittonum*) (Visy 1988, p. 177). Then South of it, at Alisca, *coh. III Lusitanorum* was stationed till the 4th century (Visy 1988, p. 119). At Ad Statuas was located *coh. II Asturum et Gallaecorum* (Visy 1986, p. 510, note 93; Visy 1988, p. 120), but the situation of the nearby station at Lugio is not clear. Starting with

Hadrian here was located *coh. VII Breucorum* which under Trajan was still in Orient, so that even if the fort here could have been built under the Flavians its garrison under Trajan is not known (Visy 1988, p. 124). In late Roman times it was probably called *Florentia* and the fort on the other bench of the Danube was consequently named *Contra Florentiam*. From here started the road towards the mouth of Mureş river and Dacia (Mócsy 1974, p. 110 and Fig. 59; Visy 1988, p. 124).

South of Lugio the situation under Trajan is completely unclear. Starting with Hadrian at Altinum was stationed *coh. I Lusitanorum* (Visy 1988, p. 125 sq.), but under Trajan the troop was placed somewhere in the North of the province, probably at Matrica, as the order in the military diplomas of the time clearly shows (Visy 1986). Then, at Ad Militare, the only garison attested is *coh. II Augusta Thracum* which came into Pannonia Inferior later, and appears for the first time in the diplomas of this province in 139 A. D. (Visy 1988, p. 126). The military road South of Ad Militare passes East of Mursa, leading directly to Teutoburgium, South of the mouth of Drave river. Before becoming a colony under Hadian, Mursa was an important military point, occupied succesively by *ala II Hispanorum Aravacorum* and by *coh. II Alpinorum*, but it did not seem to lie directly on the border. At Teutoburgium a post trajanic inscription (CIL III 3272 + 10 257) mentions *ala Praetoria c. R.* and *ala I c. R.*. The latter is attested by the diplomas of 109 and 110 A.D. (AE 1990, 860; CIL XVI, 57) in Dacia, and will be transferred in Pannonia around 118 A.D. by Turbo, in order to replace at Intercisa the *ala Tungrorum Frontoniana*, which at its turn was moved into Dacia Porolissensis, at Ilişua (Petolescu 1995 a, p. 36, nr. 1 and p. 47—49, nr. 14). Before that *ala II Hispanorum Aravacorum* from Mursa is also attested at Teutoburgium (Visy 1988, p. 127).

The same goes for the units from South-west Dacia, facing Pannonia, where the position of the troops is not clear. *Cohors I Augusta Ituraeorum sagittariorum* (Piso-Benea 1984, p. 280; Petolescu 1995 b, p. 29—30, nr. 46—47) and *coh. I Thracum sagittariorum* (Piso-Benea 1984, p. 285; Petolescu 1995 b, p. 270, nr. 55—56) which were permanently garrisoned in Dacia, must be located on the line *Lederata-Arcidava-Tibiscum*, controlling the plain of Banat, like other units of archers stationed at Tibiscum and Micia (*numerus Palmyrenorum Tibiscensium* and *coh. II Flavia Commagenorum sagittariorum*). Such troops were very efficient against the laziges from Alföld (Piso-Benea 1984, p. 80). However the exact location of these troops on the Dacian border is not known.

But the most relevant feature is the Pannonian segment between the mouth of river Drave and the one of Theiss, and then downwards to Singidunum. At Cornacum must be located *coh. I Montanorum* (Visy 1988, p. 127), and at Acumincum, facing the mouth of the river Theiss, should be located under Trajan *coh. V Gallorum*, which left here a stamped tile (Radnóti 1975, p. 212). It was later replaced by *coh. I Campanorum voluntariorum* (Visy 1988, p. 129 sq.). In this region was placed in the 2nd-3rd centuries the *ala I Britannica milliaria c. R.* (Visy 1988, p. 128), but under Trajan the troop was somewhere in the NE,

around Aquincum, and in 114 was „*missa in expeditione*“ in the Orient (*Radnóti* 1957, p. 136 and *Visy* 1986, p. 507), so that it should have been brought in the South the earliest under Hadrian. South of the mouth of Theiss river, at Rittium, *ala I Augusta Ituraeorum* was stationed, and then at Burgenae, *coh. I Thracum c. R. equitata* (*Visy* 1988 p. 130). Or three of these troops are attested under Trajan simultaneously in Pannonia and Dacia (*coh. I Montanorum*, *coh. V Gallorum* and *coh. I Thracum*), and the forth (*ala I Ituraeorum*) only in Dacia. It seems obvious to me than in this region a few years after the final defeat of the Dacians the troops of Pannonia and of Dacia were still not completely separated.

The best explanation is that immediately after 106 A.D. the situation of the region was not stable, so that only in 109 A.D. the first diplomas were issued for the veterans of the wars (including the one with the laziges immediately after the second Dacian war). On the 2nd of July 110 A.D. two other *constitutiones* are promoted in Rome, one for the troops of Dacia (*CIL XVI 163*) and one for the troops of Pannonia (*CIL XVI 164*). Three cohorts (*V Gallorum*, *I Montanorum* and *I Thracum*) appear simultaneously in that day in both diplomas and were thus belonging to the armies of the two provinces. The three cohorts were already in Dacia in October 109. Without going into the details of a tricky problem like the one of the homonymous troops from different provinces, it is worth mentioning that from such formations will be later created troops which appear with the same name simultaneously in more provinces. So a *coh. I Thracum*, besides the Pannonian one from Burgenae, will later be part of the army of Dacia Superior, where it is attested by several diplomas. The explanation of Strobel who wants to have three different *cohortes I Thracum* in the Dacian wars, coming from different provinces, is too complicated and does not solve all the problems involved, especially the origin of the troop attested in Dacia (*Strobel* 1984, p. 143 sq, followed by *Petolescu* 1995 b, p. 269—270, nr. 53—56). A *coh I Montanorum c. R.* appears in Pannonia and Moesia Superior and then later in Pannonia Inferior and in Moesia Superior, besides the one attested in Dacia in 109—110. Probably before the second Dacian war it had been transferred from Pannonia to Novae, in Upper Moesia, where it had built the local fort, and after first having belonged to the Lower Pannonian and Dacian army it was separated into a Lower Pannonian and an Upper Moesian troop (a different version at *Strobel* 1984, p. 139—140, and simplified at *Petolescu* 1995 b, p. 266—267, nr. 49). *Coh V Gallorum* was permanently stationed in the 2nd-3rd centuries in Pojejena de Sus and was bearing the name of *Gallorum et Pannoniorum*, testifying that a part of it was stationed and reinforced in Pannonia Inferior at Acumincum as showed above. The rest of the troop could be already under Trajan in Pojejena (*Strobel* 1984, p. 131; *Petolescu* 1995 b, p. 258—259, nr. 40). Anyway, this unit was not transferred from Dacia to Moesia Superior and back, as it could be suggested by successive diplomas from the two provinces, but as shown (*Piso-Benea* 1984, p. 282—284 and 289) it was sometimes under the authority of one governor then of another. It is certain that the troop was not separated into two units, one in Dacia-

Moesia Superior and another in *Pannonia Inferior*, because it does not show up any more in the diplomas of Lower Pannonia.

Under Trajan such a dispersion of the components of one and the same troop is rather usual. For instance *coh I Hispanorum veterana equitata* from the army of Lower Moesia had its main garrison at Stobi, in Macedonia, between the two Dacian wars, when the Hunt papyrus must be dated (Fink 1971, no. 63, col. i, 24). One group was located „*intra provinciam*“ some hundred kilometres North at Piroboridava (Fink 1971, no. 63, col. ii, 24: „*pirob[oj]ridavae in praesidio*“. Cf. Fink no. 70, frg. b, col. ii, 13a: „*mis(sus) ad praesi(dium) bab(ylonis)*“, also very far from Doura where the troop was stationed). At the same time other groups from *coh. I Hispanorum veterana equitata* were assigned „*extra provinciam*“, some as far as Gaul.

On the other hand the troops stationed on the Danube, downstreams *Tricornium*, at the mouth of the river Save (where *coh I Pannoniorum veterana* was located), are all attested as belonging to the Dacian army between 106 and 118 A.D.. As a matter of fact it is hard to find any auxiliary troops in *Moesia Superior* after the second Dacian war and before Hadrian. Thus from the troops attested in *Moesia Superior* starting with Hadrian (CIL XVI 111 from 159/160 A.D. and RMD 55 from 161 A.D.), *coh V Gallorum* (from Transdierna and Pojejena) and *I Montanorum* from (Novae) have been already mentioned as simultaneously attested in Dacia and Pannonia in July 110 A.D. (and they were already in 109 in Dacia, so they did not belong to the Upper Moesian army between 106 and 118 A.D.). Also in Dacia under Trajan were stationed *ala I Claudia* (later somewhere in North-west of Moesia Superior), *coh II Gallorum* (Piso-Benea 1984, p. 285—286; Petolescu 1995 b, p. 256, nr. 37—38, *coh I Pannoniorum veterana* (from Tricornium; Petolescu 1995 b, p. 267—268, nr. 51), *coh III Campestris* (from Cuppae; Piso-Benea 1984, p. 288—291; Petolescu 1995 b, p. 246—248, nr. 27). and *coh I Cretum* (from Egeta; Petolescu 1995 b, nr. 252—253, nr. 31). *Coh I Antiochensium sagittariorum* (Petolescu 1995 b, p. 239, nr. 17) which is attested at Drobeta in Dacia, was probably placed in the newly formed province of Trajan immediately after 106 and was only later transferred back to Moesia Superior (or the authority upon these troops was transferred from a governor to the other). Further troops of Moesia Superior were by then in other provinces, like *coh I Augusta Lusitanorum* which is attested in July 110 A.D. in Pannonia (CIL XVI 164), probably at Matrica, and *ala I Gallorum Flaviana* which was still in 105 in *Moesia Inferior* (CIL XVI 50), and was transferred only later to *Moesia Superior* sok. Under the circumstances I wonder if in Upper Moesia any legion (e.g. VII Claudia) was left between 106 and

118 A.D., and if the province was regarded at all in that period as a frontier one. Probably by then the troops later attested on the right bank of the Danube were, put under the authority of the consular governor of *Dacia*, leaving the province of *Moesia Superior* almost without garrison. However it is less probable that these troops were permanently installed in the forts along the Danube. It looks like after the conquest of *Dacia* the whole army of Upper *Moesia* was transferred in the new province.

ALEXANDRU DIACONESCU

ABBREVIATIONS AND LITERATURE

- Aricescu 1977 A. Aricescu, *Armata în Dobrogea romană*, București 1977 (in brackets are given the pages of the English version published in BAR).
- Benario 1986 H. W. Benario, *Legionary speed of march before the battle with Boudicca*, in *Britannia* XVII, 1986, p. 358 sqq.
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Fig. 1 = Column of Trajan, drawing after Cichorius scene L—LI/126—129 = Florescu XXXVIII. The march of legio I Minerva and the image of an *itinerarium*.

XXXVI millia passum (53.2 km)
 VIMINACIVM ... X ... LEDERATA ... XII ... APO FL. ... XII ... ARCIDAVA ... XII ... CENTVM PVTEA ... XII ... BERZOVIS

XXXV mil. pas. (51.7 km) XXXVII mil. pas. (54.6 km)
 BERZOVIS ... XII ... AZIZIS ... (X)III ... CAPVT BVBALI ... X ... TIVISCO ... XIII ... AVGAVIAE ... VIII ... PONTE AVG. ... XV ... SARMATEGTE
 (col. Dacica Sarmizegetusa)

XXXVII mil. pas. (54.6 km) XXXVII mil. pas. (54.6 km)
 SARMATEGTE ... (X)XIII ... AD AQVAS ... XIII ... PETRIS ... VIII ... GERMIASRA ... (X)VIII ... BLANDIANA ... VIII ... APVLO

XXXVI mil. pas. (53.15 km) XXXVI mil. pas. (53.15 km)
 APVLO ... (XII ... ??? ...) XII ... BRVCLA ... XII ... SALINIS ... XII ... POTAVISSA ... XXIII ... NAPOCA

XXXVI mil. pas. (53.15 km)
 NAPOCA ... (X)XVI ... OPTATIANA ... X ... LARGIANA ... XVIII ... CERSIAE ... IIII ... POROLISSO

EGETA ... XXI ... DRV BETIS ... XXXVI ... A MVTRIA ... XXXV ... PELENTOVA ... XX ... CASTRIS NOVIS ... LXX ... ROMVLA

ROMVLA XIII ACIDAVA XXIII ... RUSIDAVA ... XIII ... PONTE ... ALVTI ... XIII ... BVRIDAVA ... XII ... CASTRA TRAGANA

Fig. 2. The main roads of Roman Dacia...





Fig. 3 = Geographical map showing the main roads of Roman Dacia (1 = Viminacium, 2 = Lederata, 3 = Arcidava, 4 = Bersobis, 5 = Tibiscum, 6 = Sarmizegetusa, 7 = Petrae, 8 = Apulum, 9 = Salinae, 10 = Napoca, 11 = Porolissum, 12 = Dierna, 13 = Drobeta, 14 = Bumbesti, 15 = Oescus, 16 = Romula, 17 = Caput Stenarum) and the pattern of the sistem after the recalibrated Tabula Peutingeriana.




Fig. 4 Map of pre-Roman Dacia with the main fortresses that had to be conquered by Traian: 1 — Pecica, 2 = Săvârșin, 3 = Deva, 4 = Piatra Craivii, 5 = Arcidava, 6 = Pelendava, 7 = Buridava, 8 = Bănița, 9 = Piatra Roșie, 10 = Sarmizegetusa regia, 11 = Costești and Bildaru, 12 = Cucuiș and Cugir, 13 = Căpâlna, 14 = Tilișca, 15 = Arpașu, 16 = Cumidava, 17 = Sighișoara, 18 = Porumbeni, 19 = Odorhei, 20 = Jigodin, 21 = Zetea, 22 = Poiana/Piroboridava, 23 = Răcătău, 24 = Piatra Neamț, 25 = Sărățel, 26 = Porolissum, 27 = Șimleul Silvaniei, 28 = Marca, 29 = Tășnad, 30 = Clit.




Fig. 5 The first phase of the operations in the Dacian war: A = Pannonian army with legg. XIII Gemina and I Adiutrix, B = Legio II Adiutrix, by then probably at Sirmium, C = The main Roman forces, the army of Moesia Superior with legg. III Flavia Felix and VII Claudia, the vexillations from Britannia, Germania and from Orient, D and E = The forces of Lower Moesia: legg. V Macedonica from Oescus and I Italica from Novae. 1 = Pecica, 2 = Șimand, 3 = Deva—Petrae, 4 = Bersobis, 5 = Tibiscum, 6 = Tapae, 7 = Băniță, 8 = Peleendava, 9 = Buridava, 10 = Sarmizegetusa regia, 11 = Piatra Roșie, 12 = Costești, 13 = Blidaru, 14 = Gârâlna, 15 = Tilisca.




Fig. 6 Column of Trajan, drawing after the scenes Cichorius XXV/58—58 = Florescu XVII—XVIII. The battle of Tapae.




Fig. 8 The second phase of the operations in the first Dacian war: 1 = Bersobis, 2 = Tibiscum, 3 = Sarmizegetusa (*colonia Dacica*), 4 = Petrae, 5 = Apulum, 6 = Pescăreasca, 7 = Târgușoru Vechi, 8 = Drajna de Sus and Mălăiești, 9 = Piroboridava, 10 = Troesmis, 11 = Durostorum.




Fig. 9a. Block with heraldic relief of leg. I Adiutrix from Dacian Sarmizegetusa.



Fig. 9b. Block with heraldic relief and inscription of leg. I Adiutrix from Carnutum.




Fig. 10. Dacia and surrounding provinces under Trajan: 1 = Altinum, 2 = Ad Militare, 3 = Ad Novas, 4 = Teutoburgium, 5 = Cornacum, 6 = Acumincum, 7 = Rittium, 8 = Taurunum, 9 = Burgenae, 10 = Brâncovenesti, 11 = Călugăreni, 12 = Sărăteni, 13 = Inlăceni, 14 Ordoheiu Secuiesc.




Fig. 11. Roman provinces and now a days regions mentioned in this paper.