

## **ABOUT THE TACTICS AND FIGHTING PARTICULARITY OF THE AUXILIARY INFANTRY IN ROMAN DACIA**

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This study is part of a series of studies that look at the Roman army from a slightly different perspective: that of the tactics and strategy used according to the specific fighting of the populations forming the auxiliary units. This paper, alongside the others in this series, is not meant to be an exhaustive study of the auxiliary troops from the point of view of tactics and strategies. Thus, in order to know the Roman study strategy, literary sources and the geographic positioning of the fortresses are being used; other aspects, such as epigraphic and archaeological sources, were left aside, having been discussed enough up to the present moment. That is why it is possible for some troops to have been wrongly positioned, due to the use of epigraphic information alone. From this point of view, a much more complete work must be elaborated; it will study the Roman army's tactics and strategy, omitting none of the circumstances, and it will cover a wider surface. Moreover, I did not use a clear chronology here, divided into smaller periods of the history of the province Dacia, the entire study referring, chronologically speaking, to the centuries II–III.

The infantry probably represented the most important component of the Roman auxiliary troops. The troops made of heavy infantry, legionary troops, were completed with others, having a better mobility and greater diversity: the light infantry troops. Nevertheless, there was an auxiliary heavy infantry, as well<sup>1</sup>. In fact, some authors believe that all the auxiliary troops were armed as heavily as the legionary ones, except for some conscriptions used for skirmishment<sup>2</sup>. The infantry was very important in an armed conflict because it was the only one that could

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<sup>1</sup> Ruscu, Ruscu 1996, 214.

<sup>2</sup> Goldsworthy 2007, 127.

conquer and maintain a certain position, that being its main function<sup>3</sup>. It was also often used, combined with archers, for supporting the cavalry<sup>4</sup>. The auxiliary infantry units were called *cohortes*<sup>5</sup>.

The regular auxiliary Roman troops, the cohorts included, were divided in two categories, depending on the number of soldiers: *quingenariae*, which were made of six centuries and *milliariae*, of ten centuries<sup>6</sup>. The terms *quingenaria* and *milliaria* are approximate in this case, as well<sup>7</sup>, a *quingenaria* cohort being made of approximately 480 soldiers and a *milliaria* of approximately 800 soldiers<sup>8</sup>. Death on the battlefield, the recruitment of an insufficient number of soldiers or some vexillations' departure in missions led to the variation in number of the soldiers in these troops, the number of soldiers present in the fortress being usually smaller than the theoretical number of soldiers in a troop<sup>9</sup>. Likewise, the structure and number of soldiers in a troop were influenced by the local conditions, the Roman military system being very flexible and capable of readjustment<sup>10</sup>. The number of soldiers the most important army subunits had indicates the type of conflict that was expected to take place in the area and the modifications of this number suggests changes in the military situation<sup>11</sup>.

There were cohorts that had a cavalry contingent beside the infantry. These troops were called *equitatae*<sup>12</sup> and those solely of infantry were called *peditatae*<sup>13</sup>. We are going to discuss the *peditatae* cohorts here, the *equitatae* ones being the subject of another study<sup>14</sup>. Of course, the elements of equipment and the infantrymen's tactics in the *equitatae* cohorts are identical to those of the *peditatae* cohorts.

The auxiliary infantry benefited from a good management, thus having, just as the legions did, an advantage and superiority over the disorganized, non-Roman

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<sup>3</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 191.

<sup>4</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 188.

<sup>5</sup> Cichorius 1900, 233; Spaul 2000, *passim*.

<sup>6</sup> Hyginus 28.

<sup>7</sup> Ureche 2009, forthcoming.

<sup>8</sup> Cheesman 1914, 25.

<sup>9</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 24.

<sup>10</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 13.

<sup>11</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 13.

<sup>12</sup> Cichorius 1900, 235; Cheesman 1914, 28; Davies 1989, *passim*.

<sup>13</sup> Hyginus 28; Cichorius 1900, 235. From the entire range of classical authors, the term is to be found only in Hyginus, and in inscriptions, only as *Cohors I Alpinorum peditata*, to differentiate it from *Cohors I Alpinorum equitata*.

<sup>14</sup> Ureche 2009, forthcoming.

infantry troops<sup>15</sup>. The gradual regularization of the auxiliary troops is by no means evidence attesting that the soldiers lost the special abilities they were recruited for, but rather a proof of the fact that they became a part of the Roman army<sup>16</sup>.

The well-ordered formations, with many rows in width, kept people in motion; thus, the troop could attack as a compact body<sup>17</sup>. Consequently, Arrian made up a fight line consisting in five to eight spear throwers, each row throwing over the heads of the ones in front of it; behind them, he placed a row of infantry bowmen and one of bowmen on horses, which shot above the spearmen<sup>18</sup>. These compact formations were extremely useful against heavy cavalry attacks; furthermore, because they were so compact, the Roman soldiers could not run away<sup>19</sup>.

The Roman infantry used several fighting techniques: at the beginning of the fight, they attacked in wide formations, at high speed, to scare the enemies away and put them on the run<sup>20</sup>. This first attack was followed by several others, the soldiers not getting involved in individual duels except for very few situations; their purpose was staying alive, rather than killing an enemy<sup>21</sup>. Still, during these charges, individual duels were inevitable.

Intimidation tactics were an important factor that sometimes helped to obtain easy victories. Initially, the enemy was intimidated at the sight of a great number of people that went forward in disciplined formations, slowly or at great speed. That visual impression was important to most of the armies, the soldiers using different tricks to seem taller than in reality<sup>22</sup>. After creating this visual impression, the second intimidation phase they used was at auditive level. The noise was created with the help of different instruments<sup>23</sup> used by the armies in fighting signals, but the shouting, the noise made by men hitting their shields with the weapons, or the march of hundreds of men with a firm step were intimidating, as well<sup>24</sup>. This type of noisy movement was used by the Roman army in Polybius's time, this technique being used by other populations, too<sup>25</sup>. The intimidation could also be achieved by advancing slowly, quietly and it suggested imperturbability /

<sup>15</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 20.

<sup>16</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 21.

<sup>17</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 178.

<sup>18</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 177.

<sup>19</sup> Goldsworthy 2007, 138–139.

<sup>20</sup> Sabin 2000, 8.

<sup>21</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 208.

<sup>22</sup> Goldsworthy 2008, 184.

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch, Crassus 23.7.

<sup>24</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 195–197.

<sup>25</sup> Goldsworthy 2007, 134.

impassibility, even if this was only for show<sup>26</sup>. That implacable closeness usually created a stronger effect than the noisy advancing would have. It was first used in Caesar's time, and for it to be possible, a high standard discipline was required, to keep the formations as a dense mass, despite the natural instinct of the soldiers to scream and run towards the enemy line<sup>27</sup>. The only army of that time that was disciplined and organized enough for this type of advancement was the Roman one. The implacable closeness ended at a distance of less than 15 meters from the enemy, this one receiving a double shock: a physical one by the *pila* volley and a psychological one, induced by the fight shouts that were released at that moment<sup>28</sup>.

The ability to go forward in a constant rhythm and throw the spears only from a short distance required a lot of self-control, and Roman soldiers were doubtlessly taught to have that<sup>29</sup>.

The typical equipment of the auxiliary infantrymen consisted in a *lorica hamata* that had the same weight as the *segmentata* used by the legionnaires, a bronze helmet, an oval and flat shield, a *gladius* and a lance or short spears<sup>30</sup> (*iacula*). The *iacula*, no matter if warriors attacked or defended themselves, were the first weapons used in a fight to break the enemy line before coming to the hand to hand fight<sup>31</sup>. These weapons were superior to the legionary ones (*pila*) from the point of view of the ability to hit from a short distance<sup>32</sup>. An experiment dating from Napoleon the 3<sup>rd</sup>'s time proved that a spear could be thrown 30–35 meters away<sup>33</sup>. In hand to hand fights, the *gladius* or the *spatha* were used most often, but it is possible for some of the units to have used the lance in this type of confrontation<sup>34</sup>. Considering this typical equipment of an auxiliary infantryman, it is believed that these troops were actually heavily armed, just like the legionary ones<sup>35</sup>.

Most of the infantry troops represented on Trajan's Column and on funerary monuments seem to have as defensive equipment a helmet, *lorica hamata* or *squamata*, a long, oval and flat shield, unlike the legionary one that was

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<sup>26</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 197.

<sup>27</sup> Goldsworthy 2007, 134.

<sup>28</sup> Goldsworthy 2007, 134

<sup>29</sup> Goldsworthy 2008, 184.

<sup>30</sup> Goldsworthy 2007, 127.

<sup>31</sup> Peddie 1996, 81.

<sup>32</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 20.

<sup>33</sup> Harmand 1967, 62, *apud* Luttwak 1976, 44.

<sup>34</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 216.

<sup>35</sup> Goldsworthy 2007, 127.

semicircular. There is no proof that the auxiliary troops may have used *lorica segmentata*<sup>36</sup>.

The shield used by the auxiliary troops was about 125 cm long and 64 cm wide. It was made up of three layers of wood stuck together, being 10 mm wide in the end. The iron *umbo* was placed a little above the centre. The shield had a vertical strengthening crossbar on the interior side that formed a vertical handle right where the *umbo* was on the other side. Both faces were covered in leather and there is no trace of any metallic strap on the side<sup>37</sup>.

The infantry helmet left the face and ears uncovered, so that the soldier could see, hear, understand and follow orders<sup>38</sup>.

The bowmen and slingers' equipment is a bit different from that of the regular troops (see *infra*).

In Dacia, the cohorts, the *peditatae* and the *equitatae* ones as well, were placed in the front line of the *limes*, having behind them the *alae*, which could intervene on a wider area, due to their mobility.

Cohorts recruited from various parts of the Roman Empire proceeded to Roman Dacia. The most famous troops are: the Gauls, the Hispanians, the Britons and the Thracians.

From the Gallic peditate cohorts in *Dacia*, the following have been confirmed: *cohors I Gallorum Dacica* and *cohors III Gallorum*. The first one's garrison is unknown, the second being stationed in the fortress from Ionești Govorei<sup>39</sup>, then in Hoghiz. The Gallic cohorts were camped near river flows, *cohors III Gallorum* stationed in two fortresses on the *Alutan limes* and *cohors V Gallorum equitata* stationed on the Danube riverside, from where they could watch over the road from Drobeta to Berzobis.

Troops composed of Hispanians can be found on various parts of *Dacia's limes*. Thus, as far as the *peditatae* cohorts are concerned, there was one in the north – in Românași (*cohors I Hispanorum pia fidelis*)<sup>40</sup>, and one on the *limes Transalutanus*, *cohors I Bracaraugustanorum* at Brețcu (Angustiae)<sup>41</sup>.

A population that also gave many troops to the Empire even before the Flavian<sup>42</sup> dynasty was that of the Brittons. Three peditate cohorts of Britons saw

<sup>36</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 216.

<sup>37</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 211.

<sup>38</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 213.

<sup>39</sup> Petolescu 1995, 257; Bejan 1998, 40.

<sup>40</sup> Bejan 1998, 40; Zahariade 1976, 479.

<sup>41</sup> Petolescu 2002, 85.

<sup>42</sup> Marcu 2004, 219.

action in Dacia: *cohors I Augusta Nervia Pacensis Brittonum milliaria*, *cohors II Augusta Nervia Pacensis Brittonum milliaria*, which was stationed in the fortress in Buciumi<sup>43</sup>, and *cohors I Aurelia Brittonum milliaria*, which was initially stationed in Bumbești<sup>44</sup>, then in Stolniceni<sup>45</sup>.

There is a possibility for *cohors I Augusta Nervia Pacensis Brittonum milliaria* to be identical to *Cohors I Aurelia Brittonum milliaria* from Bumbești<sup>46</sup>, the hypothesis concerning the identification of the first with *cohors II Augusta Nervia Pacensis Brittonum milliaria* being excluded<sup>47</sup>.

The troops in Buciumi guarded simultaneously two passes in the Meseș Mountains: Rag and Poic. The fortress was situated 3.5 km behind the Rag pass, beyond which lied the most important way of communication west of the *limes*, the road along the Crasna river<sup>48</sup>.

The fortress in Bumbești controlled the Valley of the Jiu and one of the most important roads of Dacia as well, from Drobeta to Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa, which passed through this valley.

The Thracians are also found within the Empire troops, especially in the *equitatae* cohorts, being a population of horse riders. The troops of Thracians in Dacia are: *cohors I Thracum*, *cohors VI Thracum equitata*, *cohors I Thracum c. R.*, *cohors I Thracum sagittariorum* and *cohors II Flavia Bessorum*.

Of all these, we know about the first two being *equitatae*. Little do we know about the places they were stationed in. *Cohors I Thracum c. R.* was used only for a little while in Dacia: after taking part in the Dacian wars, it appears in a *diploma* from 109 in Dacia and in 110, it is moved to *Pannonia Inferior*<sup>49</sup>. *Cohors II Flavia Bessorum* was stationed in a *castellum* in Rucăr during Trajan's time<sup>50</sup>, and during Hadrian's time it was moved to *Dacia Inferior*, then later on, probably under Antonius Pius's reign, it was relocated to Cincșor (Brașov), on the upper Olt river<sup>51</sup>.

There is little information about *cohors I Thracum sagittariorum*, as well: we know it was stationed in *Dacia Superior* because it appears in their diplomas<sup>52</sup>.

<sup>43</sup> Petolescu 1995, 245.

<sup>44</sup> Petolescu 2002, 91.

<sup>45</sup> Petolescu 2002, 92.

<sup>46</sup> Marcu 2004, 223.

<sup>47</sup> Eck, MacDonald, Pangerl 2001, 39–40; Weiss 2002, 250, *apud* Marcu 2004, 222.

<sup>48</sup> Dumitrașcu 1993, *apud* Gudea 1997, 7–8.

<sup>49</sup> Petolescu 1995, 270.

<sup>50</sup> Petolescu 2002, 84.

<sup>51</sup> Petolescu 1995, 240.

<sup>52</sup> Petolescu 1995, 270.

It was part of the infantry bowmen of Dacia, along with *cohors I Cretum*, *cohors I Antiochiensium*, *cohors I sagittariorum milliaria*, *cohors I Augusta Ituraeorum sagittariorum* and *cohors I Ituraeorum*.

The Thracians and the Cretans used a long bow characterized by high performances (within a range of 210–230 m)<sup>53</sup>, but which was not really the same as the composite bow used by Oriental bowmen. *Cohors I Cretum* was stationed in Banatska Palanka, from where they watched over the Drobeta - Berzovis road. It is assumed that *cohors I Antiochiensium* and *cohors I sagittariorum milliaria*, which was recruited from Syria, were stationed in Tibiscum<sup>54</sup> and Drobeta<sup>55</sup> and may have been joined after 165.

The bowmen had to support other troops by standing behind them and shooting above. They were usually used to provide support to the heavy infantry against cavalry attacks, but they could not resist an attack by themselves<sup>56</sup>.

The infantry bowmen used bows that were bigger and stronger than those of the infantry horsemen and their shooting range was wider<sup>57</sup>.

All the bowmen in the Roman army used the Mediterranean technique of shooting, whether on foot or on horseback. The bow was held in the left hand, which was straightened ahead, and the right hand bent the bow spring up to the chin before releasing it. While being bent, the bow spring was held with a finger above the arrow and with one or two fingers under it<sup>58</sup>.

There are lots of variants regarding the effective range of action of the arrows shot from a composite bow. Vegetius believed that the bowmen should train with a target that should be positioned 200 meters away<sup>59</sup>, the French estimated that an arrow shot from a Roman bow would reach up to 165–175 meters<sup>60</sup>, Bivar suggests a maximum distance of 230 meters and an effectiveness at 90 meters<sup>61</sup>, and McLeod reduces the effective distance to 50–60 meters<sup>62</sup>. Saracen manuals support the idea that a professional Bowman on horseback is capable to hit a target with the diameter of 90 cm from a distance of 70 meters, and the

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<sup>53</sup> Peddie 1996, 92, Table 4.

<sup>54</sup> Benea 1980, 136.

<sup>55</sup> Benea 1976, 77 sqq.

<sup>56</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 190.

<sup>57</sup> Coulston 1985, 245–246, *apud* Dixon, Southern 1992, 53.

<sup>58</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 185.

<sup>59</sup> Vegetius 2. 23.

<sup>60</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 184.

<sup>61</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 184.

<sup>62</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 184.

bowmen horse riders use less stronger bows, thus with a short range of shooting<sup>63</sup>. One of the main reasons behind these different opinions concerning the range of action of a Roman bow is the fact that the skillfulness of the bowman is more important than the bow's manufacturing technology<sup>64</sup>.

The infantry archers' quiver was fixed by the *balteus*, as sculptural monuments show (a tomb stone in Walberdorf)<sup>65</sup>, and that of the horse riders in the *equitatae* cohorts was usually worn on the right side of the saddle, behind the rider<sup>66</sup>.

The recruitment of the Iturean archers, an Arab population that shared its domination together with the Nabateans in Syria, is testified from the beginning of the first Civil War<sup>67</sup>. These ones, on foot and on horseback, were frequently used by Caesar<sup>68</sup>, while Pompeius preferred the ones from Crete<sup>69</sup>.

The troops of Iturei in Dacia acted on the northern and north-western *limes*, being found in the fortresses from Romita and then Porolissum (*cohors I Ituraeorum*) respectively Porolissum and Buciumi (*cohors I Augusta Ituraeorum*)<sup>70</sup>. Regarding the Călugăreni stamps, Ioan Piso and Felix Marcu were both of the opinion that *cohors I Augusta Ituraeorum* was also stationed here<sup>71</sup>.

The Iturean, Numidian and Cyrenian troops included other categories of infantry warriors besides the archers, as well. They were used in pursuit actions, after the enemy was forced to flee<sup>72</sup>.

*Cohors I Augusta Ituraeorum sagittariorum*, *cohors I Ituraeorum*, *cohors I Antiochiensium* were made of soldiers recruited from the Orient, who used the composite bow that had an action range of up to 330–365 m<sup>73</sup>.

The sling was used, as well, besides the bow and spear, in order to sustain the infantry. The first two originate from the Orient and the sling is also signaled in David's fight against Goliath<sup>74</sup>. The usage of slingers in the Roman army is less

<sup>63</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 184.

<sup>64</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 184.

<sup>65</sup> Coulston 1985, 271, *apud* Dixon, Southern 1992, 57.

<sup>66</sup> Schleiermacher 1984, No. 23, *apud* Dixon, Southern 1992, 57.

<sup>67</sup> Țentea 2004, 805.

<sup>68</sup> Caesar, Bell. Afr., 20; Cicero, Philippicae, II, 112.

<sup>69</sup> Davies 1977, 261, *apud* Țentea 2004, 805.

<sup>70</sup> Țentea 2004, 808.

<sup>71</sup> Piso, Marcu 2008, 176-177.

<sup>72</sup> Ruscu, Ruscu 1996, 225.

<sup>73</sup> Peddie 1996, 92.

<sup>74</sup> Peddie 1996, 82.



clarified than that of the archers. The Cretans<sup>75</sup> and the Hispanians are mentioned to use slings beside swords and spears<sup>76</sup>.

The slingers were probably included in other units, because cohorts of soldiers specialized in using the sling remains unknown<sup>77</sup>. They were gathered in special units in the light armed troops, especially the light infantry and probably archers, so that together they could offer support to the infantry<sup>78</sup>. The sling was a popular weapon because of its light weight and simplicity in the construction and usage. It is made of a piece of leather in which one puts the projectile and two side straps, out of which one is fixed by the hand one throws with and the other is held between the thumb and the index of the same hand. After one swing around the head, the strap between the fingers is released. The range of action is influenced by the throwing angle, the length of the side straps and by the thrower's force<sup>79</sup>, as well as by the ability of the slinger or by the projectile's weight. Given these variables, it is difficult to establish the approximate range of action of the sling<sup>80</sup>. Still, they assume an approximate reach of 27–37 meters<sup>81</sup>. The projectiles were carried by the slingers of the Roman army in the folds of their cape, which was thrown over their left arm, just as it is shown on Trajan's Column<sup>82</sup>.

Unlike the arrow or the spear, the projectile shot from the sling had the advantage that it could not be seen in the air and consequently, it could not be avoided. Likewise, it didn't have to penetrate the armour or the helmet to put the enemy out of action, which explains why, sometimes, the sling could be more dangerous than the bow<sup>83</sup>.

Like the archers, the slingers had two possibilities of taking action: either they established a precise target and hit it, or threw as many projectiles as possible in the enemy area, leaving them to find their targets on their own. In this case, the skillfulness did not lie in the ability to hit a certain target, but in sending as many projectiles towards the enemy as possible. The second option was sometimes more useful, especially when the enemy made up a dense body<sup>84</sup>. Acquiring the habit

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<sup>75</sup> Appian 2.71.

<sup>76</sup> Strabo 3.4.15.

<sup>77</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 19, 186.

<sup>78</sup> Peddie 1996, 81.

<sup>79</sup> Peddie 1996, 82.

<sup>80</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 186.

<sup>81</sup> Peddie 1996, P.92, Table 4.

<sup>82</sup> Richmond 1982, P.2, 19, fn 22, *apud* Peddie 1996, 82.

<sup>83</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 186.

<sup>84</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 186–187.

and then the great art of handling the sling was obtained, just like in the bow's case, by continuous practice<sup>85</sup>.

In the marching column, the slingers, being the scouts<sup>86</sup>, were frequently placed in front of the main body of troops.

The Batavian *alae* were considered to be elite forces, but the Batavian infantry is not inferior to them, either. *Cohors I Batavorum milliaria* operated in Dacia at Romita<sup>87</sup>. Tacitus mentions the Batavian cohorts that participated in conquering Britain and covered themselves with glory<sup>88</sup>.

The Batavian cohorts were different from the rest of the cohorts in the Roman army, maybe due to their extraordinary skillfulness and even swimming talents<sup>89</sup>, and to the fact that after crossing the river, they got out on the other side in formation<sup>90</sup>. This capability is due to Batavians' origin, they lived on the Rhine riverside<sup>91</sup>.

In the description of the assault over the island Mona, Tacitus mentions that the Batavian infantrymen landed on the island in ships and the *equites* swam across with their horses, even if the water was extremely deep<sup>92</sup>.

There is not very much to say about the other cohorts that acted on the territory of Dacia. Those troops were situated on the north-western border, in the east or inside the province. Thus, the following troops were on the north-western *limes*: *cohors I Cannanefatium* – testified in 164 in Tihău<sup>93</sup>, *cohors V Lingonum in Porolissum*<sup>94</sup> and *cohors I Aelia gaesatorum milliaria*, which was stationed in Bologna<sup>95</sup>. These last ones took their name from *gaesum*, a special heavy lance, the weapon they used in fights<sup>96</sup>. The troop in Tihău was recruited from the Caninefatian people, who had an origin, language and virtues similar to the Batavi<sup>97</sup>. These troops were integrated in the defense line in the north-west of the

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<sup>85</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 186.

<sup>86</sup> Peddie 1996, 83–84.

<sup>87</sup> Petolescu 1995, 240.

<sup>88</sup> Tacitus, *Historiae*, IV, 12.

<sup>89</sup> Fleuret 1998, 126.

<sup>90</sup> Tacitus, *Historiae* IV, 12.1

<sup>91</sup> Fleuret 1998, 126.

<sup>92</sup> Tacitus, *Annales* XIV, 26.

<sup>93</sup> Petolescu 1995, 248.

<sup>94</sup> Petolescu 1995, 266.

<sup>95</sup> Petolescu 1995, 254.

<sup>96</sup> Petolescu 2002, 103–104.

<sup>97</sup> Tacitus, *Historiae* IV, 15.1.

province, formed by the fortresses of Tihău, Porolissum, Romita, Românași, Buciumi, Bologa.

Besides these, there still were a few to watch over the important roads of the province. Thus, on the imperial road from Drobeta to Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa were stationed two such troops. The first was *cohors III Campestris*, present only for a short while in Drobeta<sup>98</sup>, then replaced by *cohors I sagittariorum milliaria*. Then the *cohors IV Cypria c. R.* was stationed on a very important road as well, the one that connects Drobeta to Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa through the Jiu Valley; they were garrisoned in the fortress from Bumbești-Jiu<sup>99</sup>, where they could supervise and control the entire valley from. This troop's soldiers distinguished themselves by bravery in the wars against the Dacians, thus receiving Roman citizenship. The cohort was replaced here by *cohors I Aurelia Brittonum milliaria*<sup>100</sup>.

Little do we know about the next three troops, the last ones that we are actually studying, the place where they were stationed being unknown. *Cohors Afrorum* was testified only once in an inscription in Rome<sup>101</sup>, and the other two troops, *cohors I Pannoniorum veterana*<sup>102</sup> and *cohors I Montanorum*, participated in the second war against the Dacians<sup>103</sup>, and then they went back to the provinces they came from. Therefore, in 110, *cohors I Montanorum* had already come back to *Pannonia Inferior*<sup>104</sup> and *cohors I Pannoniorum veterana* reappeared in *Moesia Superior* in the year 159<sup>105</sup>.

The *cohortes peditatae* had an extremely important role in the campaign, where they took or maintained a special fighting position or fight line side by side with the legions they accompanied. Likewise, being disposed in an organized manner on several fight lines, they were extremely effective in the fights against barbarian populations, whose organization during the attacks was not brilliant. In peace time, these troops were stationed in fortresses on the *limes*, from where they watched over the neighboring populations and repelled their attacks with specific tactics, fundamentally aggressive and offensive, their defense being based on the counter-attack<sup>106</sup>.

<sup>98</sup> Petolescu 1995, 246.

<sup>99</sup> Petolescu 1995, 253.

<sup>100</sup> Petolescu 1995, 253.

<sup>101</sup> Petolescu 1995, 237.

<sup>102</sup> Petolescu 1995, 267.

<sup>103</sup> Petolescu 1995, 266.

<sup>104</sup> Petolescu 1995, 266.

<sup>105</sup> Petolescu 1995, 268.

<sup>106</sup> Goldsworthy 1996, 227.

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


Fig. 1. Dacian units based their fighting style.




Fig. 2. The ethnic and provenience of the soldiers from the regular cohorts in Roman Dacia.