

THE WALACHIAN'S IN OTTOMAN-HUNGARIAN POWER RELATIONS (1430's – 1440's)

More than the battle at Kossovopolje (1448), the clash of Varna (1444) put an end to the *Christian* hopes of rescuing Constantinople. Varna became a medieval object of controversy. As it happened after Nicopolis (1396), many political actors and by-standers regarded, once again, the Genoese and the Walachians, due to their *treason*, and John (Ioan/ Iancu, János) Hunyadi, voivode of Transylvania, and Wladislaw (Władysław, Ulászló) I (III), king of Poland and Hungary, due to their military decisions, as responsible for the defeat. As for the sultan Murad II, even after his victory of Varna, he was not viewed as Christendom's real nemesis¹.

From this turmoil of charges and credits the figure of Ștefan (Stephen) II of Moldavia, involved mainly indirectly in these actions, surfaced. It 'was added' to the list of characters that shaped East-Central and South-Eastern Europe in the mid 1400'. At that time, in spite of appearances, namely of modern origin, for historiography has long viewed the failed Ottoman attack on Cetatea Albă (Maurocastro, Akkerman) as the first Moldavian-Ottoman clash (1420), Moldavia had entered too the collision course between Christendom and the *mighty Turk*².

The Moldavian Throne and the Ottoman Question. In 1393–1394, like Mircea I *cel Bătrân* (the Old) of Walachia, Roman I of Moldavia sent troops in support of his suzerain Sigismund (Zsigmond) of Luxemburg. The king was fighting Bayezid I at the Lower Danube. Not even two years later, the king's failed campaign against Stephen I, Roman's unwanted successor, was viewed by German sources as Moldavia's fall under Ottoman rule. Still, Stephen apparently entered Sigismund's anti-Ottoman system, by means of Transylvanian estates, granted to him after Nicopolis (1397). The young Moldavian state had been pushed into the great conflicts at Christendom's south-eastern border³.

Events and Crusader Calls of the Early 1400'. Alexander I *cel Bun* (the Just) had to uphold this political course. His state had to adapt or change its position following the ruler's

¹ Francisc Pall, *Les relations entre la Hongrie et Skanderbeg*, RHSEE, X, 1933, 4–6, p. 119–141; O. Halecki, *The Crusade of Varna. A Discussion of Controversial Problems*, New York, 1943; Halil Inalcik, *Ottoman Methods of Conquest*, SI, II (1954), p. 104–129; Ivan Djurić, *Le crépuscule de Byzance*, Paris, 1996, p. 329–339; *The Crusade of Varna. 1443–1445*, ed. Colin Imber, Aldershot 2006.

² See for instance: Nicolae Grigoraș, *Relațiile Moldovei cu Imperiul Otoman până la domnia lui Ștefan cel Mare* [Moldavia Relations with the Ottoman Empire prior to Stephen the Great's Reign], RDI, XXVIII (1975), I, p. 33–34; Dan Mureșan, *Isihasmul și prima etapă a rezistenței la deciziile conciliului florentin în Moldova* [Hesychasm and the first stage of Moldavian resistance of the Council of Florence], SUBBH, XLIV, 1999, 1–2, p. 3–57 (in particular).

³ DRH, D, I, no. 102, p. 169; *Leben und Taten der türkischen Kaiser. Die anonyme vulgärgriechische Chronik Codex Barberinianus Graecus (Anonymus Zoras) (=OGS, VI)*, ed. Richard F. Kreutel, Graz, 1971, p. 37; Thomas Ebendorf, *Chronica regem Romanorum (=MGH, I, NS, 18)*, ed. Harald Zimmermann, I, Hanovra, 2003, p. 552; D.-I. Mureșan, *Avant Nicopolis: observations sur la campagne de 1395 pour le contrôle du Bas-Danube*, QCR, III, 2004, p. 183–184.

policy of balance between the great powers of the area. This policy brought Moldavia close to political partition in 1412 and then once again 1429. King Sigismund's plan to divide Moldavia between Hungary and Poland, initially accepted by Wladislaw II Jagiello, was to survive the crusader times of the 15th century⁴.

In 1408, as far as we know, the papacy first called on Moldavia as a crusader force. In 1412, in the context of the Ottoman civil war, Moldavia was first charged with great treason of the *Christian* cause. The charge, though hidden under the mask of political possibility, in order not to bring up other local conflicts, allowed Sigismund to propose the division of Moldavia. Lithuanian reluctance to such a plan and later Walachia's transformation into a battlefield between Sigismund and Mehmed I postponed further action in this direction⁵.

Nevertheless, less than a year after Alexander's death, the Ottoman fate of Moldavia seemed clear. In return, there was still crusader hope. In November 1432, eager once again to put an end to Genoa's hegemony in the Black Sea area, the Venetian authorities wrote to Wladislaw II, who had his own agenda at the Dniestr and Danube Mounds, now under Moldavian control. They asked him to continue supporting *Walachia* [i.e. Moldavia] *and the Walachians, who are Christian Catholics <fallen> under the power and rule of the Turks*⁶.

[...] *Videbitisque in illis litteris, quod contentatur et vult relinquere Walachiam et Walachos, qui sunt catholici christiani sub potestate et dominio Turcorum, in detrimentum et dedecus fidei et nominis christiani, pro habendo treugas ante dictas, intendens sub illis treugis sicut prediximus agere contra illos, quio nomen Christi et fidem catholicam colunt venerantur atque tuentur* [...].

By aiding Hussites, against namely Sigismund, by supporting Lithuanian rebels, against Wladislaw, Alexander had placed his state in a delicate position. Exposed to Tartar raids and Ottoman pressure, in the 1420' in particular, he was apparently trapped, in his last years of rule, between the colliding powers, Christian or Muslim. Seemingly, in spite of actual Ottoman strength or influence, he thus tried to at least keep one (major) option out of the crisis (1430–1432). This meant making the most out of the crusader needs of a divided Catholic world⁷.

The First Years of the Moldavian Civil War. In the spring of 1432, Iliaş (Elias) I, Alexander's legitimate successor, had defeated the Ottomans. They had come to enthrone his brother, Stephen II, Alexander's illegitimate son. Elias' success seemed to have been short-lived. In order to preserve his throne, Elias had to acknowledge Ottoman suzerainty within a few months after he had repelled the attack⁸.

Elias had little help to count on. Wladislaw lacked the means or maybe even the interest to aid Elias, married to Mary, the sister of Sophia, Wladislaw's last wife. Poland supported the Council of Basel. Crusade and Church Union were not vital matters for Krakow. Jan Długosz, an

⁴ E.g. *Codex Vitoldi*, no. 1286, p. 771; *Codex*, II, no. 197, p. 267, nos. 202–204, p. 285–291; no. 210, p. 307; III, Appendix, no. 24, p. 533; Al. Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin. O coexistență medievală* [Stephen the Great and Matthias Corvinus: A Medieval Coexistence], Cluj-Napoca, 2007, p. 93–97.

⁵ *Hurmuzaki*, I–2, no. 456; pp. 544; XV–I, no. 21, p. 16; DRH, D, I, no. 192, p. 291; *Recueil des voyages et des documents pour servir à l'histoire de la géographie depuis le XIII^e jusqu'à la fin du XVI^e siècle*, ed. Charles Schefer, XII, Bertrandon de la Broquière, *Voyage d'Outremer*, Paris, 1892, p. 149.

⁶ *Codex*, II, no. 209, p. 305 (13th of November 1432); no. 210, p. 307; see also *Notes*, I, pp. 546–543, and Momčilo Spremić, *I tributi veneziani nel Levante nel XV secolo*, SV, XIII (1971), pp. 221–252.

⁷ E.g. Jan Władisław Woś, *Politica e religione nella Polonia tardo medioevale*, Trento, 2000, pp. 48–50; Matei Cazacu, *Venise et la Moldavie au début du XV^e siècle*, SMIM, XXI, 2003, pp. 131–138.

⁸ In these matters, see *Raguza*, no. 228, p. 374; Ilie Minea, *Vlad Dracul și vremea sa* [Vlad Dracul and his Time] (offprint from *CI*, IV) (Iași 1928), pp. 28–32, Leon Șimanschi, *Criza politică din Moldova dintre anii 1432–1437* [The Moldavian Political Crisis. 1432–1437], *AIIX*, XXXIII, 1996, pp. 23–34.

admirer of Stephen II, recorded the aid the latter had received from the Turk and made no secret out of these Polish facts, in spite of his otherwise Christian politically correct speech⁹.

A few months after the Venetian message, Stephen II became the ruler of Moldavia. Walachia too had supported him. Giving in to the sultan's demands had done Elias little good. Stephen remained Murad II's favorite. Yet, Stephen failed to preserve the crown. He was forced to bow in front of Elias (1435), compelled, in return (1436), to accept a partition of Moldavian power with his brother. Elias' domestic position was more than delicate¹⁰.

Out of the two great Genoese colonies under Moldavian control, Stephen held Chilia, while Elias retained Cetatea Albă. Nevertheless, apparently prior to 1440, Elias lost the harbor in favor of his brother. This forced him to take risky decisions, namely in relation to Hungary and Poland. Such a course of events had become clear as early as 1435¹¹.

Imperial Concerns and Moldavian Stands. The foreign context offered Elias little hope for his domestic worries. Neither emperor John VIII Palaeologus, nor patriarch Joseph, 'ruled' the troubled city of Byzantium. Whether it was the prospect of its fall in *Turkish* hands or the perspective of a *Latin* hegemony over the city, the shrinking empire was a victim of its own past. The same was true for another *Greek* state, Walachia. From a loyal subject of the old Sigismund († 1437), Alexandru Aldea (1432–1436) had become the sultan's trusted vassal and a supporter of Stephen II¹².

Buda (Ofen) was far from the power once held. This became very clear in the times of the Transylvanian rebellion and Ottoman attacks of 1437–1438. Besides, the Hungarian kingship viewed Elias as too connected to the Jagellonians in order to confide in him. To the north, Wladislaw II had died (1434). The crown had gone over to a child. The real ruler of the realm was the divided Polish-Lithuanian elite, who, nevertheless, favored Basel to the West and Stephen II to the South-East, where the Tartar menace was still present¹³.

Under these circumstances, Elias turned to the (failed) Lithuanian model of Svidrigiello, whom, a few years earlier he and his father had supported. Elias took up contact to Rome. Pope Eugenius IV advocated crusade and Church Union in order to counteract the power of the Council of Basel. It was a political gamble that paid off for the pope in 1439. Three years earlier, in rather great distress, Eugenius had been however more than pleased to welcome Elias' representative, the Greek metropolite of Moldavia, Gregory (February-March 1436)¹⁴.

In August 1435, Elias had returned to the throne. In spite of his victory, he had to make an arrangement with his brother, an omen that his new rule would be troubled. Elias thus sent his

⁹ Długosz (1883), p. 154; I. Minea, *Informații românești ale cronicii lui Jan Długosz* [The Romanian Data from Jan Długosz's Chronicle] (Iași 1926), p. 23, 33, Constantin Rezachevici, *Cronologia critică a domnilor din Țara Românească și Moldova (a.1324–1881)* [The Critic Chronology of Walachian and Moldavian Rulers (a.1324–1881)], I, *Secolele XIV–XVI* [14th–16th Centuries], Bucharest, 2001, p. 476–491.

¹⁰ *Documente moldovenești*, II, nos. 163–166, pp. 601–610; Virgil Ciociltan, *La Campagne Ottomane en Transylvanie (1438) dans le contexte politique international*, *RRH*, XV, 1976, 3, p. 438–442.

¹¹ *Documente moldovenești*, II, no. 192, p. 683; Nicolae Iorga, *Noi descoperiri privitoare la istoria românilor* [New Discoveries on the History of the Romanians], *AARSMI*, 3rd series, XIX, 1937, p. 194.

¹² E.g. *Codex*, II, no. 261, pp. 403–404; DRH, D, I, no. 180, p. 281; Ștefan Andreescu, *O icoană dispărută și un titlu domnesc* [A Vanished Icon and a Princely Title], *RI*, NS, XI (2000), 1–2, p. 101–103.

¹³ E.g. Paul W. Knoll, *Poland as Antemurale Christianitas in the latter Middle Ages*, *CHR*, LX, 1974, pp. 388–390; Pál Engel, *Magyarország és a török veszélye Zsigmond korában (1387–1437)* [Hungary and the Turkish Peril during the Age of Sigismund (1387–1437)], *Sz*, CXXVIII, 1994, 2, p. 281–284.

¹⁴ Namely: *Epistolae pontificiae*, I, no. 55, p. 49; *FHDR*, IV, no. XLIX, p. 313–313; Emilian Popescu, *Compléments et rectifications à l'histoire de l'église de Moldavie à la première moitié du XV^e siècle*, in Idem, *Christianitas Daco-Romana. Florilegium Studiorum*, Bucharest, 1994, p. 461–466.

metropolite to Rome in view, most likely, of, at least, a return of Moldavia to its former status (1370'–1380') of *Latin* duchy. Elias' gesture and Eugenius IV' acceptance of it were however too pro-Roman in order not to awake both *Catholic* and *Orthodox* discontent, even prior to the Florentine Council. Eventually, such, desperate, acts eased Elias's fall of 1442¹⁵.

I. Cetatea Albă and Genoa. The year of Elias' fall was marked by John Hunyadi's anti-Ottoman successes. For a Christendom more divided than ever, the victories of the 'Walachian newcomer' were both a gift and a challenge. Arisen from the ashes of an only partially concluded Hungarian civil war, Hunyadi became a hero, in particular after the *Long Campaign* (1443). Roman and Venetian diplomatic and propaganda structures came into full action. The crusader pressure grew immense. More than before, the rulers of Walachia and Moldavia had to choose a side¹⁶.

1. The Crusade and the Harbors. The Ottoman Empire called for peace. For personal financial and political gains, the offer was accepted. For 'Roman reasons', the peace of Szeged, favorable to *Christians*, was then broken (1444). Rome, Venice, Buda, Krakow and Byzantium too prepared to deal the final blow to the Ottoman Empire. Stephen II therefore drew closer to Hunyadi. Since 1442, Stephen was Moldavia's only ruler, after having dethroned and blinded his brother¹⁷.

Moldavian Options and Actions. Długosz was profoundly hostile to the Hunyadis. His resent turned into hatred after Wladislaw III died at Varna, death for which he blamed John Hunyadi. Yet, years later when we wrote on the events of the 1440', Długosz did not omit to mention that his Moldavian favorite, Stephen II, had taken John Hunyadi's side on the eve of the Varna campaign. As Moldavia was Poland's traditional vassal, in order to avoid the more effective Hungarian suzerainty, this acknowledgement from Długosz's part had far reaching implications¹⁸.

Already in 1441, after Wladislaw had been elected king of Hungary also (1440), John Hunyadi had asked and Wladislaw had accepted that, during his reigns as king of both Hungary and Poland, Moldavia should be only under Hungarian suzerainty. Not too long before his fall, Elias had allied himself with the grand-duke of Lithuania, Casimir (Kazimierz), Wladislaw's brother. Though Hungary was not listed as a common enemy of Elias and Casimir, their alliance was a direct challenge for Wladislaw and John Hunyadi (1442)¹⁹.

By Stephen II's victory over Elias, it could seem like Wladislaw had won control over Moldavia. Nevertheless, as far as we know, no Moldavian troops were present at Varna, though Moldavian mercenaries had been employed by Hunyadi during the *Long Campaign*. Most likely the Moldavian aid rendered to the 'crusader cause' took another

¹⁵ E.g. *Acta Eugenii PP IV (1431–1447)*, ed. Georgio Fedalto (Rome 1990), no. 421, pp. 229; Al. Simon, *În jurul Carpaților. Formele și realitățile genezei statale românești* [Around the Carpathians: The Forms and Realities of the Genesis of the Romanian States], Cluj-Napoca, 2002, pp. 414–419.

¹⁶ E.g. AAV, XVIII, no. 4807, pp. 22–23; no. 4925, pp. 129–134; F. Pall, *Ciriaco d'Ancona e la crociata contro i Turchi*, BSHAR, XX, 1938, p. 29–47; Emanuel C. Antoche, *La bataille de la rivière de Ialomița. Une victoire majeure de la chrétienté face aux armées ottomans*, NHB, IX, 1999, p. 61–88.

¹⁷ Domenico Caccamo, *Eugenio IV e la crociata di Varna*, ASRSP (Rome), LXXIX (1956), p. 35–87; M. Cazacu, *Les Ottomans sur le Bas-Danube au XV^e siècle. Quelques précisions*, SOF, XLI (1982), p. 27–41; Sorin Iftimi, *La politique de Jean Hunyadi en Moldavie*, in *Between Worlds*, II, p. 343–345.

¹⁸ E.g. Stefano Magno, *Annali veneti e del mondo [1443–1478]* (ÖNB, Codices, Cod. 6215–6217), I, *Ad annum 1443*, ff. 7'–8'; *Ad annum 1444*, ff. 21'–22', 24'–27'; Długosz (1883), p. 295; (1887), p. 1–2.

¹⁹ *Codex*, II, no. 261, p. 403; *Documente moldovenesti*, II, no. 206; p. 717; Bogdan-Petru Maleon, *Stephen the Great and John Hunyadi: Opinions of Historiography*, in *Between Worlds*, II, p. 354.

form, due to the direct connection established between Stephen II and Hunyadi. Moreover, in May 1444, Stephen, who, apparently, had not contested previously Hungarian suzerainty over Moldavia, had once more defeated Elias. With troops from Casimir, he had tried to regain the throne²⁰.

Moldavia was useful for the crusade, for Hunyadi, in particular, namely because of Chilia and Cetatea Albă. Hence probably the feudal and political formula of *the fortresses of the Hungarian* used for these (and maybe other) harbors by late Byzantine chronicles, by Italian and Ottoman sources, and also by Matthias Corvinus and Stephen III. In 1444, such facts and aims involved, first of all, the centrifuge Genoese colonial empire, to which the harbors had belonged and, in fact, perhaps still were a commercial and political part of it²¹.

Genoa, Stephen II and the Turk. Genoa and its almost independent colonies had a long pro-Ottoman history, in spite of her constant use of pro-Christian propaganda and also smaller gestures of goodwill towards the crusade. Since the 1380's, this had been a great problem for any crusader plan or endeavor. In 1444, the colonies of Chios, 'in front of' Byzantium, or Caffa, which controlled from the Crimea the Genoese of Cetatea Albă and Chilia, favored Murad II in particular²².

In the fall of 1444, the ships that brought Murad II's troops from Asia Minor to Europe, when nobody, except maybe Venice, expected it anymore, were provided by 'Genoese businessmen'. Given the number of vessels needed for such an operation, the action of the merchants must have been endorsed by the major local colonies and also by the metropolis. Wladislaw and Hunyadi had focused apparently only on the northern Genoese, leaving the southern ones in Venice's care, a division of attention turned into mistake²³.

Chilia and Cetatea Alba, in particular, were the only harbors, directly connected by land to the crusader troops, from where aid could be rendered, by sea, to Byzantium or to troops marching against the Ottomans in the Eastern Balkans. Over the last years, Stephen II had won more control over the harbors, diminishing the Genoese influence in the area. In the fall of 1444, a violent conflict irrupted between the ruler and the great Genoese families from the Black Sea area, causing great concern not only in Caffa, but in Genoa too, amongst the members of the council, who had to deal with the complains coming from the East²⁴.

[...] *Intellecta relatione scripta facta ab Egregio Officio Mercantie/ Comunis Ianue super concessione represaliarum petitarum ab Angelo Iustinio/ de Garibaldo contra Stephano Vaivodam. Decreverunt et ipsi Officio/ Romanie presenti et*

²⁰ E.g. Alexandru A. Vasilescu, *Urmașii lui Mircea cel Bătrân până la Vlad Țepeș (1418–1456), I. De la moartea lui Mircea cel Bătrân până la Vlad Dracul (1418–1456)* [Mircea the Old's Successors up to Vlad the Impaler. 1418–1456. I. From Mircea the Old's Death to Vlad Dracul], Bucharest, 1915, p. 42–49; Veniamin Ciobanu, *Țările Române și Polonia. Secolele XIV–XVI* [The Walachias and Poland. 14th–16th Centuries], Bucharest, 1985, p. 53; Minea, *Vlad Dracul*, p. 79; Grigoraș, *Relațiile Moldovei*, p. 39.

²¹ E.g. F. Pall, *Stăpânirea lui Iancu de Hunedoara asupra Chiliei și problema ajutorării Bizanțului* [Hunyadi's Rule over Chilia and the Question of Aiding Byzantium], *Studii*, XVIII, 1965, 3, p. 619–638; in these matters see also FHDR, IV, no. LXXII–5, 6, 7, pp. 560–562; no. LXXIII (*Manolis Sclavos*), p. 567; and Martin Rady, *The Medieval Hungarian and Other Frontiers*, SEER, LXXXI (2003), 4, p. 698–709.

²² For instance: ASG, A.S., *Diversorum*, 3034, nn (5th of June 1420); Kate Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade in Early Ottoman State. The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey*, Cambridge, 1999, p. 134–141.

²³ Klaus P. Matschke, *Italiener, Griechen und Türken im Umfeld des Kreuzzuges von 1444*, MN, III (1997), p. 159–177; Ș. Papacostea, *Gênes, Venise et la croisade de Varna*, BP, VIII, 1997, p. 27–37.

²⁴ ASG, A.S., *Diversorum*, [reg.] 38/533, c. 94^l (16th of October 1444; other data on the conflict of 1444 between Stephen II and the Genoese in *Acte*. III, p. 11, 16–21; on such editions from the archives of Genoa, see also the comments made by Gian Giacomo Musso, *Russia e Genovesi del Levante nel Quattrocento*, in Idem, *La cultura genovese nell'età dell'umanesimo*, Genoa, 1985, p. 197, note 17).

intelligenti domisereunt: ut totum ipsarum represaliarum/ processum inspiciat atque examinat; et sumptis instructionibus ad/ eam materiam pertinentibus referat que mueris eqonomom sibi/ pruidendum videatur petitioni dicti Angeli. Seque faciat mita dies octo proximos (16th of October 1444).

In a different context, the conflict could have been regarded as almost trivial. Similar, if not greater, conflicts took place during the reigns of Petru (Peter) III Aron and Stephen III *cel Mare* (the Great). Such disputes, more or less violent, were basically a part of 'everyday' relations between Suceava and the Genoese from the Black Sea area. In 1444, on the eve of the battle of Varna, such a conflict had however a quite different weight and implication²⁵.

2. *Pontic and Danubian Affairs*. Several conflicts between the Moldavian authorities and the Genoese (led from Caffa) involved the 'custody' / 'possession' over Cetatea Albă in the first place. Whether it was the case of the monk (*kalogeros*) that controlled, on behalf of the Moldavian crown, the city (1435) or whether it involved the entire *commune* of Cetatea Albă, regarded as one of the four great powers of the Black Sea region, the feuds were rather intense. The same applies for conflicts that were apparently of strictly personal nature, which were more frequent²⁶.

Aims and Commitment. The Genoese-Moldavian pontic conflicts were probably one of the main reasons for the 'entente' between Stephen II and Hunyadi. By gaining Hungarian support, Stephen hoped to strengthen his position in the Black Sea area, with clear domestic consequences, in the context of the forthcoming crusade. An 'entente' with Buda also allowed Suceava, due to the pontic necessities of a crusade, to 'settle' also some of the lasting conflicts between Moldavia and Hungary, such as the one over Chilia, the harbor at the Danube Mounds²⁷.

In return, Hungary could count on the military advantages offered by Stephen's harbors. After the 'rescue of Byzantium', Buda would have benefited from the trading advantages offered to the realm by the vassal state of Moldavia. Basically every Hungarian-Moldavian agreement of the 1400', only attempted or put into practice, from the time of Alexander I and Sigismund to the reigns of Stephen III and Matthias was based on these interests²⁸.

On the other hand, almost regardless of the specific context, these were rather risky diplomatic games that came also to Walachia's disadvantage. Walachia had always tried to regain full control over the Danube Mounds. In general, Walachia had benefited from Hungarian support in her attempts, while Poland supported Moldavia in this 'contest'. In 1444, though Vlad Dracul, very likely married to a sister of Stephen II, a fact which may have eased, in Buda's view, such new regional political deals, was amongst the crusaders at Varna, the Danubian political table seemed to have completely turned in Moldavia's favor²⁹.

²⁵ *Codice*, I, no. 120, p. 307; II-1, no. 658, p. 338; see also Șt. Andreescu, *Trois actes des Archives de Gênes concernant l'histoire de la Mer Noire au XV^e siècle*, RESEE, XXI, 1983, 1, p. 38-46.

²⁶ E.g. *Codice*, I, no. 377, p. 815; II-2, no. 1087, p. 103; Enrico Basso, *From Cooperation to Clash of Interests: Genoa and the Turks in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries*, in *The Turks, III, Ottomans*, edited by Hasan Celal Güzel, Ankara, 2002, p. 183-184; Cazacu, *Venise et la Moldavie*, p. 134-136.

²⁷ Andrei Pippidi, *Din nou despre inscripțiile de la Cetatea Albă* [Once again on the Inscriptions of Cetatea Albă], in *In honorem Paul Cernovodeanu*, ed. Violeta Barbu, Bucharest, 1998, p. 83-84; Șt. Andreescu, *Note asupra Cetății Albe* [Notes on Cetatea Albă], SMIM, XVIII, 2000, p. 73-75.

²⁸ See, for instance, Șerban Papacostea, *Aux débuts de l'état moldave. Considerations en marge d'une nouvelle source*, RRH, XII, 1973, 1, p. 148-150 (in particular); Al. Simon, *The Arms of the Cross: The Christian Policies of Stephen the Great and Matthias Corvinus*, in *Between Worlds*, I, p. 88-91.

²⁹ From 1438 on: *Codex*, I, no. 94, p. 88, no. 99, p. 104; no. 399, p. 839; Ferenc Szakály, *Phases of Turko-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of Mohács. 1365-1526*, AOASH, XXXIII, 1979, 1, p. 88-90.

Vlad II eventually fled the field at Varna and took Hunyadi prisoner when the voivode of Transylvania tried to escape to the Hungary. The political instability had been great also prior to Varna, despite great crusader hope and pressure. This called for caution. Stephen II's practical anti-Ottoman commitment was reduced to his Genoese conflict that, amongst others involved a family, Garibaldo, the future Garibaldi, known for its strong Ottoman ties³⁰.

Consequences and Circumstances. Stephen knew that his was not Wladislaw's first choice for the Moldavian throne. The young king, the son of Elias's wife's sister, would have much rather supported Elias who also had a (much) more pro-Roman background. The support given to Elias by Wladislaw's growingly rival brother Casimir had however diminished Wladislaw's reluctance towards Stephen. Besides, the latter very likely reached an agreement with Casimir too, after he defeated the grand-dukes troops in spring 1444. The Moldavian ruler proved to be a clever politician under difficult circumstances that paradoxically held also positive prospects³¹.

It is therefore not surprising that, even after the outcome of the battle of Varna, the conflict between Stephen II and Genoese around the Garibaldo family was never actually settled. Neither Genoa, nor Caffa took effective measures against the Moldavian ruler, who seems also not to have been affected by the crusader response of 1445. Involving both John Hunyadi and Vlad II the anti-Ottoman campaign was, in the long term, a fiasco. On short term, despite the legendary incertitude surrounding Wladislaw III's fate, Varna had apparently fortified Stephen II's regional position between the great powers of the time³².

The 1445 anti-Ottoman campaign along the line of the Lower Danube had a major Walachian backfire for Hunyadi. His minor successes could not compensate the general failure and the conflicts between him and his crusader partners. Distance between him and the rulers of Walachia, in particular, and Moldavia, dramatically grew over the next year³³.

Apparently, neither Hungary nor Poland was able to considerably influence Walachia and Moldavia. Casimir was elected king of Poland only in 1447. Hunyadi was appointed governor of Hungary, but had major domestic and foreign enemies. Byzantium was more than ever in crisis. Rome and Venice fought with their Italian problems. Though the victorious Murad II had abdicated in favor of his son Mehmed II, the Ottoman Empire was, for the time being, the only power able to significantly influence Moldavian and Walachian politics³⁴.

II. Suceava and Mitilene. One year after the battle, the allies of 1444 realized the actual magnitude of the defeat. This was namely the case of Venice and Byzantium, the powers least involved in the land operations of 1444. Venice thus re-focused on the defense of her Mediterranean dominium. John VIII, confronted with bitter conflicts within his family too, thought it best to reach, like his predecessors, an agreement with the Ottomans, now officially

³⁰ E.g. ASG, A.S., *Diversorum*, 3035, nn (6th of March 1444); Sandra Origone, *I mercanti e la crociata (Caffa Genovese, sec. XIV-XV)*, SG, V, 1987, p. 3–10; Geo Pistarino, *Dal declino del Mare di Levante tra cristiani ed islamici alla conquista del Mar Nero*, in Idem, *Genovesi d'Oriente*, Genoa 1990, p. 116–119.

³¹ In this respect: *Documente moldovenești*, II, no. 213, p. 727 (see Rezachevici, *Cronologia critică*, I, p. 492); P. Engel, *János Hunyadi and the Peace of Szeged (1444)*, *AOASH*, XLVII, 1994, p. 241–257.

³² E.g. *Acte*, III, pp. 16–21; *Notes*, III, p. 196; *Historia*, p. 15; Șt. Andreescu, *Moldavia's Pontic Policy: Stephen the Great and Ilce Castle*, MN, III, 1997–1998, pp. 179–180; Halecki, *Crusade*, pp. 71–73.

³³ For instance: *Magno*, I, *Ad annum 1445*, ff. 38^r–39^r, 40^r–41^r; *Codex*, I, Appendix, nos. 1–2, pp. 4–5, nos. 5–6, pp. 10–12; II, nos. 305–306, pp. 453–458; no. 308, pp. 459–469; *Długos*, 1887, pp. 2–4.

³⁴ E.g. F. Pall, *Intervenția lui Iancu de Hunedoara în Țara Românească și Moldova în anii 1447–1448* [John Hunyadi's Intervention in Walachia and Moldavia. 1447–1448], *Studii*, XVI, 1963, 5, pp. 1049–1072.

led by sultan Mehmed II. Many already regarded the city of Byzantium as doomed. 1453 proved them right³⁵.

1. *A Sultan's Return to the Throne.* The, at times, excessive efforts and over-stretched anti- but also pro-Ottoman plans, had led to a shrinking of the political distances between Moscow and Rhodes, for instance. After Varna, such developments came namely to the *Turk's* advantage. A skilful Ottoman propaganda and the *Christian* passing of blame for the disaster ensured this outcome. This came also under the effective form of *God's punishment* by the hands of the Ottomans³⁶.

Christian Rivalries and Conflicts. In 1446, the crusader crisis deepened and spread amongst its main promoters. The Papacy took its distance from the crusade, due to Rome's western problems and to the Byzantine failure of the Union of Florence. In Hungary, though Hunyadi became governor in June 1446, his means were in fact limited to increasing its domestic land power and could difficulty be used on the foreign level. Things did not look better elsewhere for the cross³⁷.

The king of the Romans and future emperor, Frederic III of Habsburg, the tutor of the very young Ladislas (László) V the Posthumous, Hungary's king by name only at that time, lacked the resources and the interest to fight Murad II. To the North-East, Casimir IV, not yet crowned king of Poland, had started setting the Polish-Lithuanian union on a pro-Ottoman course. This course of events had an immediate impact on Moldavia and Walachia³⁸.

Defended by cardinal Zbigniew Oleśnicki, his main Polish protector and still a major advocate of the Council of Basel, Stephen II had a greater political freedom to act. This freedom was increased by the deeds of Vlad II, eager to recover the Transylvanian duchies, Amlaş (Amlasch, Omlás), Făgăraş (Fogarasch, Fogaras), from under the control of Hunyadi. In face of a Kingdom of Hungary on the brink of collapse and with two sons' hostages of the Ottoman Empire, Vlad II took his distance from any anti-Ottoman plan of Hunyadi³⁹.

Vlad II's, as well as Stephen's, choice of the Ottoman side was a natural option under those circumstances. Murad II's decision to abdicate once more in favor of Mehmed II, after the victory of Varna, had not in fact diminished the power of the empire. It had led to an even greater impression of Ottoman power amongst the *Christian* states and rulers⁴⁰.

Ottoman Actions. Murad II's power was apparently at its peak. After Varna, he had retaken the liberty to abdicate in favor of his son (December 1444). Slowly, in the course of 1446, Murad II returned to the throne. The intrigues in Adrianople and Bursa, the anti-Ottoman actions of the future emperor Constantine XI Palaeologous that menaced the Ottoman

³⁵ *The Holy Wars of Sultan Murad Son of Sultan Mehmed Khan*, in *The Crusade of Varna*, pp. 41–106; Franz Babinger, Franz Dölger, *Mehmeds II. Frühester Staatsvertrag*, OCP, XV, 1949, pp. 225–258.

³⁶ E.g. M[y]lada], Paulová, *L'Empire byzantin et les Tchèques avant la chute de Constantinople*, BSL, XIV, 1953, pp. 158–225; H. Inalcik, *Byzantium and the Origins of the Crisis of 1444 under the Light of Turkish Sources*, ACIEB, XII, 1961 [1964], 2, pp. 159–163; Setton, *The Papacy*, II, pp. 105–106.

³⁷ E.g. *Epistolae pontificiae*, III, nos. 284–285, pp. 107–109; Joseph Held, *Hunyadi. Myth and Reality*, Boulder, 1985, pp. 92–95; M. Cazacu, *La péninsule balkanique au XV^e siècle*, CB, XI, 1987, pp. 12–15.

³⁸ E.g. *Długosz*, 1887, p. 7; *Thuróczy*, 1985, p. 267; *Bonfini*, 1936–1941, IV, pp. 244–249; Wiktor Weintraub, *Renaissance Poland and Antemurale Christianitatis*, HUS, III–IV, 1979–1980, 2, pp. 921–923.

³⁹ Paul Maria Baumgarten, *Die beiden ersten Kardinalskonsistorien des Gegenpapstes Felix V.*, RQ, XXII, 1908, 2, p. 154; I. Minea, *Din trecutul stăpânirii românești asupra Ardealului. Pierderea Amlaşului și Făgăraşului* [From the Past of the Romanian Rule over Transylvania: The Loss of Amlaş and Făgăraş], Bucharest, 1914, p. 43; Nicolae Stoicescu, *Vlad Ţepeş [Vlad the Impaler]*, Bucharest, 1976, p. 15–23.

⁴⁰ *Chalcocondil*, ed. 1958, p. 158; V. Ciociltan, *Poarta otomană și gurile Dunării în secolul al XV-lea* [The Ottoman Porte and the Danube Mounds in the 15th Century], RdI, XXXVIII, 1985, 11, p. 1061–1066.

interests in the area of the Peloponnesus, were the main causes of Murad II's return to official dignity⁴¹.

George (Đurađ) Branković's, Vlad II's or Stephen II's hostility towards Hunyadi also directed him towards the South. Byzantium was still a difficult target. Besides, the Byzantine weakness and the increase in power of the anti-unionist and pro-Ottoman party allowed Murad II to regard the situation on the Bosphorus as favorable. Prior to Hunyadi's election as governor of Hungary, he therefore chose to fortify his empire in the Eastern Mediterranean⁴².

The Genoese-Venetian rivalry, the common Italian conflict, the Byzantine civil strife were key factors for the success of his action, both in *Latin* and *Greek* possessions. Murad II subdued Mitilene (Lesbos), a key position between Byzantium and the Italian Peninsula. Nevertheless, as a Venetian intelligence report, which reached also Milan, points out, Murad's thoughts were directed towards Buda, Vienna (Wien, Bécs) and Moldavia. At about the same time an Ottoman attack on Genoese Colchis in Crimea took place, or was still in preparation⁴³.

[...] *De novo abbiamo asay et bone et optime nove per che par certo essere tuti isti reali, zoe Imperador [Frederic III] e Re/ d'Ungaria [Ladislas V] el brancho tuti uniti proposti de andar contra isto inimicho de Dio ch'el Turcho [here, both Murad II, and Mehmed II] e cusi/ el brancho haveva za pinciprado a la caxon. Araccordandone unammitear che se torbello none vene fra/ isti regali presto metera a isto neamigo de Dio. E de questo scrive certo el Santo Padre [Eugenius IV] na havuto lettere/ dal cardinale [Juan Carvajal] che se trovava li in Ungaria. Etiam anchora da lo Imperador et da Re e da Janus [John Hunyadi]; et per/ el file no venuto messo entra lettere de qui a la nostra Illustrissima Signoria, de che sa fato de solompente feste per questi acordi sequenti sopradicti.*

Come per altre Ve disse el Turcho [here Murad] ha impresona el Signor de Heno [Palamede Gattilusio de Aenos] messo el suo palazzo a fochol et levate tute le famiglie del tuto luogo.

Et anchora la fato quel medesimo del isola de Metelino [Mitilene-Lesbos] che la levato tute la famiglie et despochato tuto/ che romani deshabitato nel luogo che era grassissimo et utile. La figlia del Signor de Metelino [Dorino I Gattilusio] ha mandata a un Signor de Mondavia [Stephen II] che e de soto da la Valachia. In questo ato, el dicto Turcho ha fato/ coxa contro suo natural haver fato tanto ben che la mandata quella garzona; eparame da novo el non la/ metesse in el suo saraglio dove el tene tute le altre sue femene concubine.

⁴¹ Notes, III, p. 210–211 (the Ottoman-Venetian treaty of February 1446); K.M. Setton, *The Papacy and Levant (1204–1571)*, II, *The Fifteenth Century* (=MAPS, CXXVII), Philadelphia, 1978, p. 92–95.

⁴² For instance: Sima Ćirković, *La Serbie au Moyen Âge*, Vauban, 1992, p. 189–191; D.-I. Mureșan, *De l'intronisation du métropolitte Théoctiste I^{er} au sacre d'Etienne le Grand*, in Ștefan-Atlet, pp. 351–352.

⁴³ ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Ungheria*, cart. 650, fasc. 1, nn (28th of April 1446); *Spharantzes*, (1966), p. 66–70; *Chalcocondil* (1922–1927), II–1, p. 38; (1958), p. 158 (the attack on Colchis of 1446; in this respect, see also Setton, *The Papacy*, II, p. 161, note 3) it is worth noting that a real treaty (truce) was signed, through Juan Carvajal's offices, between John Hunyadi and Frederic III, Ladislas V's legal guardian, only a year later. In also perhaps worth noting, that on the 10th of August 1453, in Chios, a Lorenzo Gattilusio *olim de Porta* freed his Walachian slave Sophia (Ausilia Roccatagliata, *Notai genovesi in Oltremare. Atti rogati a Chio (1453–1454, 1470–1471)* (=CSFS, XXXV), Genoa, 1982, no. 56, p. 96).

Et non se sa miga anchora de fermo che l'abra spogliado tuta la isola de Metelino, ma dice aparachiva la sua/ hoste per andar a far sachomanzo de tuta quella isola; emetela in precipitio et preda [...] (Venice, 28th of April 1446).

Murad II tried to make the most out of his success, though not in all too 'conventional' manner. Confusion played its part. It seemed to largely mark Christian, but also, however to a lesser degree, Ottoman politics. The *Turkish* 'gift' bestowed upon Stephen II of Moldavia was probably Murad's most intriguing gesture in that context, not so much under political terms, but on the personal, private, level of the sultan. Stephen and, through him, his state of Moldavia, had a special place in Murad's circle of interest and, seemingly also, of trust⁴⁴.

2. *A 'Gift' and its Value.* The only 'diplomatic gift' of matrimonial use comparable, on a Walachian level, to that made by Murad II to Stephen II dates from 1513. Maximilian I of Habsburg sent a *bride*, unnamed in this case too, to Bogdan III. Even if we overlook the remark of the author of the report that such a gift, especially if it involved a *girl*, was not in the sultan's nature, the gift of 1446 is more significant than that of 1513, for it came from a Muslim and not a Christian monarch (plus, life in the harem was far from involving eternal slavery and damnation)⁴⁵.

Moldavian Circumstances. Prior to the end of the Romanian Middle Ages (1541), we do not know of a similar gift made by the sultan to a Moldavian or Walachian ruler. The only marriage that could be used for comparison on this level would be the one concluded between Radu III *cel Frumos* (the Handsome) of Walachia and Maria Despina, most likely a niece of Mara Branković, Murad II's wife. The marriage was concluded prior to 1462, when Radu III was enthroned by his patron Mehmed II, in Istanbul, where Radu lived as hostage and as the sultan's personal favorite⁴⁶.

The girl's fate and name remain unknown. Probably, she was supposed to become lady of Moldavia. The delicate foreign and domestic (Moldavian) context worked in favor of such a marriage. Stephen was referred to as *un signor de Mondavia*, due to his long joint-rule with Elias and his efforts to find an associate ruler within his family (probably because he had no direct male heir). Disputes divided the *Greek* world, caught more than ever between Rome and Adrianople. Besides, the 'bride' had been sent to Suceava by sultan Murad II himself⁴⁷.

At that time, Stephen II had a wife from the *Limbădulce* clan. Whether he was to divorce his wife or one of his brothers still loyal to him was to marry the *girl*, the 'Ottoman gift' had to reinforce Stephen and his family's position. What actually happened is a mystery. If we give credit to some of the contradictory sources on Mehmed II's Moldavian campaign of 1476,

⁴⁴ Murad's 'Greek methods': Spharantzes, 1966, p. 60; Dumitru Năstase, *Le Mont Athos et l'Orient chrétien et musulman au Moyen Age*, *RRH*, XXXII (1993), 3–4, pp. 316–317; Inalcik, *Byzantium*, p. 162.

⁴⁵ HHStA, R.H.K., *Maximiliana*, fasc. 23a–1, f. 133' (27th of August); Nicolas Vatin, Gilles Veinstein, *Le Sérail ébranlé. Essai sur les morts, dépositions et événements des sultans ottomans, XIV^e-XIX^e siècle*, Paris, 2003; Mihailo Popović, *Mara Branković-Leben und Wirken einer Frau an der kulturellen Schnittstelle zwischen Serben, Byzantinern und Osmanen*, PhD Thesis, Vienna, 2005; for the gift of August 1513: Al. Simon, "Fata de la nemți". Maximilian I de Habsburg, Bogdan III și o căsătorie din 1513 [The German Girl: Maximilian I of Habsburg, Bogdan III and a Marriage of 1513], *AȘD*, II, 2006, p. 108–109.

⁴⁶ E.g. Șt. Andreescu, Șt.S. Gorovei, *Alianțe dinastice ale domniilor Țării Românești <respectively> Moldovei (secolele XIV-XVI)* [The Dynastic Alliances of the Walachian Rulers (14th–16th Centuries)], *RIU*, II, 1987, 1, p. 679–680, 695–696 (also Șt. S. Gorovei comments, in *AIIAI*, XXIII², 1986, p. 1017).

⁴⁷ ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze Estere, Ungheria*, cart. 650, fasc. 1, nn (28th of April 1446); for further data, see Al. Simon, *Porturile Moldovei. Ștefan II, Iancu de Hunedoara și Murad II în documente italiene* [The Moldavian Harbors: Stephen II, John Hunyadi and Murad II in Italian Documents], *AȘUI*, NS, LII, 2006.

we could well image that Alexander, Stephen II's son brought by the sultan with him to become ruler of Moldavia, was the son of Stephen II and the girl from the important Gattilusio family⁴⁸.

The key to the purpose of the gift has remained with Murad II. We do not know of family ties between the House of Bogdan and the Genoese family Gattilusio, with its Aegean center of power on Lesbos. In return, the Gattilusi were connected by politics and marriage to the Doria (D'Auria) family, which had played an important part in Moldavian affairs. In this context, we could assume that the girl had been sent to Stephen as a political and financial argument in his Genoese conflicts. Given the political circumstances and the Byzantine family ties of the Gattilusi, this possibility should however be viewed as a collateral effect of the sultan's gift⁴⁹.

Aegean and Byzantine Connections. The mercenary Francesco I Gattilusio had received Lesbos and the title of *archontes* from John VI Palaeologus, as his wife's (Mary, John's sister) bride's gift (1355). When his brother, Niccolo, which had become master of the city Aenos, at the Maritza Mounds, the city went over to Francesco's grandson, Palamede, son of Jacopo (Francesco II) and of a unknown Byzantine princess (1409). Palamede's sisters, Eugenia and Helena, were wed to John VII Palaeologus (around the year 1397) and Stephen (Stepan) Lazarević (1405)⁵⁰.

In general the marriages of the Gattilusi women were more prestigious than those of the men, usually married to Genoese patricians or Aegean Latin rulers. Married to Orietta Doria, Dorino I, Eugenia's and Helena's brother, married his daughters Catherina (†1442) and Mary to Constantine XI, then despot of Morea (1441) and Alexander Great Comnen, emperor of Trebisonda (1417–1429). Dorino received from Constantine's father, John VIII, prior to his death (1448) Lemnos and Thasos. However, in 1456, because of Venetians, Ottomans and Hospitallers, out of their seven Aegean possessions, the Gattilusi still held only Lesbos⁵¹.

Their rule over Lesbos ended in 1462, when the island was conquered by Mehmed II, against whom the Gattilusi had refused to rebel (e.g. in 1456), even after he had taken their lands and increased their tribute (for this, they were punished by the Hospitaller Knights). In 1446, Murad II's action had been a display of power. After 1444, when due to Byzantine pressures, the Gattilusi had agreed to support the crusade, the family had not taken anti-Ottoman stands. Nevertheless, by their political and family ties, especially to Constantine who openly challenged the *Turk*, the Gattilusi were a potential problem for the sultan⁵².

⁴⁸ E.g. DRH, A, I, no. 262, p. 372; no. 272, p. 386, *Historia*, p. 15; Damian P. Bogdan, *Pomelnicul mănăstirii Bistrița* [The Dyptic of the Bistrița Monastery], Bucharest, 1941, p. 50, 86; Șt. S. Gorovei, *Mușatinii*, Bucharest, 1976, p. 51–53; Rezachevici, *Cronologia critică*, p. 481–484, 497–502.

⁴⁹ In these matters, see also Peter Schreiner, *Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken. II. Historischer Kommentar*, Vienna 1977, pp. 421–422; H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1329–1451*, in *Crusades*, VI, pp. 258–259; Al. Simon, *October 1444–April 1455: Two Moments in the Relation between John Hunyadi and Genoa*, in *Between Worlds*, II, p. 384; Setton, *The Papacy*, II, pp. 161, 188.

⁵⁰ For instance: Phillip P. Argenti, *The Occupation of Chios by the Genoese*, I, Cambridge, 1958, p. 332–334; Anthony Luttrell, *John V's Daughters: A Palaiologan Puzzle*, *DOP*, XL, 1986, p. 103–112; Thierry Ganchou, *Valentina Doria, épouse de Francesco II Gattilusio, seigneur de l'Île de Mytilène (1384–1403), et sa parenté. Le Lesbian Puzzle résolu*, *NRS*, LXXXVI, 2004, 3, p. 619–686.

⁵¹ E.g. Ducas, *Historia Turco-Graecica: 1341–1462*, edited by Vasile Grecu, Bucharest, 1958, p. 26–29, 345–346; John B. Bury, *The Lombards and Venetians in Euboea (1340–1470)* (II), *JHS*, IX, 1888, p. 91–117; William Miller, *The Gattilusi of Lesbos*, in Idem, *Essays on the Latin Orient*, Cambridge, 1921, p. 340–349; Pio Paschini, *La flotta di Callisto III, ASRSP*, LIII–LV, 1930–1932, p. 215–220.

⁵² In these matters, see also R. Valentini, *L'Egeo dopo la caduta di Constantinopoli nelle relazioni dei gran maestri di Rodi*, *BISME*, LI, 1936, p. 137–168 (in particular, p. 142–145, and the Appendix, no. 4, p. 166–167); Halecki, *The Crusade of Varna*, p. 92–93; Pall, *Ciriaco d'Ancona*, p. 44–46.

Lesbos was plundered and a great number of inhabitants were deported. Still, Dorino I remained the tribute-paying ruler of the island. In return, he lost the Northern Sporades to Venice, now the sultan's ally. The sending of Dorino's daughter, whose name is missing from the known genealogies of the family, to Moldavia, reveals, under the circumstances, the Ottoman trust enjoyed by Stephen II. Naturally, though he was very valuable to the sultan on the Hungarian and Polish levels namely, for Murad Stephen was only a subject, a protégé⁵³.

III. Moldavia and the Cross. Both the attack on Lesbos and sending of the Gattilusio girl to Moldavia were part of the scenario of Murad II's return to the throne. The scenario culminated with the attack on the Corinthian *Hexamilion* in December 1446. The crusade seemed near its end as the new pope Nicholas V was more concerned by the fact that, profiting from the post-Florentine climate, *Latins* went over to the *Greeks*, contrary to the provisions of the union itself, than by the Ottoman power. And it was not just the pope who had others matters of concern⁵⁴.

1. The End of a Rule. Two months after Murad's Aegean actions, Hunyadi became governor of Hungary, but had to acknowledge young Ladislas V as lawful king. For his personal interests that closely connected anti-Ottoman aims and domestic targets, the situation was not too auspicious. Hunyadi was compelled on, one hand to gather his forces and, on the other hand, he had to act quickly, before it was too late, both on Hungarian soil and in the neighboring areas⁵⁵.

Ottoman 'Buffer States'. Both North and South of the Danube, Hunyadi has basically no political figure on which he could rely on. Skanderbeg was too far away. Vlad II and Stephen II, the rulers of Walachia and Moldavia, could not be moved anymore, by diplomacy and menaces, from their pro-Ottoman stands. Vlad II, whose sons, Radu (III) and Vlad (III), were the hostages of Murad II, and Stephen II had turned their lands into *Christian* bulwarks of the Ottoman Empire⁵⁶.

Because of the harbors and of his good connections in the Byzantine World, namely in the anti-Latin camp, due to the circumstances, Stephen II was more valuable to the sultan than Vlad II. Moreover, Stephen had never taken an open anti-Ottoman stand, while the ruler of Walachia, now loyal to Murad, had previously taken the field against him. Other than Vlad, raised a knight of the Dragon Order by Sigismund of Luxemburg, Stephen had confided, had been compelled to confide in the *Turk* since the beginnings of his rule⁵⁷.

Otherwise, Murad II would not have sent the daughter of Dorino I to an Orthodox ruler that could have taken Constantine's side, Dorino's former son-in-law, a supporter of the crusade. Besides, the Moldavian context gave the sultan supplementary reassurances. In April 1445, Stephen II's brother and associate-ruler, Peter II, aided by John Hunyadi, had

⁵³ E.g. ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, *Ungheria*, cart. 650, fasc. 1, nn (28th of April 1446); ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 20, c. 29^v (16th of August 1454; cf. Setton, *The Papacy*, II, p. 141), *Ducas*, 1958, p. 395, 423; Denis A. Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec de Morée*, I, *Histoire politique*, Paris, 1932, p. 228–231.

⁵⁴ Raynaldus (1693), XVIII, 1448, no. 10, p. 359 (cf. Setton, *The Papacy*, II, p. 104); Donald M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations*, Cambridge, 1988, p. 381–407.

⁵⁵ Lajos Elekes, *Hunyadi*, Budapest, 1952, p. 390; F. Pall, *Byzance à la veille de sa chute et Janco de Hunedoara (Hunyadi)*, BSL, XIX, 1969, I, p. 123–125; M. Cazacu, Petre Ș. Năsturel, *Une démonstration navale des Turcs devant Constantinople et la bataille de Chilia (1448)*, JdS, [CCXCIII], 1978, p. 197–210.

⁵⁶ E.g. *Ducas* (1958), p. 292–293; F. Pall, *Skanderbeg et Janco de Hunedoara*, SA, VI, 1968, I, p. 103–117; Constantin A. Stoide, *Basarab al II-lea (1442–1444)*, AIIA, XVII, 1980, p. 296–300.

⁵⁷ *Długosz* (1883), p. 154; I. Minea, *Principatele române și politica orientală a împăratului Sigismund* [The Romanian Principalities and Emperor Sigismund's Oriental Policy], Bucharest, 1915, p. 221–224.

rebelled against his brother. As Stephen had defeated Peter in battle, Murad's gift could have been regarded both as a prize and as token of trust meant to improve Stephen II's position. Stephen II lost his throne a year later. The gift may have backfired on the sultan⁵⁸.

Murad seemed rather sure of his European position (late 1446-early 1447). He turned to the pressing matters of Asia Minor, to the threat posed by Timur Lenk's son, Shah-Rukh, too. Crusader diplomacy seemed to have been more successful here than in Europe. It proved to be the break governor Hunyadi needed to intervene, at least, in Walachia and Moldavia⁵⁹.

Moldavian Campaigns and Contenders. Hunyadi planned to put Alphonse (Alfonso) V of Aragon, king of Naples, on the throne in Buda. He had promised Alphonse V also the support of 10000 Walachians. Hunyadi thus needed a ruler loyal to him at least in Walachia. With Alphonse V on the throne and the aid of Skanderbeg, he wanted to come to Byzantium's aid. For this, he had to replace also Stephen II as ruler of Moldavia. Hunyadi therefore focused on Walachia and Moldavia⁶⁰.

Less, seemingly, because of a structural opposition towards Church Union and Rome and more, apparently, due to the necessities of political survival that called for pro-Ottoman stands, Stephen had become a major obstacle for the crusade and for another of Hunyadi's *grand designs*. Stephen II prepared for an attack from the West. The fatal blow came from the North, from Poland, where his ally Casimir IV was crowned king in late June 1447⁶¹.

Elias' son, Roman II, was quicker than the governor of Hungary. With Polish aid, he caught and beheaded Stephen in mid July 1447. Over the following months, neither through Csopor of Monoszló, vice-voivode of Transylvania, nor through Peter II, Hunyadi managed to gain actual control over Moldavia. Still, he obtained from Peter II the cession of the Chilia harbor, placed under joint Hungarian-Walachian 'control' (until late 1464/ early 1465) where John Hunyadi installed his own garrison. This largely compensated his Moldavia failures⁶².

What happened to the girl from Mitilene during these events remains unknown. Maybe she succeeded in returning to her island or in escaping to the Ottoman Empire. The latter would have been her most likely destination and shelter in case she would have had a son with Stephen II, a son that was to become a contender to the Moldavian throne in 1476⁶³.

2. *Byzantium, the Turk and the Papacy.* Stephen II's body was taken by the monks of the Neamț monastery and buried in their church. During his rule, he had endowed and protected the monastery grown into a staunch center of Orthodoxy. This feature was preserved even half a century later, when a Catholic bishop of Moldavia was murdered on the lands of the monastery. Until 1467–1468, if not 1473, the Neamț County, largely in the hands of the

⁵⁸ Hurmuzaki, XV–I, no. 58, p. 32; *Documente moldovenesti*, II, no. 212, p. 724; Sphrantzes, 1966, p. 68–70; L. Șimanschi, N. Ciocan, *Acte slavone inedite, din anii 1443–1447, privind istoria Moldovei* [Unedited Slavonic Documents regarding the History of Moldavia. 1443–1447], *AIIAI*, XI, 1974, p. 181–184.

⁵⁹ E.g. *Historia*, p. 16–17; D.M. Nicol, *The Immortal Emperor: The Life and Legend of Constantine Palaiologos, Emperor of the Romans*, Oxford, 1992, p. 85–86; Inalcik, *The Ottoman Turks*, p. 264.

⁶⁰ See also Lajos Thallóczy, Samu Barabás, *A Frangepán Család Oklévéltára. Codex diplomaticus comitum de Frangepanibus*, I, 1133–1453 (= MHH, I, 35), Budapest, 1910, no. 344, p. 350; Constantin Marinescu, *La politique orientale d'Alfonso V d'Aragon, roi de Naples*, Barcelona, 1994, p. 149–154.

⁶¹ F. Pall, *De nouveau sur l'action de lancu de Hunedoara en Valachie pendant l'année 1447*, *RRH*, XV, 1976, 3, p. 458–459; Idem, *Intervenția*, p. 1061–1063; Rezachevici, *Cronologia critică*, I, p. 494.

⁶² See also *Documente moldovenesti*, II, no. 231, p. 787; DRH, D, I, no. 293; p. 402; *Đugosz*, 1887, p. 509–510; Pall, *Stăpânirea*, p. 620–637; Rezachevici, *Cronologia critică*, p. 500–501, 509–510.

⁶³ In this respect, see *Codex*, III, no. 258, p. 281 *Đugosz*, 1887, p. 644–645; Al. Simon, "Quello ch'e apresso el Turcho". *About A Son of Stephen the Great*, *AIRCRU*, VI–VII, 2004–2005, p. 156–157.

monastery, paid all by itself Moldavia's tribute to the Porte. Moldavia's troubles and options gathered at Stephen II's tomb⁶⁴.

Questions of Survival. When Byzantium fell, except for Roman, the other three Walachian metropolitan seats were under the control of the pro-unionist and pro-Hungarian camp. In return, none of the rulers of Moldavia and Walachia, in particular, were openly supporting the crusade. The Ot toman attack on Cetatea Albă, shortly after the fall of Byzantium, brought the downfall of the Moldavian pro-unionist party, forced to seek refuge in Hungary and in conciliarist Poland⁶⁵.

After 1435–1436, no ruler, who failed to keep a political balance in favor of the anti-Latin and pro-Ottoman parties, retained his crown for too long. Compromises, such as those attempted by Vlad II, who sided actively with Hunyadi and Murad, almost equaled a death-sentence. Plus, few Latin power figures could have offered aid to a Greek crusader. Several Latin rulers and politicians opposed the crusade or at least despised the Greek schismatics⁶⁶.

Rome had little chances in gaining control over the Walachian areas. The papacy could not rely also on Hungary and Poland, but for different reasons. In comparison, the Byzantine means, seemingly more reduced, were in fact more effective, at least on the churchly level. Still, they failed to bring lasting results. As long as Byzantium allied itself with the Latins, the fate of its policies was basically the same as that of Greek rite rulers who 'took' the cross⁶⁷.

The question of how far Frederic III was willing to go in Turkish matters, in order to assure the Hungarian rule of the Habsburgs, especially after 1445, might be worth while. Most of the few preserved sources on the matter speak of Habsburg crusader foul-play. One peculiar charge could thus be of interest. In early 1447, Hunyadi prepared his attack on Moldavia and Walachia. He was accused of raiding the Habsburg lands, with Ottoman and Walachian aid. Due to the context the charge was absurd. After 1449, it became less and less absurd⁶⁸.

Domestic and Foreign Affairs. Neither Byzantium, nor the West, proved to be a safe option for an Orthodox ruler, Athos thus grew in importance. Defender of tradition, promoter of the hesychast renovation, Athos, not too homogenous, due to the regional protectors of the monasteries, stood under Ottoman protection, namely since 1424. It had also revealed its capacity of dealing with Latin lords, such as king Alphons V of Aragon). Prior to Stephen II, Moldavia, though a Greek rite state, had little ties to Athos. He took over the protection of Zographu, previously under Walachian patronage (1442). Hunyadi had just attacked the Turk and changed the rulers of Walachia⁶⁹.

Although Sigismund had argued differently, in order to push through the provisions of Lublau, in the 1420's, Moldavia had endorsed Constantinople's pro-unionist policy. After making use of Elias' too pro-Roman actions, Stephen took his distance from Byzantine imperial

⁶⁴ See also DIR, A, *Veac XVI*, I, no. 169, p. 191; P.P. Panaitescu, *Contribuții la istoria lui Ștefan cel Mare* [Contributions to the History of Stephen the Great], AARMSI, 3rd series, XV, 1933–1934, p. 63–64.

⁶⁵ E.g. *Acten der Ständetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens*, edited by Martin Toeppen, III, *Januar 1447-Juli 1453*, no. 91, p. 242–243, Leipzig, 1882; IV, *August 1453-September 1457*, 1884, no. 17, pp. 30–31; Piccolomini, II, no. 135, p. 243; no. 165, p. 294; no. 186, p. 365; no. 291, p. 562.

⁶⁶ E.g. Radu Constantinescu, *Quelques observations sur l'époque de Vlad Țepeș. II. Vladislav II et sa politique transylvaine (1450–1456)*, RRH, XVII, 1978, p. 313–326; Minea, *Vlad Dracul*, p. 159–163.

⁶⁷ E.g. *Epistolae pontificiae*, III, no. 295, p. 121 (1448); D.-I. Mureșan, *Le royaume de Hongrie et la prise de Constantinople: Croisade et union ecclésiastique en 1453*, in *Between Worlds*, II, p. 365–371.

⁶⁸ For instance: Magno, I, *Ad annum 1447*, f. 70^{rv}; *Regesta*, no. 2232, p. 226 (30th of January 1447); in these matters, see also Thuróczy, 1985, pp. 202–204; Bonfini, 1936–1941, IV, pp. 238–241.

⁶⁹ DRH, A, I, nos. 61, 221, pp. 89, 312; B, I, no. 135, p. 194. Anscari Mundó, *Alphonse V d'Aragon et le Mont Athos*, in *Le millénaire du Mont Athos 963–1963. Études et mélanges*, I, Chevetogne, 1963, p. 150.

and patriarchal official stands, in particular by supporting Murad. On the Byzantine level, he was probably one of the supporters of Demetrios, Constantine's rival brother, loyal to Murad⁷⁰.

After 1444–1445, except for the *Turk*, no power could have endangered Stephen's rule. His fall was first of all the result of a domestic conflict. It was no accident that the main anti-*Latin* propaganda works in Moldavia were related to the events during Stephen's rule. The main challenges to the Moldavian supremacy of the anti-*Latin* factions came after 1447, respectively 1473. The weaknesses on both sides made the clashes even more violent⁷¹.

After her control over Walachia had become very relative, due also to Walachian and Hungarian civil strifes, the chances of the Hungarian realm, rather small from the start, to control Moldavia significantly decreased, in spite of John Hunyadi's efforts, during the 1440' and 1450'. Greek double-dealings could not compensate for it. The Byzantine quarrels made the idea of a *Latin* 'alliance' more than questionable not only in the City of Constantine, but also in the remaining parts of the *Byzantine Commonwealth* that were under direct Ottoman threat⁷².

The Times of a Ruler. Almost regardless of the events of 1447–1448 and of Bogdan II's years of rule (1449–1451), Stephen II's reign had one major crusading effect. It separated Moldavia from the crusader movement until the early 1470' and placed it in the pro-Ottoman camp even before Moldavia officially started paying tribute to the Porte (1453–1456). At least on the domestic level, Stephen III's attempts to take active anti-Ottoman stands in his first decade of rule (1457–1473) were hindered by the 'Moldavian legacy' of the 1430' and, namely, 1440'⁷³.

Lords and Protectors. The Moldavian rulers, almost regardless of their supporting party and origin, seem to have tried to avoid, as much as possible, John Hunyadi's 'protection'. The only relatively clear exception from this 'rule' was Bogdan II, the father of the future Stephen III the Great. The same largely applies, further to the South, for the rulers of Walachia and for the Balkan rulers, Serbian, Bosnian or Albanian, with the relative (distant) exception of Skanderbeg⁷⁴.

By frequency, chronology and provisions, Moldavian-Polish deals were more than just the result of the need to keep a balance between Hungary and Poland, kingdoms where the real power was held by the barons. In fact, it was rather natural for the magnate and actual ruler of Podolia, Di(e)dri(c)h Buczacki to have a greater influence over Suceava than Hunyadi. It was not only a question of geography or of political and private tradition of the Moldavian elite⁷⁵.

⁷⁰ D.-I. Mureșan, *Le Patriarcat œcuménique et les Principautés roumaines. Droit nomo-canonique et idéologie politique (XIV^e-XVI^e siècles)*, PhD Thesis, Paris, 2005, p. 361–363; Ș. Papacostea, *Un humaniste Italien au service de Byzance en Europe Centrale au XV^e siècle*, EBPB, V, 2006, p. 365–375.

⁷¹ E.g. *Codex*, II, Appendix, nos. 11–12, pp. 479–480; *Hurmuzaki*, VIII, no. 20, p. 15; *Cronica moldo-rusă* [The Moldo-Russian Chronicle], in *Cronicile*, p. 158–159; Mureșan, *Le royaume*, p. 369–370.

⁷² E.g. Michel Cacouros, *Un patriarche à Rome, un katholikos didaskalos au Patriarcat et deux donations trop tardives de reliques du seigneur: Grégoire III Mamas et Georges Scholarios, le synode et la synaxis*, in *Byzantium, State and Society: In Memory of Nikos Oikonomides*, eds. Anna Avramea, Angeliki Lailou, Evangelos Chrysos, Athens, 2003, p. 71–124; Pall, *Byzance*, p. 119–122.

⁷³ For instance: *Magno*, I, *Ad Annum* 1448, ff. 109^v–112^v; *An Annum* 1451, ff. 165^v–167^f, 169^v–171^f; Al. Simon, *Giovanni Hunyadi da Kossovpolje a Belgrado (1448–1456)*, in *La Tarda Crociata e il Mar Nero* (= *MHG*, NS, II, 1), eds. Ovidiu Cristea, Iulian-Mihai Damian, Al. Simon (Cluj-Napoca 2008).

⁷⁴ See in these matters: M. Cazacu, *Du nouveau sur le rôle international de la Moldavie dans la seconde moitié du XV^e siècle*, RER, XVI, 1981, pp. 36–37; Pall, *Intervenția*, p. 1061–1064; as well as Jan Krajcar, *Simion of Suzdal's Account of the Council of Florence*, OCP, XXXIX (1973), p. 103–130.

⁷⁵ For instance: Ilona Czamańska, *Moldavia i Wołoszczyzna wobec Polski, Weigieri Turki w XIV i XV wieku* [Between Poles, Hungarians and Turks: Moldavia and Walachia in the 14th and 15th Centuries], Poznań, 1996, p. 86–87, 95–101, 361–369 (abstract); Rezachevici, *Cronologia critică*, p. 476–534.

On one hand, Hunyadi led an active crusader and pro-union policy in an environment where both concepts caused great resentment, amongst the *Greeks* and the *Latins*. On the other, due to civil strife, the role of the Moldavian Church had increased. The rulers as well as the local magnates increased their churchly, monastic donations to a level not known before in Moldavia. As the hierarchy of the Moldavian Church had reluctantly signed the union, it was natural, both prior and after Varna, for politicians to make use of such feelings and beliefs⁷⁶.

Church and Politics. The number of Hussites sheltered in Moldavia had grown under Stephen II's rule. This displeased Rome for it increased the risks presented by Moldavia's official rejection of the Union of Florence (1445). Her metropolite, Damian, had signed the charter of union (1439), nevertheless, on behalf of Elias, not Stephen, but had sided with the anti-unionists (1443–1445). Damian had to be replaced as metropolite in order to enforce the union in Moldavia⁷⁷.

John VIII Palaeologus, John Hunyadi's ally and a supporter of the union, postponed the nomination of Joachim as the new metropolite of Moldavia until November of 1447. Then four months had passed since Stephen II's death and Hunyadi's troops were ready to enter Moldavia. Moldavia's relations to the Ecumenical Patriarchate were restored. Still, Joachim's Moldavian career was short. After the fall of Constantinople (1453), he was chased away. Theoctiste I took his seat as metropolite for a quarter of a century. Moldavia's relations to the patriarchate were restored, but now the patriarchate was under the control of the sultan⁷⁸.

As a loyal and respected vassal of Murad II, Stephen II could not favor Church union. Church union was one of the greatest fears of the Ottoman Empire since the days of Murad I and Bayezid I. The political context enforced the altogether natural resentments caused by the Florentine union in large areas of the Byzantine Commonwealth, namely on the ecclesiastical and monastical levels. Regardless of what Stephen II's own beliefs were (for instance, after the union was concluded, he seemingly tried to gain emperor John VIII's goodwill in 1440), the context selected his options and cleared up his political path until his death of 1447⁷⁹.

Since 1433–1436, between the *Türk* and the Polish oligarchs, he had proven his ability to speculate on the opportunities presented to him. Though on a foreign political level (at least between 1436–1438/1439), in spite of the domestic division of power, Elias I was Moldavia's only legitimate ruler, though, for political and commercial reasons, Stephen II, like Byzantium, was connected to the Venetians (1435/1436–1437), much more intolerant than the Genoese towards the *Greeks*, he obtained patriarch Joseph's and emperor John VIII's approval of the 'creation' of the metropolity of Roman (1436). It was one of Stephen's greatest successes⁸⁰.

⁷⁶ E.g. DRH, A, I, *passim* (for an analysis: Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, p. 522–527); *Les "Mémoires" du Grand Ecclesiarque de l'Eglise de Constantinople Sylvestre Syropoulos sur le Concile de Florence (1438–1439)* (= CF, II, 9), édité par Vitalien Laurent, Rome, 1971, p. 448, 450.

⁷⁷ *Acta Bosnae potissimum ecclesiastica cum insertis editorum documentorum regestis ab anno 925 usque ad annum 1752* (=MSM, XXIII), ed. Eusebius Fermendžin, Zagreb, 1892, no. 789, p. 176; no. 803, p. 179; no. 835, p. 191; D.-I. Mureșan, *Notes sur une histoire parallèle de l'Église de Moldavie au XV^e siècle*, in *Between Worlds*, II, p. 124–127 (see here FHDR, IV, no. XLIX–3, p. 315).

⁷⁸ E.g. Michel Lascaris, *Joachim, métropolite de Moldavie et les relations de l'Église moldave avec le patriarcat de Pec et l'archevêché d'Achris au XV^e siècle*, BSHAR, XIII, 1927, p. 129–134; Jean Darrouzès, *Ekthesis Nea. Un manuel des pittakia byzantin du XIV^e siècle*, REB, XXVII, 1969, p. 46.

⁷⁹ Ragusa, nos. 165–167, pp. 247–250; Notes, IV, no. 17, p. 25; Anton Kern, *Der Libellus de notitia Orbis Johannes III (de Galonifontibus?) O.P. Erzbischofs von Sultanieh*, AFP, VIII, 1938, p. 100–101.

⁸⁰ E.g. Notes, IV, no. 22, p. 33; P.Ș. Năsturel, *Un témoignage byzantin sur la métropole de Roman (Moldavie)*, RER, XV, 1975, p. 200; Zacharias Tsirpanlis, *Il decreto fiorentino di Unione e sua applicazione nell' Arcipelago Greco. Il caso di Creta e di Rodi*, in *Thesaurismata*, XXI, 1991, p. 43–88; Claudine Delacroix-Besnier, *Les Dominicains et la Chrétienté grecque aux XIV^e et XV^e siècles*, Rome, 1997, p. 407.

Survival and Impact. For 14 years, Stephen II began and ended his reigns alongside the *Turk*. Except for the years of Hunyadi's great glory (1441/1442–1444), when he, with his own agenda, cautiously approached Hunyadi, there is no evidence to show that Stephen officially renounced his Ottoman ties. The ties grew stronger after Varna as Murad II's gift of 1446 best proves it⁸¹.

Stephen II's actions and options, known mostly by indirect means, may be viewed, even from an Orthodox point of view, as a betrayal of the common Christian cause. Nevertheless, they allowed to him rule (all his reigns added together) more than any other Walachian or Moldavian ruler between 1418/1432–1457. Like Bosnian or Serbian rulers, Stephen II was a political survivor. This too came at the price, that of a deep Moldavian domestic division⁸².

The conflict between Alexander I's sons, Elias and Stephen, brought great division, in terms of administration and belief, to the already divided state. Stephen III tried to bridge the division that was as well between North and South as between East and West. A century after the events of the 1430'–1440', Stephen III's illegitimate son and successor, Peter IV Rareș attempted also a symbolical reconciliation. He baptized his sons and heirs Elias and Stephen. The 'result' was a catastrophe, due to namely Peter IV's policies. Elias abdicated and converted to Islam. Stephen took his place as ruler and began killing the non-Orthodox⁸³.

In November 1497, Stephen III went to the Neamț Monastery for the inauguration ceremony of the new church. The ceremony had been postponed because of recent Moldavian events. With probably Venetian money given to him for other purposes (anti-Ottoman ones namely) than the ones for which he had used them, he had rebuilt the monastery's church. The new church had a burial chamber for one person: Stephen II. With Habsburg support, as well as with Ottoman aid, Stephen III had just overcome the most important Polish-Hungarian military and diplomatic attempt to dethrone him, all in the name of the holy crusade⁸⁴.

⁸¹ E.g. ASM, A.D.S., *Potenze Estere, Ungheria*, cart. 650, fasc. 1, nn (28th of April 1446); Minea, *Vlad Dracul*, p. 79; Mureșan, *Prima etapă*, p. 51–55; Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, p. 92–96.

⁸² In comparison: Boško I. Bojović, *L'idéologie monarchique dans les hagio-biographies dynastiques du Moyen Âge serbe* (=OCA, CCXLVIII), Rome, 1995, p. 121–125, 143; Erdmute Heller, *Venezianische Quellen zur Lebensgeschichte des Ahmed Paşa Hersekoglu*, *EJOS*, III (2000), 4, p. 1–85 (in particular).

⁸³ *Cronica moldo-rusă*, p. 158; Ș. Papacostea, *O veche tipăritură despre Moldova la mijlocul secolului al XVI-lea* [An Old Printing of Moldavia in the Mid 1500'], *Studii*, XXII, 1969, 3, p. 460–462; Bogdan P. Maleon, *O schimbare de domnie la mijlocul secolului XVI și rolul elitei clericale moldovenești* [A Change of Rule in the Mid 1500' and the Role of the Moldavian Ecclesiastical Elite], *AIIX*, XLII, 2005, p. 58–59.

⁸⁴ See, for instance, *Repertoriul*, no. 16, p. 148; Al. Simon, *The Hungarian Means of the Relations between the Habsburgs and Moldavia at the End of the 15th Century*, *AIRCRIU*, VIII, 2006, p. 277–282.