

1975. A COMPREHENSIVE MEETING CONCERNING THE ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN CULTURAL RELATIONS

Abstract: The article presents a meeting held in October 1975 between two delegations of Romanian and Hungarian politicians who were responsible for the cultural policy of the two countries. The cultural relations of the two countries were not the best at the time and the parties harboured mutual reproaches against one another. The archival documents studied show that both sides were satisfied with the meeting, with the manner in which the talks were conducted and with the results reached. It should be noted that the two delegations were led by the key figures responsible for the cultural policy of the two countries: Dumitru Popescu and György Aczél, both important officials of the two parties and states. The Romanian guest was received by the head of PMSU, János Kádár, with whom he had talks on overall bilateral relations. During the talks, the Hungarian party insisted on openly expressing their dissatisfaction with the political line of Bucharest and emphasised that this affected the bilateral relations between the two countries. In his replied, Dumitru Popescu showed that Romania's interest was to develop bilateral relations across all fields and defended the policy adopted by Bucharest.

Keywords: Romania, Hungary, cultural relations, János Kádár, György Aczél, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Dumitru Popescu, the Helsinki Accords.

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The article presents the meeting of October 1975 between Dumitru Popescu and György Aczél and the discussions of the two personalities responsible for the cultural policies of Romania and Hungary. In addition to presenting the event, we considered it important to bring into question archival documents showing the positions adopted by the parties regarding cultural relations.

A Hungarian document from April 1975 showed that cultural relations between the two countries had a new basis after 1944/1945, when their objectives had become the same. However, the changes incurred by Bucharest's policy in the mid-1960s had a negative overall influence on these relations and, from the late 1960s, on cultural relations in particular.² In the early 1960s, cultural relations were developing, even if not necessarily in a sustained manner, but by the end of the decade, according to Budapest, Bucharest had begun to prefer large-scale and spectacular actions. Because of this Romanian attitude, Budapest was of the opinion that the cultural relations between the two countries were at a lower level compared to the cultural relations between Hungary and other socialist countries. The fact that Bucharest did not agree, during multilateral cultural negotiations, with the adoption by the socialist countries

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² Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltár (MNL OL), 288 f. 32/1975 129 ö. e., leaf 101.

of a common position on cultural policies also exerted an influence on bilateral cultural relations.

For the Hungarian party, an important goal envisaged preventing Bucharest from decreasing cultural relations. For this purpose, Budapest also attempted to undertake separate actions that were not included in the cultural plan. A special role was that of the Joint Romanian-Hungarian Cultural Commission, formed, at the Hungarian initiative, in Budapest in February 1972. Up until 1975, this committee had three meetings, two of which were held in Budapest in October 1972 and April 1975 and one of which took place in Bucharest in February 1974. Among the topics discussed were the joint commemorations of personalities such as Apáczai Csere János, of events such as the execution of the 13 generals in Arad, discussions about scientific relations and about relations at the level of higher education or between libraries. Other issues discussed included the realisation of exhibitions, tournaments of various ensembles in the other country, the regulation of problems regarding editorial collaboration, cooperation in the spheres of the theatres, libraries and music.³

Another more special problem concerning Budapest was that Bucharest hindered Hungary's maintenance of cultural relations with the Hungarian minority in Romania. Also because of this policy adopted by Bucharest, for Budapest it was very important that it should ensure the collaboration between the literary and publishing establishments of the two countries. The results were not among the most desirable and Budapest blamed the Romanian side for this. Among the factors that caused problems for the Hungarian party, we could include the passivity of the delegations of Romanian writers who went to Hungary and who were not authorised to sign agreements; the efforts of the Romanian party to prevent the Hungarian writers from having relations with the Hungarian intellectuals in Romania; the attitude of the Romanian writers who were delegated to international conferences and the Romanian writers' relations with circles of emigrants who were hostile to Hungary.⁴

Even the editing in common of books, an activity that started in 1951, was not without problems. That meant, in practice, that a certain number of books of various kinds were sent from one country to the other and vice versa. For the Hungarian side, there was a problem as regards the intent of the Romanian party to diminish the number of literary works from Hungarian and world literature (translated into Hungarian) and to prefer dictionaries and books with a technical content. On the other hand, Bucharest considered that the agreement of 1951 was out-dated and wanted a new one, but Budapest was of the opinion that a new agreement would be more unfavourable for the Hungarian side than the one in force.⁵

Cultural relations were not helped by the fact that in 1970, during the Hungarian book exhibition in Bucharest, the Romanian party unilaterally decided to eliminate some volumes and in 1972 it requested the Hungarian party to take out some the volumes proposed for the exhibition in Bucharest. Under such circumstances, in 1972 the Hungarian side considered it inappropriate that the

³ Ibidem, leaves 102, 103.

⁴ Ibidem, leaves 103, 103/a.

⁵ Ibidem, ff. 103/a, 104, 105.

exhibition should be held at all.⁶ The Hungarian document mentioned that Budapest had not made such claims when the exhibition of Romanian books was held in the Hungarian capital in 1972. As a result of what happened in Bucharest, the Hungarian side decided that it was useless to organise exhibitions of books until parties agreed on some basic issues. Because of these disagreements in the exhibitions organised on the occasion of the Romanian Cultural Days in Hungary or of the Hungarian Cultural Days in Romania, there were exhibited only books published separately.⁷

Theatre relations were considered the best of all the segments of cultural relations. In 1971 and in 1975, Hungarian theatres visited Romania, while in 1972 and in 1974, Romanian theatres visited Hungary. In addition to these examples that refer to theatres from the capitals of the two countries, there was also good cooperation between the theatres in the territory.⁸

On the musical level, relations were focused on the exchange of visits between artistic ensembles. There were almost no relations between creators.

As regards the exchange of films, relations remained at the level of potentiality. According to the Hungarian document, the Romanian party preferred Hungarian films with a lower cultural value and the number of productions broadcast in the other country was rather small.⁹

On other levels, such as those of the relations between artists, between libraries, between museums, between archives, between adjacent counties, exchanges were rather formal and on a smaller scale.¹⁰

The document also contains accounts about the Romanian Cultural Days organised in Hungary in 1974 and about the Hungarian Cultural Days held in Romania in 1975, as well as about the Romanian-Hungarian joint commemoration from Arad, in 1974. The Hungarian praised the assent of the Romanian party whereby two Hungarian writers from Romania, Károly Kós and István Nagy, could receive state honours from Hungary. Budapest's plans included the joint commemoration of Petru Groza, Mihai Eminescu and the unveiling of a statue of Nicolae Bălcescu in Méhkerék.¹¹

The document concluded that the interest of Budapest was that cultural relations should develop and that there should be encouraged the links between institutions and ensembles from Hungary and Romania, in areas inhabited mainly by Romanians.¹²

Another Hungarian document drawn up on 24 September 1975 focused on bilateral relations. The chapter on culture estimated that most problems were located here. The document reveals that the different way of looking at the events that had taken place on the international political stage or at events of the common past, the

⁶ Ibidem, f. 105.

⁷ Ibidem, ff. 105, 106.

⁸ Ibidem, ff. 106, 107, 108.

⁹ Ibidem, ff. 108, 109, 110.

¹⁰ Ibidem, ff. 110, 111, 112.

¹¹ Ibidem, ff. 112, 113, 114, 115.

¹² Ibidem f. 115.

problems concerning the joint publication of books, problems concerning the dissemination of Hungarian press and literature in Romania, the lack of opportunities to send teachers from the schools of the nationalities for training courses in the other country, the coordination of efforts to achieve a common didactic material for the teaching of their joint history, the manner in which the Romanian party was implementing the 1-1 rate in cultural exchanges, all these were key issues which influenced the course of these relations.¹³

An archive document from Bucharest, compiled on 21 April 1975, analyses the Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations. The chapter that refers to cultural relations includes a brief history thereof and of the events that had occurred because of this collaboration. The document also talks about the mutual opening of the houses of culture in the capitals of two states. In this document, the Romanian side does not mention any problems about such relations.¹⁴

Another archival document drawn up by the Romanian party also on 26 April 1975, before the impending visit of István Roska, the deputy of the Hungarian Foreign Minister, contained a review of cultural relations. Bucharest made a positive assessment of these relations and wished to develop them. At the same time, according to the document, Bucharest was interested in the speedy opening of the houses of culture.¹⁵

A third Romanian archival document, also from 1975, which groups together “outstanding problems in the Romanian-Hungarian relations,” shows that in the domain of cultural relations, the Hungarian party considered unjustified the position of the Romanian negotiators regarding the exchange of 1-1 when discussing the mutual import of published books between the two countries, since in Romania there lived many more Hungarians than there were Romanians in Hungary.¹⁶ The Romanian document mentions that Budapest had requested, on several occasions, the mutual specialisation of teachers who worked in educational institutions where Hungarian was the language of instruction in Romania and, respectively, teachers of Romanian in Hungary. In this case, according to the document, the Romanian party had taken steps to resolve the situation. The Hungarian party considered that the collaboration between the didactic publishers in the two countries was insufficient.¹⁷ At the same time, Bucharest believed that the Hungarian party interpreted differently, in a “biased” manner, moments in the history of the Romanian people. By way of exemplification, we can mention: Hungarian historiography supported the theory of Romanian emigration south of the Danube; the activity of Michael the Brave, as regards Transylvania, was criticised; the Treaty of Trianon was considered unfair; the Romanian military operations from the end of World War I were considered decisive for the fall of the Republic of Councils; what was silenced was the Romanian Army’s

¹³ Ibidem, ff. 133, 134.

¹⁴ Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Problem 220, file 4982, f. 37.

¹⁵ Ibidem, f. 47.

¹⁶ Ibidem, f. 73.

¹⁷ Ibidem, f. 73.

role in the battles waged on the territory of Hungary in 1944-1945.¹⁸ The Romanian document considered that Budapest manifested an “exaggerated” concern for the Hungarian culture, art and population in Romania and for the popularisation of Hungarian culture in Romania, both in Hungary and in other foreign countries. The Hungarian side tried to maintain and develop direct relations both with Hungarian cultural personalities and with Hungarian cultural institutions in Romania. For this, the assent of the Romanian party was requested. The document noted that the Hungarian party frequently used the word *Transylvania* in its actions of popularising Hungarian culture in Romania, but without indicating that it was a territory that belonged to Romania.¹⁹ The document also stated that the Romanian party was not pleased that in 1976, at the fourth session of the Joint Commission for Culture, discussions should focus on the Hungarian proposal for the joint protection of Hungarian monuments on Romania’s territory. Instead, the Romanian party expected that it would propose discussing the traditions of solidarity between the two peoples “in the struggle for social and national justice.” There was discontent in Bucharest also as regards the manner in which the Romanian people was presented in books or films from Hungary and the situation of the graves of the Romanian soldiers killed in Hungary. With respect to Decree no. 275 of 6 December 1974, which limited the possibilities for the accommodation of foreign tourists in Romania and which caused dissatisfaction among the Hungarian citizens, the Romanian document stated that the measure had been taken “to limit the movement of foreigners in general and to facilitate the entry of hard currency into the country.”²⁰ The measure and its effects became a subject for the Romanian-Hungarian meetings that followed.

On 1-3 October, a Romanian delegation led by Dumitru Popescu, a member of the Political Executive Committee, Secretary of the RCP, Chairman of the Council for Socialist Culture and Education, visited Budapest. The delegation also included Ioan Dodu Bălan, Vice-Chairman of the same commission, President of the Romanian members of the Romanian-Hungarian Joint Commission of Cultural Cooperation and Ștefan Pascu, President of the Romanian side of the Romanian-Hungarian Joint Commission of History. The Hungarian team that participated in the discussions consisted of György Aczél, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, László Orbán, Minister of Culture, István Roska, Deputy Foreign Minister, László Marczali, Deputy Minister of Culture, Professor Daniel Csátri, secretary of the Hungarian side of the Romanian-Hungarian Joint Commission of History. On this occasion, the participants addressed the development of Romanian-Hungarian cooperation in the fields of education, science, culture, art, developing the exchanges of information and cultural values.²¹ The meeting was expected to take place in January 1975, but it was cancelled by the Hungarian side. György Aczél motivated this decision by reference to their busy calendar of internal events.²²

¹⁸ Ibidem, f. 73.

¹⁹ Ibidem, ff. 73, 74.

²⁰ Ibidem, f. 74.

²¹ *Scântea*, year XLV, no. 10300, 2 October 1975, p. 4.

²² MNL OL, 288 f. 32/1975 129 ó. e., f. 578.

Dumitru Popescu was also received by János Kádár on 2 October. On this occasion, the parties stressed the need and the possibilities for intensifying economic collaboration, as well as cooperation in the field of production, technology, science and culture. The solidarity between the two countries also had to be “deepened,” and the Romanian-Hungarian friendship had to be strengthened even more, based on equality, esteem, mutual respect, Marxism-Leninism, and socialist internationalism.²³ During the talks, Kádár stated Budapest’s desire to develop bilateral relations and critically referred to some Romanian political positions. He also evoked the meeting he had had with Nicolae Ceaușescu in Helsinki and the fact that they had agreed on examining the problems and the unresolved issues pertaining to the bilateral relations. Kádár also brought into discussion the common past of the two nations and said that the “progressive forces have taken over a difficult legacy from the former ruling classes.”²⁴ It was not good that the two countries should embark on different paths since that could possibly get them face to face rather than beside one another. The Hungarian Party Head agreed with the idea upheld by the Romanian foreign policy, in the sense that Romania wanted good relations with everyone, but emphasised that, in this case, the cooperation between the socialist countries had to be even better.²⁵ Besides this, the leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party informed the Romanian guest that Hungary wanted to collaborate with Romania on a multilateral level and invoked, above all, the possibilities within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Budapest also wished to express its dissatisfaction that “there were too many separate opinions among the Romanians.” It was desirable that their number “should drop”, as this affected both the bilateral cooperation between the two countries and the multilateral cooperation inside the socialist bloc.²⁶ It should be noted that the Romanian opinions were aimed at an integration program developed within the CMEA. Kádár opined that the meetings at the highest level had to bring results so that the two peoples could see their purpose. The opportunities for economic cooperation between the socialist countries had to be valorised also because these countries were less exposed to the negative trends worldwide. The Hungarian leader stated that in such circumstances it was not appropriate to establish a meeting at the highest level since the parties would not do anything but to declare their position of principle, without registering real progress. Such a meeting had to be well prepared in order to have positive results.²⁷ In his reply, Dumitru Popescu stated that it was the desire of Nicolae Ceaușescu that the bilateral relations between the two countries should further develop and that Ceaușescu was ready to commit himself to achieving the goals discussed by the two party heads in Helsinki. The Romanian official also wanted to defend his country’s foreign policy stating that although Romania supported the complex program of CMEA, when things were enforced in practice, there could exist practices that did not

²³ *Scântea*, year XLV, no. 10301, 3 October 1975, p. 6.

²⁴ MNL OL, 288 f. 32/1975 129 ö. e., ff. 333, 334, 335.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, ff. 335, 336.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, ff. 336, 337.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, ff. 314, 337, 338.

pay attention to sovereignty and the principle of voluntary annexation. It was necessary to stage debates before taking a decision. No one should be prevented from exercising their opinion. According to Dumitru Popescu, the relations were relatively good and preparations should be stepped up for a new bilateral meeting at the highest level. This event would have a beneficial effect on bilateral relations and would be welcomed by the public opinion of the two countries.²⁸

The discussions between György Aczél and Dumitru Popescu were longer and more comprehensive. The two officials informed each other about the domestic and foreign policies of the countries they represented and they started to discuss bilateral relations based on the mutual Memorandum signed in Bucharest in 1972, during the visit of the Hungarian delegation led by János Kádár. Aczél wanted to enumerate the problems of the bilateral cultural relations, as they had been presented in the documents mentioned above. To these were added problems in the sphere of tourism.²⁹ The Hungarian official was critically linked to the Romanian political line, which Popescu defended even in polemical terms. Bucharest aimed at developing bilateral relations with all the socialist countries and provided support to countries in the developing world. The essence of Romanian politics was expressed by Dumitru Popescu in the following way. "We wish to think independently about the world around us, to try to judge by ourselves the international events and to draw Marxist-Leninist conclusions. Let not think one head think instead of the others and transmit already charted out conclusions, which just have to be executed in practice, because this does no service to the common interests."³⁰ Cultural and other types of relations had to develop because they entailed many opportunities and it was indicated that the parties should hold consultations on issues concerning mutual cultural relations. Dumitru Popescu gave straightforward answers to all the issues raised by György Aczél. One of the thorny issues was the obligation that the foreign tourists who went to Romania should stay at hotels and not at their relatives. Budapest was of the opinion that the law was directed mainly against the Hungarian tourists who travelled in large numbers to Romania and were put up by their relatives, while Bucharest considered that the law was for the Western tourists, who were "engaged in inimical activities."³¹ Otherwise, the Romanian official gave positive answers to the issues launched by the Hungarian side, but he also wanted to highlight how differently the two sides regarded aspects pertaining to the past of the Romanian people. For the Hungarian delegation, it was surprising that Dumitru Popescu stated that the nationalities must foster rapprochement and friendship, because the Romanian delegations did not condone such formulas in their discussions with the Hungarian delegations. According to Budapest's conclusions, the desire to cooperate expressed by Dumitru Popescu could also be explained by the fact that Bucharest wanted again a meeting at the highest level. The parties also adopted a memorandum at this meeting, but the Romanian delegation was no longer so cooperating on the provisions

²⁸ Ibidem, ff. 339, 340.

²⁹ Ibidem, f. 316.

³⁰ Ibidem, ff. 316, 317.

³¹ Ibidem, ff. 317, 318, 319.

of the document, except at a verbal level, at least according to the archives in Budapest. The Hungarian side considered the meeting to be useful.³²

The fact that the discussions between Aczél and Popescu were important is also demonstrated by the project that the party apparatus prepared for György Aczél, a document that contained serious allegations against Romanian politics.³³

This document showed that the propaganda that served Romanian nationalist politics was expanding, that the moral and psychological pressure exerted on people belonging to the Hungarian nationality was accentuating, that negative discrimination was applied more and more broadly and that the ways in which the specific wishes of the minority could be resolved were increasingly limited. There were also problems with education in the mother tongue.

The way in which the history of the Romanian people was regarded gave no hope for an improvement of cultural cooperation. Official history was excessively “Romanianised” and deliberately ignored the history of non-Romanian populations.

The Hungarian document stated that at present there were no signs indicating any change in the Romanian ideological and political life. It seemed that the official political line was to remain in force for years.

Romanian politics had several specific viewpoints on Hungary also as regards the PMSU policy, which influenced the behaviour of the politicians in Budapest, but also public opinion and the political atmosphere of the PRH. The Hungarian public opinion was becoming increasingly discontent as the national situation worsened in Romania. The Hungarians in Romania would have wanted this help to manifest more concretely, more poignantly.

This document proposed the following ideas as a working hypothesis:³⁴

- It should be specified whether the national question was part of the internal policy of that state, but, at the same time, whether the mother country was concerned indirectly to ensure those rights. The final document of CSCE contains such a reference.
- It was assumed that following the latest decisions and practices, the situation of the Hungarians in Romania had deteriorated. The Hungarian public opinion was concerned.
- The Hungarian Party worked to achieve the national policy in a Leninist style.
- In terms of the role played by the nationalities in the cooperation between the two countries, the PMSU's position of principle was that the nationalities represented an important factor for the closeness and brotherly multilateral cooperation of the socialist states and peoples.

A report by the Hungarian ambassador in Bucharest, dated 24 October 1975, showed that the Romanian side have issued a positive assessment of the visit and the talks Dumitru Popescu had had in Budapest and it was appreciated that the event could give an impetus to the dialogue on other issues.³⁵

The event was important for several reasons. This was the meeting of the two personalities that, at that time, were responsible for the cultural policy of the two

³² Ibidem, ff. 319, 320.

³³ MNL OL, XIX-J-1-j-România-1-004930/16-1975, unnumbered leaf.

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ MNL OL, 288 f. 32/1975 129 ó. e., ff. 545, 546.

leading political parties. On the other hand, this was a meeting in which the countries were represented by the two dignitaries, but even though they were officially on the same side in political, military and economic terms, they were very different and their bilateral relations were also not among the best.

After the 1956 revolution, which had been crushed by the Soviets, Hungary had pursued an external policy that was faithful to the Soviet Union. On the internal, domestic level, in 1968-1972 there was an attempt to introduce economic reforms and not only, but they were hampered by the criticisms launched by Leonid Brezhnev. Another important change in Budapest's policy envisaged the "rediscovery," in the late 1960s, of the Hungarian minorities in the countries neighbouring Hungary and Budapest's changed policy towards the national minorities in Hungary. This "rediscovery" was seen as a wind of change by Raphael Vago. The essence of this politics was that the nationalities should serve as a bridge in the relations between the socialist countries.³⁶ Yugoslavia was the only socialist state neighbouring Hungary that registered some success in this sense, but they stayed mainly at a declarative level after the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980. As part of this new political direction, the Hungarian state was interested in the fate of the Hungarian minorities from the neighbouring countries, but only Romania, on whose territory there lived the largest Hungarian community, received a special attention, accompanied by more or less overt criticism.³⁷ With regard to the conditions in which the minority communities were living in Romania, there was a strong contradiction between the official positions of the two countries. While the Hungarian documents on which the delegations of this country relied spoke of the growing pressures on this community, the documents and the position of Bucharest maintained that there was no such thing, as the laws of Romania prohibited any discrimination. Bucharest supported its position also with statistics, showing the number of cultural and education institutions that operated in Hungarian and the representation of the minority in the national or the local public apparatus. On the other hand, Romania argued that for any citizen it was important to know the official language of the state in order to find a job anywhere on the territory of the country. The fate of the Hungarians in the USSR or Czechoslovakia was also followed by the Hungarian politicians, but without the existence of such criticism as those addressed to Romania.³⁸ The intelligentsia in Hungary was worried about the fate of these minorities. Due to the behavioural manner of the Hungarian political elite, we can agree with the historian Ignác Romsics, who felt that Budapest was critical of Bucharest also because it wanted to convey the Soviet dissatisfaction caused by the Romanian political agenda.

It should be noted that the governments in Bonn also watched the fate of the German minority in Romania and that the conclusions drawn were not the most reassuring. It was expected, ever since 1972, that the objective of Romanian politics was the assimilation of the minorities.³⁹

³⁶ Raphael Vago, *The Grandchildren of Trianon*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 103.

³⁷ *Magyarország története*. Főszerkesztő Romsics Ignác, Akadémiai Kiadó, 2007, pp. 924, 925.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 924.

³⁹ Auswärtiges Amt Politisches Archiv Zwischenarchiv 112639, unnumbered leaf.

Romania was in a different situation. The Soviet troops had left its territory in 1958 and in 1964 the country adopted a different political line. This caused, in time, tensions with Moscow and its loyal allies, among them Budapest, which sometimes acted as a mouthpiece for the Kremlin. Another element of tension was the changed incurred by Romanian domestic politics in 1971, after the visit that a delegation led by Nicolae Ceaușescu had undertaken in the Far East.

It should be noted that the meeting of the two delegations took place after the signing, on 31 August 1975, of the Helsinki Accords. These were important both for Hungary and for the neighbours. Budapest could try to have cultural relations with the Hungarian minorities abroad and the neighbouring countries were assured that there would not be attempts to change the borders by military means. It was also in Helsinki that the new policy promoted by Hungary from the late 1960s on received a very strong echo because in his speech, János Kádár spoke about the territorial losses suffered by Hungary at the end of World War I and about the long-lasting past of the Hungarian state.⁴⁰

As regards the consequences, we can say that up until the end of the communist period, cultural relations were the most neuralgic and created the biggest problems. Basically, two different concepts collided. Budapest, which deemed that the national communities from the territory of the neighbouring state, in this case, Romania, could also be involved in these relations, and Bucharest, which believed that cultural relations could only be established between the two independent sovereign countries. In Romania's view, the RCP and the Romanian government were solely responsible for the country's citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin. The Hungarian attempts to have cultural relations with the Hungarian minority in Romania or to channel cultural contacts primarily to the areas inhabited by Hungarians were viewed not favourably by Bucharest. It should be mentioned that, at that time, Romania did not show increased attention towards the Romanian communities in the neighbouring countries also in order to avoid creating this reciprocity. The parties did have discussions but they were never able to see eye to eye in order to open cultural houses in the capital of the other country.

The event had positive consequences, at that moment, due to the meeting of two personalities that played an important role in the cultural policy of the two countries, Dumitru Popescu, nicknamed Popescu God, and György Aczél, the one who introduced the rule of the three *Ts* in the Hungarian cultural policy. These were the words *támogatott, tűrt, tiltott* - *supported, tolerated, prohibited*, terms that were used in labelling the creation and conduct of the members of Hungary's cultural and artistic life. Their talks, among others, created the possibility of the last bilateral meeting held between Nicolae Ceaușescu and János Kádár, two years later.

⁴⁰ *Magyarország története*. Főszerkesztő Romsics Ignác, Akadémiai Kiadó, 2007, p 924.