

REGIONAL AND HUNGARIAN DESIGNS AT THE END OF BARTHOLOMEW DRÁGFFY'S POLITICAL CAREER

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The Drágffy family lost most of its power and exited history as the Drag(oș) family at the beginning of the 15th century.¹ Then – alike several Hungarian barons – it chosen to rise against Sigismund of Luxemburg, who eventually prevailed.² At first loyal followers of the contested monarch,³ who even granted them a sort of “Wallachian patronage” in the realm, extending as far south as the Land of Hațeg (the future Hunyadi cradle) in the 1390s,⁴ the Dragoș family had even retained its *Greek* rite fate, also in the days of the zealous Louis I of Anjou, in the service of Holy (*Latin* rite) Crown of Hungary⁵.

As the family, more precisely the branch of Nicholas, the father of the future voivode of Transylvania, Bartholomew, made its way back into Hungarian politics,⁶

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¹ Ioan-Aurel Pop, *From the Hands of the Schismatic Wallachians: The Romanians and Power in the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary* (New York, Oxford, Vienna, 2013), 457–478.

² See Radu Popa, *La începuturile evului mediu românesc: Țara Hațegului* (Bucharest, 1988), 281–283.

³ Konrad G. Gündisch, “Siebenbürgen und der Aufruhr von 1403 gegen Sigismund von Luxemburg”, *Revue Roumaine d’Histoire* XV, no. 3 (1976): 399–420.

⁴ See further Ioan Drăgan, *Nobilimea românească din Transilvania. 1440–1514* (Bucharest, 2000), 331–332

⁵ In these matters, see the analysis by Șerban Papacostea, “Domni români și regi angevini: înfruntarea finală (1370–1382)”, in Papacostea, *Geneza statului în Evul Mediu românesc* (Cluj-Napoca, 1988¹), 113–130.

⁶ See in this framework Norbert C. Tóth, “Szász vajda utódainak felemelkedése és bukása. A család vázlatos története 1365–1424 között”, in Géza Hegyi, András W. Kovács, eds, *A Szilágyság és a Wesselényi család (14–17. század)* (Kolozsvár, 2012), 135–166 (with further references to contemporary sources at 144–148, 156–159, 164–165).

aided by John Hunyadi and then particularly by Matthias Corvinus,⁷ the Dragoș grew into Drágffys, forming a *Latin* rite Hungarian noble identity.⁸ Nevertheless, they did not abandon their Wallachian roots (revealed – for instance – in their own literary approach of the Battle at Câmpul Pâinii in 1479⁹) or their *Greek* rite background (highly present to their foundation in the Maramureș, the monastery of Peri, in control of most *Greek* rite Christians in the realm north of the voivodate of Transylvania and east of the Tisa¹⁰). Bartholomew managed to assert himself as one of the trustees of King Matthias and rose to the rank of administrative link (“coordinator”) between “native Maramureș” and Transylvania proper.¹¹ This experience would prove most useful at the turn of the century, when lord Bartholomew pursued his act as an East-West Hungarian administrative “bridge”.¹² It was an act and a function he had already assumed – as (firstly co-) voivode of Transylvania, during the strenuous negotiations between Buda and the Porte (autumn 1493 – spring 1495).¹³

⁷ For an overview: Richárd Horváth, “A Béltéki Drágfiak és a királyi udvar kapcsolata a Hunyadiak korában (1424–1490)”, in Hegyi, Kovács, eds, *A Szilágyosság és a Wesselényi család*, 167–212 (see in particular the information at 169–174, 184–187, 193–196).

⁸ See Vladimir Rábik, Beáta Vida, “Béltéki (Beltiug) Drágffy család a magyar királyság történetében”, *Turul*, LXXXII, no. 2 (2009): 33–45. Yet, whenever, one tends to discuss such matters of ethnical and confessional identity, one should also bear in mind the actual meanings of the royal Hungarian “melting pot”. Jenő Szűcs, “Nationalität und Nationalbewußtsein im Mittelalter. Versuch einer einheitlichen Begriffssprache”, (II), *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* XVIII, 3–4 (1972): 245–265, even though it is rather difficult to expand the reigns of Sigismund or Matthias to the entire history of the realm

⁹ Máttyás Florián, ed., *Chronicon Dubnicense cum codicibus Sambuci Acephalo et Vaticano, chronicisque Vindobonensi Picto et Budensi accurate collatum*, *Historiae Hungaricae Fontes Domestici* III (Pécs, 1884), 1–207 (at 204–206). Various Romanian nationalistic overtones have worked against the actual meaning of this text, highly critical of King Matthias Corvinus’ policies, a text composed in the entourage of Bartholomew Drágffy (and which is in fact also the prime source for Bartholomew’s involvement in the battle of 1479).

¹⁰ See the fundamental analysis of Ș. Papacostea, “Byzance et la création de la Métropole de Moldavie”, *Études Byzantines et Post-Byzantines* II (1991): 133–150.

¹¹ In relation to the general regional career of the Drágffys, see A. W. Kovács, “The Authorities of Middle Solnoc and Crasna Counties in the Middle Ages”, and G. Hegyi, “The Affiliation of the Sălaj (Szilágy) Region in Mirror of Social Relations”, *Transylvanian Review* XXI, suppl. 2 (2012): 31–66 (at 43–45), and 67–99 (at 77–86).

¹² See in this respect the discussion below based on the information in Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich (hereafter BStB), Codices, Abendländische Handschriften (hereafter A.L.H.), CML 14688, 95^r–98^r (at 95^v, from 1501, probably from the second part of that year). Ioan-Aurel Pop, ed., *Diplome maramureșene din secolele XVI–XVIII, provenite din colecția lui Ioan Mihályi de Apșa*, (Bucharest, 2009), no. 345, 405 (original signature D. 1/ 1500).

¹³ E.g. Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Venice (hereafter BNM), Ufficio Manoscritti, Codici Italiani (Cod. Ital.), classa VII, *Storia ecclesiastica e civile veneziana*, no. 999 (=8002), 40 (59)^v–41 (60)^v (25th of July 1495); Carol Wagner, ed., *Diplomatarium Comitatus Sarosiensis*, (Bratislava-Kosice, 1780), no. II–24, 128 [the document dates from late autumn 1493].

Having also developed a “bad habit” of recovering and expanding his lands through brutal methods, encouraged by Matthias Corvinus’ protection as early as the 1470s,¹⁴ Drágffy largely owed his success to making the right choice during the Hungarian civil war that followed Matthias’ death in spring 1490.¹⁵ Alike, several of Matthias’ former trustees, Bartholomew turned against the late king’s designated heir, John Corvinus, and focused on the “popular candidate”, Wladislaw II Jagiello.¹⁶ His option ultimately matched that of Stephen III, whose Moldavian heir at that time, Alexander, wed Mary, Bartholomew’s daughter in September 1489¹⁷, after the acting voivode of Transylvania, Stephen Báthory, had secured possession in the name of Matthias of the estate of Ciceu,¹⁸ one of the two main Hungarian domains granted – on paper – by the king to Stephen III in exchange – first of all – for his feudal allegiance (in view of John’s royal succession¹⁹) and crusader cooperation (in the perspective of the crusader congress of Rome rescheduled for 1490²⁰).

Still, due also to the disputes within the ranks of Wladislaw II’s supporters and – to a certain extent – to the hesitations of Stephen III, who – in spite of taking action in favour of Wladislaw (most importantly during his conflict with

¹⁴ For a list of his various deeds and abuses until the death of Matthias in particular, see also Al. Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin. O coexistență medievală* (Cluj-Napoca, 2007), 518–521 (in the area of Dej and on the Someș river at least, Bartholomew Drágffy relied heavily on Wallachians).

¹⁵ Tibor Neumann, “Drágfi Bertalan politikai szerepe II. Ulászló király idején”, in *A Szilágyság és a Wesselényi család*, 213–236 (at 214–219). The most notable feature of Bartholomew Drágffy’s attitude during those years seems to have been his opposition towards John Albert, who attempted – as his father’s, Casimir IV of Poland’s, favourite son, to win Buda from his brother Wladislaw II. This opposition clearly serviced Stephen III during the crisis of 1497.

¹⁶ See for instance Al. Simon, “Crusading at the Time of the Hungarian Royal Elections of 1490”, in Florin Ardelean, Christopher Nicholson, J. Preiser-Kapeller, eds, *The Age of the Jagiellonians in East-Central Europe. 1386–1526*, Eastern and Central European Studies II (New York, Oxford, Basel, Frankfurt-am-Main, Vienna, 2013), 187–220.

¹⁷ Endre Veress, ed., *Actae et epistolae relationum Transylvaniae Hungariaeque cum Moldavia et Valachia*, *Fontes Rerum Transsylvanicarum* IV, VI, vol. I, 1468–1540 (Budapest, 1914, hereafter *Actae et epistolae*), no. 37, 42. Given the distances and the preparations involved, the wedding had probably been decided in winter 1488–1489, during the talks for new Hungarian-Moldavian treaty.

¹⁸ R. Horváth, T. Neumann, *Ecsedi Bátori István. Egy katonabárá életpályája 1458–1493* (Budapest, 2012), 80–83. It is plausible that afterwards Báthory left for Suceava as the personal representative of Matthias at the wedding of Alexander and Mary.

¹⁹ For instance: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter HHStA), Reichshofkanzlei (R.H.K), *Fridericiana*, Karton 7, 1489–1491, fasc. 8–2. 1490, 88^{r-v} (Hârlău, 25th of July 1490).

²⁰ E.g. BStB, Codices, ALH, CML 461, 188^r–193^v [end of July (around the 26th) 1490]. The relevant passages on Hungary, *Walachia* and the *Dacians* can be found at 191^r–193^v.

the king's unwanted wife, Beatrice of Aragon, Matthias' widow, in 1491–1492²¹) – was by no means fully satisfied with a Jagiellonian monarch in Buda (as he had long feared the influence and the politics of the Polish dynasty²²), Stephen III did not take control over the estates not even in 1492²³. He had to face the challenges of the former owners of the controversial domains Ciceu and Cetatea de Baltă. Knowing that Stephen III could easily change sides and thus had to be contained, Matthias was fully aware what sort of lands he had to donate.²⁴

In effect, Stephen III only took control²⁵ over these estates after Bartholomew Drágffy became the new (af first co-) voivode of Transylvania. The latter profited also from the conflicts opposing the main power figures in Hungary, such as count-palatine Stephen Szapolyai, John Corvinus, Lawrence Újlaki, duke of Bosnia, or Stephen Báthory.²⁶ After a cleverly instrumented charge of corruption issued against him by the Szeklers in particular, Stephen Báthory was ousted in winter 1492–1493²⁷ from his office of voivode of Transylvania which he had held since the beginning of 1479.²⁸

²¹ Béla Iványi, ed., *A Római Szent Birodalmi Széke Gróf Teleki Család Gyömoi léveltára. Archivum Gyömrözense gentes comitum Teleki de Szék* (Szeged, 1931), no. 378, 179. Stephen III's action against Beatrice, who as queen of Hungary had several estates in the Maramureş, came also in the support of local uprising.

²² József Garbacik, ed., *Materialy do dziejów dyplomacji polskiej z lat 1486–1516 (Kodeks Zagrzebski)* (Wrocław, Warsaw, Krakow, 1966, hereafter *Materialy*), nos. 1–3, 1–11. Prince John Albert was Stephen III of Moldavia's only clear “no” during the royal elections.

²³ Magyar Országos Levéltár Budapest (hereafter MOL), Diplomatikai Levéltár (hereafter DL), no. 27740 (18th of April 1492; edited in *Actae et epistolae*, vol. I, no. 39, 43–45). Stephen III's royally commissioned instalment of as possessor of the estates also marked the acknowledgment of Alexander as his Moldavian heir.

²⁴ E.g. Al. Simon, “The Hungarian Means of the Relations between the Habsburgs and Moldavia at the End of the 15th Century”, *Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica* VIII (2006): 259–296. Besides, Stephen had to secure his succession in Wallachia (through Bogdan–Vlad) and in Moldavia (through Alexander).

²⁵ See for instance Ignác Ácsády, *Régi magyar birtokviszonyok 1494–1598*, offprint *Értekezések a Történelmi Tudományok Köréből* XVI, 3 (Budapest 1894), 24, 32, 38 (for data on Stephen III as one of the richest Hungarian lords).

²⁶ For more data on these matters, see also Krzysztof Baczkowski, “Walka o Węgry w latach 1490–1492. Z dziejów rywalizacji habsbursko-jagiellońskiej w basenie środkowego Dunaju”, *Universitas Iagiellonica. Acta Scientiarum Litterarumque. Schedae Historicae* CXVI (1993 [1995]): 53–59; Simon, “Crusading”, 192–195, 214–218.

²⁷ Károly Szabó, “Báthori István erdélyi vajda és székely ispán bukása 1493-ban”, *Századok* XXIII, no. 9 (1889): 701–709. If Stephen Báthory had been less overconfident (an attitude which had worked in his favour throughout 1490), he might have retained his office.

²⁸ See for instance the entries listed in K. G. Gündisch et alii, eds, *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen*, vol. VII, 1474–1486 (Bucharest, 1991), 497 (index).

In January 1493, Wladislaw II, most willing to prove that he could (and at times he even was) more than just a puppet-ruler,²⁹ replaced Stephen Báthory with Ladislas of Losoncz (whose family ties made him the feudal Transylvanian adversary of Stephen III³⁰) and Bartholomew Drágffy as co-voivodes of Transylvania.³¹ By the end of August 1494, Bartholomew Drágffy became the sole voivode of Transylvania.³² His new status came some four months after the Jagiellonian congress of Lewocza,³³ where it was decided that Stephen III was to be replaced with Sigismund, the youngest brother of the acting Kings of Bohemia, Hungary and Poland (i.e. Wladislaw II and John Albert)³⁴ and about three months after – as a token of formal trust – the monastery of Peri, founded by Bartholomew’s ancestors, was placed under the authority of the Transylvanian metropolitanate of Feleac, protected by Stephen III.³⁵

Over the next years, Drágffy established a name for himself as a ruthless and astute politician (in Ottoman matters as well³⁶), eager to make a handsome profit, while remaining very much under the influence of the poor state of royal funding legally made available to him.³⁷ He also remained loyal to Stephen III, even against his king and even after Mary’s husband, Alexander, died in myste-

²⁹ See in this case especially Martyn Rady’s analysis, “Rethinking Jagiello Hungary 1490–1526”, *Central Europe* III, no. 1 (2005): 3–18 (in particular 8–11, 14–16).

³⁰ E.g. MOL, DL 82056 (11th of May 1493). Stephen III attempted to approach Drágffy’s associate-voivode, but it is unclear whether the talks (on the estates) led to anything.

³¹ Serviciul Județean Sibiu al Arhivelor Naționale (hereafter SJAN), Urkunden, II, no. 521 (17th of January 1493); photocopy: MOL, (U Section) Diplomatikai Fényképgyűjtemény (hereafter DF), no. 245165.

³² The sources are in SJAN-Cluj, Archiv der Stadt Bistriz, Urkunden, no. 189 (1st of September 1494; photocopy MOL, DF 247424); MOL, DL 46273 (27th of August 1494).

³³ E.g. Bernard Wapowski, *Chronicorum Bernardii Vapovii partem posteriorem 1480–1535*, ed., J[ózef]. Szujki, in *Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum*, vol. II (Krakow, 1874), 66–68. One of the most noteworthy aspects of that congress was that the members of the Hungarian delegation rather expediently informed Stephen III of the decisions.

³⁴ Ludwik Finkel, “Zjazd Jagiellonów w Lewoczy w r. 1494”, *Kwartalnik Historyczny* XXVIII, no. 2 (1914): 317–350. In spite of its age and of subsequent attempts to “clear” the Jagiellonians of charges of conspiracy, this remains the standard work.

³⁵ I. Mihály de Apșa, *Diplome maramureșene din secolele XIV și XV* (Cluj- Napoca, 2000, reprint, hereafter *Diplome maramureșene*), no. 352, 607.

³⁶ One of his diplomat associates in the Ottoman talks of 1493–1495 was Peter More (BNM, Ufficio Manoscritti, Cod. Ital., VII-999 (=8002), 40 (59)^v–41 (60)^v (25th of July 1495), a Wallachian Latin rite clergyman, who played an instrumental part in the anti-Jagiellonian acts of Maximilian I of Habsburg and Stephen III of Moldavia in 1497 (for an overview, see I. Drăgan, “More-un apelativ românesc în mediul nobiliar medieval din Transilvania și Ungaria”, *Arhiva Genealogică*, NS, V, no. 1–2 (1998): 51–63; Simon, ‘Crusading’, 203–205.

³⁷ See also the (now partially lost) data already collected on these issues by Johann-Christoph Engel, *Geschichte des Ungarischen Reiches*, III/2 (Vienna, 1813²), 8–9, 69–73, 89.

rious circumstances in the summer of 1496³⁸ and Wladislaw II attempted to turn against Stephen.³⁹ Yet, at some point, in autumn 1498 (probably at the end of September), Drágffy stepped down and Peter of Sankt-Georg and Bozyn became voivode.⁴⁰ The latter change is relevant for several reasons, lastly because Drágffy returned as *alias vaivoda Transilvaniae*,⁴¹ by the start of 1500, before passing away in next fall,⁴² most likely from natural causes (he was about 55 years old, born some three years after the late Matthias⁴³).

Peter of Sankt-Georg and Bozyn was the younger brother of the rebels of 1467, John and Sigismund.⁴⁴ They had been created counts of Sankt-Georg in 1459 by Emperor Frederick III of Habsburg, Matthias Corvinus' "rival King" of Hungary.⁴⁵ After the Treaty of Wiener-Neustadt (1463), the brothers entered Matthias' service. Together with their cousin, Bertold Ellerbach, they were appointed voivodes of Transylvania by fall 1465 and went on to become the Transylvanian spearheads of the Hungarian summer rebellion of 1467.⁴⁶ Supported also by the future relative – between 1489 and 1496 by marriage of the then rising Bartholomew Drágffy,⁴⁷ Stephen III, who changed sides,

³⁸ For the elliptic mention of Alexander's death: Damian P. Bogdan, *Pomelnicul mănăstirii Bistrița* (Bucharest, 1941), 86–88.

³⁹ E.g. MOL, DL 29016 (13th of April 1497), edited in Zgismund Jakó, ed., *A kolozsmonostori konvent jegyzőkönyvei* (1289 – 1556), vol. II, 1484–1556 (Budapest, 1991), no. 3010, 153. Directly and indirectly (already since the autumn of 1496), Wladislaw II attempted to oust Stephen III's men from the estates.

⁴⁰ MOL, DL 71068, 84736, 107119 (5th of September, 1st of October, 5th of November 1498). It was basically the anniversary of the Moldavian-Polish battle at Codrii Cosminului.

⁴¹ *Diplome maramureșene*, no. 345, p. 405 (D. 1/ 1500). Unfortunately, the transcription of the record only mentioned the year of its issue, not the day or the month.

⁴² MOL, DL 65220 (26th of October 1501). Throughout time, the date of Bartholomew Drágffy's death has usually varied between the end of 1499 and 1500, respectively 1501.

⁴³ See the genealogical table drafted by Tóth, 'Szász vajda utódainak felemelkedése és bukása', pp. 166–167. The fact that Bartholomew Drágffy and Matthias Corvinus belonged to the same generation must be noted in connection to both Bartholomew's rise and to the "entourage" of John Corvinus on the eve of the royal Hungarian elections of spring-summer 1490.

⁴⁴ See A.W. Kovács, "Arhondologia voievozilor Transilvaniei (1458–1526): Competări și precizări", *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie* XXX (2012): 223–256 (in particular 240–241, 252–253).

⁴⁵ E.g. Pál Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary. 895–1526* (London, 2001), 342–343; András Kubinyi, *Matthias Rex* (Budapest, 2008), 81–83.

⁴⁶ A. Kubinyi, "Erdély a Mohács előtti évtizedekben", in István Rácz, ed., *Tanulmányok Erdély történetéről* (Debrecen 1988), 65–73. The rebellion of 1467 remains one of the most controversial events in the history of Hungary in the second half of the 15th century.

⁴⁷ In this respect, see also the passages in *Letopisețul anonim al Moldovei* in *Cronicile slavo-române din secolele XV–XVI publicate de Ioan Bogdan*, ed. P. P. Panaitescu (Bucharest, 1959), 6–23 (at 20–21).

the rebellion had annulled the planned Hunyadi-Habsburg anti-Ottoman campaign.⁴⁸ The Bozyns lost their offices, not their lives. Like, the Szapolyai brothers, Emerich and Stephen, they were pardoned” in early 1468.⁴⁹

The counts of Sankt-Georg remained in royal service, primarily as diplomats.⁵⁰ It took them however about more than three decades to return to the main offices, even if they were entrusted with delicate mission, such as conveying to the German *Reichstag* (after the Battle of Câmpul Pâinii in October 1479⁵¹) the message on the Wallachian blood relatives that “united” Mehmed II and Matthias Corvinus.⁵² Even though the major offices had been kept closed to them, the members of the family had amassed a unique insight into Transylvanian, Habsburg, Hunyadi and even Wallachian politics.⁵³

In spring-summer 1497, Wladislaw II Jagiello had nearly lost his throne trapped in the *conspiracy* of Maximilian I, Frederick III's son, and Stephen III.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ I.A. Pop, Al. Simon, “The Venetian and Wallachian Roots of the Ottoman-Hungarian Truce of 1468: Notes on Documents in the State Archives of Milan”, in Iulian Mihai Damian, I.A. Pop, Mihailo Popović, Al. Simon, eds, *The Italian Peninsula and Europe's Eastern Borders. 1204–1669*, Eastern and Central European Studies I, (New York, Oxford, Basel, Frankfurt-am-Main, Vienna, 2012), 181–196. It should be stressed out that the events of 1467 were the result of more than just Hungarian domestic disputes.

⁴⁹ For a sketch of the matters, see Kubinyi, *Matthias Rex*, 88. Even if Matthias recovered from the events of 1467, outlived other conspiracies and rebellions (mainly in 1471) and increased his strength, the conflicts and the arrangements of summer 1467-spring 1468 must be closely reviewed in connection to choices and solutions that marked the realm after 1490.

⁵⁰ For such careers, the fundamental study still belongs to Vilmos Fraknói, “Mátyás király magyar diplomatai”, *Századok* XXXII, no. 1 (1898): 1–14; no. 2: 97–112; no. 5: 385–404; no. 6: 481–489; no. 9: 769–781; no. 10: 865–875, XXXIII, no. 1 (1899): 1–8; no. 4: 291–309; no. 5: 389–410; no. 9: 773–788; no. 10: 869–878. Unfortunately, over the last decades the Hungarian scholarly preference for domestic social history has turned against researches in the extant western archives.

⁵¹ See for instance the partial edition in N. Iorga, *Notes et extraits pour servir à l'histoire des croisades au XV^e siècle*, vol. V, 1476–1500 (Bucharest, 1915), no. 9, 73–74.

⁵² Al. Simon, “La parentéle ottomane du roi Mathias Corvin”, in Ch. Gastgeber, Ekaterini Mitsiou, I.-A. Pop, M. Popović, Johannes Preiser Kapeller, Al. Simon, eds, *Matthias Corvinus und seine Zeit. Europa am Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit zwischen Wien und Konstantinople*, Denkschriften der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, CDX (Vienna, 2011), 25–33 (with further sources). For the dossier of 1479: BStB, Codices, A.L.H., CLM 443, 174^r–178^v [prior and after the 21st of December].

⁵³ For an overview of the context of the family's – long awaited – return to administrative power, see here A. Kubinyi, “Barone im königlichen Rat zur Zeit Matthias und Wladislaw II”, in Kubinyi, *Stände und Ständestaat im spätmittelalterlichen Ungarn* (Herne, 2011), 41–166 (at 134–135, 154); Kovács, “Arhondologia voievozilor”, 251–253.

⁵⁴ The report is in Státny Ústredný Archív Bratislava (hereafter SUAB), (Section L) Rody i panstvá, Rody: Erdödy Ústredný Archív/ Erdödi család levéltára, Galgóci hitbizományi levéltár, Oklevelek, no. 108 [March-April 1498; the photocopy can be found in MOL, DF 278383].

Bartholomew Drágffy had moved his troops – without his suzerain’s approval⁵⁵ – against King Wladislaw’s brother, John Albert of Poland who had entered Moldavia hoping to dethrone Stephen III.⁵⁶ By spring 1498, *half of Hungary*, including Transylvania, was deemed to be under the control of Stephen III.⁵⁷

Yet, since the autumn 1496, Drágffy had a strained relation with Transylvanian Estates.⁵⁸ Moreover, given the recent events, tremendous efforts were made in Hungary to ensure a “national reconciliation”.⁵⁹ In a context in which the main concerns not only of the royalist party, but also of several members of the elite (including those who – such as the Szapolyai family – had acted against the interest of the House of Jagiello in 1497⁶⁰), were the Habsburg and the Ottomans questions, even at the cost of expanding the break between Wladislaw II and his brother John Albert of Moldavia, the unsuccessful invader of Moldavia,⁶¹ a series of “collective” measures were enacted. They included also the voivodal retreat of Bartholomew Drágffy.⁶²

⁵⁵ E.g. MOL, DL 29016; Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor*, vol. XV/1. *Acte și scrisori din arhivele orașelor ardelene Bistrița, Brașov, Sibiu, 1358–1600*, ed. N. Iorga (Bucharest, 1911, hereafter *Hurmuzaki*), nos. 269–271, 147–149; Samu Barabás, ed., *Székely oklevéltár 1219–1776*, (Budapest, 1934), no. 107, 173–175.

⁵⁶ For an overview of the matters: I. A. Pop, Al. Simon, “Moldova și celălalt Imperiu: Preliminariile și consecințele *conspirației* lui Maximilian I de Habsburg și Ștefan cel Mare (1497)”, in Ovidiu Cristea, Gheorghe Lazăr, eds, *Vocația istoriei. Prinos profesorului Șerban Papacostea* (Brăila, 2008), 331–406.

⁵⁷ E.g. Archivio di Stato di Milano, Milan (hereafter ASM), A.D.S (hereafter Archivio Ducale Sforzesco), Potenze estere, *Illiria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. [1.] *Iliria*, nn; 4th of March, 27th of May 1498); [Gutierre Gómez de Fuensalida], *Correspondencia de Gutierre Gomez de Fuensalida, embajador en Alemania, Flandes é Inglaterra (1496–1509)*, edited by the Duke of Berwick and of Alba [Jacobó Fitz-James Stuart] (Madrid, 1907), 21 (22nd of February 1498; probably one of the most important texts on Maximilian I of Habsburg’s political ideas).

⁵⁸ Archiv Mesta Bardejove, *Középkori gyűjtémény*, no. 3291 (28th of October 1496; photocopy MOL, DF 216076]; C. Wagner, ed., *Petri de Warda epistolae cum nonnullis Wladislai II. regis Hungariae litteris Petri causa scriptis* (Bratislava, Kosice, 1776), no. 64, 127.

⁵⁹ This attitude can also be followed throughout 1498 and 1499 (until summer) in the various reports that reached the Italian and German vicinities of the Hungarian realm (e.g. ASM, A.D.S, Potenze Estere. *Iliria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. [1.] *Iliria*, fasc. [2], *Raguza*; nn; 1st, 3rd of January, 24th of February, 12th of July 1498; 20th of February, 19th of July 1499).

⁶⁰ For instance: Engel, *Geschichte des Ungarischen Reiches*, III/2, 89–90; Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen*, 342–343; Pop, Simon, “Moldova și celălalt imperiu”, 381–384.

⁶¹ In this respect, the case of young Sigismund Jagiello must be recalled as it reveals both the ambitions of the House and the hostility such ambitions encountered – on more than just one occasion – in the Hungarian realm. Adorján Divéky, *Zsigmond lengyel herceg budai számadásai (1500–1502., 1505.)* (offprint *Magyar Történelmi Tár*, XXVI) (Budapest, 1914), especially 4–5, 138). Eventually, Sigismund had to be placed in a “neutral protective custody” in Buda.

⁶² See Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, 518–521, 536–537; Neumann, “Drágfi Bertalan”, 229–234 (for the “domestic explanation” of the “retreat”).

At that time, in spite of the fact that in 1497 the troops of Bayezid II and – apparently also – Radu IV of Wallachia had aided Stephen III against the Polish army of John Albert,⁶³ Bartholomew Drágffy apparently also presented an Ottoman and Wallachian problem for the crown. Probably supported by Stephen III⁶⁴ – Bartholomew might have kept the thought – shared initially also by Wladislaw II in early 1497 (the king had considered that both Stephen III and Radu IV could be deposed)⁶⁵ – of dethroning Radu IV and replacing him with Mihnea I,⁶⁶ the illegitimate son of Vlad III sheltered in Hungary.⁶⁷ Desperate to come to terms with Bayezid II,⁶⁸ and terrified by further Hungarian unrests⁶⁹, Wladislaw II had to find a way to “side-line” Bartholomew Drágffy, a clear regional risk after his unauthorized “Moldavian intervention”. The stakes largely exceeded the Transylvanian problems of the age. By spring 1498, “compelled” by Maximilian I of Habsburg’s (as well as Stephen III of Moldavia’s victorious anti-Jagiellonian manoeuvres of 1497), the Venetian republic consecrated *Dacia* and then *Croatia* as regional political additions to the already traditional Jagiellonian structure, *Hungaria* and *Polania*.⁷⁰

⁶³ For an analysis of the (southern and eastern) actors involved in the crisis of 1497: Ș. Papacostea, “De la Colomeea la Codrii Cosminului (poziția internațională a Moldovei la sfârșitul secolului al XV-lea)”, *Romanoslavica* XVII (1970): 525–554.

⁶⁴ Given also the later events, there can be little doubt that Stephen III thought of “sparing” Radu IV as ruler of Wallachia (see further Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, 536).

⁶⁵ Wladislaw had taken on Stephen in Transylvania (MOL, DL 29016). Radu was a logical addition to a general Jagiellonian action plan. Besides, he had begun “inquiring” about the return of Severin and the Transylvanian duchies of Amlaș and Făgăraș, the old royal fiefs once entrusted to the rulers of Wallachia. This attitude gained momentum after 1497 and – in particular – after Krakow and Târgoviște (who had “teamed up” also in the 1460 and early 1470s) drew closer after 1499 (for the sources: Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, 284, notes 512–513).

⁶⁶ E.g. I. Bogdan, *Documente privitoare la relațiile Țării Românești cu Brașovul și cu Țara Ungurească în secolele XV și XVI* (Bucharest, 1905), no. 180, 216; *Hurmuzaki*, XV/1, no. 265, 146; no. 267–268, 146–147.

⁶⁷ See Alexandru Lapedatu, “Mihnea cel Rău și ungarul. 1508–1510”, *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie Națională* I (1921–1922): 46–76. It must be stressed out that – according to John Szapolyai himself (after he became voivode of Transylvania in 1510), Mihnea’s wife, Voica, was related to the Szapolyai family (*Hurmuzaki*, XV/1, no. 390, 216). By 1515, their daughter, Ruxandra, became the wife of Stephen III’s son, Bogdan III.

⁶⁸ *Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem Könyvtár*, Budapest, Codices, *Kaprinai*, A, LI, no. 47, 108–120 [November 1497 <-January 1498?>]; Wladislaw II’s instructions for his envoy sent to Istanbul; edited by I. Šišić, “Rukovet spomenika o hercegu Ivanisu Korvinu i o borbama Hrvata s Turcima (1473–1496)”, *Starine* XXXVIII (1937): 1–180, at no. 200, 102–109].

⁶⁹ As a part of a rather moderate approach, the problems were revealed by Vilmos Fraknói, *Erdödi Bakócz Tamás élete* (Budapest, 1889), 59–62.

⁷⁰ *Hungaria, Polania, Dacia et Croatia* (Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Venice., Senato Secreti, *Deliberazioni* hereafter ASVe, S.S.) first appeared in reg. 37. 1496–1497, with information up to the 1st of March 1498 (when the new Venetian year began. Al. Simon, “From Wallachia to

His replacement with Peter of Sankt-Georg and Bozyn also came when Drágffy, along with John Corvinus in the southern parts of the realm (Venice's citizen and Maximilian's ally since 1496⁷¹), were the main warrants in the area of Transylvania of Stephen III's influence, alike him, one of the richest men in Hungary, primarily since Drágffy had become sole voivode of Transylvania (1493–1494).⁷² In order not to completely alienate Stephen and to avoid adding insult to injury in Bartholomew's case, the crown moved Drágffy to the west, basically promoting him as a supreme commander in the south-western Serbian-Ottoman border area, where Józsa Somi, count of Timiș and captain of the Inferior Parts of Hungary,⁷³ was highly active (especially since the same year 1498).⁷⁴

German (Bavarian and Habsburg) reports,⁷⁵ issued in 1501 – prior to the death of Drágffy in autumn – during the Ottoman–Venetian-Hungarian war (a war that often exceeded Buda's resources and commitment⁷⁶), recorded that *Graff Peter von Pesing weyda in Siebenburghen*, [...] *oberster haubptman*,

Dacia: International Politics and Political Ideology in the Last Decades of the Fifteenth Century, in M. Rady, Al. Simon, eds, *Government and Law in Medieval Moldavia, Transylvania and Wallachia*, Studies in Russia and Eastern Europe, XI (London, 2013), 91–100.

⁷¹ See in this respect Iván Nagy, “Corvin János velencei nemességéről”, *Új Magyar Múzeum* III, no. 1 (1853): 655–656; Pop, Simon, “Moldova și celălalt imperiu”, 381–389. Vienna, Venice and Suceava were three major arguments against John at the court in Buda.

⁷² For more information, see Ácsády, *Régi magyar birtokviszonyok*, 24, 32; Drăgan, *Nobilimea românească*, 306–307; Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, 520–521.

⁷³ He had served as Paul Kinizsi's trustee, replacing him as count after the latter's death (1494). Józsa Somi retained all his office until at least 1508. Unfortunately, Somi's career has not received the needed attention until now (for an overview of the context and of the implications of his actions, see in particular Adrian Magina, “Un nobil sârb în Banatul secolului al XV-lea: Miloš Belmužević”, *Analele Banatului* XVIII (2010): 135–142).

⁷⁴ ASM, A.D.S, Potenze Estere. *Iliria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc 1, nn (24th of February 1498). He should have operated within the limits of the defensive system enacted by Matthias, see Géza Pálffy, “The Origins and Development of the Border Defense System against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (up to the Early Eighteenth Century)”, in P. Fodor, Géza David, eds, *Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: the Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest* (Leiden, Cologne, Boston, 2000), 3–69.

⁷⁵ BStB, Codices, A.L.H, CML 14688, ff. 95^r–98^r (at 95^v); HHStA, R.H.K., *Maximiliana*, Karton 41. *Undatiert*, fasc. 34–III. *Auswärtige Staaten*. 12. *Türken*, 23^r–24^v, 40^r–41^r [after the 14th of May 1501]. Even if Radu IV, known also as *Rodolpho IV*, in the Venetian-Habsburg conversations (e.g. Zaccaria Contarini's reports sent from Maximilian's court in Innsbruck, in 1502, partially edited in *Hurmuzaki*, VIII, 1376–1650, [ed. Ioan Slavici?] (Bucharest, 1894), no. 41, 34; no. 45, 36), attempted to establish himself also in relation to the Western powers, the internal division of Wallachia proper was assumed and exploited by the House of Habsburg, since the days when Radu IV was his father's, Vlad IV's, associate ruler in the early 1490s.

⁷⁶ See also V. Fraknói, “Lónyay Albert zengi kapitány velencei követségéi 1501–1515. Közlemények a velencei állami levéltárból”, *Magyar Történelmi Tár* XXII (1877): 3–44.

together with the *weyda in der Molda und der Weyda in Groß und Clain Wallachey* (a typical – in effect – it should be added Habsburg structure for the “Three Wallachias” and Eastern Hungary)⁷⁷ formed the oriental flank of the Holy Crown. In the West, Bartholomew Drágffy was acting as the commander-in-chief for the men led by Józsa Somi.⁷⁸ Since 1499–1500, Drágffy was (also) the *alias vaivoda Transylvaniae* (which consequently meant in that context the “other voivode of Transylvania”⁷⁹). The situation signals an important paradox, probably defining for both *Hungaria* and *Dacia* (since spring 1498) at both ends of the – not to seldom duplicitous – territories involved: in Transylvania proper⁸⁰, as well as near the lands bordering the flow of the Tisa river through the marshes⁸¹.

If we add together – alike the Hungarian royal administration – the tasks entrusted to Bartholomew Drágffy, “supreme commander” of the south-western anti-Ottoman troops and co-voivode of Transylvania, Drágffy’s power had grown significantly at the turn of the century. Basically most lands between the Tisa and the Carpathians (the regions around the Maramureş included⁸²) were under his control. Otherwise put: by 1500 the latest, Drágffy “governed” Stephen III’s “half of Hungary” from 1498⁸³. Nevertheless, this “administrative expansion” of Drágffy had come after his resignation/ deposition as voivode of

⁷⁷ E.g. HHStA. *Maximiliana*, Karton 10. 1499 Juni–1500 Dezember, fasc. 5b [–2]. 1500 August-Oktober, f. 59^r (13th of September 1500); Karton 12. 1501 Oktober–1502 Dezember, fasc. 6b [–2]. 1501 Oktober-Dezember, 214^v–215^r (in fact the 2nd of September 1501); Karton 23, 1510 Oktober–1511 Februar, fasc. 16 [–3]. 1510 OT, 12^r–13^r [April-August 1499].

⁷⁸ BStB, Codices, A.L.H, CML 14688, 95^v. It is a highly noteworthy miscellaneous manuscript with several reports on Ottoman matters (including on the Battle at Câmpul Pâinii).

⁷⁹ *Diplome maramureşene*, no. 345, p. 405 (D. 1/ 1500). *Alias* (unlike *olim*) can hardly be translated by “former”. “The other” is the only translation possible.

⁸⁰ E.g. BNM, Cod. Ital. VII-999 (=8002), 34 (147)^v, 37 (150)^r (26th of March, 5th of April 1496). Venice was informed that Stephen, *count of Transylvania* (i.e. count-palatine Stephen Szapolyai) was at odds with John Corvinus (who sought Maximilian’s support). The – frequent – “Transylvanian confusion” regarding Szapolyai’s office revealed the clear local divisions.

⁸¹ We refer here primarily to the case of the Polheims, acting between Wladislaw II and Maximilian I throughout the Hungarian-Wallachian events of 1497, both in Buda and in the area of Timiş, i.e. near the Hungarian-Ottoman-Wallachian *triconfinium* (e.g. HHStA, R.H.K., *Maximiliana*, Karton 8. 1497 November–1498 April, fasc. 4b [–3]. 1497 November-Dezember, 19^r, 58^r; S.A., A.D.S., *Polonica*, [Series I], Karton 1. (1257) 1468–1530, fasc. 1 [–B]. 1468–1525, f. 15^r; 18th of October, 12th of November, 5th of December 1497); I. Bogdan, *Documentele lui Ştefan cel Mare*, vol. II, 1493–1503 (Bucharest, 1913, hereafter *Documente Ştefan*), no. 175, 408; the Polheim family deserve a modern study).

⁸² In relation to the Hunyadi age, see Kovács, “The Authorities of Middle Solnoc”, 43–45; Hegyi, “The Affiliation of the Sălaj”, 77–86.

⁸³ ASM, A.D.S, Potenze estere, *Illiria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. 1, nn (4th of March, 27th of May 1498); *Correspondencia de Gutierre Gomez*, 21.

Transylvania in the autumn of 1498⁸⁴. Additionally, in 1500 and 1501 he had to share power with Józsa Somi in the West, respectively and most importantly with Peter of Bozyn and Sankt-Georg in the East.⁸⁵ The implications of these Hungarian “administrative joint-ventures” are particularly clear if we look at the diplomatic context.

Drágffy returned to official royal administrative Transylvanian grace (if he had truly fallen from it in late 1498⁸⁶) around the time of the trilateral Moldavian-Hungarian-Polish “crusader treaty” of Hârlău in July 1499,⁸⁷ on the eve of the new Venetian-Ottoman war⁸⁸. The war engulfed also Hungary (foremost because for Wladislaw II his crusader vow was the Papal way-out of his marriage with Beatrice of Aragon⁸⁹) and by the end of 1500 reunited as Rome’s crusaders Hungary, Poland and the Wallachians.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the relations between Maximilian I and Stephen III had further intensified,⁹¹ while Radu IV of Wallachia, without officially antagonizing Bayezid II and the Greek rite environment under the power of the Porte,⁹² made significant efforts to

⁸⁴ BStB, Codices, A.L.H, CML 14688, 95^r–98^r (for the entire report on the situation Hungary). It is rather difficult to believe that Drágffy was promoted, demoted and promoted.

⁸⁵ BStB, Codices, A.L.H, CML 14688, f. 95^v. *Diplome maramureşene*, no. 345, p. 405. His eastern reinstatement probably preceded his western mandate.

⁸⁶ Around that time, Stephen’s main councillors (chancellor John Tăutu and treasurer Isasc) made their donations at Peri and Feleac, the main Greek rite ecclesiastical centres in Eastern Hungary, loyal in 1497 to their protectors Drágffy and Stephen – Al. Simon, *Feleacul* (1367–1587) (Cluj-Napoca, 2004), 102–104).

⁸⁷ See *Documente Ştefan*, II, no. 178, 417–441 (the Slavonic and the Latin versions of the treaty); Papacostea, “De la Colomeea la Codrii Cosminului”, 536–539, 544–549.

⁸⁸ E.g. Hans [Peter-Alexander] Theunissen, “Ottoman–Venetian Diplomats: The Ahd-names. The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political Commerical Instruments”, *Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies* I, no. 2 (1998): 3–698 (at 133–140); Eugen Denize, *Stephen the Great* (Bucharest, 2004), 192–201.

⁸⁹ E.g.; HHStA, R.H.K., *Maximiliana*, Karton 9. 1498 Mai–1499 Mai, fasc. 5a[–1]. 1499 Januar-Mai], 93^r (9th of April 1499 Joannis Burkardi Liber Notarum ab anno MCCCCLXXXIII usque ad annum MDVI, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores XXXII, 1, vol II. [1497–1503] (Città di Castello, 1911), 212 (the Roman procedures).

⁹⁰ For instance: Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Vatican City, Miscellanea, Armadi, [reg.] II–30, 136 (141)^v–146 (151)^v, at ff. 141 (146)^r–142 (147)^r, 144 (149)^r (18th, 28th of November 1500).

⁹¹ See also Ştefana Simionescu, “Ştiri noi despre relațiile diplomatice dintre Ştefan cel Mare și Maximilian I de Habsburg”, *Revista de Istorie* XXXIII, no. 12 (1980): 1981–1986 (unfortunately, several errors marred the edition of the source).

⁹² E.g. Spyridon P. Lambros, ed., *Ecthesis Chronica* (*Ecthesis Chronica and Chronicon Athenarum*) (London, 1902), 67–70; *Aus der Chronik des Oruç*, *Aus der Chronik des Hanivaldanus*, in *Aus der Chronik des Hanivaldanus*, in *Der fromme Sultan Bayezid. Die Geschichte seiner Herrschaft (1481–1512) nach den altosmanischen Chroniken des Oruç und des Anonymus Hanivaldanus*, Osmanische Geschichtsschreiber, IX, ed. Richard F. Kreutel (Graz, Vienna, Cologne, 1978), 83, 90, 96, 198–201, 212–222, 267.

win the goodwill of Vienna,⁹³ Buda,⁹⁴ Venice⁹⁵ and Krakow⁹⁶, and was most successful in the last two cases (because of the anti- and mainly pro-Ottoman diplomatic necessities of the Republic⁹⁷ and because of Krakow's hostility towards Suceava⁹⁸). Bartholomew Drágffy apparently also functioned as a – difficult – political crossroad.

Placed in a border context in which ever since (Bayezid II's proposal had been accepted in 1486⁹⁹) no Hungarian-Ottoman border clashes involving less than 300 men on each side should be deemed breaks of peace,¹⁰⁰ Drágffy's presence and functions are also relevant for the actual anti-Ottoman actions of Stephen III in the last years of his rule (for which we lack substantial evidence on any military Moldavian action in Wallachia.)¹⁰¹ Stephen III's main Ottoman problems were not on proper Wallachian soil, but at the Dniestr and Danube Mounds.¹⁰² Meanwhile, especially between 1500 and 1502, Wallachia was on the "same Venetian side" as Stephen III.¹⁰³ Still, Wallachian-Moldavian frictions can hardly be ruled given the ambitions of both Radu IV and Stephen III.

⁹³ *Hurmuzaki*, VIII, nos. 41–45, 34–36; Marino Sanudo Il Giovane, *I diarii di Marino Sanuto (MCCCCXCVI-MDXXXIII) dall'autografo Marciano ital. cl. VII cod. CDXIX–CDLXXVII*, eds Guglielmo Berchet, Frederico Berchet, Nicolo Barozzi, Rinaldo Fulin, Marco Allegri, III. 1 ottobre 1499 – 31 marzo 1501 (Venice, 1880), cols. 567, 635, 713, 927, 1478.

⁹⁴ For an overview: *Hurmuzaki*, XV/1, no. 272, / 148–149; no. 274 / 150–151; no. 277, / 152; no. 284, / 155–156; no. 286, 157–158; *Sanudo*, III, cols. 1465, 1467, 1537

⁹⁵ For instance ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 38. 1500–1501 [*More Veneto* 1502], cc. 2 (12)^v–5 (15)^v, at c. 3 (13)^r (10th of March 1500); reg. 39. 1502–1503 [*More Veneto* 1504], cc. 46^v–47^v (21st of October 1502); BNM, Cod. Ital. VII–990 (=9582), 110^v–111^r, 125^r (9th, 18th of January 1502).

⁹⁶ See also *Hurmuzaki*, II/2. 1451–1510, ed. Nicolae Densușianu (Bucharest, 1891), no. 368, 430–435; no. 406, 509; Fryderik Papée, ed., *Acta Alexandri Regis Poloniae, magni ducis Lithuaniae, etc. (1501–1506)*, Monumenta Medii aevi res gestas Poloniae illustrantia, XIX (Krakow, 1927, hereafter *Acta Alexandri*), no. 130, 196; no. 152, 242; no. 168, 284–285.

⁹⁷ In particular: ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*; reg. 38, c. 182^r (4th of December 1500); reg. 39, cc. 22^r–23^v, 46^v–47^v (28th of July, 21st of October 1502); *Sanudo*, III, cols. 1240, 1537.

⁹⁸ ASM, A.D.S, Potenze estere, *Illiria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. 1, nn (7th of November 1499); *Hurmuzaki*, XV/1, no. 239, 159; *Documente Ștefan*, II, no. 182, 457.

⁹⁹ E.g. Iván Nagy, Albert B. Nyáry, *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek. Mátyás király korából 1458–1490*, Monumenta Hungariae Historica I, vol. III [1481–1488] (Budapest, 1877, hereafter *MDE*), no. 90, 122. The "deal" was upheld until the time of the Battle of Mohács.

¹⁰⁰ See the sources quoted by A. Kubinyi, "Die Schlacht bei Mohács und ihre Vorgeschichte", in Kubinyi, *Stände und Ständestaat*, 365–442 (in particular 372–374, 389–393).

¹⁰¹ Ileana Căzan, E. Denize, *Marile puteri și spațiul românesc în secolele XV–XVI* (Bucharest, 2001), 152–169.

¹⁰² For an overview of the sources: Pop, Simon, "Moldova și celălalt Imperiu", 377–380; Simon, "Crusading", 215–217.

¹⁰³ See also the documents in Al. Simon, "Valahii și domnii lor în războiul veneto-otoman de la sfârșitul secolului XV (1499–1503)", *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie A.D. Xenopol* L (2013): 49–62.

Collisions increased chiefly due to Radu's manoeuvres. He had close contacts to Bayezid II.¹⁰⁴ When Stephen's end drew near around April 1504, he also managed to end – naturally did with Bayezid's blessing,¹⁰⁵ – the “Moldavian hegemony” on Athos.¹⁰⁶ In parallel (1501–1503), Radu successfully negotiated with John Albert, and then Alexander.¹⁰⁷ Krakow was also desperate to come to terms with Istanbul.¹⁰⁸ Radu even stated that – unless the Polish crown had an apt pretender for the Moldavian throne that suited the interests of both the northern realm and of the Wallachian ruler, he would occupy Moldavia so that it would not fall into the hands of the *Turks*.¹⁰⁹ Stephen III's hostage son (i.e. the “other” Alexander, sent around 1471–1472 to the Porte) was the candidate of Bayezid II.¹¹⁰ Stephen appeared largely isolated in the region. Any Hungarian connection was of paramount importance for him. He made the most out of it¹¹¹.

According to a Venetian report sent from Hungary at the start of September 1502,¹¹² the *Turks* near Belgrade (on the Ottoman side of the Danube) had engaged the Hungarian troops (7,000 horse) of Józsa Somi, aided by *about 7,000 men of il Valacho* (the name commonly used in Venice for Stephen III¹¹³, and

¹⁰⁴ Al. Lapedatu, “Politica lui Radu cel Mare, 1495–1508”, in *Lui Ion Bianu amintire* (Bucharest, 1916), 191–223.

¹⁰⁵ See the confirmation charter in Georgios Salakides, *Sultansurkunden des Athos-Klosters Vatopedi aus der Zeit Bayezid II. und Selim I. Kritische Edition und wissenschaftlicher Kommentar* (Thessaloniki, 1995), no. 13, 73; as well as the chronicles of Theodosius Zygomalas (?), *Historia politica constantinopoleos a 1391 usque ad 1578 annum Christi (Zygomalas)*, and of [Manuel Malaxos], *Historia politica constantinopoleos a 1454 usque ad 1578 annum Christi (Malaxos)*, in *Historia Politica et Patriarchica Constantinopoleos. Epirotica*, Immanuel Bekker, ed., *Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, vol. III (Bonn, 1849), 11–77 (at 45–54, 70, and 78–204 (at 140)).

¹⁰⁶ See also in this matter Pierre Lemerle, ed., *Actes de Kutulumus*, Archives de l'Athos II (Paris, 1945¹), no. 48, 20; *Ecthesis Chronica*, 57; Petre Ș. Năsturel, “Radu Vodă cel Mare și patriarhul de Constantinopol Ioachim I-ul Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie XX (2002): 23–31.

¹⁰⁷ For instance *Hurmuzaki*, II/2, no. 312, 321; no. 368, 430–435; no. 406, 509; nos. 448–499, 557–564; *Acta Alexandri*, no. 130, 196; no. 152, 242; no. 168, 284–285.

¹⁰⁸ E.g. ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, reg. 38, c. 55^v, 182^r (20th of August, 4th of December 1500); *Acta Alexandri*, nos 113–114, 161–167; no. 123, 177; *Sanudo*, III, cols. 1478–1479.

¹⁰⁹ For Radu's approach of Stephen's succession, see also P. P. Panaitescu, “Contribuții la istoria lui Ștefan cel Mare”, *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice* 3rd series, XV (1933–1934): 61–80 (at 73–77).

¹¹⁰ Al. Simon, “*Quello ch' e apresso el Turcho*. About A Son of Stephen the Great”, *Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica* V–VI (2004–2005): 139–164.

¹¹¹ Papacostea, “De la Colomeea la Codrii Cosminului”, 545; Căzan, Denize, *Marile puteri*, 196; Pop, Simon, “Moldova și celălalt imperiu”, 391–394.

¹¹² Typically for the Venetian “chronicles” or “diaries”, the report was copied by the Venetian senator (see *Sanudo*, IV. *1 marzo 1501–31 marzo 1503* (Venice, 1880–1881), col.s. 320, 323).

¹¹³ E.g. I. A. Pop, “La Santa Sede, Venezia e la Valacchia nella crociata antiottomana di fine Quattrocento”, *Transylvanian Review* XX, suppl. 1 (2011): 7–22 (since the 1470s).

which – given also the talks he and Thomas Bakócz, Archbishop of Esztergom were conducting in the Republic's name with the Porte¹¹⁴, could hardly have applied to Radu¹¹⁵). Yet Venetian foreign reports and domestic records were not free of disinformation, constructed by the Republic as well.¹¹⁶ During the “Polish crusade” of 1497, the *Serenissima* attempted to divert attention from the Moldavian crisis by claiming – for instance – that Poles, Russians, Hungarians, Moldavians or Tartars all fought against the *Turk* and were closing-in on Istanbul.¹¹⁷ Such proven disinformation (1497 almost became a scandal in Venice¹¹⁸) and the bitter war consuming the Republic herself since 1499¹¹⁹ suggest however that the information from September 1502 contained a least an ounce of truth.

The only way to military connect Suceava to Belgrade was based on the administrative link established through the double-functions held by Drágffy for about two years (roughly between summer 1499 and autumn 1501¹²⁰). Before a compromise was reached between Suceava and Istanbul in fall that same year (Moldavia's Ottoman tribute was diminished¹²¹ and Stephen's troops focused on Poland¹²²), the Moldavian-Ottoman hostilities had reached a new peak. Stephen's men defeated the Tartars loyal to Bayezid II¹²³ and – more

¹¹⁴ ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*; reg. 39, cc. 22^r–23^v, 27^{r-v}, 46^v–47^v (28th of July, 20th of August, 21st of October 1502); Simon, “*Valahii și domnii lor*”, 55–58.

¹¹⁵ Radu would have however fancied such an honour. As the dominant figure at the Lower Danube in the early 1410s, his ancestor Mircea I of Wallachia had been Venice's *the Wallachian* (e.g. P.P. Panaitescu, *Mircea cel Bătrân*, ed. Gh. Lazăr (Bucharest, 2000), 391–394). Almost a century later, Mircea, in German sources as well, occasionally appeared synonymous with Wallachia's suzerainty (hegemony) over Moldavia (e.g. from the 1480s: BStB, Codices, A.L.H., CLM 14668, 7^a–43^v, at 23^v, 24^v).

¹¹⁶ The 1470s: Al. Simon, “Anti-Ottoman Warfare and Crusader Propaganda: New Evidences from the Archives of Milan”, *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* LVI (2007): 1–4, 25–39.

¹¹⁷ For instance BNM, Codl. Lat., classa XIV, *Miscellanea*, no. 99 (=4278), 45^r, 50^r–53^v, 64^r, 76^r (16th, 25th, 4th, 7th, 11th, 17th of August 1497); O. Cristea, “O altă istorie: campania din 1497 în *Jurnalele lui Marino Sanudo*”, *Analele Putnei* V, no. 1 (2009): 39–50.

¹¹⁸ E.g. *Sanudo*, I. *1 gennaio 1496–30 settembre 1498* (Venice, 1879), cols. 740, 744, 756, 950 (compared to the image in Căzan, Denize, *Marile puteri*, 183–189).

¹¹⁹ See also the information gathered in Alfred Reumont, “Un'ambasciata veneziana in Ungheria. 1500–1503”, *Archivio Storico Italiano* 4th series, III (1879): 198–215.

¹²⁰ MOL, DL 65220 (26th of October 1501); BStB, Codices, A.L.H., CML 14688, 95^v [spring-summer 1501]; *Diplome maramureșene*, no. 345, 405.

¹²¹ See also the Ottoman sources in Mihai Maxim, “Stephen the Great and the Great Porte: New Turkish Documents”, *Transylvanian Review* XIV, no. 1 (2005): 25 (at 20–22).

¹²² *Documente Ștefan*, II, no. 183–185, 459–464; *Acta Alexandri*, no. 117, 169. The attacks, launched since April, intensified after Bayezid II granted peace to Krakow in October.

¹²³ *Sanudo*, IV, cols. 320, 333. In November, Krakow then claimed that *Tartars, Serbians and Hungarian nobles* supported Stephen against her (*Acta Alexandri*, no. 125, 188).

importantly – at about the same time (in July) – the Crimean Tartars, aided also by Moldavia, crushed the Volga Tartars,¹²⁴ who had – at least allegedly – been recently “invited” by Bayezid II to settle in – very threatening – Moldavia.¹²⁵ If real, the Hungarian-Wallachian (subsequent) action near Belgrade would stand for an immediate necessary display of regional power on Stephen’s behalf.¹²⁶

At the beginning of the 16th century, aside from Venice and Rome, Stephen III had a very precise list of supporters. It consisted of Maximilian I of Habsburg (who was nevertheless remotely positioned¹²⁷), various Tartar figures (likewise, at a certain distance from his borders¹²⁸), Ivan III of Moscow (up north, to which Stephen III soon lost contact after his nephew, Dimitri, Ivan’s designated heir, lost the fight for Ivan’s succession¹²⁹), Wladislaw II Jagiello (within the quite clear limits drawn by the interests of the House of Jagiello¹³⁰), John Corvinus (in the south-western parts of Hungary¹³¹) and – up to the end of 1501 in particular – of Bartholomew Drágffy and his entourage (within and outside Transylvania¹³²). In case of immediate political need and military response, the last two, chiefly the latter, were the most important figures in Stephen’s defensive system. In their absence, in spite of glorious talks or promises, as well as of

¹²⁴ Leslie Collins, ‘On the alleged *destruction* of the Great Horde in 1502’, *Byzantinische Forschungen* (Amsterdam), XV (1990), pp. 361–399 (with further data and discussions).

¹²⁵ For an overview of the sources: Bertold Spuler, *Die Goldene Horde. 1223–1502* (Wiesbaden 1965²), 207–208; Căzan, Denize, *Marile puteri*, 184–186.

¹²⁶ Besides, at that time in German or Venetian circles, Vlad III *Dracula* (his abuses seemed forgotten) – still – “surpassed” Stephen III, probably also because of the latter’s “excessive” ability to operate between fronts (e.g. BStB, Codices, A.L.H., CLM 14668, 23^v; *Sanudo*, IV, col. 325). Confronted also with Radu IV, Stephen had to work on his regional image.

¹²⁷ For Maximilian’s “geopolitics”, see here Hermann Wiesflecker, *Maximilian I. Die Fundamente des habsburgischen Weltreiches* (Vienna, Munich, 1991), 169–172.

¹²⁸ In spite of its bias, see also Alexandru I. Gonța, *Români și Hoarda de Aur 1241–1502* (Munich, 1984), 173–180.

¹²⁹ In these matters, see also Constantin Rezachevici, “Ștefan cel Mare, Ivan III, Sofia Tominicina (Paleolog) și Elena Stefanovna Volosanca. Legături dinastice și politice”, *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie XXII* (2004): 51–72.

¹³⁰ *Hurmuzaki*, II/2, nos. 402–403, 505–507; *Actae et epistolae*, I, no. 53, 64–66; no. 55–58, 68–71; *Acta Alexandri*, no. 187, 327–328; no. 213, 354–355; no. 218, 369.

¹³¹ E.g. Viaceslav Makusev, *Monumenta Historica Slavorum Meridionalum vicinorumque populorum e tabularis et bibliothecis italicis derompta*, I/1. *Ancona-Bononia-Florentia* (Warsaw, 1874), no. 6, 317; *Sanudo*, I, col. 625. In 1493, John had forced Wladislaw to support Drágffy’s Peri (*Diplome maramureșene*, no. 348, 600). This northern connection of the largely southern based lord might have played further in his favour, had he won the seat of count-palatine in April 1500 (instead, his uncle, Peter Géreb, the brother of the Bishop of Transylvania, took the office).

¹³² The royal troubles caused by the Moldavian administration of Ciceu must also be recalled here (Stadtsarchiv Nürnberg, Nürnberg, Fürstentum Brandenburg-Ansbach., *Brandenburger Literalien*, no. 1056.1 (14th of March 1499; in MOL, DF, no. 267261).

the memory of spectacular deeds, Stephen III's chances of survival would have hardly favoured his survival, at least not in the manner the aging warlord had grown accustomed to.¹³³

Even if news on the combats in the area of Belgrade was – to various extents – manufactured, with Stephen III playing his part in the processes, who thus surfaced victorious at both ends (at the Hungarian-Ottoman-Serbian and at the Moldavian-Ottoman-Tartar one) of the terrestrial crusader front (at any rate, Habsburg, Venetian or Moldavian propaganda knew that he did possess the ability of defeating Hungarians, *Turks* and Tartars in the same day¹³⁴), such a story, spread from the Dniestr to the Sava, would not have been tenable without “Transylvanian backing” (irrespective of the real or ascribed value of this episode, more than half of the men sent to Belgrade under Stephen's nominal command, whose main Moldavian rapid intervention force consisted of 10,000–12,000 trained soldiers,¹³⁵ probably came from the Hungarian realm). How much of this “backing” was made out of political relations and how much out of human means it difficult to assert. What can be said is that – in terms of administration – the royal authorities remained unwilling to gamble the safety of Hungary proper on their confidence in Transylvania (the repeated rumours and reports on the risks of Transylvania giving-in to – through foremost Szekler or Wallachian treason – to the riders of Istanbul, Suceava or Târgoviște were too present in order not to be effective even if only as recurrent exaggerations¹³⁶) and that – in Stephen III's case – the Tartar and Hungarian events (successes) of 1502 had enough pragmatic substance to give new momentum to Stephen III's dying ambitions.¹³⁷

In early December 1502 (only a few days before Bayezid II swore in Istanbul the peace with the *Serenissima*¹³⁸) Matteo Muriano, the doctor sent by

¹³³ For an overview, see also Denize, *Stephen the Great*, 202–207; Pop, Simon, “Moldova și celălalt Imperiu”, 285–288; Simon, “The Hungarian Means”, 274–276.

¹³⁴ E.g. HHStA, S.A., A.usserdeutsche Staaten *Hungarica*, Karton 2, fasc. 2-A. 1526 Januar-Juli, 30^{r-v} [March-April 1474]; Jean Mollinet, *Chroniques*, ed. Georges Doutrepont, Omer Jodogne, vol. II, 1488–1506 (Brussels, 1935), 199–200; *Cronica Moldo-Germană* in *Cronicile slavo-române*, 28–37 (at 29–30).

¹³⁵ See also Al. Simon, Cristian Luca, “Documentary Perspectives on Matthias Corvinus and Stephen the Great”, *Transylvanian Review* XVII, no. 3 (2008): 85–112 (at 88–89).

¹³⁶ E.g. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich, Mischbestände, Fürstliche Sachen, *Literalien*, fasc. 215 [–1]. 1503–1505, 20^r (3rd of September 1504); *Hurmuzaki*, XV/1, nos. 283–286, 155–157; nos. 304–306, 165–167; nos. 308–310, 168; *Actae et epistolae*, I, nos. 57–58, 70–72; *Sanudo*, VI, 1 aprile 1504–28 febbraio 1507 (Venice, 1883), cols. 49–50.

¹³⁷ E.g. *Documente Ștefan*, II, no.185, 463–464; *Acta Alexandri*, no. 187, 310–312; no. 213, 352–358; no. 218, 369–370; *Sanudo*, IV, cols. 105, 311, 629, 735–736.

¹³⁸ For perspectives: Sidney N. Fisher, *The Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1481–1512* (Urbana, IL, 1948), 79–81; Theunissen, “Ottoman–Venetian Diplomats”, 140–148.

the Republic to Suceava at Stephen III's request, wrote to Venice of a Moldavia that seemed a "Hunyadi styled" Hungary (i.e. the exaggerations regarding the realms forces and wealth during the reign of Matthias Corvinus¹³⁹), ruled by Stephen III, who had 60,000 men and could accommodate 100,000 horses, being able to reach Istanbul within 15 or 20 days.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, like a quarter of century earlier (when Venice wanted him to attack in Bulgaria and he was more concerned about the northern shores of the Black Sea¹⁴¹), Stephen was looking less towards the Bosphorus and more towards the Crimea, under – the altogether reasonable – pretext that the Tartars could attack him while moved into the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴² But there was one pass (*Pericop*) at the western limits of the peninsula (the same pass he wanted to use to invade the Crimea more than two decades earlier) where 10,000 men (i.e. his men) could easily block the Tartars (and "at some point" even to conquer the peninsula).¹⁴³ Needless to say that this all was wishful thinking unless he secured (his attacks on Poland could have been considered a preparation in this respect) the Podolian lands (divided between Poland, Lithuania and Tartars¹⁴⁴) that shielded the connection between chiefly Cetatea Albă (at the Dniestr Mounds) and Ilice (at the Dniepr Mounds), two of the harbours he had lost to Bayezid II in the summer of 1484.¹⁴⁵

If Stephen III, almost crippled by age and sickness (basically since 1497, he could not walk anymore and had to be carried¹⁴⁶), still officially thought of Crimean expansion, it is very difficult to believe that Wallachia was omitted from his plans, forged by the clashes north of the Lower Danube in the 1470s–1480s (the ensuing conflicts between Bogdan III and Radu IV leave little

¹³⁹ See also the context in Al. Simon, "Stephen the Great and his Involvement in Transylvania (1457–1504)", *Transylvanian Review* XIII, no. 2 (2004): 35–53 (at 46–48).

¹⁴⁰ *Sanudo*, IV, cols. 736–737, 804–807 (December 1502; January 1503, see s cols. 102, 246, 248, for the background); Căzan, Denize, *Marile puteri*, 186–188.

¹⁴¹ E.g. *Documente Ștefan*, II, no. 154, 345; *Actae et epistolae*, I, no. 26, 29; Simon, Luca, "Documentary Perspectives", 88; Simon, "The Costs and Benefits", 49–50.

¹⁴² E.g. Al. Simon, "The Weak Sultan and the Magnificent Monarchs: Ottoman Actions in the Black Sea Area in 1484", *Il Mar Nero* IX (2013): 217–246.

¹⁴³ For Stephen and the Crimea, see also Ștefan Andreescu, "Autour de la dernière phase des rapports entre la Moldavie et Gênes", *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* XXI, no. 2 (1982): 257–282.

¹⁴⁴ See for instance B. Spuler, "Mittelalterliche Grenzen in Osteuropa. I. Die Grenze des Grossfürstentums Litauen in Südosten gegen die Türken und Tataren", *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* VI (1941): 152–170; Șt. Andreescu, "Moldavia's Pontic Policy: Stephen the Great and Ilice Castle", *Il Mar Nero* III (1997–1998): 179–187.

¹⁴⁵ For further information: O. Cristea, "Matthias Corvin et l'expédition de Baiezd II contre la Moldavie (1484)", *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* XLII, no. 1–4 (2003 [2005]): 81–88.

¹⁴⁶ D. P. Bogdan, "Știri despre români în cronică publicată la Moscova", *Revista Arhivelor* LIV, no. 4 (1977): 436–448 (at 446); *Sanudo*, VI, col. 50; Radu IV too had to be carried for 7 years until his death in 1508 (*Aus dem Anonymus Hanivaldanus*, 267).

room for doubt¹⁴⁷). In relation with Venice, who – alike him – was at peace with the Ottoman Empire, Stephen III was acting as if there was nothing between the Tisa, the Sava, the Danube, the Dniestr or the Black Sea he could not control.¹⁴⁸ How much of this was due to his mind (searching for one last victory), to propaganda (necessary notwithstanding circumstances) or to fact (as meagre as it might have been) will hardly ever receive an enduring answer.¹⁴⁹ A certain balance between these items might however be attempted based on Croatian, Banatian and Transylvanian examples.

After the Hungarian domestic arrangements of 1499–1500 (to which the Treaty of Hârlău must be added), not just Bartholomew Drágffy moved to the south, south-west, to the Banate, but also Józsa Somi came – one more than one occasion – to the east, to the north- and south-east, to Transylvania, throughout the first decade of the 16th century¹⁵⁰. In 1508, after almost 15 years as count of Timiș and captain of the Inferior Parts of Hungary (as his protector's, Paul Kinizsi's, successor¹⁵¹), Józsa Somi played an important role in the settlement of the rebellion of the Wallachian nobles (boyars) in the Land of Făgăraș,¹⁵² that ultimately produced – through the local assembly of the same noblemen¹⁵³ – the first known codified set of customary regulations in the medieval Hungarian kingdom.¹⁵⁴ Intimately connected also to the influential

¹⁴⁷ Al. Simon, “The Habsburgs, the Hungarian Crown and Crusading in the East: From Rákos to Rákos (1505–1514)”, *Transylvanian Review* XIX, suppl. 2:4 (2010): 1101–1118.

¹⁴⁸ For the real military conditions: Ferenc Szakály, “Phases of Turko-Hungarian Warfare before the Battle of Mohács. 1365–1526”, *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* XXXIII (1979): 65–112 (at 102–103). A Venetian (dis) information is noteworthy. In November 1500, a report from Hungary stated that Wladislaw II had to recuperate *Boemia*, recently occupied – with the approval of the *Turk* – by the *re di Valachia* (*Sanudo*, IV, col. 112). The only Bohemia is question for such a rumour was Transylvania.

¹⁴⁹ Extremely relevant information on those years can be found in the J. F. Böhmer, ed., *Ausgewählte Regesten des Kaiserreiches unter Maximilian I, 1493–1519*, *Regesta Imperii* XIV, general-editor H. Wiesflecker (*Regesten Maximilian*), published since 1989, chiefly in the 2nd Series [II]. *Österreich, Reich und Europa* (3 volumes published so far).

¹⁵⁰ E.g. in autumn 1500, the testament of count Józsa Somi was written in Turda, in north-western Transylvania, near the city of Cluj (MOL, DL 32041; 29th of September 1500).

¹⁵¹ E.g. Ioan Hațegan, *Pavel Chinezul* (Timișoara, 1994), 206–220; Drăgan, *Nobilimea românească*, 401–402; Kubinyi, “Barone im königlichen Rat”, 153

¹⁵² Ioan Pușcariu, “Două documente privitoare la revolta boierilor din Țara Făgărașului în favoarea lui Mihnea Vodă, numit cel Rău (1508–1510)”, *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, 2nd series, XXXIII (1910): 61–70.

¹⁵³ David Prodan, “Boieri și vecini în Țara Făgărașului în secolele XVI–XVII”, *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie din Cluj* IV (1962): 161–312 (in particular at 176–179, 193–194, 242–443; M. Rady, “Introduction”, in *Government and Law*, 1–13 (at 8–10);

¹⁵⁴ Sándor Kolosvári, Kelemen Óvári, eds, *Corpus Statutorum Hungariae Municipaliū*, vol. I, *Statuta et constitutiones municipiorum Transylvaniae ab antiquissimis temporibus usque ad finem*

prelate George Szatmári,¹⁵⁵ as well as to the “political survivor”, Blaise Ráskai, one of Matthias Corvinus’ “creations”,¹⁵⁶ still largely in control of the royal finances (during the royal elections of 1490, Ráskai had been deemed one of the main “Wallachian infiltrators” of the Hungarian system¹⁵⁷, an assertion that – irrespective of whether it Ráskai was a Wallachian at all – is relevant foremost in terms of paranoia¹⁵⁸), Józsa Somi, a “border-creature”, was apparently another well-trained “middle-man”, active between the administrative and the political fronts of Jagiellonian Hungary.

At the end of the 15th century, Józsa Somi, Bartholomew Drágffy and Peter of Sankt-Georg formed (more precisely – given the documentary lacunas – went on to form) a west-eastern “administrative triad”¹⁵⁹. Together with Thomas Bakócz, Archbishop of Esztergom (Stephen III of Moldavia’s and Bartholomew Drágffy’s adversary during the conflicting “conspiracies” of 1497¹⁶⁰), Dominic Kálmáncsehi, Bishop of Oradea (highly favourable to Stephen III,¹⁶¹ as well as to the *Greek* rite Wallachians in his diocese¹⁶², similarly to his successor Somi’s friend, George Szatmári¹⁶³) and Nicholas Bánffy (he and his family suffered greatly in Matthias’ last years of reign¹⁶⁴ and

seculi XVIII (Budapest, 1885), 169 (unfortunately for science, except for the works of M. Rady, this aspect has seldom received proper international scientific attention).

¹⁵⁵ See also A. Kubinyi, “Die Rolle der Kirche in der Landespolitik und in der Landersverteidigung am Ende des Mittelalters”, in Kubinyi, *Stände und Ständestaat*, 7–32 (at 21–22).

¹⁵⁶ For such –exaggerated or minimized – “Wallachian features” under the Hunyadis, see Drăgan, “*More*”, 54–55; *Ibid.*, *Nobilimea românească*, 331–333.

¹⁵⁷ For instance ASM, A.D.S., *Ungheria*, cart. 642. 1490–1492., fasc. 1. 1490, nn (1st of June 1490; edited in *MDE*, IV. [1488–1490; 1458–1490] (Pest, 1878), no. 145, 208–209).

¹⁵⁸ Al. Simon, “Treaties and Legacies”, *Transylvanian Review* XIX, suppl. 2:3 (2010): 1001–1050. The case of the *Siculi*/ Szecklers is as Roman colonists is worth reviewing.

¹⁵⁹ BStB, Codices, A.L.H, CML 14688, 95^v. *Diplome maramureşene din secolele XVI–XVIII*, no. 345, p. 405. Triad is an uneasy word, even though it suits the political context.

¹⁶⁰ The “Bakócz report” on the *conspiracy*: Státny Ústredný Archív, Bratislava, Rody i panstava, Rody: Erdödy Ústredný Archív/ Erdödi család levéltára, *Galgóci hitbizományi levéltár, Oklevelek*, no. 108 [March–April 1498; photocopy in MOL, DF 278383].

¹⁶¹ E.g. MOL, DL 27982 (26th of June 1495; edited in *Actae et epistolae*, I, no. 42, 46–47). We must note that furthermore Bishop Kálmáncsehi and Drágffy were on friendly terms.

¹⁶² V. Bunyitay, *A váradi püspökség története*, vol. I (Nagyvárad, 1881), 149 (an attitude seemingly connected to John Vitéz’s in the 1450s.).

¹⁶³ MOL, DL 36571 (21st of September 1503; edited in *Actae et epistolae*, I, no. 54, 66–67). It could be tempting to connect this attitude to the context of the *General Peace* of Buda.

¹⁶⁴ István Katona, *Historia critica regum Hungariae ex fide domesticorum et exterorum scriptorum concinnata*, [C series] *Stirpis mixte*, vol. IX (XVI), *Ab Anno Christi MCCCCLXXVI–Ad Annum usque MCCCXC* (Buda, 1793), nos 185–186 (1095–1086), 563–580. The conflict between King Matthias and Nicholas Bánffy seemingly had “feminine causes” (1487).

still Nicholas prayed for the late king,¹⁶⁵ and during the 1490s from Stephen III's actions on feudal Transylvanian soil¹⁶⁶), Somi was in May 1499¹⁶⁷ one of the four warrants (guardians) of the testament of Oswald Túz, Archbishop of Zagreb,¹⁶⁸ who had had his own bitter Hunyadi and – then even – Jagiellonian history (Józsa Somi's involvement in this delicate matter was probably also the result of his difficult relation with Lawrence Újlaki, Duke of Bosnia, one of Wladislaw II Jagiello's main opponents, respectively a major supporter of Matthias' son, John, Duke of Croatia,¹⁶⁹ who had a rather strained relation with the Archbishop of Zagreb¹⁷⁰). The testament of Oswald Túz was handled as a matter of the outmost importance, of stately relevance and even reconciliation in view of “greater deeds” for the common good of the Holy Crown, being placed under Wladislaw II's personal guarantee and – at the same time – in direct connection – a connection maintained until the, difficult, Diet of Rákos of next spring – with the Ottoman threat.¹⁷¹

Prior and after Bartholomew Drágffy's death, Stephen III certainly had access to this system and his influence could be deemed sufficient enough to claim control over “half” of Hungary. Such a claim would have remained largely an instrument for Habsburg-Jagiellonian disputes¹⁷² or a “symptom” for the often unstable situation in the realm.¹⁷³ Yet the problem gained

¹⁶⁵ Mária Makó-Lupescu, “*Item lego...* Gifts for the Soul in Late Medieval Transylvania”, *Annual of Medieval Studies at CEU* VIII (2002): 161–185 (at 172, 180).

¹⁶⁶ E.g. *Actae et epistolae*, I, no. 42, 48–49; no. 44, 51–53. Voivode Peter of Sankt-Georg and Bozyn attempted to be more “neutral” (to say the least) than Drágffy in these issues

¹⁶⁷ Ivan Krstitelj Tkalčić, ed., *Monumenta historica liberae regiae civitatis Zagrabiae metropolis regni Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Slavoniae*, [series] I. *Diplomata: 1093–1526*, [volume] 2. *1400–1499* (Zagreb, 1894), nos. 394–395, 516–523. We must also note that it was probably around that time that Croatia was added to the “Venetian regional formula”.

¹⁶⁸ See the highly accurate analysis by Zoltán Czovek, *Számadás, leltár, vegrendelet: tanulmányok középkor végi forrásokról* (PhD Thesis, Debrecen, 2013), 48–54 (with further sources and comments). A closer look at the “international context” would have greatly served further studies.

¹⁶⁹ E.g. István Tringli, “Az 1481 évi szlavóniai közgyűlés”, in Enikő Csukovits, ed., *Tanulmányok Borsa Iván tiszteletére* (Budapest, 1998), 291–318 (at 308–309). Matthias waited a decade to behead John Túz, Oswald's brother. Both had been highly involved in the rebellion of 1471.

¹⁷⁰ In spite of the age of the monograph (still the only on John Corvinus), see the information in Gyula Schönherr, *Hunyadi Corvin János 1473–1504* (Budapest, 1894), 237–240.

¹⁷¹ See in this respect also Stjepan Razum, *Osvaldo Thuz de Szentlászló vescovo di Zagabria, 1466–1499. La famiglia, i sinodi e le residenze* (PhD Thesis, Rome, 1995), 63–68.

¹⁷² For instance: Simon, “The Hungarian Means”, 283–284; *Ibid.*, “*Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin, 473–474*”; Pop, Simon, “Moldova și celălalt Imperiu”, 279–283.

¹⁷³ E.g. ASM, A.D.S, Potenze Estere. *Iliria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia*, cart. 640, fasc. 1; nn; fasc. 2, nn (1st, 3rd of January, 24th of February, 12th of July 1498; 20th of February, 19th of July 1499); BStB, Codices, A.L.H, CML 14688, ff. 95^v–98^r [summer 1501]; HHStA, R.H.K., *Maximiliana*, fasc. 34–III.12. *Türken*, 23^r–24^r, 40^r–41^r [April 1499, after the 14th of May 1501]

stately meanings by the “creation” of Dacia¹⁷⁴ and the “separation” of Croatia in 1498–1499.¹⁷⁵ On one hand, the interests of Venice and Vienna created a “regional political square”, consisting of Croatia, Hungary, Dacia and Poland.¹⁷⁶ On the other, at about the same time, following Hungarian unrests and compromises a joint administrative system¹⁷⁷ attempted to connect the realms’ Croatian and Dacian limits.¹⁷⁸ The question gained weight as each unit needed to have a *head*, a figure to symbolize it (e.g. Matthias had been *the Hungarian* and Stephen *the Wallachian*¹⁷⁹). By spring 1499, the “Venetian-Habsburg stately formula” *Hungaria, Polania et Dacia, atque Croatia*¹⁸⁰ could have been read:¹⁸¹ Wladislaw (II, the King of Hungary¹⁸²), John Albert (the

¹⁷⁴ Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, 560; Ibid., “From Wallachia to Dacia”, 99. It is intriguing to how “Romanian nationalism” missed out on this Venetian *Dacia*.

¹⁷⁵ See also H. Wiesflecker, “Maximilians I. Türkenzug (1493/4)”, *Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft V* (1958): 152–178; Miroslav Kurelac, “Croatia and Central Europe during the Renaissance and the Reformation”, in Ivan Supićić, ed., *Croatia in the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance: A Cultural Survey* (London – Zagreb, 2008), 41–62 (43–44).

¹⁷⁶ Al. Simon, “Massimiliano I, Venezia e il problema ottomano (1493–1503)”, in C. Luca, Gianluca Masi, eds, *L’Europa Centro-Orientale e la Penisola italiana: quattro secoli di rapporti e influssi interscambiati tra Stati e civiltà (1300–1700)* (Brăila, Venice, 2007), 91–109. Unfortunately, much of the Venetian archives were lost through fire in the 1570s.

¹⁷⁷ Transylvania seemed uncontrollable for Buda, but “not” for Vienna. Yet Paris (Vienna’s main western adversary) was informed (1502) that only Transylvanians truly fought the *Turks* as far as *Vidin* (Henrik Marczaki, “Közlemények a párisi nemzeti könyvtárból”, *Magyar Történelmi Tár XXIII* (1878): 83–122, at no. 3, 111).

¹⁷⁸ Soma’s and Bozyn’s cooperation “under” Drágffy pointed towards this. Buda could have “additionally” hoped that Radu and Stephen were to join the system, following Boyzn’s “Transylvanian lead”. For Vienna this was logical, but suitable “under” Buda (BStB, Codices, A.L.H, CML 14688, 95^v; HHStA, R.H.K., *Maximiliana*, fasc. 34–III.12, 23^r–24^v).

¹⁷⁹ E.g. Simon, “Anti-Ottoman Warfare”, 31–34; Ibid., “The Costs and Benefits”, 40–42; Pop, ‘La Santa Sede’, 16–19.

¹⁸⁰ The formula lasted from spring (the Venetian new year began on the 1st of March) 1498 to spring 1500 (from reg. 36. 1496–1497, to reg. 53. 1528–1529, in the ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*), outliving by a couple of years the turmoil caused by the Battle of Mohács and the double-royal Hungarian elections of John Szapolyai and Ferdinand of Habsburg (1526).

¹⁸¹ Initially the formula, first recorded in reg. 36. 1496–1497 [i.e. 1498] of the ASVe, S.S., *Deliberazioni*, did not include Croatia, which was added afterwards by means of an *atque*: *Hungaria, Polania et Dacia <atque Croatia>*. As: *Hungaria, Polania et Dacia atque Croatia*, it featured in reg 37, 1498–1499 [i.e.1500] and reg. 38, 1500–1501 [i.e. 1502]. In reg. 39, 1502–1503 [i.e. 1504], it turned for good into *Hungaria, Polania, Dacia et Croatia*. Croatia was consequently appended at some point between March 1498 and February 1500 (most likely prior to the end of 1498), but did not become an “organic part” of the formula until spring 1504, until after the end of the Venetian-Ottoman war and the *General Peace* of Buda (1503),

¹⁸² See in Jagiellonian comparison Ch. Nicholson, *Law and the Estates: The Bohemian Land Ordinance of 1500 in Context* (PhD Thesis, London, 2013), 9–13, 104–109, 123–131.

King of Poland¹⁸³), and Stephen (III, the *Duke of Moldavia and Wallachia*)¹⁸⁴, as well John (Corvinus, the Duke of Croatia).¹⁸⁵

Given that Stephen Szapolyai died in July 1499, Thomas Bákokcz was a prelate, or that Józsa Somi and Peter of Sankt-Georg and Bozyn had rather clear power basis in the south-west (the Banate), respectively in the north-east (Transylvania),¹⁸⁶ at least one figure must be added – for some two years – to this set of four rulers (all monarchs, unlike him, because they also held their titles due to God's divine grace¹⁸⁷). As the superior (supreme) commander of the Inferior Parts of Hungary for Józsa Somi,¹⁸⁸ and as the co-voivode of Transylvania, for Peter of Sankt-Georg and Bozyn,¹⁸⁹ Bartholomew Drágffy was the connecting lord between Hungaria, Croatia and Dacia proper. If the Wallachian held half of Hungary in 1498, it was Drágffy who administered it after 1499. This “structure”, born perhaps out of more than just necessity (after his son-in-law Alexander had died in 1496 and the Jagiellonians were surrounding Stephen, Drágffy could have easily stayed in Transylvania and not moved against the invading Polish army in Moldavia in 1497¹⁹⁰), was to outlive him as revealed – both in matters of propaganda and of actions – by the Hungarian, Ottoman, Venetian and Wallachian events, plans and renderings that have survived the second half of 1502.¹⁹¹

Evidence and reason compel scholars to accept that the Hungarian realm was more than a “walking dead man”, still in possession, though far less frequently than normal in control, of resources and men,¹⁹² as well as still capable of

¹⁸³ E.g. Natalia Nowakowska, *Church, State and Dynasty in Renaissance Poland: the Career of Cardinal Fryderyk Jagiellon (1468–1503)* (Aldershot, 2007), 63–69, 178–181.

¹⁸⁴ E.g. Manfred Hollegger, Kurt Riedl, Ingeborg Wiesflecker-Friedhuber, eds, *Regesten Maximilian, II–2. 1496–1498* (Vienna, Cologne, Weimar, 1993), no. 8506, 681.

¹⁸⁵ For instance: Šišić, “Rukovet spomenika”, 18–25; Szakály, “Phases of Turko-Hungarian Warfare”, 100–104; Simon, “Treaties and Legacies”, 1010–1015.

¹⁸⁶ Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen*, 359–360; Kubinyi, “Barone im königlichen Rat”, 71–83; Czovek, *Számadás, leltár, vegrendelet*, 48–54; Magina, “Un nobil sârb”, 135–142.

¹⁸⁷ E.g. Al. Simon, *Pământurile crucii: românii și cruciada târzie* (Cluj-Napoca, 2012), 231–233, 258–261.

¹⁸⁸ BStB, Codices, A.L.H, CML 14688, 95^v–98^v, in connection to the contemporary Habsburg anti-Ottoman plan in HHStA, R.H.K., *Maximiliana*, fasc. 34–III.12. *Türken*, 23^r–24^v.

¹⁸⁹ *Diplome maramureșene*, no. 345, 405, in connection also to the Moldavian troubles in Transylvania in *Hurmuzaki*, XV/1, nos. 283–284, 155–156.

¹⁹⁰ For instance MOL, DL 29016; *Hurmuzaki*, XV/1, nos. 266–267, 146–147; nos. 271–272; 148–149; *Leopisetul anonim*, 20; *Pomelnicul mănăstirii Bistrița*, 86–88.

¹⁹¹ For the events of the 1502 and their Wallachian-Hungarian-Moldavian aftermath (1503–1517), see also *Sanudo*, IV, cols. 629, 735, 737; Simon, *Pământurile crucii*, 256–262.

¹⁹² E.g. A. Kubinyi, “Die innenpolitische Lage des ungarischen Staates vor Mohács”, in Kubinyi, *Stände und Ständestaat*, 291–354; Rady, “Rethinking Jagiello Hungary”, 3–18.

retaining Moldavia and Wallachia as its official “satellites” through the General Peace of Buda in 1503.¹⁹³ Yet it would most narrow-sighted to fail to realize that the Hungarian system as Matthias had wanted it to stand (and this too remains a mystery in its own right¹⁹⁴) was moving away from Buda and not towards it.¹⁹⁵ Venice noticed that whatever should have been Jagiellonian, centred primarily around Buda and Krakow, had grown into a composite structure, still nominally under Jagiellonian suzerainty (although he accepted Maximilian I of Habsburg as King of the Romans and King of Hungary,¹⁹⁶ Stephen III never renounced his <co- under the circumstances after 1497> status of a vassal of Wladislaw II Jagiello and of a member of the – blurred, yet enduring – structure of the Holy Crown¹⁹⁷). Dacia and Croatia had to be taken into account. Two peculiar appendixes, out of which one was a borderline invention, became factors of powers, equalling – at least on paper – the crowns in Buda and Krakow.¹⁹⁸

Bartholomew Drágffy’s career (chiefly after 1496) was symptomatic for the changes and uncertainties of an extremely ambitious age.¹⁹⁹ It is no wonder that beyond the wealth he gathered (largely brutally like his Hunyadi patrons²⁰⁰), Drágffy’s legacy was still very much alive almost two decades after his death and thirty years after the death of his son-in-law, Alexander of Moldavia, when – in autumn 1517 – Thomas Bákokcz, by then Cardinal and Archbishop of Esztergom, and still Venice’s men,²⁰¹ attempted to secure the – allegedly – immense fortune

¹⁹³ E.g. MOL, DL 39328 (4th of November 1503; the unedited Ottoman confirmation of the treaty); *Hurmuzaki*, II/1, 1451–1575, ed. N. Densușianu (Bucharest, 1890), 20–23

¹⁹⁴ The delicate and complex nature of his matter comes up also in the classical works of V. Fraknói, e.g. in his well-known *Matthias Corvinus* (Freiburg-in-Breisgau, 1891), 381–384.

¹⁹⁵ For the lasting debates on this matter, see the overview of the Jagiellonian kings by M. Rady, “Jagiello Hungary”, in János M. Bak, M. Rady, Péter Banyó, eds, *Decreta Regni Medievali Hungariae*, vol. IV, 1490–1526 (Budapest, New York, Idyllwild, 2012), XI–XLVII, at XII–XVII, XLV–XLVI), as well as by Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen*, 335–341, 359.

¹⁹⁶ E.g. for Stephen and the House of Habsburg (1490–1497): HHStA, R.H.K., *Fridericiana*, fasc. 8–2. 1490, 88^{r-v}; MOL, DF 278383; *Actae et epistolae*, I, no. 38, 42–43.

¹⁹⁷ For an overview (1470s–1520s), see also *Hurmuzaki*, II/2, no. 401, / 503; XV/1, no. 327, 178; *Documente Ștefan*, II, no. 147, 337; no. 156, 354; *Actae et epistolae*, I, no. 96, 130.

¹⁹⁸ E.g. Lajos Thallóczy, Antal Hodinka, eds, *Codex Diplomaticus Partium Regno Hungariae Adnexarum. Magyarország Melléktartományainak Oklevéltára*, Monumenta Hungariae Historica, I/31, 33, 36, 40, vol. I, *A Horvát véghelyek oklevéltára, 1490–1527* (Budapest, 1903), nos. 6–7, 4–5 (1497); Norman Housley, *Crusading and the Ottoman Threat. 1453–1505* (Oxford, 2012), 43–46, 52–53 (with further references also to events in the first decade of the 16th century).

¹⁹⁹ For instance Kubinyi, *Matthias Rex*, 158–160; *Ibid.*, “Die Schlacht bei Mohács”, 366–368; Simon, “Massimiliano I”, 103–107.

²⁰⁰ For an overview: Simon, *Ștefan cel Mare și Matia Corvin*, 518–521; Horváth, “A Bélteki Drágfiak”, 193–196; Neumann, “Drágfi Bertalan politikai szerepe”, 223–228.

²⁰¹ At the time of Bákokcz’s plan (MOL, DL 38738; 20th of September 1517), Rome finalized its crusader design, which again included Moldavia and Wallachia (e.g. *Sanudo*, XXV, 1 *Ottobre*

of Alexander and Bartholomew's daughter, Mary, for his own profit,²⁰² only a couple of months after the death of Bogdan III, Stephen III's son, the lord who had inflicted great damage to this prelate in 1497.²⁰³ Like Bartholomew, like Stephen in Hungary, Thomas owed much – if not all – in Hungary to Matthias, whom he betrayed.²⁰⁴ And in this last respect, one question must remain: to what extent did Matthias's quest for dynastic survival create the succession of alliances and treasons that shaped *Hungaria, Polonia, Dacia et Croatia* and that ultimately broken down the crusader and stately system that should have united the Western (Roman-German) Empire to the Black Sea.

Appendix

[Passages from the report sent by Gutierre Gómez de Fuensalida, Knight-Commander of Haro, since 1496 the representative of *los Reyes Católicos* at the court of Roman King Maximilian I of Habsburg] [...] *Otrosi* [the 21st of February] *me ha dicto el Rey de Romanos* [Maximilian I of Habsburg] *de las muchas diferencias que ay entre el Rey de Polonia* [Jan Albert] *y el Rey de Ungria* [Wladislaw II Jagiello] *y el Valaco* [Stephen III of Moldavia], *y que heran muy peligrosas para toda la Christianidad, por quel Valaco se ayuda de los Turcos y de los Tartaros, y una parte del Reyno de Ungria es con el Valaco, y que recela que se podra encender de alli algund fuego en su tierra, por la cercania y vezindad que con ellos tyene, y aunque una parte del Reyno de Ungria le llama para que vaya a tomar quel reyno, pero que todo lo echa a las espaldas, porque es buen Espanol y Aragones* [Maximilian's mother had been Eleanor of Portugal], *y que es un cuerpo de qual Vestre Alteze son la cabeza, y el y el rey de Napoles* [Frederick of Aragon] *y el archiduque* [Philip of Burgundy, King Maximilian's son] *los mienbros, y que hasta ver sosegadas estas diferencias de Francia y Italia, y que Vestre Alteze esten syn contrariedad, no comencara cosa que por ella oviese de estar enpachado para no poder socorrer a qualquier necesidad que a Vestre Alteze viniese* [...] (Innsbruck, 22nd of February 1498).

[Gutierre Gómez de Fuensalida], *Correspondencia de Gutierre Gomez de Fuensalida, embajador en Alemania, Flandes é Inglaterra (1496–1509)*, edited by the Duke of Berwick and of Alba [Jacobo Fitz-James Stuart] (Madrid, 1907), p. 21.

1517–31 Agosto 1518 (Venice, 1889), cols. 96–105) while Neagoe Basarab of Wallachia received the Geoagiu estate in Transylvania (*Actae et epistolae*, I, no. 86, 112–113).

²⁰² Al. Simon, "The Habsburgs, the Hungarian Crown and Crusading in the East", 1101–1118.

²⁰³ See Engel, *Geschichte des Ungarischen Reiches*, III/2, 83–87, 90–95; Fraknói, *Erdödi Bakócz Tamás*, 71–77; Pop, Simon, "Moldova și celălalt Imperiu", 292–293.

²⁰⁴ Unlike Drágffy who drew closer to John Corvinus throughout the 1490s (in this respect too, John's intervention in Peri's favour in 1493 has to be reviewed), Bakócz remained his nemesis. In 1503, the prelate (again) prevented John from becoming count-palatine at the death of his uncle, Peter Géreb (see also Kubinyi, "Barone im königlichen Rat", 146, 151).

PROIECTE REGIONALE ȘI MAGHIARE LA SFÂRȘITUL CARIEREI POLITICE A LUI BARTHOLOMEU DRAGFFY

Rezumat

Bartholomew Drágffy (†1501) reprezintă, pentru cel puțin un secol, una dintre cele mai uimitoare figuri politice în istoria ungaro-română a evului mediu târziu. Cercetări recente au redus multe dintre conotațiile care au influențat relațiile despre el. În același timp, au deschis noi perspective. Unele dintre acestea sunt legate de evoluțiile regionale frâmate de alianța anti Jageloniană dintre Maximilian I de Habsburg și Ștefan al III-lea al Moldovei (1497) și de noul război otomano-venețian (1499–1503). Articolul explorează contextul acestor legături, concentrându-se asupra evenimentelor și rivalităților de la începutul secolului al XVI-lea. Două “tendențe” păreau să se dezvolte în paralel în acest timp, una venind predominant din afara regatului ungar, cealaltă, în primul rând din interiorul acestuia. Prima “tendență” venea sub forma formulei statale venețiano (-habsburgice) *Hungaria, Polonia et Dacia, atque Croatia/Hungaria, Polonia, Dacia et Croatia* (formula a fost inventată în primăvara anului 1498 și a dăinuit mai mult de trei decenii, până la bătălia de la Mohács și dubla alegere regală ungară din 1526). Cea de a doua “tendență” s-a constituit din eforturile de a lega într-un sistem funcțional – mai cu seamă defensiv – diversele unități aflate sub directă sau indirectă autoritate a Sfintei Coroane, din Croația, trecând prin Părțile de Jos ale Ungariei (așa numitul Banat bosniac, în special) și Transilvania, spre Moldova și Țara Românească, împărțită în Muntenia și Oltenia (aceste procese au fost determinate mai ales de încercările de a rezolva conflictele ungare interne din 1497 și criza dinastică jagelonă din același an).