

Nur Köprülü
Near East University Nicosia

Parsing the reflections of the 2011 Uprisings on democracy and identity in the Arab Middle East: A Retrospective

Abstract:

Ten years have passed since the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings. Kicking off first in Tunisia following the self-immolation of a street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, the public demonstrations swept throughout the Arab Middle East from early 2011. As noted by Gregory Gause III, most academics were astonished by the Arab Spring, especially the downfall of the two long-standing rulers in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011. What makes the Arab Spring or Revolts or Uprisings an extremely significant series of events is not solely related to the regional power shifts it caused; instead, it was the nascent idea of ‘democracy as a panacea’ embedded in the people’s demands that resonated.

The key objective of this article is to parse the reflections of these popular protests on notions of democracy and identity in the Arab Middle East today. To that end, this work will first shed light on the demands of the demonstrators during and after the Arab revolts, and as the corollary of this, the changing perceptions of the effectiveness of democracy in the region amid mounting economic challenges will also be addressed. In the second part of the article, new regime-survival mechanisms enacted to stimulate new forms of nationalism(s) in Egypt and Jordan will be explored.

Keywords: Arab Spring, democracy, Egypt, Jordan, Middle East, nationalism, revolt, uprising

The notion of democracy in the Arab world before and after the Arab Spring

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has conventionally been considered as a region with a democracy deficit or authoritarian persistence¹. It has been argued that there exist four main sources of this authoritarian stability or of undemocratic rule in the region. A group of academics highlighted particularities of Arab or Islamic culture, citing a purported incompatibility between democracy and the patriarchal and religious features of Arab societal structures². The second perspective has to do with rentier economies and the political economy of oil commodities. For instance, according to Beblawi and Luciani, the notion of the rentier state – wherein oil rents are directly accrued to the state, and in turn the state's sole function becomes to allocate this artificial money to the citizens – led to demands for “no taxation without representation”³. Thirdly, it is argued that the repercussions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the intra-state wars in the region hinder democratization, leaving the states too fragile to take action towards meaningful democratic reformation⁴. Last but not the least, some also have embraced the idea that “interconnected factors” related to state formation in the Arab Middle East “drastically limit state's capacity for social control”⁵; according to this framing, the Arab state is rather weak but rules its economy, and in so doing “manipulates the social groups”⁶.

Putting these together, some also have attributed the stability of the authoritarian type of government among Arab regimes in the region to “two common factors: the military-security complex and state control over the economy”⁷. In the context of unpacking the Arab Spring, the 2011 popular protests can thus be framed as a new source of opposition, with the large-scale public demonstrations bringing about the end of both Mubarak's rule in Egypt after 30 years, and Bin Ali's in Tunisia after 24 years.

Despite the fact that the root causes of the Arab Spring stemmed

¹ Bellin, 2004; Hinnebusch, 2006; Heydemann, 2016.

² Kedourie, 1992; Sadowski, 1993; Tessler, 2002; Lewis, 2003.

³ Beblawi & Luciani, 1987, p. 53.

⁴ Sayigh & Shlaim, 1997.

⁵ Kuran, 1998, p. 113.

⁶ Ayubi, 1995.

⁷ Gause III, 2011, p. 83.

primarily from economic problems and increased unemployment among the Arab young generation, from the protest movements promptly emerged the question 'Is democracy a panacea' for the problems of the Arab citizens? In other words, while the public protests had been motivated by economic concerns, they awakened far-ranging demands from the masses, resulting in the people's call not only for 'bread' but also for 'freedom'.

One of the most remarkable upshots of the Arab Spring was its *falsification* – to some extent – of the idea that Arabs do not want democracy. Public surveys have explicitly shown that Arabs do ask for democracy, as well as political and civil rights. In accordance with the results of the Arab Barometer survey conducted in 2011, 26.3 percent of the respondents in Tunisia said 'not at all' to the question: 'To what extent do you feel that you are being treated equally to other citizens in your country?' Meanwhile, Jordanians with 15 percent, Egyptians with 20 percent and Yemenis with 11 percent replied 'to a great extent'⁸. To the prompt 'A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems', 53.4 percent of Lebanese participants, 20.5 percent of Jordanians, 19.3 percent of Palestinians and 16.4 percent of Algerian respondents replied 'strongly agree'. In total, 26.2 percent of respondents in the Arab Middle East said 'strongly agree' and 46.6 percent stated 'I agree'. With regard to the question about the 'state of democracy and human rights in your country today', overall 5.6 percent of participants stated 'very good' and 33.8 percent of them said 'neither good nor bad'. The highest scores were recorded in Jordan and Yemen, with 9.2 percent and 6.4 percent, respectively. The lowest numbers, however, came from Lebanon, Algeria and Tunisia⁹.

These figures therefore illustrate that the region had embraced the potential for a new area of politics, one that brought the question of shifting state-society relations to the fore. With the onset of the Arab Uprisings, some countries witnessed power alternations, such as in Egypt and Tunisia; some of them descended into civil wars, as in the cases of Syria, Yemen and Libya; and finally, Kingdoms like Morocco and Jordan rather enacted reforms in response to sporadic public protests. Both Morocco and Jordan have been considered, since 2011, models of stability in the region, exemplifying *resilient* regime-survival. In accordance with more recent Arab Barometer public surveys, 23.4 percent of respondents 'strongly agreed' and 48.6 percent 'agreed' with the prompt: 'democratic

⁸ Arab Barometer, 2011.

⁹ Arab Barometer, 2011.

systems may have problems, yet they are better than other systems'¹⁰.

Having said that, a drastic change has lately been noticed in peoples' perspectives on the effectiveness of democracy in finding answers to their problems. In accordance with the Arab Barometer records of July 2022, there has been an increase in the perception that 'democracy is ineffective at maintaining stability', drastically increasing from 23 percent in 2011 to 70 percent in 2022¹¹. Similarly, the perception of the respondents regarding 'the ability of democracy to maintain order' dramatically increased from 17 percent to 66 percent in ten years¹².

Increased Youth activism

As observed by Asaf Bayat, "the youthful claims are articulated mostly at the cultural level and in the form of claims over lifestyle"¹³. Bayat postulates that youth both engage in cultural politics and assert wider political contentions, and as a result serve as 'transformative agents'. He goes on to say that during the Arab Uprisings, the Arab youth ultimately performed a leading role in "opening a new chapter in the history of the Middle East"¹⁴. So, why have the Arab youth become the centre of attention in the post-2011 era in Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia and elsewhere?

According to UNICEF's records, it is expected that several MENA countries – specifically Iraq, Sudan and the State of Palestine – will be "experiencing approximately a doubling of their population in the 35 years between 2015 and 2050"¹⁵.

The recent Child Poverty in the Arab States report took into account 78 per cent of the under-18 population in the relevant countries (approximately 118 million). Of those 118 million under-18-year-olds, approximately 53 million (nearly half) experience moderate poverty, while 29.3 million (1 in 4 on average) experience acute poverty.

A POMPEX Report on Youth Activism in MENA countries also indicated that almost 60 percent of people fall under the age of 30, half of whom are aged between 15 and 29. Moreover, unemployment among working-age youth surpasses the overall jobless rate in the entire region¹⁶.

¹⁰ *Arab Barometer*, 2018.

¹¹ *Arab Barometer*. 2022, p. 6.

¹² *Arab Barometer*. 2022, p. 6.

¹³ Bayat, 2017, p. 22.

¹⁴ Bayat, 2017, p. 22.

¹⁵ UNICEF, 2019.

¹⁶ Yom *et al.*, 2019, p. 3.

The overall unemployment rate in 2021 reached 10.5 percent in the region at large, in accordance with the World Bank Group's data. The highest unemployment rate is recorded in Djibouti, at 28.4 percent, followed by the West Bank and Gaza at 24.9, Libya at 19.6, Jordan at 19.3, Tunisia at 16.8, and Lebanon at 14.5 percent¹⁷.

These figures in fact reveal the unavoidable outcome of the Arab Spring: that, while the protests are over, the people's demands for democracy and the right to a livelihood continue¹⁸.

Do the people still support democracy in the Arab world?

The Arab Uprisings have opened a new era of articulating collective demands and calling for a change in the MENA region. Having said that, a huge number of refugees fled Syria for different parts of the world in the first couple of years after the uprisings turned into civil war in that country. The number of Syrian refugees exceeds 6.6 million, mainly hosted in neighbouring Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan¹⁹. Moreover, the military coup against the Muhammad Morsi-led government in Egypt turned back the clock on democratic transformation with the rise of Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi and the military-led government. In addition, the escalation of the civil wars in Yemen and Libya, and Kais Saied's decision to dissolve the government and suspend the legislature, allowed him "to seize wide-ranging powers", which also led opponents to call this move as "a coup against the only democratic system to have emerged from the Arab Spring revolts"²⁰.

Various scholarly works have described early works on the Arab Spring or Uprisings as inadequate, and have moved towards unpacking the key motivations behind the popular uprisings²¹. For Kılavuz and Sumaktoyo, in the post-2011 era, support for democracy has actually decreased in those countries that experienced the downfall of dictators, as compared to those that experienced no regime change²². Some argue that only in Tunisia did the mass protests pave the way for "a process of democratization"²³, and "no transition away from autocracy occurred,

¹⁷ International Labour Organisation, 2022.

¹⁸ *Washington Post*, 2022.

¹⁹ UNHCR, 2022.

²⁰ *France 24*, 2022.

²¹ Valbjørn & Volpi, 2014.

²² Kılavuz & Sumaktoyo, 2020, p. 855.

²³ Heydemann, 2016, p. 193.

with the possible exception of Tunisia”²⁴. For instance, Heydemann argues that despite the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt exemplifies a case of “authoritarian reassertion”²⁵. Following the Arab Spring, Heydemann added that “the future of authoritarianism will be darker, more repressive, more sectarian and even more deeply resistant to democratization than in the past”²⁶. One reason behind Heydemann’s point relates to incumbents’ responses in containing the growing opposition and their demands; namely, through instruments of co-optation and social control.

Although the uprisings revealed hopes for democratization, with the exception of Tunisia – the aforementioned only case for democratic transition, albeit with certain challenges that became apparent with the 2022 referendum expanding President Kais Saied’s powers – the region’s countries face “a higher degree of repression today than they did in 2010”²⁷. One of the mechanisms put in place by incumbents to contain the social movements and increased youth activism has led to the emergence of new forms of nationalism.

Revisiting the notion of Identity – Various *forms* of nationalism and identity

It is imperative to underscore that the popular demands for democracy have not been grappled with in the MENA region yet; these demands retain their salience, and “the role of elections as a mechanism of legitimacy and co-optation may no longer function as they once had”²⁸. In light of this, this part of the article aims to illustrate, despite the existing calls for democracy and social justice, that these exigencies are still alive among the Arab citizenry, and that incumbents have attempted to develop ‘new’ devices and tactics in encountering growing opposition. However, these new tools for sustaining their rule, accompanied by the paradox of legitimacy, represent new motivation behind a Second Wave of the Arab Uprisings, such as during the protests in Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon and Iraq during 2018 and 2019.

²⁴ Stacher, 2015, p. 259.

²⁵ Heydemann, 2016, p. 193.

²⁶ Heydemann, 2013, p. 72.

²⁷ Josua & Edel, 2021, p. 587.

²⁸ Köprülü, 2022.

The emergence of ‘new’ forms of nationalism

The variation among Arab autocracies has lately begun to dominate post-Arab Spring literature²⁹. Precisely, the formidable effects of authoritarian legacies such as “the effect of the various actors’ identities – including sectarian, tribal, class, urban–rural and geographic – and how these intersect with and complicate efforts to establish stable, legitimate forms of government”³⁰ are central in illustrating the new devices and mechanisms used by the incumbents to maintain regime stability. Most of the regimes in MENA attempted to instrumentalize identity cleavages or divisions with the aim to either exploit them – through the policy of divide and rule – or constrain their capacity to mobilize³¹. These new mechanisms bring us the question of, as Lisa Anderson postulated, “how we understand historical moments”³². In saying that, it is imperative to indicate that the higher legitimacy enjoyed by some monarchies such as Morocco and Jordan in the region made “protesters more likely to demand reform instead of the revolutionary fall of a regime”³³. Having acknowledged that, the popular protests also revitalized “the political space”, and so “empowered new political actors”³⁴ to demand that the government act effectively in policy-making, as well as to be transparent in their decision-making.

While the 2011 Arab protests engulfed most of the Arab states – mainly the republican regimes such as those of Tunisia, Syria, Egypt and Libya – Jordan and Morocco coped with the effects of the popular protests by bringing reform-oriented policies onto the agenda. The Kingdom of Jordan has also enacted regime-survival strategies to co-opt the growing opposition and contain the key Islamist movement in the country – *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (Muslim Brotherhood) and its political wing IAF (Islamic Action Front) – through the *Jordanization* of the Brotherhood. In Jordan, protestors suddenly took to the streets a second time in 2018; this came to be known as the ‘June protests’, and was very alarming to the Kingdom. What is relatively new about this phase of

²⁹ Josua & Edel, 2021; Valbjørn & Hinnebusch, 2019.

³⁰ Heydemann, 2016, p. 195.

³¹ Valbjørn & Hinnebusch, 2019, p. 16.

³² Anderson, 2018, p. 478.

³³ Josua & Edel, 2021, p. 7.

³⁴ Heydemann, 2016, p. 202.

Jordan's Spring is its newly grown domestic opposition – and as a corollary of this, the regime's attempts to quell public anger in order to sustain its rule.

Jordan has traditionally acquired its popular support from the East Bank tribes – the Bedouins – who reside in the southern part of the country³⁵. Meanwhile, the Kingdom's stability has been susceptible to the ups and downs of the decades-old struggle for Palestinian national liberation. This ongoing conflict has resulted in a demographic imbalance in the Kingdom – wherein the Palestinian population of Jordan outnumbers that of native Jordanians (East Bankers) – has become a defining component of the Kingdom's identity politics with respect to its legitimacy. Accordingly, Scott Greenwood argued that in maintaining budget as well as regime security, the Kingdom has manipulated both the electoral law and economic reforms in the country³⁶. One of the long-standing regime-survival strategies of the Hashemite Kingdom has been the gerrymandering of electoral constituencies³⁷. This has helped the regime to acquire legitimacy from native Jordanians (East Bankers); it has also launched neoliberal policies in line with King Abdullah II's desire to curb the established patronage nexus between the monarchy and the East Bank tribes.

Additionally, the Kingdom has often played the 'identity card' to curb the opposition, particularly the growing influence of Islamist activism and Palestinian identity in the country. In doing this, King Abdullah II, for instance, initiated a campaign called 'Jordan First' in the aftermath of the Al-Aqsa intifada, with the aim of shifting public attention away from the Palestinian issue. As a matter of fact, when the Kingdom uses the rhetoric of 'Jordan First', it is also meant to be 'Arabs Second', which allows the regime to bring more public attention to Jordanians' problems. According to Yazan Doughan, the state's response to these developments was to nationalize politics by shifting it away from the transnational concerns of pan-Arabist politics that had dominated the political scene until then, and focusing instead on the nation-state and on national interests³⁸. Furthermore, "the public protests in the Jordanian streets have been claimed by the regime as sprouting from Jordanian-Palestinian divisions. This response reveals the re-contextualization of

³⁵ Brand, 1995.

³⁶ Greenwood, 2003.

³⁷ Lucas, 2005, p. 30.

³⁸ Doughan, 2020, p. 3.

Ikhwan-throne relations”³⁹.

A new nationalist discourse and practice has been underway in the Kingdom since then, which culminated in the establishment of a ‘new’ Jordanian *Ikhwan* whose main goal was to secure its registry by distancing itself from Egypt’s *Ikhwan*.

In the case of Egypt, the downfall of the Mubarak regime and the ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood after an electoral victory in 2012 were major sources of alarm for secular groups in the country. *Ikhwan*’s victory, with Mohammad Morsi as the first popularly elected president of Egypt, swiftly transformed into a secular-Islamist cleavage, as well as a source of internal friction between the old regime and the *Ikhwan*, in addition to its regional implications⁴⁰. Having said that, the newly drafted constitution kept the article from the previous constitution, stipulating that “the principles of Islamic law are a main source of legislation”, which was not opposed by any opposition leader. A new article has, however, been added to the new constitution, which “defines those principles as the established schools of Sunni Muslim scholarship”. Accordingly, for Hamdeen Sabahi, a leftist and former presidential candidate, “This is a constitution that lacks the most important prerequisite for a constitution: consensus ... This means we can’t build our future based on this text at all”⁴¹.

In light of this, a quotation by al-Sisi immediately after the *coup* on July 4th, 2013 explicitly reveals the fear that Egypt’s old regime still retains its anti-*Ikhwan* character. Al-Sisi stated that “We will build an Egyptian society that is strong and stable; that will not exclude any of its sons”⁴².

In the post-Arab Spring era, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s portrayal of *Ikhwan* “as an existential threat to their own ruling regimes” required it to be stopped, and as a matter of the two Gulf countries having rewarded al-Sisi financially. So, de-Brotherhoodization in Egypt has also had regional repercussions, which in turn stimulated internal cleavage between the established secular civilian-military bureaucracy and religious conservatives. The postulation/presumption of the Brotherhood as an existential threat to Egypt’s stability is then reflected in al-Sisi’s and the regime’s nationalist discourses. For instance, Fattah al-Sisi positioned counter-terrorism missions at the forefront of the Egyptian agenda, and

³⁹ Köprülü, 2014, p. 124.

⁴⁰ Rutherford, 2018.

⁴¹ Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2012.

⁴² *The Guardian*, 2013.

often emphasized the wording ‘counter-terror strategy’⁴³. For Michele Dunne, the fall from power of the Morsi-led *Ikhwan* government in Egypt stimulated a “specific brand of nationalism – militaristic, populist, anti-foreign – that evoked the Nasserism of the 1950s and 1960s, in contrast to the more inclusive strains of nationalism articulated during the 2011 uprising against Mubarak”⁴⁴.

Is the Arab Spring an ‘Arab matter’?

The onset of the Arab Uprisings not only prompted scholarly debate with regard to democratization, but also underpinned a new discussion on whether Arab identity still matters. The effects of the Arab Spring or Uprisings are still being felt in various countries in the MENA region – precisely Algeria, Iraq, Sudan and also Lebanon with the 2019 riots. Such experiences have come to be labelled as the Second Wave of the Arab Uprisings, and also had a regional and an Arab component. In other words, the Arab Spring has been an ‘Arab matter’ regardless of its divergent trajectories of state re-building in the post-2011 era. Nevertheless, some countries have moved towards reforming their rules, as in the cases of Morocco and Jordan, and some others have upgraded their authoritarian character since the uprisings, as in Egypt. Having said that, the Arab Uprisings were to a great extent particular to the Arab geography, and the protesters more or less demanded similar reforms. In this regard, the data provided by the *Arab Opinion Index* of 2013 depicted that “79% of the Arab public believes in the integrity of a single Arab nation, or that the various Arab peoples comprise one nation, notwithstanding the possible differences between Arab peoples”⁴⁵.

In line with this discussion, Youssef Sawani argues that “The Arab Spring reflects a pan-Arab revolutionary spirit – to the dismay of those who proclaimed that Arabism was dead”⁴⁶. Sawani refers primarily to the widely-known Fouad Ajami’s article entitled ‘End of Pan-Arabism’, published in 1978. Ajami argued that the story of pan-Arabism’s retreat traces primarily back to the 1967 Six Day War, also referred to as the ‘Waterloo of pan-Arabism’, for which Anwar Sadat’s move towards peace-making with Israel in 1978 became a symbol. Forty years later,

⁴³ Dehlvi, 2018.

⁴⁴ Dunne, 2015, p. 1.

⁴⁵ *Arab Opinion Index*, 2013, a representative survey of 20,350 people from 14 Arab countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Mauritania, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait and Libya).

⁴⁶ Sawani, 2012, p. 395.

however, Sawani postulates that the “absent peoples” of the region have now been replaced by a “historical mass” with this wave of the Arab Spring, and simultaneously has invigorated the vision that “Arabism and Islamism have maintained their position and hold on public opinion and prevailing attitudes as the primary and inseparable trends of Arab thought”⁴⁷.

Conclusion

Since the 2011 Uprisings, the MENA does not stand as it had before. No matter which realm you look from, things have changed. From an International Relations perspective, the power alternations have bought a new power balance to the region which has enabled primarily Israel to normalize relations with the Gulf countries and Morocco under the umbrella of the *Abraham Accords*; from the angle of comparative politics it can easily be seen that the uprisings have revealed various trajectories of state-formation and (un)democratic transition. Looked at from the perspectives of democratization and social movement studies, despite the efforts of incumbents to co-opt and control the growing opposition, from the Arab Spring has emerged a new dynamic in the region – that of the *Arab Street*. The notion of the Arab Street arose through youth activism and also the cross-cutting alliances that brought together various groups.

This article has aimed to shed light on the existing calls for democracy in the region with respect to the evolving view of the notion of democracy in the eyes of the masses. The viability and effectiveness of democratic governance cannot be a panacea for the people living in this region. In addition, in the period since 2011 the regimes in the region have sought to deploy new forms of nationalism(s) in an effort to make their rule more durable. Last but not least, regardless of whether various regimes have succeeded in meeting the demands of the people, the Arab Spring can be defined as an Arab matter with new underlying components. It is no longer the heyday of Nasserist or Ba’athist forms of Arabism; instead, a new Arab paradigm of identification is on the rise which aims to identify and articulate social equity, justice and freedom. With respect to these developments, the Arab Street has become the new venue of politics, mostly replacing the old institutions⁴⁸.

Thus, it is not the political elites causing Arab nationalism to

⁴⁷ Sawani, 2012, p. 382.

⁴⁸ El Issawi & Cavatorta, 2020.

flourish, as during the 1950s and 1960s, it is the Arab citizenry and also social movements that have invigorated the idea of Arabism today.

References:

- Ajami, F., 1978. "The End of Pan-Arabism", *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978/1979. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/1978-12-01/end-pan-arabism>
- Amin, S., 1978. *The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggles*. Trans. Michael Pallis. London, Zed Press.
- Anderson, L., 2018. "Bread, dignity and social justice: Populism in the Arab world." *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 44(4): 478-490. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453718757841>
- Arab Barometer, 2011. *Arab Barometer*, Wave II, 2011. <https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-ii/>
- Arab Barometer, 2018. *Arab Barometer*, Wave V, 2018. <https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-v/>
- Arab Barometer, 2022. *Arab Barometer*, Wave VII, 2022. <https://www.arabbarometer.org/surveys/arab-barometer-wave-vii/>
- Arab Opinion Index, 2013. *Arab Opinion Index*, Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, June 2013. <http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/get/44aba9e5-3cd1-42fd-bd89-fa197b9f6d4a.pdf>
- Ayubi, N. N., 1995. *Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*. London, I. B. Tauris.
- Bayat, A., 2017. "Is There a Youth Politics?" *Middle East – Topics and Arguments* 9: 16-24.
- Beblawi, H. & Giacomo, L. (eds.), 1987. *The Rentier State*, London, Croom Helm.
- Bellin, E., 2004. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics* 36(2): 139-157.
- Brand, L., 1995. "Palestinians and Jordanians: A crisis of dentity." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 24(4): 46-61.
- Dehlvi, G. R., 2018. "Theology, Terror and Politics In Egypt: Interplay in the Triangle", *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 22(2): 34-39.
- Doughan, Y., 2020. "The New Jordanian Patriotism After the Arab Spring." *Middle East Brief*. Brandeis University, Crownn Center for Middle East Studies. 1-7. <https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/101-200/meb134.pdf>
- Dunne, M., 2015. "Egypt's Nationalists Dominate in a Politics-Free Zone."

- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, April 2015.
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Brief-Dunne-Egypt_Nationalists.pdf
- El Issawi, F. & Cavatorta, F. (eds.), 2020. *The Unfinished Arab Spring: micro-dynamics of revolts between change and continuity*. London, Ginko.
- France 24*, 2022. "Tunisian president dissolves council tasked with ensuring judicial independence". *France 24*, February 6, 2022.
<https://www.france24.com/en/afrique/20220206-tunisian-president-kais-saied-dissolves-supreme-judicial-council>
- Gause III, G. F., 2011. "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability". *Foreign Affairs* 90(4): 81-90.
- Greenwood, S., 2003. "Jordan's 'New Bargain': The Political Economy of Regime Security." *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Spring, 2003): 248-268
- The Guardian*, 2013. "Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two years." *The Guardian*, July 4, 2013.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution>
- Heydemann, S., 2007. "Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World." The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute, Analysis Paper 13, October 2007. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10arabworld.pdf>
- Heydemann, S., 2016, "Explaining the Arab Uprisings: transformations in Comparative Perspective." *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 21.1: 192-204.
- Heydemann, S., 2013, "Tracking the "Arab Spring": Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 24, Number 4 (October 2013): 59-73.
- Hinnebusch, R., 2006. "Authoritarian persistence, democratization theory and the Middle East: An overview and critique." *Democratization* 13(3): 373-395. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340600579243>
- IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2014*. Barcelona, European Institute for the Mediterranean. <https://www.iemed.org/publication/arab-youth-values-and-identities-impact-of-the-arab-uprisings/>
- International Labour Organization, 2022. "Unemployment - Middle East & North Africa". ILOSTAT database, June 2022.
<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=ZQ>
- Josua, M. & Edel, M., 2021. "The Arab uprisings and the return of repression". *Mediterranean Politics* 26(5): 586-611. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2021.1889298>

- Kedourie, E., 1992. *Democracy and Arab Culture*. Washington, DC, Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Kılavuz, M. T. & Sumaktoyo, N. G., 2020. "Hopes and disappointments: regime change and support for democracy after the Arab Uprisings." *Democratization* 27(5): 854-873.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1746766>
- Kirkpatrick, D. D. & El Sheikh, M., 2012. "Egypt Opposition Gears Up After Constitution Passes". *The New York Times*, December 23, 2012.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/24/world/middleeast/as-egypt-constitution-passes-new-fights-lie-ahead.html>
- Köprülü, N., 2014. "Jordan since the Uprisings: Between Change and Stability." *Middle East Policy* 21(2): 111-126. <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12075>
- Köprülü, N., 2022. "Is the Arab Spring over? Unpacking perceptions of democracy, elections and regime-types in MENA countries." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. 2022. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2022.2067835>.
- Kuran, T., 1998. "The Vulnerability of the Arab State: Reflections on the Ayubi Thesis." *The Independent Review* 3(1): 111-123.
- Lewis, B., 2003. *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*. New York, The Random House.
- Lucas, R.E., 2005. *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges, 1988-2001*. State University of New York Press.
- Rutherford, B. K., 2018. "Egypt's New Authoritarianism under Sisi." *The Middle East Journal* 72(2): 185-208. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/693086>
- Sadowski, Y., 1993. "The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate." *Middle East Report* 183: pp. 14-21. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3012572>
- Sayigh, Y. & Shlaim, A., 1997. *The Cold War and the Middle East*. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Sawani, Y. M., 2012. "The 'end of pan-Arabism' revisited." *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 5(3): 382-397.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2012.696785>
- Stacher, J., 2015. "Fragmenting states, new regimes: militarized state violence and transition in the Middle East." *Democratization* 22(2): 259-275. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1010810>
- Tessler, M., 2002. "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes Toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries." *Comparative Politics* 34(3): 337-354. <https://doi.org/10.2307/4146957>

- UNHCR, 2022. "Syria Emergency." UNHCR. <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html>
- UNICEF, 2019. "MENA Generation 2030." UNICEF. <https://data.unicef.org/resources/middle-east-north-africa-generation-2030/>
- Valbjørn, M. & Hinnebusch, R., 2019. "Exploring the Nexus between Sectarianism and Regime Formation in a New Middle East: Theoretical Points of Departure." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 19(1): 2-22. <https://doi.org/10.1111/sena.12293>
- Valbjørn, M. & Volpi, F., 2014. "Revisiting Theories of Arab Politics in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings." *Mediterranean Politics* 19(1): 134-136. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2013.856185>
- Washington Post*, 2022. "The Arab Spring Is Over, But the Struggle for Democracy Isn't." *Washington Post*, August 3, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/the-arab-spring-is-over-but-the-struggle-for-democracy-isnt/2022/08/03/78ded41c-130b-11ed-8482-06c1c84ce8f2_story.html
- Yom, S., Lynch, M. & al-Khatib, W., 2019. "Youth Politics in the Middle East and North Africa." In *Youth Politics in the Middle East and North Africa*, POMEPS Studies 36, pp. 3-6. https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/POMEPS_Studies_36_Web-1.pdf