volume V ♦ issue 1

2014

Logos & Episteme

an international journal
of epistemology

Romanian Academy
Iasi Branch
◆◆◆
"Gheorghe Zane" Institute
for Economic and Social
Research

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Logos & Episteme

ISSN 2069-053

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RECOVERING PLATO: A PLATONIC VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

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ABSTRACT: Recently, there has been a move in contemporary epistemological philosophy toward a virtue epistemology, which sees certain character traits of the rational agent as critical in the acquisition of knowledge. This attempt to introduce virtue into epistemological investigations has, however, relied almost exclusively on an Aristotelian account of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to take a new tack and examine a virtue epistemological account grounded in Platonic thought. Taking seriously the distinction between knowledge and opinion found in the *Republic*, I then draw upon two virtues, humility and what I call sincerity, to flesh out this account.

KEYWORDS: virtue epistemology, Plato, knowledge, belief

Introduction

When Sosa wrote "The Raft and the Pyramid" in 1991, it signaled a major shift in epistemological thought. Through his criticism of both foundationalism and coherentism (at the time, the two competing epistemological systems), he moved away from an epistemology founded on the properties of beliefs and shifted the focus onto properties of the rational agent. Since his introduction of what is now called virtue epistemology, there has been an ongoing debate regarding what the appropriate disposition of the rational agent is. Some epistemologists focus on the dispositions of faculties, arguing essentially for a reliabilist account of virtue epistemology. In these accounts, the relevant agent dispositions, i.e. virtues, are the excellence of certain faculties, e.g. perception, memory, etc. Greco has gone so far as to claim that this is the consensus view.[1] The alternative account claims that the relevant virtues are character dispositions of the rational agent, and these accounts traditionally focus on virtues understood in an Aristotelian sense. Even Greco, who rejects Aristotle as providing an account of the virtues relevant for knowledge,[2] turns to Aristotle when he seeks an account of understanding.[3] Thus, we have contemporary virtue epistemology dominated by Aristotle.

[1] John Greco, "Intellectual Virtues and Their Place in Epistemology" (paper presented at the University of Georgia, Department of Philosophy Colloquiam, Kleiner Lecture Series, Athens, Georgia, April 13, 2012).

[2] John Greco, "Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* LX, 1 (2000): 179. It might be argued that he is only rejecting Aristotle's account of *moral*

Plato is rarely appealed to in the discussion, and when he is, he is often misunderstood. An example is Sosa's appeal to Plato as offering an account in which such things as eyesight are understood as "virtues."[4] Zagzebski rightly points out that Sosa, and Greco following him, misunderstands the point of the passage and follows this response by stating, "I would find it very interesting if Sosa or Greco made a careful use of the work of Plato or Aquinas in their theories, and hope they will do so."[5] What would a virtue epistemology look like from the Platonic perspective? What presuppositions would be necessary for such a view? How would such a perspective answer some of the perennial problems of epistemology? These are the questions I will attempt to answer in this paper.

The Epistemological Problems

The reason for the shift away from understanding knowledge as a relationship between beliefs, or a property of beliefs, lies in the problems that arose from this understanding. Traditionally, contemporary epistemology has understood knowledge in terms of *justified* true belief (however one understands justification). The fundamental question lay in how justification was to be understood. Some understood it in terms of foundations, i.e. what grounds a belief. One problem with this view is that it leads to an infinite regress. Ultimately one needs a foundation belief that is not itself grounded on any other belief. The alternative was a coherentist approach which viewed beliefs as justified based on their interrelations within a whole system of belief. One problem with a coherentist perspective is how one can account for beliefs which do not seem integral to the system, i.e. can be removed without damage to the overall coherence of the system.[6] Sosa resolved this problem by turning to dispositions in the rational agent to understand justification.

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virtues as a model for understanding knowledge, but I believe Zagzebski is correct in arguing that the Aristotelian distinction between moral and intellectual virtues is not a distinction in kind, and so to argue that one and not the other is an appropriate model for intellectual virtues is ultimately inconsistent. (Cf. Linda Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 137ff.)

[3] Greco, "Intellectual Virtues and Their Place."

[4] Cited in Greco, "Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue," 180.

[5] Linda Zagzebski, "Responses," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* LX, 1 (2000): 207-208.

[6] I recognize the simplicity and superficiality of my account of these positions. It is not my intention to either refute them or to defend a virtue account against them. I merely offer a brief explanation of Sosa's motivation in positing virtue as a critical epistemological criterion.

This move, however, has not resolved all the problems. Conflict over how justification is to be understood rages still in the debate between internalists and externalists. Following Zagzebski, the difference between the two sides can be understood as follows: "Internalists claim, roughly, that the believer must have cognitive access to the justifying condition of a belief, and externalists deny this."[7] According to Zagzebski, the problems the debate seeks to resolve relate to the role of luck in justification and skepticism. Internalists are concerned to free knowledge or justification from luck, as far as possible, while externalists are willing to accept a certain amount of luck in their accounts, as long as they can avoid the skeptical dilemma and with it, the "worst sort of epistemic luck."[8]

With this framework established, we have two of the fundamental problems of contemporary epistemology: 1) the role of luck in knowledge and 2) the skeptical dilemma. In addition to these two problems, we will also examine the problems posed by Gettier Cases. But before we move on, the skeptical dilemma requires further elaboration. The skeptical dilemma is a problem connected with two related aspects typically (or at least intuitively) associated with knowledge: meta-knowledge, i.e. how can I know that I know, and certainty. The problem of meta-knowledge is a concern because if it is not possible to know that one has knowledge, then there's a question as to how belief is significantly different from knowledge. If I only think I know, then that that seems to be the same as merely believing that I know. It seems that knowledge requires meta-knowledge in order to be distinguished from mere belief. But this raises a further difficulty. If meta-knowledge is required for knowledge, then I must know that I know that I know or else my meta-knowledge is mere belief. Thus we seem trapped in an infinite regress (or ascent depending on your perspective). It seems that knowledge is impossible, at least if knowledge pretends to anything greater than belief. This seems to further entail certainty. Knowing that I know seems to mean I am certain that my belief is true. The classic formulation of the problem goes back to Descartes' Evil Genius and is often represented by "Brain-in-a-Vat" scenarios. How do I know I'm not being deceived by an Evil Genius? How do I know I'm not simply a brain in a vat? If we can't answer these questions, if I am

[7] Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind*, 31. She also notes that there is an internalist/externalist debate in relation to knowledge as well as justification. However, as it seems to me the problems the debate is intended to resolve are the same, or at least relevantly similar, whether we are talking about knowledge or justification, the solution a Platonic virtue epistemology provides should resolve both, once such a view has been worked out. On this ground, I will not overly concern myself with the difference between internalism and externalism in relation to knowledge versus justification.

[8] Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind*, 39.

not certain this is not the case, then what claim can we make to knowledge? This account will attempt to address all of these problems.

A Platonic Virtue Epistemology: I The Epistemological Account – The Divorce of Knowledge and Belief

Contemporary epistemological accounts begin with an understanding of knowledge that entails belief. Sosa states, "despite leaving the word 'knows' undefined, one might proceed in three stages as follows: (a) affirm that knowledge entails belief […]"[9] Almost all contemporary epistemologists follow suit.[10] But this is already a departure from a Platonic account of knowledge, and it is a critical one.

Plato's account of knowledge is not unambiguous, and it is beyond the present scope to examine his account in detail and argue for a particular interpretation. Gail Fine notes, "The *Meno* tells us that knowledge is true belief bound by an *aitias logismos*, an explanatory account,"[11] and this is certainly the case. The *Meno* states, "True opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long[…], so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why[…]After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place."[12] But the account is not so simple. As Zagzebski rightly notes, in the *Theaetetus*, 201c-210b, Plato examines and rejects knowledge as true opinion plus λόγος.[13] To get a true picture of the distinction between belief and knowledge, we must turn to the *Republic*.

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[9] Ernest Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 24.

[10] I hesitate to assert "all epistemologists" only out of caution.

[11] Gail Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* V-VII," in *Epistemology*, ed. Stephen Everson, Companions to Ancient Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 85. It should also be noted that understanding "αἰτίας as "explanatory" is a bit idiosyncratic and already prejudices the discussion. The main definition is that of a "charge" or "accusation" as in an indictment. It can also be understood as "cause," and it is likely this definition that Fine draws upon in her translation as "explanatory." However, I think this already injects propositionality into the discussion, and I believe this creates problems which can be avoided by recognizing that knowledge, for Plato, is not propositional, even if belief can be. One might somewhat justifiably argue that λογισμός, with is correlation to λόγος, does inject propositionality into the account, but it is defining knowledge as true belief with λόγος that becomes a problem in the *Theaetetus*. (Cf. 201c9ff.)

[12] Plato *Meno* 97e5-98a4. All English translations are taken from Plato, *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997) unless otherwise noted.

[13] Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind*, 35.

In Book V 476e3ff, Plato lays out the distinction between knowledge, belief/opinion, and ignorance, and significantly, it is grounded in a particular metaphysical perspective. Knowledge is of "what is," i.e. Being. Ignorance is of "what is not," i.e. non-Being. Only "what is" can be known, so "what is not," by definition, cannot be known and so is related to ignorance, since ignorance is the lack of knowledge. But the world isn't divided only into what is and what is not. There is a category of "things" that participate in both. These are sensible objects, and it is of these that we form beliefs. Just as sensible objects lie between "what is" and "what is not," so beliefs lie between knowledge and ignorance. Plato states, "Then we agree that opinion [δόξα] is clearly different from knowledge [ἐπιστήμης] […] Hence each of them [opinion and knowledge] is set over something different and does something different?"[14] So knowledge and opinion are specifically different. They are different not merely in degree but in kind.[15]

The conclusion to be reached is that knowledge must be true and ignorance must be false, but opinion can be either. So the first aspect of our account is that belief and knowledge are different in species, such that knowledge *qua* knowledge is unrelated to belief. The distinction will be critical, but it must be noted that this does not entail that it is impossible to move from belief to knowledge.

As noted above, this understanding depends on a particular metaphysical conception which also must be laid out in order to explicate the relationship between belief and knowledge further. In the Line Analogy,[16] Plato divides reality into four sections: images, things, dianoetic concepts and the Forms.[17] Images and

[14] *Republic*, (477e8-478a1).

[15] Fine claims that this leads to the consequence that objects of knowledge (Forms) and objects of opinion (sensibles) are at a disjoint, and then reaches the conclusion that "one cannot move from belief to knowledge about some single thing. I cannot first believe the sun is shining, and then come to know that it is." Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* V-VII," 85. This is true. If my reading of Plato is correct, then we can never "know" that the sun is shining. What we have is a true belief. But as Plato notes in the *Meno*, knowledge and true belief, from a pragmatic perspective, are equally valuable. The difference is simply that true beliefs don't "remain." (97aff) However, her claim that objects of knowledge and opinion are at a "disjoint" ignores the fact that sensible objects participate in the Forms. It is the fact that they participate *in* the Forms while not *being* Forms that gives them their intermediary state between knowledge and ignorance, i.e. between being and non-being.

[16] *Republic*, 509d6ff.

[17] I am calling these dianoetic concepts for lack of a better term. The text does not give them a unique designation but includes such things as mathematical concepts in this category. At this level, conclusions are reached through a deductive, or dianoetic, process. Hence the designation.

things belong to the realm of Opinion (δόξα)[18] and dianoetic concepts and the Forms belong to the realm of Knowledge (γνῶσις).[19] The distinction is that images and things belong to the realm of sensible objects while dianoetic concepts and the Forms do not. The state of objects in these two realms is what determines the epistemic character they have. The problem with sensible objects, as Plato notes in the *Theaetetus*, is that they change.[20] This means they can't be known. Knowledge must always be true, and since sensible objects are not always anything, then they can't always be true and so can't be known.

It might be argued here that there is an easy solution which reveals itself by indexing beliefs regarding sensible things to a particular time. So, to use Fine's example,[21] when I say "I know the sun is shining," what I mean is that the sun is shining *at a particular time*, and since it is always true that the sun was shining at that particular time, then the belief can always be true and so we escape Plato's dilemma: I *know* the sun is shining. However, indexing the belief to a particular time does not enable us to tie the belief down such that it can be subject to knowledge.[22] The problem is that even if the belief is true, it cannot be

[18] Until now, I have been using opinion and belief interchangeably, but in the Line Analogy, they have distinct usages. Opinion (δόξα) is used to refer to our epistemic relationship to both images and things, while belief (πίστις) refers properly to our epistemic relationship with sensible things (in relation to images it is imagination). The distinction will not be important for our account but does need to be noted.

[19] Again, the proper epistemic states at this level are dianoia (διάνοια), in relation to mathematical concepts, i.e. concepts reached through deductive processes (beginning with a hypothesis and reaching a conclusion) and understanding (νόησις), which is described as a "seeing" in the Cave Analogy (Book VII 514aff) and in the Line Analogy, it is described as "grasping" (ἅπτεται, the middle voice of ἅπτω) (511b3). This will have implications for the problem of meta-knowledge later.

[20] *Theaetetus*, (181cff).

[21] Cf. n. 15 above.

[22] I am consciously avoiding the term "proposition" because I believe it clouds the issue. I believe that propositions are properly the subject of belief and not knowledge, which should become clear as the argument progresses, for precisely the same reason the belief that the sun is shining is not properly subject to knowledge (cf. n. 15 above): propositions are essentially contingent, just as the shining of the sun is contingent, and because of their contingency, they can be true or false. One might raise the objection that some propositions are necessarily true, e.g. the principle of non-contradiction. The principle of non-contradiction cannot possibly be false. The *cogito* might be another example, although it is possible that it is only impossible for us to *imagine* the *cogito* to be false, while it might in it itself be possible that it is false. While it may be the case that a certain proposition might entail truth, it is essential to the nature of propositions that they can be true or false. Insofar then as the principle of non-contradiction is a proposition, it is not necessarily true. What is necessarily true is the aspect of reality that it

knowledge. The belief is contingent, which entails that it is subject to the possibility of being false.[23] Knowledge cannot be false, and so anything that can possibly be false, even if it is not false (even *necessarily* not false, e.g. the sun was shining at a particular time which now is necessarily not false), cannot be a proper object of knowledge. Because knowledge and belief are essentially different, one can be false and the other cannot, knowledge *essentially* cannot be tied to belief. Thus, a fundamental assumption of contemporary epistemology is shown to be problematic. Sosa explicitly recognizes this as an assumption and states, "Not everything believed is known, but nothing can be known without being at least believed (or accepted, presumed, taken for granted, or the like) in some broad

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represents. This signifies an important characteristic of propositions: they are images of reality, and it is this feature that makes them contingent. Just as sensible things are contingent, so also propositions about things are contingent. If there is a proposition that represents reality itself, then the truth of the proposition might be true necessarily, but the truth of the proposition *qua* proposition is contingent upon the reality it represents. This is a problem that arises in Plato regarding definitions. No definition can *be* the reality it defines, so just as things both are and are not the Form in which they participate, so also a definition both is and is not the Form it represents (if it is an accurate definition, it is the Form insofar as it accurately represents the Form, but it is not the Form insofar as it is an instantiation of the Form). This is why, I believe, definitions are so problematic in the Socratic dialogues: no definition is ever completely accurate because it is not, in some respect, that which it defines. So also all propositions are contingently true insofar as their truth depends on the reality they represent. Some might argue that Wittgenstein gives us a picture of the world as propositional, but I would argue this is not the case. He must, and does, I claim, recognize the necessity of presupposing some underlying metaphysical realm to ground logic, even if that underlying metaphysical ground cannot be expressed logically. It might be significant to note that the epistemological shift to propositions and logical forms was the result of a loss of metaphysics, and it is the problem which arises from this loss which Wittgenstein is addressing. If we can recapture metaphysics, then returning to a more Platonic epistemology might be less controversial and less difficult. With Zagzebski's claim that knowledge involves "cognitive contact with reality," it might be possible to see epistemology returning to a metaphysical ground. (Cf. n. 36 below.)

[23] The same argument applies to other types of beliefs, e.g. the sun is hot, the rose is red, etc. as well as propositions. Any belief which involves recognizing contingent properties of objects can be substituted here. Properties of objects which are necessary will be proper subjects of knowledge, e.g. it is a necessary property of fire that it is hot, although fire and hot are different, thus if fire is known, then it is also known that it has the essential property heat. Knowing the Form (to use Platonic terminology-we could use the word "essence" or "nature" as well) entails knowing its essential properties as well. This is possible because the connection is necessary, i.e. unchanging and unchangeable. The distinction might seem merely semantic, but I will argue that it will allow us to escape several problems which have arisen in contemporary epistemology.

sense."[24] However, none of the broad senses which he requires can avoid the contingency in question. And seeking some additional property which eliminates this contingency, which is what, I believe, justification ultimately seeks to do, cannot solve the problem. None of the additional properties (whether justification by itself or causality (in the case of Greco[25] and Zagzebski[26]) or aptness (in the case of Sosa[27]) in addition to justification or understood as a component of justification) remove the essential contingency. Justification does not provide the necessity required, otherwise it would not be justified *true* belief which is knowledge; rather, it would simply be *justified* belief. Justification would remove the essential contingency through its own necessity.[28] Plato's argument that knowledge cannot involve contingent things is much deeper than might appear at first glance, and solutions such as indexing a belief to time fail to resolve the problem. The problem relates to the essential nature of knowledge itself, and this prohibits knowledge from being related to anything contingently true.[29]

This distinction between knowledge and opinion is what divides the sensible and intelligible realms from each other. Now we must examine how the two realms can be connected. Just as they are metaphysically connected, i.e. things are connected to Forms through their participation in the Forms while at the same

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[24] Ernest Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge," *Midwest Studies In Philosophy* 5, 1 (1980): 3.

[25] John Greco, *Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 75.

[26] Linda Zagzebski, "What Is Knowledge?" in *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*, ed. John Greco and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 211.

[27] Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge*, 22ff.

[28] The same is true of any additional property. If it of itself removed the contingency, then we could simply say knowledge is belief plus this additional property. This is clearly revealed by the fact that we must always add "true" to the belief in any definition, but to add "true" to any definition of knowledge is redundant.

[29] This essential distinction between knowledge and belief is also noted by Plato in the *Timaeus* 51e2-4, regarding which Vlastos notes, "his [Plato's] whole epistemology is built on the restriction of what is known to what is necessarily true." Gregory Vlastos, *Socratic Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 54. Fine argues that Plato does not restrict knowledge to necessary truths, that we can have knowledge of sensibles, i.e. contingent things. She states that once we have knowledge of the Forms, we "can apply these accounts [of the Forms] to the sensibles, in such a way as to have L4 [understanding or knowledge in Plato's highest sense] type knowledge of them." Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* V-VII," 111. However, I believe she misses Plato's essential point. What we can understand of sensibles is only their essential nature, i.e. their Form. This entails that we cannot understand sensibles *qua* sensible but only as images of the Forms in which they participate. This is a significant point because divorcing belief from knowledge is essential to my account.

time they are metaphysically distinct from the Forms,[30] so also is there an epistemological connection.[31] The path to knowledge through the sensible realm is most explicit in the Ascent passage of the *Symposium*.[32] In the Ascent, Diotima describes how one moves to knowledge of Beauty Itself, or The Good (i.e. ultimate reality). She tells Socrates that the proper way to begin is with beautiful objects, and by realizing (κατανοέω) that the beauty of one object is "brother to" the beauty of another,[33] one can recognize that which is the same, unchanging, in both, and recognizing the superiority of the unchanging nature, i.e. Form, leave the particular behind and ascend, ultimately, to that which is True, Real. In the *Phaedo*, this process of recognition is used to argue for Plato's theory of Recollection.[34] It is when one sees two equal objects that he recognizes that which is the same in both, i.e. the Equal Itself. In the Line Analogy as well we see this process at work. At the level of dianoetic concepts, which is deductive, one, using as images the things that were imitated before [at the level of the sensible, the objects which were imitated in images (such images as shadows and reflections)], is forced to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion. In the other subsection [the higher section where knowledge is of reality], however, it [the soul/mind] makes its way to a first principle that is *not* a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but without the images used in the

[30] For our purposes, we can understand Form as "nature" or "essence" or "reality." What is essential here is that the essence does not change, even if the sensible aspects of the things do. The precise metaphysical details do not need to be worked out here.

[31] Fine's misunderstanding of this connection is what leads her to assert that sensibles are knowable. Fine, "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* V-VII," 86.

[32] *Symposium*, 210a4ff.

[33] The use of κατανοέω here is, I believe, significant. The lexical definition of the word is "perceive," but there is another Greek word for perception, αἴσθησις (verb form is αἰσθάνομαι), which is much more common in Plato, especially when referring to perceiving through the senses. Κατανοέω is a compound of κατά, a preposition with the general sense "down, downwards," and νοέω, which means "to think." The etymological background of this word is also interesting. There is a sense in which νοέω and its cognates, e.g. νόημα and νόησις, can be understood as perception. This must, however, be distinguished from perception through the senses and, as I believe Plato shows in the *Republic*, refers to a kind of immediate grasp or understanding (cf. n. 19 above). So what Plato seems to mean by κατανοέω is a kind of downward understanding or looking down with the mind (noting the etymological connection with νοῦς, i.e. mind). It is, I believe, a seeing of the Form *in* the particular object. It is significant that the words used for Form, ἰδέα and εἶδος, are etymologically derived from the verb "to see" (εἴδω).

[34] *Phaedo*, 73c1ff.

previous subsection [that of mathematical concepts], using Forms themselves and making its investigation through them.[35]

At the level of διάνοια, we hypothesize what is the same in similar objects and use these hypotheses to draw further conclusions about the objects as they are in themselves. So we are already moving away from the sensible to something higher, i.e. Reality, but we don't have knowledge of these "Forms" yet, because they are merely hypotheses at this level, i.e. they are not first principles. It is at the higher level that reality, essence, the nature of things, is "grasped," i.e. understood, and so it is here that knowledge properly obtains. Yet, we can see an epistemic connection between the realm of belief and the realm of knowledge. We begin with belief but move through belief to knowledge.[36] Finally, in the *Phaedo*, to obtain pure knowledge "one must be free from it [the body] and one must, with the soul itself, see [θεατέον] the things themselves."[37] Again we see the attainment of knowledge described as a "seeing" but one that is not a perception through the senses. There are no senses without the body. What Plato is describing is an immediate grasp which occurs when the soul/mind comes into contact with reality. We must point out that part of Plato's argument in the *Phaedo* is that there can be no knowledge while the mind is embodied. This might seem to contradict our argument that one obtains, or *can* obtain (there is no reason to suppose that knowledge can *only* be obtained by moving from sensibles to reality), knowledge through sensible objects. But this need not be the case. Plato's point can be stated simply as a claim that knowledge and its object are essentially separate from the sensible, and if one focuses on the sensible, then one can never obtain more than true belief. The mind must move away from that which is sensible in order to obtain knowledge.[38]

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[35] *Republic*, 510b3-9.

[36] A pertinent question to ask at this point is whether a Platonic account such as I am laying out requires Plato's theory of Recollection to be coherent. Recollection significantly grounds the process of moving from sensibles to knowledge for Plato, but is it required for such a move? I believe not. In the Line and Cave Analogies, and even in the Ascent of the *Symposium*, the process is not grounded in previous forgotten knowledge of the Forms. Rather what is involved is a "grasp" or immediate understanding of the Forms once the mind comes into contact with them. I will rely on Zagzebski's "indisputable" claim that knowledge "puts the knower into cognitive contact with reality" to argue that such contact with reality is not a radically controversial claim (Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind*, 45). However, I will, perhaps controversially, argue that knowledge does not *put* the knower into cognitive contact with reality; rather, knowledge occurs once cognitive contact with reality occurs.

[37] *Phaedo*, (66e1-2). My translation.

[38] That we can't take Plato too literally here can be argued from the fact that in the *Phaedo* he says that we can never obtain knowledge while in the body, but in Alcibiades' speech in the

But if we move from belief *to* knowledge, then is it not possible to argue that knowledge still entails belief? There is an important and significant difference here. In contemporary epistemology, knowledge is defined as a form of belief.[39] It is true belief plus something. In a Platonic account, knowledge might be obtained by moving *through* belief, but knowledge in no way includes belief. Belief, like the sensible realm upon which it is grounded, is left behind.[40]

There is a final question to be addressed before we move on to discuss the possibility of Platonic epistemological virtues. There has been a discussion in current epistemological literature regarding the necessity of recovering understanding in any sufficient epistemological account. Is it possible that the account for which we are arguing is merely a semantic argument that claims understanding is knowledge and knowledge is belief? In other words, are we really making a claim that is significantly different from what some current epistemologists are already claiming? After all, the highest level of the Line is often translated as "Understanding."

We have seen that in Platonic terms, this highest level is an immediate grasp of reality. Greco, following Kvanvig, Riggs and Hankinson, conceives of understanding as knowing the causal relations between things, such relations grounding explanation.[41] He later explains that understanding is "a systematic knowledge of dependence relations."[42] This is not knowledge as we have explained it, because it isn't connected to reality at all. Knowledge of the things that have such dependent relations is not part of Greco's account of understanding. They belong, it seems, to knowledge. This is the essential aspect of Plato's account of knowledge. We only have knowledge of the relations between things *through* knowledge of the essential nature of things themselves. Knowledge of these relations is part of what is known. It does involve causality, but causality is not the

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Symposium (212c3ff), we get a picture of Socrates who, even while still alive, in the body, has separated himself from the body to a remarkable degree, indicating that perhaps it is not necessary to die in order to "see" reality, at least to some degree.

[39] Cf. Sosa's assumptions above.

[40] Perhaps this seems counterintuitive. If so, perhaps it would be helpful to understand it in the following terms: once I know something, I no longer believe it. For example, I may have believed it was raining in Moscow, but once I checked the weather, I no longer believed it. Instead, I had come to know it. I recognize this is a problematic example, since it claims that something properly relegated to the realm of belief can be known, but for one who finds my claim difficult, the example should help clarify the difference between knowledge and belief.

[41] Greco, *Achieving Knowledge*, 9.

[42] Greco, "Intellectual Virtues and Their Place."

object of knowledge; it is not what we know.[43] It is a result of knowledge. By knowing reality, I know the essential relations entailed by reality, and only thus know any causal relations.[44]

Riggs offers a notion of understanding that is an "appreciation or grasp of order, pattern, how things 'hang together.'"[45] According to his conception, we can understand a variety of things, such as machines, people, mathematical proofs, etc., and of each thing we would have "a deep appreciation, grasp, or awareness of how its parts fit together, what role each plays in the context of the whole, and the role it plays in the larger scheme of things."[46] In fact, Riggs' account of understanding might sound much like the account of knowledge we are offering. He even says, "One of the more significant differences between understanding and knowledge is that knowledge is a species of belief, but understanding is not (at least not necessarily)."[47] While Riggs' account seems promising, he stops short of explaining precisely what he means and falls back on "coherence" and "explanatory coherence" as "getting very close" to what he means.[48] Following Cartwright, he even considers the possibility that understanding doesn't entail

[43] In the Sun Analogy (507b1-509d1), knowing The Good does entail knowing that The Good is the cause of all things, but this is a result of knowing The Good. It is not any cause, as such, that is known.

[44] A question might be raised here whether causal relations can be the object of knowledge at all since one might see them as contingent. I would argue that causal relations can either be contingent, if grounded in contingent qualities of a thing, or not contingent, if grounded in the essential nature of a thing. The latter can properly be an object of knowledge while the former could only properly be the object of belief. A point must be made here regarding contingency. I have already argued that propositions are contingently related to that which they reference, even if that which they reference is eternally unchanging. Could one not make the same claim here, namely that causal relations are always contingent based on those things which are causally related? I would argue no, because propositions are always something external and apart from their referents. I would argue causal relations are not external to the things causally related; rather, the causal relation is inherent in the very nature of the things related. It is either inherent in the contingent properties of a thing, and so the causal relation is contingent, since the qualities which ground it are contingent, or it is eternal and unchanging since it is part of the very fabric of the unchanging and essential nature of the things so related.

[45] Wayne Riggs, "Understanding 'Virtue' and the Virtue of Understanding," in *Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology*, ed. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 217.

[46] Riggs, "Understanding 'Virtue,'" 217.

[47] Riggs, "Understanding 'Virtue,'" 217.

[48] Riggs, "Understanding 'Virtue,'" 218.

truth.[49] I believe Riggs has some insight here, however. That knowledge, for Plato, is knowledge of the whole is clear. In the *Republic*, Book IV, 438e4-8, Plato says, "when knowledge became, not knowledge of the things itself that knowledge is of, but knowledge of something of a particular sort [ποιοῦ τινος], the result was that it itself became a particular sort of knowledge, and this caused it to be no longer called knowledge without qualification, but – with the addition of the relevant sort – medical knowledge or whatever." Further, in Book V, 475b5, he says, "Then won't we say that the philosopher doesn't desire one part of wisdom rather than another, but desires the whole thing [the whole of this Form – παντὸς τοῦ εἴδους τούτου]?" So Riggs is correct in claiming that knowledge must be of the whole. However, as we noted above, understanding how the parts fit together, the relations, is grounded upon this knowledge of the whole. We can know the relations between the parts only because we know the whole. By knowing the whole, we know all the essential aspects and characteristics of it, and this entails that we know how the things that are its parts relate both to each other and to the whole. This further entails that we know the truth, in its fullness, about the whole. It is not possible to have partial knowledge or knowledge which is only partially true, at least not in the Platonic sense which we are advocating.[50]

Zagzebski defines understanding as "the state of comprehension of nonpropositional structures of reality."[51] As she notes, she does not exclude understanding as having reality itself as its subject, however, it is not limited to this. She even asserts that philosophy "aims to understand the whole of reality."[52] Like Riggs', this initially seems like a promising account. However, her account is grounded on understanding as deriving from skills, which is completely foreign to a Platonic account. Skills are too essentially involved with the sensible realm to be related to knowledge. Further, skills, understood as "how to do something," cannot even lead to truth, since all they entail is knowing the means to achieve

[49] Riggs, "Understanding 'Virtue,'" 219. Catherine Elgin also claims understanding does not entail truth. Catherine Elgin, "Is Understanding Factive?" in *Epistemic Values*, eds. Alan Millar Adrian Haddock, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[50] Does this rule out degrees of knowledge? This is an interesting and important question which deserves a more detailed examination than we can give it here. However, it is not ruled out necessarily. We could admit the possibility of degrees of knowledge as long as we recognize that this is not knowledge properly understood. It certainly is not understanding, although we might be able and willing to call it something else. Cf. n. 59 and n. 84.

[51] Linda Zagzebski, "Recovering Understanding," in *Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility and Virtue*, ed. Matthias Steup (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 242.

[52] Zagzebski, "Recovering Understanding," 243.

some end.[53] Given that better means may, and often do, come along in time, this is deeply problematic for a Platonic account which ties knowledge essentially to the unchanging, and thereby to truth. Finally, structure, on her account, is essentially tied to understanding "the relation of parts to other parts and *perhaps even* the relation of part to a whole."[54] This account of Plato turns him on his head. We only understand the relations between parts *by* knowing the whole. Her account clearly bases any possible knowledge of the structure of the whole on understanding the relation of parts *qua* parts.

We have now explicated a Platonic epistemology which has several features. First, knowledge and belief are distinct. Knowledge necessarily entails truth and cannot be false, while belief can be either. On this ground, knowledge cannot be of the sensible realm, which is changing. It is precisely because the sensible changes that it is properly the object of belief, which can be true or false, and not the object of knowledge. Second, knowledge and belief are, nevertheless, both metaphysically and epistemology related. One can obtain knowledge by moving through belief, i.e. sensible things. Third, the object of knowledge is what is real; the object of belief is what appears, i.e. what changes, the sensible.

Finally, we need to answer the question: What is the value of knowledge in Platonic terms? It can't be pragmatic and isn't. Pragmatic concerns are the domain of contingency. Although there, perhaps, will be a pragmatic value (e.g. knowing what Larissa *is* might entail knowing where it is which will entail knowing how to get there, to borrow an example from the *Meno*[55]), this isn't its essential value.[56]

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[53] She explicitly ties understanding to "knowing how to do something well" (Zagzebski, "Recovering Understanding," 241).

[54] Zagzebski, "Recovering Understanding," 241. (emphasis added)

[55] 97a1ff. It should also be noted that Socrates emphasizes here that for the sake of pragmatic concerns, true belief is just as efficient as knowledge.

[56] Another issue arises here: Can we have knowledge of the particular? Knowledge involves knowing what is unchanging and thus what is eternal. When we have true opinion we do not know the necessary unchanging essence of things. The difference between knowing Larissa and having a true opinion about Larissa (in each case I can direct someone to Larissa) is that in the former, I know what it is in a way that is unchanging. I know what a city *is.* I thus know what makes Larissa a city. An essential characteristic of cities is to be spatially located, so I know Larissa is spatially located. Can I know where it is, i.e. the specific spatial location? It would seem that, on Platonic terms, the answer has to be no, since this is contingent. Larissa may or may not be at the specific location it happens to be currently. So can there be knowledge of contingency, or better particularity, itself? To follow an earlier example, we know it is the nature of the sun to shine, but we do not know that the sun is shining now. The former is an essential characteristic of the sun, but the latter is a particular instance of which we can have true (or false) opinion but not knowledge. It is an essential characteristic of Larissa to be in a

The essential value of knowledge for Plato is ethical. We must know the Good in order to *be* good. This entails that we cannot live a good life without knowledge of the Good.[57] As Socrates notes in the *Meno*, it is only through ignorance that men are bad.[58] As we have seen, true knowledge is knowledge of the whole, and so true knowledge will entail that one knows fully what is good in all its aspects. So in order to be able to live well, one must have knowledge, particularly knowledge of what is good. But this involves knowing the whole and how one relates to it.[59]

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particular spatial location, so if Larissa has an essential nature distinct from other cities, e.g. if Larissa is *this* city located at *this* spatial location, and this essential nature does not and cannot change, then I can know Larissa as a particular city. Suppose one of the essential characteristics of a city is a contingent characteristic, e.g. its essential nature is to be inhabited by people? But being inhabited by people is something that can be the case at one time and not the case at another, and so it is contingent. We seem to have the paradox of a necessary contingency, or a contingent necessity. This type of knowledge might be possible but might be impossible for a contingent being, such as a human being. One way it might be possible to know this is if we can have knowledge of time. But to know time is to know the whole of time in an unchanging manner, i.e. I must know temporal things in an eternal manner. This would entail knowing all moments of time "simultaneously." If this type of knowledge is possible, then I might be able to know Larissa as a particular city located in a particular place at a particular time. What I would have knowledge of is when Larissa *became* a city and when it *ceased to be* a city. I must know both in order to *know* Larissa and not simply have a true opinion regarding Larissa. This might not necessarily entail eternal knowledge, if Larissa existed in the past, for example. However, to have knowledge of a particular present city, I would have to know when it ceased to be a city, and this I can only know if I have future knowledge or eternal knowledge. Knowledge of these aspects *is* knowledge of contingent things as contingent, but in such a way that they are no longer contingent. They are unchanging. Is this different from indexing the shining of the sun to a particular time? Doesn't this remove the contingency from the sun's shining? No, because it is not knowledge of the whole. To know the shining of the sun as a particular event (as opposed to the essential nature of the sun, which entails shining), I would need to know the sun's shining as it occurs *at all times*. Only then do I have knowledge of the sun's shining, and not true opinion. This is a critical question that requires a detailed exploration in order to fully explicate an account such as the one for which I am arguing, but the foregoing should be sufficient to offer a possible solution to the problem. Another, and perhaps better, solution is to simply admit that my epistemic relationship with all particular things is one of belief, either true or false. Nothing significant is lost in such an admission.

[57] As we saw earlier, The Good is the highest Form for Plato. Plato says, "not only do the objects of knowledge [Forms] owe their being known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power." (*Republic*, 509b6-10) So when we speak of knowledge of The Good, we are speaking of knowledge in its fullest sense.

[58] *Meno*, 77c4-78b1.

[59] It may be the case that this is not attainable, or at least not fully attainable, for human beings. Plato does indicate this in several places. In the *Phaedo* he claims we can only truly obtain knowledge after death. (66e) In the *Timaeus*, "of true belief, it must be said, that all men have a

Thus, we can already see that knowledge, in Platonic terms, will entail virtue. Knowing seems to entail being virtuous.[60] But is this a reciprocal relationship or does it only go in one direction? In other words, is virtue required for knowledge? If so, which virtues and how are they related to knowledge?

A Platonic Virtue Epistemology: II The Virtues

Now that we have explored the nature of knowledge itself on a Platonic account, what role do the virtues play in such an account and would such virtues be? Plato clearly follows the four traditional Greek virtues: wisdom, justice, moderation, and courage. But only one of these relates to knowledge, i.e. wisdom. The other three follow from wisdom, i.e. when wisdom rules, then the other three come to be.[61] But are there any virtues that are required in order for one to attain knowledge? We will argue that there are two: humility and sincerity. To understand both, we turn to the *Meno*.

In the *Meno*, when Socrates is demonstrating his notion of Recollection with the slave boy, he brings the slave boy to the point where the slave boy recognizes his own ignorance. The slave boy thought he had knowledge but now is forced to admit that he doesn't. In fact, Socrates asserts that this state of recognizing one's ignorance is an important condition for knowledge. Without this, one will not know one is ignorant and so will not seek the knowledge he does not know he lacks.[62] That this is not simply a passing comment on this particular person's epistemic state can be seen if we consider this passage in light of the discussion about Socrates' wisdom in the *Apology*. In the *Apology*, Socrates asserts that true wisdom is recognizing one's lack of knowledge.[63] So in order for one to

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share, but of understanding, only the gods and a small group of people do." (51e8-10) And in the famous passage in the *Apology*, Socrates asserts that true wisdom is knowing that one does not know. (23b1-5) This has special significance for the skeptical problem, as we will see.

[60] Can I have knowledge of what is good without applying it? This is another important question we cannot fully address here. However, I certainly cannot have a good life without knowing the good, or, assuming that it might be possible to have a good life accidentally, I at least cannot have the best life. It is at least better to have a good life through knowledge rather than through accidental circumstance.

[61] In the *Republic*, justice is understood as each part of the soul doing its job. The job of reason is to rule the other parts, so it is only when wisdom is attained and rules over everything in the city (or soul) that the other parts can function properly, i.e. can do their jobs, being moderate and courageous and just. So wisdom/knowledge is essentially the source of the other virtues. (*Republic*, 248a1ff.)

[62] *Meno*, 84a2-c8.

[63] *Apology*, 23b1-5. Ionescu also recognizes the connection between the *Meno* and the *Apology*, stating, "it is worthwhile comparing *Meno* 84b9-c2 with *Apology* 29b" (Cristina Ionescu,

attain knowledge, humility, in the sense of recognizing one's ignorance, is a necessary condition. As long as one arrogantly thinks one knows, then knowledge cannot be attained. The result of one failing to recognize one's ignorance and the corresponding arrogant state of character can be seen in the *Euthyphro*, where Euthyphro makes no progress in his search for knowledge of piety. In fact, Euthyphro continually repeats the same definitions Socrates has refuted, and even when it is obvious that his definitions don't work, rather than accept that there's a problem with his understanding, he blames Socrates for the perplexity. "I am not the one who makes them [the definitions] go round and not remain in the same place; it is you who are Daedalus; for as far as I am concerned they [the definitions] would remain as they were."[64] Meno, on the other hand, is able to make progress precisely because he admits the problem is with him.[65] "I have made many speeches about virtue before large audiences on a thousand occasions, very good speeches as I thought, but now I cannot even say what it is."[66] Thus, by the end of the dialogue, Socrates can say to Meno, "Convince your guest friend Anytus here of these very things *of which you yourself have been convinced* [σὺ δὲ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἅπερ αὐτὸς πέπεισαι][…]"[67] Meno has made epistemic progress. So the first Platonic epistemic virtue to be recognized is humility.

The second is what we will call sincerity. It is related to humility but is slightly different. It is an openness to honest discussion, a sincere search for understanding. Again, this is reflected in the *Meno*. When Meno asks Socrates what kind of answer he would give a questioner, Socrates replies, "A true one,

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Plato's Meno: An Interpretation (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 100 n. 71); however, she doesn't follow through and strangely focuses on 29b where Socrates claims his superiority lies in his ignorance of things regarding the underworld, rather than his far more significant claim, it seems to me, that human wisdom in general is "worth little or nothing."

[64] *Euthyphro*, 11c9-d1.

[65] In identifying Meno with the "friends" as opposed to the disputatious (i.e. eristic) debaters (cf. the quote from the *Meno* below) and identifying in him the virtue of humility which I am distinguishing, it must be recognized that I am disagreeing with a significant movement in contemporary scholarship which views in the distinction a criticism of Meno, including him among the eristic debaters (cf. Klein, Weiss, Scott, Ionescu). I believe this to be a mistake which hinders us from seeing the full significance of this distinction and its importance in a Platonic epistemology. It can too easily obscure the fact that Meno has made epistemic progress by the end of the dialogue and the reason for this progress. Ionescu, interestingly, recognizes the importance of *aporia* in attaining knowledge, but she doesn't make the connection to virtue, making it seem like a technical requirement, and fails to identify it in Meno. She sees Meno's epistemic progress as "slow and doubtful." (Ionescu, *Plato's Meno*, 72)

[66] *Meno*, 80b2-4.

[67] *Meno*, 100b8-9. (emphasis added)

surely, and if my questioner was one of those clever and disputatious debaters, I would say to him, 'I have given my answer; if it is wrong, it is your job to refute it.' Then, if they are friends as you and I are, and want to discuss with each other, they must answer in a manner more gentle and more proper to discussion."[68] Why the different method of response? Because the debater is not sincere in his search for knowledge, and as we see in the *Euthyphro*, unwillingness to listen to rational argument obstructs knowledge.[69] What is a friendly interlocutor as opposed to a "disputatious debater"? Speaking of why the majority of people aren't persuaded by philosophical arguments, Socrates says in the *Republic*, "Nor have they [the majority] listened to sufficiently fine and free arguments that search out the truth in every way for the sake of knowledge but that keep away from the sophistications and eristic quibbles that, both in public trials and in private gatherings, aim at nothing except reputation and disputation."[70] So sincerity or honesty in discussion is also required for to attain knowledge.[71]

It might seem that these aren't truly epistemic virtues but merely states of character that affect one's willingness to seek knowledge but don't really impact the acquisition of knowledge. One might argue that these alleged virtues merely involve a willingness to look for truth. However, we will attempt to show that they involve more than that. The type of humility and sincerity we are discussing involve an orientation of the mind (or soul, to use the Platonic terminology). It is

[68] *Meno*, 75c8-d4.

[69] This might sound similar to Zagzebski's account of motivation. However, it should be noted that in her account, the virtues *arise from* a motivation for knowledge, but they are distinct from this motivation and each virtue has its own distinct motivation. Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind*, 166ff.

[70] *Republic*, 499a2-5. "Eristic" is also the word used in the *Meno* passage to describe the disputatious debaters.

[71] This is different from what Montmarquet views as open-mindedness. He states, "The open-minded person must tend to see others' ideas *as* plausible." James Montmarquet, *Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1993), 24. The Platonic "sincerity" is not a tendency to see others' ideas as plausible but a willingness to listen to arguments. Zagzebski's account of open-mindedness is similar to Montmarquet's but includes receptivity to arguments. Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind*, 269. The difference hinges on the distinction between simply considering someone's idea or argument as possibly true and recognizing the truth *in* an argument. This is intimately related to our account of knowledge insofar as knowledge entails recognizing truth, but to do this, you must be open to seeing it. The difference lies in that our account entails an orientation of character not an acceptance of possibility, as we hope to show.

active rather than passive.[72] We have already seen that knowledge, in its true sense, is immediately grasped rather than actively acquired. Now we must examine the state one must attain in order to be properly prepared or oriented to grasp knowledge.

In the Sun Analogy,[73] we see that The Good, i.e. the ultimate reality,[74] is what makes knowledge possible. Plato says, "what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good."[75] How does it give the power to know to the knower? One way this can be understood is that by making things knowable, it allows the knower to know. Or, more precisely, since knowledge is of *what is*, by giving being to things,[76] it makes them knowable and so allows the knower to know. While this is certainly the case, the true understanding of this passage can only be grasped if one recognizes the connection between these statements and the analogy Plato uses. The image is one of the Sun which, by shining light on visible objects makes it possible for the eye to see them.[77] It is this image which corresponds to the way reality makes knowledge possible. But with sight, it is the light moving from the object to the sense organ which *is* sight. The eye receives the light and it is this receiving of the light which is sight. Knowledge works in the same way. The mind receives the reality (or the essence/nature) which is in a thing, and it is this reception of the reality which is knowledge.[78] This is why Plato can talk about knowledge as a "seeing."[79]

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[72] It might seem strange that we argue that this orientation is an active state, since we will argue (in fact, have argued) that knowledge is passively received rather than actively acquired. But the state one must be in in order to grasp knowledge is not passively attained. We must and can work toward it.

[73] *Republic*, 507b1-509d1.

[74] Plato does say The Good is superior to Being and so is "beyond being," so it might be somewhat misleading in equating it with Being or Reality. However, this is a complex and difficult passage with a long history of interpretation. Since The Good is the source of all being, and in order to be an object of knowledge (cf. n. 75) it must be real, it will suffice here to identify it with Being. This also allows us to remain uncommitted to this aspect of Platonic metaphysics. What our account requires is an understanding that the object knowledge is what is real and that this reality is what reveals itself in knowledge. We do not need to adopt the specific details of the Platonic metaphysical account for our account of knowledge.

[75] *Republic*, 508d8. It should also be noted that Plato goes on to say that The Good is an object of knowledge.

[76] *Republic*, 509b6-8.

[77] *Republic*, 507d5-508b6.

[78] I see no problem in replacing "reception of reality" with Zagzebski's "cognitive contact with reality," as long as we understand such cognitive contact properly. The difference, as I see it, lies fundamentally in the metaphysical understanding. The reality which we receive and with

But it is here the virtues of humility and sincerity play their role. Just as the eye must be in the proper orientation in order to see its object, and no matter how brightly the sun shines, unless the eye is open and oriented appropriately, nothing will be seen, so also unless the mind is sincere and open to grasping the truth and recognizes that it does not already possess the truth, no truth, or knowledge, can be obtained. One will not seek knowledge, i.e. turn the mind toward the knowable, as long as one thinks one already knows. Thus, it is necessary to recognize one's ignorance, i.e. possess humility, in order to know. And one cannot grasp the truth unless one is sincere in the desire to "see" the truth. Arrogance and close-mindedness prevent the mind from being able to receive knowledge, i.e. to come into contact with reality. We must orient ourselves, turn our eyes in the proper direction, focus them properly (in epistemological terms, recognize our ignorance and be open to the truth of arguments and reality), but once we do these things, knowledge happens. Knowledge is essentially a passive activity. It is passive insofar as knowledge is received, immediately grasped, but it is active insofar as it involves our orienting ourselves properly.[80] In the Cave, the prisoner must walk out into the Sun. He must look at the Sun. He must open his eyes. But assuming he has the proper character, i.e. is properly oriented, he simply receives knowledge. He immediately grasps it. So we can see that both humility and sincerity are necessary if one is to have knowledge.[81]

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which we have contact does not belong to sensible, tangible objects which change, as we noted above.

[79] Cf. particularly the Cave Analogy. (*Republic*, Book VII 514aff.)

[80] We have argued, on Platonic grounds, that knowledge must be received and cannot be acquired by the rational agent himself. Are there other reasons to believe this to be the case? Two things to note here. 1) Given the nature of knowledge, i.e. that it is of what is eternal and unchanging, its source cannot be something temporal and changing. The source can only be eternal and unchanging itself. We, given our finite nature, cannot be that source. 2) If such knowledge of eternal realities (I avoid the term "eternal truths" as it seems to me to imply propositionality) is to be possible at all, it can only be received, again, because we are finite.

[81] It might be objected that in order to show the *necessary* (rather than merely practical) connection between humility and knowledge, I must show that truth reached without virtue is not knowledge. Two things need to be pointed out here. 1) Truth is not a sufficient condition for knowledge. The necessary condition for knowledge is the fixed, eternal, unchanging nature of reality. Knowledge must *be* true and always true, but that it is true does not make it knowledge. The truth of knowledge follows from the relation to reality. Truth doesn't ground that relation. In other words, there can be truth without knowledge, e.g. true belief. So when we use "truth" and "knowledge" interchangeable, it must be understood that this truth is of a certain type, i.e. unchanging, and actually follows on the reality given in knowledge. It is not that once we have truth, we have knowledge. It is rather once we have knowledge, then we know truth. A question arises here whether I can know my belief to be true. We will examine

We must now offer a better explanation of the value of knowledge according to our account. We noted above that the value of knowledge can essentially be seen as ethical, according to Plato. Knowing The Good entails being good. But that explanation requires accepting the Platonic metaphysical theory in greater detail than might be desirable or necessary for our account. Knowing The Good is equivalent to knowing reality, and knowing reality entails knowing the characteristics of reality in its unchanging nature. This also entails knowing reality as a whole, which involves knowing how the different aspects of reality interrelate. As we have noted,[82] full knowledge might be beyond human capacity, but two things should be noted here. Our account does not necessarily exclude partial knowledge.[83] Although such partial knowledge would not be knowledge, neither would it be belief.[84] Knowing reality and how it interrelates is necessary in order to properly guide one's life, and so our account, like Plato's, has the same ethical value.[85]

A Platonic Virtue Epistemology: III Solutions to the Problems

Earlier, we discussed several problems that arise in the current epistemological debate. How would the account we have laid out respond to those problems? The essential divorce of knowledge from belief solves several of them in itself.

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this later. 2) Knowledge cannot be attained without these virtues because knowledge is received, not acquired. Since knowledge occurs by receiving what is offered, without the proper orientation, knowledge cannot occur. To receive what is offered (this is true regardless of what is being offered), there must be a recognition that one does not already possess what is being offered. To receive knowledge, the mind must recognize that it lacks knowledge, i.e. must have humility, and consequently must open itself up (I avoid the word "seek" since it implies active acquisition) to a position whereby what is offered can be received, i.e. must have sincerity. Thus, knowledge cannot occur without the virtues, although truth can be obtained without the virtues, e.g. the truth of beliefs.

[82] Cf. n. 59.

[83] Cf. n. 50.

[84] What such partial knowledge would be is an interesting question, and one I wish to leave open for further discussion. However, I see no necessary problem in recognizing the possibility of an incomplete knowledge; one in which certain unchanging aspects of reality are understood while others are not. One might also ask whether it would be problematic should one ever actually attain knowledge, since then it seems one could no longer be virtuous, i.e. have humility or sincerity. This could only arise as a problem if meta-knowledge is possible, i.e. if one knows that one knows, as I hope to examine in more detail shortly.

[85] Whether it has other types of value and whether the conclusions of science can be knowledge are things I will leave for further exploration, although I believe we have offered some insight into the latter question.

Recognizing that belief is not a part of knowledge removes the problem of justification. We can ask whether a belief is justified or not, but it no longer has the significance it had before. In fact, how beliefs arise is no longer an essential epistemological concern, and so epistemological luck does not enter into the discussion.[86] This also removes Gettier concerns from our epistemological account. Since all that matters as far as beliefs are concerned is whether they're true, that they are arrived at by luck is unproblematic.[87] With the removal of justification as an epistemological problem, much of the concern surrounding the internalist/externalist debate loses its force, since this debate is primarily concerned with justification of true beliefs.

The skeptical problem gains a new intrigue on our account. Understood as a meta-question problem, i.e. how do we know that we know, it becomes unnecessary to answer. In fact, it becomes necessary that it cannot be answered. Understood as a problem of certainty, i.e. how I can be certain of my knowledge, not only is skepticism not a problem, but to be certain of our knowledge runs counter to the conditions necessary for knowledge to begin with. If it is a necessary condition of knowledge to be humble, i.e. recognize one does *not* know, then certainty becomes an obstacle to knowledge. To be certain would be to remove the possibility of knowledge. Skepticism not only ceases to be a problem but becomes a necessary condition for knowledge, if we understand skepticism properly, i.e. as a lack of knowledge regarding one's knowledge.[88]

We should clarify what is meant by "certain." To say that one is certain is to say that one knows that one knows. But this has implications. To say that one

[86] Is there luck involved in our account of knowledge? Perhaps it is easier for some to possess the appropriate virtues. Some might find humility and sincerity easier to come by than others, but unless it turns out to be the case that these virtues are impossible for some to attain, I do not see a problem here. And while one might not be praiseworthy for possessing the appropriate virtues (after all, if virtues have a normative character, i.e. if one *should* be virtuous, what is there to be praised for in simply being what one *should* be?), one is certainly responsible for being virtuous, as long as it is up to the agent to orient himself properly.

[87] For example, Susan has reason to belief that John owns a car. She therefore believes that someone owns a car. John turns out not to own a car, but her belief that someone owns a car is still true. Good for Susan. She has a true belief. She formed it improperly, perhaps, but that is not a problem, because she doesn't (*and never did and never could* on our account) know that someone owns a car. She only believes it, because the object of her belief isn't a proper object of knowledge.

[88] Whether this could entail a radical pyrrhonian skepticism is an interesting question. Since knowledge might be relegated to only a few, and full knowledge is certainly unattainable by most, if not all, it is possible a pyrrhonian skepticism, at least of some kind, might actually play a role here.

knows is to say that what one knows cannot be false (especially given our account of knowledge). This is, obviously, antithetical to humility. One cannot recognize one's lack of knowledge if one claims to know. Thus, humility and certainty are mutually exclusive.[89] And thus, if we are correct that humility is a necessary condition for knowledge, one cannot know that one knows. The meta-question is excluded as unanswerable. In fact, meta-knowledge is not properly an object of knowledge at all. One must ask: What is the proper object of meta-knowledge? The object of meta-knowledge is the interior state of the rational agent regarding knowledge, i.e. does the rational agent possess knowledge or not? This is contingent. It can be either true or false. Thus, since the state of one's knowing is always contingent and can be either true or false, the knowledge of one's knowledge falls in the realm of belief. The knowledge one has must necessarily be true, but knowledge of one's knowledge does not entail such necessity and so isn't the proper object of knowledge at all. Thus, meta-knowledge as *knowledge* is impossible on these grounds as well.

It seems that given the considerations just discussed one might ask the question: Must one always doubt one's knowledge in order to have any knowledge at all? This seems paradoxical, to say the least. If one does indeed possess knowledge, to claim one does not know is false, and how can this be virtuous? A couple of considerations here. First, a lack of humility cuts one off from the source of knowledge, and since knowledge is given, to cut one off from the source of knowledge is to abandon both knowledge and its possibility. Does this entail that knowledge is constantly being given? It seems so. Knowledge can never be fully possessed, because then I no longer need to look at that which is known; I, rather, look inward at that which I possess. Since I am not what is known, such a course of action immediately cuts one off from what is known.[90] For this not to be the case, I must become that which is known, and this would entail that I become eternal and unchanging. This also entails that sincerity must always be present since one must also always be open to seeing that which is offered. Second, humility, at the meta-level, would simply be recognition that I can never have meta-knowledge. We might call this meta-humility. Thus, even after knowledge has been acquired, the virtues play an essential role.

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[89] This also has implications in the realm of public discourse, but such a discussion does not belong here. I wish here merely to raise the issue for thought.

[90] Can I be the object of knowledge? In other words, what about self-knowledge? If this is a question of knowing one's *particularity* as a human being, which I believe it is, then it falls under the question of whether particularity can be known, which was examined earlier. Cf. n. 56.

A brief examination should be made regarding the level of belief. We have spent much of this paper discussing knowledge, but there are several questions which arise regarding beliefs which deserve some consideration. First, can we know the truth of our beliefs? If this is a meta-question, i.e. can I know that I know my belief is true, then the answer is no on the grounds already stated for rejecting the meta-question. If we are simply asking whether I can have knowledge of the truth of my belief, the answer remains no. This is not the proper domain of knowledge, since such truth is contingent, i.e. can either be true or false. The most I can ever say about my own belief is that I believe it to be true. Second, do the virtues play any role on the level of belief?[91] It may be the case that humility is only necessary at the level of knowledge, but this does not entail that it is unimportant on lower levels. If one lacks humility in one area of one's life, it seems difficult that it might be claimed in another. One must at least, even on the level of belief, realize that one's beliefs are uncertain and further realize that belief is of lesser importance than knowledge. One must always recognize a certain deficiency in one's epistemic state, as long as one remain on the level of belief.[92]

Finally, it should also be noted that nothing in our account entails infallibility on the part of the knower. Just as the eye can be defective or some obstacle can hinder its ability to receive what the light gives to it, so also the mind can be obscured by a variety of possible factors such that its reception of the reality revealed to it is obscured. This does not entail that one's knowledge is false. Rather it entails that one does not know.[93]

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[91] I thank Dr. Sarah Wright who raised the question of what advice might be given regarding thinking well on the level of belief, which led to these concerns. I do not completely answer her question here, but I hope I offer some insights into a direction such an exploration might go.

[92] Even if one could be certain that the sun shone yesterday, it must be recognized that such certainty is far inferior to knowledge of the eternal and unchanging nature of the thing which makes such things as "shining" possible. One is reminded here of the prisoners in Plato's Cave who mock and ridicule the returning philosopher for failing to understand the shadowy relations of things as well as they do. However, as a reminder, certainty on any level is excluded. Perhaps a recognition and embrace of this principle could be seen as a gift of post-modernism. Lyotard's definition of post-modernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives" (Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, ed. Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte-Sasse, Theory and History of Literature, vol. 10 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv) reflects this. By recognizing the inadequacy of metanarratives, we must suspend any claims to meta-knowledge even of ourselves.

[93] Again, partial knowledge is not necessarily excluded here.

Conclusion

To summarize our account, we have argued that properly speaking, knowledge and belief are specifically distinct epistemological states.[94] Each has its own proper object: belief is oriented toward things that change, the sensible, contingency, while knowledge is oriented toward reality, nature, what is unchanging and necessary. Knowledge requires a proper orientation, which is primarily an orientation of character, involving humility, i.e. a recognition of one's ignorance, and sincerity, i.e. an openness to seeing the truth when it presents itself. Without these virtues, knowledge is impossible. This means that while perhaps we are not to be praised for our knowledge, we are still responsible for our knowledge. Finally, knowledge has value in how we live our lives. This does not exclude other values of knowledge, but, we have argued, this is its primary value. The relationship between virtue and knowledge is reciprocal. Just as one must have knowledge to be good and live well, so also one must be virtuous (humble and sincere) in order to live a good life.[95]

[94] If belief is an epistemological state at all.

[95] I recognize that explanation of the relationship between knowledge and the good life might be unsatisfactory, but we will leave that to be explored in more detail later.

EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND MEMORY

B.J.C. Madison

ABSTRACT: Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject's perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory. My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with epistemic internalism and an awareness condition on justification. Specifically, I will explore the plausibility of various options open to internalists, including both foundationalist and non-foundationalist approaches to the structure of justification. I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address.

KEYWORDS: epistemology, justification, memory, epistemic internalism

Introduction

Some beliefs are epistemically justified, whereas others are not. But what, exactly, marks this difference? Under what conditions does justification obtain? A related family of views insists on the indispensability of the subject's perspective. As such, these views count themselves as versions of epistemic internalism. While the details vary quite widely, internalists of all stripes hold that only factors internal to the subject, in the relevant sense, can make a justificatory difference. Different senses of the epistemically internal include being things that the subject is, or easily can be, consciously aware of, or mental states internal to the subject.

Some version of these basic requirements strike many as plausible at first blush: being justified in believing something is a matter of (epistemic) reasonableness; (epistemic) reasonableness requires that the subject have reasons for their beliefs; further, what it is to have a justifying reason is, in part, to satisfy an awareness condition, or to be in a certain mental state.

However, despite any *prima facie* appeal internalism might enjoy, certain kinds of beliefs have been thought by critics to pose special problems for the view. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the

subject either immediately or upon introspection, it can serve to justify beliefs. But many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, alleging that internalism cannot account for the possibility of the justification of beliefs stored in memory.[1] My aim in this paper is to offer a response that explains how memory justification is possible in a way that is consistent with even the most demanding forms of epistemic internalism.

In section 1, I will formulate what is perhaps the most demanding version of internalism, which will be the subject of this paper. If I am able to vindicate it, I thereby ought to be able to also vindicate weaker and less demanding forms of internalism. In section 2, I shall then clearly outline the challenge for internalism presented from the justification of memory belief. Upon distinguishing different kinds of memory in section 3, I will then put forward the following two different positions as individually sufficient ways of addressing the *prima facie* worry of the justification of memory belief, within an internalist framework:

1. section 4.1 introduces foundationalist strategies, arguing that justification for some memory beliefs is provided by phenomenal states that can be described as memory-seemings, states in which one has an experience of seeming to remember that something is the case;
2. section 4.2 introduces a non-foundationalist version of an approach that holds that a necessary condition of being justified in holding a memory belief is having access to reasons for accepting the particular memory belief in question.

In short, I intend to show that despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address.

1. Epistemic Internalism

Suppose that a belief is justified. In virtue of what is it justified? What kind of ground must a justified belief have, and what kind of access, if any, must the subject have to that ground? Is it enough that the belief is caused in the right way, or must the belief be supported by evidence of some kind of which the subject is, or easily could be, consciously aware? The internalism / externalism distinction in

[1] For example, Sven Bernecker, *Memory: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Alvin Goldman, "Internalism Exposed," in *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism*, ed. Hilary Kornblith (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 207-230; Timothy Williamson, "On Being Justified in One's Head," in *Rationality and the Good*, ed. Mark Timmons, John Greco, Alfred R. Mele (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 106-122.

epistemology addresses these issues. Internalists hold that all the relevant factors that determine justification must be "internal" (in a sense that needs to be specified). Epistemic externalism is the denial of internalism.

Classical forms of epistemic internalism stress the epistemological significance of consciousness.[2] Traditionally, epistemic internalism requires that a subject either has conscious awareness of some reason to think that a belief is true, or that the subject could easily become aware of such a reason, upon reflection. However, it is not enough that subjects are merely *aware of* the existence of their grounds; they must *appreciate* the existence and relevance of their grounds to what is believed.[3] Specifically, epistemic internalists ought to endorse:

AWARENESS: S is justified in believing that *p* only if

i. there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of belief B; and

ii. for all X that contributes, S is aware (or potentially aware) *that X contributes to the justification of belief B*.[4]

The primary considerations offered by internalists in favour of AWARENESS are cases of unusual but reliable cognitive faculties, such as the cases of clairvoyance, originally introduced by Laurence Bonjour.[5]

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[2] The other way that epistemic internalism has been understood is in terms of being internal to a subject's mental life; "Mentalism," as it is known, holds that a subject's justification supervenes on her mental states. See: Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, "Internalism Defended," in *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism,* ed. Hilary Kornblith (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 231-260; and Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, "Evidence," in *Epistemology: New Essays,* ed. Quentin Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 83-104; for other expressions of Mentalism, see also Ralph Wedgwood, "Internalism Explained," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65 (2002): 349-369.

[3] Otherwise, it has been argued, such weak awareness gives rise to what Michael Bergmann has called the Subject's Perspective Objection (SPO): roughly, from the subject's own perspective, it is an accident that what he believes is true, since from his own perspective, the status of his belief is no better than a hunch or arbitrary conviction, or as one might grant, at best a strong but groundless conviction (which is nevertheless incompatible with a belief being justified). For more on the Subject's Perspective Objection, see Michael Bergmann, *Justification Without Awareness* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006).

[4] This formulation is similar to Bergmann, *Justification Without Awareness,* 9. However Bergmann's formulation has been amended to rule out considerations making a justificatory difference if the subjects fail to *appreciate* their existence or relevance to what is believed. For discussion of whether Bergmann's own formulation captures the kind of awareness relevant for respecting the internalist intuition, see BJC Madison, "Epistemic Internalism," *Philosophy Compass* 5/10 (2010): 841-842.

In addition to demanding awareness as a necessary condition for justification, traditional internalists ought to think of their position as the conjunction of AWARENESS and DEMON:

> DEMON: factors external to the subject's awareness, such as the reliability of the mechanism that gave rise to the belief, are not necessary for the belief to be justified.

DEMON tends to be supported by appealing to what has become known as the New Evil Demon problem.[6] One form of the argument proceeds by comparing what constitutes justified belief for one who lives in the actual world with what constitutes justified belief for one's counterpart who lives in a demon world, like the one entertained in Descartes' First Meditation. The demon world is one which, by hypothesis, is from our own perspective, just like the actual world. What we experience and believe in the demon world is as it is in the actual world except that crucially, the demon ensures that all of our empirical beliefs are false, and that our perceptual experiences are not veridical.[7] Nevertheless, internalists point out the intuitive plausibility of holding that the counterparts are equally justified in believing as they do: their beliefs are justified to the very same *extent*, sharing sameness of justificatory status.

Epistemic internalism, therefore, will be understood as any view which endorses the Awareness Requirement, and that holds that factors external to such awareness play no justificatory role. While the most thorough-going epistemic internalism ought to embrace both AWARENESS and DEMON, some authors

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[5] Laurence Bonjour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).

[6] Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen, "Justification, Truth, and Coherence," *Synthese* 55 (1983): 191-207; Stewart Cohen, "Justification and Truth," *Philosophical Studies* 46 (1984): 279-295.

[7] Some externalists about mental content, however, may deny that such a case is possible. That is, they may deny that there could be a world where a counterpart has all the same beliefs that we do, but that all of their beliefs are false. Since many people hold that some form of content externalism is obviously true, if it is incompatible with epistemic internalism, this would seriously threaten the position. For charges that content externalism and epistemic internalism are incompatible, see for example Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup, "An Argument for the Incompatibility of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism," *Philosophia* 31 (2004): 345-354; Williamson, "On Being Justified". For replies that the two views *are* compatible, see for example Mikkel Gerken, "Is Internalism About Knowledge Consistent With Content Externalism?," *Philosophia* 36 (2008): 87-96; BJC Madison, "On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism," *Acta Analytica* 24 (2009): 173-183.

have accepted something like AWARENESS but not DEMON;[8] whereas others accept DEMON but not AWARENESS.[9]

Nevertheless, for the purposes of this discussion, epistemic internalism, as I understand it, is a thesis about epistemic justification that holds that *all* the factors upon which justification supervenes are "internal" to the subject, where the epistemically internal is captured by the conjunction of AWARENESS and DEMON. Externalism will be understood as the denial of internalism.[10] I am focusing on this traditional version of internalism, committed to both AWARENESS and DEMON, since it is the most demanding. I aim to show that the justification of memory belief poses no special problems for even the most demanding forms of internalism. This defense therefore ought to be of interest both to traditional internalists, as well as those who accept weaker versions of the position.

2. Epistemic Internalism and Memorial Justification

When reflecting on two of the primary motivations for epistemic internalism, namely clairvoyance-style cases and the case of the New Evil Demon, internalism might seem most plausible when one considers the justification of perceptual belief. In perception, which is thought of as a paradigm source of justification for beliefs about the external world, conscious awareness seems both epistemically significant, as well as easy to come by.

For example, suppose that one seems to see a lamp on the table in standard viewing conditions, and on that basis believes that there is a lamp on the table. Here one is consciously aware of a ground that justifies one's belief, namely

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[8] For example Duncan Pritchard, "McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism," in *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, ed. Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 283-310; Duncan Pritchard, "Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism," in *Evidentialism and Its Discontents*, ed. Trent Dougherty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 235-253; and arguably John McDowell: see John McDowell, "Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge," in his *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), 369-394; John McDowell, "Knowledge by Hearsay," in his *Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), 414-444; John McDowell, "Knowledge and the Internal," in his *Meaning, Knowledge and Reality* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), 395-413.

[9] See Feldman and Conee, "Internalism Defended."; Conee and Feldman, "Evidence."; Wedgwood, "Internalism Explained."

[10] For a recent critical survey of problems and prospects in the contemporary literature on the internalism / externalism distinction in epistemology, as well as for various ways of drawing the distinction, see BJC Madison, "Epistemic Internalism," 840-853.

having an experience of seeming to see a lamp on the table. One is (or easily can be) aware that one is having this experience, as well as that such an experience justifies the belief in question: seeming to see a lamp on the table provides one with *prima facie* justification to believe that there is a lamp on the table (in the absence of defeaters). In answer to the perfectly reasonable question, "why do you believe that there is a lamp on the table?", the subject could easily reply that they believe there is a lamp in front of them because they seem to see one. In short, an internalist will maintain that awareness of one's grounds is a necessary condition of being justified, and that factors external to such awareness are not necessary either: one's recently envatted counterpart is also justified in believing that there is a lamp on the table if he seems to see one, and this is so even if he is suffering a hallucination that is subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical perception.

Whatever the *prima facie* plausibility of internalism about perceptual justification, many philosophers seem to think that it is utterly *obvious* that epistemic internalism is going to be inconsistent with any plausible account of memory justification, and since it is taken as a datum that many of our memory beliefs are justified (as they surely are), so much the worse for epistemic internalism. For example, in Sven Bernecker's recent monograph *Memory: A Philosophical Study*, less than two pages are dedicated to a discussion of epistemically internalist conditions on the justification of memory beliefs.

Bernecker's principal reason to reject internalist accounts is what he calls "the problem of absent justification."[11,12] He approvingly quotes Timothy Williamson who sketches the problem as follows: the fact is that many beliefs are ones which may have been based on adequate grounds available to the subject at the time the belief was formed, but as time lapses, the grounds are often forgotten. So, at this later time when the grounds are forgotten, the worry is that the would-be grounded belief is unjustified (which leads to scepticism) because the justifying grounds are no longer available to the subject, even upon introspection.

Explaining the possibility of memory justification and responding to the Problem of Forgotten Evidence are challenges that internalists must meet if they

[11] Sven Bernecker, *Memory: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 72.

[12] The label "the problem of absent justification" is an unfortunate one, as it is potentially misleading, implying that in the cases in question justification is absent, which is to say that the relevant beliefs are either *unjustified* or else at best non-justified. This is unfortunate since the open question under discussion concerns what kinds of memory beliefs are justified, and if some are, how is this justification possible? Accordingly, referring to these cases as ones of "forgotten evidence" seems more neutral on the question of whether or not such beliefs are in fact justified (cf. Alvin Goldman on what he calls the Problem of Forgotten Evidence: Goldman, "Internalism Exposed.")

are to provide a general account of epistemic justification. So the question is: in cases of memory justification, what grounds could there be that are accessible to the agent that could satisfy both AWARENESS and DEMON?

Before attempting to answer this question, however, it is important to reflect on the various *kinds* of memory to determine which sorts might be most problematic for epistemic internalism, as well as which might be brought in to the service of internalist epistemology.

3. Kinds of Memory: Some Important Distinctions

It is common to distinguish between at least three different kinds of memory, the latter two of which are relevant to our discussion:

1) practical/procedural memory;
2) episodic/experiential memory;
3) propositional/factual/semantic memory.

Of the three sorts of memory, practical memory concerns retained skills or abilities, rather than doxastic attitudes, and so seems of no threat to epistemic internalism, which is a thesis about the justification of such attitudes.

What has been labeled episodic or experiential memory takes an experience or particular mental episode as its object. One might remember what colour the train was that one took this morning, or what one had for breakfast. In these cases what one remembers is *experiencing* the things in question; one is able to recall one's experience of seeing a red train, or is able to recall one's experience of eating burnt toast.

Given that what is recalled is a particular experience, this kind of memory is also not apt for epistemic justification, any more than states of seeing or hearing are apt for epistemic justification: to ask if one's *seeming to smell* the burnt toast is epistemically justified would similarly be to commit a category mistake. Accordingly, just as perceptual experiences are no potential threat to epistemic internalism, neither is episodic memory as such.

In fact, if it is constitutive of episodic memory states that they involve conscious mental imagery, then when this kind of memory accompanies an instance of propositional memory, it is easy for the internalist to explain how the propositional memory is justified. For instance, one's belief that one took a red train to work might be justified by one's retained, and consciously accessible, perceptual experience of seeming to have taken a red train this morning.

However, such cases of experiential memory might plausibly be thought of as one's *evidence* that justifies one's memory belief (one's state of propositional memory): one has justification to believe that one took a red train to work this

morning on the basis of an experience of taking such a train, and the faculty of memory retains both states. Accordingly, while this form of memory may be a useful resource for an epistemically internalist epistemology of memory, it will be of no help with the specific challenge of the Problem of Forgotten Evidence.

Of the three main kinds of memory philosophers typically distinguish, the most *prima facie* difficult kind to reconcile with epistemic internalism has been variously called propositional, factual, or semantic memory. One feature that distinguishes this sort of memory from others is its object: in cases of propositional memory, what one remembers is a proposition or fact. One remembers *that* 2+2=4, or *that* London is north of Paris. Unlike episodic memory, one need not have directly experienced the thing in question: one can remember that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo without oneself needing to have experienced the battle.

On the face of it, the key problem internalists are thought to face with the justification of propositional memory is posed by the combination of two theses:

i. The vast majority of what we believe is stored in long-term memory; but most of these memory beliefs seem to lack a justifying basis.

ii. The justification of belief requires a justifying basis; the justification of belief is never a brute fact.

As the Problem of Forgotten Evidence indicates, one can have propositional memory without any accompanying episodic memory, (such as remembering that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo), but be unable to call to mind how or when one learned this fact. The question, of course, is if such beliefs are justified, and in the present context, if such beliefs are justified, can an epistemic internalist accommodate this fact?

4. Internalist Solutions to the Problem of Memory Justification

I will now show that the internalist has at least two very different broad ways of satisfactorily accounting for the justification of memory belief, depending on if the justification of memory belief is taken to be epistemically basic or non-basic. In section 4.1, I consider a seeming-based view, and argue that states we can describe as memory-seemings can provide immediate, non-inferential justification for beliefs retained in memory. In addition to developing a variation of a view that holds that seemings can justify belief, I distinguish the view from a number of others, and also respond to pressing objections. In section 4.2, I offer an account of memorial justification which denies that such justification is immediate. As I will show, the main objection to this view is based on a confusion. Either way,

whether the justification of memory belief is basic or non-basic, the internalist has the resources to offer an adequate account of each.

By epistemically basic, I mean that a belief is justified in what has been called an "immediate"[13] or "non-inferential" way, which is to say that while the belief is justified, it is not justified by virtue of other things one believes. Examples of putatively basic beliefs, that is, beliefs not justified on the basis of any others, are ones like 2 + 1 = 3 or certain beliefs about oneself, such as the belief that one has a headache, when one does, or my belief that I seem to be typing at my computer right now.

If a belief is epistemically non-basic, on the other hand, its justification comes from standing in relation to one's other beliefs. Alvin Plantinga gives the following examples of non-basic beliefs:

> 'umbrageous' is spelled u-m-b-r-a-g-e-o-u-s; this belief is based upon another belief of mine: the belief that that's how the dictionary spells it. I believe that 72 multiplied by 71 = 5112. This belief is based upon several other beliefs I hold: that 1 multiplied by 72 = 72; 7 multiplied by 2 = 14; 7 multiplied by 7 = 49; 49 + 1 = 50; and others.[14]

With this distinction in hand, we can now explore various ways an epistemic internalist can account for the possibility of memory justification.

4.1 Internalists' Responses If Memory Beliefs Are Regarded As Epistemically *Basic*

Internalists Must Reject Preservationism

Just as memory preserves beliefs, some have argued that memory also preserves whatever justification a subject originally had for those beliefs.[15] So, for example, on this view if one acquired sufficient justification to accept some contingent empirical proposition on the basis of testimony at some point in the past, one can

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[13] James Pryor, "There is Immediate Justification," in *Contemporary Debates in Epistemology*, ed. Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 181-202.

[14] Alvin Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?," in *Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology*, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 133.

[15] Here I follow Michael Huemer in labeling such views as versions of what he calls "Preservationism" (Michael Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 80 (1999): 346-357.) For defenses of preservationism, see for example: David B. Annis, "Memory and Justification," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 40 (1980): 324-333; Norman Malcolm, *Knowledge and Certainty* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Andrew Naylor, "Justification in Memory Knowledge," *Synthese* 55 (1983): 269-286; David Owens, *Reason Without Freedom* (London: Routledge, 2000).

still have justification to believe the relevant proposition, even if one cannot now (even *potentially*) recall that one learned it via testimony.

This approach to the justification of memory belief is obviously one that cannot appeal to internalists. Epistemic internalism, as I am construing it, stresses the epistemic significance of consciousness, while holding that factors external to such awareness can play no justificatory role. In the example above, the subject is not aware of anything that could justify the belief, such as its being formed on the basis of testimony. Even if the subject is not even *potentially* aware of anything that could justify the belief, the preservationist will insist that the belief can still be justified, so long as the belief was originally justified and has not been subject to any defeaters – a claim that the internalist must balk at. Also, the preservationist account appeals to facts about the belief's causal history, but these facts must be held to be irrelevant by the internalist, given their commitment to the New Evil Demon case.

To see this, take a subject S and her recently envatted counterpart S*; both seem to remember attending a concert last night, and on that basis both believe that they did attend a concert last night. However, while their memory-seemings are subjectively indistinguishable, only S's memory experience is veridical, in that S did attend the concert the night before, whereas S*'s memory experience is not veridical, but only seems that way due to the meddling of the demon. Nevertheless, the two subjects are equally justified in believing as they do, the internalist will maintain, and so memory justification cannot just be a simple matter of preserving whatever justification the subject originally had.[16]

Memory Beliefs Justified By Memory-Seemings: The Positive Proposal

The basic proposal is a simple one: just as *seeming to see* that P justifies the belief that P (in the absence of defeaters), an internalist might hold that *seeming to remember* that P justifies the belief that P (in the absence of defeaters).[17] In order

[16] Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," 350 makes a similar point in terms of Bertrand Russell's well known five-minute hypothesis, i.e. the hypothesis that the world was created five minutes ago, replete with all of one's apparent memories. In such a case, the internalist plausibly holds that subjects in the world of the five-minute hypothesis are just as justified in their apparent memory beliefs as we are in ours.

[17] The view I defend in this section is similar to the view that Michael Huemer calls "The Foundational Theory" (Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," 348-9). He rejects that view principally because of the consequence of the position that memory can raise justification, as well as a version of the so-called "Epistemic Boost" problem. I defend the view against these two objections below.

to distinguish this proposal from the one above, it is important to note what the proposed justifier or ground is meant to be: it is one's experiential state of seeming to remember, not a remembered experience of any kind. A remembered experience is a piece of episodic memory, and as I indicated above, such experiences seem to have associated imagery.

One's state of seeming to remember something, on the other hand, or a memory-seeming, as I shall call the state, is a kind of experience one can undergo, one with content and a distinctive phenomenology, but one without any associated imagery.[18] Such imagery might accompany a *sensation*, but plausibly sensations and seemings are distinct states of mind, as it seems that there can be seemings without sensations, and vice versa. Take a blindsight case: it might seem to the patient like there is a red square just outside their field of vision, yet they report no sensation of a red square. Conversely, arguably the phenomena of

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Huemer calls his own preferred account of the justification of memory belief "The Dualistic Theory" (Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," sec. 4). It is dualistic since it aims to incorporate *both* the foundational view and the preservationist view of memorial justification. Huemer holds that seemings can bring about *prima facie* justification for a memory belief, but only if that is the way that the subject comes to acquire the belief in the first place; otherwise, Huemer insists that past justificational states can matter to current justificatory status. In so doing he also thereby incorporates preservationism. In effect I think that Huemer is on the right track, insofar as he allows memory seeming-states to play a foundational role; however, his dualistic view is unavailable to internalists as it incorporates preservationism, which as I have argued above, they must reject. Huemer himself acknowledges that his dualistic theory "cannot maintain the supervenience of epistemic justification on the current, intrinsic state of the believer", which is a thesis internalists will want to endorse (Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," 352). A key aim of mine, therefore, is to defend the internalist's foundational view in light of objections raised by Huemer et al.

[18] For recent discussion of what seemings are, as well as the thesis that they are justificatory, see for example Chris Tucker, "Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism," *Philosophical Perspectives* 24 (2010): 529-545; Chris Tucker, "Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology," in *Evidence and Religious Belief*, ed. Kelly James Clark and Raymond J. VanArragon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 52-76; Chris Tucker, "Seemings and Justification: An Introduction," in *Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism*, ed. Chris Tucker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1-29; Andrew Cullison, "What Are Seemings?," *Ratio* 23 (2010): 260-274; Michael Huemer, "Phenomenal Conservatism," in *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2013): http://www.iep.utm.edu/phen-con/. For critical discussion, see for example Clayton Littlejohn, "Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism," *Analytic Philosophy* 52 (2011): 35-48; Peter Markie, "The Mystery of Direct Perceptual Justification," *Philosophical Studies* 126 (2005): 347-373; Peter Markie, "Epistemically Appropriate Perceptual Belief," *Noûs* 40 (2006): 118-142; as well as a number of papers in *Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism*, ed. Chris Tucker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

associative agnosia is a case of sensation without seeming: patients suffering from this condition seem to be able to remember familiar objects like pens and rings, but they are not able to recognize these objects *as* pens and rings; they have sensations of rings and pens, but these objects do not *seem* to them to *be* rings and pens.[19]

The proposal I am advancing here might seem to amount to Phenomenal Conservatism. Phenomenal Conservatism is the following thesis about justification: if it seems to S that P, then in the absence of defeaters, S has propositional justification for P.[20] Phenomenal Conservatism is a form of epistemic internalism since it satisfies DEMON: the Phenomenal Conservative holds that demon world subjects are as justified as their normal world counterparts, so long as all the same things seem the same to them: as long as there is no difference in seemings, there is no difference in justification. Phenomenal Conservatism also puts epistemic weight on the subject's perspective, by holding that how things seem to the subject can confer justification.

But despite these similarities, Phenomenal Conservatism does not insist on AWARENESS, which recall asserts that:

> AWARENESS: S is justified in believing that *p* only if
>
> i. there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of belief B; and
>
> ii. for all X that contributes, S is aware (or potentially aware) *that X contributes to the justification of belief B*.

While Phenomenal Conservatism meets the first conjunct, it does not meet the second: it does not require that the subject be aware of his seeming as a seeming, or that the subject is aware (or even potentially aware) that this seeming contributes to the justification of his belief. As such, traditional internalists will hold that Phenomenal Conservatism is too weak, as it can give rise to what Michael Bergmann calls the Subject's Perspective Objection (SPO): roughly, from the subject's own perspective, it is an accident that what he believes is true, since from his own perspective, the status of his belief is no better than a hunch or

[19] See Tucker, "Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism," 530-531 for the introduction and discussion of these examples. For general discussion of the distinction between seemings and sensations, see for example Ibid. sec. 1; Tucker, "Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology," sec. 2.2; Tucker, "Seemings and Justification: An Introduction."

[20] Tucker, "Phenomenal Conservatism and Evidentialism in Religious Epistemology," 55.

arbitrary conviction, or as one might grant, at best a strong but groundless conviction (which is nevertheless incompatible with a belief being justified).[21]

But in addition to the Subject's Perspective Objection, intuitively, only certain kinds of seemings are relevant to the justification of certain kinds of beliefs, something that Phenomenal Conservatism fails to take account of. For instance, as noted above, it seems possible that a subject might suffer from blindsight: in such a case, a subject might genuinely be visually perceiving a material object, and they might report that the object seems to them to be before them, although from their point of view, it would not seem like an episode of seeing at all. If a subject did form a belief on the basis of such perception, traditional internalists would judge the belief unjustified, as it is structurally parallel to a case of clairvoyance.

In the classic clairvoyance case, while it might seem to Norman the clairvoyant that the President is in New York since he feels very sure of it, he is not justified in accepting this proposition on that basis. From Norman's own perspective, the status of his belief is no better than a hunch or arbitrary conviction, or as one might grant, at best a strong but groundless conviction. If the belief turns out to be true, then from Norman's point of view, that is accidental, given what he is aware of. Similarly, if there are states of memory that mirror the blind sight phenomenon, in that there is nothing that it is like for the subject to be in the memory state, resulting in the subject being unable to recognize the state as a seeming-memory, then so too should an internalist hold that such memory beliefs are unjustified.

So what is similar between the view I am advancing and Phenomenal Conservatism is the contention that seeming to remember that P can provide justification for a subject to believe that P. A Phenomenal Conservative would agree with that, since they hold that all seemings that P provide some *prima facie* justification for the belief that P. I am suggesting that where we differ is that, in particular, it is the seeming-to-remember that P that justifies the memory belief that P – it is not enough that P just seems true to the subject: it must also seem to the subject like an instance of remembering. This is needed to satisfy AWARENESS.

To clarify, I do not claim that, necessarily, *all* memory states have these distinctive phenomenal features: perhaps some memory states lack them. What I am contending is that if there are memory experiences that cannot be recognized

[21] See Bergmann, *Justification Without Awareness* for the introduction of the Subject's Perspective Objection, as well as for an extended argument that the SPO both motivates, and puts constraints upon, the correct formulation of epistemic internalism.

as such from the first-person perspective, they cannot justify memory beliefs based on them, any more than an internalist will grant that perceptual beliefs can be justified by perceptual states that cannot be recognized as such from the first-person point of view (e.g. as seen in blindsight and clairvoyance cases). So while it may be an empirical question if all memory experiences have "memory markers" – intrinsic features of the experience that indicate that the experiences provide information about the past – it is an a priori question which memory experiences, if any, *justify* belief.[22]

As we have noted, the state of seeming to remember that P is an experiential state with P as its content. As it is an experiential state, rather than a doxastic one, it is able to foundationally ground beliefs, thus rendering them epistemically basic. What in part makes the state one of *seeming* to remember is not its content, however, but rather its distinctive phenomenal properties. This allows one to (fallibly) distinguish, from the first person perspective, seeming to remember that P, from other states with the same content, such as wishing that P, or hoping that P, etc. It must be granted that seeming to remember something has a distinctive phenomenology. That is, there is 'something that it is like' to seem to remember something, since otherwise, we would be unable to identify a state as a putative memory state from the first person perspective, which is obviously something that we are able to do. Seeming to remember something does not seem

[22] Sven Bernecker has criticized positions which hold that, necessarily, memory experiences have memory markers, as well as epistemic views that contend that what *constitutes* a state as one of (veridical) memory is the presence of a memory marker, rather than some extrinsic, relational feature of the state, such as having been caused in the right kind of way by some previous representation and retained (see Sven Bernecker, *The Metaphysics of Memory* (New York: Springer, 2008), ch.6). I need take no official stand on these issues here. Rather, the position I aim to defend is that for all clear cases of *justified* memory belief, the subject is, or easily can be, aware of an experiential state of seeming-to-remember, one that can be recognized as such from the subject's perspective, partly in virtue of the state's phenomenal features. As Bernecker himself concedes, "It is an undeniable fact that some of our memory experiences have a recognizable feeling of familiarity about them, and that it is that which distinguishes them from other experiences. The trouble with Russell's proposal as with others of its kind, is that it does not offer a *reliable* mark." (original emphasis) (Bernecker, *The Metaphysics of Memory*, 91) But it should not trouble the internalist if these phenomenal features are not an infallible way, or are perhaps not even always a reliable way, of distinguishing veridical from mere seeming memories, or for distinguishing memory from other kinds of states. Given internalist commitments, reliability is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification. What matters for the internalist is the presence of some justifying ground that can satisfy AWARENESS and DEMON, which I shall argue is something that experiences of seeming to remember are able meet.

to one like hoping or wishing that it is the case. When one attempts to recall what one did in the distant past, and then seems to remember what one did, without calling to mind any retained perceptual experience or imagery of any kind, the content of what one seems to recall strikes one as, among other things, true, familiar, and seemingly acquired in the past.

However, some have claimed that memory *beliefs* themselves have a distinctive phenomenology.[23] Some have suggested that these phenomenal properties, or what has been termed the state's "feel," provides one with a defeasible reason for belief.[24]

It is important to distinguish the view I am advancing here from this one where it is held that phenomenal properties of a memory belief justify it. While I agree that there are distinctive phenomenal features which are epistemically important for the justification of memory belief, I am not suggesting that they attach to the memory *belief* itself – rather, the properties are properties of the *experience* of seeming to remember something.[25] Also, it is not these properties *alone* which justify belief, as Phenomenal Conservatism maintains, but rather, it is

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[23] Robert Audi, "Memorial Justification," *Philosophical Topics* 23 (1995): 31-45; Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant and Proper Function* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 59.

[24] Robert Schroer, "Memory Foundationalism and the Problem of Unforgotten Carelessness," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 89 (2008): 75-76.

[25] The view that I am suggesting is preferable to the one where it is held that a particular feel of a memory belief justifies it. First, is it true that *beliefs* have a phenomenology? Secondly, suppose that some beliefs do have a kind of "feel", as some have thought. How could a mere *feel,* in itself, be a rational reason to believe something? A feel might *cause* a belief, or perhaps together with some other claim about such feels, one might infer some proposition and hence be non-foundationally justified in believing it on the basis of a feel, but it is difficult to see how a merely qualitative feel or sensation could stand in a genuinely rational relation to a content. A final advantage of holding that it is an experience of seeming to remember that P that justifies belief that P, rather than the mere "feel" of a memory belief that justifies it (granting for the sake of argument that beliefs can have such a feel), is that the analogy with foundational perceptual justification is maintained. In the visual case, a foundationalist holds that it is one's state of seeming to see that P that gives one justification to believe that P, rather than holding that one's justification comes from some phenomenal properties alone of the belief itself. The latter scarcely makes sense, especially by internalist lights: the idea would be, for example, that one's belief that there is a tin on the table could be justified by some feel associated with the belief itself, e.g. perhaps if one was subjectively quite certain that the tin was on the table. In short, since memory foundationalists in part ought to argue for their position by analogy with the case of perceptual justification, they ought to hold that it is the experience of seeming to remember that P that provides justification to believe that P, just as it is the experience of seeming to see that P which justifies the belief that P, in the absence of defeaters.

an experiential state of seeming to remember, complete both with its phenomenal properties and particular content, that are taken to justify memory belief.

While it is not in virtue of phenomenal properties alone that memory beliefs can be foundationally justified, that is not to say that such properties play no epistemic role. For one thing, as I noted above, these properties allow the subject to distinguish memory-seemings from other experiential states from the first-person perspective. Given that internalism as I am construing it insists that subjects must be able to recognize their epistemic reasons as such in order to satisfy the awareness requirement, memory-seemings having these distinctive phenomenal properties is epistemically indispensible.

My proposal thus far has been that *seeming to remember* that P justifies the belief that P (in the absence of defeaters). Finally, it is important to further still distinguish this view from one introduced, but then rejected, by John Pollock in the first edition of *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*.[26] In that work, Pollock considers and rejects a view that is superficially similar in some ways to the one I propose here in the course of his discussion of foundationalist theories of reasoning and memory. On the view considered, Pollock allows that the *process* of remembering itself confers justification on memory belief, and not its original grounds. Therefore, this view too is incompatible with Preservationism. And like the view I have advanced, this view holds that the experience of seeming to remember something is a discrete mental state that has an introspectively distinguishable characteristic; holding a belief on the basis of memory *feels* different than from holding it on no basis at all, or on the basis of perception, for example.[27]

Despite these similarities, a key difference between the view I offer here, and the one that Pollock introduces and rejects, is that I maintain that a memory belief can be justified immediately, non-inferentially, by an experience I am calling a memory-seeming. Pollock's account, on the other hand, suggests that memory beliefs would be *non-basic*. On the view Pollock considers, memory provides us with beliefs about what we seem to remember, and *then* we infer the truth of what is remembered (non-basic) from the *beliefs* about apparent memories.[28] By contrast, as I have been stressing, on my account, the memory-seemings themselves, not beliefs about them, are one's justificatory grounds.

[26] John Pollock, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986).
[27] Pollock, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, 51.
[28] Pollock, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, 51.

Memory Beliefs Justified By Memory-Seemings: The Objections

Objection 1: Non-Occurrent Seemings?

Against the thesis I am proposing, one might press the following worry: it is very unclear how memorial-seemings address the key problem with respect to memorial justification, for the following reason. If seemings are necessarily occurent and conscious, then we presumably have very, very few of them at any given time. Consequently, memorial seemings can explain, at the relevant time, how only a very, very small subset of our memorial beliefs are justified, which is tantamount to skepticism.[29]

This objection presupposes that seemings are necessarily occurrent. But why think that? As a kind of experience, seemings can go unnoticed, unattended to. 2+2=4 seems obviously true to me. It seems true now when I consider it, but I submit that it also seemed true to me a moment ago, before actively reconsidering it. Just as I now also occurrently believe that 2+2=4, a moment ago I dispositionally believed it as well. It is not that I merely had a disposition to believe that 2+2=4, which is also true, but I already held the belief dispositionally. When I now occurrently believe that 2+2=4, I do not form the belief for the first time, as it were; rather, I am now consciously entertaining a belief that was dispositionally held. In general, we allow that beliefs and experiences can be had occurrently or dispositionally; so too, we should allow, with seemings.

But suppose that our objector continues as follows: granted, seemings are not necessarily occurrent; one can have a dispositional seeming, i.e. a seeming that is not occurrent. But if we allow seemings to exist without being occurrent and conscious, then they cannot have their phenomenal character essentially. Would that not then raise the question of how they do any justificatory work?

We can respond to this worry in at least two ways: on one understanding, the claim that seemings have their phenomenal character essentially might be true. But it need not follow from this that necessarily one is always consciously aware of the experience and its character. Perhaps a seeming might not seem any particular way to the subject at a time, if only because she does not attend to it.

But what if the seeming does not have its phenomenal character essentially? In that case, we can still allow that a seeming can justify, but only when one is, or easily can be, aware of it. Such seemings still satisfy AWARENESS. What the internalist needs to rule out is that states that necessarily fail the awareness condition can ever be justfiers. Internalism, construing it, as I do, in terms of

[29] Thanks to Chris Tucker for impressing upon me the need to consider this objection.

AWARENESS, puts a necessary condition on justification. What AWARENESS in part does is spell out what it is to have a justifying reason. Memory-seemings can at least sometimes satisfy this condition, and when they do, they can justify memory belief. But it is no part of internalism in general, or the internalist picture of the justification of memory beliefs in particular, that memorial-seemings necessarily have a particular phenomenal character, or if they do, that it must always be consciously present to the subject.

Objection 2: Can Memory Really Raise Justification?

At this point one might object that the view being presented here, one that makes use of memory-seemings, has the untoward consequence that the faculty of memory can raise the justification a belief had, over and above the justification one originally had for it.[30,31] For instance, suppose at t1, some time in the distant past, one comes to believe that P on the basis of justificationally sufficient, yet rather weak, evidence. Suppose also that at t2, the present, one has since forgotten one's original evidence, but it now seems utterly obvious to one that P is true – upon introspection, one has an experience of seeming to remember that P. Is it problematic to hold that one is now justified, and perhaps more justified in believing the original proposition, especially since the alleged improvement in epistemic status is said to come from forgetting one's original evidence? How could one kind of epistemic failure result in another kind of epistemic improvement, one might wonder?

While the view sketched here does have the consequence that memory can raise justification, it is difficult to see what the principled objection might be. It should be generally and un-problematically accepted, for example, that one can come to be less justified by coming to believe more things, either in a simple case

[30] Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," Section 2; Thomas D. Senor, "Internalistic Foundationalism and the Justification of Memory Belief," *Synthese* 94 (1993): 453-476.

[31] Jennifer Lackey has argued that not only can the faculty of memory *raise* the epistemic status of a belief, but it can *generate* positive epistemic status as well (Jennifer Lackey, "Memory as a Generative Source," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70 (2005): 636-658). See in particular section 3 of that paper for cases of justification being generated because of forgotten defeaters. I myself find Lackey's cases convincing, but for my purposes here, I am only committed to the weaker claim that memory can *raise* justification, which I defend below, rather than generate it anew. For a response to Lackey, see Thomas D. Senor, "Preserving Preservationism: A Reply to Lackey," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (2007): 199-208; for Lackey's reply, see Jennifer Lackey, "Why Memory Really *Is* a Generative Epistemic Source: A Reply to Senor," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (2007): 209-219.

of discovering disconfirming evidence against an inductive claim, or by acquiring defeaters for a belief. If one is justified in believing that the table before one is red based on how it looks, for example, this justification can be undermined by believed testimony that the table is white, but being illuminated with red light. If acquiring defeaters can lower justification, why should it be surprising that losing defeaters can raise justification?

If it is correct in general that losing defeaters can raise justification, why should it make an epistemic difference if the defeater is lost by being defeated by a further consideration, or if the defeater is lost by being forgotten? (Assuming that it is not forgotten intentionally, or in some way that is epistemically blameworthy.) In either case its defeating force should be neutralized. In the case above, if one went on to acquire a defeater-defeater for the testimony that the table is white under red light, such as further testimony from a reliable shop foreman that the first piece of testimony was part of a practical joke, one's justification that the object was red would be restored.

In a similar way, if the table still looks red to one, but one (non-culpably) forgets the testimony that asserted that it was white under strange lighting conditions, it seems that one's prima facie justification that one is looking at a red object would be restored. If this is right, it seems plausible in turn that one might seem to remember that one has seen a red table, despite one's having forgotten both one's experience of seeming to see it, as well as any defeaters one might have had for the belief when one originally acquired it. Nevertheless, one's belief that one has seen a red table enjoys some degree of justification if it is epistemically based on a memory-seeming, complete with state's distinctive memorial phenomenology and content. Granted, such a belief may be less justified than it would have been if one had retained one's original episodic grounds. Also, such a belief may be less justified than it would have been when based on occurrent, conscious perceptual experience. Still, factual memory, even if a case of forgotten evidence, may be justified all the same, and justified in a way consistent with epistemic internalism.

A closely related worry is what Matthew McGrath calls the "epistemic boost" problem.[32] The worry is that the view I am presenting here generates the counterintuitive result that the faculty of memory can "boost" the justification a belief had, over and above the justification one originally had for it. The worry is this: one might think it implausible that each and every time a belief is retrieved from memory it receives an extra epistemic boost due to the epistemic import of

[32] Matthew McGrath, "Memory and Epistemic Conservatism," *Synthese* 157 (2007): 19-22.

the experience of seeming-to-remember, over and above the belief's initial good grounds. As Sven Bernecker puts it,

> Suppose that S initially comes to believe that P by means of an a priori proof. The next day S still remembers P and the proof of it. But since he also has the experience of seeming to remember that P, he now has two reasons for holding P true, an inferential and a foundational one. Thus S has more justification for P now than he had at the original learning.[33]

The potential oddness here can be explained by the ambiguity surrounding what is meant by having "more" justification once the belief is seemingly remembered. It would perhaps be odd if the strength or amount of justification were raised in such cases. But a perfectly natural and unproblematic way of interpreting what it is to have "more" justification is in terms of the sources of justification. Here one's belief is justificationally overdetermined in the sense that it has two independent sources of justification, each of which is individually sufficient for the justification of the belief in question.

So one's justification is not strictly speaking boosted in the cases in question; rather, it is reinforced, and nothing about such reinforcement is counterintuitive. Compare a non-memory case: for example, suppose that one believes that a red bird is in the garden, justified by one's seeming to see it. Suppose further that someone then comes by and tells you, while you are still looking at the bird, "there is a red bird in the garden." Does this piece of testimony now boost your justification over and above the level of justification established by one's perceptual evidence? We are not required to say that it does. One may have more justification, but only in the sense that one's belief about the red bird in the garden is justificationally overdetermined: one's belief now has two independent sources of justification, each of which is individually sufficient for justified belief. So the so-called epistemic boost problem turns out to be no problem at all.[34] We are still left with the result that factual memory cases of forgotten evidence may be justified in a way consistent with epistemic internalism.

Objection 3: Moon on Epistemic Internalism and Evidence

Finally, it is worth examining recent criticism of epistemic internalism raised by Andrew Moon,[35] since on the face of it, his arguments might be thought to threaten the position I defend here. Seeing why Moon's central argument, even if

[33] Bernecker, *The Metaphysics of Memory*, 120.

[34] For two more possible responses to the epistemic boost problem, see McGrath, "Memory and Epistemic Conservatism," 20-21.

[35] Andrew Moon, "Knowing Without Evidence," *MIND* 121 (2012): 309-331.

sound, fails to undermine the position I defend here will help clarify internalism's essential commitments. Moon argues against what he calls the Evidence Thesis, as well as a particular internalist understanding of evidence (a principle he labels IUE). Specifically, the principles Moon targets are the following:

Evidence Thesis: S knows that P at t only if S believes that P on the basis of evidence at t.

IUE: S believes that P on the basis of evidence E at t only if S can become aware that he has E by way of introspection at t.[36]

Moon aims to undermine the Evidence Thesis by way of counterexample. The constraints that Moon places on what will make a cogent counterexample are twofold: first, the case must clearly be one where a subject has knowledge, and second, it must be clear that the knowledge is not based on any evidence.[37] Given these constraints, Moon presents his example as follows:

> Tim, a freshman college student enrolled in an introductory logic course, is asked to consider for the first time the law of non-contradiction, the proposition that *for any proposition p, it is not the case that p and not-p*. The proposition seems clearly true to him and he comes to believe it. Tim immediately lies down and falls asleep from all the excitement.[38]

Moon standardizes the argument as follows:

(1) Tim knows that *the law of non-contradiction is true* (LN) while he naps (Premise)

(2) Tim does not believe LN on the basis of any evidence while he naps. (Premise)

(3) Tim knows that LN while he naps, and he does not believe LN on the basis of any evidence while he naps (1, 2).[39]

The above conclusion is inconsistent with the Evidence thesis; thus if (3) is true, then the Evidence Thesis is false.

First, it is not clear that Moon's example, if successful, would count against the internalist treatment of memory belief that I am giving here. First, his target is specifically *knowledge*, whereas my focus throughout is on epistemic *justification*. While I am not committed to it here, I am open to the possibility that perhaps there are some cases of knowledge without justification: maybe instances of knowledge while asleep are some such cases.

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[36] Moon, "Knowing Without Evidence," 309.
[37] Moon, "Knowing Without Evidence," 311.
[38] Moon, "Knowing Without Evidence," 312.
[39] Moon, "Knowing Without Evidence," 312.

Second, and more importantly, suppose Moon's case is a successful counterexample to the principles he formulates: would this undermine any form of epistemic internalism worth endorsing? While Moon asserts that "virtually all epistemic internalists affirm" the Evidence Thesis and a particular understanding of evidence, not a single reference is given to the work of any of these people (though many references are provided for those who *reject* these principles).[40] I suspect that this is because no internalist does (or should) accept these theses.

While an internalist might give an account of knowledge that incorporates internalist elements, such as a justification condition, it is widely held that no purely internalist treatment of knowledge can be given. As has been made especially clear in the post-Gettier era, knowledge requires that at least some epistemically external conditions obtain, e.g. truth, an anti-luck condition to handle Gettier cases, as well as crucially for our purposes here, as we shall see, the basing relation.

Moon supposes throughout his discussion, and many will agree, that for the basing relation to obtain, that is, for a belief to be held on the basis of some ground, it requires (at least in part) that the belief is non-deviantly *caused* and / or *causally sustained* by that ground (details of the accounts vary[41]). But causal relations are paradigm cases of the kinds of things that are not accessible to the subject through reflection alone. Accordingly, no epistemic internalist should endorse Moon's IUE: whether or not S believes that P on the *basis* of evidence E at t is *not* the kind of thing that depends on whether S can become aware that he has E by introspection. If standard conceptions of the basing relation are correct, whether P is based on E depends, at least in part, on a causal relation, and one cannot tell by introspection alone whether a causal relation obtains between one's belief and one's evidence. For example, suppose that S's superstitious beliefs non-deviantly cause him to believe that P; S's belief that P is thereby based upon his superstitious beliefs. Everyone, including internalists, should allow that this can be so even if S is aware of no evidence for P upon introspection, or even if S would appeal to, cite, or otherwise become aware of some *other* evidence E upon reflection.

How then ought internalists think of the relation between evidence and their position? First, internalism should be thought of as fundamentally a thesis about epistemic justification, not knowledge. As I indicated above, internalists

[40] Moon, "Knowing Without Evidence," 310-11.

[41] For a recent overview, see Keith Allen Korcz, "The Epistemic Basing Relation," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition)*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/basing-epistemic/.

should hold that it is a necessary condition of being epistemically justified in believing that P that the subject is, or easily could be, aware of some evidence in support of that belief. To be an internalist about knowledge, therefore, would simply be to insist on the requirement that (internalist) justification is required in addition to whatever epistemically external conditions are needed for knowledge.

Second, while *knowledge* requires that a subject bases her belief upon her grounds, internalists ought to stress that their primary concern is not with *doxastic* justification, which requires proper basing, but rather, is with *propositional* justification.[42] That is, it is important to note that not all epistemologists, internalists and externalists alike, cast their theory of justification in terms of justified *belief* (doxastic justification). Often their concern is with, as Jim Pryor puts it, "whether you have justification for believing certain *propositions* – regardless of whether you actually do believe those propositions."[43] (emphasis in original) I shall follow convention and call this kind of justification *propositional justification*.[44] The upshot of this distinction is that one can have justification to believe things that one does not actually believe; also, one can believe things that one has justification to believe, but fail to believe *with* (on the basis of that) justification.

To illustrate, consider a subject who reads a reliable report that predicts that mortgage rates will fall. The subject now has justification to believe this, even if he never happens to form the belief that mortgage rates will fall. Suppose, on the other hand, that the subject does come to believe that mortgage rates will fall, although what causes him to believe this is wishful thinking on his part, and not his having read a reliable report. Here the subject's belief is propositionally justified, since he has good reason to believe it; on the other hand, his belief is not doxastically justified, since he does not believe it on the basis of his good reason, but rather he believes it on the basis of his wishful thinking. As I noted above, typically it is held that the basing relation, which is usually taken to be, at least in

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[42] For discussion, see for example Ted Poston, "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology," in *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2008, http://www.iep.utm.edu/int-ext/, section 1b.

[43] James Pryor, "Highlights of Recent Epistemology," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 52 (2001): 104.

[44] Others use different terminology to express the same basic distinction. For a discussion of "well-foundedness" as a way of characterizing this distinction, see Richard Feldman and Earl Conee, "Evidentialism," in their *Evidentialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 83-100. However the distinction is labeled, when specifying and evaluating different theories of justification, it is important to make explicit whether we are evaluating justification for *propositions* relative to a person at a time, or *beliefs* that a person actually holds. Internalism ought to be thought of as a theory of propositional justification.

part, a causal relation, marks the difference between a propositionally justified belief and a doxastically justified belief (where doxastic justification is propositional justification plus proper basing).

Given this distinction, the internalist understanding of evidence ought to be construed as follows: S is (propositionally) justified in believing that P only if the subject, is, or easily could be, aware of some evidence in support of that belief. Whether the subject's belief is doxastically justified, that is, whether the subject *bases* his belief upon the propositional justification that he enjoys, is not something that the subject can be aware of upon reflection alone. Therefore, neither an internalist, nor anyone else for that matter, ought to endorse such a view.

With these points in mind, we can see that Moon's example of Tim the logic student, and modified variations of it, pose no threat to epistemic internalism, properly understood. Suppose for the sake of argument that it is the seeming obviousness of the law of non-contradiction that justifies Tim in accepting it – that is, it is not his *belief* that it seems obvious that the law of non-contradiction is true, but that it is the *experiential state* of its seeming obviously true that justifies Tim in accepting his belief about the law of non-contradiction. His belief is propositionally justified, since he possesses good reason to believe it. Even when sleeping, Tim has this justification, and the awareness condition is satisfied: he is, or in this case, easily could be, aware of some reason to think that his belief is true, namely: his remembering its having seemed to him that the law of non-contradiction is true. Even when asleep, we may suppose, a subject is able to retain the memory that it seemed to the subject that P, as Moon himself concedes.[45] Here the internalist will suggest, as Moon will allow, that even when asleep the subject has a memorial-seeming which plays a justificatory role. This is so even though he is not presently aware of this experience, since he is in a dreamless sleep, we may suppose, and so is consciously aware of nothing.

This further highlights that it is ambiguous what 'a seeming' refers to: there is the occurrent sense, as well as a non-occurrent sense. The non-occurrent sense refers to the experiential state of its seeming to the subject that P, even though the subject is not presently aware of the state. To add a further example, I can retain in memory that it seems to me that torture for fun and profit is wrong, even when asleep. This is a case where it seems to me that P, even though asleep: when in a dreamless sleep, this seeming does not (occurrently) seem any way to me, so to speak. Nevertheless, I retain this seeming all the same.

[45] Moon, "Knowing Without Evidence," 321.

Moon's primary concern is not to deny that non-occurrent memories exist; rather, his contention is that subjects cannot *base* beliefs on such non-occurrent states.[46] For all that I have said here, and given the nature of the basing-relation, perhaps Moon is correct that the sleeping subject cannot at that time base his belief on his non-occurrent memories; but this is not something internalism, properly understood demands: epistemic internalism is a thesis about propositional, not doxastic justification. Moon's argument from cases of non-occurrent memory, therefore, is no threat to internalism, properly understood.

4.2. Internalists' Responses If Memory Beliefs Are Regarded As Epistemically *Non-Basic*

So far I have been considering epistemically internalist responses to the justification of memory beliefs from within a framework which holds that memory beliefs can be properly basic, which is to say that they can be foundationally justified. Roughly speaking, foundationalist epistemologies hold that some of our beliefs are justified, but not in virtue of being justified by other beliefs we hold. That is not to say necessarily that such foundational beliefs are *groundless*, but just that their justifying grounds are something other than other beliefs.[47] The main alternative kinds of grounds examined have been broadly *experiential*, rather than *doxastic*. Looking again at responding to the challenge of the justification of memory beliefs from within an epistemically internalist perspective, I have been exploring two possible kinds of foundationalist grounds. Recall that Williamson asserted:

> Many of our factual memories come without any particular phenomenology of *memory images* or *feelings of familiarity*. We cannot remember how we acquired the information, and it may be relatively isolated, but we still use it when the need arises.[48] (emphasis added)

Two possibilities that one might possibly conflate in the above passage, as we have seen, are first that memory beliefs are foundationally justified by what Williamson calls "memory images," or what I have been calling "episodic memory." In so-called cases of "forgotten evidence," on the other hand, I have been arguing that what foundationally justifies factual memory beliefs are phenomenologically distinct states of memory-seemings that are characterized in terms of, among other things, a feeling of familiarity and pastness for example, as

[46] Moon, "Knowing Without Evidence," 322.
[47] cf. Pryor, "There is Immediate Justification."
[48] Williamson, "On Being Justified in One's Head," 110-11.

well as their content. Such phenomenology seems to be constitutively involved in experiential states of what we would describe as *seeming to remember*, states whose content is the proposition seemingly remembered.

But what if one rejects epistemic foundationalism in general, either because one endorses a version of coherentism[49] or infinitism,[50] or else while one accepts foundationalism for some class of beliefs, one denies that memory beliefs are epistemically basic? In that case, is there any non-foundationalist account of the epistemology of memory that can accommodate epistemic internalism? Or would the rejection of foundationalism in general, or about memory in particular, thereby entail a rejection of epistemic internalism about memory?

I myself am inclined to accept some version of moderate foundationalism. Such a foundationalism would be "moderate" as opposed to "classical," since it does not require that basic beliefs be infallibly justified, incorrigible, or necessarily evident to the senses, etc. Also, non-basic beliefs need not be *logically entailed* by basic beliefs in order to be justified, for example. Still, it is worth examining what strategies might be open to non-foundationalists who are otherwise tempted by epistemic internalism, but are worried about the issue of the justification of memory beliefs.

Memory Beliefs as Non-Basically Justified: The Positive Proposal

How then might memory beliefs, regarded as epistemically non-basic, be justified in a way consistent with epistemic internalism? Supposing that one must have an internally accessible reason to think that a particular memory belief is likely to be true if it is to be justified, what form might such a reason take?

Take a paradigm case of forgotten evidence, such as one's firm belief that, for example, the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066. One is confident that this belief is justified, but suppose that one cannot call to mind how or when one learned this. Also, contrary to what I suggested earlier, suppose that memory-seemings play no justifying role. Still, the following supporting considerations are available to one, upon reflection:[51]

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[49] E.g. Bonjour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*; Keith Lehrer, *Theory of Knowledge*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2000).

[50] E.g. Peter Klein, "Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of Reasons," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 58 (1998): 919-925.

[51] One might object that this cannot account for the justification of beliefs among the cognitively unsophisticated, such animals or very small children. Perhaps, or perhaps not. I take it as an open question, not necessarily as a datum to be explained, whether animals and small children have justification for their beliefs (granting that they may enjoy other positive epistemic statuses, such as knowledge). Either way, the charge of over-intellectualization is a

1. One can seem to recall in the past having produced many correct answers to questions about English history trivia;
2. Therefore, one is usually correct about English history trivia;
3. One is now considering a proposition concerning English history trivia;
4. One believes that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066;
5. Therefore, one's belief that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066 is likely true.

Here we can see that both conditions an epistemic internalist places on justification can be satisfied. First, recall the awareness condition:

AWARENESS: S is justified in believing that *p* only if

i. there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of belief B; and

ii. for all X that contributes, S is aware (or potentially aware) *that X contributes to the justification of belief B*.

Here there is something that contributes to the justification of the subject's belief about when the Battle of Hastings was fought that the subject is *potentially* aware of, namely the simple inductive argument presented above.[52]

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worry for internalism in general, and so is no special difficulty for the question of the justification of memory beliefs in particular, which is the focus of this paper.

[52] The account I offer here is similar in spirit to an account Christopher Peacocke gives of what he calls "knowledge which is not based on reasons," where reasons include other beliefs, testimony, as well as sensory experience (Christopher Peacocke, *Thoughts: An Essay on Content* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) – see the final chapter on "Rationality Requirements, Knowledge, and Content", 160-7). What Peacocke calls the Model of Virtual Inference holds that "a belief held without reasons is knowledge only if a sound, and in the circumstances knowledge yielding, inference to the best explanation *could* be made from the evidence available to the believer to the truth of his belief." (Peacocke, *Thoughts*, 163-4) Here Peacocke's focus is on knowledge, rather than my focus, which is on justification. Also, he specifically, and perhaps quite demandingly, requires a knowledge-yielding inference to the best explanation. My account is more general, in that I allow that it be enough that an inference to the best explanation be *justified* or *reasonable*, rather than knowledge yielding. Even more generally, while an inference to the best explanation might be sufficient to confer *prima facie* justification, I allow that other accessible rational relations might obtain between grounds and belief, such as simple inductive considerations, like in my example above. Still, what is similar between our accounts, is that both Peacocke and I are proposing a kind of rationality requirement that does not require the subject to have actually made the relevant inferences – it is enough that these considerations are *available* to the subject, given their evidence. As Peacocke writes, "The model is one of virtual, rather than real inference, since it denies that the thinker who has knowledge ratified by its claims is really himself making these inferences." (Peacocke, *Thoughts*, 164)

In addition, the internalist's second principle can be satisfied too. DEMON states that:

> DEMON: factors external to the subject's awareness, such as the reliability of the mechanism that gave rise to the belief, are not necessary for the belief to be justified.

So whether the subject is the victim of an evil demon or not, for example, he would have justification to hold his memory belief, so long as he had access to the simple inductive argument above, which he would, supposing that an envatted twin and his normal world counterpart share subjectively indistinguishable first person perspectives.

Memory Beliefs as Non-Basically Justified: An Objection

Does this approach to the justification of memory beliefs not lead straightforwardly to an untoward form of scepticism? In criticizing what he calls the "Inferential Theory" of memory justification, Michael Huemer writes,

> […] I would have to be in some sense using the argument *every time* I had a justified memory belief. It would not be enough for me to go through the argument once, and thenceforth merely remember that I had demonstrated the reliability of memory. […] Given that my belief that the sun is 93 million miles from the earth [for example] is continuously present (it remains as a dispositional belief even when I'm not thinking about it), I will apparently need to be employing the argument for the reliability of memory continuously, if I am to keep my justification. The defender of the inferential account may claim that I am using this argument (whatever it is) for the reliability of memory only unconsciously, but it remains implausible that I am using it all the time, even unconsciously. Indeed, there is no evidence that I have ever employed any such argument at all, so scepticism seems to be the price of the inferential account.[53]

If internalists were committed to holding that a subject must have actually occurrently performed such justificatory reasoning, or is somehow performing such reasoning "all the time," in some unconscious way, as a necessary condition of holding a justified memory belief, then Huemer is right to conclude that such a view is psychologically implausible and accordingly leads to scepticism. It could then be rejected on this basis.

Thankfully, internalists need not be committed to any such thing. This is because as I said above, internalists ought to think of their view as a thesis about *propositional* rather than *doxastic* justification in the first instance. With the

[53] Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," 347-348.

distinction between propositional and doxastic justification now drawn, the internalist can consistently maintain that a subject's memory belief is justified without having to appeal to unconscious use of arguments or having to insist that for every justified belief, a justifying inference must actually have been performed at some point in the past. This is because the subject may enjoy *propositional* justification for his memory beliefs, as well as for their supporting grounds (and also in many cases doxastic justification, if the basing relation obtains).

In my earlier example of believing that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066, the subject might have justification to believe this, as well as for the premises for the supporting inductive argument I offered above, regardless of whether he actually does believe these propositions. Remembering that the awareness condition specifies actual or *potential* awareness of justification contributors, it seems the subject *would* or *could* access his justifying grounds, in this case, simple inductive grounds, upon reflection. So while there may not be doxastic justification in *some* cases of forgotten evidence, there can remain propositional justification, which is enough to account for our pre-theoretical intuition that there can be justification in such cases. For these reasons the 'must-use-argument-every-time' objection is off-point, and accordingly, fails.

5. Conclusion

I have argued that if memory belief can be foundationally justified, it can be justified by one's retained episodic memory. However, in cases of "forgotten evidence," no such grounds are available. In such cases I have argued that memory beliefs can still be justified foundationally on the basis of the phenomenally distinctive experiential states I described as "memory-seemings:" one's seeming to remember that P is *prima facie* justification for one's memory belief that P. The grounds of apparent memories *feel* like memories – they have a distinctive feel of familiarity and having been acquired in the past, and they present their content as true. It is in virtue of these grounds that such memory beliefs enjoy *prima facie* justification.

If on the other hand memory beliefs are not properly basic, I have outlined a strategy that aims to show that for all clear cases of justified memory belief, we have easy access to simple inductive considerations that count in favour of the truth of the apparent memory belief, thereby justifying it.

Epistemic internalism has not been thoroughly motivated and developed here, but enough has been said to bring out some of its essential commitments, namely an insistence on the necessity of an awareness requirement on justification, as well as holding that factors external to such awareness play no

justifying role. Many have thought it obvious that no such view can be correct, as it has been alleged that internalism cannot account for the possibility of memory justification. I hope to have shown that this conclusion is far from obvious. Rather, I believe that I have shown that, despite other difficult challenges that epistemic internalism might face, memory belief poses no special problems that the resources of internalism cannot adequately address.[54]

[54] Thanks to audiences in Warwick, Belfast, Lund, and Cambridge. Thanks to Vickie Madison, Rhiannon James, and especially Chris Tucker for helpful written comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

CONSCIOUSNESS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH QUALIA

Frederic PETERS

ABSTRACT: The equation of consciousness with qualia, of wakeful awareness with awareness-of-cognitive content (perceptions, conceptions, emotions), while intuitively attractive, and formally referenced as the primary index of consciousness by many philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, nevertheless has significant difficulties specifying precisely what it is that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious cognition. Moreover, there is a surprisingly robust congruence of evidence to the contrary, supporting the notion that consciousness, as a state of reflexive awareness, is distinct from the content one is aware of, that this awareness/content amalgam is actually the product of an incorporation process of various intermittent, and constantly varying streams of content onto a pre-existing reflexively conscious state which is not reliant on these streams for its constitution as a reflexive state. Consciousness, the evidence strongly indicates, is not qualia, not the awareness of this or that perceptual, conceptual or emotional content, but reflexive, autonoetic awareness as such.

KEYWORDS: consciousness, reflexivity, awareness, qualia, introspection, subjectivity

Introduction

As scholars have been insisting for some decades,[1] the essential question in relation to consciousness, concerns the specific psychological factor that discriminates conscious from nonconscious cognition. For many (see below), this distinction can be accounted for in terms of the presence or absence of qualitative character or qualia. There is, however, a twofold problem with the identification of consciousness with qualia: firstly, the sensory, conceptual and emotional content which provides the distinct quality of experience are available in

[1] Bernard Baars, *A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Bernard Baars and Nicole Gage, *Cognition, Brain and Consciousness: Introduction to Cognitive Neuroscience* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007); Rocco Gennaro, "Liebniz on Consciousness and Self-Consciousness," in *New Essays on the Rationalists,* eds. Rocco Gennaro and Charles Huenemann (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 353-371); Uriah Kriegel, "Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness," P*henomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 2 (2003): 1-26; William Lycan, "What Is the 'Subjectivity' of the Mental?," *Philosophical Perspectives* 4 (1990): 9-30; David Rosenthal, "A Theory of Consciousness," in *The Nature of Consciousness*, eds. Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 729-753; Robert Van Gulick, "What Would Count as Explaining Consciousness?," in *Conscious Experience,* ed. Thomas Metzinger (Paderborn: Schonigh, 1995), 61-79.

nonconscious states as well as conscious; and secondly, the awareness of qualitative experience which comprises the ordinary conscious state can, in exceptional circumstances come apart, revealing a clear distinction between awareness and qualitative content. Consequently, it will be argued, consciousness is better understood, not as the awareness of this or that perceptual conceptual or emotional content, but as a state of reflexive autonoetic (self-knowing) awareness as such.[2]

1. Consciousness is Not Qualia, Not awareness-of-content

Consciousness is best understood in context, as one element of an interactive waking state in which a significant portion of cognitive processing takes place in a nonconscious fashion. But if conscious and nonconscious processing are combined in the waking state, what distinguishes the former from the latter? For many philosophers,[3] psychologists,[4] and neuroscientists,[5] the answer is qualia (plural

[2] This distinction between qualitative content and awareness per se should not be confused with Block's distinction (Ned Block, "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 18 (1995): 227-257; Ned Block, "Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 30 (2007): 481–548) between phenomenal (qualitative content) consciousness and access consciousness. On the one hand, the former (p-consciousness), according to Block ("On a Confusion," 235) obtains even in deep, dreamless sleep, a state which is consensually understood as nonconscious, and when awake, p-consciousnsess obtains even when we are not aware of it – as in the case of the pneumatic drill ("On a Confusion," 234). Access "consciousness," on the other hand, does not appear to be conscious at all, but simply content waiting or available to be included within a conscious state ("On a Confusion," 231). As for awareness, Block claims initially ("On a Confusion," 235) to "balk" at any notion of a monitoring or awareness-of capacity. In his later piece ("Consciousness, Accessibility," 284), he equivocates, insisting that while "phenomenal consciousness requires Awareness," the capitalized *Awareness* can refer either to simple intentionality as such ("that in having an experience, one experiences one's experience"), or to the claim that intentional experience includes an additional reflexive awareness of itself (as championed by Brentano). Clearly, *Awareness* cannot, as Block claims, be accommodated by both of these positions, since they differ so radically.

[3] David Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Rocco Gennaro, *Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology* (Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins, 2004); George Graham and Terry Horgan, "Qualia Realism: Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents," in *The Case for Qualia,* ed. Edmond Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008) 89-108; Thomas Nagel, "What is it Like to Be a Bat?," *The Philosophical Review* 83 (1974): 435-450; William Robinson, "Experience and Representation," in *The Case for Qualia*, ed. Edmund Wright, 73-88; John Searle, "Biological Naturalism," in *The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness*, eds. Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 325-334; Leopold Stubenberg, *Consciousness and Qualia* (Philadelphia PA: John Benjamins, 1998); Dan

form of the singular *quale*),[6] the qualitative character of cognitive experience. Qualia are what makes consciousness conscious. Now while *qualia* has been described as "perhaps the slipperiest of all technical terms employed in the philosophy of mind"[7] with no agreed-upon definition,[8] and even outright denial by some of their existence,[9] contemporary usage commonly emphasizes at least

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Zahavi, *Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999).

[4] Baars, *A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness*; John Benjafield, *Cognition* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall International, 1992); William Farthing, *The Psychology of Consciousness* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992); Anthony Marcel, "Conscious and Unconscious Perception: Experiments on Visual Masking and Word Recognition," *Cognitive Psychology* 15 (1983): 197-237; Thomas Natsoulas, "Consciousness," *American Psychologist* 33 (1978): 906-914; Anil Seth, "Theories and Measures of Consciousness Develop Together," *Consciousness and Cognition* 17 (2008): 986-988.

[5] Francis Crick and Cristof Koch, "Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness," *Seminars in Neuroscience* 2 (1990): 263-275; Antonio Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999); Gerald Edelman, *Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness* (New Haven, Ct: Yale University Press, 2004).

[6] For a history of term "qualia", see Tim Crane, "The Origins of Qualia," in *History of the Mind-Body Problem*, eds. Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson (London: Routledge, 2000), 169-194**;** Brian Keeley, "The Early History of the Quale and Its Relation to the Senses," in *Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology,* eds. J. Symons and P. Calvo (London: Routledge, 2009), 71-89.

[7] James John, "Review of *The Case for Qualia* by Edmund Wright," *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews,* 2009.06.19. URL= http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24057-the-case-for-qualia/.

[8] Amy Kind, "Qualia Realism," *Philosophical Studies* 104 (2001): 44; Crane, "The Origins of Qualia," 170; Daniel Dennett, *Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 78.

[9] The very existence of qualia has been denied on several grounds: by Churchland (Paul Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes," *The Journal of Philosophy* 78 (1981): 67-90; Paul Churchland, "Subjective Qualia," *Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association* (1984): 773-790; Paul Churchland, "Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States," *The Journal of Philosophy* 82 (1985): 8-28) as part of his claim that mental entities including qualia are a misidentification (or folk psychological mischaracterization) of purely physical processes; by Dennett (Dan Dennett, "Quining Qualia," in *Consciousness in Modern Science,* eds. Anthony Marcel and Eduard Bisiach (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 42-77), on the basis that the four properties claimed for qualia (that they are ineffable, intrinsic, private and immediate) do not obtain; and by advocates of the transparency thesis (Gilbert Harman, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience," *Philosophical Perspectives* 4, *Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind* (1990): 31-52; Michael Tye, *Consciousness, Color, and Content* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000)) to the effect that the Blockean notion of qualia as qualities of the representing experience (rather than properties

one of three dimensions of qualia as the quality of cognitive events which supports their conscious status.

(1) The first characteristic of qualia aligning it with consciousness concerns the fact that the distinctive quality is subjectively or privately apprehended. Thus Nagel famously equated consciousness (in the sense of qualia) with subjectivity:

> The fact that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means basically that there is [cognitive subjectivity] something it is like to *be* that organism … [F]undamentally, an organism has conscious states if and only if there is something it is like to *be* that organism – something it is like *for* the organism … like perceiving or feeling pain, fear, hunger and lust.[10]

And Searle similarly insists:

> There is a sense in which each person's consciousness is private to that person, a sense in which it is related to his pains, tickles, itches, thoughts, and feelings in a way that is quite unlike the way that others are related to those pains…. [S]ince consciousness and qualia are coextensive, it is unnecessary to introduce another expression. All qualia are conscious states, all conscious states are qualia. It is important to hammer this point home. There are not two kinds of conscious state, one qualitative, one nonqualitative. All conscious states are qualitative.[11]

(2) The second and most frequently emphasized characteristic of qualia supporting its equivalence with consciousness is the specific qualitative character of mental events, including sensations (the redness of a ripe tomato, the smell of gasoline, the unignorable discomfort of a pebble in the shoe or the insistent pain of arthritic inflammation), feelings (hope, fear, love) and thoughts (concepts, plans, opinions, judgments).[12] Crick and Koch express their equation of qualia with consciousness in this manner:

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of things represented by the experience) must be false because, ordinarily, we notice only the objects represented by the experience.

[10] Nagel, "What is it Like," 436, 439 (his emphasis)*;* cf. Benj Hellie, "Factive Phenomenal Characters," *Philosophical Perspectives* 21 (2007): 259-306.

[11] John Searle, "The Problem of Consciousness," *Consciousness and Cognition* 2 (1993): 310; John Searle, *Consciousness and Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 26; John Searle, "Biological Naturalism," in *The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness,* eds. MaxVelmans and Susan Schneider (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 327.

[12] There has been considerable debate as to whether, in addition to perceptions (redness, roundness), bodily sensations (pain), and emotional moods (regret, boredom, love, fear), one should include propositional attitudes (believing, desiring, hoping, understanding) and conceptual thought (5+5 =10) within the concept of qualia (For discussion, see Tim Bayne, "Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction," in *Cognitive Phenomenology*, eds. Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1-34; Sara Copic, "The Content of Consciousness: Do We Need Qualia?," *Kaleidoscope* 9 (2010): Article 23, available at:

> The most difficult aspect of consciousness is the so-called 'hard problem of qualia – the redness of red, the painfulness of pain, and so on. No one has produced any plausible explanation as to how the experience of the redness of red could arise from the actions of the brain…. [Thus] we are interested in the general nature of the neural activities that produce each particular aspect of consciousness, such as perceiving the specific colour, shape or movement of an object.[13]

Chalmers emphasized a similarly tight equation of consciousness with qualitative feels:

> We can say that a being is conscious if there is *something it is like* to be that being … Similarly a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that mental state. To put it another way, we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel – an associated quality of experience. The qualitative feels are also known a phenomenal qualities, or *qualia* for short …. A number of alternative terms and phrases pick out approximately the same class of phenomena as 'consciousness' in its central sense. These include 'experience,' 'qualia,' 'phenomenology,' 'phenomenal,' 'subjective experience,' and 'what it is like'…. To be conscious: in this sense is roughly synonymous with 'to have qualia,' 'to have subjective experience,' and so on.[14]

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http://uknowledge.uky.edu/kaleidoscope/vol9/iss1/23; Sørenarnow Klausen, "The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 7 (2008): 445-462. But I follow Kriegel's argument (Kriegel, "Consciousness as Sensory Quality," 11-13) that "intellectual" concepts, emotional states and propositional attitudes should be considered qualia in virtue of the fact that they, while they do not represent external things, can nonetheless be differentiated from each other by the cognitive system. The fact that they have some distinguishable cognitive quality implies representation of some kind, and their necessary inclusion within the notion of qualia (cf. George Graham and Terence Horgan, "Qualia Realism: Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents," in *The Case for Qualia,* ed. Edmund Wright (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 89-108; Terry Horgan and John Tienson, "The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality," in *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings,* ed. David Chalmers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 520-533; Galen Strawson, *Mental Reality* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994); John Haugeland, *Artificial Intelligence:The Very Idea* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 230-35). On the other hand, some insist (Ned Block, "Inverted Earth," *Philosophical Perspectives* 4, *Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind* (1990): 53-79; Barry Maund, "A Defense of Qualia in the Strong Sense," in *The Case for Qualia,* ed. Edmund Wright, 269-284) that qualia most properly refer to nonintentional qualities of the experiencing state rather than intentional features of the thing represented. The adoption here of the phrase "Qualia are the way things seem to us" is intended to allow for both possibilities.

[13] Francis Crick and Cristof Koch, "Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness," *Seminars in Neuroscience,* 2 (1990): 119.

[14] Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind,* 4-5; and cf. Gerald Edelman and Giulio Tononi, *Consciousness – How Matter Becomes Imagination* (London: Allen Lane, 2000), 157; Rocco

For some authors,[15] qualitative character and subjectivity constitute the two essential dimensions of qualia.

(3) Arguably, however, in order to distinguish conscious from nonconscious cognition, we require some specification of the character of the subjective apprehension, a more precise notion of the manner of subjectively cognizing the distinct qualitative feel, if the equation of qualia with consciousness is to succeed. For there to be a distinctive quality for the subject, for experience to be this way rather than that way for the subject, it must be cognized as such in some manner. We need some reference to the epistemic dimension of qualia.[16] The epistemic character of qualia is usually accounted as direct acquaintance – as opposed to inferentially deduced cognizance. Graham and Horgan, for example, express their equation of consciousness with qualia (phenomenal consciousness) in terms that stress this epistemic "direct awareness" sense:

> […] *genuinely* conscious mental states have a distinctive and proprietary qualitative character, a 'what-it's-likeness.' To use the influential terminology of Ned Block all 'access conscious' mental states are, on our view, 'phenomenally conscious' as were. Indeed, being phenomenally conscious is what *makes* the states 'access conscious.' … Since phenomenal character is also self-presenting to the experiencing subject, it therein wears its intentional content on its subjectively manifest sleeve, that is, intrinsically. Suppose, for example, I am thinking of a city. A city-thought immediately presents itself to me, without needing to be 'read' or interpreted by me … (the city-ish intentionality of my thought, the thought's purporting to refer to a real city, is intrinsic….The what-it's-likeness of conscious experience is not just intentional, but intrinsic.[17]

Dennett also highlights the epistemic element in his attempt to "Quine" (argue for the inexistence of) qualia:

> [Q]ualia are essentially private properties. And … since they are properties of my experiences … qualia are essentially directly accessible to the consciousness of their experiencer (whatever that means), or qualia are properties of one's

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Gennaro, *Consciousness and Self-Consciousness* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1996), 7; Sydney Shoemaker, "Self-Knowledge and 'Inner Sense,'" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54 (1994): 121; Stubenberg, *Consciousness and Qualia*.

[15] Maund, "A defense of qualia," 270; Joseph Levine, *Purple Haze* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 6-7; Peter Carruthers, *Phenomenal Consciousness: a Naturalistic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 27ff.

[16] As discussed by Kind, "Qualia Realism."

[17] Graham and Horgan, "Qualia Realism," 90, 91-92.

> experience with which one is intimately or directly acquainted (whatever that means), or 'immediate phenomenological qualities' (whatever that means).[18]

Indeed, what *does* that reference to direct or immediate apprehension really mean? Scholars differ. For some this can mean simple cognitive registration without awareness of the underlying cognitive mechanisms at work.[19] For others, immediate apprehension can refer to direct access to internal cognitive content via introspection.[20] And finally, there are those scholars for whom direct awareness signifies pre-introspective reflexive awareness, which is directly aware of its own occurrence as well as of its content.[21]

For the purposes of the following analysis, "qualia" can be taken to reference several intertwined notions: qualitative character, subjectivity, and direct apprehension. But is the equation of consciousness with qualia in these several senses warranted? Do all or any of these dimensions actually distinguish conscious from nonconscious cognition? In the following, evidence will be marshaled to demonstrate that only the last-mentioned characteristic of consciousness – reflexivity – actually differentiates conscious from nonconscious mental processing, and that consequently, consciousness is more properly characterised by reflexivity alone rather than the broader concept of qualia.

Subjectivity, the first of our 3 dimensions, was originally hailed as the index of consciousness by Thomas Nagel, who claimed that if conscious mentality were not realized subjectively, there would be no conscious experience, there would not be something it is like for the organism to be that organism.[22] Some scholars have interpreted Nagel's terse and somewhat enigmatic language to indicate that the first person perspective of cognitive experience, in and of itself, is sufficient for conscious awareness. Stubenberg, for example, insists that the having of qualia is

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[18] Dennett, "Quining Qualia," 621-622.

[19] Fred Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Fred Dretske, "How Do You Know You Are Not a Zombie?," in *Privileged Access and First Person Authority*, ed. Brie Gertler (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003), 1-14.

[20] Kind, "Qualia Realism;" William Lycan, *Consciousness and Experience* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Michael Tye, "Qualia," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013). Available at <http//plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/>.

[21] Kriegel, "Consciousness as Sensory Quality"; Greg Janzen, *The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness* (Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins, 2008); Frederic Peters, "Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location," *Psychological Research PRPF* 74 (2010): 407-22; Frederic Peters, "Theories of Consciousness as Reflexivity," *The Philosophical Forum* 44 (2013): 341-372; Frederic Peters, "Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues," *Axiomathes* (2014): In Press.

[22] Nagel, "What Is It Like," 436.

subjective and the subjective having of qualia (not the *knowing* that you have, just the having) is consciousness.[23] In a similar vein, Van Gulick writes "[T]he reflexive meta-intentionality associated with conscious states … [derives] from the implicit self-perspectuality that is built into the intentional structure of conscious experience itself."[24] But subjectivity, like intentionality does not discriminate conscious from nonconscious mental processing.[25] Blindsight patients manually locate objects they are unaware of in relation to themselves, and dreams retain an egocentric perspective, again without consciousness. Clearly, subjectivity characterizes cognition as such, not conscious cognition in particular.

What, then, of cognitive content, the second element of qualia? Can this sustain the equation of qualia with consciousness? As Vosgerau, Schlicht and Newman point out,[26] many philosophers assume that a mental representation is conscious if it has a certain, distinct kind of content. However, the evidence indicates clearly that no kind of content – perceptual, conceptual or emotional (P-C-E) – is exclusively conscious, all manifest unconsciously as well. More significantly, consciousness and cognitive content are dissociable: P-C-E cognitive content can manifest in the absence of consciousness; conversely, consciousness can manifest without access to and as distinct from P-C-E cognitive content. In relation to the first point, research in relation to the cognitive (or psychological) unconscious has demonstrated that a substantial degree of multimodal informational integration takes place preconsciously, including subliminal perception, preconscious semantic and featural analysis, the ascription of emotional valences, implicit learning and memory retrieval and reconstruction.[27] Modern philosophy of mind has also that conscious states cannot be conscious in virtue of having perceptual, conceptual or emotional content because contentful states sufficient to drive coherent behaviour need not involve consciousness at all. Armstrong drew the frequently-referenced analogy of the absent-minded long

[23] Stubenberg, *Consciousness and Qualia,* 33; and cf. Searle, "The Problem of Consciousness," 310-311.

[24] Robert Van Gulick, "Higher-Order Global States (HOGS): An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness, in *Higher Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology,* ed. Rocco Gennaro (Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins, 2004), 67-92, 84-85; and cf. Owen Flanagan, *Consciousness Reconsidered* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 194; Zahavi, *Self-Awareness and Alterity,* 21-22.

[25] Joseph Neisser, "Unconscious Subjectivity," *Psyche* 12, 3 (2006): 1-14; Peters, "Accounting for Consciousness."

[26] Gottfried Vosgerau, Tobias Schlicht, and Albert Newen, "Orthogonality of Phenomenality and Content," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 45 (2008): 329-348.

[27] Peters, "Accounting for Consciousness."

distance truck driver who, thinking of other things, arrives at his destination and realizes he has been negotiating curves in the road, the hills and valleys without being aware of what he was doing:

> After driving for long periods of time, particularly at night, it is possible to 'come to' and realize that for some time past one has been driving without being aware of what one has been doing. It is natural to describe what went on before one came to by saying that during that time one lacked consciousness.[28]

Armstrong's example is dramatically illustrated in situations involving petit mal epileptic seizures, where subjects perceptually engage with the environment, walk, talk, and play the piano while completely nonconscious of doing so.[29]

That the generation of P-C-E cognitive content is insufficient to account for a mental state being conscious is also evident, it has been argued, in situations like blindsight, covert face recognition and linguistic parsing, where perceptual processing sufficient to underwrite object recognition takes place without conscious awareness on the part of the subject.[30] In fact, nonconscious P-C-E processing, often referred to as the "cognitive unconscious,"[31] is thought to compose the greater part of cognitive activity.[32] But if unconscious informational processing comprises a significant component of wakeful mental processing, it forms the entirety of cognitive processing during periods of sleep when the conscious state is no longer active. Somnambulism (sleepwalking, sleeptalking, sleepeating) involves informational processing as part of active behavioural engagement without conscious awareness,[33] while REM dreaming involves the

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[28] David Armstrong, "What Is Consciousness?," in his *The Nature of Mind and Other Essays* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1981), 59.

[29] Block, "On a Confusion;" Robert Van Gulick, "What Difference Does Consciousness Make?," *Philosophical Topics* 17 (1989): 211-230.

[30] Carruthers, *Phenomenal Consciousness*; David Rosenthal, "Unity of Consciousness and the Self," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 103 (3003): 325-352.

[31] John Kihlstrom, "The Cognitive Unconscious," *Science* 237 (1987): 1445-1452.

[32] Jeffrey Gray, "To thine own synapses be true?," *Nature Neuroscience* 5 (2002): 1102-1115; Sue Pockett, "Does Consciousness Cause Behavior?," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 11 (2004): 23-40. On the extent of nonconscious preprocessing, see Wilhelm Hoffman and Timothy Wilson "Consciousness, introspection and the Adaptive Unconscious,"" *Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition*, eds. Bertram Gawronski and Keith Payne (New York: Guilford, 2010) 197-215; and Max Velmans, "Is Human Information Processing Conscious?" *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 14 (1991): 651-669.

[33] John Kihlstrom, "Conscious, Subconscious, Unconscious: A Cognitive Perspective," in *The Unconscious Reconsidered,* eds. Kenneth Bowers and Donald Meichenbaum (New York: Wiley, 1984), 149-206.

nonconscious[34] fabrication of narratives, albeit significantly disjointed, which still retain an egocentric perspective,[35] spatial location,[36] a sense of extension or progression through time,[37] and the full gamut of sensory qualities.[38]

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[34] Some scholars contend that dreaming, with its capacity to construct spatially embodied narratives, however strange, constitutes a kind of conscious awareness (Block, "On a Confusion;" Churchland "Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States;" Jean Delacour, "An Introduction to the Biology of Consciousness," *Neuropsychologia* 33 (1995): 1061-1074; Antii Revonsuo, "Conscious and Nonconscious Control of Action," *Behavioral and Brain Science* 18 (1995): 265-266). However, the significantly limited extent of neurological activation argues for caution. The hypothalamic flip-flop switch runs its waking signal to the lateral hypothalamus, thence to the tuberomamillary nucleus (TMN) and brainstem nuclei (locus ceruleus, raphe), all of which contribute to the ventral (non-thalamic) projection directly to the cortex as well as to the dorsal projection through the thalamus. TMN also has its own dedicated projection directly to the anterior thalamus, thence to the posterior medial cortex. All three of these nuclei (TMN, LC, Raphe) cease activity during REM, which depends largely on cholinergic projections from the brainstem and the basal forebrain. And, of course, large areas of the cortex are deactivated during REM. Consequently during periods of REM, when the cortical arousal system is inhibited, EEG recordings of the early (0-200ms) thalamo-cortical sensory input remains the same as in waking, but the later (200-500ms) intra-cortical processing either recedes to a much later and weaker signal or disappears altogether (Denis Paré and Rodolfo Llinas, "Conscious and Pre-conscious Processes as Seen from the Standpoint of Sleep-waking Cycle Neurophysiology'" *Neuropsychologia* 33 (1995):1155-1168; Giles Plourde, "Clinical Use of the 40-Hz Auditory Steady State Response," *International Anesthesiology Clinics* 31 (1993): 107-20; Nancy Wesensten and Pietro Badia, "The P300 Component in Sleep," *Physiology and Behavior* 44 (1988): 215-229). In addition, there is the fact that the limited cortical activation is generated initially by the amygdala, source of emotional processing which, as Ledoux made clear, is preconscious (Joseph Ledoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)). Moreover, at the physiological level, the entire REM state is supported by secondary activations within the overall *sleep* (as opposed to waking) setting of the hypothalamic sleep-wake control switch (Jun Lu, David Sherman, Marshall Devor, and Clifford Saper, "A Putative Flip-Flop Switch for Control of REM Sleep," *Nature* 441 (2006): 589-594). At the cognitive level, the temporary emergence of lucid or conscious awareness within the dream state (lucid dreaming) demonstrates clearly that the dream state is normally nonconscious. As against the evidence that cognitively and physiologically, the brain is not in a waking state during REM, the contention that dreaming constitutes a kind of conscious awareness relies heavily (perhaps exclusively) on the equation of qualia, or representational P-C-E content, with consciousness. But the evidence presented in this paper indicates that the production of qualia is distinct from the conscious state.

[35] David Foulkes and Nancy Kerr, "Point of View in Nocturnal Dreaming," *Perceptual and Motor Skills* 78 (1994): 690.

[36] Revonsuo, "Conscious and Nonconscious Control."

[37] Alfred Gross, "The Sense of Time in Dreams," *Psychoanalytical Quarterly* 18 (1949): 466-470.

[38] Farthing, *The Psychology of Consciousness*.

In both the waking and sleep states, then, distinct qualities of sensory, emotional and conceptual information are constructed without the involvement of consciousness. The unavoidable conclusion is that since unconscious cognitive states have these sensory quality characteristics, then consciousness cannot be said to come into being as a result of, or as a necessary accompaniment to, these integrative informational processes. Manifestly, it does not. In short, the processing of informational content constitutes an *insufficient condition* for consciousness, as Kreigel points out:

> When a mental state is conscious - in the sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have it - it instantiates a certain property *F* in virtue of which it is a conscious state. It is customary to suppose that *F* is the property of having sensory quality…. [But] if unconscious mental states can have a sensory quality, then sensory quality is an *insufficient* condition for consciousness.[39]

Not only is it the case that that perceptual, conceptual and emotional processing are an *insufficient condition* for consciousness, but, as discussed below, the evidence from cognitive dissociation studies indicates clearly that they are an *unnecessary condition* as well. Consciousness survives their disruption and/or elimination in dissociation, and can even be said to persist as a distinct, unchanging cognitive dimension during the ever-changing sequential flow of cognitive P-C-E content.

In spite of longstanding claims from the contemplative traditions of East and West regarding the possibility of "pure" contentless consciousness,[40] the case for consciousness without content has received remarkably little attention in

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[39] Kriegel, "Consciousness as Sensory Quality," 1, Abstract. Other scholars making this point include Peter Carruthers, "Brute Experience," *Journal of Philosophy* 85 (1989): 258-269; Güven Güzeldere, "Problems of Consciousness," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 2 (1995):112-143; Marcel, "Conscious and Unconscious Perception"; Norton Nelkin, "The Dissociation of Phenomenal States from Apperception," in *Conscious Experience,* ed. Thomas Metzinger (Paderborn: Schonigh, 1995), 373-386; David Rosenthal, "Two Concepts of Consciousness," *Philosophical Studies* 49 (1986): 329–59; David Rosenthal, "The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality," in *Consciousness: Philosophical Issues,* ed. Enrique Villanueva (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1991), 15-36; David Rosenthal, "Sensory Qualities, Consciousness, and Perception," in *Consciousness and Mind,* ed. David Rosenthal (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 175-225; Vosgerau, Schlicht and Newen, "Orthogonality of Phenomenality and Content."

[40] Robert Forman, *The Problem of Pure Consciousness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Philip Almond, *Mystical Experience and Religious Doctrine* (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1982); Robert Zaehner, *Mysticism: Sacred and Profane* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961).

either classical or contemporary philosophy of mind,[41] although recently discussed evidence in regard to the cognitive registration of state properties as well as properties of the represented content suggest that the cognitive system is quite capable of relying on the former (state properties) without the latter – see below for details. Psychology has, moreover, found abundant evidence in various forms of dissociation for the closely-related claim that since consciousness persists without access to, and thus in the absence of various streams of content, it must, in some sense, be distinct from and constituted independently of those inputs.

On the perceptual side, hemispatial neglect provides an example of this consciousness-from-content separability, where consciousness can function without perceptual access to large sectors of sensory input.[42] Simultagnosia

[41] The possibility of pure (contentless) consciousness invited substantial debate within the discipline of Religious Studies (Foreman, *The Problem of Pure Consciousness*; Steven Katz, *Mysticism and Religious Traditions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) as a consequence of Katz' claim that "all experience is processed through, organised by and makes itself available to us in extremely complex epistemological ways ... [such that] there are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences (Steven Katz, "Language, Epistemology and Mysticism," in *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis,* ed. Steven Katz (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), 25). Within Philosophy of Mind, the topic has remained marginal, although both Dainton (Barry Dainton, "Précis: Stream of Consciousness," *Psyche* 10, 1 (2004): 1-29; Barry Dainton, *Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience* (New York: Routledge, 2000/2006)) and Gennaro (Rocco Gennaro, "Between Pure Self-Referentialism and the Extrinsic HOT Theory of Consciousness," in *Self Representational Approaches to Consciousness*, eds. Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 221-249; Rocco Gennaro, "Are There Pure Conscious Events?," in *Revisiting Mysticism*, eds. Chandana Chakrabarti and Gordon Haist (Cambridge Scholars Press, 2008), 100-120) have mounted sustained arguments against the possibility of a conscious state without P-C-E content. Gennaro's disciplined approach is grounded in the conviction that all cognition involves the application of, and is structured by, concepts (Gennaro, "Are There Pure Conscious Events," 2-3), which negates the possibility of contentless consciousness from the outset. Dainton's highly questionable treatment (Dainton, *Stream of Consciousness,* 51ff) sets up a series of "straw man" arguments which misdefine consciousness variously as attention, engagement with content, cognitive vacuousness indistinguishable from noncognition, and nondual awareness with content, only to reject each, not surprisingly, as an implausible candidate for bare, contentless awareness. Strangely, Dainton ignores the one characterestic most scholars in Philosophy of Mind currently understand consciousness to be – reflexivity (see Peters, "Theories of Consciousness as Reflexivity") – and consequently he does not canvass the possibility that reflexivity requires no P-C-E content.

[42] Daniel Schacter, Mary McAndrews, and Morris Moscovitch, "Access to Consciousness: Dissociations Between Implicit and Explicit Knowledge in Neuropsychological Syndromes," in *Thought Without Language,* ed. Larry Weiskrantz (London: Oxford University Press, 1988), 242-278.

(Balint's syndrome) again involves an inability to grasp the whole field of vision in its entirety such that individual objects disappear[43] with no impairment of arousal, alertness, or cognition. In blindsight, consciousness persists without access to particular visual sensations (which are nonetheless registered nonconsciously), and persists in the retinally blind without access to any visual sensory input. In agnosia resulting from brain injury, consciousness persists in the absence of perceptual recognition in one or other sensory mode (visual, auditory, tactile). Subjects with either Broca's or Wernicke's aphasia remain conscious and functional without access to syntactic and semantic information.[44] There are also reports of general content diminution – referred to as *minimal perceptual environments* – during lucid dreaming episodes,[45] as well as during experimental conditions involving sensory deprivation where subjects are encouraged to maintain awareness.[46] Similar results of continuing conscious awareness with minimal to no cognitive content have been obtained in ganzfield experiments involving exposure to a featureless perceptual field.[47] Hypnosis also provides a rich array of sensory effects (positive and negative hallucination, posthypnotic amnesia) induced during periods when consciousness is deliberately dissociated from preconscious perceptual processing.[48] In short, as numerous scholars note,

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[43] Antonio Damasio, "Disorders of Complex Visual Processing," in *Principles of Behavioral and Cognitive Neurology,* 2nd ed, ed. Marcel Mesulam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 332-372.

[44] Schacter, McAndrews, and Moscovitch, "Access to Consciousness."

[45] Stephen Laberge and Donald J. DeGracia, "Varieties of Lucid Dreaming Experience," in *Individual Differences in Conscious Experience,* eds. Robert Kunzendorf and Benjamin Wallace (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000), 269-308.

[46] The generation of minimally contentful conscious states, characterized by "a loss of body and time awareness, an absence or diminution of thought, and a feeling of egolessness" (William Plotkin, "The Alpha Experience Revisited: Biofeedback in the Transformation of Psychological States," *Psychological Bulletin* 86 (1979): 1132) have been achieved in experimental conditions during EEG alpha-biofeedback training that involves sensory deprivation in combination with an emphasis on sustaining alertness. In these trials, conducted in several EEG laboratories, minimization of sensory and conceptual content was achieved by the sparse biofeedback setting (trainees sit on a comfortable chair or lie on a bed, eyes closed, in a sound-proof room with low or no lighting, and asked not to move so as not to disturb the EEG electrodes), along with restricted attentional focus on the monotonous alpha feedback signal. Sustained alertness is encouraged by high levels of motivation and dedication to the task on maintaining the feedback tone for as long as and as strongly as possible, along with the expectation of distinct changes in experiential state.

[47] Moshe Gur, "Perceptual Fade-Out Occurs in the Binocularly Viewed Ganzfeld," *Perception* 20 (1991): 645-654.

[48] Kihlstrom, "Conscious, Subconscious, Unconscious."

the evidence indicates that consciousness is neither intrinsic to nor derivative of the occurrence of cognitive P-C-E content.[49]

It is the evident dissociability of consciousness from various input processing streams that induced Schacter[50] to formulate his model of a *conscious awareness system* (CAS) distinct from and constituted independently of its various input sources. Schacter explains:

> [In view of the dissociation evidence] we hypothesize that (a) conscious or explicit experiences of perceiving, knowing and remembering all depend on the functioning of a common mechanism, (b) this mechanism normally accepts input from and interacts with a variety of processors or modules that handle specific types of information, and (c) in various cases of neuropsychological impairment, specific modules are disconnected from the conscious mechanism … Such disconnection need not involve damage to the consciousness mechanism itself and thus would not result in a global disruption of conscious awareness; it would produce the kind of domain-specific impairments that were observed in the studies reviewed earlier.[51]

Schacter's CAS diagram[52] shows various specialist input processors feeding a common "conscious awareness system" to illustrate the independence of consciousness from any one of its inputs. But it could be argued that the dissociative conditions reviewed above, particularly the evidence regarding the diminution of perceptual input as a whole, demonstrates that access to cognitive content as a whole is unnecessary for the persistence of consciousness the state; or better, that it is not so much a matter of consciousness *without* content, as of consciousness *as distinct from* content. Perhaps what these abnormal dissociative conditions actually illustrate is that consciousness and P-C-E content are distinct and in a sense dissociated and independently constellated in normal unaffected cognition *at every moment*.

It could be said that the cognitive system functions successfully *because* it is able to dissociate informational input from conscious awareness in two distinct ways. Firstly, and most obviously, it has developed a specific mechanism to manage this dissociation – attention – which selects specific inputs for inclusion

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[49] A point argued for by several scholars, including Kriegel ("Consciousness as Sensory Quality"); Vosgerau, Schlicht and Newen ("Orthogonality of Phenomenality and Content"); and Velmans ("Is Human Information Processing Conscious?").

[50] Schacter, McAndrews, and Moscovitch, "Access to Consciousness."

[51] Schacter, McAndrews, and Moscovitch, "Access to Consciousness," 269-270.

[52] Daniel Schacter, "On the Relation Between Memory and Consciousness: Dissociable Interactions and Conscious Experience," in *Varieties of Memory and Consciousness,* eds. Henry Roediger and Fergus Craik (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1989), 355-389.

within the conscious state and ignores others. Secondly, within the conscious state itself, a real distinction remains between the invariant ongoing awareness and the ever-changing stream of cognitive content of which one is aware (the constant ebb and flow of different sensory modes, the serial progression of internal thoughts and the consistently changing balance between perceiving and thinking). This very real distinction can be explained in terms of a differential reading of content features as distinct from properties of the state. There is a clear contrast, in other words, between the registration of features of the objects represented, as distinct from representation of modal or state properties.

The capacity of the cognitive system to register features of its processing state as opposed to the content of that state has received a great deal of attention, specifically in relation to the question of consciousness. Following Moore,[53] both Dretske[54] and Tye[55] have argued that consciousness is essentially invisible or transparent, that cognition sees through the autonoetic state, as it were, to register only the contents of the representational state, that the "awareness-of" component of conscious cognition is negligible because it is invisible. But this strong transparency claim is essentially negated by the fact that our conscious experiences do explicitly register qualitative features that are not identical to the particulars of the objects represented.[56] These include the "inner light show" one experiences when one presses a finger against the eyeball,[57] the continuous explicit awareness of the distinction between current auditory and visual streams of sensation,[58] as well as non-object-related qualities of these sensations, such as the difference between seeing clearly and with blurred vision (where blurriness is a property of the visual process not the content.[59] Moreover, there is an overt, ongoing distinction registered between the external perceptual panorama as a

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[53] Gordon Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," in his *Philosophical Papers* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1903).

[54] Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind.*

[55] Michael Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

[56] Greg Janzen, *The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness*; David Woodruff Smith, "Return to Consciousness," in his *Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 76-121; Zahavi, *Self-Awareness and Alterity*.

[57] Amy Kind, "What's So Transparent about Transparency?" *Philosophical Studies* 115 (2003): 225-244.

[58] Michael Pace, "Blurred Vision and the Transparency of Experience," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 88 (2007): 328-354; Amie Thomasson, "Phenomenal Consciousness and the Phenomenal World," *The Monist* 91 (2007): 191-214.

[59] Greg Janzen, "The Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character: A Phenomenological Critique," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5* (2006): 321-339 ; Kind, "What's So Transparent"; Pace, "Blurred Vision and the Transparency of Experience."

whole as against internal bodily sensations on the one hand as well as one's ongoing thought commentary on the currently perceived situation on the other hand.[60] In addition, there is the direct awareness of a distinction between memories recalled to mind as against ongoing perception (*reality monitoring*)[61] and pseudo hallucination, a condition involving internally-derived perception-like experience sufficiently vivid to constitute a hallucination, but explicitly recognized to be a hallucination by the subject,[62] much as dream content is recognized as such by the lucid dreamer.[63] In both instances, there are characteristics of the cognitive experience over and above the qualities of the represented content. Metzinger[64] points out that deliberately-initiated periods of conscious thought processing entail an awareness that these are internal thought processes.

There is also the temporal dimension of experience. During the passage of the sensory, emotional and conceptual events, there is ongoing, overt awareness of the temporal duration of an experience, the passage of time, a temporal awareness which is intrinsic to the cognitive state, not the objects represented in that state. This temporal awareness is called subjective time because time is not a quality directly registered by the senses, but constructed internally. Of significance is the fact that this internally-constructed sense of duration varies. Time spent in interesting and novel surroundings that one is attending to and actively exploring can seem to pass in an instant. Acutely life-threatening situations can seemingly slow the passage of time to a standstill. The course of an average undemanding, uneventful day, on the other hand, can flow by relatively quickly. This difference in the sense of time passing quickly or slowly is related, as Pockett[65] explains, to a

[60] Pace, "Blurred Vision and the Transparency of Experience."

[61] On reality monitoring, see Marcia Johnson, "Reality Monitoring: Evidence from Confabulation in Organic Brain Disease Patients," in *Awareness of Deficit After Brain Injury. Clinical and Theoretical Issues,* eds. George Prigatano and Daniel Schacter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 176-197; Robert Kunzendorf, "Self-Consciousness as the Monitoring of Cognitive States: A Theoretical Perspective," *Imagination, Cognition and Personality* 7 (1987-88): 3-21.

[62] German Berrios and T.R. Denning, "Pseudohallucinations: A Conceptual History," *Psychological Medicine* 26 (1996): 753-763.

[63] Celia Green and Charles McCreary, *Lucid Dreaming: The Paradox of Consciousness During Sleep* (London: Routledge, 1994); Stephen LaBerge, *Lucid Dreaming* (Boston: J.P. Tarcher, 1995).

[64] Thomas Metzinger, *Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 359-62

[65] Sue Pocket, "How Long is 'Now'? Phenomenology of the Specious Present," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 2 (2003): 55-68.

difference in the duration of *now*. Experimental studies suggest that the subjectively experienced duration of *now* can vary from milliseconds,[66] through hundreds of milliseconds,[67] to one or two seconds.[68] The duration of this now-moment, in turn, is a direct reflection of the rate of sensorimotor sampling of the external world, or better, according to the rate of sensorimotor processing which includes sampling.[69] The subjective sense of the duration of *now* expands and contracts as the rate of sensorimotor updating expands and contracts, but inversely; that is, a faster rate of updating generates more *now* moments in relation to the actual passage of the event – more subjective time is packed into the event – which makes it seem to be passing more slowly. Fewer updates of subjective *now* pack in less *now* moments, less time into an event which seems to pass more quickly.

The principal implication is that this sense of temporal duration reflects a registration of properties of the cognitive state (the rate of sampling which generates the state), not features of the particular objects which comprise the content of the represented event. Though it may not seem so, subjectively sensed time is actually a feature of the representing vehicle or state, not a quality or feature of the event represented much less the objects represented.

The weight of the evidence, then, strongly favors the conclusion that we are aware, at any and every waking moment, of aspects of the representational state as well as the content represented within that state. Taken in conjunction with the argument developed above that the conscious state does not consist in the awareness of representational content,[70] that conscious is not qualia, we are left with the conclusion that consciousness must reflect a reading or registration of a state property. As to the nature of that property, recall that this consideration began by noting the normal everyday qualia awareness consists of three distinct elements or dimensions – subjectivity, qualitative content and direct awareness – but that neither subjectivity nor representational content are specific to consciousness, and both constitute key elements of unconscious processing as well. That leaves the third property – direct awareness – as the one possible characteristic specific to consciousness.

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[66] Pocket, "How Long is 'Now.'"

[67] Tallis Bachmann, *Microgenetic Approach to the Conscious Mind* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2000)

[68] Ernst Poppel and Tom Artin, *Mindworks: Time and Conscious Experience* (Boston: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988).

[69] Pocket, "How Long is 'Now.'"

[70] Peter Carruthers, *Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Janzen, *The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness*.

As noted above, scholars insisting on a third, epistemic, dimension to qualia, agree that in addition to subjectivity and qualitative character, qualia are constituted by direct, non-inferential kind of knowing or awareness. But, as Dan Dennett[71] interjects – what exactly does that mean? Current analysis suggests three interpretations of what *direct awareness* amounts to in relation to qualia and consciousness. Dretske,[72] Tye[73] and others[74] invoke the notion of the transparency of cognitive experience relating to the fact that we are unaware of the representational mechanisms actively generating cognitive content, and are immediately or directly aware only of the content.[75] Now, as noted above, the claim that we are aware only of the content of cognitive states and not of the character of the state is inaccurate. Cognition registers both the content of experience and the character of its states. Moreover, as several critics have pointed out,[76] the assertion that conscious awareness and representational content are one and the same amounts to the claim that all intentional states are conscious as a consequence of their having intentional content, which in effect nullifies the distinction between conscious and unconscious representational states, and consequently fails as a distinguishing characteristic of the former.

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[71] Dennett, "Quining Qualia," 621-22.

[72] Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind*, Ch. 2; Fred Dretske, "The Mind's Awareness of Itself," *Philosophical Studies* 95 (1999): 103-24; Dretske, "How Do You Know," 1-14.

[73] Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness*, 30; Tye, *Consciousness, Color, and Content*, 47; Michael Tye, "Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience," *Nous* 36 (2002): 137-151.

[74] Others supporting transparency include Harman, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience;" Brian Loar, "Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia," (Unpublished manuscript, 2002, 1; available online at http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/loar2.htm); Sydney Shoemaker, "Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?" in his *The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 101.

[75] As pointed out by James van Cleve (James van Cleve, "Troubles for Radical Transparency," in *Supervenience in Mind: A Festschrift for Jaegwon Kim,* eds. Terry Horgan, Marcelo Sabates, and David Sosa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), there are in fact two distinct notions of transparency. The sense of transparency introduced by Harman (Harman, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience") highlights our lack of awareness of the cognitive processing which gives rise to cognitive content. An earlier version outlined by Moore (Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism") focused on the fact that we see through the conscious state of awareness and experience only the P-C-E content of that state.

[76] Carruthers, *Consciousness*, 44-45; Robert Lurz, "Advancing the Debate Between HOT and FO Theories of Consciousness," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 27 (2003): 30; Peter Carruthers, "Missing the Mind: Consciousness in the Swamps, Review of Fred Dretske's *Naturalizing the Mind*," *Noûs* 31 (1997): 529; Amie Thomasson, "After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Consciousness," *European Journal of Philosophy* 8 (2000): 201.

A second interpretation of the epistemic dimension of qualia has *direct awareness* as involving introspection.[77] This however, aligns the subjective apprehension of qualitative character not with consciousness, but with an act of attention subsequent to and dependent upon a preexisting state of self-awareness. Kriegel[78] and Janzen[79] enumerate four important distinctions between immediately reflexive consciousness and subsequent introspection and reflection; the former is not effortful while the later requires deliberate effort to remain focused on just those inner mental events as opposed to external, perceptually-mediated content; the former is involuntary or automatic (you cannot choose not to be conscious) where the latter requires volition, is a matter of choice; the former is constant, ongoing, while the latter is temporary and intermittent; finally, the former is ubiquitous, self-aware at every moment where the latter is infrequent. Introspection, then, is not constitutive of consciousness, it is constituted – infrequently – by consciousness.[80] Qualia do not align with consciousness on this interpretation of direct awareness.

There remains the third understanding of the epistemic dimension of qualia, that direct awareness consists of pre-introspective reflexive or autonoetic (self-knowing) awareness. Kriegel writes

> It is unlikely there could be anything it is like for a subject to be in a mental state she is unaware of being in … [consequently] intransitive self-consciousness is a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness: unless M is intransitively self-conscious, there is nothing it is like to be in M, and therefore M is not a phenomenally conscious state.[81]

Janzen, similarly, emphasizes reflexive awareness in relation to qualia insomuch as every conscious mental act "upon whatever object it is primarily

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[77] Kind, "Qualia Realism," 151; Lycan, *Consciousness and Experience,* 69-70.

[78] Uriah Kriegel, "Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 33 (2003): 105.

[79] Janzen, "The Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character," 329.

[80] Further points supporting the nonequivalence of introspection and consciousness are raised in Peters, "Accounting for Consciousness."

[81] Kriegel "Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness," 106; cf. Uriah Kriegel, "Naturalizing Subjective Character," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 71 (2005): 23, 25**;** cf. Rosenthal, "The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality," 19; Rosenthal, "A Theory of Consciousness," 733; David Rosenthal, "Exaggerated Reports: Reply to Block," *Analysis* 71 (2011): 433; and Zahavi, *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, 23-4. The understanding that consciousness is intrinsic to each perceptual moment was originally introduced by Brentano (Franz Brentano, *Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint*, eds. Oscar Kraus and Linda McAlister, trans. Antos Rancurello, D. Burnham Terrell, and Linda McAlister (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1874/1973)).

directed, is concomitantly directed upon itself [such that] my act of seeing is a reflexive act or a form of self-consciousness."[82]

Of the three commonly-referenced dimensions of qualia (subjectivity, informational content, direct awareness), only reflexivity, the *recursive awareness-of* component, is specific to and constitutive of consciousness. Subjectivity is common to both conscious and nonconscious states, qualitative character proves to be neither sufficient nor even necessary for consciousness, and the only form of direct awareness which is both exclusive to and constitutive of conscious mental processing is reflexive or autonoetic awareness. Consciousness then is most properly characterised by reflexivity alone rather than the broader concept of qualia which references elements of nonconscious processing as well. So what is reflexivity?

2. Consciousness is Reflexivity, Awareness as Such

Reflexivity points to the referring-back-upon-itself or autonoetic character of awareness. Common linguistic usage of the term "consciousness" as *reflexivity* is captured in the OED's definition of consciousness as "the reflex act whereby I know that I think, and that my thoughts and actions are my own and not another's." The understanding of consciousness as reflexivity, in the sense of knowing-that or being-aware-that one is perceiving, thinking, feeling or doing can be fairly described as the classical pre-scientific position of western Philosophy of Mind from Aristotle[83] through Descartes,[84] Kant,[85] Leibniz,[86] and Locke,[87] as well as of eastern contemplative philosophy.[88]

A significant quorum of contemporary scholars continue to maintain this emphasis on reflexivity, characterizing consciousness as "a process that takes note

[82] Janzen, *The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness*, 105.

[83] Aristotle, *De Anima,* ed. David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 33 BCE/1961).

[84] René Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (vol. 2), eds. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984-99).

[85] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[86] Gottfried Leibniz, "Principles of Nature and Grace," in *G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays,* eds. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).

[87] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,* ed. Peter Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

[88] On reflexivity in eastern contemplative traditions, see Frederic Peters, "Lucid Consciousness in Traditional Indian Psychology and Contemporary Neuro-Psychology," *Journal of Indian Psychology* 16,1 (1998): 1-25.

of itself,"[89] "states [that] represent themselves,"[90] "direct reflective awareness of [a] mental-occurrence instance … not contemporaneously mediated by any other mental-occurrence instance,"[91] "concurrently aware of its own transpiring,"[92] "higher-order self-referential representational activity,"[93] and "a perception-like awareness of current states and activities in our own mind."[94] Most widely recognized, perhaps, is Rosenthal's formulation (his "transitivity principle") that consciousness "…is a state that I am aware of being in."[95] It is also understood that this awareness of being in the conscious state is "pre-reflective," indicating that before initiating any additional metacognitive operations such as self-attention (introspection – see above) or discursive thought, and independent of them, I am already directly acquainted or "self-intimate" with my self-consciousness.[96] Consciousness is essentially matter of being aware *that* we know.

This longstanding characterization of consciousness as reflexivity however, while correctly referencing the way consciousness seems in subjective experience,

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[89] Donald Perlis, "Consciousness as Self-Function," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 4 (1997): 513.

[90] Uriah Kriegel, *Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 370.

[91] Thomas Natsoulas, "What Is Wrong with Appendage Theory of Consciousness," *Philosophical Psychology* 6 (1993): 137.

[92] David Woodruff Smith, *The Circle of Acquaintance* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 81.

[93] Hans Flohr, "Sensations and Brain Processes," *Behavioural Brain Research* 71 (1995): 160.

[94] Armstrong, "What Is Consciousness," 61.

[95] Rosenthal, *Consciousness and Mind,* 3-4. See also David Rosenthal, "Thinking That One Thinks," in *Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays,* eds. Martin Davies and Glyn W. Humphreys (Oxford*:* Blackwell, 1993), 199; Rosenthal, "Two Concepts of Consciousness," 335; Rosenthal, "A Theory of Consciousness," 736, 742; and cf. Alex Byrne, "Some Like it HOT: Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts," *Philosophical Studies* 86 (1997): 103-129; Janzen, *The Reflexive Nature of Consciousness,* 17 and Ch. 4; Kriegel, "Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness," 131; Uriah Kriegel, "Consciousness and Self-Consciousness," *The Monist* 87 (2004): 191; William Lycan, "A Simple Argument for a Higher Order Representation Theory of Consciousness," *Analysis* 61 (2001): 3; Thomas Natsoulas, "The Case for Intrinsic Theory I," *Journal of Mind & Behavior* 17 (1996): 269; David Smith, "Rey Cogitans: The Unquestionability of Consciousness," in *Perspectives on Mind,* eds. Herbert Otto and James Tueidio (Norwell: Kluwer Academic, 1988), 28; Van Gulick, "Higher-Order Global States (HOGS)," 69, Robert van Gulick, "Mirror, Mirror—Is That All?," in *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness,* eds. Uriah. Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006) 12; Josh Weisberg, "Same Old, Same Old: The Same-Order Representation Theory of Consciousness and the Division of Phenomenal Labor," *Synthese* 160 (2008): 162, 176.

[96] Flanagan, *Consciousness Reconsidered*, 194; Alvin Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 96; Kriegel, "Consciousness as Sensory Quality," 14.

often assumes that subjectively experienced reflexive awareness is self-validating. Philosophers, in particular from Descartes[97] through Husserl[98] to Chalmers,[99] Flanagan,[100] Smith,[101] and Stoljar[102] have taken this reflexivity to be a self-validating or incorrigible fact, a claim which depends heavily on "epistemic transparency," the unawareness (or refusal to recognize the fact) of representational processing giving rise to cognitive states. More importantly, as Thompson[103] points out, it involves the untested assumption that there is necessarily an isomorphism between the content of subjective experience and the structure of the underlying psychological representations and processes, such that the way the psychological moment seems to the subject is a direct reflection of the cognitive components and their operation.

But complete – even partial – isomorphism is unlikely to be the case given that the brain's electromagnetic activity does not use time, space, or any of the sensory qualities (colour, texture, smell, shape etc.) to directly represent time, space, and the sensory qualities.[104] What then of conscious reflexivity? Is self-awareness merely seemingly so or actually so? Since isomorphism between subjective experience and cognitive structures is clearly not the case, current consensus[105] holds that conscious self-awareness, while it does indeed arise for the subject in a *seemingly* reflexive fashion, is not necessarily so at psychological and neurological levels. It *could* be genuinely reflexive to a significant extent, in other

[97] Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy."

[98] Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1960).

[99] David Chalmers, "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 2 (1995): 200-19.

[100] Owen Flanagan, *The Science of Mind* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984).

[101] Smith, "Rey Cogitans."

[102] Daniel Stoljar, *Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

[103] Evan Thompson, "Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery," *Phenomenology and Cognitive Science* 6 (2007): 137-170.

[104] Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind*; cf. Lycan, "What Is the 'Subjectivity' of the Mental."

[105] Andy Clark, "Is Seeing All It Seems? Action, Reason and the Grand Illusion," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 9 (2002): 181-202; Daniel Dennett, "Who's on First? Hetero-Phenomenology Explained," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 10 (2003): 19-30; Güzeldere, "Problems of Consciousness;" Alva Noë, "The Critique of Pure Phenomenology," *Phenomenology and Cognitive Science* 6 (2007): 231-245; Eric Schwitzgebel, "No Unchallengeable Epistemic Authority, of Any Sort, Regarding Our Own Conscious Experience – Contra Dennett," *Phenomenology and Cognitive Science* 6 (2007): 107-113; Charles Siewert, "In Favor of (Plain) Phenomenology," *Phenomenology and Cognitive Science* 6 (2007): 201-220; Thompson, "Look Again."

words, but subjectively seeming to be so does not guarantee that outcome without further proof. It remains for empirical investigation to determine whether subjective experiences really are as reflexive as they seem.

In order to address this question of the empirical reality of reflexive, self-aware, cognitive processing, it is perhaps best to begin with the cognitive system as a whole. Is it self-referential to the extent that it could give rise to a fully reflexive processing module given a sufficiently compelling functional reason for doing so? The evidence suggests that the answer is unequivocally yes. Self-reference, in the sense of intercommunicaton between parts of a whole, comprises a fundamental dimension (arguably *the* defining characteristic) of cognitive architecture, for the same reason that self-regulation (via self-reference) is what biological organisms, including cognitively-endowed biological organisms, are all about. Cognition is an extension of biological organization, and biological organisms are, of necessity, self-regulating machines.[106] That is to say, the fundamental challenge for all biological organisms is to maintain survival by sustaining homeostasis – the internal conditions supporting life – in the midst of ongoing interaction with an ever-changing, often threatening environment.[107] Cognition provides a means of extending the biological homeostasis by maintaining self-regulative capacity beyond the organism itself to the organism-environment interaction through developing the capacity to not simply to generate self-movement,[108] but to control or guide self-movement in relation to the homeostatic and emotional needs of the organism.[109] A cognitive organism unable to relate the behavior it produces to what it needs for ongoing homeostatic balance will not – cannot – survive.[110] A cognitive organism self-regulates then by *controlled* self-to-environment interaction.

This self-regulating control of self-to-environment interaction is achieved through self-referencing cognitive architecture that regulates one cognitive process by another. Behavioral outputs are monitored, prioritized and adjusted by homeostatic requirements for food, water, oxygen and thermoregulation,[111] and more generally by motivational and behavioral goals.[112] Bottom-up sensory inputs

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[106] Marcello Ghin, "What a Self Could Be," *Psyche* 11 (2005): 1-10.

[107] Walter Cannon, *Wisdom of the Body* (New York: Norton & Company, 1932).

[108] Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens.*

[109] Peters, "Consciousness and Self-Regulation."

[110] Patricia Smith Churchland, *Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).

[111] Churchland, *Brain-Wise.*

[112] Karl Pribram, "A Review of Theory in Physiological Psychology," *Annual Review of Psychology* 11 (1960): 1-40.

are referenced against top-down perceptual expectations,[113] which in combination with attentional highlighting,[114] determine what sorts of sensory inputs proceed into the higher perceptual and ideational processing levels.[115] Motor output is monitored by feedback loops that register a sense of agency to the cognitive system without which schizophrenic confusion and behavioral paralysis ensue.[116] More broadly, the ideomotor principle underlying perceptual control theory indicates that motor output is monitored and controlled by pre-established goals represented internally in terms of desired perceptual inputs.[117] Most fundamentally self-referential processing is embodied in the brain's executive function, which includes the setting of goals, planning of actions, even the shifting of homeostatic set points by reference to internally generated motivational and emotional dispositions.[118] The metacognitive capacity to monitor and control one's current emotions, or one's understanding of, or ability to deal with a particular situation, to learn particular kinds of information, and assess the workability of a plan – all are yet further forms of self-referential cognitive processing.

Of singular importance to the claim that immediately reflexive self-awareness develops from an existing base of self-reference that characterizes cognitive processing generally, cognitive systems have developed an even more proactive feed-forward or anticipatory form of self-reference in the form of predictive emulation architectures.[119] Anticipative or predictive self-referential processing regimes feature throughout the cognitive system, in sensory and emotional processing, attentional selection, motor control, language production

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[113] Robert Desimone, "The Physiology of Memory: Recordings of Things Past," *Science* 258 (1992): 245-6.

[114] Risto Naatanen, *Attention and Brain Function* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1992).

[115] Larry Cauller, "Layer I of Primary Sensory Neocortex: Where Top-Down Converges Upon Bottom-Up" *Behavioral Brain Research* 71 (1995): 163-170.

[116] Chris Frith, "The Positive and Negative Symptoms of Schizophrenia Reflect Impairments in the Perception and Initiation of Action," *Psychological Medicine* 17 (1987): 631-648.

[117] Bernhard Hommel, Jochen Musseler, Gisa Ascherleben, and Wolfgang Prinz, "The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): a Framework for Perception and Action Planning," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 21 (2001): 849-937.

[118] Phan Luu and Don Tucker, "Self-regulation by the medial frontal cortex. Limbic representation of motive set-points," in *Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain,* ed. Mario Beauregard (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004), 123-161.

[119] Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, "Neural Worlds and Real Worlds," *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 3 (2002): 903-907; Rick Grush, "The Emulation Theory of Representation: Motor Control, Imagery and Perception," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 27 (2004): 377-442.

and comprehension as well as executive control.[120] Several analysts have concluded that predictive processing (an ongoing future orientation) constitutes one of the fundamental principles of cognitive processing.[121] In conjunction with the organizing principle of self-regulation via self-referential processing, this leads to the conclusion that cognitive self-regulation is achieved in large measure by *predictive* self-referential processing architecture.

Predictive self-referential processing, in turn, provides the basis for developing the capacity for the self-referential monitoring of a process by itself. It has been argued[122] that predictive feed-forward processing architecture has developed reflexive feed-forward circuitry as a simple, energy-efficient means of providing a continuous base reference frame for ongoing wakeful interaction between the subject and the environment. Continuous iteration of this base frame is achieved by means of recursive, self-stimulatory processing circuitry because predictive architectures already employ a more extended form of recursion (recurrent self-reference) as a way of monitoring the capacity of motor outputs to achieve required perceptual outcomes. Rationalizing this periodically self-referencing circuitry into a more immediately recursive, self-updating circuit simply repeats the evolutionary emergence of fast predictive processing loops within slower motor-output-to-perceptual-feedback loops that form the basis of predictive processing architecture.

Recursive self-activation (or self-updating) at the neural level has the capacity to support reflexive self-knowing or self-awareness at the cognitive level, on the basis that reflexive self-awareness embodies a registration of state rather than content properties; in this case the reflexivity of the processing regime. As noted above, conscious mentation does in fact register many features of the cognitive state including the different sensory modes, the distinction between externally-sourced perception and internally-generated conception and the temporal duration of events. Since, as we have argued, consciousness is not qualia, not a cognitive registration of content properties, it can be concluded that

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[120] Peters, "Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location."

[121] Andreja Bubic, Yves von Cramon, and Ricarda Schubotz, "Prediction, Cognition and the Brain," *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 4 (2010): 1-15; Jacob Hohwy, Andeas Roepstorff, and Karl Friston, "Predictive Coding Explains Binocular Rivalry: An Epistemological Review," *Cognition* 108 (2008): 687-701; Marcel Kinsborne and Scott Jordan, "Embodied Anticipation: A Neurodevelopmental Interpretation," *Discourse Processes* 46 (2009): 103-126; Giovanni Pezzulo, Joachim Hoffmann, and Rino Falcone, "Anticipation and Anticipatory Behaviour," *Congitive Processing* 8 (2007): 67-70.

[122] Peters, "Consciousness and Self-Regulation;" Peters, "Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location."

consciousness reflects a reading of the principal state property of the reflexive self-referring processing regime established by recursive processing circuitry, a kind of reflexive self-knowing or autonoetic awareness of the fact *that* it knows. Consciousness, then, is best understood as expressing at the cognitive level, a modal reading of the principal state property of the reflexive processing regime – reflexivity.

We began this section by asking whether conscious reflexivity is merely a subjective phenomenal appearance, or whether there is a degree of empirical reality to the apparently reflexive, self-aware, cognitive processing. The evidence reviewed indicates that cognitive architecture is self-referencing because it is, of necessity, a self-regulating regime, and that cognitive self-regulation is achieved in large measure by *predictive* self-referential processing architecture. Predictive self-referential processing, in turn, has the capacity to develop self-referential monitoring of a process by itself in the form of recursive feed-forward circuitry as an energy-efficient means of providing a continuous base reference frame for ongoing wakeful interaction between the subject and the environment.[123] Recursive self-activation (self-updating) at the neural level gives rise to reflexive self-knowing or self-awareness at the cognitive level, on the basis that the reflexive self-awareness embodies a registration of state rather than content properties, in this case the reflexivity of the processing regime.

Establishing the mechanism of conscious reflexivity is critical to establishing the empirical reality of reflexive, self-aware, cognitive processing because, on the working assumption that mental activity is brain activity, identifying a suitable brain mechanism or processing regime can be taken as equivalent to establishing the empirical reality of a mental process or phenomenon. "Suitable" brain mechanisms would include those (1) similar to other known mechanisms but distinct in their own right (if the mechanism is not distinct from other mechanisms, then the cognitive correlate cannot be taken as a distinct natural kind); and (2) those which serve a real function, because a mechanism that does not fulfill a function is unlikely to be real.[124] The mechanism proposed here (recursive circuitry) is similar to existing *predictive* self-referential processing architecture but unique, in that it feeds forward into itself. Recursive circuitry serves a purpose, the need to provide an energy-efficient form of consistent activation of a base reference frame for the ongoing self-to-

[123] Peters, "Consciousness as Recursive, Spatiotemporal Self Location;" Frederic Peters, "Consciousness as Reflexivity: A Neuro-Cognitive Mechanism," 2014, Under Review.

[124] Elizabeth Ervine, *Consciousness as a Scientific Concept: A Philosophy of Science Perspective* (Dortrecht: Springer, 2013).

environment interactive event. Similarly, registration of the principal state property of this reflexive processing regime shares a common ancestry with other readings of state features (temporal duration, sensory modality etc.) which serve to augment properties not available in the represented content. The legitimacy of the processing regime (reflexive circuitry and state property registration) constitutes a basic empirical demonstration of cognitive reflexivity as a natural kind.

Following this focus on mechanism, one can look to evidence canvassed from four distinct areas of research which point to the conclusion that a recursive processing circuitry in combination with a modal reading of the principal state property of that processing regime does achieve a genuine capacity for reflexive self-reference in the form of a self-recognizing, self-perceiving and self-knowing cognitive state.

At the level of personal subjective experience, consciousness arises as a single experiential field wherein distinct sensory, emotional and conceptual elements are simultaneously co-experienced as part of a common state.[125] But while a unified cognitive state could be operationalized by the iterative or recurrent activation of a single schema, the resultant state would not be conscious, not self-aware, not aware of its being unified, because the mere repetition of an intentional data structure does not reverse the direction of intentionality which is antireflexive, always about something other than itself. A reflexively-processed schema on the other hand would be diachronically unified and self-knowing, aware of being so. The experience of consciousness as a consistently unified state provides strong support, then, for the contention that consciousness is genuinely reflexive in the sense of self-knowing.

Secondly, when conscious, cognition does genuinely recognize itself in the sense that it is immune to error through misidentification. One cannot think an 'I'- thought without knowing that it is in fact about oneself, because self-recognition is non-inferential, it does not rely on perceptual identification processes.[126] And this ongoing self-recognition has practical, empirically-

[125] Baars, *A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness*; Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, "What is the Unity of Consciousness?," in *The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration and Dissociation*, ed. Axel Cleeremans (Oxford University Press, 2003), 23-58; Paul M. Churchland, *The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey Into the Brain* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Thomas Metzinger, "The Problem of Consciousness," in *Conscious Experience*, ed. Thomas Metzinger, 3-40.

[126] Hector-Neri Castaneda, "Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing," *Philosophical Perspectives* 1, ed. James Tomberlin (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1988), 405-454; John Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," *Nous* 13, 1 (1979): 3-21; Shoemaker, "Self-Knowledge and 'Inner Sense.'"

observable consequences.[127] In Perry's[128] illustration of following a trail of spilt sugar through supermarket aisles, only to realize that he was the careless shopper, the realization "It is I" had real psychological effects leading to immediate action (adjusting the leaky bag of sugar in his own cart). The motivational force of internal attitudes depends critically whether the subject recognizes herself as the subject of that attitude. Consequently, self-awareness in the form of self-recognition can have a real psychological effect in terms of objectively observable behavioural expression. Consciousness can be accounted genuinely reflexive in the sense of self-recognizing.

A third source of confirmatory evidence issues from the fact that reflexivity involves a form of self-perceiving. It has always seemed self-evident, indeed logically incontestable, that when conscious, the mind is aware of itself. Thus Güzeldere notes, "The very fact of questioning the nature of my consciousness renders the fact of our not being in some way self-aware, a blatant contradiction."[129] The empirical reality of this self-perception is expressed in the capacity for metacognition, which requires a more basic pre-existing reflexive awareness by the mind of its own state, including the contents of that state such that I am able to know when I do or do not understand, remember or perceive such and such. Reflexive awareness then can be accounted a genuine form of self-knowing in the form of self-perceiving.

Finally, where philosophy has concluded that self-awareness or "I-consciousness" is genuinely immune to error through misidentification, psychology provides evidence that conscious self-awareness is immune to error through misattribution – that it is not possible to seem to be awake and reflexively self-aware without actually being so. "False awakening" is conventionally described as a nonconscious, dreaming subject who thinks she has awakened when in fact she has not. This conventional interpretation appears mistaken, however, based on the false assumption that dream content only arises in nonconscious sleep states. This is not the case. Abnormal waking states such as sleep paralysis, alternate veridical perceptual content with internally-generated dream-type content,[130] and lucid dreaming constitutes a conscious awake state where all the content is internally generated.[131] The presence of dream content,

[127] Brie Gertler, *Self-Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2011), 214-5.
[128] Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical."
[129] Güzeldere, "Problems of Consciousness," 115; cf. Weisberg, "Same Old, Same Old," 166.
[130] Allen Cheyne, "Borderlands of Consciousness: Between Dream World and Wake World," Paper presented at *Toward a Science of Consciousness*, Tucson, Arizona, April 10, 2004.
[131] Laberge, *Lucid Dreaming.*

then is not an infallible indicator of a non-conscious sleep state. In fact, the state of "false awakening" bears all the hallmarks of an awake state wherein the subject exercises explicit metacognitive judgment (correct or not) upon her state;[132] remembers the content of her state;[133] deliberately controls the narrative content of the dreams as it progresses;[134] and remembers details of one's waking life as being of one's waking life.[135] The fact that false awakening is in fact a genuinely awake state with dreamlike content can be taken as an indication that reflexive self-knowing cannot be simulated, that reflexivity is not a mere subjective seeming but a cognitive actuality.

Conclusion

In sum, consciousness can be accounted genuinely reflexive in the sense that it is generated by an empirically real recursive processing mechanism giving rise to a genuinely reflexive cognitive state which is immediately self-recognizing, self-perceiving and self-knowing. No doubt, it is the veracity of this autonoetic state of knowing *that* it knows which lends such deep conviction to the naïve presumption that it knows what it knows, that it sees everything there is to see (the grand illusion), that it is intimately aware of its own motivations (telling more than it could know) and that it delivers unmediated contact with "the real world" (transparency). Conscious experience seems complete and veridical – the basis of naïve realism – in large measure because the medium of that experience, the reflexive state, is genuine and cognitively complete in itself.

[132] Giorgio Buzzi, "False Awakenings in Light of the Dream Protoconsciousness Theory: A Study in Lucid Dreamers," *International Journal of Dream Research* 4 (2011): 114.
[133] Buzzi, "False Awakenings," 69.
[134] Buzzi, "False Awakenings," 113.
[135] Cheyne, "Borderlands of Consciousness," 9.

DEBATE

VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, TESTIMONY, AND TRUST

Benjamin W. McCRAW

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to an objection raised by Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup against virtue epistemology. In particular, they argue that the virtue epistemologist must either deny that *S* knows that *p* only if *S* believes that *p* because of *S*'s virtuous operation or deny intuitive cases of testimonial knowledge. Their dilemma has roots in the apparent ease by which we obtain testimonial knowledge and, thus, how the virtue epistemologist can explain such knowledge in a way that both preserves testimonial knowledge and grounds it in one's virtues. I argue that the virtue epistemologist has a way to accomplish both tasks if we take epistemic trust to be an intellectual virtue. I briefly discuss what such trust must look like and then apply it to the dilemma at hand: showing that a key intellectual virtue plausibly operates in cases of testimonial knowledge and/or belief.

KEYWORDS: testimony, trust, confidence, dependence, virtue epistemology

Recently, Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard argue that a robust virtue epistemology finds itself at odds with mainstream social epistemology; in particular, with mainstream epistemology of testimony.[1] As they argue, robust virtue epistemology's commitment to knowledge as creditable to the believer runs into tension with social epistemology's view that placing trust in a speaker can give one testimonial knowledge. I shall argue that the robust virtue epistemologist has a natural way to solve this tension and thoroughly 'socialize' itself by accepting a widely-ignored but vital epistemic virtue: trust. In section 1, I shall develop in some detail the problem Kallestrup and Pritchard see for virtue epistemology. In section 2, I shall diagnose what exactly would serve as a solution to this problem from a virtue-theoretic perspective and develop such a solution using the notion of epistemic trust. Section 3 takes a closer look at trust itself, and finally, Section 4 examines trust as a solution to Kallestrup and Pritchard's objection and draws some implications for the epistemology of testimony and social epistemology in general.

[1] Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, "Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 93 (2012): 84-103.

1. Kallestrup and Pritchard's dilemma for virtue epistemology

Kallestrup and Pritchard begin by distinguishing "modest" from "robust" virtue epistemology.[2] A 'modest' virtue epistemology defines knowledge using both virtue-theoretic and non-virtue-theoretic concepts.[3] A modest virtue epistemology can, for instance, add a safety condition to virtue-theoretic content. In contrast, a 'robust' virtue epistemology defines knowledge solely in virtue-theoretic concepts. On this view, there is nothing more to knowledge than true belief plus some virtue-theoretic condition or set of conditions.

As a response to Gettier cases, robust virtue epistemologists insist that the true belief involved in knowledge must be a credit to the believer's virtues or virtuous activity. Adherents to this sort of virtue epistemology argue that one's success in holding a true belief must be *because of* or *due to* one's exercise of virtue in coming to hold the belief in question – i.e. one deserves credit for the one's beliefs that amount to knowledge. Call this the Credit Thesis

(CT): *S* knows that *p* only if *S* believes that *p* because of *S*'s virtuous operation.

According to the robust virtue epistemologist's acceptance of CT, knowledge implies credit for the true beliefs that ultimately yield knowledge. Without CT, Kallestrup and Pritchard argue that the virtue epistemology lacks the conceptual and argumentative tools to respond to Gettier cases. So, let's take it that a virtue theorist should be loathe to reject CT.

CT, on Kallestrup and Pritchard's interpretation, commits the virtue epistemologist to epistemic individualism. An epistemic individualist claims that the warrant or justification converting a true belief into knowledge "supervenes on internal features of the agent."[4] It is important to note that the use of "internal features" refers to the belief-forming properties of an agent within his/her physical body. As Kallestrup and Pritchard use the term, a process-reliabilist account of knowledge counts as proposing "internal" features for justification insofar as one's cognitive faculties lie within one's skull. So, the epistemic individualism thesis, even with its appeal to talk of internal features, does not commit one to either epistemic internalism or externalism.

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[2] Kallestrup and Pritchard, "Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism," 85.

[3] Excluding, of course, the conditions for truth and belief.

[4] Kallestrup and Pritchard, "Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism," 86. Kallestrup and Pritchard distinguish 'strong' epistemic individualism from 'weak' epistemic individualism. The former takes *warrant*, or that which converts true belief into knowledge, to supervene on internal states and the latter takes "defeasible doxastic justification" to supervene on such internal features. While I find this distinction useful and enlightening, it plays no role in my argument and so I shall ignore for the purposes of this paper.

CT makes sense of epistemic individualism: if we have knowledge only for that which we deserve credit, it would seem that it's only those "internal features" about us that can determine a belief's credit-worthy warrant or justification. So, if we hold some belief on the basis of something (or, as we shall see in a bit, someone) *external* to us – i.e. outside of us – then that belief will lack warrant/justification (on epistemic individualism) and credit (given CT). Therefore such an externally-based belief can't amount to knowledge since it lacks both a warrant/justification dimension and the element of credit. Instead, only beliefs based on internal features can be creditable to us and, supposing a CT reading of epistemic individualism, such features are the only sort that can generate the warrant/justification required for knowledge. In short, externally-based beliefs can never yield knowledge since they run afoul of CT's internalist, credit-based analysis of epistemic warrant/justification.

This brings us to testimony. Kallestrup and Pritchard argue that instances of testimonial belief do not merit credit for the believer and yet count as pieces of knowledge. Consider their case of Morris* – based off a similar counterexample by Jennifer Lackey.[5] Imagine a trusting fellow named Morris, who is an unfamiliar visitor to Chicago and wanting to visit the Sears Tower. Arriving in the train station, he finds a passerby and asks directions to his desired locale. We may suppose the passerby asserts truthfully and competently and, on the basis of this person's testimony, Morris forms a true belief regarding the location of the Sears Tower.

Whereas Lackey takes this to be a clear and obvious case of testimonial knoweldge for Morris, Kallestrup and Pritchard argue that we must add a bit to the specification of Morris' interaction with the passerby. In particular, "we need to be reading the case such that Morris is displaying a reasonable degree of relevant cognitive skill" in weeding out unreliable looking testifiers and monitoring for signs of a competent, trustworthy assertor in asking directions.[6] So, while Lackey sees nothing deserving credit in *her* case of Morris, Kallestrup and Pritchard modify the case to allow him something deserving of credit in his acceptance of the testimony.

But this will not save virtue epistemology from the case of Morris. It is still too easy for him to obtain his belief – we don't see much about Morris aside from vague monitoring talk that would seem to merit any epistemic credit for his belief. For all the world, it seems as though he blithely accepts whatever it is the passerby

[5] Jennifer Lackey, "Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know," *Synthese* 158 (2007): 345-361.

[6] Kallestrup and Pritchard, "Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism," 89.

would say. Thus, Kallestrup and Pritchard conclude that "Morris*'s trust in his informant's word [plays] such a central role in his acquisition of konweldge his cognitive success is still not primarily creditable to his cognitive ability."[7] The credit for Morris*'s testimonial knowledge is due to the informant rather than Morris.

Taking stock of the Morris* case, it seems that we have a trouble for robust virtue epistemology and its commitment to CT. We have an instance of knowledge – our intuitions say – but where the believer lacks credit for the true belief in question.Thus, Kallestrup and Pritchard formulate a dilemma for the robust virtue epistemologist. Either:

(A) Robust virtue epistemologist must "bite the bullet" and deny that Morris* has genuine testimonial knowledge, OR

(B) Accept that Morris* knows; denying CT.

Neither horn is attractive – let's see why.

If the virtue epistemologist accepts (A), then that requires biting an awfully large bullet. Lackey, Kallestrup, and Pritchard all find the pro-knowledge intuition clear and I'm inclined to agree. But more worrisome than this intuition is the larger philosophical implications. If one denies cases like Morris* amount to knowledge, then it seems we're committed to a fairly wide and deep skepticism. A cursory glance at any of the growing literature of the epistemology of testimony gives one a sense of the significant and wide-ranging dependence we have on the testimony of others for most of what we think we know. Denying simple testimonial cases like Morris*, then, commits us to denying most simple cases of testimonial knowledge; threatening us with a dark and far-reaching cloud of skepticism.

But accepting (B) fares little better. CT looks appealing for its use in defeating Gettier worries about knowledge. Without CT and its notion of getting to the truth *because* of one's virtues, we lack the tools to explain the legion of Gettier cases in the literature. In less theoretical terms, removing CT undercuts the ability of our theories to explain how luck can defeat knowledge. As many theorists claim – including Pritchard – the anti-luck lesson of Gettier cases has become an epistemological platitude. Without CT, we can't make sense of this platitude. Again, the virtue theorist should do everything possible to avoid accepting (B).

Kallestrup and Pritchard provide us with a dilemma for robust virtue epistemology with horns no one should be willing to accept. Thus, the prospects

[7] Kallestrup and Pritchard, "Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism," 90.

for such a theory look dim. What we need is a solution that avoids both (A) *and* (B) – maintaining credit for testimony based beliefs – showing that the dilemma in question is a false one.

2. The recipe to solve Kallestrup and Pritchard's dilemma

What *exactly*, though, will such a solution look like to the above dilemma? What is on our check list for plausible solutions? We need a recipe for the solution. Let me suggest the following.

> (1) The answer must be a plausible epistemic virtue or some other virtue-derived concept. A non-virtue-theoretic answer won't provide any help to Kallestrup and Pritchard's dilemma; whereby we need to retain CT in a *robustly* virtue-theoretic manner.
>
> (2) The answer must be able to explain or account for testimony-based belief or knowledge. Even if the virtue in question is not exhaustively testimonial in nature, it must be at least capable of accounting for how we come to obtain testimonial knowledge or belief.
>
> (3) The successful virtue (or virtuous operation) must be somewhat widespread. Since we believe that many people have justified or warranted testimonial beliefs and since we're deeply committed to a rejection of testimonial skepticism, the answer must apply to a large number of people.
>
> (4) The answer must be epistemically praiseworthy. That is, it must be something for which we (can) deserve epistemic credit. Alternatively, the answer must be something for which we are responsible.

What can satisfy (1)-(4)? The answer lies in what Kallestrup and Pritchard have already said about testimony. On their view, it is trust that does the epistemic heavy lifting cases of testimony; or at least, in cases of testimony like that of Morris*. That seems entirely right, but if we have the right view of how the trust in question operates, I suggest it has precisely the opposite conclusion that Kallestrup and Pritchard draw.

Trust is exactly the answer we need for the dilemma that they pose. In particular, I suggest that epistemic trust, or a kind of intellectual trust *in* some person, provides the solution to the dilemma at hand working as an epistemic virtue crucial to understanding testimony. But, we must say a little about what trust is to see how it works. Kallestrup and Pritchard, from their comments, seem to take trust to be something cognitively thin or shallow. Since they clearly think that such trust does *not* generate epistemic credit, it would seem that trust functions more like acceptance or belief. When Morris* trusts the passerby for

directions, they mean simply that Morris* accepts or believes what this passerby says. Note that, on their usage, Morris* always places his trust in *the words* of another. However, a more robust account of trust in changes the object from the speaker's communication to the speaker directly. We move from trusting another's words to trusting that *person* him/herself.

3. The nature of trust

Consider a point from Elizabeth Anscombe: a friend tells you that Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo.[8] Now, you certainly accept or believe what your friend tells you, but this acceptance clearly doesn't imply that you trust your friend. Why not? Well, Anscombe's answer is that trust involves reliance.[9] When I trust someone for some belief that *p*, I rely or depend on that person or that person's communication (that *p*) for my belief. But we can accept things that we already know. So, while trust involves reliance, acceptance does not: therefore, there must be more to trust that mere acceptance or belief.

So, once we've got reliance in the analysis, is there anything left to add? Plausibly, there's more to trust than just relying on someone. Consider the influential analyses of trust by Annette Baier and Karen Jones.[10] Both include reliance in their account of trust but, in addition, they add a condition whereby the truster sees the trustee as competent in some way. Their concerns are a *moral* competency and good intentions of the trustee, but we can modify their second condition for an epistemological point. What they seem to be emphasizing in a moral way is a kind of confidence placed in the trusted person. So, if we can think about some kind of *epistemic* confidence, then that will provide an epistemic analogue to their moral trust. I suggest that an epistemic confidence in *S* is an attitude whereby one sees *S* as epistemically authoritative – the sort of person that is reliable or typically one who asserts with warrant.

Putting all of this together, we trust in *S* epistemically when we believe what *S* tells us, we rely on *S*'s communication, and we place our confidence in *S* (i.e. we see *S* as epistemically authoritative for us on this issue). This "thickened" account of trust in a person provides the propositional belief that Kallestrup and Pritchard seem to think exhausts trust while adding a reliance component and an

[8] G. E. M. Anscombe, "What Is It to Believe Someone?" in *Rationality and Religious Belief*, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 144-145.

[9] Anscombe, "What Is It to Believe Someone," 145.

[10] See Annette Baier's "Trust and Anti-Trust," and "Trusting People," in her *Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), and Karen Jones' "Trust as an Affective Attitude," *Ethics* 107 (1996): 4-25.

attitude of confidence. Trusting successfully in this more robust sense – taking "success" in the vaguest possible way – will be more than a matter of just haphazardly believing the truth. Let's see how this account of trust satisfies the recipe above.

4. Trust as the solution to Kallestrup and Pritchard's dilemma

Answering (1) seems easy enough. Taking such trust as an epistemic virtue obviously provides a virtue-theoretic response to Kallestrup and Pritchard's dilemma. And, just as easily, taking trust to be a virtue solves (2): given such trust, we can easily explain how someone comes by a testimony-based belief. When I place my trust *in S*, as we've described above, I rely on *S* and my confidence in *S* leads me to believe what *S* communicates – a clear case of belief by testimony. What's more, (3) seems unproblematic. Much has been said on how pervasive our epistemic reliance is, and I think we can make similar cases for widespread confidence. Denying widespread confidence in others would be tantamount to seeing no one but one's self as epistemically authoritative. Intuitively, it seems to me, we often see others as epistemically well placed and, thus, as the sort of reliable person in whom we can trust. Certainly there is such a thing as epistemic pride or arrogance, but it's difficult to take seriously the claim that someone can *always* fail to see another as reliable, authoritative, or trust-worthy in a deep, pervasive way.

(4) is not quite as straightforward. To satisfy (4), the virtue-theoretic mechanism must be something whereby the belief formed must be due to or creditable to the agent doing the believing. Kallestrup and Pritchard hinge their argument on this very denial: epistemically proper testimonial based beliefs seem to be more creditable to the testifier than the person receiving the testimony. Yet, on the view proposed, the trust involved in testimony isn't just a passive, intellectually bare acceptance by the believer. Rather, when placing trust in the testifer/speaker, the truster has robust attitudes of confidence and reliance directed towards the speaker. Certainly the role of the speaker insofar as s/he makes competent, undeceiving assertions is crucial in getting to the truth via testimony, but affirming the vital role of the speaker doesn't necessarily denigrate the role of the hearer. On the account I've provided, trusting in that speaker involves seeing the speaker as authoritative – a kind of affective epistemic attitude – paired with an attitude whereby one relies/depends upon the speaker to perform his/her role as communicator well. Adding these attitudes to trust makes it more like a trait or cognitive disposition for which one can merit praise: the sort of thing that one can place well or poorly just as any putative epistemic virtue.

Thus, we can "thicken" or "beef up" the cognitive part played by the hearer in thinking about placing trust in a testifier. That more sophisticated approach to trust yields a disposition, ability or trait (depending on your favored flavor of epistemic virtue) that can account for testimony and do so in a way that is a credit to the hearer. Hence, with the tools to satisfy (1)-(4), we can grasp both horns of Kallestrup and Pritchard's dilemma: accepting both CT and affirming that Morris* (and, by extension, many others) has genuine testimonial knowledge. Testimony appears to be too easy for credit attribution. However, on a more nuanced and robust account of trust, we see that it's not simple acceptance/belief but a complex of attitudes that can be displayed well or poorly and, hence, something for which we can deserve praise (or blame, I suppose). When we rightly understand epistemic trust, it allows us to keep the intuition that knowledge implies credit and that we can easily acquire a good amount of testimonial knowledge (that only *seems* too easy) at the same time. Epistemic dependence, when combined with confidence adequately to yield proper epistemic trust, doesn't undermine credit.

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND SELF-DEFEAT

Moti MIZRAHI

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect. In other words, if self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to PC, then Huemer's Self-Defeat argument doesn't uniquely motivate PC.

KEYWORDS: appearances, dogmatism, justification, phenomenal conservatism, seemings, self-defeat argument

1. Introduction

Michael Huemer defends the principle he calls "Phenomenal Conservatism." According to this principle:

(PC) If it seems to *S* that *p*, then, in the absence of defeaters, *S* thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that *p*.[1]

[1] Michael Huemer, "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (2007): 30-55. See also Michael Huemer, *Skepticism and the Veil of Perception* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001). Michael Huemer, "Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 43 (2006): 147-158. Michael Huemer, "Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat: A Reply to DePoe," *Philosophical Studies* 156 (2011): 1-13. Others who endorse a principle like PC include: Andrew Cullison, "What Are Seemings?" *Ratio* 23 (2010): 26-274 and Chris Tucker, "Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism," *Philosophical Perspectives* 24 (2010): 529-545. See also Chris Tucker, "Seemings and Justification: An Introduction," in *Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism*, ed. Chris Tucker (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1-30. For other versions of dogmatism, see James Pryor, "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist," *Noûs* 34 (2000): 517-549 and Michael Pace, "Foundationally Justified Perceptual Beliefs and the Problem of the Speckled Hen," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 91 (2010): 401-441. Pace considers a version of dogmatism according to which "If S has an experience as if p then S has foundational (defeasible) justification for believing that p" (Pace, "Foundationally justified perceptual beliefs," 402). Pace argues that the problem of the speckled hen is a problem for this principle. Accordingly, PC can be thought of as a more general version of dogmatism insofar as it is supposed to cover not only perceptual appearances (or sensory seemings) but also intuitive appearances (or intellectual seemings). See, e.g., Elijah Chudnoff,

In support of PC, Huemer puts forth an argument he calls "The Self-Defeat Argument" for PC, according to which "any theory [of basic propositional justification] that rejects PC is self-defeating, in the sense that if such a theory is true, it is (doxastically) unjustified."[2]

In his reply to DePoe,[3] Huemer himself reconstructs the Self-Defeat Argument for PC as follows:

(1) All our beliefs (in relevant cases) are based upon appearances.

(2) A belief is (doxastically) justified only if what it is based upon constitutes an adequate source of (propositional) justification.[4]

"The Nature of Intuitive Justification," *Philosophical Studies* 153 (2011): 313-333. On intellectual seemings, see Berit Brogaard, "Intuitions as Intellectual Seemings," in Symposium on Herman Cappelen's *Philosophy without Intuitions*. *Analytic Philosophy*, ed. David Sosa (forthcoming).

[2] Huemer, "A Reply to DePoe," 1. For critiques of PC, see Nathan Hanna, "Against Phenomenal Conservatism," *Acta Analytica* 26 (2011): 213-221; Clayton Littlejohn, "Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism," *Analytic Philosophy* 52 (2011): 35-48; Moti Mizrahi, "Against Phenomenal Conservatism," *The Reasoner* 7 (2013): 117-118; Moti Mizrahi, "Against Phenomenal Conservatism: A Reply to Moretti," *The Reasoner* 8 (2014): 26. Hanna argues that "PC is false because it […] follows from PC that beliefs can confer foundational justification for believing their contents in cases where they should not be able to do so" (Hanna, "Against Phenomenal Conservatism," 220). Cf. Kevin McCain, "Against Hanna on Phenomenal Conservatism," *Acta Analytica* 27 (2012): 45-54. Like Hanna, Littlejohn also argues that PC "really does have abhorrent implications we know we should reject or the justification for PC has been undermined" (Littlejohn, "Defeating Phenomenal Conservatism," 37). For Littlejohn, however, the abhorrent implications of PC are also moral, not just epistemic.

[3] John DePoe, "Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument for Phenomenal Conservatism," *Philosophical Studies* 152 (2011): 347-359. Against Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC, DePoe argues that Huemer's ("Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," 39) premise to the effect that "when we form beliefs, with a few exceptions not relevant here [i.e., cases of self-deception and leaps of faith], our beliefs are based on the way things seem to us" is false. See also Michael DePaul, "Phenomenal Conservatism and Self-Defeat," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 78 (2009): 205-212. For a defense of PC, see McCain, "Against Hanna," 45-54.

[4] Here Huemer seems to accept the view that "Doxastic justification is what you get when you believe something for which you have propositional justification, and you base your belief on that which propositionally justifies it" (Jonathan Kvanvig, "Propositionalism and the Perspectival Character of Justification," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 40 (2003): 3-17). See also John Pollock and Joseph Cruz, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 35-36. In what follows, I grant Huemer this assumption about the basing relation. Cf. Keith Korcz, "The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 30 (2000): 525-550.

(3) Therefore, if appearances are not a source of justification, then all our beliefs are unjustified, including the belief (if one has it) that appearances are not a source of justification.[5]

The Self-Defeat Argument, according to Huemer, "is not directly an argument that Phenomenal Conservatism is true, but rather that epistemological theories that oppose Phenomenal Conservatism are self-defeating."[6] Accordingly, Huemer seems to think that being self-defeating is a strike against a theory of basic propositional justification. Since any theory of basic propositional justification that rejects PC is self-defeating, Huemer argues, PC is thus superior to other theories of basic propositional justification.

In what follows, I argue against this latter claim. More explicitly, I argue that PC is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then there is nothing special about PC in that respect.[7] Constructing one such argument, of course, is sufficient in order to show that self-defeat arguments similar to Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. So, in the next section, I sketch a parallel self-defeat argument for a simple version of evidentialism and then defend its main premise. If Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument supports PC, then this parallel self-defeat argument supports evidentialism as well. If this is correct, however, then there is nothing special about PC as far as being the only non-self-defeating theory of basic propositional justification.[8]

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[5] Huemer, "A Reply to DePoe," 1. See also Huemer, *Skepticism and the Veil of Perception*, 98-115.

[6] Huemer, "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," 41.

[7] Cf. Ali Hasan, "Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification," *Philosophical Studies* 162 (2013): 119-141. Hasan argues, pace Huemer, that classical foundationalism "can avoid the charge of self-defeat" (Hasan, "Phenomenal Conservatism," 120). In this paper, I do not argue that other theories of basic propositional justification can avoid the charge of self-defeat. Rather, I argue that self-defeat arguments similar to Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for alternative theories of basic propositional justification. In that respect, then, there is nothing special about PC as far as self-defeat is concerned.

[8] DePoe argues that "Huemer's self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservatism is unsound" (DePoe, "Defeating the Self-Defeat Argument," 348). In this paper, I do not argue that Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC is unsound. Rather, I argue that PC is not superior to other theories of basic propositional justification as far as self-defeat is concerned, since parallel self-defeat arguments can be constructed for alternative theories of basic propositional justification.

2. A self-defeat argument for evidentialism

In this section, I sketch a self-defeat argument for a simple version of evidentialism. For present purposes, I take evidentialism to be "the view that the epistemic justification of a belief is determined by the quality of the believer's evidence for the belief."[9] More explicitly:

> *S*'s belief that *p* at time *t* is justified (well-founded) iff (i) believing *p* is justified for *S* at *t*; (ii) *S* believes *p* on the basis of evidence that supports *p*.[10]

Fantl and McGrath put it this way:

> *Evidentialism*. For any two subjects *S* and *S** , necessarily, if *S* and *S** have the same evidence for/against *p*, then *S* is justified in believing that *p* iff *S** is, too.[11]

Now, here is a self-defeat argument for Evidentialism:

(1*) All our beliefs (in relevant cases) are based upon *evidence*.[12]

(2) A belief is (doxastically) justified only if what it is based upon constitutes an adequate source of (propositional) justification.

(3*) Therefore, if *evidence* is not a source of justification, then all our beliefs are unjustified, including the belief (if one has it) that *evidence* is not a source of justification.

Premise (1*) is a simple variation on premise (1) of Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC; instead of "appearances" as in premise (1) of Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC, we now have "evidence" as the basic source of propositional justification. If the phenomenal conservative is entitled to premise (1), then the evidentialist is entitled to premise (1*). Indeed, Huemer invokes appearances in support of PC when he says that "We should accept Phenomenal Conservatism […] because Phenomenal Conservatism just *seems* right" (emphasis added).[13] Premise (2) remains unchanged. Consequently, from premises (1*) and (2), conclusion (3*) is supposed to follow, just as conclusion (3) is supposed to follow from premises (1) and (2) in Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC. Like

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[9] Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, "Evidentialism," *Philosophical Studies* 48 (1985): 15-34.

[10] Richard Feldman, *Epistemology* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 46.

[11] Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, "Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification," *Philosophical Review* 111 (2002): 67-94. See also Dorit Ganson, "Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief," *Philosophical Studies* 139 (2008): 441-458.

[12] As in Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC, the "in relevant cases" clause is meant to rule out beliefs that are "based upon self-deception, faith, or the like" (Huemer, "A Reply to DePoe," 1, footnote 1).

[13] Huemer, "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," 54.

Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC, this parallel self-defeat argument is not directly an argument that Evidentialism is true, but rather that theories of basic propositional justification that oppose Evidentialism are self-defeating.

It might be objected that premise (1) of Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC is more plausible than premise (1*) of the parallel self-defeat argument for Evidentialism. But I do not think that is the case. To see why, recall that, as in Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC, the "in relevant cases" clause is meant to rule out beliefs that are "based upon self-deception, faith, or the like."[14] That is, the "in relevant cases" clause rules out accepting certain claims on faith or without (adequate) evidence. The relevant cases, then, are beliefs that are based on (adequate) evidence, whatever that may be. In other words, the relevant beliefs are taken to be beliefs that are based upon an adequate source of justification. The question is what that source is. For Huemer, the source is appearances. For evidentialists, the source is evidence. In that respect, evidentialists might even accept that appearances are a form of (defeasible) evidence, and yet reject the internalist and foundationalist elements of PC. That is, evidentialists could argue that appearances, understood as defeasible evidence rather than as the subject's internal mental states,[15] can be used to inferentially justify beliefs.

Huemer argues that "the rejection of Phenomenal Conservatism is self-defeating"[16] and that "alternative theories are self-defeating."[17] If Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC shows that theories of basic propositional justification that reject PC are self-defeating, however, then the aforementioned parallel self-defeat argument for Evidentialism shows that theories of basic propositional justification that reject Evidentialism are self-defeating as well. If this is correct, then, contrary to what Huemer claims, PC is not superior to Evidentialism in terms of being non-self-defeating, for the same sort of self-defeat argument that Huemer puts forth in support of PC can be made in support of Evidentialism. The parallel self-defeat argument for Evidentialism shows that PC is not special in that respect.

I think that the reason why parallel self-defeat arguments can be made for alternative theories of basic propositional justification, such as Evidentialism, and hence why PC is not special in that respect, is quite simple. Any theory of basic

[14] Huemer, "A Reply to DePoe," 1.

[15] T. Ryan Byerly, "It Seems Like There Aren't Any Seemings," *Philosophia* 40 (2012): 771-782. Byerly argues that "the central motivations for positing seemings are insufficient" (Byerly, "It Seems," 772).

[16] Huemer, "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," 32.

[17] Huemer, "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," 54.

propositional justification, such as PC, classical foundationalism,[18] or Evidentialism, which identifies *X* as a basic source of justification would have to appeal to *X* in order to justify itself *on pain of self-defeat*. To see why, consider the following question:

> *If beliefs are justified in virtue of being based on evidence that supports them, then what justifies the belief that beliefs are justified in virtue of being based on evidence that supports them?*

If Evidentialism is true, then the answer ultimately has to be:

> *The belief that beliefs are justified in virtue of being based on evidence that supports them is justified in virtue of being based on evidence that supports it.*

on pain of self-defeat. More generally:

> *If beliefs are justified in virtue of being based upon X, then what justifies the belief that beliefs are justified in virtue of being based upon X?*

If it is true that beliefs are justified in virtue of being based upon *X*, then the answer ultimately has to be:

> *The belief that beliefs are justified in virtue of being based upon X is justified in virtue of being based upon X.*

on pain of self-defeat. This general point about theories of basic propositional justification applies to PC as well. To see why, consider the following question:

> *If beliefs are justified in virtue of being based upon appearances, then what justifies the belief that beliefs are justified in virtue of being based upon appearances?*

If PC is true, then the answer ultimately has to be:

> *The belief that beliefs are justified in virtue of being based upon appearances is justified in virtue of being based upon appearances.*

on pain of self-defeat. In fact, as mentioned above, Huemer himself invokes appearances in support of PC when he says that "We should accept Phenomenal Conservatism […] because Phenomenal Conservatism just *seems* right" (emphasis added).[19]

For this reason, self-defeat arguments, if they work at all, work for theories of basic propositional justification other than PC as well. In other words, I submit that any basic source of propositional justification (e.g., "evidence" as in evidentialism, "basic/non-inferential beliefs" as in classical foundationalism,

[18] Cf. Hasan, "Phenomenal Conservatism."

[19] Huemer, "Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism," 54.

"seemings" as in PC) can be plugged into the following argument scheme instead of *X*:

> All our beliefs (in relevant cases) are based upon *X*.
> A belief is (doxastically) justified only if what it is based upon constitutes an adequate source of (propositional) justification.
>
> ∴ If *X* is not a source of justification, then all our beliefs are unjustified, including the belief (if one has it) that *X* is not a source of justification.

This is so because any theory of basic propositional justification that identifies *X* as a basic source of justification would have to appeal to *X* in order to justify itself *on pain of self-defeat*. Since the "in relevant cases" is supposed to rule out beliefs that are clearly not justified, the remaining beliefs must be justified in virtue of being based upon *X*. This is a general point about theories of basic propositional justification. PC is no exception, which is why the Self-Defeat Argument for PC fails to show that PC is superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating.

Of course, Huemer could simply abandon the Self-Defeat Argument for PC and argue that there are other reasons for accepting PC.[20] In that case, I will have done my job. For my aim in this paper is to expose the problems with Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC. In particular, Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC does not uniquely support PC, since similar self-defeat arguments can be made to support alternative theories of basic propositional justification, such as Evidentialism. Moreover, if Huemer were to take this line of defense (namely, claim that there are other reasons for accepting PC), it would simply make salient the problems with his Self-Defeat Argument for PC. Recall that, for Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument to go through, one needs to assume that appearances are a basic source of justification (i.e., the first premise of Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC) and that *that* is what matters as far as doxastic justification is concerned (i.e., the second premise of Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument for PC). If one accepts these assumptions, however, it is not clear what work is left for the Self-Defeat Argument for PC to do. As an argument for PC, Huemer's Self-Defeat Argument thus becomes redundant.

[20] For instance, Huemer argues that PC can accommodate the internalist intuition better than other theories of basic propositional justification can (Huemer, "Phenomenal conservatism and the internalist intuition," 147-158). Cf. Hasan, "Phenomenal Conservatism," 119-141.

3. Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I have sketched a parallel self-defeat argument for an alternative theory of basic propositional justification, namely, Evidentialism. This shows that self-defeat arguments can be advanced in support of alternatives to PC. If this is correct, then Huemer's Self-Defeat argument doesn't uniquely motivate PC.

REVIEWS

Susan Haack: *Putting Philosophy to Work. Inquiry and Its Place in Culture. Essays on Science, Religion, Law, Literature, and Life*, Expanded Edition, New York, Prometheus Books, 2013

Reviewed by Teodor Dima

In the preface to the expanded edition of the volume reviewed here, Susan Haack, Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts and Sciences, professor of philosophy, and professor of law at the University of Miami, explains its genesis as follows: "... after the publication of my *Evidence and Inquiry* (1993), *Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate* (1998), and *Defending Science—Within Reason* (2003), I received such a variety of intriguing invitations – from people in the natural, the medieval, and the social sciences, from scholars in literature and scholars in law, from humanists and theologians, even from professors of architecture and the editors of an avant-garde art magazine – asking me to write or speak about the bearing of my work on their concerns" (p. 12). At the same time, these invitations were challenges to new research topics and answers regarding the epistemological significance of several concepts always debated in specialized literature: "truth; evidence; fact; objectivity; bias; self-deception; reason and the emotions; the demands of rationality and the limits of formalism; the ways in which unbiased inquiry differs from advocacy research, and inquiry in the sciences from inquiry in other fields; the threats to the integrity of the scientific enterprise posed by pressures from political and commercial interests; the difficulties our legal system has had in handling the scientific (and quasi-scientific) testimony so often crucial to the reduction of key factual issues; the tensions between science and religion; the possibility of learning true things from works of fiction; and even what gives human lives meaning" (p. 12). Through the essays reunited in this volume, Susan Haack wishes to convince the readers that philosophical analysis and reflection can influence people's conceptions of life.

I must confess, from the beginning, that I find the author's opinion according to which readers familiar with academic philosophy today may be skeptical of the real-world relevance of philosophy, pessimistic. I do believe that, like myself, many of the readers still accept, along with Susan Haack, that

philosophical reflection must be relevant to the real world. And I do agree with the author when, following William James (p. 21), she accepts that the most desirable way of practicing philosophy nowadays is to track patterns and principles without losing sight of particulars, and to engage with the relevant issues of culture without sacrificing clarity and rigour (p. 21).

Obviously, this is the path of philosophical reflection that Susan Haack (in my view, successfully) takes with her second, expanded edition of *Putting Philosophy to Work.* I believe that her choice is salutary, since I, too, believe that she is right in noticing that philosophy at present faces two opposite dangers: to either engage with concerns that are too particular, at the expense of clarity and rigourous abstraction (as, for instance, radical neo-pragmatists, feminists or post-colonialists do, generating "more heat than light"); or to aspire at high standards of rigor, failing to engage with general concerns, as, for instance, neo-analytic philosophy does.

The picture of recent philosophy resulting from these insights is both bewildering and dissappointing: neo-analytic philosophy has become more tempered since it lost the tendency to take possession of other philosophical fields; postmodernism abandoned some of its favourite topics proving itself inconstant; some philosophical writings are intoxicated with extravagances that obscure their originality, others are hermetic because of the unnecessary use of formalisms, and others deal with aspects that are philosophically insignificant.

I think this is the reason why Susan Haack engages with the previously mentioned path, putting, indeed, philosophy to work in the twenty essay-like chapters of the volume, with clarity and rigour, the way she learned it from the first pragmatists: Pierce, James, Dewey, and Mead. Moreover, out of correctitude, she admits there is a certain affinity between her book and *Philosophy and Civilization* by John Dewey. Of course, Haack's social conclusions are quite different from Dewey's and she also speaks from an epistemological rather than a political perspective. However, the subtitle, *Inquiry and Its Place in Culture*, indicates that philosophy should be engaged on the real life level in order to play the role of an active cultural factor.

The book deals with a diverse range of cultural questions – vital issues about science, society, religion, law, and literature, even about what makes a life meaningful. Thus, in the first essay, "Staying for an Answer: The Untidy Process of Groping for Truth," the author argues against the cynicism of those who profess to believe that the ideal of honest, unbiased inquiry (an ideal that Susan Haack pursued through all her carreer) is nothing but a smoke-screen diguising the covert operation of power, politics and rhetoric. She argues that "these cynics'

supposedly sophisticated disillusionment is really a quite crude, and an entirely factitious, despair. The ideal of honest inquiry is a robust one, well worth aspiring to. Granted, finding things out can be enourmously difficult. Evidence can be hard to come by and, when we get it, may be overwhelmingly complex or seductively misleading. Moreover, our fragile will to find things out," she maintains, "is only too easily undermined, only too readily diverted into pseudo-inquiry, self-deception, self-indulgent fantasy, or complacent confidence. But there is no need to give up on the objectivity of truth or evidence, or on the possibility of finding things out. What we need, rather, is to articulate a realistic understanding of the scope, limitations, and defects of the capacity for inquiry that all normal human beings share, and of the special capacities and quirks of individual minds – an understanding both of the possibilities and of the pitfalls of human beings' ability to inquire, to figure things out" (p. 23).

The purpose of the next essay, "The Same, Only Different," is to show that inquiry is different from other human activities, such as dancing, cookery, storytelling, advocacy, etc. To inquire means to search for the truth taking into account the nature of that particular field: natural sciences, social sciences, law, literature, history, philosophy, morality, etc.

There is a similar problem as truth is concerned, Haack argues in the essay "The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths." There is one truth, one unambiguous, non-relative truth-concept; and to say that a claim is true is to say (not that anyone, or everyone, believes it, or that it follows from this or that theory, or that there is good evidence for it, but) simply that things are as it says. But there are many truths of many different kinds, in many different vocabularies – empirical, logical, mathematical, historical, legal, literary, and so on.

It is of real interest to pay attention, here as well, to the author's critical position towards Karl Popper's philosophy of science, first expressed in her doctoral thesis and in all her published works afterwards. Perhaps, *Putting Philosophy to Work* is the most recent and devastating critique of his (unfortunately, in Haack's view) still influential conception. In the previously published essay "Trial and Error: The Supreme Court's Philosophy of Science," Susan Haack discusses the *Daubert* case, the first US Supreme Court ruling on the standards of admissibility of scientific testimony. What is the best way for the legal system to use scientific expertise? In Haack's view, not the way in which Justice Blackmun mixes elements from Karl Popper's and Carl Hempel's conceptions of science in order to discriminate between scientific and unscientific testimony. On one hand, the two conceptions are mutually incompatible; on the other hand, because Popper's criterion of demarcation between scientific and

unscientific statements (according to which a genuinely scientific statements must be "testable" – meaning, in Popper's words, "refutable" or "falsifiable," i.e., susceptible to evidence that could potentially show it to be false – if it *is* false) is radically unsuited for the use to which the Supreme Course put it in *Daubert*. That is, because, first, as Justice Blackmun himself put it, one must acknowledge the "important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory" (p. 157); and, second, because "the legal system sometimes asks more of science than science can give, demanding definite answers to scientific questions when no such answers are yet to be had (…)" (p. 158).

Susan Haack emphasizes the tension between fallibilism and finality in the legal system. On one hand, not all scientific theories are supported by good evidence and, as the history of science showed so far, most get discarded as the evidence turns against them. This process goes along the lines of Popper's epistemological conception according to which the "conjecture and refutation" scientific method is critical: making a bold, highly falsifiable guess, testing it as severely as possible, and, if it is found to be false, giving it up and starting over rather than protecting it by *ad hoc* or "conventionalist" modifications. (Readiness to accept falsification, and repudiation of *ad hoc* stratagems to protect a theory from contrary evidence is Popper's "methodological criterion" of the genuinely scientific.) Indeed, the author admits, "preparedness to revise even the most entrenched claim in the face of the unfavorable evidence is essential to scientific inquiry" (p. 158). But, on the other hand, in law a quick, final and binding judgement must be reached, however weak or defective the available evidence may be. This is why it is still difficult to adapt science to the U.S. legal culture, especially in the case of the legal rules of admissibility.

In maybe the most critical position against Karl Popper's philosophy of science that I have seen so far, the essay "Just say 'No' to Logical Negativism," Susan Haack labels his conception as a covert skepticism: if, as Popper says, induction is not acceptable, we have no reason to believe that a theory tested today would pass the same test tomorrow; and, if, as he maintains, again, the criterion of acceptance for basic sentences is not observation, but mutual agreement between the members of the scientific community, there is no guarantee that a "falsified" scientific statement is, actually, false; this "implies that scientific claims can no more be shown to be false than they can be shown to be true" (p. 183). If Popper's "Logical Negativism were true," Susan Haack maintains, "what we call 'scientific knowledge' could be nothing but *a web of unjustified and unjustifiable conjectures anchored in unjustified and unjustifiable decisions on the part of the scientific community*" (p. 183, her emphasis).

Nevertheless, his criterion of demarcation is a very important element of his philosophy of science: falsification distinguishes between empirical sciences (e.g., Einstein's theory of relativity) and pre-scientific myths, or non-empirical disciplines such as pure (abstract) mathematics, or metaphysics, or non-scientific disciplines such as history, or pseudo-scientific theories such as Freud's and Adler's psychoanalytic theories, and Marx's "scientific socialism." Here, again Susan Haack puts her analytic skills to work and identifies places in Popper's work where he is not consistent with his declared intentions. For instance, although he always insisted on the importance of distinguishing genuine science from pretenders, Popper acknowledges from the beginning, in *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* that his criterion of demarcation is a "convention;" and in 1959, in his introduction to the English edition of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, he even mentions that scientific knowledge is continuous with common sense knowledge; and in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* Popper acknowledges that "the problem with orthodox Marxism was not, after all, that it was unfalsifiable; in fact, it was falsified by the events of the Russian Revolution" (p. 184).

Haack presents the Popperian methodology in order to to see the extent to which it can be applied to test theories. Her answer is pessimistic in this regard, and complies with the Critical Common-sensist theory that she develops in another important book she autored, *Defending Science—Within Reason*: a theory which, in her author's words, "is not skeptical, but fallibilist; it focuses less on demarcation than on continuities between scientific and other kinds of empirical inquiry; and is not purely logical, but worldly – not confined exclusively to statements and their logical relations, but also giving a role to the world and scientists' interactions with it" (p. 190). It is a theory which rejects, as Popper does, the viability of inductive logic and the defensibility of probabilism, but accepts, as Popper does not, the legitimacy of the idea of supportive-but-not-conclusive-evidence. And I do believe, in agreement with Susan Haack, that if there is a theory that can help us see how the world is, her Critical Common-sensism is perhaps the best theory that could explain us how to do so.

Undoubtedly, a professor myself, I cannot finish this review without saying a word about the last essay of the book, "Out of Step: Academic Ethics in a Preposterous Environment." I cannot but agree with Susan Haack when she writes that "as time passes, the erosion feeds on itself, and the pace of decline quickens – until we find ourselves in an environment in which an academic who conducts his (or her) professional life in a way truly in accordance with its real ethical demands is likely to find himself at a real professional disadvantage, 'out of step' with the new ethos of the academy" (p. 33). But I am optimistic in this regard, and I do

believe that the "academic virtues" that she highlights: industry, patience, persistence, judgement, integrity, focus, realism, impartiality, independence, consideration and courage are still to be found in universities today and may still shape the future of academy as long as we carry our job in accordance to them.

Together with the ones that I mentioned here, all the other essays included in the book, from "An Epistemologist Among the Epidemiologists" to "After my Own Heart: Dorothy Sayer's Feminism" are a sound proof of how pragmatism is developing today in the United States; and I take the opportunity here to express my sincere belief that it can bear a relevant influence on the European thinking, as well. Through her two major objectives: to prove that the issues concerning evidence, justified belief, and truth are wrongly approached by some of the recent philosophers, such as the radical neo-pragmatists, the feminist epistemologists, and the postmodernists, and to prove the active role of philosophy by describing its implications in science, religion, law, literature, and life; through her remarkably clean and rigurous style; through her reasonable, original and forceful arguments, Susan Haack succeeds, once again, in delivering a milestone of the English-speaking philosophy of today.

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