

## Forgotten Heroes: Extremes in the Spanish Civil War. The Case of Romania. 1936-1938

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Naturally, the events in Europe during the second half of the 1930s left their mark on Romanian society. The victories of the Popular Fronts in Spain and France, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War modified the political climate in Romania. It is necessary to be emphasised from the beginning that, in the case of Romania, the two political extremes developed in different ways in the interwar period, this being determined first by the specific conditions of Romanian society. For the Communist Party, the survival in the Romanian political space was impossible. Three factors prevented the rise of the extreme left in interwar Romania: 1. The anti-Russian psychosis of the end of the First World War which led the Communist Party's affiliation in 1921 to the Communist International to be associated with the expansionist intentions of Soviet Russia<sup>1</sup>. In the collective imaginary of the Romanians, Russia represented the eternal enemy and occupier and the Soviet regime a permanent peril; 2. The traditional right-wing orientation of the Romanian political class; 3. The ethnic composition of the Communist Party, with a preponderance of Jews and Hungarians. It must be noted that no leader of the Communist Party in the interwar period was of Romanian origin. The association of Jews with Communism became a constant in public discourse. The sources of such perceptions reside in traditional political culture, but also in media circles which cultivated and maintained the hysteria against Judeo-Bolshevism. The adoption by the Romanian Communist Party, in 1924, of the Cominternist theses regarding the rights of peoples to self-determination, was interpreted as a direct threat to the unitary national state constituted in 1918. The presence on Romanian territory of some important minority groups, Hungarians, Germans, and Jews, who might be attracted by the promise of independence, brought about an extreme solution<sup>2</sup>. The government intervened and the Communist Party was outlawed through a special law. This situation lasted until August 23 1944. In Romania, the communist idea was considered anti-

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<sup>1</sup> At the end of the first world war the Soviet Union refused to recognize the union of Bessarabia with Romania and also to return back the Romanian treasure.

<sup>2</sup> In 1930, according to census almost 28% among the Romanian's citizens were minorities: 7.9% Hungarians, 4.1% Germans, 4% Jews, 3.2% Ukranians, 2.3% Russians, 2% Bulgarians etc.

Romanian. The massive Jewish presence in the ranks of the Communist Parties of Central and Eastern Europe is a complex phenomenon which needs more rational explanations. They have their origins in sociological, psychological and moral motivations. The aspirations of many Jews were fulfilled in the internationalist dream of Communism.

The outlawing of the RCP was a measure by which the state apparently resolved the problem of the presence of the extreme left in the Romanian political landscape. Those who adhered to the Communist idea were few and ended up recanting not the ideal, but the way in which it was applied. One of the best-known Romanian writers, Panait Istrati, who was initially attracted by the achievements of the Soviet regime and the idea of a socialist fatherland, expressed himself publicly in his *Confessions to the Defeated*, recounting the "private drama" he suffered at the moment when he came to know Soviet realities at first hand<sup>3</sup>. Perhaps not without relevance is the fact that at the end of the war, the Romanian Communist Party numbered only around thousand members, being in a clear popularity crisis. Sympathies for the Soviet Union therefore were limited to the narrow circles of a left which was struggling to survive. Most of the Party leaders were either arrested or exiled in France or the Soviet Union. The Great Terror did not spare the ranks of this tiny party. A series of party leaders (Marcel Pauker, founder of the RCP, Al. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, Elena Filipovici, Imre Aladar, Fabian Rozvany, Alexandr Stefansky-Gorn, Ecaterina Arbore etc.) fell victim to the Stalinist terror. What distinguished them from their successors was their education in the school of social-democracy and the ideological debates which animated the left at the beginning of the twentieth century.

On the other hand, the sources of the extreme right reside in a difficult process of seeking and defining the identity of a new generation. Interwar Romania was marked by the difficulties created by the transition from an agricultural civilisation to an industrial one, while the Legionary Movement developed against the backdrop of a conflict between traditionalism and modernity. Founded in 1927 by leaders of student movement in Moldavia, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and some of his closest companions, in less than 10 years the Legionary Movement became the third political force in the country. The sources of its spectacular ascent reside in the decline of parliamentary democracy and the interventions of King Charles II in the mechanisms of power. As in the case of the Communist Party, the interwar governments showed no indulgence, and the movement was frequently outlawed. But unlike the Communist Party, the sources of its popularity resided in the themes of national

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<sup>3</sup> Panait Istrati, *Spovedanie pentru cei înviniși. După șaisprezece luni în URSS*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1990, p. 137.

rebirth and consolidation of the unitary national state. Codreanu's promise to make a "Romania like the holy sun in the heavens" found an echo among those who believed that a new destiny could be built. The anti-establishment discourse of the generation of 1930 was pointed in two directions: against the failures of the democratic system and state institutions, and against an extreme left it assimilated with the destructive intentions of Soviet Russia. One of the motivations for Romanian intellectuals being attracted to the extreme right must be sought in the belief that this was not a political movement, but one of spiritual rebirth. For young intellectuals, Romanian legionarism and fascism became the great temptation of their lives. They believed in the Romania of Codreanu – Christian, spiritual and mystical – and fed the Legionary ideology and utopia.

From the Legionary perspective, the reason for the decadence of Romania had one name only: the Jew. The Jew embodied all that was wrong in the present: democracy, Communism, and the 'corrupt' Romanian political system. The hostile attitude to the Jews had its origins in social and economic rivalries. Their massive presence in urban areas, high level of education, economic mobility and religious incompatibility transformed them into victims of the nationalist programme. Nationalism and orthodoxy were the pillars of the Legion's programme. The return to religion followed the line of national reaffirmation. Orthodoxy gave the Movement an atypical feature. Without doubt, their crimes were in contradiction with Christian laws, but they could be absolved if they were committed in the name of the nation. Paradoxically, the political violence of the Legion did not reduce its popularity, on the contrary. Assassination, as part of a process of purification, appeared, in Romania of the 1930s, to be the only possible way to accomplish the aspirations of renewal<sup>4</sup>. They were committed in the name of political necessity.

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War led to open confrontation between the two extremes. Initially received as an internal problem, the Spanish Civil War soon became one of the most hotly disputed subjects. Whether, on the diplomatic level, the Romanian government decided, together with the countries of the Balkan Pact, to respect the agreement of non-intervention in Spanish problems, for the political extremists the Civil War became an issue of conscience. For the political left, the Spaniards were heroic fighters against Fascist barbarism and for progress and freedom; for the right, in Spain was waged the struggle against Communism and anarchy, and a crusade for the

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<sup>4</sup> See for more informations Armin Heinen, *Legiunea „Arhanghelul Mihail”*. *Mișcare socială și organizație politică. O contribuție la problema fascismului internațional*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1998; Leon Volovici, *Ideologia naționalistă și „problema evreiască”*. *Eseu despre formele antisemitismului intelectual în România anilor '30*, Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995.

defense of civilisation and God. The hopes and disillusion of the war generation found recognition in the Spanish situation. Monarchists, nationalists, those with fascist sympathies, those who desired a new order supported Franco. Antifascists and Communists took the side of the Republican government. One of the most important Romanian sociologists, Mihai Ralea wrote on October 31, 1936 that "today there is no café, in any provincial town, where there is no one ready to have a fight over the Spanish phenomenon. Of course, some are ready to die for the rebels, while others would offer their lives for the government"<sup>5</sup>.

The struggle for the cause mobilised the energies of right and left alike. At a time when it was on the rise, the Legionary Movement used the Spanish Civil War to fulfil the heroic ideal of sacrifice. The Legionaries went to Spain to pay homage to the defenders of the Alcazar and to struggle against those who killed priests and burned churches, and especially against the Bolsheviks. The Franco cause was much more attractive as it corresponded to nationalist mythology<sup>6</sup>. The idea of going to Spain was that of Ion I. Moța. The group of eight legionaries was led in Spain by the old general Alexandru Cantacuzino. This group comprised: Ion M. Moța, the initiator of the group and number two in the hierarchy of the Movement, the engineer Gh. Clime, Leader of the Legionary Workers' Corps, Neculai Totu, chief of the Moldovian region, the priest Dumitrescu Borșa, Prince Alexandru Cantacuzino, Party secretary and advisor to Codreanu, Vasile Marin, commander of the Bucharest organisation, and Legionary commander Bănică Dobre<sup>7</sup>. Their departure was preceded by a veritable ritual: the eucharist, the writing of testaments (Alexandru Cantacuzino, Ion Moța), the reception of sacks of soil from Codreanu. It should be pointed out that the groups' departure was not obstructed by the authorities. On 24 November, the group left on the route of Bucharest–Lvov–Berlin. France refused them entry visas, so they reached Spain via Portugal. On board the boat from Hamburg to Spain, the legionaries listened to lectures by general Cantacuzino on military theory. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of December, the Legionaries were in Lisbon, and on December 4<sup>th</sup> reached Spain at Villa Formosa.

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<sup>5</sup> Mihai Ralea, *Politică externă și mizerie internă*, in „Dreptatea“, anul X, 31 octombrie 1936.

<sup>6</sup> Francisco Veiga, *Istoria Gărzii de Fier. 1919-1941. Mistica ultranaționalismului*, Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1993, p. 227.

<sup>7</sup> Pr. I. Dumitrescu Borșa, *Cea mai mare jertfă legionară*, Totul pentru Țară Publishing House, Sibiu, 1937; Neculai Totu, *Însemnări de pe front. Note din expediția legionară în Spania, noiembrie 1936–ianuarie 1937*, Sibiu, Curierul Publishing House; Bănică Dobre, *Crucificații. Zile trăite pe frontul spaniol*, Bucharest, 1937; Alexandru Cantacuzino, *Pentru Kristus*, 1937.

At Soria, in the course of a ceremony, they handed the sword of Toledo to General Moscardo, defender of the Alcazar. The Legionaries had come to Spain to fight for a month in the Nationalist army. On December 7 1936, seven Legionaries enrolled as simple soldiers, without formalities, in the sixth Regiment of the Spanish Foreign Legion. General Cantacuzino was refused because of his advanced age. The period of instruction was difficult, and two of the seven, the priest Dumitrescu Borșa and Neculai Totu, fell ill. On December 20 they left for the front arriving at Navalcarnero, after which they made for Boadilla del Monte. On January 3 1937, the Legionaries entered combat. First they attacked the locality of Las Rozas. Bănică Dobre was wounded and evacuated to the rear. On January 13 1937, the Legionaries' platoon was in Majadahonda and, during an attack by artillery, a shell struck the zone in which were Ion I. Moța and Vasile Marin, who were killed. The death of two men put an end to the Legionary expedition in Spain. All the survivors received, with some difficulty, permission to withdraw from the struggle and to return home. Prince Alexandru Cantacuzino showed disappointment with a Spanish captain, who had nothing to say about the heroic death of the two Legionaries. It was a death like any other in this Civil War where horror had become a daily reality. The Legionaries left for home on January 31. In Berlin they were assured of a triumphal reception. On returning to the country, General Cantacuzino reported to Codreanu: "Captain! I bring you the Legionary expedition force to Spain. Two dead, two sick, one wounded and two in good health. Long live the Legion, long live the Captain"<sup>8</sup>.

Effective participation in the struggle lasted a fortnight. Although they had included the ultimate sacrifice in their calculations, none of them thought they would die in Spain. Their dream was a triumphant entry into Madrid. Consequently, in this case it was not death that fulfilled this ideal, but staying alive. It is certain that the Legionary group (and especially Ion I. Moța) went to Spain filled with ideological and anti-Bolshevik fervour. In his *Testament*, I. Moța explained simply: "Machine guns are firing at the face of Christ! The foundations of the Christian world are being shaken! How can we remain indifferent?"<sup>9</sup>. It is very difficult to interpret rationally the actions of movements dominated by irrationalism. Indeed what the Legionaries thought about God, sacrifice and death is very difficult to understand, when we know that the organisation put on the same level religious devotion and crime.

Although it had derisory results, the Legionary expedition was spectacular in effect. The death of the two Legionaries made a powerful

<sup>8</sup> Bănică Dobre, *op.cit.*, pp. 107-108.

<sup>9</sup> *Testamentul lui Ion Moța*, Bucharest, Tipografia Legionară Publishing House, 1937, p. 9.

impression in the entire country. The mortuary train crossed the country to Bucharest. All along the way there were impressive demonstrations of sympathy: peasants kneeled in the stations, and priests officiated ceremonies. On February 13 1937, the funeral ceremony took place in the capital, and a funeral cortege of 4 km blocked the city centre for many hours. Four hundred priests officiated the ceremony, and dozens of peasants played funeral tunes on alphorns. The procession lasted six hours. The burial ceremonies were a proof of strength by the Legion: "Codreanu paraded like a sovereign behind the hearse, and people fell to their knees and crossed themselves". By their death the two men created the heroic myth of the Movement and consecrated them as Christian martyrs. Their grave became a place of pilgrimage, and there was created a special corps, "Moța and Marin". Explanations of the myth are more linked to feeling than to reason. Public emotion was so powerful that the historian Nicolae Iorga published an article entitled *Two Heroic Young Men: Moța and Marin*, in which he praised the sacrifice of the two for "un-Bolshevised Latinity". Almost three years later, the historian would be declared by the Movement the moral author of the death of Codreanu and would be assassinated, in November 1940.

The persistence of the myth even today is the result of a propaganda which used emotional symbols to the maximum. In Bucharest, at the former Legionary church, there was erected, after 1990, a small white cross on which the initials of the two Legionary leaders are inscribed. This gesture is part of the recuperation of a mythical past. The political end of the Legion took place in January 1941, when General Antonescu put an end to the experiment of the National-Legionary state. It was for the Legionaries in exile, from 1941, but also 1945, to defend and perpetuate Legionary beliefs. They never gave up the struggle for Romania, and the groups parachuted in Romania in 1953 to overthrow the Communist regime followed the same logic of sacrifice for the cause. Majadahonda became the symbolic landmark of the Movement. Perhaps the fact that a large number of Legionaries chose Spain as their destination after the war is not without relevance. In September 1970 a monument raised in honour of the two heroes was inaugurated, being a symbol of "the eternal victory of Legionary youth".

The presence of volunteers from Romania in the Republican camp is a subject rarely approached on in Romanian historiography due to the lack of documents. The Communist Party followed Moscow's directions on the Spanish issue<sup>10</sup>. Communists attempted to organise actions of solidarity and support for Republican Spain, but the results were modest. The idea of enrolling in the International Brigades had a powerful echo among those who were active party

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<sup>10</sup> See for more informations in Jaques de Launay, *Istoria secretă a Cominternului, 1919-1943*, Bucharest, Venus Publishing House, 1993, p. 113.

members or sympathisers of the Republican case. The Comintern, the national committees and the call-up centres in Paris played an essential role. The volunteers who fought in the International Brigades had various motives for engaging in this action: some went to Spain by sympathy, others to struggle against Fascism, some because of Party discipline, others for material reasons or through a spirit of adventure. For this last category, Nick Gillian writes that he went to Spain "out of a spirit of adventure, boredom, and because the autumn of 1936 was rainy"<sup>11</sup>. Romanian participation more or less reflects the above typology. In a note to the General Inspector of police, dated December 30 1936, it is reported that the RCP wanted "the intensification of propaganda for help to the Spanish government, determining Communist members and sympathisers to leave in great numbers for Spain"<sup>12</sup>. In the country it was created a Committee for recruiting volunteers<sup>13</sup>, being doubled by a similar centre in Paris<sup>14</sup>, which took care of volunteers from Romania.

There are many aspects still unclarified regarding the number of Romanian volunteers. In some works it is written that they were "about 500" or even 625. The lack of precision is shown in the case of those who died in Spain, either 50 or 70. The lists existing in the archives are incomplete. The probable number of volunteers for the International Brigades is situated around the figure of 470. The Comintern Archives, in Moscow, contain a note dated July 18 1939 by Boris Ștefanov, RCP representative at the Comintern, according to which the number of Romanian volunteers is 315, among whom only 50 are Communists<sup>15</sup>.

From the lists it emerges that the majority came from the regions which joined Romania in 1918, especially Bessarabia. Among the volunteers there were few ethnic Romanians, around 100. The ethnic composition reflects on a small scale the situation of the RCP. Public opinion in Romania was to a clear majority favourable to the Nationalist camp, this sympathy being thanks to the rising

<sup>11</sup> Nick Gillian, *Le Mercenaire*, Paris, 1938, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> N.A.R., *Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei* Records Group, folder 24/1936, p. 48.

<sup>13</sup> Gh. Beza, Ilie Constrantinovski, Raia Cotliar, Kraus Denkner, Ștefan Foriș, Petre Gheorghiu, Dori Goldstein, Izer Griman, Nicolae Josanu, Gh. Lazăr, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, Ilie Pintilie, Isidor Pomârleanu, Gh. Rădulescu, Ioan Turcu, Mihai Vuc și Toive Zukerman.

<sup>14</sup> The case of Alexandru Buican, Petre Grosu, Eugenia Luncaș, Vasile Șimandan and Gh. Vasilichi.

<sup>15</sup> Gh. Buzatu, *Românii în arhivele Kremlinului*, Bucharest, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing House, 1996, p. 355. In Romanian archives there is a special collection about the volunteers, but unfortunately the informations are not complete. See also Romanian Military Archives, microfilms of the RCP Archives, roll I-106-101-82-423 and I-106-101-82-424.

popularity of the Romanian right, as well as the negative image of the Republican government, caused by anticlerical excesses and, especially, Communist radicalisation. As concerns professional composition, the Romanian Brigades did not conform to the western typology, the majority of them being workers and not intellectuals. Similarly, very few of them had higher military rank: Petre Borilă, Valter Roman, Nicolae Cristea, Hecht Solomon, Iulius Lunevsky, Nicolae Olaru and Mihai Burcă.

The historical literature referring to the volunteers is extremely poor. In the Communist period only two memoirs were published: a collective volume and another signed by one of the most controversial figures of Romanian Communism, Valter Roman<sup>16</sup>, both at the beginning of the 1970s. In the collective volume, it emerges that Romanian volunteers for Spain came from three directions: illegal emigrants recruited from industrial centres, from France and from the Soviet Union. Those who travelled legally to Paris gave as a pretext that they were going to the international exhibition in Paris, the costs of their journey, including obtaining papers, being covered by the Comintern. In Paris they were looked after by Rosa (Eugenia Lucaci), a member of the committee for receiving volunteers. The groups (60-70 volunteers) were directed to the reception centre in Albacete. The first groups trained with those from France, their number being enhanced by the volunteers from Romania. The Romanian volunteers were initially received in the framework of the Balkan Company of the 9<sup>th</sup> Battalion Dombrowschi, 14<sup>th</sup> International Brigade, and later, during the spring of 1937, they were part of distinct units and sub-units: the "Ana Pauker" Romanian artillery regiment, the "Grivița" rifle company (commanded by Mihai Burcă, and the political commissar, Petre Borilă), the "Tudor Vladimirescu" battery (founded after August 24 1937, and commanded by Nicolae Cristea, with the political commissar Andrei Roman); the "Gheorghiu-Dej" Romanian artillery group as part of the Balkan Artillery Division. All these names referred to either imprisoned Communist leaders (Ana Pauker, one of the most famous female figures of Romanian Communism, or the leader of the party, Gheorghiu-Dej), or national heroes, in the case of Tudor Vladimirescu, who rose up against Ottoman domination in 1821. Grivița was the symbol of the workers' strikes of the early 1930s. However, the Spanish situation put under strain the volunteers' beliefs and willpower. Valter Roman complained, in September 1938, in a letter to Boris Ștefanov that the volunteers acted without directives, control and material<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> *Voluntari români în Spania. Amintiri documente. 1936-1939*, Bucharest, Political Publishing House, 1971; Valter Roman, *Sub cerul Spaniei. Amintiri*, Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 1972.

<sup>17</sup> Valter Roman's letter to Boris Ștefanov, September 1938 in *Copilăria comunismului românesc în arhiva Cominternului*, the National Archives of Romania,



Moreover, the links between the volunteers and the Spanish Communist Party, as well as the Romanian one were broken. However in his reply, the secretary of the Comintern in France, André Marty, considered that Valter Roman displayed a great "misunderstanding" of the role of the international Communists in Spain. The idea of creating little "parties of nationalities" seemed to him absurd and he invited Roman to reflect more on collaboration with the Spanish Communist Party. After the end of the Civil War, many of the survivors, captured, would die later in the prison camps of Spain, France and Germany. Some of those interned in France escaped and took part in the French Resistance<sup>18</sup>. Boris Ștefanov insisted that those wounded and invalids would be sent back home, so they could be trained to not become informers for the security services and thus to put in danger the Party's underground networks.

Romanian volunteers took part in all the struggles during the Spanish Civil War<sup>19</sup>. However, unlike the extreme right, although they struggled for a cause, their heroism was passed over in silence. A silence that can be attributed to at least two motives: on the one hand, they fought on the losing side and thus the impact of their actions was insignificant in Romanian society, which as we have seen sympathised with the nationalist cause from the outset; and the internal situation of the Party. The struggle for power between rival groups (the Moscow group, and that in Romanian prisons) did not facilitate the exploitation of the symbolic capital accumulated during the Civil War. Some of them found themselves in the Divisions set up on Soviet territory and returned home at the end of the Second World War, this time on the winning side. Their evolution in the Communist power structures does not follow a particular pattern, and an attempt to find a rational explanation fails, because, as in the case of the Legionary Movement, the acts of the Party towards its members have nothing rational about them. The wave of terror launched in Moscow in 1949 against party leaders in the Communist bloc directly targeted Spanish and French veterans, who were suspected of being American spies! As in the case of the illegals, some survived the purges, being distributed in marginal positions in the state or party apparatus, while others were looked on with approval (Petre Borilă, Gh. Vasilichi, Gh. Gaston Marin), but not due to their status as veterans of the Spanish war, but because they had the psychology of a gambler. Trained in the struggle for power, they took the side of the winner, in our case Gheorghiu-Dej. Those who betted on the Ana Pauker-Vasile Luca group lost positions in 1952.

The antisemitic policy of Stalin at the beginning of the 1950s had negative repercussions for the Spanish veterans, most of whom were of Jewish

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Bucharest, 2001, p. 423.

<sup>18</sup> The case of Gheorghe Gaston Marin and Gh. Vasilichi.

<sup>19</sup> See Valter Roman, *Sub cerul Spaniei...*, p. 106.

origin. Similarly, the marginalisation of Spanish veterans can also be interpreted as a result of the lack of confidence the leader of the Kremlin had in them. The instrumentalisation of right-wing deviation, against a backdrop of anti-semitic hysteria, makes it very difficult to establish whether in this period the "Spaniards" were targeted because they were "Spaniards" or because they were Jews<sup>20</sup>. The silence over the Spanish episode is at least paradoxical for the Romanian Communist Party. A marginal formation, lacking a political tradition, facing a severe popularity crisis, could have exploited the heroic past of its members, although the presence of RCP members in the International Brigades was modest. A party which monopolised the antifascist idea would not have displayed any scruple in saying that all the volunteers belonged in reality to the RCP! Yet this did not happen, and instead everything was passed over in silence. Significantly, the hagiographies of the Party contain no reference to the Spanish heroes. Moreover, Party leaders avoided popularising the names of those of Jewish origin, and operated with a selective mythology. The history of the Party was airbrushed according to the principle: rather than having Jewish martyrs, it is better to have no martyrs at all<sup>21</sup>.

After the death of Stalin, the Romanian leadership, undergoing a wholesale process of homogenisation (Romanianisation), did not permit the creation of other myths and other heroes. If up until 1964, there was silence on the episode of the volunteers for Spain, after 1971, with the development of a national Communism, the subject again fell into disuse. The partial recuperation of this past at the beginning of the 1970s, when the two volumes were published, can be explained not from a heroic and mythical perspective, but from a pragmatic one. The tone was set in 1968, when Ceaușescu rehabilitated the victims of the Stalinist terror, as well as those who had fallen at the time of Gheorghiu-Dej. However the consequences of these rehabilitations were minimal, the Spanish veterans being continually ignored.

In conclusion, the forgetting of the volunteers for Spain can be explained from two perspectives: in the case of the extreme right, the motivations are principally of an ideological order. "Reactionaries" and "Fascists", the Legionaries fell victim to repression by the Communist regime. In the case of the extreme left, their occlusion is explained by the situation within the Party: the struggle for power combined with national group's hostility towards minorities.

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<sup>20</sup> Robert Levy, *Gloria și decăderea Anei Pauker*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2002, p. 131.

<sup>21</sup> Pavel Câmpeanu, *Ceaușescu, anii numărătorii inverse*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2002, p. 185.