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And Humanities
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STUDIA SECURITATIS, FAKE NEWS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN TIMES OF THE SARS COV 2 PANDEMIC

Abstract:	<i>Fake news and lies exist since humans live on this planet. In our times the means of spreading fake news and lies are different by the general use of internet. Media trusts have, in this sense, large possibilities by using traditional mas-media communication and on-line communication. Although fake news is a threat to democracy, the fight against these should not affect the freedom of speech. During the Sars Cov 2 pandemic censorship was some times used in Romania. I stand against these actions! Information claimed to be “fake news” like the one saying that the Sars cov 2 is not so dangerous is undergoing research and investigation so it is premature to call it “fake news”. For some it is already obvious that these is not fake news. The editorial board of the “Studia Securitatis” magazine stands for freedom of speech, for the important principal of listening to all opinions on a metter (“Audiatur omnia pars”) and condemns censorship.</i>
Keywords:	Freedom of speech; Fake news; Manipulation; Studia Securitatis
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During this first half-year of 2020 while the “Studia Securitatis” editorial board was editing this first issue for 2020, the Sars Cov 2 spread all over the world, became an overpublicized pandemic and, in a way, took over our lives with lockdowns, economic crisis, big business with equipments needed to satisfy the medical protocols suggested by the World Health Organization, big business of the big pharma corporations¹, the shutdown of very many small businesses and some big businesses all over the world. In this time we could notice quite a monopole of this pandemic subject in the media as well as in the international political science,

¹ <https://theintercept.com/2020/03/13/big-pharma-drug-pricing-coronavirus-profits/> (25.04.2020), <https://www.ft.com/content/000a129e-780e-11ea-bd25-7fd923850377> (25.04.2020)

international relations and security studies magazines.

- Did anything else happen in the world in all of these months?
- What about the ongoing wars?²
- What about the so called refugee crisis?
- What about the important trails on child trafficking and child abuse in the US, against which the Trump administration tries to take measures?
- What about the big credits with interest (small or big) that some countries took

²<https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/26/10-conflicts-to-watch-2020/>. At the end of 2019 „Foreign Policy” spured its readers watch some of the conflicts in 2020. (20.05.2020) The CFR offers an interactive and updated map: <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/?category=us> (20.05.2020)

from international banks or from other international creditors in these months?¹

Of course, this editorial cannot answer all these questions and further more this is not my objective.

In some countries some of these subjects and many more important ones are silently censored. In Romania different opinions than the official position regarding the measures to be taken in order to stop the spread of the new corona virus were sometimes censored. These aspects determined me to write this editorial. On the one hand, the “Studia Securitatis” editorial board wants to make a statement about the editorial policies, on the other I as chief editor, want to make an analysis on the current situation, with an accent on the Romanian situation, as a historical testimony.

The policy of the “Studia Securitatis” magazine is not to censor the authors. This was the guiding line of the founder and first chief editor, prof. Corvin LUPU, from the beginning of the magazine, back in 2007. After prof. Eugen Străuțiu became chief editor, he got the magazine indexed in international databases and introduced the “peer review” publishing system and guided the editorial activities in the same way of freedom of speech, freedom of publishing research in the field of security studies, exactly like Ike analyzed the situation back in 1961². The institution of the free researcher is very important for the human society and we prize it by publishing any study that follows our guidelines without any tax or fee³. In this way, authors with a globalist point of view as well as nationalists, euro-skeptics as well as euro-enthusiasts could publish their research.

¹ <https://www.zf.ro/banci-si-asigurari/pandemia-si-a-pus-amprenta-asupra-imprumuturilor-statului-bnr-in-19192433>, as an example for the Romanian government (28.05.2020)

² <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=90&page=transcript>, (20.05.2020)

³ http://site.magazines.ulbsibiu.ro/studiasecuritatis/?page_id=10 (20.05.2020)

Coming back to the present censorship I could notice that in Romania, during these days of pandemic, a massive so called anti fake news campaign was launched. Sometimes, victims of this campaign were some newspapers, magazines and sites. The present means of spreading news are significantly different than in the past because of the internet and the use of internet by the main stream media⁴. Lies, although, are in the world as old as mankind and I dare to say that lies – fake news – will be here as long as human beings will live on Earth. Of course, every one of us has to fight against lies, fake news, manipulation but limiting the freedom of speech is not a solution for solving the fake news issue but a certain way of deepening it and deluding people! Evelyn Beatrice Hall wrote in 1906 in the book “The Friends of Voltaire”: “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it”⁵. We, the editorial board of “Studia Securitatis” and me as the chief editor stand for the freedom of speech, considering that the truth usually comes out, fake news and lies and especially the persons or mass-media that spread it will be avoided, excluded and blamed for fake news without using censorship. These issues are a matter of the security of democracy. Democracy cannot exist without the freedom of speech. In fact, democracy cannot exist without the correct information of the public, as the public also represents the voters⁶.

The authorities in most of the European countries and also in Romania

⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-downward-spiral> (20.05.2020)

⁵ <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/56618/56618-h/56618-h.htm>, (20.05.2020).

⁶ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ey_4-CvAM (20.05.2020). The connection between Naom Chomsky’s explanations and my statement about the threat to democracy is the fact that in a world where voters are misinformed about the candidates, these win the elections by means of public relations just like in the advertising industry.

adopted a fearful position over the Sars Cov 2 pandemic. The media spread out panic news. These created hysteria in a lot of countries. Some doctors, infectious disease specialists and researchers in the field of viruses blew a whistle and explained that people should not get in panic. In Romania these specialists were soon catalogued as fake news spreaders and people got advised they should not listen to these ideas. An interview of dr. Sucharit Bhagdi with Romania subtitles was taken out YouTube. The opinions of dr. Sucharit Bhagdi were presented as Russian propaganda¹ Of course there were some authors who disagreed with these things but they did not become main stream². In the moment I am writing this editorial these opinions seem to get confirmed so the urge of avoiding “Russian propaganda” seems to be wrong. Our urge is *audiat omnia pars!* (Listen to all opinions!).

Our position towards these problems is that the Sars Cov 2 virus pandemic is continuing and is further more being researched from the medical point of view, as well as from the political point of view. In this last sense I mean that it is investigated whether this virus was used as a bio-weapon or not, whether it was artificially spread or not. While these researches and investigations are ongoing any opinion should be accepted!

One important newspaper lead by an investigative journalist, Romanian patriot and whistle blower was closed because it translated into Romanian and published an article which doubted some facts about the Sars cov 2 pandemic, facts that now seem to be proven as untruth myths³. Because of these arguments I

consider that an important research topic in the politics and security studies of the Sars cov 2 pandemic should be why some – or many – journalists and opinion formers were against the alternative information about the disease caused by the Sars cov 2 virus, why they took part in the anti fake news campaign and tried to shut up by these means the whistle blowers and the persons who called out for normality and against fear, panic and hysteria. It is obvious that this pandemic generated some major security issues in many countries and created major economical problems not necessarily because of the disease but because of the measures taken by the authorities on the one hand, by the public on the other. That is why it might be necessary, when the pandemic is over, to hold some representatives of the authorities accountable for some errors, major errors or even for deluding or manipulating the public opinion, as means of stopping repeating such acts in the future. That is one more important argument why free research, freedom of speech and freedom of opinion are worth fighting for and, on the other hand, should be granted!

I hope that until the next issue of our magazine the worst of the Sars cov 2 pandemic will be over and the society will get back to normal, to seeking normality, ethics and morality! As far as the problems and difficulties that many people had in these month make me consider that many of those persons know better what is important for them and for the society and prize more other values than just the material comfort and hedonism.

¹<https://larics.ro/stop-fals-coronavirus-cei-12-apostoli-ai-dezinformarii-despre-coronavirus-au-ajuns-si-in-romania/> (05.04.2020)

²<https://fgmanu.ro/2020/04/08/manipulare-in-numele-luptei-impotriva-fake-news/>, (10.04.2020)

³ <https://www.cotidianul.ro/interzicerea-site-ului-justitiarului-grav-atac-la-adresa-libertatii-presei/> (28.04.2020)
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THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE NORTH SEA REGION UNDER THE SIGN OF CORONAVIRUS

Abstract:	<i>The global context of the Middle East has changed these past few years. Increased power/energy competition brings forth the need for a new strategic outlook. State secretary, Mike Pompeo expressed how the US are and will remain a force of good in the region: "As we look towards the future, we'll have to see the region in a new light. We will consider the Middle Eastern governments as constructive partners for both regional challenges and global commitments with Russia and China. It is a challenge which the US is well equipped to handle".</i>
Keywords:	USA; China; Russia; Syria; Turkey; Libya; New World Order
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In an unpredictable world, of great competition between great powers, time stood still, to make room for an unprecedented health crisis, since the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic. The world is now facing a different crisis from that of the beginning of World War II. At the time, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill's confident ruling led to the creation of an alliance that proved paramount for the final victory. This alliance issued the Washington Treaty, for what was to come after the war. Today's leaders compared the current situation to war, but it is a different war. What makes this crisis different, is that countries and citizens are on the same fighting side.

Globalization in the time of Coronavirus

The world is faced with the perspective of significant change: returning to self-sufficient economy¹. This change

opposes globalization. While globalization implies work division amongst disparate economies, going back to a natural economy means that states will head towards a state where supplying economic goods is entirely up to them. This is not an irreversible move. If governments can control and overcome the current crisis within the next six months or a year, the world would probably get back to globalization, even if some of the hypotheses that lead it to this situation (production chains stressed by timely deliveries) should be revised. But if the crisis continues, globalization could fall apart, at first becoming a mix with self-sufficiency. The longer the crisis lasts and the more obstacles against free turnover of people, goods and capital, the more is it

interaction are needed for survival. It can also be called in-house usage, as this situation can only exist when the producer is his own consumer: they produce everything they use and they use everything produced. It can be applied partially or limited to a single sector, like food or energy: food self-sufficiency, energy self-sufficiency etc.

¹A form of complete personal or collective autonomy, resembling independence from an economic standpoint. No external help, support or

likely for the abnormal to become normal. There will be special interests in supporting it and constant fear of a new pandemic may motivate calls for national self-sufficiency. To this end, economic interest and rightful health concerns may generate consequences. Even an apparently small request- for example that all those entering a country to present a health certificate together with their passport-might hinder the return to globalization, considering the high number of people travelling. Europe will definitely reform. How? There are various scenarios, from a federal state to going back to a national status, from reconfiguring community bodies to reconfiguring the turnover framework for goods and people within the EU. One question generated by the crisis is: where will Italy and Spain - countries most seriously affected from an economic standpoint- be? In Europe, for sure, but still in the Union? Yes, if Europe displays unity. At the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, the EU followed the dangerous scenario of the 2008-2010 financial crisis, when countries in the Euro zone were incapable of agreeing on an uncompromising solution. The late reaction endangered the very survival of the single currency. The taking of sides is almost identical since 10 years ago, with only a change in some of the main players. Emmanuel Macron's France is leading the group of leaders arguing for a coordinated fiscal system that would partially mitigate the economic impact of a health crisis, whose human costs are inevitably projected as very high. The opposing side, featuring German chancellor Angela Merkel, uses the same arguments as during the financial crisis, claiming that Paris and its allies' "screams" are nothing but another attempt at relaxing fiscal discipline and forcing a North-to South transfer of budgetary resources- writes the Spanish paper, *El Pais*.

The European Commission is going to great efforts to ensure an optimal solution, which is rather difficult given the

difference of means to ensure medical conditions of the EU countries, the most important being the lack of ICU equipment. Most crises, even the most severe, are not followed by major changes. Crisis generally serve as accelerators, highlighting the existing faults and making them bigger. Just like patients with pre-existing conditions are more vulnerable, geopolitical ruptures already existing within the EU are vulnerable during the coronavirus crisis. Unity in solving the pandemic together with a means of coming out of it together and restarting European economies will lead to a reinforced Union and to turning it into a strategic partner in the great powers' competition.

New World Order (!?)

The end of the XIXth century was a quiet one, under the hegemonic protection of the USA. Crises were reduced, or were put on second place, the first being re-organizing alliances in a post Cold War Europe, as the East claimed its rightful position with the Western countries. In January 1994, Madeleine Albright sent a memo to the top American hierarchical (President, Vice-president, State Secretary and Secretary for National Security) presenting the status of the region after an extensive tour in Central and Eastern Europe. The message sent by the Clinton administration speaks about the need for Central and Eastern European countries to gradually adopt western structures, for securing and consolidating the democratic progress after 1990.

In the mid'90's, Boris Eltin, who needed a new mandate, tried to force the hand of the American president in postponing NATO expansion after 2000. The Russian president had significant interest in Ukraine, to which added the Baltic states' group of northern states, where there was already the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. There is one last attempt in November 1999, an era of downfall of the Russian democratization

experiment and of the Eltin era: "I ask but one thing. Give Europe to Russia. The United States is not in Europe. Europe should be European's business. Russia is half European, half Asian.(...) You can have all the other states and give them security. I will take Europe and provide security for it. Not me, of course. But Russia. (...) Russia has the power to protect all of Europe"¹. NATO admission carried on and the entire eastern block was in NATO in 2004, which irritated Vladimir Putin's Moscow. The idea that Russia is USSR's successor is advanced for the new Russian Federation's constitution, and this makes us think of future territorial claims from the Kremlin. Then, in 2008 history suddenly changed its course, with the Bucharest NATO Summit. Discussions on NATO adhesion for countries like Georgia and Ukraine - that were to receive the Adherence Action Plan (AAP), lit the spark for historical changes, at the beginning of the XXth century. At the time, German Foreign Secretary, Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated that "there is no urgent reason to worsen relations with Russia this year", relations that were already tensioned once the West acknowledged Kosovos' independence, despite Moscow's opposition. Poland's president at the time, Lech Kaczynski, criticized Berlin's opposition to Ukraine and Georgia's adhesion, reminding Germany of its past, in a letter addressed to the members of the Alliance². NATO leaders, gathered in Bucharest, failed to reach an agreement regarding Ukraine and Georgia's access to the Adherence Action Plan, a last step before adhering to the North-Atlantic Alliance.

¹ "I ask one thing of you: give Europe to Russia". This was the moment that also decided Romania's fate-Octavian Manea Governing Course 2019.

² Germany was accepted in NATO in 1955, in a moment when its borders were not acknowledged by all European states, and the situation in Berlin could start an unimaginable armed conflict, as Kaczynski stated in a letter to his counterparts of the 25 member states in the Alliance.

American president, George W. Bush, who was firmly supporting the nominations of the two former Soviet states, failed to overcome the opposition of several European countries, mainly Germany and France. And so, Pandora's box was open. A New World Order emerged, and the competition of the great powers was off to a quick start. In 2003, Germany, France and Russia did not join the campaign to remove Saddam from Iraq. In 2008, the concept of New Europe initiated by State Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, was consolidated. There are a few things to be considered. First off, what was the reason behind Donald Trump's visit to Warsaw? The official pretext for the American president's visit is rather meaningful: attending the second summit of the "three seas" Initiative, the means for accomplishing the Polish dream of becoming the leader in Eastern Europe.

Donald Trump's gesture held a certain symbolism: a return to president G.W. Bush's gesture of visiting Poland at the beginning of his mandate in 2001, before visiting the western countries; it was, at the same time, a visit made on the dominant territory of the main objector to the excessive character of the European Union, the Law and Justice Party, and of the main fighter for granting sovereignty back to national states; it was a visit to one of the NATO countries that award 2% to defence budget, a country that will also host an American military base and it was also a courtesy visit, thanking the thousands of Polish-Americans who helped Trump's 2016 victory in key states, like Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania. And maybe, the most important reason- a visit for promoting American exports- a manner of winning back global influence through massive gas and oil export, given that the Three Great's Initiative wanted to develop a regional energy infrastructure, offering liquified natural gas (LNG) American exporters a market that aims at sweetening the bitterness of Russian monopol (June 2017 was the date of the

first American shipment of LNG to Poland). The symbolic nature of the visit is also emphasized by the highlight of 6th July 2017: president Donald Trump holds an historic speech in Krasinski Square, in front of the monument honoring the 200,000 Polish killed by German bullets and Soviet cunningness during the 1944 Warsaw rebellion.

These last few years, two global and a regional powers made great efforts in revising security arrangements in that area. Russia invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine and secretly tried to destabilize European democracies. China built artificial insular fortresses in international waters, claimed large areas of the Pacific and began economically organizing Eurasia in a manner that favoured Beijingului. The Islamic Republic of Iran expanded its influence on most of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen and aims at building a road with sea bases in the Mediterranean and, while at the same time, building nuclear weapons.

What characterises this New World Order is described by Richard Haass in his book "A World in Disorder-American foreign policy and the old order crisis"¹: Nowadays, foreign policy must begin with a focused effort in discouraging rivalry amongst the great powers, competition and, first of all, for avoiding conflicts within international systems. Richard Haass's arguments are: (1) Such a deterioration would be extremely costly even if it would not lead to conflict and (2) antagonistic relations would make for a difficult cooperation in actions against great global and regional challenges.

This new world will require a new American foreign policy, one that the White House administration would install immediately after the 2020 elections. During the Cold War, the United States chose to isolate the Soviet Union,

successfully discouraging military aggression and limiting its political influence for 10 years. The United States should once again apply the previous scenario with the Russian Federation, China and Iran. But the most important measure remains cutting its ties with China. We must start taking back production and investing in regional diffusion of supply-chains, for both Europe and the USA. The imperative need to cut off ties with China is just as important as before. But getting there will not be easy. The concept of „Re-shoring” is in itself a complicated process, that will take years to get results. The change will require incentives, both positive and negative, including changing corporate taxation code, subsidies, penalties and maybe even planned efforts for changing behaviours.

Contemporary world is, to some extent, similar to the mid XXth century era. A new politics of isolation offers the best chance in defending XXIst century transatlantic interests. The Cold War divided the world into opposing sides, and even divided countries. Today, similar separations develop, each revisionist power searching for their own sphere of influence, outside the global order endorsed by the USA and joined by the EU. Just like before, revisionist powers are dictatorships contesting American values, as well as transatlantic interests. Revisionist powers attempt at overturning political, military and economic agreements, built by the United States and the West after World War II. In the event of an apocalyptic scenario, where Vladimir Putin's Russia manages to take control over new areas of the former Soviet Union, Xi Jinping's China gains control over Western Pacific sea trade and Ali Khamenei's Ayatollah of Iran dominates the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf, the global order endorsed by the USA and its allies would be seriously hurt. For most of the Cold War, Washington faced but one great enemy, the Soviet Union, leader of the international communist movement.

¹ Richard Haass, *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order*, Reprint Edition, Penguin Books, London, 2018, p. 232

Now it has to face three separate adversaries, each independent from the other two.

Russia and China are cooperating, but are also competing. And even though the two are in good relations with Iran, both also have significant Muslim populations and face a high risk within these communities. For sure Moscow would have preferred to actively engage with the USA in the Middle East, but the best opportunities explored so far, did not bring about any real effects. By shipping several hundred hired killers in Libya, or by condemning Soleimani's execution by the Americans, Moscow draws attention in the European capitals. If this attention translates into a relaxation of sanctions-Kremlin's objective to be achieved with any available tricks- this constitutes a serious problem for the European Union. President Putin acts under the assumption that this unity is damaged beyond repair. What attracts Russia in its interactions with the Europeans is these states' incapacity of agreeing on a coherent course of actions or of offering support to the American way, which some European leaders deem as too stirring and inconsistent.

Middle East at a turning point

2019 is a turning point for the Middle East, the partial retreat of American military troops from Syria enabling Turkey to enforce its new strategy on creating a safety corridor, at the southern border. Before 2016, Erdogan's plans for a military intervention into Syria were rejected by both the Obama Administration and Turkish high military officials. Subsequently, Erdogan refused to attend the US-led anti ISIS coalition, which came into being in the summer of 2014, after the conquest of Mosul, by the terrorist organization. Turkey objected to the use of Incirlik airbase by allied forces, so Washington was forced to use the bases in Al-Udeid- Qatar and Riffa- Bahrain. We can now notice the twists and turns behind the political decision of retreating

American forces from the area. USA State Department's policy, under former State Secretary Rex Tillerson, defined, in 2018, four key objectives for its presence in Syria: ensuring a lasting defeat of ISIS, creating adequate conditions for Syrian refugees to return to their homes, limiting Iranian influence in the region and organizing UN-supervised elections, meant to bring a new administration in Damascus.

In March 2018, president Donald Trump fired Tillerson and Ankara took advantage of this situation and changed the geo-political situation in its favour. A telephone conversation between Erdogan and the American president led to setting off the Turkish military operation in northern Syria. Ankara deems the Units for Protection of the Kurd Population- presently controlling the area targeted by the "Peace Spring" operation, as a military extension of PKK, a group that carried out a long military campaign for autonomy against the Turkish state, since the 80's. The presence at the south border, of such a group, controlled by the Syrian Democratic Union Party - created on the 20th September 2003- having a democratic confederate view and ideologically affiliated with the Kurdistan Labourers Party (PKK), was deemed as an unacceptable threat to Turkish national security and territorial integrity.

What was Europe's reaction? The UE firmly condemned the operation and quickly requested a meeting of the UN Security Council for a joint statement against Turkey, but the initiative was unsuccessful because of the opposition manifested by Russia and the USA, so Bruxelles was on its own with the sentence. Despite the fact that this sentencing took place on the 14th October 2019 during the meeting of EU foreign secretaries, they failed to reach an agreement on imposing a Union embargo on delivering weapons to Ankara. By dissolving the so-called "terror corridor" and securing southern borders with Syria

through military operations like “The Shield of Euphrat”, “Olive Branch” and “Peace Spring”, Turkey challenges the status-quo from the Mediterranean Sea. By signing the Unity Memorandums regarding the arrangements for marking areas of naval jurisdiction with Libya and granting military assistance to the Tripoli regime, Ankara ensured itself a change in the geopolitical scales of the Mediterranean. The geopolitical area that Turkey wants secured is bordered at one end by the Mediterranean, area covering the west and south of Crete island, and to the other by the General Headquarter of the Turkey-Qatar Mixt Task Commandment, covering Hormuz Straits of the Persian Gulf. The southern end of this area comprises the Turkish and Somali Task Commandment of Mogadiscio, capital of Somalia, on the coast of the Indian Ocean.

Turkey is competing for geopolitical influence in Libya, in eastern Mediterranean, for creating a different model from the one in Syria, where Russia plays the main role and the Teheran comes second. We must pay attention to this oily smelling mix of interests, where Turkey and Russia are the main players, fighting through proxies, and the USA, France and Italy are the referees that will eventually tilt the scales favouring one side or the other.

The rise and fall of the British Empire in the East

Fifty years ago, the United State began filling the blanks left after the British retreat from the Persian Gulf, first assuming the role of a regional peace agent, during the Suez crisis¹. The war was as a direct consequence of the decision made on July 26th 1956 by General Gamel Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s ruler, to nationalize

the Suez Channel, a French and British ownership under Egyptian control, and namely to reject the American and British offer for building the Aswan dam on the Nile. After the war, Great Britain abandoned its colonial dreams in the Middle East. Its military base on the Suez Channel, which held roughly 80,000 soldiers, was disbanded at the end of 1956, given the Egyptian opposition and lack of American support. Washington intended to eliminate Great Britain’s control in the area and stop Soviet expansion in the Middle East. On January 5th 1957, the American president presented the Congress a common resolution regarding the Middle East, known as “The Eisenhower Doctrine”. It stipulated that the president had the power to intervene in the event of a communist attack on a Middle Eastern country and offered those states the right to economic aid, from the USA, in the amount of 200 million dollars². In the following period, USA’s decisions from that moment on generated historic dividends, including the 1987 Camp David Accord, between Israel and Egypt, the 1991 liberation of Kuwait and maintaining oil exports during periods of intense conflict. Now, however, the USA’s apparent vital interest in promoting peace and security in the Middle East is collapsing under the burden of changing energy markets and the human and financial impact of the apparently endless wars in the area. „Let somebody else fight for this blood-stained land”, declared American president Donald Trump in October of 2019, explaining his sudden decision of eliminating American troops from north-eastern Syria.

The USA spent over 8 billion dollars on wars in that region. President Trump’s availability in detaching from the Middle East seems to be supported not only by Congress Republicans, but also by a series of Democrat candidates in the 2020 presidential campaign, who, just like

¹The different names of the Eastern crisis of the mid ‘50’s: the 1956 War of the Suez Channel. For Great Britain and France it was Musketeer Operation. For the Israeli it was the Sinai Campaign or Kadesh Operation (Mivtza Kadésh).

²Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, André Kaspi, op.cit., p.119

him, endorsed a drop of troops and even backing out from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

A powerful example was Iran's attack on Saudi Arabia oil plants, in September 2019, when the lack of a military response and applying a new sanction plan were obtained by president Trump from the Congress. As long as there are still around 60,000 and 70,000 American troops in the Middle East, it is premature to think of an alleged American pull back from the region. Russia takes back its central position through a military occupation of Syria and, to some extent, goes back to what it was during the USSR. The lessons learned from the Thirty Years War, a series of devastating conflicts that rampages Central Europe between 1618 and 1648 and the Treaty the finally settled them - Westphalia Peace Treaty - can be successfully applied to the conflict in Syria and the violences affecting the Middle East, starting with the 2010-2011 Arab rebellions. The Syrian civil war is not the oldest conflict in the area- it is foreseen by the Afghanistan war nearly a decade before. However, the Syrian war is the roughest conflict in the area, with hundreds of thousands of Syrians either killed or wounded, six million forced to flee the country and another six million dislocated internally. The conflict also enclosed a series of regional actors and great powers in a manner that would echo for a long time after the ceasing of violences. Syria is also the burial ground of a series of third party, diplomats, tactical interventions and other "peacemakers'" ambitions. Why is that? Because the various ethnic wars and crises currently taking place in the Middle East- including the Syrian disaster- must not be considered as separate conflicts in different countries with individual origins, but as a sole regional crisis affecting the Middle East.

Iran versus Saudi Arabia

The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia for supremacy in the Middle

East has spread to almost all regional problems, breaking international alliances and supporting war throughout the region, at the same time raising concerns for a direct conflict between the two powers. After Mohammed bin Salman's appointment as crown prince, in 2017, the son of powerful king Salman, Saudi Arabia tried to force its politics in the Middle East and was supported by the help of the White House administration. Determined to undermine the Iranian regime, Washington backed out from the nuclear agreement with Teheran and used its economic power to suffocate Iranian economy. The tensions between these two, initiated by Iran's attack of an American drone and Saudi oil plants, culminated with USA's assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in Iraq, immediately followed by an Iranian military response comprising of an Iranian ballistic missile barrage, targeting American troops at Al-Assad base. Collateral victims of the incident: 176 people on board of a Boeing 737-800 on a flight from Tehran to Kiev, shut down by an Iranian missile shot from a TOR-M1 Russian system.

Under the indulging Moscow eye and with the support of Bagdad government, Tehran built a road through Iraq and Syria towards the Mediterranean, through which it ships military materials to Syrian and Libyan proxies. Its endpoint would be a sea pier, in Latakia port, for its battleships. Saudi newspaper Asharq al-Awsat¹ revealed on the 15th february that the Russians have given up on limiting Iranian military presence in Syria. They quoted sources from the Saudi intelligence system, present on site in eastern Syria, where the Saudi people had taken over the eastern Syria oil region in December 2019, under the aegis of the USA. These sources

¹Asharq al-Awsat is an Arab international newspaper headquartered in London. Pioneer of the offshore model, for Arab media, the paper is known for its distinctive edges in shades of green. The 2005 New York Times said Asharq al-Awsat was "one of the oldest and most influential of the area".

ask themselves „how can Israel hope to be successful in stopping Iranian expansion, if the Russians failed”. While Russia’s objective was the restoration of the Iranian state, Iran’s game plan is different from building a strong military point in Syria. The grounds for this is opening a new front against Israel.

The last thing Moscow, as a major power in Syria and “controller of airspace”, wants is for Iran to put it at war with Israel. Moscow depends too much on Iran in Syria in ensuring control and stabilizing the situation. It cannot afford to cast out an essential military ally. Donald Trump’s realpolitik approach towards the East, including Iran, is a Washington neo-conservative approach, manifested through that former state secretary, David Acheson (1949-1953) said: „What America learned the hard way a long time ago is that it must negotiate from a position of strength”. This was their negotiation during the Cold War, and this is how they negotiate today. But Iran lacks the economic and military power necessary for taking on the USA, Saudi Arabia and Israel and any attempt at manufacturing ballistics that would carry nuclear charges would offer the three a clear reason for a military intervention¹. The efforts of Tel-Aviv officials are still valid².

A report of experts and politicians from the Syrian opposition and quoted by the Saudi press, state that Iran has consolidated its military and economic position along the Syrian coast. The National Liberation Front, led by Fateh al-Hassoun, accused Tehran of having searched/searching solutions for sea routes and land alternatives in order to avoid

American sanctions and hamper Russia’s increasing influence in the ports of Latakia and Tartus.

According to the report, before 2011, Iran had no military presence on the Syrian coast. Its role was limited to building schools and charities. With the rebellion, Iran tried to infiltrate the coast, through various means like agencies with a wide range of businesses. Deploying Russian military forces with the Hmeimim base dramatically reduced Iran’s military expansion towards the coastline. At that point, Tehran had limited to a military and civil infiltration of Syria. These past few months, however, Tehran increased its efforts of establishing a pivot-like point on the coastline. A recently issued document confirms the fact the Latakia port manager ordered that the managing committee discusses with the “Iranian party” the possibility of transferring port administration to the latter. This is confirmed by the The New York Times, who revealed that an agreement was reached on signing over port coordination/control to Tehran. The agreement was signed on February 25th 2020, during Syrian leader Bashar Assad’s visit to the Iranian capital.

Companies affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard began shipping merchandise through Latakia port, which is used as an alternate route for weapons smuggling. Moreover, it would gain significant influence by controlling the largest Syrian port, partially disregarding the degradation of economic conditions in areas under the regime’s control. Israeli military and intelligence sources, quoted by Haaretz’s publication website, revealed that given the situation from the borders with Israel and the attacks of Israeli air forces, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah have recently relocated their Syrian headquarters from Damascus to the northern province of Aleppo. They liberated the so-called “Glass Hour” centre near Damascus and set up a new command

¹ Alexandru Grumaz, *Russian roulette: Israel versus Iran*, in “Adevărul”, May 11, 2018.

² Quoting the same source, on February 13th, Israel eliminated four Iranian officers in an attack on a new Iranian weapon shipment delivered in the area of Damascus. Two of the dead were generals of the Revolutionary Guard- Riday Mahmadi, commander of Iranian forces in the region of Damascus and Haj Hossein, responsible for arming Iranian forces in Syria.

centre at the Al-Assad Military Academy, 7 km off the centre of Aleppo.

This campus can host 2,000 soldiers. The new centre is secured with Bavar-373 Iranian anti aircraft batteries, having an operational range of 200 km. Hezbollah forces were entrusted with the task of ensuring the new headquarter and its approaching routes. The unexpected visit of brigade general Esmail Ghaani, new IRGC commander, to Syria, in March 2020, would oversee this move. Although this was his first journey to Syria since the assassination of his predecessor, Qassem Soleimani, no Syrian officials welcomed Ghaani to Damascus. His sole destination was Aleppo, for the clear purposes of setting up the new command centre that would run under his command. Tehran is quick to replace lost officers, as can be seen in the case of new Al Quds forces' leader, after the loss of Qassem Soleimani.

The same goes for the destruction of weapons' shipments. Inevitably, some pass through and many are delivered without delay. How else could one explain the increasing number of precision missiles reaching Hezbollah? In presenting his five year plan, Lieut.Gen. Aviv Kochavi¹, has indeed emphasized: „Hezbollah is advancing with their own project of buying, using precision missiles”. This is despite three years of constant Israeli attacks on Iranian weapon shipment/storehouses on Syrian territory. The general mentioned that Israeli armed forces must face „terrorist armies around Syria, Libya, Gaza and Sinai”, as well as with Iran who „presently owns 1,000

precision missiles, equipped with Russian gyroscopic systems with an accuracy of up to 10 m, capable of reaching Tel Aviv”.

Syria- a never ending war

Syria (Figure 1) is now in its 9th year a civil war that often promises, but never actually succeeds in ending. President Bashar al-Assad took over a large portion of the country, but there are still large areas at war. On February 2020, Assad's troops, aided by Russia, advanced in Idlib province, a north-western Syrian defence fortress, after a nearly 10 months offensive. Since December 1st 2019, over 800,000 Syrians have fled from their homes. Assad may have won a territory, but his regime is seriously fragile, and the regions under his control are unstable. This war is not one that Assad can conclusively win, even with the support of Iran and Russia. We must acknowledge the fact that the Syrian civil war is not likely to end in the near future. The prospect of a larger war is devastating. The current state of things shows us that Syria's fate is far from decided. Assad has spread his forces with the help of Iran and Russia. But the army of their coalition is overestimated. Damascus and its partners have stretched the military protection over a wide area, in order to be able to convince the international community to accept the regime's victory.

The coalition, in fact, hopes that other countries would help her consolidate its power by investing in reconstruction projects, that could reimburse Iran and Russia and finance Assad's corrupt system, that helps him rule. Here and now, China fully joined in. Assad's plan worked almost perfectly. Until the end of 2018, the Syrian regime had advanced so much that some countries began to reconsider their opposition against Assad. The United Arab Emirates re-opened their embassy and invested in reconstruction projects. Saudi Arabia and some European countries considered following the same process. The USA, however, stood aside.

¹ Lieutenant-general and head of Israeli general staff, as of January 2019. Between 2017-2019 he held the position of deputy of Israeli general staff. Kohavi commanded the Gaza Division during the unilateral disengagement of Israel from Gaza and subsequently, (2014-2017) he was the commander of the Israeli army's North Commandment. Between 2010-September 2014 he served as commander of the army's military intelligence service. He excelled especially during the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and in stopping the terror wave of Intifada al Aqsa.

Washington refused to accept the regime's false victory and, in turn, added more sanctions against Damascus and re-focused western world on a diplomatic process meant to bring a political solution that would take into consideration Assad's regime and deny him the reconstruction funds.

The "Syria Study Group" report of September 2017 stated: „Throughout the Syrian war, Iran's deployment of their own forces and foreign recruited militia was conclusive for the loss of territories of the Syrian opposition. Subsequently, Iran can now carry on their own geopolitical agenda on Syrian territory, including the introduction of sophisticated weapon systems that would enable Iran to open a new front against Israel and threaten Eastern Mediterranean free navigation. In the event Iran ever acquires nuclear weapons, Israel is worried they might face a situation very much alike the one in South Korea, threatened by an enemy with both a conventional massive arsenal, as well as a nuclear capacity that might discourage foreign partners, like the United State, from offering their help in case of a conflict. A war between Iran and Israel is but a secondary conflict generated by the Syrian civil war. The threat that Iran represents to Israel on Syrian territory has motivated Tel Aviv leaders to find solutions for solving the Russian crisis. Also, Jordan and Lebanon have tighten their relations with Russia, concerned with the Iranian presence, the increasing instability in south-western Syria and the increasing uncertainty regarding American policy”¹.

¹From the study introduction: "This report is the bipartisan agreement of the Syrian Study Group. No member can be satisfied with each individual wording and argument. The results of this report do not represent the opinion of the US Peace Institute, who was managed by the Congress in order to facilitate the activity of the Syrian Study Group. In this report, members of the Syrian study group explain the reason for which Syria is important for US security and why should American people be concerned with the situation there".

The Black Sea

In between the Middle East and Southern Europe lies „Mare Nostrum” which can be accessed through Bosphorus and Hellespont of the Black Sea. There is a simple argument explaining the importance of the Black Sea, a peripheral sea, to an extremely important operational area. The Black Sea is located at an important crossroad between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Black Sea's military main element is Crimea, from the point of view of the Russian Federation, and Constanta harbour, from NATO's point of view. In his opening lesson² dedicated to the history of the Black Sea, historian Gheorghe Brătianu (dean of the Philosophy and Languages College of Bucharest University), he called it Romania's "secure space": "If Romania holds an interest in the Black Sea- an undeniable fact since ancient times- it must take into consideration all possible angles that this sea bears two positions, that a modern term, generally overused, calls "key positions", namely definitive positions:1) Bosphorus strait, and generally the Straits' system, enabling navigation beyond this closed sea; and 2) Crimea, which, given its natural ports, its ancient fortresses, its advanced sea outpost in the Black Sea, is obviously in a ruling position for the entire maritime complex of the area. He who owns Crimea, reigns the Black Sea. Who doesn't, cannot reign it... One thing is certain, that the notion of a secure space implies that we cannot remain indifferent to what is going on in these two key positions of a sea that is so closely tied to our existence".

Oil and gas pipes, as well as fibre optic cables go over the bottom of the sea, while at the surface, hundreds of ships cross it, in the process of moving merchandise and people. For centuries, the Black Sea was the object of dispute among the world's greatest empires. Throughout

²Gheorghe I Brătianu, *The Black Sea (from its origins until its Roman conquest)*, Vol. 1, Editura Meridiane, București, 1988, p.108

history, it proved to be one of the most important geopolitical and economic points in Eurasia. Since the disappearance of the Soviet Union, there have been major changes in the the Black Sea's geopolitics. The Black Sea region, poorly controlled during the bipolar era (1947-1991) by the USA led side, was dominated by the USSR and Turkey. Ankara dominated Black Sea's southern shore and was the only pro-west country back then. Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Georgia were closely monitored by Moscow. With Georgia's 2002 drastic change of direction and Ukraine's new pro-western view, Romania and Bulgaria's 2004 admission into NATO and the EU rounded up the dramatic change in regional relationships, with global consequences that cannot be underestimated.

Throughout history, "the Great Salt Lake" was the acting stage for conflicts between the Russian-orthodox world, the Turkish-Islamic world and the West. Controlling it was important from both a strategic and military and economic standpoint. The region's current geopolitical structure is marked by two main dynamics. The first is setting-off Russian and American influences- that, is in turn competing with Turkey's ambitions. The second refers to emphasizing an energy axis connecting Central Asia, the Caspian Sea's natural gases and oil to the Balkans and the EU.

Russia „Black Sea's military police"

Russian Federation's relationships with its immediate neighbours - former Soviet Republics Georgia and Ukraine- went from a cold conflict to an open one. Russia engaged in a short war in 2008 with Georgia, and then, six years later, with a new type of war, hybrid war, it occupied Crimea, that belonged to Ukraine and started a secessionist war in Donbas. The War between Russia and Ukraine expanded to the Azov Sea¹. The Black Sea

Russian fleet (FMNR) already had enough power to oppose NATO troops dispatched in the Black Sea. By the end of 2020, Russia plans to introduce 30 new battleships for the FMNR battle service, an addition to the 47 existing ones. All new Kilo-class electric diesel submarines of the Russian marine, armed with Kalibr cruise missiles (SLCM) that can be launched from sea are attributed to the Black Sea fleet, together with the most recent class of Buyan-M corvettes and two of the six large vedette boats with stealth technology. Black Sea's air force assets include two attack and reconnaissance regiments positioned in Crimea, equipped with Su-30SM and Su-24M planes, while four small Be-12PS ships are used for marine patrolling and SAR. Surveillance is carried out with old ships belonging to a worn out fleet, ships ready for an anti-submarine war (ASW), Iliushin IL-38 turbo-jet engines² that are to be brought up to date.

In short, broad militarization for 98% of the Black Sea. New Russian military assets now includes Anti-access/Access Denied (A2/AD) modern systems, bringing about security challenges for NATO troops and Black Sea residing states. A2/AD assets are strategically placed, and include modern air defence systems - for example S-400 missile systems, located in Crimea, and extensively used for blocking potential adversaries, namely NATO, from accessing the area of interest or from operating in certain land, maritime or aerial areas.

Organization against Russia's unilateral and illegal actions, stopping search and rescue missions in the Black Sea, Azov Sea and Kerch strait, which connects the two large seas.

² Upgrading Il38 planes, means installing the new Novella-P-38 target system, to search and track, able to detect aerial targets up to 90 km, land targets up to 320 km. The system enables up to 32 simultaneous targets. Novella system is installed on three short poles above the cockpit, while an electronic and optical/infra-red turret is installed under the nose. (EO/IR).

¹ On January 18th 2020, Ukraine and Georgia filed a complaint with the International Maritime

The illegal annexation of Crimea is, in fact, the most dangerous crisis since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Moreover, out of the many idling conflicts in the Black Sea area, one can always be resumed, from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, to Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova and the Donbas in Ukraine. Black Sea's importance grew after the Russian military intervention in Syria, the Russian fleet of Sevastopol offering logistic support to the expeditionary force. This is one of the reasons for which the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean became a common security environment. Russia initiated a new "Iron Curtain" in the Black Sea. It created a A2/AD area, using Murmansk-BN equipments for electronic war¹ or equipments that jam high frequency telecommunications, including the high frequency global communication system – HFGCS- namely the global network of transmitters offering communications for command and control systems between ground agencies and American military aircrafts, ships, command centres dispatched within operating theatres etc (USA's military partners have access to this network). Russia also has radar systems monitoring all NATO ships in the Black Sea, especially the access points from the Mediterranean, through Bosphorus and Hellespont straits, and also S-400/S-300 anti aircraft systems, including short action range Iskander M missile systems (that could launch SSC-X-8 intermediate range missiles). The Black Sea is important even for a country

¹ As early as 2017 Russia installed in Crimea the EW "Murmansk-BN" system. This strategically important technology was studied since the 60's in the USSR. It was only in 2015 that the first efficient prototype was built. It was tested by the Northern Russian fleet, and in 2016, the EW "Murmansk-BN" system became operational. The system jams radio communications within a 3,000-5,000 km range, and in the event of a good signal, even by 8,000 km. This is an automatic system for short-wave radio interference, jamming the operation of military equipments on board ships, throwing off even their navigation parameters, which display false coordinates, confusing the staff.

thousands of kilometres away, like the US. To the US, its strategic importance comes from two issues.

The first comes from the Washington treaty's provisions- the one that created NATO alliance. Three out of the six Black Sea countries (Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania) are NATO members. Two more countries (Ukraine and Georgia) are part of the NATO Peace Partnership and Georgia is also an official candidate to NATO.

Second, one of America's greatest geopolitical adversaries, Russia, hinges on the Black Sea region for reasons related to energy, trade, security and economy. For Russia, its dominance in the Black Sea area was always deemed as a matter of national survival. During the Warsaw Alliance Summit, Romania requested the foundation of an exercise centre for the Black Sea in Constanta, but a decision regarding this project was delayed because of Bulgaria and Turkey, who initially accepted but then opposed such an initiative. After a year of negotiations, the North Atlantic Alliance approved the creation of a special unit for monitoring risks in the Black Sea. The structure operates within NATO's maritime headquarters in Great Britain and has the mission of coordinating naval exercises in the region and collecting intelligence necessary for risk assessment.

This will increase the number of NATO ships in the Black Sea and also that of ally naval exercises. Russian Federation's ports with the Black Sea, as the country's only warm water ports, have always served its economic interests. For example, in the eve of World War I, 50% of all Russian exports and 90% of its agricultural exports went through Bosphorus into the Black Sea. Nowadays, an oil carrier makes the same journey with Russian and Kazakh oil, every 15 minutes (the latter, of course, transiting Russia, so Moscow gets transit fees). Russia also uses its Black Sea bases, many of which are located in the Peninsula occupied by

Crimea, for deploying military force operations, like the military operations in Syria.

How important is Romania to NATO and the European Union, in the context of the current progress regarding Black Sea security¹? General Ben Hodges (former commander of NATO forces in Europe- SACEUR): Romania is definitely essential to NATO, given its location, at the western end of the Black Sea, controlling Danube's outfalls, neighbouring Ukraine, that is currently at war with Russia. I believe Romania is essential for NATO's efforts in the Black Sea area. Secondly, if this sea port of Anaklia, Georgia, is ever established, there is the possibility of a very important economic corridor between Romania, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, making Romania a gateway to Europe by significantly intensifying economic trade with China. Hence, if Romania can significantly improve its infrastructure- roads, highways, railway- then I think Constanta can become a much more interesting port for enhancing trade. But, if you don't have the infrastructure to ship merchandise out of port, it will be irrelevant how large the port is, as roads and railways leaving Constanta are just as important.

A new American concept for NATO's eastern flank was presented two years ago at a conference held on March 7th-8th 2018, at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island²: "The Hedgehog Strategy".

¹ Mircea Olteanu, *Interviu cu generalul Ben Hodges: România este centrul de gravitație pentru eforturile NATO în zona Mării Negre*, <https://monitorulapararii.ro/interviu-cu-generalul-ben-hodges-romania-este-centrul-de-gravitatie-pentru-eforturile-nato-in-zona-marii-negre-1-17197> (13.05.2020)

² Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, *Consolidated Report of the Workshop Sponsored by the Under Secretary of the Navy*, March 7-8, 2018, http://aspennstitute.ro/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Porcupine-Strategy-for-Europe_Naval-War-College.pdf (14.05.2020)

The strategy is based on three hypotheses: (1) the geography of the Black Sea and the two straits- Bosphorus and Hellespont; (2) the ability of the NATO endorsed state areas to stop and defeat a potential aggression or attack, including setting off active measures; (3) NATO ensuring discouraging and re-assuring measures for mitigating threats escalation. Essentially, this strategy is a version of the A2/AD strategy, where aerial denial (AD) uses more measures encompassing setting-off Russian active measures, intelligence and electronic war, subversion by means of the "little green men" (special troops). In Romania, the American strategy will focus on strengthening its position at the Black Sea, having Constanta as the centre, but also on the other NATO advantages in the area.

The Black Sea is the test result for the Hedgehog Strategy, which is to be subsequently applied for the Baltic Sea, as well. The Hedgehog Strategy will focus on the weaknesses of the three categories of Russian armed forces (aviation, navy and infantry) and on setting off Russian active measures. The strategy will use Romanian military forces supported by NATO C4ISR command and control systems, forces that focus on the extensive use of unmanned systems (UAV- that would monitor aerial and underwater space, equipped with war ammunition for carrying out anti-ship and anti submarine operations), cruise missiles and other types of missiles, on thousands of anti-car (Javelin) and anti-aircraft (Stinger) missiles, the use of GPS systems and C4I cutting edge technology, difficult to jam, on low altitude military satellites, on partisans and local guerilla forces (land troops must have a guerilla like organization so as to attack enemy logistics and supply line considering that every ingress will be by sea) and last, but not least, on the combined forces of infantry and aviation (paratroopers) with a high speed of reaction. Constanta is to be fortified with a verity of military systems, including for electronic war (EW), which,

in turn, will be protected by the Aegis-Ashore system, MK-41 systems for vertical launching, enabling the launch of Standard 3 (SM3) missiles and Patriot batteries, an upgraded aerial logistic base (Kogălniceanu).

The American army intends to bring “various enhancements” to Mihail Kogalniceanu air base¹, the list comprising of buildings, a new railway terminal and the corresponding infrastructure worth 100 million USD dollars and the multinational brigade of Craiova, together with a series of concentric defence with a 200 mile range into the Black Sea (a 321 km range means roughly $\frac{3}{4}$ of the distance to Simferopol in a straight line. If Russia decides to attack on land, it will have to attack through Ukraine, which will be hard given an alleged strong Ukrainian resistance.

If the military options were established above, a complex strategy for using NATO support forces will have to be established within a time-frame of 1-2 years, one that comprises deployment of equipments and the logistic commandment point. At the same time, Bulgaria and Turkey’s strategic use must also encompass revising the 1936 Montreux Convention, which, in the words of president Trump, is obsolete because among the original signing parties there is also the USSR that was dissolved, and Ukraine and Georgia are new states.

There is also a need for strengthening alliances. Hence, we need to strengthen the two deals carried out at the initiative of the Polish president, Andrzej Duda, Romanian president Klaus Iohannis and Croat president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic: ”Bucharest Format and The

Initiative of the Three Seas”. Their purpose is to discourage any potential Russian movement towards western Europe.

Once Russia went back to the status of major regional power, Intermarium geopolitical concept, launched at the beginning of the XXth century, takes shape. We find together countries like Croatia, the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. Some Western chancelleries are concerned about the emergence of such a block.

Not many Europeans want to go back to the Cold War politics. Most Europeans, especially German and French businessmen believe Russian interests can be met without creating a new line of discouragement. On the other hand, for Washington and their strategists, such a solution would benefit from their support, as NATO cannot really offer military assistance without American help, given the European Deterrence Initiative (the former Reassurance). The amount of this help went from 1 to 5,9 billion US dollars for 2020, and this year there are plans to start the pre-positioning of American military technique within a division. Although many analysts fear the Russian threat on the Baltic states, the dramatic change was in the Mediterranean, where the Russian navy now prides itself with missiles that can endanger most European countries. For some time now, the Kremlin functioned/functions de facto on war mode. What should we do? Admiral James Stavridis² stated in an article published by Bloomberg³ some of the necessary options to be considered in the Black Sea area.

I’d name a few: (1) first off, NATO should improve its schedule of waterside

¹ Roughly 500 American soldiers who are part of the “Fighting Eagles” 1st Battalion and several M1 Abrams tanks, Bradley war machines and Paladin self-propelled shells are dispatched for 9 months at Mihail Kogalniceanu Base. The presence of the “Fighting Eagles”, 1st Battalion, 8th Regiment of Marine Infantry highlights the fact that the strong strategic partnership between Romania and the US is real, not just on paper“.

² Retired US Marine admiral, former NATO military commander in Europe (SACEUR), currently the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University.

³ James Stavridis, *Crimea isn’t the End of Russia’s Black Sea Ambitions*, <https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/crimea-isn-t-the-end-of-russia-s-black-sea-ambitions>, (14.05.2020)

visits, exercises and instruction mission; (2) second, the Alliance must develop and finance a coherent intervention plan for Black Sea naval operations; (3) third, the US¹ must increase military deployments, independent from NATO operations; (4) forth, the US must have a tight cooperation with Turkey, that literary holds the key to the Black Sea, given that it controls the straits guarding it, Bosphorus and Hellespont²; (5) finally, the US can encourage western companies to invest in Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine. Oil and gases are paramount, but so are logistics, fibre optic cables and other development projects within communications. Helping these countries connect their economies both within the Black Sea community as well as Europe and the US represents the “soft power” that can mend the region’s stability. The current situation is presented by NATO General Secretary, Jens Stoltenberg, at the press conference preceding the April 2020 reunion of defence secretaries: “Russia endorses eastern Ukraine separatists, we notice a rise of its military presence in Ukraine, and we see their naval presence in the Black Sea. These are part of the security challenges we are faced with. We faced them before the COVID-19 crisis and we’re facing them during this crisis and I expect they will continue to exist even once this crisis has ended. This emphasizes the fact that NATO must offer support to civilian efforts in fighting COVID-19, while at the same delivering our main responsibility, namely protecting all of our allies. That is exactly what we’re doing. We have expanded our presence in

the Black Sea region, on land, with our presence in Romania, but also on sea and aerial and we are working closely with partner countries of the Black Sea, like Georgia and Ukraine”.

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¹ US marine forces have four destroyers with Aegis weapon systems in Rota, Spain, for anti aircraft defence and for force display in the Mediterranean. There is talk about adding two more to these and carrying out maintenance operations in Spain.

² According to the 1936 Montreux Convention, the rules governing tranzit are extremely limiting, and Turkey refused to sign the Sea Law Treaty, signed under ONU aegis, that would transfer straits to a more relaxed set of rules, basically governing any other such spread of water in the world.



Figure 1. Syria Areas of Influence 2020-05-13
as of January 13¹ 2020¹

¹ Congressional Research Service, *Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response*, p.4, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf>, (14.05.2020)

COMBATING TERRORISM AND ENSURING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WHICH CONSTITUTES THE „NUCLEUS” OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CHALLENGES WHICH THE SECURITY FACES AT THE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL

Abstract:	<i>The impressive increase of the number of terrorist acts in different parts of the world and „internationalization” of this issue lead to diversification of the forms of combating this phenomenon, especially in the international cooperation form, as well as to the adoption of some regulatory documents which often contravene to the regulatory framework which ensures the fundamental human rights and freedoms. The adopted measures are argued by the necessity to ensure national, regional and international security, but sometimes they are directly contradictory with particular norms of imperative character from the view point of the international law. In these conditions, as mentioned in numerous reports of the institutions concerned about the human rights, it is emphasized the attempts to justify the application of different forms of torture toward the persons suspected to be involved in the acts of terrorism are emphasized.</i>
Keywords:	Security; Torture; Terrorism; Fundamental rights; Treatment; Non-return; Jurisdiction.
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Introduction

From the very beginning we should remark the fact that the uncertainties toward the anti-terrorism and torture measures are precedent to September 11, 2001 attacks. At the same time, the fact which constitutes the character of reactions which followed after these attacks, were the efforts undertaken for creating an international legal regime for fighting against terrorism. Thus, as a result all the states were mandated for adopting the measures and anti-terrorism law in compliance with the resolution 1373 (2001) of UN Security Council¹. This

resolution and evolutions at the national level undertaken simultaneously revised the security systems and lead to the adoption and revision of law as refers to security, anti-terrorism fight in several states².

These evolutions made fragile the guarantees, protections and involved an increasing vulnerability of persons

caused by terrorist acts,
[https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373\(2001\)](https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001)), (28.10.2019)

² Philippe Bonolitti, Colombe Camus, Stephan Davidshofer et al., *Le rôle des militaires dans la lutte contre le terrorisme*, Centre d'études en sciences sociales de la défense, 2008, 221 p.
https://www.academia.edu/2105423/Le_r%C3%B4le_des_militaires_dans_la_lutte_contre_le_Terrorisme, (28.10.2019)

¹ UN. Security Council. Resolution S/RES/1373 (2001). *Threats to international peace and security*

suspected as being participants to terrorism actions.

The truth is that this process had also negative consequences; we especially refer to the indirect favouring of torture application toward the persons suspected about terrorism.

Without pretending to a new element in defining torture we will try to describe the torture phenomenon in the conditions in which it gains a special weight – armed conflicts, mass disorders, presence of totalitarian regimes etc. We draw attention that the regulatory framework applicable to the mentioned situations differs – from the norms of the international humanitarian law up to the constitutional provisions of this state. We also have to remember the fact that for all these situations is common the obligation to respect and to ensure the respect of the so called "nucleus" of human rights, through which is the non-admission of applying torture.

The level of applicability of torture by the state bodies mostly depends on the level of "civilization" society to which is joined the level of tolerance of torture cases from the decision makers in each separate situation, although at this chapter we have particular reserves. Who could suppose, for instance that the German nation, whose level of "civilization" hadn't never woken doubts, would admit the Nazi regime in the middle of the XXth century? Another example constitutes the case of the ex-Yugoslavia. At the end of the XXth century in the centre of Europe there were committed terrible crimes which can be compared with those from the Middle Ages, characterized by religious, inter-ethnic wars, inquisition etc. Which would be, for instance the arguments in case of massacres of Srebrenica of 1995?! That is why this criterion cannot be a secure one. Another criterion would be the ECHR jurisprudence, after its examination we can find that the torture cases are committed not only in the "new" independent states and those which recently got rid of

totalitarian communist regimes, but also in such states as would be France, Great Britain, Italy etc., states which are considered as being the swing of democracy and where the human rights are ensured at the highest level.

The imperative character of the obligation of combating torture in the context of anti-terrorism fight

We will focus on the report which is an integral part of REDRESS project with the title "Reparation for Torture: Global Sharing of Expertise", supported by the European Union through the European instrument for democracy and human rights¹.

The answer of USA administration after the attacks of September 11, 2001 raised a number of uncertainties and gives a negative example, compromising the absolute interdiction of torture, trying to argue the negation of this interdiction. This is characterized by:

- Putting into question the absolute interdiction of torture, asking if it can be applied to persons suspected of terrorism;
- Restricts the definition of torture, excluding the sad practice celebrated by *water boarding* by its significance, pretending that some obligations, as would be prohibition of return is not applied to other cruel types of treatments;
- Searching to exclude the persons taken under custody from the justice protection (especially in the detention centres of Guantanamo Bay);
- Limitation of critical position of public opinion and access to justice, especially offering confidentiality to the information and focusing on ensuring national security;
- Putting into operation a difficult program together with other states where the persons suspected of terrorism will be sent in order to be interrogated and

¹ *La justice pour les victimes de la torture dans le monde. Droit, pratique et évolutions nécessaires*, Octobre 2013, <https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=52fa28dd4>, (28.10.2019)

supposed to cruel treatments, including by application of torture;

- Offering an effective impunity to the persons responsible of torture acts or acceptance of this practice¹.

The special report on promotion and protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms and anti-terrorism fight described the main elements of the American program of return as follows:

On 17th of September 2001 President Bush authorized the CIA to operate a secret detention program which involved the establishment of clandestine detention facilities known as “black sites” on the territory of other States, with the collaboration of public officials in those States. At about the same time he allegedly authorized the CIA to carry out “extraordinary renditions” (the secret transfers of prisoners outside any lawful process of extradition or expulsion) enabling them to be interrogated whilst in the formal custody of the public officials of other States, including States with a record of using torture. At the beginning of August 2002 the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel purported to authorize a range of physical and mental abuse of terrorist suspects known as “enhanced interrogation techniques”. The Bush administration has since publicly acknowledged the use of “water boarding” on “high value detainees” on the personal authority of the President².

In a memorandum of the Office of Legal Counsel of the American department

of justice of May 10, 2005, the authorized treatments were distributed to three categories:

1. Techniques of conditionality;
2. Corrective techniques;
3. Coercive techniques (123)³.

The techniques of conditionality were conceived for demonstrating to the person under custody that he has no type of control on the basic human needs. They include nudity, manipulation of diet and deprivation of sleeping.

By the corrective techniques especially we speak about correction, fear or to wait another objective on getting results from the person under custody. More concretely, facial slaps or abdominal slaps and facial hold or the action of attention grasps make part of these techniques.

The coercive techniques put the person under custody in a more stressed situation from the psychological and mental view point. These measures contain walling (projection of person before a wall), water dousing and using positions which cause mental shyness (stress positions); these methods can in equal measure be used in association with the coercive or conditionality techniques. These techniques were recognized by the European Committee for prevention of torture as „categorically leading to violations of torture interdiction and inhuman and degrading treatments”⁴.

Meetings with 14 persons under custody, called “of great value”, had with CICR after their transfer in Guantanamo

¹ Comité des droits de l'homme, *Observations finales: États-Unis d'Amérique*, Doc. ONU CCPR/C/USA/CO/3, 15 septembre 2006, pp. 11-21

² *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism*, Ben Emmerson, «Framework Principles for securing the accountability of public officials for gross or systematic human rights violations committed in the context of State counter-terrorism initiatives», Doc. UN A/HRC/22/52, 1 March 2013, p. 15

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A-HRC-22-52_en.pdf, (28.10.2019)

³ CIA, *Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques*, Central Intelligence Agency, Dan Levin, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, 30 December 2004, p. 4, http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/olcremand/2004olc97_.pdf (28.10.2019)

⁴ *Report to the Lithuanian Government on the visit to Lithuania carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 November to 4 December 2012*, <https://rm.coe.int/1680697367>, (28.10.2019)

Bay at the end of 2006 year, describe the return processes as follows:

„The transfer procedure was clearly regulated in the majority of cases. The person under custody was photographed, inclusively dressed and naked before the transfer and after it. An examination of the body cavity (rectal examination) was performed and according to some persons under custody, a suppository was administered at that moment (the type and effects of those suppositories weren't known by the persons under custody). Than the person under custody was forced to wear a diaper and some cloths over their cloths. They put headphones on their ears, and often put music. Their eyes were covered by a fabric knotted around the head and black glasses-mask. The person under custody was with tied hands and feet and he was transported to the air-port and then he got into the plane. Generally he was transported in a inclined position handcuffed in front. Obviously that the time for transportation was varying considerable and it was from 1 hour to 24 or even 30 hours. In addition, the person under custody had no right to go to WC, sometimes the persons under custody were transported lying down or inclined in the air plane and/or handcuffed in the back part. In case they were transported in this position, the persons under custody had complaints of strong pains. In addition we mention the acute mental pains, these transfers to unknown places and unforeseen detention and treatment conditions cause mental tensions to those 14 persons under custody, intensifying their sensation of disorientation and isolation. The capacity of authorities of custody bodies to transfer persons to important distances, in secret places and foreign countries, considerable increases the sufferance feeling and helplessness of persons under custody, it made them more vulnerable to the described bad treatments”¹.

¹ ICRC, *Report on the Treatment of Fourteen "High Value Detainees"* in CIA Custody, 14 Feb

This program made place to the torture practices and bad treatments. The main objective of the program of return was to get information from the suspected persons. While it was conducted, the suspected persons were humbled, badly treated and supposed for a long period to torture acts in the states where were interrogated. For instance, Maher Arar, a Canadian engineer, specialist in telecommunications who was suspected as being a terrorist was "returned" by USA, with the participation of the intelligence services of Canada, Jordan and then Syria where he was under custody for about 1 year and he was supposed to long period torture².

The returns were in equal measure applied also by another states, fact which makes us to think that the American practice served as a model. For instance, Kenya returned five Kenyans to Uganda authorities. Mbugua Mureithi, a Kenyan lawyer and Al-Amin Kimathi, another Kenyan were arrested by the authorities of Uganda while they were searching to get the freedom of those five Kenyans, thus exposing themselves to an expulsion procedure and one year of being under custody³.

Accusations of complicity to torture were also formulated as in the case of the behaviour of Great Britain in Pakistan.⁴ Although, it was very difficult to submit the facts reported in the secret situation which covered this subject. Binyam Mohamed, an Ethiopian national who was a legal resident in Great Britain of 1994, he was arrested in Pakistan in 2002, and he was saying that he was the subject of an extraordinary return in Morocco and Afghanistan, before being under custody in Guantanamo Bay.

2007,
<http://www.nybooks.com/media/doc/2010/04/22/icrc-report.pdf>, (28.10.2019)

² *La justice pour les victimes de la torture dans le monde*, p. 33

³ *Idem*

⁴ *La justice pour les victimes de la torture dans le monde*, p. 33

Binyam Mohamed being under the risk of being accused of terrorism before an American military commission, through his lawyers submits an action in justice in 2008 for getting the communication held by Great Britain¹.

After making available of some grounds within this action in justice long and complex, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Home Secretary) of Great Britain required the General Prosecutor to be organized the investigation about the actions undertaken by MI 5 (British intelligence service) and CIA referring to the treatment (presumed torture) of Binyam Mohamed. The British government finally was obliged to offer the details known about the treatment of Binyam Mohamed, but the efforts which concerned the identification of responsible persons from the high commandment failed due to the lack of grounds for initiating the criminal prosecution².

In the conditions in which the programs of secret return lead effectively to the forced disappearance of persons under custody, the states looked for expulsion or extradition of persons who were suspected of terrorism to the third states. This practice is a problematic one, because the concerned persons are supposed to an inevitable risk to be tortured in the destination states.

As a consequence, some states, as would be the case of Great Britain and Morocco,³ started more often to make appeal to „diplomatic insurances” or agreement protocols for preventing the return cases. With these instruments, the destination states guarantees not applying torture toward the returned persons and accept putting into operation some supervision mechanisms. These insurances were widely criticized by the supervision bodies instituted by concluded treaty, inclusively by the International Charter of human rights of the United States, as well

as by several NGO's the national authorities as would be British SIAC (Special Immigration Appeals Commissions), and those regional, especially ECHR adopted an approach from case to case which reflects this case, sanctioning the expulsions applied based on such insurances.⁴ This practice aroused real incertitude, especially referring to the terms of efficacy of insurance in individual cases, but in equal measure of pertinence to make appeal to such dispositions, being given the fact that it is about an approach in the context of some states in which the attitude toward the torture is enough contestable.

The adverse effect of the measures for fighting against terrorism goes out of the mediatized affairs; especially it refers to proliferation of law in the issues of security and anti-terrorism fight. While, in usual way this law doesn't explicitly authorize the torture and bad treatments, it frequently creates exceptions which make fragile the guarantees against use of torture. It especially applies to the guarantees in the period of temporary detentions before a judge⁵. Some laws, as is the law of Sri Lanka on prevention of terrorism (Prevention of Terrorism Act), also facilitated the practice of forced confessions, imposing the task of evidence to the defender and accepting the confessions made at the police office and restrict other rights to defense. In many countries as would be, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sudan or Syria, the official representatives benefit based on laws on security or anti-terrorism fight of immunity, fact which impedes the investigations⁶.

Considering the more global systemic pact, the security measures and

¹ Idem

² Idem

³ Ibidem

⁴ European Court of Human Rights, *Case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom*. 17 January 2012,

⁵ *La justice pour les victimes de la torture dans le monde*, p. 35

⁶ Ibidem

anti-terrorism fight grants more priority to the security aspects in relation to the individual rights, thus favouring the international networks which are accomplices in applying torture, in the implicit or explicit manner. In the American return programs, states as Lithuania, Poland and Romania pretended that held "black sites" for the "great value persons under custody", Great Britain and others were offering the right of making a pass over and others as would be Libya and Syria received the suspects for interrogating them¹. The measures of legislative manner served as bad examples, creating exceptions and consolidating the excessive control of those who depend on guarantees of legal manner and of the obligation to become responsible. All these politics are argued by factor of ethical and religious manner of persons who woke up before a vacuum of rights as a consequence of a series of measures. For instance, vague offences, long term custody and lack of the second appeal. In this context, the persons under custody are vulnerable before different forms of torture, including the positional, psychological torture and degrading treatments through which a special role is offered to religious, racial and sexual offends.

The civil society, lawyers specialized in human rights and other actors every time denounced these practices with mixed results. The attempts to initiate investigations in several cases were blocked, especially in USA where the government invoked several times the privilege of the state secret. For instance, in the case of Mohamed c. Jeffesen Dataplan Inc., which concerned five victims of the program of extraordinary return to CIA, initiating an action against the transportation company for its presumed involvement, application of this privilege transformed in a rejection even before the identification or evaluation of

the substantive aspects.² At the same time, other cases, as would be that of Binyam Mohamed of Great Britain knew a favorable result, despite the obstacles of legal matter and the secret privilege³.

Human rights in the light of the contemporary concept of the international security

Through the institutions with an important role in maintaining the international security, but concerned about the protection of human rights is OSCE. In principle this organization rediscovered itself in 1973 as a multicultural dialogue, called "Helsinki process", transformed in the Conference for security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), thus initiating cooperation in the issues of European security. From the very beginning, the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975 defined one of those three fields of action of the Conference – cooperation in the field of human rights. Thus, the action of CSCE, transformed in 1995 in the organization (OSCE), provides through others to participate in offering help to old authorities in strengthening the observance of human rights on its territory. In addition, UN which provides the protection and development of observance of human rights by the states in the art. 1 of the Charter was authorized by the states with competences sometimes being secondary in their vision Chapter VII of UN Charter when the violation of human rights is classified as a „danger for peace, a violation of peace or an act of aggression”, by the Security Council. This role permitted meanwhile, in the Viennese vision of UN to enclose in the concept of

¹ Ibidem

² United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Mohamed c. Jeffesen Dataplan Inc. September 8, 2010, <https://www.aclu.org/cases/mohamed-et-al-v-jeffesen-dataplan-inc>, (28.10.2019).

³ *La justice pour les victimes de la torture dans le monde*, p. 36

human security, the arguments will be immediately presented¹.

The approach which consists to make connection between the international security and the protection of human rights has a historical continuity. In principle, integration of protection of these rights in the issues of security goes in parallel with the notion of security. Starting from the notion of security where the accent is put on the military security of the state, to a definition where the main concerned persons are those who should be protected by the state, namely its population. Especially in this context it appeared the notion of human security. In principle, this notion is more concise than that of security in its wide meaning and it rests in a clear manner to suppose that it considers the well-being of human person. Namely in 1994 this notion of human security appears in the World Report on human development, published by UNDP².

Today, in the moment when UN considers the protection of human rights in all the fields of activity of the organization, as a result of proposals of reforms made by the Secretary General of UN, Kofi Annan in 1997, it seems to be logic that one of the objectives for which the organization was established, the security comprises also and this issue. Even the notions of human rights and human security have different definitions; this fact doesn't impede their interaction between them. The interest of a relation between the human rights and security was expressed during the seminar organized in 2001 in Costa Rica by the Commission on human security and as it is provided in the Report of 2003 called

"Human security now",³ the last and the human rights are two concepts which can be mutually qualified. The fact for us not considering that the international security could be seen without referring to the protection of human rights; permitted putting the human person in the centre of the international game. In principle, as it could be seen together with UN, considering that the human protection makes part of its objectives and as a consequence feeds its legal body in the matters of texts which do not impose participation, as would be the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 or texts mandatory from the legal view point, as would be the Treaties of 1966.

Thus we see several centres of interest referring to security which are examined in the light of human rights protection. In this chapter we can refer for instance to the arms trafficking. In principle, we find out that several groups and NGO's for the protection and defence of human rights, as those who interested about the human security proposed the same methods for fighting against arms and arms trafficking, considering that this issue reflects both fields. The interests we could identify referring to this subject, on the other hand is disarmament.

This analysis of the notion of security permits us to find out that the subject of the international security cannot be today analyzed without considering the protection of human rights. This protection is in the heart of the security objective which is put in terms, in a different way from that of the organizations.

As it was already mentioned, in 1994 the World Report on human development published by UNDP evokes for the first time the notion of human

¹ Adélaïde Etong-Kamé, Marie-Pierre Djekou, Pauline Zamia, *Sécurité internationale et protection des droits de l'homme*, <https://mastercarrieresinternationales.wordpress.com/2013/09/22/la-securite-internationale-et-la-protection-des-droits-de-lhomme/> (28.10.2019)

² *Rapport mondial sur le développement humain 1994*, Economica, Paris, 1994, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_1994_fr_complet_nostats.pdf (28.10.2019)

³ *La sécurité humaine en théorie et en pratique. Application du Concept de Sécurité Humaine et Fonds des Nations Unies pour la Sécurité Humaine*, <https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Publication%20and%20Products/Human%20Security%20Tools/Human%20Security%20in%20Theory%20and%20Practice%20French.pdf> (28.10.2019)

security. According to it, this concept was integrated by a big number of international organizations and institutions which within its actions follow to put it into operation. Through them we have to signal that UN is in the first line, especially after it seized about the principle of the "responsibility to protect" after the report of the International commission for intervention and sovereignty of states, published in 2001 and which attempted to define in a more clear manner this principle¹. Or, we can see that it is an attempt to regulate the international system putting into operation an order founded not only by the primacy and sovereignty of the states, but in equal measure on considering the population and protection of its rights. Thus, this responsibility to protect is based on the totality of entities of the international community, either it is about the states or inter-governmental or non-governmental international organizations, each having the possibility to have a role at each involved stage. It introduces a mission of prevention, reaction and reconstruction, the first one being essential and that where the majority of actors have the capacity and possibility to react. The purpose is the „elimination of deep causes and direct causes of the internal conflicts and other crises produced by human being which endanger the populations”². Thus we see that the relation between the protections of human rights which constitutes a large element of human security, together with the maintenance of the international security is widely set. That's from this point of view that UN fully identifies in the conditions in which the first victims of the conflict, usually are the representatives of the civil society.

¹ CIISE, *La responsabilité de protéger : Rapport de la Commission internationale de l'intervention et de la souveraineté des États*, Ottawa, Décembre 2001, 120 p. <https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/17566/IDL-17566.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y> (28.10.2019)

² Idem

In the case when it applies to the approach of human security concept, the actions undertaken by NGO's and international organizations which aspire to ameliorate the life conditions of persons, they also participate to the sanitary objective in its classical approaching, while they build an environment which will be not supposed to emergencies of frontal confrontation. Thus, it is widely admitted that the deep causes of crises are identified in sub-development, poverty, starvation, but in equal measure in the more general issue of the rule of law. Thus, all the enterprises which follow the purpose of consolidating the democracy especially can be seen as the preventive mechanisms. This is the approach which was adopted by the International Organization of Francophonie, for instance, which introduced in an express manner its action in the mission of preventing, fact which is indicated by the concept of the responsibility of protecting.³

In a general manner, we can say that the development of the human security concept which makes a large part to the promotion and protection of human rights reflects the need of granting a central place, in any case in speeches, to human rights. The parallel is drawn between the well-being of population and security in the future its approach. Thus, the international organizations as would be NATO which in principle is focused exclusively on the military issues, can register its actions in the lineage of human rights protection.

The issue which is put in this general tendency which consists in invoking protection of human rights within the international relations, firstly in relation to security which is concerned of putting into operation the reactive aspect of

³ André Cabanis, Jean-Marie Crouzatier, Ruxandra Ivan, Ernest-Marie Mbonda et Ciprian Mihali, *La responsabilité de protéger: une perspective francophone*, Idea Design & Print, Cluj, 2010, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d42e/71d782fb9e32d35d96135d07da0187be9bc3.pdf> (28.10.2019)

the responsibility of protecting and to know if it is not about an additional means to make playing the existent force reports and following hidden interests, a principle to which no-body can oppose in an opened manner.

The main feature of OSCE action is the multidimensional approach in the assistance offered to the states. Thus, the pure issues of security itself and approach are focused on promotion of human rights. The human rights represent a topic of Helsinki Conference founder of the organization created in the conditions of the "cold war". Next it was signed the Charter of Paris which institutionalizes the Helsinki Conference putting into operation the permanent institutions, as would be the Office of Democratic institutions and human rights, so the heart of the mission being focused on the position of electoral observer.

Thus, becoming a member of OSCE, the states assign the political engagement, and in no case the legal engagement to accept electoral observers on its territory. This mission of observers is made for a short and long period through a report on the second day after the elections, making the first appreciation of its conduct, followed than by a report with recommendations on different means for ameliorating their organization to more democracy and as a consequence to a greater respect of human rights.

For instance, some politicians or experts make reference to Kosovo case which currently, in their opinion this is the most important OSCE mission in this issues. The challenge for the organization consists in promotion of coexistence between the communities and amelioration of the dialogue between the Kosovo government and Serbian community. This mission contains in equal measure an action of counselling for the acceptance by the minorities of the state activity, but mostly it comprises a project of cooperation for putting into operation of a rule of law – the fundamental target for

these populations. For this purpose, OSCE reached the consolidation of a Ministry of Internal Affairs. Actually, in June 2012, a mission of observers went in Serbia, especially for helping regulating the issue on participation to vote of Serbians of Kosovo¹. As a result, there is the fear to see the organization of some clandestine polling stations, so not-controlled, especially in the Northern part of Kosovo. In the opinion of these experts, OSCE is the only one organization which could have a role which would permit this participation in compliance with the legal rules, organizing the voting based on the sample of voting system at the consulates for expatriates.

The target and impact of such a procedure remains limited to the sense of absence on legal basis. These post-election reports come simple to influence the image which can be re-sent by the nominalized state, so respecting the democratic rules related to elections and in relation to the democratic legitimacy of the winning parties. For making sweet the absence of legal effects, in parallel there are reunions within the permanent Council which meanwhile is the theatre of some debates, including the aspects of human dimension.

Conclusion

The situations of political transition are meanwhile perceived as being the most propitious for guaranteeing the obligation to be liable, paying the reparations and applying the widest democratic changes. They offer to the actors of the civil society and other persons a unique occasion to involve and to defence the mechanisms or the processes which concern the identification of causes and consequences of torture, offer indemnities and other forms of reparation to victims, and the possibility to initiate particular reforms in this field. At the same time, some of these

¹ OSCE Chair welcomes facilitation of voting in Kosovo in Serbian parliamentary, presidential elections,
<https://www.osce.org/cio/90173> (28.10.2019)

processes didn't pay sufficient attention to the specific experiences of torture, or the multitude of actors involved can easily lead to a limited understanding of the types of specific reforms necessary for the fight against torture more efficiently and guaranteeing the specific resources. For not producing particular deficiencies of the past „transitional justice”, it is important the complete integration of torture issues on these processes and keeping watch as the victims of torture and the persons who action on their behalf, to have the necessary space for sharing their experience, including the mechanisms which would permit them to capitalize their rights.

Defenders of human rights use more and more the networks at the national, regional and international level for getting justice and protection in individual cases and for pleading in the favour of the more large changes concerning the re-establishment of the rights of victims and prohibition of torture. This includes an increased focus on the potential of defending the cases using submission of claims and favourable decisions for emphasizing the need of a deep change. Making appeal to the authorities who keep watch the treaties in the issues of human rights and studies of reports of the member states prepared by the Committees of the United Nations and the bodies established based on UN Charter can be means for using the international courts for making a diplomatic pressure on these states. The companies also have to be carefully established for getting clear results and for benefiting of a space inside so that the change to be effective.

This research permits us to find out that the norms which constitute the „nucleus” of human rights are recognized as the norms with imperative character of international law, fact which imposes the obligation to respect them in any conditions, either it is about an armed conflict, or a crisis situation dictated by the

provision of the national security. Or, in the context in which there are formulated new directions of research in the international law, whose objective is ensuring the interests of person, ignorance of a such approach can be catalogued not else than a refusal to recognize the direction of civilizing development of the society. It is certain that approaching the subject on international security, except the aspects related to provision of fundamental human rights and freedoms doesn't correspond to current tendencies of construing the international law.

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HYBRID THREATS: MODERN PERCEPTION AND TACTICS

Abstract:	<i>The article " Hybrid threats: modern perception and tactics" addresses the issues of hybrid threats which directly affect European security, especially in the South-East European countries, including the Republic of Moldova and Romania. In these countries, hybrid threats affect both security and national interests and destabilize the political system in general. Carried out by external actors with geostrategic interests in the region, the tools of hybrid attacks are often national politicians with double standards or organizations, which undermine the democratic values of society. The author argues that the effects of globalization, pandemic, hyper connectivity and digitization have greatly amplified the effectiveness of hybrid threats, which is the reason for a strong necessity to encourage further studies of new forms and tactics of this phenomenon.</i>
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At international and national levels, there is currently an ongoing battle against hybrid threats. Specialists in various fields are trying to find viable solutions in the process of combating this phenomenon, which obviously affects all areas of a state.

Asymmetrical threats, including hybrid threats are on the agenda of post-Cold War era. If hybrid threats were a characteristic of the Cold War, then today, when the multipolar world is increasingly pronounced in its pursuit of supremacy, there are some which take a more severe form in addition to these one. Historical events, such as the emergence of ISIS and the annexation of Crimea, show that hybrid threats have entered a new stage. These are the hybrid wars that are difficult to detect. Behind the hybrid threats, there are the state's intelligence institutes.

Today hybrid threats directly affect European security, focusing especially in the South-East European countries, including Republic of Moldova and Romania. In these countries, hybrid threats affect both security and national interests and destabilize the political system in general. Carried out by external actors with geostrategic interests in the region, the tools of hybrid attacks are often national politicians with double standards interests or institutions, which undermine the democratic values of society.

The basic purpose of hybrid threats is to weaken social cohesion in society, to form political instability, to increase mistrust among state citizens, to radicalize vulnerable members of society, to create worry and panic in the social environment. The main mechanisms of hybrid threats are fake news, cyber-attacks, and

misinformation campaigns. There is no doubt that today hybrid threats have penetrated into various areas of the global social system, using economic, political, military, cultural, cyber, media tools.

The means of attacking the enemy have a political, informational, psychological and economic character. These methods allow achieving the necessary results – to cause political, economic and territorial damage to the adversary, to disorder the state and administrative system, to demoralize the society¹.

In the current context of the multiple security challenges facing the international community, the in-depth study of the phenomenon of hybrid threats is a priority for security theory and practice. Although for some the term “hybrid threat” is unclear and imprecise, the studies on this term have a multi aspectual character in the literature.

Many scholars and analysts contest the utility of the ‘hybrid’ label, criticizing it for conveying little that is new, or for being imprecise or outright misleading. The way we label developments in international security is not merely an academic issue, but it will affect how policy-makers understand and deal with security challenges, with potentially far-reaching repercussions for interstate relations².

To facilitate a basic common understanding of the concept of hybrid threats, the European Centre of Excellence for countering hybrid threats (HybridCoE), established in Helsinki in 2017, has studied around 40 different definitions including

three formulated by the EU (2015-2018) and four by NATO (2010-2018)³. Based on those definitions, it has extrapolated an overarching characterization, describing hybrid threats as follows: “Coordinated and synchronized action that deliberately targets democratic states’ and institutions’ systemic vulnerabilities, through a wide range of means. The activities exploit the thresholds of detection and attribution as well as the different interfaces (war-peace, internal-external, local-state, national-international, friend-enemy). The aim of the activity is to influence different forms of decision-making at the local (regional), state, or institutional level to favour and/or gain the agent’s strategic goals while undermining and/or hurting the target”⁴.

Hybrid threats are used by both state and non-state actors, representing subversive and restrictive activities. The main purpose of a hybrid attack is that the object exposed to the attack does not realize who is the author of hybrid threats. This represents a problem not only for states, but also for the European Union entirely. That is why the EU is working hard to strengthen its capacity to respond to hybrid threats from outside. The biggest hybrid threats in the EU are those related to political destabilization and critical infrastructure, especially the energy sector. Although different EU structures use a wide range of indicators on early warning of hybrid threats, there is still no a EU-wide Strategy to Combat Hybrid Threats. On December 10, 2019, the Council of Europe adopted a series of conclusions setting out priorities and guidelines for EU cooperation in combating hybrid threats and improving resilience to such threats. The European Council recognizes the progress made on the implementation of the Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid

¹ Svetlana Cebotari, *Războiul hibrid. Unele considerațiuni*, in “Revista Militară”, No. 1 (13), 2015, p. 27

² Mikael Wigell, *Hybrid Interference as a Wedge Strategy: A Theory of External Interference in Liberal Democracy*, in “International Affairs”, vol. 95, No. 2 (2019), pp. 255 -256, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330957623_Hybrid_Interference_as_a_Wedge_Strategy_A_Theory_of_External_Interference_in_Liberal_Democracy, (26.05.2020)

³ Hanna Smith, *Countering hybrid threats*, in “The EU and NATO. The essential partners, EU Institute for Security Studies”, 2019, p. 14 [https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISS_Files/EU%20and%20NATO.pdf\(21.03.2020\)](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISS_Files/EU%20and%20NATO.pdf(21.03.2020)).

⁴ Ibidem, p. 15

Threats (2016) and the Joint Communication on Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats (2018) as well as the Action Plan against Disinformation (2018), in line with the relevant Council Conclusions. The European Council emphasizes the EU's commitment to continue close and mutual reinforcing cooperation and support to all relevant partner countries, in particular in the EU neighborhood, on enhancing resilience and countering hybrid threats¹.

Referring to the classic conflict, the hybrid model is a dynamic interaction between hard power elements (military force consolidation, deployment of military forces and capabilities in conflict zones, financing separatist movements, destabilization and undermining security of a state or region); and soft power (maintaining an economic or energy dependency, applying economic sanctions, running propaganda campaigns, misinforming and influencing, cyber attacks, etc.).

Hybrid actions represent violence manifests in new forms, such as a skilled use of asymmetric and asynchronous fighting methods, proven to be successful in other conflicts/ areas; the use of top technologies (IT, drones, etc.) that can give unanticipated circumstantial advantages to the players relying on conventional military power; the use of the initiative, limited objectives, special communications, known field objectives, sufficient time to prepare and deploy combat positions; the use of civilian resources and industrial-technical objectives, of weapons of mass destruction, special operations munitions and forces; the use of subversion and combined terrorism; the use of the advanced command/control, training, and

maintenance potential, of intelligence resources in order to gain supremacy; the use of terror and military violence in order to destroy the rule of law; non-military operations, other than war; the development of transboundary crime networks affecting national security; human trafficking (ISIS = sexual slaves, Ukraine = prisoners exchange); blocking the capital market (setting up BRICS bank, Chinese stock exchange gambling); encouragement of corrupt governments (social and economic effects); cyber attacks - bank frauds, identity theft, damage to government and military structures, population disruption; activation and support actions of pro-Russian NGOs and social environment in states considered vectors by Russian Intelligence structures; infiltration of ISIS (through controlled migration) and Russian agents (via business); maintaining frozen conflicts; maintaining instability in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine; political and religious fanaticism, obstruction, repression; political diversion, segregation, fragmentation of states².

The hybrid nature of the new security threats must be seen on two levels: organizational level, when the situation and conditions require it and the level of methods and means, when the involved actors use both conventional and non-conventional means, pursuing the goal of achieving success.

The methods of hybrid threats are implemented through non-military tactics such as propaganda, disinformation, sabotage, subliminal manipulation etc. As a rule, hybrid attacks are carried out by states, but others also become eligible as they have the technological capabilities

¹ *Complementary efforts to enhance resilience and counter hybrid threats - Council Conclusions* (10 December 2019) <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14972-2019-INIT/en/pdf>, (26.05.2020)

² Vasile Simileanu, *Războiul hibrid: abordare conceptuală*, <http://irim.md/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/3-Simileanu.pdf> (22.03.2020)

and financial resources needed to carry out extremely complex cyber attacks¹.

The superior form of manifestation of hybrid threats is the hybrid war, and the light one, but not less dangerous for national security is hybrid interference. In a geopolitical context, "hybrid war" is a new concept, especially used in the field of special forces operations, which combines the practice of harsh resistance with threats to international security with the lessons learned from the struggle against extremism of state or non-state origin. "Hybrid war" is driven both by forces that tend to weaken or overthrow government within a state or area, and by external forces. The actions of the latter aim at supporting and converting the followers for a possible operative support, the impact on the economy and the social sphere, the coordination of diplomatic efforts, and certain protest actions. To this end, special forces, research forces, criminal groups, information and psychological influence on the masses, the use of the whole range of technological innovations are involved².

Specifics of a hybrid war is that the fight is not for the territories, but for the minds and attitudes of the citizens of other states, and the means of combat are very sophisticated. A hybrid war is a confrontation between states, in which one of these states tries to subordinate itself to the other by various means: economic, informational, historical memory. It is a war in which military actions are not a priority, but only as a catalyst.

From a political-military point of view, hybrid warfare can combine a wide range of actions, executed by the opponent with the use of military and irregular units with a simultaneous involvement of civilian components. A researcher at the Center for Strategic International Studies,

N. Fraier presents the following threats, which represent a part of the hybrid war - non-standard terrorist attacks, the use of new technologies superior to military equipment³.

Three bundles of instruments are central to hybrid interference: clandestine diplomacy, geo-economics and disinformation. Clandestine diplomacy is a form of covert action that involves fostering counter-elites and cultivating local subversive organizations to create disarray in the targeted country. It can take the form of backing radical or secessionist political parties, supporting proxies and other agents of influence, as well as nurturing protest movements⁴.

The most well-known tool of hybrid war is propaganda through which it is intended to intoxicate public opinion, change perceptions, misinform and, respectively, modify human behavior.

Disinformation is an encompassing category, covering various forms of information influence operations, whose vast reach and penetration are enhanced by the use of modern media technology. Disinformation campaigns are designed to provoke public discontent and create an aura of distrust. There are two types of disinformation: the inner type, as a lie presented as truth and the superior type in which the object of manipulation is determined to build itself a misrepresentation⁵. Disinformation implies dissimilarity of the real sources and purposes, by a deformed representation or by a tendentious change of reality⁶.

There are twelve professional ways of disinformation: denial of facts if the public had no way of confirming what

¹ *Război hibrid și atacuri cibernetice*, <https://intelligence.sri.ro/razboi-hibrid-si-atacuri-cibernetice/>, (22.03.2020)

² Svetlana Cebotari, *Războiul hibrid. Unele considerațiuni*, in "Revista militară", No. 1 (13), 2015, p. 25

³ Ibidem, p. 27

⁴ Mikael Wigell. *Democratic Deterrence. How to Dissuade Hybrid Interference*. FIIA working paper, September, 2019, p. 5, https://www.fiaa.fi/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/wp110_democratic-deterrence.pdf, (12.02.2020)

⁵ Vladimir Volkoff, *Dezinformarea armă de război*, Incitatus, București, 2000, p.5

⁶ Henri-Pierre Cathala, *Epoca dezinformării*, Antet, București, 1995, p.17

actually happened, we can simply deny; reversal of facts that are simply declared; the mix between truth and falsehood with various titles; changing circumstances; modification of the reason; blurring which consists in drowning the real facts in the mass of other facts without any connection with them, preferably more capable of causing public interest; camouflage that communicates the facts in the smallest details; interpretation represents the facts that are not denied, modified, blurred or camouflaged and that can be presented and commented in a favourable or unfavourable way; the generalization is used to show that you are not the only one in such a situation; illustration is used to move from individual to general (the behavior of several people); equal parts are practiced in the last phase of misinformation, when the public opinion has already become predominantly favourable to the disinformation; quantity plays a decisive role in misinformation¹.

Hybrid threats are aimed at the vulnerabilities of the adversary, when complex state and non-state actors are applied to those states or institutions that are considered as adversaries.

Hybrid threats are a danger to the state security and have a very complex structure, with a direct involvement of intelligence services which conduct integrated and controlled hybrid actions. That's why measures to combat hybrid threats must be complex, involving both state institutions and civil society. Combating measures must include national hybrid anti-threat policies, increasing citizens' security education by raising awareness of these dangers, implementing various media campaigns and national projects to expose the dangers of hybrid threats.

The development of close collaboration at regional and international

level is one of the major priorities in preventing and combating hybrid threats by detecting, investigating and tracking timely cyber connections, used hybrid threat techniques and possible links to other forms of criminal activity.

Due to the geostrategic interests of other states, in the Republic of Moldova hybrid threats are more pronounced. The Moldavian authorities established on January 31, 2019 the Working Group for the Development of the Interinstitutional Mechanism on Combating Hybrid Threats.

The maintenance of each state's national security is based on the creation of an inter-institutional framework, compliance with international rules and active involvement in the management of hybrid threats. Hybrid threats are taking on a new form, involving the widespread use of political, economic and information measures. In order to combat them, the efforts of the state authorities are aimed at strengthening the capacities to combat these threats through new and improved technologies that can provide unforeseen circumstantial advantages over hybrid actors.

Cybercrime, espionage, propaganda, diversion and exploitation of excessive amount of personal data through electronic communication networks are used as basic tools at all stages of designing a hybrid threat security and calls for a collective and regulated response based on coordinated mechanisms and actions for the implementation of policies in the field, technical and legal assistance from the perspective of security imperatives, oriented towards creating a favourable and safe information environment for the citizens, for the business environment at any level and for the state².

¹ Diana Benchechi, *Puterea politică și ordinea socială în perioada de tranziție: manifestări și interdependențe (cazul Republicii Moldova)*, CEP USM, Chisinau, 2003, p. 118

² *Strategia securității informaționale a Republicii Moldova pentru anii 2019–2024 și a Planului de acțiuni pentru implementarea acesteia*. Hotărârea Guvernului Nr. 257 din 22.11.2018, in: Monitorul Oficial No. 13-21 art. 80 din 18.01.2019

It is important that public institutions with competences in the field of information security encourage and promote official sources, penalize sites that promote hybrid threats, and delete provocative materials that could harm citizens and the state.

The evolution of information technology and the diversification of media sources, on the one hand, create favourable premises for the proper functioning of contemporary society, and, on the other hand, facilitate the use of propaganda and media aggression by subversive centers in order to destabilize the socio-political situation and undermine the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. Hybrid security threat is a subversive and intelligence operation, conducted or placed under the command of states, non-state entities, organizations, individuals, which specifically targets the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of a sovereign, independent and honest government¹.

Not only state institutions are actively involved in combating hybrid threats, but also civil society. Thus, for example, the Institute for the Prevention of Hybrid Threats, a non-governmental organization created in July 2019 whose purpose is to prevent and combat false news, misinformation and propaganda in Moldova, launched at the same time as the Center for Prevention and Combating Hybrid Threats.

It's important to note that hybrid threats have already overtaken the testing of their effects in achieving their goals. Cybernetic space is widely used for various purposes. As major aspects of our interest, we particularly want to note the manipulation of public opinion, formation of a way of dissimulated perceiving events, interference in political life, and

mobilization of large groups of people (the so-called Twitter revolution).

The system of measures for the annihilation of hybrid threats must comprise three directions: *prevention* (application of measures that would help to avoid certain effects in the context in which the truthfulness of the sources of hybrid threats are unknown); *detection* (identification of the presence of hybrid threats in different domains of social system); *answers to threats* (actions that could be considered and solutions for similar situations in the future).

In conclusion, we should mention that hybrid threats are not new. But due to the increasing influence of the digital world, globalization and the effects of self-isolation on the strength of pandemic, hybrid threats reach their peak of effectiveness. This is the reason for a strong necessity to encourage further studies of new forms and tactics of this phenomenon.

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HOW ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE IS SECURING THE NATIONAL SECURITY

Abstract:	<i>This article brings into discussion the way in which globalization becomes increasingly complex and the economic competitiveness has reached a level never found in history, and why an adaptive reaction from the state is required. Achieving the state's economic security objectives is dependent on its ability to integrate into global and regional structures. The strategic process that allows it to adapt in the geo-economic space is the economic intelligence. History proves it fully.</i> <i>The great global powers have adapted, in their own particular way, the competitive intelligence, and their well-being and power are the fruit of the efficiency of the implementation of these processes. Competitive intelligence has helped Japan recover after World War II, it has also helped France become a great colonial power, while the United States maintains and extends its power globally.</i>
Keywords:	Economic competitiveness; Globalization; Economic intelligence; History; Competitive intelligence; Global power
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Introduction

The concept of security is constantly evolving and is updated by the realities of an era. Several interacting dimensions of security can be currently identified. Among the most important, we can identify the following: economic, political, military, social, environmental, juridicial etc.¹.

Of all those mentioned, the economic aspect of security is the one offering support in accomplishing the other aspects. Lack of a strong economy renders it impossible to sustain a military force and manage integration in a global context. Romania's National Defence Strategy defines, from an economic standpoint, the following two national security objectives: "insuring a top of the line economic environment and financial and budgetary

¹ Constantin Onisor, Veronica Mihalache, *Introduction to Security Issues*, Publishing House of the National Academy of Information "Mihai Viteazul", Bucharest, 2011, p. 125

stability (...) promoting economic interests in strategically relevant regions”¹.

It is also stated, on the Romanian Intelligence Department’s website that an important aspect in security policy is “an important, top of the line and competitive economy”². Economy is seen in the context of globalization and is subject to risks, given the highly competitive environment and a continuous readjustment to market signals. The main objective is protecting macro(economic) decision mechanisms.

Separating concepts

From a state standpoint, economic security is defined by the CSIS³ (Centre for Strategic and International Studies) as follows:

- Maintaining conditions leading to higher productivity, improved capital and labour, which subsequently lead to a higher living standard for people;
- Ensuring a dynamic, innovative business environment;
- Protecting local and foreign investment setting;
- Securing economic growth.

According to the IISSI⁴ (Institute for Advanced Studies in Internal Security, France) the specific effects of economic intelligence are:

- Economic performance (dissemination of economic information valuable for companies);
- Transforming the state (knowing the business environment);
- Local development (organizing highly specialized networks of companies);

¹Presidential Administration, *Guide to the National Defense Strategy*, 2015, http://old.presidency.ro/static/Ghid%20SNApT_2015-2019_AP.pdf, (10.02.2020)

²<http://www.sri.ro/securitate-economica.html>, (15.02.2020)

³ Center for Strategic and International Studies- <https://www.csis.org/> (07.03.2020).

⁴Institute for Advanced Studies in Internal Security (France), https://data.bnf.fr/en/12155703/institut_des_hautes_etudes_de_la_securite_interieure_france/

- Influence Strategies (companies can, to some degree, influence the environment)⁵.

Geo economy is a concept launched by Edward Nicolae Luttwak, in „The National Interest” journal, where he defines its general characteristics: replacing military means with economic ones, as inner-state confrontation tools. He envisions replacing the influence of military forces of an area with a product’s performance⁶. Geo-economy focuses on a material or economic within a certain area or territory.

Geopolitics defines the power map, namely how various actors carry out their politics of interest within a territory. It is in this context that a new term emerged, describing the new method of action, namely ”soft power”. This term, created by John Nye, describes the ability of successfully carrying out strategies, based on voluntary participation instead of military coercion⁷. Geo-strategy offers the strategic scenario for reaching geo-economic goals.

Globalization is the framework in which economic actors relate with each other in various areas. With globalization, the traditional concept of sovereignty is gone, being replaced with new forms of shared, articulated or common sovereignty. Globalization leads to new opportunities, as well as identifying new risks. The document, also known as “Carayon Report”⁸ highlights a few of the effects of

⁵ Laurence Affres et al, *What Place for Public Power*, in ”Business and Economic Intelligence”, Institute of Higher Internal Security Studies, 2003, p. 232

⁶ Edward N. Luttwak, *The Endangered American Dream: “How to Stop the United States from Becoming a Third World Country and How to Win the Geo-Economic Struggle for Industrial Supremacy Sept. 1994*, Paperback, September 7, 1994

⁷ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*, Paperback - April 26, 2005, p. 72

⁸ Bernard Carayon, ”*Economic Intelligence*”, Competitiveness and Social Cohesion, p 432 <https://books.google.ro/books?id=nuiRDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT36&lpg=PT36&dq=Bernard+Carayon,+Economic+Intelligence,+Competitiveness+and+Soci>

globalization, noticeable in various areas: economic, political and social, in the context of an increased inter-state interdependence and the emergence of new actors, new power centres (regional blocks, non-government organizations etc.

Economic Intelligence

Economic Intelligence is the nervous system operating on all three levels: geo-economic, geopolitical and geo-strategic. It defends both tangible assets (the economy of natural resources) as well as temporary intangible assets (patents, trademarks, intellectual property) or permanent intangible assets.¹

Some of its characteristics are:

- Timely identification of opportunities occurred in the geopolitical space, the market, including identifying and capitalizing the weaknesses of actors competing against us,
- Identifying from an early stage all threats from geo-economic actors, with regards to our own plans and decisions
- Identifying global and local risks, as well as preventing surprises
- Predicting global or regional economic events
- Predicting the behaviour of allied and opposing actors, in short, medium and long term Economic Intelligence focuses on action, and to this end it supplies information helping beneficiaries in making their decisions. It, thus, offers alternative scenarios, supporting decisions makers in view of strategy creation.

It is a systematic process, abiding by the stages of classic intelligence: planning and directing, collection and assessment, analysis and processing of

information, results dissemination and feedback.

Planning is the stage of establishing objectives, the necessary data and defining deadlines, assigning teams and task managers, as well as the financial and logistic budgets. This is the stage where the following questions should be answered: “What must the beneficiaries know?”, “What do they know based on the issue under research?”, “Why must they know?”, “When must they find out the requested information?”, “What decisions and actions are to be taken once the necessary data is disseminated?” and, a very important question: “What are the beneficiary's losses if the required or needed information is not obtained?”

Collection and assessment

Economic intelligence is the nervous system of information, and it involves gathering the data established during the previous stage. This is the stage when information is also assessed. There is also an initial processing of information, making it available for analysis. What matters is not data quantity, but its quality, which is essential for an efficient analysis. Data collection demands a high volume of work. These past years, there has been a significant increase of collected information, due to internet development².

Challenges arise from processing massive quantities of data and verifying their validity. Huge effort was made in building automatic data gathering platforms, that extract entities and the relations between them, duly mapping the data for complex algorithm processing.

Analysis and processing is the stage where the data gathered on actors, the market and relations in economic intelligence is transformed. While the

al+Cohesion,+2003&source=bl&ots=RSyyFnyD3e&sig=ACfU3U0Z6BLLqVKCdPj_3NoedSr1bWYF7A&hl=ro&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiJmvWC6LvpAhVliIsKHeNcAREQ6AEwAXoECAsQAQ#v=onepage&q=Bernard%20Carayon%2C%20Economic%20Intelligence%2C%20Competitiveness%20and%20Social%20Cohesion%2C.

¹ Loredana Ivan, *French Economic Intelligence System*, in “Romanian Journal of Intelligence Studies”, No. 14/2015, p. 145

² Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, Gary Schmitt (eds.), *SUA Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform*, DC: National Strategy Information Center Inc., Washington, 1995, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684520701770634> (20.05.2020)

collection stage implied a high work volume, analysis is intensive, implying significant knowledge and abilities.

Disseminating the analytic product comprises delivering the analytic product to the decision maker or beneficiary. Dissemination is carried out depending on the data, access level and responsibilities. There is a wide range of beneficiaries, depending on the country and the economic intelligence model, and they can be state rulers, ministers and decision makers within ministries, private companies (USA, Japan, China)¹.

Why do we need economic intelligence?

First of all, correct and timely data is required in defending national economic interests, supporting the decision-making process and implementing strategies.

Second, competition is a different process. According to former DGSE (The General Directorate for External Security)² - director, Pierre Marion, from a geo economic standpoint (with regards to interests), we are competitors, not allies, despite the fact that from a military standpoint states are allies, and obtaining economic information from an ally is not inconsistent with being an ally. France is the first country to develop an efficient and primary economic intelligence system, based on data gathering networks of economic information and developing internal structures for economic support³.

Economic war involves actions that are generally unpredictable, invisible for a

superficial analysis and have an important impact on economic processes.

Japan used economic intelligence for its economic reconstruction after World War II, becoming one of the greatest economic powers. MITI (The Ministry of International Trade and Industry)⁴ The Ministry of International Trade and Industry was the institution responsible for carrying out economic intelligence specific activities.

Geopolitics analysis is a products of economic intelligence that must address the following key questions:

- Who are the actors and which are the power relationships?
- What are the actors' interests?
- Which strategy do actors use in achieving their interests?
- How do actors justify their own actions?

Generally, actors from a geopolitical space are states, or interstate groups, that interact economically, culturally and ideologically. In order for an entity to be considered an actor, it is necessary that there is a vital interest in that entity within the space, and for it to hold a certain degree of influence (military, economic, cultural etc). It is by means of these two elements, interest and power, that the actor is connected to a geopolitical space.

Actors who have the capacity of making their power felt and who manifest intent of using it within a region, become geo-strategic players. The most important aspect is to establish allies, current and potential enemies, the conditions for forming alliances and how to set off enemy threats. Which is why, their intents and motivations, as well as relationships and various alliances between various actors are being analysed.

¹ Ibidem, pp. 110-112

² The General Directorate for External Security (French: Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure, DGSE) is France's external intelligence agency. The French equivalent to the United Kingdom's MI6 and the United States' CIA, the DGSE operates under the direction of the French Ministry of Defence and works alongside its domestic counterpart, the DGSI (General Directorate for Internal Security), in providing intelligence and safeguarding French national security.

³ Valentyn Levytskyi, *Economic Intelligence of the Modern State*, 2001, p. 542

⁴ The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/regional-innovation-monitor/organisation/ministry-industry-and-trade->, (07.03.2020)

Instead of a conclusion

In the context of an increasingly complex globalisation and an unprecedented economic competition, the state must have an adaptive reaction. Achieving objectives of economic security of a state depends on its capacity to integrate with the global and regional structures. The strategic process enabling adaptation to a geo-economic space is economic intelligence. There are plenty of examples of this throughout history. The great global powers adapted competitive intelligence their own way, and their wealth and power is the result of an efficient implementation of such processes. Competitive intelligence helped rebuild Japan after World War II, helped France become a great colonial power, the United States in maintaining and expanding its power globally, so it can, of course, help Romania, too.

It takes the activity of state and government specialized institutions, for an economically intelligent system to work, such as the National Security Council, and not Defence one, then the intelligence communities' bodies of management for information requests for coordination, as well as national and department intelligence services. Economic intelligence is, of course, one of the main elements of strategic intelligence¹.

But unfortunately, after 1989, in Romania, there were no talks for a national economic intelligence system. The first actions in this area were taken only a few years ago, through the efforts of some specialists, among whom we refer to Marian Sebe and Gabriel Sebe. It is remarkable that these two professors carried out studies and researched this field, building the foundation of a postgraduate learning program., which wasn't, however publicized nor well

known. The government, as well as the academic environment must be more engaged, through the effort of the Romanian Academy, the economic research institutes, Mihai Viteazu Intelligence Academy and Romanian Universities. We emphasize the need for cooperation between state and private universities, to help and grow the efforts of these two professors, by creating the Economic Intelligence System and, by following the French or American example, invest in training and development.

Of course, the Romanian state has very little control over what is left of national industry and natural resources- a paramount currency for the global geopolitical economy. Consequently, there is no economic intelligence culture in Romania, rather a group, which means there is still a long way to go until the concepts and knowledge of the pioneers and mainly their endeavours are accepted by the political decision makers.

Moreover, in Romania, strategies and action plans are not cohesive: hence, at national level we find the European strategy, but the national strategy is barely visible in regional strategies and the information gets seriously lost before reaching sustainable development strategies locally. Even worse, upon a brief analysis, it becomes obvious that there are four or five styles of strategic models, depending on the areas- energy/economy/local development/communication. Most of the time, these are generally multiplied for each field, without even adapting them. Every four years, we find the same strategy present in an administration's portfolio, re-edited, depending on the available budget, without starting with a professional analysis and moving downward to establishing investment and development priorities.

In Romania there are roughly four million employed people, more than half earning the average gross wage and

¹ Marian Sebe, *Governmental and Private Intelligence for Competitiveness and National Security*, National Academy of Information Publishing House, "Mihai Viteazul" Bucharest, 2009, p. 289

taxation is also high. Romania also has a subsistence agriculture, with the exception of a few large companies who leased state lands through APIA or investors, mainly Italian, who have already bought lands, including at the borders!

Romania also has a large number of retired people, and this number will only go up, considering the fact that the last people born after the 1966 decree (*n.trad. a decree which outlawed abortion and contraceptives*) will retire in roughly 40 years¹. There are a few Romanian educational elites, but the state apparently forgot to take care of the large mass of students or pupils, and this is noticeable in the skills acquired by many graduates and the high number of functional illiterates. In Romania, however, incomes are 1 to 5, for the same level of training, in comparison, for example, with England. Romania is seriously behind other EU developed countries, it is not a strong economy and has lost many advantages, through various arguable privatizations, as one can see nowadays². But there is still room for change. Moreover, few know the real value of a well used information, including by the decision makers. And this is paramount, especially during a crisis or security threatening situations, among which is the one against health security, during a pandemic.

A collective approach, where the government aims at protecting and building national industries ("national champions"), participate directly in the market and, at the same time, supply information and extensive services to the private sector, through formal and standard channels- this could be a possibility, if we were to have a powerful state. Another possible solution, given the respective lack of national strategy, would be an increased complementarity between the public and private sectors, making them equal in the EI supplying process.

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¹ Ibidem, pp. 320-321

² Marian Sebe, *Op. cit.*, p. 234

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30 YEARS OF TRANSFORMATION AND RECONSTRUCTION. THE SECURITY OF ROMANIA IN THE POST-COMMUNIST ERA

Abstract:	<i>In 2020, Romania celebrates 30 years since the establishment of the first contacts with NATO and three decades since the creation of its first post-communist security institutions. If the year of 1989 is one of breakup from the communist regime, the evolution of 1990 represents, therefore, the first steps for resetting most of the areas of state functioning, including the issues related to national security. The purpose of this paper is to provide a short glimpse into Romania's security situation in 1990, in order to reveal the progress of the 30 years of mutations and reform, and to highlight that there are areas that need further improvement and lessons to be learnt. In relation to the recent past, the study operates with three concepts: understanding (the path), consolidating (the objectives already achieved) and improving (the vulnerable areas of transformation).</i>
Keywords:	Romania; NATO; Transition to democracy; Security sector reform; 1990
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Introduction

In 2019, Romania celebrated 30 years since the communist political regime has been overthrown and 15 years since the country joined NATO. The year of 1989 had been a moment of breakup from the past. However, the revolutionary events only drafted the conditions, and not necessarily the measures for the change to take place. It was only the year of 1990 that brought the real entrance into democracy and the solid, concrete steps in this direction.

The organization of the first free elections, the reconstitution of the relations between the governors and the citizens, a free media or the transition from a centralized economy to the rules of the market economy were only the most important changes of the period that followed the moment of December 1989.

These transformations were accompanied, in the field of security, with a reorientation of Romania's security relations and the renewal of its connections with the West, as well as with the resetting of the entire internal establishment responsible for security. Due to the events in 1989 and to some of the measures adopted in 1990, Romania turns, this year, three decades since its first direct contacts with NATO and since the creation of its first post-communist security institutions.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief overview of Romania's security situation in 1990, to underline the progress of the 30 years of post-communist transformation of this sphere, and to point out the issues that, after three decades of changes and mutations, still require reform or intervention. In order to do that, the article addresses the recent past through

the filter of three actions: *understanding* (the zero point of change, the course of the transformation, the causal relations), *consolidating* (the positive aspects built in the 30 years of post-communist history) and *improving* (the problematic issues that are still pending for solutions).

The study has no purpose in providing a comprehensive analysis of the events in 1990 and in the years that followed. It intends, however, to provide a short glimpse into the fundamental moments that built Romania's security as it is nowadays, with its full range of positive elements and areas that need further improvement.

In the research, by *recent past* we will refer, with predilection, to the period after 1989, while the concept of *security sector* covers all the Romanian institutions with responsibilities in the field of security, as defined by the law¹ - the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice, as well as the intelligence services of the country².

The paper draws on various resources, from news and discourses released in 1990, to a small number of documents declassified in the recent years. Except for the introductory part and the concluding remarks, the study is composed of two parts: an analysis of the external changes in terms of security that took place in 1990 and in the following years and an overview of the internal reset of the security sector.

¹The concept of *security sector* (and its corollary, the concept of *security sector reform*) gained importance, on the academic agenda, especially in the 1980^s and 1990^s. The perspectives on its content are heterogeneous - while some approaches favor solely the institutional expression of the security sector, others include within it the coordination and control bodies, the paramilitary organizations and the civil society.

²Romanian Parliament, *Law no. 51/1991*, Bucharest, 29th of July 1991, art. 6, <http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliiDocument/1517>, (08.05.2020)

From the membership to the Warsaw Pact, to joining NATO

In 1989, just like other nations in the region, Romania made its first steps on the road to democracy, after almost 50 years of totalitarianism. Central and Eastern Europe begun, at that time, a complex process of reconfiguration - in political terms, the communist regimes were removed, through round table transitions or, in the case of Romania, through revolution; economically, the transition from centralized to market economy had also begun. At the same time, with the end of the Cold War, the security situation of the actors in the region has undergone consistent changes.

Consistent with the spirit of cooperation of the period, it was in 1990 when the West reopened relations to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, even though the Warsaw Pact and USSR were still vivid. For the first time in the post-communist period, high rank officials from France, Germany or the United States visited the former communist states, while the new leaders in the region travelled, in return, to Washington. Vaclav Havel was one of the first politicians in the region who had a direct dialogue to the president of the United States, in February 1990, some of the key issues on the agenda covering the security situation of Czechoslovakia and the cooperation, in this area, to the American agencies³. Even more, in the first part of 1990, the Polish and Czechoslovak foreign ministers visited NATO, suggesting, just as an allied communique pointed out, that a continent divided for four decades it was searching

³*Memorandum of conversation between Vaclav Havel and George Bush in Washington*, Washington, 20th of February, 1990, National Security Archive, Washington, 2017, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4325688-Document-12-1-Memorandum-of-conversation-between-> (13.10.2019). Vaclav Havel concretely asked, for instance, for cooperation between the intelligence agencies in Czechoslovakia and their counterparts in America.

for new patterns and structures of cooperation¹.

A further step in this direction came in the summer of 1990, when in Turnberry, Scotland, the NATO member states' foreign ministers announced, in the final statement of the meeting, not only that the Alliance was going to withstand and that the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was to be one of the pillars of European security, but also that the reforms in Central and Eastern Europe were of a crucial importance for the security of the continent and that NATO was not ignoring them. The Alliance was emphasizing:

The continued progress of these states towards becoming democratic and economically prosperous partners cooperating with us will be an important element in the future security and stability of Europe².

A month later, in July 1990, Heads of State and Government of the Allied countries, meeting in London, released a historical final communique, that underlined NATO's intention to extend the hand of friendship to the former communist countries³. The Alliance also invited them to a joint statement concerning the profound transformation of their dialogue. Moreover, the leadership of the former communist countries was invited to visit NATO, as well as to establish permanent diplomatic links with the Alliance⁴.

NATO's decisions in London were presented to the Soviet Union during the visit of the Secretary-General of the Alliance to Moscow, just one week after

the summit. In the spirit of cooperation that dominated the end of the Cold War, NATO's proposals were welcomed by Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who even stated that the bipolar confrontation was about to be surpassed without implying with the concepts of winner and loser⁵.

In this external context, dominated, on the one hand, by NATO's interest in establishing cooperative relations with Central and Eastern Europe and, on the other, by the Soviet openness towards developing constructive relations with the Alliance, Romania, who was still a member of the Warsaw Treaty, accepted the invitation to visit NATO and to establish permanent diplomatic relations with the Alliance. Just 10 days after NATO's Secretary General Manfred Wörner had presented to Mikhail Gorbachev the conclusions of the meeting in London (and just two weeks after the final declaration of the heads of state and government in the UK's capital was released), the Romanian prime minister, Petre Roman, invited Manfred Wörner to visit Romania. In the same letter, Bucharest expressed its interest to send an ambassador to NATO⁶. This intention came to fruition in October 1990, when the Romanian ambassador to Belgium was authorized to represent Romania's interests in relation to the Alliance.

One of the first missions he had to fulfil in this capacity was to organize the visit of Prime Minister Petre Roman to NATO, on the 23rd of October 1990. The presence of the Romanian prime minister to the headquarters of the Alliance was the first high level interaction with NATO, the Romanian official being received by

¹North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Turnberry, 7th-8th of June, 1990, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608a.htm>, (12.10.2019)

² Idem

³The North Atlantic Council, *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, , London, 5th-6th of July, 1990, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm>, (12.10.2019)

⁴ Idem

⁵Serge Schmemmann, *Evolution in Europe; Gorbachev meets with NATO's Chief*, in "The New York Times", New York, 15th of July, 1990, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/15/world/evolution-in-europe-gorbachev-meets-with-nato-s-chief.html>, (13.10.2019)

⁶ Mihail Ionescu, *România – NATO. Cronologie 1989 – 2004*, Editura Militară, Bucharest, 2004, p. 46

Manfred Worner and addressing to the representatives of the 16 member countries of the organization¹. The interaction with NATO, unprecedented up to that time (and difficult to imagine less than a year before), thus benefited not only from a first impulse of openness but from a permanent channel of dialogue and a first high level political step in the direction of cooperation. The visit of Prime Minister Petre Roman was followed, in the next months of 1990, by the trips to NATO of other Romanian officials, such as the Vice President of the Senate, Oliviu Gherman, or the Chief of the General Staff, General Vasile Ionel².

Those progresses were followed, in 1991, by the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which provided a structured framework of dialogue between NATO and the former communist countries. At the same time, the Alliance created the first mechanisms to support the transformation of the security sectors of those states (e.g. launching the Rose-Roth initiative, which was aimed at preparing the political elite and the civil society in Central and Eastern Europe to exercise a real democratic control over the security sector).

The opening of NATO was, however, in 1990, only a facet of the transformation of the European security system. In Central and Eastern Europe, the traditional guarantees and security arrangements were about to dissipate, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Although its break-up was made official in 1991, in the summer of 1990, the first signs in this direction were already present. Thus, almost simultaneously with the NATO meeting in Turnberry, after which the Alliance transmitted the first sign of openness towards the former communist states, a parallel meeting took place in Moscow, reuniting the leadership of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

It was the first meeting of a completely new political leadership, in which the member states were no longer represented by their communist leaders, but by a political elite engaged in the democratic transformation of the countries of origin. Less connected to the Soviet sensibilities and objectives, and responsive to the transformation of security relations on the continent, the political leaders of the states of Central and Eastern Europe have questioned, in the summer of 1990, the preservation of the Warsaw Treaty. While Poland or Czechoslovakia called for its re-evaluation, even suggesting that it is not a timeless³ alliance, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Jozsef Antall, described the organization, for the Western media, as outdated and poorly adapted to the post-Cold War transformations⁴.

The meeting in Moscow did not tip the balance either in favour of the Soviet point of view, according to which the Warsaw Treaty was to be maintained⁵, and and neither in favour of the disaggregation of the organization. However, this last option became possible, the member states deciding, a few months away, in Prague, to disband the alliance.

In a positive sense, the reduction of the Soviet role in the former communist space was equivalent, for the countries in the region, to the chance to formulate independent security options. Moreover, block thinking, which had dominated the continent for almost half a century, was replaced by cooperation and the possibility to reconnect Central and Eastern European

³Ioan Mircea Pașcu, *Note de la consfătuirea Comitetului Politic Consultativ al Tratatului de la Varșovia*, Moscow, 7th of June, 1990, p. 16, in Ioan Mircea PAȘCU, *Jurnal de... front*, Editura RAO, Bucharest, 2010, p. 124

⁴Michael Dobbs, *Warsaw Pact Summit Urges Transformation*, in "The Washington Post", Washington, 8th of June, 1990
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⁵Ioan Mircea Pașcu, *Op.cit.*, pp. 99-102

¹ Idem

²Mihail Ionescu, *Op.cit.*, p. 48

states to the Western progress and prosperity, while several international commitments enhanced trust between states and attenuated the spiral of insecurity (e.g. CFE Treaty). However, once the Soviet pressure vanished and the structures that had kept in balance, for a half of century, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, were also disbanded, the region became a fertile arena for new security problems. Dominated by challenges extended from the eruption of nationalisms and the remaking of the existent borders, to the increase of threats such as migration and organized crime, the new regional security context was uncertain and unstable. While Western Europe benefited from the security umbrella provided by NATO or by the Western European Union and maintained its stable and integrated character, the former communist space went through massive fragmentation processes and internal clashes¹.

Romania found itself, in the beginning of the 1990s, with no security guarantees (due to the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and to the early stage of its relations to NATO), caught between two areas of instability (Balkans and Transnistria), managing poor relations with Hungary, with internal problems and, moreover, internationally isolated². Bucharest did not benefit of the confidence of the former allies in Central and Eastern Europe, as a consequence of the external position promoted during the communist period, nor of the full support of the Western partners, due to the negative international image of the state and to the mistrust in its democratic progress.

The opening of relations with NATO was a significant progress for the perspectives on its security, but not a direct contribution to it or an immediate help. The opening of the relations in 1990 did not concern NATO expansion. Not only

that the member states of NATO and the organization did not intend to extend the alliance eastwards, but they did not even consider, at that time, this concrete possibility. In 1990, some American agencies evaluated, for instance, that the question of the enlargement should not even be on the agenda³. Even two years later, when Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia pushed for bilateral security agreements with NATO and, lately, for membership, Manfred Wörner, the General Secretary of the Alliance, was still reassuring the Russian president at that time, Boris Yeltsin, that NATO expansion was unlikely⁴.

It was only when CSCE failed to respond to the high expectations concerning the security of its members (with its consensual decision-making processes and uncertain provisions and instruments of intervention) that the interest for enlarging NATO came up as a real option.

The road to NATO was a long one, Romania joining the Alliance only in 2004, 15 years after the collapse of communism, while the full integration required even more time. The interim period was not only one of preparation for membership, but also one of concrete efforts to improve regional dialogue, to overcome the fragility in the foreign relations and to ensure the minimal conditions of security, in a turbulent space and in times of massive change. To quote a CIA report from 1994, which is analyzed the situation of Romania, Bucharest was, during the

³The United States Department of State, *Memorandum to National Security Council: NATO Strategy Review Paper for October 29 Discussion*, Washington, 25th of October, 1990, p. 1, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4325705-Document-27-James-F-Dobbins-State-Department>, (26.10.2019)

⁴National Security Archive, *Memorandum to Boris Yeltsin from Russian Supreme Soviet delegation to NATO HQs*, Bruxelles, 3rd of July, 1991, Washington, 2017, p. 2, <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4325708/Document-30-Memorandum-to-Boris-Yeltsin-from.pdf>, (19.10.2019)

¹Ioan Mircea Pașcu, *Bătălia pentru NATO. Raport personal*, RAO, Bucharest, 2014, p. 22

²*Ibidem*, p. 26

transition to democracy, in the situation of *seeking security and overcoming isolation*¹. However, the difficult security situation was overcome by consistent efforts, by assuming the costs of transformation, through national consensus on the major security objectives, dynamism in external action and readiness to negotiate.

Folding up after the decisions at the NATO summit in Madrid, bearing the financial and social costs of transforming the Army and aligning it with NATO standards, participating with military personnel in theatres of operations, agreeing to the conditions of bilateral treaties with the neighbouring states or making delicate foreign policy decisions (as in the case of supporting the intervention in Kosovo, in 1999) required vision and effort and finally played a major role for NATO accession.

If only a few progresses in the last 30 years were to be highlighted, they would be that Romania moved from international isolation and the absence of any real partnership in the field of security to becoming a NATO member and developing a reliable security dialogue to countries such as USA, Germany or Great Britain. The willingness to support the initiatives of the Alliance, the participation in international missions under its auspices or in support of its partners (Afghanistan, Iraq), providing significant components for the allied activity or inputs relevant for NATO's credibility and performance (for instance, through the national cyber protection capabilities) or the interest for fulfilling the fundamental criteria arising from membership, such as the allocation of 2 percent of GDP for defence, had credited Romania as a reliable partner, contributed to strengthening its relations in the field of security and significantly improved its

security situation, compared not only to the year of 1990, but to any other period in the national history.

As for Romania's position in the region, the last 30 years brought improvement in the relations to the neighbouring countries and a significant progress in building Romania's profile of a stable and secure partner of dialogue. The accession to NATO required the amelioration of the relations to Hungary or Ukraine (that were fragile in the first part of the 1990s), that turned to be an imperative for joining the Alliance. The military relations to Hungary even got so good that the two countries established, in the 1990s, a common military battalion². Bucharest decreased tensions in relation to Budapest, signed bilateral treaties with most of the countries in the region, continued to promote peace and stability, became involved in most of the cooperation formats concerning the Black Sea area, the Balkans or Central and Eastern Europe and even advanced its own multilateral initiatives of cooperation. Even further, Romania was concretely involved in finding solutions for the security problems in the region and in ensuring the framework for settling down the conflicts in its neighbourhood. For instance, Bucharest deployed forces for the IFOR and SFOR, in Bosnia, for the operation ALBA, in Albania, under Italian leadership, and supported the NATO intervention in the Balkans, in 1999.

Turning attention to the 30 years of transformation of its external dimension of security, Romania is obliged to understand and consolidate. The three decades of relations to NATO do not only reveal a concrete progress, but also remind the efforts involved for attaining the current security situation. They further highlight, if necessary, not only how much Romania should appreciate its membership to NATO, but also how much Bucharest

¹Central Intelligence Agency, *Romania: Overcoming Isolation, Seeking Security*, Washington, 7th of July, 1994, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0005657431>, (29.02.2020)

²Mihai Romulus Vădean, *Relațiile româno-ungare în contextul integrării în structurile europene și euroatlantice: 1989-2010*, Lumen, Iași, 2011, p. 90

should exploit the opportunities offered by it and how active and engaged we should be in supporting the cohesion and performance of the Alliance.

At the same time, the current security of Central and Eastern Europe partially relies on the evolution in the 1990s (disarmament, borders, peace talks, security guarantees or frozen conflicts). In order to perform a significant role in the region, Romania must have a clear view on the recent history, map the causal relations and adapt to them. The occasional disharmonious episodes in the region do not constitute unprecedented moment, nor the most acute bilateral tensions. Even in the difficult dialogues, the last 30 years have created enough space for cooperation, formed the specific channels of dialogue that can be accessed to de-escalate tensions, and laid the foundations for common security interests that can be exploited to overcome problematic situations.

On the external component of security, Romania must understand and consolidate - understand and internalize the efforts already made, value the progress, consolidate the goals achieved and use the opportunities and the favourable context of security, which did not exist 30 years ago, when the membership to NATO and the current regional relations were barely imagined.

The security sector - Resetting and rebuilding

Except for the international mutations concerning security, 1990 and the 30 years that followed were also a time of internal change and reform. The current architecture of the Romanian security sector was rebuilt in the 1990s, most of the institutions that are currently responsible in this area celebrating, in 2020, 30 years of existence.

The most relevant features of the pre-1989 security sector consisted of a low demarcation from politics, the lack of transparency and accountability in relation

to the citizens, a hyper-centralized and massive security apparatus, as well as a heavy reliance on intruding methods and a poor relation to the citizens. At the same time, the security sector reflected the needs of the Communist leadership, such as to secure the political regime and to protect the presidential family or to provide valuable insights for the national economy. Those features were no longer suited within democracy. For these reasons, after the events of 1989, a massive reset of the activity of the security sector was required. This materialized in the dissolution, in December 1989, of the former Department of State Security and the reorganization, since 1990, of the entire security sector.

In February 1990, the first new entities in charge of the intelligence field were set up. Thus, within the Ministry of Interior, a departmental information structure was created, while the External Information Centre, which functioned before 1989, within the (disbanded) Department of State Security, became an independent, self-governing institution, which became, by the end of 1990, the current Foreign Intelligence Service. In May 1990, a Special Guard and Protocol Unit was also established, later becoming the Protection and Guard Service. Finally, in March 1990, the Romanian Intelligence Service was also set up, amidst the internal turmoil and the need to create a structure that would provide the necessary knowledge for the decision makers and a solid protection of the national interests, on democratic basis. A new network of institutions responsible to national security was, therefore, created in the first months of 1990.

As for the institutions with responsibilities related to national security which continued to function after 1990, there were also changes. Thus, in the case of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior, in 1990, new operating laws were issued, which laid the foundations for the democratic activity of the two bodies. At the same time, there

were also new delimitations of tasks and responsibilities. For instance, the administration of the penitentiaries entered, from October 1990, on the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior delimiting itself by this component of activity.

Apart from these transformations, in 1990, new mechanisms of coordination of the security sector were also created. The Supreme Defense Council of the Country was, thus, established, and it also received a law of operation in December 1990.

The new security establishment was put under financial and legal control and under the democratic control of the Parliament. The decision of the Government no. 631 from May 1990 established, for instance, that the financial activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service was controlled by the Ministry of Finance, by the Ministry of Economy and by the National Bank¹. Even though the first permanent parliamentary commission aimed to control an intelligence service was only established in 1993, the Romanian Intelligence Service presented to the Parliament its first report of activity in November 1990. The minister of Defence and the minister of Interior also responded in front of the legislative body, not necessarily in the same manner as the heads of the intelligence services, but in their quality of members of the government.

The new institutional establishment in the field of security concerned significantly more institutions than before 1989 and came up with a completely new perspective on their tasks and subordination. One of the most relevant improvements concerned depoliticization and the fact that the security sector was no longer responsible in relation to any political party (by comparison, before 1989, the minister of Defence or the minister of Interior responded, among

others, in front of the Central Committee of the Communist Party). At the same time, the politico-ideological training of the staff was removed from the curricula and the military publications were no longer censored by a superior, political authority. The tasks that exceeded the core missions of the security sector (such as using the workforce of its people within agriculture, as it happened before 1989) were ousted, while the relation to civil society was redrafted, in order to reflect the principles of accountability and transparency.

In order to enhance this relation, the new security establishment created reliable communication channels to the citizens. Within the Ministry of Defence, the military mass media, that was subordinated, before 1989, to the Direction for Culture and Propaganda from the Superior Political Council of the Army, had been abolished and replaced by new communication mechanisms. Thus, in 1991 it was created a new Section for Information and Public Relations of the Army, directly coordinated by the minister and aimed to facilitate the relation to the citizens². The Romanian Intelligence Service also created an office for letters and audiences (that received more than 500 letters and petitions from the citizens, only in the first half of year of functioning) and designated a spokesman³.

The year of 1990 did not bring perfect democratic mechanisms or an activity that was, from the beginning, devoid of slips. Some of the newly established entities have undergone, in the years that followed, continuous reform processes, their staff continued to contain, despite the renewal efforts, employees recruited before 1989, the legislation concerning national security was

¹ Iulian Dicuțescu (coord.), *SRI Monograph*, RAO, Bucharest, 2015, p. 94

² Răduț Bîlbîie, *The Professionalization of Public Relations in the Romanian Army*, in "International Conference Knowledge Based Organization. Conference Proceedings", Vol. 22, No.2, 2016, p. 402

³ Iulian Dicuțescu, *Op. cit.*, p. 95

completed gradually, public trust continued for a long time to be fractured by negative, public events, while the consolidation of the control mechanisms took place over time (e.g. the creation of a parliamentary control committee on the SRI took place it was not until 1993, a national security strategy was approved in Parliament only in 1999, while some institutions, such as the Foreign Intelligence Service, received their own operating law only in the late 1990s).

However, unlike in 1989, at the end of 1990, a new institutional arrangement was already working in the field of security, relying upon new principles of functioning and aimed at improving its activity, on democratic foundations.

Most of the current features of the security sector - whether they concern the institutional density, the polarization of activity or the level of horizontal cooperation between institutions - have their origins in the way the institutional architecture (roles, responsibilities, sharing of tasks between institutions, mechanisms of cooperation, forms of coordination and control) were designed in 1990.

In 2020, Romania has approximately the same national security institutions as in 1990. Much of the legislation in this field was also issued in 1990 or in the immediately following years. The mechanisms of democratic control, although significantly improved along time, were also drafted in the first year after the collapse of the communist regime. 1990 left many unresolved issues. However, change could only occur gradually, linked to the interaction with NATO, with the maturation of Romanian democracy or with the transformations in the security environment.

Topics related to the renewal of the personnel that had been active before 1989, the Western model of reforming the Ministry of Defence, the demilitarization of certain bodies within the Ministry of Interior, the appointment of a civilian leadership of the security institutions, the

shape of the strategic planning or the increase of the horizontal coordination between the institutions in the security sector have been significantly improved along time.

Romania has begun its path to democracy with a military doctrine of the war of the entire people, about 300.000 people under arms (both professionals and conscription-based recruits) and almost no openness for external military cooperation. The Czechoslovak experience in 1968 and the poor military relations to USSR made the country reluctant both to host and to participate into foreign military exercises within the Warsaw Pact, while the deployment of the army outside borders was denied by law. There were no interoperable capabilities or procedures to the Western partners, almost no common standards for training, and even almost no channels of communication. The security sector benefited of an ambivalent trust from the citizens and it had no experience in working under democratic conditions, while the strategic documents aimed at shaping its activity occurred with difficulty. Looking back at the situation in 1990 and to the 30 years of transformation, progress is certain, even if there are still issues to be improved.

On the internal dimension of security, Romania needs to understand, to improve and to intervene – to understand the progress and the road behind and to appreciate the previous efforts – a balanced view on the recent past is perhaps the most appropriate approach, understanding not only that the post-communist history has been marked by multiple positive elements, but also that the shortcomings should become lessons learnt; to improve the good things created in the last 30 years, such as interoperability with NATO, the performance of the armed forces or the democratic control over the security sector; and to intervene where challenges are still present or where they were only partially approached (as in the case of the non-homogenous public trust towards the

security sector or the under-developed security culture of the citizens).

Concluding remarks. 1990 versus 2020

In 2019, Romania celebrated 30 years since the communist political regime has been overthrown. While 1989 was a turning point for the beginnings of democracy and the zero moment for the reconfiguration of the entire political, economic and social life of the country, 1990 came up as a time when the door opened to democracy was actually accessed, with its entire spectrum of benefits and difficulties raised by the transitional processes. The network of institutions, the premises on which the relations between the political elite and society were redrafted, the renewal of the economy or of the foreign policy begun in the first months that followed to the events in December 1989.

Despite the positive change, Romania started its journey to democracy under harsh conditions, with an intricate external situation and under the impact of numerous internal difficulties. Quoting two sources contemporary to the beginnings of the Romanian post-communist history,

We were practically alone, with no security guarantees, in a context dominated by radical transformations, with obvious or potential dangers on our borders, while the capacity of the country to generate (economic and military) power was naturally diminished by to the transitional period that we had to cope with¹.

At the same time, the country had fragile foreign relations. Just as an article in the *New York Times* pointed out in 1990, for its foreign counterparts, who could provide help in the matters of security, Romania was not a credible state².

¹ Ioan Mircea Pașcu, *Op. cit.*, p. 26

² Steven Greenhouse, *The World: Romania Isn't Trusted, Within Or Without*, in "The New York Times", New York, 29th of July, 1990, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/29/weekinreview/the-world-romania-isn-t-trusted-within-or-without.html>, (12.09.2019)

Internationally isolated, without reliable partnerships and cooperation concerning security, part of a collective security arrangement that was about to collapse and relying on the performance of its newly established security institutions, Romania has started, in 1990, a process of restructuring its entire security framework. Rebuilding the security mechanisms abroad and at home was an intrinsic part of and precondition for the consolidation of the democratic regime. The two key processes of this transformation, that took place in the first months after the anti-communist revolution, consisted in the opening of relations with NATO and the Euro-Atlantic community and the reconfiguration of the activity of the internal security sector.

Comparing the security situation of the country in 1990 and 2020, the images of the two moments are profoundly different. The transformation of the security situation of Romania in the last three decades covered a drastic mutation in the participation into international security arrangements, a consistent redraw of the profile in the region, a major structural reform of the security sector, the resettlement of this area on democratic foundations, as well as a continuous effort to detach from the communist past. In 2020, Romania is a member of NATO, it is part of most of the regional cooperation formats, it has improved its relations with neighbouring states and it has formed a credible profile of security exporter. Domestically, the security sector was also gradually reset, change encompassing a new institutional framework, a decrease in the number of people under arms, the demilitarization of certain areas of activity, a new concept on training, a reviewed strategic planning or even different equipment, norms or day by day activities.

A brief analysis of Romania's security situation in the 30th year of its security institutions and after 30 years of relations to NATO shows that the country made a significant progress. Given the

profound change, there may be a temptation to consider the transforming process completed and to perceive no further reasons to analyze the past. And, yet, there are still lessons to be learnt. Looking back at the zero point of the transformation process and remembering the landmarks of change are useful for at least three inter-related reasons: for a better understanding of the current security situation and its causes, for supporting the progress and reinforcing the goals achieved in time and for improving the areas that were not sufficiently approached.

If only a few lessons from the last 30 years were to be highlighted, they would be that no real progress - whether it was about achieving the membership to NATO or enhancing dialogue with the states in the region - emerged without real internal and external efforts, that the existence of a national consensus was one of the most important assets for achieving the major security objectives, that the formation of a credible international profile has always been based on real contributions to ensuring international security, but also that the themes that kept pending for solutions produced negative effects, delaying the evolution towards a better security situation.

In order to appreciate the benefits of the current security situation and to value the stability and security that Romania now enjoys, to avoid putting aside the achieved goals, instead of improving them, but also in order to understand the unresolved issues and their causes, the return to the recent past will always be an useful and necessary source of knowledge. The 30 years of change were certainly positive for Romania's security situation. However, despite the benefits of the security umbrella provided by NATO and the performance of an experienced security sector, neither the challenges have been exhausted, nor is security a permanent asset. Update and

improvement should permanently remain, therefore, on the agenda.

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DANGERS OF CORRUPTION IN THE NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGY – WHY A MORE EFFICIENT APPROACH IS NEEDED?

Abstract:	<i>Corruption has existed since ancient times, the proof being the term's Latin origins (corruptio-onis). It was assimilated in Romanian through French, basically expressing inappropriate, immoral behaviour of public servants. Throughout centuries, an unstable geographic and historical environment, as well as violent and inefficient political systems generated acts and deeds of corruption that lead to initiatives, concerns and prevention actions and countermeasures, including means of legal regulations.</i> <i>Periods of crisis have especially experienced a weaker state authority, a degraded standard of living, altering of moral judgement, lack of efficient control leverages, lesser confidence in social institutions and values, a lack of cohesion between the law and the economic and social realities.</i> <i>Acts of corruption, that have been a part of public servants' activity, result from violating human rights, freedom of speech and action, depending on social need.</i>
Keywords:	Corruption; Phenomenon; Concepts; Fraud; Illegal act
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Corruption was generally assessed as an ideology or supporting act, which lead to different perceptions from the public opinion. In certain historical periods, the giving and receiving of goods by public servants was deemed as natural, a professional courtesy. In Romania, for example, during the Fanariot era, backshees were not illegal, just morally frowned upon.

The issue of corruption resurfaced with the transition to democracy and the rule of law, and Romania's adhering to the EU.

The phenomenon of corruption is still a widespread problem, affecting several aspects of society, like health, education, public acquisitions, assigning infrastructure contracts and the citizen's relationship with local authorities.

Romania's experience in the last decade, as well as other Central and Eastern European countries', proves that most anti-corruption actions mainly materialized as punitive measures, the effect being far from the one expected.

Corruption is a threat to democracy, the rule of law, social equality and justice, eroding the basics of an efficient administration, undermining market economy and endangering the stability of state bodies. This is why the fight against this phenomenon must be carried out by competent legal authorities, with the support of civic society, without hindrance, so that nobody may be perceived as being above the law. In this context, preventing acts of corruption, by monitoring conflicts of interest and incompatibilities, as well as controlling

illegally made fortunes, must become the pillars of any such strategy. Adopting the correct measures in preventing "corruption" requires knowing its actual spread, complexity, triggering mechanisms and resulting consequences.

The complexity and ever changing shape this phenomenon takes, together with globalization tendencies, make it necessary to create and elaborate appropriate strategies, tackling, in a scientific and systematic manner, facts generating criminal acts and the effects of criminality and offer efficient instruments for social prevention and control.

Various types and forms of corruption

Corruption can come in various forms and types - material or symbolic¹, depending on the nature of the affected social areas, the degree of manifestation, the frequency/scope, the perception on how serious the acts and deeds generating them are, as well as the forms of organization of individuals or groups committing such acts or deeds. These are highlighted by a series of identifiers like: spread, social reaction, active subjects, time, space, scope.

A look on some of the forms of corruption²:

1. In terms of the nature of social areas affected:

Political corruption – represents the moral degradation of violent and inefficient political elites and it refers to:

- buying a place on voting lists;
- accepting bribes, selling of information, stealing public goods, enabling financial speculation for their own interest;
- advancement within a party on criteria other than competency;
- using public or administrative positions for illegal or immoral purposes.

The Parliament (parliamentary immunity and its effects, lobbying, group

or client interests influencing legislative initiatives) and political parties (inappropriate financing of their activity and the election campaigns, as well as an inefficient control on sources of financing and spending of resources) are particularly vulnerable to this form of corruption.

Administrative corruption (some analysts call it "agency corruption") – represents the moral degradation of public servants and it refers to:

- offering and taking bribes, influence peddling, fraud, granting authorizations for private entrepreneurs, assigning lands for constructions, buildings and spaces for private companies, sending manpower abroad etc;
- unilateral abuses of government officials;
- embezzlement;
- nepotism or abuse connecting a person from public service to one in a private service;
- partnerships between members of intelligence or military structures and members of organized crime, illegal trafficking of classified information, attending auctions, taking bribes.

Vulnerable entities to corruption: local public administration (a result of some illegal actions on issuing authorizations and certificates, signing of lease, association and rent contracts, public acquisitions contracts for works, goods and services, transferring assets between public authorities, capitalization of public authorities' excess assets, offering help in case of disasters, granting facilities in various fields, car registrations, issuing driving licenses, selecting/promoting personnel etc); central public administration officials (a result of illegal activities concerning privatizations, public acquisitions, granting licenses, quota systems, authorizations, tax exemptions and instalment plans on taxes, capitalizing controls, customs control etc); structures working in national security (a result of illegal actions concerning

¹ Cătălin Zamfir, Lazăr Vlăsceanu, *Dictionary of sociology, coordinators*, Babel Publishing House, București, 1993, p.142

² Idem

commissioning, criminal investigation of acts prejudicing national security etc).

Economic corruption – represents violation of market economy rules by state and private operators¹, and it refers to:

- granting or facilitating preferential access to credits by various bank clerks;
- granting credits with rebated interest based on false documents;
- issuing payment documents by credit authorities with no warranties, or coverage for carrying out certain operations;
- illegal assessment and selling of state-owned company assets;
- involvement of state officials in private-like actions;
- illegal transfers of capital and assets.

Vulnerable entities to corruption: manufacturing divisions (a result of illegal actions concerning the artificial rise in prices of devices and important stock materials, a drop in exported goods' prices, unduly close outs, auctions for selling, acquisition and leasing investment works, privatisations, connecting third parties and phantom companies, directing economic contracts from well known companies towards private companies, selling products to economic agents without cashing-in their respective value, changing the destination of state awarded funds for import, not monitoring the precise and timely execution of economic contracts, farm outs, sells, associations, the allowance system, importing of tax exempted products etc) and the financial and banking sector (a result of illegal actions concerning granting or facilitating granting of illegal credits, instalments for credit reimbursement, issuing payment documents with no warranties or real coverage, granting credits with reduced interest, foreclosures).

2. In terms of occurrence, corruption acts classify as follows:

High corruption – associated with both high officials and major decision makers and serious fraud, embezzlements, even organized crime; it is a problem even for overdeveloped states.

Western analysts call this type of corruption “white collar” crimes² (individuals in public high places, who use this status for their own benefit, by violating morals, laws and all sense of normality). American sociologists define “white collar crimes” as any “illegal act, punishable by law, committed while holding a lawful profession or the carrying out actions for the purpose of reaching established goals, by any corporation or individual with a high social status, deemed as respectable”. “White collar crimes” have the following characteristics:

- are usually masked by a legal professional activity;
- almost impossible to establish victims, as there isn't a group of people who could be defined as such;
- most of the time, such crimes are uncovered by official investigations, being claimed by specific individuals, or carried out “in the open”.
- Main types of “white collar crimes”:
- business crimes: false advertising, bribing officials;
- crimes carried out by employees against large corporations: theft, fraud;
- state authorities' crime: police bribing, abuse of office;

There is a clear distinction between high corruption and fraud. High corruption involves a direct intervention of some government members or other officials for their own or others' benefit, a crime investigated by the DNA (National Anti Corruption Division). Frauds infer violation of laws, especially by businessmen, causing the state to lose significant amounts of money. Such cases

¹ Virgil Ardelean, *Corruption potential risk factor for national security*, in “Journal of the Foundation of the National Defense College”, Year VI/2000, p. 22

²Sahr J. Kpundeh, *Political Will in Fighting Corruption*, in “Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries”, UN Development Program, New York, 1998, pp. 96-97

fall under the jurisdiction of the High Court¹.

Frauds and high corruption are strongly linked: it is virtually impossible for great frauds not to be rely on official and politic support.

- "small corruption" – carried out by poorly paid public servants; present for both office servants as well as less serious types of corruption; it refers to the offering and receiving of small amounts of money; it involves members of the lower levels of a service/organizations).

3.In terms of frequency and range, corruption can be: incidental, systematic or systemic.

- incidental corruption (sporadic, occasional) distinguishes cases within a limited area, with little dispersion, which may comprise more complex elements of what is known as "corrupt exchange", and sometimes, even the origins of a network. This:

- refers to giving and receiving of small amounts of money as bribe;

- entails individuals or groups speculating favorable opportunities, usually by means of financial power in order to gain influence ;

- is rather the exception, than the rule.

- systematic corruption appears when the phenomenon is fully manifested, striking official levels, right up to the political chain. There are no isolated cases, as they are connected, a genuine network, penetrating many sectors and places of social activity.

Systematic corruption:

- is organized;

- is not necessarily generalized or official;

- is recursive, especially because of a basic weakness in the office/organization or a corrupt internal environment;

- is highly profitable, usually engaging the offering of large sums of money;

- cases often become a matter of public scandal;

- a typical case is smuggling.

The origins of systematic corruption lie with the initiatives of decisions makers, who are best at recognizing and exploiting opportunities - arising in the activity of the departments and divisions they manage- for their own benefit. The high status of these members explains why systematic corruption grows especially by attracting new players. This type of corruption represents a direct and often overt violation of the law, but, unlike the next one - systemic corruption, if the corrupted individuals are replaced, corruption disappears.

- is generalized, official;

- is especially characteristic for economy and politics;

- it is part of the office/organization's activity, to the point it identifies itself with it, completely side-tracking the initial goals or objectives in favour of certain interests, usually belonging to minority groups;

- involves members from all levels of hierarchy in an office/organization.

4.In terms of perceived severity of corruption acts:

- black corruption – the unlawful act is condemned by public opinion and social elites, who want it punished;

- grey corruption – when members of a society and especially the elite want to punish the unlawful act;

- white corruption – when public opinion and the elite do not endorse the attempt to punish a certain type of corruption which they find tolerable (for example for the education and health systems).

Defining corruption in the 2015-2019 National Defence Strategy

Ensuring national security is currently based on the National Defence Strategy. This is the working instrument that manages risks, threats and weak points, having as starting points the need to defend the country's defence, interests, values and national security objectives.

National security aims at ensuring a state of normal democracy desired by the society - citizens, communities and the

¹Ibidem, pp.118-119

state- based on efforts that target establishing legality, building economic well-being, social equilibrium and political stability. National security is accomplished within democratic order by exercising citizenship rights and liberties; voluntary undertaking of responsibilities; perfecting state's capacity of decision and action; making Romania a noticeable active member of the international community. National security is ensured by means of inherent efforts and cooperation with allies and partners, according to national programs, EU security strategy and the strategic concepts of the Alliance. It targets harmonizing national efforts with international commitments and identifying working styles able to prevent and set off threats.

National security is achieved through appropriate political, economic, diplomatic, social, judicial, educational, official and military measures, through intelligence, counter-intelligence and security, as well as through efficient crisis management, according to the European and Euro-Atlantic regulations and international law.

It is our opinion that the danger that corruption poses in the National Defence Strategy, where it is presented as a mere vulnerability or risk, is seriously mitigated.

It is worth observing that the 2015-2019 National Defence Strategy barely addresses the dangers posed by corruption. There are clear references, but the subject is not discussed further. For example, it is deemed that "defending and consolidating constitutional democracy and the rule of law" represent "National security interests"¹, but there is no mention of corruption as a major threat to state security. There are but two references to corruption. One of the points in chapter "Risks to national security" mentions: "Failure to achieve Romania's development objectives may be generated

by the persistence of economic difficulties, the proliferation of underground economy and corruption, tax evasion, precarious infrastructure, but also by external factors such as the perpetuation of progress gaps in the European Union and a low resistance to foreign markets major changes, especially in the financial banking area².

And the second reference, in the chapter regarding the vulnerabilities, there is a mention on corruption, at the end of a list: "corruption weakens the state, leads to economic losses and impacts the country's potential progress, good governance, deciding for the benefit of citizens and communities, as well trust in justice and state's authorities. Externally, the fact that corruption still exists has a negative impact on our country's credibility and image"³.

Despite being said that it is rather a matter of (public) perception, the effects of corruption are real, measurable and for all areas of social life, from politics to business, even reaching personal and family life. Furthermore, on a global scale, people see corruption ("high political corruption" as well as "small administrative corruption") as one of the biggest issues their countries are facing.

To summarize, corruption affects democracy and the rule of law⁴, as:

- it brings a high level of risk, generating multiple weaknesses for the state;
- it allows networks of organized crime, terrorist groups and other threatening vectors to attack and block the strengthening of individual security;

Conclusively, the new 2020-2024 security strategy must tackle the fight against corruption and make it a priority. To this end, given Romania's EU

¹ Idem

² National Defense Strategy for The Period 2015 - 2019 - A strong Romania in Europe and in the world, Bucharest, 2015

https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/National_Defense_Strategy_2015_-_2019.pdf, (20.05.2020).

³ Ibidem, p. 225

⁴ World Bank, *Corruption and its fight. Towards a model for building our integrity*, Irecson Institute, Bucharest, 2003, p.14

membership, knowing all problems that impact good governance is paramount, amongst them being the corruption of the public sector authorities (correlated with budgetary transparency), the correlation between corruption and crime, corruption and the business environment etc.

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MOLDAVIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

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MODERNIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES

Abstract:	<i>The article "Modernization of the national security system of the Republic of Moldova: achievements and perspectives" analyses the national security system as an integral part of the state, which is exposed to modernization processes. These processes affect the way in which citizens perceive the national security and it is reasonable to assume that the roles of security institutions will also be affected by these changes. The relationship between the state and citizens on the level of perception of national security at least has become increasingly problematic. The author considers that the basic diagnosis consists of the non-transparency of the activity of the state security organs, the perception of the current security institutions, especially of the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova, as follower of the Soviet Union repression bodies and the loss of the citizens' confidence towards the state security organs.</i>
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Referring to the Republic of Moldova, a requirement of the European Union is the modernization of the national security system through the civil society control over the state security bodies and developed security policies. In addition, in recent years there are attempts to participate in civil society for elaboration of national security policies in the Republic of Moldova. The modernization of the national security system is directly proportional to the democratization of its institutions. Security institutions have an independent effect not only on policies, but also on the quality and sustainability of democracy¹.

¹Lars Johannsen, *Democratization and Development: Modernization and Political Institutions*, Department of Political Science,

The democratization of the institutions of the national security system of the Republic of Moldova must be seen from the point of view of the security institutions' transition from the Soviet Union system of internal organization to the democratic rules of the security institutions, as well as of the factors of institutional security consolidation through the reformation of the security institutions. These approaches to the process of democratization of security institutions take place through the perspective of modernization and transition. Democratization is conceptualized as a set of institutional

University of Aarhus Draft: Paper for presentation at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Copenhagen, Denmark, 14–19 April, 2000

changes and as a form of elite domination¹.

The levels of the national security system typically connect the macro modernization processes to the micro-level of institutional modernization through the state security bodies. At the same time, the mistakes made in the initial phase of the democratic reforms diminished the capacities of the law enforcement institutions, as well as the state regulation and monitoring. Thus, it leads to the diminishing of the role of the state and to the decrease of its efficiency in solving the national security problems. Developing increasing transparency together with the best practices of states with long-standing democratic traditions can really contribute to the democratization of the security sector².

The national security system of the Republic of Moldova includes defence, foreign policy, constitutional order and justice, financial, economic, ecological, energy, communications, and social protection components, being interdependent. The institutional framework of the national security system of the Republic of Moldova consists of the supreme public authorities in the field of national security assurance (the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Government of the Republic of Moldova, the Presidency and the Supreme Security Council) and the state security bodies. An important component of the national security system is the system of state security organs, consisting of the Information and Security Service, the Security and Guard Service, the Border

Police of the Ministry of Defence and the Customs Service, which operates in compliance with the respective laws, as well as from the educational institutions and other non-militarized institutions and organizations of the state security bodies.

The state security bodies are specialized structures of the executive power, meant to ensure the security of the state. The state security bodies carry out their activity according to the principles of law, delimitation of the powers of the concerned bodies, equality before the law, respect for human rights and freedoms, non-partisanship, professional conspiracy, transparency, opportunity, ensuring the security of the Republic of Moldova without prejudice to the security of other states. In a modern society, the state security bodies provide important functions for democracy, related to informing the state institutions about internal and external threats. The information in the field of national security is used to serve the needs of the political factors, that is, the legitimate representatives of the people are limited by national interest.

The system of state security bodies manifests itself through the activity of information for security, which represents the set of actions and operations carried out permanently by the components of the national security system, and namely, planning, searching, obtaining, verifying, analytical processing of data and information relevant to national security and informing decision makers, legally invested with the competence to achieve national security or to enforce the law. The activity of information for security is regulated by specific norms, issued in accordance with and for the application of the law and is carried out secretly, with the protection of the sources, means, methods and techniques used.

The creation and activity of the national security bodies represent processes related to the history of the development of the Republic of Moldova

¹Ion Ciobanu, *Democratizarea și modernizarea sistemului politic din Republica Moldova în contextul globalizării*, Chișinău, 2019, p. 92, p. 163

²Tatiana Busuncian, *Democratizarea sectorului de securitate – o necesitate a noilor societăți democratice*, în "Politicile de vecinătate ale NATO și UE – Noi dimensiuni pentru cooperarea regională. Tezele seminarului internațional. Chișinău", Centrul Pro Marshall din Republica Moldova, 2007, pp. 76-85

itself. The component institutions of the national security system have formed during their operation an absolutely distinct entity, which reacts to the challenges of the international security environment, as well as to the internal vulnerabilities specific to the system.

An important element of the national security system is the civil servants and the politicians who elaborate the national security policies. These are official persons, elected or named, who regard the world, first of all, in the light of the interests of the institutions they represent but also of the different perception of reality, the character of the information used, as well as the uncertainty of the situations. Other psycho-social qualities that are of great importance for the level and quality of the influence of the officers in the national security system are competence, ability to interact, personal relations with other politicians, ability and willingness to make a decision. Political-military analysts consider that the interests of security organizations represent a dominant factor in forming a position with which politicians agree in establishing national security interests. This implies a political collaboration in the national security system and is considered as a "political balance" in the activity of the various persons who are part of the upper echelon as a hierarchical level¹. For example, the political power consists of various politicians and civil servants, who occupy leading positions in the organizations that are part of the national security system. The decisions made by

these institutions depend not only on the individual preferences of the organizations, but also on the preferences of the state governing factors, as well as on how these preferences combine. The recognition of the interests of specific organizations as sources of influence in politics, that is, of politicization, is the most important aspect to be taken into consideration when forming the national security system.

The politicization has three main effects on the relations between the security and political bodies. First, it outlines the content and tone of the estimates, as politicized information tends to reduce ambiguous or controversial data and presents findings with an unusual sense of certainty. The politicization process inhibits re-evaluation. Information agencies are less likely to review the type of bold and unequivocal statements that are characteristic of politicized estimates, even after a dissonant or contradictory information appears that could lead to a review of previous conclusions. Finally, in fact, politicization episodes can poison political-information relations for many years. Severe breakdowns tend to exacerbate mutual distrust and strengthen old stereotypes that divide information and policy officials².

The functioning of the national security system in schematic form can be presented in the following way: the state security bodies notify the danger, assess it, elaborate the policy and the concrete measures designed to neutralize the possible dangers or those that may occur. In reality, this process is much more complex, given that, first of all, various elements of the mechanism may be missing or not acting properly. Secondly, the system itself includes different personalities and organizations, each having their own idea of what should be done in the interest of the state. Thirdly,

¹Ionel Goian, Mihăiță Niculescu-Ciocan, *Comunitatea națională de informații între modelele occidentale și perspectiva românească*, în "Securitatea și apărarea spațiului sud-european, în contextul transformărilor de la începutul mileniului III: Sesiunea anuală de comunicări științifice cu participare internațională: Strategii XXI/2006", București, 13-14 aprilie 2006, Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I”, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2006, vol. 15

²Joshua Rovner, *Intelligence in the Twitter Age*, in "International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence", 2013

each department has its own interest and tends towards its realization¹.

The supreme public authorities in the field of national security are the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the Government of the Republic of Moldova, the Presidency and the Supreme Security Council.

In the structure of the national security system, as a whole, a main link is represented by the person with the highest position of responsibility in the state - the President of the State, as supreme commander of the armed forces, the first diplomat and the chief of executive power. The constitutional hypostasis of the president determines his position as the main character in the elaboration of the decisions in the field of national security.

With regard to national security, the President of the Republic of Moldova has the following powers: he exercises the general management of the activity of ensuring national security and is responsible for its status within the limits established by the law; bears negotiations and concludes international treaties on behalf of the Republic of Moldova related to national security; issue normative decrees regarding the problems of ensuring the security of the state; ensures the cooperation of public authorities in the concerned field; establishes and administers advisory bodies for state security issues; takes the necessary measures to ensure the security of the state, in accordance with the legislation.

According to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, the Parliament carries out the legislative regulation in the field of national security in the following

forms: it approves the National Security Conception and Strategy that represent the main directions of the state's internal and foreign policy; approves the military doctrine of the state; adopts and interprets laws and decisions in the field of security; creates the legal basis for the establishment and activity of the bodies that ensure the security of the state; declares referendums on national security issues; approves the volume of budgetary allocations to the respective state security bodies; establishes the state border of the country; ratifies, denounces, suspends and cancels the action of the international treaties concluded by the Republic of Moldova; exercises the direct parliamentary control over the execution of the legislation by the organs of assuring the national security in the forms and within the limits provided by the Constitution; declares partial or general mobilization, state of emergency, siege or war.

On the level of ensuring national security, the Government of the Republic of Moldova: ensures the execution of the laws and decisions of the Parliament, as well as of the decrees elaborated by the President of the Republic of Moldova on state security; establishes, in accordance with the legislation, state security bodies; establishes the structure, functions and volume of budgetary allocations for their maintenance; issues decisions and provisions regarding national security issues; exercises control over their implementation by ministries and other central administrative authorities under its subordination; promotes domestic and foreign policy according to the interests of ensuring national security; exercises the management of the activity of the public administration authorities for assuring the state security.

The components of the national security system are coordinated unitarily by the Supreme Security Council (SSC), subject to parliamentary control through specialized commissions, financed from

¹Constantin Moștofleu, *Securitatea și apărarea spațiului sud-european, în contextul transformărilor de la începutul mileniului III*, Sesiunea anuală de comunicări științifice cu participare internațională Strategii XXI/2006: București, 13-14 aprilie 2006/ Universitatea Națională de Apărare „Carol I”, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2006

the state budget and acting integrated to achieve national security. The Supreme Security Council is a consultative body, empowered to analyze and carry out the general coordination of the activity of the institutions of the national security system, of the actions of other institutions exercised on its various dimensions and to adopt recommendations for the decisions regarding the national security. Also, SSC gives recommendations to the President of the Republic of Moldova on internal and foreign policy issues of the state.

The SSC members have no additional powers of decision makers and have no right to issue provisions that exceed the limits of the competences conferred by the function they hold. The members of the Council include: the SSC secretary, advisor to the President of the Republic of Moldova in the field of security and defence, the President of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Security, Defence and Public Order Commission, the President of the Committee on Foreign Policy and European Integration of the Parliament, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European integration, ISS Director, General Attorney, Minister of Internal Affairs, CNA Director, Minister of Defence, Minister of Justice, Governor of the National Bank.

The need to reform the Supreme Security Council has been repeatedly mentioned in the documents of policy adopted by the Parliament and the Government of the Republic of Moldova. The security sector and, in particular, the Supreme Security Council as the supreme body specialized in this field, are in urgent need of remodeling its role and structure, its functions and functional capabilities¹. On September 14, 2012, the former President of the Republic of Moldova,

Nicolae Timofti, issued a decree establishing the Commission for the reform of the Supreme Security Council². The given commission elaborated the Reform Concept of the Supreme Security Council and a Bill for the Supreme Security Council, which was presented to the President of the Republic of Moldova and to the members of the Council³. The bill for the Supreme Security Council was not examined by the Supreme Security Council and was not presented to Parliament as a legislative initiative of the head of state. At the same time as the bill for the Supreme Security Council was drafted, the Commission for the reformation of the Council also elaborated the Concept of reforming the Supreme Security Council. This Concept was presented at the meeting of the Supreme Security Council, which, at the meeting of November 26, 2012, examined the work implementation of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova⁴. The SSC members approved the Reform Concept of the Supreme Security Council, which ensures, among other things, the increase of the efficiency in combating threats to national security and increase of the level of transparency of the security and defence sector. The content of the Concept is not secret and it has become known to us thanks to interviews inside of the Service of the Supreme Security Council. However, its text has not been made public for wide discussion. The concept contains five chapters: General aspects; Description of the situation and definition of the problem; Tools and ways of reforming the SSC; Evaluation of the impact of the SSC reform and the list of relevant legislative and normative acts to

¹Vadim Enicov, *Monitorizarea implementării Programului de activitate al Guvernului*, in "Integrarea Europeană: Libertate, Democrație, Bunăstare 2011-2014", Institutul de Politici Publice, Chișinău, 2014, p. 3

²Decret nr. 297 din 14.09.2012, <http://lex.justice.md/index.php?action=view&view=doc&lang=1&id=344802>, (15.05.2020).

³Comunicat de presă, <http://www.presedinte.md/rom/css-comunicate-de-presa/consiliul-suprem-de-securitate-a-examinat-modul-de-implementare-a-strategiei-securitatii-nationale-a-republicii-moldova>,

⁴Vadim Enicov, *Op.cit.*, p. 8

be elaborated, repealed or modified in the context of concept implementation. According to the Concept, the cardinal reorganization of the entire system of coordination and policy development in the fields of security and defence is necessary for carrying out the SSC reform, starting from the achievement of the most stringent objectives, such as:

a) Elaboration, promotion, adoption and implementation of a Law on the Supreme Security Council, taking into account the provisions of the National Security Strategy.

b) Modification of the legal framework regarding the activity of state security bodies and related bodies as a result of determining the new competences of the SSC, by repealing outdated acts or provisions, inefficient in the current situation, generating double interpretations.

c) Elaboration of a Regulation regarding the organization and functioning of the Service of the Supreme Security Council in order to increase its efficiency and competences.

d) Identification of the possibility of financial assurance of the reform, including staff expansion and efficient modernization of technical means used in professional activity.

e) Ensuring the transparent character of the SSC reforming activity.

From the analysis of the conception text, we find that currently there is no substantial change of the place and role of the Supreme Security Council in the system of the supreme organs of state security. At the same time, the conception does not clearly establish the planned actions, the terms and the executors of these actions. Respectively, the concept remains a declarative text of intent, without a clear purpose. In practice, no action was taken to implement it.

The supreme public authorities in the field of national security assurance (the Parliament, the Government, the

Presidency and the Supreme Security Council) have the task of establishing a democratic control over the Security bodies. To this end, the task of these institutions is to create a legal framework, which is well defined for the proper functioning of the security organs. In addition, in order to establish democratic control over the state security bodies, the civilian elements of the national security system must monitor the establishment of relations between the political factor and the information structures; the volume and structure of the allocated resources, depending on their missions; determination of the optimal balance between military and civilian components of intelligence resources.

Approaching the subject of the volume of resources that can be allocated to the state security bodies, depending on the missions they receive and analysing their budget allocations for the period 2015-2019, we note that the ISS, SSPS, CS, BP budgets have been steadily increasing, as in 2019 practically doubles as compared to 2015. As an example: annual allowances for the Information and Security Service 182.210,1 thousands of lei (2015¹), 218.147,9 (2016²), 237.239,3 (2017³), 254.194.7 (2018⁴). These denote the understanding by the decision makers of the importance of ensuring national security and placing this subject as a prerogative of their policy.

A central administrative authority in the system of law enforcement bodies with responsibilities in the field of state security is the State Security and Protection Service (SSPS)⁵. This

¹ *Legea bugetului de stat pe anul 2015*, Monitorul Oficial No. 102-104/172, 28.04.2015

² *Legea bugetului de stat pe anul 2016*, Monitorul Oficial No. 230-231/486, 26.07.2016

³ *Legea bugetului de stat pentru anul 2017*, Monitorul Oficial No. 472-477/943, 27.12.2016

⁴ *Legea bugetului de stat pentru anul 2018*, Monitorul Oficial No. 464-470/810, 29.12.2017

⁵ *Lege cu privire la Serviciul de Protecție și Pază de Stat*, Monitorul Oficial No. 120-121/470, 08.07.2008

institution is specialized in ensuring the protection of the dignitaries of the Republic of Moldova, of the foreign dignitaries during their stay in our country, of their family members, within the limits of the law, as well as in ensuring the safekeeping of the work places and their residences.

SSPS collaborates with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Service for Information and Security and other central and local public administration authorities, including with international organizations of profile. On May 25, 2012, the Bill on amending and supplementing the Law on SSPS was adopted. The Service College is established and operates within the Service, which is an advisory body in organizing its activity. The Service College is composed of 9 members. The composition of the College is approved by decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova. The meeting of the College is deliberative if at least 2/3 of its members attend it. The mode of activity of the College is stipulated in the internal regulation, which is approved by the Director of the Service. The decisions of the College are adopted with the vote of the majority of its members. Decisions shall be recorded and made public by order of the Director of the Service.

The State Protection and Security Service were established on April 24, 1997, by Government Decision no.389 of April 25, 1997. With the establishment of the Security and Guard Service, by the same decision, the Government also approved the provisional Regulation stipulating the functions, rights, categories of collaborators and civilian personnel, as well as their social and legal protection. At the same time, the objectives of the Service were extended, by approving the categories of persons benefiting from state protection, both from the Republic of Moldova and from abroad. However, following the Constitutional Court Decision no.40 of 22.12.1997, the

Government Decision regarding the establishment of the Security and Guard Service, as well as the Decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova of 25.04.1997, were declared unconstitutional. As a consequence of this fact, by Law No. 1456 of 28.01.1998, the Security and Guard Service was included in the system of state security bodies, and in order to comply with the constitutional provisions, the Law on State Security and the Law on State Security Bodies, the Law on the Security and Guard Service was approved by the Parliament. After the adoption by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on June 13, 2008 of Law No. 134 on the Security and Guard Service, the institution operates in accordance with the criteria of a democratic state and meets international standards in the field, and again passes to the control of the President of the Republic of Moldova. Following the modifications made in the special law by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova by Law no.270 of 09.12.2016 for the modification and completion of some legislative acts, the Security and Guard Service is again subordinated to the Government. Starting with June 21, 2019, following the publication in the Official Monitor of the Republic of Moldova of the modifications made to Law no. 134/2008, the Security and Guard Service has been subordinated to the President of the Republic of Moldova.

The SSPS has the following basic obligations in the field of national security: to take the protective measures necessary to ensure the security of the persons who are beneficiaries of state protection and the security of the work places and of the residences of these persons; to carry out, in accordance with the law, special investigation activities for the collection, verification and use of the information necessary to fulfill the functional obligations; to inform, by means of a notification document, with the submission of the confirmatory

materials, other authorities that carry out special investigative activities about the illicit facts that have become known within the competence of these authorities; to prevent, detect and annihilate any action that would endanger the life, physical integrity, freedom of action and health of persons receiving state protection, regardless of their location; to ensure the protection of workplaces and residences of these people; to maintain, within the limits of the competence, the public order in the places of permanent or temporary accommodation of the persons benefiting from state protection and to exclude the causes that prevent this order from being ensured; to participate, within the limits of competence, in the fight against terrorism; to ensure the accompanying or escorting of the means of transport by which the persons benefiting from state protection move; to organize the activity of defence of state and service secrecy; to ensure their own security and activity; when declaring the state of emergency, siege or war, to coordinate, within the limits of the competence, with the General Staff of the Armed Forces the actions to maintain the regime of emergency, siege or war; to carry out independently or in cooperation with other specialized bodies actions of search, identification and neutralization of suspicious objects, which would endanger the persons benefiting from state protection, the work places or the guarded residences.

The Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova (ISS) has an important role within the state security bodies, representing a component of the national Security system. On the other hand, based on national legislation, the place of ISS in the system of specialized central public administration bodies is not clearly determined. Adjusting the competences of the Information and Security Service to the needs of the current security environment and adapting the legislation in the field to

European standards are priorities of the modernization process of this institution. Moreover, the objective of the reform of the ISS can be found in various national policy documents, such as: Government Activity Program “European Integration: Freedom, Democracy, Welfare” 2009–2013, Government Activity Program “European Integration: Freedom, Democracy, Welfare” 2011–2014, Individual Action Plan of the Republic of Moldova - NATO Partnership updated¹.

On September 9, 1991 by Decree no. 196 of the President of the Republic of Moldova, the State Security Committee is liquidated, the Ministry of National Security being created. In December 1999 the Ministry of National Security was reorganized into the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova, whose activity is coordinated by the President of the Republic of Moldova. Today the activity of ISS is coordinated by the President of the Republic of Moldova, within the limits of its competence and is subject to parliamentary control. Thus, if the ISS carries out tasks of direct assurance of national security, the President of the Republic of Moldova is the one who sets the tasks and priorities of the ISS, and coordinates the elaboration of the national security policies. Also, the Parliament, the Prosecutor's Office and the Court of Accounts control the activities of the ISS.

An important aspect in the modernization of ISS is the assurance of the independence of its activity vis-à-vis other state institutions, to this end ensuring the clear delimitation of state security functions. The independence in the activity of the Service implies the freedom to act, within the limits of the

¹ *Hotărâre privind aprobarea Strategiei de reformare a Serviciului de Informații și Securitate al Republicii Moldova și a Planului de acțiuni pentru implementarea Strategiei de reformare a Serviciului de Informații și Securitate al Republicii Moldova pentru Anii 2014–2018*, No. 230, 10.10.2013, Monitorul Oficial, No. 243-247/696, 01.11.2013

institutional competences, in strict accordance with the provisions of the legislation in force, without being influenced by subjective factors, both external and institutional. The subjective factors of external influence are the interest and impact of the ruling parties in relation to the activity of ISS on the political level, but also of the business environment in relation to the activity in the field of large economic crimes; attempts by special foreign services to decompose ISS forms and means of activity. In order to avoid the negative aspects that may arise from the use and influence of the ISS by the political factor, it is necessary to apply control assurance tools, such as: institutional structuring; transparency in legal limits to public opinion and the media; ensuring supervision from the perspective of executive, legislative and judicial powers. In order to materialize them, it is necessary to follow principles such as: managerial control and external supervision; the dissociation of the supervisory activity from the control activity, where each control position will be responsible to the higher level in accordance with the principle of political control.

Regarding the topic of the subjective institutional factors of internal influence, we can mention the conflict of institutional interests (although ISS has the capacity of criminal prosecution of the crimes of danger of national security detected by the Service, this competence was excluded by legislative changes in 2011. This action has undermined. ISS authority creates a functional discomfort compared to other institutions in the field, such as Anticorruption National Centre and Ministry of Internal Affairs). Another factor of internal influence is the insufficiency of guaranteeing the clear conditions and prospects of career advancement, which generates disappointment and, respectively, the flow of cadres among the professional officers.

Another internal factor would be the vulnerability of some officers to related economic activities and the phenomenon of corruption.

At the same time, the most important step in establishing democratic control over the ISS is the creation of a well-defined legal framework in which it operates. Law no.753-XIV of December 23, 1999 on the Information and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova has an ambiguous character and generates uncertainties about the positioning of the Service in the national security system. According to art.1 of the law, the activity of ISS is coordinated by the President of the Republic of Moldova, within the limits of its competence and is subject to parliamentary control. Here comes the need to regulate by law the limits of coordination of the ISS activity by the President of the Republic of Moldova, as well as explaining how to carry out parliamentary control over the ISS activity by the Parliament.

Another important security body is the Border Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova. The Ministry of Internal Affairs exercises control over and coordinates the activity of the Border Police, elaborates and promotes the state policy in the activity of the Border Police in the field of combating illegal migration, exercises other attributions provided by the legislation in force¹.

The Border Police has the following structure:

- a) General Inspectorate of Border Police;
- b) Regional subdivisions of the Border Police;
- c) Centre of Excellence in Border Security.

The origin of the Border Police is the Decree of the President of the Republic of Moldova no. 190 "Regarding the State Border of the Republic of Moldova" issued on September 3, 1991,

¹ *Lege cu privire la Poliția de Frontieră*, Monitorul Oficial nr. 76-80/245 din 20.04.2012

in which it was stipulated that the western sector of the border is under the total jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova, and all the buildings, armament, ammunition and other goods of the border detachment no. 22 "Nijnednestrovschii" have been announced as property of the Republic of Moldova and passed under its jurisdiction.

In 1992, the Border Guard Troops of the Republic of Moldova are formed, consisting of a detachment of four border commanders and 27 pickets. By the order of the Minister of National Security no. 4 of January 11, 1992 Commander of the Border Guard Troops of the Ministry of National Security is named Colonel Vasile Calmoi. On December 23, 1999, the Border Guard Troops of the Republic of Moldova are reorganized in the Department of Border Guard Troops of the Republic of Moldova. On January 18, 2000, the Department of Border Guard Troops of the Republic of Moldova have been withdrawn from the composition of the Ministry of National Security and reorganized into an independent structure. In December 2011, the Cabinet of Ministers has approved a bill according to which from July 1, 2012 the Border Guard Service of the Republic of Moldova will be reorganized and transformed into the Border Police. In addition to the duties of the Border Guard Service, the new institution will take on competences in the field of combating cross-border crime, criminal prosecution, and examination of travel documents. On July 1, 2012 Law No. 283 of 28.12.2011 on the Border Police has come into force, according to which the Border Guard Service is reorganized into the Border Police and subordinated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova.

In 2000, the Department of Border Troops has been withdrawn from the composition of the Ministry of National Security of the Republic of Moldova and restructured into an independent structure. Since July 2012, the Border Guard

Service has been reorganized into the Border Police.

The tasks of ensuring national security carried out by the Border Police consists of preventing and combating cross-border crime, including human trafficking, organizing illegal migration, illegal crossing of the state border, smuggling, falsification and fraudulent use of documents. The Border Police, within the limits set by the legislation, exercises the criminal investigation, finds and examines the contraventions, undertakes the judicial expertise, carries out special investigative measures. The Border Police exercises its duties within the border area and the border crossing points, and in the case of combating illegal migration and cross-border crime, it exercises its duties outside this area too. The Border Police collaborates with authorities in the field of combating illegal migration, surveillance and control of the state border crossing, exchange of information of foreign states, as well as, it collaborates with international organizations, based on the international treaties to which the Republic of Moldova is a party. The Border Police provides, in the border area, the necessary assistance to the authorities empowered with control activity in the field of public health protection, the environment, as well as in the field of ecological security. In order to ensure the efficient execution of the tasks, the Border Police collaborates with the central specialized bodies of the public administration, with the authorities of the local public administration, with the law bodies.

The Border Police operates in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, the Law on Border Police, the Law on the State Border, the Law on State Security, the Law on State Security Bodies, as well as the international treaties to which the Republic of Moldova is a party.

The law enforcement body that promotes customs policy and directly

conducts customs activity in the Republic of Moldova, within the limits of its competence, contributes to ensuring the economic security of the state, combating international terrorism, smuggling, illicit human, drugs, weapons and ammunition trafficking is Customs Service¹.

The Customs Service is an administrative authority subordinated to the Ministry of Finance, which exercises the functions and attributions assigned to it and implements the customs policy of the state by uniform and impartial application of the legislation in the customs field in order to ensure the economic security of the state within the limits of its competences. The Customs Service has administrative and decision-making autonomy, respecting the provisions of the legislation in force.

The activity of the Customs Service is a special kind of activity in the public service and is part of the system of law enforcement and state security bodies. The Customs Service collaborates with civil society, ensuring access to official information, with the exception of those with limited accessibility, publishing on its official website public information and transparency of the decision-making process, in the manner established by the legislation.

The Customs Service consists of the central apparatus; customs offices, as territorial subdivisions with legal personality, subordinated to the central apparatus; customs checkpoints, as territorial subdivisions without legal personality, subordinated to the customs offices.

The central apparatus of the Customs Service and the customs offices are legal entities of public law, which have the seal with the State Coat of Arms of the Republic of Moldova, treasury accounts and are financed from the state budget.

The Customs Service is headed by a director appointed by the Minister of Finance for a term of 5 years, assisted by one of deputy directors, whose number is determined by the Government at the proposal of the Minister of Finance. Candidate for the position of director may be the person who corresponds to the requirements established by this law and Law no.158/2008 regarding the public position and the status of the civil servant.

The most important duties of the Customs Service in the field of ensuring national security are the defence of the economic interests of the state; contributing, within the limits of the law, to the implementation of measures to ensure the security of the state, public order, defence of people's life and health, protection of flora and fauna, the environment as a whole; creating the conditions for accelerating the traffic of goods across the customs border; ensuring the maintenance of an adequate balance between customs controls and trade facilitation, according to the legislation in force; identifying the commission of crimes that fall within its competence; conducting the operative activity of investigations in order to detect the persons guilty of preparing and committing some customs offences, of smuggling and of other crimes that fall within the competence of the criminal prosecution body of the Customs Service; carrying out the activities necessary for risk management; collaboration with other public authorities, institutions and bodies to protect the legal norms that have the obligation to provide assistance, etc.

An important criterion for assessing the state of the national security system is the level of intra- and inter-institutional cooperation and collaboration expressed in concrete ways by which the institutions of this system act in order to achieve common objectives. The state of competition between the state security organs, specific to the Soviet period, is one of the most extreme pessimistic views

¹ *Lege cu privire la Serviciul Vamal*, Monitorul Oficial nr. 68-76/143 din 02.03.2018

on the state transition, making it impossible to fully control decision-makers and undermining the legitimacy of the state¹.

Coordination of the operational and logistical efforts of the national security bodies, the exchange of information and other cooperation needs are achieved through protocols, programs, projects or operations². Cooperation means the organization, coordination, support and joint implementation, based on documents, by structures within the institutions of the national security system of specific actions and activities, aimed at ensuring national security.

One of the most important forms of collaboration is the cooperation between the institutions of the national security system with the central institutions of the state, because through these actions the tasks of the executive power are realized. The horizontal connection is reflected in some organizational measures undertaken by the special services, in agreement with the representatives of the central bodies of the state. In this context, the main problem arises: who and how to control the information activity, in order to prevent abuses³. Any solution to this problem is of limited character. If the central institutions of the state exercise too much control, then there is a risk that the intelligence services no longer fulfil its functions and tasks. A smaller control may result in the abusive influence of the security service on the elements that define national

security. The balance between the options described and the removal of the security service from political influence and party interests must be achieved.

The coordinated functioning of the national security system is designated by the information community, where, at the system level, common utilities and facilities are created for coordinating information planning and integrated elaboration of informational estimates of national interest, initiating and developing information programs, projects or operations limited by support of support of national security policies and strategies, specialized training and training of personnel, elaborating studies and research in strategic and national security issues, creating integrated information infrastructures and systems.

All of these foundations of the security platform represent the basic defensive structure in a state using existing technologies and security products. This platform is defined as a proposed network defence strategy allowing each security component to underline its comparative advantage and to work in cooperation with the others⁴.

In conclusion, the author considers that the best ways and mechanisms of the modernization of the national security system are the extension of civil control over the functioning of the state security institutions; increasing the level of depolarization of security institutions by broadening their spheres of action and dominating the law in the state as an element that ensures a viable connection between security institutions, citizens and the state; minimizing the role and legitimacy of traditional elites and increasing the role of modernizing elites in the field of security.

The Republic of Moldova is a consumer and not a generator of security that is why we consider that the

¹ Daniel Horsfall, *From competition state to competition states?*, in "Policy Studies", 2010, pp. 57-76

² Petre Duțu, *Echilibrul de putere și mediul de securitate*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, vol. II, București, 2011

³ I. Caraman, *Implementarea politicilor de securitate națională: Cooperarea Interagenției*, in "Politicile de vecinătate ale NATO și UE – Noi dimensiuni pentru cooperarea regională. Tezele seminarului internațional", Chișinău, Centrul Pro Marshall din Republica Moldova, 2007, pp. 115-118

⁴ Avi Chesla, *Information Security: A Defensive Battle*, Information Systems Security, 2004, pp. 24-32

modernization of the national security system by taking into account external recommendations and modernization models of other democratic states will ensure stability and reduce the vulnerability and threats to national security.

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**STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORIAL
CONFLICTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA IN THE LIGHT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW**

Abstract:	<i>The article "Strategies and tactics for the settlement of territorial conflicts in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia in the light of international law" analyses the way through conflicts resolution which is impossible not only without removing the objective bases of confrontation of the conflicting parties, but also without identifying the subjective divergences between the participants of the conflicts and the international community participating in their resolution.</i>
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The Transnistrian and Georgian conflicts should be regarded as politico-territorial and international ones, taking into account the dynamics of the changes of the geopolitical interests of the hyper-powers at regional and continental level.

The parties involved in the transnistrian conflict are: The Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, the latter using the separatist regime from Tiraspol as a tool to achieve their long-term geopolitical goals in southwestern Europe - part of the former Soviet Union. But even in the case of a more constructive approach to the Transnistrian problem by Moscow, it is impossible to find a super-special status of the Transnistrian region, whose adoption will resolve the conflict automatically. Its regulation must be found in a well thought out strategy, on the basis of which the Moldovan authorities will make consecutive efforts coordinated with the partners from abroad, aimed at eliminating the separatist regime and rebuilding the country. This is a gradual

process that will take quite a long time, as it will be necessary to find a mutually acceptable and balanced platform to eliminate negative stereotypes, which stay insistently in the consciousness of the inhabitants of the Transnistrian region.

The strategy of the Moldovan state must contain intermediate and long-term objectives, aimed at the unconditional and obligatory application of the norms and principles of international law in the conflict resolution process. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary from the very start to eliminate the foundation of the Transnistrian conflict, built by Russia, based on its true nature and its content. In this respect, the Transnistrian conflict is determined not so much as a struggle of the central power and of the separatist border regions, but as a result of the aspirations from outside, aimed at the territorial division of the Republic of Moldova and the weakening of the country's sovereignty, a process actively supported by Russia.

There is no doubt that the fate of the Transnistrian region must be decided in Chisinau, in strict accordance with the norms and principles of international law, and the mediators and guarantors must help it to find a mutually acceptable scenario on this basis. The final decisions of such decree - the agreement of the parties involved in the conflict regarding the special status of the districts of the Republic of Moldova on the left bank of the Dniester and obtaining autonomy within the Moldovan state. For now, in case when the current international security system has reached its limits, the current reality has discovered the acute need to look for new and more perfect methods of international conflict management and resolution techniques. Based on these systemic premises, the most appropriate strategy for Moldova would be resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, based on the following essential principles:

Firstly, the international principle of inviolability of borders and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity of states should remain a basic one in solving the Transnistrian political-territorial conflict, the principle of ensuring stability and security, inclusively at regional level. Arbitrary and willful attempts to counter this principle, the right to self-determination of peoples and the creation of their own statehood, based on "regional identity", should be examined as a deliberate action against the peace and tranquility of all the countries of the given region.

The negotiation process must be based on and result from the unconditional respect for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the Moldovan state, which is recognized by the international community as such.

Secondly, the methods and means used by the state to restore its territorial integrity must first of all be aimed at ensuring the security of the country, its constitutional system, real independence,

creating the premises for strengthening the state's sovereignty, economic development, consolidation of the political status, inclusively on the international arena, maintaining the geopolitical balance and stability at regional level.

Thirdly, taking into account the nature of the Transnistrian conflict, as well as the international nature, its regulatory methods must be based on political mechanisms and diplomatic means, available to the Member States of the international negotiation process of the five parties, as well as multilateral organizations (UN, EU, and OSCE). The key element of seeking an acceptable format for restoring territorial integrity must become the pro-active position of the Moldovan state, which should be based on a well-thought-out strategy and effective cooperation with foreign partners interested in stabilizing the situation in this part of southeast Europe and not only with Russia Federation.

Fourthly, the core of the efforts to restore the territorial integrity of the state must be the interests of certain concrete people, who live on both banks of the Dniester. Only when the conflict resolution becomes more profitable than the continue of hostilities, some progress will be registered.

In this respect, it is necessary that the process of peaceful regulation be taken out of the exclusive sphere of politics and diplomacy, and a realistic and pragmatic active work should be carried out in order to overcome alienation, but also to strengthen the confidence of large population groups and civil society. In this direction, the work of the state-owned media organizations should be activated in order to prepare and provide information relevant to the media, which are privately owned, including the media from Russia and other foreign countries. This activity should greatly increase the chances of advancing towards restoring the territorial integrity of the country.

Fifthly, with the formation of the approach system in resolving political, territorial and international conflicts, it should be apparent to the maximum in the specificity of the evidence and dynamics of the modern international system, which reflects the contradictions of the process of forming a new world order after the end of the cold war. The multipolar world, globalization and regionalization cause both positive tendencies towards life, which support the stable world order, and manifesting the ambitions of hyper powers under the pretext of creating a new security and stability system, especially in the Eurasian space.

Effective internationalization of the conflict resolution process regarding the participation of the international community in this process must be ensured. In this regard, Russia's intentions to play the key role of peacemaker, as well as the intermediary role through its more active involvement, and also the role of the most important international structures must be balanced in order to regulate the separatist crisis. It is necessary to exclude situations or reduce the risk of using the Transnistrian conflict by some participants of the settlement process to strengthen their status and to maintain its political influence on the international arena.

Sixthly, because of its limited geopolitical possibilities, Moldova can create real premises for restoring its territorial integrity only by convincing diplomatically Russia that it would have its own interest in resolving the Transnistrian conflict with the direct and effective support of international partners. A key element of this strategy must become the definitive abolition of the idea that the Transnistrian conflict has an ethnic character, which will allow the negotiation process to become more constructive and to identify clearly the parties of the conflict.

The main efforts of the Moldovan state to resolve the Transnistrian conflict must be directed to convince Moscow that

its current policy of supporting separatism in Moldova and, in general, of the Transnistrian conflict is not profitable for Russia in the long run and does not meet the strategic objectives of the foreign policy of its state. Only Russia's awareness of the possibility of achieving long-term geopolitical objectives in the south-east of Europe, of restoring its influence in the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, only it can cause the leaders of this country to adopt an attitude constructive to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.

If this constructive option is refused, only the realization by Russia of the loss of political capital on the international arena can force Moscow to make concessions and to lead a positive policy for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict.

Seventhly, in order to reduce the risk of direct confrontation with Russia, it is necessary, as actively as possible, to use the possibilities of public diplomacy and civil society institutions aimed at changing the wrong perception of Russian society (including the elite) and the Western one that the Transnistrian conflict is an ethnic one. The lack of progress of our state in this direction can only be explained by an inconsistent and superficial policy of the successive Moldovan governments, without being actually involved in the elaboration of a complex and argued strategy for conflict resolution.

Eighthly, in parallel with the efforts of informing the international public opinion on the true nature of the Transnistrian conflict as a political, territorial and international conflict, the Government should draw the attention of the Russian and international public opinion on the Russian financial and economic aid, on the military, political and moral support provided, which ensures the survival of the separatist regime for thirty years.

This work is important, especially in the period of the return of V.V. Putin to power, that should put an end to the

influence of many interests of Russian politics in Moldova, to make it correspond to the strategic interests of this state, which have been mentioned above, but not to individuals and groups as it is now. Namely, Putin, that is the initiator of the failed Kozak Plan, understands this interest better than any Russian politician.

In addition, the active foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova must lead Russia to the conclusion that it is not in its interest to play with separatism, especially when the former metropolis faces similar challenges in its own regions, such as the North Caucasus, the Kaliningrad region, the Far East with its uncontrolled migration flows and with premises for separatism.

Ninthly, in parallel with those mentioned above, further efforts should be made to reduce the dependence of the Tiraspol regime on Russia and, of course, the conditional reforms should be taken in order to attract Moldovan and international investments in the economic and social development of the region. This policy should help to create democratic institutions on the left bank of the Dniester, as well as the possibility for constructive negotiations between the political leaders of the two banks.

The main causes, which prevent the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict

Trying to draw a parallel between the territorial conflicts from former Soviet Union territory (Georgian and Transnistrian), it should be noted that these conflicts, being different, nevertheless have some common features that practically confirm the current problems of the settlement of the territorial conflicts in Republic of Moldova and Georgia. In both cases, the actual subjects of the conflict do not coincide with the official ones. In the case of the Transnistrian conflict, an official part of the conflict is Transnistria. In reality, however, the conflict broke out between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation. Regarding the

conflicts in Georgia, officially, parts of these conflicts are considered to be Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while in reality the conflicts are between Georgia and the Russian Federation.

In both conflicts, influential powers from the international arena are involved, a fact that mainly denotes their position in solving international conflicts. At the same time, we could consider that this is the pursuit of hyper powers own interests of economic, military, geopolitical and geostrategic nature.

In both cases there were serious violations of the norms of international law: in the case of the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict, the principle of non-aggression in international relations was violated. In our view, in the case of the Transnistrian conflict, the violation of the principle of non-intervention, the principle of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states and the principles of conducting negotiations can be attested. In none of the cases, an adequate reaction of the international community has been registered, attracting responsibility and sanctioning. Both conflicts raised the question of the practical efficiency of the international legal norms in the field and of the main international structures responsible for peace and security in the world. In both cases, the military forces of the hyper powers continue to be situated on the territory of the opponent in conflict, which is likely to keep the conflict in a latent form.

Over the years, the authorities of the Republic of Moldova have failed to develop an adequate and effective strategy for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. The Moldovan authorities continued to act impulsively and uncertainly, relying entirely on the support of one or another partner, resting the responsibility for the actions taken and their results on the latter.

The lack of an active and well-defined policy of the Republic of Moldova in the Transnistrian problem, which is

facing the active resistance of the Russian Federation, is one of the main causes that prevent the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict¹. Consequently, for more than five years, the parties of the conflict, but also the international mediators and observers, have failed to create real premises for solving the Transnistrian problem, in accordance with the norms and principles of international law.

The Russian Federation is constantly using the strategy to impose the international community the background of the alleged ethnic confrontation between Chisinau and Tiraspol through Transnistrian leaders. In approaching the specialized doctrine of the Russian Federation, the separatist regime, as the spokesperson of the interests of the "threatened ethnic group" (the so-called "Transnistrian people"), has the legal right to participate in the negotiation process at international level as a party with full rights². In this way, Russian Federation wants to convince the other parties of the negotiation process that the Transnistrian conflict has an inter-ethnic character and thus, to justify the presence of Russian troops on the territory of the Republic of Moldova as a mediator and guarantor. This, in accordance with the Kremlin's strategies, should give some legitimacy not only to the demands of the separatist regime, but also to justify the existing "peacekeeping" army in the Dniester security zone.

Namely in this direction, Russian Federation's basic diplomatic efforts to impose in the process of negotiating the equal status of the separatist regime in Tiraspol are directed. Such an approach to the conflict nullifies the accusations made

to Russia, as this country is actually another party involved in the conflict, which, by virtue of this fact, is an international one and can be reduced, in fact, to Russia's co-operation with the UN member country.

The tendency of the EU and US representatives, supported by the OSCE in order to advance it as a key objective of the multilateral negotiation format, to intensify the dialogue and the concrete cooperation between Chisinau and Tiraspol, speaking of the fact that the West also perceives the conflict as an ethnic one, as well as the tendency of the EU and the United States of America to perceive simplistically the nature of conflicts in the post-Soviet space. But most likely the West, especially the United States, as we have shown above, is simply wasting time, wishing not to aggravate relations with Russian Federation, which has no less priority (say as Iraq, Afghanistan, North Africa) than Republic of Moldova³. However, direct discussions between the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the separatist regime in Tiraspol, whose existence depends entirely on Russia, are meaningless, at least as long as Russia will not consider it necessary to make concessions or at least to change its current strategy. Until Chisinau does not destroy these models of international perception of the situation around the Transnistrian conflict, Russia can count on the success of applying these ideas in practice.

Tactics of Transnistrian conflict resolution

The most favorable option for ending the Transnistrian conflict is its solution. The political-territorial settlement of an international conflict means the elimination of the causes that led to its emergence, that is, in eliminating the

¹ Magdalena Dembińska, Frederik Mérand, *The role of international brokers in frozen conflicts: the case of transnistria*, in "Asia Europe Journal" Canada, 2019, Vol. 17, p.21

² Ilya Galinskii, Vlada Machuga, *The Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict: features of development in the early XXI century*, in "Bulletin of the Moscow Region State University", Russian Federation, 2018, No.2, p.53

³ Michael Geistlinger, *The EU-neighbourhood policy and the case of Transnistria*, Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу (Serbia), 2015, No.70, p.28

contradictions of the interests of the subjects in conflict¹. This requires considerable effort because self-conflict is practically impossible. Therefore, a priority method of settlement of such conflicts can become their regulation, i.e. limitation of open conflict, cessation of any actions of the leadership of the Republic of Moldova, to be qualified as a violation of the rights of national minorities, reducing the level of tension between parties, escalating tensions, diminishing the level of hostility in relationships, refusing each participant to take unilateral actions and moving to a compromise solution to the problem.

According to the opinions expressed in the specialized doctrine, the concrete way of solving the Transnistrian conflict must be the balance of a series of political agreements and negotiations, which will lead to its completion. Thus, according to researcher V. Serzhanova, the tendency of the Republic of Moldova during a sufficiently long period to force Tiraspol to accept a certain variant for normalizing the situation in the eastern districts of Moldova with the support of international partners has not produced real results. For this reason, it is necessary to focus attention on the negotiation strategy, on the transfer of the negotiation process from the status of the Transnistrian region, considered by Russia to be so-called ethnically in a specific field of application of the principles and norms of international law².

In order to the Transnistrian dispute to be resolved, the balance and flexibility of positions must be respected, which means, on the one hand, the possibility of demonstrating a commitment to clearly defined principles for conflict resolution,

openness to systemic interaction, and on the other hand, not to admit an open confrontation with its opponents, the cooperation which is anyway necessary for the realization of national interests³. The use of such a balanced strategy is possible if it is based on the analysis of the prognosis with multiple variants.

Russian authors N. Romashkina and S. Rastoltsev believe that a solution to the Transnistrian conflict is impossible without removing the objective grounds of the conflict opposition, but also without revealing the true, hidden interests that generate the subjective divergences of the conflict participants and the international community, which participate in the regulation of this⁴. In this context, it is necessary to move step by step towards a reasonable compromise, whereby each step will be carefully thought out and directed towards creating optimal conditions for definitive settlement of the conflict with the separatist regime.

In the opinion of the Romanian researcher M. Bucliš, the principle of "realistic conflict settlement" should be creatively applied when constructing the negotiation process, coming from the understanding of the impossibility of solving the conflict at the moment, avoiding the relatively long period of coordination of many questions. Therefore, in the Romanian author's view, the main methods of conflict resolution are negotiations and mediation⁵.

¹ Balint Magyar, *Stubborn Structures: Reconceptualizing Postcommunist Regimes*, Central European University Press, 2019, p.29

² Victoriya Serzhanova, *Reflections over the Legal and Constitutional Status of Transnistria*, in "Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego", Poland, 2017, No. 6, p. 77

³ López Jiménez, *The dissolution of the Soviet Union and complex state construction processes. Two differentiated secession models in the Republic of Moldova: Gagauzia and Transnistria*, in "Spanish Yearbook of International Law", 2018, Vol. 22, p. 407

⁴ Natalia Romashkina, Sergey Rastoltsev, *Unresolved conflicts on the post-soviet space in Europe and the role of Russia in the settlement (Transnistrian and Nagorno Karabakh conflicts cases)*, in "Strategic Stability in the 21st Century", Russian Federation, 2016, No. 4(77), p. 59

⁵ Mihail Bucliš, *Analysis of the hybrid war effects on the security of the Republic of Moldova in the present security context*, in "Studia Securitatis", Romania, 2018, No.1, p. 54

In order to make the most active use of the negotiations in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, we consider it is necessary to use six basic elements:

- 1) To insist on objective criteria for evaluating the nature of the Transnistrian conflict based on the concepts and norms of international law;
- 2) To insist on the priorities of the objective interests (vital, which are not related to the policy) of the inhabitants on both sides of the Dniester and of the Republic of Moldova, in general, in order to establish the approaches to the conflict resolution;
- 3) To focus on the interests and object of the negotiations and not on the statements of the official positions made by the parties involved in the conflict resolution;
- 4) To focus on the essence of the negotiations and not on their form, the negotiations in which the most emotional representatives of the parties express their positions. Prompt and constructive reaction to possible challenges within the tripartite commission. Exclusion from the negotiation process of such discussions;
- 5) To attract for cooperation in solving the Transnistrian conflict of the leadership of the Gagauz autonomy in the context of the positive experience gained during the period of existence of Gagauz Yeri as autonomy;
- 6) Develop mutually advantageous variants based on the clearly formulated principles of international law. At the same time, it is necessary to review and take joint decisions in order to solve humanitarian and social problems in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova, in order to strengthen the trust between the citizens on both banks of the Dniester. However, these actions, in agreement with international partners, should not lead to the amplification of the separatist regime. Only rehabilitated social and economic relations can contribute to a responsible approach in the negotiation process;
- 7) Taking into account the weaknesses existing in the Moldovan peacekeeping

operations and the lack of a systematic concept in this direction, it is appropriate to develop and adopt the Transnistrian conflict resolution strategy and to restore the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova;

- 8) There is a need for fundamental research in the field of conflictology, the involvement of scientists, specialized in international affairs, specialists in the natural sciences, experts of the main non-governmental institutions in order to strengthen the government's strategy by scientific evaluations.

Strategies and tactics for the settlement of territorial conflicts in Georgia

Analyzing comparatively the circumstances of the conflict in Transnistria with that of Abkhazia, we can see that, unlike the Republic of Moldova, Georgia has consolidated the status of Abkhazia as an occupied territory with all subsequent consequences and respects this regime, except for the provision of humanitarian assistance provided by international humanitarian law¹. In other words, Georgia has fulfilled all the conditions regarding Abkhazia as occupied territory, which is under the full protectorate of the Russian Federation.

As regards South Ossetia, there was a plan for the reintegration of Georgia proposed by former President M. Saakashvili. Initially, this plan was successful because many Georgians live in South Ossetia, and the plan put forward by M. Saakashvili had an aim to create immediately adequate living conditions for the population in the occupied territory². The plan was not implemented because the Russian Federation did not allow the

¹ Valerică Cruceru, *Thoughts on Abkhaz-Georgian conflict. Historical landmarks and Russia's influence*, in "Bulletin of Carol I National Defense University" Bucharest, 2014, No.4, p. 52

² S.G. Sizov, *The unrecognized States in the former Soviet Union and a position of Russia*, in "Bulletin of Omsk University, Series Jurisprudence", 2017, No.1(13), p. 28

implementation of these peaceful constructive intentions.

In the doctrine, it was mentioned that Georgia's policy, that consists of sanctions imposed on and isolation of Abkhazia, is a big mistake. Each new threat from Tbilisi reinforces the pro-Russian feeling in people from Abkhazia. On the other hand, Abkhazia must open its borders so that the population can travel freely in other states, and to inform people about European ideas and values¹.

Peaceful settlement of territorial conflicts in Georgia is possible only if it is economically and politically advantageous for Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be part of a Georgian state. This can become real in the case of democratization of public life, overcoming the crisis and accelerated economic development of Georgia. Restoring Georgia's territorial integrity through peaceful means may be slower in time, but from a historical perspective, it is the most fruitful way.

An alternative to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in Georgia is a military force. This path is full of vices, as the resumption of hostilities in the area of Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is contrary to the interests of the international community and threatens to destabilize the situation not only in Georgia but also in the neighboring regions of the Caucasus.

Changing the current situation requires an effective interaction of all parties involved in the conflict. All parties should recognize the presence of the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. The adoptions of normative documents that aggravate the situation in Abkhazia only worsen the conflict situation and delay the prospect of its resolution. The Georgian leadership should recognize the Republic of Abkhazia as a necessary and active participant in the conflict resolution process. A significant step in this direction

¹ Маргарита Ахвледиани, *Грузия-Абхазия в среднесрочной перспективе до 2020 года*, in "Дискуссионные доклады" Publisher International Alert, p.48

could be the conclusion of an agreement on the non-use of the armed forces between Abkhazia and Georgia².

In Abkhazian society, there is a view that the conflict with Georgia was resolved after the Russian Federation left the sanctions regime. This view is erroneous, as such a formulation of the situation does not allow to analyze objectively and adequately of all future problems and challenges that Abkhazia will face³. In this regard, a public discussion on what means the "sustainable peace" and the price of unresolved conflict is necessary.

Most of the inhabitants of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have received Russian citizenship and are no longer considered citizens of Georgia. Thus, the Georgia Law No.431-III of 23.10.2019 concerning the occupied territories⁴ can be applied for the imposition of fines or the detention of residents who have previously entered Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the Russian Federation. We are of the opinion that such uncertainty can create abuse of the law, even if the Georgian government considers that these people are de facto citizens of Georgia and not of the Russian Federation and, therefore, do not fall under the aforementioned law. Thus, the law can prevent them from crossing the conflict lines.

The strategy of territorial conflict resolution adopted by the Georgian leadership correlates with the interests of the European Union, but discredits the European initiative for the citizens of

² Татьяна Бутова, Анастасия Дунаева, Никита Удачин, *Проблема изоляции Абхазии и пути ее решения*, in "Интернет-журнал Науковедение", 2014, No. 3(22), p. 9

³ Maria Vershina, Platon Agapov, *The conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the Russian Georgian relations: problems of regional and international cooperation*, in "Bulletin of Moscow University, Series 18 Sociology and Political Science", 2010, No.2, p.118

⁴ Закон Грузии №431-III от 23 октября 2008 года "Об оккупированных территориях", <https://matsne.gov.ge/en/document/download/19132/6/ru/pdf>, (24.08.2019)

Abkhazia, thus creating restrictions on cooperation and contact between the European Union and Abkhazia. In this regard, it becomes necessary to position the strategy as an independent initiative which does not establish as the main objective "restoring territorial integrity" of Georgia¹. The practice shows that the Georgian leadership is trying to discredit all possible Abkhazian attempts to communicate independently with EU countries. Aware of this, Abkhazia should manifest collaboration abroad.

Through its actions, the Georgian Government promotes the tactic of "declaring an objective and moving in the opposite direction from it". Georgia declares the need to maintain territorial integrity and return Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but forcing international isolation of these territories, Georgia strengthens their separatism². The attempt by the Georgian authorities to prevent foreign investments from entering Abkhazia and South Ossetia leads to a doubling of the Russian monopoly in the economy of these republics. In this way, the isolation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the Western influence does not promote democratization, but, on the contrary, leads to further alienation of these republics from the rest of the world and leaves only one option - the proximity to the Russian Federation.

Territorial integrity of states on international, legal and geopolitical dimensions

Regardless of the form of state structure, government or political regime, states remain legally equal, having the same rights as subjects of international law

relations. Taking into account the analysis that was carried out in the present scientific approach, we emphasize that the state structure adopted by each nation can determine and influence the way of exercising sovereignty. It can determine the surrender of some attributes of sovereignty or it can limit the sovereignty to a degree that it would not affect the interests of the state and the people.

States intentionally and consciously delegate some of their sovereignty to international organizations, supra-state structures or jointly exercise certain powers within a state, in order to manage jointly certain fields with other states and to harness certain ideas, values, projects through international cooperation³. Thus, the integration of the state in certain international or regional structures does not cancel its sovereign character.

In modern conditions, the notion of the principle of territorial integrity is unquestionable which is true and fixed in the Constitutions of most states. For several centuries, the territory is the main criterion of the state. In international law, it has been stipulated that the principle of territorial integrity means full sovereignty of the state throughout its territory⁴. This principle is one of the most important in international law and regulates relations between states.

In contemporary interstate relations, the principle of territorial integrity is related to ensuring the security of the state, guaranteeing the protection against external invasions on its territory and forced changes of its territorial borders. Therefore, according to the UN Statute, the states are obliged to respect the territorial integrity of each Member State

¹ A.O. Lasaria, *Dynamics of a peaceful settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict (until the August events of 2008)*, in "Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series Political Science", 2017, Vol. 19, No.3, p.322

² Ahmad Jansiz, Mohammad Reza Khojaste, *Conflicts in the Caucasus Region and Its Effects on Regional Security Approach*, in "Journal of Politics and Law", Canada, 2015, Vol. 8, No.1, p.85

³ Ion Guceac, *Ansamblul trăsăturilor distincte ale suveranității și independenței în condițiile statului federativ și confederativ*, in "Studia Universitatis, Seria Științe Sociale" Republic of Moldova, 2017, No. 3 (103), p.146

⁴ Nathan Shaw-Malcolm, *The International Law of Territory*, Oxford University Press, 2018, p.103.

and not to take any actions which represent a threat to their territorial integrity.

In international law, the idea was established that the principle of territorial integrity of the state means full sovereignty over its entire territory. This principle is one of the most important in international law and regulates relations between states¹. Of course, the principle of territorial integrity serves as a basis for the existing world order. To revise or question it means putting the world into the brink of conflict, which will not only undermine the foundations of international tensions but may also lead to the advent of "chaos in the world".

Unchanged borders and territorial integrity are the guarantors of the stability of both national and international relations. The conquest and independence wars of the twentieth century determined the international community to recognize territorial integrity as a basic principle and its acceptance at the international level and in national laws.

Currently, territorial problems are some of the most acute problems of the system of relations between states, but also within them. They are directly related to the establishment of sovereign power in states in a certain region of the world or to the preservation of a people's independence, a declaration of its geopolitical identity and civilization². The unity of the constitutional space and its combination with the territorial and state integrity of the modern states constitute the basis of the activity of all structures and institutions of the state power.

The current state of the legislative norms in the field of sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination shows that, as in the past, the geopolitical factor

has an influence on one principle or another, and their fulfillment depends on the will and commitment of the states, their essence and not on the use of interpretations exclusively for the benefit of one of the parties³. At the same time, this means that the attention of the international community and the strict respect by its members of the territorial integrity of the states will depend to a large extent not only on the geopolitical distribution of forces but also on the fate of the new global order formation.

Applying the principle of territorial integrity, first of all, implies the existence of internationally recognized borders. If there is no such basis, then the principle itself ceases to work. Precisely for this reason, in the practice of international relations, there is the rule that the states would refrain from recognizing the new country if it had territorial problems, because it actually involved that the state recognized it during an unresolved conflict.

The territorial integrity of the state is ensured by the unity of the state power system. The unity of the state power is guaranteed by the Constitution, which defines a single territorial, political and legal space of the country, the building principles of the state, central and local power systems, which give the state the form of an integral unit. Thus, in accordance with Article 3 of the Constitution of R.M⁴. (1) *The territory of the Republic of Moldova is inalienable;* (2) *The borders of the state of the Republic of Moldova are established by organic law, respecting the unanimously recognized principles and norms of international law.* Also, in Article 11 of the Constitution of Republic of Moldova it is stipulated that

¹ Cedric Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction in International Law*. Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2015, p.65

² Guyomar M. *Territorial Belonging – Inclusion and Exclusion from State Territories*, in "European Review of Public Law", Greece, 2017, Vol. 29, No.1 (103), p.21

³ David Björgvinsson, *The intersection of international law and domestic law: a theoretical and practical analysis*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub Ltd, 2015, p.113

⁴ *Constituția Republicii Moldova*, 29.07.1994, Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, 1994, No.1

(1) the Republic of Moldova proclaims its permanent neutrality; (2) The Republic of Moldova does not allow the deployment of military troops of other states on its territory. Regarding the administrative-territorial status of the localities in the Transnistrian region, in the Constitution of R.M. (art. 110 para. (2)), it is regulated that special forms and conditions of autonomy may be assigned to the localities on the left bank of the Dniester in accordance with the special statute adopted by the organic law.

Similar regulations are found in the Constitution of Georgia, adopted on August 24, 1995¹. Thus, in article 1st of the Constitution it is stipulated that *Georgia shall be an independent, unified and indivisible state, as confirmed by the Referendum of 31 March 1991, held throughout the territory of the country, including the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia and the Former Autonomous Region of South Ossetia.* Also, in Article 2 of the Constitution, it is indicated that *(1) The territory of the state of Georgia shall be determined as of 21 December 1991. The territorial integrity of Georgia and the inviolability of the state frontiers, being recognized by the world community of nations and international organizations, shall be confirmed by the Constitution and laws of Georgia. (2) The alienation of the territory of Georgia shall be prohibited. The state frontiers shall be changed only by a bilateral agreement concluded with the neighboring State. (3) The territorial state structure of Georgia shall be determined by a Constitutional Law on the basis of the principle of circumscription of authorization after the complete restoration of the jurisdiction of Georgia over the whole territory of the country.*

After the adoption of the Statute of the United Nations (UN)² on June 26, 1945, the legal protection of territorial integrity, the inviolability of states and the self-determination of the peoples intensified substantially. The fixation in a series of UN resolutions and their subsequent approval in the international treaties and agreements of the states made the law on territorial integrity and the right to self-determination to have much greater authority contributed to their strengthening and to wider recognition.

Under modern conditions, the principle of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders must be respected in order to ensure global peace and security of states. But in practice, the realization of these principles is closely linked to the political interests of the states, which, after reaching their goals, violate these principles³. There should be mentioned that the current international community does not have effective tools - legal norms and mechanisms for their implementation by which the resolution of the separatist conflicts could be directed and accompanied by a system of sanctions against offenders.

Attempts to change the borders of states without their consent have always been an expression of aggression, which has often led to war. But even today, it is not possible to avoid armed conflicts between states about territorial disputes. In this context, a threat to the security of states and their territorial integrity represents ethnic, regional and local conflicts, which violate stability not only in a particular country but also can cause a conflict situation in the region and throughout the world.

² *The Charter of the United Nations* signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, <https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/>, (04.09.2019)

³ Cedric Ryngaert, *Jurisdiction in International Law* Second Edition. Oxford University Press, 2015, p.126

¹ *Конституция Грузии* принята 24 августа 1995 года, Ведомости Парламента Грузии, 1995, No. 31-33

An important right that contributes to ensuring the territorial integrity of states on the international, legal and geopolitical levels is the right of the people to self-determination until separation. The right of peoples to self-determination means the right of ethnic communities recognized by the international community to determine their status until the formation of an independent sovereign state if their existence is threatened by the incumbent nation¹.

In the specialized literature there are two approaches to the right of the people to self-determination, namely: the right of the people to independence and the right to internal self-determination². The choice of approach depends on each situation, but today, in most cases, the right to self-determination with declaring independence is blocked by the obligation to maintain the territorial integrity of the states. The right of peoples to self-determination until the separation has given rise to a special type of conflict, which is based on the desire of ethnic minorities to realize their right to self-determination in the form of an independent state formation.

Analyzing the current state of the norms of law in the field of sovereignty, territorial integrity and self-determination, it is necessary to conclude that, as in the past, the geopolitical factor exerted its influence in favor of one or another principle, and its realization depended on the will and the commitment of the subjects in regard to the essence of international law³. At the same time, under the conditions of globalization and the

emergence of a new type of threats to national and international security, international law as a civilized landmark in relations between states becomes much more necessary than before.

In order to gain the international recognition of Transnistria's independence, Russian doctrines employ the right of the people to self-determination, emphasizing that in the case of Transnistria the right of the people to independence and the right to internal self-determination should be respected. In the same context, insisting on the principle of equality of subjects within a "common state", the Tiraspol authorities are trying to "institutionalize" the regional identity of Transnistria as a distinctive one.

As an argument for Transnistria's regional identity is used the historical fact of the creation of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) on October 12, 1924 by the Central Ukrainian Executive Committee, as an "autonomous" territorial entity on the left bank of the Dniester River in the composition of the Ukrainian SSR⁴. The establishment of the respective Moldovan unit was initiated by military leader Grigore Kotovsky and included the Transnistrian rayons of today's Republic of Moldova, plus the Ananiev, Balta, Bârzula, Codâma, Cruteni, Ocna Roşie and Pesceana rayons in the current Odessa region of Ukraine⁵. Initially, the official capital of the autonomous republic was proclaimed "the temporary occupied city of Chisinau", and from 1929 until the

¹ Krzysztof Wojtyczek, *Territory and the Principle of Territoriality in Public International Law*, in "European Review of Public Law", Greece, 2017, Vol. 29, No.1 (103), p.22

² Kjeldgaard-Pedersen A., *The International Legal Personality of the Individual*, Oxford University Press, 2018, p.19

³ Guyomar M., *Territorial Belonging – Inclusion and Exclusion from State Territories*, in "European Review of Public Law", Greece, 2017, Vol. 29, No.1 (103), p.19

⁴ Alex Voronovici, *The Year 1924. Justifying Separatism: the Establishment of the Moldovan ASSR and History Politics in the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic*, in "Plural. History. Culture Society. Journal of History and Geography Department, „Ion Creangă” State Pedagogical University, Republic of Moldova, 2015, No.1, p.141

⁵ Олег Галущенко, *Год 1924: создание Молдавской АССР*, in "Науковий вісник міжнародного гуманітарного університету. Серія: Історія. Філософія. Політологія", Ukraine, 2013, No 5, p.8

abolition of the autonomous republic (1940), the capital was in the city of Balta.

By the creation in 1990 of the "Dniester Moldovan Republic", the revival of this social-political project took place, this time it was called "the Transnistrian people". Analyzing more deeply the nature of this "new regional community", it can be understood that there is no difference between the pseudo-idea of the regional identity of "Transnistrians" and the old idea about the "Soviet people" which also claimed a supranational status.

Despite the fact that the Russian-speaking groups, initiated by Transnistria's leadership, are considered to be an independent supranational community, this is to the detriment of the majority ethnic group, that of the Moldovans, as well as other ethnic and cultural minorities living on the shore of the left bank of the Dniester. This is the reason why the leadership of these Russian-speaking groups in Transnistria supports the actions of the Russian Federation in Georgia and considers that the former metropolis must carry a similar policy to the eastern borders of the former USSR, as regards the self-proclaimed "Transnistrian republic"¹. In context, the ideologies of anti-Moldovan separatism in Transnistria are increasingly insisting on the recognition of the right of the "Transnistrian people" to establish their own political status in the form of independent and sovereign state or a state with a special status within the Republic of Moldova².

Taking into account the fact that the international territorial conflict implies the situation of maximum aggravation of the contradictions in the sphere of international relations, expressed in the

form of active confrontations and clashes (armed or unarmed) of parties of the conflict, we conclude that its solution is much more difficult and complex in comparison with the settlement of international disputes.

Due to its severity, the international territorial conflict needs to be finalized both by political-diplomatic means and, in some cases, by the use of force (another criterion that differentiates it from the international dispute). Despite the fact that an effective conflict resolution is possible only if both parties analyze their contradictions and decide on mutually acceptable solutions, however, the special role of third parties in the conflict resolution process cannot be denied, which only has to contribute to the proximity of the parties and their determination to sit at the negotiating table.

The intervention of the third parties in the resolution of the conflict is a necessary, as well as complicated moment, because, depending on the interests pursued, the third party can contribute to both the resolution of the conflict and its aggravation or, at least, its maintenance. The intervention can take place both in the context of the negotiations and through the use of force in order to stabilize the situation and bring it under control, so that the diplomatic negotiations can be initiated. In both cases, the intervention of third parties entails certain risks, that is to say, it can generate certain political and legal problems. In this respect, the most serious problem lies in the distorted role that the third party can play in the negotiation process. By its vicious conduct, the third party can pursue the realization of their own interests to the detriment of the interests of the parties of the conflict, thus seriously violating the norms of international law.

Regarding the Transnistrian conflict, we emphasize that, essentially, the cause of the failure to resolve this conflict does not lie in the impossibility of the parties (of the Republic of Moldova and

¹ Krzysztof Wojtyczek, *Territory and the Principle of Territoriality in Public International Law*, in "European Review of Public Law", Greece, 2017, Vol. 29, No.1 (103), p.23

² Nina Shevchuk, *Settlement of "Identity Conflicts": the Case of Transnistria*, in "International Trends", Russian Federation, 2016, No. 3(4), p.106

Transnistria) to agree on mutually advantageous solutions, but in the implication of Russia as a "third party" and its efforts to implement its own interests in the region. Respectively, the solution of the conflict may consist either of removing Russia from the negotiation process and the peacekeeping mission (at the moment practically unrealistic and impossible), or accepting the model proposed by this country for conflict resolution, which is known to contravene all aspects of interests of The Republic of Moldova as a sovereign and independent state (also unattainable solution).

Taken as a whole, the Transnistrian conflict eloquently demonstrates that the process of managing international conflicts is only apparently carried out according to the unanimous legal framework established and recognized by the international community. *De facto*, this process is dominated by the stronger states, which seek to satisfy their own interests. This fact also denotes the inefficiency of international structures to apply the international legal framework to the great powers of the world, being unable to influence them and even more to sanction them.

Speaking of peaceful measures to resolve international conflicts using such coercive measures as retaliation, repression (embargo and boycott), break of diplomatic relations, it should be mentioned that despite their priority over the use of force in resolving conflicts, they are likely to exacerbate the relationships between the parties of the conflict, which are already in tension. That is why, it is preferable to apply these measures only in the form of sanctions imposed by the international community (the relevant organizations in the field).

Following the analysis of the facts related to the Transnistrian conflict and the international legal framework in this field, it can be concluded that this conflict is an international one. The central point in this determination is that the role of the

Russian Federation comes to the involvement of a third party in conflict, leading to internationalization. This implies that the whole corpus of international humanitarian law should be applicable to the conflict, thus offering a more expansive protection regime to those involved in and affected by the conflict.

The evolutions related to the Transnistrian settlement process clearly show the support of separatism by the Russian Federation, which has, in fact, a triple status: a state that encouraged the outbreak of separatism and which, in fact, controls the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova in military, economic, financial aspects etc.; as mediator in the process of negotiations and guarantor of the agreements reached; a party directly interested in conflict resolution. These moments prove persuasively that the Transnistrian conflict is an international conflict, all the more since all decisions are taken by Russia on behalf of Transnistria.

The fact that an international legal regime, especially an expansive legal regime, can be considered to be applicable in the Transnistrian region is all the more significant, given the region's status as a *de facto* state that has no obligations and the possibility to apply the international standards and norms, leaving the population of the region without any international legal protection. The regime of international humanitarian law would provide a certain level of protection for the population, prescribing war crimes, such as rape, murder and torture, protecting civilian goods, and providing an option for criminal prosecution of alleged offenders.

Generalizing, we argue that the main problems that face the settlement of contemporary conflicts often prove to be of the nature of those mentioned above. This can be explained by the fact that, in essence, the conflict triggering and resolution in most cases is confined to the conflict management policy promoted by the great powers of this world, which

recognize and adhere to international legal norms, but *de facto* act according to their own interests. In our view, the only solution that can destroy the effect of such a policy is the optimization of the international legal framework and the strengthening of the capacities of the main international structures, which will not admit in any case fighting and preventing any unilateral and unauthorized reactions that represent the possible challenges of the contemporary world.

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RELIGIOUS GOVERNANCE IN MOROCCO: DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Abstract:	<i>In Morocco the administration/management of the religious sphere falls entirely within the authority of the king, who is also the head of the Executive power, the President of the Judicial authority and the Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. According to the article 41st of the Constitution, the King, Prince (Commander) of the Faithful (Amir Al Mouminine), sees to the respect for Islam. He is the Guarantor of the free exercise of beliefs. He presides over the Superior Council of the Ulema (Conseil supérieur des Oulema), charged with the study of questions that he submits to it. This Council is the sole instance enabled to comment and to edict religious consultations (Fatwas) before being officially agreed to, on the questions to which it has been referred and this, on the basis of the tolerant principles, precepts and designs of Islam.</i>
Keywords:	Morocco; Religion; Demographic; Radicalization; Islam
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Introduction

Morocco is a country, in the North-West of Africa, 14 km far from Spain, of about 36 million people. The Moroccan population is presented as almost totally Muslim. 99% of Morocco's inhabitants are considered as Muslim. But, such stratification is, in fact, only statistical. In reality, the census does not provide any question about the religion of the interviewees or whether they are practising or not. Also, any survey has never been led in Morocco concerning such a subject, i.e. what are the parts of Muslims, no-Muslims, follower, no-followers, etc.

Morocco has known during its recent history – especially since the seventies of the last century - two predominant developments, one of which makes it similar to the rest of the MENA

region, from Algeria to Iraq, passing by Tunisia, Libya, Egypt or Jordan, while the other is that it represents a sort of exception within the Arab world. When it comes to this second point, Morocco is generally considered, among the Arab world, as a democracy, with a "multi-party system", local and national elections, a parliament functioning formally since the beginning of the sixties of the last century, even if it has any important power. The fact is that the real powers in the country are held by the King, who is not subject to election, is not politically responsible, so even he is the Chief Commander of the Army, the Head of the Ministers council, the head of the Justice Authority and the head of National security Council, etc.

Another manifestation of this "Moroccan exception" is illustrated by the

form and the consequences of the so called Arab spring which were initiated and led in Morocco, at the beginning of 2011, by the "20 February" movement.

This movement, supported by the radical socialist opposition parties (represented by all the socialist movements except the USFP - Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires) and by many Human rights associations as by some associations of non employed persons - led a series of important protests in almost 150 cities, especially in the most important ones like Rabat, the capital, Casablanca, Fès, or Tangiers.

The main demands of the protesters were, as in the other Arab countries:

- The reform of the state;
- The fight against corruption;
- The independence of the justice system;
- The separation at the head of the state between politics and affairs and between politics and religion, i.e. the constitution of a Civil State;
- The reduction of the social gap within Moroccan population/less social injustice;
- The eviction of some regime symbols represented by some friends of the King and other persons very close to him.

But, in opposition with what happened in Tunisia, where the street said "Ben Ali dégage", or in Egypt where the protesters did the same with former President Hosni Mubarak, the street didn't say in Morocco "le roi dégage, Mohamed VI go away". It only expressed the will/hope for deep reforms, for more justice, more jobs, more dignity, less corruption, less inequality between men and women, etc. At that level, we have one of the most important differences vis-à-vis of the protests in the rest of Arab countries where the revolution started.

Another difference, concerning Islamist movements, including the radicals among them, lies in the deep nature of the Moroccan political system. So, the Monarchy is very old in Morocco, it's founded on an historical legitimacy. It's also founded, relating to that, on a strong

religious respect vis-à-vis of the king/sultan/roi. The King is "Amir Al Mouminin" and for a part of the population, he is the "Representative of God on earth".

These two considerations make it possible that the medium class didn't contribute to the protests and also that a part of the Islamism movements, not only didn't walk with the protesters, but did support the King and condemn the protests. It's particularly the case of the PJD (The Party for Justice and Development, the brother of the Tunisian movement, Ennahda) which is rolling the Government in Rabat since the beginning of 2012. It's also the case of the "Boutchichi" association, a very strong Soufi organization based in the Eastern part of Morocco, which organized a great street demonstration calling to vote for the Constitutional reform as proposed by the King on June 2011. At that stage, when radical movements are taken into account, their opposition is directed more towards "Social deviations" and impious foreign powers/governments than towards the Monarchic system and the King, as that most of these movements are considering the latter the "Protector of Islam".

Demographic and socio-economic background, a potential base for radicalization

The number of Moroccans was multiplied by almost 3 times between 1961 and 2019¹, as shown in the table below, passing from 11,89 million to 35,67 million in 58 years.

¹ The data for 1961 and 2014 are from a back projection on the basis of the results of the general census of population and houses of 1961, 1971, 1982, 1994, 2004 and 2014. From 2014, it is the updating of population projections based on the results of the Census 2014.

Year	Total	Urban	Rural	Urban population/ Total %
1961	1.897	3.547	8.350	29.81
1971	15.379	5.409	9.969	35.17
1982	20.419	8.730	11.689	42.75
1994	26.073	13.407	12.665	51.42
2004	29.891	16.463	13.428	55.07
2014	33.848	20.432	13.415	60.36
2019	35.675 ^a	22.439	13.236	62.9

Table 1. Evolution of the Moroccan Legal population by Area of Residence (1960-2019)¹

The birth rate, after peaking at over 2.7% between 1969 and 1972, has started to decline since then. It reaches today the rate of 1.25%, one of the lowest in Africa. However, if the growth rate of the population as a whole has been reduced, that which relates to the urban population has strongly increased leading to the multiplication by 6.32 times of the latter's number, as shown in the table 1 below and the figure hereafter.

This means, in particular, that the main important issues such as housing, unemployment, security or migratory pressure would now be concentrated in the cities. On another side, Morocco is a demographically young country with 27% of its population under the age of 15 and 18% between the ages of 15 and 24, 42% between 25 and 54 years, 7% between the ages of 55 and 64 and just 6% 65 years and older. The median age of Moroccans is just 29 years old as of 2018, with a life expectancy of about 75 years of age.

Morocco 2019. Population: 35,67 million.

In addition to the 35,67 million Moroccans listed in the table above, nearly 5 million Moroccans are living abroad today, including nearly two thirds in Europe. When it comes to the foreigners living regularly in Morocco, in 2014, year of the last general census in the country,

they were 84,000 foreign residents of whom 33,615 Europeans, including 21,344 persons from France and 22,545 sub-Saharan Africans². Beside this population, in late 2013, Moroccan authorities estimated that there were more than 45,000 irregular immigrants living in Morocco immediately prior to the start of an "Exceptional Regularization Process"³, which was conducted in the framework of a New Migration Policy decided on the same date by the Moroccan authorities.

There is no census, and there have never been any field surveys in Morocco on ethnic or religious background. But, the most commonly held estimates suggest that about 99% of Moroccans are supposed to be "Sunni Muslims" religiously or culturally. The numbers of the Jewish minority has decreased significantly since the creation of the State of Israel in Palestine, in 1948. Today there are about 3,000 Moroccan Jews inside the country. There is a small, but apparently, growing minority of Moroccan Christians made of local Moroccan converts. There is a small community of "Shiaa" Muslim converts and Bahais, but of unknown numbers.

¹ Haut Commissariat au Plan, Rabat, Morocco, https://www.hcp.ma/Population-du-Maroc-par-annee-civile-en-milliers-et-au-milieu-de-l-annee-par-milieu-de-residence-1960-2050_a677.html, (15.05.2020)

²Haut Commissariat au Plan, *Les résidents étrangers au Maroc*, <https://www.hcp.ma/search/Les+residents+etranger+s+au+Maroc/>, (15.05.2020)

³ Istituto Affari Internazionali, *Migration Dynamics in Play in Morocco: Trafficking and Political Relationships and Their Implications at the Regional Level*, <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/migration-dynamics-play-morocco>, (15.05.2020)




Figure 1: The Evolution of Urban and Rural Population (1980 – 2018)¹

----- Total population
 ----- Urban population
 ----- Rural population




Figure 3: The evolution of un-employment rates among different categories on Moroccan population

¹ Haut Commissariat au Plan, https://www.hcp.ma/Population-du-Maroc-par-annee-civile-en-milliers-et-au-milieu-de-l-annee-par-milieu-de-residence-1960-2050_a677.html, (15.05.2020)




Figure 2: Age pyramid of the total population of Morocco in 2019¹

¹ Haut Commissariat au Plan, https://www.hcp.ma/Projections-de-la-population-totale-du-Maroc-par-age-simple-et-sexe-2014-2050_a2209.html, (15.05.2020)

Among the major challenges posed by the structure of the Moroccan population, that is to say mainly its youth, there is unemployment, in addition to the low level of national income and the high level of illiteracy among adults. Concerning these last elements, the available Socio-Economic data show that Morocco, and its population, can be considered in a situation of relative poverty, including within the Arab world. Indeed, with a total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 103,61 billion US\$ (estimate 2018), the income per capita equals 2,832 US\$¹;

Considering the Index of human development (IDH), Morocco has been ranked 123rd in the UNDP 2018 report among 189 countries, down from 122 in 2016. Thus, Morocco is ranked “medium” in human development group with an HDI of 0.667 out of 1 (0.598 for women and 0.713 for men) after Egypt (ranked 115), Palestine (ranked 119), and Iraq (ranked 120). And also, after Algeria, ranked 85th with “high” levels of human development with an HDI of 0.754, Lebanon (80); Tunisia (95); Jordan (95); and, despite its conflict, after Libya (105) also ranked “high.” This ranking also takes into account the fact that the rate of illiteracy in Morocco continues to be high, since it still reaches nearly 32% of the adult population, one of the highest rate in the Arab world.

When it comes to the situation on the labour market in Morocco, the highest unemployment rates are still the lot of young people, women and graduates persons, living in urban areas, according to the High Planning Commission. Thus, unemployment rate reached 26.5% in 2017 among young people aged 15 to 24 (see figure 3 below) and 43.2% among urban dwellers of the same age group. Unemployment affects women

more than men, with prevalence of 14% and 8.4%. This finding is more noticeable in urban areas where the unemployment rate reached 24.3% for women against 11.4% among men.

The unemployment rate increases with the level of qualification. It happens, and 3.4% among those with no qualifications to 17.2% for graduates. It is 14% for middle school graduates and 23% for those with a higher degree. It remains relatively higher amongst certain categories of graduates including particularly the holders of advanced degrees awarded by the faculties (25.9%), certificates for professional specialization (24.2%), technicians' diplomas and middle managers (23 %) and professional qualification certificates (21.4%).

All the elements mentioned above - which would be developed later, in particular taking into account social and spatial inequalities in the distribution of income and access to basic social services - objectively constitute a basis for religious radicalization, in the absence of other modes of political expression aimed at improving the access of the least well-off social categories to a better standard of living.

Historical background of state-organized religion relations and current institutional structure for governing religion and religious diversity: central role of the King

Any analysis of the politico-religious field in Morocco, and in particular the relatively late emergence of Islamist players in the Moroccan political and social sphere must take into account the importance of the long term.

We are indeed tackling a phenomenon taking place in a country that has been ruled since the sixteenth century by a dynasty claiming to be a descendant of the Prophet, and whose existence is based on an arbitrary religious power between the different components of the Moroccan society. This dynasty was at the

¹ *Classement de pays Africains par PIB en 2018*, https://malijet.com/actualite_internationale/210510-classement-des-pays-africains-par-pib-en-2018.html, (22.05.2020)

origin of certain "modernization" attempts in the nineteenth century, and in 1912 it accepted the French protectorate under the pressure of the colonial system and then used this new situation to establish its legitimacy over the entire territory (as the Sultan's/King's authority was exerted only partially throughout the territory). The legacy of this past consists of a certain form of religious legitimacy, to which was added a new form of legitimacy due to the commitment of the monarchy alongside the nationalists. Moroccan Islam is officially Sunni, but historical Islam is a complex and diverse religion, and has the capacity to adapt to social demand and particular context of the country.

Since its independence in 1956, Morocco has made the choice to build its own reference of a nationalized and territorialized Islam. This ideological construction, reinforced by the very early religious public policy, refers to "Malikism" (linked to Imam Malik) as the unique rite, unlike other Arab-Muslim countries where many rites coexist. The choice of the "Malikite" rite is not a newly made choice, it is based on a long historical maturation that resulted from the combination of the know-how of Andalusian clerics settled after the Reconquista and the Amazigh (Berber) Puritanism known to be pragmatic and rigorist.

As a result, the current political approach insisting on adopting a national project of "Moroccan Islam" based on "Malikism" to protect it from international salafism does not come from nowhere. It is based on three historical reasons:

- The Moroccan dynasty has been in power for 12 centuries since it started by a descendant of the Prophet who came from the Levant at the request of local Berber tribes;
- The unique situation of Morocco as the only Muslim country not to have been conquered by the Ottoman empire;
- Early relations with Europe thanks to its geographical and historical proximity

which had a lasting impact on the Moroccan cultural substratum, and constitute a key element of this Moroccan "exception".

Another characteristic that defines the nature of the Moroccan monarchy and its religious legitimacy is that it holds both a Dynastic and a Religious legitimacy, which corresponds to what the German-born American historian Ernest Kantorowicz calls the theory of "The two bodies of the king"¹.

These two bodies combine the human, the divine and the Caliph at the same time. Therefore, the Monarch will not only be "chosen" by the grace of his own personal virtues, but also because he is a member of a sacred prophetic filiation that makes him different from the others. Besides, the concept of "Cherifism" - to be a descendent of the prophet and to make of it a title of sovereignty -, means that power is not just a matter of secular governance and personal qualities, but is also a matter of legitimacy and diffuse sacredness². In the aftermath of the independence of all the Maghreb countries, the new states had to face new challenges to meet multiple expectations, by adopting an approach that corresponds to their own historical path. For its part, Morocco has suffered little from the "hormonal imbalances" of colonization, compared to the Algerian neighbour.

After the independence of Morocco, the Monarchy – characterized by a complex legitimacy – was put under the stress test of the profane reality: "to connect the political power of the historical time to the prophetic power of the sacred time". The 1980^s were decisive in the organization of the religious space in Morocco. In fact, in 1984 the public

¹ Ernst H., Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies A Study in Medieval Political Theology*, Editions Paperback, 2016

² Saghi, Omar, *Comprendre la monarchie marocaine*, Editions La Croisée des Chemins, Paris, 2016

powers initiated the reorganization and control of the religious field.

Thus, in an international context particularly marked by a return of the religious aspect incarnated by an unprecedented event in the history of the Islamic world, namely the Iranian revolution and the establishment of a fundamentally Shiite state that controls the entire society by imposing a total religious order, a mobilizing religious frame of reference has popped up all over the Islamic world. This religious frame of reference was determined to supplant "militant ideologies" that marked the world in the twentieth century, to replace them with a religious order that aims to undermine the dominant political and ideological system, and substitute it with a pure religious model!

Morocco did not escape this "spectrum" that haunts the Muslim Arab world. To better understand this unprecedented mutation, its modes of expression and its management by the Moroccan monarchy – which was anxious to remain the central producer of the political order and its values –, it should be appropriate, within the framework of this study, to make an inventory of the permanence of the religious question in Morocco, its modes of expression, its supervision by the public authorities in the light of the emergence of the Islamist player in the political arena. The Dahir of 1984 – under the rule of the late Hassan II – and the Dahir of 2004 – urged by King Mohamed VI remain the two legislative frameworks in force.

But, more important than the laws of all kinds, it is important to note the role of the king in religious matters, with particular reference to the powers conferred to him by the Constitution on the subject (see in appendix the role of the king and the place of Islam in this constitution).

In this sense, the preamble of the constitution, which was adopted in July 2011 by 95 % of the voters, proclaims that,

as "a sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plenitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber and Saharan-Hassanic components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences. The pre-eminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialogue for mutual understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world". As to the article 3 of the same constitution, it states that "Islam is the religion of the State, which guarantees to all the free exercise of beliefs"¹.

Concerning the administration / management of the religious sphere, it falls entirely within the authority of the king, who is also, according to the constitution, the head of the Executive power, the President of the Judicial authority and the Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Thus, according to the article 41st of the Constitution², the King, Prince (Commander) of the Faithful (Amir Al Mouminine), sees to the respect for Islam. He is the Guarantor of the free exercise of beliefs. He presides over the Superior Council of the Ulema (Conseil supérieur des Oulema), charged with the study of questions that he submits to it. This Council is the sole instance enabled to comment and to edict religious consultations (Fatwas) before being officially agreed to, on the questions to which it has been referred and this, on the basis of the tolerant principles, precepts and designs of Islam.

¹ Secrétariat Général du Gouvernement, Royaume du Maroc, *La Constitution 2011*, (Arabic, French and English versions), Rabat

² Idem

The attributions, the composition and the modalities of functioning of the Council are established by Dahir (or a Royal Decree). The King exercises by Dahirs the religious prerogatives inherent to the institution of the Emirate (the Principality) of the Faithful which are conferred to him in exclusive manner by this Article. Under this umbrella, the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs exerts full authority over official mosques and other religious institutions, and on all religious activities and similar events in the country.

Violent religious radicalization challenges:

Morocco will see, from the end of the 1970^s and the beginning of the 1980^s, a rise of conservatism and a process of radicalization of a part, more and more visible, of its (young) population in connection with a set of international events, and in parallel with domestic economic, social and political developments (as partially stated above).

Among the external events, it is possible to mention all those for whom Moroccans, as Arabs and Muslims, have a very strong sensitivity. In this regard, it is possible to evoke the wars of Afghanistan, from the 1970^s till today. The war in Afghanistan against the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was initially seen as a war between Islam and communism. From 2001, and the American intervention in this same country, the Afghan wars will be seen as a confrontation between the West, represented by the USA, and Islam.

The Bosnian War, which began in 1992 and lasted until 1995, and led to the deaths of around 100,000 civilians and soldiers, among which at least 25,000 Bosnian Muslims. Within this war, the massacre in Srebrenica (11th/16th of July 1995) and its 8,372 dead, all Bosnian civilians, had an immense impact in the Arab-Muslim world, including Morocco. To the effects of these wars, one must add

the consequences on the Arab (and Muslim) public opinion of the Intifidas of 1987 and 2000 in the occupied Palestinian territories, of the wars in Iraq (from 2003) and in Syria (from 2011).

These external events will be amplified inside Morocco (as in several Arab-Muslim countries) by the conjunction of socio-economic and political elements, making a large part of the population, and especially young people, more sensitive to the arguments of the supporters of "Political Islam", for whom all that the Muslims suffer lies in their distance from the "true values of Islam" and in the hatred of Westerners towards them. Among those elements, it is possible to quote some, which are of economic and social nature such as large scale poverty and a great imbalance in the distribution of national wealth, youth unemployment, a high level of illiteracy and a great weakness of the health system. Others are of qualitative, intangible, cultural and political nature, such as the school failure or the progressive weakening of «traditional» political parties, including left-wing parties.

All this will lead first - during the 1980s and 1990s – to the strengthening of Radical Islamist currents, under the influence of trends related to Saudi "Wahhabism" or to the Muslim Brothers "brotherhood". After that, young Moroccans will be involved in or will commit various terrorist actions in Europe and in Morocco, and hundreds will join the war fields in the Middle East, starting in particular from 2011.

In Europe, Moroccans (migrants or children of migrants) will be involved, particularly, in the train attacks in Madrid (11th of March, 2004) where the blasts killed 191 people and wounded 1,841¹, or in the Paris attacks (13th of November, 2015) that killed 130 people and wounded

¹ 2004: *Madrid train attacks*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-14666717/2004-madrid-train-attacks>, (16.05.2020)

hundreds more¹, or in Brussels Airport and Metro attacks (22nd of April, 2016), when 32 people were killed and many more injured², or in Barcelona and Cambrils attacks (17th/18th August, 2017), where a driver, within a group of 12 Jihadists, killed 16 people and injured more than 100³.

As for the terrorist attacks on the Moroccan soil itself, the chronology below indicates an acceleration of the radicalization from 2003. During this year, in particular, Morocco experienced its most serious terrorist attack, when five simultaneous terrorist suicide bombings hit tourist and religious sites in Casablanca. Before that date, however, a first attack - conducted by French nationals of Algerian origin - happened during the summer of 1994 and it has totally altered the political relations between Morocco and Algeria.

Chronology of attacks claimed by radical Islamists in Morocco since 1994

- On August 24, 1994, a first bloody attack is committed in the front of the hotel Atlas Asni, in the tourist district, in Marrakech. There will be several victims, including a 34 year old Spanish woman. The three terrorists have been sentenced to death and are still in central Kenitra prison. This attack resulted in a major political conflict between Morocco and Algeria, a conflict that caused the immediate closure of land borders between the two. Even today, with the exception of the border between the two Koreas, it is the only passage that remains closed, in times of peace, between two countries;
- On May 16, 2003, the Casablanca suicide bombings struck five places in the

Moroccan economic metropolis, with a heavy toll: 33 dead in addition to 12 suicide bombers. Salafia Jihadia, linked to Al Qaeda, was the sponsor of these attacks. 2,000 radical Islamists had, in the wake, been arrested following these attacks;

- On March 12, 2007, an attack on a Casablanca cybercafé resulted in one death and four injuries. Thirty people were arrested and brought before the courts of several cities in Morocco;
- On April 14, 2007, two kamikaze brothers operated explosive belts near an American cultural center in the center of Casablanca;
- On April 28, 2011 in Marrakech, an attack, known as the Argana coffee bombing, left 17 dead and 20 wounded of various nationalities. The author of the attack, which took place in Jamaâ El F'na, tourist center of the city, is from Safi - a city that has lost much of its once flourishing industrial activities in the canning sector sardine, and where there is a high level of unemployment - and comes from the Salafist movement. He was sentenced to death;
- On 17 December 2018, near Mount Toubkal, in the High Atlas, in the village of Imlil, in the region of Marrakech, two young tourists, a Norwegian and a Danish, were murdered in their sleep. This terrorist crime, carried out on the eve of the festivities of Christmas and New Year's Day, aimed in particular to strike a blow to the tourism sector in all of Morocco, and particularly in this region run at this time of year by thousands of tourists from both Europe and Morocco.

Policies and practices addressing radicalization

Under the supervision of the king, Prince (Commander) of the Faithful, as specified in the constitution, the management of the religious sphere, and thus the preservation of a "Moderate Islam", in the Moroccan way is first conducted through the Public religious education which is mainly under the

¹ *Paris attacks: Bosnian suspect arrested in Germany*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48784476>, (16.05.2020).

² *Brussels explosions: what we know about airport and metro attacks*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869985>, (16.05.2020).

³ *Barcelona and Cambrils attacks: what we know so far*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40964242>, (16.05.2020).

influence the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs.

- The Public religious education

In Morocco, the education is under the official supervision of the Ministry of National Education and Higher Education, but is oriented under the real influence of the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs. The Ministry of national education is in charge of systematic Islamic training and education, throughout the different stages of modern education system, whether it is public or private, from pre-school till university; including elementary, middle and high school. The ministry of Habous contributes to the religious education sectors by training specialists in this field.

The Ministry of National Education and Higher Education controls multiple structures of religious education, from koranic pre-elementary education till specialized university training. It is also in charge of the organization of a specific learning named "Original education". It's a two level curriculum, primary and secondary. This kind of education results in receiving a baccalaureate's degree in "original literature" paving the way to access University. In addition, primary and secondary modern schools provide a general and mandatory religious education for all students regardless of their level and orientation. The manuals of religious education clearly include ideological content more than cognitive/educational one. At the level of higher education, religious education has been set up since the academic year of 1979-1980 in the framework of a specific department called "Islamic studies". This department exists now in the fourteen faculties of literature and humanities of the country.

Moreover, at the level of higher education, the ministry of national education controls "Dar al Hadith al Hassaniya Institute", founded in 1965 by the late king Hassan II, and "Al Qarawiyyne University", with its five faculties: Sharia Faculty in Fes, Arabic

Language Faculty in Marrakech, Oussoul Addine Faculty in Tetouan, Sharia Faculty in Agadir and Sharia Sciences Faculty in Smara. In 2015, a new reorganization annexed "Dar al Hadith al Hassaniya" to "Al-Qaraouiyyine University".

The academic staff of these new departments of "Islamic Studies" was made of Arabic language professors who were reconverted into theology and of theologians who did their training in the countries of the Arab Orient, including Saudi Arabia, more specifically in the Wahhabi universities that were wide open to students from Muslim countries thanks to scholarships of the Saudi government. Moroccan Ulamas (Religious scholars), who graduated from traditional theological institutes (i.e. "Al Qarawiyyine University" and "Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniyya"), have not been involved in implementing religious education in modern faculties. Classical religious knowledge was thus abandoned under the pretext that it had become sclerotic. It has been replaced then by a new type of religious discourse intended to encompass and respond to contemporary world issues in the economic, political, social and philosophical fields. From then on, a new type of clerics emerged in Morocco who are more focused on ideological controversy than on theological exegesis (El Ayadi, 2004).

All university courses within these different structures of religious education aim at training specialized staff in different fields including religious science, Islamic law and Koranic exegesis, etc. These courses are specialized. They are intended for a part of the Moroccan school population. This population has not ceased to increase in number with the creation of new departments of Islamic studies. These departments enabled many of their graduates to obtain teaching posts of a new discipline called "Islamic education" introduced in schools curriculum at the end of the seventies – under the orders of the late King Hassan II, who wanted to reduce

the presence of Marxist/socialist streams in the Moroccan university. This discipline was the only subject making part of the school curriculum from the first year of primary school to the final year of high school. Thus, it has taken over the place of other subjects like philosophy and social sciences. It was therefore generalized, with a significant number of hours and coefficient, to all pupils in public and then private schools, without any consideration to different school grades or courses. Its main purpose was then the religious socialization of the entire school population.

The textbooks of this subject praise Islam and speak willingly of the development of the "Islamic conscience" and the reinforcement of the attachment to Islam among younger generations called to claim loudly and clearly their Islamic identity against "the threats and dangers" of the cultural invasion (*al-Ghazw al-Fikri*), the destructive thinking (*al-Fikr al-Haddam*) and the Western intrusive thoughts (*al-Fikr al-Gharbi ad-Dakhil*). This defensive and inclusive religious discourse on Islam has been widely disseminated through this subject. It became hegemonic in Moroccan Schools, and subsequently has had significant effects on the mentality, beliefs and behavior of school youth (El Ayadi, 1999).

- The Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs

The ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs – a real State within the State – controls, for its part, six key areas:

- The structures of religious education covering the Koranic education, called renovated education, of which the ministry has been in charge since 1964;
- Schools said to be traditional, which are former centers of religious learning, scattered throughout Morocco, and whose mission is to train junior clerics such as preachers, muezzins and imams of mosques. According to the census of the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs conducted in the school year 2017-2018,

there are 286 traditional schools. 50% of these schools are located in the regions of Souss-Massa (the birth place of the current prime minister) and Tangier-Tetouan-Al Huceima (the region from which many Moroccan fighters left between 2011 and 2016 towards the Syrian and Iraqi war fields). 99.56% of these schools are annexed to a mosque and 71.68% are run by associations;

- The religious science Chairs held by the *Ulemas* (religious scholars) appointed by the ministry in the main mosques of the country;

- An Islamic center for the training of religious managers. It was founded in 1974, and was autonomous before being taken under the wings of the Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs in 1985.

- Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, *Morshidin* (male religious counsellors) and *Morshidat* (female religious counsellors) in Rabat. This institute was founded in 2004 and then opened its doors to foreign students in 2015. In 2019, it had more than 1,300 students from 11 countries, including 150 women, alongside Moroccan students. Foreign students come mainly from sub-Saharan African countries, including Mali, Guinea Conakry, Ivory coast, Senegal, Chad and Niger. In accordance with an official French-Moroccan agreement signed in 2016, about fifty French students join the institute each year. These students follow a three-year course devoted to Islamic sciences, humanities, Jewish culture and the introduction to Christianity.

- The Mohammed VI Foundation of African Ulemas. It was founded in June 2015, and designed to bring together Muslim scholars of the continent to "take any initiative to integrate the religious values of tolerance in any reform that development actions in Africa are subject to".

The aim of this paragraph, which will be developed further in a subsequent phase of the project, is to understand foundations of the religious teachings in

the curriculums of different educational sectors in Morocco. Understanding these religious teachings sheds certainly the light on one of the most determining factors in the emergence and development of the Islamist radicalization phenomenon within the Moroccan society. In fact, we feel that people who have adopted the sectarian religious ideology of "Jihadist Salafis" and who are radicalized in Morocco were, in their vast majority, influenced by the Islamic teachings provided in the different public and private educational systems throughout the country (we will come back to this point when analysing the curricula followed in these structures as well as the school books attached to them).

Conclusions

All the elements – which will be developed later – and which were introduced in the paragraph on "Violent religious radicalization challenges" as well as the Chronology of attacks claimed by radical Islamists in Morocco since 1994, show that a large number of Moroccans, young people in particular, have become radicalized over the past 30-35 years, and have started violent actions – both in Morocco and abroad – over the last twenty five years.

This happened (is happening) despite:

- The role of Commander of the believers devolved by the Constitution to the King;
- All the legislative arsenal tending to "protect" Moroccan society against religious radicalization;
- The political discourse seeking to accredit the idea of a moderate and open Moroccan Islam on its international humanist environment;
- The control exercised by the Ministry of Habous and Islamic affairs on the majority of mosques in the country and on large parts of the educational system;
- The political (and often financial) control over public and private media.

However, if the reality of the ground on the front of radicalization does

not seem to correspond to what the Moroccan rulers want - or say they are wishing - is that powerful factors are acting within Moroccan society as in some of Morocco's International relationships. In Morocco itself, it is possible to mention:

- The strengthening of conservative currents within society, in cities as in rural areas, in relation with the reforms introduced in the Moroccan educational system since the 1970^s. And also with the penetration, since the 1990s, of Arab satellite televisions, easily accessible to illiterate women as well as to the most disadvantaged social strata, as it's one of their very few distractions;
- The socio-economic situation, as presented succinctly above, marked by a high level unemployment, among young people and graduates in particular, a high precariousness of a large part of the population as well as the difficulties of access to basic public services (of which school, health or water and sanitation);
- The high level of illiteracy still prevailing among the population, and the fact that the official and private media play no role in the education of society and in its possible openness to the principles and universal human values;
- The difficulties of organization and expression in (normal) political parties and also the impossibility of controlling the economic or political decisions engaging society. This gives rise to a fatalistic approach in many people, especially the poorest, who rely on God to solve their problems. Hence the great effect of the slogan "Islam is the solution", very often heard during the demonstrations/protests organized by Islamist currents.

As regards to the role of Morocco's international relations in the process of radicalization of part of its population, it should be noted that the important influence of some Gulf countries (particularly since the 1980s and the crisis of the debt that Morocco experienced in 1982-1983) on Moroccan domestic politics as well as on the religious orientations of

the society, have gone hand in hand with the funding that countries like Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and, above all, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are giving to Morocco in parallel with their own enrichment.

At this level, it seems obvious that if Morocco had sufficiently developed its economy, it would have had no need for foreign aid - including that coming from Arab countries – and from that, it would not have been submitted to any external ideological or religious influence.

Appendix Religion/Islam in the Moroccan Constitution

Preamble

With fidelity to its irreversible choice to construct a democratic State of Law, the Kingdom of Morocco resolutely pursues the process of consolidation and of reinforcement of the institutions of a modern State, having as its bases the principles of participation, of pluralism and of good governance. It develops a society of solidarity where all enjoy security, liberty, equality of opportunities, of respect for their dignity and for social justice, within the framework of the principle of correlation between the rights and the duties of the citizenry.

A sovereign Muslim State, attached to its national unity and to its territorial integrity, the Kingdom of Morocco intends to preserve, in its plentitude and its diversity, its one and indivisible national identity. Its unity, is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [saharo-hassanie] components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences [affluents]. The preeminence accorded to the Muslim religion in the national reference is consistent with [va de pair] the attachment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, of moderation, of tolerance and of dialogue for mutual

understanding between all the cultures and the civilizations of the world.

Article 1

Morocco is a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary and social Monarchy. The constitutional regime of the Kingdom is founded on the separation, the balance and the collaboration of the powers, as well as on participative democracy of [the] citizen, and the principles of good governance and of the correlation between the responsibility for and the rendering of accounts. The Nation relies for its collective life on the federative constants [constantes federatrices], on the occurrence of moderate Muslim religion, [on] the national unity of its multiple components [affluents], [on] the constitutional monarchy and [on] democratic choice.

Article 3

Islam is the religion of the State, which guarantees to all the free exercise of beliefs.

Article 41

The King, Commander of the Faithful [Amir Al Mouminine], sees to the respect for Islam. He is the Guarantor of the free exercise of beliefs [cultes]. He presides over the Superior Council of the Ulema [Conseil superieur des Oulema], charged with the study of questions that He submits to it. The Council is the sole instance enabled [habilitee] to comment [prononcer] on the religious consultations (Fatwas) before being officially agreed to, on the questions to which it has been referred [saisi] and this, on the basis of the tolerant principles, precepts and designs of Islam.

The attributions, the composition and the modalities of functioning of the Council are established by Dahir [Royal Decree]. The King exercises by Dahirs the religious prerogatives inherent in the institution of the Emirate of the Faithful [Imarat Al Mouminine] which is conferred on him in exclusive manner by this Article.

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ECOSOPHY, SECURITY AND MANIPULATION

Abstract:	<i>Ecosophy is the new philosophy of the survival, security and sustainable development of man, society and nature, a philosophy of global issues and ways to solve them, of globalization, of the human perspective.</i> <i>Manipulation, as a social phenomenon, is seen as destructive and constructive. Negative or destructive manipulation is condemnable and positive while constructive is desirable, wanted in all areas of human activity and practice. Hybrid war is an absolutism of negative or destructive manipulation. The latter should be excluded from all human activities and practices or at least reduced to the maximum.</i> <i>The dialectics of culture and civilization presupposes the cultivation of the achievements of civilization, as a whole. The accelerated development of culture, of its achievements implies, in turn, the rational support and use of the achievements of civilization. Culture and civilization are two sides necessary for the excellent functioning and development of human society. They should not be counter-routed.</i> <i>In order to ensure security and raise the defense capabilities of the Moldovan state in terms of ecosophy, it is necessary to collaborate sincerely with the EU, the US and NATO, with the Black Sea and Neighborhood countries, the refusal to neutrality, as well as the maintenance , along with professional and compulsory military service. High morality is a mandatory quality of each defense sector representative.</i>
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Preliminaries

Ecosophy, as ecological wisdom, implies the unity of ecosystems, their integrity not only in biological and environmental aspects, but also in anthropological aspect. The process of globalization will ultimately lead, we believe, to the desired optimization, including the optimization of socio-human relations and those between human society and terrestrial nature.

The relationships between people, states and various communities are

characterized today (as in the past and but even more stressed in current times) through various manipulations. The latter, for the most part, are negative or destructive. Is it possible to exclude destructive manipulations from human and interstate relations and from the variety of communities? What role do new technologies play today and what role will they play in the future? What is and will be the role of culture in using the top achievements of contemporary civilization? What is the dialectics of

culture and civilization? These are some of the issues we will refer to during our subsequent exposition.

The reality with today's problems, the scientific literature and the media has served us as a material for analysis, generalizations and conclusions. The methods used include dialectics, comparison, extrapolation and generalization, the ascent from abstract to concrete, the unity of logics and history.

Results and discussions. Ecosophy, its compartments and its fundamental problems.

Ecosophy, or ecological wisdom, presents in itself a new contemporary philosophy¹. It can be defined as the philosophy of survival, security and sustainable development of humans, society and nature. Ecosophy is also a philosophy of global problems, globalism and globalization, tolerance and morality, scientific-technical integration².

The philosophy in question analyzes all the problems through the ecological prism taken in its extended aspect; it includes in itself the philosophical problems of the general ecology, anthropoecology and social ecology³. It also includes global ecological ethics, which is based on traditional, ecological and ethnic humanism and generally human ecological values⁴. I believe that ecosophy should not bypass the problem of the paranormal, of the

parapsychology that is about humans, society and nature and which has scientific, socio-cultural, psychological and psychophysical aspects⁵.

Ecosophy integrates more specific components and philosophies, such as security, tolerance, global issues and the digital ones. It combines in itself the philosophical problems of general ecology, human and social ecology, but emphasizes the primordality of human ecology or anthropoecology. It can be said that man is the fundamental and primordial problem, the supreme value of any humanist philosophy.

The primordality of man

Some claim that the human is the greatest destroyer of the earthly nature that he is like a terrible virus that attacks the planet Earth and this is due to the anthropocentrism that has dominated human practice so far. Anthropocentrism, they say, must be replaced by biocentrism, and man should be considered a common life form with others, a form that isn't necessarily one of the best.

Intentional or not, but we forget that man is not only the destroyer of nature, but also the most skilled modeler, painter, sculptor of it. Realizing his harmful activity in nature, he is ready to restore and perfect what he unconsciously destroyed out of ignorance. Man has always changed and changes nature right now. I think he will continue changing it in the future. It only depends on how he will change it - in accordance with its laws or not.

Today, the activity of modification is directed not only to the surrounding nature, but also to the nature of man, to his body and his psyche. Modification, therefore, threatens today not only the earthly nature, but also the very nature of

¹ Ion Sîrbu, *Noua filosofie și securitatea*, in "Revista Militară", No. 1, Chișinău, 2018, pp. 52-61

² Ion Sîrbu, *Securitatea și dihotomia tehnologiilor convergente*, in "Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies. International Conference Proceedings", the 7th Edition, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, 2016, pp. 471-478

³ Ion Sîrbu, *Noua filosofie și securitatea*, in "Revista Militară", No. 1/2018, Chișinău, 2018, p. 54

⁴ Ion Sîrbu, *Etica ecologică globală și dialogul civilizațional: Aspecte epistemologice și de securitate*, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, in "Studia Securitatis", Vol. IX, No. 3, Sibiu, 2015, pp. 159-168

⁵ Ion Sîrbu, *Ecosofia sau filosofia ecologică*, Editura Fundația „D. Cantemir”, Academia Ecologică din România, Iași, 2000, p. 370

man - his body¹. Man, therefore, is threatened by man. The top achievements of civilization in the field of science, technique, medicine and technology seem to have “taken the charm” of some scholars and philosophers.

Representatives of transhumanism, for example, say that the human intellect could exist on a nonbiological basis and that it could be implemented in a machine. D.I. Dubrovsky says that the possibility of survival of earthly civilization, its transition to a new, more advanced stage of development, depends on the processes of anthropotechnological evolution. The last one takes place in the present and is carried out in an accelerated and impossible to brake tempo².

According to the philosopher P.D. Tiščenko, transhumanism expresses the tendency to merge man with the machine – “the man will acquire the immortal body of the machine, and the machine - his rational soul (already radically mechanized)”³. Thus, transhumanists like Marxists want to be able to control the evolution of man through the prism of rationality. Is that possible? Time will tell.

Transhumanism, in our own opinion, is no longer a form of humanism – the “mechanized” world, the world of robots, where the human intellect is transferred to the machines, doesn’t require morals and humanism anymore.

We consider that transhumanism absolutizes certain objective tendencies of the development of today’s human civilization. This is about the tendencies in

the artificial intelligence, robotics, and environmental degradation fields that, at one point in time, may become incompatible with life and by extension with man, with his biological body.

According to the transhumanists, if these tendencies become real, they could be the threat to human existence. In their opinion, only the human intellect moved to the machines will survive, not his biological body. Is that so? This possibility cannot be ruled out. However, one also cannot rule out the possibility of being able to optimize the interactions of humans with the environment, of societies and civilizations with terrestrial nature, the optimization of the anthropo- and socio-natural interactions - which the ecological wisdom / the ecosophy talks about. The possibility of protection, conservation and reproduction of the nature should also be taken into account.

Today the sciences, medicine, and new technologies are capable of perfecting and preserving the body, the physical and mental health of man, and they will especially be capable of it in the future at the highest level. Some human-made organs have already been created and successfully implanted, whether they are made of biological tissues, including the patient's own body, or even made of artificial materials. Nonetheless, even considering the success of the civilization, sciences, and contemporary and future technologies, the protection of man’s biological body is and will continue to be an imperative global problem. Why? Only coming from anthropocentrism? Not only.

On one hand, man created culture and civilization as a second nature. On the other hand, nature, through man, has acquired self-awareness, self-knowledge. Nature through humans is perfecting itself and evolves progressively or ascending. Man is also the creator of society, outside of which he couldn’t emerge and develop as man. Society is the result of the interactions of human individuals and cannot be reduced to a simple sum or

¹ Попова О.В. *Этика, эстетика, анестетика в контексте развития пластической хирургии*, in “Вопросы философии”, No. 4/2017, pp. 95-104.

² Дубровский Д.И. *К вопросу о глобальном будущем и трансгуманистической эволюции* (Ответ П.Д. Тищенко), in “Вопросы философии”, No. 3/2015, p. 215

³ Тищенко П.Д. *Россия 2045: котлован для аватара. Размышления в связи с книгой „Глобальное будущее 2045: Конвергентные технологии (НБИКС) и трансгуманистическая эволюция*, in “Вопросы философии”, No. 8/2014, p. 182

totality of men. Society, in turn, cannot exist and function without human individuals, as it cannot function outside and without nature. Nature, on the other hand, being continuously changed by humans and society cannot exist in its current state and extension without being supported by them.

Man is a living being in which the natural and the social / the nature and society are combined in the most harmonious way. Through his corporeality he can be seen as an organic being, a natural being. Through his rationality, conscience, spirituality, and creativity he is presenting himself also as an "artificial" or socio-cultural being. Man can only theoretically be divided into bio-, psycho-, social being. However, in practice, the natural (biological), the psychological and the social are interlocked, forming a whole, indivisible, unique, integral and harmonious.

The attenuation of the fact that the biological, natural body of the human is cardinally different from bodies of other beings is necessary. Consciousness, rationality, true creativity can emerge and manifest only in the human body and only due to social and cultural life. The human being, the child raised outside a community and society, segregated and deprived of culture, does not turn into a human being. He remains a being with a human body, but lacking in intellect, language, and other human traits and features. The physical structure of the brain of this being, its nervous system aren't much different compared to a normal human, raised in a community, society and culture. The differences are of psychological type. This being lacks immaterial mental connections which are ordinary to normal humans.

Man, therefore, isn't born a man, but only a potential man. The child becomes a human only by growing in a community and by consuming its culture. However, through the process of evolution of the brain, the human body became a

base, a unique biological foundation. Any newborn baby, with a normal body, may or may not become a human being, depending on the conditions of his development. Meanwhile none of the most advanced animals can become humans, even while being raised in a society and culture.

The monkey, the dolphin, some other "intelligent" animals can be relatively easily trained, but it is impossible of them to acquire or gain human intellect. An imitation of the human intellect is possible in a certain domain (monkeys, for example). But the whole intellect of man cannot be imitated. I believe similar thing will hold true in the future with the machines¹.

According to the Russian philosophers, T.V. Cuznețova and Z.M. Orudjev, there hasn't yet been registered any case when robots could plan their own development bypassing its human-made program of conduct. A robot's creativity could only be possible if the human will infix in it a logic of the poetic activity, struggle, creation, etc. However today no one can tell how a robot would assimilate human's creative activity².

Today not only sci-fi writers, but some philosophers as well admit that in the future conflicts between man and intelligent machines are possible. Based on these, some intellectuals think that politicians shouldn't give the machine all human activities, especially the ones of strategic aspect and long-term ones.

The war of people with robots and enslavement of the former by intelligent machines, says E.V. Mareeva, is of course a myth. However, the possibility of enslavement of men by other men with the help of the machines isn't a myth at all. The case of transforming these wonderful

¹ Ion Sîrbu, *Noua filosofie și securitatea*, in "Revista Militară", No. 1/2018, Chișinău, 2018, p. 54.

² Кузнецова Т.В., ОРУДЖЕВ З.М. *История и проблема робота*, in "Вопросы философии", No. 1/ 2016, p. 77

machines into weapons would be regrettable. Then, says E.V. Mareeva, the wars of the future will be not with the soulless androids, but with people without souls¹.

Digital Philosophy - a component of Ecosophy

Digital philosophy, in our opinion is another component, compartment for ecophy. This is called to life by a new reality of contemporary man and society. The media, television, mobile telephony, the entertainment industry, the medical and educational sphere, etc., are increasingly digitized. Man and the environment in which he activates, society - all become digitized. And philosophy, as the most profound way of reflecting on a reality, has not yet reacted accordingly, it has not yet become aware of the fact that it should (if it strives to be appreciated as much as science and new technologies) analyse this reality and its possible consequences on human development and evolution of humanity.

Lavinia Marin believes that philosophy "does not feel the shock of change. In the mainstream media, she claims, the digital age is usually accompanied by rhetoric of a change as a necessity: governance, administration, education, almost all must also have a virtual "shadow". Should philosophy be entering the digital age?"². Philosophy not only needs to, but it is bound to consider it and only by doing so it can, like the Phoenix bird, be reborn and radically changed, conforming to the said era - it would be the only possible answer.

The Internet, says C. Voinea, has radically changed the political behaviour of human individuals, either by offering new ways of gathering, verifying and

spreading the information, or by facilitating communication on a global scale. The Internet also offers another dimension, such as the logics of collective actions, the new environment, facilitating mass mobilization by offering new possibilities of communicating and collaborating. It is becoming increasingly clear that new technologies are not simple mechanisms useful in punctual activities, but real engines of social change³.

We can say that the digital world is the reality of our world. Almost all of our ways of living are already digitized. The need for digital philosophy is obvious.

Why should digital philosophy be included in ecosophy as a part of it, along with the philosophical aspects of general ecology, social ecology and anthropology? Because considering that ecosophy is the new philosophy of survival, security and sustainable development of man, society and the nature, and in order for them to be achieved as profoundly as possible the new technologies, including digital or information technologies are needed, is it not logical to include the given philosophy in ecophy? The logical answer that is required can only be the affirmative one. I'm convinced of this.

Digital technologies and their use should be the focus of the ecosophy and, by extension, of the digital ecosophy. They can influence the man, the social life, the society, both in a beneficial and an evil way. Both man and society as a whole can be objects of manipulation. We have plenty of examples. What is really problematic is that these manipulations become difficult to notice.

Digital technologies could serve not only their activities of manipulation, but also those of spirituality, morality, decent behaviour, etc. By using these technologies one could stop and eliminate, within the Internet, violence, pornography, including child pornography,

¹ Mareeva E.B. *От искусственного интеллекта к искусственной душе*, in "Вопросы философии", No.4/2014, pp. 173, 176

² Lavinia Marin, *Schiță pentru o posibilă filozofie a digitalului*, in "Revista de Filozofie", No. 5, București, 2016, p. 571

³ Voinea Cristina. *Guvernare fără guvernanți: Politica prin algoritmi și Big Data*, in "Revista de Filozofie", No. 5, București, 2016, pp. 583-595

discrimination of all kinds, various racial, xenophobic, anti-human propaganda, which are introduced anonymously and circulate virtually unhindered. The beginnings are already present, but only the beginnings. The media draws attention to the fact that there are already robots capable of detecting people who are lying, based on the same advanced digital technologies as the lie detector.

Today's robots can influence man, his behaviour, both in a beneficial and an evil way. It all depends on the programmer, his good or bad intentions. Specifically, in the field of digital technology, the training of specialized workers in this field, a digital philosophy that would serve as a theoretical basis for the industry and the activities related to robots is also compulsory. Digital philosophy as a component of ecosophy must be in accordance with its principles and imperatives. In other words, the digital philosophy must be based on humanism, the global ecological ethics, which includes in itself the traditional humanism, which considers the human individuals; the ecological humanism, spread on the nature, of the whole life and environment on Earth. Global ecological ethics itself contains ethnic humanism, the one spread over human ethnicities¹.

The philosophy of security - an efficient integrator of the compartments of the ecosophy

Digital philosophy is focused not only on robotics, digital technologies and their possibilities, but also on security. The security of man, of human society and of the terrestrial nature that are reflected in the Ecosophical Imperative or of the Ecosophy in common with the Imperative of Survival and the Imperative of

Sustainable Development. These three imperatives of the new contemporary philosophy show the way of human development in the present and future. The development of man and of humanity cannot take place in the absence of their security, in the absence of security in general. Security penetrates all the compartments of the ecosophy, thereby contributing to their integration and interactions within the given philosophy.

Security refers to practically all material and spiritual entities, to all social, economic, moral, and virtual fields. All of these serve as an argument in favour of the necessity of the existence of the philosophy of security. The questionable application and use of the term security also serves as an argument in favour of the existence of the philosophy of security. The most decisive, most fundamental argument lies, however, in the fact that security, ultimately, refers to the human being, to its nature. All other securities make sense as far as the human being is concerned, the human species. We could say that all securities are included in the human security and make as much sense as they ensure security. In order for this security to become real and sustainable, as much as possible, both computers, robotics and digital technologies are needed, their philosophy is needed. Human security, in the philosophy of security, seems to be more valuable than the security of any other form of life². However, one also should remember the Nobel laureate Albrt Schweiter saying – "worship any form of life" - these forms contribute to the maintenance of human life.

Security as a philosophical problem cannot be achieved and provided once and for all, univocal in all circumstances. It is always concrete, individual and non-standard and also difficult to carry out when it comes to choosing. Whose

¹ Sîrbu Ion, *Unirea și securitatea națiunii române în viziunea umanismului etnic și ecologic*, în "Lucrările Congresului Internațional al culturii române, Unitatea limbii și culturii române", Ed I., Academia Română, Filiala Timișoara, 2018, pp. 339-352

² Ion Sîrbu, *Filosofia securității și problemele ei principale*, în "Materialele conferinței științifice internaționale, Mediul strategic de securitate: tendințe și provocări", Chișinău, 2018, pp. 121-135

Security should be ensured if we choose between the criminal and his possible victim, for example between the pedophile and the child who may be molested? Whose Security should be strengthened and maintained in the case of the aggressor and the assaulted state?

The philosophy of security, I believe, must underpin the security of all, and therefore of the criminal, only in prison and the aggressor, whose people must not be eradicated, but helped to escape the crisis, as was the case with Nazi Germany, Japan and others after the Second World War. The culprits who have done the aggressions must be punished, even by capital punishment - death, only if the execution of the punishment is worthy of a human being and not a mockery of the person, as for example, the punishment of Hussein or Cadafi.

The philosophy of tolerance

The philosophy of security is closely linked to that of tolerance, as a part of the ecosophy. Tolerance as a concept is common in the real life of people in medicine and biology, in religious and moral theory and practice, in conceptions of social philosophy and contemporary anthropology.

Christian morality propagates absolute tolerance. In religious practice, however, neither the church nor majority of believers have implemented it to the fullest.

Tolerance, as a social phenomenon, is pluralistic, multi-faceted, and heterogeneous. From the point of view of the philosophical and political-legal approaches, tolerance signifies the esteem, the understanding and acceptance of the diversity of cultures, the forms of self-highlighting, the ways of expressing human individuality. Tolerance is favoured by knowledge, communicability, sincerity and freedom of thought, conscience and belief. According to the philosopher B.S. Galimov, tolerance is a harmony in diversity. It is seen not only as a moral

duty, but also as a political and legal necessity, contributing to the establishment of peace, to changing the culture of war with that of peace. Tolerance, according to Galimov, by no means giving up, indulgence or too much leniency. Tolerance first of all is an active dependency, formed on the basis of the universal principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Tolerance under any circumstances cannot serve as a justification for attacks on these fundamental values¹.

Tolerance is necessary in the process of identifying and maintaining security. To what extent or limit, is it allowed however? This is where the problem arises. Can the one offended be tolerant of the offender? Tolerance, in my view, can only be dual, manifested by both sides of the possible conflict that has not yet begun. Is it possible, or is it a utopia, as in the case of Christian morality? A definite answer is difficult to give. Hence the need to develop a philosophy of tolerance as part of ecosophy as with others components of it. Otherwise, ecological wisdom will not be complete and it will not be able to carry out the imperative mission of human salvation, its survival and sustainable development, of society and nature.

Manipulation - a social phenomenon

Practically all the problems highlighted can lead to heated and controversial discussions, where various manipulations can be used. Manipulation, in our vision, is a social phenomenon that manifests itself in all areas of human activity. This can be constructive when it comes to professional mastery, creativity and skill. It can be and it is often destructive, negative when it leads to forgery, deception and confusion. The top achievements of contemporary civilization

¹ Чумаков а.н., Королёв А.Д. *Философия, Толерантность. Глобализация. К итогам VII Российского философского конгресса*, in "Вопросы философии", No. 7/2016, p. 10

are embodied in advanced technologies. These include nanotechnologies, biological, informational, cognitive and social technologies. Among the latter are the hybrid war, informational and asymmetric ones, etc. as destructive technologies. Social technologies, which lead to development and progress, such as strategic communication, building social institutions, EU-type state unions, national and supranational organizations, are essentially a manifestation of constructive technologies. It should be emphasized, however, that all technologies have constructive and destructive aspects. Which of these prevails depends on many factors, which must be studied and known to obtain effective results for development and progress. Culture is the means, the process of directing the achievements of civilization along the path of human progress and security. Culture is the one about man, his vital interests. All the achievements of civilization, with the emphasis on techniques, technologies, material things must go through the analysis and cultural transformations directed towards man and his spirituality. Culture directs civilization on the path of human progress, and civilization serves as the basis and instrument of accelerating the development of culture. Culture and civilization are two sides of man and human society. They must be in harmony and not in antagonism.

Culture is also a means of combating destructive manipulations and fortifying constructive ones. The culture, ultimately, will lead to the elimination, as far as possible, of the manipulations from human life and activity.

Conclusions

Ecosophy, as ecological wisdom, is a new philosophy of survival, security and sustainable development of man, society and nature, a philosophy of the fighting with destructive manipulations.

The philosophical problems of the general ecology, social one and

anthropoecology, together with the philosophy of security, tolerance and the digital one make up the fundamental components and also problems of the ecosophy.

Manipulation is a social phenomenon with a negative connotation, incompatible with the truth. However, it must be borne in mind that manipulation can be not only negative or destructive, but also constructive or positive. Humanistic culture is the factor that can ennoble manipulation.

Culture and civilization, as two sides of human society must not be opposed.

Ensuring human security and security in general requires not only material, professional and human factors, but also a high morality of society and its members.

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BOOK REVIEWS

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AN ANALYTICAL AND NORMATIVE APPROACH TO MASS MEDIA OPERATION, IN COMPLEMENTARITY WITH MODERN MILITARY OPERATION

Abstract:	<i>Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, well-known author on the subject of communication in the military field, both as an author of books and studies and articles, offers us the book "Operația mass-media, complementaritate a operației militare moderne" [Media operation, complementarity of modern military operation], under the edition of Techno Media Publishing House from Sibiu, appeared in 2019. The research effort is directed towards the objective of designing a national strategy that includes the media operation as an extension of modern military action, but also as a factor that has the capacity to determine and influence the development of military action, with beneficial effects both on the conduct of missions, but also on the way in which civil society perceives the military action and the institution of the Romanian army.</i>
Keywords:	Mass media; Military Operation; Mass media operation; National strategy
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Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu is already a well-known researcher in the subject of communication in the military field, both as an author of books¹ and studies and articles² in internationally

¹Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Media component of the military conflicts [Componenta mediatică a conflictelor militare]*, Editura TechnoMedia, Sibiu, 2018, 304 p.; Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Requirements of Freedom of Speech in Media [Exigențe ale libertății de exprimare în mass-media]*, Burg Publisher, Sibiu, 2009, 196 p.

²Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Illegal Migration. Approach from the Perspective of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)*, "Research and Science Today Journal", Vol. 18, No. 2, 2019, pp. 103-116; Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Cyber Security*

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listed journals or in the volumes of prestigious international conferences.

Recently, it offers us an in-depth research of the media operation, understood as a distinct component of the complex of contemporary military operations, in the form of a book published and launched on the market by Techno Media Publishing House in Sibiu, in 2019.

Under the title "Operația mass-media, complementaritate a operației militare moderne" ["Media operation, complementarity of modern military operation"], the paper totals 165 pages, organized in a table of contents that makes the usual introduction, then approaching us from the general to the particular, to the object announced in the title.

The introduction puts us in contact with the terminology as well as with the working methodology: "To achieve this goal, we used a series of research methods, such as the analytical method, the logical

Conflict Prevention, "Moldoscopia. Issues of Political Analyze", No. 1 (LII), 2011, pp. 147-156; Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Mass-media Role in Conflict Prevention*, "Review of Land Forces Academy Nicolae Bălcescu" Sibiu, ISSN 1582-6384, Vol. XVI, No. 1(61), 2011, pp. 29-36; Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *„International Humanitarian Law – Guarantor for War Correspondent Security?*, "Studia Securitatis", ISSN 1843-1925, Vol. V, No. 3, 2010, pp. 122-127; Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Communication Process in Post conflict Period*, "Scientific Bulletin of Land Forces Academy Nicolae Bălcescu" Sibiu, ISSN 1224-5178, Vol. XV, No. 1 (29), 2010, https://www.armyacademy.ro/cercetare/bul1_2010.pdf; Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Media Networks and Security. Case Study: Al-Jazeera*, "Studia Securitatis", ISSN 1843-1925, Vol. IV, No. 5, 2009; Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Communication in Crises*, "Studia Securitatis", CNCSIS, B+, ISSN 1843-1925, Vol. IV, No. 4/2009; Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Terrorist Actions and Media Violence*, "Studia Securitatis", CNCSIS, B+, ISSN 1843-1925, vol. III, No. 4/2008; Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Communication – Intrinsic Element of Negotiation and Diplomacy*" "Studia Securitatis", CNCSIS, B+, ISSN 1843-1925, Vol. III, No. 2/2008; Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Media. Terrorism Weapon*, "Studia Securitatis", CNCSIS, B+, ISSN 1843-1925, Vol. II, No.5-6/2007

method, the critical method, the comparative method, as well as the type of dialectical plan cumulated with progressive approaches. All these elements of the research methodology, as well as the types of research used, such as quantitative, qualitative and exploratory, helped us to achieve our goals and objectives”¹. This impressive analytical apparatus must finally lead us to concrete recommendations to the institutions responsible for national security, which would necessarily connect with a national strategy: “We believe that the design of a national strategy that includes the media operation as an extension of modern military action, but also as a factor that has the ability to determine and influence the conduct of military action will have beneficial effects on both missions, but also on the way in which the civil society perceives the military action, directly, and the institution of the Romanian army, in particular, thus contributing to the prestige of this primordial element of the Romanian civil society”².

The first chapter systematizes the subject of modern military operations (with reference to the determinations of modern military operations; the characteristics of the modern combat space; the factors that influence modern military operations). It follows an analytical investigation of the concept of media operation follows (referring to the categories of “information operations” and “psychological operations”), an exposition of the principles of the media operation, a listing of specific structures and activities in Romania, and a comparison between the media war and the publicized war (all under the economy of the second chapter). The research continues towards the characteristics of the media operation as a modern military operation, in three hypostases: within the stability operations;

in civil-military cooperation operations; in crisis response operations.

The final chapter transfers the above theoretical acquisitions to proposals on how the Ministry of National Defense and other national security institutions can use the media operation tool to promote national security interests. The working principles are identified as follows: “Adequate and timely use of social media, participatory inter-relationship with civil society, training of military staff in the field of communication”³, and staff training and logistics related to these objectives can be solved only by “the allocation of resources for the military communication system, including the design of viable communication strategies, because the planning and management processes of modern military actions depend on the quality of information products, the principle of minimum resource consumption cannot be accepted, the optimal consumption being acceptable”⁴.

Each chapter lists the bibliography used, and the end of the book systematizes once again the bibliographic sources, on the categories “Laws and normative acts”, “Doctrines, conventions, regulations, protocols, manuals”, “Books”, “Magazines” and “Internet sources”.

The research can substantiate disciplines that are taught in the bachelor's degree program “Security Studies” and the master's program “Security and International Relations” (both organized by the Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, through the Faculty of Socio-Human Sciences - Department of International Relations, Political Science and Security Studies). Of course, it offers valuable bibliography for disciplines organized by the National Defense University “Carol I” in Bucharest and the military academies within the Ministry of National Defense, but also the intelligence and police academies. It also serves universities that

¹ Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu, *Operația mass-media, Complementaritate a operației militare moderne*, Techno Media, Sibiu, 2019, p. 16

² Ibidem, p. 17

³ Ibidem, p. 154

⁴ Ibidem, p. 155

organize study programs in communication, journalism and public relations. The level of training targeted by Nicoleta Annemarie Munteanu's work is intelligible and useful at all levels of training: undergraduate, master's, doctoral or postdoctoral students, as well as

university professors and researchers working in specialized institutes, military or civilian. It is also a pleasant work that brings extra knowledge and intellectual satisfaction to the general public.



**A NEW FUNDAMENTAL WORKING TOOL FOR THE RESEARCH OF THE
TRANSNISTRIAN ISSUE, PROVIDED BY THE LABORATORY FOR THE
ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT**

Abstract:	<i>"Transnistrian Bibliography", written by Eugen Străuțiu and published by TechnoMedia in Sibiu in 2019, is a book that represents a collection of research papers (volumes, volume chapters, magazine articles, studies, reports). that conforms to form, content, documentation and methodology criteria, as well as it fulfils scientific analysis criteria, while the groundwork process, of making conclusions, is up to the standards and the criteria of the scientific analysis.</i> <i>The table of contents offers a systematical order of the bibliography, that refers to the Transnistrian conflict in the following categories: analytical volumes, chapters of volumes, articles of magazines, studies and reports, magazines, memoirs and at the end a collection of researches that refers to the past and present of the Romanians, that live in the Transnistrian regions (historical, demographical, economic, geopolitical, ethnographical and linguistic essays). On the whole, the book offers 88 analytical volumes, 71 volume chapters, 222 articles out of scientific magazines, 173 studies and reports, 31 master's theses and PhD dissertations, 19 designated scientific specialized magazines, and 23 memorial volumes. Apart from that, the researches, that have the topic of the communication of Transnistrian Romanians, are arranged in 30 volumes, 20 articles, and 3 specialized magazines.</i>
Keywords:	Transnistrian conflict; Bibliography; Repertorization; Research instruments
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The phenomena of frozen conflicts installed at the margins of the former Soviet Union, is coming closer to the western area (where the best-evaluated universities, research institutions and specialized think-tanks are located) through the Transnistrian conflict - a secessionist process, carried out violently on the territory of the Republic of Moldova in 1992, and peacefully continued until the present, without the identification of a commonly acceptable solution, from the actors that take part in the conflict and the

international actors, that are involved as well.

The geographical proximity didn't create the same interest on the topic, like the similar conflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgia, that are more favoured regarding the number of books, studies, articles and research projects, that have been dedicated to those two countries.

On a global plan, a specialized research structure, in approaching the Transnistrian conflict, that has a relatively recent history, works for sure. It is called "Laboratorul pentru Analiza Conflictului

Transnistrean” (“The Laboratory for the Analysis of the Transnistrian Conflict”) which has a standing research program within the Research Centre of Political Science, International Relations and European Studies of “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu. From its establishment (2013) until present days, LACT reported 5 research volumes, one periodic publication indexed in four international¹ databases, and several research projects supported by Romanian or international sponsors.

As the main priority in research, LACT aims to offer working instruments for interested researchers. The first edited volume for this purpose is written by Mihai Melintei, who offers a chronology of the Transnistrian conflict, and a commented bibliography, also providing a Russian² translation for it. He followed the research of professor Eugen Străuțiu, the director of the “The Laboratory for the Analysis of the Transnistrian Conflict”, who offers a consistent bibliography of the Transnistrian conflict, that was edited and put into circulation in 2019³. This achievement follows research expertise of more than 7 years, embodied in original books, or books with the quality of a lead author⁴, as well as a high number of

articles in magazines and studies in scientific volumes⁵.

The Transnistrian Bibliography appears like a repertoire of research publications (volumes, volume chapters, magazine articles, studies, reports), which are conform to form, content, documentation and methodology criteria, the groundwork process of making conclusions is up to standards, as well as it fulfils the scientific analysis criteria.

The publication begins with a detailed presentation and argumentation of the researches methodology, in English and Romanian. Here are detailed the

⁵ Eugen Străuțiu, *Cercetarea românească în problema conflictului transnistrean. Prezent și viitor*, în *Știința politică și societatea în schimbare*, Chișinău, 2015, pp. 216-222; Eugen Străuțiu, *Partidele politice în Transnistria. Influența nerecunoașterii internaționale asupra sistemului de partide*, în *Post-Soviet States between Russia and the EU: analyzing special circumstances and political tendencies. International scientific conference*, 27 September, 2016, CEP USM, Chișinău, 2016, pp. 487-496; Eugen Străuțiu, *Criteriul politic în analiza și soluționarea conflictului transnistrean, în Republica Moldova în contextul noii arhitecturi de securitate regională. Materialele conferinței internaționale*, 15 mai 2015, Chișinău, 2016, pp. 19-28; Eugen Străuțiu, *Rolul organizațiilor de cercetare în analiza conflictelor: cazul Laboratorului pentru Analiza Conflictului Transnistrean din cadrul Universității “Lucian Blaga”, Sibiu, România, în Mediul strategic și de securitate: provocări și tendințe. Materialele conferinței științifice internaționale. 17 mai 2018*, Centrul de Studii Strategice și de Securitate al Academiei Militare a Forțelor Armate „Alexandru cel Bun”, Chișinău, 2019, pp. 79-87

⁵ Eugen Străuțiu, *Expertiza non-guvernamentală moldoveană în problema conflictului transnistrean*, „Studia Securitatis”, Vol. VII, No. 2, 2013, pp. 50-60; Eugen Străuțiu, *Foreign Policy Objective of Separatist Transnistrian Region. Institutional Architecture*, „Studia Securitatis”, Vol. VII, No. 3, 2013, pp. 21-27; Eugen Străuțiu, *Security Policies and Institutions in Transnistrian Region*, „Studia Securitatis”, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 2014, pp. 110-117; Eugen Străuțiu, *Security Policies and Institutions in Transnistrian Region*, „Studia Securitatis”, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 2014, pp. 110-117; Eugen Străuțiu, *A Proposal for a Method for the Calculation of the Convergence between the two Banks of the Dniestr*, „Studia Securitatis”, Vol. XII, No. 2, 2018, pp. 110-124

¹ ”Anuarul Laboratorului pentru Analiza Conflictului Transnistrean / The Yearbook of the Laboratory for Transnistrian Conflict Analysis”, Vol. I, No. 1, 2017; Vol. II, No. 1, 2018, Vol. II, No. 1, 2019.

² ² Mihai Melintei, *Cronologia conflictului transnistrean adnotată bibliografic – cu traducere în limba rusă*, Editura Armanis, Sibiu, 2018, 450 p.


³ Eugen Străuțiu, *Transnistrian Bibliography*, Technomedia, Sibiu, 2019, 148 p.

⁴ Eugen Străuțiu, *The Transnistrian Conflict Files*, Technomedia, Sibiu, 2017, 397 p.; Eugen Străuțiu, Vasile Tabără, *A comparative analysis of the development on the two banks of the Dniestr*, Techomedia, Sibiu, 2015, 245 p.; Eugen Străuțiu, Nicoleta Munteanu, Marius Șpechea, *Opțiunile partidelor politice din Republica Moldova în problema transnistreană*, Mega, Cluj-Napoca, 2017, 161 p.

criteria about the selection of the bibliographic items, the logic of the content's structure, the methodology of selecting the bibliographic items, the standards of the quotation and the rules of the translation process.

The table of contents offers a systematical order of the bibliographic sources, that refers to the Transnistrian conflict in the following categories: analytical volumes, chapters of volumes, articles of magazines, studies and reports, magazines, memoirs and at the end a collection of researches that refers to the past and present of the Romanians, that live in the Transnistrian regions (historical, demographical, economic, geopolitical,

ethnographical and linguistic papers). On the whole, the book offers 88 analytical volumes, 71 volume chapters, 222 articles out of scientific magazines, 173 studies and reports, 31 master's theses and PhD dissertations, 19 designated scientific specialized magazines, and 23 memorial volumes. Apart from that, the researches, that have the topic of the communication of Transnistrian Romanians, categorize in 30 volumes, 20 articles, and 3 specialized magazines.



The bibliographical sources are given according to the original title - in Romanian, Russian, English, French, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian, Polish, Slovak, Swedish etc.. An English translation was added to the titles, that aren't originally English, to maximize the

public access and to uniform the publication to the basic version - in English.

All indexed works are created in uniformity according to the recommendations of the "Romanian Academy" ("Academia Română"). A short interrogation on the original bibliographic

sources depending on the publishing country, we find a poor placement of scientific Romanian literature, characterized by different approaches and that is not very consistent, without mentioning the researchers persistent dedication to the Transnistrian problem. A noble exception is made by the group of researchers that work in "Laboratorul pentru Analiza Conflictului Transnistrian" - which produced books, studies and articles, that were published in proper volume collections and magazines, but also in magazines, volume collections and conference volumes, that were published in other works in Romania but also abroad. Potential beneficiaries of Transnistrian Bibliography are found in different environments. It can be of use for students who are preparing for their bachelor's degree, master's degree or their PhD, but also for professors and researchers, that work on complex researches. "Laboratorul pentru Analiza Conflictului Transnistrian" already works on a follow-up to Eugen Străușiu's book, building an information service for bibliography, where interested people can obtain a list with bibliography organized by author, topic, publishing country etc.¹.

¹ *LACT inaugurează un serviciu de informare bibliografică / LACT opens a bibliographical information service,*
<http://www.lact.ro/2020/03/29/lact-inaugureaza-un-serviciu-de-informare-bibliografica/> (14.05.2020)