

## TWO TYPES OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY THE CASES OF E. A. FREEMAN AND MAX WEBER

I. By his life-work D. M. Pippidi has demonstrated that Universal History remains an essential expression of our twofold Jewish and Greek heritage. It may therefore not be inappropriate to offer him a contribution to the analysis of this intriguing product of the historical imagination. I shall try to examine two related, yet diversifying, trends in the writing of universal history during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and to indicate some of their implications. I hope Pippidi will accept this as a souvenir of a friendship which goes back to 1931 when he was working on Tiberius and I on Claudius.

As universal history cannot be total in the sense of including the totality of past events, we may start from the assumption that all it can do is to isolate types of events and to attribute a meaning to the replacement of one type by another type. A golden age may be followed by a silver age: the Assyrian Empire by the Persian Empire. Polytheism may be succeeded by monotheism, slavery by feudalism, sailing-ships by steamers. The universal historian isolates and defines types of events and tries to make their appearance or disappearance meaningful. By giving more importance and therefore more attention to certain types of events than to others, he will provide his own universal history with a characteristic line of development.

So far, I believe, our definition of universal history may apply equally to Hesiod and to Daniel, to Bossuet, Marx and Toynbee. But in the nineteenth century universal historians began to breach in one respect what had previously been the commonly accepted conventions of their literary genre. Far more than in previous centuries they recognized the possibility that their typology, rather than providing criteria for the description and classification of successive ages of mankind, would lead to the partition of mankind into several coexisting groups or races, each with its own permanent features. Consequently the problem arose whether the members of one group or race, being conditioned in their mental equipment by the culture to which they belonged, were qualified to pass judgement on the members of another group or on other groups as such. Universal history as a history of co-existing human groups — that is, as a history of concurrent and competing permanent groups, each with its own permanent characteristics — seems to be a new feature of the nineteenth century. It is therefore no accident that towards the end of the same century doubts should multiply about the objective validity of judgements passed by members of one group on the ways of life of other groups. The eighteenth-century game of having the Europeans described and judged by imaginary Persians, Scythians and American Indians was turned into the serious operation of considering whether and how one can understand alien civilizations and judge alien ways of life by

objective criteria. Such different cultural historians as Dilthey, Lannprecht and Huizinga were involved in this search. Any recent attempt to write universal history has had to reckon with this preliminary problem — namely, the legitimacy of understanding another culture in terms of the categories of one's own culture. Anyone oblivious of or indifferent to this problem is not likely to go very far.

This would be enough to justify my choice of E. A. Freeman on the one side and of Max Weber on the other side as representatives of the two stages of the discussion on universal history I am considering. My less obvious choice, E. A. Freeman, may exemplify the disruption which racism caused inside the unity of history. The disruption was particularly effective just because Freeman was clearly unaware of his predicament, as his grand Rede lecture on the Unity of History delivered at Cambridge in 1872 shows. More obviously, the name of Max Weber stands for the sociologist who most precisely tried to define the methods and the limits of understanding alien civilizations when the conflict of values and presuppositions becomes patent.

There is, however, a further reason for my choice of Freeman and Weber as the protagonists of my story. As Freeman was a historian of federations, monarchies and parliaments, he was presenting a modern version of one of the ancient forms of universal history, that based on the succession of political institutions. On the other hand, in order to save the universality of historical understanding, Max Weber was increasingly driven to place religion at the centre of his historical understanding — which was another ancient direction in the writing of universal history. It would be too crude to connect Freeman directly with the historian he admired most in antiquity — Polybius; and it would certainly be silly to establish a direct line between Max Weber and the Hebrew prophets he knew so well and respected so deeply. But though it is not a point I shall develop here, there is some justification in taking Freeman's universal history as oriented towards the Greek type and Max Weber's universal history as one oriented towards the Jewish type.

II. Since E. A. Freeman, this proudest of Anglo-Saxons, is now half-forgotten even in Anglo-Saxon countries — witness the ever-diminishing length of his entry in the successive editions of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* — it is perhaps not superfluous to give a few biographical details. Born in 1823, Freeman entered Trinity College, Oxford, in 1841 at the height of the Oxford Movement and seemed to be destined to play an important part in it. In fact, the Oxford Movement left him with a permanent interest in ecclesiastical architecture, but little else. He soon relinquished the fellowship bestowed on him by his College and retired to lead a gentleman's life in the country. For most of his life he supplemented his unearned income by journalistic work. After several failed attempts to become either a professor or a Member of Parliament he was appointed Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford in 1884. Eight years later he died in Spain during one of his regular journeys abroad. A *History of Federal Government*, of which only the first part ever appeared; six volumes on the Normans; four of an unfinished *History of Sicily* are his main works. Though his only direct attempt at world

history was his earliest book, a *History of Architecture* published in 1849, a vision of the whole development of mankind underlay all his other works, not only the major ones, but also the several popular books and even his most journalistic pieces.

Freeman is also explicit in declaring where he got his notion of the unity of history : it was from the inaugural lecture he heard as an undergraduate in 1842, when Thomas Arnold took up his Chair of Modern History. Forty-two years later Freeman could say in his own inaugural lecture : "It was from Arnold that I first learned the truth which ought to be the centre and life of all our history studies, the truth of the unity of History". There was indeed something in that inaugural lecture of Arnold to remain in the mind of a boy who had just entered University and who was not unshakeably committed to his earlier religious beliefs. Thomas Arnold had said : "but without any presumptuous confidence, if there be any signs, however uncertain, that we are living in the latest period of the world's history, that no other races remain behind to perform what we have neglected or to restore what we have ruined, then indeed the interest of modern history does become intense, and the importance of not wasting the time still left to us may well be called incalculable... So, if our existing nations are the last reserve of the World, its fate may be said to be in their hands. God's work on earth will be left undone, if they do not do it". The biblical and Christian images of the last age are not surprising in the clerical rhetoric of the Headmaster of Rugby. And there is no doubt that Freeman was correct in reading into them the notion of the unity of history. What was less biblical, and not yet obvious, in 1842 was that by the latest period of the world's history Arnold meant the one in which the German race was already master of half the world and likely to become master of the other half. In another less biblical passage of the same Inaugural Arnold declared : "I say nothing of the prospects and influence of the German race in Africa and in India — it is enough to say that half of Europe, and all America and Australia are German more or less completely, in race, in language or institutions, or in all". Arnold had apparently been won over to the German idea by Niebuhr's friend Baron Christian Karl Bunsen who later became Prussian envoy to the Court of St. James's. The racist aspect of this belief, which in Bunsen and Arnold was still combined with rather old-fashioned notions about esoteric Oriental wisdom, became far more pronounced in Freeman who knew all about the new comparative philology and counted among his ambitions that of doing for the study of politics what Max Müller, the other champion of the Aryan race in Oxford, was doing for religion by his researches on comparative mythology. Freeman jettisoned Arnold's Christian apocalyptic imagery, but kept to German imperialism.

In his lecture of 1872 on the "Unity of History" Freeman gives his most explicit opinion on the importance he attributed to the comparative method in the study of history : "I do not for a moment hesitate to say that the discovery of the Comparative Method in philology — let me add in politics and history and the whole range of human thoughts — marks a stage in the progress of the human mind at least as great and memorable as the revival of Greek and Latin learning. The great contri-

bution of the nineteenth century to the advance of human knowledge may boldly take its stand alongside the great contribution of the fifteenth". In the following year, 1873, Freeman reprinted his lecture on the "Unity of History" together with six new lectures entitled *Comparative Politics* which were meant to be an application of the comparative method to the reconstruction of constitutional history. His purpose was, in his own words, to trace out "the signs of original unity which are to be found in the primitive institutions of the Aryan nations, above all, in the three most illustrious branches of the common stock — the Greek, the Roman and the Teuton . . . We are now ready to stand face to face with our own immediate forefathers and kinsmen. And along with them, we are ready to look, with fresh interest and reverence, on those other branches of the common stock — kinsmen themselves, though kinsmen less nearly allied — who went before our own race in holding the first place among the nations on the earth". Far more explicitly than Arnold, Freeman was inclined to identify the unity of history with the unity of the Aryan race. At times the reader has the impression that he moves from one to the other in the same sentence without even being aware of the transition. A passage of the Rede lecture is instructive from this point of view. Freeman says: "Looking then at the history of man, at all events, at the history of Aryan man in Europe, as one unbroken whole, no part of which can be safely looked at without reference to other parts". The simple interjection of a meaningless "at all events" operates the transition from the history of man to the history of the Aryan race. In a long paper on Race and Language written in 1877, which is one of his most important theoretical pronouncements on this matter (*Historical Essays* III, 173 — 226), the answer to the question whether race and language go together is, not surprisingly, left in suspense for some time until an ambiguous sentence is introduced to settle the matter: "the natural instinct of mankind connects race and language".

Freeman had plenty of time, in his long and prolific production, to give his verdict on all sorts of present and past political situations. He maintained that the Normans, like the Greeks before them, had saved Sicily from being occupied by the Semitic race. He elaborated a precarious historical construction to explain how the Teutonic Normans came to fight against the Teutonic Anglo-Saxons on English soil. The only way out of this breach of racial etiquette was for Freeman to surmise that the Normans, while on French soil, had been contaminated by French vices and returned to liberty and other Teutonic virtues by the unorthodox method of imposing themselves on their reluctant Anglo-Saxon cousins. As Freeman disliked the French and Napoleon III even more than he disliked Benjamin Disraeli and his kin, the story of the palingenesis of the Normans in England had for him a paradigmatic meaning.

In the sixties, when far more options were still open for the future of Europe than after 1870, Freeman did intensive research on the history of Federalism. The drafts of some chapters of the unpublished second volume of the *History of Federal Government*, which were posthumously published by J. B. Bury in 1893 and also several letters from Freeman to his friend George Finlay, the historian of medieval and modern Greece, leave no doubt about the importance which Freeman attributed to federal

constitutions for the solution of European, not to speak of American, political problems. He would have liked to see the Ottoman Empire dissolved and replaced by a Balkan Federation; he would have liked a similar dissolution of the Austrian Empire. There was a moment in the sixties when he would have preferred the federal solution for Italy, though he was soon ready to accept the Piedmontese occupation of the peninsula. All this culminated in a somewhat vague, but intensely felt, glorification of the past and future potentialities of the Holy Roman Empire — the heir of the ancient Roman Empire, the instrument of German supremacy in the Middle Ages, and, God knows how, the frame for a future collaboration between England and Prussia in the world. Far be it from me to try to give a precise meaning to the prophetic conclusion of the posthumous chapter X in Bury's edition: "Then will the title which has been too long degraded by the impostors of Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Elba, Mexico, Brazil and Haiti pass of right to the true successor of Charles, of Berenger and of Frederick. And none will be more ready than those who once looked forward to a Confederate Italy, once more to wish life and victory to an Augustus crowned by God, a King of Italy and Emperor of the Romans" (p. 617). Freeman probably meant nothing more than the hope of seeing Vittorio Emanuele crowned king in Rome. But by wishing at the same time for the disappearance of the Austrian Empire he was playing with the extension of the Prussian Empire towards the Mediterranean. It is useful to keep in mind that in 1864 — one year after the appearance of the *History of Federal Government* — James Bryce published in Oxford what turned out to be one of the seminal books of the historiography of the nineteenth century — *The Holy Roman Empire*. Bryce's book passed through several drastic revisions from 1864 to 1904 when (by now Viscount Bryce) he brought it up to date for the last time. Those who want to taste the genuine flavour of the original production will do well to go back to one of the first two editions. Freeman and Bryce, both Trinity College men, soon became friends. Both were looking at the Holy Roman Empire not only as an important European institution of the past, but as a desirable inspiration for the future. Of course Bryce was wiser than Freeman, and his expectations were less sanguine. In a telling note he remarked suspiciously that the partition of the Austrian Empire would have been likely to increase the weight of Prussia in the Mediterranean. It remains true, however, that Bryce, like Freeman, looked at the Holy Roman Empire as a living and useful tradition. Universal history, like the Holy Roman Empire, had become German, after having been Roman. There is some irony in having a man like Freeman choosing federalism as his subject and ending in recognizing the Holy Roman Empire as the best model of Federalism.

III. I chose Freeman as the case to oppose to Max Weber because he is a good example of the situation in which universal historians found themselves when they accepted power struggles as the most important feature of history and furthermore treated them as being brought about by the co-existence of incompatible racial groups. Max Weber was no less patriotic about Germany than Freeman was about England. In fact he was a German patriot of a hue which, though not inconceivable or

unintelligible in Victorian or Edwardian England, made Freeman's political prose look like Sunday sermons. I do not know whether Max Weber read anything by Freeman. As a careful student of Marxist writings he certainly noticed Engels' contemptuous reference to Freeman in the preface to *Der Ursprung der Familie*: "die schlechten liberalen Verfälschungen des Herrn Freeman". What concerns us here is the contrast between these two patriots when they turned from the immediate political questions of their respective countries to a consideration of the course of history.

Max Weber was of course no less a universal historian than Freeman. The first words one meets in the introduction to Weber's greatest work, the unfinished *Sociology of Religion*, are "Universalgeschichtliche Probleme". If he treated Helmut's once famous *Weltgeschichte* as puerile, that was because he agreed with Eduard Meyer that universal history cannot dispense with criteria of relevance which Helmut and his collaborators tried to avoid as being subjective. In what precise relation Max Weber himself was putting history and sociology becomes a secondary problem once it is realised that there have always been two types of history, the history which pursues the fleeting event and the history which analyses permanent or long-lasting structures. Whether you call the second type of history antiquarianism or "histoire de la longue durée" or anthropology or sociology or structural history is less important than the relation which at any given moment exists between these two types of history. As far as Max Weber is concerned, he found in the elaboration of the notion of ideal types an original method for keeping structural research separate from, but connected with, the study of the individual facts. This went together with a rigorous refusal to avail himself of certain notions which were fashionable in his time when one talked about history. This great German patriot refused to consider race, nation, and even state, as objective realities from which to start. In a famous passage of his *Ueber einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie* (1913) he stated that the notion of race is relevant to the sociologist only in so far as there are people who believe in race and make it a conscious motive of social action. The same attitude was maintained towards the principle of nationality: nationality is not a datum, but a motive given by certain individuals for their social actions. As for the state it is almost superfluous to point out that Weber never included an entity called state in his sociological analysis, but concentrated his attention on the various modes of legitimation of authority (charismatic, traditional and bureaucratic or legal) — this in the Germany where Ranke had proclaimed not long before that States are ideas of God. Generally speaking, as is well known, Weber recognizes only individual men and women as agents and therefore seeks the ultimate explanation of history in the motives of individuals and in the meanings they attribute to their social actions. Weber's profound hostility both to the bourgeois and to the socialist traditions of political thought of the nineteenth century is never so evident as in his refusal to start his analysis from nations or from social classes. This led him to attribute maximal importance to religion as a principle of classification of social realities because religious beliefs can only be assumed to exist if they are observable in individuals.

I must immediately add that I am under no illusion of having fully understood the limits and the function of religion in Weber's thought. Religion is clearly not the only form of subjective experience indisputably leading to social action (it is worth remembering the place music had in Weber's theory). More specifically, though Weber's typology of political authority is related to his typology of religion (most obviously in the case of charismatic power, but also distinctly in traditional forms of power), there is no necessary connection between his typology of religious life and his typology of political legitimation. Even in the case of charismatic authority he can put together the prophets of Israel who were inspired by religion and Pericles — or indeed any Athenian demagogue of the fifth century B.C. — who was not, at least in any obvious sense. In some cases Weber even appears to argue that the success of a religious tenet was conditioned by the support it obtained from a political power the roots of which seem to have been independent of religion. He considers the power of the Confucian literati to oppose magic to be dependent on their social status, and not vice versa. He attributes the success of the brahmins to the convergence of their interest with that of the princes. Most interestingly he has no illusions about the religious feelings of peasants. He does not share the romantic image of the peasants' simple faith which played such a part in the interpretation of earliest Hebrew prophecy by Wellhausen. He believed that peasants become deeply involved in religious experiences only when they are in danger of enslavement or proletarianization.

Thus religion is for Max Weber an essentially urban phenomenon — with magic set aside for the satisfaction of the needs of the countryside. But even in the treatment of the city (which is after all one of the masterpieces of Weber's mature thought) we vainly seek a clarification of the position of religion as a force shaping social integration. It was indeed the task of the intellectuals from the cities to persuade or to coerce the peasants by imposing regulations which would make the co-operation of city and countryside effective. But the marvellously subtle and complex typology of the city pays almost no attention to the religious functions of the city — not even to the religious associations existing in each city. This is so true (unless I am guilty of a disastrous oversight) that the type of the temple-city (to which Jerusalem belonged) does not seem to be considered at all. I can only admit that I do not see the typology of the city as being related to Weber's thesis of the centrality of religion in shaping social institutions.

This does not affect the point that by the mere fact of turning his interest to religion as a pivot of social action Max Weber escaped the danger of being Europeo-centric or Aryano-centric, when almost everyone (even, in practice, the Marxists) was either one or the other. China, India, Islam, Judaism were inevitably pushed to the fore. If religion was the major indicator of how a society organizes its principles of authority and its forms of production, the mental processes leading from religious beliefs to political and economic institutions became of paramount significance. The function of the intellectuals in society was no new problem. What was new was the attempt to analyse with a uniform method the role of Confucian literati, brahmins, prophets and rabbis inside their respective

societies. I am not aware that anything of similar scope had been attempted before. Max Weber never found the time for developing his ideas about Islam. Although his most famous specimen of research on the relations between religion and economy, his essay on *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, was published in 1905, it was in many ways as yet an immature and incomplete product of his method. Weber never lost faith in the results of this work — which linked the development of Capitalism with the vocational ethics of Calvinism — but he left further research on this and other topics about Christianity in social life to his friend, the theologian Ernst Troeltsch. I am not competent to judge the validity of this early work, but I should not be surprised if K. Samuelson and others were right in their radical criticisms of Weber's thesis on Calvinism. What is missing in the booklet on *Protestant Ethic* in comparison with Weber's more mature works is the identification and analysis of the type of intellectual capable of guiding the various groups of producers towards a uniform economic and social behaviour. The authors Weber likes to quote — Richard Baxter, Benjamin Franklin and even Wesley — are hardly a coherent group for his purpose. A Brahmin himself, especially in the leisurely Heidelberg years before the first world war, Max Weber was acutely sensitive to the steps the intellectuals needed to take in order to establish their authority and to shape the everyday activities of their followers into meaningful and acceptable patterns. He understood why the Chinese official had to prove his status by the canonical correctness of his literary form or why the Bible, being so accessible and intelligible to the common reader, was bound to make it impossible for the rabbis to be mysterious in their public utterances.

For Max Weber, the task of the intellectuals was to give wordly dimensions to unworldly creeds. Through their intellectuals, religious groups learned to make specific economic and political activities compatible with their basic religious beliefs. The efforts which the intellectuals of the various religions made to harmonize creeds with power or gain could be measured and compared in terms of degrees of rationality. It follows that, whatever the importance of the intellectuals, the decisive element was the rationality inherent in the attitudes of each group as a whole. Rationality, needless to say, is another difficult and complex notion in Max Weber who sometimes opposed rationality in relation to plurality of values (*Zweckrationalität*) to rationality in relation to one value (*Wert-rationalität*), and at other times distinguished between formal rationality — an accurate calculation of given quantities — and material or substantive rationality, that is, choice between goods. But when he applies the notion of rationality to religion, Weber means primarily the opposite of magic — that is, the use of reliable methods for the exploitation of natural resources such as occurs, at its highest level, in a capitalist society. Thus religions can be classified in terms of their different approximation to the rationality which is necessary for the development of a capitalist society. None of the great religions studied by Max Weber after his essay on Calvinism ever developed the rationality which would have made

the rise of capitalism possible. The rejection of Werner Sombart's thesis which connected Judaism with the origins of capitalism is complete and supported by the simple, but decisive, remark that the Jews played no part in the development of modern industry. The distinction of having created modern capitalism is thus left to the Protestant sect, Calvinism.

IV. But Max Weber was never absolutely certain that the rationality he found most congenial was that of capitalism. Many of the most difficult questions Weber asked himself come to the surface in his treatment of Judaism, the most extensive and ambitious he ever planned for any religion.

What we have is only a small part of what he had intended to write. He wanted to go into Talmudic Judaism. Apart from a disconnected chapter on the Pharisees and Essenes, he barely reached the return from the Babylonian exile. German Universities had of course, especially in the Protestant theological Faculties, excellent students of biblical history, in which we include the age of Jesus. There were also some ancient historians — among whom Eduard Meyer was the greatest and the one from whom Weber learned most — who were prepared to go deep into the problems of the so-called inter-testamentary period, the no-man's-land between the end of the Hebrew Bible and the beginnings of Christianity. But no German theologian or ancient historian took the trouble to study the Talmudic texts seriously as documents for religious and social history. When Weber started to write about Judaism after 1910 Jewish scholars, who had always been infinitely superior to their Christian colleagues in their command of Talmudic texts, were beginning to exploit them for social history : it is enough to mention the names of W. Bacher and A. Büchler. Weber had only a modicum of Hebrew and would probably have had to rely on translations if he had ever reached the Aramaic texts of the Talmud ; nor were reliable translations easily available. The reason for his success is therefore to be sought in the questions he asked and even more in his truly formidable gift for analysing intellectual situations in their social contexts. Unlike his Protestant colleagues, he could understand both prophets and rabbis ; and unlike Jewish scholars, he knew about other religions.

In Weber's interpretation of Judaism there is clearly a teleological preoccupation. Weber wants to understand how the Jews survived as a group after having been deprived of their national centre and scattered throughout the world. He finds the answer in an interpretation of the prophets which emphasizes the ethics of humility and pain. Weber took as his guiding text the chapters on the suffering servant in Deutero-Isaiah and also liked to recall the prophet's saying : "I set my face like a flint

and I know that I shall not be ashamed". Paradoxically the rabbis—either because of or despite their *petit bourgeois* intelligence — perfected the work of the prophets by teaching the Jews to adapt themselves to a permanent life as marginal foreigners without losing their dignity, their wits and their hope for the Messianic age of justice and the triumph of Yahwe.

There were many ambivalences in Weber's attitude to the Jews. They were partly personal. His father had signed the 1880 Declaration against Anti-Semitism with Mommsen; and he did not like his father (though he liked Mommsen). The Weber's fashionable house at Heidelberg was open to assimilated Jews and Jewish converts to Christianity who do not invariably seem to have been to Weber's taste. What is more curious is that his work on Judaism was dedicated to his mistress who was the wife of a Jewish colleague and friend. Intellectually, it is easy to find in the research on Judaism even more echoes of Nietzsche than in Weber's other works. As always, he must have had Marx in mind. He certainly demonstrated that he knew much more about Jews and Judaism than Marx ever did. The very word *pariah* which he chose to define the Jews even before the destruction of the Second Temple is an indication of this ambiguity. Hannah Arendt — the pupil of Max Weber's friend and pupil Karl Jaspers — did much to rescue the word *pariah* in her fine collection of essays published in 1947, *Die verborgene Tradition*, but the ambiguity remains and has more than biographical implications.

As a universal historian dealing with Judaism, Max Weber was faced with a fact which ran counter to all the other cases he had been considering — Buddhism not excluded. Religion among the Jews could bypass substructures of political authority and yet produce a remarkably well integrated, rational society, even if it was not the rational society which could support capitalism. Since Max Weber felt more at home with intellectuals than with capitalists and, as we have said, approved of capitalism more with his brain than with his heart, the discovery was bound to be disturbing. Judaism proposed to Weber the alternative of a satisfactory life which was not a political life. It was not an alternative he could make his own or desire for his own Germans. But twice at least, in the last year of his life, 1919-20, he faced it in public as a real alternative. In his Inaugural Lecture at Munich he hinted at the possibility that the Germans might have to live without a State like the Jews (Marianne Weber, *Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild*, 711). In his speech on *Wissenschaft als Beruf* to his German students he concluded with the famous allusion to the oracle concerning Dumah in *Isaiah* 21, "The watchman says: Morning comes, and also the night. If you will inquire, inquire; come back again". Weber added: "The nation for whom Isaiah spoke has asked questions and waited for the

answers for more than two thousand years, and we know its terrible destiny". As a matter of fact, the nation which is supposed to wait for the answers in this particular oracle is not Israel but Edom.

In spite of his own warning against the prophets Max Weber had gone back to the prophets to try to unravel the inner structure of social action. Freeman had relied both on the instruments of political analysis offered by classical political thought and on racial categories, which had never been extraneous to Greek thought. We may now go back ourselves to the origins of these two types of analysis which by implication are also two types of universal history. In a paper called "The Origins of Universal History" I have tried to describe the Greek side of these origins and have also said something on the confluence of Greek ideas in the Book of Daniel, but the Jewish-Christian side of the story is still very obscure to me. Perhaps rightly, as obscurity is inherent in prophecy<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> It is not necessary here to give bibliography either on Freeman or on Weber. But on Freeman the reader should be referred to J. W. Burrow, *A Liberal Descent*, Cambridge 1981, for a complementary view. My Pisa seminars on Freeman and Weber are published in *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* 3, 8, 4, 1978 (Weber) and 3, 11, 2, 1981 (Freeman). See also on Weber my paper in *History and Theory*, 19, 1980, 313 – 348. On Universal History, *Annali Pisa* 3, 12, 2, 1982.