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RESEARCH ARTICLES

Reading Nehamas's Nietzsche: An Overview of the Project of Self-Fashioning

Filip Čukljević

Abstract: In this article I shall investigate Alexander Nehamas's classic interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche in relation to the idea of self-fashioning. My aim is to dispel certain misconceptions about Nehamas's Nietzsche and to explore what his vision of life actually involves. First, I shall expose some basic presuppositions about self-fashioning, that have to do with the nature of the self. Then I shall examine the concept of style, which is related to the concept of the self, and what it means to give style to oneself. This endeavour will further expand on the prominently literary model of life espoused by Nehamas's Nietzsche. We will see that Nietzsche's (in)famous idea of the eternal return plays a pivotal role within this framework. Afterwards, it will be argued that realizing the idea of self-fashioning is a pluralistic affair, unique to each person. Subsequently, the temporal structure of self-fashioning will be addressed in greater detail, by focusing on two aspects: coming to terms with the past and being open to the future. Finally, the processual nature of this project will be further revealed with the analysis of its slogan 'become who you are.'

Keywords: Friedrich Nietzsche, Alexander Nehamas, self-fashioning, self, style, eternal return.

1. The Presuppositions of Self-Fashioning

In his classic *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* Nehamas provides an influential interpretation of Nietzsche which centers on two main themes: his perspectivism and aestheticism. According to the former, all knowledge-claims (including Nietzsche's own) are perspectival and depend on the given form of life, its needs, interests, and values. In other words, all views are interpretations – not passive reflections of neutral facts – and other interpretations are always possible, although this does not mean that they are all equally good (Nehamas 1985, 1, 3, 5, 6, 42, 72, 81, 105, 127, 198). The latter expresses Nietzsche's outlook on the self and the world at large through the artistic lens, more precisely as if they were literary texts (Nehamas 1985, 3, 39, 165). Aestheticism, according to Nehamas, motivates both perspectivism and, jointly with it, Nietzsche's presentation of his philosophical views through the voice of his specific literary character, which is Nietzsche himself as he appears in his writings (Nehamas 1985, 3-4, 137). I shall

focus primarily on aestheticism, particularly as it concerns the nature of the self and especially the idea of self-fashioning.¹

The first thing that might come to mind when one thinks about the idea of self-fashioning is that it sounds paradoxical – it seems implausible within the Nietzschean worldview. Does Nietzsche not hold that the idea of the self, the subject, is an illusion, an ill-conceived idea, obtained from the way our language functions – with the word ‘I’ apparently denoting something substantial – and also the idea from which we have derived the dubious idea of substance, being (see *TI*, III, 52; *WP*, 473, 485; Nehamas 1985, 85, 171)² And if ‘the self’ does not actually exist, then what does one have to fashion or create (Nehamas 1985, 172, 176-177)?

Clearly Nietzsche is of the opinion that the self as an already unified entity, unified in itself, cannot be presupposed (see *BGE*, 12; *WP*, 490, 561; Nehamas 1985, 177-178). Yet, as Nehamas points out, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra maintains that: “And all my creating and striving amounts to this, that I create and piece together into one, what is now fragment and riddle and grisly accident [human beings]” (*Z*, II, 20, quoted in Nehamas 1985, 178). How are we to understand these two strands of Nietzsche’s thought in order to make them compatible with each other?

Nehamas provides us with the answer: the unified self cannot be presupposed as a given, but it can be achieved, at least in theory. According to Nietzsche, human beings are made up of various ‘drives’ which interact with each other, often struggling among themselves. There is nothing above this level of drives that keeps them in check, decides upon which drives to act upon and which to curb, thereby providing some kind of pre-established unity (see Nehamas 1985, 177; *BGE*, 12; *WP*, 490). The only possible unity is the one that can be achieved when all drives become organized enough to be directed towards a common end (Nehamas 1985, 177-178). Only then can one achieve selfhood.

¹ The phrases such as ‘self-fashioning,’ ‘life as literature,’ ‘life as a work of art,’ ‘self-creation,’ ‘becoming who one is,’ and their variations are used by Nehamas as synonyms. I shall follow him in this practice, although I shall primarily use the term ‘self-fashioning.’ All of these terms will be shown to be somewhat lacking, but I believe the previous one to be the least so. The idea to which these terms refer to expresses a certain ethics – the so called ‘*aesthetics of existence*’ – and is related to other historic traditions, as noted by Marinus Schoeman (Schoeman 2008, 437).

² Nietzsche’s texts will be cited by section number using the standard English-language acronyms: *The Birth of Tragedy* (BT); *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (PTG); *Untimely Meditations* (UM); *Daybreak* (D); *The Gay Science* (GS); *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Z); *Beyond Good and Evil* (BGE); *On the Genealogy of Morality* (GM); *The Case of Wagner* (CW); *The Twilight of the Idols* (TI); *The Antichrist* (A); *Ecce Homo* (EH); *The Will to Power* (WP); *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe* (KSA).

³ Nehamas notes that the idea of this derivation is inconsistent with what Nietzsche says elsewhere, which is that the derivation goes in the other direction, or at least that the ideas of the subject and the object developed simultaneously. Also, the idea of the substantial self is an essential presupposition for attributing freedom of choice to human beings, which was invented – according to Nietzsche – in order to hold us responsible, hence punishable (Nehamas 1985, 85-86; *GM*, I, 13; II, 21-22).

But if there is no already unified self, how can we even talk of 'us' having conflicting drives that could be organized in a more coherent, unified way? Does this talk not presuppose that we are already unified to certain extent, which allows us to discern one person with its drives from another? According to Nehamas's Nietzsche, this minimal required unity is provided by the (relative but sufficient) unity of the body, with its basic bodily needs and interests being mostly in agreement with each other. The body acts as a sort of battleground for various mental contents, actions, characteristics, and habits that fight for the provisional position of the body's commander, its manifestation being the ability to say 'I' – at least for a certain time. Although it seems that this term has a constant referent when uttered by the same body, it actually refers to the current presiding drive (Nehamas 1985, 180-182).

If one does not begin as a self but rather has to achieve that status, then one's character – a particular set of drives and its relations that constitute a person – is not set in stone but changeable. Moreover, it must not only be changeable, but also capable of being changed at least in part by ourselves and not just by some external factors, e.g. various socio-historical forces. Otherwise, it could not count as an achievement but rather as something that simply happens – or does not happen – to us (see Pippin 2015, 152).

Nietzsche often insists that these conditions are indeed met. He points out that human beings are composed of numerous drives that they can cultivate in different ways (see *D*, 560; *GM*, III, 13). We can develop some, while neglecting others; we may minimize the grip some of these drives have on us, or redirect them in a specific manner. By this "plastic power" to fashion oneself Nietzsche means "the capacity to develop out of oneself in one's own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds" (*UM*, II, 1). Thus one tries to keep one's life from resembling "a mindless act of chance" (*UM*, III, 1). In exerting this power one gives form to oneself (Schoeman 2008, 435).

Nietzsche encourages us to approach this activity with a boldness and willingness to take risks (see *UM*, III, 1). Having in mind that Nietzsche often proposes the artist as the paradigmatic case of a human being wielding this shaping power, such encouragement is only to be expected. Great art is rarely, if ever, created without an audacity and will to experiment.

In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche gives us a glimpse into his own self-fashioning, or at least into how he perceived it. He claims that one must be open to what one might become, without knowing in advance what exactly that might be. One should not be discouraged by past mistakes or infelicities, for even these are significant if one knows how to integrate them into the larger whole of one's life (*EH*, II, 9).

Moreover, in this section Nietzsche strongly suggests that the process of self-fashioning is not primarily conscious, if so at all, which casts doubts on one of this process's major presuppositions. Because it requires a separate analysis, I

shall not dwell deeper into the question of the extent to which self-fashioning is (un)conscious, although it is a prominent one. If it turns out that self-fashioning is primarily, or entirely, unconscious, then it becomes contentious to what extent is self-fashioning up to us (Pippin 2015, 152), as Nietzsche assumes elsewhere. Whatever the answer, this emphasis on the unconscious dimension of self-fashioning is in accordance with the fact that its paradigm is artistic activity, which is often regarded as unconscious to a significant extent.

2. Giving Style to Oneself

The project of self-fashioning presupposes a certain conception of the self. Nehamas states that the self is not something solid and persistent. One does not always already have a self. Selfhood is to be achieved – although most often one does not achieve it. A person does not consist of some insulated essential core – selfhood as traditionally conceived – but of everything they think, experience, and do. In most people, their thoughts, experiences, and actions are connected accidentally, lacking a unifying principle of organization. However, in some cases they are connected in a way that indicates the presence of a style. And where there is a style, there is a self (Nehamas 1985, 7, 17).⁴

Nehamas's Nietzsche holds that an exceptional self is composed of many different potent and clashing inclinations that are successfully managed and integrated (Nehamas 1985, 7, 187-188; *WP*, 966; *EH*, II, 9). A self is more admirable the richer it is with content and tension, and if it maintains this abundance with a distinct style. The plurality of powerful and conflicting tendencies is of critical importance for an exceptional self, because the mere coherence in one's tendencies can also be the result of one's frailty, conventionality, and shallowness (Nehamas 1985, 7). A person who has just a few strong propensities, not distinctly at odds with each other, could be said to have achieved a certain level of selfhood, but this would not be a particularly exceptional self.⁵ Thus Richard Schacht's claim that according to Nehamas it is enough to create a "coherent whole" out of one's life in order to be a true self is specious (Schacht 1992, 274-275, 280).⁶

⁴ According to Nehamas, this denial of the existence of the substantial self above one's thoughts, actions, and experiences is an instance of Nietzsche's overall rejection of the existence of the thing-in-itself, understood as an underlying thing that holds together all of its apparent properties (Nehamas 1985, 154-155).

⁵ Schoeman correctly points out that the self does not experience tension only within itself, but also between itself and the others – the other selves as well as the socio-historical setting in which it is situated (Schoeman 2008, 434).

⁶ Robert B. Pippin has misgivings similar to Schacht's (Pippin 2015, 145-147). Nehamas is partly to be blamed for these doubts. He claims that the project of self-fashioning entails "a radical formalism" – meaning that the organizational coherence of one's life is what matters, not the intrinsic characteristics of its parts – and that Nietzsche was aware of this (Nehamas 1985, 39, 136; see *WP*, 818). In my opinion, Nehamas does not argue in a sufficiently assertive manner that the project of self-fashioning, besides this 'coherential' aspect on which he mostly focuses,

What exactly does it mean to give style to oneself? It is hard, if not impossible to provide a detailed answer to this question, given that style is something idiosyncratic to a genuine self, and thus differs between the various selves (Nehamas 1985, 225-226, 228-230). Nietzsche states that the function of a style is "to *communicate* a state, an inner tension of pathos, with signs [...]. Good style in itself – this is *pure stupidity* [...]" (EH, III, 4). Although what makes a good style in one case may differ from what makes a good style in another, in the following famous passage Nietzsche gives to my mind the best description of what the process of giving style to oneself might generally be like:

One thing is needful. – To 'give style' to one's character – a great and rare art! It is practised by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses that their nature has to offer and then fit them into an artistic plan until each appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a great mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of first nature removed – both times through long practice and daily work at it. Here the ugly that could not be removed is concealed; there it is reinterpreted into sublimity. Much that is vague and resisted shaping has been saved and employed for distant views – it is supposed to beckon towards the remote and immense. In the end, when the work is complete, it becomes clear how it was the force of a single taste that ruled and shaped everything great and small – whether the taste was good or bad means less than one may think; it's enough that it was one taste! (GS, 290, quoted in Nehamas 1985, 185; see BGE, 116)⁷

For Nehamas, Nietzsche's attempt to give the question of style preeminence in his thinking by transposing it from the domain of the arts to that of everyday life is a manifestation of Nietzsche's aestheticism: Nietzsche looks at the world and its components through the prism offered by artistic – or, more precisely, literary – models, and assesses persons and their actions accordingly (Nehamas 1985, 39).⁸

has a 'quantitative' aspect (the more urges one has the better), as well as a 'dynamic' one (the more powerful and conflicting with each other these urges are the better). Simon May also discerns these aspects (May 2009, 93-94).

⁷ David Owen offers a more exhaustive and insightful analysis of this passage (Owen 2013, 78-80).

⁸ The main aim of this article is not to examine to what extent Nehamas's Nietzsche corresponds to the actual Nietzsche, but to overview and appreciate Nehamas's Nietzsche in his own right. Nevertheless, it ought to be remarked that Mark Tomlinson notes that Nehamas's interpretation sometimes seems to impose Nehamas's own views onto Nietzsche and thus to smooth over the complexity (and potential contradictions) of Nietzsche's thought (Tomlinson 2011, 208-209). Moreover, Brian Leiter holds that the aestheticism that Nehamas ascribes to Nietzsche goes against the naturalism that Leiter ascribes to Nietzsche (Leiter 1992, 276-280). However, relations between aestheticist and naturalist elements in Nietzsche's writings – and both can be found there – demand a separate enquiry. Still, as Tomlinson suggests, a rigid reliance on the texts might not be the best way to read a philosopher like Nietzsche – a bolder, more daring and ambitious approach, such as Nehamas's, might be more fecund (Tomlinson 2011, 208-209).

3. The Literary Model of Life

One of Nehamas's major claims is that Nietzsche views the ideal person as the ideal literary character, and subsequently construes the ideal life as the ideal story (Nehamas 1985, 165). This connects and develops two previously explored trains of thought: Nietzsche's recurrent insistence on fashioning one's life as a work of art and his view of the self as an achievement.

Nietzsche never explicitly states that the model for the ideal person should be the literary character (see Tomlinson 2011, 208-209; Pippin 2015, 142). Furthermore, I am not sure whether he mentions literature, much less the novel when he discusses the artistic aspects of the life worth living⁹ – he mentions theatre (see *GS*, 78) and poetry (see *BT*, 33; *GS*, 299, 301), which might be said to come closest. Nietzsche mostly refers to the arts in general. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine why Nehamas identifies literature, more precisely the novel, as the art form which is best suited for demonstrating what it means to fashion oneself as a work of art. The sheer (potential) complexity and the shape our lives take – being made up of various thoughts, memories, experiences, encounters, events, and many more – most easily fits in a narrative structure which, for its part, can best be articulated in great novels such as Marcel Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*.¹⁰ This novel is the chief example Nehamas provides for Nietzsche's idea of self-fashioning (see Nehamas 1985, 167, 168, 188).

Nehamas believes that literary characters are nothing more than what is said of them in the narratives in which they take part (Nehamas 1985, 165). This fits well with his peculiar view of the self, as it provides a familiar example for an idea that may seem strange at first. Furthermore, Nehamas argues that – in the ideal case scenario at least – changing just one detail concerning a literary character harms both that character and the story of which it is a part. This brings back the notion of style, which should act as the organizing principle of the character's (literary or real) life. The totality of a life's narrative should be so well organized, its parts connected in such a way and inwrought with a single style, that the slightest alteration in its details would dispense with the whole altogether (Nehamas 1985, 165, 194).

⁹ Only Nietzsche's claim that "the higher human being" is the "ongoing author of life" (*GS*, 301) comes to mind.

¹⁰ Tomlinson notes that the type of the literary character that Nehamas considers as the model for the ideal person is not omnipresent in novel, nor in literature in general. It is a type of character "in which growth, development, and change are privileged;" the other types that can be found in literature are not taken into account (Tomlinson 2011, 203). Although Nehamas should have acknowledged this fact, I do not think that it represents a major flaw of his reading of Nietzsche. As stated above, it seems that the (potential) complexity and the content of one's life can best be captured in novels such as Proust's – that is, "the nineteenth-century realist novel and some early versions of the modernist novel," as Pippin observes (Pippin 2015, 142) – and the vehicles for this are the characters of the specific sort which Tomlinson identifies.

One consequence of this position – which Nehamas is well aware of – is that the intrinsic character of an action is not what is truly important; what matters is how an action fits in with other actions and particularities of one's life. In other words, the im(morality) of one's actions is not particularly important when appreciating a literary character – there are great literary characters who are not morally commendable. If a person is to imagine and fashion themselves as a literary character, their (im)morality would not necessarily play a significant role (Nehamas 1985, 165-166, 193-194).

Because Nehamas often mentions Proust's novel as the best example of what having a literary model for one's life might mean, it is instructive to cite one such passage at length, especially considering that here we are introduced to yet another (in)famous idea of Nietzsche which Nehamas deploys in order to further explore Nietzsche's vision of self-fashioning – the idea of the eternal return:

In thinking of his [Nietzsche's] ideal life on the model of a story, we would do well to think of it in the specific terms supplied by Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past*. In this fictional autobiography the narrator relates in enormous, painstaking detail all the silly, insignificant, pointless, accidental, sometimes horrible things he did in his rambling efforts to become an author. He writes about the time he wasted, the acquaintances he made, the views and values he accepted at different times, his changes of heart and mind, his friendships, the ways in which he treated his family, his lovers, and his servants, his attempts to enter society, the disjointed and often base motives out of which he acted, and much else besides. Yet it is just these unconnected, chance events that somehow finally enable him to become an author, to see them after all as parts of a unified pattern, the result of which is his determination to begin at last his first book. This book, he tells us, will relate in detail all the silly, insignificant, pointless, accidental, sometimes horrible things he did in his rambling efforts to become an author. It will concern the time he wasted, the acquaintances he made, the views and values he accepted at different times, his changes of heart and mind, his friendships, the ways in which he treated his family, his lovers, and his servants, his attempts to enter society, the disjointed and often base motives out of which he acted, and much else besides. It will also show how these unconnected chance events somehow finally enabled him to become an author, to see them after all as parts of a unified pattern, the result of which is his determination at last to begin his first book, which will relate all the pointless, accidental... – a book he has not yet begun to write but which his readers have just finished reading (Nehamas 1985, 167-168).

Leiter argues that Proust's narrator cannot be the proper model for self-fashioning as envisioned by Nehamas's Nietzsche. He says that when we consider Nietzsche's praise of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Nietzsche's paragon of self-fashioning – as Nehamas himself observes – self-fashioning seems to consist in a particular way of living rather than fashioning oneself through writing. In Goethe's case, this 'practical' self-fashioning preceded and led to him creating great

artworks, not the other way around, as Leiter claims to be the case with Proust's narrator (Leiter 1992, 289; see *TI*, IX, 49-50).¹¹

Leiter is right to point out that there are aspects of Proust's narrator's self-fashioning that are not and need not be present in other cases of self-fashioning – such as the significance of writing – as well as that there are important aspects of other cases of self-fashioning that are not visible in Proust's narrator's self-fashioning – such as the more 'practical' type of behaviour one engages in. Still, it is impossible to come up with a perfect example of the self-fashioning as envisaged by Nehamas's Nietzsche because it varies from person to person, with the formal characteristic being the only common denominator. This characteristic – incorporating all of one's life content (the more multifarious and intense the better) into a single coherent narrative that shows how it all led to one being the person one is today and continuing to live according to this narrative – belongs to Proust's narrator, as Nehamas indicates in the passage cited above. One of the defining marks of the life of Proust's narrator, if not the defining one, is his struggle to become an author. Eventually, after all kinds of considerable failures, misfortunes, and chance events, both artistic and personal, he grasps them all as parts of the larger whole, meaning that all of them had led him to become an author and start writing his first book. Becoming an author is of fundamental importance for Proust's narrator – it is only fitting that his self-fashioning is so closely connected to writing. After all, being an author – committing oneself to writing – is a type of behaviour and a way of living, contrary to what Leiter claims.

There are two further reasons as to why Nehamas puts forward Proust's narrator as an exemplar of what it might mean to fashion oneself. First, there is a deeper analogy between Proust's narrator's self-fashioning and that of Nietzsche, as Nehamas understands it; for both writing and creating a specific literary work are essential for their self-fashioning (see Nehamas 1985, 8, 29, 41, 98, 114, 188, 196, 231, 233). Second, at the very end of Proust's novel his narrator makes the decision to start writing a book about how all the events of his life had led him to become an author. The book in question is *Remembrance of Things Past*, which the reader has just finished. This circular narrative structure of Proust's novel, which invites us to read it over and over again with no real end to this process, is a fitting illustration of the idea of the eternal return (Nehamas 1985, 168).¹²

¹¹ As Pippin shows, Nehamas himself sometimes writes in a way so as to suggest that there is some kind of 'literary' self-fashioning, exemplified in Nietzsche, which does not make a difference to one's real character. Pippin correctly indicates that this is not consistent with Nehamas's general view (Pippin 2015, 153-154).

¹² Pippin is troubled by this (potential) infinity of the process of self-fashioning. He objects to the idea of being an author of one's life in the following way: the process of creating a unified narrative out of one's life is also a part of one's life and will require to be incorporated into that narrative, while this incorporation itself will also need to be incorporated, and so on ad infinitum (see Pippin 2009, 78-79; Pippin 2015, 144, 152-153). Nehamas is aware of this apparent conundrum, although he is not entirely clear on how he deflates it (Nehamas 1985, 198-199). What Nehamas should have said more clearly, I believe, is that this seemingly

4. The Eternal Return

According to Nehamas, the idea of the eternal return does not provide some exotic metaphysics or cosmology, as Nietzsche is sometimes interpreted to be doing. This concept is not so much about the universe as it is about the self (Nehamas 1985, 150). More precisely, it presents us with a psychological test of the utmost aesthetic and existential significance.

Nehamas points out that Nietzsche believes that a person's life has no value in itself. It gains value only insofar as that person assigns it value – that is, they create their life's value rather than discover it (Nehamas 1985, 135; Nehamas 1996a, 232).¹³

How does one assign value to one's life? Nehamas identifies two steps. First, one must accept that one's life will necessarily involve a certain amount of pain and suffering, blunders and misfortunes, but that these are neither intrinsically bad or good (Nehamas 1985, 136, 228-230). The mere fact that these 'negative' aspects exist does not preclude one from creating a meaningful whole out of the totality of one's life, thus exploiting and in a sense justifying even the unpleasant parts of it. Like Nehamas says: "[...] everything in the world, like everything art touches, can become part of a great work" (Nehamas 1996a, 245).

Second, one must create a life that is so well-fashioned and unified that one would be willing to live it again, exactly as it is, with all of its ups and downs. If one would be willing to live one's life again under these conditions, then one would be unwilling to exchange one's life for any other conceivable life – that is, if one could even conceive of living a life different than one's very own. As Nehamas argues, if a person could somehow relive their life it would have to be exactly the same as it was before – being that a person is constituted by the totality of their actions, thoughts, and experiences, if anything were different it would not be their life anymore, but someone else's (Nehamas 1985, 154-157).

This is what the concept of the eternal return implies.¹⁴ Passing this test means that one has created a veritable work of art out of oneself, with each part so inextricably connected to every other part and the whole that even the most

bewildering feature is completely in harmony with the fact that self-fashioning has a processual, open structure without an inherent closure. After all, Nehamas not only ascribes this view to Nietzsche, but also claims that the latter celebrates it (Nehamas 1985, 175-176).

¹³ Nehamas claims that in his earlier writings Nietzsche held that life – understood as a force beyond individual lives – had an intrinsic positive value, while in his later writings he had a more neutral view expressed above (Nehamas 1985, 134-135). Nehamas also draws our attention to the difference in how Nietzsche understood giving one's life a meaning in his early and mature periods. The view presented above is from his mature period. In his early period Nietzsche held that any attempt to give meaning to one's individual life would ultimately end in failure (Nehamas 2006, 63-64).

¹⁴ Concerning Nietzsche's thought of the eternal return, locus classicus is *GS*, 341. Some other prominent places include *Z*, III, 2, III, 13, IV, 19; *BGE*, 56; 11[141], 11[163], 11[338] from Nietzsche's notebook M, III, 1, in *KSA*, volume 9.

minute alteration would ruin everything (Nehamas 1985, 136). Thus, the psychological test provided by the idea of the eternal return is of utmost aesthetic and existential importance, because it is both the criterion of whether one has successfully turned oneself into a work of art and of whether, in doing so, one has successfully provided one's life with value.

But does not it appear quite unrealistic to demand that every tiny detail of a person's life be so integrated with each other that they would not want to change anything, as Pippin wonders (Pippin 2009, 78)? Are there not some actions that just do not seem that important, if so at all, and that could be different? Nehamas is aware of these doubts. He points out that, while all of one's life's details are indeed equally necessary for one's identity, one does not and does not need to give them equal significance (Nehamas 1985, 184). If a person considers some parts of their life insignificant – and all lives must have these parts, otherwise nothing would be significant – then the question of how they fit in with the rest does not arise. What counts is how those parts of one's life that one regards as significant fit together¹⁵ – what is significant varies among different persons and may change for the same person over time (Nehamas 1985, 157-158). This is true for both real and literary characters, as all narration is essentially selective, that is perspectival (see Nehamas 1985, 55-56, 160-161).

The ideal life and works of art share more than just the same structure, which consists in the harmonious relations between the parts themselves as well as between them and the whole they constitute. As Nietzsche writes: "We want to experience a work of art over and over again! We should fashion our life in this way, so that we have the same wish with each of its parts! This is the main idea!" (11[165] from Nietzsche's notebook M, III, 1, in *KSA*, volume 9). This statement explicitly combines the idea of the eternal return and the experience of great art. Just as one is, in the ideal case at least, willing to encounter a single great work of art again and again – or, more realistically, is inclined to return to it after a certain period of time (many people have at least one artwork that they hold special) – one should be willing to return to one's life, that is, relive it in its entirety.

¹⁵ This gives rise to the problem of self-deception. What if a person, purposefully or unbeknownst to them, ignores those parts of their life that they actually deem significant? Nehamas is aware of this problem, and according to him so is Nietzsche. His answer is twofold: first, self-fashioning is an endless process that requires persistent self-examination. Self-deception is a constant possibility, but so is its overcoming. Second, the concept of style is necessarily public. Therefore, when evaluating someone's character the final word will always belong to certain audience, which keeps one's alleged self-fashioning in check (Nehamas 1985, 162-164, 185-186, 251; see Owen 2013, 76-77). Pippin's suggestion that Nietzsche's criterion for evaluating self-fashioning is not grounded in the social context is thus unfounded (Pippin 2015, 148).

5. The Plurality of Styles

Exactly what kind of life should one live in order to pass the test contained in the idea of the eternal return? Do Nietzsche or Nehamas offer any insightful suggestions? Fundamentally, no. The idea of the eternal return is not primarily concerned with the content of one's life, but with its form. Regardless of how one chooses to fill the gap between the moment one is born and the moment one dies, what matters most is the overall shape that one's life takes. To reiterate, (Nehamas's) Nietzsche thinks that actions, like everything else, have no significance in and of themselves. They gain meaning when they are integrated into a whole and imbued with a single style that keeps everything together.

But could there be a single style fit for all the various lives? No, because in that case the very concept of style would lose sense – from what would we differentiate that single style? How would it count as a style at all (Nehamas 1985, 17)? Imagine some eccentric art historian proposing that there exists a single encompassing style throughout all the ages and regions – the apparent myriad of historic styles being merely an illusion. How could we identify such a singular style, if not against the background comprised of other styles? Hence, we can only speak of styles in plural.

As we have already seen, there is a close relationship between the concept of style and the concept of the self. Furthermore, the concept of the self is interwoven with that of the individual, as Nehamas's Nietzsche understands it. By becoming a self, one becomes an individual. How does one become an individual? If there was a singular instructive answer to this question, the term 'individual' would not have the meaning that it has (Nehamas 1985, 8, 225-226). Nehamas draws another comparison with the arts. No formula or set of rules can tell us what to do in order to produce a new genre in art or a great artwork. To achieve this, one needs to break at least some established rules and conventions, and there can be no instructions on how to do this. The same goes if one is to become an individual (Nehamas 1985, 225-226, 228-230; Nehamas 1998, 142-143). To see what a person can become, given all their abilities, desires, experiences, and so on, they must look beyond the horizon enclosed by the convention and conformity of the time and place they find themselves in (see *CW*, Preface).¹⁶

It may be said that the test provided by the idea of the eternal return serves as a kind of sieve, preventing all ways of living that do not possess the adequate form from being considered as worthy of pursuing. It is essentially a negative criterion (see Nehamas 1985, 8, 167). One is left to come up for oneself with the

¹⁶ Daniel Conway emphasizes how hard it is to come to terms with and develop one's abilities, given the social limitations on what counts as permissible behaviour (Conway 1997, 54). On the other hand, John Richardson points out a more positive role for social context in this endeavour of self-fashioning – one builds one's individuality on the basis of what is 'common,' by making it one's own and giving it an idiosyncratic touch (Richardson 2015, 239-242). This proposition is in tune with Nehamas's claim that creation does not happen in a vacuum (Nehamas 1996a, 247; Nehamas 1996b, 51).

exact sort of life one would be willing to live over and over again – one may have some other criteria that would exclude certain other ways of life, as Nietzsche clearly had (A, 1-5; see Nehamas 1985, 167; Schoeman 2008, 435). The thought-experiment contained in the idea of the eternal return bestows us with the form of the ideal life, but we must each contribute our own content to it. As Zarathustra remarks: “‘This – it turns out – is *my* way – where is yours?’ – That is how I answered those who asked me ‘the way.’ *The* way after all – it does not exist!” (Z, III, 11; see Nehamas 1985, 38, 158).

A natural consequence of this standpoint is that there is no sense in imposing one’s way of life upon others (Nehamas 1985, 34, 68, 70-71). We humans are incredibly complex and unique webs of thoughts, memories, desires, actions, affects, etc. – although our attempts to conform to societal norms, be them intentional or merely habitual, make us appear (or maybe even truly become) much more simple and common (see *UM*, III, 1).¹⁷ Those who aspire to selfhood and individuality must draw from these resources, which are unique to each of us, in order to impose a singular stylistic order on this haphazard multitude (Nehamas 1985, 228). It is completely unreasonable to suppose that different people will have exactly the same life content, or to be so similar that it would allow for an identical style. While there may be, and probably always will be, numerous resemblances between different life stories, there will invariably be ample variations between that demand an idiosyncratic ideal way of life (Nehamas 1998, 143).

That being said, one should not be deceived into thinking that there is a single specific ideal way of life available to each of us if we try hard enough. Nehamas’s Nietzsche does not seem to believe that we are all capable, at least not to the same extent, of giving meaning to our lives in the aforementioned sense (Nehamas 1985, 224-225). A large number of human beings are probably bound to remain compounds of various competing drives and affects that they are,

¹⁷ It is important to make an explicit distinction between our ‘uniqueness’ and possible ‘individuality’ in the context of Nietzschean self-fashioning, as understood by Nehamas. The etymology of these words might be of help. The word ‘unique’ traces its origins from Latin word ‘unus,’ meaning ‘one.’ The word ‘individual’ is derived from Latin word ‘individuus,’ meaning ‘indivisible’ (*Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, Eleventh edition 2004). All persons are unique in a sense that each of us represents a multiplex network of thoughts, memories, desires, actions, affects, etc. which did not, does not, and never will have an exact copy – it is ‘one’ of its kind. Being unique in this sense is no achievement whatsoever, nothing which we could be proud of or praised for. Therefore, a popular saying that ‘we are all unique,’ while being true, is nothing to write home about (see Nehamas 2016, 202-205; Nehamas 1996a, 237). On the other hand, becoming an individual is an achievement obtained when this multiplex network – that each of us is – becomes organized as a single coherent unity, with its parts being necessarily connected to each other and to the whole they comprise, while maintaining and advancing the variety and force of its drives. This whole thus becomes an individual, that is ‘indivisible’ because of the interrelatedness of its parts. To sum up – we are all unique, but we are not all, if any, individuals.

unable to successfully mould this tumultuous plenitude into a coherent narrative unity to any significant extent.

In addition, those human beings who can find a style for their lives are not guaranteed to have a single style for the entirety of their lifetime. As time passes, life's content – one's experiences, thoughts, desires, habits, and the rest – can and probably will change significantly. The same is true of the social, historical, political, economic, and environmental background against which life occurs. As a result, in a new state of affairs, a certain way of life may cease to be optimal, if not downright possible. One could then adopt a new way of life (Nehamas 1985, 70-71, 228). Nehamas does not say whether this would count as some kind of evolution of a style, or rather as a disruption. Looking at how art styles change throughout history, there is no reason why it could not be either of these, depending on the circumstances.

Curiously, it seems that Nietzsche suggests in one passage that some people (himself, nonetheless) could have more than one style of shaping oneself at the same time (*EH*, III, 4). Theoretically speaking, this would be consistent with Nietzsche's perspectivism. The same phenomenon, in this case one's life, could be interpreted differently, both by different persons and by the same person. Nietzsche often encourages us to view things from different points of view (see *GM*, III, 12; Nehamas 1985, 50, 84). Why not apply this to one's life? Considered practically, however, it is not entirely clear how one person could fashion oneself in two or more distinct styles at the same time. Perhaps one would have to be Nietzsche, but it is an interesting prospect nonetheless.

Self-fashioning does not occur in a vacuum, but in the real world where all sorts of social, historical, political, biological, economic, and environmental factors affect it. Nehamas sometimes writes in a manner that may lead us to think that self-fashioning dictates that one should create an entirely new way of life, completely breaking off from at least some established social practices and thus somehow insulating oneself from one's social surrounding (see Nehamas 1998, 142). For example, he writes: "Nietzsche's self-fashioning [...] is an essentially individual project. It does not allow you to follow, in any straightforward sense, the example set by someone else; for instead of creating yourself you would then be imitating that other person. Individuality, however, is threatened not only if you imitate someone else but also [...] if others imitate you" (Nehamas 1998, 143). This should be understood in light of what has already been established – a particular individuality, like a certain style, cannot be shared by two or more people. One cannot simply copy someone's way of life without somehow compromising that style and the individuality related to it. In the worst-case scenario, if everyone were to adopt the same style it would cease to be a style at all – instead it would become a conventional way of conduct. Even if it does not come to this, each of us has a unique life's content and it would be inappropriate to try to impose one's person style of life to someone else (Nehamas 1998, 142-143).

However, this does not mean that one's attempt at self-fashioning cannot influence, or be influenced by someone else's style. In fact, it is inevitable to be influenced by some already existing model. To return to the arts: the phenomenon of older styles influencing newer ones is the *sine qua non* of artistic production, responsible for countless genres and works of art, whether great or forgettable. Stylistic influence can manifest itself in a sort of imitation – but with a catch. Certain aspect(s) of an existing style might be artfully adapted to a different material under changed conditions and combined with other stylistic approaches, resulting in a new and distinct style. Why would not the same hold for self-fashioning? Nehamas is at times quite explicit: literary narratives do not emerge *ex nihilo*, absolutely original, but are necessarily influenced by previous similar endeavours (Nehamas 1996a, 247; Nehamas 1996b, 51). Furthermore, Nehamas argues that the best we can do is to allow ourselves to be influenced by the greatest narratives we can find (Nehamas 1996b, 51). To become an individual means to effectively employ the given resources – the facts of one's personal life, the socio-historical context in which one finds oneself, the models one looks up to, and so on – in order to create a different narrative that is both grounded in factors that precede us and over which one has no direct control, and that represents something irreducibly one's own.

Nehamas draws a parallel with the arts: both an individual and an artwork must not be too far removed from the norms that regulate the context in which they emerge in order to be acknowledged as someone, or something, with whom other persons could fruitfully engage with. However, they must also be sufficiently remote from these norms so as to demand further engagement and interpretation. A true individual reveals hitherto untapped prospects for living, which others could pursue and further stylize according to their own peculiarities (Nehamas 1996b, 51). If a person strays too far from the established norms they risk not being recognized as a genuine individual at all, the one worthy of admiration and emulation. Yet how far is too far? This cannot be told in advance and the reception may change over time, as many stylistic innovators might testify.

6. Coming to Terms with Necessity and the Past

This focus on the artistic activity and experimentation does not mean that 'anything goes' when one fashions oneself. Far from it. Becoming who one is, as Nietzsche famously calls his vision of self-fashioning and which Nehamas accepts (see *GS*, 270, 335; Nehamas 1985, 65, 171, 174), is not an escape from oneself as one is currently. On the contrary: it is "no longer to be ashamed before oneself" (*GS*, 275; see Conway 1997, 68). In order to achieve this "we must become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in the world" (*GS*, 335). This is analogous to the experience of the artists. As Nietzsche claims: "Every artist knows how far removed this feeling of letting go is from his 'most natural' state, the free ordering, placing, disposing and shaping in the moment of 'inspiration' – he knows how strictly and subtly he obeys thousands of laws at this

very moment [...]” (*BGE*, 188, quoted in Nehamas 1985, 47; see *PTG*, 7; Nehamas 1985, 48, 61). The project of self-fashioning is thus sensitive to the fact that even in one's most creative moments one does not simply will something into existence, but is subject to forces largely unknown and beyond one's control (see Conway 1997, 68).

Self-fashioning is not an 'anything goes' affair in the voluntarist sense, nor is it in the way in which one invests oneself in this project. If we are to organize our drives in a way that allows us to become "human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves" (*GS*, 335), there must be "obedience in one direction for a long time" (*BGE*, 188). In other words, this project requires time, dedication, and sacrifice. It is no wonder then, as Nehamas points out, that it is in artists that Nietzsche finds the "attained 'freedom of the will'" (*TI*, V, 3, quoted in Nehamas 1985, 187; see Nehamas 1985, 195, 219). Nietzsche states that "[...] freedom is being understood here as freedom and facility in self-direction. Every artist will understand me [...]" (*WP*, 705, quoted in Nehamas 1985, 195).¹⁸ As Nehamas claims, for Nietzsche freedom is not opposed to necessity, but consists in having all of one's dispositions jointly working towards a single course of action, with the contrast between the ability to choose otherwise and the sense of being compelled completely dissolving. Thus freedom, like selfhood, is not a given but something to be achieved, and is firmly connected to the achievement of selfhood (Nehamas 1985, 187, 253; see Pippin 2009, 76-77). Nietzsche attempts to reconcile necessity and freedom by showing that the latter presupposes the former on the basis of experience that the artists have while engaging in the creative act.

In his ruminations on the intimate relationship between freedom and necessity Nietzsche goes so far as to celebrate what he calls "a cheerful and trusting fatalism in the *belief* that only the individual is reprehensible [the individual details of one's life, not the individual human beings], that everything is redeemed and affirmed in the whole [...]" (*TI*, IX, 49; see Nehamas 1985, 174), which he attributes to Goethe, his prime example of what a human being dedicated to self-fashioning is capable of. According to Nietzsche, Goethe was the ultimate "Yes-sayer" (*GS*, 276) who "disciplined himself to wholeness" (*TI*, IX, 49) into which he tried to incorporate as much as possible, no matter how diverging his passions were – "he *created* himself" (*TI*, IX, 49, quoted in Nehamas 1985, 174). Goethe held that while the particular details of one's life might be shameful, if successfully assimilated into the whole of one's life, everything becomes vindicated.

¹⁸ Nehamas further explores this analogy between self-fashioning human beings and the artists. He suggests that in pursuing the project of self-fashioning one's choice of a particular action is similar to the artist's decision regarding their choice of a particular style – artistic decisions provide the model for all decisions. He stresses that this does not mean that one is free to do whatever one pleases, but rather that one's decisions, like the artistic ones, are constrained in numerous ways by society, history, etc. (Nehamas 1996a, 233).

As Zarathustra says: “[...] to recreate all ‘it was’ into ‘thus I willed it!’ – only that would I call redemption!” (Z, II, 20; see Nehamas 1985, 159, 160, 178). He adds: “All ‘it was’ is a fragment, a riddle, a grisly accident – until the creating will says to it: ‘But I will it thus! I shall will it thus!’” (Z, II, 20). Through Zarathustra Nietzsche laments over the fact that human beings are mere fragments and not integrated beings, left to the mercy of chance and numerous forces acting upon them. The aim is to interiorize, to make one’s own everything that has happened to oneself during one’s lifetime – most of which one had none or little control over. This one achieves by seeing everything from the single narrative perspective, in which all of one’s past goings-on make sense, leading to who one has become. Thus, there is no longer denial of some part of one’s life, only affirmation of the life in its entirety and the world of which it is a part.¹⁹

As May notes, this sort of fatalism and ‘willing the past’ might at first seem in conflict with Nietzsche’s emphasis on self-creation and the re-evaluation of all values (May 2009, 103). But this is not the case. Becoming who one is has both creative and factual aspects. Affirming the past requires understanding the past, that is, interpreting it. This interpreting is always perspectival and has a creative side to it (see Nehamas 1985, 56), as one needs to relate different parts of one’s life to each other, to integrate them into the larger whole, and to proceed living according to the story that one is telling oneself. Meanwhile, this fatalistic yet affirmative and creative attitude is perhaps best summed up in the following longing that Nietzsche expresses: “I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them – thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. *Amor fati*: let that be my love from now on!” (GS, 276; see EH, II, 10; Nehamas 1985, 146, 191).

7. Being Open to the Future

Giving an aesthetically satisfying form to one’s life does not involve only accepting and assimilating into a coherent narrative all parts of one’s past. It also presupposes a certain openness to the future, meaning the ability to integrate into one’s life whatever chance may bring.²⁰ It is to be able to turn misfortunes into opportunities, to select what is significant and forget what is not, not to be

¹⁹ Vasti Roodt brings attention in a particularly clear way to the interplay between the interrelatedness of everything and its affirmation (Roodt 2008, 416-418). It should also be noted, as Lawrence J. Hatab does, that affirming everything does not mean approving everything, or being satisfied with everything. To affirm everything is to be willing to relive all the parts of one’s life, including the worst episodes, the things one opposes, but only so that one could oppose and overcome them again. After all, the will to power, which is according to Nietzsche the fundamental drive of all life, always presupposes something that is to be overcome (Hatab 2019, 346-347).

²⁰ Nietzsche notes that the sudden, unpredictable occurrences in one’s life that force one to break one’s current habits might be just what one needs if one’s way of living has become a monotonous routine (D, 130).

dumbstruck by unanticipated events but use the occasion to reinvigorate one's life, and so on (see *EH*, I, 2; Nehamas 1985, 230-231). After all, life is an on-going process, full of sudden twists and turns, and one's self-fashioning must accommodate this fact if it is to be worthwhile and manageable (Nehamas 1985, 185). It is not a finished product while a person is still alive, and even after when they are no longer alive, as their life can be subject to diverse interpretations – although those interpretations are in no way up to that person anymore.

Hence to give style to oneself does not mean that one's personality ossifies and becomes immune to changes, challenges, and opportunities that life brings. Nehamas emphasizes that the point is not for one's actions to become formulaic, but for one's character to become supple enough to be able to use whatever one has done, is doing, or will do "as elements within a constantly changing, never finally completed whole" (Nehamas 1985, 190). These changes could lead one to adapt one's style to the point that it actually evolves into a distinct style altogether. The unexpected events may even be so momentous that they force a person to outright abandon the story they have been telling themselves about themselves so far, and to come up with a new one (Nehamas 1985, 185). This is not necessarily a defeat of one's project of self-fashioning. Knowing when to abandon a style that no longer serves its purpose and being able to adopt a different one is a sign of having learned the lesson of perspectivism, which Nehamas regards to be firmly connected to Nietzsche's aestheticism (Nehamas 1985, 3-4). To have these capacities is, in Schoeman's words, to "understand the art of living" (Schoeman 2008, 438).

Finally, one's abandonment of a previous way of living, for whatever reason, could itself be incorporated as a constitutive part into the succeeding narrative that one tells oneself by showing how it led to or was necessary for the current style of life that one has adopted. Nehamas claims that the process of unifying all of one's characteristics, habits, actions, etc. in a single narrative can "integrate even a discarded characteristic into the personality by showing that it was necessary for one's subsequent development" (Nehamas 1985, 185). There is no reason why the same could not apply to a discarded way of living.

8. Becoming Who You Are

The phrase that Nietzsche often uses to express his ideal of self-fashioning, and which Nehamas commends, is 'become who you are' (see *GS*, 270, 335; *Z*, IV, 1; Nehamas 1985, 169, 171-172, 174-175, 190). What do these enigmatic words mean? Immediately there seems to be some tension at work here. First, this phrase instructs us to become something, which normally means that we should become something that we are not at the moment – for example, one might say to a rude person to become more polite. But here comes the catch: these curious words urge us to become that which we (already) are. How does one accomplish such a feat? Moreover, if at the end of this process one is essentially returning to

where one has started, why engage in such an affair in the first place (see Nehamas 1985, 174-175)?

There is a further tension at play. Nietzsche, both the original and Nehamas's, all too frequently describes his project of living the ideal life as one of 'self-creation,' accentuating its artistic nature (see Nehamas 1985, 174, 188). This implies some sort of creative action on one's part – making something new that has not simply been there all along – we ourselves being the object of such an action, moulding ourselves into living works of art. However, if the words 'become who you are' suggest that the aim of this process is to achieve the state of being in which one already is, then it seems more appropriate to say that this is a case of self-discovery, self-knowledge, rather than self-creation. Instead of saying that one acts upon oneself – creates, forms, moulds, etc. oneself – maybe we should rather say that one comes to know, discover, find out one's true nature. This is perhaps one way to understand the words 'become who you are,' although Nehamas believes the process of self-fashioning to be more complex (see Nehamas 1985, 168-169, 174, 188, 190-191).

Let us start with the tension between knowledge and action. In order to mould oneself into a work of art one needs to know the material one is working on – one's very life and its manifold aspects. One needs to come to terms with what one has done (or did not do), what one has suffered (which could be painful and difficult to remember), with the desires and fantasies that one may not be proud of, with one's deepest thoughts and motivations for one's major life decisions, and so on. This is essentially achieving a kind of self-knowledge. A person needs this so as to try to fit all of these facts of their life into a single meaningful narrative (Nehamas 1985, 190). After all, an artist should know the material they are working on.

However, simply passively knowing all this about oneself and how it might fit into an overarching narrative is not enough; it is necessary to actively employ that knowledge in life. This includes novel actions on one's part that aim to harmonize with the self-narrative that one has built with the help of one's self-knowledge (Nehamas 1985, 168-169). For their part, these new actions provide material for further self-knowledge that leads to even newer actions, and so forth. In effect, we might say that knowledge-that generates knowledge-how, and vice versa in this process of self-fashioning. Thus (self-)knowledge and (one's) actions do not oppose each another, but feed into each other, keeping the process of becoming who one is alive and constantly rejuvenated.

The tension between knowledge and action is closely related to the one between discovery and creation. In becoming who one is, is one discovering – by coming to know – one's true nature that is already there, or is one creating it by acting upon the world and oneself (see Nehamas 1985, 174, 188)? Nehamas gives his favourite example, Proust's narrator, who allegedly 'creates' himself, as envisioned by Nietzsche's ideal of becoming who one is (Nehamas 1985, 188). Nehamas cites Proust's narrator according to whom "in fashioning a work of art

we are by no means free, we do not choose how we shall make it; it preexists and thus we are obliged, since it is necessary and hidden, to do what we should have to do if it were a law of nature, that is to say to discover it" (Proust 1981, 915, quoted in Nehamas 1985, 188). These words nicely capture the experience that many artists claim to have while in the process of creating art – rather than having an 'everything is possible' feeling regarding their artistic choices, they are somehow inexorably 'led' in a certain direction, as if the artwork is already there and they simply need to retrace its contours.

It must be noted that in Proust's previously mentioned sentence there is a strong emphasis on the discovery of one's self, and not on its creation. Why does Nehamas then keep putting forward Proust's narrator as a paragon of Nietzschean 'self-creation,' rather than simply of 'self-discovery'? Nehamas observes that what Proust calls "the discovery of our true life" can be made only in the very process of creating the work of art which describes and constitutes it" (Nehamas 1985, 188; see Nehamas 1985, 59). Or, as Nehamas claims elsewhere: "Our creations eventually become our truths, and our truths circumscribe our creations" (Nehamas 1985, 174).

What does Nehamas mean by these statements? Self-fashioning consists of fitting all of one's actions, thoughts, feelings, etc. into a single coherent narrative. This presupposes that a person has become willing to, post facto, accept responsibility for their entire past and to recognize that all of it makes them who they are (Nehamas 1985, 190-191). We can say, as does Nehamas, that self-fashioning represents "the creation, or imposition, of a higher-order accord among our lower-level thoughts, desires, and actions" (Nehamas 1985, 188). This willingness and recognition can, from different perspectives, be regarded both as a new state of character that has not been there previously, and as no specific state of character at all. Recognizing all of one's previous actions as one's own may result in a change of behaviour, but not necessarily. It depends on one's past and the style that one has adopted (Nehamas 1985, 188-189). To point out once again, becoming who one is has a processual structure: "[...] all those who are 'becoming' must be incensed to find in this area complacency [...]" (*WP*, 108, quoted in Nehamas 1985, 189). As Nehamas suggests, it would be more useful to think of becoming who one is as "a matter of degree," perhaps even as "a regulative principle," something to which one should strive but can never fully realize (Nehamas 1985, 182, 189).

Nehamas notices a further problem with the idea of somehow bringing to an end the process of fitting all of one's actions, thoughts, desires, etc. into a coherent whole. There is no sense in which we could enumerate one's mental states and actions in a single, privileged manner. The way they are enumerated depends on how we connect them to one another and to the whole of which they are parts. After all, the claim that one's actions and thoughts have value and meaning only as parts of a single whole that is never finalized is consistent with Nietzsche's overall worldview. One's life is always open to new reinterpretations

which may presuppose a different way of counting one's actions and thoughts (Nehamas 1985, 189). It is these reinterpretations and their 'creative' quality that preclude us from understanding the project of becoming who one is as a mere self-discovery of what is already there independent of one's perspective (see *WP*, 767; Nehamas 1985, 38, 61, 168). We may conclude that self-fashioning, as envisioned by Nehamas's Nietzsche, has elements both of self-creation and self-discovery.²¹

Let us return to the perhaps most obvious tension in the words 'become who you are,' the one between being and becoming. Nehamas tells us how to properly understand 'being' and 'becoming,' as these terms are used by Nietzsche, in order to remove the aura of paradox that surrounds the previous phrase.²² To reiterate, becoming who one is consists in the continuous activity of accepting one's deeds, thoughts, desires, etc., and fitting them together into a coherent narrative, thus taking responsibility for one's life, which is what Nietzsche labels 'freedom' (*TI*, IX, 38; Nehamas 1985, 190-191). To achieve this freedom is an expression of the supreme will to power, which Nietzsche defines as follows: "To *impress* upon becoming the character of being – this is the highest expression of the *will to power*" (*WP*, 617, quoted in Nehamas 1985, 191).

It is crucial not to mistake this 'being,' in the Nietzschean sense, for something constant and solid (Nehamas 1985, 191). So, what exactly is this 'being'? The key for understanding it is the idea of the eternal return. Nietzsche states the following: "That *everything recurs* is the *nearest approach a world of becoming makes to a world of being* [...]" (*WP*, 617, quoted in Nehamas 1985, 191). Keeping in mind that to pass the test contained in the idea of the eternal return is to have arranged one's life contents into such a well-crafted unit that one would be willing to relive one's life in its entirety – because if anything would be different it would not be that life anymore – Nehamas proclaims: "Being, for Nietzsche, is that which one does not *want* to be otherwise" (Nehamas 1985, 191).

Therefore, to become who one is means not to exit one ontological state and enter another – it can be said that for Nietzsche all 'being' is nothing more than becoming, everything being connected with everything else and constantly changing (see *EH*, III, on *BT*, 3; *GM*, I, 13; Nehamas 1985, 146, 154-155) – but to accept that everything that one has done, is doing, and will do, has experienced, desired, and so forth constitutes who one is. Moreover, as a consequence of this

²¹ Conway and Pippin come to the same conclusion when discussing this kind of project (Conway 1997, 69; Pippin 2009, 77).

²² Nehamas rejects a possible 'Freudian' interpretation of this phrase, according to which the self is identified with the unconscious content and one must 'become who one is' by making it conscious, because it goes against Nietzsche's non-substantive view of the self as an organizational achievement (Nehamas 1985, 173, 251). Nehamas also dismisses a possible attempt to interpret this phrase in an 'Aristotelian' way, as a call to actualize all of one's potential capacities. According to Nehamas, such interpretation presupposes that one's 'becoming who one is' has an end, since it is in principle possible to actualize all of one's capacities, and that it is essentially a process of self-discovering with no salient creative aspects, since one's capacities are already there from the beginning (Nehamas 1985, 175).

acceptance, one ought to strive to fit all of one's diverse and conflicting life's contents into such a cohesive narrative, so as to be willing to live one's life over and over again. This means to fashion oneself, or, as Nehamas quips: "[...] to be, we might say, becoming" (Nehamas 1985, 191).

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Turing Algorithms in Art

Arnold Cusmariu

Abstract: Exemplifying with sculptures the author created, the article shows that ontological algorithms can yield aesthetic content, while epistemological algorithms can capture it. Bridging the gap between art and logic creates new and exciting aesthetic opportunities, allaying Henry Moore's fears of 'paralysis by analysis.' On the flip side, appreciating all that algorithmic art has to offer poses intellectual challenges that run counter to subjectivist approaches to art and its education.

Keywords: sculpture, aesthetic content, aesthetic properties, Turing algorithms, sense-data, awareness categories, interpretation, mereology.

Background

Familiar definitions of 'abstract' and 'figurative' would classify my sculpture *Counterpoint A22* abstract and Wittgenstein's *Head of a Girl* figurative [Cusmariu 2022].



Cusmariu: Counterpoint A22, 2019
Alabaster on mahogany and marble
16.5 inches high



Wittgenstein: Head of a Girl, 1925-28
Fired clay
15.5 inches high

Head of a Girl is the only sculpture Wittgenstein is known to have produced. Quite possibly, however, he may have made others but were lost or destroyed. There is no evidence either way. Accordingly, we can only speculate whether sculptures he might have made after *Head of a Girl* would also have been figurative. After all, it is possible to start out working in one style and then stick with it, which

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is true of every major artist in the history of sculpture before the twentieth century and even after in quite a few cases. Stylistic changes amounting to a paradigm shift, such as a move from figurative to abstract, are very difficult to bring off, especially if the artist already has a financially successful market niche, a personally rewarding style, and sees no need to 'move on.' On the other hand, considering that Wittgenstein was a great innovator in philosophy, perhaps *Head of a Girl* would have been only a stepping stone to quasi-figurative sculpture, followed by a progression of sculptures all the way to full abstraction. Alas, we will never know.

These are not idle speculations. I am hypothesizing by way of preamble to the key consideration of this article, namely, an analysis of my own progression of styles over the years from figurative to quasi-figurative to abstract and beyond.

I am having to function as my own art critic for a number of reasons. Though my work has been on display in public exhibits, including juried exhibits, this was a while ago. None received media coverage. An article about my sculptures appeared in the Northern Virginia *Reston Connection* in 2000 but only early work was discussed and gave no hint of what was to come. Finally, the analysis below makes clear that my most innovative sculptures were made possible thanks to expertise in technical concepts of logic and philosophy. Art critics do not have this kind of training and are probably hostile to the very idea of such applications.

Question

Is there an analytic approach that can explain key properties of sculptures across the entire spectrum of my output from 1985 to 2023, including its evolutionary path? For instance, can an explanation account for *Study in Motion* (1985) and *Counterpoint A20* (2019), as well as the evolutionary path from one to the other and beyond that occurred over decades of artistic development?



Answer

Turing-type algorithms can solve this problem.

Turing Machines

The term “Turing machine” was coined not by Turing himself but rather by Alonzo Church (Church 1937: 42) in his review of Turing 1936. (Turing got his PhD at Princeton under Church in 1938.)

The author [Turing] proposes as a criterion that an infinite sequence of digits 0 and 1 be ‘computable’ that it shall be possible to devise a computing machine, occupying a finite space and with working parts of finite size, which with write down the sequence to any number of terms if allowed to run for a sufficiently long time. As a matter of convenience certain further restrictions are imposed in the character of the machine, but these are of such a nature as to cause no obvious loss of generality – in particular, a human calculator, provided with pencil and paper and specific instructions, can be regarded as a kind of Turing machine.

For example, ‘specific instructions’ exist for building a truth table, filling in its columns with truth-values, and then determining ‘with pencil and paper’ the truth-value of logically complex sentences based on standard truth-table definitions of logical connectives. Thus, truth tables are an effective method for determining whether a well-formed formula (wff) of the propositional calculus (PC), x , is or is not a tautology in PC. Truth tables can compute in a finite sequence of steps the values of a function F of PC whose domain is the set of formulas of PC and whose value for any given wff x , written $F(x)$, is 1 or 0 according to whether x is, or is not, a tautology. Thus, truth tables (discovered independently by Peirce and Wittgenstein) are an algorithm. Completing a truth table for a wff of PC consisting of ten variables (for example) ‘with pencil and paper’ is impractical and is best be left to computers.

Two Algorithms

Computability algorithms in the form of instructions for sequences of 1 and 0 digits, important though they are in mathematics, would not be of interest in art or its interpretation. To be relevant to the context at hand, we need to distinguish between ontological and epistemological algorithms. I will state them first and then explain the concept involved.

Ontological Algorithm (OA): A finite sequence of tasks T applying concepts of phenomenalism or mereology such that if person P were to complete T , P would bring it about that an object exemplifies properties that determine aesthetic content.¹

¹ We should leave open the possibility that non-aesthetic properties can determine aesthetic content.

OA Comment: T is a lengthy sequence of tasks, identified below for sculpture, completed by the artist.

Epistemological Algorithm (EA): A finite sequence of tasks T such that if person P were to complete T, P would bring it about that P is aware, in a sense to be specified, of properties that determine aesthetic content exemplified as a result of applying concepts of phenomenalism or mereology.

EA Comments: The artist as well as the viewer can complete EA tasks. Standard and non-standard concepts of vision may be involved, explained below.


Musical Concepts

Three concepts are relevant: Consonance, dissonance and counterpoint.

Consonance

Standard reference works define consonance in music as combinations of tones that 'create the impression of stability and repose.' Sculptures can be described as consonant in two ways, depending on the kind of inferences that are valid:


- For any viewing angle V of physical object O, properties of O that are not apparent from V can be inferred from properties of O that are apparent from V. It can be inferred from the fact that only two legs are apparent at V that a chair has two more legs attached the same way. This inference is obviously valid for figurative, quasi-figurative and even abstract sculptures, which are consonant in this sense.
- For any viewing angle V of physical object O, it can be inferred from properties of O apparent from V and from any other viewing angle that they are all properties of the same object. Thus, we can infer that we are looking at the same car as we walk around it checking its features. This inference is also valid for figurative, quasi-figurative and even abstract sculptures, which are consonant in this second sense.²



Rodin



Archipenko



Smith

² Images of famous artworks in this article are used for illustrative purposes only.

Consonant sculptures are, in a sense, 'worldly' physical objects with aesthetic content.

Dissonance

Dissonant sculptures are, in a sense, 'otherworldly' physical objects with aesthetic content.

Dissonant music has been said to use combinations of tones to 'create the impression of tension or clash.' Sculptures can be described as dissonant in two ways as well, depending on which of the above inferences breaks down:

- Properties apparent from one viewing angles cannot be inferred from properties apparent from other viewing angles.
- It cannot be inferred that properties apparent from different viewing angles are properties of the same object.

Here is one of many sculptures of mine, *Nici* (2002), which is dissonant in both senses. Other examples are noted and analyzed below.



Counterpoint

'Counterpoint' is defined as 'the technique of combining two or more melodic lines in such a way that they establish a harmonic relationship while retaining their linear individuality.' It is not paradoxical for an artform that does not have melodic lines to 'combine individual melodic lines to produce a harmonic relationship' because music and sculpture both use algorithms to combine components. (I have used the term 'counterpoint' to entitle many sculptures.)

- In music, the building blocks are melodic lines and counterpoint is the algorithm by which they are combined to produce harmonic relationships. 'Harmonic' does not entail 'consonant' because counterpoint can also be used to produce dissonance. Mozart supplied an example in his C major String Quartet, K. 465.
- In sculpture, the building blocks are physical components degrees of arc apart or elements of mereological sums or both. Sequences of steps result in the exemplification and awareness of properties that determine aesthetic content.

Vision Relativity

The appearance physical objects present depends on several factors, lighting conditions being the most obvious. Assuming such conditions are standard, the next critical factor is position of the observer with respect to the object, i.e., the angle of vision. To put the point in terms of a philosophical theory called Phenomenalism, sense data associated with a physical object will vary depending on viewing angle. Usually, no matter how many degrees of arc apart, variations in viewing angle do not impact one's ability to recognize, classify, identify or describe the properties of sense data. Vision relativity offers one way of distinguishing two dimensional from three dimensional objects. Sculptures regarding which angle of vision makes no difference are closer to paintings.

Properties


Reference in OA and EA to properties is not mere convenience. I am indeed a Platonist. I hold that there are properties (and relations) whose existence is independent of whether they are exemplified or even exemplifiable. See Cusmariu 1985, 1980, 1979, 1978A, 1978B and 1978C.

It will be helpful to note some properties that will recur in algorithmic analyses below. (Platonists accept properties of any logical complexity):

- *being the F of x and the F of y*: In my sculpture *Counterpoint A1*, shown below, a braid of hair is, and is seen as, a component of two adjoining figures, one larger than the other.
- *being the F of x and the G of y*: A component of a mereologically complex sculpture could be, and seen as, an arm of one component of the sculpture and a leg of a different component.
- Consonance and dissonance properties, which are logically complex, are also included.

Aesthetic Content

A general account of what it means for properties to determine aesthetic content is a book-length subject. The best that I can do here is to explain by example. Here is my *Alar* (2000), analysed later.



Phenomenalism

We should distinguish between ontological and analytical phenomenalism. Ontological phenomenalism (OP) is the view that physical objects are collections of actual and possible sense data. Analytical phenomenalism (AP) is the view that statements about physical objects can be analyzed into statements about sense data. I find OP useful and shall be taking it for granted, setting aside well-known problems with OP. OP does not logically imply AP.

I shall be speaking extensively of views of a sculpture and properties apparent. This will be shorthand for properties of sense-data. If it's not already apparent, the above images of my *Counterpoint A20* and *Counterpoint A22* are only some views of these sculptures. Thus, rotation a few degrees of arc in either direction will reveal other sense data in the collection to which they all belong, with different mereological properties, requiring different interpretations.

Mereology

This is a branch of metaphysics that studies part-whole relationships.³ Of interest here is the concept of mereological sum (MS), understood as a configuration of components that can be apparent horizontally or vertically. The full extent of horizontal MS configurations is evident only if a sculpture is rotated. The idea of a vertical MS occurred to me after starting a new *Counterpoint B* series in 2019. Here is the first sculpture in this series, analyzed below. It looks deceptively simple.

³ See Simons 1987.



Mereological sums fall under Phenomenalism but ‘drill down’ to offer new and potentially interesting aesthetic variations. MSs can be figurative, quasi-figurative, or non-figurative.

Figurative MS

Components are figurative and their configuration likewise corresponds to reality. Michelangelo’s *David* and Rodin’s *Thinker* are figurative MSs, as are virtually all sculptures before the 20th century and even after. For such artworks, mereology is consonant from view to view.

Quasi-figurative MS

Configurations correspond to reality but components do not, at most resembling components that correspond to reality. Giacometti’s *Walking Man* series are quasi-figurative MSs in this sense, as are Moore’s scattered object sculptures. Components correspond to reality but their configurations do not. David Smith’s *Cubi* series, whose components are geometric volumes, are quasi-figurative MSs in a second sense. Mereology is still consonant, as the reader can easily verify.

Non-figurative MS

Neither components nor their configuration correspond to reality. Non-figurative MS artworks, e.g., Cubist compositions by Lipchitz and Picasso, in a sense disconnect art from reality. What such artworks are about, what they mean and what they accomplish are challenging questions. I will characterize my own sculptures in due course.

Awareness

Perception is a key concept in epistemology. Philosophers are interested in (a) defining various concepts of perception and (b) studying the relation between perception and knowledge. Here, only issue (a) can be addressed and in a limited way at that; specifically, only as a path to awareness that an art object exemplifies properties that determines aesthetic content.

- **Standard vision:** This concept is expressed in propositional form using the locution “person P sees that object x has property F.” Standard vision is veridical. If person P sees that object x has property F, it follows that x has property F.
- **Seeing-as vision:** This concept can be expressed using several locutions:
 - (i) “person P sees x as an F”;
 - (ii) “person P sees x as the F of y”;
 - (iii) “person P sees x as the F of y and as the F of z.”
 - (iv) “person P sees x as the F of y and as the G of z.”

There are veridical as well as non-veridical uses of (i)-(iv). Non-veridical uses are well known. Just because we see a cloud in the sky as a bear does not mean there is a bear up there; just because we see a part of the cloud as the arm of a bear does not mean there is an arm of a bear up there; just because we see a part of the cloud as the arm of a bear and as the leg of a sheep does not mean there is an arm of a bear and a leg of a sheep up there.

Nevertheless, I show below with examples of my own work that component x of a sculpture can be seen as the F of component y and as the F (or G) of component z in a veridical sense. Components that do ‘double duty’ as the F of y and as the F of z exemplify an aesthetically valuable ambiguity and are an important feature of my work. While ‘in real life’ body parts cannot do ‘double duty’ as an arm here and a leg there, it does not follow that ‘in an aesthetic context’ seeing-as forms (i)-(iv) must be non-veridical.

- **Directional vision:** This concept can be expressed using locutions such as:
 - (i) “object x can be seen as having property F from left-to-right”;
 - (ii) “object x can be seen-as having property G from right-to-left”;
 - (iii) both (i) and (ii).

Properties F and G may well be dissonant and in fact they are dissonant in my sculpture *Prometheus* shown below, which is an important, and innovative, aspect of this sculpture. As far as I know, no one else has thought of applying directional vision in sculpture. Directional vision appears to be veridical if construed as above and avoids the thorny problem of attributing logically incompatible properties.

An Elementary Application

An ordinary physical object such as a chair is a mereological sum. The configuration of components is determined by the instructions in the box, if the chair is purchased unassembled, which consist of a list of tasks to be carried out in a certain order. The instructions are an ontological algorithm. Completed as described, the result will be an object that can function as chairs usually do. Thus, legs are to be attached under the seat; one leg would go behind another; armrests are to be attached opposite one another and above the seat; the back rest goes behind the seat; screws are to be tightened only provisionally until all the parts have been assembled and aligned correctly; overtightening screws risks stripping threads, which in time will cause the chair to come apart; and so on.

In addition to physical attributes of ordinary objects such as size, heft, color, and configuration of parts, aesthetic attributes can and sometime do merit attention, pertaining to individual parts as well as their configurations. Steps involved in becoming aware of aesthetic attributes of ordinary objects such as chairs would obviously not be included in the instructions manual for assembling them, so that EAs are seldom relevant and then in attenuated form. Art is a very different matter.

A Crushing Objection?

It will be instructive to face the music right away, so to speak, rather than at the end of the article under 'Objections and Replies.'


Artists, art critics, art aficionados and some philosophers may well object that a conceptual gap exists, always has existed, and always will exist, between art and logic so that attempts to bridge such self-evidently distinct categories – let alone trying cross the bridge – must amount to a category mistake. Moreover, algorithmic art is bound to be ... boring. The rest of this article, they would insist, is a road to nowhere. Algorithms have no place in art, ontological or epistemological.

Several responses may be made:

- It is premature as well as bad method to argue against an empirical proposal without first examining evidence that may well turn out to support the proposal. Far better to wait and see what develops and then come to a conclusion.
- OAs and EAs already exist in music. For example, counterpoint is indeed a sequence of 'specific instructions' – taught in music theory classes – such that carrying them out correctly to completion would bring it about that overlapping parts in a piece of music would not sound like mere noise when performed. Moreover, a listener who applied knowledge of sonata form correctly to music in sonata form would thereby become aware that the music was in sonata form, thus following the appropriate EA.
- OAs are in fact routine in sculpture. Sculptors trained in traditional methods first produce models or drawings (or both) and use them as guidance to make

the sculpture. This means that two OAs are at work, involving different finite sequences of tasks. Arguably, model building is more of a creative effort than moving from models and drawings to produce the sculpture, though the production process can involve changes in design, major as well as minor.

- If the material is stone, creating the sculpture involves OA tasks such as (a) checking for cracks in the block; (b) removing stone using a variety of tools, including power tools, until the sculpture matches or resembles models or drawings; (c) polishing the stone; (d) building an appropriate base; and (e) securely mounting the sculpture on the base. Sculptors are known to have employed assistants to work on these tasks to varying degrees. For example, if the block is a large one, the sculptor may leave it to assistants to carve a rough outline – called ‘blocking’ – polish the completed sculpture, and mount it on a base.
- Direct carving, which I do, means ‘finding it in the stone.’ There are no models or drawings, so that task (b) is shorthand for a long list of tasks, too many to even list let alone arrange as a sequence. I very seldom use power tools and have never employed assistants to work on any (a)-(e) task. Indeed, expecting an assistant to work on task (b) would defeat the purpose of ‘finding it in the stone!’
- An EA already exists in sculpture. For example, many figurative sculptures (Rodin’s *Thinker*) and even some abstract sculptures (Archipenko’s *Seated Woman*) are best appreciated from a preferred viewing angle, namely, front and slightly off to the right (see photos).




- Viewership instructions next to sculptures would help museum visitors understand the relativity of vision and appreciate its impact on interpretation.
- OAs already exist in figurative and even some abstract art that have the human figure as subject. Arms, legs, head, torso and so on are as they should be and so is their configuration. They are figurative mereological sums in the sense described above. Though stylized to varying degrees, arms, torso, head and legs are just where they should be in the Archipenko sculpture shown above, where configuration is that of the female figure. Henry Moore’s scattered object sculptures are quasi-figurative mereological sums. Jacques Lipshitz’s cubist

Arnold Cusmariu

sculptures, though considered abstract, are in fact figurative mereological sums.

Base Algorithms in Sculpture

Names of artworks function just like ordinary proper names, i.e., as disguised descriptions. Thus, *Pieta* is 'the sculpture Michelangelo completed in 1499 showing Mary holding Christ' (see photo.)



The referent of 'the sculpture' is obvious: 'the one and only one Michelangelo sculpture whose interpretation is that it shows Mary holding Christ.' It follows that the base underneath the sculpture thus defined is not included in the reference of 'the sculpture.' Indeed, this is true of the vast majority of sculptures made prior to the twentieth century and even after. Let us look into the matter further.

A sculpture can be displayed by placing it on the ground, with or without a base; or on a platform or pedestal, with or without an intermediate base. If the base only has a functional purpose, e.g., to prevent damage that might occur if the sculpture toppled or was bumped into, it does not matter whether the base has aesthetic properties, though its shape and size must be consonant with the sculpture placed on top. The bases of the Michelangelo, Rodin, and Archipenko sculptures are functional in this sense and also meet the consonance requirement. Base material can be different from or the same as the material used to make the sculpture. The material is the same in the Michelangelo and Rodin sculpture but not in the Archipenko.

If the base has more than a support function, then the question becomes how base algorithms relate to sculpture algorithms. Thus, a base can exemplify mereological and phenomenal properties consonant with those of the physical world, such as the cuboids used to support the Rodin and Archipenko sculptures. The sculpture, on the other hand, can exemplify mereological and phenomenal

properties consonant with those of the human figure. Consonance between base and sculpture that may or may not be important, depending on the artist's intent. The OAs of my bases evolved over time and are still in transition as this article is written.

As to EAs, bases of all traditional sculptures and even many contemporary sculptures do not raise EA-related issues at all. This is true of the bases of the sculptures cited above as well as purely functional bases of sculptures in general. My research has yet to identify sculpture bases that raise EA-related issues. EA algorithms do apply to some of my bases and will be discussed in due course.

Negative Space

Gaps and hollows are the principal types of negative space that I have exemplified in my sculptures, which raise a host of interesting and difficult questions about what philosophy calls '*negativa*.' I propose to sidestep these questions here.⁴ For present purposes, it will suffice to list varieties of gaps and hollows that I found aesthetically significant.

Anchored Gaps: Counterpoint A22



Gaps of various shapes and dimensions are discernible, open on three sides. Connectivity to adjoining components is achieved in a variety of ways.

Bordered Gaps 1: *Bolero III*



⁴ Casati & Varzi 2019 discuss the ontology and epistemology of negative space – but not its aesthetics.

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Two gaps are discernible, mirroring the adjoining solids. The two negative-space borders were cut from the adjoining positive spaces. Other examples of bordered gaps will be discussed later.

Bordered Gaps 2: *Counterpoint A20*



The gap is a window to another component of the sculpture. More on this sculpture later.

Bordered Gaps 3: *Counterpoint A24*



More on this sculpture later.

Bordered Gaps 4: *Counterpoint B64, Counterpoint B143, Counterpoint B76*



Components are 'found objects.' For analysis, see below.

Hollows: *Counterpoint A20, Counterpoint A27*



Analysis will be provided in due course.

An Avoidable Controversy

A statue titled “The Embrace” dedicated to Dr. Martin Luther King and his wife Coretta Scott King was unveiled in Boston in mid-January 2023, the work of Hank Willis Thomas. Made of bronze and weighing 19 tons, the statue cost a reported \$10.5 million to produce.

Coretta Scott King’s cousin, Seneca Scott, echoed the reaction of many who viewed the statue⁵:

The mainstream media ... was reporting on it like it was all beautiful, 'cause they were told they had to say that. But then when it came out, a little boy pointed out – ‘That’s a p*nis!’ and everyone was like, ‘Yo, that’s a big old d*ng, man.’

Radio host Megyn Kelly made the same comment⁶ on her show:

Okay, this is what they came up with. It was meant to be just the arms and the hands of the hug. What it looks like, I’m just gonna say it – is a giant p*nis being held by two hands.

Explanations Mr. Thomas offered were unhelpful. He posted a comment on his website⁷ that muddies the waters with vague jargon typical of much that passes for art criticism these days.

When we recognize that all storytelling is an abstraction, all representation is an abstraction, hopefully it allows us to be open to more dynamic and complex forms of representation that don’t stick us to narrative that oversimplifies a person or their legacy, and I think this work really tries to get to the heart of that.

⁵ See <https://nypost.com/2023/01/15/woke-mlk-penis-statue-insults-black-community-coretta-scott-king-kin>.

⁶ See <https://www.mediaite.com/podcasts/megyn-kelly-says-new-mlk-statue-in-boston-looks-like-a-giant-penis/>.

⁷ See <https://hankwillisthomas.com/public-art/the-embrace>.

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OA Comment: A photo on the artist's website shows that a traditional method was followed. A model was created first; then it was enlarged and cast in pieces – reportedly over 600 of them – that were welded together; finally, a patina was applied.



EA Comments:

- 1.It has been pointed out, correctly, that information apparent from several viewing angles is inconsistent with the sculpture's theme.
- 2.Mr. Scott and Ms. Kelly have suggested that information apparent from some viewing angles can be construed as overtly sexual, to which they evidently took exception.
- 3.Information apparent from some angles show no specific connection to Dr. King, his wife, and the loving relationship between them.
- 4.Absent knowledge that the statue was about Dr. King embracing his wife, the intended referents and their relationship could be inferred from only a few viewing angles, if at all.



5. The artist and the competition review committee would have preferred use only of viewing angles consistent with the photo of Dr. King embracing his wife.
6. However, a public exhibit cannot limit viewership to angles believed to be consistent with the artwork's intended theme to the exclusion of all other viewing angles.
7. The controversy that ensued could have been avoided by heeding elementary facts about three-dimensionality in sculpture during submission review stages.
8. The most elementary fact is the relativity of vision, which has been understood since Plato. One's perception of an object, any object, depends on one's position with respect to it.
9. Thus, it would have been helpful to think of the MLK statue as a collection of sense data, each potentially suggesting its own interpretation.
10. Taking a dozen or so photos of Thomas' model several degrees of arc apart would have revealed sense data viewers found objectionable later.
11. The significance of these points will become apparent as we proceed.

A Vivid Recollection


Impressions and ideas have a life of their own, operating in what has been called the subconscious mind. They can percolate for months and even years, one day bubbling up out of the blue in a form that may surprise and even shock. We would do well to ask, as philosophy teaches, how many of our beliefs are truly our own; how many were picked up willy-nilly along the way; and how many, as Platonic anamnesis theorizes, were held in a former life.

So, with that by way of preamble, there I was, sometime in the early '80s, about to walk into a Tower Records store in Washington DC when I spotted an imposing structure across the street. Assembled from metal railings painted black, it was attached to a concrete base and rose to some thirty feet. I assumed it was a work of art. Why? Well, it stood alone; it wasn't part of the building behind it; and had no recognizable shape or function. Ergo ... I walked over for a closer look. The artist may have been identified but I don't recollect the name or the title of the artwork.

I moved around it this way or that, changing perspective, trying to figure out what I was seeing as most people would when confronted with an unfamiliar object. Nothing came to mind. I walked back across the street and entered the store to add to my collection of classical records. Nevertheless, the experience became something of a stepping stone, though at the time I had no inkling that it opened a door I would walk through only a couple of years later and then keep going for decades.

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In the Beginning ...



A photo of an Art Deco horse in an issue of *Architectural Digest* – May 1984, page 280 – had me wondering if I could make something like that, out of curiosity.

The only way to find out is to try. I'd had no training in art but I knew my way around tools, having had carpentry in junior high school. So, I purchased wood boards, glued them together, and got wood carving chisels and a coping saw. A couple of weeks later, this is what I produced.



Producing a wood carving that resembled the original. My horse's head turned the same way and the hind quarters were consistent with the original's; but its front legs resembled those of an actual horse and I decided a freely hanging tail would accentuate the physical impossibility of hair supporting the weight of a horse. The base only served a practical purpose the original, so I eliminated it.

Having finished the work, it occurred to me that I may have what is usually referred to as a 'hidden talent.' If I could carve a little horse, maybe I could do something else too, but what? For inspiration, I decided to pay a visit to the Hirshhorn Museum in Washington, DC. I'd been there before but this time I'd be going with a plan and looking with new eyes.

I did not find inspiration in the museum's Sculpture Garden. As I recall, back in the early '80s the area had sculptures by, among others, Smith, Moore and even one by Brâncuși, *The Kiss*. I had more luck inside the museum. Displayed unobtrusively in a corner was another Brâncuși masterpiece, *Prometheus* (1911).



Prometheus was the ancient demigod who defied Zeus by giving mankind fire and was forced to endure horrific punishment as a result, to be chained to a mountain while a vulture pecked away at his liver. One day Hercules would come along and freed Prometheus.

OA Comments: Brâncuși's sculpture is a casting in polished bronze made from a model. It is quasi figurative and is consonant with features of the human head.

Interpretation: We see Prometheus worn out by his daily ordeal, lost in his own private world, perhaps resigned to his fate. The reader might want to compare this sculpture with paintings on the same subject, e.g., by Rubens. Lipshitz also made a Prometheus sculpture.

EA Comments: Standard vision is sufficient to capture aesthetic content and arrive at an interpretation. There seems to be a preferred viewing angle. As I found out at the Hirshhorn, moving away several degrees of arc in any direction definitely affected interpretation. Interpretations of this and other artworks on this theme have an important feature in common: There is a single story line or narrative, consonant in various ways with the ancient legend.

My Prometheus (1986)

There are many conceptual differences between art, on one hand, and science and mathematics, on the other. For example, science and mathematics cannot tolerate contradictions, whereas dissonances in an artwork are not just possible, they sometimes enhance aesthetic appeal.

However, artworks based on algorithms that could suggest (a) multiple stories that are (b) dissonant are in an entirely different category. What OA sequence of tasks could lead to the production of a sculpture on the Prometheus legend that exemplified (a) and (b); and what EA sequence would enable a person to become aware that the sculpture exemplified (a) and (b)?

Here is a photo of the *Prometheus* I produced in 1986 in reaction to the Brâncuși masterpiece.

My composition is also simple even though, unlike Brâncuși's, it is a mereological sum. The base is pine; the top is walnut I cut from a board. They are held together with a pin and epoxy. Height is 24 inches. (I also made a version in steel with a soapstone base of similar design.)




EA Comments:

- (1) If person P were to complete a finite sequence of tasks T1, then P would become aware that *Prometheus* exemplifies property F.
- (2) If person P were to complete a finite sequence of tasks T2, then P would become aware that *Prometheus* exemplifies property G.
- (3) F and G are associated with stories whose dissonance is apparent to P.

Here is the conundrum: Is step (3) realizable by applying perceptual concepts that usually make it possible for a person to become aware of the properties an object exemplified? I don't think so.

By 'perceptual concepts that usually make it possible for a person to become aware of the properties an object exemplified' I have in mind standard vision. As already noted, there is also directional vision, specifically (in coordinate terms), vision along the x-axis in both directions.

Here are photos of *Prometheus* side by side with arrows on top pointing in opposite directions.



Innovation: Use special vision to tell radically dissonant stories.

Left-to-right EA: The curved section expresses courage and optimism, even ‘in your face’ defiance. Prometheus is convinced that he had done the right thing by giving mankind fire. On this interpretation, the steps serve as a means to transcendence.

Right-to-left EA: A contradictory story emerges. Prometheus looks back and recoils with horror and justified rage, despite being convinced of the rightness of his cause. The steps are now interpreted as part of the ordeal Prometheus was made to suffer.


Viewers can experience these conflicting interpretations, and the emotions they arouse, in quick succession merely by shifting visual focus in opposite directions along the x -axis. The sculpture also poses an ontological conundrum: How many sculptures are there? Arguably, two: (1) *Prometheus-as-seen-from-left-to-right*; (2) *Prometheus-as-seen-from-right-to-left*.

David (1998)

Directional vision along the x -axis leads to dissonant stories in another sculpture I made based on an ancient legend, the Biblical fight to the death between David and Goliath. Once again, I was inspired by a famous sculpture, Michelangelo’s *David*. Here I am with the two versions of my *David*, painted wood (left) and stainless steel (right) at a Washington DC exhibit.



Here are two images of my painted wood *David* side by side with arrows on top.



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Left-to-right EA: The figure faces the target, stiff and unyielding, conveying certainty and confidence of victory; that, with God's help, David would prevail against the odds. This is the 'outer' David that Goliath was meant to see. An enemy must be shown resolve at all times.

Right-to-left EA: A dissonant interpretation comes into view: This is the 'inner' David, who realized that the future of his people rested on his frail shoulders and a lucky shot. The wedge-shaped negative space symbolizes the result of defeat.

***Andromeda* (1987 wood, 1998 bronze)**

I made another sculpture, *Andromeda*, based on an ancient Greek legend. Here is the bronze version. Readers are encouraged to supply their own analysis.



Doubling Up

It is fairly common for artists to make castings of an original. Here are three of mine.



What is not common – indeed, extremely rare as far as I know – is seeing two castings of the same original side by side in a museum or art gallery.

However, what if showing two castings of the same original side by side as mirror images of one another made possible communicating a story not possible by means of showing the castings taken singly? In other words, what if OAs and EAs were combined to produce such a display?

Doubling *Andromeda*

Innovation: *Tell different stories with copies of a sculpture placed side by side.*



In Greek mythology, Andromeda was the daughter of King Cepheus. When his wife Cassiopeia boasted that her daughter was more beautiful than Poseidon's sea nymphs, the Nereids, the angry god sent the sea monster Cetus in revenge. Andromeda was chained to a rock as a sacrifice to sate the monster but was rescued by Perseus, who married her and took her to Greece to reign as his queen.

OA & EA Comments: Displaying *Andromeda* castings side by side (OA) allows viewers to see the result as two beautiful female figure silhouettes that (EA) help explain why Perseus risked his life to save a damsel in distress. Note how components do double duty.

View 1: In this assembly, Andromeda's slender thighs are seen rising to her slim waist and above it we see either her folded arms or her ample chest.

View 2: Reversing the order of assembly leads to another interpretation. Here we see Andromeda's ample hips, slim waist and a hint of her chest.

Doubling *David*

A story that cannot be told by means of a single exemplar also applies to my *David*, and in a way that is even more interesting. Here is the side-by-side configuration I have in mind.⁸



This OA version suggests a very different EA, namely, that we are looking at the imposing physical stature of the giant Goliath, so that we can visualize that he must have been at least twice David's size, which is consistent with the Biblical account. A much sharper sense of what the boy was up against emerges as a result.

So, as with *Andromeda*, there is more here than is apparent at first, which only an analysis in terms of ontological and epistemological algorithms can bring out.


***Bolero I & II* (1998), *Bolero III* (2000), *Infinity* (1998)**

Innovation: *Achieve dissonance by means of asymmetric mereology.*

Three sculptures I made during 1998-2000, *Bolero I-III*, exemplified bordered negative space. They create dissonance by throwing off perceptions of balance and expressing links between components not found in the 'real' world, which is ruled by ironclad laws of nature. As we shall see throughout this article, algorithmic methods have led to art that in many ways stands outside reality.

Bolero I and *Bolero II* (1998, painted wood) are shown next *Bolero III* (2000, aluminum). On far right, also exemplifying negative space, is *Infinity* (1998, mixed media), which was inspired by Brâncuși's *Endless Column* series, located in Târgu-Jiu, Romania.

⁸ I made four versions of *David*: two in painted wood, one in stainless steel and one in Mexican yellow heart wood. The latter required lamination of several boards.



Bagatelles I & II (1998)

Here is *Bagatelle I*. I sold *Bagatelles II*.



Materials included aluminum, wood, plastic, and paper. The general shape in each view is the same but surface mereological properties in views 1-4 are not inferable from each other. This is a variation of the first dissonance described earlier.

Stone Carving Begins

The Art League School associated with the Torpedo Factory Gallery in Alexandria, Virginia – where I had exhibited as part of juried shows – offered sculpture classes, so I signed up.

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On day one of class, the instructor asked which medium students wanted to learn: wood, metal or stone. I had already worked with wood; metal entailed welding, which was not for me. Stone became my medium by default.

My first carving was completed in 1999 and was an alabaster version of my wooden 1985 *Study in Motion*. I made bronze castings in 2000, pictured earlier.



Other figurative or quasi-figurative carvings followed in relatively quick succession.




Mimi (1999, alabaster) *Nina* (1999, alabaster) *Ariadne* (2000, soapstone) *Venus* (2000, alabaster)

***Thy Fearful Symmetry* (1999)**

Innovation: *Achieve consonance and dissonance by changing perspective.*

A stone version of my *David* led to significantly different interpretations only a few degrees of arc apart. Several images are necessary to illustrate my points. This will be true for many other stone sculptures for reasons that will become apparent as we proceed.



All Views: The base is the only component that is symmetrical. *David* shapes are evident in views 1, 2 and 3 but not 4 and 5. The negative space of *David* acquires three-dimensionality here. It means very different things in views 1, 2, 4 and 5. The only one that resembles the negative space in *David* is in view 3.

Views 1 & 5: Symmetry is evident only here. Views are 180 degrees of arc apart but only the outline is consonant. Surface configurations are dissonant.

Views 2-4: Dissonance with the theme is exemplified. Dissonances with a theme do not exist in traditional or even contemporary sculpture.


EA Comments: The sequence of tasks to be completed under EA begins with symmetry defined at view 1, then proceeds through a sequence of three views where symmetry is absent and ends in a different concept of symmetry defined at view 5. Another EA sequence begins and ends with symmetry is 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, though the symmetry of 5 and 1 will have a different impact this time. EA sequences are also possible that do not begin and end with symmetry, such as 2, 3, 4, 5, 1; or sequences that begin with symmetry but do not end with it such as 1, 5, 4, 3, 2. Finally, there is a sequence that begins with symmetry defined at view 1 and ends with symmetry at view 1 by rotating a full circle; likewise, one that begins with symmetry defined at view 5 and ends at view 5 also by rotating a full circle. The impact will be different each time.

Alar (2000)

In *Alar*, I applied the innovative lesson of *Thy Fearful Symmetry* without symmetry. I sought to create a sculpture such that views degrees of arc apart (a) formed a family resemblance around a wing theme, and (b) included dissonance. Task (a) is achieved in views 1, 2, 5 and 6. Task (b) is achieved in views 3 and 4. The dissonance of views 3 and 4 exemplify change of direction heard in classical music,

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where it occurs frequently, so sculptures evidently can express the musical concept of modulation.



The sequence from 1-6 reveals dissonance in our second sense, i.e., when it cannot be inferred from properties apparent from different viewing angles that they are properties of the same object. Thus, views 2, 3 and 5 cannot be inferred as the same wing even though they are only a few degrees of arc apart. View 4 shows an object in a different ontological category: a blade of fire! The blade of fire in view 4 morphs into a wing at 5 and then another wing appears at view 6.

Eve (2001)



Innovation: *Use different carving techniques to create space-time dissonances.*

This was my first narrative in stone, based on the biblical story of Adam and Eve. Base and stone components are much more closely linked than in previous sculptures. I also had a bronze casting made, whose patina has a different emotional impact.

OA Comments: Sculpture has always exemplified consistency of scale and surface configuration, which is a form of consonance. While Picasso distorted body parts for various reasons, that is not the same at all as using radically different scales for body parts. Carving techniques are also consonant in sculpture, even cubism.

Views 1 and 2: Scale and surface configurations are dissonant. In-the-round carving technique is exemplified in view 1 and bas-relief in view 2. Eve is shown as if from a distance in view 2 and close up in view 1. This is another new idea in the history of sculpture.

EA Comments: Surface details of views 1-4 are dissonant. Thus, view 1 shows what Adam saw that made him fall in love with Eve. View 2 shows Eve holding an apple, contemplating whether to bite into it. View 3 shows Eve as pregnant, which is not inferable from views 1 and 2. View 4 links the narrative contents of views 1 and 3. Views 1, 2 and 3 show Eve at different stages of life. Temporal discontinuity, exemplified only a few degrees of arc apart, is another new idea in the history of sculpture.

Here is why the primary base (mahogany) and the intermediate base (marble) are elliptical while the stone sits at one of the foci. The ellipse is the shape described by our planets as they revolve around the sun, which is situated not in the center – an ellipse does not have a center – but rather at one of the foci. Eve is in the sun position as a way of expressing that women are life-givers, as is the sun.

Leda (2001)



Innovation: *Achieve ontological dissonance by changing perspective.*

Michelangelo's *David* and Archipenko's *Seated Woman* share an ontology: Only one person is the subject in both sculptures. This is apparent from any pairs of sense data no matter how many degrees of arc apart, as the reader can verify.

Dissonances: It is difficult to infer that the same woman is the subject from virtually any two sense data. There is reason to wonder if the same woman is shown in views 2 and 3. Views 5 and 6 should be mirror images of each other but evidently are not. The woman's stomach in view 5 is her posterior in view 6. Most radically of all, seen from left to right, most of view 4 is repeated in view 6. From right to left, the other half is view 5. This is a new application of directional vision. Previously, two copies of the same sculpture – *Andromeda* and *David* – were required to produce such dissonant effects. *Leda* is a five-in-one sculpture. But, is it really just one sculpture?

Cleo (2001)



1



2



3

Innovation: *Use a traditional approach to achieve dissonance.*

The head and the base greatly facilitate association with the same female figure. With some effort, it can perhaps be inferred that properties apparent from the three viewing angles are properties of the same figure. Base and head aside, however, we cannot easily infer any of the three views from the other two views,

so that dissonance appears to be exemplified. Properties apparent in view 1 cannot easily be inferred from properties apparent in views 2 or 3. The three poses are very different: 1 is aloof; 2 reclines; 3 is bold.

Nici (2002)



Innovation: *Use radically different styles to achieve dissonant mereology.*

It is hard to believe that views 1 & 2 are front and back views. View 1 is close in style to Cubism. The simplicity of view 2 recalls Hans Arp. Such radical stylistic differences are a form of dissonance. Views 3 & 4 face each other but are not mirror images. Details do not match fully. Anatomical dissonance with the female figure in view 1 is exemplified. View 2 is quasi-figurative but the other three are not. Identifying the four views with one and the same person or object is doubtful. This is our second dissonance. A female figure is discernible in view 2 but nowhere else.

First Game Changer

Counterpoint A1 (2002)



Innovation: *Relate components of different scales using a unique component.*

This sculpture exemplified differences of scale, as did *Eve* made the previous year. From one angle, two figures of different scale appear side by side, separated by a willowy braid. To the left of the braid, we see a figure in sitting position, her left arm reaching around to the front. The back and shoulder of the figure to the right of the braid are much larger. Despite the fact that the two figures are of different scale, there is no difficulty at all in seeing the willowy braid as belonging to both of them.

OA Comment: Having two figures of different scales share the same component was a major innovation and a novel application of our ontological algorithm. Let us restate it for ease of reference.

Ontological Algorithm (OA): A finite sequence of tasks T applying concepts of phenomenalism or mereology such that if person P were to complete T, P would bring it about that an object exemplifies properties that determine aesthetic content.

The finite sequence of tasks here is the usual sequence that is part of in-the-round composition. The new property is the mereological property, exemplified by the braid, of being the F of both x and y, where x and y are components of the figures flanking the braid.

EA Comment: Because the braid could now be seen as a component of both figures, a novel application of our epistemological algorithm also occurred. Let us restate it as well.

Epistemological Algorithm (EA): A finite sequence of tasks T such that if person P were to complete T, P would bring it about that P is aware, in a sense to be specified, of properties that determine aesthetic content exemplified as a result of applying concepts of phenomenalism or mereology.

The 'sense to be specified' is seeing-as-vision. The property in question is the mereological property noted above.

Then, something even more remarkable happened. I noticed that the braid could also be seen as a figure in her own right, so that the composition contained three figures, not two. The same figure could be seen-as a component of two adjacent figures and also seen-as a stand-alone figure.

OA Comment: This discovery meant that the cluster of properties that determine aesthetic content in *Counterpoint A1* also include a mereological property expressed by a sentence of the form 'being the F of x and being the F of y and being G.' This property is unprecedented in the history of sculpture.



EA Comment: This discovery also meant that we would see the braid as a component of figures flanking it and as a figure with an identity independent of and, indeed, incompatible with its identity as a component of the other figures. This discovery is also unprecedented in the history of sculpture.

General Comments: The mereological property of being the F of x and being the F of y and being a G opened the door to innovations that I am still pursuing twenty years later. Closely related to this property, and just as useful, is the property of being the F of x and the G of y . Thus, a mereologically complex sculpture could have a component that was the arm of one figure and the leg of another figure. Once the ontology is settled, epistemology can follow suit. Thus, we could see a component of a mereologically complex sculpture as the arm of one figure and as the leg of another figure. There may well be such a thing as epistemic consonance and dissonance. I'm not ready to suggest definitions of these concepts.

Counterpoint A2 (2002)

The floodgates literally flew open after I internalized the lessons of *Counterpoint A1*. Its successor is more complex and required greater carving skill.



Innovation: *Relate multiple figures in unique and dissonant ways.*

Views 1-4: Mereological dissonance is exemplified. Mereological properties of views taken singly are logically independent of the mereological properties of any other view.

View 1: The quasi figurative on left supports an abstract one.

View 2: The long arm of the rightmost figure reaches across the figure attached to the base and grasps a figure with its back to the viewer, whose buttocks are evident.

View 3: Arms of an unseen figure reaches across the figure attached to the base.

View 4: Two figures are locked in an embrace while a component of a third points away.

Counterpoint A5 (2002)



Innovation: *Exemplify dissonance in stone by means of special vision.*

View 3: From right to left, the dominant figure on right is 'trapped' in the composition.

View 3: From left to right, this figure seeks to escape the confines of the composition.


All views: The dominant figure in views 1-3 has been replaced by another dominant figure in view 4.

View 4: Very different and more abstract relationships are evident.

Views 1 and 4: Logically independent mereological properties are exemplified.

Views 2 and 3: Front and back views are dissonant.

Counterpoint A7 (2002)



Innovation: *Use carving virtuosity to create components that do double duty.*
 Carving virtuosity is exemplified throughout. The dominant figure in views 1 and 2 is gone in views 3 and 4, which have no dominant figure. Several components do double duty. Components point in opposite directions in all views. Different components appear to be attached to the base, exemplifying different grounding concepts. Grain plays a much greater role.

Counterpoint A8 (2003)




View 1: A figure bends at the waist over an abstract figure facing the viewer.
View 2: Concave negative space appears, while chest, arm and back of a large figure face away.
Views 2 and 3: Double duty is exemplified. The back of the figure in 2 is a breast in 3.

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Views 1 and 4: Dissonance with the bent figure shown in view 1 is exemplified in view 4. Dissonant mereology is exemplified only a few degrees of arc apart in views 1 and 4.

Counterpoint A10 (2003)



Innovation: *Create radical dissonance by combining quasi-figurative and abstract components.*

Mereology corresponds to human mereology only loosely. There are differences of scale. Mereological details are not easily inferable from view to view, creating dissonance throughout.

View 1: Two figures with different surface configuration point in opposite directions.

View 2: An abstract figure in sitting position is attached to the base.

View 3: This view is the 'back' of view 1 but the mereology is dissonant.

Views 1 and 3: The figure on right is the F in view 1 and is the G in view 3 as the figure on left.

Counterpoint A12 (2004) & Counterpoint A14 (2005)

Both compositions are much closer to traditional sculpture and normal perception seems sufficient for EA purposes. This, however, does not mean these sculptures are retrograde because figurative, quasi figurative and abstract components are present side by side, supplying dissonance.



There are figurative, quasi figurative and abstract components in A12.1 and A12.2. A14.1 has male and female figures locked in an embrace. A14.2 is abstract, creating dissonance. Details of front and back views are dissonant: they cannot be inferred from one another in either sculpture.

Florida Production

I relocated to Florida in the summer of 2012 and had an outdoor studio built in my backyard sheltered from the elements and equipped with lighting, which enabled me to get back to making sculpture in 2019. I produced five stone carvings that year, *Counterpoint A18-A22*, that satisfied variations of our algorithms OA and EA. Then, things changed.

Two New Counterpoint Series (2019-2022)

Consider sculptures that are such that:


- a) seeing-as applied vertically is the operative concept in EAs
- b) assembly of mereological sums is the *modus operandi* of OAs
- c) assembly consists of stacking components vertically in various ways
- d) materials such as glass, wood, metal and ceramic are used for components
- e) component colors do not necessarily match
- f) component shapes and sizes do not necessarily form a consistent set
- g) components are 'found objects' in Duchamp's sense

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The two new B and C *Counterpoint* series based on (a)-(g) proved remarkably prolific. In the space of a mere three years, I created a total of 176 sculptures! Moreover, (a)-(g) led to a new generation of *Counterpoint A* sculptures that broke away from in-the-round methods, as we shall see. But first, analysis of *Counterpoint B* series is needed to lay down some conceptual markers.

Counterpoint B Series (2019 – 2022, 120 sculptures)

Counterpoint B1 (2019)



Innovation: *Use vertical awareness to change the epistemology of mereological sums.*

Views 1-3: The object in view 1, O1, resembles a perfume bottle. This interpretation does not change in view 2. Only rotation 90 degrees of arc in view 3 changes interpretation.

Let us list the five components in View 1 from the bottom up.

- C1: a thick disc made of wood painted white
- C2: half an ellipse made of soapstone
- C3: two small marble disks glued together
- C4: a soapstone chunk resembling a hand-held fan
- C5: a small multi-colored marble sphere

View 4: The object in this view, O2, is a mereological sum that is a subset of object O1 in view 1. C4 is and is seen as the head of figure O2; C3 is and is seen as the neck of O2; C2 is and is seen as the arms and torso of O2.

View 5: The object in this view, O3, is another mereological sum that is a subset of O1. C5 is and is seen as the head of O3; C4 is and is seen as the arms and torso of O3; C3 is and is seen as the waist of O3; and C2 is and is seen as the body of O3.

Here are photos of more Counterpoint B sculptures to which the above analysis applies as well.



Counterpoint B33 (2019): In Memoriam

The Holocaust has been the subject of many artworks, though none by the foremost artist of the 20th century, Pablo Picasso, who lived in occupied France during World War II and died in 1973.

The photo that inspired my sculpture was taken during the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.



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Counterpoint A20 (2019)



1



2



3

Innovation: *Use negative space to relate components.*

View 1-3: The three views are dissonant with respect to one another. Rotating any view degrees of arc away changes interpretation significantly.

View 1: Combines a see-through gap (top) with a window gap (bottom).

View 2: A bordered hollow has a component in the center.

View 3: Combines a see-through gap (top) with a filled hollow (bottom). This is the only view that is quasi-figurative. The frame of the hollow can be seen as arms. The head is in the center of the hollow. The figure leans perilously to one side, adding drama.

Views 1 and 3: The leg of the figure in view 3 is an arm in view 1.

Counterpoint A21 (2019)

Innovation: *Create dissonance by means of components suggesting different species.*

View 1: It is possible to see-as a female figure and also a wide-mouthed fish. The woman's breast doubles as the eye of the fish. Her shoulder doubles as the jaw of the fish. Her back doubles as the nose of the fish. Her unusually long and supple left leg doubles as a gill. The component that attaches to the base is also part of the fish.

View 2: What was part of the fish's gill is seen as the dancer's upraised leg.

View 3: The right leg of this dancer doubles as the right leg of the dancer in view 2.



2 & 3: See through gap in view 2 is a windowed gap in view 3.

Counterpoint A22 (2019)




Innovation: Use anchored gaps to facilitate awareness of dramatic effects.
View 1: Two components are discernible: One quasi-figurative, one abstract.

View 2: The companionship aspect of view 1 is absent, which suggests a single figure.

Both views: Figures hang precariously, heightening drama. They are front and back but are not inferable from one another, creating dissonance. The anchored gap visible in view 1 is not visible in view 2. The intermediate base can be seen as a component in both views. The different material (mahogany) is another source of dissonance.

An Interlude: Untitled (2020)



Components are found or manufactured objects. A Japanese motif seems to be exemplified.

***Counterpoint C Series* (2021 – 2022, 56 sculptures)**




These are mereological sums of found and manufactured objects. I wanted to make something that children can relate to. Turing might have cracked a smile, at least I hope so.

Second Game Changer

Counterpoint A23 (2022)

Innovation: *Combine carved components with found objects to achieve radical dissonance.*

Component details: The two bases, the rod and the white component were found objects. The black component is an assembly of carved and painted stone.



Views 1 and 3: Dissonant interpretations are suggested.

View 1, interpretation 1: A leaning figure is seen facing us, turned at an angle. Its head, painted white is shown as negative space. The arms are flexed and hang down. The left arm is connected to the rod attached to the base. An unusually limber right leg is raised high

View 1, interpretation 2: We can also see a mythical creature. Its legs were formerly seen as the legs of the figure in view 1.1. Its head is held high pointing left. The head was a leg in view 1.1. It would fly off if not tethered to the base!

View 2: The mythical creature is now in full flight. The dissonances in view 1 are gone, replaced by others. Perhaps we're looking at a ... rooster? The white negative space is its plumage. Its head was a leg in view 1.1 and a head in view 1.2

View 3, interpretation 1: We see the creature/rooster from behind, flying away. The crest is still identifiable as such. The rest of the body is more difficult to categorize.

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View 3, interpretation 2: Another interpretation suggests a figure in prone position that seems to be coming toward us. The plumage is now a white bar, which appears to be attached to a head. Its right arm is stretched out, while the left arm is pinned to the base. A hind leg points up. It was a head in view 1.2 and the head of a bird in view 2.

View 4: Something wicked this way comes. Watch out!

Counterpoint A24 (2022)



1

Innovation: *Use sculpture to raise important philosophical questions.*



2



3



4



5



6

Let us begin by listing components shown in view 1, starting from the bottom.

- C1: A triangular prism made of mahogany
- C2: Two marble discs glued together, found objects
- C3: An alabaster globe, found object
- C4: Brass disk, found object
- C5: Found-object combination of wood and metal
- C6: Red alabaster carving.

View 2: C1 is and is seen as the body of object O1. C2 is and is seen as the neck of O1. C3 is and is seen as the head of O1.

View 3: C3 is and is seen as the body of figure O2. C4 is and is seen as the neck of O2. C5 is and is seen as the head (H) of O2.

View 4: C5 is and is seen as the arms and trunk of a figure O3. C6 is and is seen as the neck and head of O3.

View 5: C1 is and is seen as the lower body of figure O4. C2 is and is seen as the waist of O4. C3 is and is seen as the arms and trunk of O4. C4 is and is seen as the neck of O4. C5 is and is seen as the head of O5.

View 6: C3 is and is seen as the lower body of figure O5. C4 is and is seen as the waist of O5. C5 is and is seen as the arms and trunk of O5. C6 is and is seen as the neck and head of O5.

Comments on this analysis

A philosophically significant problem is how to determine the aesthetic content of art objects that are mereological sums. Perhaps the aesthetic content of such objects can be determined by 'adding' the aesthetic contents of component objects. Or, perhaps the aesthetic content of art objects that are mereological sums is a truth-function of the aesthetic content of the component objects. It is unclear at this point how to make these ideas precise. Finally, compare the components seen in view 1 with those in view 7, which was the result of turning the sculpture 90 degrees counter-clockwise.



1



7

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For ease of reference, here are components C1-C6 shown view 1:

- C1: A triangular prism made of mahogany
- C2: Two marble discs glued together, found objects
- C3: An alabaster globe, found object
- C4: Brass disk, found object
- C5: Found-object combination of wood and metal
- C6: Red alabaster carving.

View 7: C1 ontology is the same but a new sense datum is apparent. C2 and C4 are unchanged. C3 ontology is the same but a new sense datum is apparent. C5 ontology is the same but a new sense datum is apparent. C6 ontology is the same but a new sense datum is apparent.

My Latest Counterpoint A

Counterpoint A26 (2023)

Innovation: *Combine static and dynamic elements using a variety of components. Exemplify several types of negative space. Suggest radical dissonance by combining figurative, quasi-figurative and abstract components.*



1

2

3

4

There are seven components:

- C1: Black marble base, found object.
- C2: Wooden cuboid, cut and stained from a larger piece.
- C3: Alabaster cuboid, cut and finished from a larger piece.
- C4: White stone cube, found object, drilled and assembled.
- C5: Carved alabaster.
- C6: Small marble disk, found object, polished and drilled.

C7: Multicolored stone cube, found object, drilled and assembled.

Views 1 & 4: Gaps are mirror images of one another. Carved alabaster views are not mirror images of one another. This is dissonance with regard to mirroring expectations. C5 views suggest two different human figures. C7 suggests association with different human figures.

View 2: Another upright human figure is suggested, which is a third figure. The right arm of the figure defines the gaps in views 1 and 4. The left arm of the figure extends to the hollow in view 3.

View 3: A fourth figure is suggested, though C7 does not function as a head. A small hollow is enclosed in a larger one, suggesting the figure is not human. The hollows have different shapes. Grain helps to accentuate differences.

View 4: A human figure leans on his/her right knee; left arm and wrist are bent.

Views 1-4: Four figures total, three human and one non-human. This has never been done in the history of sculpture.

Innovations Summary

It might be useful to have a list of innovations identified above.

1. Use special vision to tell radically dissonant stories.
2. Tell different stories with copies of a sculpture placed side by side.
3. Achieve dissonance by means of asymmetric mereology.
4. Achieve consonance and dissonance by changing perspective.
5. Use different carving techniques to create space and time dissonances.
6. Achieve ontological dissonance by changing perspective.
7. Use a traditional approach to achieve dissonance.
8. Use radically different styles to achieve dissonant mereology.
9. Relate components of different scales using a unique component.
10. Relate multiple figures in unique and dissonant ways.
11. Exemplify dissonance in stone by means of special vision.
12. Use carving virtuosity to create components that do double duty.
13. Create radical dissonance by combining quasi-figurative and abstract components.
14. Use vertical awareness to change the epistemology of mereological sums.
15. Use negative space to relate components.
16. Create dissonance by means of components suggesting different species.
17. Use anchored gaps to facilitate awareness of dramatic effects.
18. Combine carved components with found objects to achieve radical dissonance.

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19. Use sculpture to raise important philosophical questions.
20. Combine static and dynamic elements using a variety of components.

A Comparison

How do the sculptures discussed in this article, on behalf of which a large number of claims to innovation were made, compare to sculptures by famous artists considered innovative? Below are necessarily brief comments on two sculptures: *Agricola* by David Smith (1906-1965) and *Seated Man with Guitar* by Jacques Lipchitz (1891-1973). The issue is a book-length subject.



Smith



Lipshitz

Smith Comments: The sculpture is painted steel. If it weren't for the mounting on a base, one would be hard put to consider it significantly different from a painting – Smith is known to have held that sculpture and painting aren't far apart. Components are contemporaneous and mostly coplanar. We seem to be looking at a barnyard denizen, whose mereology has been replicated. We see plumage, a hind leg and a crest. Front and back view are consonant. Standard vision is sufficient to capture content because no components do double duty. There is no dissonance in either of our two senses. Only a single story is told, e.g., crowing at sunrise? The association with the title would disappear if a side-view photo were to be taken. Moreover, such a photo would not show anything dissonant, e.g., a member of another species. There is a preferred viewing angle, so vision relativity is not a factor.

Lipshitz Comments: This is a quasi-figurative sculpture. Components are not coplanar but are contemporaneous and only one story is told, of a person strumming a guitar. The mereology of the guitar player is consonant with that of the human body. Arms and shoulders have the same scale and general shape, albeit stylized. There is a preferred viewing angle, as shown. Variations 90 degrees of arc away from the preferred viewing angle would lose contact with the theme; even 45 degrees would do that. The back is probably flat, so that a painterly impression is generated. A painting would have captured aesthetic content just as well. Some components do double duty: the legs double as chair legs; the left arm doubles as the chair's left armrest; and the guitar doubles as part of the head. The guitar itself is also quasi figurative. It's modern sculpture but suggests classical rather than modern music.

Concluding Comments

Henry Moore flatly refused to read a book analyzing his sculptures for fear it might inhibit his creativity – the ‘paralysis by analysis’ syndrome. For me, just the opposite has been the case. Analysis has boosted creativity and helped me understand factors driving existing paradigms so they can be changed. Cusmariu 2009 opened that door. I applied my training in analytic philosophy elsewhere as well: to film analysis in Cusmariu 2015 and to art criticism and music analysis in Cusmariu 2021A and B, respectively. I worked on my book *Logic for Kids* and several technical philosophy articles concurrently with making *Counterpoint* sculptures. I wrote three film scripts, *Muybridge*, *Fancy Free* and *Light Becomes Her*, while making sculptures, including the first *Counterpoint* series and its predecessors. Phenomenalism, mereology and logic have gotten me this far and I fully expect their concepts to continue to be productive. I look forward to new and exciting applications of Turing-like ontological and epistemological algorithms.

Postscript

After submitting this article, I began work on a new series of Counterpoint B sculptures based on the theoretical framework described above, inspired by Umberto Boccioni's Unique Forms of Continuity in Space. The sculptures will involve seeing-as vision for their interpretation, unlike Boccioni's. Some two-dozen pieces using found and manufactured objects are planned.

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Rousseau: The Rejection of Happiness as the Foundation of Authenticity

Yuval Eytan

Abstract: The roots of the ideal of authenticity in modern Western thought are numerous and complex. In this article, I explore their development in relation to Rousseau's paradoxical conclusion that complete satisfaction is an aspiration that not only cannot be fulfilled but whose actual realization will make a person miserable. I argue that there is an unresolved tension between the notion of humans as creatures who by nature strive to eliminate suffering to achieve static serenity and the idea that their natural goal in society is to constantly change and enrich themselves. The purpose of this article is not to construct another pessimistic interpretation according to which our most profound desire – happiness – cannot be achieved, but rather, by understanding natural inequality as a historical phenomenon, to shed light on Rousseau's idea that happiness should be rejected because it contradicts the new foundation of morality: the realization of people's uniqueness.

Keywords: authenticity, happiness, Jean Jacques Rousseau, natural inequality, uniqueness.

1. Introduction

According to Charles Taylor, "the background understanding to the modern ideal of authenticity, and to the goal of self-fulfillment or self-realization [is the duty to be] true to myself [...] to my own originality, and that is something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself." (2018, 29) Rousseau plays a significant role in shedding light on the roots of the ideal of authenticity, and it is customary to argue that two parameters link him to the most basic principles of an ideal of life, which were only fully developed over a hundred years after his death. First, truth is found in every individual, and hence moral freedom is possible due not to human beings' subordination to external truth, but rather to their deep, natural, inner voices. According to Taylor (1989, 265, 357-61), Rousseau's idea that supreme happiness exists in a life dedicated to these voices, which replace the *summum bonum* of medieval regimes, reflects a turn in Western culture towards independent, autonomous, and radical self-inquiry. Second, any social organization that prevents people from being loyal to their authentic emotions and needs is perceived as threatening their ability to achieve happiness. In Rousseau's criticism of social institutions that prevent humans from being loyal to their authentic natures, Lionel Trilling (1972) sees a new moral ideal – authenticity. This ideal expresses a kind of sincerity that is different from the common English version of it, i.e., a person's duty not to mislead others, and is

based on rejecting the perception according to which society is natural and eternal (a kingdom) in favor of one according to which society is a dynamic phenomenon determined by human will. According to Alessandro Ferrara, Rousseau's authenticity involves deep reflection to negate external emotions that originate in society and the courage to act in the context of authentic emotions to achieve happiness (2016, 22; 2017, 3-4). In a similar vein, Tzvetan Todorov sees Rousseau as a pioneer of modernity because he distinguishes between false freedom, which brings misery, and authentic freedom, which leads to happiness. The former characterizes people's evaluation of themselves in terms of others' expectations and is caused by *amour-propre*. The latter, which originates in *amour de soi*, is the state of people's loyalty to their true selves, i.e., their true caring for themselves (Todorov 2001, 2, 31, 60).

Scholars' belief that authentic life leads to happiness is related to the fact that these two notions – that truth is found within people and that society can be changed – played a crucial role in what is commonly identified as the subjectification of happiness, which, like the ideal of authenticity, reflected a profound change in Western culture that involved focusing on individual freedom.¹ According to Taylor, while in Plato and Aristotle happiness is not based on the satisfaction of personal desires or the achievement of individual goals, modern freedom, which was necessary for the ideal of authenticity to emerge, developed based on the principle that only individuals should determine the good for themselves since there is no better judge than themselves to determine their happiness (1989, 82). In other words, while in ancient objective theories, happiness is perceived as the result of normative behavior, indicates the fulfillment of essential qualities, and is not related to emotions, feelings, and personal desires, in modern subjective approaches, normative principles are rejected, and, as Christine Vitrano argues, the common denominator is that "happiness involves [achieving] a state of satisfaction [... by] getting or doing the important things that one wants."² (2018, 113)

In genealogies of the concept of happiness, Rousseau does not play a significant role, as he does in the ideal of authenticity, since it is customary to see Hobbes and Locke as the most important contributors to the subjectification of happiness and argue that Rousseau adopted their fundamental point in thinking of happiness as a positive emotional state.³ In this context, we can identify two main streams of thought. According to the first of these, Rousseau, like his predecessors, based happiness on an individual conception of freedom. Within this interpretive framework, the debate over happiness stems from the different meanings attributed to this kind of freedom. For example, according to Thomas Davidson, morality functions as a means of achieving happiness, and therefore

¹ See Guignon (2004, 24-5, 76); Trilling (1972, 40-1, 51-2); White (2006, 69).

² See also Mulnix and Mulnix (2015, 4-6); Annas (2014, 41-5); Haybron (2000, 208-13).

³ Rutherford (2003, 380); Strauss (1963, 17, 23, 57); Wood (1990, 53-4); McMahon (2006, 184-5); Haybron (2013, 103-4).

Rousseau's theory is a utilitarian one, in which freedom expresses the individual's ability to maximize personal satisfactions, i.e., to be happy (Davidson 1975, 185). For John Hall, the general will is not reconcilable with a utilitarian worldview, but, in his view, while moral behavior is based on self-control, the freedom associated with happiness is simpler, i.e., "freedom to walk in the woods [...] to do whatever one wants." (1973, 69-70) Joshua Cohen (2010) argues that happiness is a state of balance between desires and powers, with freedom expressing the self-control needed to create a moderate life. According to Strauss, Rousseau embraced a negative conception of happiness: "the happiest man [is the one] who has the smallest number of evils."⁴ (2014, 126) On the one hand, this is a critique of Hobbes's conception of happiness as a race to maximize satisfaction, and, on the other hand, the adoption of the idea of severing the necessary connection between a normative system and happiness (Strauss 1965, 166-9, 182). Frederick Neuhouser (2014) agrees that Rousseau's conception of happiness is negative, but emphasizes that he conceives of well-being, a broader concept that, apart from happiness – defined formally (as a match between powers and desires) and subjectively (as dependent on individual satisfaction, whose meaning is not derived from an abstract concept of humanity) – also contains freedom, which is perceived as a real, objective, and universal need related to moral activity.

Thinkers from the second stream do not disagree with the emotional-subjective element, but believe that there are also eudemonistic elements in Rousseau's conception of happiness, and in Ernest Cassirer's (2015) formulation, this is a syncretism of moral duty and the personal sense of satisfaction that should result from it. In this approach, the debate concerns the means required for human beings to desire their obligations. For example, according to Masters (1997), Rousseau's rejection of Hobbesian egoism is expressed in the idea that reducing the suffering of others has become a significant part of the moral agent's happiness. According to Rafeeq Hasan (2016), in his political writings, Rousseau seeks to bring about a situation in which human beings will be satisfied with the realization of their civil liberties, and this is an attempt to merge the general will and private will and create a correspondence between people's desires and their ability to fulfill them. Mark Jonas (2016) argues that heterosexual love relationships within the marriage covenant express a merging of the eudemonic and individualistic elements of Rousseau's approach to happiness.

I disagree neither with the idea that Rousseau sees happiness in psychological terms nor with the two assumptions regarding his influence on the ideal of authenticity. What I seek to do is challenge what I see as the uncritical link between authenticity and happiness in Rousseau's thought. The interpretation

⁴ Strauss's argument is taken mainly from the definition of happiness in *Emile*, 80. All references used for Rousseau's works are taken from *The Collected Writings of Rousseau* (1990 -2012). Abbreviations: E, *Emile*; D, *Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues*; FD, *First Discourse*; SD, *Second Discourse*; J, *Julie*; SC, *Social Contract*; C, *Confessions*; RS, *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*; HP, *History and Politics Writing*; L, *Origin of Languages*; LD, *Letter to d'Alembert*.

according to which a free and moral life does not lead to happiness has recently been developed by John Warne, who sees the impossibility of resolving the “tension between virtue and happiness” as a significant factor in “Rousseau’s tragic theory of human relations,” which teaches us how fragile happiness is in any social relationship (2018, 113-4, 225).

I claim that Rousseau sees morality as a necessary part of people’s ability to be self-sufficient, and indeed repeatedly arrives at a dead end regarding the possibility of unity between the two. But I would like to emphasize how natural inequality, a concept that, to the best of my knowledge, is not central to the interpretation of Rousseau’s concept of happiness, can function as the basis for a new morality according to which happiness is an ideal worth overcoming. By this, I do not mean arriving at a tragic reconciliation with the inability to achieve happiness (Melzer 1990, 285), but rather understanding it as a tendency that is unnatural for a social person.

Rousseau’s paradoxical conclusion – that achieving what all humans naturally seek, i.e., complete satisfaction, will not satisfy them – can provide a theoretical basis for understanding how the ideal of authenticity developed, in part, from opposition to the notion of human beings’ purpose (seeking satisfaction or avoiding pain) that lies at the foundation of the ideal of happiness in modern thought. In the first section, I argue that the significant difference between happiness in the state of nature and happiness in society stems from the fact that, in the latter, the system of needs takes on an individual character. In the second section, I explain how this psychological change is the main reason for Rousseau’s three failures in establishing harmony between a free, authentic life and a happy, satisfying one. Happiness is revealed as an illusion because it is an unrealistic state in which social humans can separate positive emotions from negative ones and thus experience pure satisfaction from their present state. But Rousseau also understood that the problem lies, as I claim in the third section, not in being satisfied by acting as free moral agents, but rather in the fact that the actual achievement of happiness contradicts the individualistic foundation of human beings’ nature, which directs them not to satisfaction or reduced suffering, but rather intense self-enrichment.

2. Simple and Complex Happiness

Rousseau’s idea that humans “live only in order to sleep, to vegetate, to remain immobile” (L 310) implies that happiness is a static state of satisfaction marked by freedom from any feeling of pain and sorrow, while this state is mainly characterized by “not desiring anything more than what [one] already has.”⁵ (J 384) Is Rousseau’s uncompromising loyalty to this conception of happiness inconsistent with his declaration (E 324) that happiness in the state of nature and

⁵ See also SD 6; C 36, 212; SW 42; HP, 28, C, 126; E, 210.

happiness in society are completely different?⁶ I believe the answer to this question is no, since the difference lies not in the nature of happiness itself, but rather in the circumstances and means of its fulfillment, i.e., the transition from 'natural freedom' to 'moral freedom.' What remains unchanged is not only the idea of happiness as a state in which people do not strive for any change, but also the notion that this kind of stability is always based on freedom in three main senses. The first of these is the autonomy required in any subjective theory of happiness, i.e., individuals control the determination and fulfillment of their goals. The second is freedom achieved as actions that prove the fulfillment of natural and internal universal elements in humans. The third is related to the nature of happiness itself as a perfect and stable sentiment free of any emotion or thought that deviates from it (e.g., longing, fear, hope). If we are to understand the dominance of self-sufficiency in Rousseau's conception of happiness (Boisvert 2010, 59; Strauss 1947, 476), we must relate to the two innate emotions that are the sources of human activity: "[one is] purely passive physical and organic sensitivity which seems to have as its end only the preservation of our bodies and [...] our species through the direction of pleasure and pain. [The other] I call active and moral [and it is] the faculty of attaching our affections to beings who are foreign to us." (D 112)

Rousseau was dedicated to the principle that true happiness is a state in which external behavior reflects the autonomic fulfillment of universal inwardness (FD 5). This proves human beings' freedom and loyalty to *amour de soi*, which creates 'gentle passions' aimed at satisfying simple, natural, and true needs, i.e., happiness (D 112-3). In the state of nature, the absence of physical pain and suffering that result from being enslaved to another was a sufficient condition for happiness. The claim that "the happiness of the natural man is as simple as his life," (E 324) is consistent with the circular image of happiness as a continuous, monotonous, and homogeneous unity that results from the satisfaction of the same needs by the same means over and over again (SD 8, 71).

The transition to the social condition is expressed through a dramatic event, the Fall in the sense of human beings' inability to exist in harmonious unity with nature, and should not be reduced to the determination by an anonymous individual that a certain piece of land is privately owned by them or the fact that, for this determination to be valid, an individual must receive confirmation from another concerning that land (SD 43). *Amour-propre* develops 'hateful and cruel passions,' and there is no doubt that the desire for a relative advantage over others is the seed of the loss of individuals' ability to find happiness in satisfying their natural needs, which have been replaced by external desire for the satisfaction of an emotion that cannot be satisfied: pride (D 112; FD 110-113). Yet the need for private property and its basic emotional roots (*amour-propre*) are not problems,

⁶ On unresolved contradictions in Rousseau's concept of happiness, see Dent (1992, 122-3) and Gilead (2012, 269).

but rather symptoms of the change that Rousseau describes in his examination of the development of a set of desires based on human beings' knowledge of themselves as unique beings, which is always intermixed with the development of awareness of the uniqueness of all natural phenomena, most importantly members of their species (SD 91, note 12).

In the state of nature, unique personality was latent, since human beings' lack of self-conception that transcended the physical pointed to their inability to act in accordance with the desires that arose from their recognition of their uniqueness (Neuhouser 2014, 65, note 5). The reason for natural human beings' complete satisfaction (the balance of desires and powers) lies not in them having had fewer needs, but rather in the moderate character of these needs, which reflected a state of indifference to nature's plurality caused by their lack of awareness of their uniqueness. The only individuality that could be attributed to them was negative, i.e., not being controlled by others. Intense desires and emotions (hate, love, shame, hope) did not characterize their cognitive state, since their development was conditioned by reflexive and relative thinking that developed only in society (SD 27-8, 51-3), i.e., only where humans conceived themselves as creatures with individual desires. The power of these desires lays in the fact that they were directed at specific objects, and this is the difference between achieving happiness through a simple system of needs designed to release humans from physical pain and a system of needs that aims to lead to happiness through morality (E 38-44). I will use love and hate to demonstrate this point:

The physical is that general desire which inclines one sex to unite with the other. The moral is that which determines this desire and fixes it exclusively on a single object [...]. [L]imited solely to that which is physical in love [... natural] men must feel the ardors of their temperament less frequently and less vividly, and consequently have fewer and less cruel disputes among themselves. (SD 38-9)

Natural humans were indifferent to aspects of love that went beyond the corporeal – sexual relations – and stemmed from temporary desire and did not lead to the establishment of a family, as they were not preceded by intense excitement (SD 28-30). Such indifference is appropriate for creatures whose entire existence has been reduced to the present. In eliminating pain, they found complete satisfaction, as they were bothered neither by their past, nor by the future consequences of their actions (D 159; C 204). The inability to love must also mean the inability to hate, and thus, struggles did not deviate from the point in time at which they occurred, were not preceded by planning, and did not develop into war, in the same way that reciprocal relationships could never develop into peace. In a moral (social) relationship, love becomes powerful and dangerous, since it is a state in which individuals feel that the object of their love has no substitute, i.e., their happiness is dependent on one source that is not under their control, and this undermines the stability of happiness. But I focus here on what I believe is more significant for understanding the puzzling nature of happiness.

The problem lies in Rousseau's recognition that the awareness of uniqueness means that positive and negative emotions, present and future, human beings and their fellows cannot be harmoniously united or separated because nature and history are intertwined. It is only in hypothetical philosophical discussions that hate and love can be identified as opposite states, while, in reality, those who find happiness in love must also experience hate, jealousy, or fear of what they perceive as a threat to the proper fulfillment of their love (HP 67; SD 35).

Between the laxity, complacency, and stupidity that led to the happiness of natural humans and the restlessness and enslavement to pride that caused the misery of the modern citizen, Rousseau describes the Golden Age of societies that achieved domestic happiness (SD 46-8). In these primitive societies, human beings maintained a simple and egalitarian system of needs, with the crucial difference between them and humans in the natural state being that the happiness of the former stemmed "from one source only, unspoiled family love," (Shklar 1969, 21) which in Rousseau's thought becomes an element that expresses the 'the supreme happiness of life.' (E 497; J 115) Efficient work processes created leisure, allowing human beings to increase their well-being through the endless creation of needs, which later became habits that required dependence, hence creating social inequality in connection with which Rousseau describes the loss of innocence and happiness (and not in connection with natural inequality) (SD 47). Rousseau's frequently repeated argument that the solution to misery may be found in the balance of desires and powers (E 211) implies an individualistic conception of happiness since individuals must choose a path that suits them to reach this balance (Salkever 1978). But the fact that according to Rousseau doing this will not bring happiness, as I explain below, directs us to a different understanding of the source of misery. Of course, misery stems from an imbalance between desires and powers, but the more significant question is what undermines a balanced state, or, in other words, what exactly made humans feel 'uneasy in the bosom of happiness' (J 38) and what this tells us about their happiness in the first place. I refer to the loss of happiness that characterized the Golden Age, and not humans' exit from the happy state of nature, which is described as the result of external changes (especially natural disasters) that forced people, in light of their most basic motive – the pursuit of welfare (*bien-être*) in the sense of self-love – to develop, on the basis of their perfectibility, latent cognitive capacities to survive (SD 45; SC 138). Since in every society people judge their situations by comparing themselves with others, the claim that *amour-propre* characterized the psychological fabric of these primitive and happy societies is valid,⁷ and therefore *amour-propre* should not be seen as a source of misery. The solution to deep restlessness or dissatisfaction that I seek to offer concerns the fact that natural differences between human beings, which preceded history, but are not detached from it, have become a major aspect of existence. It

⁷ See Neuhouser (2014, 82) and Warner (2018, 7).

is important to distinguish between unique character and natural inequality, since the latter assumes a social existence in which uniqueness, expressed in personal desires, emotions, and thought, contains a relative dimension. Since the awareness of uniqueness occurs in a social framework that affects it, in principle social differences cannot truly reflect natural uniqueness. The source of misery lies not in this gap, but rather in a situation in which human beings are more concerned with the unequal and relative elements in themselves than the natural and universal elements (D 71). That is, instead of seeing compassion for others as a source of happiness, they believe that happiness is a matter of satisfying personal desires that do not express their unique natures, since they are influenced by time and place. These are arbitrary circumstances on which happiness must not depend, and which should be recognized as a means of establishing happiness by fulfilling human beings' beautiful and eternal elements (E 635; C 87). When the means become the end, humans are unhappy because they do not satisfy their natural needs and because their happiness depends on external elements that they do not control and that ultimately control them and cause them constant dissatisfaction (C 343). Yet it is important to understand that the external does not consist only of others, social institutions, norms, and so on, but also of the dimension of uniqueness that includes natural and historical elements that are indistinguishable from each other. This is what Rousseau means when he declares, "[o]ur sweetest existence is relative and collective, and our true self is not entirely within us." (HP 118)

I agree that for Rousseau "the great defect [of] the Golden Age [is that it] is dull and men are restless" and for this reason "[i]t cannot last" (Shklar 1969, 29). But I believe that the inability to "resolve the conflict between social duty and natural inclination" cannot be the reason that this age was "by definition, unstable and fleeting." (Shklar 1969, 58) Restlessness (the defect) is not the product of this conflict or any specific social setting but rather originates in humans' necessary awareness of the element of particularity in themselves and others. But before we can understand restlessness as natural, that is, before we can understand happiness as a desire that contradicts our historical nature, we must examine Rousseau's attempts to establish the optimal conditions for happiness, and, no less importantly, his awareness of his failure to do so. The transition from a moderate and static system designed to fulfill universal needs and characterized by indifference to all else to a powerful and constant war between individuals' desires, i.e., "the point where love of the self [*amour de soi*] turns into *amour-propre*," (E 235) reflects not the loss of happiness, but rather the need to establish harmony that was not expected to develop naturally. Because the need of all humans to express their individuality and gain recognition of it is natural in the context of social relations, happiness will be fulfilled by overcoming individual desires, and never by negating them, which would mean rejecting part of human beings' social nature (E 389; HP 73).

Rousseau's formula, which appears in various forms throughout his corpus, requires individuals to overcome their personal interests by choosing to do the noble deed. Doing so expresses the difference between natural humans (who care for themselves by avoiding pain) and moral humans (who care for themselves through painful sacrifice to reduce the suffering of others). By overcoming their personal desires, humans develop true self-esteem. That is, they are happy thanks to their recognition of their own fulfillment as spiritual and free moral creatures: "[man is] free in his actions and as such is animated by an immaterial substance [...]. The supreme enjoyment is in satisfaction with oneself; it is in order to deserve this satisfaction that we are placed on earth and endowed with freedom." (E 442-3) For Rousseau, natural pleasure is supposed to stem from the liberation from suffering and pain that preceded it (J 65; LD 293). In the state of nature, physical pain provided the only motivation for humans to act, and its reduction led to happiness, since humans did not differentiate themselves from their own natures or from natural phenomena. In society, these distinctions are inevitable, and therefore a need for self-esteem develops and is related to others in two main ways: in the most basic sense, others function as a necessary means through which humans can express compassion, that is, act freely. But because this action is not sufficient in itself, the positive recognition that people receive thanks to their choice to sacrifice their pleasures for the sake of others is necessary for them to be satisfied with themselves: "mak[ing] people happy [...] will leave us an everlasting sentiment of satisfaction." (J 97; SW 84)

Thus, humans' recognition of themselves and others as unique is necessary for their happiness, since overcoming the desires that develop in connection with this recognition will enable self-mastery, suffering, and positive recognition, all of which are required for them to be satisfied with themselves as creatures who have chosen to be loyal to their 'true sel[ves]' (HP 118) and fulfill their sublime purpose, as "there is no happiness without courage nor virtue without struggle." (E 633) Moral freedom lies not in noncompliance, but rather in obedience to one's reason: "[I]earn to become your own master [...] and you will be virtuous." (E 633) Rationality helps humans understand that caring for others is caring for their own well-being, their *amour de soi*, and this is suitable for a psychological structure in which a separation between people's conditions and those of their fellows is unnatural and unsatisfying, as it cannot create true self-esteem (SD 11). What makes happiness in society immeasurably superior to happiness in the state of nature is that only in the former does satisfaction stem from overcoming the suffering involved in morality (SC 141), that is, from the expression of free will, which was irrelevant in the state of nature, for, as Strauss argues, "natural man is characterized, not by freedom, but by perfectibility." (1965, 271, note 38) This is the positive element of Rousseau's conception of happiness, and it means that a life devoid of suffering is certainly not possible, but, even so, people in social frameworks are likely to suffer from this situation, as it negates both their ability to achieve freedom and their ability to be satisfied by doing so (J 570). The idea

that Rousseau has only a negative perception of happiness is based on the assumption that in his view “pleasure is the absence of pain, nothing positive.” (Strauss 2014, 126) According to Strauss, this view expresses a kind of Epicurean vulgarization, which, as mentioned above, is prevalent in the interpretive discourse. I claim that this interpretation expresses to a certain extent a vulgarization of Rousseau’s belief that pleasure derives its meaning from the freedom from suffering that preceded it. The error that allows the positive element to be ignored is expressed in the replacement of the notion of overcoming pain with the notion of absence of pain, without noticing that the latter characterizes happiness of the kind relevant only to the state of nature, in which, as Neuhouser aptly argues, “human animals do not differ [in terms of happiness] much from their nonhuman counterparts.” (2014, 139)

Rousseau’s clarification that the happiness of the moral person is completely different from that of the natural person means that the former does not reflect a lack of suffering, but overcoming suffering increases self-esteem through the fulfillment of authentic needs. Lack of attention to this aspect of happiness is apparent, as I argue above, among a wide and varied range of commentators who claim, in line with contemporary theories of well-being, that it is possible to distinguish between subjective (associated with pleasure, satisfaction, positive emotions) and objective (associated with moral duty, honor, health) well-being. The problem is that, for Rousseau, happiness is not pleasure, since it expresses satisfaction based on something stable and eternal in human nature, i.e., compassion, the fulfillment of which is not sufficient in itself, but is nevertheless necessary for individuals’ ability to be satisfied with their sincere concern for themselves, which involves undergoing torments that express their concern for others.⁸

It may be said that the interpretation of moral freedom proposed here characterizes Isaiah Berlin’s (2013) notion of ‘positive liberty,’ which is based on the distinction between superior and inferior elements of human nature (authentic emotions and individual desires, respectively), and according to which freedom is expressed solely in fulfilling the former by controlling the latter. But seeing Rousseau as part of this philosophical stream provides only a partial explanation, since ‘negative liberty,’ which is based on the principles of individualistic development and autonomy, plays a crucial role in his pessimistic conclusion regarding happiness. I suggest that his three well-known attempts to achieve happiness failed due to the impossibility of reconciling these notions of freedom which, as Berlin argues, are based on worldviews that essentially contradict each other.

But the conflict I seek to emphasize in what follows is not between a perception that sanctifies individuals’ freedom to determine the purpose of their

⁸ See Rousseau’s (2018) letter to M. D’Offreville. On the difference between sensual pleasure and sentiment of happiness, see Salkever (1978, 37-41).

lives and one that sees freedom as an expression of the fulfillment of a universal purpose of the human race, that is, between subjective and objective theories of happiness. The deeper contradiction lies in the contrast between the perception of humans as creatures who strive for perfect satisfaction and their definition as entities that strive for constant self-improvement. According to the former, movement and change are bad because of their source: pain and sorrow, while avoiding change, signifies liberation from evil: peace, tranquility, and satisfaction. According to the latter, good becomes evil because humans are perceived as creatures who are likely to suffer from a static state of complete satisfaction. Here evil becomes good, as befits a natural element – a unique character – that seeks to evolve frequently and the system of needs in which the dichotomy between satisfaction and its absence, and, in the more general sense, between the natural internal and the historical external so necessary for the pure sentiment of happiness, collapses.

3. Love of the General Self

In his political vision, Rousseau seeks to explain how a state that provides its citizens with happiness will ensure its survival, which is threatened by human beings' hope of improving their lives (HP 143-4). An image emerges of a static and happy society that seeks to reconcile the private interest with the general will by reducing the value of uniqueness in human existence.⁹ Rousseau's idea of turning love of the homeland into breast milk (HP 179) implies that the purpose of national education is to bring about a situation in which individuals strive for the common good without experiencing the great suffering that results from giving up their own desires.

One popular interpretation is that failure lies in the fact that an objective conception of happiness cannot be imposed on modern human beings, who seek their happiness in self-realization with the clear recognition that this quest requires the liberty to determine for themselves the means necessary to do so. According to this interpretation, love for the homeland completely satisfied the citizens of Sparta because they had not yet developed powerful personal desires (Graeme 2014, 73). I suggest that the ideal society would not provide its citizens with happiness not because they would be unable to freely fulfill their individual desires, but rather because it would prevent them from properly developing these, that is, it would prevent them from properly developing their natural uniqueness. Powerful private wills are necessary for happiness because self-esteem is made possible by overcoming them through an act in line with the general will, humans' 'real need[s].' (SC 201)

⁹ See, for example, the oath: "I unite my self by body, by possessions, by will, and by all my power to the Corsican nation in order to belong to it in all property, my self and all that depends on me." (HP 158)

Humans are born good, but not moral, because morality requires a struggle with the self: "virtue is a state of war [...] [L]iving in it means one always has some battle to wage against oneself." (J 560) Only victory (overcoming the 'private self') will provide happiness, since loss (privileging individual desires at the expense of the 'true self') is the most significant source of social misery that stems from the shame involved in humans' awareness of their failure to satisfy their authentic needs (J 560; E 446). In other words, a society run according to the general will indeed expresses a universal externalization of compassion (Cohen 2010, 125-7), but it weakens the necessary mental struggle involved in freedom, and with it the supreme self-esteem and sublime self-satisfaction that acquire their meaning, for a reflexive entity, through the suffering that preceded them, which individuals must choose by their own free will (SC 200; J 33; SW 51, 72; E 635; HP 134). There is no doubt that the citizens of the ideal state would tend to easily give up self-interest for the sake of 'general happiness,' (SC 192) but doing so would not be likely to cause them to value their existence since duty must involve overcoming a powerful internal foundation. In the state of nature, self-esteem was irrelevant, since humans did not act out of self-perception, and therefore did not conceive their happiness in terms of duty. This is not the case in social relationships, where a dialectical relationship between universal and individual elements should lead to happiness that is based on duty, as Rousseau implies when he suggests, "let us be good in the first place, and then we shall be happy. Let us not demand the prize before the victory." (E 444) Because it is natural for social humans to strive to express their superiority over others, and since differences are in part natural, the purpose is not to abolish them, but rather to make them a reflection of only the universal element of human nature. This means that social status is determined by conduct that reflects the duty of the citizen. For example, in the constitutions of Poland and Corsica, it is not inequality that is negated, but only the external and false element that characterizes it in modernity (property, honor, luxury, talent), which should be replaced by moral behavior to create a condition in which humans' loyalty to their homeland proves their loyalty to their universal authentic emotions and needs (HP 178, 210-3). But the attempt to position social differences on a universal, egalitarian foundation to reduce the tension between the general will and private interest, i.e., to reach a state where the individual acts in accordance with the former while remaining completely indifferent to the latter (SC 170, 219; C 47), is both paradoxical and unnatural. It is paradoxical because the general will expresses freedom solely out of a conflict with private desires: "I have never believed that man's freedom consisted in doing what he wants." (SW 56) A framework that seeks civic freedom and social solidarity by reducing the importance of individual desires contradicts itself because it requires human beings to realize their freedom by going against the element that gives meaning to freedom in a social framework. It is not natural because the basis for determining social differences should be natural inner qualitative elements and not the natural universal element of humans, which makes all differences quantitative (e.g., the

different degrees to which citizens fulfill their duties). I believe Rousseau's conclusion that "[t]he more these natural forces are dead and destroyed [...] the more the institution as well is solid and perfect" (SC 155) reflects his awareness of the tension between his ideal society and the unique nature of humans. This is a fundamental incongruity between the attempt to establish a perfect, natural, and ahistorical society and the fact that humans are incomplete creatures because they are historical creatures. The problem is that Rousseau seeks simple or negative happiness appropriate for humans in the state of nature in a future social setting – "Corsicans, here is the model that you ought to follow to return to your primitive state" (HP 165) – that will contradict simplicity not because of its specific organization, but rather because humans have become complex entities, self-aware and free individuals, due to social relationships. In *Dialogues*, Rousseau imagines a perfect world in which people are happy because they act only concerning their simple and natural needs. Their *amour de soi* is expressed in passive ease and a lack of restlessness and attests to their release from powerful desires that originate in *amour-propre* and cause the endless pursuit of external needs, subjection to others, and self-alienation. But their happiness is not based on morality: "[p]eople there are themselves good, whereas virtue among us often requires fighting." (D 10-11) Unlike the utopia described in *The Social Contract*, this perfect world does not function as a Platonic ideal to be realized but belongs to a later period of disillusionment with the idea of the possibility of establishing a happy society while devoting oneself to imagined happiness, which is always more enjoyable than any happiness that can be achieved in reality (D 119-21; C 545; HP 28). The image is illusory because the means of achieving moral freedom contradict the possibility of simple and moderate existence, which is based on the illusion that in society there are only two innate natural sources of human activity (happiness and pity) and ignores the third (natural inequality). As I will now argue, the illusion is also expressed in the fact that a perfect life can satisfy a person who is not whole, but free.

4. Love for Others

True love in a family setting in a rural society should provide happiness for three main reasons. First, it causes people to 'find pleasure in suffering,' (J 201) that is, to be satisfied with the suffering they feel when they choose to sacrifice their individual desires for the sake of what they see as their moral duty: the happiness of their loved ones (J 272). Second, love serves to balance desires and powers, since it causes humans to develop indifference to their other desires and strive to maintain their perfect state. Third, freedom, according to Rousseau, "is in the heart of the free man. He takes it with him everywhere," (E 667) and therefore "the enjoyment of virtue is a wholly inner one and is perceptible only to him who feels it." (J 400) The innerness of this enjoyment characterizes the kind of sentiment that stems from love: "happiness followed me everywhere; it was not in any definable thing, it was entirely in me, it could not depart from me for a single

instant.” (C 189) Unlike love of the homeland, family love reflects the harmonious fulfillment of universal and individual elements of human nature (C 172).

The fact that the characters Rousseau, Emile, Sophie, and Julie fail to achieve happiness in romantic relationships points to Rousseau’s understanding that the goal of returning humans to the lost happiness of the Golden Age is unattainable. The unhappiness of Emile and Sophie, described in the posthumously published incomplete sequel to the story, may be interpreted in line with what Jeffery Church (2021) identifies as the ‘standard interpretation,’ according to which ‘[o]ur free, active nature,’ which involves free moral behavior compatible with our natural desire to “extend our being beyond our selves and what is given to us in this world,” turns itself into a passive, determined nature, indicating a state in which we are “moved by the desire and sensations we receive from the outside world,” and thus “lose ourselves in the eyes of others, as the public comes to determine our will.” (404-7) From this point of view, Emile and Sophie’s misery is the result of their move to Paris, with its corrupt society that is expected to defeat individuals and sentence them to endless and futile subjugation to external, unnatural desires.¹⁰ But this interpretation cannot fully explain the misery of Julie, who represents, from her marriage until her death, an exemplary ideal of authenticity. The difficulty stems from the fact that, in *Julie*, Rousseau maintains the formula for achieving happiness in society: “[y]our desires overcome will be the source of your happiness” (J 33) and “only in [self-esteem] can that permanent sentiment of inner satisfaction be found which alone can make a thinking being happy”. (J 69) Self-control is necessary for the pure sentiment of happiness: “[He] is master of his own felicity, because he is happy like God himself, without desiring anything more than what he already has.” (J 384) Julie’s morality contains satisfaction that points to her happiness as she strives to change nothing (J 453). Nonetheless, her firm conclusion that “there is no true happiness on earth” stems from the fact that, while she is thankful that everything is “conspiring toward [her] happiness [...] a single sorrow poisons it, and [she is] not happy.” (J 420-1) Her anguish is related to her husband’s choice of an atheistic way of life, which causes her “to see in the father of her children a mere reprobate.” (J 485)

Rousseau sees atheism as resulting from popular or metaphysical philosophy, both of which developed due to distorted social institutions and detract from humans’ ability to find their happiness in moral conduct (D 242). Thus, again, it may be said that the source of misery is society’s corruption, but individual interests, desires, illusions, social institutions, pleasures, and so on are negative only to the extent that they impair humans’ freedom and cause them misery, i.e., make their active natures passive (E 634; HP 103). It would therefore be more accurate, I claim, to argue that Julie’s misery is a direct product not of her husband’s atheism and the development of her negative feelings toward him

¹⁰ This is appropriate for the transition from *amour propre* to ‘inflamed amour propre,’ which leads to misery (Neuhouser 2014, 72, 120, 180).

(anxiety about his future in the next world) or toward herself (shame and guilt over her choice to live with him). Julie's problem will not be solved through repentance since, like private property, atheism is only a symptom of the real problem, which is that love is a natural feeling that allows individuals to feel a sublime sentiment that points to the fulfillment of their authentic emotional needs. But, at the same time, it is natural only in society, so it inevitably leads to a state in which external historical circumstances, which should be the means to achieving pure complete inner satisfaction, become an immanent part of happiness (J 400). By external, I mean neither her husband, nor the social norms that in the first place cause the tension between living with the man she loves and her love for her father, but rather her awareness of inner uniqueness, which produces the ability to love and make choices. Heinrich Meier (2016) notes that love relationships provide happiness, but because they involve another entity, the necessary stability required for happiness is compromised (183). There is no doubt that love is fragile because humans connect their happiness with the happiness of the ones they love (J 156, 184). Therefore, the powerful happiness Rousseau describes in *Confessions* turns out to be tenuous, since the unbearable misery stems from his lover's decision to leave him, i.e., in his words, "to separate her happiness from mine." (C 221) But love, like moral duty, reflects the notion that human beings' awareness of themselves as individual creatures expresses the loss of something meaningful in the nature of happiness. I refer here not to the inability to find complete satisfaction by fulfilling authentic needs, but rather to the inability to be happy in a state of complete satisfaction. Stability is undermined not because there is a possibility of separation from the beloved, just as it was not undermined by the possibility of others' lack of recognition of one's private land, but rather because of the nature of love, which, like any other powerful desire, originates in humans' uniqueness, from which develop desires that can never be fully satisfied given their historical nature. In all the happy moments in which Julie enjoys her existence and seeks to change nothing, there is also a fear of future factors that could undermine her situation, as well as hope for a future identical to the present. A struggle to preserve or change the situation only distracts us from the real problem that the novel seeks to depict, and which appears concisely in *Emile*: "[E]verything is mixed in this life; in it one tastes no pure sentiment." (E 210) The tragedy stems from the fact that, in *Julie*, Rousseau continues to embrace the notion that happiness expresses a natural wholeness that lacks any trace of negative emotion or thought of another state of existence while claiming it is not possible because, in society, humans have lost their ability to fully control their happiness (J 347, 558).

I refer here not to the loss of self-control that stems from people's inability to separate their self-esteem from others' opinions of them, but rather to people's inability to separate their self-esteem from their feelings toward others, i.e., the inability to experience something meaningful without the involvement of emotions and thoughts that go beyond the self and the present moment and

contaminate the purity of happiness.¹¹ For a social creature, such separation is possible only in the imagination, and therefore Rousseau makes it clear that an erotic image is always more perfect than its realization, since it does not contain the negative emotions (fear, shame) that must exist in every manifestation of romantic relationships (J 41). This view is consistent with the conclusion mentioned above regarding utopian political images, which are always better than reality, since only the image can be under the complete control of the individual, and only in it can we imagine people who live in society, but because their psychological structure is suited to the state of nature in the sense that they are unaware of their natural inequality, they do not hope to improve their lives (D 119; HP 28). Solitude expresses individuals' control over their lives and is conceived as a means of experiencing the sublime sentiment of existence (Meier 2016, 45, 118, 182, 210, 212). What is most interesting here is the way in which Rousseau's awareness that this sublime feeling is not happiness is connected to his declaration that happiness itself is an illusion (Wokler 2001, 147). In the context of the present article, the significant innovation can be found in two points. The first is the idea that the most radical source of the inability to achieve happiness is not the form of government or institutions, but rather the very existence of social life: "my independent natural temperament always made me incapable of the subjection necessary to anyone who wants to live among man." (SW 56) The second is the notion that the main psychological impact of living in society, the one that makes us restless, is the source of the solution, which is not achieving happiness, but rather understanding that happiness itself is a problematic ideal for individualistic creatures.

5. Love of the Unique Self

Already on his first walk, Rousseau claims: "I am a hundred times happier in my solitude than I could ever be living among them." (SW 5) This statement should not be seen as the abandonment of the necessary connection between moral freedom and self-esteem leading to happiness, which, as in other works, appears here quite clearly: "I know and feel that to do good is the truest happiness the human heart can savor; but it is a long time now since this happiness has been put out of my reach." (SW 29-30) Thus, in his last work, too, it is impossible to argue for a change in the formula for the fulfillment of happiness: "[by means of] general and abstract truth [...] man learns to direct himself [...] toward his true end [...] to achieve happiness." (SW 34) Because human beings' assessment of themselves as moral beings is defined as the ultimate achievement, and because morality and positive recognition from others exist solely in the context of social relations, Rousseau is most consistent in his awareness that solitude and happiness contradict each other (SW 29-34, 55, 61). But must this be a pessimistic conclusion? The pursuit of happiness is conceptualized as an initial desire that nature has

¹¹ A mental state of peace means freedom from fear and hope (Meier 2016, 199).

planted in every human being “and the only one which never leaves us.” (E 630) In the early texts, the contrast between happiness and misery is clear-cut (SD 12), as it draws its meaning from the binary contrast between the good (static, pleasurable) and the bad (unstable, changing, painful). Happiness characterizes the static state of enjoying the fulfillment of authentic needs, while misery characterizes restlessness that stems from the pursuit of the approval and recognition of being superior to others. Optimism stems from the fact that it is not humans in general who are miserable, but only modern humans, and thus the utopian image draws its power from historical examples of people’s successes in achieving happiness by being loyal to their true selves. Theater criticism, for example, is aimed toward modern urban life, and the innovation is not that external, distorted desires and pleasures are created due to the moral corruption that the theater promotes, but rather that they are created due to the distorted need, relevant only to modern people, for such an institution (J 208). Therefore, “if we had the same maxims [as in Sparta] a Theater could be established at Geneva without any risk; for never would Citizen or Townsman set foot in it.” (LD 300) This optimism was gradually abandoned due to Rousseau’s understanding that the things that make us miserable (private property, honor, luxury, powerful desires, pride, corrupt institutions) and the things that should make us happy (love relationships, marriage, self-esteem, moral freedom) do not represent the contrast between the artificial and the natural, since they are all related, in one way or another, to the same natural-historical source: awareness of the uniqueness of humankind. Rousseau does explain why perfect satisfaction will be sufficient for a simple and non-reflexive person, and, in this context, his objections to the misery of the relational modern person, who is constantly striving to fulfill external and artificial needs, are also understandable. However, it is not clear why dissatisfaction must make a social person miserable, since it is unclear why the deep psychological change that took place profoundly changed the meaning of freedom without a radical change taking place in the meaning of happiness. If happiness expresses a sense of pure wholeness without any desire for change and is characterized by a balance between passions and powers, and if dissatisfaction that results from a lack of such a balance is a consequence of a social existence that is necessary for survival, then what we have before us is radical pessimism. Escape from pessimism is possible only to the extent that the paradox that Rousseau revealed, i.e., that happiness will not satisfy human beings, indicates that the solution lies in a different understanding of the problem: to the extent that the source of restlessness is natural and universal, happiness becomes an unnatural purpose for an entity with natural-historical elements.

6. Radical Pessimism?

God alone enjoys an absolute happiness. But who among us has the idea of it? If some imperfect being could suffice unto himself, what would he enjoy according to us? He would be alone; he would be miserable. I do not conceive how someone

who needs nothing can love anything [...] how someone who loves nothing can be happy. (E 372)

Woe to him who has nothing left to desire! He loses [...]. One is happy only before happiness is achieved [...]. He who could do anything without God would be a miserable creature [...] deprived of the pleasure of desiring; any other deprivation would be more bearable than that. (J 569-70)

In Rousseau's time, it was common to differentiate between perfect happiness attributed to the next world and partial happiness in this world. These quotes, however, are not intended to emphasize the hierarchy between the types of happiness associated with each world. I believe Rousseau's argument is different: perfect satisfaction will not satisfy humans in this world. His late conclusion that "[r]epose and freedom appear incompatible to me; it is necessary to choose" (HP 170) indicates that the problem lies not in finding the optimal formula for achieving harmony between happiness and morality, but rather in the idea that social humans, and not only modern ones, cannot be satisfied by being free from suffering since freedom is conceived in terms of the dynamic project of self-realization. As mentioned above, happiness is defined as a situation in which the dominant desire according to which the rest of the set of desires is organized is the desire to prevent change. But Rousseau also challenges this view: "if the state which makes us happy lasted endlessly, the habit of enjoying it would take away our taste for it. If nothing changes from without, the heart changes. Happiness leaves us, or we leave it." (E 636) According to the interpretation that I have proposed, the source of dissatisfaction or restlessness is not the social structure or the type of love that develops as a result of it, but rather a natural element that develops solely in a social framework. Thus, it is possible to interpret the claim that "[w]e are so little made to be happy" (C 207) in a positive way. Instead of seeking the best formula for happiness, we should look for the optimal conditions for fulfilling something else for which we were created. In all of Rousseau's writings, freedom is expressed in the fulfillment of natural elements of human beings. In his last text, this element is uniqueness, and the goal is to express it in a way that is not relative to others. But the most significant revelation is that this element is perceived as an organic, pluralistic, and wild entity that, by nature, is open and develops in unexpected ways (D 150, 158). Leonard Sorenson (1990) argues that the prevailing interpretive trend, and the correct one in his view, is to understand natural inequality primarily as concerning intellectual differences. I believe, however, in line with Neuhausser's understanding of natural inequality as differences 'of body, mind, and character,' (2014, 14, 24) that inequality is much more complex and also involves temperament, abilities, talents, tendencies, and skills.

According to Eli Friedlander (2000), in his solitude, Rousseau portrays the pleasure of existence as unrelated to the psychological plane (the opposite of pain), free of any interest, purpose, or passion, and characterized by openness to the world. Unlike scholars who see his last text as an expression of a new ideal of life

that indicates sublime philosophical happiness (Strauss 1965; Meier 2016), Friedlander is careful not to identify this mental condition as happiness, and, in the context of the present article, the question is what this means. I believe that the idea that, if happiness is achieved, we will abandon it, entails a different conception of freedom. This conception is different than both the one according to which we realize our morality by controlling our private desires, as in objective theories of happiness, and the one in which freedom consists of fulfilling individual goals, as in subjective theories of happiness. This new view maintains the basic structure of freedom – the realization of our nature – but the element that should be realized was not relevant in the state of nature, as it developed with the transition from a general and static system of needs aimed at full satisfaction through the elimination of pain to an individual system aimed at constantly enriching natural skills and powers. Social relationships decrease the possibility that this kind of freedom will be realized, since relativity turns the enrichment of natural uniqueness into development based on competition.

The pleasure of loving our unique selves involves self-enrichment that characterizes negative morality (not harming others), which is in line with the negative definition of the self – free from others and all matters of society and time. But it is important to note that such indifference did not characterize the state of nature and was not expressed in complete inaction after the negation of pain, nor does it characterize love relationships by causing humans to be indifferent to any other matter than preserving their love. Rather, it is expressed in choices that intensify people's love for their unique characters (SW 7). In *Emile* (341-3), the development of unique qualities is often perceived as a means of achieving a good civic life, and, in *Julie* (461-4), we are first exposed to the development of the unique element as a purpose in itself. In many respects, the self that Rousseau portrays in his solitude appears symbolically in Julie's secret garden – Elysium – which is described as a "solitary place where the sweet sight of nature alone would banish from my memory all this social and factitious order that has made me so unhappy." (J 399) The words Saint-Preux uses for his impression of the garden point to Rousseau's understanding of its novelty: "I was looking at the wildest, most solitary place in nature, and it seemed to me I was the first mortal who ever had set foot in this wilderness." (J 387) Julie confirms "that nature did it all, but under my direction, and there is nothing here that I have not designed." (J 388) Elysium signifies "a sort of well-being that the wicked have never known; it is to enjoy being alone with oneself." (J 400) The perfect design symbolizes freedom in the sense of activity that suits Julie's unique natural character, but what does the wilderness symbolize? I believe it symbolizes the natural-historical structure of the particular self, which is constantly changing. With work, "every moment of the day [will reveal] some new beauty" in the self, as in the garden (J 390). In his political texts, Rousseau emphasizes that natural pleasure should be the result of ending the efforts of the work process itself, and not of artificial amusement, and this is consistent with his moral theory, in which a sublime satisfaction should

originate in overcoming the suffering involved in virtue. In contrast, Julie's work in her garden is pleasing in itself, in the same way that botany is pleasing (SW 64-5), since it expresses the cultivation of Rousseau's natural love of plants and has no external motive (e.g., the need to transcend others or gain their recognition). The pleasure involved in this kind of work should not be understood in terms of satisfaction or the balance of desires and powers, since serenity is conceptualized as an unbearable static situation that contradicts an element of the self that aims not for satisfaction or development, but rather for enrichment. In this sense, we can think of Rousseau's conclusion in a positive way: "[h]appiness is a permanent condition which does not seem to be made for man here-below [...]. Everything around us changes. We ourselves change, and no one can be assured tomorrow what he likes today. Thus, all our plans for felicity in this life are idle fancies." (SW 78) It is important to understand that the transition from a life that is uniform in terms of homogeneous, natural, and simple needs (E 424) to a model of constant, unpredictable, and uneven development of needs (C 537) preserves the idea of freedom as a practice in which humans fulfill their nature, with the difference being that, in the latter case, the element that is fulfilled – uniqueness – has historical and natural foundations. Solitude does not express an attempt to return to the state of nature, but is intended to free humans from hierarchizing their diverse activities, thus making the whole of existence, nature and history alike, equally loved. Self-enrichment represents a unity of nature and history in line with humans' historical nature, and, from this point of view, happiness is natural only in the state of nature and becomes a negative illusion in history.

7. Conclusion

I have attempted here to claim that Rousseau's failure to achieve pure happiness by overcoming historical circumstances to fulfill humans' eternal nature is connected to his perception of natural inequality as a phenomenon that is both natural (internal) and historical (external). This situation leads him to strive for the impossible: harmony between a perception of freedom that indicates humans' awareness of themselves as individual entities whose happiness lies in overcoming their historical aspect (individual desires) by being loyal to their universal emotions and the kind of happiness that befits people who act out of complete indifference to their uniqueness and therefore see freedom in perfect satisfaction characterized by the absence of all pain and suffering. From the point of view of nature, happiness is the goal and "[t]he happiest is he who suffers the least pain," (E 80) while the observation of humans in history leads to the opposite conclusion: "[t]o live without pain is not a human condition; to live thus is to be dead." (J 570) The solution I offer here is to reject happiness by understanding the unique self as a new universal foundation for morality, which, because of its dualistic character, brings about the reconciliation of nature and history. It is a partial solution not only because it does not involve compassion, and not only because Rousseau never explicitly claims that happiness is a negative ideal, but

especially because, in most of his works, he clings to the Platonic tradition in thinking of truth as static, unchangeable perfection, embracing Berkeley's notion that "[a]ll change argues imperfection." (2009, 57) Perfection or wholeness must involve the absence of all change (SC 155), and therefore Rousseau could not disagree with his contemporary's conclusion that "[t]he happiest man is he who least desires to change his rank and circumstances." (Du Châtelet 2009, 359) Strauss (1965) argues that the first crisis of modernity was expressed in Rousseau's philosophy, in which his return to Antiquity was articulated in an original conception that rejected elements that modern thinkers of his time continued to embrace. Accordingly, I have sought to clarify that what makes Rousseau's thought a significant crossroads lies in points where its originality is reflected not only in the immanence of truth and the conception of freedom in relation to it, as argued in genealogies of the ideal of authenticity, but also in the attainment of this truth as a dynamic, concrete process that involves nature and history.

If the purpose of existence is self-enrichment rather than happiness, then the pain, suffering, and anguish that indicate dissatisfaction as a basis for every movement must become desirable and satisfying. In this paradox, Rousseau offers us the theoretical basis for the belief of many nineteenth-century thinkers that positive satisfaction should not be identified as happiness since it must involve positive suffering that allows individuals to continue to develop their unique inner structures. Hegel's conclusion that "[h]appiness is the mere abstract and merely imagined universality of things desired ... [a] baseless chimera" (2003, 236-8) is related to his notion that "every sensation of happiness is connected with sensation of melancholy," and to his "insist[ing] so greatly on the distinction between 'being satisfied' and happiness." (Pinkard 2000, 298) Marx's critique of Stirner's "desire to promote happiness [which is proof] of how strongly he is held in thrall to existing bourgeois society" (1975, vol. 5, 416) is connected to his notion of freedom as a "manifestation of [...] human *activity* and human *suffering*, for suffering, humanly considered, is a kind of self-enjoyment of man." (vol. 3, 300, emphasis in the original). Nietzsche (2012, 216) outlines an ideal of life in which freedom reflects what he calls 'suffering happiness' (*leidendes Glück*). I provide these quotations not to oversimplify the profound differences between these thinkers, but rather to clarify that the choice not to see man as a creature whose natural purpose is satisfaction reflects a radical turning point. We need to return to Rousseau to understand why the most prevalent synthesis today – the one between authenticity and happiness – is enabled by ignoring the deep tension that stems from the very different conceptions of human nature that stand at the foundation of each of these ideals. What is missing is a critical discussion of the profound revolution that indeed took place, i.e., the emergence of a concept of freedom that symbolized not the abandonment of objective theories of happiness in favor of subjective ones, but rather the abandonment of both due to a perception according to which freedom (thought of as an open, dynamic process

of self-enrichment) and satisfaction (which indicates the end of a need) come, in some sense, to contradict each other.

This idea was recently proposed by Ute Frevert (2019), who argues that perfect and static satisfaction, which characterized happiness in the Middle Ages, is rejected by modern thinkers who see the struggle of personal development as a necessary part of happiness. I believe that Rousseau can be seen as one of the most significant thinkers behind this change, but in my view, this is not a matter of shaping a new ideal of happiness, but rather of negating it in favor of another ideal of life based on a dynamic and open perception of truth, one of whose significant sources is none other than one of its most resolute opponents, Rousseau.

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The Moral Status of AGI-enabled Robots: A Functionality-Based Analysis

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Abstract: For a long time, researchers of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and futurists have hypothesized that the developed Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) systems can execute intellectual and behavioral tasks similar to human beings. However, there are two possible concerns regarding the emergence of AGI systems and their moral status, namely: 1) is it possible to grant moral status to the AGI-enabled robots similar to humans? 2) if it is (im)possible, then under what conditions do such robots (fail to) achieve moral status similar to humans? To examine the possibilities, the present study puts forward a functionality argument, which claims that if a human being and an AGI-enabled robot have similar functionality, but different creative processes, they may have similar moral status. Furthermore, the functionality argument asserts that an entity's (a human being or an AGI-enabled robot) creation/production from carbon or silicon or its brain's utilization of neurotransmitters or semiconductors does not carry any significance. Rather, if both entities have similar functionality, they may have similar moral status, which implies that the AGI-enabled robot may achieve human-like moral status if it performs human-like functions.

Keywords: Ethics of AI, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), functionalism, functionality argument, moral status.

Introduction

Suppose you and a robot work on a project together in the future. The robot is enabled with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), which may perform intellectual and behavioral tasks similar to yours. Let us suppose the robot can think, ride, drive, cook, write a research paper, play football, and so forth, similarly to you. Despite all these functional similarities, we must admit that you are a biological entity born out of natural reproduction. However, the robot is a non-biological entity born out of programming. Both of you are functionally similar, but the creation process is different. Here, a question may arise whether it is right to lie to or mistreat the robot. Or, if one of your friends comes to the office and starts mistreating or misbehaving with the robot, will you stop your friend and ask him to be polite with the robot? Since you know that the robot is functionally similar to you (or your friend). To be precise, the robot can think similarly to you (and your friend) and understand the mistreatment or misbehaviour. Or will you not react to your friend's behavior because biologically (or physically) you both are not similar to the robot? In such a situation, if you consider it morally wrong to mistreat the robot, what kind of moral status or rights can we confer to the robot? Is it possible to grant human-like moral status to such robots? As it is assumed

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that the primary purpose of developing AI is to serve the interest of humans, the moral status of robots is becoming increasingly important. One may presume that future AI may get human-like moral status by looking at the present AI systems' moral and legal rights. In 2017 a humanoid robot called Sophia, developed by Hanson Robotics, was granted citizenship by Saudi Arabia. The European Parliament proposed to confer electronic personhood and legal rights to specific AI systems. Given these developments, there is a scope to think about granting human-like moral status to the AGI-enabled robots. This paper puts forward a functionality-based approach to examine the possibility of conferring human-like moral status to AGI-enabled robots. To look into the possibilities, this paper is divided into four sections. The first section of this paper talks about the basic understanding of the concept of intelligence and AI. Based on intelligence and AI, this paper estimates the conception of AGI. The second section discusses the concept of moral status. This section looks into the Turing triage test, a hypothetical scenario introduced by Robert Sparrow to examine the importance of future AI's moral status. The third section criticizes the intelligence and sentience arguments as the criteria for conferring moral status to intelligent systems. The fourth section discusses the theory of Functionalism. Based on Functionalism, this paper puts forward a functionality argument. The argument states that if the AGI system can have human-like functionality, it may have human-like moral status.

1.(a) Intelligence

In this section, we discuss the gradual development of the concept of intelligence in the literature of psychology. The main objective of this section is to offer a rough estimation of the idea of AGI. Before sketching, what is intelligence? We must stress that intelligence is one of the most debatable subjects in psychology. Intelligence may be described but cannot be fully defined since various psychologists give various definitions of intelligence. Roughly, intelligence is the capability to reason, think logically, imagine, learn, and apply judgment. As Sparrow states, "intelligence is generalizable; it is capable of doing these things across a wide range of problems and contexts." (2004, 204). Legg and Hutter (2007) collected 70 informal definitions of intelligence in their paper *A Collection of Definitions of Intelligence*. They deduct some common features of intelligence out of the 70 definitions; *firstly*, intelligence is a quality of an individual agent through which it interacts with its environment. *Secondly*, intelligence is an agent's ability to achieve success concerning a particular goal or target. And *thirdly*, intelligence determines the ability of an individual agent to adapt to varied goals and situations. (Legg and Hutter 2007, 9). There are several intelligence theories, such as the g-factor, primary mental abilities, the theory of multiple intelligence, and the triarchic intelligence theory. Charles Spearman (Spearman 1904; quoted in Pal, Pal and Tourani 2004, 181-182) proposes the g-factor theory of intelligence, a traditional psychological indicator of intelligence.

Spearman talks about two factors: the 'g' factor, which is general intelligence, and the 's' factor, which is specific. The 's' or specific factor refers to distinct, singular, and special activities and abilities. However, all intellectual factors have a single factor, called the *g-factor* or general intelligence, that underlines all specific abilities. For instance, people may have particular talents like playing cricket, playing the harmonium, singing, writing poems, etc. All of these specific talents fall under the *g-factor*. Psychologist Louis L. Thurstone (Thurstone 1938; quoted in Cherry 2022, 2) focuses on a different theory of intelligence based on primary mental abilities. He offers seven primary cognitive abilities instead of a single general intelligence, for instance, Associative memory, Numerical ability, Perceptual speed, Reasoning, Spatial visualization, Verbal comprehension, and Word fluency. Howard Gardner (Gardner 1983; quoted in Pal, Pal and Tourani 2004, 183-184) also mentions that we do not have just an intellectual capacity. He divides intelligence into eight specialized-intelligence components (known as the *theory of multiple intelligence*), namely *logical-mathematical, visual-spatial intelligence, linguistic-verbal, musical intelligence, bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, interpersonal intelligence, intrapersonal intelligence, and naturalistic intelligence*. Robert Sternberg (Sternberg 1985; quoted in Cherry 2022, 3) gives a different approach where he differentiates three aspects of intelligence (*triarchic theory of intelligence*) such as *componential intelligence, contextual intelligence, and experiential intelligence*. *Componential (analytical) intelligence is the capacity to analyze information and solve issues. This intelligence includes logic, abstract reasoning, speaking ability, and mathematical ability. Contextual intelligence, also known as practical intelligence, applies information and knowledge to real-life situations. This kind of intelligence can adapt to a changing environment. And finally, experiential or creative intelligence is the mind's capacity to learn and adapt through experience. This kind of intelligence can come up with new ideas.* As a conclusion of this review of various approaches, intelligence refers to the capacity to attain goals in an extensive range of situations. Here, the ability to learn, adapt or understand is included since, through these abilities, an agent can succeed in an extensive range of situations. The subsequent section will discuss what AI means and the commonalities and differences between intelligence and AI.

1.(b) Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Artificial General Intelligence (AGI)

As we learn that there is little agreement on the definition of intelligence, similar disagreement is visible in the context of AI. In 1955, Stanford Professor John McCarthy originated the term artificial intelligence (AI) at a conference in Dartmouth. John McCarthy defines AI as the engineering and science of developing intelligent systems (Liao 2020, 3). Artificial Intelligence (in short, AI) is the sub-domain of Computer Science used to develop software programs that enable computers to exhibit intelligent behavior (Thomas 2020, 1). Or, AI reproduces

human intelligence in systems that can think like humans and imitate their activities. Bringsjord and Govindarajulu (2022) state,

AI is the field devoted to building artificial animals (or at least artificial creatures that – in suitable contexts – appear to be animals) and, for many, artificial persons (or at least artificial creatures that – in suitable contexts – appear to be persons). (1)

Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig define AI in four different manners, such as, a) acting like humans (acting humanly), b) thinking like humans (thinking humanly, c) thinking rationally and d) acting rationally (Russell and Norvig 2010; quoted in Liao 2020, 3). They give more interest in the (iv) option, that is, acting rationally or rational action of AI. Based on such understanding, AI can take various forms. The initial form of AI is symbolic AI or [good old-fashioned AI(GOFAI)], which dominated AI research and development from 1950 to 1980. Through logic and symbolic reasoning, symbolic AI portrays cognitive tasks like thinking, learning, and problem-solving. Such AI creates the input-output relationship using a sequence of explicitly designed if-then rules. This type of symbolic AI is based on rule engines, for instance, expert systems. It also contains knowledge graphs, which are graphical representations of information stored in databases. The fundamental disadvantage of such AI is that it is problematic to change the rules or data if encoded into an AI system. Machine learning (ML) is one more form of AI which employs an algorithm to learn from various data without being explicitly programmed. There may be three kinds of ML: supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning. Supervised learning is a kind of ML in which a given data set is labeled. Liao (2020) states that in supervised learning,

an algorithm is trained on a training data set in which the correct answers for certain data are known, and the data are labeled accordingly. This way, the algorithm can use the labeled information to learn the relationship between inputs and outputs. Once the algorithm is properly trained, it is then able to apply what it has learned to predict the correct answer in different (target) data sets. (3-4)

However, unsupervised learning doesn't label a given data set. The algorithm is capable of sorting the data on its own. In this type of learning, "through clustering, an algorithm aims to group data that are more similar to each other than data in other groups." (Liao 2020, 4) Reinforcement learning is a kind of ML where the algorithm attempts to learn through experience or trial and error. There is also advanced learning called Deep learning (DL), inspired by the structure of the human brain. According to López-Rubio (2018),

Deep learning is a kind of machine learning which happens in a certain type of artificial neural networks called deep networks. Artificial deep networks, which exhibit many similarities with biological ones, have consistently shown human-like performance in many intelligent tasks. (667)

In terms of DL, this structure is called an artificial neural network. (ANN).¹ DL employs ANN, which simulates neuron activities in the brain. The primary goal of this work is to simulate the human brain, i.e., learn concepts similarly to humans. Presently, DL is the most successful ML approach.

AI may be of three kinds: artificial narrow intelligence (ANI), artificial general intelligence (AGI), and artificial super intelligence (ASI). Here we will only discuss about ANI and AGI. In short, ASI is a hypothetical intelligence in which machines could exceed human intelligence and perform any task better than humans, and it is an outcome of AGI. The term 'narrow AI' was used by Ray Kurzweil in order to specify the development of AI systems that can execute particular intelligent behavior or tasks in particular areas. (Kurzweil 2005; quoted in Goertzel 2014, 1). Narrow AI algorithms are domain or task-specific, meaning the AI algorithms that are equivalent or superior to human intelligence are intentionally programmed only in a particular or restricted field. For instance, Deep Blue of IBM becomes the world champion in Chess after beating Gary Kasparov, the world champion. Though Deep Blue wins the chess championship, it can't even play checkers. Taylor, Kuhlmann and Stone state that narrow AI differs significantly from naturally intelligent systems, such as humans, which have a wide range of abilities (Taylor, Kuhlman and Stone 2008; quoted in Goertzel 2014, 1).

The primary objective of the AI field is to create software and hardware systems that can have general intelligence. Or thinking machines that are similar to or even more than human intelligence. In recent decades wider communities of AI researchers focused increasingly on the primary goal of the AI field. The concept of AGI emerges as opposite to ANI or 'narrow AI.' (Goertzel 2014, 1). We will get a better understanding of AGI by looking at the following features of general intelligence that the AGI community agreed upon. Firstly, general intelligence refers to the capacity to attain various goals and perform multiple activities in several circumstances. Secondly, a generally intelligent system has to be capable of dealing with difficulties and situations that its developers do not predict. Thirdly, a generally intelligent system has to be capable of generalizing its acquired knowledge in order to move it from one context or problem to another context or problem (Goertzel 2014, 1-3). Goertzel and Pennachin (2007) state that

¹ The model of ANN is based on a neural network. Approximately one hundred billion neurons exist in the human brain. Every neuron is united to 1000 (approximately) neurons through synapses, giving the brain about one hundred trillion connections. An artificial neural network (ANN) is composed of artificial neurons that are simpler relative to natural ones. In pattern recognition, neural networks are efficient. For instance, it is not necessary to program the criteria used by humans to recognize a cow in an image if anyone wants to teach a neural network to do the same. In the human case, there is no problem distinguishing between two animals, i.e., cows and goats. A human may explain the distinctions to some extent; nevertheless, very few (probably no one) can provide a thorough list of all criteria employed in the identification. This is an example of tacit knowledge learned through examples and counterexamples. A similar type of learning process is employed in neural networks.

these characteristics depend on a certain level of human intelligence and hypothesize that

the multiple specializations nature of human intelligence will be shared by any AGI systems operating with similarly limited resources, but as with much else regarding AGI, only time will tell. (7)

However, later Goertzel states that AGI is reasonably an abstract concept that is not inherently linked to any specific human features. Some qualities of human general intelligence might be universal to all-powerful AGIs, but considering our limited understanding of general intelligence, it is unclear what these might be (Goertzel 2014, 6).

We need to keep in mind that natural intelligence and artificial intelligence are different. Certainly, both may share some standard features, but they are different in many cases. In 1976 Joseph Weizenbaum, in his book, *Computer Power and Human Reason* (Weizenbaum 1976; quoted in Fjelland 2020, 2) distinguished between human reason and computer power. According to Joseph, human reason and computers are fundamentally diverse. Computer power has the capacity to employ algorithms at an incredible speed. However, human reason is based on Aristotelean prudence and wisdom. Prudence is the capacity to take or make the correct decision in specific circumstances, whereas wisdom is the capacity to grasp the entire picture. Human reason is not algorithmic. Thus, it is not possible to develop computer power into human reason. Similarly, human reason cannot substitute computer power. Roger Penrose (Penrose 1989, 1994; quoted in Fjelland 2020, 2) also mentions that our (human) thinking is not algorithmic. Certainly, the field of AGI is a new field of study on a relatively early stage of development. Based on the features discussed above, we can estimate AGI as the subfield of AI, which has the capacity to resolve general problems and handle problems and circumstances by itself. It also has the ability to acquire knowledge from other intelligent beings and their environment, like humans. As I already mentioned, AGI presently does not exist; however, the development of AGI has become a heated topic in the media and academic circles. As AI technology is evolving extraordinarily, there is a chance to develop AGI systems in the future. The future existence of AGI brings questions, such as: can the AGI achieve moral status? if so, what kind of moral status does such a system deserve? is it possible to grant it with human-like moral status or not? if we grant the AGI human-like moral status, what is the ground, or under what condition, may it be granted human-like moral status? This paper aims to give light on this kind of related questions. To do so, it is helpful to have an idea of what moral status represents.

2. Moral Status

In his paper called *The Turing Triage Test* Robert Sparrow (2004, 206-207) proposes a hypothetical situation where he talks about the moral status of future AI. The situation goes like this; you are a top medical officer in a hospital. The

hospital employs a powerful AI system for diagnosing diseases. The AI system can learn, reason, and make decisions independently. It can also have conversations with the doctors of the hospitals regarding the patients. Furthermore, the system can pass the Turing test² since people cannot identify whether it is a human or an intelligent machine when communicating with doctors at other hospitals over the phone (or with hospital employees or patients) via intercommunication. The hospital also has an ICU (intensive care unit) facility where six patients may benefit of the life support system. Now imagine the electricity service of the hospital is shut down due to a catastrophe. It may take some time to restore the hospital's electricity service. Then, there are only two patients in the ICU. Though the hospital has a power backup system, it is also seriously affected due to catastrophic events. The technician informs you that the available power will end very soon. However, with the available backed-up power, only one patient can survive on the full life support system. At that moment, you have to decide which patient should get continuous life support. If you don't make any decision, both patients may die soon. In the meantime, the powerful (or sophisticated) AI system also doesn't have much battery, and it might shut down at any time. At the moment, you face a 'triage' situation because you have to decide which entity (either a human patient or a powerful AI system) should get the resources. You have to make an immediate choice between the human patients and the AI system: if you want to save the patients' lives, you must switch off the AI; if you want to keep AI system 'alive', you must switch off the life support system. Switching off the AI system leads to fusing its circuit, and, as a result, it will never operate again. But if you don't make any decision immediately, both the patients and the AI system will die. The AI system signals you to plug it in in order to survive. So, in that situation, if you think it is good or reasonable to save a powerful AI system over human life, then one may say that such a powerful AI system has moral status.

However, questions may arise in this regard. Gibert and Martin argue that such a life-or-death situation shown by the hypothetical test doesn't entail the whole picture of moral status (Gibert and Martin 2022, 320). Maybe this kind of situation is helpful for moral relevance. According to them, Francis Kamm states that "X has moral status=because X counts morally in its own right, it is permissible/impermissible to do things to it for its own sake." (Kamm 2007, 227-236; quoted in Bostrom and Yudkowsky 2014, 321). He indicates that entities have moral status when they have rights and are valued for their own sake, as well as when they give us reason to maintain their existence in their own rights. An example might clarify this claim. Suppose A and B are two non-living entities, i.e., A is a gold ring, and B is a diamond ring of your marriage ceremony. Suppose fire catches at your home; you want to prevent these entities from burning, because you think it is good to save them from burning (you want to keep them), but you

² Oppy and Dowe (2021) state, "the phrase the Turing test is most properly used to refer to proposal made by Turing (1950) as a way of dealing with the question whether machines can think." (1)

don't think it would be good for the gold and diamond ring to continue their existence. In such cases, we may say that such entities don't have moral status but are morally significant. There may be moral reasons not to destroy or burn the diamond ring, but that doesn't suggest the diamond ring has moral status. On the other hand, we may say that a cat has some degree of moral status because it is good for a cat to continue its existence for its own sake. The sophisticated AI system described in the 'Turing Triage Test' may have moral status if one decides to preserve it for its own sake. However, the moral reason behind saving the AI systems is not similar to the moral reason behind saving entities like the gold ring and the diamond ring of your marriage ceremony. Bostrom and Yudkowsky (2014) state,

if someone (or something) has moral status, then it is commonly agreed that the particular being has legitimate interests, that one should consider her well-being in one's decisions, and that we accept some strict moral constraints in how we treat that being; for example, the being should not be murdered or robbed, nor should anything to be done to her property without the being's consent. (321)

Thus, we may say that humans and animals have moral status. However, it is crucial to mention that an entity having a moral right or status is not identical to being a moral agent. For instance, human infants, persons with mental disabilities, and animals have some degree of (or partial) moral status, but they are not moral agents. Kantian ethics states that only adult human beings with sophisticated cognitive capacity have full moral status, but others don't have full moral status. According to Immanuel Kant, "autonomy, the capacity to set ends via practical reasoning, must be respected and grounds the dignity of all rational beings." (Kant 1785, 434, 436; quoted in Jaworska and Tannenbaum 2021, 9). Only adult humans possess such capacities and have full moral status. Human infants, persons with mental disabilities, and animals are moral patients and have partial moral status. A moral patient can be morally wronged, but they can't be morally responsible for their wrong actions. However, moral patiency comes before moral agency³ in the human case. For instance, a human infant is a moral patient, but they have potential to be moral agents. Moreover, each moral agent is also a moral patient. The 'Turing triage test' may not play a significant role in determining future AI systems' moral status because it is possible to have a more substantial reason to save an entity that doesn't have moral status than an entity

³ Navari (2003) states, "there are two ways in which collectives may be considered subjects of moral concern, or have moral standing. One is as moral agents. Moral agents are characterized by the possession of autonomy, rationality, and choice, as well as by the ability to take responsibility for their actions. The other is as moral patients. Unlike moral agents, moral patients may not be autonomous, they may not have reasoning capacity, nor are they necessarily in a position to make moral choices. They are entities whose chief characteristic is not that they have duties, but rather they are those to whom duties may be owed. Rather than duties, they may have rights. In any event, they have moral standing, even if they lack the usual criteria for moral agency." (1)

with moral status. For instance, one may protect their wedding ring over a plant or an animal. Similarly, if there is only one choice, one may have more substantial reasons to rescue or save a child instead of an older person while drowning. However, it doesn't mean that the older person lacks moral status. Indeed, the older person has moral status, too.

There is a difference between AI systems and other artifacts. The major difference between AI systems and other artifacts is that AIs are intelligent entities, but other artifacts are not. But if we compare an AGI system with a human being, we will find out that both AGI and humans may be intellectually similar. Though present AIs are domain-specific, general AI may develop more or less similar to human intelligence in the future. Then the question may arise if the AGI systems are more or less similar to humans, should such systems get moral status similar to humans? Or what kind of moral status should be given to the intelligent system? Or how much moral concern or regard should we have for them? To look into such queries, we need to put forward the functionality argument, which argues that the AGI system may achieve human-like moral status if it may have human-like functionality. Before proceeding to the main argument, i.e., the functionality argument, let us understand why arguments from sentience and intelligence may not be the criteria for granting moral status to the AGI system.

3. The Arguments from Intelligence and Sentience

Undoubtedly, *intelligence* is morally crucial in many cases. For instance, we apply ethical principles to personal goals, values, actions, and moral reasoning. However, intelligence may not be the only criterion for grounding moral status. In general, in the case of humans, intelligence is not needed to confer moral status. Because it is generally agreed that human infants or people with mental disabilities can be wronged even if the cognitive ability of such beings is not the same as any typical adult human. Peter Singer (Singer 1993; quoted in Gibert and Martin 2022, 324) denies intelligence as a measure of moral status. He describes an intelligence-based slave society; in a slave society, a person with a lower IQ is a slave to a higher IQ holder. Based on this observation, he maintains that such societies are unfair and consider intelligence as arbitrary as race or gender. Singer (1993) goes further and argues,

intelligence has nothing to do with many important interests that humans have, like the interest in avoiding pain, in satisfying basic needs for food and shelter, to love and care for any children one may have, to enjoy friendly and loving relations with others and to be free to pursue one's projects without unnecessary interference from others. (23)

Furthermore, if intelligence grounds moral status, then the strong AI deserves higher moral status than human beings since, hypothetically, strong AI's intelligence would be higher than that of human beings. Therefore, intelligence may not be a measure for granting moral status to the AGI systems.

Similarly, the sentience argument is not a requirement for granting moral status to AGI systems. Roughly speaking, being sentient is similar to being conscious and is common in the domain of animals. As Gibert and Martin state, "sentience is the ability to have subjective experience, which includes perceiving and experiencing." (2022, 326) Low et al. (2012) state in the *Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness*,

the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in processing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Nonhuman animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates. (2)

However, some animals cannot process the capacity of sentience (mussels, oysters, sea sponges, etc.). These entities lack sentience because they do not possess complex nervous systems available to vertebrates. Even plants can show some intelligent behavior, but they lack sentience. According to Sentientism, (Gibert and Martin 2022, 327) since sentient beings possess subjective experiences of the world, such beings can be affected by positively or negatively. For example, a sentient being like a human may not want to suffer, stay alive, or be free. Because of these interests, we should behave towards them in such a way that it doesn't violate their rights. Therefore, they should get moral status.

However, Deep environmental ethicist Richard Sylvan criticizes anthropocentrism and Sentientism based on moral status in his paper *Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic?* (Routley 1973, 205-210). There is a crucial debate in environmental ethics about what kinds of beings have intrinsic value. An entity is intrinsically valuable if it is valuable in itself. On the other hand, instrumentally, an entity is valuable if it can be used to do something else. Many people state that clean water is not intrinsically important but is instrumentally important or valuable since it is required for a good life. Humans are intrinsically important, and good life is also intrinsically important for humans. Three theories in environmental ethics are based on the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values: Shallow Green Environmentalism or Anthropocentric or Human-centric (MacKinnon and Fiala 2015, 401-402), Mid-Green Environmentalism or Sentientism (Gibert and Martin 2022, 327) and Deep Green Environmentalism or Deep Ecology (Hyde, Filippo and Zach 2021, 19). Shallow Green Environmentalism is Anthropocentric or Human-centric as it only provides intrinsic value to human beings. However, nonhumans are also valuable if they are useful to the humans. Shallow-Green Environmentalism states that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with destroying species, felling a forest, and torturing an animal because one finds it fun to cut down trees or torture animals. However, these practices are instrumentally wrong. It means cutting down the forest is wrong because other people enjoy walking in the woods or the forest to help prevent landslides. Furthermore, torturing an animal is bad because it has a brutalizing effect on the person committing the torture.

However, in Mid-Green Environmentalism, intrinsic value or moral status is extended to all sentient creatures. The most common form of this approach is Sentientism. As Gibert and Martin state, “sentientism extends the set of entities with a moral status to many nonhuman animals, but excludes plants and ecosystems.” (2022, 327)

Animals, i.e., dogs, are worthy of moral consideration in themselves. However, what about felling a forest? Sentientism states that cutting down or destroying a forest is not intrinsically wrong. On the other hand, Deep Green Environmentalism argues that all living things, all ecosystems, natural wilderness, and the earth have intrinsic values. DGE argues that it is intrinsically wrong to fell a forest. Even if nobody cares about it and no animal lives in it. Richard Sylvan (Routley 1973, 205-210) presents a thought experiment called *the Last Man on Earth* to motivate more deep ethics. This thought experiment tries to push our intuition in a different direction. Sylvan does not accept that trees have feelings or anything similar to that. Nevertheless, he still believes that trees have intrinsic value.

The Last Man on Earth Argument:

(a)The First Form: Let us imagine that all humans are dead except a man. Let us consider him as the last man on earth. The last man wants to kill or destroy everything just before his death. He tries to destroy or kill every living plant, animal, bacteria, and so forth on the planet through powerful technology. If we look at the traditional views, the last man does nothing wrong. However, many people may have objections to what the last man does. This indicates that we need a new ethics where nonhuman nature is treated as valuable and independent of our interests. This new ethics implies that nature also has intrinsic value. However, some may argue that if trees are only instrumentally valuable, then it is not counterintuitive to state that the last man is wrong. People may judge the last man for his doing while not accepting or adopting a deep green ethics. One could argue that the problem is simply that he kills so many sentient animals. We can further reshape or even give more strength to our thought experiment.

(b)The Second Form: Let us imagine that all humans are dead except a man. Let us consider him as the last man on earth. The last man wants to kill the rest of the living things before his death. This time he destroys the entire planet, including bacteria, fungi, etc. Here, does the last man do something wrong? If so, then we need a deep green ethics. In this case, we reconcile anthropocentrism and Sentientism with our intuition and state that the last man is wrong because he kills all potential future intelligent or sentient creatures. Both theories argue that only intelligent or sentient beings are intrinsically valuable. On the other hand, non-intelligent or non-sentient life is instrumentally valuable since one-day such entities might help intelligent or sentient life evolve in the world. The last man destroys this possibility. It means the last man is wrong in preventing the potential

future intelligent or sentient creatures from evolving, but not wrong in destroying all the nonhuman creatures. Our thought experiment can be modified further.

(c)The Third Form: Let us imagine that all humans are dead except a man. Let us consider him the last man on earth. In this form, it is acknowledged that the sun will die in one million years, and sentient creatures have no scope to evolve in the future. The last man decides to kill all the creatures before his death. In this form, we are only considering non-sentient entities. If you believe that the last man did anything wrong in this case, it will be tough for you to resist a deeper green ethics. Sylvan distinguishes two values to solve the problems: Sole value assumptions and Greater value assumptions (Hyde, Filippo and Zach 2021, 17-18). According to the Sole value assumption, only humans and human projects have intrinsic value. However, the Greater value assumption is different. Although the Greater value assumption considers nonhuman things to have intrinsic value, human value always outweighs this value. It implies that whenever there is a clash between nonhuman ideals and human goals, the latter must always take priority. Richard Sylvan and other Deep environmentalists rejected both Sole and Great value assumptions (Hyde, Filippo and Zach 2021, 19). Still, Greater value assumptions of something are intuitive, and the last man argument cannot push our intuitions in a different way. The Greater value assumption may not apply when you have to choose between saving a human, i.e., Hitler, and a nonhuman animal, i.e., a pet cat. Many of us would say it would be good to save a nonhuman being, i.e., a pet cat, over a human-like Hitler. In such scenarios, we could argue that Hitler violated other people's rights and cruelly killed a particular group of people. So, he deserves to die, since people have the responsibility not to violate other people's rights and so on. In this case, the Greater value assumption is not applicable. We can modify the last man's argument further.

(d)The Fourth Form: Let us imagine that all humans are dead except a man. Let us consider him the last man on earth. In this form, it is acknowledged that the sun will die in one million years, and there is no scope for sentient creatures to evolve in the future. Further, imagine that the only remaining non-sentient entities are kept in an underground laboratory. Earth's surface is entirely destroyed due to climate change or environmental-related issues. The last man also lives in the underground laboratory and dies within a week, no matter what. He has two choices: either release some organisms to the surface to repopulate the Earth and die tomorrow, or eat them and die next week. Here, the conflict between nonhuman values and human needs is clearly visible. In this case, many people would have the intuition that the last man should give up that week and release nonhuman animals. Suppose the last man releases the nonhuman beings. In that case, the Greater value assumption (whenever there is a clash between nonhuman ideals and human goals, the latter must always take priority) must be wrong, because it contradicts what it initially states. This thought experiment gives some sense of why people might be inclined to deeper environmental ethics and why being intelligent and sentient may not be a criterion for having moral status.

Now problematic questions may arise in the context of the possibility of developing sentient AI. Some people predict that sentient AI is possible through a hypothetical technology called brain emulation or uploading⁴. Even science fiction movies such as 'Transcendence' (2014) also show the possibility of sentient AI. Currently, there is an AI system called Shelly, a robot tortoise designed to mimic pain. An AI system like Shelly can react like a sentient being. However, it can only mimic without authentic feeling. Apart from such issues, arguments from sentience can be criticized on the grounds stated by the *problem of other minds*. Nagel (1987) asks, "can you really know about the conscious life in this world beyond the fact that you have a conscious mind?" (26-27) The philosophical problem of other minds can be condensed in the following terms: I am aware that I have a mind and have mental status, i.e., feelings, sensations, and thoughts. I have direct access to know such mental states, or I have direct awareness about the mental states. However, how do I know other people also have a mind and such mental awareness in their mind? I can only observe others' behavior, but how can I know others also have minds? We cannot directly access other minds because the knowledge of other minds is always indirect. Now let us take an example to understand whether sentient AI is possible. We do not have any access to know how exactly a cat experiences; similarly, though we know what precisely an AI is, we do not know how exactly an AI experiences certain things. We can understand better an AI system than a cat. A cat might be a more complex entity. Cat experiences and human experiences may have very slight similarities, and thus, in general, when a cat seems to be in pain, the humans can, at least in a minimal sense, understand what it is to have pain. There are some biological similarities between a human and a cat, but these similarities do not apply to the human being and the AI system. If an AI looks as if experiencing pain, we certainly cannot tell if it is actually in pain. Regardless of the issue of other minds in the context of animals, we can decide with certainty if a cat is really in pain. Therefore, the sentience argument may not be a criterion for conferring moral status to the AGI systems. Moreover, there is no substantial evidence that a sentient AI will exist. In the next section, we look into the argument from functionality for conferring moral status to the AGI systems. Before going into the functionality argument, let us glimpse the theory of Functionalism.

4. (a) Functionalism

Functionalism is one of the most famous theories in the philosophy of mind, which deals with the nature of mental states. As Polger (2022) states,

⁴ Bostrom and Yudkowsky (2014) state, "uploading refers to a hypothetical future technology that enable a human or human or other animal intellect to be transferred from its original implementation in an organic brain onto a digital computer." (325)

Functionalism is a theory about the nature of mental states. According to functionalism, mental states are identified by what they do rather than by what they are made of. (1)

The main idea of Functionalism can be explained by taking the example of an ATM and a diamond. ATMs could be made out of plastic, metal, or any other material, but the job or function of ATMs is to help withdraw money. Because of this reason, an ATM can be considered as having a functional organization. Similarly, the functionality of a caretaker is to assist with personal care, i.e., bathing and grooming, preparing meals, shopping, housekeeping, and so on. A caretaker may be anyone; it may be me, it may be another person, or it may be X, Y, and Z, or even it may be an intelligent robot. Whoever may be the caretaker, if anyone can perform the expected job mentioned above, then he/she is fulfilling the functionality of a caretaker.

However, we can't keep a diamond in the same category since diamonds are particular physical objects that consist of molecular lattice structures and carbon crystals. Without such specific materials, a diamond can't be made out. Functionalism states that mental states are similar to ATMs but not to diamonds. Some things may be created or proven to exist based on how they relate to other things and their features. A key may be physical stuff with a particular composition, but being physical stuff with a particular composition doesn't matter much. The main thing that matters for a key is whether it can perform a specific action, such as opening a lock. Similarly, a lock is a kind of material that exists in connection to keys. There may be various types of keys, such as metal, wooden, plastic, and digital keys. Functionalism states that what makes something a mental state is not what it is made of but what it does. In the case of a key, the material composition of a key doesn't make it a key but rather what it does or can do. The actions a key performs or is expected to perform are referred to as its functions. Opening a lock is a function of a key; that's why they are functional entities or a functional kind.

The original idea of Functionalism arises from the comparison of minds with computers. But the comparison between minds and computers is just an analogy. Functionalism comes as a substitute for behaviorism and the identity theory of mind. As already mentioned, what makes something a mental state is not what it is made of, but what it does, and mental states are more like ATMs than diamonds. This statement distinguished Functionalism from Descartes's mind-body dualism. As mentioned by Polger (2022, 2), Descartes states that the mind is made of a specific substance called *res cogitans* or thinking substance. Functionalism is different from behaviorism which holds that to be in a mental state is merely to exhibit certain kinds of behavior. As against behaviorism, it argues that mental states must be inner states with functional-causal roles. It is also different from the mind-brain identity theory. According to the mind-brain identity theory, mental states are specific kinds of biological states of the brain (Polger 2022, 2). Thus, mental states are made up of some brain stuff. Mind-brain

identity theory states that mental states are more similar to diamonds than ATMs. Opposing mind-brain identity theory, Functionalism brings a more liberal approach through which any entity/being/system, for instance, computer program, souls, extra-terrestrials, etc., can pass the *Turing Test* is eligible as an intelligent being (Gokel 2013, 13).

According to Shagrir (2005) Hilary Putnam's computational functionalism is the theory of mind which holds that:

mental states and events-pains, beliefs, desires, thoughts and so forth-are computational states of the brain and so are defined in terms of computational parameters plus relations to biologically characterized inputs and outputs. (1-3)

The nature of the brain is not dependent on its physical structure. He further mentions, "we could be made of Swiss cheese, and it wouldn't matter." (2) The only thing that matters is functional organization. A brain could be made out of different materials, made out of metal or wood; what is important is how mental states are causally related to one another, for instance, sensory inputs and motor outputs. Some things, such as trees, stones, and hearts, don't have minds. But why do such things not have minds? The answer to this question is that such things don't have the right functional organization. This implies that other thinking entities may be made of Swiss cheese along with the right (or suitable or appropriate) functional organization. Putnam considers mental states as functional states (Putnam 1967a, 1967b; quoted in Shagrir 2005, 3). According to Putnam, it is helpful to consider minds as machines of a specific sort. Functionalism was advanced as a reply to the mind-brain identity theory. As Smart (1959) states, "sensations are brain processes" (144). It indicates that mental states and brain states will have a one-to-one relationship if we consider mental states to be brain states. However, functionalists argue that mental and brain states are not identical. Were they identical, everything with sensation S would have brain state B, and everything with brain state B would have sensation S. Functionalism denies the mind-brain identity theory. Mammals, reptiles, and mollusks can have the ability to feel pain, but such entities do not have brains similar to humans. Thus, there is no one-to-one relationship between sensations and brain processes. Though mammals, reptiles, and mollusks have different brains, they still perform the same action or function similarly. Therefore, it is not necessary to have a one-to-one relation between mental states and brain states. Functionalism holds that minds are mechanisms, and there are multiple ways to construct such mechanisms (Polger 2022, 5).

(b) The Functionality Argument

Let us put forward a functionality argument to look into the possibility of the moral status of AGI-enabled robots. The functionality argument states that if two entities, such as a human being and an AGI-enabled robot, have similar functionality, but the creation process of both entities is different, then they may

have similar moral status. As already discussed, mental states are recognized by what they execute (or do) rather than by how they are formed. The argument from functionality states that the creation process of an entity does not bear the moral status of whether an entity is produced from carbon or silicon. It also doesn't matter whether the brains of such entities use semiconductors or neurotransmitters. If the AGI system can have human-like functionality, it may be granted human-like moral status. In the past, the moral status of a person was dependent on their caste, gene, or bloodline. Alternatively, there could be other criteria, i.e., *intelligence*, *sentience*, and so forth, through which people confer moral status to an entity. However, the argument from functionality is against such bases of moral status. It argues that causal factors, for instance, in vitro fertilization (IVF), assisted delivery, family planning, gamete selection techniques, etc., do not affect the moral status of a baby. Using such techniques, one may have deliberate choice and design in creating human beings. Human babies born through these technologies also have equal moral status, similar to normal human babies. Even those who oppose human reproductive cloning on religious grounds agree that cloned and natural babies should have equal moral status. Bostrom and Yudkowsky (2014, 322) mention that denying the argument from functionality would be similar to a situation where people support racism, believing that they are superior to other communities or ethnic groups. On the other hand, technology may create a fetus without a brain. In that case, a baby without a brain or an anencephalic baby does not have equal moral status, similar to a normal baby. In the case of an anencephalic baby, the function is disabled. One has a brain, and the other does not have a brain. In this case, the argument from functionality may not apply. Here, one may argue in the following manner: if we suppose that the concept of functionality is fundamental in deciding the moral status of something, then an anencephalic baby will not have any moral status. However, it seems counterintuitive to say that we can render any treatment to an anencephalic baby since it does not have a brain, because of which there is a difference in functionality. Responding to such queries, one may argue that an anencephalic baby may not have a similar moral status as a normal baby. However, such a baby will have some degree of moral status. It is not argued that an anencephalic baby will not have any moral status and that we can render any treatment to such a baby. As mentioned earlier, an entity having a moral status is not equal to being a moral agent. For instance, human infants, persons with mental disabilities, and animals have some degree of moral right or status. However, they are not considered moral agents but are moral patients. An anencephalic baby is a moral patient; a human baby is also a moral patient. Nevertheless, these two babies are different; an anencephalic baby does not have the potential to develop a cognitive capacity (most anencephalic babies die before birth; if born, they die within a few hours, days, or weeks). On the other hand, normal babies have the potential to develop a cognitive capacity in the future.

However, authors like Alison Davis do not find any dissimilarity between these two babies. Davis (1998) writes,

in my view, there can be no sound differentiation between the two, and that being so, I believe individual rights begin when individual lives begin-at conception- and should be protected from then on. Transplants from those other than anencephalic are subject to very strict rules, and the donor must have consented and/or be physically dead. I can see no reason why anencephalic should be treated any differently. They are not physically dead when used as donors, and are in any case incapable of consenting. (151)

Although anencephalic babies do not have cognitive capacity (or are unable to develop cognitive ability), they have specific functionality, i.e., they have a brain stem that regulates respiration and reflex movements. In such cases, the anencephalic baby may be granted some degrees of moral status in virtue of functionality. As we discussed already, AGI system does not exist currently. However, a rough estimation of the feature of an AGI system could be given. The rough estimation entails that functionally an AGI system may be similar to human beings. The argument from functionality states that though AGI would be different from humans, it may still exhibit similar intellect and behavior to humans. It does not matter whether an AI system is developed or born out of programming or runs on a computer instead of in a brain. The AGI system may deserve human-like moral status if it can have human-like functionality.

Conclusion

The main objective of this paper was to discuss the future AI's (or AGI's) moral status. Regardless of not having the certainty concerning the development of such systems, there is already a heated debate in the media and the academic circle. Gradually AI systems have become more powerful and adaptable and can execute different cognitive tasks. For instance, identifying objects from videos and images, translating various languages, stock trading, driving automobiles, drawing their encryption language, identifying cancer in tissues, and so on.

Apart from these advancements in AI technology, three milestones in AI technology have gained public attention. Based on such milestones, one may assume that AGI is knocking on our door; however, the development of AGI is still in an early stage. The first milestone of AI technology is the Deep Blue of IBM. The Chess algorithm Deep Blue won the Chess championship after beating the world champion, Garry Kasparov, in 1997. Even though Deep Blue performed extraordinarily well, it is still a narrow AI since it could only play Chess but could not even play checkers.

The second milestone is IBM's AI program, Watson. IBM developed a computer program called Watson to participate in a quiz show called Jeopardy. Contestants on Jeopardy were given the possible answers and were then expected to find the correct answer. Jeopardy is more complex than Chess since it requires a wider variety of knowledge and skills. This game includes various areas of

expertise, i.e., geography, history, science, sports, and culture. Analogies and puns are also included in the game. Since its beginning in 1964, the quiz show has gained enormous popularity in the US. There were three participants in Jeopardy. If the first participant answered incorrectly, the second could answer the question. The quiz program participants needed the knowledge, speed, and capacity to limit themselves. Watson's communication was based on NLP or NLU⁵. According to IBM cloud education,

natural language processing (NLP) strives to build machines that understand and respond to text or voice data- and respond with text or speech of their own- in much the same way humans do. (2020)

Most importantly, Watson was not enabled with internet while playing the Jeopardy game. However, Watson had access to almost 200 million pages of information. Watson defeated Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter in 2011. Jennings won 74 consecutive races in 2004 and earned \$3 million in prize money. In 2005 Rutter defeated Ken and received 3 million US dollars. Further, IBM wanted to develop an AI medical super-doctor. IBM thought that if Watson could access all medical data like medical records of patients, journal papers, drug lists, etc., then Watson may give better diagnoses and treatment than human doctors. However, that could not happen in reality.

The third and latest milestone of AI technology is DeepMind's AlphaGo. Go is a board game that originated in China about 2000 years ago and is one of the most complex games, considered more challenging than Chess. The game Go is mainly played in East Asian countries, i.e., China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, and Taiwan. AlphaGo, which was built on an advanced search tree and deep neural networks, defeated three-time Go champion of Europe Fan Hui in 2015 and eighteen-time world champion Lee Sedol in 2016. DeepMind has gradually launched an enhanced version of AlphaGo called AlphaGo Zero. It was trained by playing against itself, beginning with purely random play. In late 2017, DeepMind again introduced an extended version of the algorithm known as AlphaZero. This algorithm also taught itself. MuZero is the most recent version of DeepMind's algorithm. It performs the game similar to AlphaZero in Go, Chess, and Shogi. MuZero also learns to master various visually complicated Atari games without being taught the rules of any of them. AlphaGo utilizes Deep reinforcement learning, which is based on the ANN model. There is a significant difference between Deep Blue and AlphaGo. Let us first compare human chess players and Deep Blue. Human chess players use intuition and calculation. Through these two

⁵ "Watson Natural Language Understanding (NLU) - analyze text in unstructured data formats including HTML, webpages, social media, and more. Increase your understanding of human language by leveraging this natural language tool kit to identify concepts, keywords, categories, semantics and emotions, and to perform text classification, entity extraction, named entity recognition (NER), sentiment analysis and summarization."(<https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/natural-language-processing#toc-natural-la-H2GEqPVg>)

capacities, one can estimate a particular board position. However, Deep Blue was designed to compute many different board positions and determine the best potential positions in a specific situation. On the other hand, the scene was different in the context of the game Go. AlphaGo illustrated that algorithms could handle tacit knowledge⁶. However, Fjelland argues that AI's tacit knowledge is different from humans. The tacit knowledge of AI is limited to the idealized realm of science. The traditional AI programs' parameters were explicit and transparent. However, Deep Neural Networks are not transparent because one may not understand what parameters are used in the systems. That is why AlphaGo is considered one of the significant milestones in AI technology and shows that technology is advancing rapidly. Here one may argue that even though AlphaGo is an excellent in-game playing domain in having learned to play the game without being taught the rules, it is still a narrow AI system. We may not draw an appropriate comparison between human beings and AI systems yet. It might carry the comparison with earlier AI systems. Therefore, this advancement can't entail that AGI is very near, or that we can compare its intelligence with human intelligence. We need a more convincing set of reasons to claim that such game-playing abilities indicate such models evolving to AGI. As already mentioned, the primary goal of this paper was to investigate whether it is possible to confer human-like moral status to future AGI-enabled robots or not when they come into existence. The AGI is a hypothetical technology in AI that may be more or less intellectually similar to human beings. Therefore, we may say that if the future AI or AGI shows human-like functionality, it may have human-like moral status.

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⁶ "Michael Polanyi, in his book, *Personal Knowledge* introduced the expression tacit knowledge. Most of the knowledge we apply in everyday life is tacit. In fact, we do not know which rules we apply when we perform a task. Polanyi used swimming and bicycle riding as examples. Very few swimmers know that what keeps them afloat is how they regulate their respiration: when they breathe out, they do not empty their lungs, and when they breathe in, they inflate their lungs more than normal." (Fjelland 2020, 3)

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The Buried Promise of Sections 74 and 75 of Chapter V of Division Two of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927) in light of *New Testament Christianity*

Rajesh Sampath

Abstract: This article will offer a close reading of sections 74 and 75 of "Chapter V: Temporality and Historicity" of Division Two of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927). Our goal is to expand on a speculative metaphysical reconstruction of Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John, when Jesus is finished speaking to the disciples and is addressing the Father alone. This is right before his Passion, namely the arrest, trial, crucifixion, and ultimate Resurrection. The work is not situated in either abstract systematic or biblical theology, which seeks to defend faith, particularly using modern continental philosophical resources, such as the early Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Then again, it is not a philosophy of religion either, in the sense that it is not concerned with investigating the nature or essence of religion. Rather, it is trying to move within *Being and Time* to construct anew its 'missing Division Three' by creating new terms and distinctions beyond what is offered in the first Two Divisions. Our hypothesis is this: the supersession of *Being and Time* requires an imaginative metaphysical expansion of hidden secrets buried in the Gospel regarding a strange double temporalization in the discourse of Jesus to his Father. These two temporal planes are phenomenologically irreducible to either the linear sequence of events of his life as narrated in the four Gospels; or the history of theological attempts, particularly twentieth-century theological giants (Barth, Tillich, Rahner, Moltmann, Pannenberg), to think about the time-eternity-history relation with regard to the Kairos (through the Incarnation of the Son) at the fulfilled time and the Parousia, namely the Second Coming at the eschatological end of time. The article concludes with certain criteria regarding judgements on the undecidability of theism vs. atheism when attempting to go beyond Heidegger's *Being and Time*. The ontological consequences, and therefore meaning of such an undertaking at a step beyond *Being and Time*, remain indiscernible for specific reasons.

Keywords: Heidegger, New Testament Christianity, time, movement, being.

Introduction

This exposition will offer a microscopic reading of sections 74 and 75 of "Chapter V: Temporality and Historicity" of Division Two of Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1927). Our goal is to advance a speculative metaphysical reconstruction of Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John, when Jesus concludes his discourse to the disciples and is reaching out to the Father in apparent solitude. This precedes his

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Passion, namely the arrest, trial, crucifixion, and ultimate Resurrection. The labor of thought in this reflection is not located in either abstract systematic or biblical theology, which seeks to buttress faith, particularly through the appropriation of modern continental philosophical resources. One such resource is the early Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Inversely, the analysis undertaken here is not merely a secular philosophy of religion either, in the sense that it is not absorbed in investigating the nature or essence of religion.

Rather, it is trying to navigate within *Being and Time* to create anew its 'missing Division Three' by formulating new terms and distinctions beyond what is presented in the first Two Divisions. Our singular hypothesis is this: the surpassing of *Being and Time* necessitates an imaginative metaphysical penetration of concealed secrets buried in the Gospel of John regarding a perplexing double temporalization in the speech of Jesus to his Father. These two temporal planes intersect but are phenomenologically irreducible to either the linear sequence of events of his life as attested in the Gospel writers' biographical accounts; or the history of theological systems, particularly by twentieth-century giants (Barth, Tillich, Rahner, Moltmann, Pannenberg), to think about the time-eternity-history relation with regard to both the Kairos through the Incarnation of the Son at the fulfilled time and the Parousia, namely the Second Coming at the eschatological end of time.

By concealed secrets, we mean secrets that we failed to know were there because they had to be invented to appear now. The invention of a secret is rather uncanny. For if I say that I have a secret when there is none, you will never know whether there is a secret or not unless I choose to come forward and disclose that there is not. But similarly, if there is a secret whose content is not disclosed, then one can remain undecided as to whether the secret conceals something or not. We will have to attend to this undecidability regarding a secret we claim exists in the Gospel that can be used to expose the limitation of what *Being and Time* is truly concealing regarding its own impasse, incompleteness, and perhaps failure. The double movement of *Being and Time* to the Gospel and from the Gospel to *Being and Time* is neither strictly within worlds of theological research on the one hand nor secular philosophy of the human on the other.

Instead of engaging systematic or biblical theology through a philosophical lens, we seek to draw a distinction between A.) the relation between Jesus's pre-death on the Cross double temporalization and his movement-towards-death but also movement-towards-birth and B.) the ontological distinction Heidegger already makes in Division Two in *Being and Time* between "primordial," "ecstatic," "authentic," "finite," unified "temporalizing of temporality" in section 65 of Chapter III of Division Two (Heidegger 1962, 380) and the ordinary, inauthentic notion of linear time as flowing now-points with present as now, past as no longer now, and future as yet to be now. For sure, we cannot begin by assuming an entity that is "present-at-hand" or "ready-to-hand" to use Heidegger's language in describing Dasein (Heidegger 1962, 67, 98).

To construct the missing Division Three, we need to move past Heidegger's distinctions in *Being and Time* and on to a complex double temporalization at work in Jesus's anticipation of physical death on the Cross, in which the polarities of birth and death meet certain alterities while complicating what it means to be-in-time. Before we assume any understanding of either Jesus or ourselves as being-in-time (and being in historical time in the case of Jesus as the historical person who lived over two-thousand years ago), we need to consider being-towards-birth, and not just 'being-towards-death.' And in that, we must do so in new ways. They are dynamic events that form a complex set of moving interrelations for which the spatialized line or circle cannot help us. Heidegger readily admits the incompleteness of his investigation within *Being and Time* in which he fails to treat, sufficiently, "being-towards-the beginning" or treat it at all as much as he did "Being-towards-the-end" (Heidegger 1962, 424-425). But in the case of Jesus's being-towards-birth and being-towards-death, as we shall argue, in Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John, this is all prior to his actual death and Resurrection, and therefore irreducible to Christian faith too.

In other words, we do not seek to expound theologically the question of Jesus's 'Pre-existent Logos' (in the Prologue to the Gospel of John) or the meaning of the Resurrection after he is raised from the dead and ascends to the Father. As Hegel taught us in 'Revealed Religion' of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, those are all forms of "picture-thinking" (Hegel 1977, 477) and that something else, namely the philosophical "Notion's Time" or "Absolute Knowing" (Hegel 1977, 493) – must take its place. The rising passage of epochal shifts is what is being conceptualized through its actualization. The ontological consequences of this undertaking in terms of what this all means remains indiscernible as we conclude the investigation. Therefore, the work does not seek to engage in debates about faith or heresy regarding theology. And within Heidegger scholarship, the role of religion, in his avowedly secular philosophy, is a separate arena of debate and discussion (Caputo 1993). We will turn our attention elsewhere from both theology and mainstream continental philosophy.

Reading Sections 74 and 75 of "Chapter V: Temporality and Historicity" in *Being and Time*

Let us begin with arguably the most important passage in all of "Chapter V: Temporality and Historicity" of Division Two of *Being and Time*, and perhaps the work as a whole:

Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual 'there' by shattering itself against death – that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process if having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for 'its time'. Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate – that is to say, authentic historicity (Heidegger 1962, 437).

When Heidegger says, 'in its Being' as 'essentially futural,' then we must not lose sight that he is talking about an event-motion; but it is one unlike flowing now-points within linear time that can be measured by clocks and calendars. The being of this motion-event is not a being-in-time that can be spatialized. Whether human beings, who are born and die, have their own internal clocks that shape their self-consciousness about their own anxious passage in time, or whether they measure that internal sense against observing an external mechanism or spatial object like a clock or calendar is not the issue. We must erase notions of past as no longer now and future as yet to be now. We are not starting with the living present. Yesterday was a certain day, today is a certain day, and tomorrow is a certain day as they all follow one another in a line, and each cannot take the place of another; that is the commonplace experience of most people. But suspend being present for a while and do not start with a human or animal/plant subject that typically is born at some point and then must die.

Furthermore, to think the complex interrelations of past, present, and future within a moving whole that is itself irreducible to any of those three axes of time raises the specter of the complex metaphysical problem of movement going back to the Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle, in particular Plato's *Parmenides* and Book XII of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. We must elaborate on the mystery of this all-important paragraph not only in this section of this chapter but all of Division Two and one can say all of *Being and Time* as a whole. For *Being and Time* is nothing but one gigantic response to the history of Western philosophy beginning with the Pre-Socratics to Plato, Aristotle to Descartes, Leibniz and then to Kant and Hegel. Quite frankly Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche too are reckoned. It is also one massive reaction to Western Christian thought of which Augustine, Aquinas, Eckhart, and Luther are paramount (Kisiel, 1995).

Returning to Heidegger's text, let us break up the paragraph into parts and quote the actual phrases –

In its Being
Essentially futural
Free for its death
Let itself be thrown back upon its factual there
Shattering itself against death
As futural is equiprimordially in the process of having been
Handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited
Take over its own thrownness
Be in the moment of vision for 'its time'
Authentic temporality as finite makes possible fate
Authentic historicity (Heidegger 1962, 437).

One would think that the complex interrelations of all these terms and phrases constitute one massive Event, one that is not linear, circular, or rectilinear even though the passage appears to be a linear succession of words and phrases. But we have to resist this interpretation towards a linear reading and try to capture the Gestalt intuition of the whole in which the different parts intermingle

with one another, realizing new configurations. (One could easily read the passage backwards or start from the middle and go in both directions at the same time.)

The interesting thing is that one is inclined to utilize all one's intuitions to create a spatial representation of such a massive, interrelated Event; but this is impossible for one reason. Dasein is never present, and as long as it 'is,' it is incomplete; but what makes Dasein's Being whole is death, which is a 'possibility,' not an external limit to which one can cross into a beyond of this world (Heidegger 1962, 276-277). Death is also not negation of presence or mere absence. Death, as pure possibility to be, cannot be represented in this life or the next by oneself or another, even the death of the other who is mourned. If it - Dasein as 'being-there' - were to 'complete' itself, it would no longer be, and that is the paradox. But it is more than that; death is the non-visible, non-entity as a tracing horizon that makes possible the completion of a totality, which only, inauthentically, appears to be a succession of moments that constitute a life unfolding from beginning to a would-be end. However, death is not negation or an end point in linear time since it is the possibility to be, but being is no longer being in the world, namely impossibility. The lived empirical world is not the world, and the afterlife is not the supersession of either the empirical world, or fantasy/fictive worlds that emerge at the intersection of experience and imagination. The past is not in the future or behind the present. Rather, death could be englobed in a larger expanse that has nothing to do with the religious or spiritual realms. Ontologically, it has nothing to do with medically pronounced biological death. Perhaps, we need to erase any sense of what the word even means, across languages, civilizations, and histories. And that event would constitute an unthinkable moment of transcendence: one that even goes beyond the thought that death is an 'illusion' or 'fiction' that human beings, across time, invented because they cannot come to grips with the fact of their inevitable mortality. Religion becomes the first antidote to this malady.

Simply put, if one were to use a living human subject as an example, death seems to be in the future, but one will never live past it. Or on the other side, one would never know when it is coming (the actual event of transpiring and passage) even if one were to plan their suicide, say utilizing physician-assisted dying; and in that case, a doctor could tell the patient how long a lethal concoction would take to actually kill a person. That means the anticipation of death is also not in linear time because the whole death event is not in linear time. And although it would appear that we are becoming as we flow in linear time towards some future date of death, that event is still in linear time as we imagine it and our approach to it; but the event is not whether we approach it or not. All said and done, it is not 'within-time,' which Heidegger tries to derive from something deeper in chapter VI of Division Two of *Being and Time* (1962, 456). Therefore, the relation between the 'being-towards,' its unique movement, and the being at 'its time' called death is irreducible to anything like a human being aging and approaching the finality of biological or medically pronounced death. For Dasein, death is not the unthinkable tragedy of losing a young person to an accident either. Any imagining of what

happens after our death (as most religious conceptions of the afterlife try to espouse) is inadmissible. This is not about others witnessing or testifying to our death after we die, say at our funeral. So, we turn to another hypothetical entity, which is not exactly human but not exactly not human either. Something is both fully human and other to human.

The Christological substance from the Chalcedonian Creed in response to *New Testament* Christianity reads:

We, then, following the holy Fathers, all with one consent, teach men to confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Godhead and also perfect in manhood; truly God and truly man, of a reasonable soul and body; consubstantial with us according to the manhood; in all things like unto us, without sin; begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, for us and for our salvation, born of the virgin Mary, the mother of God, according to the manhood; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of natures being by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one Subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son, and only begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ, as the prophets from the beginning have declared concerning him, and the Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us, and the Creed of the holy Fathers has handed down to us (Chalcedonian Creed, n.d.).

And of course, the Christological substance (2 natures = 1 Person) who with two other Persons (Father and Holy Spirit) = One Trinitarian Christian God. Yet the monotheistic principle is sacrosanct and unquestioned, and it is not the job of faith to trespass what reason cannot accomplish on its own. To speculate about the complex interrelational movement event within the unicity of the Christological substance is one thing; and then to situate that substance of One Person in the equiprimordial interpenetration of the Two other Persons to comprise the Trinity is another. The great Western and Eastern Church Fathers up to Aquinas attempted that. Needless to say, this cannot be reduced to idol worship of an object or raised to a speculative abstract concept; it can only be felt through faith by way of intuition that springs from the heart and conscience when a person is addressed by this ineffable God who speaks to their soul. But that is a theological project for another time.

Instead, we will read – deconstructively – Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John where Jesus is no longer with his disciples but talking to the Father only about “not being in the world” (John 17:11) right before his Passion – namely his arrest, trial, and actual death on the Cross, let alone the Resurrection (of an actual body, not just an immaterial spirit) in the sealed tomb with no witnesses. The nature of His suffering cannot be accessed, understood, or replicated by any other human being. Jesus is conveying a type of non-mythic, non-cosmology that points to another temporalization in which one can be in the world but not be in the world, which is not simply articulating that one is not in the world while being in the

world. Jesus the historical person, unlike Odysseus, was in the world. But in the pre-Passion moment, the being that is not in the world has something to do with what is prior to birth in this world and after death in this world; but it also crosses out those polarities because we see a higher level of transcendental consciousness in the relation between Son and Father, namely the movement of his “coming” (John 17:11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.) to the Father and a realm “before the foundation of the world” (John 17:24, King James Bible Online, n.d.). Those are not points situated in spatialized linear time where we can equate ‘prior’ with past and the arrival to what Jesus is ‘coming’ to as future. If we say the lived Jesus’s ontological whole must include those moments in addition to his lived time on earth (virginal birth and death on the Cross as a succession of discrete events), then, obviously, we are talking about something far more complex as a movement-event, which engulfs and shrinks down linear time within a larger horizon. But this brings back the temptation of spatialized thinking as if we were talking about something empirically real. Attempting a meta-physics of this complex event in dialogue with contemporary theoretical physics – Black Holes, Wormholes, Relativistic Cosmology, Quantum Gravity, String Theory, Multiverse – would be exciting. But it does not advance the project undertaken in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* that relegates all human, social, and natural science to the ontic realm of entities that exist and appear to observation, experience, or even mathematical description (1962, 29-31).

But what does all this have to do with Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, particularly Division Two? There is no way we intend to argue that Heidegger is simply talking about Christian dogma in secular disguise with his entity named Dasein in *Being and Time*. We are also not putting forward a defense of Christian faith. Rather, we speak of an Appropriation out of the faith-context and into a speculative metaphysical realm for which mainstream Christians would not follow. If we were to proclaim this as the truth of the Christian faith, then the accusation of heresy would be warranted. But we do not speak on or behalf of theology for its defense. If one wants to call it a speculative metaphysical philosophy of religion, then so be it. But that is not the intention either since we are not interested in the nature or essence of religion. We care about responding to Heidegger and going into realms that he himself could not traverse.

Rather, we seek to map out eerie resemblances between what Heidegger is articulating in his text, which he says in the very “Introduction” is not theology (Heidegger 1962, 30) and what we see as a philosophical possibility buried in the *New Testament* Gospels unbeknownst to faith. Theology, either through faith, intuition, or systematic philosophical language, tries to attest to something like the experience of God – whether that is construed positively as an ontological entity or through negative theology as that which, apophatically, exceeds all conceptual representation to the point where we can only declare what God is not: namely, that it is not this or that entity in or as space and time. Christian dogmatic religion also must believe in the literal events of a Trinitarian God (1 God = Three

Persons), which undergoes an actual human death and an actual resurrection, with a Pre-existent Logos become incarnate (Kairos) and prophesied Second Coming (Parousia) at the end of time. We are not endorsing or describing any of this age-old content. Something has to sublimate this whole structure, as if it were coming from within it, but in fact is wholly external to it. It is truly Other.

Hence, we intend to re-occupy *Being and Time* with aquatic gear that will allow us to move and visualize within it something that cannot be seen from outside the depths of the ocean, say on the shore, or from a boat on its surface. This is strictly the work of philosophy but one that does not seek to contribute or adhere to Heideggerian scholarship. Hence it is attempting something 'new.'

Let us resume the work. Coming back to Heidegger's all important propositional structure and its component parts:

In its Being
Essentially futural
Free for its death
Let itself be thrown back upon its factual there
Shattering itself against death
As futural is equiprimordially in the process of having been
Handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited
Take over its own thrownness
Be in the moment of vision for 'its time'
Authentic temporality as finite makes possible fate
Authentic historicity (Heidegger 1962, 437).

Being forward looking, running ahead of the now, divorcing oneself from the now, stretched out but not from a center point called being-present; all these connote, that is outside oneself in another realm, almost looking back and coming to that non-place of exteriority. Exteriority is not what is outside of one's body and mind as they relate to time or are infused by time, particularly the passing astrophysical time of days, months, years, decades, etc. One should not think that one is racing ahead in their mind to all the things they must do tomorrow or looking on a calendar for an event or project they must prepare for. From section 65, we must consider a more primordial sense of "letting itself-come-towards itself" (Heidegger 1962, 372); but as a "coming up to" (Heidegger 1962, 373) and up and against, one can say, and standing before, a kind of 'Coming', arrival, presencing as if it were something menacing. But again, do not start with a subject located in space and time, and some external event that is about to land on someone or something, like an asteroid timed at a certain point to hit the earth. Therefore, the 'coming towards' – as a motion-event – could but should not be mistaken as something coming towards one (as if one were situated as a point in space-time) or one going towards 'something.' Becoming is not the becoming of something in something else; nor is becoming some kind of substance itself that undergoes change or changes itself while actualizes itself as both. We would be back to the tradition from Aristotle up to Bergson in the nineteenth century,

Furthermore, death, which is not an event in time, is like an encircling arc but only 180 degrees, not a full circle, trying to go around one; but also, it is not fully entrapping oneself in a circle, which means the bottom half where the circle does not close is like a groundless ground. Another temptation in terms of metaphors is to think of one's time as a finite amount of water contained in a bucket at birth; but simultaneously at birth, a hole is poked in it, and little by little the water drains out until it is completely gone. If one were the bucket, then one would have a sense of losing more and more weight within it; the anxiety increases as each drop leaves. Or a finite amount of water in a bucket without a lid, and the water slowly evaporating is another example. One is tempted towards such metaphors about the finitude of time and how it gets "consumed or used up" (Heidegger 1962, 381), but Heidegger warns against any ontic registers throughout *Being and Time*. A human being who feels like they are 'losing' something or 'gaining' more of it, namely time, points to artificial and derivative registers. Hence the task of fundamental ontology necessitates an existential-analytic of Dasein to go back to the very beginning of the work (Heidegger 1962, 32; Dahlstrom, 2005).

Simply put, the time-death relation for Dasein is uncanny to say the least; by which "being futural in its essence" (Heidegger 1962, 437) requires us to imagine an entity that is not simply human in any ordinary way. It may appear as such given how "guilt and anxiety" are equiprimordial with Dasein's being-towards-death (Heidegger 1962, 437). So, to interpret the Heidegger passage, maybe we can bring in another hypothetical entity, who in a certain scene has yet to physically die, namely Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane praying to his Father before he is arrested, tried, and crucified.

Let us read chapter 17 of the Gospel of John:

1

These words spake Jesus, and lifted up his eyes to heaven, and said, Father, the hour is come; glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee:

2

As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him.

3

And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.

4

I have glorified thee on the earth: I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do.

5

And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was.

6

I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world: thine they were, and thou gavest them me; and they have kept thy word.

7

Now they have known that all things whatsoever thou hast given me are of thee.

8

For I have given unto them the words which thou gavest me; and they have received *them*, and have known surely that I came out from thee, and they have believed that thou didst send me.

9

I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine.

10

And all mine are thine, and thine are mine; and I am glorified in them.

11

And now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we *are*.

12

While I was with them in the world, I kept them in thy name: those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition; that the scripture might be fulfilled.

13

And now come I to thee; and these things I speak in the world, that they might have my joy fulfilled in themselves.

14

I have given them thy word; and the world hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

15

I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil.

16

They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

17

Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth.

18

As thou hast sent me into the world, even so have I also sent them into the world.

19

And for their sakes I sanctify myself, that they also might be sanctified through the truth.

20

Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word;

21

That they all may be one; as thou, Father, *art* in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.

22

And the glory which thou gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one:

23

I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one; and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me.

24

Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world.

25

O righteous Father, the world hath not known thee: but I have known thee, and these have known that thou hast sent me.

26

And I have declared unto them thy name, and will declare *it*: that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them. (John 17:1-26, King James Bible Online, n.d.)

Ideally, we would treat the original ancient Koine Greek, but for now we will do this quick read before returning to Heidegger's text. Being 'free for death' in no way signifies the human psychological idea of being brave in facing death like a soldier boldly dying for his comrades to save them, say during war. It cannot mean simply ignoring death or running away from 'it' especially since, inauthentically, we would not know what we are running from if we do not even know both the thing we think we are running from; or the fact that we are not even conscious or aware of the fact that we are running from something. There is no thing we are running from – whether we know the thing or the running; or do not know either or both or neither. Freedom, therefore, can mean (not without anxiety per say) an embracing and going into but also around and back to retrieve from oneself; one only suspends oneself from the here and now, but also any present relation to a past (say a memory of childhood) or a present relation to a future (one's upcoming birthday). Freedom is the refusal to accept being now and heading towards an end, but not because one knows one can outlive their death through faith in a resurrection as the Christian kerygmatic proclamation offers. We could not even have a conception of eternal life if all that means is the banal notion of this life we are living going on forever in both directions, a time before our birth, a time after our death, and everything in between. This includes a one-time occurrence repeating itself eternally.

Rather, let us venture what could be going on in the mind of Jesus but using the language in the text of *Being and Time*.

Let us isolate these verses from Chapter 17 in the Gospel of John:

1

These words spake Jesus, and lifted up his eyes to heaven, and said, Father, the hour is come; glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee:

5

And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was.

11

And now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we *are*.

12

While I was with them in the world, I kept them in thy name: those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition; that the scripture might be fulfilled.

13

And now come I to thee; and these things I speak in the world, that they might have my joy fulfilled in themselves.

14

I have given them thy word; and the world hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

15

I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil.

16

They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

17

Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth.

24

Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world.

25

O righteous Father, the world hath not known thee: but I have known thee, and these have known that thou hast sent me
(John 17: 1-25, King James Bible Online, n.d.).

And in particular these phrases within the verses:

John 17:1 – “The hour has come.”

John 17: 11 and 13 – “I come to thee.”

John 17: 11 – “No longer in the world.”

John 17:14 and 16 – “I am not of the world.”

John 17: 5 and 17 – “Existing before the foundation of the world” (King James Bible Online, n.d.).

These are the verses we want to isolate. Together, all the interrelations constitute an Event in which the ordinary idea of human birth and death are included, but there are alterities to both poles in the uncanny movement-release-transcendence. Ecstasy is englobing of the event without a geometric circumference. We interpret the text to think that Jesus is living in that moment (of his life’s narrative) in the world while speaking these strange words. (Note the psychology of suicide is not relevant here because Jesus is not taking his life out of desperation because he is exasperated with living in general.) But the Christological substance, in fact, is saying something different, offering a complex ecstatic temporalization in relation to movement while anticipating what would be a human death. With the Christological substance, we have to keep in mind the two natures as one (say time and eternity) in which neither one can be separated

or mixed, and neither one changes nor divides the other, both true and complete to repeat the historic Creed of 451 C.E. (Chalcedonian Creed, n.d.). But no one but Jesus knew when the time would come: we only know because we have heard the story billions of times, and learned of it through the canonization of the Gospels long after his actual historical death. Yet, we are not focusing on the event of the actual death on the Cross; but rather the temporalization of the acceptance of the timing of death, the acceptance of being at one's time. As gruesome as Jesus's actual death was, at least, some might say, he had the comfort of knowing before anyone else (like his disciples for example) that he would live again. The first life and the living again share resemblances even though theologically they are not the same. We mortals do not have such comfort. Hence, we have to go back to Heidegger's text to articulate this temporal complexity by deconstructing the linear time frame of the Passion narrative that is told every Easter.

What Jesus is saying involves two temporal planes interacting in a way that is phenomenologically reduced away from the events that follow – physical death of a man and then miraculous resurrection. The two texts together – Heidegger and the *New Testament* – point to a third text waiting to be written. This is the text of double intertwining temporalizations in the relation of Jesus and the Father as an ultimate act-event of universal transcendence. The whole constitutes a complex Event.

Heidegger's secular attempt to describe the "finitude of temporality" (Heidegger 1962, 438) as the basis of "fate" and "authentic historicity" (Heidegger 1962, 437) leaves us in suspense. Maybe that is how fundamental ontology must face its limit: there can be no movement from the question of the meaning of Being (with time as the horizon for understanding Being) to the question of the meaning of time both in terms of the Being of Time and the Time of Being. We know that inauthentic, linear, flowing time of now points (present now, past as no longer now, and future yet to be now) is derived from a deeper, primordial "ecstatic temporalizing of temporality" in section 65 (Heidegger 1962, 377). We will attempt to contrast the two temporalizations in Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John with what Heidegger gives us in terms of the "primordial," "ecstatic," "authentic," "finite," unified "temporalizing of temporality" (Heidegger 1962, 380).

To recall Heidegger's credit in being philosophically innovative, the primordial temporalizing is not an 'entity that emerges out of itself' but is in itself the "process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstasies" (Heidegger 1962, 377). Process evokes a kind of movement. This unity is not a 'sequence' of past, present, and future on a spatialized line or circle, but "temporalizes itself in their equiprimordially" (Heidegger 1962, 378) within which each ecstasy – future as "coming towards," past as "I-am-as-having-been," present as "making present" (Heidegger 1962, 373-374) – temporalizes differently as "modes of temporalizing" (Heidegger 1962, 378). It would appear that each ecstasy temporalizes itself in relation to the other two differently, and therefore we have three triangles, or one

triangle with each point pointing to the other two in different ways. One triangle with three directions or three different triangles seems to be the case; either way, a fourth ecstasy is never articulated in *Being and Time*.

Even though each of the ecstasies reside in relation to one another in an “equiprimordiality” (Heidegger 1962, 378), a soup-like unity, they relate to each other differently. This entire mysterious event of motion, given the different ‘modes of temporalizing’ of one ecstasy to the other two within the ‘equiprimordiality,’ is what derives our commonplace, inauthentic, linear, one-directional flow model of time as an “infinite” (Heidegger 1962, 379) sequence of now points that are a “coming along” and “pass away” (Heidegger 1962, 475). In this irreversible, entropic, linear time, time travel would be impossible. Paramount for our task is an extreme focus on section 65 in Chapter III on this ecstatic temporality and the problem of movement, launched in Chapter V, particularly sections 72, 74, and 75. Heidegger is recognized for his breakthrough insights on death in *Being and Time*. But he is the first to admit the incompleteness of his investigation in neglecting to attend to the problem of ‘being-towards-birth’ at the outset of chapter V (Heidegger 1962, 424-425), and then later in the chapter, the “enigma of Being as...motion” (Heidegger 1962, 444).

In order to elaborate the “equiprimordiality” (Heidegger 1962, 378) of the ecstatic temporalizing of temporality in which each ecstasy temporalizes differently (Heidegger 1962, 378) while considering the problem of ‘motion’ (which is not a change of location), we come back to the Jesus passages about being at its time (John 17:1, King James Bible Online, n.d.), the coming to the Father (John 17:11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.), and therefore no longer being in the world before his physical death, and this greatest of questions, the primordial urge, so to speak, of coming (John 17:11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.) to the “before the foundation of the world” (John 17:24, King James Bible Online, n.d.). To see past Heidegger is to see inside Jesus. But to speak for Jesus without being Jesus raises the question of ‘who’ is speaking. The uncanny resemblance between what is missing in Heidegger’s explication and what is not stated forthright in the Gospel, which must remain with the obscurity of faith, must be bracketed as a question. In other words, the Other in Jesus is the other Heidegger. How the two relate becomes the basis to formulate the criteria on how to craft the architecture of the missing Division Three.

We see the phrases not as a sequence of moments on a line as the narrative unfolds but a complex metaphysical conception in which there is something other to an origin and other to an end, but also other to non-origin and other to non-end. For sure, one cannot simply read the Gospel Chapter from beginning to end like a movie. Or one can, but we will not.

John 17:1 – “The hour has come.”

John 17:11 and 13 – “I come to thee.”

John 17:11 – “No longer in the world.”

John 17:14 and 16 – “I am not of the world.”

John 17:5 and 24 – “Existing before the foundation of the world” (King James Bible Online, n.d.)

The complex set of interrelations constituting the event gives us a type of content, which can never be verified empirically, and therefore is a product of the imagination. But it helps us flesh out what Heidegger does not with his ‘equiprimordially’ of the different “modes” (Heidegger 1962, 378) of ecstasies temporalizing themselves in relation to the others. The voice of Jesus in stating that he is no longer in the world while we still see in the scene that is he is obviously in the world (because he is praying in a garden before he dies on a cross) operates by the temporal plane that splits the world in two: in one level he is there praying and speaking the words of alterity in reference to the other plane, where only the Father can understand the transcendental relation. The ‘Coming’ to the ‘before the foundation of the world’ is not the same as Heidegger’s formulations in section 65 on ecstatic temporality:

Taking over thrownness, however, is possible only in such a way that the futural Dasein can be its ownmost ‘as-it-already-was’ – that is to say, its ‘been’ [sein ‘Gewesen’]. Only in so far as Dasein is as an ‘I-am-as-having-been,’ can Dasein come towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back. As authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as ‘having been.’ Anticipation of one’s uttermost and ownmost possibility is coming back understandingly to one’s ownmost ‘been.’ Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having been. The character of ‘having been’ arises, in a certain way, from the future (1962, 373).

The double intertwining of ‘futural’ and ‘having-been-ness’ cannot be mapped to the rich theological content we see in John 17:11 and 13 and John 17:5 and 24. For one, Jesus’s virginal birth and death on the Cross are not ordinary human events of birth and death even if they are mythic in nature. But then we have something prior to his birth in the Pre-Existent Logos (‘before the foundation of the world’ in John 17:5 and 24) and this ‘Coming to’ (John 17:11 and 13), which in the linear sequence of the narrative is before his physical death on the Cross while ‘no longer being-in-the world’ (John 17:11).

By being in the world but not of it (John 17:14-16, King James Bible Online, n.d.), Jesus points to the Christological substance, which is obviously irreducible to one plane, namely the human plane of lived, flowing, linear time. It contains that plane in relation to another because there are two natures involved, not compromising the unity from the Creed. If Dasein is in the world – as its “basic state” (Heidegger 1962, 78) – but incomplete and only complete at death, which is pure possibility, and never an actual event that is experienced or lived through, then with Jesus we have something more mind-bogglingly complex. If Dasein is “essentially futural” in its “Being” (Heidegger 1962, 437), then the priority is death even though it involves a ‘coming back’ to take up a responsibility from “inherited” possibilities (Heidegger 1962, 437). By doing so, Dasein can be in the “moment of vision for ‘its time’” (Heidegger 1962, 437). But Heidegger leaves us in abeyance

by concluding with the fact that his “finite” temporality makes possible anything like “fate” and “authentic historicity” (Heidegger 1962, 437). We, however, have the ambition to give metaphysical content to this ‘moment of vision for its time;’ but we do so by way of a metaphysics of Jesus’s non-cosmology, which is irreducible to the figure of Jesus Christ (one Person with Two Others – the Father and Holy Spirit) that constitutes the core of the dogmatic religion known as Christianity. Why does it have to be this way? Why extract a Dasein-like Jesus out of the *New Testament* and present it as an-other to the central revelation of the doctrinal truth of Christianity?

This is where the speculative imagination has to take flight as it did for Hegel in his time. But unlike Hegel, we will not operate with a three-moment dialectic or at least an ascription of that model to Hegelian philosophy. Rather, what we have in mind is fourfold in its essence, and hence not at all related to Christianity’s central revelation, namely a Trinitarian unity. One could ask whether the later Heidegger does go down this path since he too articulates a “fourfold” (Heidegger 2001, 171). Yes and no. Yes, he does with his “earth, sky, mortals, and divinities” (Heidegger 2001, 171). We, however, are expropriating, directly, biblical material straight from *New Testament* Christianity. If Heidegger left dogmatic, scholastic Catholicism or any identifiable tradition of Christianity, we are going inside it, but for opposite purposes than Heidegger. We are going inside it to try to imagine the missing Division Three of his own philosophical work, namely *Being and Time*, by turning to a moment that it could not possibly consider: another Jesus, other than Christianity.

Let us go inside that biblical world with renewed phenomenological language and conceptualizations. To do so, we must always consider that we are speaking about a transcendental relation, Son and Father, not within time; but this then makes possible the articulation about “coming to” (John 17:11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.) and the “before the foundation of the world” (John 17:24, King James Bible Online, n.d.). The four-dimensional temporalization-interrelations-movement-event, never circular, linear, or rectilinear, involves polarities and alterities about what is other to an origin. As stated before, the “before the foundation of the world” (John 17:24, King James Bible Online, n.d.) is other to the virginal birth through Mary. The “coming to” (John 17: 11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.) is other than the physical death on the cross, or mere ending of an incarnate being as a human body. But, also, we have other than a non-origin because a simple idea of eternity would negate the complex ecstatic temporalization of the finitude of Jesus, which only derives any simple idea of eternity as the opposite of time, eternity as the negation of time, eternity as timelessness, eternity as time (time flowing on forever without a Big Bang or a Big Crunch), even the ‘moving-image’ as it is for Plato’s *Timaeus*. We also have other to non-end because we are not racing ahead to the Resurrection as the death of death, negation of negation, and the re-instantiation of eternal life as you would find in basic Christian faith. We must remain within the ecstatic event that is

Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John. Let us proceed further into its depths, which is the haziness of an occurrence trying to reveal itself.

We seek to articulate the mystery of the ontological movement, not of “fate,” “historizing,” or “historicality” as Heidegger tries to do in Chapter V (1962, 437, 441). Rather, we want to see how the four points of the four others move towards one another in a dynamic Event: namely, other to origin, other to end, other to non-origin, and other to non-end. These four, of course, presuppose that there are entities like origin, end, non-origin, and non-end; these are the classic cosmological antinomies that go back through the Western philosophical tradition from Plato’s metaphysical texts on time and movement up to Kant’s dialectical antinomies in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1998, 470). Many in many traditions would think that origin and end refer to some sense of time, and non-origin and non-end evoke an idea of eternity. We do not suggest the negation of these definitions or senses; nor do we want to dismiss or reduce the complexity of treatment of these problems by the giants, such as Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel all of whom have to be remembered and appropriated at the same time. Nevertheless, we want to open the space of alterities by reinscribing in the biblical text the passage to the missing Division Three of *Being and Time*. In other words, we have to go into the Gospel to go out of it to go into the missing spaces of *Being and Time* to go out of it onto a new horizon.

The interrelations of the four points as a complex event of movement supersede even the English translators’ attempt to make some sense of Heidegger’s original German on the usage of the term “vision” (Heidegger 1962, 436). This takes place in the page of the text that precedes the “moment of vision for its time” (Heidegger 1962, 437). The translators tell us that “Hellsichtigkeit” means “clairvoyance,” and that the German reader might interpret this as a “seer’s mystical trance” (Heidegger, 1962, 436). We will have to come back to not only this moment in Macquarrie’s and Robinson’s English translation of the original German (which is offered in the footnote of the English translation of the Harper and Row 1962 Edition). But for now, the ‘mystical trance’ by a Christian or even non-Christian devotee enthralled in some kind of religious mysticism is distinct from the inner self-consciousness of Jesus Himself in the moment of his agony but also ecstatic release in no longer being in the world. The mystic may have a genuine intuition, an impossible repetition of Jesus’s suffering, which one cannot easily dismiss. That is not the point. The real question is the speculative metaphysical complexity in the “moment of vision” (Heidegger 1962, 437) superimposing Heidegger’s philosophical insights into the Gospel, for which Heidegger would not admit in *Being and Time* and the mystic must pass over in silence.

Let us return to Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John. The arrival of the hour for Jesus is not physical death as one would normally assume for humans at the moment of their death; common language would say ‘their time has come,’ for example someone in hospice with the end approaching. Instead, it connotes the

reverse of the kenosis, or the emptying out of the Godhead when Jesus is incarnate as a human being, but also the emptying out on the Cross in which death – as sacrifice – through unconditional love is what accomplishes the overcoming of death and sin for those humans who believe in Jesus’s resurrection. For those who believe in the Resurrection will also receive eternal life; which, if you think about it, is quite paradoxical because belief would mark the origin of an eternity when an eternity is not supposed to have an origin. Leaving that aside, we can come back to Jesus’s opening declaration of Chapter 17. But this coming of the “hour” (John 17:1, King James Bible Online, n.d.) in relation to the coming to the Father (John 17:11 and 13, King James Bible Online, n.d.) is not an emptying out but a filling up. It is an anti-kenosis. One can think of a bulging of time that takes the exteriorities on either side of Jesus’s being-in-the world and gives us the plenitude of a seemingly salvific moment for no one but Jesus. In other words, at the Cross, Jesus dies for humanity. But here he dies for himself in relation to the Father. What is going on?

We can bring this back to the uncanny singularity of Dasein too, which is no single human being, self, subject, or ego. But that does not mean that it does not involve a “radical individuation” (Heidegger 1962, 62) in the relation of transcendence even though one is not starting as a point in time or space. Towards the end of Part II of the Introduction, which is the very end of the Introduction as a whole, before Heidegger announces the “Design of the Treatise” (Heidegger 1962, 63), he gives us the full thrust of what he wants to accomplish in his work. Ironically, this passage precedes the announcement of the ‘third division’ of Part One – “time and Being” (Heidegger 1962, 64), which, as we know, was never included in the publication of *Being and Time* with its First Part and Two Divisions. We quote it here because it will help us return to Chapter 17 of the Gospel of John with the full philosophical armature. This way we can get into the mystery of the ontological movement of Jesus’s double temporalization; again, the latter is that which spits and interrelates the ‘coming to’ and the ‘before the foundation of the world’ in which the linear sequence of events we see in the Passion narrative is but one moment in the whole of a much larger temporalization.

Quoting Heidegger:

Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple. And the transcendence of Dasein’s Being is distinctive in that it implies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation. Every disclosure of Being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is *veritas transcendentalis* (Heidegger 1962, 62).

As we move towards our provisional conclusion, we must stay with this paragraph for a while. As Division Two will ultimately show, the basic constitution of Dasein’s Being as Care/Concern is grounded in the “equiprimordiality” of the “ecstatical” temporalizing of temporality (Heidegger 1962, 380). By substitution,

one can say that “ecstatical” temporalizing of temporality (Heidegger 1962, 380) is what is “distinctive in that it implies the possibility and necessity of the most radical individuation” (Heidegger 1962, 62). In other words, it is so individuated and so radical that nothing can be compared to it, seemingly incomparable, unique, and non-relational in an infinite sense. However, infinite is not endless, a nefarious regression to harken Hegel. But paradoxically, we are talking about a relation that is such, and hence a relation to which no other or no other relation can be related. One such relation, as an obvious candidate, is the relation between Jesus and the Father. In Heidegger’s work, it is the relation of the “transcendence of Dasein’s Being” (grounded in primordial, ecstatic temporality) and the “Phenomenological truth” (disclosedness of Being) (Heidegger 1962, 62). But *Being and Time* cannot reveal this truth, and it cannot answer its own question of the meaning of Being by way of time. It leaves us hanging, gasping for more, and the whole treatise ends with a question: “Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of *Being*?” (Heidegger 1962, 488).

To answer that question, for Heidegger but not on his behalf, we venture our hypothesis. Four-dimensional time is akin to a Hegelian speculative metaphysical will to expound the mysteries of a complex temporalization ‘radically individuated’ to Jesus’s Christological substance. The effort, to restate again, is not theological and not for the faithful. In Chapter 17, the substance gives us a glimpse of its heretofore undisclosed truth. The Being of God truly revealed (even after the sequence of events in Christianity the religion and its theological pillars – Pre-Existent Logos, Virginal Birth, Life, Miracles, Death on the Cross, Resurrection, Ascension, Sending of the Holy Spirit during the Time of the Earthly Church, the Apocalyptic Revelation, the Second Coming, the Final Defeat of Evil, and Eternity Regained with a New Heaven and Earth) relates to the Being of God’s Time in a fundamentally primordial and ecstatic way. In order to articulate that, we would have to marry this passage in Part II of the Introduction in section 7 (‘Being as transcendens,’ ‘radical individuation,’ ‘Phenomenological truth’) with section 65 (on ‘primordial ecstatic temporalizing of temporality’) of Chapter III of Division Two with sections 74 (on the ‘moment of vision’) and 75 (on the ‘enigma of Being as motion’) in Chapter V of Division Two. This prepares the way for the passage into the Gospel. We can articulate, in preliminary fashion, the question of the meaning of Being of God’s Time and the question of the meaning of the Timing of God’s Being revealed above and beyond Christian dogmatics of a Trinity. Two intertwining questions will add to Heidegger’s title, *Being and Time*, four other terms – Time of Being and Being of Time.

Conclusion

What comes out of these passages is not a new interpretation of *Being and Time*. However, it is also not the re-instantiation of faith in its Trinitarian structure. It makes no claim to defending Christian faith or aggressively and atheistically trying to attack and dismiss it. It works from within, in which the motive force to reveal

what is hidden in the Gospel has some fundamental relation to the problem of 'fate' and 'historicality' that Heidegger could not articulate in Chapter V. To set out on this work, we must develop new terms and registers that can link the question of the meaning of God's Being as a transcendental relation – irreducible to linear time – with the question of the meaning of the Being of God's Time as a four-dimensional temporalization; but this also requires linking with the question of the meaning of the Timing of God's Being, which is irreducible to the history of Western (and Eastern) Christian theological concepts as revelatory and truth-disclosing. This four-dimensional temporalization would be inclusive of linear time (with its past as no longer now or prior, present as now and here, and future as yet to be now or after) and therefore derive it, thus confirming that Heidegger was on the path so to speak. But by articulating that four-dimensional time, it is a place that neither Heidegger nor *Being and Time* can go. To go there, we have to go inside the Gospel with the aim of shooting out of it into a universe that the Gospel had no aim to articulate. Maybe we might meet Hegel again. We shall see.

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Truth about Artifacts

Howard Sankey

Abstract: Truth in a correspondence sense is objective in two ways. It is objective because the relation of correspondence is objective and because the facts to which truths correspond are objective. Truth about artifacts is problematic because artifacts are intentionally designed to perform certain functions, and so are not entirely mind independent. Against this, it is argued in this paper that truth about artifacts is perfectly objective despite the role played by intention and purpose in the production of artifacts.

Keywords: truth, correspondence, facts, artifacts.

I.

It has been raining for days. It is raining still. I hear the patter of raindrops striking the metal roof sheets. Out the window, I see cypress branches, a wet road, a wooden fence, an old riding boot hanging from a fence post, a bale of hay, two kangaroos grazing on the opposite hillside.

We live our lives surrounded by and interacting with artifacts, things that have been made by humans. The window, the roof, the road, the fence, the boot, and the bale of hay, have all been built or made by humans. Though the cypress is a natural object, it is not a member of a native species. It came as a seedling from a nursery and was planted where it now grows. Perhaps the kangaroos are natural objects. But the fact that they choose to live close to humans where they can find grass rather than deeper in the forest gives pause to that thought. Maybe only the rain is entirely natural. That too is questionable, given the role of humans in the climate change of which the recent heavy rains are an effect.¹

II.

It is true that it is raining, that an old boot is hanging from the fence post, that there are two kangaroos grazing on the hill opposite. But what is it to be true? It is not just to believe that these matters of fact obtain. Nor is it to be justified in believing that they obtain. To be true is for the facts that I have mentioned to obtain. It is for the world to be as it is said to be.

¹ I assume for present purposes that artifacts are produced by humans rather than by non-human animals. Thus, I will set aside the question of whether bird nests, spider webs, beaver dams and wombat burrows constitute artifacts.

This is the correspondence intuition. The intuition is that for a proposition or belief to be true is for it to correspond to the way that the world in fact is.² Suppose I assert the proposition, "There is a boot hanging from the fence post". Or suppose I believe there is a boot hanging from the fence post. For the proposition or the belief to be true, one thing and one thing only is required. There must in fact be a boot hanging from the fence post. The boot's hanging from the fence post is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of the proposition that the boot is hanging from the fence post. The same applies for the associated belief.

To briefly spell the point out, truth is a property that a proposition possesses in virtue of bearing a certain relationship to reality. The relationship holds when what the proposition asserts to be the case is in fact the case. To continue with the example of the boot, the proposition "There is a boot hanging from the fence post" is true just in case there is a boot hanging from the fence post. The proposition asserts that a certain fact involving the boot obtains. To be true, the fact asserted by the proposition must obtain. The relationship between the true proposition and the fact that obtains is the relationship of correspondence.

The idea that truth is correspondence takes truth to be non-epistemic. The relation of correspondence between what is asserted to be the case and the way that the world is does not depend on belief or any form of epistemic justification. The truth of a proposition is a property that the proposition possesses whether what it asserts to be the case is believed to be the case or not.³ Indeed, the proposition may be true regardless of whether the proposition is justified or belief in the proposition is justified. Truth is a matter of how the world is. It is not a matter of how we believe the world to be or of what we are justified in believing about the world.

III.

Truth, in the correspondence sense just indicated, is objective. Indeed, it is objective twice over. As I have argued elsewhere, the objectivity of truth is twofold.⁴

First, the relation of correspondence is an objective relation that obtains independently of whether one believes that it obtains. Even if I (or anyone else) did not believe that there is a boot on the fence post across the road, it would still be the case that there is a boot on the fence post. It is true that there is a boot on the fence post even if I (or anyone else) do not believe that there is a boot on the

² Nothing important hangs on my use of the term 'proposition'. I use the term 'proposition' simply to refer to the content of beliefs. A proposition is that, whatever it is, that two sentences of different languages which are precise translations of each other have in common. It is what both such sentences express. If you do not like propositions, feel free to think in terms of sentences, claims or assertions instead.

³ A similar remark applies, of course, for falsity: a false proposition has the property of being false regardless of whether anybody believes that the proposition is false.

⁴ See my 'The Twofold Objectivity of Truth'.

fence post. The relation of correspondence obtains objectively, independently of whether it is believed to obtain. Truth is objective in virtue of being a non-epistemic relation of correspondence that holds between what we say or believe and the way the world is. Let us call this the correspondence aspect of the objectivity of truth.

Second, correspondence truth is objective because the facts to which true propositions correspond have objective status. It is not just that the correspondence relation is objective. The facts themselves are objective. Facts obtain in a way that is independent of our beliefs or thoughts about them. The fact that the boot is hanging from the fence post does not depend in any way on thoughts about the boot or the fence post. It is an objective fact that obtains independently of whether anyone is aware that it obtains. It is the way that the world objectively is that makes it true that there is a boot hanging from the fence post. Let us call this the factual aspect of the objectivity of truth.

IV.

At this point, a problem emerges. The boot and the fence post were made by humans. The boot was made to be worn (not to hang from the fence post). The fence was built to keep animals in. The fence post is part of the fence. It contributes to the purpose for which the fence was built. A boot maker made the boot for a purpose. A fence builder built the fence to perform a function.

How, then, can the fact that the boot is hanging from the fence post be objective? Neither the boot nor the fence post exists in a way that is devoid of mental involvement. Both depend upon the intentions with which they were made and the role they were meant to play. If objectivity requires mind-independence, both the boot and the fence post fail to be objective. Equally, the fact that the boot is hanging from the fence post is not an objective fact.

Here we have an objection to the idea that truth about artifacts is objective. The objection is not that the non-epistemic relation of correspondence fails to be objective. The objection is that the facts that make claims about artifacts true fail to be objective facts. This is an objection to the factual aspect of the objectivity of truth, not the correspondence aspect.

V.

Is this a good objection to the factual aspect of the objectivity of truth?

I do not think so. The objection exaggerates the significance of mental factors in the production of artifacts. It is true that the boot was made by a boot maker. The boot maker formed the intention to make the boot and made the boot so that the boot might perform a certain function. It is also true that the fence was built by a fence builder. The fence builder formed the intention to build the fence and built the fence to perform a certain function. The fence post was positioned in the post hole as part of the process of building the fence. As for the location of the

boot, someone attached the boot to the fence post with a piece of rope. That was an intentional action, though what the purpose of the action might have been is a subject for speculation.

Both intention and purpose contribute to the circumstances surrounding the fact that the boot is hanging from the fence post. This reflects the fact that both the boot and the fence post are artifacts produced by human hand. It also reflects the fact that a human actor engaged in the intentional activity of suspending the boot from the fence post.

None of this detracts in the slightest from the objectivity of the fact that the boot is hanging from the fence post. Once the boot has been attached to the fence post, it is a fact that the boot is hanging from the fence post. That remains the case until such time as the boot ceases to hang from the fence post. This may occur through various means, including human action or events not produced by human action. The fact that the boot is hanging from the fence post is an objective fact that obtains no matter what human intention or purpose led to it being there in the first place.

That the boot and fence post are artifacts is irrelevant to the objectivity of the fact that the boot is hanging from the fence post. It is no doubt a relevant feature of the history that lies behind the fact that the boot is hanging from the fence post that both boot and fence post were made by humans. But it is simply irrelevant to the obtaining of the fact that the boot is hanging from the fence post. That fact is as objective as you can get.

VI.

What, then, are we to say of truth about artifacts?

To my mind, the truth about an artifact is as objective as any other truth. This holds for both aspects of the objectivity of truth. It is both the case that the correspondence aspect of truth about artifacts is objective, and that the factual aspect of truth about artifacts is objective. The proposition, "There is a boot hanging from the fence", corresponds to the fact that there is a boot hanging from the fence. It is both the case that the correspondence relation is objective, and that the fact is objective.

Hence, we may say that truth about artifacts, like truth in general, is objective in a twofold sense.

ERRATA NOTICE

I. A sentence on page 199 of the article "The Private Language Argument: Another Footnote to Plato?" authored by Arnold Cusmariu and published in *Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences* 9, 2 (2022): 191-222 contained a typographical error. The original sentence read:

"We should focus on the details of his contribution and asses rigorously whether it has philosophical merit."

It should have read:

"We should focus on the details of his contribution and assess rigorously whether it has philosophical merit."

II. A paragraph on page 205 of the article "The Private Language Argument: Another Footnote to Plato?" authored by Arnold Cusmariu and published in *Symposion, Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences* 9, 2 (2022): 191-222, contains erroneous information that came to light after the article was published. The original paragraph read:

"Grammatical Comment: 'Bedarf' is a (masculine) noun in German, so the word should have been written with a capital 'B' in the original because nouns are capitalized in German, e.g. 'Kriterion.' Perhaps it's a typo; perhaps the text was intended to read 'bedarf' meaning 'requires.' Accordingly, I propose this:"

It should have read:

"Translation Comment: 'Bedarf' is the 3rd person singular present tense indicative active form of 'bedürfen.' So, while the standard translation 'stands in need of' will work, it is preferable to translate in a way that clarifies the connection to the all-important term 'criterion.' Accordingly, I propose this:"

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