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# **RESEARCH ARTICLES**



# The Hidden Future

Alex Blum

**Abstract:** We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle unknowable.

**Keywords:** cannot be, omnipotence, omniscience, true, truth-value.

It is reasonable to assume that we may not know what we are going to do on a particular Tuesday, even if it is all up to us. But it doesn't appear reasonable to assume that it is *impossible* for us to know what we are going to do on a particular Tuesday, if it is all up to us. But there is a straight forward argument which shows that we cannot know what we are going to do on a particular Tuesday or on any other day. For if we know what we are going to do on a particular day, say, go to the lecture, then it is true that we are going to go to the lecture on that day, and thus it *cannot* be (**not could not have been**) true that we are not going to attend the lecture on that day. But if we *can* change our mind and not attend the lecture on that day then we can make the true proposition that we will attend the lecture on that day false. But that is impossible.

For what is true cannot be (**not could not have been**) false.<sup>1</sup> Nor can a proposition change its truth value.<sup>2</sup>

If the above argument is sound, then an omnipotent being who can change his mind cannot possibly know the future. Omniscience would then be limited to the past and the present.

But this does not stop us or an omniscient being from forming plans for the future and on the appropriate occasion to act on them. The future may then be open, as Aristotle contended,<sup>3</sup> and remain open till it becomes the present.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> It is "a truth of the logic of modalities" that "if a proposition is true it is self-necessary." (Von Wright 1957, 122). He explains: "... relative to the hypothesis (supposition) that it is true, a proposition *cannot* be but true (is necessarily true). Thus *not*: if a proposition is true, then it is (absolutely) necessary. But: if a proposition is *true*, it is *self-necessary*." (Von Wright 1957, 122) For additional discussion, see Blum (2011).

<sup>2</sup> For it would mean that one and the same state of affairs will both occur and not occur. For further discussion, see Blum (2013).

<sup>3</sup> See Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* ch 9,19<sup>a</sup> 30-40, in McKeon (1941, 48).

<sup>4</sup> I am deeply grateful to Menachem Domb, Yehuda Gellman, Peter Genco, Asa Kasher and Danny Statman for their helpful comments.

Alex Blum

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# From the Dissolution of the Anima to the End of All Things (The Question of Death in Poetry and Gothic Music)

Ștefan Bolea

**Abstract:** In the present paper I analyze the theme of death in Gothic Metal songs such as *Forever Failure* (1995) by Paradise Lost, *Everything Dies* (1999) by Type O Negative, *The Hanged Man* (1998) by Moonspell or *Gone with The Sin* (1999) by HIM. The subthemes I am mostly interested in are the death of anima, the suicide of the self and the universal death. Several Romanian poets – Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889), Iuliu Cezar Săvescu (1866-1903), George Bacovia (1881-1957) and D. Iacobescu (1893-1913), who all have in common the pursuit of nihilism – used death to enhance their nihilist poetical universe. I will trace the aforementioned subthemes in some of their most spectacular poems.

**Keywords:** death-in-life, death of the anima, Gothic Metal music, *Liebestod*, nihilist poetry, personal apocalypse, romanticism, symbolism.

## 1. Death of the Anima

The Romantic poet Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889) conceives in his early poem *Mortua est* (1871) the death of the anima as the absolute destruction of meaning. The Romanian writer imagines the scene of mourning in the manner of Novalis, reminding us also of Edvard Grieg's *Death of Aase*. The poetic self rises in a Schopenhauerian way from the subjective level of solipsistic misery to the objective level of universal contemplation, ascending to a kind of eagle eye's perspective of existential *sapientia* (like Hamlet, he is discerning between life and death):

O, death is a chaos, an ocean of stars gleaming,  
While life is a quagmire of doubts and of dreaming,  
Oh, death is an aeon of sun-blazoned spheres,  
While life but a legend of wailing and tears. (transl. Corneliu M. Popescu<sup>1</sup>)  
(Eminescu 2014, 67)

We have here an amplification of death in three steps that is significant for my whole article: (1) death of the anima implies the (2) suicide of the self and this personal apocalypse presupposes the (3) end of everything. First the anima dies

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<sup>1</sup> Available at: <http://www.estcomp.ro/eminescu/mortua.html>.

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in Romantic fashion, the personal self follows, universal death being the third and final phase.

Through my head beats a whirlwind, a clamorous wrangle  
Of thoughts and of dreams that despair does entangle;  
For when suns are extinguished and meteors fail  
*The whole universe seems to mean nothing at all.* (italics mine, transl. Corneliu M. Popescu<sup>2</sup>) (Eminescu 2014, 67)

The presence of death (first as the death of the loved one, last as universal death) is coupled with meaninglessness (“To exist! O, what nonsense, what foolish conceit.”). If death exists, life is only a forgery, a sort of prelude of death, a *living death*. The poetic self will experience *the ordeal of nihilism* (the “uncanniest of all guests”) (Nietzsche 1968, 7) as the state of decomposition of meaning (“the aim is lacking; ‘why’ finds no answer”) (Nietzsche 1968, 9) and as decentering and moving away from the ‘first principle’: “Since Copernicus man has been rolling from the center toward X.” (Nietzsche 1968, 9) Nihilism is more than a way of seeing (and fighting) the world, in its interiority nihilism being equivalent to anti-theism, a method of conceiving (and fighting) God. That is why Eminescu’s poetic self, after experiencing the nihilist destruction of meaning, becomes an atheist. A universe where *her* death and *my* death are possible is a territory deprived of God’s light, a fallen Gnostic sub-world ruled by ‘decreators’ and ‘snakes.’

O, what is the meaning? What sense does agree?  
The end of such beauty, had that what to be?  
Sweet seraph of clay where still lingers life’s smile,  
Just in order to die did you live for a while?

O, tell me the meaning. This angel or clod?  
I find on her forehead no witness of God. (transl. Corneliu M. Popescu<sup>3</sup>)  
(Eminescu 2014, 68)

The Post-Symbolist poet George Bacovia (1881-1957) re-writes *Mortua est* in his masterpiece *Lead* (1902). One could call Bacovia an essentialist or a minimalist: his poems are extremely precise and deprived of all the unnecessary embroidery.

Upturned my lead beloved lay asleep  
On the lead flower ... and I began to call –  
I stood alone by the corpse ... and it was cold ...  
And the wings of lead drooped. (tr. Peter Jay<sup>4</sup>) (Bacovia 2001, 34)

Bacovia’s imagery is extremely depressive, almost psychotic. The ‘lead beloved’ lies ‘upturned’ and the poetic self stands ‘alone by the corpse.’ The

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<sup>2</sup> Available at: <http://www.estcomp.ro/eminescu/mortua.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Available at: <http://www.estcomp.ro/eminescu/mortua.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Available at: <http://www.aboutromania.com/bacovia1.html>.

severe heaviness of 'lead' (melancholy and depression) brings along a sort of schizoid coldness, an impression of isolation (1) between the self and anima (she is a 'corpse'), (2) between the self and world (the self is 'alone'), (3) between the self and self (everything is 'upturned,' 'the wings ... drooped'). Something snaps in the poetical character's brain: the poet senses anxiously the advent of insanity.

The Swedish Doom Gothic Metal band Draconian, in the track *She Dies* (2006), reminds us both of Eminescu (the liaison between self and anima) and Bacovia (the coldness that separates the two):

This lovelorn kiss of death in lugubrious silence  
Dawn breaks open like a wound and the dreadful sun

Two souls entwined together,  
still so alone.  
Both you and I are shattered  
and frozen in stone. (Draconian, 2006)

Eminescu's *Liebestod* (Wagner's Romantic expression of 'love-death') is reversed by the Finnish gothic rock band HIM, in one of their most renowned videos, *Gone with the Sin* (1999). If the Romantic poets used to mourn for their loved ones, the Post-Romantic musicians would cherish the dying of the loved ones, searching for the point "where love and death embrace," to quote another single by HIM. Love = death: Wagner, Eminescu, Novalis and Shelley would agree to it.

I love your skin oh so white  
I love your touch cold as ice  
And I love every single tear you cry  
I just love the way you're losing your life

I adore the despair in your eyes  
I worship your lips once red as wine  
I crave for your scent sending shivers down my spine  
I just love the way you're running out of life (HIM, 1999)

Love is a sort of a personal death (I die while worshipping the other) and at the same time death has a kind of mysterious purity (while life is generally trivial) that unites it with love. Moreover, in HIM's interpretation of the Wagnerian *Liebestod*, death is seen as a fulfillment of love, a co-participation in a heightened state of being (we can observe this in their hit, *Join Me in Death*).

And we've waited for so long  
For this moment to come  
Was so anxious to be together  
Together in death (HIM, 1999)

One can say that the only mirror of the absolute of love is the absolute of death. In other words, on the heights of erotic ecstasy the sole transcendence is the abyss of death: the rest is nothing else than bourgeois banality or the decrepitude of everydayness. A fact known to poets from of all times: Romeo and

Juliet, Tristan and Isolde escape the separateness of individuality and the subject-object dualism, making love on the shrine of death. This fundamental idea is present in many Gothic Metal songs: "In our heavenly rapture we die on and on," "I'm waiting for you to drown in my love," "I taste death in every kiss we share/ Every sundown seems to be the last we have/ Your breath on my skin has the scent of our end," "It's not our fault if death's in love with us .../ It's not our fault if the reaper holds our hearts" (HIM), "Loving you was loving the death," "Now close those eyes and let me love you to death" (Type O Negative), "And as we lay, we kissed/ Fingers wet with poison/ Thinking to each one/ There is beauty in death" (Moonspell), and so on. For a limitless love, the only logical limit is death.

## 2. Suicide of the Self

For the second step of the death or suicide of the self, let us compare two works with the same title (with a brief incursion into the nihilism of Dostoevsky and Tiamat): one by the Symbolist poet Iuliu Cezar Săvescu (1866-1903) and the other by the Portuguese Gothic Metal band, Moonspell. The name of the poem/song is *The Hanged Man*.

In Săvescu's poem, which has Symbolist influences (one senses the imprint of Baudelaire and Lautréamont) but also a Gothic and Romantic touch (one might name Byron, Musset or Mary Shelley), the 'self killer' renounces Christ, becoming 'a martyr of Satan' (to quote Saint Bruno's expression).

At the village church  
One icon has fallen  
The very icon of Christ  
Because in the cold high night  
Swiftly passes Satan  
Cursing.

And we remember from the old  
That under moldy stone  
He is buried long before  
The man who dared first  
To end himself and die

Hanging. (transl. mine) (Săvescu 2015, 125)

Suicide becomes – in Săvescu's poem – a sort of dark martyrdom: despite being an act of courage, it may also be understood as a way of embracing absolute damnation. The idea of the Romanian poet seems to contradict a brilliant intuition of the Swedish Death Doom Gothic Metal band Tiamat, who in their track *The Sleeping Beauty* (1992), wrote that "suicide could be the key/ To the place called paradise" (Tiamat, 1992). We can grasp both Săvescu's and Tiamat's convictions. The Romanian poet seems to be implying that the suicide belongs in hell with his master Satan because he transgressed the conventional territory of Christianity (when he destroyed his own body, the self murderer obliterated the

God within, that's why the Church hates him and is ashamed of him). The Swedish band seems to say that if I killed myself, I would be my own master, my own decreator, my own God and if I killed myself at the peak of my life, without regrets and without tears, I would *die high* and gain access to my own private paradise: Ego would become the Self beyond good and evil. We can see that suicide, depending on how one uses, may be either a method of damnation or salvation.

Tiamat's insights remind us of the reflections of a famous suicide from literature, Dostoevsky's Kirillov, a literary character frequently compared to nihilists such as Nietzsche or Cioran. If nihilism can be defined as a philosophical reaction to the meaninglessness of life (no life can have absolute meaning as long as death brutally ends it: death cuts us off so decisively that one almost has the feeling that we have never existed), the dark wisdom of Kirillov is introduced in two of fragments. First of all, he claims that life = death = 0. While optimists argue under the umbrella of common sense that life is a plus and death a minus, and pessimists such as Schopenhauer, Leopardi, Byron or Eminescu reversed the formula, Kirillov observes that neither life, nor death, have a significant value or a positive quality. For a nihilist, life is a disguised form of death, an illusion created by nonbeing, and death only a confirmation of nothingness.

Nihilistic freedom comes to us when we grasp that life = death = 0. "There will be entire freedom when it makes no difference whether one lives or does not live." (Dostoevsky 1995, 115) But to choose freedom, Dostoevsky teaches us that elsewhere, is to reject happiness. Because happiness is the bribe of destiny: as long as we are happy, we adore life and dread death. If we chose freedom over happiness, we would despise the servitude of life and happiness and attain a sort of ontological coldness, an initiation in the *adiaphoria* of nihilism.

Second of all, Kirillov anticipates the Nietzschean death of God, imagining a strange history of future nihilism:

God is the pain of the fear of death. He who overcomes pain and fear will himself become God. Then there will be a new life, a new man, everything new... Then history will be divided into two parts: from the gorilla to the destruction of God, and from the destruction of God to ... to the physical changing of the earth and man. Man will be God and will change physically. (Dostoevsky 1995, 115)

The key of the fragment is the definition of God as "the pain of fear of death": the fear of death is considered sacred in our society; fear (of death) is our God, because it is our *numinosum*, our most precious possession, our Achilles heel. One can claim, such as Epicurus, that death is nothing, but – condensing our hopes, our loves, our lives – fear of death becomes everything. Our entire culture is built upon pain + fear + death. Moreover, one can see that in Kirillov *suicide* (and in Tiamat's song as well), *sui* is emphasized and not *caedes*. Personalized *suicide* becomes another kind of death, a sort of super-death. Fighting against the iron dictatorship of the instinct of self-preservation and killing the pain of the

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fear of death (our mantra: “I fear, therefore I am”), the suicide becomes basically a sort of new god. Killing fear, the suicide becomes I in death. One can almost say that the suicide kills death.

Moving on, let us pay attention to Moonspell’s erotic and esoteric song (perhaps inspired by Pessoa and Crowley):

Put your arms around my neck  
just like a pathetic lace of death  
displays like a tarot deck  
I am the card of the hanged man

Put your lace around my face  
just like a fairytale  
through the blank of my closed eyes  
you can foresee the rope within...

And it makes you wanna ride  
through the fake suicide of someone  
already dead inside (Moonspell, 1998).

Moonspell’s *The Hanged Man* is an existential posture (*asana*), a *Weltanschauung* from the reversed position of the ‘hanged man.’ Seeing the world from the corner of the Other is *seeing what no one else sees*, the esoteric *essence of existence* that comes to some of us like lightning, changing us from the core. *Suicide* becomes a metaphor of initiation, and death becomes a necessary step to the *second life* of the spirit. Is the man hanged or is the whole world hanging? *Death in life* becomes a prelude to genuine, *real life*. We have to use the corrosive forces of death carefully; we have to be pierced by *nigredo* in order to be transmuted into the authentic *lapis*.

There will come a time when we will have to choose between initiation and nihilism, between the anguished spleen of the Symbolists (and Dumitru Iacobescu (1893-1913) is one of the finest ones) and the ‘erotic alchemy’ presented by the Postmodern Moonspell. What would we choose: Moonspell’s amorous rope or Iacobescu’s decadent noose?

Nothing sacred. Nothing good. No rhythm  
Just a taste of solar idleness  
Along with an especially long decadence  
And a noose – unable to break your neck. (transl. mine) (Iacobescu 2014, 16)

### 3. The Death of Everything

Three poetical fragments will present to us this passing from the theme of the death of anima and the suicide of the self to the apprehension of the total apocalypse. The first one comes from Bacovia’s poem *July* (1916):

There are some dead in the town, darling,  
And I came to tell you just that;

## From the Dissolution of the Anima to the End of All Things

On the bier, because of the heat in town –  
Slowly the corpses rot.

The living, with flesh drenched in sweat  
From the heat, also move in decay;  
There's a stench of corpses, my darling,  
And even your breasts wilt today. (tr. Peter Jay<sup>5</sup>) (Bacovia 2001, 51)

A sort of dystopian feeling of deathless death, an impression that no one else is alive, seems to influence these verses. Moreover, one might wonder whether the narrating self and his 'darling' are anything but ghosts (and whether Death writes the poem with Bacovia's hand). If life is essentially death ("slowly the corpses rot," "there's a stench of corpses"), we must ask ourselves what really death is.

Another Post-Symbolist anthem by Bacovia, *Pulvis* (1916) seems to answer the aforementioned question: what is the nature of death? The four terms that comprise our *chaosmos* ('immensity,' 'eternity,' 'chaos' and 'void') are synonyms of *insanity*. One could say that if our manifold universe or lawless *chaosmos* ('chaos' + 'cosmos' i.e. universe + abyss) is an aberration and an imbalance of the original *cosmos*, *insanity* as an aberration and derangement of the usual norm is the new law of being. Thus, we would all understand the nature of death only in our insanity.

Immensity, eternity,  
You, chaos, who gather everything ...  
In your void is insanity –  
You make us all insane. (tr. Peter Jay<sup>6</sup>) (Bacovia 2001, 50)

Bacovia is too close to Postmodernism to understand universal death with other statements than ironic ones: we must go back to Eminescu's Romantic ode of nothingness *Memento mori* (1871) to see the nihilist apocalypse that welcomes absolute destruction:

May death expand its colossal wings upon the world:  
Only darkness is the coat of buried waste.  
A lingering star extinguishes its small spring.  
Deathlike time spreads its arms and becomes eternity.  
When nothing will persist on the barren landscape  
I will ask: What of your power, Man? – Nothing!! (transl. mine) (Eminescu 1993, 125-6)

We usually forget that our everyday 'time' is 'deathlike' and that it can become the dark eternity that will swallow our world; we easily forget that in reality we live the Beckettian 'zero hour,' the hour of nihilism and nothingness, the hour of 'to live is to die,' the hour of the chaos who will 'make us all insane.'

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<sup>5</sup> Available at: <http://www.aboutromania.com/bacovia23.html>.

<sup>6</sup> Available at: <http://www.aboutromania.com/bacovia22.html>.

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Eminescu unites the gloomy apocalypse of Byron's *Darkness* with Cioran's Post-Romantic 'death of everything' from *A Short History of Decay*. After reading his poem/poems one can only think of Dresden, Hiroshima or Chernobyl.

In contemporary Metal music, this 'zero hour' of universal destruction is sung by many artists. I will name only three. The British band Paradise Lost, who co-created the Gothic Metal subgenre, in their 1995 song and video *Forever Failure* have these splendid lyrics indicative of a sort of passive nihilism:

Are you forever?  
Loss of purpose in a passive life  
Are you forever?  
Pale, regarded as a waste of time (Paradise Lost, 1995)

This melancholic chorus, combined with the sorrowful melody and the repressed anger that makes this song more powerful, all transform *Forever Failure* in the absolute funeral anthem. The alternative metal artist Marilyn Manson has an interesting vision of apocalypse in his track *In the Shadow of the Valley of Death* (2000), seeing death as a total God that usurps and destroys everything:

Death is policeman  
Death is the priest  
Death is the stereo  
Death is a TV  
Death is the Tarot  
Death is an angel and  
Death is our God  
killing us all (Marilyn Manson, 2000)

To say that death is a 'policeman,' a 'priest,' a 'TV' or an executioner is to claim that death is – not unlike God – a metonymy of absolute control, a merciless hegemon that collects tribute from us all. I will end this article with the lyrics of the video *Everything Dies* (1999) by the American gothic band Type O Negative (what is most impressive about this song is that – despite the message – the simple chorus *Everything Dies* is not entirely unhappy: if we listen to it carefully we also hear a ceremonial and an almost exulting and liberating tone):

My ma's so sick  
She might die  
Though my girl's quite fit  
she will die  
Still looking for someone  
Who was around  
Barely coping  
Now I hate myself  
Wish I'd die  
  
Everything dies (Type O Negative, 1999)



## By Way of Conclusion

Comparing two fields less researched in this combination (mainly Romanian nihilist poetry from the late 19th century and Gothic Metal Music especially from the late 20th century) we have seen how the theme of death did not seem to evolve in our (Post)Modernity. The death of anima (a favorite subtheme of the Romantic poets like Goethe, Lermontov or Novalis, who seem to experience the disaster of losing the loved one with such intensity) will not disappear from the history of our mentalities as long as the concept of 'Romantic love' lives on. From Wagners's *Liebested* to HIM's *Join Me in Death* is only a small step and we have seen how love and death are correlated, almost equivalent. The second subtheme, the suicide of the self, evolves from the motif of the death of the anima and I have argued – with the Gothic Metal band Tiamat and Dostoevsky's nihilistic character Kirillov – that suicide may become a way of accessing our personal paradise. Finally, the subtheme of the universal death (treated not only by Romanian poets such as Eminescu and Bacovia but also by authors like Byron, Jean Paul or Lautréamont) has huge echoes in the contemporary apocalyptic Metal music: Paradise Lost, Type O Negative and Marilyn Manson dedicated some of the most beautiful melodic poems to the deity of Death. I have named this obsession with dying and destruction 'the zero hour' in the manner of Samuel Beckett.

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# Third World Themes in the International Politics of the Ceaușescu Regime or the International Affirmation of the ‘Socialist Nation’

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**Abstract:** The present article aims to offer a synoptic picture of communist Romania’s relations with Third World countries during the Ceaușescu regime. Within these relations, economic and geopolitical motivations coexisted along with ideological ones, thus making the topic one of the most interesting and relevant key for understanding RSR’s complex and cunning international strategy. However, I intend to prove that mere pragmatism is not enough to comprehend the drive behind Ceaușescu’s diplomatic efforts in post-colonial Africa; ideological factors need also to be taken into account.

**Keywords:** blackness, consciencism, ‘group of 77’, Maoism, national-communism, neo-colonialism, pragmatism.

## Introduction

Considering itself, since 1972, a ‘socialist developing country,’ the Romanian Socialist Republic (RSR) followed with this ingenious strategy a number of specific reasons, one of them consisting in diversifying its global commercial options, another to become a well-known and respected voice on the international stage, mostly in the emerging field of nonalignment and, last but not least, to obtain a symbolic and ideological prestige most useful for future international endeavors. As a ‘socialist developing country,’ RSR was paying a lot of attention to the ‘new international order’, a revolutionary concept consisting in the attenuation of global social, economic and geopolitical inequalities, in boosting the importance of small and middle states on the international scene and in permanently paving the way for the Leninist ‘new’ to the disadvantage of the bourgeois ‘old’.

My working hypothesis resides in understanding RSR’s interest in post-colonial Africa as a means to gradually be perceived, along with Yugoslavia, as a middle sized China within the matrix of tiermondism. Second, along with this symbolic prestige specific interests like gaining access to the Western industrial market or obtaining cheap natural resources, mostly oil, several minerals or wood are wrapped up.

As far as the structure of the paper is concerned, the article starts with a detailed introduction which presents the appearance and controversies

surrounding nonalignment both as ideology and geopolitical practice, followed by a methodological and a literature review section, then by a short analysis of African post-colonial national ideologies with reference to Romanian national-communism and a critical assessment of RSR's acceptance into the so-called 'group of 77'. Finally, the conclusions of this whole scientific demarche are presented. Basically, RSR and the Third World African countries engaged in 'multilateral' relations during the 1970s, relations entailed by very practical reasons, but boosted considerably due to ideological affinities between both parties. In the following decade, substantial changes within the international political economy brought the Romanian-Third World idyll to an abrupt, but predictable halt, proving that they are best understood as a component of the whole international environment during the second half of the Cold War.

The states of the Third World – whose number simply exploded after 1950, once the decolonization process started, especially in Africa – represented for the RSR a new opportunity to manifest its independence in the sphere of international relations with reference to the Soviet Union. Therefore, once the events that allowed the dissident ally's distancing from Moscow gradually became obsolete – the Sino-Soviet split or the tensions between East and West substantially reduced in the first half of the 1970s, once the Helsinki accords were signed – the so-called nonaligned movement of the young African, South-American and Asian states became the new international playground for the RSR (Barnett 1992, 41).

The nonaligned movement named, within the United Nations (UN), the 'group of 77,' after the initial number of the founding states (quickly exceeded in a few years), was anticipated in 1955 through the Bandung conference, although it officially appeared at the beginning of the next decade. With this occasion, several international principles that would constitute the political backbone of the future nonaligned movement were adopted: the respect for human rights as they are defined in the UN charter, equal consideration for all races, nations and states, the recognition of the right of every state to individually or collectively defend itself, according to the UN principles, renouncing the use of aggressions and threats in the relations between states, the solving of international conflicts and disputes solely through peaceful means, the encouragement of international cooperation based on mutual interests and on the respect of international rules (Sprințeroiu 1985, 29-30). One of the founders of the movement, Ghana's president (and a personal friend of Nicolae Ceaușescu), Kwame Nkrumah, eloquently expressed the aim of the nonaligned states: "We were born through protest and revolt against the international status-quo, due to the dividing of the world in two antagonistic blocs. We must permanently refuse to align ourselves with one or the other." (quoted in Sprințeroiu 1985, 20-21)

Sprințeroiu refuses to refer to the nonaligned movement as an alliance of the Third World countries, considering it rather as a 'moral force' capable of putting into perspective the interests of all developing states without creating a

political, ideological and military bloc. Furthermore, the nonaligned movement could not be equated with a mechanical equilibrium through which its member states would have tried to obtain benefits from both the West and the Soviet Union, because the whole essence of the movement consisted in the refusal of 'bloc policy' and of 'all forms of dependence,' of coercing states in the field of international relations. The nonaligned movement wanted to democratize the relations between states and to create a global environment different from that of the Cold War, based on growing inequalities and recurrent crises – a new international order, one that appealed to the RSR more from pragmatic than from ideological reasons (see Sprințeroiu 1985, 44-45, 64-65). Nonalignment was not only a (geo)political option, but also an ideological one, therefore neither capitalism nor communism, in its European form, at least, could be directly extrapolated within the thinking and the practice of the young states, most of them African, which managed to win their independence despite the opposition of their former European oppressors. "Some would like the liberation movements to orient themselves towards class-struggle, like in Europe. Some would want them to become realist: a Don Quijote which throws himself over white skin windmills." (Neto quoted in Dragoș 1982, 54). Federalization by tribal criteria was also rejected: the African nations in the making wanted only to inspire themselves from the political solutions of the North (capitalism, communism), not to copy them, reserving themselves the right to formulate their own political answers to the problems they encountered: "Our European friends need to make way in their thinking and conceptions to the necessary flexibility in order to understand that our countries, being in a development stage, must discover their own political formulas in the context of their situations and civilizations, which are very much different from that of the European or American countries." (Ahidjo quoted in Dragoș 1982, 91-92).

Nonaligned radicalism provoked even from the beginning the hostility of the United States, Great Britain and France, but also of the European Community as a whole, the last one managing, through economic pressures, to subordinate the raw materials and the markets of the former colonies (Sprințeroiu 1985, 54-58; Quenum 1969, 18-19; Țurlea 1970, 19-20). Although the North-South polarization was, during the Cold War, and still remains, an undeniable reality, the three above quoted authors exaggerate: the young independent states could not have possibly survived in the absence of strong economic relations with the developed West, the most important global consumer of raw materials. And because these states, from reasons specific to colonialism, were obstructed to develop their own industries, they were effectively obligated by the structure of the global economy to play the role of raw material suppliers. However, on the long term, the reduction of global asymmetries could not be satisfactorily put into practice against rich states, but only with them as partners.

## Methodological Aspects

Beside the handy ideological explanations, it is certainly intriguing how a socialist country with problems relating to late and accelerated industrialization decided to place such an emphasis on its 'unshaken friendship' with poor, unstable and mostly political unpredictable Third World countries, many of them lacking even a basic infrastructure. Therefore, the proposed research questions are the following: isn't RSR's drive towards the Third World motivated, at least partially, by Ceaușescu's ambition to achieve an important symbolic capital in international relations? Were the material aspects of this relation really rewarding, in the light of the institutional and administrative turmoil existing in the newly independent African countries? Last but not least, what role could we ascribe to ideological tenets in understanding the complex and often contradictory role RSR aspired to play in the development of post-colonial Africa?

The working hypotheses I advance are strongly intertwined with the research questions presented above. Namely, that RSR's interests in the Third World were both pragmatic and symbolic, on one hand, and that between Romanian national-communism and some post-colonial branches of African nationalism a powerful and compelling ideological common ground existed, on the other hand.

Regarding the research steps, they are outlined as follows. First, I discuss concepts like nonalignment and the 'new world order' and their relevance for RSR and the Third World countries regarding their postures on the international scene. Second, I advance a concise theoretical presentation of concepts like 'blackness' and 'consciencism,' focusing on how Romanian national-communism strived to construe ideological ties in their direction, insisting especially on the last one. Third, before the conclusions section, I once again bring into discussion the 'new world order' and how it applied to RSR's struggling endeavor to be accepted as a full member of the 'group of 77.'

Ideological and comparative analyses are the main methodological tools used to outline the hypotheses, the conclusions and the overall scientific argumentation put to work in this article. Contiguously, critical discourse analysis or radical constructivism are also important for shedding light on how RSR and some African Third World countries articulated their identities with reference to present political and geopolitical stakes.

Some of the most important findings of the paper consist in pinpointing the congruency between Romanian industrial development plans and Third World's objective of post-colonial reconstruction. Basically, Romania was, for its entire modern procommunist history, an agrarian periphery acting as a supplier of cheap cereals, natural resources and workforce for the West European capital. In this regard, RSR perceived in the national liberation struggle of the young African nations its own hypertrophied past of struggles, heroes, betrays and malicious foreign powers. Consequently, historical empathy gave way to ideological synergy, as both parts tried to obtain more maneuvering space with

reference to their specific hegemonic powers: The Third World in relation with Western Europe and the United States, and RSR in relation with the USSR, in the first place but, as the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s unfolded, in relation with Western powers as well. The RSR – Third World alliance was far more than a simple, occasional collaboration between states sharing exclusively common external objectives. It was, even if lacking any chance of success, an attempt of starting a counter-hegemonic movement in world politics, one in which the ‘chauvinism of great power,’ as it was called in RSR, would be contested and rejected to the end, even if the great power was the United States, the Soviet Union or, to a lesser extent, the European Economic Community.

### Literature Review

Surprisingly, the scientific literature on the Romanian-Third World relations is considerably small even before the end of the Cold War. Afterwards, it is almost absent, with the notable exception of Thomas Barnett’s book, the first and, until now, only one dedicated entirely to RSR’s connections with the global South, a first class politological analysis of the subject. Of course, there is no shortage of national-communist propaganda, some of it intelligently and interestingly written. Reaching well beyond propaganda is Ioan Roșu-Hamzescu’s book *Formarea cadrelor naționale în țările în curs de dezvoltare*, which offers an interesting insight in RSR’s major contribution to the technical education of future engineers or doctors from different African countries. Furthermore, although adopting the official national-communist rhetoric, Ilie Șerbănescu’s articles are incisive, pertinent and they definitely point out the shortcomings of the international political economy during the 1980s, by far a creation of the highly developed Western world. Another relevant work is that of Voiculescu Marin and Voiculescu Elena, *Renașterea Africană* (1979), which discusses in length the ideological affinities between Third World national ideologies and Romanian national-communism. A useful working instrument is Dragoș Gheorghe’s chrestomathy *Gândirea politică africană. Antologie* (1982). Outside Romania, important scientific articles on the topic were written by Robert King and Collin Lawson, both insisting on the political and diplomatic aspects of the gradual rapprochement between communist Romania and African, South-American or Middle-Eastern countries amidst decades of mutual ignorance, distrust, or even hostility. Radio Free Europe’s reports are excellent contemporary journalistic syntheses of the different turns and evolutions this political relationship undertook with the passing of the years. In post-communist Romania, one relevant article is that of Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu et al., „Les étudiants africains en Roumanie (1970-1990). De l’internationalisme militant à la commercialisation des études” (2014). Then there is my own contributin from 2011, ‘Aspects of a “brilliant assertion into the consciousness of the world”. The Third World in Socialist Romania’s foreign policy. Due to reasons of space and relevance, none of them was quoted in the present study.

I would emphasize that the present contribution is relevant because it insists on the importance of the ideological dimension in understanding the rest of the components that sum up RSR's one of a kind partnership with Third World countries, especially African ones. In communist Romania, ideology was not simply a disposable layer which the regime could conveniently put one and take off whenever the international situation called for it. On the contrary, national-communism was firmly embedded in the internal and international practice of the political elite. Only Thomas Barnett's and Voiculescu Marin and Voiculescu Elena's books take this factor into account, but the last one is full with propagandistic clichés, while the first one, although excellent from many point of view, does not satisfactorily discuss concepts like 'consciencism' or 'blackness' and does not use at all critical discourse analysis or radical constructivism as methodologies. Although the present study makes use of these methodologies only tangentially, overall it does not adopt the positivist stance that Barnett's book does, preferring interpretative over causal explanations.

### **From 'Blackness' to 'Consciencism': the Emergence of African Post-colonial Nationalism and Its Ideological Ties with Romanian National-communism**

Two of the most important ideologies of nonalignment, 'blackness' and 'consciencism' both emerged inside a violent and complex political space. The African decolonization process was abrupt and chaotic, concentrating itself on industrialization in the absence of infrastructure, technological know-how and education. Foreseeable, the result consisted in numerous economic and political crises, assassinations, and coup d'états (McWilliams and Piotrovski 1988, 232-245). As an expression of this situation, political identities in the making were themselves contradictory, incompatible and many times simply incoherent. The main question of emerging nationalism was an unsurpassable one: were they products of European political culture or, although influenced by it, their roots were firmly grounded in pre-colonial African mythology? This puzzling dilemma was resolved by stating that the configuration of specific African political identities begun long ago before the European invasion which abruptly and irreversibly put an end to them. Although the new national revolutions were confined to a foreign territorial pattern, imposed by the former occupants, they were considered to be essentially original attempts to continue the lost legacy of pre-European African greatness (Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 20-26, 37-38; Senghor 1986, 41-42).

African theorists distinguished between two main alternatives in the process of national edification. One was the tribe and the extended family as premises for the new nations. As we will see, this alternative will constitute the one of the main theoretical drives for 'blackness.' Acting as intermediary between local and national identities, these two pre-national identities also guaranteed an original theoretical model which excluded the unwanted intrusion of Western political concepts (Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979,



51-54). The other condemned tribalism as a means of the former colonial powers to ideologically maintain Africa subordinated and easily exploitable. Tribalism obstructed the creation of powerful and homogenous African nations, an evolution that would have hindered the West's ambition within the Third World. Furthermore, tribalism was an alienated expression of the class struggle that nevertheless existed in Africa, despite apparent aspects that would have deemed it impossible. Intellectuals and politicians like Sékou Touré, Tom Mboya or Kwame Nkrumah argued, in Marxist-Leninist terms, that class struggle was a permanence of history and, in a specific form, it existed in Africa too, where a huge rural class lived along a small but rapidly growing proletarian class and an urban or rural bourgeoisie created to respond to the administrative needs of the former European colonists (Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 40, 47-48, 54-60). Both types of African nationalism, that we could name cultural nationalism and pro-communist nationalism, acted as 'ideologies of late industrialization' and were keen on obtaining the progress of this whole continent wronged by history either through the development of autochthonous cultural elements, either through a class struggle entailing the efforts of the rural class and of the proletariat against a bourgeoisie behaving as a transmission belt for colonial interests, a class struggle that would underline the newly found political independence with a more substantial economic one (Matossian in Hutchinson and Smith 1994, 218-225; Cabral in Alcoff and Mendieta 2003, 55-61).

As expected, RSR supported the last version of African nationalism, the pro-communist one. Ghana's president Kwame Nkrumah was a fierce adept of nationalization, a process that would restore African dignity and its rightful possession of vast and diverse natural resources. Nkrumah criticized other theorists of 'patriarchal socialism' or 'African socialism' like Julius Nyerere or Léopold Sédar Senghor for denying class struggle and for insisting too much on Africa's cultural uniqueness, thus isolating it from the global class struggle against imperialism. While many African traditions were definitely worth keeping, other ones like rampant feudalism doubled by inequitable possession of land was not something to make Africans proud, Nkrumah argued. Due to theorists like Senghor, African socialism had lost its post war militancy and political relevance and became a mere cultural ornament for the personal ambitions of several theorists, among which Senghor was the most prominent. His concept of 'blackness' represented exactly this unwanted and pernicious culturalization of African socialism, rendering it as a mild and innocent form of claiming 'a place in the sun,' as the Chinese saying goes, for this continent ravaged by European capitalism in its most aggressive period. However, Africa cannot truly win its independence by appealing to the mercy of great powers; Africa needs to have its geopolitical and ideological rights recognized as an equal member of the global club of regions and continents (Marinescu 1986, 174-175; Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 103-105, 109; Tănăsie in Popișteanu 1989, 149; Nkrumah 1973, 440-445; Guibernau 1996, 124; Senghor 1986, 148).

As theorized by Nkrumah, 'consciencism,' represented a form of synthetic African dialectical materialism, one that would encompass Western, Islamic and Euro-Asiatic elements in order to offer Africa the political possibility to better grasp its position, advantages and perspectives on the world stage on the basis of an unique and non-recurring ontology. Consciencism was grounded in 'communalism,' an idealistic form of African society existent in pre-colonial Africa that was to be adapted to present day realities and needs, not mechanically and uncritically revived (Tănăsie în Sprințeroiu et al. 1989, 148-150; van den Boogard 2017, 50-51).

Furthermore, in the new political environment made possible by consciencism, the liberal system of multiple parties and free elections would have been harmful for consolidating the independence of this ancestral continent due to the fact that it would have perpetuated Western foreign interferences in African internal affairs. Only the Leninist vanguard party was suitable for the historic mission of obtaining and strengthening Africa's independence in the context of internal and international class struggle (Nkrumah 1970, 100-101; Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 68-79, 83).

Socialists like Senghor repelled the authoritarian one-party system in favor of multipartidism and representative democracy based on free elections (Voiculescu E. and Voiculescu M. 1979, 1987; Senghor 1986, 148). This plural political system responded better to the needs of blackness, through which Senghor understood the overall cultural heritage of black people as manifested in their day to day existence. As ancient Greece offered the world reason, Africa offered the world blackness, a specific emotion deeply stratified within the historical and cultural layers of African becoming. Of course, Nkrumah fiercely rejected blackness as a cultural setback of African global political struggle, a totally useless, when not wholly dangerous, 'metaphysics of knowledge' (Nkrumah 1973, 443-445; Marinescu 1986, 185-187).

Romanian national-communism was especially fond of consciencism. Both shared the adamant conviction in the Leninist party as vehicle of historical and social progress. Both were culturally eclectic and politically one-sided. As consciencism insisted on recuperating the African past in order to fit the present and future political struggles, Romanian national-communism also integrated a discursively articulated heroic past in order to legitimize the existing political regime. Unlike conservative nationalism, which valued above all the past, or liberal nationalism, placing emphasis first of all on culturally and institutionally construed citizenship, national-communism was very pragmatic oriented and in the same time extremely exclusivist: it aimed to mold a new type of nationalism centered around the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) in order to militantly inspire the population to assume the regime's developmental imperatives as its own. In the realm of international relations, Romanian national-communism did not benefit from the privileged discursive position it had within the Romanian borders; consequently, it was compelled to adopt more flexible discursive

strategies and to play the role of a global moralizer, secretly suffering because it was not a superpower (Popescu 1993, 307). Regarding blackness, the ideological substance of the concept was condescendingly considered as a 'petite-bourgeois' simulacra of a revolutionary notion, too much inclined towards the liberal political philosophy in order to count as truly relevant from an ideological standpoint. However, like in the case of Eurocommunism, while the political doctrines per se were treated with disbelief, their contextual political usefulness came handy on many occasions. Therefore, Senghor's works were translated in Romanian and he was esteemed as one of the most important and prolific theorist of African renewal. As the Romanian saying goes, make yourself brother with the devil until you cross the bridge.

### **Forging the 'New International Order': An Overview of RSR's Acceptance into the Group of 77**

As already mentioned in the introductory section of the paper, the nonaligned movement represented for the RSR not only an opportunity to maintain its dissident foreign policy, initiated in the 1960s, but also a means of legitimating the official discourse within the Romanian borders (Barnett 1992, 2). Mircea Malița, a Romanian diplomat with a prodigious career, remembers that RSR could have become a member of the group of 77 even from 1964, the year the group was constituted within the UN, but, in the context of its alienation with reference to the 'socialist camp,' the Romanian leadership preferred to maintain its attention on European political problems and especially on USSR (Malița 2015, 349-350).

Despite their diplomatic and ideological closeness, RSR and the other East-European regimes were competing with Third World countries when it came to the access of their products to the Western markets. Far from being worried by this evolution of the relations between East-European regimes and the Third World countries, the Soviet Union derived some advantages from it. First of all, Moscow could easily retract the assistance offered to a Third World state in case of civil war or in case of a hostile Western reaction – without entirely eliminating the communist influence from the region. Next, the Soviet assistance was made more efficient by the fact that Czechoslovakia's military technology and the German Democratic Republic's (GDR) communicational abilities were promptly put to its disposal. Furthermore, through the participation of the East-European regimes in helping Third World countries, the pressure upon the Soviet budget oriented to the same goal was lowered. Finally, East-European assistance attenuated the sensation that the Soviet Union involves itself with Third World countries just to military compete with the West (Barnett 1992, 14-17).

RSR signed more treaties of friendship and cooperation with Third World countries than the Soviet Union did and also emphasized itself among the other East-European regimes in this regard, leading Thomas Barnett to affirm that the RSR – which named itself starting with 1972, in order to underline its solidarity

with the nonaligned movement, a 'socialist developing country' – aspired to become a bridge not only between East and West, but also between North and South. Comparing himself with Tito or Mao, Ceaușescu "wanted to position himself with reference to Moscow as a natural leader of an increasingly radicalized and (possibly) socialist Third World. In this time, he planned to transform Romania into a 'Japan of Europe,' a middle sized state with great economic authority" (Barnett 1992, 47; see also Linden 1987, 58-59; King 1978, 879). But, at the end of the 1970s, in the context of an alarming increase in oil prices, of the oscillations of the international economy and of some uninspired investments, the relations between RSR and the Third World began to visibly diminish in terms of commercial volume, despite keeping the bombastic rhetoric against imperialism and neocolonialism.

Maoism represented for the RSR the main ideological inspiration source in the process of its rapprochement with the Third World. Romanian national-communism also borrowed from Maoism numerous defining elements: militant art and literature, voluntarism, romanticism, the correctness and responsibility of activists, indispensable for a proper construction of socialism, hostility towards anarchic manifestations and towards erroneously understood liberty, in the absence of necessity to which liberty is connected within every phase of the advancement of history upon revolutionary coordinates, respectively the critique of bureaucracy and small-bourgeois commodity which alters the revolutionary spirit of the party (Tsetung 1971, 134-136, 275, 368-369, 437, 445; Tze-Dun 1955, 347-348).

Ceaușescu also inspired himself from the propaganda and ideology of North Korea (Sung 1976, 588-593), also derived from Maoism. Maoism – which, as James Gregor points out, through its 'reactive and developmental nationalism' aiming to mobilize the 'masses' in the name of national rebirth, for too long obstructed by what Mao named the 'foreign national yoke,' and by dividing nations between 'proletarian' and 'bourgeois' and discursively creating a global conflict which will eventually end with the victory of the first – becomes intelligible with the help of fascist rather than Marxist theories (Gregor 2000, 207-208; Tze-Dun 1957, 506-507). Regarding the Third World, the Chinese communists affirmed even from the end of the 1940s, an opinion that later made its way into the RSR (Voiculescu and Voiculescu 1979, 58-60; see also Marinescu quoted in Marinescu 1984, 141-143), that the effervescent nationalism manifested by the former European colonies, despite the fact of being 'bourgeois' in its essence is, in the global revolutionary equation, a progressive one, and thus needs to be supported by all (Chao-Tsi 1949, 43-44).

Adopted as a UN program in 1974 at the initiative of the nonaligned movement (Senghor quoted in Dragoș 1982, 375), the new international order foresaw the attenuation and finally the elimination of the economic disparities existent between North and South through intensifying the efforts against colonialism, which obstructed the emergence of a much more fair international

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status-quo (Stanciu 1979, 65-70; Giorgios quoted in Dragoș 1982, 156-157). The new instruments of colonialism, more efficient than military intimidation and direct economic exploitation, were multinational companies. These were guilty for threatening the independence of the young developing states through neglecting and even intensifying the social problems which already existed there, through supporting the reactionary forces from these countries, blackmailing them to obtain new concessions in order not to move their business elsewhere and, in general, deepening the Third World's dependence on Western capital (Bogdan quoted in Florea, Duculescu and Opaschi 1982, 251-253; Moise quoted in Florea, Duculescu and Opaschi 1982, 269-277; Seftiuc quoted in Florea, Duculescu and Opaschi 1982, 354; Elian 1977, 125-139). However, the economic and demographic growth rates of the South were growing, and the prognoses for the year 2000 anticipated new quantitative jumps of developing states which, RSR argued, had to be encouraged through a qualitative change of the international environment on the whole. And that could only mean one thing: the implementation of the new international order.

Due to an efficient and assertive diplomacy, RSR signed numerous treaties with African states, in which it committed to financially and materially contribute to their independence (see Vais 2012, 433-451). Few of these treaties entailed concrete benefits, at least until the end of the 1970s when, due to the recession of the global economy and the increase of oil prices, Romania started to massively invest in sub-Saharan Africa in order to gain access to the cheap energy sources and markets from the region (Romanian industrial products being refused, due to their low quality, more and more on the western markets). Joint societies were created, in which the Romanian part contributed with technology, experts and capital, and the African part with the working force and raw materials. In this way, RSR could sell some products on the western markets, these being presented as made in Africa. But when, due to international economic conditions, the States of the Third World asked for more concessions from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) member states, the RSR opposed, arguing that the responsibility for economic development belongs to each nation individually (Barnett 1992, 67-68; Roșu-Hamzescu 1979, 119-120).

On the other hand, one cannot deny that RSR substantially contributed to the financial help of the Third World countries, especially before becoming a member of the 'group of 77' (1976), providing almost a third of the amount granted by all East-European regimes. For RSR's budget, the numbers were impressive: Argentina and Algeria – 100 million dollars (1972); Brasil – 180 million dollars (1975); Egypt – 230 million dollars (1972-1974); Iran – 135 million dollars (1968-1969); Syria – 170 million dollars (1971-1974); Guinea – 80 million dollars (1974) (SR/Romania: 22 December 1975, 1-8; „România și schimburile...”: 2 April 1975, 7). RCP even created a “solidarity and support fund of the national liberation movements, of the young independent states” and “of

developing countries,” an initiative “received with warm approbation by the Romanian people” (Botoran and Unc 1977, 227). RSR’s support was not limited to the financial component, but expanded towards forming the ‘cadres’ specialized in different fields of industrial engineering that would have built afterwards socialism in their origin countries, thus ensuring their prosperity and independence (Roşu-Hamzescu 1979, 111-122; *Dezvoltarea colaborării și solidarității...* 1978, 21-22).

As a self-proclaimed socialist developing country, the RSR had greatly to suffer from the global recession that occurred at the end of the 1970s: the massive industrialization policies, way beyond the country’s real possibilities, now proved, along with the growing fuel prices RSR had to import sometimes from thousands of miles away, their lack of inspiration. The short term solution resided in borrowing money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, a fact which further deepened the country’s foreign debt because, during crises, the interest rates of money go up. Confronted with this disappointing solution, for which the West bears the major responsibility, Ceauşescu blamed the ‘neocolonialist interest rates’ which only limited the progress chances of developing countries and deepened the inequalities between the West and the Third (Cercescu in *Practici imperialiste...*: 1982, 133). For Third World countries, the situation was even worse. Practically, at the end of the 1950s, “a field car could be bought by a Latin-American with the equivalent of 124 coffee bags, and today (1977, my note) it necessitates the equivalent of 344 coffee bags. A rubber exporting country could purchase, in 1960, with 25 tons of products, 6 tractors, and today only 2 tractors”(Popescu quoted in Mitran and Lotreanu 1977, 47). In order to combat these worrying tendencies, RSR proposed the reconfiguring of interest rates as follows: 5% for developing countries and credits without interest rates or with a maximum interest rate of 2-3% for the less developed countries. On the whole, it was desirable that “the maximum level of the interest rate not to grow beyond 8%” (Şerbănescu in *Practici imperialiste...* 1982, 108). Indeed, beside the propagandistic exacerbation, the situation was alarming. In 1970, for example, from the loans contracted by developing countries (14, 3 billion dollars), only 45% were effectively cashed by these, “the rest representing interest rates, commissions and due rates of previous loans, while in 1980, from the 96,5 billion dollars, only 30% entered into the possession of the debtors”(Stănescu in *Practici imperialiste...*: 1982, 139).

Due to the combined pressures of developing countries within the UN, the interest rates begun to diminish in the second half of the 1980s. But the prospects still remain worrying for debtors, because the number of credits with variable interest rates went up while the reimbursement terms of the credits went down.

It is clear now that RSR’s situation progressively deteriorated during the 1980s and the alliance with the nonaligned movement started to become a real burden. But the circumstances through which the rapprochement between RSR

and the nonaligned movement occurred were very much different. Presenting itself as a 'developing socialist country,' RSR took into account not only a global political stake – the continuation of its dissident foreign policy – but also an economic stake at a regional scale. In 1971, the European Community announced some concessions to the imports from developing countries, namely Third World countries, a development that greatly interested the Romanian leadership. In order to legitimate its new position, RSR begun the adhering procedures to the 'group of 77' (Lawson 1983, 366; King 1978, 880-882, Căpățînă, Miga-Besteliu and Tănăsescu 1973, 38-39). Emphasizing the velocity and the efficiency with which it built socialism, RSR tried to become, as we have seen, a model for Third World countries, for economic reasons (obtaining facilities at the exports for Western markets), for political reasons (maintaining and consolidating its dissidence towards Moscow) and nevertheless for ideological and historical reasons (the affirmation of independence and of the national state as the main actor of the new international order and of the similarities between the present of Third World peoples and the past of the Romanian people, on its turn subjugated by oppressive empires) (see *Politica externă...* 1972, 129-130; Vadim Tudor 1983, 237; Caraciuc 1974, 72-73; Lache quoted in Mitran and Lotreanu 1977, 430). Later, both before and after RSR became a member of the 'group of 77,' numerous African leaders, motivated, among other things, by Ceaușescu's consistent financial help, referred to him, among others, as an 'example' from which they could learn a lot 'in elaborating their way (...) to socialism' (*Solidaritate militantă...* 1977, 77, 25, 109; Bourguiba Jr. 1968, 9; Bourguiba 1968, 6-7; Okumba D'Okwatsegue 1975, 8-9; Malecela 1974, 7-8; Voiculescu and Voiculescu 1979, 117-118).

RSR's integration into the 'group of 77' represented the most credible moment in its campaign to present itself as a 'socialist developing country' (Barnett 1992, 62), being the result of a long and laborious process entailed in 1964. But "the group was organized in regional sections, Asian, African and Latin-American, and Romania was not acceptable for none of these sections. Doubts regarding the acceptance of non-regional members, Romania's motives, the effect which its position as a CMEA member would have had upon the group's negotiation possibilities, led to its rejection" (Lawson 1983, 365). Encouraged by the fact that Yugoslavia was included in the group, in the Asian section, being also a member of the nonaligned movement, RSR perseverated, constantly supporting the group within the UN (Nicolae 2000, 171-172). In 1976, the Latin-American section of the group announced its intention to include RSR in the case it had no pretention to take part in the 'specific decisions of the countries from this area.' But the Arab states manifested their opposition, due to the fact that RSR was not present to the voting, within the UN, of a resolution incriminating Zionism; wishing to maintain good relations with Israel, RSR was absent and the resolution was not adopted. Next, the African countries opposed, along with Yugoslavia. As independent and nonaligned the RSR pretended to be,

its affiliation to CMEA and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) undoubtedly transformed it into a promoter of the policies of the 'socialist bloc' (Nicolae 2000, 174; Gafton and the Romanian Section 23 May 1979, 7-8). Finally, the efforts of Romanian diplomats paid and RSR was accepted into the 'group of 77.' The event was emphatically presented in the Romanian press and in the foreign affairs books and propaganda materials, RSR's new found quality confirming "a principle convincingly supported by our party, by its general secretary namely that it does not exist and it cannot exist a reason for which a socialist country being in the same time a developing country not to act as a member of the 'Group of 77'" (Ene and Bogdan in Ene 1985, 209). Or, in other words, "the essential resides not in the appurtenance or non-appurtenance to different political-military groups, but in the positions and way of action of states for the affirmation of the new international relations, in actively promoting the principles of peaceful coexistence, of the essential objectives, of the cause of peace, independence sovereignty, tempering and international collaboration" (Sprințeroiu in Popișteanu: 1989, 30; see also SR/ Romania 19 August 1976, 2 and Ciorănescu 1976, 1-8).

### **Concluding Remarks**

Although economic pragmatism was the main drive behind RSR's decision to improve its relations with the Third World during the 1970s, ideological considerations played an important role in this process. Romanian national-communism aimed to influence national-liberation movements, to export in the area its own 'revolutionary' model, different from that of the Soviet Union. Its failure has a lot to do with the internal flaws of the model itself, but also with external factors such as the oil crises from 1973 and 1979. Overall, raw materials from the Third World represented an important supply alternative for a highly industrialized RSR in a more and more unstable economic world, while the Romanian know-how and industrial technology benefited the young independent states in the process of consolidating their independence. The relation was mutually satisfactorily until the 1980s neoliberalism drove both parties to more precautious international economic approaches, shattering their dreams of authentic independence, on one hand, respectively RSR's ambition to become a middle-sized power acting as a natural leader of a radicalized national-revolutionary global movement, on the other hand.

This article insisted on how material factors intertwined with ideological factors in making possible the complicated and sinuous rapprochement between RSR and the African Third World countries, pinpointing that national-communist ideology was not a facile camouflage for an otherwise pragmatic and ruthless political elite, but was inscribed into its cognitive, epistemological and behavioral code. Future research should take into account to a greater extent empirical factors and, maybe, concentrate on more particular issues, such as RSR's relations with one or two Third World countries, or maybe the whole



Third World, not only its African dimension. As a synoptic assessment of the subject, my study is unavoidable improvable when it comes to empirical issues and the it could also be vulnerable due to its systematic reliance on arguments based ultimately on generalizations, maybe even some risky ones.

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# Parental Leave Provision in Romania between Inherited Tendencies and Legislative Adjustments

Anca Dohotariu

**Abstract:** This article seeks to identify and analyse the most significant changes regarding parental leave provision in post-communist Romania, as well as the extent to which its legal adjustments that took place after 1990 reveal both old trends inherited from the former political regime as well as new tendencies influenced by EU norms and directives. Consequently, this article has a twofold structure. First, a brief overview of the main concepts and theoretical approaches to parental leave will allow us to proceed to a proper understanding of the epistemological tools underpinning this research object. Second, this article tackles the numerous legislative changes concerning parental leave that occurred after the fall of the communist regime. Although limited to a single category of research sources, this inquiry is indispensable for analysing the extent to which childcare and the gendered division of parental responsibilities have become real political struggles within the post-communist public agenda in Romania.

**Keywords:** childcare provision, Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), family policies, parental leave, Romania.

In the context of the political, social and economic shift from the former communist regime to a 'new' democratic system including the liberalisation of the labour market, public childcare provision in Romania has also been reshaped, revealing a specific domestic mixture between old political principles and institutional settings and new tendencies. For instance, family allowance was reconceptualised in terms of children's rights, although it has remained linked to the pursuit of universality despite the drastic downgrading of its value (Inglot et al. 2011). Day-care services for pre-school children have been reorganised and placed either under the authority of the Ministry of Education or under the authority of the local municipalities, revealing "institutional tensions" (Saxonberg 2011) as a still visible legacy of the former communist regime. Whenever intergenerational family support is not an available option, families often choose to make use of childminders' services, at least in urban areas (Băluță and Dohotariu 2013), an aspect that is highly significant for the local *familialism* visible at every level of social life in Romania. More importantly, the legislation regarding parental leave provision changed unceasingly between 1990 and 2017, suggesting that "the government is interested in promoting the image of gender sensitive incentives, while in fact, it pursues its financial

interests, seeking to decrease public expenditures on parental leave” (Dohotariu 2015a, 129).

Despite these significant changes, family policies instruments in Romania, including parental leave provision, remain insufficiently researched. Different analyses have aimed at understanding the differences and similarities that characterise welfare states and social protection systems in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), including also approaches focusing on the transversal issue of gender. For instance, some studies interrogated the *refamilialisation* trend that could be more or less identified and observed across the post-communist family policies systems (Hantrais 2004; Pascall and Lewis 2004). In turn, others sought to reveal the prevalence of the *diversity* of instruments (Fodor et al. 2002; Saxonberg 2014; Szelewa and Polakowski 2008). Yet, some other studies proceeded to an in-depth analysis of the *Europeanization* process that affected the social protection systems and parental leave schemes within the post-communist countries that have joined the European Union. Nevertheless, beside the fact that this literature often privileges a regime-type perspective based on the correlation between women’s labour market participation, the labour market’s dynamics, and the related social provisions – thus undertheorising the micro-logic of human behaviour –, it also rarely includes Romania as a relevant Central and Eastern European case. More precisely, in spite of the research carried out on different themes connected to the issue of parental leave provision – such as childcare (Băluță 2014; Kovács 2015), family policies (Dohotariu 2015a; Fodor *et al.* 2002; Inglot *et al.* 2011), work-life balance (Crușmac and Köhler 2016; Dohotariu 2015b), or the social construction of gender (Răducu 2016), yet systemised and exhaustive research on parental leave as part of the broader social protection system in Romania is still lacking.

Thus, this article seeks to identify and analyse the most significant legislative shifts regarding parental leave provision in post-communist Romania, as well as the extent to which these legal adjustments reveal both old trends inherited from the former political regime as well as new tendencies influenced by EU norms and directives. Consequently, the article has a twofold structure. First, a brief overview of the main concepts and theoretical approaches to parental leave will allow us to proceed to a proper understanding of the epistemological tools underpinning this research object. Second, this article tackles the numerous legislative changes concerning parental leave which occurred after the fall of the communist regime in Romania. Although limited to a single category of research sources, this inquiry is indispensable for analysing the extent to which childcare and the gendered division of parental responsibilities have become political struggles within the post-communist public agenda. Furthermore, this investigation is also necessary in order to reach a proper understanding of the domestic political approach to childcare and the gendered division of parental responsibilities, as well as of their correlation with



global commodification drifts and Central and Eastern European re-familialisation tendencies.

### **Theoretical Approaches and Concepts Related to Parental Leave Provision**

The scientific literature reminds us that it is only since the 1970s that one can talk about *parental leave* as a strand of social policy that has been implemented across most industrialised countries (Kammerman and Moss 2011). However, its design still remains very heterogeneous across Europe, especially if one considers all differences between *maternity*, *paternity* and *parental leave*. While *maternity leave* and *paternity leave* are generally available to mothers or to fathers only, usually being understood as a health and welfare measure, *parental leave* in return is, by definition, a care measure that has been shaped for both working parents, women as well as men. Furthermore, *parental leave* can be supplemented by an additional period of leave, such as *childcare leave* or *home care leave* – i.e. a care measure that follows the end of parental leave and that can be granted in certain circumstances<sup>1</sup>. In addition, leave entitlements are sometimes considered individual rights and other times family rights – that partners can share –, or even “mixed rights,” like in Romania (Moss 2013, 2).

According to Blum, Koslowski and Moss (2017, 8-9), two approaches related to maternity leave and parental leave policy have been emerging recently. The first of them is related to a more traditional concept of maternity leave, conceived mostly as a health and welfare measure designed only for women during pregnancy or around childbirth, including the first months of motherhood. Under this approach, parental leave is an additional measure that is usually designed for either women or men. Consequently, this traditional perspective is more auspicious for women, as they may be entitled to more overall leave than their partners. The second approach related to maternity leave is more recent. It consists of a shift either towards a birth-related leave for women that can be transferred to fathers under certain circumstances, or towards a generic parental leave covering periods for ‘mothers only’ and ‘fathers only.’ In Norway for example, there is not any statutory, designed and paid ‘maternity leave’ entitlement. More precisely, the Norwegian legislation refers to ‘parental leave,’ part of which is for mothers, part for fathers, and part to be shared by parents, either simultaneously or in a consecutive way (Kvande and Brandth 2017, 30).

Overall, forms of parental leave differ widely across Europe, in terms of length, payment and eligibility criteria. For instance, Sweden was the first country in the world to introduce parental leave for both parents in 1974. In return, Hungary is the only Central and eastern European country that has offered, since 1982, a form of “flat-rated parental leave” designed not only for

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<sup>1</sup> For an exhaustive overview on maternity, paternity and parental leaves, as well as on leave to care for sick children and early childhood education and care policy, see Blum, Koslowski, and Moss 2017.

mothers, but also for fathers (Kispeter 2009). Later, in the context of recent political and economic changes registered at the international level (migration, increase in unemployment, political and economical crisis, transformations of the labour market, family life and demographic metamorphosis, etc.), continuity of employment has become an indispensable factor for the implementation of Europe's strategy for growth and development (Reysz 2010). Subsequently, EU parental leave policies are nowadays at the heart of the nested relationship between the recent redesign of the welfare state and social protection systems aimed at encouraging employment of both women and men, and the contemporary changes regarding *care* arrangements and gendered parental negotiations.

Despite the fact that all EU countries provide different forms of childcare leave entitlements, a very important diversity in policies concerning *parental leave* – understood as one of the main instruments of family policies – is evident across EU member states. This diversity has been addressed, in a more or less explicit manner, by numerous inquiries based on different theoretical and methodological approaches. In a nutshell, the literature in the field can be structured along two main axes. On the one hand, *social policy research* focuses on policy outcomes and outputs and creates typologies that permit comparison between countries (Esping-Andersen 2007). On the other hand, *historical-institutional and cultural-institutional perspectives* focus on the diachronic dynamics of cultural norms and institutions, having thus the major advantage of being able to emphasise the critical historical shifts from one socio-political context to another (Palier 2010). At the same time, regardless of the preference for the typological or for the historical-institutional appraisal, three intertwined transversal criteria inform the literature on parental leave and family policies in the European context. The first one is the degree to which research attends to or ignores the gendered dimension of work (paid or unpaid), of care, and of social care work. The second one classifies the scientific literature from the point of view of the geographical area of its research object – e.g. inquiries dedicated to western social protection systems, or to the recently reshaped CEE ones. Finally, the third criterion allows us to distinguish the research on the topic in terms of the arguments and findings related to the *convergence* or *divergence* characterising national social protection systems along the lines of the complex process of *Europeanization* and/or *democratisation* (Bonnet 2015; Lombardo and Forest 2012).

For instance, social policy analyses, as well as the literature on welfare state regimes, focus mainly on the correlation between social protection and the dynamics of the labour market, in order to reveal the ways in which social policies diminish or contribute to increasing social wellbeing and (in)equalities. According to Esping-Andersen's famous typology of welfare states, social equality and welfare depend directly on the degree of *decommodification* and *defamilialisation* of the social protection systems. In other words, the more the

social protection system is developed and efficient, the more individuals do not depend either on the market, or on their families in order to maintain a certain standard of living while out of employment (Esping-Andersen 2007). However, feminist literature underlines the limits of this approach whenever it ignores the gendered division of labour, as well as the (in)equalities between women and men in paid and unpaid work. More specifically, research focused on ‘women friendly welfare states’ (Orloff 1993; Sainsbury 1994) draws attention to the intertwined correlation between social rights and benefits, *care* responsibilities, and politically legitimated gender relationships (Lewis 1993).

Furthermore, scholarship on public childcare facilities as one of the most important family policy instruments in CEECs often refers to the processes of *familialisation*, *defamilialisation* (Esping-Andersen 2007, 2009) or *re-familialisation* in order to understand the extent to which domestic social policies contribute to diminishing, or on the contrary increasing wellbeing and social equality. More precisely, these processes are frequently cited whenever scholars seek to explain the withdrawal of the state and the occurrence of the market-liberal policies that have been taking place after the 1990s in CEECs. For example, Sonja Blum analyses family policies in post-socialist welfare states and underlines that:

“ [...] the post-socialist welfare states have come from very different starting points. They repeatedly reached fundamental junctures and experienced dramatic institutional shifts: before World War II the Central European countries, in particular, were based on a conservative Bismarckian model. Following an employment-centred, universal welfare provision during the socialist era, the restructuring since the 1990s has included both path-dependent and path-shifting decisions. Case studies have shown that *all* former communist countries – to different degrees – quit the path of de-familialization and ‘tried to reintroduce the traditional familialization regime [...] as they move back toward the path of re-familialization’ (Saxonberg and Sirovatka, 2006: 186).” (Blum 2016, 21-22).

However, some scholars consider that, although applicable to care policies, the concepts of *familialisation* or *defamilialisation* remain too narrow when applied to the analyses of all types of social policies. For instance, Saxonberg states that it is not clear whether parental leave as social provision is rather ‘familializing’ – because it encourages family members to take care of their toddlers –, or ‘defamilializing’ – because it increases women’s financial autonomy (Saxonberg 2013, 3-4).

Moreover, scholarship on family, gender and social protection in CEECs has also developed the theoretical concept of domestic *familialism*, related to social policies implemented during the former communist regimes. Nevertheless, on the one hand, some authors state that *familialism* cannot be associated to the processes of *familialisation*, *defamilialisation* or *re-familialisation*: domestic *familialism* exceeds social policies regarding family life, reflecting certain cultural meanings and values, as well as a specific relation between the state and the

'ideal' family (Szikra and Szelewa 2009, 89). On the other hand, other scholars describe *familialist policies* within CEECs as public mechanisms that encourage families above all to undertake the main responsibility for care for children and other dependent members of the family. For instance, Szelewa and Polakowski (2008) have analysed parental leave and childcare facilities in eight post-communist countries that gained EU membership at the same time, and have identified four clusters of childcare policy: *explicit familialism* (in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia), *implicit familialism* (in Poland), *female mobilising* (in Estonia and Latvia) and *comprehensive support* models (in Lithuania and Hungary). However, these analyses could be further developed by including the Romanian case, regarding both parental leave and other childcare facilities.

In light of all these theoretical considerations, a closer look at the various ways in which maternity, paternity and parental leave legislation has been reshaped in post-communist Romania would allow us not only to identify the main changes that occurred after 1990, but also to understand them in relation to the local familialism as well as to the Europeanization process. Hence, the following preliminary questions are the starting point for the next part of this article: do these legal changes reveal a completely new approach regarding parental leave schemes, or do they simply prolong, under different forms, old principles related to childcare? And to what extent does this legislation reveal any domestic political will to reduce the gendered asymmetric parental responsibilities that mothers and fathers have to share?

### **Maternity Leave: the Legacy of the Past**

In Romania, all forms of parental leave, either inherited from the communist regime or redefined afterwards, are closer to a more traditional approach to childcare<sup>2</sup>. Before the fall of the former political regime, *maternity leave*<sup>3</sup> was designed exclusively for mothers – i.e. as a non-transferable right – who were employed prior to the pregnancy (Doboş 2010, 248-252). According to Chapter 3 of the Decision of the Council of Ministers (H.C.M.) 880/1965 (Art. 13-17), the length of maternity leave could not exceed 112 days – i.e. 52 days before birth and 60 days afterwards. As for the payment and eligibility criteria, mothers

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<sup>2</sup> Some other details regarding maternity leave as part of the social protection system in Romania before HCM 880/1965 are available in Dohotariu (2015c: 203-204).

<sup>3</sup> During the former political regime, *maternity leave* was regulated by H.C.M. 880/1965, available at: [http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis\\_pck.http\\_act\\_text?id=1503](http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.http_act_text?id=1503), last consulted in April 2018. One year later, Art. 15 of this Decision was amended by the Decision of the Council of Ministers and of the Central Council of the General Union of Trade Unions (Hotărârea Consiliului de Miniştri şi a Consiliului Central al Uniunii Generale a Sindicatelor) n° 2489/1966 (Doboş 2010, 248). Moreover, maternity leave was also regulated by Art. 155 of the *RSR Labour Code*, 1<sup>st</sup> Part, no. 140, 1<sup>st</sup> of December 1972: [http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis\\_pck.http\\_act\\_text?id=10038](http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.http_act_text?id=10038), last consulted in April 2018.

received 90% of their monthly salary if they had had at least 12 months of uninterrupted employment prior to the child's birth, 70% for a working period varying between 6 and 12 months, and only 50% for a period of less than 6 working months prior to the birth (H.C.M. 880/1965, Art. 15). Furthermore, in 1966 the legislation became somewhat more generous for any mother who gave birth three times or more, who would thus be receiving 100% of her previous monthly salary irrespective of the duration of her working experience prior to the birth (Doboş 2010, 248). The legislation of that time also stipulated that mothers could not be laid off during maternity leave (H.C.M. 880/1965, Art. 16). More significantly, before the fall of the former political regime there was not any kind of *parental leave* for fathers or for mothers (other than *maternity leave*), although Art. 17 of the same H.C.M. 880/1965 mentioned the mothers' right to benefit from a *leave for care for sick children under two years old*, as long as they had had a tenured working position. Finally, in 1967 another Decision of the Council of Ministers stipulated that mothers with children under 7 years old were legally allowed to employment on a part-time basis (Doboş 2010, 250)<sup>4</sup>. However, this legislative norm cannot be understood either as a childcare mechanism or as a work-life balance incentive for mothers, as long as it was designed mainly for "all industrial branches and activities that registered periods with very high production" (Doboş 2010, 251). More specifically, this law suggests that the political will of the time sought rather to increase the industrial workforce – thus hiring mothers of preschool children – than to ensure the wellbeing of toddlers and of their family members. This assumption is also corroborated by the fact that the Labour Code adopted in 1972 stipulated that mothers with children under 6 years old were allowed to work on a part-time basis only if their toddlers were not enrolled into nursery schools<sup>5</sup>.

After the fall of the communist regime the most important change related to the length of *maternity leave* occurred in 2000, when the Law 19/2000<sup>6</sup> regarding the public pension system and other social security rights (Dohotariu 2015, 204-205) increased the duration of this entitlement from 112 to 126 days (63 days before and after birth, or offset depending on mothers' options). More specifically, Law 19/2000 stipulated that the maternity allowance was fully covered by the state social insurance budget, and calculated at 85% of the

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<sup>4</sup> Corina Doboş mentions the Decision of the Council of Ministers on part-time employment of women with children under 7, (Hotărârea Consiliului de Miniştri n° 54/1967 cu privire la încadrarea în muncă cu jumătate de normă a femeilor cu copii sub 7 ani), *Buletinul Oficial al RSR*, Partea I, n° 7, 23.01.1967.

<sup>5</sup> *Labour Code*, 1972, Art. 158:

[http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis\\_pck.htp\\_act\\_text?id=10038](http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?id=10038)

<sup>6</sup> Law 19/2000 was abrogated when another law regarding the public pension and insurance system entered into force (Law 263/2010). While the former law explicitly regulated maternity leave and benefits (Law 19/2000, Art. 118-120), the latter refers strictly to "the unitary public pensions system" and to the related public institutions – i.e. The National House of Public Pensions and "the sectorial pension houses".

mother's monthly-insured income (Art. 120). Only a few years later, the conditions imposed by the EU accession led to an urge to adapt the legislation in force to the newly defined social protection and work safety policies of the time (2005-2008). Consequently, O.U.G. 96/2003 regarding maternity protection and workplace-related risks (as well as its subsequent modifications introduced by Law 25/2004) provided not only for 42 days of compulsory postnatal-leave, but also for a newly introduced *maternity risk leave* for either pregnant or breastfeeding female employees, which consisted of a total amount of 120 days of leave that could not be granted simultaneously with any other type of leave (Art. 10, par. 2), and which was paid at a rate of 75% of the average monthly income obtained during the 10 months prior to the birth (Art. 11, par. 2). Finally, the O.U.G. 158/2005 repealed all previous legal provisions related to maternity leave and provided for "health insurance leaves and benefits," among which medical leaves and benefits for temporary work-incapacity and work-related accidents, maternity leave and benefits, care leave for sick children under 7 or for disabled children under 18, as well as *maternity risk leave* for either pregnant or breastfeeding female employees. Despite the fact that it has been modified many times since its adoption, O.U.G. 158/2005 has remained the main legal provision that determines the length – i.e. 126 days, including 42 days of compulsory postnatal leave, and the payment criteria for *maternity leave*. More specifically, although maternity leave entitlements have not been drastically altered for almost 20 years, they nevertheless have remained defined as mainly health insurance benefits that are fully covered by the "Sole National Health Insurance Fund," as if maternity benefits were by definition a health issue that had no connection with family policies, as well as if maternity could be reduced to women's biological needs.

### **Parental Leave: between Changes and Continuities**

After 1990, some significant changes occurred at the national level. First of all, the Decree-Law n° 31/1990 introduced *parental leave* as an extension of *maternity leave*. More precisely, apart from the 112 days of *maternity leave*, only working mothers could also benefit from a *parental care leave* up to the first anniversary of the child, paid at 65% of their previous monthly wage. This law remained in force until July 1997, when it was replaced by Law 120/1997, which increased not only the duration of *parental leave* – i.e. until the child reaches the age of 2, but also the payment, established at 85% of the insured income for military and other employed mothers, or 80% of the insured income for women working in agriculture. Nevertheless, three years later parental leave entitlements were being redesigned again, once Law 19/2000 redefined the entire social insurance system of the time (Dohotariu 2015c, 204-205). Besides *maternity leave*, the law also regulated *parental leave* for all children under two years old, as well as under three years old when disabled, and under seven when sick (Art. 121), for a monthly allowance established at a rate of 85% of the

employee's regular insured income (Art. 125). Law 19/2000 also stipulated that parental leave benefits were covered by the "state's social insurance budget" (Art. 121, par. 2), and, more importantly, it introduced *for the first time in Romania* a father's right to take parental leave: according to Art. 122, "One of the two parents may benefit from either the parental leave allowance or the leave for care for the sick child allowance," only if the applicant – the mother *or* the father of the newborn child – fulfilled the eligibility criteria related to the compulsory period of contributions prior to the child's birth. Hence, one can observe that, while in Hungary fathers could also benefit from a certain form of parental leave starting from 1982 (Kispeter 2009), in Romania parental leave for fathers became regulated only as late as 2000<sup>7</sup>.

A few years later, the legislation changed again. In 2003, several governmental decisions (for instance O.U.G. 9/2003, or O.U.G. 23/2003) introduced different changes, with the parental leave allowance being calculated as based either on the net income or on the gross income. More importantly, in the context of the pre-accession to the European Union, O.U.G. 148/2005 stipulated that parental benefits were no longer financially supported by the national social insurance system, being taken over by the state budget (Art. 19), in line with the 2005-2008 Government Programme. Nevertheless, this change did not follow the universality principle, meaning that work experience remained the main eligibility criterion allowing mothers or fathers to take parental leave. More precisely, O.U.G. 148/2005 referred to the "family support for child-rearing" and stipulated that parental leave benefits do not, in fact, refer to a "social risk" (Chauchard 2010), and therefore they cannot be treated as a social insurance right. Moreover, O.U.G. 148/2005 stipulated that, starting with 2007, the parental leave allowance was being standardized to 600 RON (i.e. approx. €189<sup>8</sup>) for all parents who had worked during the 12 months that had preceded the child's birth. This money was also supplemented by the 200 RON (i.e. approx. €63) representing the allowance for children under two, meaning that the amount of all benefits received during parental leave was almost comparable to the average net salary of the time<sup>9</sup>. Consequently, demographers estimate that this governmental measure led to a temporary increase of birth rates, especially among women with a lower level of education (Ghețău 2007). In addition, O.U.G. 148/2005 also provided for a "back to work bonus" for parents

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<sup>7</sup> Before 2000, Law 120/1997 was ambiguous: on the one hand, it regulated parental leave for women, as a provision following maternity leave (Art. 1 and 2). On the other hand, it stipulated that "any of the two parents of the child" was allowed to take the parental leave (Art. 6).

<sup>8</sup> The local currency exchange rate is available at: <https://www.cursbnr.ro/arhiva-curs-bnr-2007-08-01>, last consulted in May 2018.

<sup>9</sup> The table with the average salary in Romania, since 1991, is available at: <http://www.insse.ro/cms/ro/content/castiguri-salariale-din-1991-serie-lunara>, last consulted in May 2018.

who decided to give up their paid leave and return to work. In 2007 this “back to work bonus” was 100 RON (i.e. approx. €31).

The subsequent legislative changes regarding all forms of parental leave remain closely connected to the economic depression and its resulting dynamics that affected Romania around 2008. For instance, Law 257/2008 stipulated that, starting with January 1<sup>st</sup> 2009, any parent that had worked for at least 12 months prior to the birth of her or his child was entitled to a parental leave allowance of 600 RON (i.e. approx. €143) or, optionally, calculated at 85% of the average earnings for the 12 months prior to the child’s birth, until the toddler became 2 years old (or 3 years old, if disabled). At the same time, O.U.G. 226/2008 invoked EU recommendations and stipulated that any parental leave allowance calculated at 85% of previous earnings has to be limited to a maximum amount of 4000 RON (i.e. approx. €956) (Art. 12). However, in 2010 Law 118/2010 reduced not only salaries of employees in the public system by 25%, but also diminished by 15% the parental leave allowance (not less than 600 RON per month, i.e. approx. €138 per month).

Other major changes regarding parental leave are regulated through O.U.G. 111/2010, which entered into force as part of a “comprehensive anti-crisis program supported by the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the World Bank” that was meant to lead to “the normalization of the financial conditions and the preparation of the economic recovery” (O.U.G. 111/2010). More precisely, starting from January 2011, any of the two parents had the possibility to choose between one or two years long parental leave, or a three years long parental leave if the child was disabled. In the first and third case, the parental leave allowance could not exceed 75% of the average net income obtained during the 12 months prior to the child’s birth, calculated thus at a variable amount between 600 RON (i.e. approx. €145) and 3.400 RON (i.e. approx. €825) per month. In the second case, the parental leave allowance could vary between 600 and 1.200 RON (i.e. approx. €291) per month (Art. 2). At the same time, parents who opted for a one year long paid leave (or three years long leave for a disabled child) and yet decided to give up their paid leave and return to work were entitled to a monthly 500 RON (i.e. approx. €121) “back-to-work” bonus until the end of the parental leave period (Art. 7)<sup>10</sup>.

Although it has not been abrogated yet, O.U.G. 111/2010<sup>11</sup> has a tremendously long legislative trajectory, meaning that it has been modified more than a dozen of times since its adoption. For instance, according to Law 66/2016, parental leave eligibility criteria consist of a compulsory period of 12 months of gainful employment undertaken during the two years prior to the child’s birth. Moreover, Law 66/2016 withdraws the two-option system regulated by O.U.G. 111/2010 – i.e. until the child turns one or two years old. Furthermore, parental

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<sup>10</sup> In 2017, the value of the “back-to-work” bonus is 650 RON (i.e. approx. €145).

<sup>11</sup> The legislative trajectory of O.U.G. 111/2010 is available at: [http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis\\_pck.htm\\_act?ida=100481](http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htm_act?ida=100481), last consulted in May 2018.



leave can be taken until the child becomes two years old, and, more importantly, the upper limit of the parental leave allowance – i.e. 85% of the average previously monthly earnings –, is lifted entirely. Nevertheless, Law 66/2016 did not produce the full range of its legal effects for too long. According to O.U.G. 55/2017 and to O.U.G. 82/2017, which are the last modifications related to O.U.G. 111/2010, parental leave allowance is being covered by the national budget, and has to be indexed with the national social benchmark<sup>12</sup>. More precisely, parental leave allowance is currently being calculated at 85% “of the average net income for the last 12 months of the last two years preceding the child’s birth”, and its value cannot be less than 2.5 multiplied with the social benchmark’s value, nor more than 8.500 RON (i.e. approx. €1847) per month. Although it is, by definition, a social assistance benefit, parental leave remains however conditioned upon gainful employment, which implicitly makes it unavailable for parents who do not work.

Last but not least, due to directive 2010/18/UE, in 2012, domestic legislation introduced ‘the other parent’s’ quota (H.G. 57/2012), consisting of at least one month of non-transferable parental leave designed for the parent (usually the father) who did not choose to benefit from the parental leave entitlements. In other words, the parent who chooses to take parental leave has the obligation to cede one month of leave to the other parent of the child, which, once again, proves that parental leave in Romania is not an individual non-transferable right, but rather designed as a social assistance benefit limited to only legally working parents.

### **Paternity Leave: a Real Political Concern for Fathering?**

As mentioned above, *parental leave*, *maternity leave* and *paternity leave* are three distinct measures relevant for the extent to which the hegemonic political interest supports the gendered specific a-symmetrical involvement in different childcare activities, which is also coherent with the fact that parental leave legislation does not explicitly focus either on the wellbeing of the two parents, or on the interests of the child. Although *maternity leave* has not drastically changed after the fall of the former political regime, all related legislation adopted after 1990 reveal a special political attention paid to *health* features related to pregnancy and motherhood, as if childcare could be considered a public concern only under a health perspective. *Paternity leave* in return is conceived as an optional childcare measure. Introduced in 1999 (Law 210/1999), it provides for only 5 days of paternity leave, irrespective of the contractual nature of the parents’ relationship (i.e. legally married or not). Furthermore, if fathers can prove that they attended a “childcare course”, they can benefit from another 10 days of paternity leave (H.G. 244/2000). Unlike parental leave, paternity leave

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<sup>12</sup> The social benchmark’s value is regulated by Law 76/2002 regarding “the unemployment insurance system and the employment stimulation”.

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has remained the same ever since its adoption. It is thus relevant for the dominant cultural meaning (incorporated at the political level too) according to which, unlike mothers who are 'natural' carers, fathers have to learn how to take care of their newborn children.

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In a nutshell, the analysis focusing on the length, the payment and the eligibility criteria related to all forms of parental leave in post-communist Romania reveals at least two main remarks. First, the ways in which legislation on parental leave has changed over the last decades suggest that financial interests are the first and foremost driver of the hegemonic political interest related to childcare. Providing parental leave benefits is definitively a less expensive option than developing the public childcare infrastructure (nursery schools, after-school services, etc.). At the same time, the state's choice to increase parental leave in terms of length and payment is not only perfectly compatible with the domestic familialism incorporated at the social and political levels, but it also suggests that there is no commodification tendency related to this family policy instrument. Second, the legislation in force suggests that there is no political will to reduce the gendered asymmetric parental responsibilities related to childcare. On the contrary, the legal changes to parental leave seem to prolong, under different forms, old principles related to childcare, mothering and fathering. For instance, maternity leave is still conceived mainly as a health issue, revealing also the persistence of old tensions between health and care aspects related to childcare for toddlers under three. Among others, this tension could be interpreted as one of the main factors that hindered the development of local early childhood education and care provision (ECEC), in spite of the political awareness related to EU incentives in this field.

Nevertheless, at least two research directions could further develop this analysis. First, an in-depth study concerning all post-communist programmatic documents (i.e. strategies and government programmes) could definitively contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the political discourse related to all forms of parental leave. Second, an inquiry on the social practices, values and cultural meanings related to parental leave would also lead to a better understanding of the key mechanisms underpinning domestic familialism in post-communist Romania.

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# Declaring the Self and the Social: Intellectual Responsibility and the Politics of the Cognitive Self

Rizalino Noble Malabed

**Abstract:** The epistemological problem is traditionally expressed in the question “How do we know that we know?” The emphasis is on the relationship between the claim that we know and what it is that we know. We notice, only belatedly, that the agent who knows does not really matter in the question. The knower is but an abstracted entity whose only qualification is that s/he claims to know. Virtue epistemology’s virtue lies in the centering of the knower: What is it about the knower that enables her to claim that she knows or that enables us to agree that she indeed knows? The concept of intellectual responsibility in virtue epistemology does not only brings us into the realm of the normative but also implicates, necessarily, the social and the political. Invoking the openness of alternative virtue epistemology to unconventional sources and methods, this essay turns to metaphysics and social ontology in order to explore the problems of intellectual responsibility, society, and politics in humankind’s disposition and striving to know.

**Keywords:** cognitive self, intellectual responsibility, politics, Searle, Sokolowski, virtue epistemology.

The epistemological problem is traditionally expressed in the question “How do we know that we know?” The focus is on the relationship between our claims that we know and what it is that we know. Thus, traditional epistemology considers sentences of the form “*S* knows that *p*” where *S* is the knowing agent, *p* is some state of affairs to be known, and *S* stands in some privileged epistemic relation to *p*. (McKinnon 2003, 227) But the knowing agent *S* in the above formulation is part of the problem only in the sense that she is making the claim that she knows. In the actual analysis, *S* is bracketed from what epistemology deems fundamental. The real epistemological problem is the proposition *p*, which can be expanded to the general form of predication “*x* is *y*,” wherein *x* is the subject of the predicate *y*. The epistemological conundrum is how the statement “*x* is *y*” is true (or false); that is, how it depicts the state of affairs in such a way that the depiction corresponds to reality. Thus, if the statement is true then, of course, *S* knows that *p* or, because *p* is equal to “*x* is *y*,” *S* knows that *x* is *y*.

We notice, belatedly, that the agent who knows, our *S*, does not really matter in all these. *S* is not even a container, with simple shape and features, that accommodates particular instances of the knower, but a totally abstracted entity whose only qualification is that it claims to know. Who (or, since the

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requirement is only that one knows: what) it is not taken into account. But *S* is interesting. Is there anything about her that affects her claim to know that *p*; that is, that “*x* is *y*?” What if *p* is about her; that is, that she is the subject *x*? Thus the statement “Mary Jane knows that she is given temporary reprieve for her execution” (Rappler 2015) stops us in our analytical track and ask: Who? The state of affairs *p* can also be about somebody else: “Mary Jane knows that Manny lost his boxing match.”<sup>1</sup> Or, the more complicated “Mary Jane knows that Manny interceded in her behalf prior to losing his boxing match.” (Philippine Star 2015) Don’t we want to know about Mary Jane and how she knows? And what if “Manny knows that Mary Jane is given temporary reprieve?” Don’t we want to know about Manny too? Don’t we want to know about how both know and how both are also known? How Mary Jane’s knowing is tied to her being given reprieve? How Manny’s knowing is tied to his capacity to intercede?

Virtue epistemology’s virtue lies in its focus on the knower. What is it about the knower that enables her to claim that she knows? Or, what is it about the knower that we can agree that she indeed knows?<sup>2</sup> These questions highlight the values that initiate virtue epistemology’s break from traditional epistemology: first, epistemology is a normative discipline; and second, epistemic agents and their communities constitute the criteria and are, at the same time, the focus of epistemological valuation. (Greco and Turri 2011) Also, these questions yield the answer from which virtue epistemology gets its name: *intellectual virtue*. Intellectual virtue is the property of the knower that makes her say that she knows or that makes us agree that she knows. But intellectual virtue means different things to the two camps of practitioners within this novel trajectory in epistemology. Virtue reliabilists claim that intellectual virtues refer to faculties such as perception, intuition, reflection, memory, imagination, etc. Reliabilist call these intellectual virtues *faculty-virtues*. They are virtues because even if they are natural faculties, they are not automatically reliable. Perception can be deceived, reflection can be misled, and memory can fail. Like any virtue, we have to develop these in such a way that they become reliable. Virtue responsibilists, meanwhile, understand intellectual virtues to mean developed character traits such as honesty, conscientiousness, open-mindedness, responsibility, etc. Responsibilists call these intellectual virtues *trait-virtues*. How these are virtues is pretty straightforward. But responsibilists value the other-regarding characteristic of these virtues. The goal is not just the development of an individual’s intellectual virtues but also the promotion of a community’s intellectual flourishing. (Hookway 2003; Greco and Turri 2011)

After highlighting the relevance of the knower and her virtues, reliabilists (and some responsibilists) are more open and predisposed to addressing the

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<sup>1</sup> *Manny* here is Manny Pacquiao, the popular Filipino professional boxer turned politician (See Wikipedia 2015).

<sup>2</sup> The first question can be interpreted as a question for reliabilist virtue epistemology, and the second question for responsibilist virtue epistemology.

standard problems in epistemology. They reconstruct these problems from the point view of the reliability of the knower's faculty-virtues. Like traditional epistemologists, they make explanations for the skeptic. (Sosa 2003; Greco and Turri 2011) More often than not, responsibilists are concerned with exploring non-standard epistemological questions or they deploy new (to epistemology) methods and consult non-traditional sources. Their interests go beyond knowledge and justification to such themes as deliberation, inquiry, understanding, wisdom, and the social and political dimensions of knowing. They do not feel the need to address the skeptic. (McKinnon 2003; Greco and Turri 2011) John Greco and John Turri call these distinctions conventional and alternative virtue epistemologies.<sup>3</sup>

I remark on this distinction as I now state the themes and trace the limits of this essay's concern. The concept of intellectual responsibility appeals to me as it brings us into the realm of the normative. It also implicates, necessarily, the social and the political. In this sense, the focus is no longer just the singular knower but knowers, not just knowing the world but knowing other knowers. Specifically, we enter the realm of knowing in both the physical and the social sciences. In her essay *Knowing cognitive selves*, Christine McKinnon (2003) opened many possibilities for the exploration of what virtue epistemology means not just for the study of *cognitive selves* but for the study of society in general. But the bracketing of *politics* in her deployment of feminist analysis, in clarifying what is involved and is at stake in knowing others, hobbled her attempt, as feminism is precisely a political critique. Applied to society in general, we know that even supposedly pure epistemic endeavors are determined by the political – if we understand it to refer to the structuring of social relations by means of power. As I wish to explore the dynamics (conceptually and practically) of intellectual virtue, knowing the social, and power, McKinnon essay is an impasse.

Aligning myself then not only to what inspire alternative virtue epistemology but also to their openness to alternative sources (and methods), I turn to metaphysics and social ontology in order to explore the problems of intellectual responsibility, society, and politics in humankind's inclination and endeavor to know. Robert Sokolowski (2008) in *Phenomenology of the Human Person* and John Searle (2010) in *Making the Social World*, both address these problems. They both start from the responsibility and power implied by declarations – a syntactical form that declares the knower for Sokolowski, a speech act for Searle.

Sokolowski claims that the declarative use of the word *I* in sentences like "I know that the acacia tree is very old," discloses not only the acacia tree but also the knower. As such, the declaration also commits to two levels of responsibility: to the truth of the nested statement "The acacia tree is very old"

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<sup>3</sup> Greco and Turri note that what they designate as conventional/alternative distinction in virtue epistemology is similar to Solomon's (2003) routine/radical distinction within virtue ethics.

and to the appropriation of the proposition. The knower stakes his being as an agent of truth in this appropriation. Sokolowski also entangles the social in all occurrences of speech. This is because all speaking occurs in conversations (even solitary reflections are in anticipation of such conversations). For Sokolowski then, intellectual responsibility extends from the knower to the known, and the speaker to other knowers/listeners. "There is a distinctive kind of friendship and justice in our cognitive achievements." (Sokolowski 2008, 66) But Sokolowski fails to account for the politics of the responsibility of knowing. The syntax, speech, and actions of the knower/speaker, he says, have enormous social consequences. Yet he does not tell us how, and he elides the negative consequences of such knowing/speaking nuances that stare us in the face every day.

Searle claims that the intentions, which underpin declarations, are self-referential; that is, the conditions of satisfaction of intentions must refer back to the intention itself. This connects to the reliabilist and responsibilist basic demand for intellectual strivings to be self-referential – that it be suitably reliable and that it be responsible for what it finds out. Moreover, not only are intentions self-referential but also when we speak them (represent them as propositions and speech acts), we become committed or obligated to the conditions of their satisfaction – that they must be true. But the more significant assertion for this essay is Searle's claim that declarations are necessarily deontological. Structurally, their utterance makes rights and duties – status functions on which social institutions are built. Declarations make the social world. Searle does not really give it attention or even acknowledge it, but in his social ontology the role of intellectual responsibility becomes paramount. This is true not only in making the social world, which is Searle's main concern, but especially in unmaking it. After all, there have been and are social institutions whose effects (also social facts) we do not want: slavery, poverty, war. As Searle casually comments about social facts: "You are already committed to [the] acceptance [of social institutional facts] by your acceptance of the institution. The only problems are epistemic." (Searle 2010, 103) This is a formula for the workings of power and how it relates to and deploys knowledge. This, to me, brings us to the crux of the issue in terms of commitment and responsibility whether they are moral or intellectual – the analysis and resolution of which is political.

In the next two sections I discuss the particulars of Sokolowski's metaphysics of the human person and the specifics of Searle's social ontology. More precisely, I focus on their concepts of, and concepts related to "declaration," "intellectual responsibility," and the socio-political implications of intellectual responsibility; that is, I ask the question "If I have intellectual responsibility, what does this demand of me politically?" I then conclude with an evaluation of their implied politics with regard to the political and social

demands on intellectual responsibility: what the politics of the cognitive self ought to be.

### **Declaring the Self: Sokolowski on the Responsibility of the Declarative Use of *I***

Sokolowski uses the “special way in which we use the word *I* and its variants” as a lever to open up “the dimension of being that is proper to persons.” (Sokolowski 2008, 7) This way of using *I* when we speak manifests what we are as persons. When we consciously and thoughtfully speak of ourselves (as humans, as persons, and as selves) our rationality and our personhood appears. This same act of speaking wherein we declare ourselves also shows how things appear to us. Our rationality and our deployment of reason are essentially the disclosure of things. Thus, when think, remember, picture, quote, when we act; the world of things manifests in various ways its truth to us, until our reason rests finally in understanding.

There are two different ways in which we use the first-person pronoun *I*. When we refer to ourselves the way we refer to things, when we simply name ourselves, the word *I* simply tells and informs. Thus “I am hungry” or “I weigh 145 pounds” or “I study in UP Los Banos” might as well be “The cat is hungry” or “That poor dog is obese” or “She teaches in UP Los Banos.” All these statements are informational, and there is no qualitative difference in the deployment of the first-person and the third-person points of view. But when we declare using *I*, when we say “I believe that she teaches in UP Los Banos,” or “I will come back,” or “I must honor this debt of gratitude,” we do not merely report on ourselves but we engage ourselves in what we say. We point to our responsibility in speaking; we signify our agency. We put our rationality at stake. To say “I know that our politics is corrupt” is to report that our politics is indeed corrupt, but more importantly that I have looked at and noted its appearances, analyzed and reflected about it, and judged it so. What I know do not just come to me, I pursue them and commit to their truth.

Sokolowski lists different types of declaratives and their deployment to convey cognition, emotion, decision, and existence. All these types of declarations are commitments to truths: to the truth of what we understand, the truth of how we feel, what we commit, and the truth of our presence. (Sokolowski 2008, 22-29) He says these declaratives “achieve a double disclosure.” They show the rational activity we are engaged in and they show that we are engaged in it. Declarative speech as such is both achievement and appropriation – we declare an achievement of our reason and the appropriation of this achievement as our responsibility. But there are also declaratives that go beyond the first and second order disclosure of the thing and the speaker herself to the disclosure of the philosophical dimension – the dimension beyond the linguistic space from which we ordinarily declare (Sokolowski 2008, 30).

Philosophical declarations disclose, among other things, the structure of our agency in the quest for truth.

From this philosophical dimension, Sokolowski claims that our being agents of truth is disclosed by our act of appropriating or owning up to our disclosure of the things of the world. But what makes possible this double disclosure? What is the structure of our agency in the game of truth? To declare is to speak. To disclose is to speak. But speaking is not as simple as making sounds, expressing, and naming. To speak is to possess language. To possess language is to be able to say something about what we name, not just one thing but also many things, to manifest the myriad appearances of what we name. To speak is to propose a state of affairs, to point to a truth. A lexicon cannot make this happen. But add syntax and the world can be spoken.

Syntax is the structure of language. It allows for the nesting or embedding of words within phrases, phrases within phrases, phrases within statements, statements within statements, paragraphs, arguments, stories, and so on, so that they make books, laws, lectures, poems. Syntax allows language to build thoughts, to embed thoughts within thoughts. Syntax makes possible for language to speak of things even in their absence. And finally, "...if reason is expressed paradigmatically in speech, then the human person... is likewise expressed primarily in it... if syntactic structure establishes language as such, then syntax is the most tangible presence of reason and the most palpable presence of the human person." (Sokolowski 2008, 39)

There is a sense in Sokolowski then that the responsibility that necessarily attaches to declarations is structural. It is demanded by the syntax of our speech that makes possible the making of propositions and the personal appropriation of these propositions.

But there is more to syntax than just structurally underpinning Sokolowski's version of intellectual responsibility. Syntax structures not only speaking but conversation and, effectively, society – to the extent that society is made up of our conversations or discourse.<sup>4</sup> Let us look, for example, at predication – what philosophy has traditionally considered as the principal activity of reason, and what Sokolowski considers as the fundamental act in syntax. (2008, 48) Sokolowski asserts that predication is intersubjective, that speakers and listeners predicate for one another. What is asserted here is that communication is not an afterthought to language, it is there from the beginning. This fundamental intersubjectivity enriches philosophical analysis, as we take into consideration not just the formal structure of propositions but also that aspect of language that contextualizes their articulation. (Sokolowski 2008, 69-72)

Sokolowski cites *quotation* as naming the instance of the intersubjective syntactic form. In quoting we embed or nest in our articulations the articulations

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<sup>4</sup> Searle makes a stronger assertion on this matter: declarations make social reality.

of others, we hold others to what they say, we declare our agreement or disagreement, and we disclose not only the things of which we speak but also each other. (Sokolowski 2008, 73-79) In such exchange of quotations, we signal our acts of thinking as speakers, and we signal our listeners to think. Our goal is veracity and truthfulness, wherein: "There is an intrinsic connection between the flowering of veracity and the presence of human freedom or responsibility. The awakening and growth of truthfulness calls for our personal involvement; in fact, it is our personal involvement." (Sokolowski 2008, 93) This leads to Sokolowski's earlier assertion that there is an ethical dimension in intersubjective predication. We are required to be logical for others; we must be sincere and accurate. But this is not automatic, for we can go about this virtuously or viciously. When we are virtuous, we achieve "a distinctive kind of friendship and justice." But what about when we are vicious?

Syntax also structures our actions in so far as speaking underpins them, and to the extent that we socially deploy them in combination. Sokolowski approaches this from the practice of wishing and willing. When we wish we intend and choose. Here, we not only show how we think but also why we desire and act. Sokolowski lists three kinds of wishes: We wish for something entirely impossible, which shows us the outermost contour of our practical world. It also points to what we can achieve or what we can do, which is the third kind of wish. The second kind of wish is both impossible and possible. It is impossible for us to achieve but someone else can do it. This shows our dependence on others, that we need our fellow human persons. It shows the intersubjective condition of volition. (Sokolowski 2008, 238-250) The wish that depends on our own action is mediated by our choices and our performances. They are wishes because as such they "cover a distance." When a wish is engaged, when it starts to direct what we do, it becomes an intention or a purpose. It is through intention that we become active, when we choose and perform. When we choose, we act. Choice "is an intervention, and it creates the world in a way that exhibits rational articulation." (Sokolowski 2008, 257) We act and we speak, we are agents who make a difference in the world through our deeds and our words.

This combination makes for action of immense magnitude that can have enormous consequences in the world: "World wars are syntactic structures [they are consequences of our rationality], so is globalization, as well as weights, measures, and prices, which bind people in commercial communities... [t]he various political regimes are categorial wholes that define countries." (Sokolowski 2008, 266)

The emphasis here for our intellectual responsibility is that it is public, its space is public space. This necessarily implicates the social. Our responsibility in our declarations and our actions is not only connected to their truth and to our appropriation of their truth, but also to how the speaking and acting of these truths (about the world and ourselves, about our will) can make and unmake our relations with others. They structure our relations and, as such, the whole of

society. Thus the social importance of intellectual responsibility rests, not so much on its relationship to truths, but on its power.

### **Declaring the Social: Searle on the Deontology of Declarations**

Like Sokolowski, Searle's version of intellectual responsibility is primarily structural. Unlike Sokolowski, Searle is not so much interested in what this responsibility ethically implies. What we find in Searle are the boundaries that limit and put any version of responsibility in its place. But he does provide an interesting concept of freedom wherein we can extrapolate on intellectual responsibility beyond the confines of its structural beginnings. Structurally, responsibility is related to a much larger account not only of commitment but also of duty, obligation, right, and power – what Searle calls deontology.

Where Searle starts from is also language – from a simple 'formal linguistic mechanism' that all institutions and institutional facts trace their lineage and power. The overall claim is that a specific type of speech act – declarations,<sup>5</sup> constitutes social institutions and facts from basic physical facts by assigning them status functions with corresponding deontic powers. This is made operational through our collective recognition or acceptance, which ensures not only that status functions take hold but are also maintained. Institutions regulate our relations in such a way that we are inclined to act according to desire independent reasons for action – a supreme achievement of any society.

Here, we can see that Sokolowski and Searle diverge on the significance of declarations. Sokolowski insists that they manifest our being agents of truth. Searle, on the other hand, claims that they make society. Let us to follow Searle's arguments for his overall claim by defining some his constitutive ideas.

Searle uses *status function* to refer to our capacity to attach "functions on objects and people where the objects and the people cannot perform the function solely in virtue of their physical structure." (2010, 7) In an earlier work, Searle introduced the formulation "X counts as Y in context C" as the structure of status functions. X is the object or person on which the status Y is assigned. The context C specifies the framework or condition of the collective recognition. Status functions depend on *collective intentionality*. The kind of collective intentionality that is most relevant here is collective recognition, which can be acceptance or merely acknowledgment of any form such as "[h]atred, apathy, and even despair..." (Searle 2010, 8) We need not support a status function. We need only to acknowledge it, grudgingly or even by opposing it.

Status functions, without exception, imply *deontic powers*. Status functions come with "rights, duties, obligations, requirements, permissions, authorizations, entitlements, and so on." (Searle 2010, 9) Searle uses the concept of deontic power to encompass positive powers such as rights and negative powers such as obligations, among others. Status functions are made by or through *Declarations*

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<sup>5</sup> Searle himself dramatically spells this with the capital *D*.



–widely accepted cases, which act like rules that either constitute or regulate. Declarations are a special kind of speech act. For Searle, they “change the world to match the content of the speech act” and to “represent reality [in the sense of how propositions work] as being so changed.” Declarations “change the world by declaring that a state of affairs exists and thus bringing that state of affairs into existence.” (Searle 2010, 11-12)

*Intentionality* underpins Searle’s account of social ontology at two important moments: at Declarations and at the workings of collective intentionality. If there is no Declaration then there is no status function. If there is no collective intentionality, expressed as recognition, acceptance or cooperation, then there is no deontic power. To talk about intentionality is to talk about mental states and language. To talk about Declarations is to be already at the level of language (with corresponding mental states). There is, to Searle, a quality of Declarations from wherein deontic powers necessarily flow: articulation, the publicness of their articulation. But all these start with intentionality.

Intentionality, according to Searle, is the “capacity of the mind by which it is directed at, or about, objects and states of affairs in the world, typically independent of itself.” (2010, 25) To intend (in the ordinary sense), to believe, to desire, to hope, to fear, etc., are examples of intentional states that manifest this capacity. Intentional states are not really isolated states but come in complex network of other intentional states that are mostly unconscious. It also assumes a set of presuppositions and capacities that makes its conditions of satisfaction possible. Intentionality as intention (in the ordinary sense of *intention*) moves us into or prompts our actions. This happens in two ways: as prior intention, when we decide and plan to do something, and as intention-in-action, when our intention is a component of the action itself and causes the necessary body movement (and/or vocalization for speech acts) for the action. Intentions are causally self-referential since “the form in which the content sets a condition of satisfaction is a causal one that refers to the intentional state itself.” (Searle 2010, 35)

But intention is a mental state and as such can only exist in individual minds. How can there be collective intentionality then? What is involved in the linguistic formulation “we intend” that must be qualitatively distinct from “I intend?” We know of course that we can come together, plan, and decide a course of action. In so doing, we put together a collective prior intentionality that we individually hold in our individual minds. The next question then is how each of these individually held collective prior intention can ensure the collective intentionality’s condition of satisfaction when what can we individually cause can only be part of what the collective intentionality intends? Searle asserts that “[p]art of what it means to say that the intentionality is collective is that each agent has to assume that the other members of the collective are doing their parts... each has to assume that the others also have an intention-in-action which

has the same goal... *B*, where the [individual] *A* can be different because each person can only perform his[/her] own action *A*." (2010, 52) This relies on the fact that further actions can be achieved by way of or by means of previous ones; that is, prior collective intentions for goal *B* can be achieved by the many individual intentions-in-action to achieve individual *As*, by way/means of which *B* is caused. Each intention in action in this case need not refer to other intentions in action, they only need to assume or to take them for granted. What Searle adds is the crucial many intention-in-actions and the complexity of actions that lead to "by way/means of" causations.

A weaker form of collective intentionality that is essential in all cases of cooperation is collective recognition or acceptance. To Searle, "institutional structures require collective recognition by the participants in the institution in order to function, but particular transactions within require cooperation..." (2010, 57) Further, "in the case of collective recognition, even if the participants are opposed to collective recognition all the same if they each individually recognized the phenomenon and there is mutual knowledge that they do so recognize it, then... we have collective recognition." (Searle 2010, 58) Society is composed of collectively recognized institutions and institutional facts that facilitate cooperation. Language is co-existent with society. But language also serves a bridge between mind and society, between our intentional states and institutional facts.

In a chapter on free will or freedom, Searle connects the concepts of rationality, free will, and deontology in such a way that social institutions become naturalized in the two senses of the word: first, that they follow logically (also naturally) from our biologically traceable capacity to articulate our intentions into Declarations; and second, that they are something we can question only at the risk of endangering our conceptions of who we are. The argument is simple and, thus, elegant: The rationality that Searle is interested in is practical reason. To Searle, this is usually seen as desire-based or desire-dependent.<sup>6</sup> But it is characteristic of language to create reasons for intention and/or action that are desire-independent, such as obligations.<sup>7</sup> Obligations are desire-independent because they do not depend on desire but they create the desire to act. Deontology then is "locked" into our rationality. They are reasons for our actions within society. But all these do not matter without our experience of the *gap*; that is, that ultimate disconnect between reasons and action expressed in the experienced conviction that *we could have chosen otherwise*. Social institutions persist because we experience our recognition or acceptance

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<sup>6</sup> "There must be a total reason for the practical intention and/or act that includes at least one motivator, an effector and/or a constitutor. The relevant component here is the motivator, which analysis identify it as usually desire-based." (Searle 2010, 124-132)

<sup>7</sup> The obligation or deontology Searle talks about are rights, duties, authorizations, requirements, permissions, etc. that connect with auxiliary verbs such as ought, should, must, etc. (Searle 2010, 123)

of them as free. We experience our cooperation within them as free. This is precisely why institutions as deontology can become, in turn, reasons for our intentions/actions.<sup>8</sup>

The experience and practice of freedom makes possible the opposite effect: "People [can] have strong motivations to break the rules, and rules are not self-reinforcing... [s]ometimes you have to call the police or other coercive measures." (Searle 2010, 141) All these are why "society have this structure and not some other." And thus Searle can accept with confidence the conclusion: "The institutions enable free agents to do things they could not otherwise do, but in so enabling they constrain the agents in ways that make the continued functioning of the institutions possible at all." (2010, 144)

Thus, if institutions are natural then the way they enable and the way they constrain are natural too.

As is usual with Searle, he provides the point for possible engagement: "...an obligation I am under can only motivate me, can only succeed in affecting my behavior through the exercise of rationality if I internalize [it] ...in the form of some intentional state." (2010, 131) Searle makes it possible for us to pose the eminently political question: How does this internalization occur? For the moment, let us leave this political question and address it instead in the next section.

So far, we can identify three instances wherein the issue of intellectual responsibility becomes important in Searle. First, we intend and make our intentions effective through Declarations. What we do when we do so is to declare the world as such and represent the world as so changed. Second, we collectively intend changes in the world through our individual actions by way/means of which the collective goal is achieved. Third, we collectively recognize or accept these changes and as such attach to them status functions in such a way that they become social institutions. Responsibility for Searle consists in making a statement about the world (whether proposition or Declaration) and ensuring that such is true. This actually translates into two kinds of responsibility. The first is epistemological. The second is deontological. But we must be careful even with epistemic responsibility in Searle since it may be contextualized by the physical world, which means it is an objective epistemic responsibility. Or it may be contextualized by the social world, which means that it is an objective epistemic responsibility that is warranted as such by a subjective ontology; that is, it is an objective epistemic responsibility in so far as we recognize the social institutions in which the statement occurs. This dual characteristic of intellectual or epistemic responsibility is not resolved even with Searle's assertion that social facts are founded on brute physical facts. There is a kind of autonomy in the practice of Declarations and collective intentionality that

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<sup>8</sup> To be more violent: Deontology is in our rationality as reasons, but this is only possible because we experience such reasons as freely accepted.

wrests social facts from brute facts. The social fact that money can buy us food when we are hungry is not so apparent in the brute fact that this particular money I am holding right now is cellulose pulp (even *paper* is social). The social fact that there are billions of people who are hungry because they do not earn enough money is a world away from the brute reality that there is so much cellulose pulp lying around, even in garbage dumps. We can only reconcile this cleavage when we see that the social institutions of physical (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) sciences (universities, research centers, scientific foundations and agencies) actually determine what counts as brute physical facts. Then everything becomes an issue of epistemic responsibility. Deontological responsibility, on the other hand, cautions us about the effects of the deontic powers of our statements. Declarations, after all make the social world. They can also unmake it.

### **The Politics of the Cognitive Self**

Both Sokolowski and Searle provide an account of the intellectual responsibility of the knower based on his/her relation to truth. In Sokolowski the agent of truth as knower must strive for veracity and truthfulness. This is because when she declares and appropriates a statement about the world, she structurally commits herself to the truth of the proposition and to the truth of her appropriation. In Searle, the individual as knower commits to the truth of his Declaration at the moment of its utterance. If it is a proposition then it must depict an obtaining state of affairs. If it is a promise, then the knower must make it true as such. Both also hint of an intellectual responsibility that goes beyond structural origins in language. In Sokolowski, conversation as the context for all speech makes us beholden to our listeners who are also speakers and as such similarly responsible. In Searle, the experience of the gap, as being able to choose otherwise, not only makes possible the collective recognition of Declarations but also of the deontology that comes with them. This means not only rights but also more importantly duties to each other. But the final relevance of Sokolowski's and Searle's versions of the knower rests on his/her power. Through our statements, declarations (or/and actions) we make our world, we make the good and the bad of our world. But we do this asymmetrically: Some of us are powerful, most of us are not.

The next question then is: Do Sokolowski and Searle account for what this power demands of the knower? What is our political and social responsibility as knowers? Unfortunately, both Sokolowski and Searle fail to adequately address this question.

*Sokolowski and the politics of the cognitive self.* In discussing the consequences and concomitants of what we do, Sokolowski lets in a fleeting glimpse of the dystopic possibilities, the disastrous consequences of our speech and action. He says, "world wars are syntactic structures." (Sokolowski 2008, 266)

Scattered within his text, we find that as agents of truth we can lie, mislead, deceive, we can insist with authority and force. As agents of truth we are responsible for these acts, we are accountable. But we are also accountable even if we are at the receiving end, “modern tyranny is complete only when the subjects are willing to disavow their own exercise of truthfulness, and to say that the four fingers being held up in front of them are not necessarily four, but they could be three, or five, or four, or even all of these at once, depending on what the [authority]<sup>9</sup> says they are.” (Sokolowski 2008, 96) What Sokolowski misses here is the tangential naming or referring of the phrase four fingers. It may, as we know in ordinary speech, refer to four fingers. It may also refer to a gun pointed at our heads, or the threat of being fired from a job we so desperately need, or to a structured (we are poor and never learned to count properly) ignorance. How can we be agents of truth in such circumstances?

Isn't poverty a syntactic structure? Isn't persecution, whether social, political, or religious, syntactical articulations? How can we, as agents of truth, let these happen? Are we all to be blamed, agents of truth that we are, even when we are in a position of structured weakness and fear?

In not even two pages of reflection, Sokolowski speaks of “speech and politics.” He says that politics “is a crown of speech, it... perfects it and makes it more exact... it provides the setting in which speech is most itself.” He appropriates someone else's<sup>10</sup> speech by quoting him approvingly “It is not the word that produces community, but community that produces and sustains the word. If there are all sorts of communities and, therefore, all sorts of words, all the words nonetheless find the place for their pronunciation in the political association, the city.” (quoted in Sokolowski 2008, 269)

Sokolowski, of course, has been saying this all along with his insistence on the intersubjectivity of speech. To speak is to converse. The world is conversing. Rationally? Yes, but also with guns, with threats, with bribes, with asymmetrical positions of power, with asymmetrical capacities to speak. What kind of politics is Sokolowski imagining for his speech, for our speaking?

What can a philosophy of the human person do to address this contextual reality of our words?

*Searle and the politics of the cognitive self.* In discussing how deontology extends to social reality, Searle explains the society creating power that comes after a Declaration “This is my property” and “This is my husband.” But with the words “property” and “husband,” these speech acts already assume a huge network and background of institutional facts and capacities. So let us start instead with “This is my land” and consider it as a *founding* Declaration that is quite new (in the

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<sup>9</sup> Sokolowski's word is *Party*. I replaced it with *authority*. Sokolowski places the assertion within a specific timeframe and context. I want it to be more generic. After all, do we not say *four fingers* even today when we are faced with terror (state or state-to-be)?

<sup>10</sup> Sokolowski quotes Pierre Manent. See Sokolowski for the complete citation.

sense that the convention is communal use). Searle then glosses over what is required prior to this kind of founding Declaration: “A person who can get other people to accept this Declaration will succeed in creating an institutional reality that did not exist prior to the declaration.” (2010, 85) The deontology Searle is interested in comes after language and its performance. Searle does not consider the power that must guarantee the founding claim: violence. “This is my land. Recognize my claim or else” – uttered with much effect over a lifeless body for those listening in trembled silence.

The violence of the founding claim is precisely the problem in the “state of nature.” In the absence of an overarching authority, all claims are founding claims. But Searle derides the social contract theorists by declaring, “*for language-speaking animals, there is no such thing as a state of nature.*”<sup>11</sup> His point is that to assume language is to assume social institution, to assume society. But we know, of course, that he makes an easy argument by misrecognizing what the social contract creates: the modern state. So Thomas Hobbes may claim that the state of nature is no place “for Industry... no Culture...no commodious Building...no Instruments of moving and removing...no Knowledge of the face of the Earth... no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society” and so on. (1991, 89) But we can interpret this as not the absence of industry, culture, etc. but the absence of *one* industry, *one* culture, *one* of everything else. Put differently, it is the presence of many industries, cultures, etc. This is precisely Hobbes’ problem, that the many (or the multitude) makes conflict. Hobbes solution is precisely the arrogation of the violence of founding claims and its demarcation as the power of the Sovereign alone. This is illustrated, of course, through the social contract. (Malabed 2012)

There are historical and historico-theoretical works that account for the emergence of modern state institutions in Europe precisely from this kernel of state power: the standing army from fighting enemies without; the police from fighting enemies within, the tax system from efforts to fund all these fighting; the justice system in order to redress expropriations made through (and resulting entitlements because of) the tax system, etc. (Van Creveld 1999; Tilly 1993; Mann 1986). Thus, while these institutions may historically owe their lineage to societal institutions prior to the modern state, a large part of their institutionalization and persistence is due to violence.

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<sup>11</sup> The whole passage in Searle is more telling: “They assume the existence of us as language-speaking creatures, and then they speculate how we might have got together in a ‘state of nature’ to form a social contract. The point I will be making, over and over, is that once you have a shared language you already have a social contract; indeed, you already have a society. If by ‘state of nature’ is meant a state in which there are no human institutions, *then for language-speaking animals, there is no such thing as a state of nature.*” (Searle 2010, 62; Emphasis is Searle’s) He repeats this again later in the book after asking “What sort of *society* would you contract into?” (Searle 2010, 134; emphasis is mine.)

The contemporary liberal democratic state, admittedly, looks different. But then it has a history. This history, typically, can be tracked down to a founding violence – war of liberation, civil war, and empire/colonial occupations. The contemporary application of this violence, which is also the liberal democratic state’s power, appears not to have diminished if we look at the many internal and external conflicts, proxy wars, cyber and drone wars around the world that originate from the exemplar liberal democratic state – the state from where Searle philosophizes and writes.<sup>12</sup>

But to blame violence alone is too easy. Searle asks the relevant question: “How do we get away with it?” “How does it get to be so successful?” “Why do people accept institutions and institutional facts?” The problem is that he also gives easy answers: “Many institutions... are in everybody’s interest and it is hard how one would go about rationally rejecting them.” “... [O]ne feature that runs through a large number of cases is that in accepting the institutional facts, people typically do not understand what is going on.” “... [T]he individual tends to feel helpless in the face of the institution.” “A related powerful motive for acceptance... is the human urge to conform...” All these in three-pages-long answer to the first question above in a 200-page book. (Searle 2010, 106-108) Within these passages, Searle quotes Karl Marx: “One man is king only because other men stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, on the other hand, imagine that they are subjects because he is king.” (Searle 2010, 107)<sup>13</sup> The relevant concept in Marx here is ideology. But since Marx, this concept has evolved in the thoughts of Marxists and post-Marxists. The problem is no longer simple *false consciousness*, or if we are aware of the “arbitrariness or even injustice of the institutional phenomena, [we] despair of ever being able to change it” as Searle puts it. (2010, 108) Ideology works because we consent to it through the negotiations-like *quid pro quo* between domination and resistance, or because we console ourselves that we can choose otherwise, or because we accept the bribe of the putative post-ideological world: that we can enjoy without the guilt. (Žižek 2002)

It is not that Searle does not recognize the role of violence and ideology in the constitution of the institutions and institutional facts that make society and the state. It is that Searle elides them or that he does not consider their importance at the appropriate juncture of his account of society: violence reinforces the founding claim and warrants its maintenance; ideology makes

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<sup>12</sup> Searle, in a letter submitted to an op-ed page and published online as part of a collection of writings on *Philosophy in Wartime*, showed support for the US War on Terror, suggesting what might constitute an intelligent response on the part of the USA. (Searle, 2015)

<sup>13</sup> The quote comes from a footnote in the first chapter of Marx’s *Capital*.

societal/state institutions internal to the identity of the subjects, constitutive parts of their self-discipline.<sup>14</sup>

Perhaps these are not really Searle's concern. But of what use is Searle's social ontology then beyond its "elegant"<sup>15</sup> account of social institutions and facts?

*The politics of the cognitive self.* I see Sokolowski and Searle as eliding the pertinent socio political questions that necessarily entangles the knower and her knowing. They both recognize the power of the knower and the power of the activity of knowing. But they fail to give account of how these powers are distributed, that they are distributed asymmetrically, and that this lopsided distribution affects the knower, her knowing, and the limits of what she can know. All these, in turn, are internalized in the knower and become part of how she sees herself as such. All these make what the knower must designate and recognize as her intellectual responsibility.

But perhaps I demand too much from Sokolowski's ontology of the human person and Searle's social ontology. Perhaps there is some fundamental weakness in limiting ourselves to ontologies, as there is fundamental weakness to limiting ourselves to traditional epistemological analyses. What is there to know? How it is that we know? These questions do not tell us why we live in this crazy, crazy (human) world. And they do not tell us how to make a better world.

I steer this essay's discussion of intellectual responsibility towards the political and dwell on the issues it stirs because they are important to me. They are reasons for my philosophy and why I do philosophy. The whole point is not just to describe reality, as Marx would say,<sup>16</sup> it is to change reality. But before this, Marx preempts Sokolowski and Searle so pithily. At the beginning of his "Theses of Feurbach," he criticizes all existing materialism for mistaking reality as the object of contemplation, and "not as human sensuous activity...not subjectively." Further, he dismisses objective truth and instead asserts that we "must prove truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of [our] thinking in practice." (Marx 1978, 143-144) For me, this is the exemplar intellectual responsibility: a subjectively militant commitment to truth that changes the world. This should be the burden and power of any human endeavor to know.

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<sup>14</sup> Searle considers them mainly as effects of institutions or as institutions themselves that are necessary for the maintenance of the social structure of institutions as a whole. (2010, 141-142)

<sup>15</sup> Searle's social ontology is, as he says of one of its aspects, "so elegant, and indeed so beautiful..." (2010, 39)

<sup>16</sup> "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." (Marx 1978)



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# Reading “On Time and Being” (1962) to Construct the ‘Missing’ Division III of *Being and Time* – or “time and Being” – (1927)

Rajesh Sampath

**Abstract:** This paper will articulate the conditions of thinking about the transition of Division II in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* in order to imagine the architecture of the missing Division III, which never appeared in the published Part I of *Being and Time* (1927). The paper explores questions of temporality, historical temporality, and Heidegger’s confrontation with Hegel at the end of *Being and Time* while enlisting the resources of his very late lecture of 1962 – “On Time and Being” – to lay down the conditions of possibility to reconstruct the missing Division III. The paper argues that this feat has yet to be adequately accomplished given 90 years that have elapsed since the publication of *Being and Time*.

**Keywords:** Being and Time, Heidegger, metaphysics, ontology, onto-theology, phenomenology.

Within *Being and Time* the leap from section 65 on ecstatic temporality to section 72 on motion to section 81 on within-time-ness and the ordinary conception of time to section 82 on the encounter with Hegel is quite daunting. To traverse this movement from an independent, speculative-metaphysical reconstructive impulse to imagine the missing Division III seems altogether impossible. But this is what we will set out to do. Our guiding clue will be the 1962 lecture “On Time and Being,” which was delivered some 35 years after the publication of *Being and Time*.<sup>1</sup> We are not trying to avoid the densely,

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<sup>1</sup> This is not the place to enter into the massive landscape of perspectives on the relationship between *Being and Time* and the 1962 lecture “On Time and Being.” For that discussion, see Hubert Dreyfus’ (2005) forward to Carol White’s *Time and Death: Heidegger’s Analysis of Finitude*, edited by Mark Ralkowski. Ashgate: Hants, ix. For general discussions on death and time in *Being and Time* in relation to his whole corpus, see Critchley, Simon and Reiner Shurmann. 2008. *On Heidegger’s Being and Time*, edited by Steven Levine. Routledge: Oxford; Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall, eds. 2007. *Blackwell Companion to Heidegger*. Blackwell: Oxford; Blattner, William. 2006. *Heidegger’s Being and Time: A Reader’s Guide*. London: Continuum; Dreyfus, Hubert and Mark Wrathall, eds. 2002. *Heidegger Reexamined, Vol. 1: Dasein, Authenticity and Death*. London: Routledge Press; Blattner, William. 1999. *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Faulconer, James E. and Mark Wrathall. 2000. *Appropriating Heidegger*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Taylor, Carmen 2003. *Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being and Time*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Wrathall, Mark and Jeff Malpas, eds. 2000. *Heidegger, Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert Dreyfus*. Cambridge: MIT

complicated debates of what caused the demise of the project of fundamental ontology in *Being and Time*, the question of the Kehre, or the turning of/to the History of (the Sendings) of Being, the second attempt at *Being and Time*, namely the quixotic *Beitrag* (1936), and the final, ghostly attempt to rethink the main question throughout Heidegger's philosophical life, namely the mysterious link between being and time, namely the 1962 lecture "On Time and Being." Heidegger's genius was to avoid an uncritical metaphysical conceptualization of time in terms of the history of concepts of being while giving new breath, mystery and vision to the question of time when it is not predicated on these two classic extremes: *either* the paradoxes of metaphysical logic, i.e. the problems of motion and change, *or* the theological-existential-psychological fears of human mortality. He was not pursuing a solid foundation to conceive of time as some 'thing' present (essence, concept, intuition, or sign); nor was he a psychologist trying to discover a solution to the mystery of why human beings feel anxious about coming to an end, i.e. a mid-life crisis or terminal disease. Neither being in time (beings who come and go in time) nor time in being (kairos as the fulfilled or propitious time) *and* neither the being of time (substance as permanence) nor

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Press; Dreyfus, Hubert and Harrison Hall, eds. 1992. *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*. Blackwell: Oxford; Guignon, Charles, ed. 1993. *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Kisiel, Theodore. 1993. *The Genesis of Being and Time*. University of California Press; Richardson, William. 1993. *From Thought to Phenomenology*, 2<sup>nd</sup>. Ed. New York: Fordham University Press; Barash, Jeffrey. 2003. *Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning*, Expanded Edition. New York: Fordham University, Press; Taminiaux, Jacques. 1991. *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*. Translated by Michael Gendre. Albany: SUNY Press. For works on Heidegger's thought in general and the history of philosophy, see Guignon, Charles. 1993. *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.; Rorty, Richard. 1991. *Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Schmidt, Dennis. 1988. *The Ubiquity of the Finite: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Entitlements of Philosophy*. Cambridge: MIT Press; Steiner, George. 1987. *Martin Heidegger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Schurmann, Reiner. 1987. *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to Anarchy*. Translated by Christine-Marie Gros and Reiner Schurmann. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; Olafson, Frederick A. 1987. *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Carr, David. 1986. *Time, Narrative and History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; Fynsk, Christopher. 1986. *Heidegger, Thought and Historicity*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Gillispie, Michael Allen. 1984. *Hegel, Heidegger and the Ground of History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Kockelmans, Joseph J. 1986. *On the Truth of Being: Reflections On Heidegger's Later Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press; Kolb, David. 1986. *The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and After*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Farrell, David Krell. 1986. *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press; Ricoeur, Paul. 1984-86. *Time and Narrative*, 3 Vols. Translated by K. McLaughlin and D. Pellaner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Shahan, Robert W. and J.N. Mohanty, eds. 1984. *Thinking about Being: Aspects of Heidegger's Thought*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press; Derrida, Jacques. 1982. *Margins of Philosophy*. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Murray, Michael, ed. 1978. *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

the time of being (epochality or the sign of the times) will be our focus in this paper.

The transition from Division II to Division III (which has never appeared) is like the transition from a place to a place that does not exist. Hence a creative act has to suspend any kind of historiographic impulses based on ordinary conceptions of time: a) the missing Division III was contemporaneous with the material that was presented with the rest of *Being and Time* (Introduction, Divisions I and II) but never came to light; b) the missing Division III is hiding somewhere or has been destroyed; c) everything after *Being and Time* can be appropriated and utilized to either justify the collapse of fundamental ontology or glorify the turn to language, art, and technology thereafter, which then becomes a shadow of the missing Division III's allegedly, true concerns or intentions; d) "On Time and Being" is a delayed version of the missing Division III and should serve as an ample substitute for it because it leaves open the true promise of the end of *Being and Time*: the passage to an-other beginning of Western philosophy will always run the risk of resuming the contents in the history of Western philosophy, which *Being and Time* attempted to destroy, and so such a passage should never be attempted but left in suspense to respect the true achievement of *Being and Time*. The possibility of metaphysics is itself a perpetual mystery and never a progenitor for an eternal concept-solution to the main question, which is the meaning of Being in general.<sup>2</sup> Because *Being and Time* does not answer its last question – "Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of *Being*?" – does not mean it should not be answered or cannot be answered. For it would be quite shocking that a normative response of what should or should not be takes the place of a singular ontological answer to a fundamental question, namely the meaning of Being. The italicized *time...Being* in the last question foreshadows both the title of the missing Division III and "On Time and Being" of 1962.

So we begin with some precautionary measures as to not be weighed down with initial presuppositions that go unquestioned. "On Time and Being" is not a substitute for the missing Division III, and whether it gives us a proper orientation to appreciate the achievements and limits of *Being and Time*, let alone its 'failure,' is not the issue. Rather, if one were to attempt a reconstruction of the missing Division III without ever having seen any fragments or notes of it, then in fact a reconstruction of something that does not exist would have to be an original construction in its own right. If what is missing does come to light after such an independent construction is attempted, and if both texts – real and imaginary – are deemed similar in content, then this would not detract from the

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<sup>2</sup> This is how we view the legacy of postmodernism, or Derridean deconstruction specifically, which pronounces an end to the idea of an 'end of metaphysics,' any notion of an 'end' (both completion and goal) as ahistorical and hence illusory and unstable; true historicity or finitude is better conceived as deferral and suspense. See Derrida, Jacques. 1995. *Gift of Death*. Translated by David Wills. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

singular, i.e. unique, attempt at such a construction. At most it would point to a parallel discovery – one that was made over 80 years ago but never saw the day and one that does appear and receives attention in its own time.<sup>3</sup> These prognostications may appear to be hopeful wishes of a would-be attempt to imagine an independent version of the missing Division III given the waning moments, which conclude the version of *Being and Time* that we have had in our possession over the last eighty years. However, making clear our intention and goal will help clarify our main thesis: the creation of the missing Division III from scratch is not dependent on some a priori understanding of the relation or discontinuity between *Being and Time* and “On Time and Being.” The question then is what is the ground by which our quest to construct the missing Division III can become intelligible? Using Heideggerean language, we can say ours is the *question of the meaning of the being* of the missing Division III.

It is always hard to justify one’s philosophical project in one’s age precisely when the very question of ‘age’ and hence ‘time itself’ is at stake. One is reminded of powerful projections from Hegel such as “it is in the nature of truth to appear in its own time” (Hegel 1977, 44) and “philosophy is its own age conceptualized in thought.” (Hegel 1991, 21) However, these statements have been construed *either* as an attempt to transcend one’s time and hence let truth appear in its own time independent of human design *or* the failure at such transcendence and the relegation of truth to a particular age even when such a truth passes itself off as a detached universal; the first Hegel quote points to the former and the second to the latter. Yet we are not discussing how one transcends time to offer an eternal truth; nor are we succumbing to the notion that any truth or revelation is no more than the sum parts of the particular age within which it appears. Coming back to the question of the missing Division III we point to an opportunity that runs counter to many contemporary assumptions: a) the attempt to speak on behalf of a conclusion to *Being and Time* that could have appeared in its time is impossible *now* because the past in which the conclusion could have appeared is more appropriate *then* than it is *today*; b) no one actually believed then nor do they believe today that the way in which *Being and Time* was set up renders it possible to answer the last question about the manifestation of time if in fact manifestation is linked to an event, logos or phenomenon attached to presence and presence is derived from a ‘now’ – be it no longer now (past), now (present) or yet to be now (future); c) the correlation between the question of the meaning of being and the would-be answer as ‘time’ mistakes the one who asks the question *ex nihilo* with a tortured, delimited

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<sup>3</sup> This happens in science quite often; some discoveries are independent and parallel, say the simultaneous discovery of calculus by Newton and Leibniz, and the close proximity of Poincare’s “principle of relative motion” (1904) and Einstein’s *Theory of Special Relativity* (1905). However, in history, usually one thinker is credited for changing the paradigm and shaping the next epoch in human thought. In the cases provided here that would fall on the shoulders of Newton and Einstein respectively.

temporalized being seeking self-reflexively the timing of one's asking; or that time is exteriorized falsely from that being requiring a separation between the meaning of being (as if it were atemporal) and the answer called the manifestation of time as if it were something other or opposite to eternal being; d) the futility of converting time into a predicate is directly proportionate to imagining the meaning of being as something other than being and hence being as past, present or future.

It would appear that the prefatory remarks we offer are unceasing; in fact the temptation to continue must be resisted. In that light, let us juxtapose first section 65 in *Being and Time* with "On Time and Being" as we begin to weave the strands together as a silhouette of the missing Division III begins to form. The contours of a shape begin to emerge not with a comparison and contrast of what is left wanting in *Being and Time* and reborn in "On Time and Being." Rather, the attempt at a synthesis has to negate the continuities and discontinuities of both texts as an inter-species dialogue while superseding the presences and absences within both texts as an intra-species sublation. This way we avoid repeating any presuppositions that would lead to conclusions about "On Time and Being" filling up *Being and Time* or *Being and Time* being re-read to make clear the chronic ambiguities and spectral elisions, which abound in "On Time and Being." We must stick to our conviction about the *original construction* of the missing Division III in a manner, voice, force and inspiration that cannot be derived from either *Being and Time* or "On Time and Being."

## Being and Time

In section 65, Heidegger reluctantly tries to move forward to the problematic of temporality to which everything prior seemed to be leading.<sup>4</sup> But for every step he takes, he reverts back to try and ensure himself and the reader that he is not over-glossing or inadvertently simplifying his previous insights into care, resoluteness and being-towards death. He wants to make sure that the ontological meaning of Dasein's being, the latter of which is care, is not reduced to something present because the previous themes (care, resoluteness, etc.) are never ontic or grasped in common sense, transparent, experiential ways. To grasp it 'phenomenally' means it is never an object of a subject, a subject as an object to itself, any relation between a subject and object whatsoever, and certainly nothing that is present-to-hand. (Heidegger 1962, 370) Dasein's Being is Care and the meaning of its being will turn out to be temporality, which is to be

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<sup>4</sup> Although, he does give an idea of it in the Introduction: "We shall point to temporality as the meaning of Being of that entity which we call Dasein." Heidegger (1962, 38) And "time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being." Heidegger (1962, 39) Finally, "the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time..." Heidegger (1962, 40) and "Thus the fundamental ontological task of Interpreting Being as such includes working out the *Temporality of Being*." Heidegger (1962, 40)

discussed in depth in section 65. But the 'totality of the Dasein's structural whole' should not be lost in a mindless dissection of how all the themes hang together – guilt, anxiety, care, resoluteness, and being-towards-death – in a dramatically creative but aimless way. It is not simply tossing the dice randomly and seeing which sides turn up on the table. To answer the meaning of care (as the being of Dasein) does not mean that anything will actually appear as something that is "explicit or thematic." (Heidegger 1962, 371) At rock bottom, the meaning of Dasein's being is at stake: this is temporality. All we have at this juncture is a *becoming* of Dasein in its essentiality, a becoming of Dasein to itself, an *occurrence* which happens as 'authentic existence,' the *self-constitution* of this occurrence as authentically 'existential' (not to be confused with existentialist or psychological absurdity about the futility of living or being suicidal) and the *naming* of this occurrence of authenticity as 'anticipatory resoluteness.' Furthermore, the 'resoluteness' is a *mode* of the 'authenticity of care' and in that mode is contained Dasein's 'primordial Self-constancy and totality.'<sup>5</sup> If we were to line up the terms, then the linkage between them becomes the main issue for discernment:

Dasein becomes X essentially.

This is an occurrence as an authentic existentiality.

The occurrence can constitute itself as anticipatory resoluteness.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Full quotation from Heidegger in the English translation: "Dasein becomes 'essentially' Dasein in that authentic existence which constitutes itself as anticipatory resoluteness. Such resoluteness, as a mode of authenticity of care, contains Dasein's primordial Self-constancy and totality." (Heidegger 1962, 370) and the original German: "Das Dasein wird 'wesentlich' in der eigentilichen Existenz, die sich als vorlaufende Entschlossenheit konstituiert. Dieser Modus der Eigenlichkeit der Sorge enthält die ursprüngliche Selbst-ständigkeit und Ganzheit des Daseins." (Heidegger 1993, 323)

<sup>6</sup> This will be discussed further down the line when we discuss the ecstasies of having-been, making present, futural-coming-towards. Needless to say, we can *anticipate* what 'anticipatory resoluteness' is not based on Heidegger's previous insights in Division I and the chapters of Division II leading up to section 65. Anticipation is not the anticipation of something: for example, I am waiting to find out how I did on my exam. Resoluteness is not the unstoppable motion of a killing machine – be it man made or from nature – like a great white shark. It is not a setting out to do that which cannot be reversed. It is also not because of the law of internal necessity either (i.e. inertia – a body in motion tends to stay in motion). Rather, we must ponder the uncanny: somehow an event of self-justification occurs in which an irreducible decision to act becomes ontologically meaningful based on an inscrutable sense of ecstatic freedom; one is free not to be stymied by indecision on so many other possibilities for paths to take and free to take the path one has thrown themselves into without being determined by that path. Anticipating the unknown and resolutely driving into that anticipation without waiting for any 'thing' in particular (i.e. getting older, a moment to die, being elected president, giving birth to a child) involves a very abstract type of phenomenological bracketing; while being resolved in such an anticipation in a manner that transcends fate/destiny/determinism and the free-will divide, one is suspended from any ordinary linkages that would normally



Resoluteness is a mode.

The mode is a way of occurring and in this case it is the way of how care is authentic.

Contained in the mode is Dasein's primordial self-constancy and totality.

By breaking up the Heideggerean proposition into these elements we can begin to see the kind of complex, uncanny occurrence that speaks to the deepest primordial totality of Dasein's whole being, which is the authenticity of care; and this is what gets simplified in many analyses.<sup>7</sup> The meaning of Dasein's being (care) will turn out to be temporality – specifically, the ecstatic, finite, primordial, unified, temporalizing of time's ecstasies (having-been, making present, futural coming towards).<sup>8</sup> Before we penetrate further into the very Being of Dasein as Time-Occurrence (Timing, Timeliness, Being One's Time) let us shift to "On Time and Being." Heidegger does admit of the following: Dasein becoming Dasein essentially, authentic existence self-constituted as anticipatory resoluteness, mode of authenticity of care, primordial Self-constancy and totality contained in the mode – all of these have to be understood 'existentially' in order to reveal "the ontological meaning of Dasein's being." (Heidegger 1962, 370) It is these features that have to be reread very carefully while appropriating elements in "On Time and Being." And then we can weave in new reflections on the actual ecstasies in section 65 to depart from *Being and Time* and begin an exploration of unknown territory – the actual creation of what would have and could have been the missing Division III.

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bind the discrete event of existence and the palpable experience of time (as an unstoppable flow, a dreadful limit, an irreversible loss, or any feeling of getting old and/or losing time on a project). In other words, one is not determined by resoluteness or free to anticipate; and likewise, anticipation is not the necessity of a future holding a helpless present hostage, and resolution is not a despotic present trying to over-determine the untamed future. The *relation* between the anticipation in resoluteness and the resoluteness in anticipation constitutes a nexus in which the well-spring or surge of being 'anticipatory resolute' comes from within and without rather than the so-called 'agent' experiencing either one. It is an ecstatic swarming effect that drives a transcendental form of propulsion (which is neither circular, linear, nor rectilinear) so one is thrown outside of themselves in chasing a singularity called the legacy of being-there without being past, present or future.

<sup>7</sup> This is not to dismiss any particular analysis of time in Division II, but to suggest that any speculative metaphysical constructions of the 'occurrence' is deemed inadmissible given the ontological-ontic distinction that is so fundamental to how the entire 'existential analytic' of Dasein functions in *Being and Time*. Heidegger is destroying the history of metaphysical attempts to conceive of time as some 'thing' or concept and thereby undoing all previous attempts to think of being as being-in-time or time as an object of either the metaphysical or scientific imagination. See the entire Introduction to *Being and Time*. And yet time is the meaning of the Being of Dasein. Logically however it follows that if time means being (of Dasein's being as care), then what does time mean?

<sup>8</sup> This is what section 65 tries to elaborate.

## “On Time and Being”

The 1962 lecture is like an aquatic work. One can swim through it but feel like they were in these waters before sensing resemblances based on past experiences of the force of the tow, the composition of the ocean bedrock and the animal and plant species that inhabit it in its marvelous aesthetic display. The lecture comes off as quasi-autobiographical where the author reflects back and takes stock of his achievements and failures, particularly in *Being and Time*. He leaves open room for future thinkers to try to resume the project of *Being and Time* but in a fresh and new way.<sup>9</sup> In the summary to the lecture, Stambaugh states: “*Being and Time* is on the way toward finding a concept of time, to which that which belongs most of all to time, in terms of which ‘Being’ gives itself as presencing. This is accomplished on the path of the temporality of Dasein in the interpretation of Being as temporality” and “after the meaning of Being had been clarified, the whole analytic of Dasein was to be more originally repeated in a completely different way.” (Heidegger 1972, 32)<sup>10</sup> That is the key: to ‘originally repeat’ the whole analytic of Dasein in ‘in a completely different way.’

Our hypothesis is simple: the original repetition of *Being and Time* involves a type of movement and its self-understanding in which a reciprocal, entwining appropriation of insights in *Being and Time* and “On Time and Being” is required to create the missing Division III, which is then irreducible to either *Being and Time* or “On Time and Being,” let alone their relation or discontinuity.<sup>11</sup> The question of movement relates to the question of genesis, and

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<sup>9</sup> Heidegger says: “Whether a few will, now or later, be prompted by the lecture to think further on such matters, cannot be foreseen.” This is in reference to other great novelties put forward by geniuses in different fields – that if the painter Klee, the poet Trakl, and the physicist Heisenberg were to present something new, then few would be able to say that it is ‘immediately intelligible.’ (Heidegger 1972, 2)

<sup>10</sup> Also see her Introduction to the volume. Stambaugh does not accomplish this repetition in an original way in which something is revealed in a completely different manner. If anything, she pronounces the judgment that “On Time and Being” is a ‘reversal’ of the entire project in *Being and Time*. But in fairness to her, she does not speak of a simple reversal but a ‘road that is complex and subtle’ leading from Heidegger’s early masterpiece to his mysterious later lecture: “For in the later lectures these ‘concepts’ (i.e. Being and time) have undergone a profound change without, however, relinquishing their initial fundamental intention.” (Heidegger 1072, vii) Again, it is not our task to engage in intellectual history or enter into the philosophical debates about the relation or discontinuity between the two works. We want to stay focused on the original task of creating the missing Division III *without ever having witnessed it*. Hence we speak of a construction and neither a *deconstruction* or *reconstruction*. Simply put, this means we have to introduce new distinctions and terms while grounding them in our own mode of systematic philosophical reasoning the likes of which are nowhere found in any of Heidegger’s published writings. Ultimately we must be sensitive and attuned to the debates about *Being and Time* and “On Time and Being” without necessarily submerging into them.

<sup>11</sup> This is why we feel justified in our endeavor and do not feel the need to traverse the enormously complicated debates on the ‘failure of *Being and Time*’ and the *Kehre* (turn) and

the event of revelation in response to both questions is none other than 'time itself.'<sup>12</sup> This, however, means we cannot ignore all the cautionary measures that Heidegger offers in his lecture about those who try to think the relation of Being and time in ways other than the tradition of Western metaphysics – Being as beings which presence and time as the spatialized becoming of nows. Traditionally, Being has always been thought of by the presence of time, time has determined Being in some way, and because of Being, time is thought to 'to be' spatial or geometric – linear or circular for example. But when one takes the plunge into the radical rethinking of the *relation* between Being and time in terms other than the history of Western metaphysics all kinds of obscurities can arise. He asks: "Why, in what manner and from what source does something like time have a voice of Being? Every attempt to think adequately the relation of Being and time with the help of the current and imprecise representations of time and Being immediately becomes ensnared in a hopeless tangle of relations that have hardly been thought out." (Heidegger 1972, 2) Indeed the *relation* is what has 'hardly been thought out.'

We try to put time into Being and conceive it as some type of substance that only we humans for some reason tend to feel anxious about; we think we see everything around us perishing including our individual selves (the physical feeling of getting older and the body wearing out), or the cyclical nature of disasters, or the dramatic changes in political history, which cannot be anticipated (9/11 and the 2011 Arab Spring), or a technological breakthrough (the Internet). We think time is something in us (we intuit it or feel it but cannot name it) or something outside of us (we perceive it or sense it) – like a river flowing of which we are its hapless eddies swirling through it without being able to control our own movements within its movement, let alone the movement englobing all movements, which we think is time. We are slaves to time in terms of the tenses that structure our linguistic contexts. Time haunts us in our dreams by invoking past experiences and blending them in a creative act that foreshadows future events. Often, we feel the dread of past actions, explicit or implicit guilt not about any particular event or act or decision, but the collective malaise of a period of life spent, which did not meet certain expectations for achievement. Furthermore, metaphysics has compounded the matter by instantiating a distinction that logic fails to overcome – namely being as seemingly unchanging (a stone) and becoming as change (a person getting older

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what "On Time and Being" has to say about those matters. See footnote one, which lists the extraordinary commentaries and philosophical analyses by at least two generations of scholars in the Anglo-American world and continental Europe. Also see Stambaugh's *Summary* of the Seminar. She argues how the lecture differs from everything else in the later Heidegger's seminars (art, technology, the History of Being) in that Heidegger's own thought is the subject of the seminar and not another text from the history of metaphysics (Nietzsche, Hegel or Aristotle for example). Parentheses are my insertions. See Heidegger (1972, 25).

<sup>12</sup> This points back to the last question of *Being and Time* about the very manifestation of time.

or the history of a presidential administration). Being – from the verb ‘to be’ – goes unquestioned; and on the basis of it our uncritical usage of the verb it is temporalized in an arbitrary way to speak of things that ‘were’, ‘are’ and ‘will be.’ Yet these precisely are all the ‘imprecise’ representations that for Heidegger have descended from the dawn of Western metaphysics. His novel question is to ask why did this history begin and to question its origin as something unnatural or contingent – that perhaps we could have been fashioned differently and that all historical concepts in philosophy about time and Being could have been otherwise.<sup>13</sup>

Instead of thinking about a being in time, say a chronological date of an event or the age of a person (like one of your relatives), Heidegger invites us to think of the other aspect of time. We can test whether something closer to timing or propitiousness, like *kairos*, when the time is ripe for something, is more appropriate. He states: “We name time when we say: everything has its time. This means: everything which actually is, every being comes and goes at the right time and remains for a time during the time allotted to it. Everything has its time.” (Heidegger 1972, 3) Time is not a thing; nor is it the analogy or the metaphor for a spatialized flow; nor is it unchanging substance as a transcendental category (hence never an object of the empirical sense) for change or simultaneous and successive events to take place in it (Kant’s first analogy of experience). Time is not the movement of ticks on a clock, the rotation of the earth on its axis or its trip around the sun.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, Being is not a being or a thing, which has its time. (Heidegger 1972, 3) And yet we must ask the question about the ‘is’ which is never to be found in any statement when we say something ‘is’ this or that. Being is not a thing and everything has its time, which leads to the next great but perplexing question – does Being have ‘its time’ in a manner that is ontologically distinct from things that have their time, i.e. time for a boy to start acting like a man? By this question we are not asking whether Being (which is not the ‘is’ of any copula) possesses time like a landowner who owns his property. Heidegger says time is named as something allotted or appointed. When someone’s time has come, they have come out in their own,

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<sup>13</sup> Similarly, one can ask as Nietzsche once did in his blistering *Antichrist* (1888) why truth of a particular religion took the form of a specific narrative of events regarding the life of a single human being that lived 2000 years ago, namely Jesus of Nazareth. Could the life of Jesus have been totally different and with a different outcome (not dying on the Cross or being resurrected from a sealed tomb) and still become one Person in the Trinitarian God of Christianity? If so, then how else could this truth have been presented in a totally different content and form? For dogmatic Christianity, this question is unnecessary, if not downright heretical. There is only one story and one outcome that forms the basis of the truth of Christianity and this truth is universal and necessary. If not, then there is not faith at all as Paul says. (1 Corinthians 15:13.)

<sup>14</sup> It is certainly not derived from the scientific theory of evolution or the astrophysical time, however mysterious and complex, say the paradoxes that flow from Einstein’s *General Theory of Relativity*.

revealing the essence of who they truly are.<sup>15</sup> Time remains; it is allotted; things happen at the right time. It is in the nature of time to remain and occur rightly. This is not equivalent to an actual physical measurement of time like a certain hour or date, say New Year's Eve.<sup>16</sup> So how do we think about the relation between Being (the undisclosed ground that makes possible any 'is') and time, which remains and is allotted (but not like a physical event that exists) in terms of the question of Being and its (non-possessive) time? That is the question we must ask as we return back to the inner-anatomy of section 65 in *Being and Time*.

Before we do that we must extract a few more insights from "On Time and Being":

"Being is not a thing, thus nothing temporal, and yet it is determined by time as presence."

"Time is not a thing, thus nothing which is, and yet it remains constant in its passing away without being something temporal like beings in time."

We have several distinctions here and commonalities between distinctions. For example, both Being and time are not things. Only things can be temporal – they perish or become or die and we can witness that process. Things that are temporal suffer internal mutation and transformation or can change both their content and form. Neither Being nor time falls in this category. But one caveat is that time is constant even though it passes away just as temporal things pass away within it (i.e. in one calendar year this many people died in this particular city thus affecting its census). So we have a distinction between a) time passing and remaining what it is and b) temporal beings in time that perish. Time as presence does not mean it is like any present thing to our senses or imagination. Presence is not present or ready to hand or a measurable moment.<sup>17</sup> We also

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<sup>15</sup> One common sense notion of this is when an artist or musician is recognized at the peak of their achievement. They are in the moment and their time has arrived, one can say.

<sup>16</sup> One can argue that the only possible being, who can be compared to this issue of time allotment and one's time has come, is the being alluded to in the statements by Jesus in the Gospels about his time. For example, we find "my time has not yet come" and "this is the hour for which I was sent" in the *Gospel of John* or the secret of time as in "Neither man, nor the angels nor the Son knows the hour – only the Father" in the Synoptic Gospels (Mark 13:32; Matthew 24:36; Luke 17:26). As a single substance of two natures (divine and human) the experience of time is by necessity totally transcendent given the Son's co-eternal substance and relation with the Father and yet fully human in every sense of the word – being born, living and dying in historical time – with all the anxiety and perplexity surrounding any human being that knows they are going to die. To synthesize the transcendental consciousness of knowing one's time and yet *appearing* in time while being before it and after it as an eternal commitment is something Hegel, for example, struggled with in the penultimate chapter and last chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. But this is another matter altogether for theology and the philosophy of religion.

<sup>17</sup> Perhaps a word other than 'presence' (and hence absence) would be more useful to avoid all the connotations that surround the term: something that has presence is tied to the dramatic ('stage presence') or that you have a real sense of a charismatic personality with all its charm,

have Being and time as not things (temporal or otherwise), they share a relation, Being has its time allotted to it and time remains for it. These will be important considerations when we return to the main features we saw opened up in section 65 in *Being and Time*, namely the motion-occurrence-mode of authenticity, which contains Dasein's 'primordial self-constancy and totality, which in turn reveals the ontological meaning of Dasein's whole Being. This of course is hypothesized to be time itself but not as a substance, concept, intuition, phenomenon or emotional feeling, however, intangible. Hence we are back to the reciprocal relation of Being and time. "On Time and Being" pursues these reflections as well.

Heidegger makes several statements, which require speculative expansion. He says that "time is determined by some kind of Being" (whereby Being is not a thing and therefore neither is time). But then he asks how "is Being determined by time?" (Heidegger 1972, 3) And then comes the big push for Heidegger: "Being and time determine each other reciprocally, but in such a manner that neither can the former-Being-be addressed as something temporal nor can the latter-time-be addressed as a being." (1972, 3)<sup>18</sup> It is amazing that Heidegger readily admits the limitations of his thinking and the threat of contradictions and circular repetitions. But is there a way out? Someone like Hegel would speak about one self-consciousness (say the master) and another (say the slave) becoming the other and seeing itself as the other and vice-versa in a double movement of reciprocal determination. (Hegel 1977) Is something similar occurring with regard to Heidegger's statements about Being and time? Admittedly, to construct another Division III would have to avoid the pitfalls of contradiction, redundancy and circularity that Heidegger admits to in "On Time and Being."

Let us analyze his statements further. Being and time determine each other 'reciprocally' but in a way where Being is not a temporal thing and time is not a being, and only beings-in-time and time itself as passing away can be perishable. But time also has the quality of remaining itself. We must inquire into this mode of mutual or reciprocal determination and phenomenologically reduce any notions of being temporal, being in time, time as passing way entropically in

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force and charisma; presence is tied to the supernatural or paranormal – something is present – you can sense it, feel it or apperceive it – without identifying it exactly in tangible, material terms; presence is something that surrounds and bounds a place or space so that some things are excluded from the purity its realm (the presence of a temple); presence is the secret organizing principle of a complex event or gathering (say a national convention), which is irreducible to any particular moment or series of moments and their relations that would otherwise comprise the duration of the whole event.

<sup>18</sup> The very next statement after that is: "As we give thought to all of this, we find ourselves adrift in contradictory statements."

which everything tends in one direction.<sup>19</sup> We must be extra-cautious about not presuming any immediate given sense of what it means to give and receive and give-back and all their underlying complex presuppositions. Geometric diagrams of the gift-flow will not help us. And to remind ourselves, Being is nothing temporal and time is never a being. Let us bracket the phenomenon of the reciprocal determination of Being and Time. And then we have the miraculous question of timing and if and whether Being has its own timing but unlike anything else that has its time – like something coming to an end or a person who dies or an artist who finally gets an audience. The question of timing, movement and the event of reciprocal determination will provide the clues for our re-immersion in section 65. We will be on the path of the original repetition to think *Being and Time's* project in a 'completely different way.' Ultimately this should and will result in the creation of the missing Division III.

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<sup>19</sup> Of course this means we have to reduce phenomenologically the dictionary terms of reciprocity in terms of the following typical attributions: a) state or relation derived from the Latin *reciprocus*; b) any type of mutual exchange in which one gives to the other not out of self-interest but for the benefit of the other and vice-versa, which then benefits the giver and the receiver twice-over; c) contractual relations of exchange and commerce in which giving and receiving has advantages for both sides of the exchange; d) literally to receive a gift without any expectation of it and then to give something back in the spirit of benevolence and friendship whether the actual exchange of things are equal in value or quantity or not (i.e. you did something nice (x) for me and so I will do something (y) for you in which no standard or measure can equalize x and y); e) theories of excess and gift-giving where power and prestige is not based on self-accrual of wealth and interest in a form of competition that leads to great social and economic disparity in the system (say an aristocracy or class system), but rather the ability to give to the Other involves a complex circular return based on ritual and the generation of meaning (Mauss, Bataille, etc.).





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