



The Romanians in the "Great War" The Year 1915

Documents, Impressions, Testimonies



Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History

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Notes on the edition

During this period, the conflict completed its profile, becoming, at least on the western front, a positional one, in which trenches played the central acting part. Trying to gain the victory, the belligerent coalitions increased their material, human and financial efforts, diversified their military strategies, intensified their political and diplomatic activity in order to attract new allies, accepting to discuss – for the first time in history – on the same level with the leaders of the small countries and granting them concessions hard to imagine a year ago. This last aspect materialized both in Italy's accession to the Triple Entente by signing the Treaty of London on 26 April, 1915 and entering into war on 23 May, and in Bulgaria's accession to the Triple Alliance by signing the Pless Convention on 6 September 1915 and entering into war on 14 October, but without these steps leading to the denouement of the conflict that will continue for more than three years.

The failure of the Schlieffen Plan in the first weeks of the war determined Germany to reconsider its strategic projections. Erich von Falkenhayn, the new chief of the German General Staff, who had replaced Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, considered that he could not get the decision on the western front and thus he focused his efforts on the eastern one with the aim of getting Russia out of the war. From May to August 1915, the German and Austro-Hungarian armies obtained categorical victories against the Russian army, but the final goal was not achieved. Russia remained an active combatant, capable of major offensive reactions, such as the one led by the General Brusilov in June – September 1916, which would take by surprise the Central Powers. On the western front, the Germans were satisfied that they had repelled the Franco-British offensive. In their turn, the Entente powers tried unsuccessfully to force victory on the western front, but their actions in Artois and Champagne had quite mediocre results.

On the other hand, London and Paris resorted to the „peripheral strategy” or the „diversion strategy”, which was expected to hit the enemy in his vulnerable points. The most important was the Ottoman Empire, for a long time considered „the sick man of Europe”. At the initiative of the British, the Gallipoli campaign was organized, aiming at occupying the Black Sea Straits and, finally, putting the Ottoman Empire out of the war. The expedition was in the end a failure, but the Allies, wishing to remain anchored in Balkans, disembarked an expeditionary body at Thessaloniki, forces that would prove a minimal combatant value, the new front having however a great political and strategical importance in the process of Romania’s accession to the Entente in the year 1916.

Also in Balkans, the entry of Bulgaria into the war on 11 October 1915 led soon to the crushing of Serbia by the combined action of the military forces of the Central Powers.

On the Italian front, the battles got from the beginning “a wear and tear” aspect, the four battles of the Isonzo in 1915 bringing only minor successes to the forces commanded by General Luigi Cadorna.

In this extremely tensioned context, Romania maintained its neutrality with great difficulties, the pressures of the two belligerent camps being very strong. As it is well known, in the political class and public opinion there were two options, the one favourable to the Entente of the majority, and the one favourable to the Central Powers, the confrontation between them being manifested strongly, especially in the press and by organizing demonstrations in the main urban centers of the country.

In the elaboration of this volume we maintained the same topic approach of the previous one. We reproduced diplomatic documents issued by the governments of the belligerent powers with manifest interests in the Romanian space, but also of the government of Bucharest. Telegrams, notes of conversations, analyses, information, opinions etc. were exchanged between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bucharest and the diplomatic missions abroad, as well as between the legations of the great powers in Romania and the capitals of the big or small powers, belligerent or not.

The available documents are in impressive numbers, so the selection was difficult. However, we consider that the included documents outline the very complex situation of the Romanian nation in the second year of the „Great War”.

The documents in Romanian were translated into English, as well as the three German documents. The documents in French and Italian were

not translated, since, on the one hand, this practice is often used in document editing, and, on the other hand, the two languages are, generally, quite well known. In addition, modern means allow a relatively faithful and easy translation for those interested.

Most of the documents were completely reproduced, without additions and omissions, and all our interventions were marked by the square brackets [...].

The volume also includes a chronology of the main events of the year 1915, a very useful tool in order to facilitate the consultation of the documents.

List of documents

1. January 2nd/15th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of the Russian Minister in Bucharest, Stanislas Poklewski-Koziell, addressed to Sergey Sazonov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, relating to the meeting with the Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu on the relations with Russia and Romania's intentions.

2. January 9th/22nd 1915. Article published by the newspaper „Univer-sul” (the Universe) regarding the situation in Bukovina.

3. January 9th/22nd 1915, Bucharest. Article „*The Destruction of a Legend*” by Ioan Greco, published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth)

4. January 9th/22nd 1915, Bucharest. Notes by Alexandru Marghiloman on his talk with Baron Carlo Fasciotti, minister of Italy in România.

5. January – February 1915, Bucharest. Excerpts from the General Vasile Rudeanu's memoirs relating to his activity in Italy.

6. January 25th/February 7th 1915, Bucharest. Nicolae Iorga's article „After Half a Year in Romania”.

7. January 27th/February 9th 1915, Bucharest. Informative note no. 1469 of the General Staff relating to the opinions of the Romanians beyond the mountains with regard to the Romania future actions.

8. January 28th/February 10th 1915. Alexandru Marghiloman's notes following his talk with lieutenant-colonel Ludovic Mircescu, Romanian military attaché in Berlin.

9. January 30th/February 12th 1915, Bucharest. Informative note no. 1502 of the General Staff relating to the political, military and economic situation of Bulgaria.

10. February 1st/14th 1915. Excerpts from General Mihail Savov's report addressed to tsar Ferdinand concerning the situation of Bulgaria and the relations with Romania.

11. February 6th/19th 1915, Berlin. Letter of Alexandru Beldiman, Romanian minister in Germany, addressed to the Prime-minister Ion I. C. Brătianu, reproaching with the government and some diplomats' conduct.

12. February 12th/25th 1915, Bucharest. Alexandru Marghiloman's notes on his conversation with von dem Bussche, German minister in Bucharest, and the audience with the King Ferdinand.

13. February 12th/25th 1915, Bucharest. C. G. Costa-Foru's article published in the newspaper „Adevărul”(the Truth): „If the tsar of Russia wanted...!”, relating to the eventuality of handing over Bessarabia to Romania by the Russian Empire.

14. February 18th/March 3rd 1915, Sibiu. Note of the Imperial Royal Military Command, General Staff section, addressed to the register office of the Austro-Hungarian Imperial-Royal General Staff on the constitution of the „Transylvanian Legion” in Bucharest, under the leadership of Octavian Goga.

15. March 4th/17th 1915, Bucharest. Alexandru Averescu's notes relating to the content of the talk with Stanislas Poklewski-Koziell, Russian minister in Bucharest.

16. March 18th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Count Ottokar Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian minister in Bucharest, addressed to Baron Burián, informing him of the King Ferdinand's opposition to the transit of war material in Turkey.

17. March 6th/19th 1915, Bucharest. Notes of General Alexandru Averescu following his talk with Nicolae Filipescu relating to the prospects of the Romania entry into the war on the side of the Entente.

18. March 13th/26th 1915, Bucharest. Article entitled „Sufferings of the Bukovina inhabitants”, published in the newspaper „Universul” (the Universe).

19. April 3rd/16th 1915, Bucharest. Report of Ypersele de Strihou, Belgium minister plenipotentiary in Bucharest, addressed to J. Davignon, at which he annexes the report of the French military attaché in Bucharest, Captain Jules Pichon, relating to the situation of the Romanian army.

20. April 12th/25th 1915, Rome. Report of the Romanian military attaché in Italy, major Ignat, in which he transmits the translation of an article about the military potential and the strategic intentions of Romania, published in the newspaper „Corriere de la Sera” („Evening Courier”), under the signature of the journalist Giuliano Banacci.

21. April 15th/28th 1915, Bucharest. Article of D. N. Comşa, „Errors to be repaired. Need of rehabilitation”, published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth).

22. April 1915. Fragments from the interview of Al. Vaida-Voevod got by a representative of the German Headquarters referring to the problem of the Romanians from Transylvania and Hungary, in which it is pointed out the contribution of the Romanian nationality military to the victories gained by the Austro-Hungarian army.

23. April 19th/May 2nd 1915, Petrograd. Telegram of Sergey Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister, addressed to the ambassadors in Paris and London, relating to the negotiations with Romania for its entry into the war.

24. April 20th/ May 3rd 1915, Petrograd. Telegram of Sergey Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister, addressed to the ambassadors in Paris, London and Bucharest, concerning the territorial claims of Romania in order to enter the war on the side of the Entente.

25. April 21st/May 4th 1915, Bucharest. Al. Marghiloman’s notes on his talks with G. Ştirbey, Count Czernin and von dem Bussche relating to the situation of Italy and the prospect to enter the war on the side of the Entente.

26. April 28th/May 11th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of count Ottokar Czernin, Austro-Hungarian minister plenipotentiary in Bucharest, addressed to Baron Burián, informing him of his talk with Ion I. C. Brătianu who emphasized the difficult situation of Romania if Italy enters the war on the side of the Entente.

27. April 30th/May 13 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Poklewski-Koziell, Russian minister in Bucharest, addressed to the Foreign Minister, Sergey Sazonov, concerning the territorial claims of Romania.

28. May 1st/14th 1915, Petrograd. Telegram of Sergey Sazonov, Russia Foreign Minister, addressed to Poklewski-Koziell, concerning the response of the Russian government to a memorandum delivered by Constantin Diamandy, Romanian minister in Petrograd.

29. May 6th/19th 1915, Petrograd. Telegram of Sergey Sazonov, Russia Foreign Minister, addressed to Poklewski-Koziell, relating to the meeting with the ambassador of France with reference to the territorial claims of Romania.

30. May 6th/19th 1915, Petrograd. Telegram of Sergey Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister, addressed to A. P. Izvolski, Russian ambassador in Paris, relating to the importance of the entry of Romania into the war.

31. May 7th/20th 1915, Teschen. Telegram of Count Thurn, representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attached to the General Staff, addressed to Baron Burián relating to the General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf's opinion according to which the entry of Romania into the war would have catastrophic effects for Austria-Hungary.

32. May 10th/23rd 1915, [Teschen]. Telegram of General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf addressed to Baron Burián on the emergency of winning over Romania for its active participation on the side of the Central Powers.

33. May 15th/28th 1915, Bucharest. Information on the situation of Bukovina after the outbreak of the war, transmitted to the General Staff by an informer nonmentioned by name.

34. May 1915, Bucharest. Excerpt from the operational project elaborated by the General Staff (Hypothesis B.3) for a two-front war developed by Romania.

35. May 21st/June 3rd 1915, Teschen. Telegram of General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf addressed to Baron Burián on the emergency of an active intervention of Romania on the side of the Central Powers.

36. May 23rd/June 5th 1915, Vienna. Telegram of Baron Burián addressed to Count Ottokar Czernin, in which he estimates the situation of Romania asking him to present constantly to the leaders in Bucharest the negative consequences of a war triumphant Russia on the Romanian state.

37. May 24th/June 6th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of the Italian military attaché, major Luciano Ferigo, concerning the demonstrations of solidarity with Italy entered into conflict on the Entente side.

38. June 5th/18th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Poklewski-Koziell, Russian minister in Bucharest, addressed to the Foreign minister Sergey Sazonov, related to his talk with Ion I.C. Brătianu on the prospect of the Romania entry into the war.

39. June 7th/20th 1915, Petrograd. Telegram of Lieutenant-General Nikolai Ianuşkevici, chief of the Russian General Staff, addressed to the General Staff, referring to the importance and necessity of the Romania entry into the war.

40. June 9th/22nd 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of the Italian military attaché in Bucharest, Major Luciano Ferigo, reproducing the speech of the Prime minister Ion I. C. Brătianu, presented in front of the Italian delegation on a visit to the Russian Empire, concerning the Romania politics and its relations with the Kingdom of Italy.

41. June 12th/25th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of the Italian military attaché in Bucharest, Major Luciano Ferigo, related to the negotiations between Romania and the countries of the Entente, especially Russia, on the eventuality of the entry into the war and the situation of the Romanian army.

42. June 14th/27th 1915, Paris. Telegram of A.P. Izvolski, Russian minister in France, addressed to Sergey Sazonov, Foreign Minister, in which he related his talk with Théophile Delcassé on the persistent neutrality of Romania.

43. June 16th/29th 1915, Paris. Telegram of P. Izvolski, Russian minister in France, addressed to Sergey Sazonov, Foreign Minister, following the telegram received on June [15th]/28th, in which he related his talk with Théophile Delcassé on the military situation of Romania and its persistent neutrality.

44. June 16th/29th 1915, Bucharest. Talk between Ion I. C. Brătianu and General Al. Averescu relating to the possibilities of cooperation with the Russian army. Project of cooperation between the Romanian army and the Russian army.

45. June 25th/July 8th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of the Prime minister Ion I. C. Brătianu addressed to Constantin Diamandy, Romanian minister in Petrograd, asking him to explain to the Russian authorities the reasons of postponing the engagement in action of Romania.

46. June 28th/July 11th 1915, Petrograd. Constantin Diamandy's telegram addressed to Ion I.C. Brătianu, in which he sums up the discontentment of Sergey Sazonov given the delay of the Romania entry into the war on the side of the Entente.

47. June-August 1915, Bucharest. Excerpt from I.G. Duca's Memoirs concerning the „Poklewski incident”.

48. June 30th/July 13th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Count Ottokar Czernin addressed to Baron Burián, in which he informs him on the approaches taken with the Romanian authorities concerning the transit of the war material through Romania.

49. 3/16 iulie 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Count Ottokar Czernin addressed to Baron Burián, informing him on the refusal of the Romanian government to allow the transit of ammunitions for the Ottoman Empire.

50. July 10th/23rd 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Prime minister Ion I. C. Brătianu addressed to Constantin Diamandy, Romanian minister in

Petrograd, informing him on the answer he will give to Poklewski-Koziell. Romania agrees to enter the war on the side of the Entente, but she cannot provide a precise date for this if all the political and military conditions are not fulfilled.

51. July 11th/24th 1915, Bucharest. Article of Emil D. Fagure, „Germany and Romania”, published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth), in which he rejects the slanderous insinuations of the newspaper „Frankfurter Zeitung” against the Romanian state.

52. July 16th/29th 1915, Bucharest. Article in the newspaper „Universul”, signed with the initials L.I., concerning the existence of some Romanian prisoners from Bessarabia in Sibiu and the prospect of organising a „Bessarabian Action”.

53. July 21st/August 3rd 1915, Petrograd. Telegram of Sergey Sazonov, Russian Foreign minister, addressed to Poklewski-Koziell, diplomatic envoy to Bucharest, asking him to transmit to the Romanian government the agreement of the authorities from Petrograd relating to the Romanians requests with the purpose to conclude a military convention concerning the entry of the country into the war.

54. July 24th/August 6th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of the Italian military attaché, Major Luciano Ferigo, relating to the Romania situation and the problem of the transit of ammunitions to the Ottoman Empire.

55. July 25th /August 7th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of the Prime minister Ion I. C. Brătianu addressed to Constantin Diamandy, Romanian minister in Petrograd, referring to the acceptance of the conditions of the Romanian part by Russia, with the obligation to prohibit any transit of weapons and munitions for adversaries.

56. July 28th/August 10th 1915, Petrograd. Reply of Constantin Diamandy, Romanian minister in the Russian capital, to the telegram of Ion I. C. Brătianu from July 25th/August 7th 1915.

57. July-August 1915, Bucharest. Notes of I. G. Duca relating to the mission of Victor Antonescu in France.

58. August 8th/21st 1915, Bucharest. Article from „Gazeta Ilustrată” (the Illustrated Gazette) regarding the conduct on the battle field of the 33rd Regiment, consisting of Romanians from Transylvania.

59. August 18th/31st 1915, Bucharest. Article of Ion Grecu, „Romanian regiments sentenced to death. The meaning of the Hungarian praises”, published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth).

60. August 28th/September 10th 1915, Bucharest. Notes of Al. Marghiloman concerning the matters discussed during the secret audience granted by King Ferdinand.

61. September 1st/14th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Count Ottokar Czernin addressed to Baron Burián, informing him on the content of the audience with King Ferdinand, relating to the military measures taken by Romania at the border with Austria-Hungary.

62. September 4th/17th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Count Ottokar Czernin addressed to Baron Burián, informing him on the talk with Ion I.C. Brătianu relating to the retreat of the Romanian troops from the common borders.

63. September 5th/18th 1915, Bucharest. Article of dr. Nicolae Coman, „Martyrdom of Transylvania in 1914-1915”, published in the newspaper „Universul” (the Universe).

64. September 7th/20th 1915, Sofia. Report of the Romanian military attaché in Sofia, Captain Florea Țenescu, relating to the starting of the mobilization in Bulgaria.

65. September 11th/24th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Count Ottokar Czernin addressed to Baron Burián, informing him on the warning given by Ion I. C. Brătianu relating to the negative consequences of an eventual mobilization of the army.

66. September 16th/29th 1915, Bucharest. Article of Constantin Mille „Mr. Brătianu’s politics. I will go with the winner!”, published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth).

67. September 29th/ October 12th 1915, Petrograd. Telegram of A. P. Izvolski, Russian minister in Paris, addressed to Sergey Sazonov, Foreign Minister, concerning the opinions of the French circles with regard to the passivity of Russia in the Balkans, which could endanger Romania’s entry into the war.

68. October 10th/23rd 1915, Bucharest. Speech delivered by the poet Octavian Goga at the meeting of the Unionist Federation, held in „Dacia” hall, reflecting the emotion and the bitterness generated by the intervention of Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers and the successes scored by the Bulgarians.

69. October 13th/26th 1915, Bucharest. Relating published by the newspaper „Universul” (the Universe) on the meeting organized by the Social-Democratic Party from Romania on 11 October 1915.

70. October 16th/29th 1915, Bucharest. Letter of Octavian Goga addressed to General Grigore Crăiniceanu, political director of the newspaper „Universul” (the Universe) informing the public opinion on the starting of the Transylvanian leaders’deportation.

71. October 24th/November 6th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Camille Blondel, Minister of France in Romania, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, relating to the talk with Toma Stelian, Minister of Justice in the government, on the discontentments with regard to the Prime minister Ion I. C. Brătianu’s politics and the tensioned talks between him and the Russian Empire minister from Bucharest.

72. October 26th/November 8th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of C. Fasciotti addressed to A. Salandra concerning the situation of the Romanian army.

73. 1915. Excerpts from the Memoirs of Maurice Georges Paléologue, ambassador of France to Russia, with regards to the evolution of the military events, the relations within the Triple Entente and the conduct of Romania.

74. December 7th/20th 1915, Bucharest. King Ferdinand’s letter addressed to King of Italy Victor Emmanuel III, concerning the collaboration between România and Italy.

75. December 8th/21st 1915. Telegram of Camille Blondel, minister of France to Bucharest, addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he informs on the non-intervention, expectation policy of the Romanian government led by Ion I.C. Brătianu.

76. December 8th/21st 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Camille Blondel, minister of France to Bucharest, addressed to The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he informs on the criticisms made by the liberal leader Toma Stelian with regard to the policy of the government led by Ion I. C. Brătianu.

77. December 12th/25th, Bucharest. Meetings of Alexandru Marghiloman with von dem Bussche, German minister in Bucharest, concerning the political and military issues and the corruption within the Ministry of War.

78. December 13th/26th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of Camille Blondel addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France in which he informs on the outcomes of Nikolai Şebeko’s visit in Romania.

79. December 1915. Response letter of King of Italy, Victor Emmanuel III, addressed to King Ferdinand of Romania.

80. December 18th/31st 1915, Bucharest. Excerpts from Petre P. Carp’s intervention in the Assembly of Deputies.

81. 1915, Bucharest. Excerpts from the memoirs of Radu R. Rosetti, chief of the operations bureau for the General Staff, concerning the negotiations for Romania’s entry into the war, the strategic planning and the relations with Bulgaria.

82. 1915. Notes of General Iuri Nikiforovici Danilov on the diplomatic efforts of the Russian Empire in order to bring Romania in the conflict.

83. 1915. Excerpts from the notes of Constantin Diamandy, Romanian minister in Petrograd, relating to the mode of negotiation of Romania’s borders at the end of the global conflagration.

84. 1915. Excerpt from the work „*General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its critical decisions*” by Erich von Falkenhayn, concerning the preliminaries of Bulgaria’s entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers.

85. 1915. Excerpt from the work „*General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its critical decisions*” by Erich von Falkenhayn, relating to Romania’s attitude with regard to the Central Powers during the year 1915.

86. December 3rd 1923, Bucharest. Excerpt from the report on the preparation of the war during the years 1914-1916.

87. Lists of human casualties suffered by the Bessarabian soldiers of Romanian origin from Bender judet (county), rural district (rom.plasa) Căinari during the years 1914-1915.

DOCUMENTS

1. 2/15 janvier 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme de Stanislas Poklewsky-Koziell¹, ministre russe à Bucarest, adressé à Sergueï Sazonov², ministre des Affaires étrangères, concernant l'entrevue avec le Premier ministre Ion I.C. Brătianu³ sur les relations avec la Russie et les intentions de la Roumanie.

¹ *Stanislas Alfonsovici Poklewsky-Koziell* (1869-1937) – diplomate russe, d'origine polonaise, ministre plénipotentiaire de Russie à Bucarest (décembre 1913-novembre 1917, sauf novembre 1916-mars 1917 quand à sa place a été dans cette fonction le général Mossolov, ancien chef de la Chancellerie impériale). Après la guerre s'installa finalement à Bucarest où il mourut en 1937.

² *Sergueï Dmitrievitch Sazonov* (1860-1927) – Ministre des affaires étrangères de Russie pendant la période novembre 1910-juillet 1916. Au début de son mandat, il a été favorable à la reprise des relations avec l'Allemagne, le tsar Nicolas II et l'empereur Guillaume II (en allemand Wilhelm II) Ils se rencontrant à Potsdam (4-6 novembre 1910). Ces démarches ont été vues d'un mauvais œil par les partenaires d'alliance – la France et la Grande Bretagne. Les relations de la Russie avec l'Allemagne se sont détériorées en 1913 lorsque l'Empereur (Kaiser) avait envoyé une mission militaire dans l'Empire Ottoman en vue de réorganiser l'armée ottomane. Pendant les Guerres balkaniques (1912-1913), Sazonov a agi pour la création de la Ligue balkanique sous l'égide de la Russie, mais la défection bulgare l'a obligé d'accorder à la Serbie une aide plus substantielle. Son rôle dans le déclenchement de la première conflagration mondiale est controversé, certains des historiens considérant qu'il s'était efforcé de maintenir la paix, tandis que d'autres affirment qu'il avait été favorable à la guerre. Remplacé de sa fonction de ministre des affaires étrangères, Sazonov a été nommé ambassadeur en Grande-Bretagne. Il a été un opposant au régime bolchévique et a soutenu le Mouvement blanc, étant conseiller du général Dénikine. Il est mort à Nice (France) où il est d'ailleurs enterré. Ses Mémoires, *Les Années Fatales*, parues le jour même de sa mort, sont très importantes pour pouvoir comprendre la Première Guerre Mondiale, y compris les relations roumaino-russes des années 1914-1916.

³ *Ion I.C. Brătianu* (1864-1927) – Homme politique libéral, fils de Ion C. Brătianu, président du Parti national libéral (1909-1927), premier ministre à plusieurs reprises (1908-1910; 1914-1918; 1918-1919; 1922-1926; 1927). Il fut la personnalité politique dominante en Roumanie au cours des trois premières décennies du XX-ème siècle, étant un ferme adepte de l'entrée en guerre de la Roumanie aux côtés de l'Entente, pour laquelle il avait agi avec beaucoup d'ingéniosité et de persévérance. Son rôle pendant la guerre fut décisif, en tant que chef du gouvernement, étant totalement responsable de sa direction.

Télégramme secret de l'ambassadeur à Bucarest

2/15 janvier 1915. N° 8

Reçu votre télégramme n° 4934.

J'ai eu avec Bratiano une conversation dans le sens que vous m'avez indiqué; il m'a déclaré qu'aussitôt après le début de la guerre, il avait cherché, contrairement à l'avis de certains hommes d'état d'ici, un terrain pour s'entendre avec la Russie, et il ne s'est rapproché que de nous-mêmes sans garanties complémentaires de la France et de l'Angleterre, car il trouve que les relations avec la Russie ont pour la Roumanie une importance exceptionnelle; pour le moment il est occupé à faire avancer autant que possible les préparatifs militaires et diplomatiques de la Roumanie, afin que cette entente soit réalisée aussitôt que possible, il n'est pas en pourparlers au sujet d'une participation à la ligue des pays neutres, et il est d'avis que nous ne pouvons pas lui donner tort parce qu'il a le désir de se rapprocher de l'Italie, dans le but de combattre avec elle à nos côtés.

Il existe un gouvernement que Bratiano n'a pas voulu me nommer, qui aurait cherché à connaître son point de vue dans la question des détroits, mais il se refusa à répondre, donnant pour prétexte que la décision n'était pas encore mûre, et que personne n'avait rien décidé encore à ce sujet. Bratiano a ajouté que la politique de la Roumanie par rapport à la Bulgarie était bien connue du gouvernement impérial, et qu'elle avait déjà donné des résultats palpables, il demande seulement que nous hâtons l'entente entre la Serbie et la Bulgarie, car il a été informé que les agissements des bandes bulgaro-macédoniennes allaient recommencer bientôt le long de la ligne de chemin de fer Salonique-Nich. Il sait aussi qu'en ces derniers jours le transport des troupes sur les chemins de fer autrichiens dans la direction de la Serbie et de la Bucovine a été renforcé. En finissant la conversation, Bratiano a demandé que Votre Excellence continue à lui faire confiance.

Poklevsky

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes*, 1914-1917, p. 186]

2. January 9th/22nd 1915, Article published by the newspaper „Universul” (the Universe) regarding the situation in Bukovina.

The situation in Bukovina
– Our investigation at the borders –

Dorohoi, January 6th

Impelled by the desire of rendering to the readers of the *Universe* the real situation in Bukovina, I visited yesterday afternoon several localities from the Bukovina border, where I gathered rich impressions and found out very important facts.

First of all I was interested in the life of Chernivtsi. The capital of Bukovina, where up to yesterday life seemed to have disappeared, began to become animated again. All those who, a month before, had left Chernivtsi and took refuge in Siret, Rădăuți, Suceava, Câmpulung, etc., following the occupation of these cities by the Russians, returned to the capital of Bukovina. At certain hours of the day, the movement on the streets is large enough and for a moment you have the impression that Chernivtsi is the same as it was a year or two years before and that the storm did not rush on it which, whatever may be said, brought about radical changes in its everyday life.

The Mayor of Chernivtsi, Dr. Bocancea and his adjoint, Dr. Hoștiuc, took all the measures imposed by the difficult circumstances through which the city passes in order to come as much as possible to its population's aid literally impoverished. That is why storehouses were opened in the city, where flour and other articles and food brought from Russia were sold at low prices.

The Romanians, in particular, are treated in a courteous manner. Any request made by them is met by the Russian authorities with all careful speed. It is known that the first Romanian restaurant was opened in the national palace for some time past, under the supervision of the well-known Romanian fighter Livescu. By way of exception authorization was given to the manager of this Romanian restaurant for an orchestra to sing and to delight the customers as in normal times.

Mayor Bocancea charged the Chernivtsi chief of police, Tonioni, with the inventory of the goods found in all the shops left by the patrons, stores that have to be opened soon. There will be employed as salesmen clerks of the administration who will sell the goods at the prices established by the townhall and part of the amount resulting from sales will be paid to the commune.

*

In all the Bukovina localities occupied by the Russians, the first thing the conquerors do is to introduce the organization. Influential men from the respective localities are appointed to be mayors. Everywhere Romanians are preferred. The prefects and the governors, installed immediately, seek everywhere to introduce a regime of freedom and equality for everyone. Horrors and excesses, committed in the first days of occupation by the Cossacks, cease as if by magic.

The general governor of Bukovina, Evreinov⁴, to whom the Count Muraviev was attached, is involved in an important activity for the administrative organization of the whole Bukovina, being today in the hands of the Russians.

But that one who manages and controls the entire administrative apparatus is Gerowski, a man of extraordinary energy. In Chernivtsi there is currently a very reduced Russian army, and officers are practically not at all, being known that most of the Russian forces were sent in the Carpathians, towards Hungary.

Many prominent personalities from our country have visited lately and continue to visit Chernivtsi. In the last days, D. P. Moruzzi, former prefect of the capital, was in Chernivtsi, having had long meetings with Messrs. Evreinov, Muraviev and Gerowski.

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The entrances and departures from Chernivtsi are strictly supervised.

In order to leave the capital of Bukovina you have by all means to arm yourself with a permission ticket issued by the governor, and in order to enter Romania, you have to vise it at the Romanian Consulate General in Chernivtsi, whose interests are managed today by Mr. G. Gallin, in the absence of the Consul Mr. Georgescu.

At the Austrian customs in Țurenii, corresponding to our border point Mamornița, the Russian Captain Const. Mihailovici Lazaroff has been installed for a long time as chief of the Border polices.

⁴ *Sergey Dmitrievici Evreinov* (1869-1931) – Russian politician. He was vice-governor of Bessarabia, appointed on January 9th 1914. In this position, he was concerned with the construction of the statue of tsar Alexander I in Chișinău. After the outbreak of the war, he entered subordinate at the south-western front and in 1914 and 1915 he was governor ad-interim of Bukovina and of Przemyśl city. Later on, he fulfilled the same function in the Samara and Yaroslavl «guberniyas» (governorates, provinces). Put in jail in 1918, he was sentenced to prison, but released for health reasons.

This Russian soldier, who showed signs of a matchless bravery in the Russian-Japanese war and distinguished himself at the memorable siege in Port-Arthur, has his body full of wounds, wearing proudly the decorations conferred by the Tsar. The Russian border police exercise a strict control over all those who come to Bukovina or leave this province.

[“Universul” (the Universe), January 9th, 1915]

3. January 9th/22nd 1915, Bucharest. Article „The destruction of a legend” by Ioan Grecu, published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth).

The destruction of a legend

„Das sind meine braven Rumänen.”

The hand of the Serbian fanatic who, on June 15th/28th, 1914, fired two fatal revolver shots against the car in which the heir to the Hapsburg throne was in a hurry to visit a patient – wounded in a anticipatory attack – destroyed, before its solving an enigma that had interested millions of citizens.

Who could say, without being wrong, what would have led to the unraveling of this enigma? A man in the prime of his life, who had shown a great evidence of energy, succeeding in taking to wife a woman among his subjects (he felt that the Habsburgs also needed a refreshing of their blood), he knew how to awaken in the millions of the citizens of the Hasburg monarchy faith, hope and fears, at the basis of which nothing was positive, but only unverifiable rumors and legends.

Some said that Archduke Franz Ferdinand was a man of the Catholic Church – without having ever made something or making a declaration to support this affirmation; others said he was a man conscious of the need to introduce liberal, democratic reforms – without having ever made a deed or making a declaration in order to support this saying; and all over again. Others said that he was a staunch enemy of the Hungarian oligarchy and friend of the oppressed nations – without having ever made something or making a delaration in order to support this affirmation...

To discuss today whether the solving of this Austro-Hungarian enigma would have been a great disillusionment or the confirmation of hopes and fears, would be an academic discussion. The Habsburgs have always

denied their hopes set on them and perhaps even Archduke Franz Ferdinand wouldn't have been an exception. At least in regard to the Romanians beyond the mountains, perhaps even his reign wouldn't have meant a new era or, maybe, the Romanians beyond the mountains in their supposed friend of yesterday, lost the probable enemy of tomorrow.

The hopes of the Romanians from beyond the mountains were as well based only on a legend, on those alleged words of praise that he would have been once pronounced to the Romanians: „Das sind meine braven Rumänen”. („These are my brave Romanians”), words of praise with which so many dreams were woven and which gave importance to so many people. Words of praise, however he never uttered.

In the struggles of the Romanians from beyond the mountains, however, there were times, in which such legends were a fatal necessity in order to come to the aid of the resistance power of the fighters. And when a legend was needed, a legend was created, as the writer of these lines created the legend above, which now he as well destroys.

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After the 1901 elections for the Chamber of Deputies, the Kossuthist opposition faction, insignificant until then, had succeeded in having nearly 100 members and had started the most violent campaign to overthrow the Szell government on the military issue: a Hungarian command in the army of Hungary⁵. The opposition was supported by the county councils, which, for the most part, had taken declared hostile attitudes, not only against the government but also against the dynasty. In the midst of the summer of 1903, as representative of the emperor, the heir to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand comes to lead the great royal maneuvers around Lipova (Timis County).

In the press and the Hungarian society, a campaign against the heir to the throne started immediately, being published patriotic calls in which the citizens were induced not to give the heir to the throne any reception, not to meet him at the stations, not to salute him. The county administrations through which the heir had to pass had also ordered the officials to stop the people from any manifestations of sympathy. It had to give Archduke Franz Ferdinand and, through him, the emperor, to understand that the whole country approved *the Kossuthist obstruction and wanted the Hungarian command*.

⁵ In the sense that the Hungarian language to be the language of command in the army of Hungary.

The interests of the Romanians were contrary to this boycott. The Hungarian command would have meant a new means, perhaps the most dangerous one, of Magyarization. Consequently, the Romanian newspapers, with the Romanian newspaper from Arad at the top, published as well appeals, meaning that the Romanian people come out to meet the one who comes „in the name of the emperor”. The editors of the newspaper from Arad walked for whole days all over the Romanian communes where the archduke’s train would have to pass, in order to organize a most resounding demonstration.

And – where there Archduke Franz Ferdinand passed to Lipova – from ditches from fields, hundreds and thousands of Romanians appeared, dressed in festive clothing, cheering him with enthusiastic cheers. In Lipova train station, the penultimate train station, to meet the Archduke came only the prefect of the county and the two local priests, – otherwise, apart from a few journalists, nobody. The entrance to the station was forbidden. In the commune some 300 Romanians were waiting for the train to arrive and when it was to arrive, they passed jumping over the barrier and filling the platform.

Cold reception. A few words from the prefect, a few reply words from the Archduke and no acclamation, no „eljen”⁶. When the train starts moving again, the 300 or so Romanians burst into loud cheers, repeated by those left outside the station, along the rail. Archduke Franz Ferdinand stops for a moment on the wagon stairs, then gets on without making a gesture, turns to the assistance, greets coldly – *and doesn’t say a word*.

However, the Romanians needed a word of approval, a word of comfort and encouraging. And then I created in the office the legend that I destroy now: then I published in the newspaper the words he did not say, which, however, he *could have said*, which *he should have said*: „Das sind meine braven Rumänen”. – „These are my brave Romanians.”

*

No, neither this Habsburg nor the other Habsburgs showed any gratitude towards the faithful Romanian people from over the mountains. Only one was at least sincere, the Archduke Albrecht, who responded to the Romanian General Doda⁷, when this one complained that the Romanians were

⁶ *Long live!* in Hungarian.

⁷ *Traian Doda* (1822-1895) – Prominent personality of the Banat of the 19th century, Romanian military career in the Habsburg army, who advanced to the rank of brigadier

oppressed and no one from Vienna wants to come to their aid, – „Macht euch gefährlich” – „Make yourself dangerous!”

Now this is not needed anymore. The Habsburgs belong to the past.

[„Adevărul” (the Truth) , Friday January 9th 1915]

4. 9/22 janvier 1915, Bucarest. Notes d’Alexandru Marghiloman relatives à sa discussion avec le baron Carlo Fasciotti⁸, ministre de l’Italie en Roumanie.

– Fasciotti. Il faut qu’on sache bien que La Roumanie ne peut pas entraîner l’Italie à une action, ainsi qu’on semble le croire ici. – Moi: Le contraire seul peut être vrai. – Fasciotti: Nous ne voulons pas entraîner la Roumanie! – Il aurait voulu infliger un démenti à Lorand⁹, quand il a affirmé que dans trois mois l’Italie marchera. Mais un démenti aurait pu signifier aussi autre chose et il a fallu se taire. Lorand a du fréquenter les républicains, ceux-là sont 7-8 à la Chambre et eux veulent la guerre. Les socialistes Bissolati vont avec le gouvernement. Les socialistes Turatti veulent la neutralité avec des avantages, les autres veulent la tous la paix. Donc, erreur de dire que l’Italie veut la guerre pour la guerre. Nous avons donné aux Français gratis tout ce qu’ils pouvaient souhaiter; en ne les attaquant pas, ils ont pu transporter leurs troupes d’Afrique et faire face en France aux Allemands. Nous sommes prêts, mais nous attendons que les circonstances aient modifié l’équilibre dans lequel sont les adversaires. Aussi en cas d’attaque et d’écrasement de la Serbie, il ne faut pas que la Roumanie bouge, car nous ne la suivrons pas. Il y a un mois, lors de Valievo, nous l’avons déjà dit au gouvernement et j’ai averti Poklevski que je n’engagerai pas le gouvernement roumain à agir.

general of the Common Army and politician, member of the Diet of Hungary. An ardent supporter of the rights of the Romanians, he was sentenced, on September 17, 1888, in Arad, to two years imprisonment and a fine of 2,000 crowns, punishment pardoned by Emperor Franz Joseph. The conviction of Traian Doda provoked a great press campaign in his favour in Romania.

⁸ *Carlo Fasciotti* (1870-1958) – Diplomate italien, remplissant des fonctions diplomatiques à Vienne et Athènes, ministre plénipotentiaire à Bucarest (21 juillet 1911-octobre 1919), à Madrid (novembre 1919-octobre 1922); adversaire de la politique de Mussolini, il a été exclu du corps diplomatique après l’arrivée au pouvoir de ce dernier.

⁹ *Georges Lorand* (14 mai 1860-31 août 1918) homme politique belge et militant wallon, président de la Ligue belge des droits de l’homme.

Au cours de la conversation, Fasciotti m’a dit que l’Italie a absolument besoin Trieste et de l’Istrie; que depuis Dante, ses limites sont Var et le golfe de Quarnero; que les Autrichiens peuvent prendre même une partie de l’Albanie et se faire une autre base militaire maritime; que dans 35 ans ces pays seront devenues slaves et qu’il y a urgence. Le Trentin ne peut être dénationalisé et dans cent ans il sera toujours italien.

L’Italie a ses voies libres, parce que le traité de 1882 est purement défensif et conçu dans le sens de statu-quo: or la guerre tend à choquer le statu-quo, donc caduc. Il avait exposé ce point de vue au Roi Carol, qui l’avait brûlé à Berlin en laissant croire que la Roumanie ne bougerait pas parce que l’Italie „avait déclaré” qu’elle ne bougeait pas. Lors de la déclaration de guerre, l’Italie avait laissé voir qu’elle pourrait à l’occasion se porter au secours de ses alliés „mais qu’aucune proposition m’était venue”.

Moi: Peut-il convenir à l’Italie que la Serbie ait un port sur l’Adriatique? Admet-elle que les Slaves s’installent sur cette mer? – Fasciotti: Ils y sont déjà. A Trieste même, grâce aux Autrichiens, les Serbes submergent les Italiens. Et la Serbie y est aussi par le Monténégro: question d’argent pour se relier. – Résumé: en commençant, prudent, fortement neutraliste; en finissant, anti-autrichien.

[Alexandru Marghiloman, *Note politice (Notes politiques)*, vol. I, 1897-1915, pp. 394-396, Institutul de arte Grafice ”Eminescu”, Bucureşti, 1927, p. 394-396]

5. January – February 1915, Bucharest. Excerpts from the General Vasile Rudeanu¹⁰ relating to his activity in Italy.

Arrived in Rome, I immediately requested an audience with the King¹¹, through the head of the Royal Military House. Forty-eight hours later I was received at Quirinal, just like it happened at my first audience. I began by presenting to the King thanks from our President of the Council for the

¹⁰ Vasile Rudeanu (1871-1965) – General of the artillery, high rank obtained in 1917. He headed the Directorate of Armaments of the Ministry of War and carried out during 1914-1916 several missions abroad (Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Great Britain) for the purchase of armament, ammunition and fighting technique. After entering the war he was a representative of the Romanian High Command to the great French and British headquarters. His memoirs are an important source of information about the situation of Romania during the first world conflagration.

¹¹ Victor Emmanuel III (1869-1947), King of Italy (1900-1946).

approval given to the Italian factories to work for our army. „If the circumstances so require,” the King interrupted, „your orders may be increased to the limit of the possibilities of our industry.” Further on I expressed my deep gratitude for the high decoration that he had been willing to confer me „*Proprio Motu*”¹². Then, in a few words, I showed the gratitude felt by the president of the Council [of Ministers of Romania], Brătianu, finding out that Italy remained unwavering with respect to its foreign policy decisions that I had communicated to him.

„How, the King said, did Mr. Brătianu doubt?”

„No, he didn’t, but he was worried about negotiations that he had found were carried on between the new German ambassador to Rome and His Excellency Baron Sonnino.”

„It wasn’t impossible not to answer,” the King said, “to the German ambassador’s proposals, otherwise we would have compromised our neutrality.”

I continued showing the continuously increasing desire of our President of the Council for Romania to start the war with Italy and his fear that the Entente Powers would not accept to agree with our national demands therefore impeding the simultaneous entry of Italy and Romania, in spite of all the happy and maybe even decisive results that this could have on the war course.

„Our Council President respectfully asks Your Majesty to support the territorial and national claims in London, Paris and Petrograd.”

„I do not think there will be difficulties on the part of England and France,” the King said. As far as Russia is concerned, a satisfactory way of understanding could be found for both countries.”

„However, Your Majesty, we must not despise and waste, for certain political views, the considerable results that the simultaneous entry of Italy and Romania into the fight can have on the fate of the war.”

The King, who was walking along his cabinet, stopped. He stretched out his hand to mine and said: „Come tomorrow afternoon, at five o’clock, at Villa Margareta, have tea with me. I need some clarifications.” I bowed and went back.

The next day, at ten minutes to five, the car in which I was, stopped in front of a high iron gate from a wire fence that closed a large park, inside which we saw a beautiful villa surrounded, outside the façade, by tall trees could be seen. No sentry, no security guards, not the slightest hint that it was a royal residence and that the King was there. [...]

¹² Proprio motu = on his own initiative.

The King, in a corner of the room, sat on a chair and looked at a map in his hand and motioned me to sit on a chair next to him. „*I was just looking at the map,*” the King said, *the influence that the simultaneous entry of Italy and Romania into the war could have on the course of it*”.

I understood that it was about the matter on which he had told me a day before that he wanted some clarifications. It was obvious that the passage of Italy on side of the Entente would constitute for the Central Empires a rather serious event, the Italian borders being the closest to Vienna and Budapest, the Austro-Hungarian High Command would be forced to launch all availabilities against an Italian offensive, aimed at the direction of these vital centers. The Italian offensive will therefore have to fight against a large concentration of enemy forces, adding to this the difficulties of crossing the massif of the Eastern Alps. I recalled in a few words the provisions which, in 1797, General Bonaparte had taken in order to overcome these difficulties and deprive Austria of the Treaty of Campo Formio¹³. Today, the difficulties were increased by the fortifications built in this part. Whatever may be the terrain difficulties and the value of the fortifications, their stopping power necessarily depended, first and foremost, on the number, capability and spirits of the soldiers who would defend them.

The offensive of the Romanian army in Transylvania, threatening as well the two enemy capitals, Budapest and Vienna, will force the Austro-Hungarian High Command to divide its forces, that is to say to reduce the number of troops sent against the Italian offensive and this the more so as an inland manoeuvre in order to face up to the two offensives, Italian and Romanian, was significantly rendered more difficult by the radial line of the Austro-Hungarian transport routes.

On the other hand, knowing the concomitant outbreak of the two offensives, the moral condition of the Austro-Hungarian troops will be weakened, while that of the Italian ones high. Therefore, coming into action together with Italy ensured, from the beginning, the two dominant conditions of a good strategy: weaken the enemy forces and shake their morale, at the same time exalting that of their own troops. The Italian offensive will thus be able to advance much easier. The human sacrifices will be significantly reduced.

Finally, considering on the whole the result of the two concomitant offensives, we could note that the Romanian offensive would extend to the

¹³ It's about the Peace Treaty of Campo Formio, concluded on 18 October 1797, between France and Austria, following the Napoleon Bonaparte's victorious campaign in Italy.

west the Russian left wing and, through the Serbian army, would be connected to the Italian offensive, whose right wing would therefore be covered. The entire enemy Eastern Front will thus be caught in a large semicircle, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea, in which the Italian army would have the important role of surrounding wing and, implicitly, all chances to be the first master on Budapest and Vienna.

If Italy had entered the war on its own, the Austro-Hungarian High Command would have had the opportunity to resist further, thus prolonging the war with all the calamities resulting from it¹⁴. On the contrary, the simultaneous entry of Italy and Romania into the war will most likely make the Austro-Hungarian High Command unable to oppose all at once with sufficient forces at the advance of each of the two offensives, consequently at both of them, because the progress of one will pave the way for the other.

The King had listened intently, and though I had ceased to speak, he continued to check on the map what I had told him about. After a few minutes, he said, *„But what will Bulgaria do? The events of 1913 and the Treaty of Bucharest are not likely to bring it closer to Serbia and Romania. On the other hand, according to the information I have, the efforts made by England and Russia in order to attract Bulgaria into their alliance have so far been void.”*

„Your Majesty, I think Bulgaria has been declared itself neutral, among others, because its army, following the wars of 1912 and 1913, is disorganized, its weapons are partially damaged or lost, ammunitions are insufficient, so for a moment it is incapable of a serious effort. Bulgaria has nowhere from to receive material and humanitarian aid, not having a connection with the Central Empires and a clear political situation with Turkey. Even if, under the influence of Germany, these two countries approached each other and formed an alliance, Turkey, confined in Asia Minor with the Russians and the English, and at the Dardanelles with the English and the French, would not be able to give an important support; besides this, behind Bulgaria there

¹⁴ The future proved that the assessments were correct. The Russian General Iuri N. Danilov, in his work *La Russie dans la guerre mondiale* (Russia in the World War) (1914-1917) [Paris, 1927, pp. 404-406], writes: „Not being able to take action than only after a month from the signing of the London treaty, Russia was forced to fall back a lot in Galicia, and the Italian offensive was stopped from the beginning by Isonzo, without the Austrians could take from the Russian front more than two or three divisions; it took the rest from before Serbia and Romania, where they were replaced by German troops. All the cooperation projects between Russia and Italy against Austria-Hungary had no result.” (a. n.).

is Greece, bound by the 1913 treaty to intervene if Bulgaria were to move. Greece can be easily helped by the Franco-English. I therefore consider, Your Majesty, that in the current situation of the war Bulgaria will maintain its neutrality. As for the desire of England and Russia to attract it on their part, it is possible that it will be realized by itself, if Italy and Romania enter all at once the war and the Russian army, passing through Romania, will be able to be at the Danube."

"What are the feelings of the Bulgarian people for Romania?" the King asked. "The Bulgarian people, Your Majesty, were driven by their rulers into hostile feelings against Romania, although in 1877 the Romanian people shed their blood not only for their freedom, but also for that of the Bulgarian people. After 1877, our universities were wide open to Bulgarian students coming to Romania to complete their studies. Our borders allowed to be crossed by Bulgarian peasants coming here to work, along with the Romanian ones, our fertile lands on the left shore of the Danube and thus to gain better means of subsistence. During the period of the political turmoils of 1885-1892¹⁵ Romania stood by Bulgaria. However, after the installation of Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg on the Bulgarian throne, the attitude of the Bulgarian state towards the Romanian one became increasingly cold and even unfriendly. [...]"

It had been running more than an hour since the audience was lasting; it had only been interrupted for a few minutes when the lackey had served the tea. Outside it was getting dark. Noticing this, the King stood up and walked to the summer house door that he opened. He went out and motioned me to follow him. He headed for the large entrance gate.

Arriving at few meters away from it, the King stopped. He took my hand and said: *"Communicate to Mr. Brătianu, that even if I were the only one to do so, I will support the claims of Romania, because they represent the justice for a people who has suffered continually from its beginnings and has always been treated unjustly and despoiled."*

Without waiting for a response, he turned and headed quickly inside the park. I stood transfixed. His last words were echoing in my heart. I

¹⁵ Reference to some events that took place in the political life of Bulgaria during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, including: the September 1885 Uprising in Eastern Rumelia organized by the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee, following which this province was united with the Bulgarian principality; the dethronement, on August 21, 1886, of prince Alexander Battemberg and the ascension to the Bulgarian throne, on July 19, 1887, of German Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg (1887-1918).

wish the whole humanity had heard them and remained inscribed in history. [...]

Returning to Rome, I asked for an audience with the Foreign Minister, Sonnino¹⁶. Being received, I started by thanking him for the favorable response he had given to my telegram, regarding the permission for the passage of the weapons destined for our reception commission from the Bardalone factory. I then showed, in brief, what I had shown to the King about the importance for Italy of a concomitant intervention with that of Romania, an intervention which our president of the council had very much at heart and worried that it would not be impeded by the Entente refusal to admit our national claims. [...]. After a few seconds of silence, Sonnino made me understand he would do all that Italy's intangible interests would allow in order to support our national claims. I thanked and retired.

[General Vasile Rudeanu, *Memorii din timpuri de pace și de război, 1884-1929*, [Memoirs from Times of Peace and War, 1884-1929] Edition, introductory study and notes by Dumitru Preda and Vasile Alexandrescu, „Cavallioti” Publishing House, Bucarest, 2004, pp. 84-88]

6. January 25th/February 7th 1915, Bucharest. Nicolae Iorga's article¹⁷ „After half a year in Romania”

The war is still going on. On two huge fronts stay in ranks millions, as it were hidden in the secret underground places, which will give those rheumatics, tuberculosis and madness of the future. From time to time, strains of desperate beast break from the enemy several pits, leaving so many dead on the field that they could fill the pits a hundred times. And the commanders make with bannerets slight map modifications, and the newspapers record

¹⁶ *Sidney Sonnino* (1847-1922) Italian statesman, Minister of Foreign Affairs (5 November 1914-23 June 1919).

¹⁷ *Nicolae Iorga* (1871-1940) one of the great Romanian historians, with an impressive work having with difficulty an equal one. He has published about 1250 volumes and 25.000 articles. He also participated intensely in the political life, founding in 1910, together with A. C. Cuza (1857-1947), the National Democratic Party. He showed himself to be a fervent supporter of Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente, having an overwhelming role during the years 1916-1918. After the war, beside his scientific activity, he also continued his political activity, being prime minister (April 1931-June 1932). He was assassinated by legionaries on the night of November 26/27, 1940.

the success or hide the loss. However – even in countries such as Germany, where the state begins to collect and distribute food, such as Austria-Hungary, which knows no other victory than that one which pulls the enemy from one corner of the conquered provinces – the general state of minds is good. No one would swear, for sure, that victory is two steps away, and that the map of Europe will be changed according to the naive hopes of the first moment. But there is health and there is vigour at those places. No sign of that fatigue that our theories had to predict within a short time.

For the moment, in our country the army is entire. We live without weighing our bit of bread. We go out for a walk on spring days without receiving from the delicate blue sky that gift of pain and death spread by airplanes. We do not torment at night in the shake of cannons. We do not mourn for anyone close to us, snatched all of a sudden by the hasty hand of the wars death. Our youth knows only by hearsay what can mean living six months in the rain, frost and mud, eaten by the disgusting parasites and covered with the most soiled dirt, a real slime worm. The suites of the luxury laziness are on the road and neither in these moments fashion innovations are ignored.

But yet, what a fatigue reigns everywhere in all the circles! There is nothing else than fatigue! Tired, the Government in its heavy calculations, tired, the opposition in its frettings or its intrigues tired, the intellectuals, except perhaps this part of them who travel far and wide in other surroundings, tired, the young people who crossed the capital singing, tired, the listeners of the passionate speeches as well as the other ones who pronounced them; tired, the journalists from both sides!

This derives, someone would say, from the mistake we made not entering the war. If we had entered, *we would have been in the resolute brave and proud state of mind of the others!* [emphasis in original text – o.n.]

But that's not true. If, however, we had entered the war so far, would we not have noticed the same fatigue? I think we would so. Because fatigue does not result from our decisions, but from something else. It results from our procedures, from our method.

A people must accumulate, patiently, for a long time, with diligence and patience, having a purpose, just one, before their eyes. To accumulate everything of all kinds: wealth, military powers, knowledge, energy. To have them handy, held in place by a strong dam, capable of stopping the wastage in vain even of a single small piece. Then at some time or other, here comes

the moment when the whole stream is necessary, which nothing could stop in its way, once the dam, at its time, was opened. A great elementary force has started: it destroys, drowns, drags through the mud, fattens, and, catching the wandering germs in the air, bears fruit.

When this is the procedure, the nation cannot get tired. Waiting, she strains all her powers to stop unnecessary losses. Starting, all the powers are seized by the huge, invincible advance.

But when it is otherwise, when the method is that one of the enthusiastic indiscipline, of the individualism incapable of solidarity, of the party spirit, mortal for the moral unity of the nation, then wandering waters are constantly slipping by, powerless and useless, when the „time” is not yet. And when this moment comes, the weakness of the reserves that have been kept makes the advance impossible.

The first part of this phenomenon already occurred in Romania. May God defend us from occurrence of the second one!

25 January 1915

[N. Iorga, *Războiul Nostru în note zilnice 1914-1916* (Our War in Daily Notes 1914-1916), vol. I, „Ramuri” Craiova, pp. 138-139]

7. January 27th/[February 9th] 1915, Bucharest. Informative note no. 1469 of the General Staff relating to the opinions of the Romanians over the mountains with regard to the Romania future actions.

27 January 1915 no. 1469

**OPINIONS OF THE ROMANIAN CIRCLES FROM TRANSYLVANIA
CONCERNING THE FUTURE ATTITUDE OF ROMANIA**

The rumors spread by the official Hungarian circles and by some Romanian circles, that Romania will remain definitively neutral, or will enter into action with Austria-Hungary against Russia, are discussed in all the circles from Transylvania, especially in that of the intellectual Romanians, easier to be influenced by such rumors. The Romanian peasant stratum either gives credit to these rumors or does not hear them. Their main concern is Romania. They neither want to hear anything else but only „Ours will soon come to liberate us.”

On the other hand, the Romanian cultivated strata discuss these rumors, which have the gift to astonish them, and to make them to lose any

hope. The better relations between Romania and Austria-Hungary, as the Hungarian newspapers write, the statements made by a Romanian politician (senator Argetoianu¹⁸ in Vienna) which were vividly commented by the Hungarian press, as expressing the definitive decision of the responsible circles in Bucharest not to abandon neutrality; letters sent by men from the entourage of Count Tisza¹⁹ to the Metropolitan Bishop of Sibiu; the statements of the bishop Dr. Vasile Hossu²⁰ from Gherla, who says that Tisza informed him that Romania would soon start taking into action against the Russians; the measures taken by the government for a general exchange of garrisons and the countermanding of these measures „because Romania remains neutral” created in Transylvania a feeling of fear and confusion. In addition to these, the action of the Romanian deputy from Bucovina, Dr. Aurel Onciul²¹, who, in mid-January, was in Transylvania, visiting the Romanian leaders (in Sibiu on 15-16 January, the Metropolitan

¹⁸ *Constantin Argetoianu* (1871-1955) doctor, diplomat and a very well-known Romanian politician from the first half of the 20th century. He began his political life in the Conservative Party, and in the spring of 1918 he was one of the founders of the People's League (Party), led by General Alexandru Averescu. He was Finance Minister and later Interior Minister in the second Averescu government, succeeding in decapitating the communist movement. Later, he was active in the National Liberal Party, which he left in order to create a new party, the *Agricultural Union*. He supported the coming of the throne of King Carol II, being for a certain time one of the close to him. He was Minister of Finance in the government led by N. Iorga (April 1931-June 1932), whom he manipulated from behind the scenes. From September 28 to November 24, 1939, he was prime minister. During the war he left the country and settled in Switzerland, but in 1946 he returned to Romania trying to set up a new political party. He was arrested by the communist regime (1950) and died in the prison in Sighet. His extended memoirs are an essential piece for the evolution of the Romanian society at the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century.

¹⁹ *István Tisza de Borosjenő et Szeged* (1861-1918) Magyar politician, Prime Minister of Hungary (1903-1905 and June 10, 1913-June 15, 1917). The most famous events related to his name are: the Hungarian crisis of 1905-1907, the entry of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy into the World War I, during his second mandate as Prime Minister of Transleithania. Assassinated in his villa in Budapest on 31st of October 1918 (*Chrysanthemum Revolution*); warned to flee, he refused saying: *It was bound to happen*. As a politician he supported the maintaining of the Austro-Hungarian dualist system (of the House of Habsburg-Lorraine monarchy), being the representative of the „liberal-conservative consensus”, widespread during that period.

²⁰ *Vasile Hossu* (1866-1916) – Romanian Greek Catholic hierarch. He was bishop first of the Romanian Catholic Eparchy of Lugoj (1903-1912) and later of the Romanian Catholic Eparchy of Gherla (1912-1916).

²¹ *Aurel Onciul* (1964-1921) leader of the Romanians from Bukovina who, in 1918, promoted the project of dividing the province between Ukrainians and Romanians, project invalidated however by the General Congress of Bukovina which unanimously decided on the union with the Kingdom of Romania (November 15/28, 1918).

Bishop Metzian²² and Parthenie Comsa²³, director of “Albina”²⁴, in Dej on Jan. 13, Th. Mihaly), and trying to convince them that the Romanians from Transylvania should follow the example of the Romanians from Bukovina, and hold public meetings, in which to proclaim their firm desire to remain attached to the throne and their mother country. Dr. Aurel Onciul made everywhere an Austro-German propaganda and tried to persuade the Romanian leaders to address to the Romanian government with the request not to leave the neutrality policy. He was, however, refused by Metropolitan Metzianu and by Messrs. Parthenie Cosma and Th. Mihaly.

The large Romanian population was informed about Mr. Onciul's attempts and the answers he received from the leaders, has the definite impression that something is being prepared, and that all the spread rumors are only the sound of a skilful diplomatic game.

[A.N.R., Fund 948, Section III informaton, file no. 546/1915, pp. 78-79]

8. January 28th/February 10th 1915. Alexandru Marghiloman's²⁵ notes following his talk with the Romanian military attaché in Berlin, Lieutenant-Colonel Ludovic Mircescu²⁶.

²² *Ioan Mețianu* (1828-1916) – An Austro-Hungarian cleric of the Romanian Orthodox Church. He studied Theology in Sibiu and was an ally of Metropolitan Andrei Șaguna. From 1875-1898 he was bishop of Arad, and from 1899 until his death he was an orthodox Metropolitan of Transylvania and Hungary.

²³ *Partenie Cosma* (1837-1923), Romanian political leader from Transylvania, deputy in the Diet of Hungary, director of the bank „Albina” (1885-1915) in Sibiu.

²⁴ The bank „Albina” was established in Sibiu in 1871 on the initiative of the teacher Roman Visarion (1833-1885), with the support of other Romanian personalities from Transylvania. It worked until 1948.

²⁵ *Alexandru Marghiloman* (1854-1925) – Romanian politician, one of the leaders of the Conservative Party, its head since 1914. He held many portfolios (justice, public works, agriculture, industry, trade and lands, foreign affairs, home affairs, finance) in various conservative offices. It was in favor of Romania's neutrality with regard to the World War, but favorable to the Central Powers. He was prime minister from March to October 1918, having an important contribution to the union of Bessarabia with Romania.

²⁶ *Ludovic Mircescu* (1872-1930) – He was a graduate of the Higher War School, from 1907 to 1909, head of the commission at the armament factories in Charlottenburg and Berlin (Germany). Between April 1911 and August 1916, he served as a military attaché in Berlin. In this position, he visited the Eastern and Western fronts, which allowed him to send documented information and reports to the country. During the war he carried out important functions – chief of General Staff of the 1st Cavalry Division and commander of the 2nd Rosiori Brigade. As the head of this unit, he fought in the Battle of Oituz, which brought

Colonel Mircescu, our military attaché in Berlin, was for months on the firing line on both fronts. The German army will have 91 corps. The Russian one does not fight, whole battalions surrender. The French infantry does not know how to shoot; the exceptional artillery frightens the Germans. The Emperor²⁷, confident, believes that things have calmed down in Romania: „Mr. Filipescu²⁸ shortened his gallop.”

Mircescu is conscious that he is wrong. He believes that Germany *will demand our participation in the war* [emphasis in the original text – o.n.]; it can bring the peace. Falkenhayn²⁹, when he was war minister, told him that if we did nothing, we would have nothing. When talking about Transylvania, he replied that „we are in a position to dictate in Austria and diplomatically to say what we request.” He reported all these from the first days of November, personally to Mr Brătianu, and does not believe that the necessary steps have been taken.

him the rank of general (September 1, 1917) and the order „Mihai Viteazul” IIIrd class (higher decree no. 1327/11 November 1917). He was a member of the Romanian delegation that negotiated the Armistice (the «Truce») of Focșani with the Central Powers (November 26 / December 9, 1918). After the war, Ludovic Mircescu commanded the local Gendarmerie (1918-1919), the 8th Infantry Division, deployed in Bukovina (1920-1925). Later, he was commander of the Mountain Huntsmen Corps (1925) and the 3rd Army Corps deployed in Bessarabia. From 30 March 1926 to 4 June 1927, he was war minister in the third Averescu cabinet (government). His military career and reputation in posterity were affected by the theft by the Soviet intelligence agencies, through the „Gerda” agent, of the „Plan of mobilization of the Romanian army in 1926”. He was asked to resign from the army, but refused to do it. He died on November 17, 1930.

²⁷ Wilhelm II (January 27, 1859-June 4, 1941), Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia (1888-1918). He was born in Berlin, in the Hohenzollern family, as the son of Frederick III and Victoria Adelaide Mary Louisa – the daughter of Britain’s Queen Victoria – and died in the Netherlands, where he had taken refuge after the implosion of the German empire. During his reign, Germany experienced a great economic, social, cultural and military progress, Wilhelm II desiring the hegemony of Germany. He has a major responsibility in the triggering of the First World War.

²⁸ Nicolae Filipescu (1862-1916) – Romanian politician, one of the outstanding leaders of the Conservative Party. He attended the high school in Geneva and the Sorbonne Law School. Owner of the newspaper „Epoca” (the Epoch). Deputy and mayor of the Capital (1893-1895). Minister of Agriculture, Industry, Commerce and Domains (1900-1901), War Minister (1910-1912), Minister of Agriculture and Domains (1912-1913). He militated vigorously and consistently in favor of the entering the war on the Entente side with the aim of the union of Transylvania with Romania.

²⁹ Erich von Falkenhayn (1861-1922) – German general, Chief of the German Imperial General Staff (September 1914-August 1916). On 29 August 1916, he was appointed commander of the 9th German Army, which was to act on the Romanian front. He commanded this army from September 1916 to May 1917. He later led the Army Group from Asia Minor (1917-1918).

Mircescu's opinion is that in Russia, up to a month, through the movement led by Ludendorff³⁰ in the direction of Stanislaus-Warsaw, he will succeed in driving away the Russians down the Vistula, where the Germans will eventually stand on the defensive. They will ask for our participation. Certainly, the Italians came to an agreement with the Germans, and when Burián³¹ went to the headquarters, of course, Trentino was surrendered; only in January did the Italian military attaché³² make his appearance at the headquarters, although he had been invited for a long time before. The news of agreement was confirmed to him by the head of the Infantry Bureau of the Swiss General Staff. What response should he bring to Berlin? – „I do not go with Russia; but I cannot react in the sense of an action with Germany, unless the requests of Transylvania are granted and Bucovina is given.” – Mircescu believes that all the incoherences he saw in Filipescu are his son's³³ work.

[Alexandru Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 1897-1915, 1927, pp. 399- 400]

9. January 30th/February 12th 1915, Bucharest. Informative note no. 1502 of the General Staff relating to the political, military and economic situation of Bulgaria.

³⁰ *Erich Ludendorff* (1865-1937) – German general. He assisted the field marshal Hindenburg in conducting the operations on the eastern front from 1914-1916, when he achieved great victories. After the entry of Romania into war, the Hindenburg-Ludendorff couple led the operations of the German army on all the fronts.

³¹ *Istvan (Stephan) Burián von Rajecz* (1851-1922) Austro-Hungarian politician, diplomat and statesman, he was born in Stompfa, near Bratislava (Pressburg), in to an ancient Hungarian noble family. He followed a diplomatic career, working on the diplomatic missions of Sofia (1880-1882; 1889-1895) and Athens (1897-1903). Between 1903-1912, he was Finance minister of the dual monarchy, and from 1908 he also served as governor of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In June 1913 he was appointed minister besides the King of Hungary, i.e. the Hungarian minister to the Court of Vienna. On 13 January 1915, he was appointed at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remaining in this position until the middle of December 1916. He returned at the head of this ministry on 15 April 1918, and on 27 October, the same year, he resigned, under the conditions of a visible defeat of the Central Powers.

³² *E. Tellini*, major of artillery, see *Almanach de Gotha*, 1915, pag. 657.

³³ *Grigore N. Filipescu* (1886-1938) Romanian lawyer, engineer, politician and journalist. He was the first of the five children of Nicolae Filipescu and Maria Blaremburg. He was a member of the Conservative-Democratic Party, of the People's Party, and, in 1929, he founded his own *Vlad Ţepeş League*. He was director of the *Epoca* (the *Epoch*) newspaper.

30 January 1915 no. 1502

Copy of the report of the Agent F. sent in Bulgaria

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BULGARIA

The political situation of Bulgaria is beginning to become clearer. The latest event, the 150 million loan contract in Berlin and Vienna, is a proof for the outside world that Bulgaria adhered to the politics of the two Central Powers.

The entire Russophile press protested against Bulgaria's heavy burdens with regard to the new loan. Of course, at the moment, contracting a loan in Germany, which itself is in sore need of money, but especially in Austria-Hungary, is an unusual thing. There is no doubt that in the political calculations of the politicians in Vienna and Berlin, they rely in a great measure on the aid of Bulgaria in the current crisis for making the sacrifice we have talked about.

From the statements of the politicians it will be seen that Bulgaria is on the verge of some events that it is preparing for itself.

In Bulgaria, the proposals of the Triple Entente for the reconstruction of the Balkan Bloc have never been taken seriously. It was very well known in Sofia the Serbian and especially the Greek intransigence. So, across the mind of the Bulgarian current rulers didn't flash nothing than the idea that the reoccupation of Macedonia would not be done without the aid of the Central Powers, especially without Austria-Hungary.

On the other hand, in Bulgaria any hope to reach an agreement with Serbia, so much the less with Greece by way of concessions, was lost from the proclamation of the Serbian heir to the Macedonians that he would grant them political rights.

The only solution left was the military occupation of Serbian Macedonia. But this was not so easy either. Would it have meant an act of hostility against the powers of the Triple Entente?... Hence, the definitive attachment to the fate of the weapons of the Dual Alliance, the war with Greece and maybe also with Romania. The risk was too high and of course it couldn't escape to anyone's understanding. Then it resorted to a collaboration of Italy in the Balkans with the Bulgarians. This is the purpose of Ghenadiev's³⁴ mission in Italy.

³⁴ Nikola Ghenadiev (1868-1923) bulgarian Liberal politician, Foreign Minister in Vasil Radoslavov's coalition cabinet (17 July 1913-21 June 1918).

The minister Apostolov gave me the following explanations in a long talk I had with him, being accompanied by Leapov, chairman of the Macedonian-Andrianople revolutionary committee.

„Mr. Apostolov told me that for internal political reasons, as for external reasons too, Ghenadiev could not enter the last ministerial combination. As a matter of fact, Ghenadiev's re-entry into the Ministry would have meant the beginning of a scandal era on the part of the opposition. On the other hand, Ghenadiev's personality would have been an overly obvious indication against the Triple Entente, but especially against Russia. The Russophobia of our chief is very well known.

„The danger that would result for us from being definitely engaged in one of the belligerent groups determined us to seek support for our aspirations in Italy. When this prospect was presented, we did not hesitate to bring it to fruition. The sought man in this regard was Ghenadiev, only he could, by his talent and authority, render a service to our country, seeking to feel out the situation in order to obtain aid and cooperation, for the achievement of our national ideals. To be clarified precisely about the outcome of the mission, I went with Leapov to Apostolov. During this time the servant brings a telegram from Rome with the following content:

„I am waiting for the arrival of the Italian ministers from the zones affected by the earthquake³⁵. I am sure that your Ghenadiev obtains great things for Bulgaria.” From the government circles as well as from the opposition ones, everyone agrees with the opinions expressed about Ghenadiev's mission in Rome.

Mr. Takev, an opposition leader, told me:

„We thought that the occupation of Valona was definitive on the part of Italy. Not only that, but, to put an end to the Greek and Serbian chicanes concerning Albania, Italy needs our help. We take advantage of these velleities of the Italian government to do our own business in Macedonia. After all, we are not content to do only solidarity actions, sentimental demonstrations with those in Rome. We come with positive things. We promise priority to the Italian products, over all the others in our country, and give our whole aid to the Italian action in Albania”.

The purpose of Ghenadiev's visit in Italy was:

„a) To sound the Italian government on how the government of Rome would consider the possibility of the occupation of Serbian Macedonia and the likelihood of an armed conflict with Greece;

³⁵ On 13 January 1915, the center of Italy was hit by a devastating earthquake in the region of Marsica.

b) Isolation of Greece from Romania through the aid and authority of Italy;

c) To seek the possibility of reaching an agreement with the government of Rome on how to achieve the claims of these two countries.

d) To sound if it is possible the conclusion of a military convention”.

I have information about this program from the prefect of Varna, Pirilincov, a relative of mine – he is Romanian – a program that, he told me, he heard being exposed by the prime minister in a council of the majority in the *Sobranie*³⁶.

From the news received so far from Ghenadiev, the Italian government would have declared, better said – it would have given to the Bulgarian statesman to understand that a prior agreement with Romania would be required when it comes to changing the Balkan balance.

For this reason, there was a drawback in the Bulgarian public opinion. The officious and semi-officious newspapers began to diffuse news about the opportunity of an agreement with Romania. Some parties, like the democratic one, even have as the basis of their foreign policy program a closer friendship with Romania. The truth is, however, that everyone doubts that we will remain impassive to a new disturbance of the Balkan balance. Therefore suspicion and military actions taken on our border.

The intransigent attitude of Greece and Serbia exasperates the Bulgarians. The aim of their current policy is to isolate the Greeks.

General Savoff³⁷ said in a circle where I was too:

³⁶ Name of the Bulgarian Parliament.

³⁷ *Mihail Savov* (1859-1928) – Bulgarian general, one of the most important military personalities of Bulgaria from the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. He participated in the Serbian-Bulgarian war (1885), getting himself noticed in the battles of Slivnitsa and Pirot. On 17 April 1887 he was promoted to major, becoming also adjutant of Knyaz Ferdinand. Under the complicated conditions of Alexander Battenberg's removal from the throne and the bringing of Ferdinand de Coburg into the country, Mihail Savov became Minister of Defence (1891-1894) in the cabinet of Stefan Stambolov, the most powerful man of that moment in Bulgaria. It worked in this capacity until 1894, when the Stambolov government was forced to cede its power, and the following year Stambolov was assassinated. After leaving the government, he resigned from the army, but, in 1897, he was recalled to the active cadres, being promoted to colonel and becoming director of the Military School until 1903. From 1903 to 1908, Mihail Savov was for the second time minister of Defence in the cabinets of that period, being promoted to major-general in 1904. One year later he was promoted to lieutenant general and left the army for the second time, being accused of onerous business in arms procurement. In 1912, in the conditions of the outbreak of the First Balkan War, Savov returned to the army, being appointed assistant (counselor) of

- The crushing of Greece is required for us, one of the two countries must disappear from the Balkans, or become inoffensive". Speaking about the possibility of a war in the Balkans, the former generalissimo of the Bulgarian army said:

- In a war with Romania and Serbia, 50% of the people would hesitate. In a war with Turkey, no one of us would go into a fight. In a war with Greece we would all stand as one man.

*

Ghenadiev's mission is not expected to be fully fulfilled. However, high hopes are anchored on the diplomatic aid of Italy in a eventual European conference. It's not too much, but it's still something.

Marshal von der Goltz Pasha³⁸, in his passage through Bulgaria, declared to the first editor of „Dnewnik”, Damienov, personally repeating to me these statements:

We now want a Serbia within its old limits, inoffensive and crushed; on the contrary, we will work with all our forces to create a great Bulgaria.”

THE MILITARY SITUATION

The state that opposes more obstinately the Bulgarian claims in the Balkans is Greece. As a matter of fact, a Bulgarian hegemony would mean that there is no longer a peaceful life for the other peoples of the Balkan Peninsula. The hostile attitude towards Serbia and Greece was manifested

Tsar Ferdinand. The couple Ferdinand and Mihail Savov is considered by many specialists to be the main responsible for the Second Balkan War. On June 28, 1913, under the command of General Savov, the 4th Army attacked, on the night of June 29/30, 1913, by surprise, the Serbian troops at Bregalnica. At the same time, on the order of the same general, the 2nd Army attacked the Greek troops of the Thessaloniki area on the morning of June 30th. After the conclusion of the conflicts in Balkans, General Savov again left the army, together with other Philo-Austrian generals, being brought to justice. In the following years, Savov lived in France, becoming, after the war, the plenipotentiary minister of his country in France (1920-1923) and in Belgium (1922-1923). He died on 21 July 1928 in Saint-Vallier-de-Thiery and was buried on 18 August 1928 in Sofia.

³⁸ Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz Pasha (12 August 1843-19 April 1916) – Prussian Field Marshal and military historian. He had an important part in the reorganization of the Ottoman army (1883-1895). After the outbreak of the Great War he was governor of Belgium (August-November 1914), then from December 1914 until his death he was in the service of the Ottoman Empire, first counsellor of the sultan, then commander of the 1st Army in Constantinople, from October 1915 commander of the 6th Army. Involved in the Armenian Genocide, he elaborated plans for their deportation.

on all occasions. To the military measures of Greece, Bulgaria responded by taking military measures herself.

From my conversations with Leapov and my friend, Colonel Athanasoff, I could find out the following:

The „Macedonian Revolutionary Committee” organizes 2 legions of volunteers – approximately one division. These volunteers receive the instructions in huntsmen weapons and komitadji, in general. Apart from the weapon – which they must know how to handle well – Mannlicher, Mauser or Martini – they are given 2 bombs. The „Legionnaire” will only use the bomb in 2 cases: when surrounded by the enemy and when he has to attack an enemy position. These two legions were made up of all Macedonians in Bulgaria who do not enter the regular army, for various reasons, such as foreign subjects, exempt etc.

In these legions also enter about 1500 Serbian prisoners, made by the Austrians and who, following the request of the Bulgarian government, being considered as Bulgarians, taken forcibly by the Serbs in the army, were sent to Bulgaria; these legions are also composed of all the former komitadji, all the Macedonian deserters from the Serbian and Greek armies, all the refugees from Serbia, Greece and Turkey, who were able to carry arms. All the Muslims are now entering the ranks of the Bulgarian army. The legions also include Turkish gang chiefs.

The committee proceeds with them just like the state through its agents, with as much authority and much more dreaded than the state itself – they are invited by the branches of the committee, to weekly exercises in an open place. The training is done by the former komitadji, band chiefs or reserve officers.

The purpose of these 2 legions is to serve as a vanguard for the Bulgarian army in the case of an occupation of Macedonia. As soon as the Bulgarian government considers right that it has to start a military action, it will allow the legionaries to unexpectedly occupy certain positions that the regular army needs for its internal operations. The occupation of Serbian Macedonia is also planned through these legions.

In the military circles as well as in the political ones, the possibility of a war with Greece is for sure. Especially the military want it soon. Colonel Athanasoff told me – and I had the confirmation from another part – that two of the best divisions of the Bulgarian army, the first and the 6th, the Sofia Divisions, were sent to the Greek border. The 2 legions of volunteers together with these 2 divisions will have the first clash with the Greek army.

The main attack will take place through the Serbian Macedonia, namely the Vardar Valley. In this direction the Greek border is open. By a sudden attack in several directions, the Bulgarians want to seize Ghevgheli and Doiran. After this act of arms, otherwise safe for the Bulgarians, since it could not be a serious Serbian resistance, the road to Thessaloniki is open, and the army that would operate on this side of Mesta would be endangered by cutting the retreat.

Along our border, on the Rusciuk-Razgrad-Varna line, strong defense works were done. This is to avoid the possibility of a Romanian attack. Four divisions, in the case of a war with Greece, will not be moved away from our border.

With regard to the concentration of reserve officers and non-commissioned officers for a period of academic instruction, as General Savov said, it aims to get everyone used to the new army units, the new rules, and especially to help the government in order it has them at its disposal for any eventuality.

In all his talks, General Savov connects an action of Bulgaria in parallel with the Balkan army of the Austro-Germans, which is operating in Serbia. The hope of the former generalissimo is that Russia will soon be defeated on all fronts and then the right time will be for Bulgaria to take action in order to achieve its national ideals.

In fact, Prime Minister Radoslavoff told me on various occasions: „Without the Austrian victory, Macedonia will never be ours.”

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

The economic situation of Bulgaria is precarious because of the lack of gold which has greatly depreciated the Bulgarian paper currency. Hence the contracting of the loan at any price under onerous conditions of 7½%. The loan will be used for the payment of treasury bills from abroad. Out of 150 million, 75 will be received now, and 75 million from 1 April in bi-monthly rates until 15 June. 40 million from the first amount will be used in the country to save the population from the tyranny of the agio³⁹ that has reached 35%.

[From] the rest of the loan up to 500,000,000, that is 250 million, 100 million were taken at the moment of its contract during the last year, and

³⁹ Agio: the difference between the prices for buying and selling a particular currency; the cost of exchanging one currency for another.

will be used for orders of war material when it will be possible to bring this material in Bulgaria.

Autumn sowing is good throughout Bulgaria. The issue of Macedonian refugees is a big burden for the government. It spends tens of millions annually, which unbalances the state budget.

[A.M.R., Fund 948, Section III informations, file no. 546, 1915, pp. 199-205]

10. February 1st/14th 1915. Excerpts from General Mihail Savov's report addressed to Tsar Ferdinand concerning the situation of Bulgaria and the relations with Romania.

Your Majesty,

The fire that has now conquered almost the whole Europe, is getting closer to our roofs. This circumstance creates a very difficult situation for the motherland. Never perhaps, Bulgaria, since it exists, has not gone through more critical times than those through which it now passes – because the future winner will be the one who will draw the map of the Europe of tomorrow, in which each people, each state, will be rewarded. According to its merits. Many of the states existing on the current map will be deleted, to be replaced with other new ones. This state of things imposes on every conscientious Bulgarian the duty to give his help – no matter how weak it may be – to his Tsar and his government, so that the country can escape, through joint efforts, from this terrible crisis not only untouched, but even achieving its national ideals. Based precisely on these considerations, without paying attention to the situation created by different circles interested between the Tsar and his former collaborator in military tasks, I consider that I would fall short in my duty, as a Bulgarian, if, at this moment, decisive for the country, I didn't expose to the sovereign of Bulgaria my views on that matter in which, thanks to my activity for years, I – saying it with modesty – have experience and competence. At the moment, the attention of the entire Bulgarian public opinion, of all our social factors, is focused on the following issues of a very essential importance.

1. What attitude should Bulgaria have towards the fighting parties – that is, whether it should remain neutral until the end or leave neutrality and adhere to one of these parties.

2. If he has to leave neutrality in order to join one of the parties, then which of them exactly?

3. If we are to join one of the combatant parties, when is the best time to take action?

4. Is the country prepared – considering all it presents today in its internal life, not excepting the army – for such a decisive action; do the state of the army and the internal situation of the country give enough guarantee that such an action will be successfully completed and, if this guarantee is weak, then what measures should be taken to ensure – as far as possible – this success.

1. Neutrality

It must be admitted that the way so far followed by the Tsar and his government has been one of the most compliant. Thanks to this policy, the horizon for the people became clearer, the orientation became more complete and the spirits calmed and conciliated. Any haste in our determination would have very bad repercussions on the internal situation of the country and would give opposite results. However, today situation cannot last endlessly. The same mass, which now feels so satisfied with neutrality, at the end of the war will rush, with the greatest fury, upon the government, if Bulgaria leaves it dissatisfied. It would be naive to assume that others will fight – so they will expose themselves to the greatest sacrifices in humans and money and ruin their own territories – to create a good state to Bulgaria remained neutral, which, alone, first of all, must take care of itself, taking upon itself a part of the common sacrifices. Under the influence of this fact, it is obvious that one day we will have to come out of neutrality; but the question is when and with whom to go.

2. Which side to go when we get out of neutrality?

This is a very delicate matter and it is difficult to do an absolute estimation of it without knowing certain elements, which belong exclusively to the field of the General Staff policy. In any case, based on certain data, a theoretical analysis is possible – which will allow us to reach conclusions close to reality.

There are two starting points for its reasonable solution:

a) if we put the question of our determination depending on which of the two parties will win;

b) and, if we put the question of our determination in dependence on it, in which case the independence and the achievement of our national ideals will be better guaranteed – when does the Entente or the Alliance⁴⁰ win?

A. In the first case, it should be noted that, in a war, events are of decisive importance and that, under the influence of an unforeseen circumstance, sometimes the best thought out plan can give negative results. Therefore, it is not possible to predict in advance, with absolute conviction, which of the two fighting parties will win. There is, however, a criterion, based on experience, by means of which it's possible, with an accuracy very close to reality, to come to the truth. For this purpose, it will be necessary to thoroughly study all those elements whose totality constitutes what in the military language is called the fighting energy of the combatant parties or their capacity for a long battle. This circumstance has been of great importance for all the wars so far; for the general European war of today and for the future wars, it will have however an almost absolute importance – because, compared to the colossal armies that the combatants bring out today on the battlefield, supplied in addition with all those means that the contemporary technique puts the disposal of the strategy, decisive blows – which, by their effectiveness, quickly put the enemy in the situation of recognizing their inability to prolong the struggle and, as such, to demand peace, as it was during the Napoleonic⁴¹ era, in 1870/71, and in our Balkan war – at present are almost impossible.

Today, thanks to the two factors mentioned previously (increase of the armies to unbelievable proportions and improvement of the technique), the field battles have turned into the position struggle. Today, each point in the enemy's positions is transformed into a separate fortress, the conquest of which is accomplished with colossal sacrifices and only after a long battle (for a week and more) takes place, around that point, according to all the rules of the fortress battle. As such, it takes a long time for driving the enemy out of his position and the conquest of this position by those who attack – as we can see it occurs in the Polish and French battle theaters.

⁴⁰ The term „Entente” (Understanding) refers to the Triple Entente, and the term „Alliance” refers to the Triple Alliance or the Central Powers.

⁴¹ Napoleon III (1808-1873) – The nephew of Emperor Napoleon I, elected president of the Republic in 1848, organized a coup d'état on 2 December 1851 and proclaimed the Second Empire which collapsed in September 1870, following the defeat in the war with Prussia.

The enemy has not yet finished leaving his first position, and here are his troops occupying, very close, a new position, fortified in good time, for whose conquest will be necessary a new long battle, colossal sacrifices – as we see happening in Poland. It is evident, therefore, that the present great war is reduced to the conquest of a series of fortified and reinforced positions by all the most modern means offered by the contemporary military technique – for which purpose, colossal sacrifices and long time are needed. Instead of the previous quick movements towards second-level goals in order to reach the main goal, today we see slow movements towards them. Instead of the previous decisive blows, blows felt at the most sensitive point of the enemy's disposition, thanks to which, often, a significant part of his army was put in the impossibility to continue the fight (Ulm and Austerlitz – 1805, Sedan and Metz – 1870, Lozengrad, Seliolu and Liule-Burgas (1912), we see today that tactical attacks are used, aimed, at the same time, at several points in the enemy disposition, whose conquest causes enormous damages to the enemy, however insignificant in comparison with the ones caused before – by the loss, for example, of his communications, by the complete encirclement of his entire army (Ulm – 1805) or of a part of it (Metz and Sedan – 1870). The previous conditions in which the war was taking place allowed a quick joining of one of the combatant parties. Today's conditions in which the general European war is taking place do not allow such a quick joining, because there are no flanks for the strategic fronts of the fighters – they are either relying on the seashores, whose domination is assured, or on neutral shores. As such, any operations aimed against the enemy's flanks and communications (with the most effective means for weakening him quickly) are excluded. All actions are reduced today to partial frontal attacks, in strong fortified and well-armed positions, whose conquest is achieved after a great and very long battle. This fact is sufficient to establish that, in the current war, the productive part of the strategy is reduced to a minimum and that, under the influence of this important circumstance, the leader is deprived of that all-powerful means with whose help – by an artistic manoeuvre with a decisive blow, directed to the heart of the enemy – to destroy and put him in the situation of demanding peace – that is to defeat him. This victory, today, will be achieved only by slow actions, by a slow exhaustion of the combatant parties – the result of which will be that, of the two combatants, the one will have the priority which has the highest fighting energy, the highest capacity for a long time waging war.

Generally, this capacity of a country is measured:

a) according to the improvement of its military system – in the sense in which her army disposes of inexhaustible reserves of trained men and the organization of the permanent cadres is established so as to allow the widest deployment of the army – without, however, diminishing its fighting power according to the demands of the circumstances of the war;

b) according to the degree of development of its industries – military and other ones – which are necessary for the maintenance of the army – in the sense to which a certain state is capable, with its factories, to provide quickly, during the war, the lost and destroyed cannons, howitzers, guns, shells, bullets and other war materials as well as sanitary materials, clothing etc.;

c) according to the degree of its good economic status – in the following sense: the situation of finances – as a means for a prolonged war, the situation of the horse herds, horned cattle and foodstuffs – as a means for sustaining a long time the needs of the army and of the population, from this point of view;

d) according to the spirit of the population – in the following sense: as the opportunity of the main idea pursued by the war is deeply penetrated in the spirit of the large masses and to the extent that its temperament will allow it to endure, for a long time, with a firm spirit, all those heavy trials which the war will impose upon it.

All these data, in detail for each of the combatant parties, must be at the disposal of our General Staff, which is responsible for drawing up a report to the Council of Ministers, by which to determine the long-term fighting capacity for each of the parties and, as such, to decide, as accurately as possible, on which side the victory will be. This report should serve as a basis on which the government, to a certain degree, should guide its policy. If the General Staff didn't possess the information in question, then the military attachés were the ones who, according to the instructions of the ministry of war, had to obtain them so far; and if, until now, they have not been presented, then it is already late to do it; in any case, however, there is official military statistical information for each of the combatant parties in the issues mentioned in the four previous points and a thorough study of this statistical information will convince us that the Alliance of the Central Powers has a greater capacity to prolong the fight and, therefore, based on the above mentioned researches on the character of the current war, it will have more chances to win.

B. If we have to guide our politics on the consideration when the independence and the achievement of our national ideals will be better guaranteed – when the Entente or the Alliance wins, in this case it must be taken into account that, in the Bulgarian public opinion, there are two currents: one – that the domination of the Dardanelles by the Russians does not endanger our independence; the other – that this domination will put an end to it. The first ones base their point of view on the fact that England and France – especially England, with respect to its special interests in the Mediterranean – will, in no way, allow Russia to dispose in an absolute way of the fate of the Balkan states. This conclusion has been true so far; but, at this moment, when, without any exaggeration, it can be said that the fate of France and England is exclusively dependent on Russia, the situation must be considered as changed. It would be exaggerated to admit that Russian diplomacy would not be aware of this situation, in order to ensure guarantees from the part of its allies for a secure domination of the Dardanelles – security which cannot exist if it (Russia) does not get its hands on some of the Balkan states, especially those through whose territories and rivers pass the maritime and land routes for Constantinople and Dardanelles. My personal opinion is that, from a military point of view, a secure domination of Constantinople and Dardanelles cannot be imagined without the Balkans. The presence of Russians in Constantinople and Dardanelles as rulers is incompatible with the existence of an independent Bulgaria. This consideration finds its confirmation, up to a certain point, in the wars that Byzantium always carried with us when we tried to extend towards the South of the Balkans and in those obstacles and difficulties that Russian diplomacy always created us when we tried to come to the south of these Balkans, in Thrace (the case of the union with Eastern Rumelia⁴² and the question of Adrianople⁴³ in the last war). On the other hand, the Alliance aims to preserve the political existence of Turkey, ensuring all the economic advantages (advantages, which until now, all the great powers enjoyed) only for themselves. A too strong Turkey in Europe cannot enter into the Alliance calculations, because, in this case, there is a less guarantee that this

⁴² Autonomous Bulgarian province in the south of the Balkans created in 1878 by the decision of the Peace Congress of Berlin put under the administration of a Christian governor. The Eastern Rumelia was united with Bulgaria led by Prince Alexander Battenberg in August 1885, provoking major political complications in the area.

⁴³ Adrianople, the old capital of the Ottoman Empire, had been conquered by the Bulgarians in March 1913.

Turkey would not try to escape that economic influence imposed on it by the Alliance after the war. Therefore, our existence (it goes without saying, under certain political conditions), as well as our strengthening as a neighboring power to Turkey, sufficient to counterbalance it, in such a case, must fully enter into the Alliance's political calculations. The conclusion, from the analysis of these two starting points, is that *our superior interests send us to the Alliance*. [emphasis in the original text – o.n]

3. When we must go into action

Going into action must be preceded by our determination – from which following a political agreement with a military convention. This is necessary in order to give the strategy sufficient time to work out its plans for achieving those political goals that the agreement aims at, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, especially with respect to our situation, for giving sufficient time to the Ministry of War to procure, with the help of this political agreement, from the depots of our allies, those war materials that we are missing and which, in today's circumstances, by the fact that the whole Europe is in war, we cannot get. This procurement must be done in such a calculating way that, until the moment of our mobilization, all that we have to bring from outside be gathered up, stored and packed up, ready to be loaded, in a certain railway station near the Danube, in order to, immediately after the opening of the road, either through Serbia, or through Romania, right in the period of our mobilization, be sent to Bulgaria. As for the moment when we must take action, the following three situations should be considered in principle:

1) The mobilization, as far as possible, should not be too early – that is to say, be done in such a calculating way so that the people, as far as possible, taking also into account the military operations, don't stay for a long time "under the flag" because the psychical features of our nation are such that they do not allow soldiers to be kept in the army for a long time.

2) The mobilization should not be done during the harvest or in a period close to it, because three quarters of the number of those mobilized are agriculture workers – which, in this case, will go without pleasure in the ranks of the army and still even more without pleasure. They will fight, because their minds, their souls, will be wholly attracted by what happens to their field. This circumstance, no matter how insignificant it may seem, must be considered with a serious attention, as it will serve as one of the main causes in demoralizing the army.

3) The mobilization should not be too late – that is, not to be done later than the moment when the general situation of the theaters of operations (especially for us, the situation of some of them) is of a strategic nature – so that, through our late entry into action, not to have the necessary time for a strategic situation allowing us to achieve the politics goals or, if we achieve them, not to do it with too many sacrifices.

From the point of view of the Bulgarian military-political interests, the moment for our entry into action is closely linked to solving the Romanian question and to starting the decisive operations against Serbia; in fact, it is under the exclusive influence of these two issues. **Romania, due to its geographical situation, is destined to play a significant role in the current European conflict** [our emphasis]. It is located in the flank of the strategic front of both combatant parties on the Eastern operation theatre. Through it passes the shortest and most appropriate line of operations of the Russian army towards Constantinople and the Dardanelles. If the Russian army manages to occupy this strategic area, the most important in the current military-political situation, with sufficient forces, whatever this occupation will be voluntary – as a result of an agreement with Romania – or by force, then, immediately, the strategic situation of this army, from very improper, as it is now, will turn into a very proper one, because:

a) In this case, the Russian army, reinforced with the Romanian one, will penetrate through the Carpathians in Transylvania, encircling and falling behind the Austrian troops operating in the Carpathians and Galicia.

b) The Russo-Romanian troops entered in this way in Transylvania will join hands with the Serbian army, then the common efforts of these united armies will be directed towards Budapest, behind the Austrian disposition, operation in which the Austrian army, in order to avoid a catastrophe, will be forced to step back – which will also entail the retreat of the Germans.

c) The presence of Russian army corps in Romania and at the Danube will have a decisive influence on the policy of Bulgaria and, thus, also on the ability of Turkey to continue the fight. Knowing what our internal situation is, we can affirm, without any exaggeration, that the arrival of the Russian army corps at the Danube will directly result in a decisive turn in our policy. From a state currently more inclined towards the countries of the Central Alliance, we will be forced to become an ally of Russia. Our army, reinforced with one or two Russian corps, on the order of Russia, will be directed towards Constantinople, whose domination will put an end to the Turkish resistance too.

So, by their well-timed entry into Romania, the Russians succeed in occupying Hungary, Galicia, in cleaning up Poland, occupying a part of Silesia too, and breaking down the Turkish resistance – in other words: they manage to create a strategic situation that definitely ensure the victory on their side, if, of course, they have sufficient troops for this action – after leaving the necessary number for stopping and fixing the Germans and Austrians in Poland, Galicia and the Carpathians.

This is the significance of Romania for the Russians. The strategy of the allies can not fail to appreciate this significance of Romania and, as a result, not to take the appropriate effective measures, without which a serious strategic preparation of the allies – ensuring them a complete victory in the campaign they are preparing for spring – is impossible; under the influence of the same causes, any operation against Serbia is impossible too. The need for an immediate put in application of these measures will become even more evident when we will have in view the fact that, in this case, the diplomacy will be completely powerless to give the minimum aid to the strategy as, thanks to the colossal strategic importance of Romania for the end of the war, she, Romania, even though we admit that she will keep her neutrality honestly until the end, is not able to guarantee it against a possible force to which the Russian strategy will proceed – if she is given time for it and if she disposes of sufficient forces.

In order to paralyse this eventuality, the allies must concentrate considerable forces in Hungary, from which one party should remain to oversee Romania and the other one (more significant) to undertake a diversion through Lemberg, Tarnopol and Chernivtsi, to Kiev, in order to clean up Galicia of Russians, to force them to retreat from Vistula and Bessarabia – if there are concentrated troops there or if the concentration of significant troops began in the latter one – and, in this way, moving the Russians from Romania, to force the latter one to enter into action with the Alliance against the Entente; if this does not happen, then they will force its territory and, through violence, determine it going with them. Satisfying our interests, in the largest sense of the word, dictates us to take an armed part in order to force Romania to decide – by mobilizing, of course, at that moment. But unfortunately, at the most important moment for the full attainment of a part of our mentioned ideals (occupation of the whole Dobrudja), because of the two lost years, unrecoverably, for the new organization of our army, we will not be able to participate – because, for such a circumstance, we

will have to return, at the same time, on three fronts (with a strong army against Greece, with a weaker one against Serbia and, with a third, powerful enough, against Romania) and, for such a return, given the causes I mentioned above, our army is not capable, so, without wanting it, we will have to renounce the cooperation in an action against Romania, even with the risk that our claims on Dobrudja should not be fully satisfied and let others do it by themselves.

When, in one way or another, the issue of Romania concerning the above mentioned operations in Galicia and Carpathians, will be resolved; when it will be forced to decide and it will do it, then the general situation of the entire Austro-German battle theater will become strategically mature for starting the decisive operations against Serbia. Now it's the period when the mobilization of our army – whose entry into action must follow immediately after the first decisive battle against the Serbs – must begin. This opinion is based on the following considerations: if the action of the Entente (the Russians) in the Carpathians and Romania does not succeed, then, as well with the purpose of ensuring the success of the operations that its armies will undertake on the theaters of the East and the West, it will be important if Serbia attracts as many Austrian and German forces as possible. Therefore, the main idea of the Serbian operative plan, taking into account the needs of the main theater (Russia and France), should be this: with regard to a superior enemy, instead of a stubborn resistance (which, in a short time, could weaken and definitely disorganize the army), slowly, a continuous retreat (without significant fightings) in Macedonia, in order to bring the army there untouched and willing to join the Greek army, in which case, both these united armies will be able, for some time, to stop and fix for themselves the Austro-German offensive forces in Serbia and will constitute a serious obstacle to an action from our part in Macedonia, whose occupation, in this case, will require long time and great sacrifices and this, without being able, with our military operations, to bring at least a small service, a small improvement, to the general strategic situation of the allies. The question is totally different if, at the bottom of our action plan, the main idea that we put is not to allow the achievement of the union between the Greek and Serbian armies.

If we enter into action after the first decisive battle between the Austro-German united forces and the Serbian army, when the latter one begins its retreat, and we direct part of our army (the weaker one) to Niš and with the other (the stronger one) we get into Macedonia, this idea will be

fully effected, because, by operating in this way, we will enter as a wedge between the Serbian and Greek armies which will not allow their union to be realized – not to mention that, through our operations towards Niš, we will help the full encirclement of the Serbian army, its rapid and complete destruction, and as such, the rapid liberation of a significant part of the Austro-German forces operating against Serbia, to be used on time, as required, either on the Eastern or the West theater, circumstance which, on its part, is very likely to help further create a strategic situation for the Allies to ensure their victory.

The Greek army, isolated from the Serb one, will hardly decide to enter alone into war against us; but, even if it decides it, the probability of defeating it will be much higher; as such, in this case, the achievement, by means of our strategy, of the purpose set by the politics, the occupation of Macedonia, has the most chances – and still quickly, without great difficulties and without great sacrifices. This is why I affirm that, from a strategic point of view, the most appropriate moment for our army's entry into action is when the Serbian army, after the first decisive battle, begins its retreat to Niš – but before it had been arrived in this important strategic point.

Your Majesty's loyal subject, (ss) Lieutenant General Savov
Sofia, 1 February 1915

[Arch. M.A.E., fund 71-1914, E-1, Sofia 1914-1924, vol. 58, pp. 1-38]

11. February 6th/19th 1915, Berlin. Letter of Alexandru Beldiman⁴⁴, Romanian minister in Germany, addressed to the Prime minister Ion I.C. Brătianu, reproaching with the government and some diplomats' conduct of the government and of certain diplomats.

Personal letter addressed to Mr. Prime Minister Ion I. C. Brătianu, Bucharest

Secret, Berlin, 6/19 Febr. 1915

Dear friend,

Nothing could confirm more firmly all my concerns about our internal situation, dominated by the Franco-Russian action, than the fact that the

⁴⁴ *Alexandru A. Beldiman* (1855-1924) – Romanian diplomat, Minister of Romania in Berlin for two decades (18/30 January 1896-15/28 August 1916).

Prime Minister of the country is forced to avoid a meeting with me, which could cause „dangerous consequences.” It seems to me the more serious so as I suppose you know me well enough – (if I don’t indulge in illusions in this regard) – so that to be convinced that I am not in a position to create difficulties for you through unreasonable words, knowing well how tense the situation is at us. So, for the moment, I only have to make the following findings:

In Paris, my colleague Lahovary⁴⁵ has the right to attend, together with all the staff of the legation, a noisy demonstration, in which Diamandy⁴⁶ and Dr. Ion Cantacuzino⁴⁷ proclaimed Romania’s holy war against Germany. („Le Temps” of 11 January). Under the first impression, the German Government wanted to instruct v[on] d[em] Bussche⁴⁸ to ask you, how this provocative attitude of our official representative would be in line with the statements of neutrality of the Romanian Government. We intervened in time to prevent such explanations, showing that the direct contact between you and Al. Lahovary should probably have been interrupted for a long time, since he had moved to Bordeaux. There was therefore no more serious political consequence to that incident; and Bussche received only the order, that, on the occasion and during any conversation – without making a proper request – he communicated to you what Venizelos⁴⁹ had done in an analogous case.

⁴⁵ *Alexandru Em. Lahovari* (1855-1950) – Born in Paris, he had a long diplomatic career, being accredited in several European capitals – Saint Petersburg, Rome (1893-1899, 1917-1928), Constantinople (1902-1906), Vienna (1906-1908), Paris (1908-1917).

⁴⁶ *George Diamandy* (1867-1917) – Writer and socialist activist. He acted in France, Belgium, Switzerland. In 1899 he switched to the Liberals („betrayal of the generous”). He was president of the Romanian Writers’ Society (1914-1916) and director of the National Theater in Bucharest (1914-1915). In 1917, he founded the Labor Party together with other politicians, being an advocate of the Bolshevik revolution. He died on a ship at sea, on his way to Britain.

⁴⁷ *Dr. Ioan Cantacuzino* (1863-1934) – Famous Romanian doctor, founder of the Romanian school of immunology and experimental pathology. Member of the Romanian Academy since 1925. He led the campaigns for fighting against cholera outbreak (1913) and exanthematic typhus (1916-1917).

⁴⁸ *Hilmar von dem Bussche (Busche)-Haddenhausen* (1867-1939) – Baron, Germany’s diplomatic representative in Romania since September 1914 till August 1916. His status was Minister in extraordinary mission, then, since 1915, plenipotentiary minister.

⁴⁹ *Eleftherios Venizelos* (full name Elefthérios Kyriákou Venizélos) (1864-1936) – One of the most important Greek leaders, considered by some as the «maker of modern Greece». He held the position of Prime Minister many times between 1910-1920 and 1928-1932.

Afterwards Lahovary attends a rally against Germany at the Sorbonne, where Istrati⁵⁰ spoke in the name of Romania („Le Temps” from 13 February). Deschanel⁵¹ proclaims with the approval of the official representative of the country: „Et la brillante Roumanie, notre fille, dont les destins sont désormais liés aux nôtres et à ceux de nos alliés” ...At the same meeting were pronounced by the unofficial, of course, representative of Spain, Blasco Ibanez⁵², rude insults against the German emperor, like these ones: „... les exploits d’un Attila ou d’un Gengis Khan, dignes prédécesseurs du fou qui peut aujourd’hui se parer sans dispute du titre „d’ennemi du genre humain”... Cet homme périra fatalement comme ont péri tous ceux qui devinrent un danger pour la tranquillité humaine...”

The Romania’s military attaché in Paris⁵³ announces through *The Figaro* of 5 February the inevitable defeat of Germany: „...logiquement, inéluctablement bouchée, insolée, vraiment seule – car l’Autriche à l’heure présente ne compte déjà plus – l’Allemagne doit succomber!”

In Bucharest, a royal aide-de-camp, a teacher at a war high school, distributes among the officers expositions periodically worked by him on the military situation in order to show that Germany and Austria-Hungary have no chance to succeed and that Romania must by all means go into action against these powers. Our alliance with the Central Powers is considered at us far less than in Italy, where it is still recognized as being in force and even invoked by the Government of Rome, as I showed in one of my previous letters. Two members of your Government have an attitude openly hostile

⁵⁰ *Constantin I. Istrati* (1850-1918) – Chemist and physicist, member of the Romanian Academy since 1899 and its president (1913-1916). He was the general commissary of the General Exhibition of 1906. He was several times minister – of Public Works (1899-1900); of Cults and Instruction (9 January-7 July 1900); of Agriculture, Industry, Commerce and Domains (26 February-7 July 1907); of Industry and Commerce (11 December 1916 – 10 July 1917).

⁵¹ *Paul Deschanel* (1855-1922) – French politician, he had several parliamentary mandates, also serving as president of the Assembly of Deputies. He was the 11th president of France in 1920-1921.

⁵² *Vicente Blasco Ibanez* (1867-1928) – Spanish writer, journalist and politician, one of the most important novelists of the Spanish literature.

⁵³ The Romania’s military attaché in France (April 1911– July 1917) was Colonel Dumitru C. Soutzo (1870-1943) who had graduated the Piraeus Military School (1892, Greece), the Superior War College of Paris and the Cavalry School of Saumur (both from 1892-1899). He was the head of the cabinet of Alexandru Averescu, when he served as Minister of War (1907-1909), military attaché in France (1911-1917; 1920-1922), commander of the 3rd cavalry Regiment (1917-1918).

to Germany, plotting with Franco-Russian legions and pushing the things so far that they cause to the country enormous damages by stopping the export and import exchange with Germany. But under their protection, a consortium operates, which notoriously speculates with no shame on this situation, so that the attitude of excellent patriots is also very profitable.

About all these it is being said here as about things known in the circles of the Government, as well as in the financial world, indicating also the current taxes according to the value of the wagon. Although, with regard to me personally, it can be observed a retention, I still feel and see how the country's prestige has decreased as a result of that organized and unsettled speculation. The ambassador von Tschirschky⁵⁴ in Vienna, meeting me recently – (I have old friendly relations with him since he was Secretary of State at the Foreign Department) – he told me that he was scared of everything he learned about the speculations used in Bucharest under the eyes of the Government. On the other hand, stopping the transit of war material for Turkey under the fallacious pretense of neutrality – (in two recent Turkish wars, the one with Italy, as well with Bulgaria, we did not stop this transit) – alienated sympathies from the leading military circles, which we were enjoying and where it has been found with disappointment that Romania's neutrality has become malicious towards Germany.

Now, after using myself in my vain endeavours to support the politics, which I was justified to look upon as being yours, I have become a kind of dangerous man whose presence only in the country can cause complications. In such conditions I have to ask myself, what is the sense of my role as a representative of the Government and of the country in Berlin? On the day when I would be called to justify in public with deeds and acts my entire action here since the outbreak of war – and I hope this day will come – I will be able to look straight in the face of all those who today cavil about me, suspecting my patriotism, while they fill their bags by means of all kinds of shameful operations.

Jagow⁵⁵ sent me a letter, on which I informed you on Jan. 30/Febr. 12; the exposition of the entire policy of Germany regarding Romania concludes

⁵⁴ *Heinrich Leonhard von Tschirschky und Bögendorff* (1858-1916) – German diplomat, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1906-1907) and ambassador to Vienna (1907-1916) till his death survened on 15 November 1916.

⁵⁵ *Gottlieb von Jagow* (1863-1935) – German diplomat, Foreign Minister of his country from 1913 to 1916. According to some researches (Friedrich Katz, American historian of Austrian origin), he was the main artisan of a war between the USA and Mexico, which in the end provoked the entry of Americans into the First World War.

that the Imperial Government not only sincerely wishes, but considers even as a political necessity for Romania to emerge from the European war so strengthened from the political, military, economic and territorial point of view, that to maintain its position and to continue its great mission in the Lower Danube. To this purpose, the German Government reiterates its proposal, made since the outbreak of the war, to guarantee the completion of Moldova from 1812, of course provided that Romania fulfills its ally duties at a time when its co-operation will still have a real value.

As soon as I receive Burián's analogous letter, I will send both documents, the original text and the translation of it, through the courier of the German cabinet. I don't indulge in illusions that these acts could have any practical influence. Otherwise, they contain nothing new and establish, only at a time when it was not too late yet, the real situation and the responsibilities. I was intimately given to understand that a border rectification in Bukovina, especially with regard to Suceava, would not be excluded.

Best regards from your „dangerous” friend.

(s:) A. Beldiman

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Casa Regală (Royal House Fund), file 19/1915, pp. 1-4]

12. 12/25 février 1915, Bucarest. Notes d'Alexandru Marghiloman relatives à sa conversation avec Hilmar von dem Bussche, ministre allemand à Bucarest, et son audience au roi Ferdinand.

Von Bussche, modéré en ce qui regarde la réception faite à Pau⁵⁶. Se plaint que Costinescu⁵⁷ retient, malgré engagement contraire, le cuivre qui vient pour eux de Bulgarie: les Allemands seront obligés de démonter les cuivres de Belgique et de la France du Nord; que le gouvernement le sache.

⁵⁶ *Paul-Marie César Gerald Pau* (1848-1932) – Officier français ayant participé à la guerre franco-prussienne (1870-1871). En 1903, il fut promu général et en 1911, il entra dans la réserve. Au début de la guerre, il fut rappelé aux cadres actifs, recevant le commandement de l'armée de l'Alsace. Après les premières semaines de la guerre, sans obtenir des succès particuliers, il ne reçut plus le commandement de grandes unités. En janvier 1916, il fut envoyé en Russie en tant que représentant français auprès de la Stavka.

⁵⁷ *Emil Costinescu* (1844-1921) – Membre marquant du Parti national libéral, un des fondateurs de la Banque nationale de Roumanie. Il a occupé le poste de ministre des Finances à cinq reprises, la dernière fois dans le cabinet conduit par Ion I. C. Brătianu (1914-1916). Pendant les années de guerre, il fit partie du gouvernement d'union nationale, en tant que ministre Secrétaire d'État (1916-1917).

– Djavid Bey⁵⁸ vient me voir; il part le soir pour Wien et Berlin. Très intelligent. Il ne compte que comme démonstration sur l'attaque Suez; il y a pourtant 150.000 Syriens. La presse française a été inondée par l'or anglais. Lors de l'emprunt turc, Djavid lui a donné 3 millions. Toute le monde a pris, sauf Jaurès⁵⁹, Clemenceau⁶⁰ et l'„Echo de Paris”!

– Audience royale. De 5 ½ à 7h. Causons de Pau. Il a essayé de parler politique et le Roi lui a répondu: „*je veillerai à ce que à la fin (ou vers la fi?) mon pays s'en tire avec avantage*”. – Sur la guerre: Comment se fait-il (à propos de la seconde défaite mazurienne) que les Russes aillent mettre de nouveau le pied dans le trou ou ils sont tombés une fois? – Pau: Il y a des fatalités!

Je parle de finances et de tout ce que je sais de l'incroyable opération des bons de trésor, et j'attire l'attention du Roi sur le trop grand intérêt qu'un Ministre pareil a, à ce que la guerre efface, dans son incendie, les traces. – Le Roi dit: Vous avez raison. (En commençant j'avais prononcé tranquillement ces mots: les pirateries de Mr. Costinescu). J'expose ensuite que Take Ionescu⁶¹ a dit à Lexis Catargi⁶², partant pour Paris, qu'il était en-

⁵⁸ *Mehmet Cavit Bey* ou *Mehmed Djavid Bey* (1875-1926) – Économiste, journaliste, homme politique de premier plan, diplomate pendant la dernière partie de l'existence de l'Empire ottoman, membre du Comité de l'Union et du Progrès, ministre des Finances (1909-1914) ; il démissionna après le raid de la flotte ottomane orchestré sur la Mer Noire dans les ports russes, le 29 octobre 1914. Il reprit ses fonctions en Février 1917. Après la guerre, il représenta l'Empire ottoman lors des négociations financières à Londres et à Berlin. Inculpé d'implication dans la tentative d'assassinat à Izmir contre Mustafa Kemal Pacha, il fut condamné à mort et exécuté par pendaison le 26 août 1926.

⁵⁹ *Jean Jaurès* (1859-1914) – Journaliste, historien et homme politique socialiste français, fondateur et rédacteur en chef du journal *L'Humanité*, partisan renommé du pacifisme, s'opposant au déclenchement de la Grande Guerre, il fut assassiné le 31 juillet 1914.

⁶⁰ *Georges Clemenceau* (1841-1929) – Journaliste et homme politique français de premier rang, Premier ministre (25 octobre 1906-20 juillet 1909 et 16 novembre 1917-18 janvier 1920), contribution majeure à la victoire du mois de novembre 1918. Avec le président des États-Unis, W. Wilson, il fut le principal artisan de la Conférence de paix de Paris (1919).

⁶¹ *Take Ionescu* (1858-1922) – Avocat et politicien conservateur. Il commença sa carrière politique au sein du Parti National Libéral, puis adhéra au Parti Conservateur, étant en contact avec le groupe junimiste. En 1908, il fonda le Parti démocratique conservateur. Ministre dans plusieurs cabinets conservateurs. Il fut un fervent adepte de l'entrée de la Roumanie dans la guerre aux côtés des pays de l'Entente. Il accepta de joindre le gouvernement aux côtés du Parti national libéral, occupant le poste de ministre sans portefeuille (décembre 1916-juillet 1917) et vice-président du Conseil des Ministres (juillet 1917-janvier 1918). Après la guerre, il fut ministre des Affaires étrangères au sein du cabinet Al. Averescu (1920-1921), pendant un mois (décembre 1921-janvier 1922), Premier ministre. Il fut l'un des initiateurs de la Petite Entente, l'alliance diplomatique et militaire conclue entre la Roumanie, la Tchécoslovaquie et la Yougoslavie.

⁶² *Alexis Catargi(u)* (1871-1917) – Compositeur doué, auteur du premier opéra roumain „Les Noces tragiques”. Diplomate (conseiller de légation) qui, pendant la guerre, a pu-

tendu en tout avec Bratiano, que Filipescu affirme avoir de Bratianu l’assurance que pour 15 mars on entrerait en campagne; qu’au 4-e corps les chefs préviennent les officiers qu’on part d’une minute à l’autre; que les canons de Nămolosa ont été pris sans le consentement de l’État-Major, etc.

Est-ce une simple attitude pour donner le change? – Le Roi: Je crois que oui. – A moins que ce soit une tactique savante pour amener la Couronna à l’alternative de déclarer la guerre, ou... – „Ou, quoi?”, fait le Roi vivement en fronçant le sourcil, comme s’il y avait un souvenir des propos sur l’abdication du Cabinet, ce qui découvrirait V.M.” – Le Roi me remercie. – Le Roi: Ce serait folie de faire la guerre en ce moment, et puis, soyons francs, ou attaquerait-on? en Transylvanie? pour avoir les Bulgares dans le dos et les Allemands de Bucovine dans le flanc? – Nous parlons de Bucovine et du Trentin qu’on semble avoir passé sous le nez des Italiens et ensuite retiré. „Si l’Italie marche, dit le Roi, ce sera fatal que nous marcherons”.

Le Roi adopte une formule sage du Mitică Moruzi⁶³: Il faut que le paysan sache que le Roi s’occupe de la question nationale (Est-ce allusion au passé?), et il marchera alors n’importe où on leur demandera: „une chose vraie” cette formule.

Le Roi a trouvé que Bussche à juste titre était nerveux de ce qu’on avait mis de drapeaux dans les rues pour Pau. La police en est responsable.

Le Roi a interdit à la Cour d’accepter l’invitation à dîner de Take pour Pau et qui avait eu le... culot (le geste signifiait bien cela) d’inviter tout le monde. On a prétexté le deuil⁶⁴.

Au sujet du journal qui veut fonder Carp⁶⁵:

blié des articles dans la presse anglaise, soutenant les droits de la Roumanie à l’égard des conationaux de la monarchie dualiste.

⁶³ *Dimitrie Moruzi* surnommé „Cneazul” (le Prince) a été, à plusieurs reprises, préfet de la Police de la capitale.

⁶⁴ Le deuil de six mois pour le roi Carol I décédé le 27 septembre/10 octobre 1914.

⁶⁵ *Petre P. Carp* (1837, Iași-19 juin 1919, Țibănești, départ. Iași) – Homme politique roumain, membre marquant du Parti conservateur. Il étudia au «*französische Gymnasium*» (le lycée français) de Berlin (1850). En 1858, il obtint son baccalauréat puis s’inscrivit à la Faculté de droit et de sciences politiques de l’Université de Bonn. En 1862, il revint à Iași, contribuant à la fondation de la société «*Junimea*» (au printemps de l’année 1864). Il participa activement au renvoi du prince régnant Alexandru Ioan Cuza qui était à la tête de Roumanie. Le 11 février 1866, il fut nommé secrétaire intime de la Lieutenance princière, puis secrétaire de l’Agence diplomatique de Roumanie à Paris (mai 1867 – juillet 1867). Il fut élu à plusieurs reprises député et sénateur au Parlement roumain. Il remplit des fonctions politiques dans les gouvernements succédés à la tête du pays après le départ du souverain Cuza (ministre des Affaires étrangères, ministre des Cultes et de l’Instruction Publique, ministre de l’Agriculture, de l’Industrie, du Commerce et des Domaines, ministre des Finances), étant élu à deux reprises président du Conseil des Ministres. Il travailla dans la

Mr. Carp a bien le droit d'avoir son journal, comme Take Ionescu a le sien. Le Roi approuve (sans que j'en aie parlé), que j'ai épargné Costinescu; il y a "des choses qu'il faut avaler".

[Alexandru Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, vol. I, 1897-1915, p. 403-407]

13. February 12th/25th 1915, Bucharest. C. G. Costa-Foru's⁶⁶ article published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth): „If the tsar of Russia wanted...!”, relating to the eventuality of the handover of Bessarabia to Romania by the Russian Empire.

Could it be that no human mind has been able to see and propose the means, that one the most certain and decisive from all, to conquer the alliance of Romania? Do they not see there that what has separated us from Russia for 30 years and separates us today too is the Bessarabian issue? Do they not feel that the heart of Romania could be conquered by handing back that province inhabited by her brothers?

The Russians don't really understand that for a patch of land, they, the largest country on the Earth's surface, waste time – that is, blood and money – while, by handing back to us this patch, they would have us as allies, advancing together with them and forming a front that, on the left, would connect with the Serbian army, thus encircling the common enemy in a pincer of iron and fire, from which he could not escape? Why does Russia

diplomatie roumaine en remplissant les fonctions d'agent diplomatique à Vienne et à Berlin (mars 1871-avril 1873) et plus tard à Rome (avril-octobre 1873). Entre novembre 1882 et octobre 1884, il fut nommé envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire de Roumanie à Vienne. Après la fusion en 1907 de tous les éléments politiques conservateurs de Roumanie, il fut élu président du Parti conservateur (21 avril 1907-14 mai 1913). Pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale, il fut l'un des partisans de l'idée de l'entrée de la Roumanie en guerre aux côtés des Puissances centrales. Il fut premier ministre de la Roumanie à deux reprises (19 juillet 1900-27 février 1901 et 14 janvier 1911-10 avril 1912) de la partie du Parti Conservateur. Il fut marié avec Sevestia Cantacuzino, la fille de Ion Cantacuzino et ils eurent une fille, Elisabeta, n.1874, – ultérieurement mariée avec le capitaine Alexandru D. Sturdza (né le 23 mai 1869, mort le 28 septembre 1939, Zurich), avec lequel elle était cousine germaine – et quatre fils (Petre, Nicolae, Ion, Grigore).

⁶⁶ *Constantin Gheorghe Costa-Foru* (1856-1935) – Romanian journalist, lawyer and human rights activist. He was the son of Gheorghe Costa-Foru (1820-1876), the first rector of the University of Bucharest (1864), minister of Foreign Affairs in the Conservative government (1871-1873).

hesitate to make a sacrifice, insignificant for her, which is otherwise required by the holy justice?

In our country, there are many enlightened minds, righteous hearts and broad political spirits who admit without any difficulty that, by handing back to Bulgaria the territory of the Southern Dobrudja (Cadrilater), we will build on this handing back a lasting friendship in the future and a very precious alliance, at present; are there really no leaders in Russia who could think in the same manner?

Do they not know that Bessarabia is inhabited by two million Romanians and that their Russification hurt us? Do they not realize that handing back this territory, broken from the mother country, would win us all, without exception, and would determine us to take up arms immediately and to step heroically in order to make our nation beyond the Carpathians whole?

But the restitution of this territory would have an incalculable significance on the fate of the war and on the composition of the European map, after the end of the war.

The more Germany prepared itself well on the Western and Eastern front, the more it never thought of preparing itself against the southern blows. That's her vulnerable part.

The entry of Romania into action would bring the war on this front, where the road to Berlin is wide open. The Romanians, entering Transylvania, would signal the uprising of all the subjugated peoples, and the Italians would not wait for the complete collapse of the dualist empire to start in their turn. In a vertiginous élan Italians, Serbs, Romanians and Russians would advance through Pesta and Vienna to the German border. Then the Kaizer's excessive pride would kneel, and peace would be immediately concluded.

The German people, liberated from militarism, kaiserism and everything that today puts into chains their prosperity and dulls their minds, would work to heal their wounds, using the benefits of a untroubled peace in the future.

Then, all the nations, finally understanding the madness of the war, will take the necessary precautions that in future there should no longer be wars. The millions of arms held until now unproductive in barracks will be rendered to useful work, the billions hitherto immobilized for armaments will be put into circulation, and the mankind come to reason after the bloodiest war of all until now, would enter a new era of work and progress, an era of happiness that will eventually succeed in erasing the memory of the horrible scourge.

That, after all, peace will be concluded in this way, I have no doubt. The point is that a circumstance of nature to shorten the duration of the war is not overlooked and it is absolutely certain that the entry into action of Romania would have decisive consequences.

For Russia, the handing back of Bessarabia to the Romanians is only a small matter of self-esteem as it is for us the restitution of the Cadrilater (Southern Dobrudja) to the Bulgarians.

If Russia were to give the good example, handing back Bessarabia to the Romanians, we would hand back to the Bulgarians the Cadrilater, the Serbs and the Greeks would also make the necessary sacrifices, as a matter of fact widely rewarded. Italy would make up its mind and in a few weeks the Turks would be expelled from Constantinople and the Allied armies would impose the peace in Berlin. And when we think that they only depend on a generous move of the Tsar of Russia, whether or not prompted by the advice of a good man, our thoughts involuntarily go towards Mr. Poklewsky's trip to Petrograd and, on the other hand, to the face had by some of our responsible factors, if, by the miracle, the desire here expressed turns into reality tomorrow and if, while they make efforts to combine through what means they determine us to go with Austria-Germany, they would see themselves compelled – yes, yes really compelled – to go against them.

C. G. Costa-Foru

[„Adevărul” (the Truth), 12 February 1915]

14. February 18th/March 3rd 1915, Sibiu. Note of the Imperial Royal Military Command, General Staff section, addressed to the register office of the Austro-Hungarian Imperial-Royal General Staff on the constitution of the „Transylvanian Legion” in Bucharest, under the leadership of Octavian Goga.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ *Octavian Goga* (1881-1938) – Poet, prose writer and politician. One of the founders of the magazine „Luceafărul” (1902) and secretary of „Astra” from 1904. Leader of the „steeled young men” of the Romanian National Party in Transylvania, gathered around the newspaper „Tribuna”. In 1912 he was arrested by the Hungarian authorities for its press articles. The outbreak of the war found him in Paris, from where he returned to Romania. He constantly ruled for Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente. In the autumn of 1916 he was incorporated into an infantry regiment, and later worked in the editorial office of the newspaper „Romania”, led by Mihail Sadoveanu. After the war, he worked in the People's Party, led by Alexandru Averescu, as vice-president. He was the Minister of Cults and Arts (1920-1921) in the second Averescu government and Minister of the Interior

Imperial Royal Military Command from Sibiu, General Staff Section
To the Register office⁶⁸ of the Imperial Royal General Staff from Sibiu
Sibiu, 3rd March 1915

On the Transylvanian Legion

The „Transylvanian Legion”⁶⁹ was established at the end of the last month under the auspices of the Romanian national poet, Octavian Goga, originally from Rășinari, near Sibiu, and fled to Romania. From a political point of view, it is close to the „Cultural League”, and from a military point of view it must be considered as something intermediate between an association of fighters and a group of volunteers.

During the first two months of this year, the legion carried out an intense propaganda; among others things, a large banquet was organized in Bucharest, at which propaganda was made for entering the Legion. While in the middle of January, the Legion had, as it was said, barely 1000 members, it now counts 5,000, according to newspaper reports. However, according to confidential information, this figure is exaggerated and the number of members would not currently exceed 4,000.

The president of the Legion is I. Soitu from Cărpiniș, vice-president Dumitru Hașeganu, secretary V. Sabin, cashier Dumitru Seseleanu. The agitation is made especially by conferences held for example by Goga, under the title „The path of our suffering”, etc., and then by the weekly magazine „Ardealul”, an obscure paper.

A service connection with the leadership of the Romanian army exists, without doubt, and in case of war against the Monarchy, the Legion is destined to solve special tasks that demand the exact knowledge of the places. At present, however, its members mind quietly their civilian profession and must participate only in certain military exercises. In particular, shooting exercises

(1926-1927) in the third Averescu government. He leaves the People's Party and lays the foundations of the National Agrarian Party (1932), which, in 1935, merges with the League of National-Christian Defense, forming the National-Christian Party. He supported the plans of King Carol II to establish an authoritarian monarchical regime. He was President of the Council of Ministers from 28 December 1937 to 10 February 1938.

⁶⁸ Name of the intelligence services of the Austro-Hungarian Army.

⁶⁹ The Transylvanian Legion was established on February 1st, 1915. The press body was the newspaper „Ardealul”, which appeared as a weekly newspaper between October 20th, 1914 and August 26th, 1915. From May 31st, 1915, the subtitle „organ of the Transylvanian Legion” is replaced by „Organ of Romanians from abroad”. The newspaper „Ardeleanul” appeared from October 1915.

are practiced. As far as it is said, the members must be without exception originating from Transylvania, but it seems that Romanians subjects, wanting to be self-important at a moderate price, participate too. Upon entering the Legion, the members must take a kind of oath or covenant, namely that they will obey the officers indicated to them by the Romanian government. A fund-raising has been initiated in order to procure a flag of the Legion.

In addition to the Legion, there is a committee responsible for the control of those Transylvanians living in Romania who do not want to join the Legion. Due to this control, it is possible that, in the last time, particular difficulties will be created to our confidants, especially those traveling to Russia.

Chief of the Imperial Royal General Staff

Lassy, Lt. colonel, manu propria

For the authenticity of the copy: Kieler, Captain

[Published in 1918 *la Români. Desăvîșirea unității național-statale a poporului român. Documente externe. (1918 at the Romanians. Accomplishment of the Romanian People's National State Unity. External Documents 1879-1916*, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1983, vol. I, pp. 569-571, doc. no. 149; further it will be mentioned as 1918 *la Români...*]

15. March 4th/17th 1915, Bucharest. Alexandru Averescu's⁷⁰ notes relating to the content of the talk with Stanislaw Poklewski-Koziell, Russian minister in Bucharest.

⁷⁰ *Alexandru Averescu* (1859-1938) – One of the most important military leaders of Romania. In the years 1879-1881 he attended the divisional school for non-commissioned officers at Dealu Monastery, which he graduated as valedictorian. Due to the need for military personnel the authorities of that time, under a special law, granted the rank of second lieutenant to the graduates of this school. For two years (1884-1886) he attended the courses of the Superior War School in Turin, with very good results. He held important positions in the army – commander of the Higher War School (1894-1896), military attaché in Berlin (1896-1898). He commanded the 4th Rosiori Regiment and the 1st Rosiori Brigade. He was advanced brigadier general, on May 10th, 1906, division general in April 1912, and army corps general in January 1917. In 1907-1908 he was War minister, and during 1911-1913, chief of the General Staff. He commanded the 1st Army Corps (1914-1916), and after the entry into the war, the 2nd Army (1916-1918), in front of which he obtained the great victory at Mărăști (11/24 July – 19 July/1 August, 1917). He was three times Prime Minister of Romania (29 January/11 February-5/18 March 1918; 13 March 1920 – 17 December 1921; 30 March 1926-4 June 1927). In 1918 he founded a new political party – the People's League, which became, in 1920, the People's Party. On June 14th, 1930, he was advanced to the rank of marshal. (Details in Petre Otu, *Mareșalul Alexandru Averescu. Militarul, omul politic, legenda* [Marshal Alexandru Averescu. Soldier, Political Leader, Legend], Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005).

Last night I had lunch with the Minister of Russia, Poklewski Koziell, at Mrs. Elena Soutzo, the wife of our military attaché in Paris. We were four people; so an atmosphere completely intimate.

The Russian Minister Poklewski is a perfect society man in the sense of the Russian mentality.

Exuberant, a bit noisy and slipping slightly on the slope of indiscretion. All this because of the quickness with which the Russians engage themselves on the way of the intimacy as soon as they come in contact with a person interesting them.

In fact, very kind, diplomat with views as wide and clear as possible, extremely kind to us. He expressed, without any reservation, not only the desire that we take action, but even, in some way, the impatience. On the one hand, he was sure that we would do it—the question was when – and on the other hand, he asked me different questions to find out something positive with this regard.

He attaches great importance to the action in the Dardanelles. I told him that, as far as we are concerned, I did not see any political, economic or military importance for the moment.

He asked for my opinion on this important enterprise. I replied that I did not have the necessary elements to give out a judgement I suppose, however, that the English [sic!], who of course know exactly the true state of affairs, have not engaged in such a serious matter for them, without being sure that they will be able to bring it to an end.

Poklewski is of the opinion that it will end soon, in about three weeks and that the result will have a decisive effect in the Balkans.

As far as we were concerned, I maintained my opinion; I did not deny, however, that if the Allies brought significant land forces to Turkey and if these ones, becoming available, after the entry in Constantinople, were targeted not only in the Balkans, but even throughout the war theater.

He told me that this would have been planned already, because the Allies had forces on the western front that were far superior to local needs and that, instead forcing the German front, it would be preferred a southward turning. His opinion is that the port of Cattaro can be chosen as the basis for these operations.

[Marshal Alexandru Averescu, *Notițe zilnice din război 1914-1916. Neutralitatea* (Daily Notes From the War 1914-1916. Neutrality), pp. 65-66].

16. 18 mars 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme du comte Ottokar Czernin⁷¹, ministre austro-hongrois à Bucarest, adressé au baron Burián, l'informant sur l'opposition du roi Ferdinand au transit de matériels de guerre vers la Turquie.

Le Comte Ottokar Czernin au Baron Burián

Télégramme

Bucarest, le 18 mars 1915

Au courant d'un long entretien que j'eus avec le Roi à propos du transit des munitions pour la Turquie je dus constater que Sa Majesté refuse carrément et oppose une fin de non recevoir à toutes nos propositions à ce sujet. Pendant une bonne heure j'essayais de le convaincre, mais rien n'y fit. Le Roi insista sur ce que l'orage que provoquerait la découverte d'une pareille tentative tournerait contre lui personnellement et qu'à son regret il était dans l'impossibilité de seconder nos vues. Il me semble que l'obstacle vient encore plus de la personne du roi que de M. Bratiano.

Jamais encore nos chances dans cette question n'ont été aussi mauvaises et j'ai perdu tout espoir que notre désir pourrait être réalisé.

[Documents diplomatiques concernant les rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Roumanie, 22 Juillet 1914-27 Août 1916, ... p. 17]

17. March 6th/19th 1915, Bucharest. Notes of General Alexandru Averescu following his talk with Nicolae Filipescu relating to the prospects of the Romania entry into the war on the side of the Entente.

But we can't tell when. This point of the whole matter is shrouded in mystery, it seems for all. Two days before, when I saw the Russian Minister, I also saw Mișu⁷², our minister in London. He promised me he would try

⁷¹ *Ottokar Czernin*, nom complet *Ottokar Theobald Otto Maria Czernin* (1872-1932) – Depuis le 20 novembre/3 décembre 1913 jusqu'au 14/27 août 1916, il a été ministre austro-hongrois à Bucarest. Ultérieurement, du 23 décembre 1916 jusqu'au 14 avril 1918, il a été ministre des Affaires étrangères de la double monarchie. Pour détails voir Sorin Cristescu, *Misiunea contelui Czernin în România* [La mission du comte Czernin en Roumanie], Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2016.

⁷² *Nicolae Mișu* (1858-1924) – Romanian diplomat with studies in Germany and France. He was Minister of Romania in Sofia, Vienna, Constantinople and London (1912-

to see me before I left, but didn't see him anymore. He also seemed to me to have a mysterious and impenetrable air. Did he know something? Or because he was not oriented, did he consider such an air as befits the circumstance?

Anyhow, Filipescu told me that, from reliable information, he knew that the Russians would operate towards Hungary, to deprive the Austro-Germans of this country's harvest. It follows that they will have to rule over the regions they want to conquer, at the end of June at the latest.

So for us, the question arises that at the end of June we should be on Tisa. I consider necessary at least two months for this operation, without taking into account any serious opposition on the part of the Hungarians. We should therefore start the mobilization at the end of April at the latest. But if we run against opposition, what is more and more likely, then, of course, we will leave Transylvania later than the harvesting season.

I told Filipescu that one of the important points would be to make immediate contact with the Russian General Staff. Our operations need to be regulated in time and orientation, as a direction, according to theirs. They may possibly require a change in our transportation and concentration projects, which cannot be done from day to day.

[Marshal Alexandru Averescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-67]

18. March 13th/26th 1915, Bucharest. Article entitled „Sufferings of the Bukovina inhabitants”, published in the newspaper „Universul” (the Universe).

It is beyond any doubt that the current war brought disaster on the land of Bukovina and on our Bukovinian brothers, who suffered both from the Austrians and from the Russians⁷³.

It is known that through the newspaper „Înainte” (*Forward*) an investigation was proposed relating to the horrors committed by the Russians

1919). He served as Foreign Minister in the government chaired by General Arthur Văitoianu (15 October-30 November 1919), when he signed the peace Treaty of Saint-Germain with Austria.

⁷³ All the italic underlines are in the original text.

during their occupation, and that the Vienna government made known through a statement of the Bucharest legation that it received the proposed investigation.

We now receive the result of this inquiry through our correspondent in Chernivtsi. We repeat that it is beyond any doubt that the Bukovinian Romanians suffered bitterly during the two Russian occupations. As, however, no representative of the Romanian press took part in this investigation, to show once again the impartiality of our newspaper, we publish the following regarding the horrors committed by the Cossacks:

„We visited the districts of Gura Humorului and Câmpulung, we went up to near Chernivtsi, in Storojineț, we went through numerous Romanian villages and market towns, where, until a few months before, you could see a flourishing life and today, mourning and desert.

It is unimaginable what the Russians did in Bukovina during a period of almost four weeks as they had ruled it. With a cruelty and a bestiality beyond compare, they destroyed everything they encountered in their way. Public buildings, local authorities, Romanian schools, all destroyed and devastated. In the courts of Gura Humorului and Câmpulung the files with the documents of the trials were destroyed.

The property titles of all the Romanian peasants, the so-called land registers, which were kept there, were destroyed. The offices of the *Orthodox religious fund* were destroyed by the Russian orthodox believers, who regaled at their will on the church's wealth.

The estates, farms and castles of the Romanian leaders *Dr. Iancu Flondor*⁷⁴ from Storozhynets, *Baron Vasilco*⁷⁵ from Berhomet, *Baron*

⁷⁴ *Iancu Flondor* (1865-1924) – Descendant of an old boyar (aristocrat) family, who held dignities and had estates in Bukovina. He was born on August 16th, 1865 in Storozhynets, in the family of the boyar Gheorghe, knight of Flondor (1828-1892). In the years 80s of the 19th century, he was actively involved in the political life of Bukovina. He was member of the Romanian National Party, as a representative of the young generation. In the autumn of 1898, Iancu Flondor was elected in the Diet of Bukovina, and, after a series of disputes with his opponents, he resigned. He returned to the head of the National Party in 1909, but left the political life the following year because of a series of disputes with his opponents. At the beginning of the war, Iancu Flondor hoped that the Romanian kingdom would join the Powers of the Entente in order to liberate Bukovina, acting also in this regard, which caused him inconveniences on the part of the Austrian authorities. At the end of 1918 he had an important contribution to the unification of Bukovina, leading for a while the destinies of this province too. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the completed country, he retired to Storozhynets, where he also died. National funeral was organized for him.

⁷⁵ It is about the castle of the Vasilco family, built by Baron Iordachi Vasilco (or Vasilko) of Serecki (1795-1861) and become a residence for the descendants, respectively for

Alexandru Hurmuzachi, Marshal of Bukovina, from Ropcea, *Ion Bălășescu* from Slobozia-Comărești, *Ruxandra Pan*, from the village Panca, today they are changed in ruins. Buildings of great value were devastated, set on fire and turned into cattle stables.

Everywhere the wretched people suffered terribly. Everything that could be squeezed from the poor peasants was squeezed as in a press: cattle, flour, maize, beans, corn, wheat, household items, clothes, carts, precious objects, watches, money, everything that could be found, the poor peasants were plundered of all.

Today, Romanian householders are starving to death. Lacking money and food, they implore us, with tears in their eyes, crossing themselves and kneeling, to have mercy on them and to insist „in the country” to send them corn, because they starve to death. Starving to death, there is no exaggeration here, if, within the shortest possible time, the Bukovinian population, exhausted by lack of food after the retreat of the Russians, is not effectively helped.

I have seen in many villages Romanian houses and households set on fire and ruined. In Storozhynets, for example, the peasant *Simion Lesniuc* together with his 7 children escaped the anger of the Russian soldiers with nothing else but only with their clothes on them. The house was burned down and destroyed. The wretch lived with his little children now, on this winter weather, in the cellar of his former home, which fortunately for him escaped unharmed.

The widow *Casandra Nicolaiciuc*, also from Storozhynets, whose husband met his death on the warfield, remained shelterless. The Russians set on fire her house and the shed with agricultural machinery. They were not touched neither by her misfortune, nor by the tears and supplications of the 5 children remained orphaned and starved to death. Also, *Ioan Marinovici's* house and all his property were set on fire.

Dr. Samuil Isopescul, a venerable old man, dean of the lawyers in Suceava county, escaped the city from the provoked fire, falling on his knees before the Russian commander. But the soldiers beaten their young girls: one of them, a student, the other one a teacher.

The windows of the church fund were destroyed and damaged. It will run out months before they could be restored. Hundreds of Romanian workers were fed at these windows.

Alexander (1811-1893) and his sons: Gheorghe (1864-1940), Ștefan (1869-1933), Alexandru (1871-1920), Victor (1872-1934).

In Gura Humorului, many houses were devastated and destroyed. The Romanian forest administrator *Arcadie Procopovici* saw his entire house destroyed as well as his property. Likewise, the residence of the director of the Romanian vocational school in Câmpulung was completely devastated as well as the residences of the Romanian doctors, Dracinschi and Dr Mălinaș, and of the professor Moroșan. From the residence of the director of the high school in Câmpulung, the Russians made a stable for their horses. The peasants report that the Russian soldiers behaved with an Asian cruelty towards them.

A few examples from thousands of cases. The farmer *George Monor* from Brăești was hit so violently with a whip on his cheek that his skin cracked. The Romanian mayor of the Humor Monastery was slapped by Russian patrols because he hadn't give them a drink. The widow *Elena Hutu* from Stulpicani, 75 years old, was stripped naked by Russian soldiers and beaten to give them money. The Romanian farmer *Costan Arseni* from Câmpulung had two ribs broken as a result of beatings. The student *Pompe*, they wanted to kill him. After falling on his knees, they spared his life, but he was transfixed with a spear. *The museum next to the Gura Humorului gymnasium was devastated. The Russian soldiers, seeing some snakes preserved in alcohol, pulled the snakes out and drank the alcohol.*

In order to end this brief look at the horrors occurred in Bukovina, we had also to make space for the horrible, unnamed bestialities committed by Russian soldiers on Romanian women and young girls. There are thousands of cases of outrageous rapes! These people had nothing sacred. No honor, no wealth, no life, everything was profaned. In the commune B., being hosted by the parish priest D. P., after they had been hospitably received, they asked the priest's wife, threatening her with a shotgun in the chest, to put at their disposal women and girls to satisfy their lusts. Several Cossacks, entering the house of the farmer *Axenti Belei*, after they had been hospitably received, jumped on his wife and violated her by turns. The poor peasant, running to save his wife, was cruelly beaten, tied and obliged to watch how the Russians were raping his wife.

Dr. Radu, knight of Grigorcea, told us that he was at the door of his house, when eight armed Cossacks dragged a poor girl after them. They took her to a nearby devastated house and violated her. A Cossack was

guarding the door by turns, and at the doctor's protests they pushed him around. The woman *Catinca Camian* was violated by 7 Cossacks. Vasilie Niculiac's wife Varvara, was raped by 2 Cossacks. Two daughters of *Retter*, a merchant from Storozhynets, were deflowered and violated by several Cossacks. They killed their father, because he had tried to save his young daughters, and they cut their mother's teats. The Cossacks tried to violate the sisters *Elena* and *Maria Antoniac* and *Elisabeta Grumeza*. The first two escaped thanks to the intervention of the neighbors and of their brother. But the Cossacks took revenge on *Elisabeta Grumeza*, who was shot dead at the window. The girl *Maria Negura* was raped by 2 Cossacks. The woman F.N. from G. was violated in front of her husband, immobilized by them with a revolver on his chest. Nine Cossacks violated M. S. a woman from B., others five a woman from S., whose husband was at war.

The widow H. from G. together with her young daughters were raped by several Russian soldiers in the same room, so the mother had to assist at their rape by the Cossacks, and the daughters at the sexual abuse of their mother! Several Cossacks fell upon the householder R. from G., locked him in a closet and raped his wife.

In the commune V. and the city C., where a part of the Russian cavalry spent several days, the rapes are countless.

The Russians brought with them venereal diseases, infecting the unhappy mothers and daughters in Bukovina. In only one day at the pharmacy in Gura Humorului were presented 20 soldiers, requesting medicines for "bodily diseases".

I exposed above some of the thousands, tens of thousands of odious acts committed by the Russians in Bukovina. Their memory is so terrible for the population from there, so that, if the Bukovinians knew that the Cossacks could return to their parts, they told us, they would leave everything they had there as property, even the graves of their ancestors, and they would run in all directions. They implore us to open the borders and help them, in this eventuality, to come to the country.

Until then, the people of Bukovina are starving to death, and we consider that a humanity duty, if not the blood relation that unites us, must determine us to help them. Let's help them, let's help them urgently!

[„Universul" (the Universe), 13 March 1915]

19. 3/16 avril 1915, Bucarest. Rapport de Van Ypersele de Strihou⁷⁶, ministre plénipotentiaire de Belgique à Bucarest, transmis à J. Davignon⁷⁷, auquel il annexe un rapport de l'attaché militaire de France à Bucarest, le capitaine Jules Pichon⁷⁸, relatif à la situation de l'armée roumaine.

Ypersele de Strihou, J. Davignon, Jules Pichon,

Légation de Belgique

No. 241/60

1 Annexe

Monsieur le Ministre

J'ai pensé que la question de concours de la Roumanie dans la guerre approchant de sa solution, vous auriez intérêt à connaître exactement et les préparatifs militaires qui sont déjà faits et l'ensemble des forces qu'aux yeux des spécialistes, ce pays pourra mettre en ligne le jour de la déclaration de la guerre. J'ai donc prié l'attaché militaire de la France à Bucarest de me donner son avis à cet égard, d'après les renseignements détaillés qu'il est à même de recueillir journellement à l'état-major.

Monsieur le Capitaine Pichon m'a très obligeamment communiqué le dernier rapport (date du 12 Avril 1915) qu'il a adressé sur cette question au Gouvernement de la République et qui résume la situation de l'armée roumaine telle qu'elle est actuellement et telle qu'elle sera lorsqu'elle sera mobilisée. J'ai honneur de vous en donner ci-joint une copie.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que l'attaché militaire français a attiré mon attention sur le caractère confidentiel de ce rapport.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de mon profond respect.

Van Ypersele de Strihou

⁷⁶ *Maximilien-Henri van Ypersele de Strihou* (1870-1941) – diplomate et homme politique belge chargé des missions diplomatiques à Berlin, Paris, Lisbonne, Rome, Tanger, Saint-Petersbourg. De 8 août 1912 ministre plénipotentiaire à Bucarest. Après la guerre ministre plénipotentiaire à Varsovie (1919-1921), à Budapest (1921-1926) et à Vatican (1926-1935).

⁷⁷ *Julien Davignon* (1854-1916) – homme politique belge, membre du parti catholique, ministre des Affaires Étrangères (2 mai 1907-18 janvier 1916).

⁷⁸ *Jules Pichon* (1877-1949) – officier français, capitaine en 1915, général à la fin de sa carrière. En novembre 1912 attaché militaire en Roumanie, ayant la même fonction à Belgrade; il resta à Bucarest jusqu'au 8 août 1916.

Légation de Belgique

Annexe au rapport de la Légation du Roi à Bucarest en date du 16 Avril 1915, No. 241/60

Première partie:

État actuel de l'armée roumaine

L'armée a aujourd'hui 260 000 rationnaires.

Normalement, elle devrait en compter 100 000. Une classe a été maintenue, soit 40 000; il y a donc en sus 120 000 hommes appelés par appel individuel.

Ce renforcement est inégalement réparti. Rien au 2 Corps (Bucarest) pour ne pas alarmer l'opinion. Peu de chose au 5, Dobrudja, vis-à-vis des Bulgares. Dans le 3 autres corps d'armée, sont entièrement mobilisés un total de 15 régiments d'Infanterie, ou de chasseurs à pied qui assure la couverture vis-à-vis de l'Autriche: sont renforcés les autres régiments actifs. Les 40 Régiments cadres ne sont pas encore renforcés.

Dans l'artillerie sont renforcés toutes les unités prévues au budget comme ne possédant que des cadres, savoir les 2 batteries cadres des régiments actifs et les 5 régiments destinés à former l'artillerie des Divisions de réserve.

Dans la cavalerie rien.

Enfin les gardes frontières sont à peu près mobilisés: comme ils disposaient d'un excédent de 7000 hommes, on en a formé une brigade.

A partir de demain (13 Avril 1915), on va commencer à remplir par appel individuel le „schimb”⁷⁹ ce qui portera progressivement à l'effectif de guerre en hommes et chevaux les 10 régiments de Calarashi et l'artillerie.

Il convient enfin de signaler:

1) que tous les cols de la frontières autrichienne sont organisés militairement et armées des coupoles portatives Schumann enlevées aux lignes du Sereth;

2) que, dans 3 régions, col de Palanka, groupe de cols Valiceni-Predeal et passage de Verciorova, il est fait de travaux militaires considérables en vue d'assurer de nombreux points de passage;

3) que on achève de vacciner contre la tifoïde et la choléra tous les hommes mobilisables jusqu' à 45 ans.

Deuxième partie:

⁷⁹ En roumain dans le texte. Explication de l'auteur: "Soldats de cavalerie et d'artillerie faisant un service actif de courte durée et gardant ensuite chez eux leurs chevaux."

Armée roumaine mobilisée.

1) Les formations de première ligne représentant 5 corps d'Armée à six brigades d'infanterie et deux régiments de chasseurs à pied de deux bataillons chacun, soit exactement 40 bataillons d'infanterie par corps d'armée.

Ces 5 corps d'armée comptent donc 200 bataillons.

2) Cinq division de réserve comptant chacune un ou deux bataillons de chasseurs à pied et 12 bataillons d'infanterie dont pourvues de leur artillerie et susceptibles d'être utilisés en première ligne. Soit encore 65 bataillons.

3) Il reste 60 bataillons d'infanterie provenant de 4 bataillons récemment formés dans les 40 régiments actifs et dans 20 des régiments cadres.

Cette formation est inutilisable en première ligne faute d'artillerie.

4) Artillerie. Comme pièces de campagne à tir rapide 75 m/m il existe 96 pièces par Corps d'armée et 24 seulement par division de réserve. En outre 120 obusiers légers de 105 m/m, 8 obusiers lourds de 150 m/m, 16 pièces de montagne à tir rapide 75 m/m.

Comme pièces de modèle ancien, tout l'ancien matériel Krupp 87 m/m, 48 canons Armstrong 63 m/m de montagne, 60 pièces de 105 m/m, 48 obusiers de 120 m/m et 30 pièces de calibre supérieur; on s'est servi de ce matériel ancien pour compléter l'artillerie des divisions de réserve et pour créer un régiment spéciale de siège au Parc d'Artillerie d'Armée.

5) Cavalerie : sans changements, 22 régiments formant 2 divisions et disposant de 24 canons de 75 m/m à tir rapide.

Resumé.

On peut compter en première ligne sur 300 000 fusils d'infanterie appuyés par 750 pièces de canon à tir rapide, les armées comptant près de 500 000 rationnaires.

Tout ce qui est mobilisable en sus de ce chiffre, et on prétend atteindre 700.000 hommes, ne peut représenter que des dépôts de remplacement ultérieurement utilisables.

[1918 *la Români...*, vol. I, p. 578-582, doc. nr. 153]

20. April 12th/25th 1915, Rome. Report of the Romanian military attaché in Italy, Major Ignat, in which he transmits the translation of an article about the military potential and the strategic intentions of

Romania, published in the newspaper „Corriere de la Sera” („Evening Courier”), under the signature of the journalist Giuliano Banacci.

Dossier no. 3

Registered under no. 314

M. St. M. Sec. Information

Includes: Reports of the Military Attaché in Rome, Major Ignat.

Romanian Army and perspectives

„Greater Romania” and Italy’s interests. How King Ferdinand’s 500,000 soldiers are armed and trained. Exchange Regiments. Theater of operations. Ways of invasion. Transylvanian Triangle.

(According to „Corriere della Sera” of 25 April 1915, new style)

*Bucharest. April,
by Giuliano Banacci*

The entry into the campaign of Romania during the present European crisis can have no purpose other than the conquest of Transylvania, Bukovina and Banat. For obvious reasons, the problem of the Eastern irredentist Romanians is the problem of Bessarabia, an integrant part of the Russian empire, which must necessarily be left aside this time. A favorable solution for Romania, relating to the Romanian-Austro-Hungarian armed conflict, would conduct to the fulfillment in a large measure of the Pan-Romanian dream, and would be a guide to the constitution of the „Greater Romania”, namely of that Romanian Kingdom that should reconquest within its borders the most part of its dispersed members of this Latino-Balkan formation.

According to the calculations of the Romanian patriots, the „Greater Romania” would have no less than 14 million inhabitants. The Romanian state, with regard to its natural borders, would then be bigger and stronger than Hungary (to which no more than 10 million inhabitants of Magyar race can be attributed) and more than anyone of the Balkan Slavic powers.

Now, it is obvious the permanent interest of Italy by the addition of the power that will result from the ethnic and territorial integration of Romania and by the preliminary agreement concluded with this state following its enlargement. Let’s ignore the sympathies deriving from the community of origin, and relate only to the present circumstances, have before our eyes only the great benefit for Italy. Romania will rise up in arms to cross

the Transylvanian Alps through their passes, to unravel the problem of the Triple Entente war and, at the same time establishing a solid basis for the life of the Balkan states.

Then the increase of the power of the southern Slavs, the Balkan vanguard of Russia which will be more prestigious than in the past and which will have free access to the Mediterranean, this increase of power, which will appear itself before our eyes, especially through the access of Serbia at the Adriatic Sea, will be profitably counterbalanced by the territorial enlargement and by a partial ethnic integration of a Romania closely united by alliance with Italy. Therefore, the question of the composition of the armament, of the power of the Romanian army and of the perspectives of this army in the eventual and imminent armed conflict with the Dual Monarchy, has for us Italians at this moment a great importance from the point of view of the „balance of forces”.

The Romanian army with a company effective force in the invasion war in Transylvania consists of almost 500,000 very good soldiers, well trained, armed and equipped. With the reserves, which will remain in the country, the number of over 650,000 people will be reached. But if we take into account the fact that Romania will also have to defend itself against an enemy invasion army, because it has too the militias prepared for this, the number of the combatants, with those of the other army, will reach 800,000.

The Romanian soldier is armed with the Mannlicher weapon: the best small-caliber weapon (6.5), the most modern model. The Romanian infantry is well equipped with the best machine guns „Mascim”. The army units are fairly well equipped with modern artillery (110 cannons per army corps). The type is „Krupp” with a quick shot, the same one that Italy has. The army personnel are good. The Romanian army counts [on] 20 permanent and 5 reserve artillery exchange regiments. (This destination for permanent and exchange regiments will be clarified when I talk about cavalry).

General staff officers are generally well trained. Many of them graduate from the war school from Bucharest, which is considered to be at its best, adding that this school can provide officers whose scientific training is not inferior to the training of the best foreign army officers. But many of the General Staff officers completed their studies abroad, especially in Italy and Germany. Those graduated from our school are especially respected.

The cavalry has 22 regiments and is of 2 types: permanent (12 regiments) and exchange (10 regiments). The first type of cavalry has no particular characteristics, its recruitment and service being based on the

same principles as in the other foreign armies. The second type, on the contrary, is a private Romanian institution. In the exchange regiments each contingent does 3 months of service, and then is dismissed being replaced with another contingent. Each soldier is obliged to have his own horse and bring the money to buy one, being obliged to keep it for 4 years.

The Romanian army has 5 corps with more than 2 cavalry divisions. The capital of the kingdom is a large field to be reinforced with modern reinforcements, following the normal Belgian fortification plan, conceived by the famous military engineer Brialmont⁸⁰. The outer belt has 18 large permanent forts, with 18 interval batteries. The forts are served by a belt railway.

*

The main communications between Romania, on the one hand, and Bucovina with Hungary, on the other, are represented by 5 main routes, which go from N.W. towards S.W. in this order:

1) The railway from Moldova, which follows the Siret river valley. The border is at Suceava. Another railway with the general direction parallel to the one along the Siret river, is the one that passes towards Iasi, the capital of Moldova, and which doubles the communication potential while the Romanian army is concentrated, when it would need it if thrown over an enemy territory. In this part, the frontier is formed by a mountainous region, through which passes the infantry could pass.

2) The railway from the Trotuş river valley, a right tributary of the river Siret. The entry into the Austro-Hungarian territory will be realized through the Trotus Pass and through several ordinary roads, which increase the value of the pass.

3) The railway on the Prahova valley is a branch of the Bucharest – Ploieşti line and passes in Hungary through the Predeal pass at Brasov. The area covered by this railway is more difficult than the two mentioned above, having more secondary communication routes.

4) The railway from Valea Oltului, which crosses the Turnu Rosu (Red Tower) pass, at 352 m above sea level, between the Lotru Mountains, which are the most difficult in the entire frontier region. Despite all this

⁸⁰ *Henri-Alexis de Brialmont* (1821-1903) – Belgian General, famous specialist in fortifications. He designed the fortification systems in Belgium, Romania („Bucharest beltway”) and Congo.

difficulty, there are however secondary roads favorable to the invasion. This railway leads to Sibiu (Hermanstadt).

5) The railway that leaves the country through Portile de Fier (Iron Gates) or through Orșova from the Romanian-Hungarian-Serbian borders. The access to this region is quite difficult, but it also has secondary communications.

*

The triangle of Transylvania formed with Romania is characterized by a relief of extreme complexity. It is composed of inaccessible heights, of isolated masses, of a continuous chain (towards E. up to Bukovina) and at S. the Transylvanian Alps are formed by walls cut by passes formed by erosion, through which pass the main Romanian-Hungarian communication routes, listed above. The Transylvanian Alps present their two sides in a completely different way. The Hungarian slope is abrupt as is the Piedmontese slope of the Alpine mountain range, so the defense of this side will be realized with great difficulties. The Romanian side, on the contrary, is like the Provençal one of the Alps, with a gentle slope, so it facilitates the defense against the invasion.

The Dual Monarchy always acknowledged the strategic importance of the Transylvanian triangle. The historian *Bartha* in his work „The Hungarians and the Romanians in front of history” uses nearly the same terms: the purpose of the Romanians is to get possession on one third of Hungary limitrophe to Romania.

All the polemics between Romanian and Hungarian politicians and publicists regarding Transylvania recall the most recent work of one of the most famous Hungarian statisticians, Count Andrassy⁸¹, who stated that the eventual conquest of this country by the Romanians would dig between those two peoples, the Romanian and the Hungarian one, the bottomless abyss of an unextinguished hate.

It is understood that the Austro-German General Staff took all the measures to strengthen the slope of the Transylvanian triangle, building fortifications, supply stores and coordinating the railways for the defense,

⁸¹ *Iulius (Gyula) Andrássy* (1860-1920) – Hungarian politician. He was Minister of Education (1894-1895) and of Internal Affairs (1906-1910), and in 1912, as envoy of the dual monarchy, he tried to prevent by diplomatic means the outbreak of the Balkan conflict. In October-November 1918, as the last Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, he declared that the alliance with Germany was dissolved, trying to conclude a favorable peace for Hungary.

while taking the necessary measures to destroy the works of the invader. Romania also had the sense of responding with the military roads up to the positions of the Hungarian slope, also making reinforcements especially when the clouds were threatening over the Carpathians peaks. All these works are done near the passes, in view of a mountain war and according to the sound principles of the mountain war, the defender did not have to wait to oppose the invader, who would have reached the position of the slope. We have reliable indications that the Austro-German General Staff is already concerned about this problem. These indications are obtained from the war system adopted first by the Austrians and then by the Austro-Germans on the largest theater of the Carpathians, who opposed the attempts of the Russian armies who wanted to take control of the mountain chain in order to penetrate through the passes into the plains of Hungary. It is worth mentioning, in this regard, an article published last February in the columns of the newspaper „Neue Freie Presse”, an officious article, which responded to the significant movements of the army from the public opinion so as not to permanently fortify the passes of the Carpathian region. The article in question, after mentioning that the Carpathians arc is long, between the eastern border of Silesia and the Romanian one, of almost 600 km, enumerates 10 points where it is crossed by many railways and shows some 20 secondary routes and a number insufficiently large of paths that can be crossed to the other side of the Carpathian chain. It adds that the fortification of the Franco-German frontier, much less extensive and in many inaccessible places, cost France more billions and that in order to maintain them at a high level of the military technique, they must be frequently transformed. The fortifications are buried capitals, which require a high annual amortization, which would be above the financial forces of the monarchy. In addition, the Carpathian fortifications would require a large part of the army for their defense, and probably a large number of guns and rifles we still need for the active defense of the Carpathian chain.

The active, maneuvered defense through which the Austro-German armies managed until today to stop the Russian access to the Danube valley, could of course be turned tomorrow against a threat of invasion of Transylvania on the side of the Romanians, on the narrowest field of the Hungarian side of the Transylvanians Alps, by the Austro-German armies, who will support their mobile elements on those field works of a passenger character, with which they strengthened their territory in order to defend

it. They will also have the possibility, if necessary, of moving from one area to another using the network of routes they would have been coordinated for this active defense.

[A.M.R., Fund 948, Section III information, file no. 314, 1915, p. 783]

21. April 15th/28th 1915, Bucharest. Article of D. N. Comșa⁸², „Errors to be repaired. Need of rehabilitation”, published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth).

Ion Brătianu⁸³ was wrong in 1878 when he had not receive the Cadri-later (Quadrilateral) up to Rusçuk - Varna, for the satisfaction of protesting against the taking by Russia of the 3 counties from Bessarabia, which he knew lost for us.

It was a mistake when King Carol had refused in 1886 the crown of Bulgaria offered by Stambolov⁸⁴. This would have been the beginning of the Balkan confederation under the leadership of Romania.

He as well as the Conservative party was wrong in being subordinated to the Austro-German politics.

Both old parties – liberal and conservative – were wrong when they had not responded to the proposals of the Serbs, Bulgarians and Greeks to make a Balkan bloc on the ruins of Turkey, the best foundation for realizing the national ideals of all.

An unpardonable mistake was made, when my proposal made twice in the Parliament in 1918⁸⁵ was not taken into account, that is to concentrate all the capabilities of the nation both at home and abroad, so that against

⁸² *Dimitrie N. Comșa* (1868- ?) – Doctor in law in Paris, he worked as a lawyer for the ministries of war and for National Economy. He also worked at the National Bank.

⁸³ *Ion C. Brătianu* (1821-1891) – One of the most important Romanian political personalities of the 19th century. He participated in the Wallachian Revolution of 1848 and played an important role in the overthrow of Alexandru Ioan Cuza and bringing Prince Carol to the throne of Romania. He later served as prime minister in the period 1876-1888, with a pause of several months in the spring of 1881. He contributed to gaining Romania's independence, being a reliable adviser of the prince and future King Carol I.

⁸⁴ *Stefan Stambulov (Stambolov)* (1854-1895) – An important Bulgarian politician, who was prime minister and regent (1887-1894). He was assassinated.

⁸⁵ Correct: 1908.

Austria we could make peace and the Balkan confederation, rendering Macedonia to the Bulgarians, which the Greeks would have ceded in exchange for Epirus and Serbia in exchange for Northern Albania and union with Montenegro.

Mr. Ionel Brătianu was wrong in the previous liberal government, when he had prevented General Averescu from realizing the Krupp's proposal to install a weapons and ammunition factory in our country. He was wrong in the current government, because he had not immediately sought to make all the necessary commands for the army within the limits of the credits already voted under the former Conservative-Democratic government, voting also for new resources.

The European war of the summer of 1914 surprised us with the most miserable diplomatic training, with a good military training, but without having repaired the mistakes and corrected the deficiencies observed in the campaign of Bulgaria in 1913. Mr. Ionel Brătianu made the biggest mistake when he had not taken action after the French victory at Marna and the battle of Lemberg.

If before the most fervent patriotism could be stopped by the fear of not being crushed by the formidable power of Germany, then, when all the probabilities were in favor of the triple Entente, it must not longer hesitate.

Transylvania was not at all defended at that time, the passes were not mined. We entered without sacrifices this city where there was the core of Romanianism. We recruited for us the 500,000 Transylvanians recruited by Hungarians. We saved many Romanians from death, in any case they did not die for the achievement of the Hungarian unitary state. The fate of Austria could be decided, because the Russians were no longer stopped by the difficult passes in Bukovina, they had easy access to us. Further supply and recruitment would have been impossible in Austria-Hungary, the Romanians and Slavs would have been revolted.

In their interest France and England would have sent us weapons and ammunition, to arm those recruited in Transylvania, if they could not get possession of the weapons in the Austro-Hungarian depots.

The mistake of our government not to always have a number of weapons at least double the number of our soldiers would have been repaired. It must have been known that the number of fighters for Romanianism was at

least double than that of the soldiers from the kingdom.

The Triple Entente had no more than 3 million combatants. Only 500,000 Romanian fighters represent the 1/6 part of the total number of the fighters of the Triple Entente. With the soldiers recruited in Transylvania, the Romanians would have been a quarter of the number of fighters.

They would have passed not only for heroes, as the Serbs in the West are considered today, but they would have been regarded as the saviors of the Anglo-French civilization against the German invasion, as the Pope of Rome once regarded Stephen the Great as the defender of the Christianity against Turks.

Romania would have been blessed by the humanity because her intervention could hasten the defeat of the double alliance and the arrival of peace.

With such a moral situation, the Russians would not have dared to discuss our Bukovina, and especially the regions beyond the Prut, which they consider to be Ruthenian. It would no longer be claimed that Maramures is Ruthenian. The Serbs would not dare to have claims on the Banat, which apart from Torontal is just as Romanian as the most Romanian parts of Transylvania.

Unfortunately, today we have to make much greater sacrifices and yet we will not be able to obtain the moral situation to succeed in having, on occasion of this definitive liquidation of Austria-Hungary, all our brothers attached to the mother country.

It will be difficult, at the congress, to discuss with the Serbs about their claims. They are considered as heroes, while us, as shy players throwing ourselves into the whirlpool only when we believe the game is safe.

And now the Triple Entente needs us, but it is only afraid of being crushed by Germany. She knows it's a matter of time and sacrifice, but after all the victory will be hers.

We lost the moment to be the saviors of the civilization. I know that there were great difficulties because of the defunct King Carol, who, of perfect good faith, was convinced that Germany would be victorious and that it prevented us from compromising the country's existence.

I know that in order to do the right thing for Romania, we needed a man with a patriotism not only enlightened, but also more audacious, a man whose desire to bring the nation together had been an idea of such a force that it would become an obsession and make him work unusually.

For the moment, Venizelos was defeated by King Constantine⁸⁶, because he had no the army with him.

Mr. Ionel Brătianu would not have been defeated by King Carol last autumn, because the unanimous feeling of the Romanian army was to go to Transylvania, and the opposition leaders with influence on public opinion, Messrs. Nicu Filipescu and Take Ionescu, would not have been against the entry of the army into Transylvania... on the contrary.

And then the Romanian army could leave without King Carol's knowing it and without his order. It was a revolution. Some say that the King would have abdicated, we would have lost the dynasty. For the motherland and the national ideal, parents sacrifice their children, and these ones their parents. For the king and the dynasty, parents may sacrifice their children, but not their motherland. She is above the Dynasty. But I think we would not have reached this result.

Mr. Ionel Brătianu should regret a lot that God did not endow him with a greater work power and a faster decision-making power. He should regret that he was too small in front of the current events and did not think to surround himself in these serious moments not only by everything that the liberal party had better, but also by everything that the country had greater.

His unconscious fear of not being overshadowed by others better equipped, made him lose the greatest glory a Romanian could ever dream of, that of being the first of the creators of the Romanian empire.

All these mistakes must be repaired. Mr. Ionel Brătianu needs to rehabilitate himself, to rehabilitate his party. That is why I am sure he will do his best, that everything that could be done from now on to achieve the aspirations of the nation, would be done under his leadership.

The fear that he could be replaced at the right time will be a stimulus for him to get into action faster. It is not just about losing the status of chief or that of prime minister, which cannot be very important to him.

⁸⁶ *Constantine I* (1868-1923), was King of Greece from 1913 to 1917 and from 1920 to 1922. He was commander-in-chief of the Hellenic Army during the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 and led the Greek forces during the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 in which Greece expanded to include Thessaloniki, doubling in area and population. He became King of Greece on 18 March 1913, following his father's assassination in Thessaloniki. Brother-in-law of Emperor Wilhelm II, he refused to engage the country in war on the part of Antanthus and preferred to abdicate the throne on 11 June 1917 in favor of his son, Alexander. After the death of his son on 25 October 1920 and the Venizelos's defeat in the legislative elections, he was reinstated king on 19 December 1920. He was forced to abdicate in favor of his son George, on 27 September 1922, following the defeat of Greece in the war against Turkey. He died in exile in Sicily, at Palermo, on 11 January 1923. His daughter, Helen, married in March 1921 the future King of Romania, Carol II.

But it is about not to miss the opportunity to rehabilitate himself in front of the nation and the history.

That is why I told Messrs. Take Ionescu and Nicu Filipescu and all those who were for our going into action earlier, that the best way to reach such a result was a campaign in order to overthrow the government.

In troubled times, particularly such campaigns are justified. The generals considered incapable are replaced during the war.

If Mr. Ionel Brătianu had seen such a danger, if he had been afraid of missing the opportunity to repair his mistakes and those of his party, we would have had the most vigorous impulse to force him to go into action.

As we can see, he delays even now. I think the only way not to miss the right moment is to organize a campaign to overthrow Mr. Ionel Brătianu's government based on his delay in sending the Romanian army to rescue the brothers from beyond.

D. N. Comșa

[„Adevărul” (the Truth), 15 April 1915]

22. April 1915. Fragments from the interview of Al. Vaida-Voevod⁸⁷ got by a representative of the German Headquarters referring to the problem of the Romanians from Transylvania and Hungary, in which it is pointed out the contribution of the Romanian nationality military to the victories gained by the Austro-Hungarian army.

The Romanian problem

Exposed to questions and answers by a Hungarian [subject] of Romanian nationality, well informed about this problem

Marginal note with the following text: Vaida, Romanian deputy in the Diet of Hungary – for reasons easy to understand – keep his name secret.

⁸⁷ *Alexandru Vaida Voevod* (1872-1950) – Doctor, politician and Romanian publicist from Transylvania. Until the First World War, he acted consistently for the rights of the Romanians from beyond the mountains, being in the entourage of the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand, the one assassinated in Sarajevo. After the war, he was one of the prominent leaders of the National Party and then the National Peasants' Party, being three times prime minister: 1919-1920, 1932 and 1933. After the enthroning of King Carol II on 8 June 1930, he supported his wishes for an authoritarian regime, founding a new political formation – Frontul Românesc (the Romanian Front) in 1935).

Question: How do the Romanians from Transylvania and Hungary consider the hostile street demonstrations against Hungary and the Francophile attitude of a part of the Bucharest press?

Answer: The agitation against the Hungarian oligarchy caused by the oppression of the Romanians in Hungary is not a new phenomenon in Romania. The way Count Tisza proceeded in this matter during the Balkan wars and since the outbreak of the present war has brought this agitation into a state of effervescence. Romanians are a young people with a southern temperament. The freedom of the press is unlimited. Therefore, partly due to an exaltation of feelings that does not take into account realities, partly due to a calculation, to a speculation of this overflowing national sentiment, it was not difficult for some fervent patriots without sufficient political self-control, as well as for some journalists who are not responsible, to add fuel to their passions. In Romania, however, the press has absolutely no influence on the factors of responsibility, and the street demonstrations are useful as the "discharge valves" for the need for action of callow political children as well as of those with white hair. [...] ⁸⁸

Question: What causes Count Tisza to impede and foil Romania's victory? Does Hungary have a lower vital interest in the Romania victory rather than that of Austria and Germany, as if Romania's placement by the side of the Central Powers would not be in their own interest?

Answer: Of course. However, as the 200,000 to 300,000 Romanians in the Austro-Hungarian army who are fighting bravely and faithfully under the Habsburg flags, and we, their political leaders, have taken up a position since the beginning of the war for Romania joining the Central Powers, Count Tisza treats our people as Moors who have done their duty. He wants that, after the conclusion of peace, he will assure his free hand for the „national construction of the Hungarian state”, that is to say, for the most unscrupulous Magyarization policy. Romania can only be won by solving totally the problem of the Romanians in Hungary. This can only be achieved if the Magyar oligarchy renounces to its position of usurped supremacy on behalf of the non-Magyar half of the Hungary population and with the satisfaction of the Hungarians with the title of being *primum inter pares* (*first among equals*). Even if for the Romanian statesmen would be possible, despite the Romanian public opinion, to join the Central Powers

⁸⁸ The following questions and answers make the history of the national oppression of the Romanians from Hungary.

without this thing being facilitated by solving the problem of the Romanians in Hungary, or by a solemn promise in this respect, the word of Romania – after a victory against Russia with the help of the Romanian army – would hang hard enough in the balance to force the Hungarians to solve the Romanians problem. *In order to prevent this, Count Tisza, from the beginning of the war, maneuvered so that not only did he not facilitate the joining of Romania, but also to hamper it with great ability.* He hopes that, with the help of the German army, not only to save the territorial integrity of Hungary, but also to guarantee for the future too the exercise of Hungarian coercive domination. Unfortunately, Berlin is not in a position to notice the Mongolian-Asian cunning tactic of Tisza and his accomplices – which seems so unbelievable to the honest thinking of the Germans – only when it will be too late. I mean, only after the German rivers of blood are shed in Galicia and the Carpathians, sacrifices that, by winning Romania, could be easily avoided.

Question: Were any irredentist currents observed among the Romanians from Transylvania and Hungary, under the influence of the events in Bucharest?

Answer: Not at all. Our people have completely done their duty as soldiers. That this was the case, contrary to the expectations of the Hungarians, whose bad conscience feared a rebellion of the Romanian regiments, is mainly a merit of the five decades political activity led by the Romanian National Party of Transylvania and Hungary, a merit of the „agitators” ; as we, the leaders of this party, are called by our Magyar adversaries. We always, with zeal, set in motion our people against the arbitrary Hungarian domination, but also zealously for the faith respecting the country and the emperor. At the same time, for the firm joining of Austria-Hungary and Romania to the German Reich. Unfortunately, *our younger generations have been completely taken away from the German culture and German influence*, through the unfortunate Hungarian school policy, *which makes impossible to learn the German language* and forbids our church authorities to use scholarships for the abroad university education.

That the current Romanian combatant generation prefers fighting under German command than under the Hungarian one, is proved by the fact that no Romanian regiment of *honveds* (our note: “defenders of the homeland”), under Magyar command, has distinguished itself as brilliantly as the Romanian regiments of the joint army, which fight under German com-

mand. Not a certain one, but the German emperor himself gave an everlasting evidence for the bravery of the Romanians. In *Românul* (*the Romanian*), the journal of the Romanian National Party of Transylvania and Hungary, which appears in Arad, was recently published the following letter:

Honored Editor!

I am glad to inform the Honored Editor that the Infantry Regiment no. 50 from Alba Iulia – of Romanian nationality – the only one from the Monarchy to wear on the flag of the regiment the gold medal for his loyal perseverance in the sworn faith, was now similarly distinguished by the emperor Wilhelm, who sent to the Regiment 50, which is fighting together with the brave German troops on the Russian-Polish war theater, a flag on which the *Iron Cross* is fixed.

Best regards,
Bayer, Captain

Question: This is definitely a brilliant success. However, you have to admit that the Magyar troops also fought brilliantly.

Answer: Of course. Especially as the „Magyar troops”, according to the Hungarian statistics, are made up of at least 52% non-Magyars. Of the glory of the „Red devils”, of the „Honveds”, of the „Magyar regiments”, more than half is due to the non-Magyars forming them. The Honveds are nothing more than the Magyar part of the *territorial army* of the Austro-Hungarian army, and the percentage of Romanians, Germans, Slovaks, Croats etc. of this is as large (more than half) as the Magyar part of the Austro-Hungarian joint army.

The Magyar half of the Hungarian troops fought brilliantly, but of course no more brilliantly than the non-Magyar half. And however, without the faithful fraternity of arms and without the bravery of the non-Magyar half, the Magyarpart of the Hungarian troops could not have done more than half of the exploit [...] ⁸⁹

[1918 at the Romanians..., vol. I, doc. no. 159, pp. 594-599]

23. 19 avril/2 mai 1915, Pétrograd. Télégramme de Sergueï Sazonov, ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie, adressé aux ambassadeurs

⁸⁹ About the influence that a possible entry into war of Italy on the side of the Entente would exert on the foreign policy of Romania.

de Paris et de Londres, concernant les pourparlers avec la Roumanie pour l'entrée en guerre.*19 avril/2 mai 1915. N° 2010*

Du consentement de l'Angleterre et de la France je vais entreprendre la poursuite des pourparlers avec la Roumanie sur les conditions de son entrée en guerre à nos côtés contre l'Autriche et l'Allemagne, et je ne manquerai pas de tenir très exactement nos alliés au courant de ces pourparlers.

Animé par le désir d'attirer la Roumanie de notre côté, je suis prêt à considérer avec beaucoup d'attention les revendications me paraissant justes, mais j'espère que je serai fortement soutenu par nos alliés quand je serai forcé à décliner telles des sommations roumaines qui seraient inacceptables pour nous.

Sazonov

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, pp. 188-189]

24. 20 avril/3 mai 1915, Pétrograd. Télégramme du ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie, Sergueï Sazonov, transmis aux ambassadeurs de Paris, Londres et Bucarest, concernant les demandes territoriales de la Roumanie pour son entrée en guerre aux côtés de l'Entente.*20 avril/3 mai 1915. N° 2040*

J'ai vu pour la première fois aujourd'hui Diamandi⁹⁰, qui m'a énuméré les acquisitions territoriales que la Roumanie voudrait se voir garantir pour une entrée en guerre à nos côtés contre l'Autriche-Hongrie: la Bucovine jusqu'au Pruth, la Transylvanie, le Banat jusqu'à la Tisa, et une partie de la Hongrie, jusqu'à Szegedin, au confluent de la Tisa et du Somes, et plus loin les Carpathes de la Bucovine. J'ai répondu que pareilles exigences n'étaient pas acceptables, car nous ne pouvons consentir ni à ce que la population russe de la Bucovine et de l'Ugorczina soit remise au pouvoir de la

⁹⁰ *Constantin Diamandy* (1868-1931) – Diplomate roumain renommé. Il a été chef de légation dans plusieurs capitales – Sofia (1910-1912), Rome (1913) et Saint-Pétersbourg (1914-1918), ici étant arrêté par les bolchéviques à la fin de l'année 1917. Il a été membre de la délégation roumaine à la Conférence de paix de Paris (1919). Entre 1924 et 1930, il a été ministre plénipotentiaire de la Roumanie à Paris, signant, en 1926, le traité d'alliance avec la France.

Roumanie, ni à ce que les Roumains s’approchent de Belgrade pour lequel ils peuvent devenir une menace aussi grande que la menace autrichienne. Notre première conversation en a fini là, ce qui n’empêche pas que le ton en ait été cordial.

Sazonov

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 37].

25. 21 avril/4 mai 1915, Bucarest. Notes d’Al. Marghiloman sur les discussions avec G. Știrbey, le comte Czernin et Hilmar von dem Bussche concernant la situation de l’Italie et la perspective de son entrée en guerre aux côtés de l’Entente.

Bussche et Czernin vont me voir. Je diffère la conversation. Un peu trop de zèle. Bussche d’ailleurs m’a envoyé hier, en plein Comité, son télégramme annonçant la rupture du front russe à Tarnov. Apropos charmant, dans un Comité où Filipescu disait qu’un vote de confiance serait “la victoire de l’Allemagne”.

– G. Știrbey⁹¹ vient me voir. Il m’annonce de la part du Roi que l’Italie a promis à part de la Triple Entente d’entrer en action fin de Mai n.s. Le Roi le tient directement de Victor-Emmanuel. Bratiano n’a pas encore donné son consentement à notre action; il négocie pour la garantie de nos futures frontières. Le Roi est triste; Știrbey⁹² suggère que j’écrive une lettre de réconfort. Pas avec insistance néanmoins. On parle de „moments tragiques”. Le Roi m’en donne avis pour mon attitude à prendre. C’est la guerre pour nous, dans un mois!

– J’avais promis de passer chez Bussche ce matin. J’y vais à 3 ½. Il me demande quelques détails sur hier. Il me montre des télégrammes sur leurs succès du côté de Libau-Riga. A mon tour, je lui demande comment vont les choses avec Italie; selon une lettre, vieille de 5 jours, il croit que, malgré grandes prétentions italiennes, difficultés sont surmontées. Il a inter-

⁹¹ *George Știrbey* (1883-1917) – Fils du couple Alexandru Știrbey et Maria Ghica-Comănești, frère de Barbu et d’Elisa Brătianu.

⁹² *Barbu Știrbei* (1872-1946) – Grand propriétaire foncier, administrateur des Domaines de la Couronne Royale (depuis décembre 1913), proche de la famille royale, considéré comme le principal conseiller du roi Ferdinand. Il sera Premier ministre pendant deux semaines en juin 1927. Il s’est auto-exilé du pays après l’avènement du roi Carol II au trône en juin 1930. Négociateur de la Roumanie pendant les pourparlers menés avec les alliés au Caire en été 1944. Membre de la délégation de la Roumanie qui a signé la Convention d’armistice de Moscou le 12 septembre 1944.

rogé hier Bratiano „qui ne sait rien de nouveau”, mais qui lui a renouvelé appréciation que marche des Italiens peserait beaucoup sur Roumanie, mais que cela ne veut pas dire que par là même Roumanie ferait guerre. Lui aurait répliqué que Roumanie avait tort de lier son sort à celui de l'Italie. – Bussche me demande ce que je pense: je lui dis que nul ne serait assez fort pour résister si l'Italie se décide.

Bussche: Y aurait-il moyen de conjurer encore, en offrant pour exemple la Bucovine? – Moi: je n'en sais rien, mais réellement le pays n'accepterait pas. – Il doit porter au roi une lettre demain; il causera avec Sa Majesté. – Je ne lui demande pas de me dire ce que le Roi lui dira... (voir plus bas).

– En sortant nez à nez avec Mitica Moruzi. Je vais à lui. En voiture, – il tient à me reconduire, – il me demande si c'est vrai que l'Italie a signé, car on lui donne la guerre comme certaine: du IV-e corps on applique le 26. – Je lui dis qu'on a raison de prendre des mesures, car je crois que l'Italie laissée mourir les négociations avec Autriche.

– Demande à Grecianu⁹³ et à Brancovan d'agir pour que les insurgés du parti accordent un mois de tranquillité.

– (+) Oublié de noter que Bussche croit qu'on va envoyé Goluchowsky⁹⁴ à Rome, les Autrichiens ne jugeant pas plus Macchio⁹⁵ assez souple pour négociations.

– Ştirbey m'appelle téléphone, Club 8 h. „On” me recommande le plus strict secret, surtout vis-à-vis de Bussche; il croit qu'il y a un accroc. – je lui fais observer que Brancovan sait tout ou à peu près, de même que Michel Cantacuzène. Je pense source Blondel⁹⁶; que Jean Lahovary⁹⁷ aussi

⁹³ *Dimitrie Greceanu* (1859-1920) – Homme politique conservateur, maire de Iasi (1911-1912), ministre de la Justice (1906-1907; 1920) et des Travaux publics (décembre 1916-janvier 1918). Il a été victime de l'attentat au Sénat du 8 décembre 1920, organisé par Max Goldstein.

⁹⁴ *Agenor von Goluchowsky* (1849-1921) – Diplomate et homme politique austro-hongrois d'origine polonaise, ministre plénipotentiaire à Bucarest (1887-1894), ministre des Affaires étrangères (1895-1906).

⁹⁵ *Karl von Macchio* (1859-1945) – Baron, diplomate austro-hongrois, né à Sibiu. Il est entré dans la diplomatie en 1881, remplissant des fonctions diplomatiques à Constantinople, Bucarest, Saint-Pétersbourg et Belgrade. Le 11 août 1914, il est envoyé à Rome avec pour mission d'attirer l'Italie en guerre aux côtés des Puissances Centrales.

⁹⁶ *Jean Camille Blondel* (1853-1935) – Diplomate français, ministre plénipotentiaire au Mexique (1900-1907), puis à Bucarest (2/15 juin 1907-13/26 mai 1916). Son successeur, le comte de St. Aulaire, présenta ses lettres de créance le 7 août 1916. En 1922, Blondel s'établit en Roumanie – sa fille, Yvonne, avait épousé un Roumain, Ion Cămărăşescu, duquel elle divorça en 1919, se remariant en 1921 avec le capitaine Ion Postelnicu – et mourut à Oltenita.

⁹⁷ *Ion N. Lahovary* (25 janvier 1844-14 juin 1915) – Diplomate et politicien conservateur, ministre plénipotentiaire à Paris, ministre des Affaires étrangères. Père de Martha Bibescu.

m’a parlé en détail: source Giers⁹⁸. On me répond que tout est que moi je ne confirme rien.

22 avril. – Czernin me dit que l’opération en Galicie semble être une grande victoire, dont on ne peut encore évaluer toutes les conséquences. Il me renouvelle sa persuasion qu’on s’arrange avec l’Italie. Je n’exprime aucun doute. Sa femme va venir dans quelques jours s’installer à Sinaia... Je lui dis que je serais heureux de lui présenter mes hommages. Il me demande des renseignements sur Kogălniceanu⁹⁹; je l’engage à ne pas avoir de rapports avec lui. Czernin s’étonne que justement ce Monsieur, qu’il ne connaît pas, aille causer de droite à gauche et entre constamment aux Affaires Étrangères à Wien. J’ai souvenir d’une conversation remontant à une semaine, dans laquelle „Coco” m’a rapporté des propos menaçants de Tschirsky¹⁰⁰, l’ambassadeur allemand à Wien. Là-dessus Czernin me dit confidentiellement que Tschirsky peut bien les avoir tenus, car il est comme ça: ne sait rien et la prend de haut. Il compte le dire, sans indiquer de source, à Bussche.

– G. Știrbey: Bratiano este très inquiet. „Craint-il un ultimatum de l’Allemagne? (Je pense à la conversation notée ci-dessus.) Ou bien le succès inopiné des Allemands gêne-t-il les combinaisons de Bratiano?” – Cette information donne un relief spécial au coup de téléphone d’hier soir.

[Alexandru Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, p. 454-458]

26. 28 avril/11 mai 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme du comte Ottokar Czernin, ministre plénipotentiaire austro-hongrois à Bucarest, adressé au baron Burián, l’informant sur l’entretien avec Ion I. C. Brătianu qui souligne la situation difficile de la Roumanie, si l’Italie entre en guerre aux côtés de l’Entente.

⁹⁸ Mihail Nicolaevici de Giers, baron (1856-1924) – Diplomate russe, ministre plénipotentiaire à Bucarest (1902-1912), ambassadeur à Constantinople (1912-1914) et à Rome (1915-1917). Il était le fils de Nikolai Karlovici Giers (1820-1895), ministre russe des Affaires étrangères (1882-1895).

⁹⁹ Vasile Kogălniceanu (1863-1921) – Journaliste, militant pour le suffrage universel et pour l’émancipation paysanne, considéré comme instigateur des révoltes (la Jacquerie) paysannes de 1907. Il était le fils du grand politicien Mihail Kogălniceanu (1817-1891).

¹⁰⁰ Heinrich Leonhard von Tschirschky und Bögendorff (1858-1916) – Diplomate et homme politique allemand, fut tour à tour secrétaire d’État aux Affaires étrangères (janvier 1906-octobre 1907) et après fut nommé ambassadeur à Vienne jusqu’à sa mort au 15 novembre 1916.

Le Comte Ottokar Czernin au Baron Burián.

Télégramme. Bucarest, le 11 mai 1915

J'ai été trouver le Président du Conseil aujourd'hui; il se mit de suite à parler de l'Italie et me dit que la guerre lui semblait inévitable. Je lui répondis que l'acceptation de nos offres de la part de l'Italie était tout aussi possible que la guerre; que d'ailleurs nous étions parfaitement préparés à cette éventualité et que nous saurions repousser l'agression italienne d'une façon terrible. Je ne laissai que d'appeler attention de mon interlocuteur sur les brillants progrès de notre offensive en Galicie et lui fis remarquer aussi que nous, aussi bien que l'Allemagne, étions plus forts maintenant qu'au commencement de la guerre, ce pourquoi on pouvait bien nous rendre la victoire définitive plus malaisée mais non plus nous l'arracher.

Le Président du Conseil admit que nos armées en Galicie se battent brillamment et s'enquit avec intérêt de plusieurs détails. Sa position à lui, dit-il, serait fort difficile, si l'Italie entraînait en action, car l'opposition ferait le possible pour provoquer la guerre, mais il s'y opposerait de toutes ses forces et il espérait de réussir à garder la neutralité: mais il ne saurait le garantir.

Mon impression est que notre grande victoire en Galicie a donné à penser au delà de ce qu'on pouvait espérer et que la Roumanie commence à hésiter. Étant données les dispositions actuelles du gouvernement il est probable que même dans le cas d'une déclaration de guerre de la part d'Italie la Roumanie ne marchera pas, mais attendra pour voir comment les choses tourneront.

[Documents diplomatiques concernant les rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Roumanie, 22 Juillet 1914-27 Août 1916, ... p. 18]

27. 30 avril/13 mai 1915, Bucarest. Telegramme du ministre de Russie à Bucarest, Poklewsky-Koziell, adressé au ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Sergueï Sazonov, sur les revendications territoriales de la Roumanie.

30 avril/13 mai 1915. N° 27

Reçu votre n° 2204.

Bratiano ne montre aucun désir de céder, et a répété il y a deux jours à l'ambassadeur de France que la Roumanie n'entrera pas en guerre, si on ne lui garantit pas les frontières qu'elle demande. J'ai entendu dire que le

gouvernement impérial aurait voulu laisser à la Serbie le district de Torontal, et faire passer la frontière en Bucovine entre le Sereth et la Suczava. Je me permets de vous exprimer ma sincère opinion qu'une pareille proposition rendrait impossible notre alliance avec la Roumanie et pourrait même éveiller ici dans l'opinion publique des sentiments anti-russes, c'est pourquoi, si nous n'attachons pas d'importance au concours militaire de la Roumanie, il vaudrait mieux que nous déclinions les exigences roumaines en des termes généraux, les ayant trouvées inacceptables. D'autre part, si nous laissons à la Serbie seulement le district de Pantchev, qui est contigu au Danube et peuplé de Serbes, ou bien un tiers du district de Torontal, et si nous consentions à la frontière proposée par Kostinesco en Bucovine, alors la situation de Bratiano en deviendrait très difficile, car nous aurions avec nous ici tous les hommes d'État raisonnables ainsi que l'opinion publique, et on pourrait espérer qu'alors l'opiniâtreté de Bratiano devrait céder. De toute façon une réponse sans retard serait à désirer.

Poklevsky

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 190]

28. 1/14 mai 1915, Pétrograd. Télégramme du ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie, Sergueï Sazonov, à Poklewsky-Koziell, concernant la réponse du gouvernement russe à un memorandum remis par Constantin Diamandi, ministre roumain à Pétrograd.

1/14 mai 1915. N° 2235

Copies à Londres et Paris.

Le n° 2231 vous transmet le texte d'un memorandum daté d'aujourd'hui, que vous voudrez bien faire tenir au gouvernement roumain en réponse aux propositions qu'il a fait faire ici par Diamandi. Vous verrez vous-même que bien que les sommations roumaines soient faites presque sous la forme d'un ultimatum que nous et nos alliés avons trouvé absolument inacceptable, notre réponse a été rédigée en des termes amicaux et dans un sens conciliant. La délimitation que nous lui proposons laisse à la Roumanie non seulement toutes les provinces où la majorité de la population est roumaine, mais beaucoup de provinces aussi qui sont peuplées presque entièrement de Hongrois, Serbes, et même de Russes en partie. Le concours militaire de la Roumanie nous aurait fait plaisir, certes, et je continue à attacher de l'importance à ce que de solides rapports de bon

voisinage soient établis entre la Russie et la Roumanie, mais on ne peut pas exiger que pour les avoir nous sacrifions ceux qui sont de notre race et les justes espoirs du peuple serbe, qui nous est allié, et cela seulement parce qu'il est venu à l'esprit de Bratiano de délimiter à son gré les frontières de la Roumanie, qui, il n'y a pas longtemps de cela, ne rêvait même pas pareil agrandissement. La conduite de Bratiano commence à donner le soupçon qu'il fait exprès de présenter des exigences inacceptables pour rendre une entente impossible et éviter la guerre, nous chargeant du tort de ce que les pourparlers n'aient pas réussi. Si cette supposition se confirme il ne nous restera rien d'autre à faire que de rendre publiques les propositions que nous faisons à la Roumanie, et l'opinion publique du pays décidera si Bratiano a bien agi en repoussant les puissances par son extrême exigence, et en empêchant la réalisation des désirs nationaux des Roumains.

Sazonov

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 190-191]

29. 6/19 mai 1915, Pétrograd. Télégramme du ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie, Sergueï Sazonov, à Poklewsky-Koziell, concernant l'entrevue avec l'ambassadeur de France pour le problème des revendications territoriales de la Roumanie.

6/19 mai 1915. N° 2320

Copies à Paris et Londres.

Delcassé¹⁰¹ a autorisé l'ambassadeur de France à me demander si on ne pouvait pas trouver une formule conciliant les exigences excessives des Roumains avec la proposition par laquelle j'ai répondu à ces exigences. Ce faisant, Paléologue¹⁰² a indiqué la ligne du Sereth en Bucovine, et la

¹⁰¹ *Théophile Delcassé* (1852-1923) – Homme politique et diplomate français, ministre des Affaires étrangères (1898-1905), lorsqu'il a été l'un des artisans du rapprochement franco-britannique, concrétisé par la signature de l'Entente Cordiale le 8 avril 1904, ambassadeur à Saint Pétersbourg (février 1913-janvier 1914), de nouveau ministre des Affaires étrangères (26 août 1914-13 octobre 1915), il dut démissionner à la suite de l'entrée de la Bulgarie dans la guerre contre l'Entente.

¹⁰² *Maurice Paléologue* (1859-1944) – Diplomate, historien et essayiste français. Il a été l'envoyé de France en Bulgarie (1907-1912), puis en Russie (1912-1917). Son activité pendant la crise de juillet 1914 a été critiquée par certains spécialistes, à cause d'une certaine lenteur avec laquelle il transmettait les informations à la centrale de Paris. Ses mémoires sont une source importante pour connaître les rapports existants entre les grandes puissances de l'Entente pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale.

possibilité de céder aux Roumains la partie nord-est du district de Torontal dans le Banat. J’ai répondu qu’après les propositions que je viens de faire la parole est à Bratiano, mais que si ce dernier me fait une nouvelle proposition dans le sens indiqué, je suis prêt encore une fois à faire preuve de complaisance et à accepter une décision conciliante. Néanmoins, j’ai souligné que l’entrée en guerre de la Roumanie avant le 13/26 mai serait la condition indispensable à mon accord. Veuillez vous guider là-dessus dans vos pourparlers avec Bratiano.

Sazonov

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 192-193]

30. 6/19 mai 1915, Pétrograd. Télégramme du ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie, Sergueï Sazonov, transmis à l’ambassadeur russe de Paris, A. P. Izvolski¹⁰³, concernant l’importance de l’entrée de la Roumanie dans la guerre.

A. P. Izvolski, Russian ambassador in Paris,

6/19 mai 1915. N° 2321

Référence mon télégramme à Poklevsky, n° 2320.

M’ayant indiqué l’importance exceptionnelle que présenterait, étant donnée la situation actuelle en Galicie et dans les Carpathes, l’entrée en guerre de la Roumanie, Paléologue m’a demandé d’accepter la décision de conciliation soufflée par Delcassé, et par laquelle la Roumanie recevrait la Bucovine le long du Sereth et la partie nord-est du district de Torontal dans le Banat. Pour me décharger de toute responsabilité devant nos alliés, si, comme cela peut arriver, les pourparlers avec la Roumanie échouent, j’ai consenti à cette proposition, aux conditions que j’ai exposées dans mon télégramme à Poklevsky. Il serait pourtant à désirer que les Français facilitent notre situation dans les Carpathes, en activant l’offensive sur leur front.

Sazonov

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 193]

¹⁰³ *Aleksandr Petrovici Izvolski* (1851-1919) – Diplomate russe chargé d’une série de missions à Bucarest, Vatican, Tokyo, Copenhague, ministre russe des Affaires étrangères (11 octobre 1906-11 mai 1910), ambassadeur à Paris (17 décembre 1910-mars 1917). Il mourut en exile à Paris.

31. May 7th/20th 1915, Teschen¹⁰⁴. Telegram of Count Thurn, representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attached to the General Staff, addressed to Baron Burián relating to the General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf's opinion according to which the entry of Romania into the war would have catastrophic effects for Austria-Hungary.

No. 1254 Secret

Telegram

Count Thurn

Dated Teschen, 20 May 1915

Spent: hour 2 p.m

Arrived: hour 5 p.m.

No. 536

Strictly secret encryption

With regard to Your Excellency's the telegram no. 183

On the occasion of the talk had yesterday with His Imperial-Royal Highness¹⁰⁵ and with Baron Conrad, the Romanian question was raised too, when I expressed the point of view of Your Excellency regarding the importance of a possible intervention of Romania. Independently of each other, my two interlocutors declared in unison that it was doubtful if, in case of the intervention of Italy, this war would be carried out successfully, but that Romania's entry into the war against us would certainly have, necessarily, a catastrophic effect. Making preparations for this war case is impossible, considering the absorption of all the forces in the three theaters of war.

[1918 at the Romanians..., vol. I, pp. 606-607, doc. no. 165]

¹⁰⁴ Today: Cieszyn, a city in southern Poland, near the frontier with the Czech Republic. In the summer of 1914, the High Command of the Austro-Hungarian armies was installed here.

¹⁰⁵ It is about the *Archduke Friedrich von Habsburg* (1856-1936), member of the House of Habsburg, Austro-Hungarian Field-Marshal (4 December 1914), whom the Emperor Franz Joseph had entrusted with the supreme command of the Austro-Hungarian armies since yet on 5th July 1914, function had until 11 February 1917, when the new emperor Carol I put him in disponibily. It was, however, a purely honorary function because the effective command was exercised by General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf.

32. May 10th/23rd 1915, [Teschen]. Telegram of General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf addressed to Baron Burián on the emergency of winning over Romania for its active participation on the side of the Central Powers.

Strictly Secret

Telegram to *His Excellency Burián*

To be deciphered by Lt. Col. Kundmann personally and immediately handed over His Excellency Baron Burián.

With the entry of Italy into the war, the military situation is as follows:

As many German and proper forces are engaged against *Russia* as are needed to ensure the success recently achieved.

Against *Italy*, the absolutely necessary forces were directed from Galicia and from the Serbian border to the South-West.

Against a hostile intervention of *Romania* there are *not even available any forces worthy of mention as such.* (our underlining)

Under these conditions, from the military point of view of the situation of the forces, it seems that there is only one way out, namely winning over Romania for an active participation with us.

In this case, a decisive success against Russia would be expected and then the possibility of returning, quite strong, against Italy or Serbia, depending on how one or the other of these adversaries will turn out to be more dangerous.

It is my duty to make Your Excellency understand the immediate necessity of this solution.

With only a neutral attitude of Romania, no service is rendered to the cause.

General Conrad

Op. No. 10618, deciphered on 23 May 1915

Hour 2, lt. col. Kundmann

[1918 at the Romanians..., vol. I, pp. 607-608, doc. no. 166]

33. May 15th/28th 1915, Bucharest. Information on the situation of Bukovina after the outbreak of the war, transmitted to the Great General Staff by an informer nonmentioned by name.

15 May 1915

REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN BUKOVINA

Eight months of war in a country whose inhabitants were nourished by the fruit of the earth, eight months in which the Russia domination alternated with the Austrian one, could bring nothing but misery and only misery. The Romanian peasants have the most difficult part. The Austrians, taking advantage of their patience, present them as faithful in front of Romania and summon up all to the war, using the 16-18 years old boys for digging ditches, the 18-42 years olds (for the moment) in the war, and the aged people over 42 years old for ditches and transport.

In this time of despair, Romania came to their aid, during holiday times with wheat flour and several wagons of corn. For this service, warm prayers of gratitude are offered to God every day.

But in Dorna there are built large grain warehouses. But cereals? Where from? From Romania, and here's how: the Romanian deputies, as good as Onciu, were in Bucharest asking for 800 wagons of corn for the central office of the village banks. They received them at a very low price. But they worked not only for the Romanian population, but for all nationalities. In a positive way, the following are known:

Two weeks ago, two Jewish bankers, Auhauch and Görber, were in Rădăuți, where they held a conference with the mayor of the city, on the issue of food for the Romanian population. From the conference it was understood that a Jewish bank had given money to the government, and that Auhauch even said they would find the means for the corn in Romania be distributed among other nationalities. It is more certain, however, that most of the corn quantity, if stored in Dorna, will be used for the army. This was also said by the Romanian lawyer Hotinceanu, from Rădăuți, who was stopped by the government from passing through Romania, in order, that's clear, not to denounce what was happening with the corn.

The hope in Romania's friendship begins to disappear completely in Austria. The tendency of Austrians towards Romania is to delay as much as possible its entry into action so that it can at least reach a new harvest. Appeals in all languages urge on the peasants to plough their fields and to sow as many potatoes as possible. However, as the peasants in Bukovina take part in the war (lately, even women and girls went to dig trenches), the land cannot be ploughed. The matter is that by 15 May, the ploughing be completed by the army, and then gathered from here by the army too. The distrust in Romania has grown so much that two weeks ago all the

gendarmes and watchmen at the frontier were reinforced with 5 to 20 soldiers each, all along the borders.

A company of young soldiers from Colomea was brought to the posts on the Moldavian valley, from Humor to Dorna. The very next day the sentries began their guard service at all the crossing points on the frontier. These posts have the task of observing the military movements which are being talked about in Bukovina, actions done on the Romanian territory. It is said that in Fălticeni trenches would be dug and in Brânărel (Dorna) there would be reconnaissances and measurements in the mountains. These are mostly said by the Jews, who always have the most certain information.

The reinforced birch grove that stopped the Russians, was placed under guard again. Before Easter there was no guard there. So it was possible for me to take a look at the reinforcements. For all I saw and heard, the trenches start from the ridge of Giumălău to Prislop, above Cârlibaba. The strong reinforced points are at Mestecăniș, where the Putna Valley opens with the main road and the Ciocănești valley from Cârlibaba. At Prislop, the road leading to Vîjnița at Seletin, over Lucina towards Borșa, and the road from Ciocănești, also towards Borșa – that is, the Bistrita valley, are controlled.

The trenches are well covered and they are extended to the top of the mountains.

[A.M.R., Fund 948, Section 3 information, file no. 326, pp. 844-846]

34. May 1915, Bucharest. Excerpt from the project of operations elaborated by the Great General Staff (Hypothesis B.3) for a two-front war developed by Romania.

GREAT GENERAL STAFF

Section III [secret]

May 1915

OPERATIONAL PROJECT FOR THE HYPOTHESIS. 3

Organizing a war on two fronts: to north, north-west and south.

Overview. The purpose of the war

Hypothesis B.3 provides to undertake a war on two operational fronts, namely:

On the North, North-West front, against Austria-Hungary and its ally – Germany, which will help the former one;

On the South front, against Bulgaria, in case this state is hostile to us. In any case, if Bulgaria were to appear even only uncertain, at the moment of our mobilization, it is necessary to take, by way of precaution, all the military measures prepared for this front. However, all the measures have been taken to ensure that, in case Bulgaria is absolutely sure, we immediately transport all the forces destined to the Southern Front in Transylvania.

The aim of the war we are going to undertake against Austria-Hungary is to **achieve our national ideal, that is unifying the nation. The conquest of the territories inhabited by the Romanians, which are today included in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, must be the fruit of the war**¹⁰⁶.

As Austria-Hungary is currently in war, near our borders, against Russia and Serbia, our entry into action will entail the **cooperation in time with the Russian and Serbian armies**.

The cooperation in space, that is, the struggle closely linked on the same theaters of operations where the Russians and the Serbs are fighting at present, must be removed at least in the first part of the operations, because for us **the purpose shown above will be the determining factor in guiding our operations**.

The intimate cooperation of our armies with the Russian and Serbian armies will occur in the last phase of the operations, in one or more great battles, which will aim to crush the last resistance of the enemy. As indicated above, the war against Bulgaria does not serve a political purpose; it will be a means of defense, in the event that this state will try to attack us from behind, while most of our forces will be in the northern operating theater. **The military purpose of the war against Bulgaria will therefore be to defend the national territory**.

Inevitably, the operations against Bulgaria will take away a large part of our forces, to the detriment of the operational capacity that we have to carry out in the Transylvanian theater of operations.

The positioning of Bulgaria against us will mean that this state was allied with the Central Powers, so it will primarily attack Serbia and implicitly enter into war with Russia too. The operations that we will undertake against Bulgaria will, of course, firstly help Serbia, against which Bulgaria

¹⁰⁶ All the emphasis are in the original text. (o. n.)

– given its claims on Serbian Macedonia – will direct most of its forces. By helping Serbia, we help at the same time Russia and the whole cause of its allies. Our political leadership will have to ask Russia to support, in its turn, our operations against the Bulgarians in the following ways:

A) On water:

a) Protecting the maritime coasts against the Bulgarian fleet and especially against the Turkish one, which will, of course, also try to carry out operations against our maritime coasts, as soon as we take action against the Central Powers (of course if, at the moment of our entry in action, the Turkish fleet is not destroyed or closed in the Bosphorus);

b) On the Danube, reinforcing the forces of our military Navy with the Russian warships that have the possibility of advancing up the river; this aid would be valuable because, on the one hand, we could supervise the Danube course to Bulgaria, and, on the other hand, we could use our entire squadron of monitors against the Austro-Hungarian fluvial forces.

B) On land:

One or two Russian divisions will be held ready to land on the Bulgarian coasts, or, if this is impossible, on the Romanian Black Sea coasts, to operate afterwards in close connection with our troops in the new territory.

The entry of the Russian troops into the Bulgarian territory, in addition to the great material aid they would give us, would still produce such a vivid moral impression on the Bulgarian population that it would be impossible to force the Bulgarian government to cease the hostilities against Russia and thus against us.

Our operations against Austria-Hungary and Germany could be undertaken under the most favorable conditions, if the political leadership succeeds in determine Bulgaria to remain neutral, in exchange for a certain political arrangement. In this case, our back being assured, we will be able to operate with all the forces on the Hungarian operating theater, an essential condition for our armies to be able to make the decision in favor of the cause of our allies, especially at present when the Austro-Hungarian forces in the Carpathians of Galicia, Bukovina and Banat reach colossal effectives.

It results from those foregoing exposed that, if not all, at least the vast majority of our forces will have to be used on the main theater of operations, on the Hungarian theater, where they could contribute to obtaining decisive results for our cause and of our allies.

Considering the above mentioned condition, our mobilized forces have been grouped globally as follows:

A. For operations on the North, North-West Front against Austria-Hungary and Germany:

Two armies: The 1st and the 2nd Armies and a combined Corps, intended to operate on the border from Bucovina, **with a total effective of 348,000 people and 142,000 horses** (without staged troops and sedentary parties);

B. On the South Front. If Bulgaria were hostile to us, or even only when it seemed uncertain at the beginning of our mobilization, it would be concentrated on the southern front, possibly operating, the 3rd Army, a strong one with **159,000 people and 47,000 horses**.

The total of the operating forces (without sedentary parts and staged troops) amounts to: 507,000 people and 180,000 horses. The detailed composition of the armies is shown in the order of battles No. 1 annexed to the operational project; the justification of this composition is shown in the following, within the operational project.

The entry of Romania into the war against Austria-Hungary and Germany, at the present time, when the armies of these states are for a long time mobilized and in war at our borders with Russia and Serbia, must be done under absolutely exceptional conditions concerning the mobilization and the concentration of our forces. The enemy states, as soon as they feel that Romania is beginning the mobilization, will be able to transport within a few days significant forces at our frontiers, with which they will then carry out incursions on our territory, in order to prevent our operations of mobilization and concentration. These operations can only be carried out with arms in hand, under the protection of special operations that must be carried out even from the night of the first day of the general mobilization.

According to those exposed above, the present operational project will include 2 parts, namely:

The PART I will contain the special operations that will be carried out from the first day of mobilization, under the protection of which the general mobilization and the concentration of the bulk of our forces will be carried out.

The PART II of the project will include the subsequent guidance of the general operations, after all our forces will have passed over the Carpathian mountains range and after the battle order of the great units will have been reconstituted, on the enemy territory.

35. May 21st/June 3rd 1915, Teschen. Telegram of General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf addressed to Baron Burián on the emergency of an active intervention of Romania on the side of the Central Powers.

No. 1274 Secret Section

Telegram

Count Thurn

Teschen, 2 June 1915

No. 557 In cipher

Strictly secret and personally

The Chief of the Great General Staff asks me to send the following telegram to Your Excellency:

„Your EXCELLENCY pleased until now to inform me about our negotiations with Romania.

Regarding their emergency I have given indications repeatedly and I can only ask you again not to make dependent the possible conclusion of the negotiations with Romania on a more favorable development of our military situation regarding Russia. The present moment, when the situation here in the north is satisfactory, should not be missed in any case, if it is generally possible to reach an agreement with Romania. Such an agreement is always possible only when the military situation is favorable.

As soon as Romania thinks that only the need pushes us towards negotiations, it raises of course its claims enormously, that's why I consider the present moment as being important for this fast conclusion.

I can not refrain from drawing attention again to the heavy responsibility and the consequences that will necessarily result, if the possibility of attracting on our side Romania's intervention, decisive for the war, had escaped.

Conrad"

[1918 at the Romanians....vol. I, pp. 616-617, doc. no. 171]

36. 23 mai/5 juin 1915, Viennes. Télégramme du baron Burián au comte Ottokar Czernin, par lequel il évalue la situation de la Roumanie, en lui indiquant de présentant constamment aux leaders de Bu-

carest les conséquences négatives qu'une Russie victorieuse dans la guerre peut avoir sur l'état roumain.

Télégramme Vienne, le 23 mai 1915

Le Baron Burián au Comte Ottokar Czernin.

Il est évident que, méconnaissant ses vrais intérêts et leur situation par les promesses que l'Entente fait miroiter devant ses yeux, la Roumanie a essayé sérieusement à s'entendre avec nos ennemis. Sans nous faire illusion là-dessus nous espérons cependant que par une appréciation saine de toutes les éventualités, et mue par l'égoïsme politique naturel qui la fait agir, la Roumanie saura éviter avant qu'il ne soit trop tard, de s'engager dans une politique pernicieuse pour le pays.

La question pour la Roumanie n'est pas seulement de savoir ce qu'elle pourra garder, mais encore ce quelle pourra garder. Il est facile de se rendre compte que les acquisitions que la Roumanie pourrait faire à nos dépens sous les auspices de l'Entente seraient fort précaires. De plus, et abstraction faite de nos efforts inévitables à regagner ce que nous aurions perdu, une Russie victorieuse et arrivée à son but n'accepterait certainement pas cette situation sur le Balkan, qu'une Roumanie forte et agrandie lui barrât le chemin des détroits, entrava la position dominante de la Russie en Bulgarie et exerça une prépondérance prononcée sur les autres États balkaniques, et notamment sur ceux de nationalité slave.

Aux politiciens roumains d'en tirer les conséquences. La défaite de la Russie est une condition de vie pour la Roumanie, vouloir assurer le triomphe de la Russie serait le suicide. Ce sont ces vérités primordiales qu'il nous faudra discuter sans cesse à Bucarest. En outre, nous devons, par un langage calme et assuré éveiller l'impression que nous comptons sur la neutralité de la Roumanie comme sur quelque chose qui va de soi. En même temps il ne faudrait pas cesser non plus de nous enquérir de l'aide militaire de la Roumanie, surtout maintenant après les graves défaites russes.

Ceci pour votre gouverne.

[*Documents diplomatiques concernant les rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Roumanie*, 22 Juillet 1914-27 Août 1916 ,...p. 19]

37. 24 maggio/6 giugno 1915, Bucarest. Telegramma dell'addetto militare italiano, Maggiore Luciano Ferigo¹⁰⁷, concernente le manifestazioni di solidarietà con l'Italia entrata nel conflitto a fianco dell'Intesa.

Bucarest, 6 giugno 1915

Le trattative diplomatiche della Romania con la Russia – almeno da quanto si può vedere qui – sono sospese, e nessun indizio di eccitamento dell'opinione pubblica lascia ancora intravedere la soluzione del presente stato di cose.

Se si fa astrazione dei conati esercitati attraverso la stampa, conati, del resto, che non sembra abbiano una grande influenza sulle masse, ben poco si vede che riveli un risveglio delle masse stesse dall'inconsciente torpore.

Invero c'è stato qui qualche manifestazione in favore degli italiani; ma nessuna di queste – quantunque una di esse veramente grandiosa – può servire a dimostrare che l'opinione pubblica è profondamente compresa del grave momento che il paese sta attraversando e della necessità di prendere senza indugio una determinazione.

Domenica scorsa – 31 Maggio – una imponente dimostrazione in favore dell'Italia ha avuto luogo davanti la Legazione Italiana. La dimostrazione è stata organizzata dai membri della „Lega Culturale”, dall "Azione nazionale”, dall "Azione patriottica”, dall "Associazione Latina”, dall "Amicizia franco-romena”, dalla „Colonia Italiana” ecc. ecc.

Le personalità che figurano in questa dimostrazione, alla quale presero parte più di 10 mila persone, furono i Signori Take Ionescu (capo del partito conservatore-democratico), il Signor Nico Filipescu, il rev. padre Lucaci (prete cattolico della Transilvania), il Sig. Istrati, il prof. Giovanni Cantacuzino ecc. ecc. Furono pronunciati discorsi dal Ministro d'Italia Bar. Fasciotti, dal Signor Istrati e dal Padre Lucaci (presidente della „Lega Culturale”). La dimostrazione durò circa un'ora e si sciolse fra il più vivo entusiasmo; l'ambiente romeno però che vi prese parte – eccettuate le predette

¹⁰⁷ *Luciano Ferigo* (1870-1921) – Maggiore, addetto militare italiano a Bucarest (1913-1917). Promosso fino al grado di maggior-generale (1918). Ha cessato la sua missione in Romania all'inizio del mese di settembre 1917, prendendo il comando di una brigata, ma essendo ferito durante i combattimenti. Sposato con una donna romena, Ioana Slamă. Morto a Bucarest, il 6 novembre 1921.

personalità – era composto in maggioranza da studenti, cioè da gente che grida molto ma che poco può influire sulle determinazioni del paese.

Altre dimostrazioni – meno grandiose – sono state fatte in occasione della partenza dei nostri richiamati: manifestazioni queste che in maxima parte sono state inscenate dal Ministro di Francia.

In sostanza la mia personale impressione è che il paese sonnecchia ancora. Con ciò non voglio dire che non debba risvegliarsi e che il risveglio non possa essere rapido e decisivo; la Romania ha la spiccata impronta dei paesi orientali, ove i cambiamenti sostanziali di situazione possono verificarsi da un momento all'altro.

Intanto in questi giorni è avvenuto un fatto nel quale poco è mancato che l'elemento germanofilo – o per meglio dire l'oro tedesco – non trionfasse: parlo dell'elezione del capo del partito conservatore. Nelle mie precedenti comunicazioni ho fatto comprendere come questo partito sia in gran parte favorevole alla guerra, mentre il suo capo (Signor Marghiloman) – quello che verrebbero ora sostituire – era apertamente germanofilo. Dico era perchè sembra che in questi ultimi tempi il Signor Marghiloman abbia molto cambiato rispetto alle primitive opinioni. Ad ogni modo egli rappresenta ancora idee alquanto diverse da quelle della maggioranza del proprio partito.

L'addetto militare, Maggiore Luciano Ferigo

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Microfilme Italia, inv. 1555, rola 106, cadre 72-74]

38. 5/18 juin 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme de Poklewsky-Koziell, ministre russe à Bucarest, adressé au ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Sergueï Sazonov, relatif à l'entretien avec Ion I. C. Brătianu sur la perspective de l'entrée de la Roumanie dans la guerre.

5/18 juin 1915. N° 340

Bratiano m'a déclaré qu'il était prêt à s'engager définitivement à ce que les actes hostiles contre l'Autriche-Hongrie commencent au plus tard deux mois après la signature de l'entente politique entre les puissances et la Roumanie. Avant l'entrée en action de la Roumanie, une convention militaire doit avoir lieu entre elle et la Russie, pour fixer les conditions de collaboration des troupes russes et roumaines, d'après ce que représentera le champ de bataille au moment où la Roumanie y entrera. Cette même convention

doit assurer autant que possible une aide à la Roumanie de la part des alliés, qui consistera en l’envoi en Roumanie des munitions dont elle pourra avoir besoin. M. Bratiano déclara positivement que l’élaboration de cette convention retarderait en aucune façon l’entrée en guerre de la Roumanie. Quand je lui eus fait mes objections sur le délai si éloigné de l’entrée en guerre de la Roumanie, M. Bratiano m’a déclaré qu’il proposait aux puissances la combinaison suivante: si les puissances acceptent toutes les exigences politiques de la Roumanie, à la condition que la Roumanie entre en guerre cinq semaines après que cette proposition sera faite, M. Bratiano sera prêt à commencer tout de suite des pourparlers dont le but sera cette convention militaire, et il espère que la Roumanie sera prête pour la guerre, à la date que désirent les puissances; si, néanmoins, cela n’était pas, alors il va de soi que les concessions auxquelles sont, – conditionnellement – prêtes les puissances, perdraient toute valeur et toute importance.

Poklevsky

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 194]

39. 7/20 juin 1915, Pétrograd. Télégramme du chef de l’État-Major Général russe, lieutenant-général Nikolai Ianuchkevitch¹⁰⁸, adressé au Grand Quartier Général, sur l’importance et la nécessité de l’entrée de la Roumanie dans la guerre.

7/20 juin 1915. N°285

Références télégrammes Poklevsky Nos. 339 et 340.

Vue la situation militaire qui ne saurait s’améliorer de sitôt, je trouve qu’il serait très important de ne pas décliner les propositions de Bratiano. Il est certain qu’un réel concours militaire de la Roumanie serait précieux, surtout maintenant, mais comme cela est inaccessible, alors, du point de vue militaire, on pourrait se contenter de son entrée en guerre dans un délai de cinq semaines, car le moment est déjà passé où son concours aurait été le plus favorable. Ce qui importe le plus pour le moment, c’est de ne pas laisser passer l’heure et de fixer définitivement la Roumanie dans notre

¹⁰⁸ *Nikolai Nikolaevici Ianuşkevici* (1868-1918) – Général d’infanterie russe, chef du Grand État-Major de l’armée impériale russe (mars 1914-septembre 1915). Retraité de l’armée après la révolution de février 1917, il a été arrêté au début de l’année 1918 à Moguilev (Mahiliow) et ultérieurement assassiné.

camp, car son passage dans le camp de l'ennemi est certain, si – ce qui est possible – nous abandonnons la Galicie. Mon opinion est que pour aboutir nous pouvons accepter toutes les conditions politiques posées par Brătianu; la manière de poursuivre les pourparlers, qui est exposée dans le télégramme n° 339, nous paraît la plus conforme au but, c'est-à-dire, après avoir consenti à toutes les conditions politiques de la Roumanie, l'obliger en échange à entrer en guerre au plus tard dans cinq semaines après cette proposition, et à commencer tout de suite les pourparlers au sujet d'une convention militaire. En général, la manière d'agir est identique à celle qui a été acceptée au moment des pourparlers avec l'Italie. J'y ajouté encore les considérations suivantes, d'un caractère purement militaire:

1° Il est désirable qu'aussitôt après que l'entente militaire sera conclue la Roumanie ferme complètement sa frontière au transit de toute cargaison militaire à destination de la Turquie. Cela peut être fait tout en gardant secrète cette entente pendant un certain temps encore.

2° Pour ce qui est du Banat: il faut réserver à la Serbie la zone qui lui est nécessaire pour la défense de Belgrade. Il serait plus important, du point de vue militaire, que l'espace réservé pour la Serbie soit petit (toutefois pas inférieur à vingt lieues de largeur) mais avec le droit de le fortifier, que le contraire.

3° Pour ce qui est de l'approvisionnement militaire il faut établir avec précision que nous pouvons promettre à la Roumanie des denrées, des chevaux, du bétail, etc., mais pas de munitions, de canons, fusils, etc., dont nous-mêmes nous avons besoin. Cela, c'est les alliés qui pourraient le promettre.

Ianouchkevitch

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 194-196]

40. 9/22 giugno 1915, Bucarest. Telegramma dell'addetto militare in Bucarest, Maggiore Luciano Ferigo, esponendo il rapporto presentato dal Primo Ministro Ion I.C. Brătianu davanti alla delegazione italiana in visita nell'Impero russo, relativo alla politica della Romania e le sue relazioni con il Regno italiano.

Il 19 corrente ho accompagnato i due ufficiali facenti parte della missione militare italiana in Russia (Maggiore Marsengo e sottotenente Guidi) a far visita al signor Brătianu, Presidente del Consiglio romeno.

Questi ci aveva fatti avvertire che, essendo sofferente, non avrebbe potuto accordarci che una visita di brevissima durata; il colloquio invece – come esporrò qui di seguito – andò successivamente animandosi e durò più di un'ora. Il Signor Bratiano incominciò dell'esprimere profondi sensi di amicizia verso l'Italia, dimostrò quindi vivo rincrescimento per la mancata contemporaneità nell'entrata in azione, e soggiunse che se era stato disiluso nella realizzazione di questo primo (text nedescifrat) imminente cooperazione delle due nazioni sorelle.

Dopo che il Maggiore Marsengo rivolse qualche parole di ringraziamento, presi occasione per esprimere al Signor Bratiano la mia vivissima soddisfazione per avere sentito pronunciare parole che davano speranza nella prossima entrata in azione della Romania.

Il Presidente del Consiglio aggiunse qualche altra frase di cortesia e sembrava volesse terminare subito la conversazione, quando, d'un tratto, si rivolse a me e così si esprese: „Quantunque non fosse mia intenzione di trattare argomenti politici o militari durante questa breve visita, non posso ora esimermi dal farvi presente che il nuovo ritardo imposto nella fornitura delle munizioni comandate, non può che mandare più in lungo la nostra entrata in azione; esso ritardo, impiegato come sistema di pressione, non è atto di saggia politica, giacchè è ovvio che se noi domandiamo insistentemente munizioni non è certo per restare con le mani in pancia bensì per entrare al più presto nel conflitto”.

L'attacco non poteva restare senza risposta, e sopra tutto da parte mia, giacchè io conoscevo troppe cose per non valermene. Risposi subito che se i paesi i quali – con l'autorizzazione dei rispettivi governi – si erano impegnati di fornire munizioni alla Romania eran stati costretti a frapportare nuovi ritardi nella consegna delle munizioni stesse, ciò non doveva essere interpretato come atto di pressione, nè tanto meno di rappresaglia, bensì come conseguenza logica della presente situazione: quei paesi sono in guerra ed hanno assoluto bisogno di disporre di tutti i mezzi che sono in grado di produrre; essi tuttavia acconsentirebbero ancora a privarsi in parte delle loro munizioni a favore di uno stato che volesse immediatamente cooperare, ma non potrebbero certo fare lo stesso con altro stato che non sapesse se e quando vorrà entrare in azione.

„Ma non vi accorgete – soggiunse il Signor Bratiano – che la sospensione dell'invio delle munizioni costituisce il principale ostacolo al nostro intervento?”

„Se il mio governo – risposi – fosse convinto che alcuna altra causa – oltre quella delle munizioni vi sconsiglia di entrare immediatamente nel conflitto, state pur certo che farebbe per voi anche dei sacrifici pur di accontentarvi; di ciò del resto voi dovrete essere ben persuaso, considerando quanto l'Italia ha già fatto per la Romania fino a poco tempo fa”.

„Riconosco ciò che l'Italia ha fatto per noi – ribattè il Signor Bratiano – ma io devo ora fissare gli sguardi verso l'avvenire; ripartisco il mondo in due grandi categorie di persone – e ciò che dico per le persone vale anche, e forse meglio, per le collettività – una prima categoria che vive sempre in buona fede ed una seconda categoria che dubita continuamente; la prima categoria è da me di gran lunga preferita alla seconda”.

„Nessun popolo – risposi – desidera quanto il popolo italiano di vivere continuamente in buona fede; ma oggi, dinanzi ai fatti, la buona fede sulle parole perde ogni valore; non metto in dubbio che voi adorate quella prima categoria di persone e di collettività, epperò – giacchè per il momento voi siete meno degli altri sotto la pressione della necessità immediate – potreste, fidando in chi ha dimostrata tanta buona volontà – offrire una manifestazione evidente dei vostri convincimenti”.

Forse vedendo che la conversazione aveva presa una china a lui non molto favorevole, il Signor Bratiano si affrettò a cambiare argomento. Osservò che questo non gli sembrava il momento più opportuno per l'entrata in azione della Romania: „ noi vorremmo uscire quando i Russi avessero completamente ricostituito il proprio esercito ed i propri servizi e fossero, com'è ora l'Italia, pronti ad intraprendere un'azione offensiva; una maggiore attività russa e serba dovrebbe coprire la mobilitazione romena.”

Feci subito rilevare che l'attendere una situazione ideale nelle presenti circostanze è sempre un errore; l'evento potrà come non potrà verificarsi; il momento attuale è ancora assai favorevole per l'entrata in azione della Romania, giacchè i depositi della Transilvania e del Banato sono quasi vuoti di valide riserve, mentre non sono supponibili tempestivi spostamenti di truppe austro-tedesche in modo da ostacolare l'inizio delle operazioni romene. Feci, poscia, le stesse considerazioni che avevo esposte al Ministro Costinesco, nella conferenza del 18 corrente, relativamente all'opportunità di cedere – uscendo con una parte delle forze per la Moldavia settentrionale – sul fianco e sul tergo delle truppe austro-tedesche che operano in Bucovina.

Il Signor Bratiano osservò essere le esigenze politiche quelle che impongono la direzione alle operazioni belliche: „noi dobbiamo uscire secondo

la direzione che la politica ci addita e questa direzione e quella data dalla Transilvania e dalla capitale della Ungheria”.

Risposi che non intendevo menomamente discutere concezioni strategiche; ma, che non potevo esimermi dal far rispettosamente presente come tutta la storia militare dimostri essere grave errore quello di voler lasciare che la politica diriga la guerra; appena aperte le ostilità non deve esservi altro obiettivo oltre quello di battere il nemico nel più breve tempo possibile e nel modo più possibile efficace.

(Mi consta che sia stato dato ordine nello Stato Maggiore di studiare l'operazione – con un nucleo di truppe – per la Moldavia settentrionale).

Il Signor Bratiano riprese subito la questione delle munizioni ribattendo essere pessimo consiglio quello di far ritardare la spedizione delle munizioni alla Romania, giacchè questa è – sotto tale aspetto – ancora in cattive condizioni.

Feci rilevare che i Governi dei paesi che si sono impegnati nella fornitura conoscono con sufficiente esattezza di quali riserve la Romania disponga; e poichè il signor Bratiano – forse punto dell'osservazione- espresse essere egli solo giudice di ciò che occorra al proprio paese per entrare in guerra, soggiunsi che allo stesso modo conveniva lasciare il diritto ai governi interessati di decidere sull'opportunità o no di continua – ad impinguare – in momenti tanto difficili – uno stato che non pare voglia entrare immediatamente nel conflitto: „entrate in azione – replicai – e vedrete con quale facilità molti ostacoli potranno essere superati”.

„Le relazioni di cordialità e di mutuo appoggio fra l'Italia e la Romania – continuò il Presidente del Consiglio – devono andare oltre alle circostanze del momento: l'Italia ha tutto l'interesse che la Romania sia grande e forte ed io faccio molto assegnamento sull'amicizia del vostro paese anche dopo la guerra, giacchè allora, forse più che al presente, i vincoli di razza, di comunità di interessi ecc. renderanno necessaria una costante cooperazione”.

„In Italia tutti sono convinti – risposi – della giustezza delle vostre considerazioni, e già da lungo tempo si sono cercati tutti i mezzi per gettare le basi di quest'opera che dovrà essere in avvenire assai feconda: l'Italia desidera intensamente che la Romania sia forte e grande, e se non ha sempre potuto aiutarvi nelle vostre aspirazioni è perchè avrebbe dovuto vincere ostacoli insuperabili; del resto la forza della Romania non dovrà essere unicamente cercata nella quantità dei sudditi quanto nella omogenità di essi”.

Ripresi a parlare quindi dell'opportunità di non lasciar passare il momento favorevole, attardandosi nella ricerca di uno migliore nei riguardi

militari o più profittevole per i compensi; e ricordai che le aspirazioni nazionali romene erano così legate alle sorti dell'intesa da non permettere alla Romania la concezione di portare agli altri vantaggio maggiore di quanto non ne possa trarre per se stessa.

Si parlò poi della durata degli eventuali accordi militari; espressi l'opinione che – quando la Romania fosse decisa ad operare – gli accordi militari potrebbero essere completamente trattati in brevissimo tempo.

Il Presidente del Consiglio terminò il colloquio esprimendo la speranza che le sue parole non abbiano potuto lasciare in noi qualche dubbio circa la sua ferma volontà di entrare in azione, ed assicurando esservi in Italia chi – molto dall'alto – vegli con grande benevolenza sui destini romeni.

L'addetto militare, Maggiore Luciano Ferigo

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Microfilme Italia, inv. 1555, rola 106, cadrele 93-104]

41. 12/25 giugno 1915, Bucarest. Telegramma dell'addetto militare italiano in Bucarest, Maggiore Luciano Ferigo, relativo alle trattative tra la Romania ed i paesi dell'Intesa, specialmente la Russia, sull'eventualità dell'entrata in guerra e sulla situazione dell'esercito romeno.

Bucarest, 25 Giugno 1915

Sembra che le trattative russo-romene si avvicinino alla soluzione. Circa 10 giorni or sono, il Ministro plenipotenziario di Russia a Bucarest presentò la seguente domanda al Presidente del Consiglio romeno, signor Bratiano: „Nel caso in cui le trattative diplomatiche fra la Russia e la Romania approdassero ad un risultato positivo, dopo quanto tempo dall'accordo diplomatico potrebbe l'esercito romeno essere pronto a marciare?” Signor Bratiano – quantunque la domanda fosse ben determinata a tale da richiedere una risposta categorica – si esprime in parte evasivamente e in parte rivolgendo a sua volta nuove domande. Rispose che il tempo necessario all'esercito romeno per esplicare un'azione oltre frontiera variava, secondo le circostanze, da 25 giorni a 2 mesi; che, ad ogni modo, la determinazione di entrare nel conflitto rimaneva sempre subordinata alla totale concessione delle richieste territoriali da lui formulate. Chiese, infine, se l'intesa era in grado di assicurarli il rifornimento delle munizioni, e se la mobilitazione romena avrebbe potuto essere coperta da una maggiore attività per parte degli eserciti russo e serbo.

Come si vede, la risposta del Signor Bratiano non era delle più soddisfacenti, sia perchè non bene determinata, sia perchè implicanti condizioni sulle quali l'accordo appariva irrealizzabile. La totale concessione infatti delle richieste territoriali non può che disgustare la Serbia, mentre – nelle presenti condizioni – è essenzialmente sulla buona volontà di questo stato che si deve contare per assicurare il rifornimento delle munizioni alla Romania, giacchè ora non esiste altra linea di transito che quella passante per Salonico et Niso. Analoga considerazione si può fare per quanto riguarda la domanda di coprire la mobilitazione romena con una intensa attività per parte della Russia e della Serbia.

Tre giorni fa la Russia – sempre a mezzo del proprio Ministro plenipotenziario a Bucarest – faceva pervenire al Signor Bratiano una risposta sulle richieste territoriali, secondo la quale si concedeva alla Romania la Bucovina fino alla linea del Pruth e la Transilvania nei limiti dalla Romania agognati; ma si faceva una riduzione circa il Torontal proponendo di lasciare una parte di questo alla Serbia.

Il Signor Bratiano (pasaj neinteligibil n.n.) su alcun punto delle richieste romene; ma che avrebbe immediatamente disposto per l'entrata in azione dell'esercito, quando dette richieste fossero integralmente soddisfatte.

Alla obiezione rivoltagli dal nostro Ministro plenipotenziario circa la difficoltà per parte dell'intesa di conciliare la concessione del Torontal alla Romania con l'assicurazione circa il rifornimento delle munizioni, il Signor Bratiano rispose che, occorrendo, avrebbe – per il transito di queste – provveduto egli stesso procedendo ad un accordo con la Bulgaria.

Data la presente situazione sul fronte orientale, non è impossibile che la Russia ceda alla Romania su ogni punto. Certo se si avesse potuto prevedere di dover arrivare a tale conclusione, meglio valeva cedere subito; il ritardo non potè che nuocere all'azione militare, mentre rappresenta quasi un'umiliazione per la Russia nel campo politico. Comunque, provvidenziale sarebbe ora fare presto, chè l'attendere potrebbe portare a situazioni tali da indurre la Romania a non più impegnarsi.

Si noti che questo Governo – da quanto è stato detto e si ripete – vorrà gli sia concesso un tempo non certo inferiore a quattro settimane, a decorrere dal giorno della stipulazione dell'accordo per procedere alle operazioni di mobilitazione e di concentramento. Invero tale margine di tempo potrebbe – volendo – essere ridotto alla metà; ma qui evidentemente, si cercano tutti gli appigli per ritardare, sia per mettersi in migliori condizioni riguardo ai rifornimenti, sia (e questa è la causa più influente) per attendere

che la sorte prepari una situazione meno pericolosa e, forse anche, un'altra che spezzi gli impegni.

Certo è che il Signor Bratiano, il quale, dinanzi all'imponente problema dell'unità nazionale, ha creduto di poter perdere le migliori occasioni di entrata facile ed efficace nel conflitto solo per il caparbio, mercantile spirito di ottenere di più mentre gli era stato concesso già abbastanza, il Signor Bratiano, dico, si trova ora sbattuto fra i marosi della responsabilità e del dubbio e cerca velare con la maschera di un'apparente sicurezza le interne battaglie dello spirito. Egli ad ogni modo asserisce che appena gli si concederà il richiesto disporrà per l'entrata in azione; saggio consiglio sarebbe per parte dell'Intesa di approfittare senza ritardo di questi momenti che potrebbero essere fuggevoli.

Fra i molti vantaggi che apporterebbe all'Intesa l'intervento della Romania sarebbe anche quello di far cessare totalmente il passaggio di munizioni tedesche dirette in Turchia, passaggio che, ad onta delle misure prese dal Governo, sembra continui ad effettuarsi in misura non insignificante.

A questo riguardo devo osservare che la corruzione determinata dall'oro tedesco è qui tale da rendere vane in parte molte delle misure governative; si sa – per esempio – che i figli del Ministro Costinesco – di quello stesso intorno a cui si serrano gli uomini d'azione del partito liberale – sono stati implicati in molte delle più losche speculazioni, ritraendo larghi guadagni. A maggior chiarimento ed a conferma dei miei apprezzamenti, unisco qui allegato, il manifesto rivolto, il giorno 20 corrente, dall' „Azione Nazionale” al popolo romeno, per rivelare al pubblico quale ignobile mercimonio si stia ora compiendo in Romania.

Fra i mezzi di cui si servono i tedeschi per effettuare il contrabbando delle munizioni sono stati già scoperti quelli dei vagoni a doppio fondo, delle munizioni trasportate entro colonne di cemento armate ed entro barili di birra ecc.; ma tutte le frodi non vengono scoperte ed impedito. Si sa per esempio che i numerosissimi corrieri diplomatici diretti in Turchia passano, indisturbati, con enormi bagagli, e che interi vagoni sfuggono talvolta senza l'ausilio di simulazioni.

Ora il Governo ha preso la determinazione di riunire in apposita località di Bucarest tutti i carri ferroviari che vengono segnalati come contenenti munizioni dirette in Turchia, la disposizione certo potrebbe essere efficace, ma ciò dipenderà essenzialmente dal modo come essa verrà seguita. Forse sarebbe stato assai meglio formare un parco con le munizioni e non con i carri ferroviari.

Nessuna disposizione è stat ancora presa per il congedamento degli uomini delle classi richiamate; si concedono solo brevi licenze con lo scopo di facilitare i lavori campestri, e queste brevi licenze vengono opportunamente scaglionate. Naturalmente tanto i proprietari quanto i contadini reclamano per la lunga ed inutile permanenza alle armi dei richiamati, ed è presumibile che le cose più non possano trascinare così; ormai una soluzione s'impone.

Non mi è stato possibile sapere se e come si sia provviato circa il comando supremo di questo esercito; credo però che il Generale Iliescu¹⁰⁹ continui ad esercitare la massima influenza sul presidente del consiglio, e che il Generale Averesco sia solo comandante di Armata. Strano appare il fatto che solo pochi giorni or sono lo Stato maggiore è stato interpretato

¹⁰⁹ *Dumitru Iliescu* (1865-1940) – ufficiale di artiglieria con studi in Romania (1884-1886, capo classe) e in Francia [Scuola Politecnica di Parigi e Scuola di Applicazione di Artiglieria e Genio di Fontainebleau (1886-1891)]. Partito per la Francia, fu accolto dal primo ministro Ion C. Brătianu, che era anche ministro ad interim presso il Ministero della Guerra, il quale, tra le altre raccomandazioni, gli consigliò di allacciare amicizia con suo figlio Ionel, anche questo alla Scuola Politecnica di Parigi. Questo rapporto di amicizia fu utile per Dumitru Iliescu nella sua successiva evoluzione. Carriera militare: sottotenente – 1 luglio 1886; tenente – 1 gennaio 1889; capitano – 8 aprile 1893; maggiore – 10 maggio 1899; tenente colonnello – 10 maggio 1907; colonnello, 10 maggio 1910; generale di brigata – 14 marzo 1914. Il 1 maggio 1918, si dimise dai ranghi attivi dell'esercito. Dopo essere ritornato dagli studi di Francia, fu nominato, dal generale Iacob Lahovari, ministro della guerra a quel tempo, professore di meccanica alla Scuola di applicazione di artiglieria e genio, funzione in cui attivò più di due decenni. Inoltre, alla fine del XIX secolo e all'inizio del XX secolo, fu insegnante alla Scuola Superiore di Guerra, insegnando il corso di tattica di artiglieria. Fu ufficiale nell'arsenale dell'esercito (1893-1894), membro di varie commissioni per la ricezione del materiale di artiglieria, in particolare dei cannoni; nel 1907 fu nominato direttore dell'artiglieria presso il Ministero della Guerra, e nel 1909 assunse la carica di capo di stato maggiore del 2° Corpo d'armata, con la sede a Bucarest e comandato dal principe ereditario Ferdinando, per poi trasferirsi sullo stesso posto all'Ispettorato generale dell'esercito, diretto sempre da Ferdinando. Nell'autunno del 1912 fu nominato comandante del 2° reggimento di artiglieria. Prese parte alla guerra rumeno-bulgara in qualità di aiuto dell'ispettore generale di artiglieria, il generale Constantin Coandă. Con il grado di generale di divisione, diresse il Segretariato Generale del Ministero della Guerra tra il 10 gennaio 1914 e il 14 agosto 1916. Al momento della dichiarazione di guerra fu investito nella posizione di capo del Grande Quartiere Generale Rumeno, dirigendo effettivamente le operazioni dell'esercito rumeno nell'autunno dell'anno 1916, poiché il generale Vasile Zottu figurava in qualità di capo nominale di questa struttura. Il 5 dicembre 1916 fu sostituito dalla funzione e inviato in Francia come rappresentante del Grande Quartiere Generale Rumeno (1917-1919). Molto vicino al primo ministro Ion I. C. Brătianu, Dumitru Iliescu è stato una personalità militare controverso, essendo uno degli autori morali delle sconfitte militari registrate nei mesi di agosto-novembre 1916.

– per la prima volta – dal Presidente del Consiglio relativamente alla situazione militare; finora dunque l'unico consigliere del Signor Bratiano era stato il Generale Iliesco, la cui figura morale è ormai troppo nota a cotesto comando perch'io ne riparli.

Per quanto riguarda l'esercito credo poter rimandare a ciò che ho esposto in varie occasioni e che, del resto, qui riassumo: il soldato è buono, sobrio, obbediente, e gli ufficiali sono in gran parte intelligenti, colti e di buona volontà. le migliori forze e più sane del paese sono dall'esercito rappresentate, e tutto lascia supporre che se questo venisse chiamato ad operare risponderebbe all'appello con intelligenza e con eletto spirito di devozione e di sacrificio.

L'addetto militare, Maggiore Luciano Ferigo

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Microfilme Italia, inv. 1555, rola 106, cadrele 105-116]

42. 14/27 juin 1915, Paris. Télégramme du ministre russe en France, A. P. Izvolski, adressé à Sergueï Sazonov, ministre des Affaires Étrangères, relatant la discussion qu'il avait eue avec Théophile Delcassé concernant la neutralité prolongée de la Roumanie.

14/27 juin 1915. N° 393

À ma visite d'aujourd'hui j'ai trouvé Delcassé très affligé par les dernières nouvelles de Bucarest, d'après lesquelles Bratiano reste inflexible, c'est-à-dire que la Roumanie ne déclarera la guerre, – et encore dans cinq semaines seulement – que si ses exigences territoriales concernant la Bucovine et le Banat sont pleinement satisfaites. Delcassé ignore jusqu'à présent ce qu'on en dira à Londres et surtout à Pétrograd. Quant à lui, si la Russie et l'Angleterre donnent leur consentement à ce que demande la Roumanie, il n'y verra pas d'objections. «Mais il faut surtout, – ajouta-t-il – ne pas oublier les sentiments d'amertume et de désenchantement qu'a éveillés en Serbie la décision des Alliés par rapport à la Macédoine et surtout le fait qu'on n'a même pas bien établi quelles compensations on lui accordera en échange». Delcassé est d'avis que si les alliés consentent à satisfaire aux exigences de la Roumanie pour gagner son concours militaire, il faudrait alors faire savoir à la Serbie qu'elle recevra non seulement la Bosnie, l'Herzégovine et une partie de la côte Dalmate, mais encore que les alliés ne verront

pas d'objections à ce que les Serbes réalisent leur désir d'une Grande Serbie, par l'union de la Croatie au royaume serbe. Si de cette manière on réussit à gagner le concours de la Roumanie, et à sa suite de la Bulgarie, probablement faudrait-il immédiatement après faire concorder dans tous leurs détails les projets militaires de tous les alliés, pour utiliser pleinement leur supériorité numérique et forcer l'ennemi à diviser ses forces.

Suite dans prochain télégramme.

Izvolski

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 196-197]

43. 16/29 juin 1915, Paris. Télégramme du ministre russe en France, A. P. Izvolski, envoyé à Sergueï Sazonov, ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à la suite du télégramme du [15]/28 juin, par lequel il lui relate l'entretien avec Théophile Delcassé relatif à la situation militaire et la neutralité prolongée de la Roumanie.

16/29 juin 1915. N° 399

Suite de mon n° 393.

Bien qu'en me parlant Delcassé se soit soigneusement abstenu de toute critique à notre adresse ou de toute tentative d'influencer notre décision, j'ai bien vu que nos pour parlers avec la Roumanie, qui continuent à traîner en longueur, l'inquiètent extrêmement. La tournure des événements sur le champ de bataille de Galicie comme ici est la cause à Paris d'une très grande nervosité. L'offensive de l'armée française qui a commencé il y a plus d'un mois n'a eu jus qu'à présent que des succès de détail, malgré la tension de la lutte et les pertes énormes; on commence ici à douter de la possibilité de percer, par une attaque de front, les lignes allemandes et de repousser l'ennemi hors de France. On commence à redouter la nécessité d'une autre campagne hivernale dans les tranchées, ou bien que les Allemands ne jettent ici des forces redoutables empruntées au front est et n'avancent en masse sur Calais ou Paris. On continue en France à s'attendre à être sauvé par un mouvement de flanc de l'Italie et de la Roumanie, on attache donc une énorme importance à leur entrée en guerre. Les milieux gouvernementaux ne montrent encore ni faiblesse ni fatigue, mais on peut observer des symptômes inquiétants dans l'opinion publique, symptômes avec lesquels il faut compter. Une autre campagne d'hiver dans les tranchées ou bien une

invasion de la France par l'ennemi peuvent causer un accès de désespoir et des troubles à l'intérieur. Bien que Delcassé et ses collègues n'en parlent pas ouvertement je vois qu'ils partagent l'avis des milieux parlementaires, à savoir qu'en pareilles circonstances ce sont les considérations militaires qui doivent prendre le dessus, et que le concours de la Roumanie doit donc être acheté à n'importe quel prix.

Mon devoir est d'appeler sur tout ce que je viens de mentionner votre attention la plus sérieuse, car en cas de complet insuccès des pourparlers avec la Roumanie et d'une tournure défavorable des événements sur le théâtre de guerre ici, c'est nous que l'opinion publique française ne manquera pas de charger de la responsabilité.

Izvolski

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 197-198]

44. June 16th/29th 1915, Bucharest. Talk between Ion I. C. Brătianu and General Al. Averescu relating to the possibilities of cooperation with the Russian army. Project of cooperation between the Romanian army and the Russian one.

I gave the convention project to Brătianu. Together, we studied on the map the situation of the Russians.

In my opinion, Brătianu was always a big X¹¹⁰. He appeared to be very kind, but to what extent this kindness is sincere, I would not have the courage to say, nor to discuss it.

I remember February 1909¹¹¹.

Collaboration project of the Romanian-Russian forces

In the case of a cooperation of the Romanian Army with the Russian Imperial Army, the operations will be guided and carried out on the following bases:

¹¹⁰ In the sense of a large unknown.

¹¹¹ The author refers to the episode of his removal from the government led by Ion I.C. Brătianu in which he, Averescu, held from March 1907 the portfolio of the Ministry of War. The President of the Council proceeded to a cabinet reshuffle in February 1909, the only Minister replaced being the War Minister. It was a maneuver of Ion I.C. Brătianu to get rid of Averescu, become troublesome for various reasons, one of them being also the contacts with some opposition politicians, such as Take Ionescu.

1. The Romanian army will enter Transylvania crossing the Carpathians on the South and West sides of Transylvania, through the valleys opening communications towards the Mures Valley and the Trotus Valley.

2. From the Mureș valley, the Romanian army, through a conversion to the left, will cross the Apuseni Mountains of Transylvania and advance to Tisza with the wing at Szolnok.

3. The offensive movement of the Romanian army will start on the ... day following the decision of the mobilization.

4. A Russian army constituted of 3-4 army corps will operate offensively on the right flank of the Romanian army on the Chernivtsi-Kolomeea front, to enter the upper basin of the Tisza.

5. The area of operations of this army will extend to south up to: Iacobi-Borșa-Maramoros-Sziget-Nagy Banya-Szatmar-Nemety-Mate Szalka-Nyregy Haza-Mező Sombor-Miskolcz, inclusively all these points and the communication routes which connects them. (See map of Austrian General Staff scale 1: 750,000).

This demarcation line can be modified after a prior agreement between the command of the Romanian army and that of the Russian army in Bukovina.

6. The offensive of the Russian imperial army in Bukovina will be covered, on the left flank and, if necessary, even supported by a group of... Romanian divisions concentrated for this purpose in the region of Pascani.

7. The operations in Bukovina will be prepared and guided so that, on the date when the movement of the Romanian army starts for crossing the Carpathians, the imperial army should already rule over at least the upper Prut line with the Cernovitz-Kolomeea points.

8. In case the advance of the Russian imperial forces from Bukovina would face a severe resistance in the mountain passes, a part of the Romanian right wing forces could be directed to the north in the Szatmar Nemetz-Maramoros Sziget direction, in order to directly threaten the right and the back of the enemy right wing.

This convention becomes compulsory for both parties as soon as it is seen and approved by the commanders-in-chief of the Russian Imperial Army and of the Romanian Royal Army. The respective chiefs of the General Staff will certify these approvals with their own signature.

9. Should enemy superior forces try through a strong pressure, started from the upper valley of the Tisza, on the right side of the Romanian army, to stop its advance to the West and force it to return at least to the north, the Russian imperial army from Bukovina will push with energy its

offensive to the upper Tisa valley in order to coordinate its efforts with those of the Romanian army in this region.

10. The agreement in the management of the operations of the two parties will be ensured by the following means:

a) The Romanian General Staff will delegate to the main Russian Headquarters as well as to the headquarters of the imperial army in Bukovina, a single chief of staff who will keep up the commander in chief of all the Russian imperial forces, as well as the commander of the army in Bukovina, with the dispositions of the Romanian supreme command.

b) The Russian supreme commander, as well as the army command in Bucovina, will delegate a single chief of staff to the Romanian commander in chief for the same purpose.

11. In the cases provided at No. 8 and 9, the superior leadership of the operations will be incumbent to the supreme command of the Romanian army, as long as the two armies will follow directly and concomitantly the same objective.

12. The Russian army will be able to use the Ungheni-Paşcani-Itcani railway for the supply and reinforcement of the army in Bukovina.

[Marshal Alexandru Averescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 82; 215-217]

45. 25 juin/8 juillet 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme du premier-ministre Ion I.C. Brătianu adressé à Constantin Diamandy, ministre roumain à Pétrograd, par lequel on lui demande d'expliquer aux autorités russes les raisons de l'ajournement de l'entrée en action de la Roumanie.

T.C.

No. I201 expédié le 25 VI/8 VII 915 à minuit 45

Excellence Diamandy, Ministre Roumanie PTG.

O'Beirne¹¹² croit que si on a pas encore répondu favorablement à nos conditions politiques, c'est parce que Sazonow ne croit pas qu'elles suffisent à déterminer notre entrée en action.

¹¹² *Hugh James O'Beirne* (1867-1916) – Diplomate britannique. À deux reprises, il fut envoyé en mission à Saint-Petersbourg, puis accrédité à Washington, Constantinople et Paris. En juillet 1914, il fut envoyé en mission à Sofia, participant aux négociations que la Bulgarie avait menées avec l'Entente. De retour à Londres, il fut employé au ministère des Affaires étrangères. Il fut envoyé en mission en Russie mais il mourut au 5 juin 1916, au bord de *HMS Hampshire* quand, le cuirassé heurta une mine allemande au nord-ouest de l'archipel des Orcades, catastrophe qui a coûté aussi la vie de maréchal Lord Kitchener.

Je lui ait fait comprendre combien la méfiance était funeste, mais je ne lui ai pas caché que les dates d'une action militaire dépendent fatalement de la question des munitions, où a à peine comencé à prendre une attitude plus favorable, et de la situation des armées alliées; pour ce dernier point je me réfère à mon télégramme chiffré du 5 juin; à partir de: „ainsi par exemple” jusqu'à: „de toute manière”. Et si cinq semaines semblaient suffisantes avec les Russes à Lemberg et Halich, ce délai pourrait être dangereux aujourd'hui.

Mon interlocuteur a admis mon point de vue et a reconnu qu'une action roumaine devrait correspondre à des possibilités d'offensive, qui n'existent pas en ce moment; mais il pense que des explications dans le genre que je lui ai données rassureraient Sazonow et feraient faire des concessions politiques indispensables pour nous.

Je lui ai dit, que je trouve inopportun, avant qu'on ne nous ait pas reconnu la frontière du Danube, de revenir à la question des cinq semaines, car peut-être, après un sérieux et sincère examen des conditions militaires, il n'y aura pas nécessité de modifier le terme.

Il croyait que ce n'est pas à une ou deux semaines près que la question soulève de grandes difficultés.

Je m'empresse de vous communiquer la conversation, avec la conviction qu'il faut avant tout obtenir la question du Danube et l'assurance des munitions. Dans ce dernier ordre d'idées, l'Allemagne, relativement au passage du matériel de guerre à la Turquie, a pris une attitude qui donne à cette affaire une caractère ne laissant pas de doute sur nos intentions. Dans ces conditions, il est indispensable pour nous d'être sûrs que nos conditions politiques nous sont acquises de la part de la Triple Entente.

Signé: BRATIANO

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Casa Regală, dosar 29/1915, p. 1]

46. 28 juin/11 juillet 1915, Pétrograd. Télégramme de Constantin Diamandy adressé à Ion I. C. Brătianu, en lui relatant en bref le mécontentement de Sergueï Sazonov relativement à la tergiversation de l'entrée de la Roumanie en guerre aux côtés de l'Entente.

Télégramme chiffré enregistré sous No. 1228
Expédié le 28 Juin/11 Juillet 1915, après midi.

Excellence Bratiano

Bucarest

J'ai été voir Sazonow hier soir. Il m'a parlé a peu près mêmes termes que Ambassadeur d'Italie de la déception que causait notre attitude et qu'il était à bout de patience. Dans un long télégramme Poklewsky a relaté entretien Votre Excellence avec O'Beirne, dont conclusions seraient qu'il n'est pas impossible que Roumanie entre action. Je lui ai résumé votre télégramme chiffré sur ce même entretien.

Pour munitions, il m'a dit que cela concernait surtout France et Italie et qu'il ne s'en mêlait pas. Il croit savoir que nous disposons mille cinq cents projectiles par pièce, ce qui permet entrée en campagne immédiate.

A ce propos j'ai attiré son attention sur importance du passage et que a moins ouverture Detroits, nous devrions nous assurer concours Grèce, plus difficile obtenir une fois belligérants.

Sazonow est venu à me parler démarche quasi comminatoire de l'Allemagne concernant interdiction passage munitions Turquie. Il apprendre que nous nous trouvions un jour sous coup ultimatum. J'ai souligné service rendu Triple Entente. Il apprécie d'autant plus que laisser passer munitions turquie équivaldrait rupture avec Triple Tntente.

Au cours entretien, il m'a dit qu'il envisageait que intervention militaire Roumanie serait indépendante, et qu'il pensait que notre manière comprendre coopération avec Russie ne réduirait pas rôle armée roumaine à corps expéditionnaire annexe armée russe, ce qu'il croyait déplairait chez nous où sentiment amour propre et indépendance est si développé. Sazonow m'a paru désenchanté sur campagne Italie.

En terminant entretien, Sazonow m'a dit que dans quelque jours nous recevrons nouvelles propositions délimitations et que ce serait les dernières. Si après Roumanie n'intervenait pas Triple Entente se détournerait définitivement de nous et tout ce qui avait été convenu auparavant entre nous, tomberait.

Je n'ai pas insisté pour savoir quelles étaient ces dernières offres; impression est qu'elles ne seraient tout de même pas Theiss et Danube sans aucune réserve. Aussi on peut se demander si pour prévenir nouvel accord, il n'y aurait pas avantage à prendre dévants et dire que si toutes conditions acceptées nous interviendrons à telle date.

Signé: Diamandy

47. June-August 1915, Bucharest. Excerpt from I.G. Duca¹¹³ Memoirs concerning the „Poklewski incident”

At the end of June – the beginning of July 1915, we went through the most difficult moment of our neutrality. As we have seen since the beginning of spring, the negotiations with the Entente had been suspended in a deadlock. Neither the Russians nor Brătianu yielded up. When the Russians retreated from Galicia, they resorted to pressures. Obviously they would have needed us to help them. Brătianu always replied: „Until you accept my conditions, I do not enter.” It seems that in one of these discussions, in order to see if Brătianu acts really in full faith – because the opposition did not cease to tell him the opposite – Poklewski would have said to him: „If we accept your conditions, will you go in?” And Brătianu, who acts in full faith, would have replied, „Yes, I’ll come in immediately. Not the next day, but within the necessary time for me to complete my last preparations for the entry.” “And how long do you evaluate this term – at months, at weeks, how much time?” Brătianu established it at four weeks. “Really?” “Yes, really.” “Well,” Poklewski added, “do you authorize me to officially communicate it to Petersburg?” “Yes, I do.” Brătianu replied. And Poklewski asked him for a written declaration. In May and June, as things getting worse for the Russians, Poklewski – since he was leading the negotiations on the part of the Entente – was instructed to be as conciliatory as possible. With a mathematical certainty, each Russian defeat on the Polish front was followed by a new concession made to Brătianu. And when Warsaw fell¹¹⁴, the representatives of the Entente threatened Brătianu that their governments, in their great solicitude for Romania, had agreed to all our requests. At the same time, Poklewski took out the paper from his pocket, in virtue of which we were to enter in war four weeks later. How was it to go in? It was both a moral and material impossibility. Moral, because the country would never have understood how a Romanian government could have set it on fire just

¹¹³ *I.G. Duca* (1879-1933) – Romanian politician, prominent member of the Liberal National Party, president of this party (1930-1933), Minister of Public Instructions and Cults in the government led by Ion I.C. Brătianu (January 1914-February 1918) of Foreign Affairs in the great liberal government (January 1922-March 1926). Appointed President of the Council of Ministers on 14 November 1922, he was assassinated on 29 December of the same year on the platform of the Sinaia station by a legionary team. Memoirs writer.

¹¹⁴ The German troops occupied Warsaw on 5th August 1915 and held it until the end of the war.

then and, therefore, it would have been difficult to have the assent of public opinion. Material, because we always connected our military possibilities to the Russian front. But how could we rely on this front, when, defeated and disorganized, the Russian armies were running away to central Russia and when in Petersburg the official circles were discussing the possibility of an evacuation of the capital? But what was to be done? We had engaged ourselves. Poklewski had Brătianu's declaration about which there could be no doubt. Therefore, Brătianu convenes us at him one morning, shows us the document and asks us what was to do. Unanimously – even Costinescu – we declared that in any case there was no question to enter the war now. We examined the text to see if it gave us the possibility to interpret it in such a way that, based on it, we could avoid the summons of the Russians. Brătianu cavils about all the words and all the commas with a real desperation, and with a subtlety of a glossator, with a power of sophistication that I did not imagine – what a lawyer he could have been! – he forced himself to translate and reinterpret his own words in the sense of the objective he was pursuing. I admired his inventive spirits, no doubt he had not made a more fantastic intellectual effort in his whole life. He had squeezed out all that was humanly possible from his brain. But in vain, the text was clear. It was impossible to deny the evidence. I was following Brătianu with my eyes. On his face we could read that he realized himself the lack of soundness of his studied constructions, of his lawyer's squabbles. I am convinced that he wanted more to hide from us the mistake he had made than to find an interpretation with which he could present himself before Poklewski. After almost an hour of frettings, making sure that the text had only one meaning, namely the obligation for us to enter the war after four weeks, Brătianu declares himself defeated and decides therefore to suffer the consequences of his mistake and to resign. Properly speaking, he could not do otherwise, he pledge his word of honour, but he was unable to stand to it. What authority would he have had to remain in power, or to be believed in the future by the Allies? The only question was whether they were interested in Brătianu's resignation at that moment. If Take Ionescu and Filipescu could have come, of course, this resignation would have done them very well, because, especially the great powers like to negotiate with docile people. But could Take Ionescu and Filipescu come to power? With the state of mind prevailing then in the country and the defeats of the Russians, could the King appeal to them? Neither did they imagine it. Then what was

the solution? Any liberal leader, a Pherekyde¹¹⁵ for example, ruling with the majorities of Brătianu or Maiorescu¹¹⁶ and Marghiloman with a dissolution of the Chambers? Were the Allies taken with any of these solutions? Incontestably Brătianu was still preferable. Therefore, Costinescu proposed to adjourn the meeting and to assemble again that day. During this interval, he ran to Poklewski, to Take Ionescu, to Barclay¹¹⁷, to Blondel, he showed them that Brătianu had resigned and that the only escape is for the Allies themselves to release him from the commitment he had made. Otherwise, we pass into the unknown, especially with a weak German king. The allied ministers conferred, Take Ionescu and Filipescu as well. Their unanimous conclusion was that, by any means, Brătianu must remain. Costinescu was therefore authorized to inform him that in the current circumstances the Allies no longer had any claim regarding the terms in virtue of which we were to take action, that they were satisfied then, when our territorial claims had been fully recognized to us, only with the declaration of Brătianu that we would act when the circumstances allowed it. And Brătianu withdrew his resignation. It was the only time when Costinescu's pact with Take Ionescu and Filipescu was of some use. Through it, Costinescu saved the government. Until this day, it has remained an enigma to me that Brătianu, so cunning, so circumspect, could have been caught into Poklewski's trap. I find an explanation and find an excuse too. Under the impression of Italy's entry into action, Brătianu would probably have imagined that our obligation to enter the war became imminent.

¹¹⁵ *Mihail Pherekyde* (1842-1926) – Romanian politician, founder and prominent member of the Liberal National Party (April 1875), minister at various sectors in all the liberal governments since 1876.

¹¹⁶ *Titu Maiorescu* (1840-1917) – Philosopher, writer, literary critic and politician, one of the most remarkable personalities of Romania in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. He was one of the founders of the society „Junimea” (the Youth), which had a great role in Europeanizing the Romanian culture, by imposing the critical spirit and supporting great values of the autochthonous literature. He founded the theory of „forms without substance”, which constituted the basis of the Junimism on a political level. A prominent member of the Conservative Party, Titu Maiorescu has been several times minister in various conservative cabinets. Between March 28th/April 10th, 1912-January 4th/17th, 1914, he was Prime Minister. At the Crown Council of August 14th/27th, 1916, Maiorescu supported the idea of the neutrality, and during the occupation of the Central Powers he remained in Bucharest, refusing however to accept any contacts with the adversaries.

¹¹⁷ *Sir George Head Barclay* (1862-1921) – British diplomat, diplomatic functions in Washington, Constantinople and Tokyo, Minister plenipotentiary in Tehran (1908-1912) and then at Bucharest (30 August 1912-October 1920). Retired from the diplomatic service in 1920.

On the other hand, of course, when he gave his declaration to Poklewski, the situation on the Russian front permitted many hopes. However, the whole disaster of the Russians took place in the interval between the declaration itself and the accepting of our conditions by the Allies. But neither the explanation nor the excuse can cover up Brătianu's mistake, because that mistake was an undeniable serious one. During all the period of the neutrality and the war, it was his only wandering moment. For the rest, from one end to the other, he led the diplomatic action of Romania with a clarity of views, a self-control, a confidence and a mastery that no man animated by the spirit of justice can deny. From this incident we were left after all with a great benefit – clearing up our situation for a long time. Indeed, if the Allies had recognized our claims and consented to our military intervention being exercised when we judged the moment as favourable, if, on the other hand, as long as the Russian front could not be restored, it could not be question of any our intervention, and, if the Russians themselves admitted that they did not have time to restore the front that year, only one conclusion was resulted from the Poklewski incident, namely that by this, we postponed, with the consent itself of the Allies, our entry into action. Consequently, in 1915 we were – except for unforeseen circumstances – assured of peace. A period of almost a year was opening before us in which we could complete our preparation and, in any case, we were exempt from the eternal orders of the Entente. For those times this meant a real paradise.

[I. G. Duca, *Memorii*, vol. II, *Neutralitatea*, partea a II-a, 1915-1916 (*Memoirs*, vol. II *Neutrality*, part II (1915-1916), edition ad-notated and index by Stelian Neagoe, Publishing House Helikon, Timișoara, pp. 136-138]

48. 30 juin/13 juillet 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme du comte Ottokar Czernin adressé au baron Burián, l'informant sur les démarches entreprises auprès des autorités roumaines concernant le transit du matériel de guerre à travers la Roumanie.

Le Comte Ottokar Czernin au Baron Burián
Télégramme Bucarest, le 13 juillet 1915

M. Costinescu, qui se trouve à Sinaia, a différé son retour à Bucarest sous prétexte de maladie. M. Brătianu me dit que pour cette raison il ne pourrait lui parler que jeudi ou vendredi au sujet du transit des munitions destinées pour la Turquie, et que jusque-là la décision devait demeurer en suspens. Au reste le Président du Conseil me dit qu'il ne pouvait guère me

donner de l'espoir, attendu que les représentants de l'Entente, pleinement informés de l'affaire, auraient déjà protesté, et que par conséquent le ministre des finances ne consentirait pas. Je ne manquerai pas d'informer Votre Excellence de la décision définitive dès qu'elle aura été prise.

Voir le N° 30.

[Documents diplomatiques concernant les rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Roumanie, 22 Juillet 1914-27 Août 1916, ... , p. 22]

49. 3/16 juillet 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme du comte Ottokar Czernin adressé au baron Burián, l'informant sur le refus du gouvernement roumain de permettre le transit des munitions pour l'Empire Ottoman.

Le Comte Ottokar Czernin au Baron Burián

Télégramme Bucarest, le 16 juillet 1915.

M. Bratiano vient de m'informar qu'il lui était absolument impossible de permettre le transit des munitions.

Voir le N° 37.

[Documents diplomatiques concernant les rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Roumanie, 22 Juillet 1914-27 Août 1916, ... , p. 22]

50. 10/23 juillet 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme du premier-ministre Ion I.C. Brătianu adressé à Constantin Diamandy, ministre roumain à Pétrograd, l'informant sur la réponse qu'il donnera à Poklewsky-Koziell. La Roumanie est d'accord avec l'entrée en guerre au côté de l'Entente, mais elle ne peut pas en fournir une date précise si on ne lui garantit l'accomplissement de toutes ses conditions politiques et militaires.

Télégramme chiffré enregistré sous No. 1298

Expédié le 10/23 Juillet 1915, 2 h. 15, matin.

Reçu le 10/23 Juillet, midi.

Excellence Diamandy

Petrograd

Voici la réponse que j'ai l'intention de donner à Poklewsky à la demande qu'il m'a faite il y a trois jours; Veuillez ne pas la communiquer à personne, avant d'avoir reçu les details de notre entretien.

„Je suis heureux d'apprendre que le Gouvernement impérial et ses Alliés seraient disposés à admettre nos demandes touchant aux frontières futures, telles qu'elles avaient été formulées le 12/25 Juin”.

„Nous sommes prêts à conclure, sans retard, la convention politique qui mettrait une fin à toute les discussions à ce sujet. Il va de soi que cet accord implique pour nous l'obligation d'une coopération militaire avec les armées alliées. Nous acceptons, sans réserve, de prendre cet engagement dans l'acte qui en règle la convention politique entre les deux Gouvernements.

„Reste la question relative au terme de notre entrée en action. Il est important de ne laisser s'établir sur ce point aucun malentendu. Je rappelle que dès le 5 Juin dernier, dans ma conversation avec Poklewsky, lorsque je me suis expliqué au sujet de notre action militaire, je lui ai indiqué, nettement, qu'elle découle des conditions militaires dans lesquelles elle devait se produire et j'ai ajouté, qu'elle implique une entente avec les Puissances Alliées, en ce qui concerne les fournitures de munitions et l'opération de guerre. or, d'une part, bien que la France ait laissé passer quelques-uns de nos matériaux de guerre, le retard apporté dans la livraison des munitions, malgré les stipulations précises de nos contrats, conserve le même caractère de gravité; d'autre part, la situation du théâtre de la guerre a été modifiée depuis le commencement de Juin.

„Serait-ce permis de dire que l'opération militaire avec l'armée voisine se ferait dans des conditions identiques? S'il était reconnu que notre armée pouvait aujourd'hui se trouver, pendant la période même de la mobilisation, en face de forces ennemies, auxquelles la situation militaire permettrait de se retourner en masse contre nous, Sazonow voudra bien reconnaître que nous devrions nous garder de provoquer une situation aussi dangereuse que périlleuse pour nous. Elle serait dénouée de toute utilité pour le but général poursuivi par la Triple Entente; notre armée se serait exposée à un désastre sans profit pour personne. Dès lors n'y aurait – il pas une imprudence singulière de fixer, dès aujourd'hui, un terme précis pour notre entrée en action?

„Nous devons tous désirer qu'elle se produise avec le plus d'efficacité possible dans le but à atteindre. Je ne doute pas que le Gouvernement Russe ne soit aussi desirieux que nous même de nous voir écarter de tels succès aussi préjudiciables à nos alliés qu'à nous même. Il reconnaîtra l'impossibilité où nous sommes de préciser aujourd'hui une date fixe pour l'entrée en campagne”.

„Nous acceptons volontiers l’obligation de coopérer avec nos armées, mais les circonstances ne peuvent pas ne pas exercer une influence prépondérante sur la mise en exécution de nos projets.”

”Je pense qu’il s’impose qu’une étude spéciale des conditions militaires détermine, dans la Convention Militaire même, les circonstances qui décident du moment de l’intervention de la Roumanie, ainsi que des modalités de la coopération militaire.”

Signé: Brătianu

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Casa Regală, dosar 29/1915, p. 7-9]

51. July 11th/24th 1915, Bucharest. Article of Emil D. Fagure¹¹⁸, „Germany and Romania”, published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth), in which he rejects the slanderous insinuations of the newspaper „Frankfurter Zeitung” against the Romanian state.

One of the qualities of the German policy in peacetime was to take into account the reality of things and that was the secret of its economic penetration – penetration which, had it not been depreciated by the party of the militarist imperialism, would have taken Germany much further than the results of the military aggression committed would do it .

The war caused by the Kronprinz circles forces the German diplomacy and press to resort to the Byzantinism – a school that requires a refinement alien to the German intellectual structure. This is why the insinuations and

¹¹⁸ Samuel Honigman, pseudonym Emil D. Fagure (1873-1948), writer and journalist. He started his press career as an editor at „Munca” (Work), then at „Lumea Nouă” (New World) and continued at „Adevărul” (the Truth), where, between 1895 and 1921, he was editing secretary, then editor-in-chief, and later chief editor of the supplement „Adevărul literar și artistic” (Literary and Artistic Truth) (1920-1921). He was part of the editing committee of the weekly publication „La Roumanie” (Paris, 1918-1919), when he also collaborated with several French periodicals, acting for the relations between the two countries, activity for which he received the Legion of Honour. In 1921, Constantin Mille founded the newspaper „Lupta” [Fight], Fagure serving as its director until 1937 (when the newspaper was suppressed). He advocated for the National Peasants’ Party, which helped secure his entry into the Assembly of Deputies in 1929. He later became a Senator. From 1938 he took refuge in France, but during the war he was discovered by the Nazis and confined to the Drancy internment camp near Paris, and his son was exterminated at Auschwitz; he returned to the country in 1946, trying to resume the publication of the newspaper „Lupta” [Fight]. He committed suicide in the spring of 1948 when the communist regime was established.

the threats contained in the article published in „Frankfurter Zeitung” regarding the Romanian-Italian relations, the role of our King and of his dynasty in Romania, as well as the benefits Romania could take of the current war, appear so obvious.

The article begins by assigning to Romania and to her King, as a form of trust in their „fidelity”, a true felony, insinuating that, if Italy had informed Romania of its negotiations with the Triple Entente, Romania and her King would not have been late to prevent Berlin about it. The perfidy of the insinuation is a rude attempt to sow at Rome distrust in Romania. Fortunately, the Italian diplomacy proved itself to be somewhat more perspicacious than the German one.

The attempt is all the more rude, as, some lines further, the author of the article in „Frankfurter Zeitung” recognizes that it is possible that Italy, hoping that Romania will follow „her exemple of betrayal”, has initiated her in the secret of its evolution.

In other words, it lets be understood that Romania and her King – who, as far back as in the Crown Council, knew that the way Germany and Austria-Hungary had declared war canceled of its own the alliance treaty of Romania – informed Berlin about the negotiations of Italy. It is an attempt to compromise Romania, which will not reach its goal.

In order to be able to present King Ferdinand as a German prince on the throne of Romania, unaware of the offense that hides such a conception, the author of the article in „Frankfurter Zeitung” attributes to the policy of the deceased King Carol the intention freely lent by the Berlin circles to Romania to separate her ways from those of Italy.

If the circumstances had not blinded the defenders of the Austro-German-Hungarian aggression, the gentlemen of Berlin and of the „Frankfurter Zeitung” would have remembered King Carol’s word, which, when it was question about Romania’s alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany, marked immediately that the entry of Italy is indispensable for this, making the famous allusion to the „Latin blood drop” necessary to cement this alliance. That was the real „political school” of King Carol.

The rest of the article in „Frankfurter Zeitung” interests us less. That Germany does not put „so much value on Romania’s cooperation – to which goal however those politicians from us, who want to appear “more German than the Germans!” -this is the old story of the grapes that are too sour when you cannot reach them.

It is interesting, however, that the Germans too recognize that „if and as Romania wishes to use the results of this war, she must decide for a military cooperation.”

Emil D. Fagure

[„Adevărul” (the Truth), 11 July 1915]

52. July 16th/29th 1915, Bucharest. Article in the newspaper „Universul”, signed with the initials L. I., concerning the existence of some Romanian prisoners from Bessarabia in Sibiu and the prospect of founding a „Bessarabian Action”

**Bessarabian prisoners in Sibiu
Story of a Romanian leader from Sibiu.
– Founding of the „Bessarabian Action”**

A Romanian leader from Transylvania, the head manager of a bank institution – who came to the country for supplies with cereals – relates an interesting episode from the life of the Bessarabian prisoners captured by the Austro-Hungarians. A number of 14 of these Romanians from Bessarabia were transported to Sibiu. When they were brought to the station, no one knew how to understand each other But there was one able to speak Russian with them.

„We don’t speak Russian,” said one of the Bessarabians.

Then those present in the station of Sibiu found out that those prisoners are Romanians from across the Prut.

– Are you Romanians?

– We are Moldavians.

– And you didn’t learn Russian at all, did you?

– Well, only when we are in military service, we learn the commands in Russian.

– But in church, the songs are sung in Russian or not?

– As long as it was sung in Russian, we didn’t go there too many times, but now it’s sung only in Romanian and we go to church too.

Then the prisoner tells us how only the townmen from the cities speak Russian, while all the peasantry from Bessarabia speaks only Moldavian.

– This language was above our head, not on our life!...

We reproduced the talk as well as it had been related to us. It results clearly from it that the propaganda of Russification did not succeed in the Romanian villages across the Prut, despite all the severity of the measures taken there for this purpose. The fact is quite interesting and it is worthy of note especially in today's circumstances, when our national problem is raised completely and inseparably.

*

In connection with these, the news can be given that there is preparing the foundation of a *Bessarabian Action* whose purpose would be to enlighten our public opinion on the situation of the Bessarabian Romanians. This *Action* will make a vast propaganda concerning the reunification of the old Moldova. The company will start its activity in the autumn and will hold a series of meetings in the Capital as well all over the country.

As far as we are informed, the Bessarabian leaders were called on to gather around this society and right yesterday a first meeting was held for this purpose. The main goal of the new national action would be to convince the government of the opportunity of re-occupying Bessarabia within its borders from 103 years ago.

It is also about a written statement mentioning, among other things, about the devastation of the Romanian villages in Bessarabia for the retreat of the Russians, a fact that would bring our brothers from this side of the Dniester into great misery. From all this it is clear that, in parallel with the action for the claiming of the Romanian territories beyond the mountains, a Bessarabian action will be taken for the reunification of the old Moldova. Many Romanians from Bukovina will also be part of this new movement.

L.I.

[„Universul” (the Universe), 16 July 1915]

53. 21 juillet/3 août 1915, Péetrograd. Télégramme de Sergueï Sazonov, ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la Russie, adressé à Poklewsky-Koziell, représentant diplomatique à Bucarest, lui demandant de transmettre au gouvernement roumain l'accord des autorités de Péetrograd concernant les exigences des Roumains dans le but de conclure une convention militaire sur l'entrée en guerre du pays.

21 juillet/2 août 1915. N° 3756

Copies à Paris, Londres, Rome.

L'insistance de nos alliés, qui espèrent qu'une entente immédiate avec la Roumanie empêchera le transit de contrebande militaire pour la Turquie, a fait que le gouvernement impérial consent à satisfaire à toutes les exigences imposées par Bratiano, sous condition que la Roumanie s'engage dès à présent à ne plus laisser passer aucun approvisionnement militaire pour nos ennemis, et nous donne le moyen d'y veiller nous-mêmes, et aussi à ce qu'un chargé d'affaires soit envoyé sans retard au Grand quartier général pour élaborer une entente militaire établissant la date et les conditions de l'entrée en guerre de la Roumanie. Cette entente militaire doit être élaborée, comme il a été convenu entre les alliés, par nous d'accord avec Bratiano et soumise à l'approbation des puissances, pour être ensuite signée par leurs représentants à Bucarest.

Sazonov

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 198]

54. 24 luglio/6 agosto 1915, Bucarest. Telegramma dell'addetto militare italiano, Maggiore Luciano Ferigo, relativo alla situazione della Romania e al problema del transito di munizioni verso l'Impero Ottomano.

Rispetto alla mia comunicazione no. 129 del 9 luglio, la situazione politico-militare in Romania non ha subito sensibili variazioni. Come certamente sarà – per altra via – noto a cotesto comando, continuano le trattative fra i rappresentanti delle potenze della Intesa e il Presidente del Consiglio romeno per un accordo che assicuri l'intervento della Romania nel conflitto; ma ormai (neppure il Signor Bratiano nasconde) l'epoca dell'intervento non potrà essere in alcun modo determinata.

L'accordo dunque – quando si possa attenere – vincolerà la Quadruplice circa le concessioni da farsi alla Romania – ciò che forse renderà più difficili le venturose trattative di pace –; ma non obbligherà la Romania all'intervento per una data fissa – ciò che potrebbe rendere illusorio od inutile l'intervento stesso.

Quantunque la cosa sia tenuta nel più rigoroso segreto, ho potuto sapere che questo Ministro di Russia ha, alcuni giorni or sono, chiesto al Signor

Bratiano s'egli accetterebbe di firmare l'accordo, quando questo comprendesse una clausola in base alla quale la data dell'intervento romeno dovesse essere determinata dagli stati maggiori delle quattro grandi potenze dell'Intesa e dallo stato maggiore di questo esercito; ed ho pure saputo che il Signor Bratiano ha respinta decisamente la proposta, dicendo non poter egli rinunciare in alcun modo alla più assoluta libertà circa il momento di entrata in azione.

I vantaggi che, probabilmente, l'Intesa si ripromette di conseguire con la conclusione di un accordo in tali condizioni sono i seguenti:

1 – fissazione della ventura politica romena;

2 – possibilità di arrestare, o per lo meno di rendere minimo il passaggio delle munizioni dirette in Turchia.

Tralasciando completamente l'esame del primo ordine di vantaggi, come di ciò che sfugge alla mia competenza, esprimo il dubbio che la firma dell'accordo possa cambiare di molto le cose per ciò che ha tratto al passaggio delle munizioni; la Romania – allo scopo di non lasciar trapelare alle potenze centrali l'esistenza dell'accordo stesso – sarà costretta, forse, ad essere più corriva anziché più severa in quanto riguarda i transiti clandestini.

È probabile invece che – non essendo possibile mantenere qui a lungo il segreto – appena le Potenze centrali dubitino dell'esistenza del concluso trattato, o di propria iniziativa facciano atti ostili alla Romania o esercitino su di essa tali pressioni da indurla – contro il suo volere per ciò che riguarda il momento a prendere le armi; ma anche su ciò non sembra lecito fare grande assegnamento, giacché il Signor Bratiano – che in fatto di astuzia non è ad alcun secondo – prenderà certo le misure necessarie per garantirsi contro tale eventualità.

Circa il transito su territorio romeno delle munizioni dirette alla Turchia, credo che questo governo faccia del suo meglio per arrestare il passaggio di ogni contrabbando di guerra; ma credo altresì che – ad onta della sorveglianza abbastanza attiva e rigorosa, la corruzione determinata dall'oro tedesco sia così profonda da frustrare in alcuni casi le buone intenzioni governative. Questo governo – tuttavia – continua ad assicurare del contrario; alcuni giorni or sono, il Maggiore Rosetti¹¹⁹ – certo per l'incarico del

¹¹⁹ *Radu R. Rosetti* (1877-1949) – Generale, figlio dello scrittore Radu D. Rosetti. Con il grado di maggiore (1/14 aprile 1914), fu incaricato, dal 23 luglio-5 agosto 1914, delle funzioni di capo dell'Ufficio 6 operazioni all'interno dello Stato Maggiore, incarico mantenuto fino all'autunno del 1916 presso il Grande Quartiere Generale. Dopo la fine della campagna,

Signor Bratiano – mi diceva: „ci si imputa il fatto del passaggio delle munizioni, e ciò è assolutamente ingiusto; le munizioni che la Turchia ricevette qualche tempo fa sono state mandate dalla Bulgaria – che le spedì con imbarcazioni da Varna – ed i Bulgari attendono che la Germania mantenga la promessa di ricostituire i loro depositi”. Lo stesso Maggiore mi soggiungeva che la Bulgaria costituisce magazzini e aggiusta le strade verso le frontiere greca e serba, e specialmente verso quest’ultima.

Si deve riconoscere che – relativamente all’arresto dei contrabbandi – il governo romeno si è dimostrato il più possibile accondiscendente verso le potenze dell’Intesa, accordando loro di esercitare un controllo diretto mediante propri incaricati. Ciò è stato e ciò si fa tuttora; ma se la disposizione può ritenersi assai utile, essa non può tuttavia considerarsi sufficiente ad impedire tutte le infrazioni.

Si è in questi giorni chiusa la storia scandalosa degli studenti che accettarono denaro dalla Germania per dimostrare un atteggiamento ad essa favorevole; alcuni degli studenti incriminati ebbero punizioni assai severe. Non si può negare che – in questa circostanza – le autorità scolastiche non abbiano dimostrate rettitudine e severità; con questo però si è fatto ben poco contro la corruzione che trova qui un terreno assai propizio; si sono colpiti duramente pochi giovani che riceverono qualche decina di franchi, mentre i mag-

su sua richiesta, comandò successivamente i reggimenti di fanteria 55/67, 6 Mihai Viteazul, 47/72, con quest’ultimo combattendo nella battaglia di Mărășești, dove fu ferito. Radu R. Rosetti fu decorato per i suoi fatti d’armenella battaglia di Mărășești con l’ordine „Michele il Coraggioso (rom. Mihai Viteazul)”, la più alta onorificenza rumena attribuibile per la guerra. La stessa onorificenza fu ottenuta dall’unità comandata da lui. Dopo la conclusione della pace separata con le Potenze Centrali, si dimise dall’esercito rumeno e si arruolò nell’esercito francese (settembre 1918), prima addetto allo Stato Maggiore del 5 Esercito e successivamente, all’Esercito alleato del Danubio. Il colonnello Radu R. Rosetti fu ufficiale di collegamento tra il Comando Militare francese e le autorità rumene, che si stavano preparando ad affiancarsi all’Intesa. Dopo la guerra fu addetto militare in Inghilterra (1919-1920). Promosso generale di brigata il 1° gennaio 1924, si dimise dall’esercito un mese dopo. Fu uno degli organizzatori del Museo Militare Nazionale, rivestito dalla carica di Presidente del Consiglio di amministrazione di questa istituzione (1924-1931). Dopo essere passato nella riserva, fu a lungo curatore delle collezioni della Biblioteca dell’Accademia rumena. Nel 1935, l’Accademia rumena lo ammesse tra i suoi membri. Durante il periodo gennaio-novembre 1941 fu ministro dell’Istruzione e della Cultura nazionale, da dove si dimise. Radu R. Rosetti fu uno dei più importanti storici militari rumeni e la sua opera più importante è la *Istoria artei militare a Românilor până la mijlocul veacului al XVII-lea* [Storia dell’arte militare dei Rumeni fino alla metà del XVII secolo], pubblicata nel 1947. Morì in prigione il 2 giugno 1949. (Radu R. Rosetti, *Mărturisiri (1916-1919)* [Testimonianze 1916-1919], edizione, studio introduttivo e note di Maria Georgescu, Edizione Modelism, Bucarest, 1997).

giori colpevoli – e non appartengono alla studentesca – sfuggono ad ogni repressione. Ad ogni modo è sperabile che l'esempio possa essere salutare.

Come ho esposto nel foglio no. 140 del 1° c.m., questo esercito procederà ai richiami dal congedo, per istruzione, di tutti gli individui che non sono stati ancora richiamati nell'anno in corso i richiami – i quali si estenderanno dal 7 agosto all'8 ottobre – saranno ripartiti in tre serie di 20 giorni ciascuna. Quantunque queste autorità militari asseriscano che la disposizione non riveste alcun carattere eccezionale e che mira unicamente ad istruire tutti gli uomini in congedo sui metodi odierni di lotta, è lecito osservare che, qualora non si congedi una parte degli uomini presentemente in servizio – ciò che per ora non sembra probabile fino all'8 ottobre p.v. si avranno più di 300.000 uomini sotto le armi.

Le tendenze dell'opinione pubblica si mantengono costantemente favorevoli all'intesa, ma, quando si faccia astrazione dai conati di una parte della stampa, queste tendenze sembrano prese da forte torpore. Gli insuccessi russi agghiacciano momentaneamente gli spiriti, ed è prevedibile che, fino a quando permarrà questa situazione militare, non si rinnovino gli entusiasmi coi quali la popolazione, al principio dello scorso inverno, cercava di forzare la mano ai dirigenti, per gettare l'esercito in un'impresa che allora appariva facile e non molto cruenta.

L'addetto militare, Maggiore Luciano Ferigo

[S.A.N.I.C, Fondo Microfilme Italia, inv. 1555, pellicola 106, quadri 157-165]

55. 25 juillet/7 août 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme du premier-ministre Ion I. C. Brătianu adressé à Constantin Diamandy, ministre roumain à Pétrograd relatif à l'acceptation par la Russie des conditions de la partie roumaine, avec l'obligation de l'interdiction de tout transit d'armement pour les adversaires.

Télégramme chiffré enregistré sous No. 1367.

Expédie de Bucarest le 25 Juillet/7 Août, matin.

Dechiffré le 27 Juillet/9 Août, soir.

Excellence Diamandy, Ministre Roumanie

Petrograd

Poklewsky avant hier m'a communiqué être chargé par Sazonow déclarer qu'on accepte les conditions roumaines pour la Convention Politique à

condition que la Roumanie s'engage a ne laisser passer aucunes munitions ou matériels de guerre pour les ennemis et que Triple Entente puisse surveiller ce passage.

Poklewsky, sans même attendre mon objection, a atténué le mot surveillance en disant que les puissances puissent de concert avec la Roumanie empêcher la contrebande.

Un délégué du Gouvernement devrait être envoyé à l'État Major russe pour établir les conditions et le moment de notre entrée en action.

Poklewsky est autorisé de négocier avec moi le texte de la Convention Politiques; il m'a donne lecture d'un avant-projet, tout personnel a-t-il dit, dont voici le résumé:

I – On reconnait les frontières futures selon nos revendications et on s'engage de ne pas faire la paix séparée.

II – La rétrocession DOBRICI-BALCIC à la Bulgarie, si la Triple Entente le croit nécessaire.

III – La déclaration de guerre à l'Autriche-Hongrie dans les délais et suivant les modalités prévue dans la Convention Militaire qui devra être discutée immédiatement et conclue dans trois semaines.

IV – Le Gouvernement Impérial et Roumain, ou bien aussi les autres Puissances, désigneront leurs délégués qui se réuniront une semaine après la signature au Quartier-Général Russe.

La Roumanie s'engage de s'opposer dès maintenant, de concert avec les Puissances signataires, à tout passage de munitions destinées directement ou indirectement aux adversaires.

V – Pour le Banat, la Roumanie s'engage de ne pas élever des ouvrages militaires dans la zone déterminé comme intéressant la défense de Belgrade et de ne pas entretenir dans cette région d'autres forces armées que celles nécessaires à la police.

Nous nous engageons d'indemniser les serbes qui voudraient émigrer et à l'obligation de ne rien entreprendre contre la langue et la nationalité des serbes restant dans le pays.

VI – Secret obligatoire pour la Triple Entente.

En ce qui concerne ce dernier point essentiel d'observé qu'à Bucarest, tout le monde, les partis politiques, les journaux, le Ministre d'Allemagne, connaissent déjà le caractère de la nouvelle proposition.

Je me suis borné à exprimer ma satisfaction pour l'acceptation des conditions politique et je me suis refusé de donner une réponse avant

quelques jours nécessaires pour la réflexion et la consultation; mais, tout en accordant la préférence aux discussions, pour le moment je ne lui ai pas caché mon sentiment en ce qui regarde, même sous les formes les plus atténuées, toute immixtion ou contrôle du passage des munitions par la Roumanie, de même en ce qui concerne tout engagement internationale relatif à la nationalité et au langage des Serbes. Notre politique doit être libérale à leur égard, mais nous ne saurons recommencer l'expérience du traité de Berlin dans la question juive.

Je crois aussi inadmissible le délai prévu pour la Convention Militaire.

Tout ceci pour votre gouverne et je vous invite à me communiquer votre opinion.

PERSONNEL

Je ne vous cache pas qu'en dehors des réserves énumérées ci-dessus, je constate que la Convention Politique, exigeant des plénipotences et un engagement solennel, ne s'est jamais présentée à un moment plus difficile que le jour de la prise de Varsovie¹²⁰ et d'Invan-Gorod et le lendemain de la Convention des chemins de fer Bulgaro-Turcs.

Excepté la déclaration de l'action nationale, même les partisans résolus de la Triple Entente considèrent dangereux l'engagement à l'heure actuelle avec un secret quasi-impossible.

Signé: Bratiano

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Casa Regală, dosar 29/1915, p. 7-9]

56. 28 juillet/10 août 1915, Pétrograd. Réponse de Constantin Diamandy, ministre roumain dans la capitale russe, au télégramme de Ion I. C. Brătianu du 25 juillet/7 août 1915.

Petrograd, le 28-VII/10-VIII-1915

Expédié à 1 h. nuit.

T.C., No. 1374

Exc. Bratiano, Président Conseil BCR

Je n'ai pu déchiffrer votre dernier télégramme que tout à l'heure. Je crains que ma réponse ne vous parvienne trop tard et soit hâtive.

Je pense qu'il n'y a que deux solutions:

¹²⁰ Varsovie a été occupée par les Puissances Centrales le 5 août 1915.

I – Répondre que conjonctures actuelles ne permettant pas Roumanie intervention armée et ne pouvant se rendre au désir des Alliés à une action immédiate, il vaut mieux moment venu conclure le tout à la fois. En ce cas nous resterions sur accord Septembre de neutralité.

Inconvénients seraient qu'on exigerait de nous, surtout pour contrebande, attitude comme si nous étions alliés et que nous mecontenterions Austro-Allemande tout en restant isolées et à la merci surprise.

II – Accepter conclure Convention Politique et Accord Militaire, mais dans cet Accord Militaire il n'y aurait pas fixation date intervention armée laquelle ne pourrait être établie que seulement d'entente avec notre État-Major et Alliés gardant contact suivi et tenant compte des conjonctures et possibilités offensive générale efficace.

Projet que Poklewsky s'attribue revient à ancienne manière des dates fixes.

Pour Convention Politique il va de soi que engagement sur droits serbes Banat inacceptables qui pourrait vis-à-vis Grandes-Puissances se transformer contrôle et immixtion.

Idem pour munitions. Principe suffit et fait que devenons alliés et solidarisons intérêts dispense précautions surveillance.

En ce qui concerne non conclusion paix séparée, elle n'incomberait que Russie d'après sa propre formule du premier projet alliance Août où il était textuellement dit: Russie s'engage ne pas conclure paix séparée avec Autriche-Hongrie (ajoutons et Allemagne) avant que territoires cités ne soient annexés Couronne Roumanie.

Secret sera difficile garder et nous devons prévoir désagréments concernant interprétation contrebande; peut-être pourrait-on en exclure céréales etc.

Mais s'il s'agit indiscrétions la divulgation notre accord neutralité de Septembre avec Russie spécifiant délimitations Bucovine et le reste nous mettrait dans posture presque tout aussi défavorable.

Notre situation politique nous empêche garder neutralité jusqu'au bout. Il n'est pas possible que six pays se laissent dicter la loi par Austro-Allemands. Nous sommes et serons trop compromis aux yeux Autriche-Hongrie pour ne pas prévoir une vie d'enfer et notre isolement peut nous être funeste.

Dans nos calculs nous devons peut être compter plus sur usure Austro-Allemande sur tous les fronts que sur les succès d'une nouvelle offensive russe.

J'ai impression que peut-être Quadruple-Entente acceptera Convention Politique et Militaire cette dernière sans engagement des maintenant date.

Ici on ne croit pas accord Bulgaro-Turc chemin de fer, conclu.

Paléologue m'a raconté détails sur Conseil Ministres d'il y a quelques jours et un nouveau devant avoir lieu aujourd'hui. Il m'a dit que il est question votre retraite parce que partisans accord politique vous étiez minorité.

Signé: Diamandy

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Casa Regală, dosar 29/1915, p. 12-13]

57. July-August 1915, Bucharest. Notes of I. G. Duca relating to the mission of Victor Antonescu¹²¹ in France.

At the same time, Brătianu felt like giving the Allies a new assurance of his feelings towards the Entente and sent Victor Antonescu to Paris. This step was not useless. Although the opposition had admitted on the occasion of the Poklewski incident that it was impossible to take up arms then, they had however used him to denigrate once again Brătianu in front of the Allies. „Don't you see that Brătianu is of bad faith, he broke his word, he will act in the same way from now on, whenever he finds an opportunity!” This was the formula that the opposition emissaries spread through Paris and, as [all] the slanders, it worked. Brătianu was therefore trying to dispel that atmosphere. As Victor Antonescu had for years intimate relations with some personalities of the French financial world and with some of his old professors from the Faculty and from the School of Political Sciences, such as Raphael Georges Levy¹²², Brătianu entrusted this mission to him. Victor

¹²¹ *Victor Antonescu* (1871-1947) – Liberal politician and diplomat, Minister of Justice (4 January 1914-11 December 1916) and then of Finance (11 December 1916-10 July 1917). He was sent to Paris as Minister plenipotentiary (10 October 1917-25 March 1918). After the conclusion of the peace treaty of Bucharest, he remained in Paris as a simple private individual. He resumed his position at the end of 1918, holding it until 20 December 1919. In the interwar period he will be several times Minister Plenipotentiary (in Paris and later in Geneva), then Minister of Justice (14 November 1933-1 February 1935), of Finance (1 February 1935-29 August 1936) and he will succeed Nicolae Titulescu as Minister of Foreign Affairs (29 August 1936-28 December 1937).

¹²² *Raphael Georges Levy* (1853-1933) – A French banker, economist and politician. He taught for many years at the *École libre des sciences politiques* (Paris Institute of Political Studies); he was a supporter of the economic liberalism, and from 1920 to 1927 a Senator of Seine.

Antonescu rather sneaked away and, arrived in Paris, he got into contact with various leading members of the government and leaders of the opposition, explaining to them the point of view of our government and assuring them, in the name of Brătianu that Romania, as soon as it finds a favorable moment, will enter into action on the side of the Entente. Of course, V. Antonescu, who was always delighted with himself, returned from Paris convinced that he had done great deeds. The truth is, however, that his visit still contributed to restore the balance in Paris, because the opposition was working intensely there for a year, while we were not carrying on any action. The result was that all the injustices against us were believed and thus legends came into being to the detriment of the entire Romania, some of them even surviving after the war. Victor Antonescu's visit was the first step towards the illumination of the official French world. But it is a pity that the propaganda action thus started has not been organized systematically since then. It would have exempted us all – and Brătianu in particular – from many subsequent sorrows, from many avoidable difficulties.

[I.G. Duca, *Amintiri politice (Political Memoirs)*, vol. I, Jon Dumitru Verlag, München, 1981, pp. 35-36]

58. August 8th/21st 1915, Bucharest. Article published in „Gazeta Ilustrată” (the Illustrated Gazette) regarding the conduct on the battle field of the 33rd Regiment, formed of Romanians from Transylvania.

The Transylvanian Romanians in the Great Battle of Poland
„Your Excellency, the 33rd Regiment has done its duty!”

Battlefield, 1 August

The competence and the bravery of a regiment, once recognized by the general-in-chief in the thick of the war operations, are not only a praise of platonic value that is perpetuated in the regiment's history, but also a heavy duty in front of the future battles. I had had the presentiment – when, at the parade of 18 July, after the decoration of the Romanian soldiers, General Trollmann¹²³ in his speech full of gratitude pronounced at the end that

¹²³ Ignaz Trollmann von Lovcenberg (1860-1919), was a general in the Austro-Hungarian Army during World War I and commander of the 19th Corps. In 1914, Trollmann participated at the head of his army division in the failed attack against Serbia. In 1915 he

form of salutation: „God protect the 33rd Regiment” – that the Romanian lads would be sent in the next days into the most terrible fire, having to overcome immense hardships with their proverbial tenacity, to the greater glory of our nation. Not long after, the order arrived: the regiment must move to north on another field of operations. Special mission: cross for the first time the Bug River.

*

Once the regiment arrived on the new battlefield, the officers perceive with their telescopes the outlines of a small town, and to the north the Bug river flowing. Beyond, over the river, there are the enemy's trenches. On this side of the river a Bohemian regiment and huntsmen troops form the line of defense. When the Romanian regiment arrives, they pass back in reserve, and the 33rd Regiment occupies the trenches in the first line near the river. The exchange of troops proceeded quietly – the enemy had not noticed it. The order is launched: at night we cross the river and attack the enemy. The Romanian sergeant major Lucuța from Curtici with the pioneers of Ion Crista from Obârșă, Chetefan Cheverașan from Tornia, Pavel Vuculescu from Șoimuș and the other comrades-pioneers go forward to the shore to make with their tools the bridge over the Bug. The enemy observes the movement – the Russian cannons fire salvoes of grenades. The pioneers are retiring. Our artillery comes to the aid of the pioneers – it pours steel fire on the Russian trenches. As soon as the noise ceases, the pioneers return, going on building hastily the bridge.

The game is repeated, the detonations don't cease at all, Russian grenades throw lumps of earth and strips of water into the air, falling like rain on the pioneers. Finally the bridge is ready, and some pioneers are already laid on the stretchers of the medical orderlies, with the wounds bandaged under the care of the military doctors. It was getting dark. The soldiers of

led the Combined Corps in the successful Gorlice – Tarnów Offensive against the Russians. He gained his greatest victory on 8-12 January 1916, when his 19th Corps stormed and took the heavily fortified and considered impregnable Mount Lovcen during the Montenegrin Campaign. He also took Cetinje a few days later. After Montenegro's subjugation, Trollmann became in the same year General of the Infantry. In 1916-17, he remained in Albania on the Salonika Front at the head of his 19th Army Corps. For taking Mount Lovcen, he was ennobled in 1917 as baron with the style of *Freiherr Trollmann von Lovcenberg*. In October 1917 he was released from command of the 19th Corps and sent on leave. He received no new field command and retired from the Army at the end of the war. He died a few months later.

the regiment pass through the enemy's fire, aided by our artillery, which sends continuously shrapnels over the enemy positions – one after the other on the improvised bridge over the Bug. That whom the bullet hit while he was crossing the river, that one loses his equilibrium and falls into the water with his bleeding wound. There is no time and no means to save them, they die there in the river, a hero death. The concentric fire of our cannons, from the right, from the left, from behind, then some salvoes of the huge guns of 30 and a half cm caliber force the Russians to retreat some 2 km. Our wounded men, having crossed however the river at about 300 steps, are digging their trenches.

The next day is quiet – the enemy prepares for the attack, intending to push the 33rd regiment back into the river, and ours are working feverishly on double wire obstacles. At night, the wire will protect their lives.

The first night they are crossed over the Bug. The order is launched, no one must sleep! The posts be awake! Everyone feels that a critical moment is approaching. The Russians want to reconquer their previous position. Suddenly a shout in the night, the post announces: „Boys! The Muscovites are coming, shoot them! „With lightning speed, the soldiers take their guns and fire foolishly – those from the reflectors shed electric light on the battlefield, countless Russian uniforms approaching are noticed, the battalion commanders, the adjutants run to the telephones in the trenches:” Hallo, battery 3, the enemy comes from the right, at a distance about 400 meters, start immediately”. –”Hallo! Battery 6 on the left... start! „The machine guns rattle, Lieutenant Codarcea swears. – The bullets rustle often. An infernal noise, a terrible fire broke out, the cannons send the killing grenades, the shrapnels rustle overheads, the Russian artillery responded.

My work begins after the attack. In these moments I am thinking propped up near a wall that defends me from the fire of the infantry: here is the hell of our days. The skeleton holding in his hand the scythe of death stretches its fantastic wings and cut down abundantly. The fire lasts for hours. The Moscovites who came near fall dead all of a heap, they cannot resist, those who escaped alive, retreat into their trenches, from where they had started.

The regimental adjutant announces to the general who during all the fight had stayed irritated at the phone: “Your Excellency, the 33rd Regiment has done its duty. In front of our trenches lie in a heap dead Russians. „The General replies cheerfully: „Bravo, the 33rd!”

Day is breaking. The work of the medical orderlies begins. Quietness reigns again over the whole land. From a abandoned courtyard of a collapsed village, we might hear the morning singing of a rooster.

Cerdac.

[„*Gazeta Ilustrată*” (*The Illustrated Gazette*), year IV, no. 35, 8 August 1915]

59. August 18th/31st 1915, Bucharest. Article of Ion Grecu, „Romanian regiments sentenced to death. The meaning of the Hungarian praises”, published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth).

The newspapers from beyond the mountains, first of all those written in German and Hungarian, publish again laudatory articles about the Romanian soldiers fighting in the Austro-Hungarian army against the Russians. The bravery of the Romanian soldiers is acknowledged today in eulogistic comments and by the communiqués of the Great Austro-Hungarian General Staff, but the same General Staff that a few months before, under the influence of the powerful political circles in Budapest, did not even recognize the existence of the Romanian element in the Austro-Hungarian armies.

The latest Austro-Hungarian official statement to the press, from 11/24 August, relates about the bravery of the 64th Romanian regiment from Orăștie, which „captured, taking by assault the trenches defended by the Russian grenadiers, 7 officers and 900 people, as well as 7 machine guns.”

The Romanian press in Bucharest reproduces these official statements and laudatory articles with great satisfaction. But most part of this press from Bucharest isn't able to discover in praises other than the recognition – rather belated, as a matter of fact – of the loyalty of the Romanian element in Hungary. But believing that this is the truth; believing that Hungarians have really come to recognize their past mistake and convince us that a great injustice was done to the Romanians, as these Romanians are fighting with contempt of death for the Hungarian homeland, means knowing neither the Hungarian press nor the targets of the Hungarian politics.

The truth that lies behind these praises is easy to discover for anyone who wants to find it out. All we have to do is put these praises together, in the order in which they were written.

Who does not remember the exalted praises advanced by the Hungarian press to the Romanian regiments 21st from Cluj, 22nd from Tîrgul-Mureş, 23rd from Sibiu and 24th from Brasov? Who does not remember the bravery of these regiments who, for more than a month, stayed permanently on the first front and were commanded only for assaults? One of these regiments – the one from Sibiu – had even been called „*assault regiment*”¹²⁴. For a month the Hungarian press wrote only about the bravery of these regiments – *then suddenly fell silent as if by magic*.

It fell silent to start then praising another Romanian regiment. In front of the troops who, after occupying Lemberg, entered the capital of Galicia were the soldiers of the 33rd Romanian regiment from Arad. The brave Romanian youth entered singing „*Awake the Romanian!*” and singing the same anthem they left the city to make new assaults and to gain new merits. And for a few weeks the Hungarian press wrote long columns about the bravery of this regiment – *but then, suddenly, as if by magic, it fell silent*.

It fell silent to start then praising another Romanian regiment. In the fights for the conquest of the *Ivangorod* fortress, the 50th Romanian Regiment from Alba-Iulia was distinguished first of all. Only this regiment conquered, by assault, 8 important points of support and made numerous prisoners, taking cannons and machine guns. And for some time the Hungarian press wrote only about the bravery of this regiment, *and then again suddenly fell silent as if by magic*.

And now it is the turn of the 64th Romanian regiment from Orastie to be praised.

Can you observe the *system*? First the 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th Regiments were praised, then the 33rd regiment, then the 50th Regiment, and now the 64th Regiment. There are still some 3 Romanian regiments to be praised and it's all over... *But since the praises for the Romanian regiments began, as soon as the name of a new regiment was mentioned, there is no longer talk of the old regiments*.

Since the praises for the 33rd regiment began, there is no mention of the regiments 21, 22, 23 and 24. *And it is no longer talk about them, because those regiments no longer exist*. For a long time past, they melted into the fire of the Russian cannons where the Romanians were always sent „to assault”. Since the praise for the 50th Regiment began, the 33rd Regiment was not mentioned anymore, *because it does not exist anymore, or it exists with an insig-*

¹²⁴ The emphasis are in the original text (o.n.).

nificant effective. And since the praise of the 64th Regiment began, there is no mention of the 50th Regiment anymore, *because even this one was destroyed.*

And one fine morning it will be the turn of the regiments 62 from Tîrgul-Mureş, 63 from Bistriţa, 52 from Cluj to be praised – until the Hungarian press will have no one to praise up.

Because the Hungarian press – and this is the truth terribly sad for us – they praise the Romanian soldiers only after their **death**, after they, the Hungarians, killed them. Here is what a Romanian soldier on the battlefield in Russia writes in verses:

*You Highness Emperor
Make peace, not war
That without doubt you see well with your eyes
How the young boys fall like sheaves,
They fall like bundles of wheat,
Staying in blood up to their waist,
Blood of the Romanians
Up to their horses' chest.
The **German** shouted at them
Don't give up my young sons!
To the the hornist he gives order
„**Storm**” begins to blow
And we all shout „**hurrah**”!
The heart of those who heard us
Turned into stone,
Oh, you German, don't you suffer
That you straddle your horse,
That you stay safe on the way
And you are pushing us in the cannon fire?*

The Hungarian praise for a Romanian regiment means that a new regiment is sentenced to death and that the execution of the sentence has begun.

No, neither the Hungarian nor the German ever knew and never wanted to reward the Romanian soldier's faith and loyalty. Now they want it less than ever.

The hour of the reward, however, should ring one day for us too. The later it rings, the worse it will be for them, because the more brothers we'll have take revenge for.

Ion Grecu

[„Adevărul” (the Truth), 18 August 1915]

60. August 28th/September 10th 1915, Bucharest. Notes of Al. Marghiloman concerning the issues discussed during the secret audience granted by King Ferdinand.

The King called me to a secret audience. He is of the opinion that our policy must be changed, „but not until the military intervention”; the Russians are not yet completely defeated and no intervention is required to us at this moment. I am of the opinion that this is an *urgent* need, because soon our role will be very diminished. If peace occurred now, we would find ourselves isolated, surrounded only by hostile peoples. The King is of the same opinion.

Me: „Therefore, an immediate neutrality, a full one. As organized by the Fourth Hague Convention.”

The King: „Let’s speak clearly: we admit the passage of ammunition; but then our ammunition which is on the sea will be cut.”

Me: “We will have all the German reservoir at our disposal; The Quadruple Entente cannot try to throw us into the arms of Germany; and besides why do we need to do it with so many fanfares? Germany is not a mistress demanding to be exhibited.”

The King: „You are perfectly right; it’s true, it’s true!”-

Me: „Four discreet officials, and everything goes further without being known (I did not know at that time what Bussche had told me on 31st of August that Bulgaria, a neutral country, had offered to sign a declaration that the ammunition was for itself, and that it would assume all the risks!). Besides this, if Germany finds another way, for example Serbia, there will be no more reason to receive our well paid aid. If the crisis ceased without Romania obtaining anything, this would be a crisis for the Throne, because all will consider the king responsible.

The King: „I know it.”

Me: “Consequently we return as soon as possible to the real neutrality, because we are already in contravention: we deny everything to our allies; to others, we give everything. And I explain myself: gasoline, flour, water transports stop and stock up from us. The government will be forced to change its conduct, even for lack of money.” The King was told that we should look for money in the West, because we needed francs and pounds. I show the King that with the current exchange it could profitably be procured with marks all the necessary francs and pounds from Switzerland.

The King always agrees that a policy change is required: he does not say how, and he does not utter a single word that could be misunderstood by Brătianu. For the army's participation, the King considers that the public opinion is not sufficiently prepared yet.

I answer that it cannot go back without being worked by the government. *The public opinion is so as the government wants it to be.*

The King: „But there are also crazy ones.”

– **I:** „The crazy one stake for granted the luxury of being crazy, because they know very well that the obedient ones stop them to bear the consequences of their madness.” Along the same line.

The King: „Mr. T ... I ...¹²⁵ is the most perfect rascal we could ever see; you get dirty even if you touch him with a pair of tongs. Take Ionescu's articles are ridiculous and he shows signs of stupidity”. On Brătianu and his lack of determination, the King says it is a strange mixture of lym-phatism and acts of energy. The king knows that Iliescu steals; he also told Brătianu that Iliescu speaks too much. When he sees him again, he will tell him also more.

I say that Iliescu aims at the General Staff.

The King: „Yes, but I am in the middle and this will not happen.”

I drew the King's attention to be careful not to be confronted with a fait accompli. The king knows that some people boasted about this; but he is not afraid. I reported to the King the opinion of Culcer¹²⁶, who didn't believe that the army would be able not to be obedient; I also added that in Culcer's opinion an armed participation would have great chances of success.

¹²⁵ It is about *Thoma Ionescu* (1860-1926) – Romanian surgeon and anatomist, university professor, initiator of new surgical techniques, founder of the Romanian school of surgery and topographic anatomy, honorary member of the Romanian Academy. A fervent supporter, together with his brother, Take Ionescu, of Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente.

¹²⁶ *Ion Culcer* (1853-1928) – Romanian general. He participated in the War of Independence, after which he studied in Paris. He was secretary general of the Ministry of Defense (1904-1907) and inspector general of the Romanian army. He participated in the Second Balkan War of 1913, commanding the 5th Army Corps that acted in north-eastern Bulgaria (Quadrilateral). Later he was appointed governor of the province that was part of Romania and, for his merits, King Carol I appointed him Governor of the Quadrilateral (the Southern Dobruja), the province annexed by Romania after the Treaty of Bucharest (10 August 1913). In the spring of 1916 he retired, but was recalled in the summer of the same year and put in command of the First Army (August 15-11 October 1916). After the war, he served as Minister of Public Works in the Alexandru Averescu first cabinet (29 January-4 March 1918).

As for Drumaru¹²⁷, the King told Morțun¹²⁸, this morning exactly, that this was no longer disorder, but anarchy. The King considers Morțun a partisan of Germany.

I: „Only cunning and knowing, although he speaks too much, not to be discovered.” – I repeat to the King Mihaly’s¹²⁹ words that Brătianu always treated so as to make any negotiation impossible. Finally, I draw the King’s attention to the exaggerated and too suspicious military measures that were taken and which could bring the accomplished fact.

– My audience was preceded by an audience to the Queen; in the Queen’s small salon came M.S. in person to say hello to me. The Queen acknowledges the sending of Grand Duke Nicholas¹³⁰ into exile in the Caucasus: „The little Emperor¹³¹ dared to do this! The Grand Duke is the uncle, he represents the old people! What does von Bussche do? Does he find the means to become more friendly? About the disagreement between Poklewski and Blondel, known by the Queen:” What do they have these ones? „– I profit, speaking of the courts, to formulate the reasons of my discontentment: Russia had to offer us those two counties that she took us

¹²⁷ *Drumaru V.* – Journalist, author of a booklet: *Ardealul vorbește. Sermanul Ardeal (Transylvania speaks. Poor Transylvania)*, Bucharest, 1916, author’s edition.

¹²⁸ *Vasile G. Morțun* (1860-1919) – Romanian journalist and politician. In the first part of his life, adept of the socialist ideas, he was the first socialist deputy in the Parliament of Romania (1888). Then he joined the Liberals in what was called the „betrayal of the generous” (1899). Interior Minister in the government of Ion I.C. Brătianu (4 January 1914-10 December 1916), then President of the Chamber of Deputies with the headquarters in Jassy; in this capacity he presided over the adoption of the reforms initiated by the liberals in September 1913 and promised by King Ferdinand by the proclamation of 22 March/4 April 1917: the universal suffrage and the agrarian reform.

¹²⁹ *Teodor Mihali* (1885-1934) – Ahead leader of the Romanians from Transylvania. After the war he was twice mayor of Cluj (1926, 1927-1931).

¹³⁰ Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich of Russia (1856-1929) – Grandson of Tsar Nicholas I and uncle of Tsar Nicholas II, he pursued a military career. At the beginning of the world war, Nicholas II appointed him commander-in-chief of the Russian army, but he did not prove developed strategic and command qualities, which represented one of the causes of the great defeats suffered by the Russian troops at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes (August-September 1914). As a result, he was changed from this function and appointed supreme commander and viceroy in the Caucasus. Around the revolution of February/March 1917 he was re-appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army, but the new government led by Prince Lvov cancelled his appointment. He had little involvement in the Russian Civil War and finally, after a brief stay in Italy, settled in Paris, dying of natural causes.

¹³¹ In allusion to the fact that Tsar Nicholas II was a short man, and Grand Duke Nicholas was over two meters high.

in 1878¹³² and give us guarantees for Constantinople. In this way the Queen will know why I am not on the Russian side.

[Alexandru Marghiloman, *op.cit.*, pp. 512-515]

61. 1/14 septembre 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme du comte Ottokar Czernin adressé au Baron Burián, l'informant sur le contenu de l'audience chez le Roi Ferdinand, concernant les mesures d'ordre militaire prises par la Roumanie à la frontière avec l'Autriche-Hongrie.

Le Comte Ottokar Czernin au Baron Burián.

Télégramme

Bucarest, le 14 septembre 1915

Je viens d'avoir une audience d'une heure auprès de Sa Majesté le Roi; elle produira, je l'espère, une certaine détente. En voici les grandes lignes:

Je commençai par la déclaration de nos sentiments pacifiques dont j'avais été chargé, ce à quoi le Roi répondit qu'il n'en avait jamais douté et qu'il en était toujours fermement convaincu. A ma demande si je pouvais transmettre à Votre Excellence sa parole royale que la Roumanie non plus ne nourrissait point d'intentions hostiles contre nous le Roi répondit affirmativement.

Je continuai par lui exposer que puisque tous nous désirions une prompte détente de la situation, nous devons tous et d'accord en chercher les moyens. *Nous* n'aurions rien fait dont la Roumanie dut s'émouvoir, il n'était donc que juste que les troupes roumaines fussent retirées.

Malgré mes insistances le Roi garda le silence assez longtemps sans me donner de réponse. Il finit pourtant par me dire que tout ce mouvement de troupes aurait été exécuté sans qu'on l'eût consulté et que M. Bratiano aurait donné l'ordre formel de laisser les troupes à 10 km de la frontière. Le Roi ayant appris que cet ordre n'avait pas été inspecté, il aurait eu aujourd'hui même une explication à ce sujet avec le général Iliescu qu'il aurait „attrappé vertement”. Ce que je pus comprendre des dires de Sa Majesté, c'est que „avec le temps” les troupes seraient retirées.

Cette réponse évasive n'étant pas satisfaisante, j'allai – sûr d'agir en ceci selon les intentions de Votre Excellence – jusqu'à déclarer au Roi que je ne

¹³² There were actually three counties: Cahul, Bolgrad and Ismail taken to Romania by decision of the Peace Congress of Berlin from June-July 1878 and retroceded to Russia.

pouvais pas me contenter de cette réponse. Qu'on commençait chez nous à ne plus comprendre l'attitude de la Roumanie, et que le roi ferait rien de se garder de créer un ambiant qui pourrait devenir dangereux; que je demandais pardon au Roi de mes insistances, mais qu'il me fallait une réponse claire et précise quand il retirerait ses troupes.

Après s'être fait bien prier le Roi me dit enfin qu'il désirait et espérait que les troupes seraient retirées après que nous aurions levé le blocus de la frontière. Je répliquai que cette réponse ne suffisait toujours pas. Que dans un cas pareil le chef suprême de l'armée ne devait pas se borner à désirer et à espérer, puisqu'il avait à *ordonner*. Là-dessus sa Majesté m'autorisa enfin à rapporter à Votre Excellence que l'ordre de retirer les troupes serait donné après que nous aurions levé le blocus de la frontière.

Comme les entretiens avec le Roi sont fort délicats, grâce à sa manière de les conduire, et que j'avais à cœur d'obtenir toute clarté possible, je répétais les paroles de Sa Majesté en résumé, et j'obtins l'assentiment royal de les transmettre à Votre Excellence.

Immédiatement après l'audience je pris connaissance du télégramme du commandement en chef de nos armées¹³³ à l'Attaché militaire i. et r.¹³⁴ comme quoi le blocus de la frontière est levé et j'informai le Roi par écrit que je m'attendais à ce que les troupes fussent retirées sans autre délai.

Il m'aurait été difficile d'obtenir des garanties et des promesses ultérieures de la part du Roi; étant données cependant les conditions toutes spéciales du pays, étant donnée surtout l'autorité douteuse du Roi, nous n'avons pas la certitude que les troupes seront retirées.

Il faut ajouter à cela que le Roi part ce soir pour passer cinq jours sur les bords du Danube, que M. Bratiano n'arrivera ici que demain matin, et qu'il est difficile que les deux s'entendent d'ici là.

J'aurai l'occasion demain de parler de l'affaire au président du conseil.
Voir le N° 41.

[*Documents diplomatiques concernant les rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Roumanie, 22 Juillet 1914-27 Août 1916,....*, p. 24-26]

¹³³ Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (1852-1925) – Feld-maréchal austro-hongrois, chef d'état-major de l'armée austro-hongroise (1906-1911 et 1912-mars 1917), l'un des principaux responsables du déclenchement de la Première Guerre Mondiale.

¹³⁴ Lieutenant-colonel Maximilian Ritter von Randa (24 mai 1874-14 août 1941), depuis mai 1914, attaché militaire de l'Autriche-Hongrie à Bucarest. En février 1918, il exécuta une mission secrète à Iași, où il remit au roi Ferdinand une lettre de l'empereur Carol Ier de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Après la guerre, il s'établit en Roumanie et mourut à Cernăuți.

62. 1/14 septembre 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme du comte Ottokar Czernin adressé au Baron Burián l'informant sur le contenu de sa discussion avec Ion I. C. Brătianu concernant le retraite des troupes roumaines de la frontière commune.

Le Comte Ottokar Czernin au Baron Burián.

Télégramme, Bucarest, le 17 septembre 1915

M. Bratiano prétend ne pouvoir retirer les troupes de la frontière que dans une quinzaine de jours environ. Il me soutint avec emphase que personne ne pouvait le croire assez fou pour vouloir nous attaquer maintenant, du moment qu'il ne l'avait pas fait lorsque les Russes se trouvaient dans les Carpathes. De plus la Bulgarie était avec nous maintenant, personne ne pouvait donc croire sérieusement qu'il aurait choisi ce moment.

Les troupes avancées auraient eu l'ordre de construire certaines fortifications sur la frontière et ce travail ne saurait être interrompu d'un moment à l'autre. D'ailleurs les troupes auraient déjà commencée à se retirer de la frontière au fur et à mesure que leur travail était achevé. La Roumanie aurait toujours devant les yeux le sort de la Belgique et il lui fallait (à lui Bratiano) calmer l'opinion publique et lui donner la conviction qu'il veillait sur la sûreté du pays.

Mes arguments à moi ne firent aucun effet, pas même la considération qu'il mettait le Roi dans une fausse position puisque Sa Majesté m'avait promis de faire retirer les troupes, sur-le-champ.

Voir le N° 42.

[Documents diplomatiques concernant les rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Roumanie, 22 Juillet 1914-27 Août 1916, p. 26-27]

63. September 5th/18th 1915, Bucharest. Article of dr. Nicolae Coman, „Martyrdom of Transylvania in 1914 – 1915”, published in the newspaper „Universul”¹³⁵ (the Universe).

The existence of Austria-Hungary, is a perpetual danger to the peace of Europe. In parallel to the external war, Austria-Hungary is waging an internal war against the subjugated nationalities on its inside.

¹³⁵ The article is an excerpt from a forthcoming paper with the same title, in which the sufferings of the Bukovina Romanians during the first two years of the war were presented (o.n.).

Of all the European polyglot states, Austria-Hungary is the first which, based on the principle of nationalities, the dominant principle of our time, must disappear. This necessity arises in particular from two facts. First of all, in Austria-Hungary, as in none of the other polyethnical states, the ruling nation, the German-Hungarian one, is not superior to the sum of the subject nationalities, neither in number, nor in race or culture, and then because Austria-Hungary, once again like no other polyglot state, is surrounded from almost all parts by national states, with claims to it, tending to identify, on its account, their current political frontiers with the ethnic frontiers of the respective nations. .

Under these circumstances, the dismantling of Austria-Hungary, for a long time already, was only a matter of time. This was understood by both the subjugated nationalities, in a rapid crescendo enhancing their centrifugal tendencies, as well as the two dominating nations, which in the latter days were, with the exception of the German nationalists, as those who gravitate towards Germany, in a desperate struggle to resolve the problem of the nationalities in such a way that the Austro-Hungarian conglomerate will still remain in one place and ensure for some time the existence of Austria-Hungary, despite its anachronism. According to the way the Austro-Germans want to solve this problem, they are divided into two currents that are struggling between them, in „Grossoesterreich” and „Warriors”.

The first ones who too abhor the war, but only understood to exploit it for the realization of a „Great Austria”, as a confederation of nationalities, at the moment, seem to have lost the game. The death of the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince, Franz Ferdinand, the patron of this idea, and the outbreak of the European war, under conditions absolutely unfavourable to this idea, made them disappear for the time being; and if the Dual Alliance comes off defeated from this war or if, even defeating Germany, it happens – in fact very possible – that Austria-Hungary should be forced to cover the damages, they will of course disappear for eternity. However, if Austria-Germany could come off victorious, then the possibility of founding a „Greater Austria” is not excluded in the main, although in reality, judging by the current attitude of the Austro-Romanians, it is almost beyond any reasonable doubt that the absolutism will be enthroned or at least an era of subjugation of the nationalities far more cruel than it has been until now.

For the Romanian nation, and for the existence of a free Romania, the „grossoesterreich” idea was the most dangerous political movement in Austria-Hungary during the recent decades. The Romanian people from

beyond, exhausted from all points of view, through an unjust struggle and a secular oppression, even having the greatest autonomy that could be given to it, in a confederation of nationalities more numerous than it, and alongside those nations that have oppressed it for almost a millennium will no longer be able to keep pace with the enemy, and it will never be able to regain what it once lost. But who knows the Hungarian-Jewish-German rulers of Austria, that one knows that even in this case of the restoration of Austria-Hungary into a confederation of nationalities under the reign of the House of Habsburg, the nationalities will receive only pseudo-autonomies, from which always the same old oppressors will take advantage.

For Romania, the founding of a „Great Austria” would have meant only the deepening and widening of the precipice gaping between her and the fraction of the Romanian nation beyond the Carpathians. By contesting to us, under the pretext of national freedoms and autonomy granted to the Romanians in Austria-Hungary, any right of liberating intervention and claim to the Romanians from this „Greater Austria”, the Romanian nation should thus remain split in two parts by its heart itself, if not definitive, then at least for a long time, maybe even until a reunification of the Romanian nation would no longer be possible. Under these circumstances, Romania’s fate would be sealed too. Not being able to change its unnatural borders, remaining small as it is, it should remain condemned to a precarious existence, becoming more and more an Austro-German hinterland, or finally disappearing from the map of Europe.

The „warrior” Austro-Romanians put the thesis in another way. Austria-Hungary, threatened by the neighboring claiming states and by the awakening of the national consciousness of the peoples within it, can no longer continue to exist in its current form only after the destruction or at least the weakening of these states and after the abolition or at least the reduction to absolute ethnic unconsciousness of the subjugated nationalities. This goal could not be achieved, given the international political situation of the last years, nor could it be prepared except by war. As these Hungarian-Austro-Romanians took part, through their system of provocative agencies, at the outbreak of the war, and since even the assassination of Prince Franz Ferdinand, the immediate cause of the Austro-Serbian war, is their work, which for us is absolutely certain, it will be certainly known only after the war, when things could be thoroughly investigated, and they will be proved. But it is beyond any doubt that the responsibility for the current

war, as it is determined by the realization of the national principle in Europe, is carried by Austria-Hungary. Regardless of whether Austria-Hungary wanted the war or not, it itself by its anachronistic existence related to the national principle, forms the cause of the war in terms of this principle. It is very significant, from this point of view, the conference of German pacifists, held two years ago, in Berlin, at which it was stated that the only and most serious cause of the imminent war was the existence of Austria-Hungary and it was proposed, in order to avoid the European catastrophe, the dismantling of Austria in a peaceful way and the joining of the factions of the peoples to the respective conational states, which have national claims rights. In other words, if we excluded from the current war the reasons of national principle, or if Austria-Hungary continued even after the war to exist between the same borders, the European problem, in its true shadow, would remain unsolved, and the outbreak of another European war, a war for the liquidation of Austria-Hungary, would only be a matter of time. As long as there is a parasitical Austria-Hungary, mounted on the nationalities, there will be no peace in Europe.

Once the war broke out, the Austro-Hungarians applied their principles according to the most ingenious system. It's true, they couldn't conquer Serbia, and they did not reach Moscow, but this makes them more obstinate in the second direction of the Austro-Hungarian war: in the abolition of the nationalities within the Monarchy.

In this direction, they are waging a second war, internally, against their own subjects. This subjugation, humiliation and cowardly massacre of the nationalities, who cannot make a stand against them and send all their forces to the front, even sacrificing them for these secular oppressors and tyrants, will remain unique in history.

We are not, for the moment, in the sad state of being able to describe the sufferings of the Italians, of the Serbs and of the other nationalities in Austria-Hungary, during this war, and not even of the Romanians in Hungary, but we must, this time, limit ourselves to show only a part of the disaster of our nation in Bukovina, to which we had the sorrowful "happiness" to attend, which we saw and also suffered from.

But from the injustices and barbarous acts of the Austrians, who claim to be more civilized and more progressive than the Hungarians, committed against the Romanians in Bukovina, which they themselves had recognized for almost a century and a half as one of the most submissive and loyal people of the Monarchy, and at a time when the relations between

the Austrians and the free Romania are not yet hostile, anyone can easily guess what the Romanians in the Hungarian kingdom must endure from the Magyar barbarity, as well as the other „irredentist” nationalities, against whose free brothers Austria-Hungary is waging the war.

[„Universul” (the Universe), Saturday 5/18 September 1915]

64. September 7th/20th 1915, Sofia. Report of the Romanian military attaché in Sofia, Captain Florea Țenescu¹³⁶, relating to the starting of the mobilization in Bulgaria.

ROMANIA

THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF

Military attaché

SOFIA

Confidential No. 138 from 7 Sept. 1915

The military attaché in Sofia to the Great General Staff

Further to the telegraphic Reports No. 136 and 137 from 6 and 7 Sept. 1915. I have the honour to report the following with regard to the current political-military situation of Bulgaria.

At the moment when it was particularly considered that the political situation of Bulgaria had calmed down and that this state would still continue for some time its policy of neutrality, taking into account the assurances given by the government and the King in this regard, as well as their impact on the army by weakening the peace effectives [dismissing the people from the cont. 37 (1913) – and the dismissal of young people with short term from the cont. 39 (1915)], in the evening of 5 – 6 September following the audience with the King of the opposition chiefs, as a matter of particular gravity, it intervenes the order given to the Bulgarian Railways to suspend the transport of goods and to unload as soon as possible, starting from 6

¹³⁶ *Florea Țenescu* (1884-1941) – Romanian officer, military attaché in Bulgaria (1914-1916). Future general and chief of the Great General Staff (7 February 1939-23 August 1940). In this last quality he supported the acceptance of Romania of Soviet revendications contended in the ultimatum of 26 June 1940, arguing through the unfavorable ratio of forces. He was dismissed from the army by General Ion Antonescu after this latter had taken over the power on 6 September 1940.

September in the morning, all the wagons that would be loaded, so that in the shortest time the wagon park should be at the disposal of the Ministry of War.

This fact was very surprising and was motivated at the beginning in different ways, which were of course only rumors launched by the government in order to mask the events that would follow. Among others, it is said that Bulgaria needs wagons to carry the ammunition waiting in Germany and that Romania will now let pass. Then, that these wagons are necessary to transport to the training centers (see Report No. 134/915) the Macedonian militiamen gathered in the different cities of Bulgaria.

But these explanations can only be accepted by those who know nothing about the places and the necessities of the army. The fact is certain that this measure to suspend the traffic of goods, allowing only isolated packages up to 50 km, is the preliminary preparation of the operation of mobilization, which, in fact, can be seen now from other military preparations too, which in part I had the honour to have reported telegraphically in No. 137 of 7 Sept. 915.

As different suppositions have been made regarding the suspension of freight transport, so are made different hypotheses regarding the mobilization expected to be decreed tomorrow, 8 September, at 2 pm, as the version circulates in the capital of Bulgaria. So it is said that the King -, following the audience he gave to the opposition leaders, in which he was somewhat threatened – would like, in addition to his personal defense, to hasten the events, mobilizing and attacking Serbia following a plan and a policy thought up for a long time before, and which now seem achievable. On the other hand, it is said that the mobilization is imperative in Bulgaria through similar measures taken already in Romania and Greece, or which will be taken soon, and which the Bulgarian government is informed about?!

The fact is, however, that the Austro-German offensive began in Serbia, because the operations became more serious, more violent and today it is said that the Sabbath would have fallen into the hands of the Austro-Germans. Under these conditions, the possible Bulgarian mobilization against Serbia can be explained and motivated too.

The second probability is that the measure be the last means of pressure, which Bulgaria wants to use with the response it will give to the Quadruple Ententes regarding the cessions of Serbia in Macedonia and perhaps,

at the same time, as a reason – in case of non-acceptance by the Quadruple of the conditions of Bulgaria – to start the war as soon as possible.

In any case, in the actions now being carried out in Bulgaria, we can see the triumph of the Austro-German policy, which succeeded in making the Turks give up the territories of Thrace, thus assuring Bulgaria of the free use of the Svilengrad-Adrianopol-Dedeagaci¹³⁷ railway, and wishing to push now Bulgaria against Serbia, waging it in war. In fact, they are trying to win the sympathies even among the officers corps, helping with the German money the young officers to equip themselves.

Regarding the mobilization, it is further rumored that it will consist only of the mobilization of 3 divisions; it seems hardly probable. But the days to come will show us how far it will go. For the moment, only preliminary measures have been taken, namely:

- 1) Suspension of the freight traffic starting today 6 Sept.
- 2) Unloading the wagons and preparing them in the railway stations;
- 3) Declaration by merchants of the goods and supplies they have;
- 4) Requisition of bags;
- 5) Calling 3 contingents to the cavalry. It is said that some cavalry regiments have already gone to the frontier and even 2-3 battalions of the 4th Reg. artillery (probably the horse artillery)
- 6) That soon 8 classes will be called to the infantry;
- 7) The campaign kitchens were transported to the Serbian frontier;
- 8) Preparation of cantonments in Kyustendil-Dupnitsa;
- 9) Sending ammunition to Belogradic-Vidin;
- 10) Transport of large-caliber artillery to Varna and Burgas (and maybe to our frontier).

On the other hand, it is rumoured that the people would not want a mobilization and that riots could erupt even among the soldiers.

Finally, that the Cinar-Kale¹³⁸ fort would have fallen on the war theater in the Dardanelles. It seems that these two versions are related to the act of the mobilization and spread by those who do not want to see it put in practice in Bulgaria.

¹³⁷ Today Adrianopol is called Edirne; Svilengrad is 35 km west of Edirne, and Dedeagaci is the Alexandroupolis Aegean port of Greece, 140 km south of Edirne.

¹³⁸ This is the city of Çanakkale, where is the fortress built in 1462 by Sultan Muhammad II, and which in Turkish historiography denominates the Gallipoli campaign; it was never conquered by the Allies.

Until now, however, there are signs that a mobilization will be in a short time.

Military attaché at Sofia

Captain Țenescu

[A.M.R., Fund 948, Section III information, file no. 335, 1915, pp. 21-22]

65. 11/24 septembre 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme du comte Ottokar Czernin adressé au Baron Burián, l'informant sur l'avertissement fait par Ion I. C. Brătianu concernant les conséquences négatives d'une éventuelle mobilisation de l'armée.

Le Comte Ottokar Czernin au Baron Burián.

Télégramme

Bucarest, le 24 septembre 1915

Plusieurs circonstances me font supposer que le courant populaire en faveur de la mobilisation gagne rapidement en force. Comme je ne crois pas beaucoup à la force de résistance de M. Brătianu j'ai été le trouver avant qu'il se rendît au conseil et lui ai déclaré ce qui suit:

„Que n'ayant pas d'ordre exprès je ne parlais pas officiellement, mais qu'en homme qui connaissait vienne et Berlin je devais le prévenir que la Roumanie n'était pas dans la même situation que la Grèce, et que sa mobilisation nous obligerait de demander des explications, et qu'il ferait donc bien de pondérer mûrement ses décisions”.

M. Brătianu me demanda pourquoi je faisais cette distinction puisque la Roumanie était le seul pays balkanique qui n'eût pas mobilisé bien qu'elle eût le même droit de se défendre comme les autres.

Je lui répondis qu'il ne s'agissait pas pour la Roumanie de se défendre. Qu'il savait très bien que ni nous ni la Bulgarie n'avons l'intention de l'attaquer. La Roumanie par contre avait amassé des forces considérables sur notre frontière, et nous menaçait depuis un an par la presse, tandis qu'un fort parti ne cessait de pousser à la guerre; il était donc de mon devoir de le mettre en garde contre un pas qui ne saurait être considéré que comme hostile et qui pourrait avoir les conséquences les plus graves. Je finis par répéter que je ne parlais pas officiellement, n'étant chargé d'aucun ordre, mais que j'avais désiré lui dire ma manière de penser loyalement et en ami.

M. Brătianu était très ému, me remercia de mes ouvertures; mais déclara en même temps de ne pouvoir rien proposer.

Comme le conseil des ministres a été convoqué à la suite de la mobilisation grecque, donc d'un moment à l'autre, il m'a été impossible de demander des instructions et je prierais Votre Excellence de vouloir bien me dire si Elle approuve ma manière d'agir.

[*Documents diplomatiques concernant les rapports entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Roumanie, 22 Juillet 1914-27 Août 1916, ..., p. 27-28*]

66. September 16th/29th 1915, Bucharest. Article by Constantin Mille¹³⁹ „Mr. Brătianu's politics. I will go with the winner!”, published in the newspaper „Adevărul” (the Truth).

For fourteen months since I have racked my brain to find out what Mr. Brătianu wants and what his line of conduct consists of, that one glorified by „The Future”, but which neglects to tell us what it consists of, so that together we too exalt it and humbly beg his pardon for suspecting both his intelligence and good faith, more over for denying his genius...

I asked the living people and the dead, by the help of the spirits, I asked diplomats, politicians, friends and opponents. Nobody knew how to unravel this mystery to me. Some tried to lie to me, to fool me, but, happier than the opposition leaders, I didn't believe a jot.

*

However, what I was looking for in vain, I found one of those days, in the form of a political and personal friend of the vizier, who wished to enlighten my conscience and to materialize the sibylline politics of that one who holds in his hands the destinies of the country and of the Romanianism in general.

– Mr. Brătianu – the person under discussion told me – if he does not declare in favour of one part, neither on the other one, it is because, as prudent and cautious as he is, he does not want to throw himself into

¹³⁹ *Constantin Mille* (1861-1927) – Journalist, novelist, poet, lawyer and Romanian socialist militant, as well as a prominent activist for the defense of human rights. Famous after taking over the leading of the newspaper „Adevărul” in January 1898, after the death of its founder, Al. Beldiman, and that he maintained until shortly before his death, handed the paper over to a consortium headed by Aristide Blank.

any adventure which, he believes, would be fatal for us. He cannot know mathematically who will win. His hesitant policy consists in not separating irreparably from anyone. When the balance hangs considerably on a side, he will go there too and thus, with few sacrifices, he will gain a lot. Going with the *Quadruple Entente*? But if the German wins, we'll get it in the neck, isn't it? Going with the *Central Powers* is dangerous too, because they can, after all be defeated. The best way is to wait, to be ready, however this policy will be called the politics of the gravediggers, the policy of the robbers of cadavers...

– Very well, I replied. But you have to admit that this line of conduct is far more dangerous than risking everything for all. Acting in this way, you dissatisfy both alike. Do you think that the Germans are satisfied with us, the Germans who, because we let them only fraudulently and secretly transport ammunition for Turkey, are forced to attack Serbia, to make Bulgaria be discovered and thus be forced to fight on another front? The day when the Germans will be victorious, although with our help, of course, do you think that they will not pay us through the nose what they call our felony, that they will not terribly punished us for not having allow them to buy us than half and for putting difficulties in their way, preventing them from winning faster?

What about the Allies? The Allies realize that we, by our insincere neutrality, delay their victory and facilitate that of their adversairies. If they are victorious, when it comes to giving us what we ask: the whole Transylvania and Bukovina, we will be answered as the Romanian mitocan says, *but what for, sir?* You did not come when it was hard, favoured the enemies and because without you we are victorious, you dare, without shame, ask for a payment that we do not owe you?

– But we have written treaties, conventions concluded with both sides!

– Stuff and nonsense! The papers are worth nothing, in these cases. The contracts agreements apply even in ordinary times, when you are of good faith. But when you are an ordinary cheater and a shabby fellow, when you made no sacrifice, but indirectly helped the opponents, then, sorry, I refuse to pay, I deny my signature and then – I am the strongest, I am the winner, I decide – and the impostors I order out or I punish them...

If this is the policy of Mr. Brătianu – then everything is explained, but at the same time the name of the policy of fear and cowardice, the politics of the national disaster, which is given to this miserable and ugly line of conduct...

If so, as long as we have time – it is necessary to drive away the coward from the government, it is an imperious duty not to wait anymore, especially as this policy is not just about going with the winner, but to be helpful so that one party wins, and this party are the the German-Austrian allies. But today, Germany's policy is well known: to extend its empire from the North Sea to the Indies and – alas! in the way of the Germans we too stand, we who are destined to become, thanks to Mr. Brătianu, a kind of Mecklenburg or other principality of Lippe – embedded in the kingdom of the Kaizer.

Const. Mille

[„Adevărul” (the Truth), 18 September 1915]

67. 29 septembre/12 octobre 1915, Pétrograd. Télégramme du ministre de la Russie à Paris, A. P. Izvolski, adressé à Sergueï Sazonov, ministre des Affaires Étrangères, concernant les opinions des cercles français sur la passivité de la Russie en Balkans, ce qui pourrait mettre en péril l'entrée de la Roumanie en guerre.

29 septembre/12 octobre 1915. N° 639

Je ne puis vous cacher que l'excitation contre la Russie causée par des doutes sur notre empressement à participer à l'action en commun dans les Balkans s'accroît de jour en jour ici dans les milieux parlementaires, journalistes et même dirigeants. D'une part, c'est nous qu'on charge de la responsabilité de la situation dans les Balkans qui a, paraît-il, été aggravée par notre intransigeance envers la Roumanie et notre partialité envers la Bulgarie. D'autre part, on indique que l'absence de nos troupes serait non seulement un coup pour le prestige des alliés et pour la position historique de la Russie parmi les peuples balkaniques, mais encore placerait la France et l'Angleterre dans la position la plus dangereuse et la plus désavantageuse, car cela laisserait planer des doutes sur la bonne entente entre les alliés. On attache ici une énorme importance à la nouvelle phase dans laquelle la grande guerre entre dans les Balkans, et on trouve que le chemin de Constantinople ouvert aux Austro-Allemands ne ferait pas que mettre une barrière entre la Russie et les autres États, mais donnerait le moyen à l'Autriche et à l'Allemagne de recevoir d'Asie-Mineure hommes et matières premières en nombre illimité. C'est pourquoi l'opinion publique demande

à haute voix qu'à cette nouvelle attaque soient opposés les communs efforts des quatre états alliés; dans le cas contraire il faut se demander si la France, sans avoir la certitude d'être appuyée dans les Balkans, peut risquer d'affaiblir ses forces sur son front principal. On fait remarquer qu'après la guerre c'est la Russie qui va obtenir le plus de profits au détriment de la Turquie, et que si elle ne participe pas au (*omission*) commun la France et l'Angleterre seront obligées à remettre à l'étude leur décision au sujet de Constantinople et des détroits. Un article dans ce sens a été inséré dans un organe aussi sérieux que le *Journal des Débats*. Aujourd'hui encore d'autres journaux influents déclarent que pour sauver la situation et attirer la Roumanie la Russie doit sacrifier une partie de la Bessarabie; tout cela fait que l'ambiance ici nous devient extrêmement défavorable, ce qui peut entraîner de grandes modifications dans nos relations avec la France. Il y a à ce sujet une campagne forcenée contre Delcassé et Paléologue, qui peut se terminer par leur chute.

Izvol'sky

[*Documents diplomatiques secrets russes, 1914-1917*, p. 199-200]

68. October 10th/23rd 1915, Bucharest. Speech delivered by the poet Octavian Goga at the meeting of the Unionist Federation, held in „Dacia” hall, reflecting the emotion and the bitterness generated by the intervention of Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers and the successes scored by the Bulgarians.

Gentlemen,

I don't want to make a speech, I want to make a faith confession.

The speeches were a lot all along this year. For fourteen months, it was crying enough at all the crossroads, and the brothers' death was shouted in vain.

Now there is no need to mourn for our dead. The gates of the cemeteries were closed there in Transylvania and at that time your house¹⁴⁰ took fire. (Applause).

¹⁴⁰ Allusion to the entry into war of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers that had taken place on 11 October 1915 by attacking Serbia, the actual declaration of war being on 14 October.

Allow me in this new situation to tell you with all the words parsimony that great dangers demand, with the conscience conciliated before God and people, to tell you the confession of a soul for which the supreme religion is the love of the Romanian country. (Stormy applause).

I am convinced that the last hour has rang, not for the triumph of our dream, but for the escape of Romania. (Applause).

For a year and more, there were so many occasions when the hoofs of the Romanian horses would have passed so easily over the carrion of the Habsburg monarchy. We didn't it! We cried, we made speeches, we bargained. In the middle of Europe, engulfed by flames and penetrated by an epic heroism, we were a barren island, Romania appeared as a stall of insignificant marchands where here and there the tears of the helplessness were wiped. That's all. But in exchange, all the poisoned weeds of the neutrality overgrew our souls. Our altars from old were profanated and all the whirlpool of the immorality was leaked here in Bucharest. The traitors and the spies are swarming their heads up in front of us and on the bridge of Mogosoia¹⁴¹, shouting at the top the titles of their newspapers. (Stormy applause).

During this time, the enemies surrounded us and today they are shaking hands at the borders of our country.

You do not have to be a great strategist nor doze o whole life behind the cardboard side scenes of the Romanian diplomacy, to understand the danger of the last hour. Your clear mind and common sense can show it. I said it in other parts too, and I repeat it also here: the day when the German helmet meets the Bulgarian¹⁴² cap, you have to break down the statue of Michael the Brave¹⁴³, because our dream died then. The first German train

¹⁴¹ From October 1878, the «Mogosoia Bridge» («Podul Mogosoiaiei») received the name of «Victory Avenue» (Calea Victoriei), in memory of the Romanian army's victory over the Ottomans in the war of independence (1877-1878). Using the old name of the famous road artery, Goga wants to show that in relation to the state of affairs in Romania the name of Victory Avenue (Calea Victoriei) can no longer be used because even the results obtained at that time were compromised.

¹⁴² In allusion to the rapid advancement of the Bulgarian troops in Serbia and the imminence of the full occupation by the Central Powers of this country that had resisted heroically until then. It was also an exhortation for Romania and its army to run to the aid of Serbia now being attacked from two sides.

¹⁴³ The equestrian statue of Mihai Viteazul (Michael the Brave) in front of the University had been the second statue erected in Bucharest – on 8th November 1873 – after that one of Mihail Cantacuzino's ban (military governor) in front of Colțea Hospital (1869) and was the symbol of the will to unite all the Romanian provinces in one single country.

that will pass through Constantinople over the body of the defeated Serbia, is the last train of Romania. (*Enthusiastic ovations, bravo*).

Look, gentlemen, here is where we have arrived.

It is not about saving the Transylvania, sacrificed by the fraternal love of our official Romania, it is at stake the existence itself of the country, which does not want to be neither a German colony, nor a miserable hinterland of the Rusciuk costermongers. (Applause).

In front of this shame, the glass is filled up.

The Romanian country must be mistress at her home and impose her will. This nation, no matter how miserable, is not a plot of rotten Orient, it is a corner of humanity where the calls of an ideal are felt. Who does not understand the life instinct of this people, who is terribly struggling against the fever of death, who feels closer to the irons of Berlin gardens than to the hatchet in the hand of Michael the Brave, is not entitled to speak his mind at our burial feast. (Enthusiastic applause).

That is why, gentlemen, in the last hour we must rise and be penetrated by the spirit of sacrifice that opens in the great moments of our history which we want to take a step forward.

We are no longer a choir of lamenters tearing at the corners of the streets, we want to be a band of honest people ready to make of their body the pedestal of tomorrow's glory. (*Stormy applause*).

Mr. Filipescu! We didn't gather around you to receive from you portfolios and decorations. We don't care a button who will countersign the mobilization decree. We see in you in a shout from the pain of our country and that is why we follow you. (*Acclamations*).

You should know that we are ready for anything, know that the country has become tired of words and that on the eve of the death only the women mourn for.

Gentlemen, yesterday an unknown gentleman came to me, – God knows who sent him – who gave me the parental advice to mind my own business, because my head was in danger. I answered him as I answered to the others too: It's all the same to me, if for the triumph of the truth my head would fall into the mountains ravines, or fall in Bucharest. This creed is not only mine, it is yours, of all of you. (*Applause*).

Here is the confession I wanted to make, still hoping for the moral health of Romania.

If I was wrong, if we were wrong, we who passed the mountains in order to call you to us, then nothing remains but to take the pass of the

exile, to go on the active fronts where blood is shed, not helpless tears, for crushing the double-headed eagle¹⁴⁴ that for thousand years has bitten from our flesh, and not to look back at Romania, as the biblical Lotnever looked back at the flames of Gomorrah. (*Acclamations*).

[Octavian Goga, *Strigăte în pustiu. Cuvinte din Ardeal într'o țară neutrală* (Shouts in the desert. Words from Transylvania in a neutral country), Bucharest, 1915, pp. 211-214]

69. October 13th/26th 1915, Bucharest. Relating published by the newspaper „Universul” (the Universe) on the meeting organized by the Social-Democratic Party from Romania on 11 October 1915.

Pacifist Action of the Socialists

– Yesterday meeting –

Yesterday at 3 o'clock p.m an anti-war meeting was held in the assembly room of the socialist club. A large number of citizens attend it. After the choir begins to sing different revolutionary songs, the lawyer C-tin Gheorghian opens the meeting.

He says that the Working Youth Circle, together with the local section of the Socialist party convened this meeting to protest against war and militarism. Then he gives Mr. Crețeanu the floor, delegate of the Working Youth Circle, who says that the young workers too have the duty to fight against the war. He says that in other countries young people are fighting side by side with the elderly, but they are distinguished by their abnegation and courage in the struggle of the proletariat against the superposed classes. When our parents and brothers are taken to the massacre, we will remain without support. The youth is asking for schools, not killing and devastation tools.

Dr. O. Călin¹⁴⁵ says that the warriors' party changed the name of its firm. They are now called „Unionist Federation”¹⁴⁶. This Federation de-

¹⁴⁴ Allusion to the coat of arms of Austria-Hungary with a bicephalous eagle.

¹⁴⁵ *Otto Călin* (1885-1917) – Born in Iasi, in a Jewish family, he became a doctor. During his studies, he approached the socialist circles becoming a theoretician of the socialist movement in Romania. In 1910 he contributed to the foundation of the Romanian Social Democratic Party. In 1911, he left for the Occident where he met with a number of European socialist leaders. He returned to the country and ruled against the war. Mobilized as a military doctor, he died of typhus in the spring of 1917.

¹⁴⁶ On 18th September/1st October 1915, the organization „Unionist Federation” was established, bringing together the „Entente conservatives” and the „democratic conservatives”.

mands immediate entry into the war, but it is known this is impossible and therefore it rented a club as any political party and was set up for many years in the new building.

At the inauguration meeting, Mr. N. Filipescu declared that the army has no ammunition and brought accusations to the war minister. We the socialists take note of these statements and say: If these statements are true, then you are all guilty because the *country*, that is the people, endures the torment of hunger while you say that with the money collected from tributes you make and prepare the defense of the country. Now we ask Mr. Nicu Filipescu why he asks us incessantly to enter the war, if he knows that we have no ammunition and that the army is not ready? We cannot throw the country into the hazard of the European war, hoping that *maybe* we will win Transylvania and Bukovina.

It is known that main argument of the warriors was the *encircling of Romania*. They said: „Let's declare war until we are surrounded, because then it will be too late.” Well, the „encirclement” is actually an accomplished fact and it would be logical for the warriors to say now: „If until now no war has been declared, now” down the arms „, because we can do nothing more because... we are encircled.” But we cannot demand logic from those who want to wage war at any cost. Let us follow the example of the Bulgarian socialists who did completely their duty, so they are not guilty of the disaster of Bulgaria. Let's ask the government to declare neutrality.

D. Jianu, delegate of the Working Youth Circle, addresses the new recruits and tells them not to forget in the barracks that they are sons of workers and to do their duty as socialists.

D. Dr. C. Rakovsky¹⁴⁷, arrived on the rostrum, is welcomed with long applause. The today meeting – the speaker begins – was convened by the Working Youth Circle too. I will bring a word of praise to this youth that

Its purpose was to fight for Romania's entry into war on the side of the Entente and the union with Transylvania.

¹⁴⁷ Cristian Rakovsky (1873-1941) – Of Bulgarian origin, his real name being Krăstyo Georgiev Stanchev, by profession doctor, was a socialist militant in Bulgaria and then in Romania, leading the Social-Democratic Party in 1910. Arrested by the Romanian authorities as a result of his anti-national activity, he was released, in May 1917, by the Russian Bolshevik soldiers. Established in Russia, he held three times the function of Prime Minister of the Soviet Ukraine, then he was the ambassador of the Soviet Union to London (1924-1925) and then to Paris (1925-1927). He fell a victim to the Stalinist terror.

proved to be worthy of a future socialist generation. Speaking about the meeting of the „Unionist Federation”, he says that the government did good to the unionists, because it sent all the Romanians from all over the country to „Dacia” in order that its hall be populated. If the meeting was held at „Cinema Rex” too, then both meetings would end in a formidable fiasco.

About the external events regarding our country, the orator says that if we have not taken action *up until now*, this is due more to the hazard and to the Russians who refused to meet the claims of the Romanian government. This should not delight us. The danger of war can arise at any moment and that is why it is everyone’s duty to fight and ask the government to declare: Romania will remain neutral until the end. If we enter the war, either with the Allies or the Central Powers, then we will increase the number of the vassals.

Bulgaria has signed its death sentence by engaging itself in this terrible scourge that is convulsing Europe. We, the Socialists, have said since four months now: this war will end with the suffocation of the peoples of the Balkans.

The orator then pointed out that only the Balkan Confederation would ensure the peace and prosperity in the Balkans. He closes his speech with a warm appeal to the union of all the proletarian forces.

D. Gheorghiu closes the series of talks at 6 pm, the workers retiring in silence.

[„Universul” (the Universe) 13 October 1915]

70. October 16th/29th 1915, Bucharest. Letter of Octavian Goga addressed to General Grigore Crăiniceanu¹⁴⁸, political director of the

¹⁴⁸ *Grigore Crăiniceanu* (1852-1935) – Combat engineer officer, he attended the Training School of Artillery and Engineering Corps in Brussels (1875-1877). He participated in the War of Independence and advanced in his career to the rank of Army Corps General. He was chief of the Romanian General Staff between April 1st, 1907 and November 1st, 1909 and War Minister between November 1st, 1909 – December 28th, 1910. He was noted as a prestigious military theorist, especially in the field of fortifications, being received at the Romanian Academy, first as correspondent member and then as a titular member (May 18th, 1911). At the beginning of 1914 he went into reserve, but in August 1916 he was recalled to active duty, taking over the command of the Second Army, replacing General Alexandru Averescu, a position in which he did not confirm.

newspaper „Universul” (the Universe) informing the public opinion on the starting of the Transylvanian leaders’ deportation.

Dear General,

I would kindly request you to grant me the hospitality of the newspaper „Universul”, whose wide publicity crosses all over the country, so that I can denounce to the honest public opinion from the neutral Romania a miserable impudence act committed by the Hungarian authorities against the Romanian intellectuals remained in Transylvania.

Here is the fact:

From an absolute authentic source I received the information that these days the mass arrest of our scholars and their deportation within the country began. The first detentions, on which I was given precise explanations, were operated in the **in** the vicinity of Romania, around Sibiu and Brasov. Probably the same thing has happened in other parts too, from which until now nothing could be known. For the moment, I present a list of the prisoners, whose names have been communicated to me with the specification that the number of victims is much higher.

Here they are:

From Braşov and its surroundings:

I. *Butnariu*, teacher in Braşov; *Toma Brenciu*, singer at the St. Nicholas Church in Braşov; *Const. Proca*, priest in Rîşnov; *Zenovie Popoviciu*, priest in Săcele; *I. Dima*, priest in Intorsura Buzău; *D. Manole*, priest in Zizin; *I. Nanu*, priest in Sînpetru; *D. Greceanu*, priest in Herman.

From Alba-Iulia:

Dr. Zaharia Munteanu, lawyer; *S. Vlad*, pharmacist.

From Sibiu and its surroundings:

Romul Popescu, senior clerk at the bank „Albina”; *I. Sociu*, civil servant at Sibiu Treasure House; *Coman Baca*, priest in Poplaca.

All of them, along with others, were taken from their homes by soldiers and put on the way without any explanation. Those arrested from the regions of Sibiu and Alba-Iulia were taken to Cluj, and those from the parts of Brasov are still imprisoned in Brasov.

Regarding this news that stir up my soul, I refrain from any comment. I personally know all these people, who are peaceful citizens, having no other guilt than the sin of being of the same blood as that of their brothers who, weapons at ease, look at their ruin.

The comment will be made by your warm patriotism, dear Mr. General, which for a whole year preaches the duty of blood. This patriotism will find the solution of retaliation in front of the infamy befallen nowadays, when spies and traitors are mocking us in our own country.

Please receive, dear Mr. General, the expression of my infinite sorrow and of my highest consideration for you.

Bucharest, 16 Oct.

Octavian Goga

[„Universul” (the Universe), 18 October 1915]

71. 24 octobre/6 novembre 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme de Camille Blondel, ministre de France en Roumanie, adressé au ministère des Affaires Étrangères, relatant l'entretien avec Toma Stelian¹⁴⁹, ministre de la Justice dans le gouvernement, relatif aux mécontentements concernant la politique du premier ministre Ion I. C. Brătianu et les discussions tendues que celui-ci avait eues avec le ministre de l'Empire Russe à Bucarest.

Bucarest, 6 novembre 1915

Je viens d'avoir une longue conversation avec l'ancien ministre de la justice du cabinet libéral, M. Stelian, autour de qui se groupent depuis quelques jours les sénateurs et députés et les personnages politiques libéraux que mécontentent ou inquiètent les attermolements du premier ministre.

M. Stelian, qui est partisan d'une entrée en action de la Roumanie aux côtés de l'Entente et qui considère que c'est la seule voie par laquelle la Roumanie doit marcher vers la réalisation de son idéal national, ne m'a pas caché les inquiétudes que lui causait l'attitude équivoque du chef de son parti, surtout depuis l'attaque bulgare contre la Serbie. Il est décidé à le combattre ou plutôt à combattre ses hésitations par un journal qu'il est sur le point de faire paraître et au Parlement avec l'aide de ses amis.

Une scène assez vive a eu lieu hier entre le Ministre de Russie et le Président du Conseil. Mon collègue russe était venu aviser M. Brătianu des

¹⁴⁹ *Toma Stelian* (1860-1925) – Avocat, professeur d'université et homme politique libéral. Il a été ministre de la Justice (1907-1910) et ad-intérim au Ministère de la Guerre (1909).

progrès rapides faits par la concentration des troupes russes en Bessarabie et lui demander s'il ne croyait pas le moment venu de mettre, par l'envoi d'un officier roumain au Grand Quartier Général, les États Majors en rapports directs, en vue d'une action commune.

M. Bratiano a immédiatement répondu à son interlocuteur que l'heure lui paraissait encore trop éloignée où la Roumanie serait prête à collaborer avec les Alliés pour engager la procédure indiquée : „Les conditions que j'ai indiquées comme indispensables, a dit le premier ministre, sont en effet loin d'être remplies. Non seulement les Alliés n'ont pas débarqué les 500.000 hommes je juge nécessaires dans le Sud, et dont le nombre ne doit pas être diminué par la concentration russe, mais encore vous savez que le Ministre d'Angleterre m'a annoncé la constitution d'une armée de 500.000 hommes nouvelle en Russie, grâce à l'envoi de fusils, et que les 200.000 soldats dont vous m'annoncez la réunion à proximité de nôtre frontière, ne doivent pas, à mon avis, être pris sur ces 500.000 annoncés par le Gouvernement, c'est-à-dire que le front russe ne doit pas être affaibli. À ces conditions seulement, je puis entrer en action“. le Ministre de Russie n'a pu cacher le profond étonnement que lui causaient ces nouvelles exigences de M. Bratiano et lui a fort vivement reproché, une allusion qui ne rependait à sa dernière déclaration alors qu'il avait laissé entendre que les troupes russes massées à Reni ou à la frontière roumaine en vue d'une coopération éventuelle contre la Bulgarie, viendrait en défalcation des troupes fournis par la France et l'Angleterre.

Le Premier Ministre a répondu au Ministre de Russie qu'il y avait eu mal entendu et a soutenu qu'il n'avait jamais parlé de cette défalcation possible.

M. Bratiano, de bonne ou de mauvais fois (j'inclinerais volontiers à admettre cette dernière hypothèse) confond les dires du Ministre d'Angleterre qui se rapportaient à des fusils à fournir pour l'armement de 500.000 hommes avec l'envoi de 500.000 soldats pour coopérer avec les Roumains en Transylvanie ou dans les Balkans. Mon collègue russe n'a pas caché son très vif mécontentement et s'est séparé de M. Bratiano assez froidement. Une nouvelle entrevue a eu lieu ce matin, à laquelle a assisté le Ministre d'Angleterre ; celui-ci n'a pas eu de peine à faire comprendre au Président du Conseil que le Gouvernement britannique n'avait pris et n'avait pu prendre un engagement au sujet de la constitution d'une nouvelle armée de 500.000 hommes, mais qu'il avait laissé entrevoir la possibilité de fournir prochainement 500.000 fusils à la Russie, ce qui faciliterait l'armement de

nouvelles unités. Après ces explications, M. Bratiano a insisté de nouveau sur la nécessité d'un débarquement de 500.000 soldats et a ajouté qu'il se contenterait alors, d'un contingent russe de 50.000 hommes, pourvu que le front russe reste non seulement intact, mais soit augmenté des unités armées par les soins de l'Angleterre.

En résumé, le Premier Ministre continue à chercher des prétextes pour retarder sa décision qu'il subordonne in petto aux événements militaires en cours.

Blondel

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Microfilme Franța, inv. 2040, rola 316, cadre 646-648]

72. October 26th/November 8th 1915, Bucharest. Telegram of C. Fasciotti addressed to A. Salandra¹⁵⁰ concerning the situation of the Romanian army.

Nr. 2433
Gabinetto
Legazione italiana
Bucarest
Gabinetto 589

MINISTRO di Russia ha ricevuto un telegramma da Pietrogrado secondo cui esercito romeno si troverebbe in cattive condizioni sia come approvvigionamento, armamento, munizionamento ed equipaggiamento sia come istruzione.

Si come da queste false premesse si potrebbe trarre e credo appunto si traggano a Pietrogrado conseguenze pericolose ho novamente interpellato in proposito regio addetto militare d'accordo col quale siamo giunti alla seguente conclusione che comunico alla Eccellenza Vostra emettendo avviso che ne sia data notizia regia ambasciata Pietrogrado.

I. Approvvigionamento: In quanto ai cereali, riso, carne fresca, in conserva e in piedi foraggi e quato occorre nutrimento uomini e quadrupedi

¹⁵⁰ Antonio Salandra (1853-1931) – Politico conservatore italiano, primo ministro (21 marzo 1914-18 giugno 1916) decise l'entrata dell'Italia nella Grande Guerra da parte delle potenze dell'Intesa il 23 maggio 1915.

esistono grandi depositi sufficienti a tutte le esigenze dell'esercito per una lunga guerra; difetto trazione automobili a cui si è supplito colla predisposizione di frequenti depositi di trappe e con mezzi di trazione animale e ferroviaria; servizio sanitario meno qualche specialità medicinale sufficiente per tre anni guerra.

II. Armamento modernissimo, in generale omogeneo, per 650 mila uomini, dei quali 500 mila delle unità mobili.

III. Munizioni – per artiglieria di 1500 e 1 600 colpi per ogni bocca fuoco; fucileria, circa 1600 cartucce per fucile esistenti in paese; lato debole è costituito dal rifornimento che può farsi solo parzialmente in paese. Produzione locale infatti è solo di tre mila colpi artiglieria e trecento mila cartucce al giorno purchè si abbiano sufficienti materie prime.

IV. Equipaggiamento sufficiente per estate e inverno.

V. Istruzione inappuntabile.

Per comandi superiori che costituiscono lato meno soddisfacente confermo quanto è stato precedentemente segnalato non essendovi alcuna modificazione.

Affinchè tuttavia non si dia a quanto precede interpretazione che vada al di là delle mie intenzioni avverto che io non intendo con ciò escludere in via assoluta possibilità d'anche opportunità in date circostanze che l'esercito russo traversando Dobruja per attaccare Bulgaria anche senza aver ottenuto preventivo consenso governo rumeno.

Pur essendo infatti desiderabile non giungere a questa estremità devo tuttavia dichiarare che se situazione generale e locale fossero in quell momento favorevoli e se non vi fosse altro per opporsi all'azione austro-tedesca nei Balcani non ci si dovrebbe arrestare neppure di fronte a questa eventualità giacchè scopo supremo Intesa è la vittoria e quali conseguenze abbiano scrupoli inopportuni è stato già dimostrato dai recenti insuccessi dell'Intesa nei Balcani.

Per non interpretare quanto sopra diversamente dalla mia intenzione, avverto che non capisco di escludere completamente la possibilità che nelle circostanze attuali sarebbe anzi opportuno che l'esercito russo attraversasse la Dobrogea per attaccare Bulgaria, anche senza aver ricevuto il previo accordo del governo rumeno.

Fasciotti

73. 1915. Extraits des Mémoires de Maurice Georges Paléologue, ambassadeur de France en Russie, sur l'évolution des événements militaires, les rapports à l'intérieur de la Triple-Entente et la conduite de la Roumanie.

Mardi, 16 mars 1915

Après un bref entretien avec Sazonow, je me rends chez le généralissim [Nikolai Nikolaevici — n.n.], dont le train s'allonge à quelques mètres de là.

Le grand-duc me reçoit dans une cabinet spacieux et confortable, couvert de peaux d'ours et de tapis d'Orient. Avec sa franchise et sa décision habituelles, il me dit:

– J'ai à vous entretenir de choses graves. Ce n'est pas le grand-duc qui parle à M. Paléologue, c'est le general en chef des armées russes qui s'adresse officiellement à l'ambassadeur de France. En ce qualité, j'ai le devoir de vous déclarer que la coopération immédiate de l'Italie et de la Roumanie est d'une impérieuse nécessité. N'interprétez pas toutefois ces mots comme un cri de détresse. Je reste convaincu que, Dieu aidant, nous aurons la victoire. Mais, sans la coopération *immédiate* de l'Italie et de la Roumanie, la guerre se prolongera pendant de longs mois encore avec des risques terribles.

Je répons alors au grand-duc que le gouvernement français n'a cessé de multiplier ses efforts pour nous aquérir des concours:

– Japon, Grèce, Bulgarie, Roumanie, Italie; M. Delcassé a frappé à toutes les portes. En ce moment même, il s'ingénie à entraîner les gouvernements roumain et italien. Mais je ne vous cacherais pas que les prétentions de la Russie sur Constantinople et les Détroits rendront peut-être impossible l'accession de ces deux gouvernements à notre alliance.

– Oh! Cela c'est l'affaire de la diplomatie... [...]

Vendredi, 7 mai 1915

La victoire Austro-Allemands à Tarnów, Gorlice și Iaslo se répercute maintenant sur la ligne entière des Carpathes jusqu'au delà d'Uzok. Les Russes ont perdu en quelques jours la série des cols et des crêtes qu'ils avaient eu tant de peine à conquérir pendant l'hiver. L'accès de la Transylvanie leur est désormais fermé.

Cette situation réagit également sur les dispositions du gouvernement roumain. Bratiano soutient ses prétentions territoriales avec une intransigeance cassante; son calcul évident est d'acculer la Russie à un refus

péremptoire, dont il se servirait ensuite pour faire définitivement prévaloir la politique de neutralité qui a ses préférences secrètes.

Mardi, 18 mai 1915

Je reprends ce matin, avec Sazonow notre interminable discussion sur les exigences territoriales de la Roumanie et je presse instamment d'étendre un peu ses dernières concessions. Mais je le trouve fort irrité par un télégramme qu'il a reçu hier de Bucarest et qu'il brandit vers moi d'une main crispée:

– Bratiano prétend nous dicter sa loi; il parle de la Russie avec des airs d'arrogance que je ne tolérerai pas... Je sais même qu'il s'est laissé aller à dire devant plusieurs diplomates étrangers: – „Ce n'est pas le moment pour la Russie d'avoir le verbe haut!”... Eh bien! Il se trompe. La Russie est une grande puissance et ce n'est pas un échec momentané de ses armées qui lui fera oublier ce qu'elle se doit à elle-même, ce qu'elle doit à son passé, à son avenir, à sa mission historique.

– Si Bratiano a tenu un pareil propos, il a eu tort. Mais, précisément parce que la Russie est une grande puissance, elle ne saurait trop élever ses points de vue. Or, la seule question qui se pose est de savoir si le concours de la Roumanie nous est utile et si ce serait le payer trop cher que d'abandonner aux appétits roumains un peu plus de territoire ennemi... Parlons franc, mon cher ministre! Considérez votre situation militaire! N'êtes-vous pas effrayé de cette retraite rapide et imprévue? Ne voyez-vous pas que vous êtes à la veille de perdre Przémysl; que demain peut-être les Austro-Allemands auront franchi en masse le San et la Vistule? êtes-vous sûr enfin que, dans deux ou trois semaines, vous ne regretterez pas amèrement d'avoir trop marchandé le concours roumain?

Sazonow me paraît ébranlé dans son intransigeance:

– Je vais chercher, me dit-il, les termes d'une nouvelle concession en Bukovine et sur la rive danubienne du Banat. Mais j'y mettrai comme condition absolue l'intervention immédiate de l'armée roumaine... Je vous donnerai ma réponse demain.

Mercredi, 19 mai 1915

Sazonow cède sur les deux points en litige dans la négociation avec Bucarest. Il accepte de fixer au Sereth la future frontière de la Russie et de la Roumanie en Bukovine; il reconnaît, en fin à la Roumanie le droit d'annexer le district de Torontal sur la rive danubienne du Banat; mais il spécifie un

fois de plus que cette double concession a pour condition absolue la coopération immédiate de l'armée roumaine.

[Maurice Paléologue, *La Russie des Tsars pendant le Grand Guerre Tome I, 20 Juillet 1914-2 Juin 1915*, pp. 322-359]

Lundi, 1er novembre 1915

Sur l'initiative du gouvernement français, le trois puissances alliées négocient avec le gouvernement roumain pour obtenir l'autorisation de faire passer, par la Moldavie et le Danube, une armée de 200.000 russes destinée à secourir les Serbes.

Jeudi, 4 novembre 1915

Bratianu a déclaré catégoriquement au ministre d'Angleterre à Bucarest qu'il se refuse à laisser une armée russe traverser le territoire roumain pour secourir les Serbes. Il a, de plus, énuméré les conditions générales d'ordre militaire auxquelles la Roumanie subordonne son accession éventuelle à notre alliance. Voici ces conditions:

1. Une armée franco-anglais de 500 000 hommes sera réunie dans les Balkans.
2. Une armée russe de 200.000 hommes sera concentrée en Bessarabie.
3. L'armée franco-anglais des Balkans et l'armée russe de Bessarabie s'engageront à fond contre les Bulgares.
4. Depuis la mer Baltique jusqu'à la Bukovine les armées russes attaqueront énergiquement les Austro-Allemands.
5. L'armée roumaine recevra de France et d'Angleterre, par la voie d'Arkhangelsk, toutes les armes et munitions qui lui sont nécessaires.

Tant que ces cinq conditions n'auront pas été préalablement réalisées, le gouvernement roumain gardera sa liberté d'action.

Lundi, 8 novembre 1915

Sazonow me lit ce matin une lettre qu'il a reçue du général Alexeïev¹⁵¹ et dont voici le substance:

¹⁵¹ *Mikhail Vassilievitch Alekseïev* (1857-1918) – Général russe. Au début de la guerre, il commanda le groupe d'armées «Sud-Ouest», puis celui de «Nord-Ouest». En 1915, il fut nommé chef d'État-major général de la Stavka (Grand Quartier Général Impérial Russe), mais remplacé en novembre 1916 par le général Gurko, à cause des désaccords avec le tsar Nicolas II. Il revint à la tête de cet organisme pendant le gouvernement de Kerenski. Le général Alekseïev ne fut pas d'accord avec le plan de campagne de l'Armée roumaine, se prononçant pour l'abandon de la Munténie (Grande Valaquie), de l'Olténie (Petite Valaquie) et de la Dobroudja et l'établissement du front sur l'alignement Carpates orientales – Bas Siret – Danube maritime.

„D’après tous les renseignements parvenus au grand-quartier impérial, l’armée russe ne doit plus compter présentement sur le concours de Roumains.

Le transport d’une armée russe par le Danube est impossible.

Un débarquement à Varna ou à Bourgas ne serait réalisable que si la flotte russe disposait de Constantza comme base d’opération. Le tonnage total de navires réunis à Odessa et Sébastopol ne permettrait en effet de transporter qu’une vingtaine de mille hommes à la fois; les troupes que arriveraient les premières seraient ainsi exposées à un grave danger jusqu’au débarquement intégral du corps expéditionnaire.

La Russie est donc dans l’impossibilité matérielle de secourir *directement* le peuple serbe; mais elle peut lui apporter *indirectement* une aide puissante par une reprise d’offensive en Galicie.”

[Maurice Paléologue, *La Russie des Tsars pendant le Grand Guerre*, Tome II, 3 Juin 1915-17 Août 1916, pp. 322-359]

74. 7/20 décembre 1915, Bucarest. Lettre du roi Ferdinand envoyée au roi d’Italie, Victor Emmanuel III, concernant la collaboration entre la Roumanie et l’Italie.

Maison Royale

Mon cher cousin,

Je profite du voyage qu’entreprend en Italie le général Perticari¹⁵² en vue d’intérêts de famille pour lui confier cette lettre qui doit T’apporter mes meilleurs vœux pour les fêtes et continuer notre échange de lettres.

La fait que celle-ci est confiée à une personne sûre me permettra d’entrer selon Ton désir en plus de détails, ce qui ne fera en effet que contribuer à établir des rapports encore plus suivis et plus intimes entre nos deux familles.

Une série de graves événements n’a permis jusqu’ici la réalisation de notre commun désir, qui cependant correspondait aux tendances de races de mon peuple et qui me tenait personnellement au cœur. Néanmoins ces sentiments n’ont changé en rien et l’affection que moi et les miens nous

¹⁵² *Ion Perticari* (27 novembre 1852-27 novembre 1919) – Général roumain ayant eu des mérites spéciaux dans l’organisation de l’artillerie. Il a été marié avec la fille du docteur Carol Davila. À partir de 1911, gouverneur militaire du prince Carol, il est devenu un intime de la famille royale. Sa mort enregistrée dans Marie, Reine de Roumanie, *Însemnări zilnice 1919* [Notes journalières 1919], traduction Valentina Costache et Sanda Racoviceanu, Les éditions Albatros, Bucarest, 1996, p. 373.

éprouvons pour Toi et Ta famille est restée la même et c'est avec une vive satisfaction que j'ai constaté que la Reine et Missy étaient aussi en correspondance. Aujourd'hui encore une lettre si affectueuse accompagnée de la ravissante photographie de Ta petite Marie, est parvenue à donné à tous beaucoup de joie.

En ces temps si troubles, où une responsabilité lourd sur nos épaules, on éprouve le besoin de pouvoir un peu épancher son cœur, et c'est comme à un ami que je viens m'adresser à Toi, à un ami qui plus que tout autre, aura de la compréhension pour ma situation et celle de mon pays. Tu Te rends certainement compte de l'état d'esprit de mon peuple dans la guerre actuelle, car il se produit en Roumanie ce qui se passait en Italie il y a une cinquantaine d'années quand, sous Ton inoubliable Grand-père, pendant la guerre de l'indépendance tout le pays aspirait à l'unité nationale.

De mon côté je suis d'âme et de cœur avec mon peuple dont je suis décidé à partager le sort et rien ne me serait plus doux que de cimenter par le sang entre ma famille et ce pays les liens établies par mon bienaimé oncle d'une façon déjà si solide et que je compte rendre indestructible.

Dans cette tâche je suis secondé avec un entier dévouement par mon gouvernement et en premier lieu par Monsieur Bratianu dont les sentiments de patriotisme éclairé sont de tradition dans sa famille et dont la sincère affection pour l'Italie Te est connue.

Toutefois nous devons moi, mon gouvernement et le peuple entier, tenir compte de la situation dans laquelle la nature nous a placé, nous devons nous souvenir que notre force est limitée et nous efforcer de garder notre sang froid et la sérénité de notre jugement malgré les pressions qui de toute part s'exercent sur nous. Je suis convaincu que, jugeant avec Ton cœur et Ta raison, Tu Te rendras compte de la situation à dans laquelle nous nous trouvons. De tout mon être je désire tout comme mon gouvernement l'unité et la grandeur de ma patrie et pour cette cause sacrée je suis prêt à tout sacrifice personnel; mais moi et mon gouvernement nous avons charge d'âme. Nous ne pouvons exposer notre pays à la légère aux plus grand malheurs, nous ne voulons pas risquer son existence même.

Ma situation est d'autant plus délicate que mon origine peu faire attribuer la prudence de mon attitude à des motifs qui sont bine loins de ma pensés. Je M'adresse donc à Toi encore une fois comme à un ami sincère; pour ma gouverne il me serrait d'une grande utilité de savoir quelles sont les intentions de l'Italie en ce qui concerne les Balcanes, quel concours la Roumanie pourrait attendre d'elle si les circonstances devaient lui permettre

d'entrer en action et enfin si la collaboration éventuelle de la Roumanie avec l'Entente pourrait comporter le développement de nos accords spéciaux antérieure et une collaboration plus directe avec l'Italie.

Je ne nie pas que tout esprit impartial peut reconnaître combien les intérêts actuels entre l'Italie et la Roumanie sont semblables et à l'avenir l'accomplissement de l'unité nationale de la Roumanie établirait une solidarité plus complète entre ces deux pays latins.

Quant a nos rapports personnelles entre nous deux et nos familles je suis heureux de les voir si cordiaux et j'ai le vif désir qu'ils deviennent plus intimes.

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Casa Regală, dosar nr. 31/1915, p. 21-25]

75. 8/21 décembre 1915. Télégramme de Camille Blondel, ministre de France à Bucarest, envoyé au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, par lequel il informe sur la politique de non-intervention dans la guerre, d'attente de la part du gouvernement roumain dirigé par Ion I. C. Brătianu.

Bucarest, 21 décembre 1915

Un membre du Cabinet me communique les renseignements que vient de lui donner le chef d'État Major général au sujet des opérations en Macédoine. Ce dernier, d'après des indications reçues de nos agents en Grèce, croit pouvoir affirmer qu'avant la fin de la semaine une armée commandée par le général Gallwitz¹⁵³ qui se ferait suivre ou accompagner de troupes bulgares attaquera les forces franco-anglaises vers Salonique.

Le même général est convaincu qu'un traité a été signé entre la Grèce et la Bulgarie et que ces deux pays sont d'accord pour favoriser l'action des austro-allemands. Mon interlocuteur reconnaît que si les alliés doivent abandonner Salonique la Roumanie sera dans une position des plus critiques et lorsque je lui fait observer qu'un mouvement de l'armée roumaine pouvait conjurer ce danger, il m'a répondu qu'il partageait personnellement mon avis, qu'il avait énergiquement soutenu au Conseil la nécessité d'une intervention, lors de l'attaque bulgare contre la Serbie, mais que M.

¹⁵³ *Max von Gallwitz* (1852-1937) – Général allemand, le 30 septembre 1915, il devint le commandant de l'11-ème armée, nouvellement créée, faisant partie du groupe d'armées dirigé par le maréchal von Mackensen qui avait conquis la Serbie. En mars 1916, il revint sur le front d'ouest où il commanda successivement plusieurs armées.

Bratiano restait intransigeant et ne se déciderait à se mêler à la lutte que si les conditions indiquées par lui étaient remplies. On continue à répandre le bruit et le gouvernement paraît y ajouter foi entière, que les troupes russes qui avaient été massées à la frontière roumaine et le long du Danube sont actuellement renvoyées au nord. On ajoute que la Roumanie ne peut plus compter sur l'appui des russes en Bulgarie pas plus que sur le concours des alliés retirés à Salonique et dans l'impossibilité de prononcer une offensive contre l'armée bulgare et que dans ces conditions elle ne peut qu'attendre les événements qui lui permettraient d'agir utilement.

La théorie du moindre effort continue donc à prévaloir et malgré les éloquentes protestations qui s'élèvent au Parlement et dans la presse contre une indifférence qui risque d'être fatale à la Roumanie, M. Bratiano persiste à garder le silence et l'immobilité. Nous ne devons plus compter pour l'en faire sortir que sur un succès sérieux des Russes en Bukovine où il semble bien qu'une violente offensive se prépare.

Blondel

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Microfilme Franța, inv. 2040, rola 316, cadre 708-709]

76. 8/21 décembre 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme de Camille Blondel, ministre de France à Bucarest, adressé au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, par lequel il informe sur les critiques du leader libéral Toma Stelian à l'adresse de la politique du gouvernement dirigé par Ion I.C. Brătianu.

Bucarest, 21 décembre 1915

Au cours de la discussion de la réponse au message royal plusieurs orateurs de l'opposition avaient déjà violemment attaqué la politique antérieure du Gouvernement. Hier, M. Stelian, ancien ministre, membre influent du parti libéral, a fait en termes précis et très énergiques le procès de l'attitude adoptée par M. Bratiano depuis 16 mois. Il s'est notamment élevé avec indignation contre une politique qui consisterait à conserver la neutralité payée par un des belligérants ou par les deux. Il l'a qualifiée d'immorale. Les petits États, a-t-il ajouté, ne peuvent comme l'Allemagne se permettre le lux de l'immoralité ; ils ne doivent suivre qu'une politique basée sur le droit et sur la loyauté. M. Stelian a particulièrement reproché à M. Bratiano d'avoir laissé toute liberté à la Bulgarie pour attaquer la Serbie

et l'a adjuré de réparer le plus vite et le mieux possible les faits commises jusqu'ici afin de ne pas exposer la Roumanie au mépris de toute l'Europe et afin de lui rendre la place qu'elle occupait en 1913 dans les Balkans. Sur une interruption du Président du Conseil, l'orateur a terminé en s'écriant: „qu'il croyait rendre un meilleur service au parti libéral en lui disant la vérité qu'en criant simplement: Vive M. Bratiano!”

Blondel

[S.A.N.I.C., Microfilme Franța, inv. 2040, rola 316, cadru 710]

77. December 12th/25th, Bucharest. Meetings of Alexandru Marghiloman with von dem Bussche, German minister in Bucharest, concerning the political and military aspects and the corruption within the Ministry of War.

Von dem Bussche tells me about the retreat of the English from Gallipoli¹⁵⁴, that very favoured by a thick fog and a very calm sea, they were able to withdraw their troops. But no less it is a forced withdrawal. For a long time they are withdrawing troops on board hospital ships. The Turks knew it, but did not want to have any further troubles, firing at them. He is interested in Shebeko's¹⁵⁵ visit and believes he didn't get any advantage from it. Brătianu, who knew nothing, was very surprised. Germany has decided to exclude all the Takists from the companies with German or Austrian capital. She will encounter difficulties from the Austrians from the Romanian Credit, but she is determined to force them. Bussche protests against the

¹⁵⁴ *The Gallipoli Campaign*, also known as the Dardanelle Campaign or the Battle of Gallipoli, was a World War I campaign that took place between April 25th, 1915 and January 9th, 1916, in the Gallipoli Peninsula (Gelibolu in modern Turkey) of the Ottoman Empire. The peninsula forms the northern shore of the Dardanelles Strait, which provided a maritime route to the Russian Empire. Intending to secure the control over this route, the allies of Russia, Britain and France launched a naval attack followed by a landing on the peninsula, in order to conquer Constantinople. The naval attack was repulsed and, after eight months of fighting, with many losses on both sides, the land campaign was abandoned, and the invasion force was withdrawn into Egypt. The evacuation of the Allies took place on 20th of December 1915.

¹⁵⁵ *Nikolai Nikolaevici Șebeko* (1863-1953) – Son of General Nikolai Ignatievici Șebeko (1834-1904), governor of Bessarabia; Russian diplomat, minister plenipotentiary in Bucharest (1912-December 1913), then ambassador to Vienna (1913-July 1914).

alleged boycott of the country by the Germans: they sent 400 freight wagons, of which: iron, screw nuts, wire, so the articles whose lack is most felt.

Captain *Ursianu*, who was our prefect, tells me that everything is rotten at the Ministry of War. He had a lathe, which he wanted to sell for 3 thousand lei, and offered it, through a lawyer from Botosani, to the Ministry. He obtained 3 thousand lei, but the Ministry paid 5,500 lei, of which 750 for the general, and the rest for the pyrotechnic major. In 1913, while he was a senator, he offered barley for 1,100 lei / wagon, but he was refused this price, they offering him only 900 lei; Schuller however passed the barley to the ministry with 1,200 lei! Today, in the general depots there are only 10 percent of the necessary equipment. Ursianu has 263 people in his company and only 240 guns.

[Alexandru Marghiloman, *op. cit.*, pp. 560-561]

78. 13/26 décembre 1915, Bucarest. Télégramme de Camille Blondel adressé au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la France par lequel il informe sur les résultats de la visite de Nikolaï Şebeko en Roumanie.

Bucarest, 26 décembre 1915

M. Shebeko a eu hier une nouvelle entrevue avec M. Bratiano. Elle s'est terminée sur ce mot: „En rentrant à Pétrograd dites bien à l'Empereur et à M. Sazonoff que la Roumanie est l'amie de la Russie et sera son alliée dès que les circonstances le permettront“.

M. Shebeko avait été dans la journée reçu par le Roi et par la Reine. Il a gardé m'a-t-il dit de l'audience chez le souverain une bonne impression. Le Roi Ferdinand tout en restant sur une grande réserve lui a parlé de la nécessité qui s'imposait au Gouvernement roumain de n'agir qu'avec prudence et de ne s'engager dans une action destinée à réaliser les aspirations nationales que lorsque le Gouvernement croirait au succès de son entreprise.

En résumé M. Shebeko qui a vu plusieurs hommes politiques a trouvé, m'a-t-il dit, une atmosphère plus favorable qu'il ne s'y attendait et part convaincu (ce qui malheureusement n'a pas toujours été l'avis de mon collègue russe) que les Roumains en aucun cas ne pourraient marcher contre l'Entente.

Blondel

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Microfilme Franța, inv. 2040, rola 316, cadru 716]

79. Décembre 1915. Lettre de réponse du roi d'Italie, Victor Emmanuel III adressée au roi Ferdinand de Roumanie.

Cher Cousin,

Je Te suis très reconnaissant pour Tes bons voeux et pour la lettre si aimable que tu as bien voulu m'adresser et que le Général Perticari m'a remise.

Je tiens à T'assurer que les sentiments du plus sincère attachement, de la plus vive affection envers Toi et Ta famille restent inaltérables en mon cœur, et sont partagés entièrement par Elena¹⁵⁶.

C'est avec émotions que j'ai lu Tes paroles qui me disent toute la préoccupation de Ton esprit en ces temps si graves et difficiles que nous traversons. Il est des moments dans l'histoire des nations qui sont décisifs pour leur avenir. Et c'est avec raison que tu as rappelé les vénéments qui se rattachent à l'histoire du Piémont, dont la confiance dans sa mission pour l'indépendance de la Patrie n'a jamais failli.

Je forme les vœux les plus sincères que la décision qui sera prise par Toi et Ton gouvernement puisse assurer à Ton pays la plus glorieux avenir et que les Roumains actuellement puissant nous le joug de la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise obtiennent enfin leur rédemption et leur union à Mère Patrie. Rien ne serait plus précieux à moi et à mon peuple qu'une fraternité d'armes de nos deux vaillantes armées, consacrée par le sang versé en guerre contre l'ennemi héréditaire commun.

La tâche que mon Pays a entreprise pour l'accomplissement ses aspirations nationales et la sauvegarde de ses intérêts politiques est lourde et difficile, mais je partage la ferme confiance de mon gouvernement dans la victoire finale, que nos efforts unis aux efforts de nos alliés, avec lesquels nous agissons de plein accord, ne manquerons pas de nous assurer.

Tu as bien voulu me demander quelles sont les intentions de l'Italie en ce qui concerne les Balkans. La situation politiques et militaire de ces régions T'est bien connue. Nous avons envoyé des forces en Albanie pour la sauvegarde de nos intérêts adriatiques et pour faciliter le ravitaillement et la concentration des serbes. Les Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre

¹⁵⁶ *Hélène de Monténégro* (1873-1952) – Elle était la fille du roi Nicolas Ier Petrović-Njegoš de Monténégro et de Milena Vukotić. À la suite de son mariage avec le roi Victor Emmanuel III d'Italie, le 24 octobre 1896, elle se convertit au catholicisme et devint reine d'Italie lorsque son mari accéda au trône le 29 juillet 1900.

sont décidés à maintenir la défense de Salonique. Les décisions ultérieures de mon gouvernement pour ce qui a trait aux Balkans dépendent du cours des événements et aussi des résolutions des alliés.

Mais à ce sujet, il me serait particulièrement agréable si Tu voudrais bien me faire connaître quelles sont les vœux de la Roumanie par rapport à son intérêt spécial à l'équilibre de la péninsule Balkanique, en cas d'un notable agrandissement de la Bulgarie.

Quant à la seconde question que Tu as bien voulu me poser il est hors de doute que tout aide compatible avec les circonstances et avec les nécessités de notre actions militaires serait assurée de notre part à la Roumanie en cas où elle se déciderait d'entrer en action. Une convention militaire entre la Roumanie et l'Entente serait naturellement à conclure.

Tu as bien voulu me demander également s'il pourrait y avoir lieu à des accords spéciaux et une collaboration plus directe avec l'Italie. L'Italie poursuit sa voie de plein accord avec ses alliés auquel elle est liés par la déclaration de Londres. L'accord et la confiance reciproques entre les alliés sont entiere et parfaits. Tout accord spécial ou collaboration plus directe de l'Italie avec un autre puissance, même si elle entraît dans l'Alliance, ne pourrait avoir d'autre base. Mais sous cette réserve je pense que mon gouvernement ne pourrait voir qu'avec plaisir se resserrer par des ententes spéciales les liens de race et d'amitié ainsi que d'interès communs qui existent si heureusement entre nos deux pays. Ces ententes ne seraient comme Tu le fais observer, qu'un développement des accords conclus depuis le commencement de la conflagration européen. Toutefois, avant de... prononcer à ce sujets il me serait précieux de connaître Tes vues par rapport au but et à la portée de ces accords spéciaux.

Je suis heureux pour Toi que Tu sois aidé dans Ta tâche par un collaborateur aussi dévoué que Mons. Bratiano qui, de sont côté, trouvera dans mon Ministre auprès de Toi le fidèle interprète de mes sentiments ainsi que de ceux de mon gouvernement. Au reste Je lui ai fait renouveler à cette occasion mes instructions en ce sens.

En Te renouvelant.

[S.A.N.I.C., Fond Casa Regală, dosar nr. 31/1915, p. 25-28]

80. December 18th/31st 1915, Bucharest. Excerpts from Petre P. Carp's intervention in the Assembly of Deputies.

22 December 1915, No. 19

Assembly of Deputies, ordinary session 1915-1916

Friday meeting, 18 December 1915 [...]

Mr. Mihai Pherekyde, president of the Assembly [...] Mr. Carp has the floor.

Mr. P. P. Carp: I'll start with a little personal question. Mr. Take Ionescu thought it proper to read passages from a speech I gave on the occasion of the Treaty of Berlin. At that time I submitted two theses: the first one, that it is not good for us to consent to the retrocession of Bessarabia; the second one, that the control of the Mouths of the Danube, economically speaking, is of greater importance to us than Dobrudja. What I said at that time, I repeat today: The Mouths of the Danube fully controlled by us, are of greater importance to me than Dobrudja, and as it concerns the retrocession today, as then, I affirm that a people who has the sense of its duty does not make of its population an object of trading.

I'm coming to the matter now. Mr. Take Ionescu gave us 2 days in succession the example of a brilliant mystification that has not been seen yet in our parliamentary life. With a subtle art, he indicated a policy but without justifying it, and it is perhaps interesting to see how he proceeded. He began by noting his intellectual superiority over the adversaire.

He does not look at trifling things; he, a penetrating spirit, tries to see what are the causes of the events such as those we are witnessing today. And then, also in its capacity as a superior spirit, he indicates not only the causes, but also the results. What happened however between the cause and the results, it became so subtle that we had absolutely no knowledge of them. The causes: today he tells us that the cause is not the defence of the insignificant interests that we have pointed out, the real cause is that the peoples tired of a German pressure rose up all of them against it.

The results? The results of this world revolt are the triumph of democracy and it is the possibility for the peoples to retake possession of themselves. In front of such results – he tells us – a superior heart cannot hesitate. Should he look at the small details? It would be a spiritual inferiority that he does not believe capable of. France with 14 thousand square kilometres in Alsace and Lorraine? But who has thought of this? England's commercial interests? But this is nothing respecting to the revival of the freedom in all the peoples. And then, he brings us the great show of the Tsar of all the Russians, who climbs up the Kremlin to announce to the peoples that from now on the voice of the nation will be the law of the governments.

You understand very well that with such great results we are small spirits when we think of our country's interests, instead of being happy that we too have contributed to the revival of the peoples, and that we have been allowed to say, like the ancient Roman gladiators: *Ave imperator, morituri te salutant.* (*Hail, Emperor, those who are about to die salute you*). And let us not forget that if gladiators could do so, they would have neither homeland, nor family

But not always the spirit of Mr. Take Ionescu was so sharp; not always his heart was so high. It was a time when he too was looking at the interests of his country; it was a time when he too was discussing what could be the results of the storm we were in. And then, he, small spirit, here he was saying: "The Romanian politics does not have and cannot have a preference. It cannot be subordinated to any other power. As always, however, it will follow the one who will carry in Europe the flag of the resistance against the invasion of the North, this glorious flag is in the hands of the Central Powers. To subordinate the existence of the Romanian state to the temporary interests of the other Romanians, would be a wrong policy¹⁵⁷".

A voice: when? on what date?

Another voice: At 1820. (Laughter).

Mr. P. P. Carp: When was Mr. Take Ionescu right? Was he right then, or was he right today? Depending on the position we adopt, he was right then, but he was right today too, and he neither was right then, nor today. (Laughter). He was right then, because then – as today too – he pleaded a cause. He was right neither then nor today, because neither then nor today did he defend a conviction.

Then, after he made you applaud the lack of justification for his policy, Mr. Take Ionescu turned to neutrality. And then, with a language of rare violence, he attacked the neutral governments. And he went so far with this violence as he pronounced in a trembling voice the word *coward* and threw it like an eternal stigma on the forehead of the neutral governments.

I think he exaggerated; neutrality is not always a sign of cowardice, neutrality is sometimes a sign of weakness too; we are responsible for our cowardice, but we are not responsible for our weakness.

Even here however we can note a change: a year ago, – and perhaps following what happened, we will find the explanation for this change – Mr. Take Ionescu was for fixed, permanent and decisive neutrality; the reason

¹⁵⁷ Indeed Take Ionescu was a supporter in the Parliament of Romania's politics together with the Central Powers until 1911 when, under the conditions of personal conflicts with P.P. Carp and implicitly with King Carol I, he began to support the idea that Romania's place is next to the Entente.

was that at that time the Quadruple believed in its victory, and that it did not need our participation, today it rather doubts of victory and then those who are neutral are cowards too, because they do not want to push Romania into a conflagration without giving at the same time the reasons for which they push her into the fire. (Applause).

In other words, we are witnessing again a new incarnation of Mr. Take Ionescu. But let me remind you that talent does not justify all the incarnations, as well as beauty does not justify all the prostitutions.

Mr. Leonte Moldovan¹⁵⁸: Mr President, this word does not seem to be parliamentary.

Mr. Barbu St. Delavrancea¹⁵⁹: But it is not at all parliamentary (Interruptions).

Mr. P. P. Carp: I want to refer to the only real part of Mr. Take Ionescu's speech, namely to our treaty with the Central Powers; and I would ask Mr. Chairman of the Council to be willing to give us his undivided attention because I want to present you a glorious page from his parent's life.

We have been told that our treaty is the result of fear. Then, quickly let's take a look at its genesis and see how and under what conditions it was made and whether it is really the result of fear, or if it is the result of a profound and serious study of the real interests of this country. When D. Brătianu sent me to Vienna for the Danube question, after some time, studying the situation from there, I sent a report to the minister, in which there were the following words:

„You know, Minister, how much I wish, in the European conflict that will take place later, not sooner, Romania would be together with Austria-Hungary. But just for this reason, I am of the opinion that we must push resistance to its last limit in the Danube question, because the value of the ally increases, according to his power of resistance, more or less.”

¹⁵⁸ *Leonte Moldovan* (1865-1943) – Journalist, lawyer and politician. Born in Sinca Veche Fagaras, he studied letters and law at the University of Bucharest. He taught history at the High School in Braila (1887-1903). He was mayor of Braila (1907 and 1927-1928) a member of the National Liberal Party, being a deputy and senator in several legislatures and President of the Senat (10 February 1934-15 November 1935).

¹⁵⁹ *Barbu Ștefănescu-Delavrancea* (1858-29 april 1918) – Lawyer, writer and politician. In the first part of his life he was member of the National Liberal Party, then he joined the Conservatives. He was mayor of Bucharest (1899-1901), minister of Public Works (1910-1912) and of Industry and Commerce (1917-1918). On May 19th, 1912 he was received at the Romanian Academy. During the period of neutrality, he showed his firm decision in favour of Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Entente.

Some time after that, I find myself called to Bucharest by Mr. Brătianu, and then together we studied what could and what should be the situation of Romania and, first of all, what would be its situation regarding the Romanians from beyond, because it isn't necessary to say that the noise is not always a sign of love and that perhaps those who are silent think more of the Romanians in Transylvania, than those who declare them their unlimited love at Capsa and on the streets of Bucharest. (Hilarity).

Then, I say, I also investigated the issue of the Romanians from beyond. I realized that their situation would be a hindrance to a cooperation with Austria-Hungary. But we wanted to realize at the same time if not higher interests would determine us to get over this obstacle and ignore it. And then we found that we were offered only two ways. We could not get to improve the fate of the Romanians from beyond, either through conquest, or by determining the Hungarians to make the necessary concessions. The conquest! The conquest becomes complicated, because it was not for us the Romanians to go against the Hungarians, it was not for us to raise by ourselves the flag, cross the Carpathians and defeat the Hungarians. The conquest could only take place in cooperation with another power. The conquest could only be the result of a crushing of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and then the question arises for us if the crushing of the Austro-Hungarian empire did not let another neighbour stronger than the Austro-Hungarian empire, and therefore more dangerous. Slavs in North, Slavs in East, Slavs in West, Slavs in South, and us, in the middle of this ocean of Slavs. Isolated, even with the conquest of Transylvania, we would have been destroyed in a short time. Therefore, we rejected this path then, and we reject it today.

But what about the other way? The other way could only be possible by strengthening the Romanian Kingdom. And before thinking of the fate of the Romanians in Transylvania, we must think – as Mr. Stere said very well – of the fate of the Romanian Kingdom, which is the guarantee of the future, it is the guarantee of the salvation of our nation; and then we were offered the other way: of the concessions that the Hungarians had to make to the Romanians from beyond. These „*motu proprio*” concessions, we didn't think they intended to make them to us, and then we had to wait for strengthening us, and we could do it in two ways too: we could strengthen us by increasing the number of population, by increasing the wealth, wealth, and we could strengthen ourselves by winning the provinces that we had had, and which we could get without crushing the Russian empire.

I would like to know what it would be said in Paris if a French rose up and said: „Alsace-Lotharingia, this does not correspond to the national ideal, Geneva and Lausanne, they correspond to the national ideal.” I think he would be simply taken and sent to Charenton. In our country, when one rises up and says: before thinking of the unification of our nation, fact that is impossible for the moment, we must claim what we have the right to claim, we must claim what is ours and before making whole Romania, we must make whole Moldova (Applause on the banks of the majority).

Brătianu stopped at this last way, he stopped, of course, because he had understood the importance of the matter, but he also stopped because he was under the impression of what had happened on the occasion of the 1877 war, when he was forced to concentrate our army at the foot of the Carpathians, because Russia wanted to disarm the arm that had saved her in Plevna. And then, for fear, it was decided that we offered the Central Powers a treaty of alliance. At that time the King was to go to Berlin, we accompanied him up to Breslau, Mr. Brătianu came back from the bathing place to meet His Majesty, and one evening, memorable for our history, he discussed the matter with the King who agreed on what Mr. Brătianu had decided. And later, after midnight, he came to me and said: Mr. Carp, go to Vienna, „résistance à outrance” and offer the treaty of alliance. The treaty of alliance achieved a part of the program; the treaty of alliance gave us a 35-year silence; the treaty of alliance determined the increasing of our value as an ally. The other opportunity is offered to us: we are offered to regain what we have lost and, abandoning the prey for the shadow, we are looking for a national ideal that today surely cannot be achieved and which would be the disaster of our country if it were realized (Movement).

Mr. Leonte Moldovanu: Mr. Carp, I am protesting in the name of your old age. (Noise).

Mr. Petre P. Carp: My gentlemen, I admit that it was realized, let's see its effects. It can only be achieved by crushing the Austro-Hungarian empire, and then what will be for us the results of crushing this Empire? Despite the charge of having a narrow mind, I must nevertheless realize what the intentions of the belligerents are; I must realize what the conditions of peace will be and only then the question question could be cleared up: who of us is right.

Russia's intention is known thanks to a memorable speech delivered by the Russian Foreign Minister. The Russian minister said: we want to get out of this war with the complete control of the Black Sea, and added: for all

its extent. We want the Straits, we want the Dardanelles. And as a distant echo the Asquith's¹⁶⁰ voice answers: Russia has rights over the Straits, over Țarigrad, rights which we must take seriously in consideration. Anyone who knows the style of the English Chancellery knows what this means, that someone has the right to be seriously taken in consideration by the English Government. And even if he didn't say it, can you assume if Russia could be at the Straits without an access by land to Constantinople?

Absolutely impossible. And when King Carol told us that Russia asked for Galati, he asked for a passage to Constantinople, and we are told that his sayings were based on wrong information. I say, it is not based on wrong information, it was based on the nature of things, because it is absolutely impossible for Russia to go to Țarigrad without having access to it.

A voice: Without passing through Galati!

Mr. P. P. Carp: Bulgaria understood this, and that's why you see that Bulgarians are in Thessaloniki and Gallipoli today. [...]

The result of peace in the event of the victory of the Quadruple will be: Țarigrad in the hands of Russia will mean the right of military passage through Romania and Bulgaria. That is why I say, considering the conditions in which your ideal appears today, limited as it is, that in this case it would abandon Bessarabia, it would be a misfortune for us, for our country, because after the victory we would be forced to accept this humiliation.

And that is why, my gentlemen, I do not look at the public opinion, that is why, my gentlemen, I affirm that the effect of the treaty has been beneficial and can still be beneficial to us. I affirm that, under the current conditions, our single possibility of enlargement is not beyond the Carpathians, it is beyond the Prut.

Voices: A! A!

Mr. P. P. Carp: My gentlemen, I am looking at the majority that surrounds me, most of it is composed of young people who are now making their debut in the political life. Today they are led, tomorrow they will be leaders and I ask them to think then of the old man who will soon disappear from here and who says to you: The fate of the Romanians beyond is not solved beyond the Carpathians, it is solved beyond the Prut. (Applause)

[Monitorul Oficial, No. 19, Desbaterile Adunării Deputaților, 22 December 1915]

¹⁶⁰ *Herbert Henry Asquith* (1852-1928) – British politician, prime minister (5th April 1908-5th December 1916). Replaced by David Lloyd George.

81. 1915, Bucharest. Excerpts from the memoirs of Radu R. Rosetti, chief of the General Staff Operations Bureau, concerning the negotiations for Romania's entry into the war, the strategic planning and the relations with Bulgaria.

Beginning on March 1915, I was charged to maintain close relations with the English and Italian military attachés, Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Thomson (later on Lord Thomson of Cardington¹⁶¹) and L[uciano] Ferigo. Whenever Thomson was missing, he was replaced by Fr. Rattigan¹⁶², the secretary of the British Legation¹⁶³.

From time to time, I had them guests in the evening, at dinner, but, as usual, not together, because, as the English says, there was no love (not too much) lost between them, especially Ferigo being very envious on Thomson and on the influence he thought that one had.

I communicated to them, according to the order received from Iliescu – he also maintaining the contact with the French [Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice Despres – our note] and the Russian [Colonel A. Tatarinov¹⁶⁴–o.n.] military attachés, – the news I had about the movements of the Central Powers troops, their organization, etc., and they communicated to me the information they had about the same movements and organizations of our neighbours.

¹⁶¹ *Cristopher Thompson, 1st Baron Thompson* (1875-1930) – British officer and labour politician sent in 1912 as a military attaché in Serbia and then in 1915 in Bucharest. In November 1916 he supervised the destruction of the Romanian petroleum facilities in order not to fall into the hands of the Germans. He will be Secretary of State for Air (1924 and 1929-1930). He died in the air disaster of the British airship R101. Known for his relationship with Martha Bibescu.

¹⁶² *William Frank Arthur Rattigan* (1879-1952), son of Sir William Henry Rattigan (1842-1904), a British judge and Liberal Unionist, he was British diplomat, embassy attachée in Vienna, The Hague, Cairo (1912), Berlin (1913). Attachée to the 6th French Army in 1914, he was lightly wounded by an explosion. He was sent to Bucharest in February 1915, secretary of British Legation since May 1916. After Romania signed the separate peace in Bucharest on 7 May 1918, he became ill and had to leave back in England through Russia. He came back in Bucharest as chargé d'affaires (22 April 1919-15 Octombrie 1920). Between May and July 1921 he was transferred to Constantinople. He retired in 1922. He was the father of British dramatist Sir Terence Mervyn Rattigan (1911-1977).

¹⁶³ Thomson made quite frequent sentimental walks in the country and was at least once at the Russian General Headquarters and once in England (see his book *Smaranda*). Thomson's letter of 16th August 1915, and Rattigan's letter of 2nd August 1915, both in my papers. (a.n.).

¹⁶⁴ *Alexandr Tatarinov* – colonel, Russian military attaché in România (accredited on 27th September 1915).

I always discussed the situation on the different fronts and always showed them, given the stationary situation of the fights on the western theater, that the war could be won only on the theater from the south-eastern Europe. That is why I insisted on forcing the Dardanelles, and after the retreat of the Anglo-French troops from there and the occupation of Thessaloniki¹⁶⁵, I insisted on increasing the number of effectives landed in the latter city in order to take an vigorous offensive, starting from Thessaloniki. Thomson was of the same opinion as many others¹⁶⁶. The opening of the Dardanelles would have been useful to Russia too, which, in fact, requested it. However, who opposed firmly the increase of the allied effectives engaged on this theater of operations was the French Command. Thomson gave me to understand this – and all the documents revealed from the Peace Treaty of Versailles to now confirm this fact¹⁶⁷.

If the French Command was against an important action first in the Dardanelles and then starting from Thessaloniki, because of the conviction that victory could and should be won on the western¹⁶⁸ theater, England was not enthusiastic to attack, for political reasons, attacking the Bulgarians¹⁶⁹.

However, we continued to insist on the necessity to intensify the attack on the Dardanelles and to take Constantinople by the English and the French. And, apart from the fact that the defense of Constantinople by an Anglo-French army would have assured us of an easy supply of ammunition and material of all kinds and would have allowed the armed assistance of England and France, it would have protected us from the ugly dream of staying only in two with Russia and would have saved from a possible occupation of Țarigrad with the same power, an idea circulating at that time.

¹⁶⁵ The occupation of Thessaloniki by the troops of the Entente on 5th October 1915 was done with the consent of the Prime Minister of Greece, E. Venizelos, but without the consent of King Constantine I, which led to the dismissal of the Prime Minister and his replacement with A. Zaimis.

¹⁶⁶ *Smaranda, a Compilation in Three Parts by Lord Thomson of Cardington*, p. 22; Poincaré („La Revue de France”, 15 June 1929, pp. 599-611); Lloyd George. Sir Maurice Hankey, Galieni, Kitchener (Liddel Hart, *The War in Outline*, pp. 81-83); Sir Valentine Chirol, *Fifty Years in a Changing World*, pp. 314, 315 (a.n.).

¹⁶⁷ „La Revue de France”, 15 June 1929, pp. 600, 601, 611, 621; *General Berthelot's Memoirs* – II, on 1st of March 1915 (a.n.).

¹⁶⁸ Theory that was also supported by General Berthelot; he himself told me. (a.n.).

¹⁶⁹ The Great General Staff, op. cit., I, p. 93; General D. Iliescu, *Documents regarding the war for the unification of Romania*, pag. 69 (a.n.).

Ferigo's attitude was somewhat different. He too realized the importance of the operations in the Balkan Peninsula. But he insisted on that we had to stay on the defensive in the Carpathians and advance with the maximum of force towards south in order to "shake hands", somewhere in the Sofia region, with the allied army that would have advanced from Thessaloniki¹⁷⁰.

And there were some of us who maintained, especially after the war, that we should have carried on the war as (I have already said) Ferigo had proposed. The answer was given by [Nicolae Iorga] (*A History of Romania*, vol. X, p. 361): „but the public sentiment had been prepared for the invasion of Transylvania ... No one could have imposed another direction on the Romanian flags.”

That our point of view regarding the necessity to conquer the Dardanelles was justified, is proved by the [Erich] Ludendorff's care to defend the Dardanelles at any cost and the way he motivates the need to keep them closed¹⁷¹, as well as the fact that Bulgaria did not move as long as a success of the Allies in the Dardanelles seemed possible.

In order to better inform Brătianu on the conditions of the future operations, on 3rd/16th November 1915, I presented him a note showing the military situation on 31st October/13th November 1915. In that note I showed that for our army could enter the war, there were necessary large Russian effective forces – at least 500,000 people – in close operational connection with our right, as well as the necessity for the Thessaloniki allied armies to have at least 750,000 men, which effectively would have included the 150,000 Serbs who would have possibly escaped through Albania.

The concern to secure the back of our action over the mountains, especially after Bulgaria entered the war, and to ensure an action in connection with the Allied troops from Thessaloniki, determined Brătianu to ask, following the proposals made by the military authorities, the concentration in the South Dobrogea of an army of at least 200,000 Russians. And this request was all the more well-grounded so as, at the entry into war of Bulgaria, the Russians had concentrated an army (commanded by General [Dimitri Grigorievici] Șerbacev¹⁷²) of such an effective force in the Odessa

¹⁷⁰ Both the Russian and French Supreme Command had also this point of view at certain moments (the General Staff, op. cit., I, pp. 92, 94) (a.n.).

¹⁷¹ English edition, pp. 174-175 (a.n.).

¹⁷² *Dmitri Grigorievici Șerbacev* (1857-1932) – Russian general of the infantry, in April 1915 he was appointed commander of the 11th Carpathian Army; in May 1917 he

region, its purpose being to be transported to Bulgaria in order to attack its army in the rear¹⁷³ Even the Russian generals know it now, including General [Andrei Medardovitovici] Zaioncikovsky¹⁷⁴, later commander of the Russian troops sent to Dobrudja, who were of the opinion that the effectives of these troops should be at least of 3-4 divisions of the best quality troops¹⁷⁵.

About the bringing of this Russian contingent, the discussions followed until the convention was signed. In view of the arrival of this army, I put the intendant Captain V. Cuzen¹⁷⁶ to organize, in the Cernavoda-Medgidia region, some subsistence depots for providing with food, during the first days after its arrival, this large effective force. I was really surprised to hear, on 4th/17th or 5th/18th August 1916, from Colonel A. Tatarinov, the Russian military attaché, who came to me for a connection question, that we had agreed that the Russians would send only 50.000 men. Thomson, whom I saw immediately afterwards, confirmed this news to me, being somehow astonished that I had accepted the effectives of 50,000. Even today I do not know exactly which of our negotiators gave in with regard to this matter and convinced Brătianu to consent to the decrease of the demanded number from the beginning, because the Bureau of operations always insisted on the total number of 200,000 as a condition *sine qua non*. I also know from the person who presented to King Ferdinand the project of the convention that he had considered the effective force of 50,000 as being too small¹⁷⁷. Brătianu considered that the commitments made by Sazonov were

replaced General Sakharov as chief of staff of the Russian armies in Moldova. In the Russian Civil War he had a major role in the leadership of the whiteguardist movement. He died in exile in France.

¹⁷³ *Memoires du general Broussilov*, p. 174; Pierre Gilliard, *Le tragique destin de Nicolas II et de sa famille*, pag. 129 (n.a.).

¹⁷⁴ *Andrei Medardovitovici Zaioncikovski* (1862-1926) – Commander of the 47th Russian Army Corps, composed of two Russian divisions and a Serbian one, and which had an effective force of about 30,000 people (the Convention signed on 4th/17th August 1916 provided for 50,000 soldiers). Subsequently, commander of the Eastern Task Group and then of the Army of Dobrudja (composed of large Romanian and Russian units). He was replaced, because of his failures, with General Vladimir Vladimirovich Zaharov, the Army of Dobrudja taking the name of the Danube Army.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 223, 224 (n.a.).

¹⁷⁶ *Vasile Cuzen*. At that time intendant captain. Later, member of the High Court of Accounts.

¹⁷⁷ Nicu Filipescu said, on August 31st, 1916, that Brătianu made two big mistakes; he thought that we would not have much trouble with the Bulgarians and, fearing to have too many Russians in Dobrudja, he asked for only 50,000 (N. Polizu-Micșunești, Niculae Filipe-

not sufficient and did not provide sufficient guarantees. After all, he had lived near his father and remembered the years 1877-1878, knowing the value of the Russian signatures. Therefore he was trying to obtain the commitment of the other powers of the Entente as well, as he was tormenting itself to obtain a more precise definition of the clauses of the „Sazonov – Diamandy Convention”. Some of the clauses of this convention that were the occasion for, even from the beginning, to special interpretations on our part and on the Russians one were those regarding the boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian territories that were due to us. So the Russians argued that northern Bukovina had to be theirs, on the grounds that it was mostly inhabited by Ruthenians (Ukrainians), which contained some truth, and that one – quite fantastically – that the monasteries in Bukovina would be Russian foundations. In order to combat the first Russian argument, according to Brătianu's suggestion, I made a map of Bukovina (based on the data I had and with the help of the officers in the office (as I also made up one, approximately at the same period, for the territories between the Carpathians and Tisza), showing the proportion of the Romanian population compared to other nations from the same regions. These maps were immediately spread¹⁷⁸.

scu. Notes 1914-1916, p. 265). That Brătianu had had the reasons shown by Nicu Filipescu, it is not impossible, but to have asked only 50,000 Russians in Dobrudja, this is absolutely untrue. He asked for 200,000 and resigned himself only in front of the Russian refusal, the Allies' assurances and other arguments that would have been given to him (what were those ones? By who were they given to him?) in order to receive 50,000. Discussing, on July 31, 1922, with Barbu Stirbey on this matter, he told me the following: at the beginning of August 1916, he (Știrbey) brought to Sinaia the military draft convention with the King's agreement. The King accepted it, with the only objection that 50,000 Russians in Dobrudja were insufficient. As Stirbey had arrived in Sinaia, he was asked by [Hilmar von dem] Busche [Germany's minister plenipotentiary in Bucharest, 1914-1916 o.n.] to come to him. Busche told him that Brătianu was currently negotiating with Russia, under certain conditions, which were exactly the ones in the draft convention. Busche asked Stirbey to inform the King. In front of Bussche, Știrbey took up the attitude that for two years the negotiations were still continuing and that, as a matter of fact, it would not be for the first time when Brătianu did it over the King's head. Stirbey was, however, very alarmed by the exact information Busche had, and continually since then he asked himself who was the person one who had informed Busche (a.n.). Asking him if he knew positively who had given up in front of the Russians, receiving 50,000 instead of 200,000 soldiers, Știrbey replied that it had been Iliescu, and he added that this was all the more inexplicable as C. Diamandy [the minister plenipotentiary of Romania in Petrograd – o.n.] had told him (Știrbey) that he had obtained from the Russians 120,000 soldiers for Dobrudja (a.n.).

¹⁷⁸ They were printed on May 14th/27th, 1915 (notes in my papers). A few days before, on May 9th/22nd, 1915, we had stopped to be published by the Romanian Academy (after a

As for the second argument, which had impressed the English especially, knowing through I. Bianu¹⁷⁹ that Professor I.I. Nistor¹⁸⁰ was in Bucharest, I asked him to call and see me (April 25th/May 8th, 1915). Telling him what it was about, I asked him, for up to 48 hours, to draw up a memorial, presenting in a documented way when and by whom each of the monasteries had been founded. The work was completed on 1st/14th May and after it had been translated I gave it to Thomson. Brătianu, finding it very good, put someone to translate it into French too and distributed it to those who had a word to say in the matter or had to be informed¹⁸¹.

The discussion regarding the future western border of Transylvania and especially of Banat, during which Russia supported the claims of the Serbs, was no easier at all. On our part it was requested that the whole Banat, except for a bridgehead of 16 kilometers deep in front of Belgrade, would be assigned to Romania¹⁸². I supported this point of view in the discussions with Thomson and Ferigo. In fact, since February 1915, starting with those included in a report of our military attaché to the Serbian army, Major Toma Dumitrescu¹⁸³, I had presented to Brătianu a note showing that

conversation with I. Bianu) an ethnographic map of Bukovina, made up by I.I. Nistor, because it was in favour of the Russian thesis (note in my papers) (a.n.).

¹⁷⁹ *Ion Bianu* (1853-1935) – Romanian philologist and bibliographer, director of the Romanian Academy Library from 1884 to the end of his life. He was a correspondent member (1887) and a member (1902) of the Romanian Academy, being elected its president during the period 1929-1932. The mentioned work appeared in 1914 having the title *Pentru lămurirea situației* (Making things clear).

¹⁸⁰ *Ion I. Nistor* (1876-1962) – professor of history and geography at the University of Cernăuți; member of the Romanian Academy (1915) with a rich scientific activity in the field of history; refugee in Romania (1915), he acted constantly in favour of the union of Bukovina with our country; he was elected to the Romanian National Council in Cernăuți (October 1918) and participated in the General Congress of Bukovina (November 15th/28th, 1918); he founded the Democratic Union Party of Bukovina (1919) which will merge in 1923 with the P.N.L. (National Liberal Party); Minister of State (1918-1920). Imprisoned in Sighet during the communist regime.

¹⁸¹ The original in my papers. (n.a.).

¹⁸² Note (1st/14th May 1915), in my papers. (a.n.).

¹⁸³ *Toma Dumitrescu* (1877-1936) – Major, chief of the general Dumitru Iliescu's cabinet in the campaign of 1916. He advanced to the rank of divisional general. He had many missions abroad – military expert at the Romanian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (1919); delegate to the international conferences in Genoa (1922) and Lausanne (1922-1923), commander of the Superior War School (1926-1927), commander of the 4th Infantry Division (1927-1930), of the 4th Army Corps (1932). Details in Toma Dumitrescu, *Războiul național* (The National War) (1916), edition elaborated, introductory study, notes and index

during the negotiations with the Serbs it should be insisted (it was foreseen the entry of Italy into war in a short time) that they advance through Sirmia and not through Banat. This was for political reasons (Banat should not be released by Serbs), as well as for military ones, namely to maintain a connection with the Italian attack and reply to the eventual Hungarian resistance from the Tisza¹⁸⁴.

The general idea from which I started was shown in a note dated 15th/28th February 1915 (presented to Brătianu on 19th February). This general idea provided for the concomitant attack of the Italian armies (entered the war however only in the month of May of that year) and the Romanian ones, with the general direction to Budapest. The facts proved that Brătianu was right not to have entered into war concomitantly with Italy, because its entry into action did not bring the expected results. It did not prevent the Austro-Germans from gathering in August 1915 a large army with which they crushed Serbia and opened a direct route to Constantinople and Thessaloniki. The information given by the Allies, as the Germans were permanently fixed on the two fronts of France and Russia and that they could not take a single unit from there, proved to be unfounded then as well as in August 1916.

Everything I have shown so far, as well as the frequent changes in the military situation, have greatly rendered difficult the activity of the Bureau of Operations, the guiding idea remaining however constantly the same. namely:

- attack with a maximum of forces against Austria-Hungary;
- defensive towards the south, Bulgaria being considered as an enemy; the border incidents that it had caused, at the end of June and throughout the month of July 1914, had proved that it was playing Austria-Hungary's game, given that it had shown the feelings entertained towards us;
- a central reserve.

This guiding idea remained constant, but it required special measures of execution, as:

- Bulgaria had not yet entered the war or it had entered.
- Bukovina was dominated by the Austrians or the Russians, and we

by Petre Otu and Maria Georgescu, Publishing House of the Academy of Higher Military Studies, Bucharest, 1999).

¹⁸⁴ Note from 20th February 1915, in my papers (a.n.).

know that this land has passed several times from the domination of some to the domination of others. Austria-Hungary had few troops in Transylvania or had much more as it had in the summer of 1915, being even foreseen a possible attack by the Central Powers against us. It is now known that such an attack was even announced by the General Staffs of those powers¹⁸⁵. This forced us, at the end of August of that summer, to send the covering troops on the frontier. The placement of these troops in their initial situation of war simplified the operations that were to be done at the moment of the mobilization decree, but it required new changes in the works of the hypothesis „Z” [Romanian campaign plan of 1916 – o.n.].

- The Serbian army was at the Danube or its armies were forced to step back to and through Albania.
- The Allies were at the Dardanelle or Thessaloniki.
- The Russians agreed or not to cooperate with us in Dobrudja and with how many effective forces.

Therefore, new hypotheses had to be made to cope with the changed situations¹⁸⁶. However, each hypothesis demanded many works and its change meant: changing the distribution of troops, as the transports changed (so a new responsibility at the Transport Office); another distribution of the depots; changing also the covering disposition; necessity of new reinforcement works as well as new operational and administrative instructions. And the charge of these workings were incumbent especially on my collaborators from the Operations Bureau, as well as on the Transport Bureau, because they were charged with the carrying out of hundreds of detailed works, always the same. While my work was much more varied, even though not less important.

If the general political situation and that one on the different battle fronts had natural consequences and changes in the establishment of our war plan (prepared under the form of hypotheses), its requirements had, in turn, an influence on the diplomatic negotiations, as it was seen above. At the same time, the necessity not to engage in warfare, if it had been possible, on two fronts determined our diplomacy to intervene, both in Sofia and Niš¹⁸⁷, in the negotiations that had preceded the entry of Bulgaria into the war, to moderate the claims both of some and the others.

¹⁸⁵ Great General Staff, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 77-78. (a.n.).

¹⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 83-95. (a.n.).

¹⁸⁷ Niš was the city where the Serb government had fixed its headquarters.

Regarding the entry of Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers, we were informed by the report of a secret agent, who communicated to us, on the 26th of August 1915, the text of the Bulgarian-Austro-Hungarian convention, a convention which stipulated that, in case Romania attacked Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria would have to intervene¹⁸⁸.

Following Brătianu's instructions, I disposed the translation of that report and immediately gave it to Thomson and Ferigo. The former knew, as early as July, when he had returned from his leave of absence in England through Sofia, where he had been received in an audience by King Ferdinand of Bulgaria¹⁸⁹, that Bulgaria was decided to take action on the side of the Central Powers¹⁹⁰.

Lastly, the negotiations in Bucharest were not facilitated by the fact that their leadership had been entrusted to Russia, England, France and Italy being content with to the role of supporting its action. It was a psychological mistake on the part of the Entente, especially since Brătianu was the head of the government, a mistake against which he always reacted, using every opportunity to deal directly with the other Allied Powers and to try to obtain from them pressures on Russia or oppositions to its claims.

On the other hand, the work was not facilitated by the atmosphere of intrigue and corruption maintained by both groups of opponents in Bucharest, where the so-called high society life followed its course, and the nightlife had become extremely intense.

In addition to the underworld and the ordinary society dregs of the capitals, in addition to the more or less honest businessmen, Bucharest and especially the hotels, coffee houses and day and night party restaurants had been overwhelmed by a real invasion of newspaper correspondents, commissioners, actresses and other people of this kind, some in the service of one or another group of powers, others adventurers in search of money.

On the part of the Central Powers, who needed at least the benevolent neutrality of Romania in order to be able to send to the Turks the ammunition they needed so much at the Dardanelles and to get the cereals and the oil necessary for themselves, the use of such means and such agents was somewhat explicable and Brătianu was forced to admit them so as not

¹⁸⁸ Agent's F. report, no. 3132, 26th August 1915 (a copy in my papers) (a.n.).

¹⁸⁹ *Ferdinand I of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha* (1861-1948) – Prince of Bulgaria (1887-1908), and later Tsar of the Bulgarians (5th October 1908-3rd October 1918).

¹⁹⁰ Thomson, *op. cit.*, on 17th July 1915. (a.n.).

to reveal his intentions too early. On the part of the powers of the Entente, however, who were well informed about our intentions (by the „Sazonov – Diamandy Convention”¹⁹¹), it was less explicable.

I will not recall here the story of all those manoeuvres¹⁹², of all the affairs, of all the corruption of all kinds, perhaps exaggerated in some publications, but proved at a documentary level and well known to those who had some purpose then¹⁹³, as I will not show the hatreds rose then, neither the meannesses¹⁹⁴ of life, nor the espionage and the betrayal, which unfortunately were not lacking¹⁹⁵. It could not be discovered then, and I do not even know today, if the fire and explosion from the Army's Pyrotechnics (May 16th/29th, 1916) and the explosion from the gunpowder works Dudești, on the eve of the war (July 27th/August 9th, 1916), when many lives were lost and there were important material damages, caused by accidents, sabotage actions or even betrayal.

Another reason for the difficulties was represented by the different frontier incidents caused by the troops of our neighbours. We had a more active role thanks to two of them.

¹⁹¹ Signed at Petrograd on 18th September/1st October 1914, see its text in I. G. Duca, *op. cit.*, pag. 284.

¹⁹² One of the maneuvers, especially of the Entente, was to bring, under one pretext or another, to Bucharest, some prominent personalities. Such was the visit of General [Paul-Marie] Pau. An English author (R. H. Bruce Lockhart, *Memoirs of a British Agent in Russia – 1912-1918*) maintains (p. 149) that Pau made a report on this visit very unfavorable for us. But General Berthelot notes in his (unpublished) memoirs, on September 25th, 1916, that General Pau was delighted with his visit to Romania. I met General Pau in Bern, in the autumn of 1926, on the occasion of a Conference of the Red Cross. We had lunch together several times and he spoke to me in the most praiseworthy terms about his visit in Bucharest (a.n.).

¹⁹³ Contemporary memoirs, daily press, foreign writings. I personally know the following cases: Anton Rosetti-Roznovanu, in Palanca, in the winter of 1915/1916, where I saw him. Eugene Ghika-Comănești, Nicu Ghika-Comănești, with the help of the prefect of Bacău, Mircea Costinescu, and of P. Polter, confirmed on January 11th and 13th, 1942 by Elise Brătianu [Ion I.C. Brătianu's wife – o.n.] and on January 26th, 1942 by I. Andreescu [administrator of the estate of the author from Brusturoasa – o.n.].

¹⁹⁴ Iancu R. Sturdza, after having received, following an error of the post, a postcard from Father addressed to Mișu Sturdza, published it in „Adevărul” (September 5th, 1915), with comments showing how much he had been abased. (a.n.).

¹⁹⁵ Major Tr. Stârcea's letters to me. General Max Ronge, *Les maîtres de l'espionage 1914-1918*, pp. 56, 248, 254, 265. R.W. Seton Watson, *A History of the Roumanians*, p. 497, note 2. The case is true only that indeed an officer in the 4th Army Corps of the General Staff was culpable of an indiscretion act for which he was brought to justice. Curious coincidence, an officer in the 2nd Army Corps of the General Staff, with the same family name and holding the same function, pleaded guilty to treason, committed suicide at the moment he was to be arrested. (n.a.).

A small Bulgarian detachment commanded by an officer crossed the Danube and landed on our coast lower down Giurgiu. Disarmed by ours, the officer and the troop were sent to Giurgiu. Colonel G. Mărdărescu¹⁹⁶, then chief of staff of the 2nd Army Corps (later, general and commander of our troops in the fight against the Hungarian Bolsheviks, and minister of war), and me, were received the order to investigate the causes of the incident. The Bulgarian officer (reserve), a lawyer in Rusciuc, who had studied in our country, speaking perfectly Romanian, told us that he had crossed the Danube to come to an agreement with the Romanian post, which was in front of his, requesting that our troops not always shoot as soon as something moved along the Bulgarian shore or a boat passed along that shore. It must be said that the Bulgarian sails on the Danube and especially their attempts to steal into the Danube islands were not always innocent. But from all the investigation, it resulted however that no other intention could be attributed that time to the Bulgarians and the incident was closed.

[General Radu R. Rosetti, *Mărturisiri 1914-1919 (Confessions 1914-1919)*, edition, introductory study and notes by Maria Georgescu, Publishing House *Modelism*, Bucharest, 1997, pp. 58-63]

82. 1915. Notes du général Iouri Nikiforovitch Danilov¹⁹⁷ sur les efforts diplomatiques de l'Empire Russe en vue d'attirer la Roumanie dans le conflit.

¹⁹⁶ *Gheorghe Mărdărescu* (1866-1938) – Army Corps General; during the war of the national unification, he was chief of staff of the 3rd Army (August-September 1916) and of the 2nd Army (September 1916-January 1918), contributing to the great victories from Mărăști and Oituz in 1917; Infantry Technical Inspector (February 1918-April 1919); On April 11th, 1919 the Great Headquarters appointed commander of the troops from Transylvania, conducting the offensive operation of the Romanian army to Budapest (August 4th, 1919) in response to Hungary's violent and repeated attacks against Romania. After the war, he was inspector of the infantry, on April 13th, 1922 being named inspector general of the 3rd Army Inspectorate. Shortly afterwards, he was invested Minister of War in the cabinet led by Ion I.C. Brătianu (April 24th, 1922-March 29th, 1926). After the removal of the Brătianu government, he returned to the position of inspector general of the 3rd Army Inspectorate, which he exercised until October 1st, 1930, when he went into reserve.

¹⁹⁷ *Iouri Nikiforovitch Danilov* (1866-1937) – Général russe, chef des Services d'informations de l'armée russe (1907-1914). Pendant la guerre, chef du Bureau des opérations de la Stavka, commandant du corps d'armée (1915-1916), chef d'état-major du Front du nord (1916-1917), puis commandant de la 5^{ème} Armée (avril-septembre 1917). Après le coup d'État bolchévique, il réussit à s'enfuir en France, où il mourut.

Notre repli de la ligne du Sán [septembre-décembre 1914] produisit une fort impression en Angleterre et surtout en France. M. Izvolsky télégraphia qu'à Paris on était consterné d'une pareille tournure des événements, car l'avis de parlementaires influents „il était douteux que la France pût supporter un deuxième campagne d'hiver dans les tranchées." Cette considération fut également soulignée par M. Izvolsky dans une autre dépêche, où il insistait, en raison du délai de l'entrée en campagne de l'Italie, sur la nécessité de persuader la Roumanie de se joindre à l'Entente. Au commencement de mai, de nouveaux pourparlers avaient été entamés avec ce pays et cette fois, d'accord avec la France et l'Angleterre, ils avaient lieu à Petrograd. M. Diamandi, ministre de Roumanie, exposa les exigences de son pays, exigences qui ne cadraient ni avec les intérêts de la Serbie, ni avec ceux de la Russie elle-même; d'autre part le gouvernement Brătianu ne se montra pas suffisamment conciliant dans la question d'une entente avec la Bulgarie au sujet de la Dobroudja. Afin de se décharger vis-à-vis des Alliés de la responsabilité d'un échec éventuel des négociations, M. Sazonov alla aussi loin que possible au devant des exigences roumaines. Cependant il ne pouvait pas ne pas protester contre l'assujettissement à la Roumanie des populations russes de Bukovine et Karpathes, ainsi que contre l'extension de cette puissance dans le Banat presque jusqu'à Belgrade, ce qui la devait rendre tout aussi dangereuse pour la Serbie que l'avait été l'Autriche. L'attitude conciliante prise par M. Sazonov n'aida que peu les pourparlers. Les événements qui se déroulaient sur le front de Galicie n'était pas de nature à décider les Roumains à entrer dans le mêlée. Ceux qui avaient cru que l'intervention de la Roumanie dépendait bien moins de telle ou telle promesse de compensation territoriale que de la tournure des événements du front se trouvaient avoir raison. Cependant, certains milieux dans les pays de l'Entente était enclins à accuser la Russie de manquer d'esprit de conciliation ce qui était absolument injuste; on laissait entendre que étant données les circonstances, les intérêts politiques „séparés" des alliés devaient s'effacer devant la nécessité commune à tous de vaincre au plus vite. Après tous nos efforts et tous nos sacrifices une pareille attitude de la part de nos alliés ne pouvait naturellement pas manquer de produire chez nous une impression fort pénible. Plus tard, dans la deuxième quinzaine de juillet, après une série de nouvelles concessions, la Roumanie finit par déclarer carrément qu'à ces conditions elle était prête à conclure une convention politique et militaire, mais qu'étant donnés les événements peu rassurants du front oriental elle ne saurait préciser le terme de son entrée en campagne. Un arrangement aussi vague ne pouvait satisfaire les Puissances de

l'Entente, le projet de conclure une convention avec la Roumanie dut être abandonné. Il y avait que peu de chances de voir cette puissance prendre bientôt part à la guerre, d'autant plus que son gouvernement annonçait que, si l'État-Major roumain n'entrevoyait pas la possibilité de franchir les Karpathes avant la tombée des premières neiges, on ne devait pas compter sur son entrée en campagne avant le printemps suivant. Bref, la Roumanie était en train de s'assurer contre tous les risques à la fois. [...]

[Youri Danilov, *La Russie dans la Guerre Mondiale (1914-1917)*, Paris, 1927, pp. 428-429]

83. 1915. Excerpts from the notes of Constantin Diamandy, Romanian minister in Petrograd, relating to the mode of negotiation of Romania's borders at the end of the world conflagration.

How the map of Greater Romania was negotiated

On 1st October 1914, Romania had concluded a treaty of neutrality with Russia, which had to be ratified by London and Paris and which was the first stage of the Romanian politics in the Great War¹⁹⁸.

But we would have realized immediately that, in order to realize our national unity, Romania could not remain on this treaty of neutrality. Not once have we been specifically told, both in Petrograd and in other capitals, that the countries that would remain neutral, weapons at ease, would not be received at the peace conference and would not have the right to state their claims. Therefore, believing that Romania could remain neutral in this world conflict, which at the same time posed the question of the nationalities, was for us a certainty that we could not achieve the integrity of our country without participating in the war.

On May 3rd, 1915¹⁹⁹, I had been commissioned by Ion [I.C.] Brătianu to present to Mr. Sazonov at Petrograd the map of our claims. As I explained in a previous chapter, as soon as I entered Mr. Sazonov's office, [he] told me: now, when Italy entered the war, Romania's demands have diminished. I realized immediately that the negotiations would be difficult, but I did not expect them to be as heavy as they had been and that they had lasted for over a year.

¹⁹⁸ Sazonov – Diamandy convention.

¹⁹⁹ Correct: 23rd May 1915, the day when Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary.

Russia and the Entente imagined that, since they had obtained the participation of Italy, the cooperation of Romania was no longer of the same value.

At the meeting held on May 23rd, with Mr. Sazonov, I had come up with the map of our claims, but, from the beginning, he presented me a map that, curiously, dated from 1875 and in which the nationalities between Tisza and Prut, that is Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina, precisely the territories that had to be negotiated by us, were marked with colors and the dominant colour, at first sight, was the green one, representing the Slavic element.

I could not help telling Mr. Sazonov: the map looks horrible in green and let me bring you a map more updated than this one.

I understood from the first talk that if for Transylvania, strictly speaking, we would not have difficulties, there would be instead great difficulties for Bukovina and Banat, namely precisely those provinces in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy where there were also Slavic elements among the Romanian elements.

The first talk with Mr. Sazonov was friendly, but he emphasized the difficulties of the problem to be negotiated. At the same time however, I also felt something else, which the documents published by the Soviets showed, that is to say that they gave me a hint that we would negotiate directly with Russia and not hope for the support of the Allies in maintaining our cause.

I said that I felt this – and the subsequent documents showed it more precisely –, and when I told Mr. Sazonov that we could not come to terms on the main point of our requests, this was immediately interpreted, also by the general of the Russian army, Nicolae [Nikolai] Nikolaevich, as that Romania was launching an ultimatum and we had made our proposal in the form of a summons. In fact, it was not an ultimatum and it was not a summons; but in the opinion of the Great Powers it was hard to believe that a small state, to which they demanded [the] highest sacrifice, that is, of blood and of entering into war, might put the condition for its entry into action.

What was our conception when we were negotiating the conditions, first of all those territorial of our entry into the war?

First, I realized that this war, which had been unleashed as a result of Germany's policy, had been brought up for consideration in order to resolve the national issues. First of all, France had to claim Alsace and Lorraine; Italy – Dalmatia and Trentino. Serbia, which had been one of the first countries invaded by Austria, had its claims too for the Slavs under the Austro-Hun-

garian monarchy, so the question of the nationalities was brought up for discussion. Could Romania – which had national claims in Austria-Hungary and regarding Russia – be absent when it was negotiating and when it was reshaping the „map of Europe” on the basis of the question of nationalities? In our opinion it couldn’t, because, as I said above, we had more than indications, we had statements that only the participants in the war would have their word in the matter of the reforming the map of Europe.

Secondly, an occasion like this, a world war, made us believe that the question of the national unity of Romania had to be solved at once and not in successive stages. In other words, the example of Italy, which reached the national unity in successive stages, was an example that should not have been initiated. The opinion of the Ion Brătianu’s Romanian diplomacy was that we had to take advantage of those circumstance to solve, once and for all, the Romanian national issue regarding its ethnic borders.

But Ion Brătianu had a conception that the natural borders, as far as possible, are those ones that best decide and defend the interests of the state. Perhaps this conception came from the fact that he, like all of us, had the conception of land ownership, that the question of the boundaries played a very important role for the property, either large or small. It is no less true that the question of the boundaries and the significance of the natural borders, as far as possible through rivers, was for Ion Brătianu the guarantee that our state, surrounded by natural borders, had the possibility of its subsequent safety and development.

I said above that Romania wanted to realize its national unity at once and that the question of the nationalities was posed through the fact that there were great powers having national issues, so [those ones] had written in their treaties the question of all who had national issues, so our question too. It was found that the idea of the principle of the nationalities was a not definitive principle. Indeed, it could happen that principle would be favorable sometimes to the states invoking it, and sometimes unfavorable. But in history it is not only the point of view of a political calculation that plays a role, there is also another consideration, namely that the states often enter the war for a mystical [ideal]. Or, at that time – and things must be judged with the mentality of that time, not with the today’s one—the national unity and the national claims were a mystical [ideal] and the ideal of the states that had not realized it yet.

[Romania during World War I, documentary testimonies ... pp. 149-152]

84. 1915. Excerpt from Erich von Falkenhayn's work „General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its critical decisions”, concerning the preliminaries of Bulgaria's entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers.

Conclusion of the Convention with Bulgaria

Under pressure from the G.H.Q. negotiations had again been under way in Sofia since July for Bulgaria to join the Central Powers. Ably conducted by Prince von Hohenlohe-Langenburg, and by the new German military attaché, Major von Massow, they resulted in the attendance at G.H.Q. at the end of August, of a Bulgarian representative, the then Lieutenant-Colonel Gantschew²⁰⁰, to discuss the terms of a military convention. The real motive of the Bulgarians in joining us was presumably to be found in their realization that they could not expect from the Entente any support in their national aspirations for the acquisition of the territory inhabited by Bulgarians in Serbia and Rumania. Even in the matter of a possible extension of their territory at the expense of Turkey they could have little to hope far from the side on which Russia stood, while their adhesion to the Central Powers immediately brought them, thanks to the broad-mindedness of the Turkish statesmen, the Turkish territory to the west of the Maritza, for which they so earnestly longed. One need hardly mention that, apart from these considerations, confidence in the strength of the Central Powers and the ultimate victory of their good cause had great weight.

The convention was signed on the 6th September at Pless by Generals Conrad von Hötzendorf and von Falkenhayn, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Gantschew; full provision was made for Turkey's concurrence.

By the convention, Germany and Austro-Hungary, with six divisions each, were to be on the Serbian frontier ready for operations within 30 days, while Bulgaria had to reach the same stage with at least four divisions²⁰¹ within 35 days. Field-Marshal von Mackensen²⁰² was to take the supreme

²⁰⁰ Peter Gantschew was a Bulgarian military attaché in Berlin, see *The Almanach de Gotha*, 1911, pag. 534.

²⁰¹ The Bulgarian divisions were almost double the German in infantry strength.

²⁰² *August von Mackensen* (1849-1945) – German field marshal; he commanded a group of armies on the eastern front, in Galicia, gaining the victories of Gorlice and Tarnov (May 2-June 22, 1915), by recapturing the cities of Przemyśl and Lemberg, then at the command of another group of armies crushed effective military resistance in Serbia, but failed to destroy the Serbian army. He will lead the troops of the Central Powers to the conquest

command of all these troops. Germany was ready, if the undertaking developed as was hoped, to station one mixed infantry brigade at Varna and one at Burgas, and to ensure as far as possible, the introduction of submarines into the Black Sea for the defence of the Bulgarian coast. In this way was hoped to influence the attitude of some circles of the Bulgarian population, which could otherwise not be relied upon against the Russians. Bulgaria further undertook to have the four above-mentioned divisions mobilized at the latest by the 21st September, and to move into Serbian Macedonia on the 11th October with at least one further division. Germany in return declared her readiness, in addition to granting substantial financial aid, to supply Bulgaria with munitions, so far as her own needs permitted. She also consented to induce the Turks, if Bulgaria desired, to defend the port of Dedeagatch²⁰³ against hostile landings, and to place the troops employed for this purpose under Bulgarian command. To avoid undesirable incidents, it was agreed that Bulgaria was to preserve unconditional neutrality towards Greece and Rumania until the completion of the operations against Serbia, subject to an assurance from these States that they would remain neutral and not occupy any Serbian territory. A further clause, by which Bulgaria was bound to allow absolutely unrestricted transport of troops and material to and from Turkey, so soon as the way through Serbia, the Danube route, or through communication via Rumania should be open, may seem superfluous, but was nevertheless advisable, having regard to conditions in the Balkans.

The agreement gave us the long yearned for opportunity to act energetically in clearing up the position in the South East, where there were much to be gained.

If we succeeded in eliminating Serbia as a serious factor in the war – and of that we had no doubt – the threat of the Austro-Hungarian flank, and with it the whole of the South Slave danger, would disappear.

The establishment of communication with Turkey would presumably ensure the safety of the Dardanelles and the final isolation of Russia from her Entente partners. It also gave prospects of new possibilities for the Turkish operations in Asia.

of Muntenia in November 1916, he entered Bucharest on 6th December 1916. He failed in his attempt to permanently remove Romania from the war, being defeated at Mărășești and Oituz in July-September 1917. Commander of the German troops from Romania managing to withdraw without losses in November-December 1918.

²⁰³ Today Alexandroupolis in Greece, near the border with Turkey.

The adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers, and the successes which were soon obtained in Serbia as a result, could not fail to have an effect on the attitude of Rumania.

Sources of supply for foodstuffs, and important raw materials, especially copper, were rendered available.

[Erich von Falkenhayn, *General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its critical decisions*, London, 1919, pp. 159-161]

85. 1915. Excerpt from Erich von Falkenhayn's „General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its critical decisions” concerning Romania's attitude towards the Central Powers during the year 1915.

Rumania's attitude to the Central Powers had been obscure from the first day of the war, and after the death of King Charles I in August, 1914²⁰⁴, became suspicious. Every time Austria-Hungary suffered a reverse it got worse, until it was hardly more than veiled hostility – only to become almost friendly as soon as a victory was won over Russia.

Neither the German nor the Austrian General Staff had any doubt that the political leaders of Rumania intended to follow the same course which had led to such cheap victories in the last Balkan war. They only intended to take part in the mighty struggle when they could do so without risk. Accordingly they were postponing the day of decision and taking the greatest pains to avoid committing themselves in any way to either side.

The waiting attitude was facilitated by the fact that German policy had not succeeded in peace time in obtaining the confirmation of the treaty concluded with Rumania by the Rumanian Parliament, an event which would alone have given it legal sanction. On the other hand this attitude was rendered difficult by the very active party in the country which was unconditionally pro-Russian and pro-French. This party was boisterously demanding Rumania's adhesion to the Entente, and in this they were receiving distinguished support from adroit diplomatist working with unlimited supplies of money.

In anticipation of these developments the German General Staff had ceased to place any serious reliance in peace time on Rumania's adhesion

²⁰⁴ King Carol I died on September 27/October 10, 1914.

if war broke out. Nevertheless, the vacillating attitude of that country was having unpleasant consequences for the military operations of the Central Powers. Austria-Hungary was always very sensitive to the situation in that quarter. Our communication with Turkey and Bulgaria was seriously interpreted the principles of international law as regards neutrality in a way that could not be regarded as less than benevolent to the Central Powers, but was none the less very questionable. This became more noticeable after the Entente began the attack on the Dardanelles²⁰⁵. As early as the spring of 1915 we had had to look into the question whether it was advisable compel Rumania by force of arms to adopt an attitude more in keeping with her moral obligations. We had decided against such a step. As long as the Russian pressure against Austria-Hungary in Hungary and Galicia continued in full force no operation against or through Romania was possible. The forces required could not be made available, even though the power of resistance of Rumania could only be considered small in view of her lack of arms and ammunition.

The question came up for consideration again when, at the end of summer of 1915, it had to be decided whether we should seek to clear our path to the south-east through Rumania or through Serbia. The Chief of the General Staff chose the Serbian route. It was true that Bulgaria, our new ally, saw no objection whatever to an attack on Romania. Quite the contrary. The healthy hatred in every Bulgarian heart against the treacherous foe in the Balkan War would have made her only too anxious to participate in other circumstances. On the other hand, her yet more ardent desire to recover possession as speedily as possible of the former Bulgarian territory torn from her by Serbia, as well as her defective military equipment made it necessary to adopt the shortest route. That route led through Serbia. Even apart from those considerations we should have been compelled to decide in favor of it. Bulgaria was not in a position to undertake operations against Rumania as long as her souther and western flanks not secured against Greece and Serbia. The internal situation in Austria-Hungary just after the beginning of the Italian offensive²⁰⁶ made it imperative that she should be relieved of the Southern Slav danger, which was always potential so long as Serbia had not been overthrown.

²⁰⁵ The British naval attacks began on February 17, 1915, and the actual landing on March 18.

²⁰⁶ Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary on May 23, 1915.

Moreover, there had been a material improvement in Rumania's attitude after our break-through at Gorlice-Tarnow²⁰⁷. Her frontiers had been thrown open more almost every day. The rapid overthrow of Serbia had intensified this favourable development. We got as far as negotiating for the delivery of large quantities of Romanian corn, which was calculated to relieve the approaching food and fodder famine in Germany, and still more in Turkey. The equally urgent demand for oil seemed likely to be met from Romanian sources.

Of course no one at German G.H.Q. allowed the accommodating spirit shown by the Rumanian authorities to blind them to their true feelings. All of us were perfectly clear that it was solely due to the compulsion of circumstances, and could become the reverse as soon as those circumstances changed. We therefore clung fast to our notion that matters must finally be cleared up as regards Rumania.

[Erich von Falkenhayn, *General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its critical decisions*, London, 1919, pp. 202-205]

86. December 3rd 1923, Bucharest. Excerpt from the report on the preparation of the war during the years 1914-1916.

STATEMENT

Relating to the establishment of the truth concerning the preparation for the war during the years 1914-1916.

According to the decision taken by the Ministry of War – the Cabinet of the Minister – under No. 5002 of December 3rd, 1923, the commission composed of:

Divisional General Popovici Ioan²⁰⁸ – President;
Reserve Divisional General Cica Constantin;
Retired Vice Admiral Ursianu Vasile²⁰⁹;

²⁰⁷ The German penetration was carried out on May 4, 1915.

²⁰⁸ *Ioan Popovici* (1865-1951) Romanian general, graduate of the School of Artillery and Genius (1887) and of the Superior War School (1891), Colonel (1912), commander of the Superior War School (1914-1915), brigadier general (1916) and division (1917). Governor of Bessarabia (1918-1923) and Minister of Agriculture and Domains (September 27-November 28, 1919). He was also a Member of Parliament in several legislatures.

²⁰⁹ *Vasile Ursianu* (1848-1926) studies at the naval school in Brest (France). He partic-

Honorary Counselor at the High Court of Cassation V. Bossy²¹⁰ and
Honorary President at the Bucharest Court of Appeal N. Budişteanu –
members

Having the task of studying, minutely and in a well-informed way, the activity of the Ministry of War, during the period 1914-1916, assembled at the Military Circle in Bucharest – the library room – where the following measures were taken:

Gathering up documents, with the necessary data, from the General Staff, from all the Directorates of the Ministry and different establishments, warehouses and units; documents in which it should be clearly show, numerically and graphically:

1. The situation on January 1st, 1914;
2. The training movement, in effective forces, material and funds allocated, from January 1st, 1914 and August 14th, 1916 – the day before the declaration of war – with the data concerning any movement that took place;
3. Establishing the definitive preparation situation, as it was on August 14th, 1916.

Consequently, the appropriate approval was requested from the Ministry of War, which granted it with no. 81 – General Secretariate.

Gathering up the necessary documents, the commission proceeded to study and analyze them in detail.

*

I. From the study of the documents sent by the General Staff with no. 4 secret of January 18th, 1924 (the report No. 2 with four tables, three diagrams and three annexes²¹¹), the results are as follows:

1. **On 1st January 1914**, the effective number of officers is: (see table No. 1):

ipated in the war of independence and was one of those who supervised the construction of the „Mircea” brick. In 1898, he was promoted to Rear Admiral and later appointed Inspector General of Ports and Navigation. He resigned shortly thereafter and stepped into the army reserve. In 1912, he was promoted to Vice Admiral in reserve, and in 1913 he was mobilized near the Grand Headquarters. He is one of the founders of the Romanian Astronautical Society and the creator of the Astronomical Observatory in Bucharest, which bears his name.

²¹⁰ *Vasile Bossy*, descendant of a boyard family from Moldova, literate, member of the society “Junimea”, counsellor at the High Court of Cassation and Justice. He was the father of diplomat, historian and memorialist Raoul Bossy (1894-1975).

²¹¹ The diagrams tables and annexes are not published (o.n.).

- 111 generals, of whom 66 reserve;
- 1,173 senior officers, from which 424 reserve;
- 8,664 non-commissioned officers, from which 5,206 reserve (captains: 1,481 active-duty and 727 reserve, lieutenants: 1,078 active-duty and 1,776 reserve, sub-lieutenants: 899 active-duty and 2,703 reserve).

Total officers: 9,948, from which 5,696 reserve.

1,263 students at the officers school, from which 488 destined for reserve officers.

460,000 effective mobilization force of the troop.

2. On 1st January 1915, the same categories of effective forces are:

- 127 generals, from which 74 reserve;
- 1,348 senior officers, from which 506 reserve;
- 11,755 lower officers, from which 8,069 reserve (captains: 1,412 active-duty and 759 reserve, lieutenants: 1,176 active-duty and 1,796 reserve, sub-lieutenants: 1,098 active-duty and 5,514 reserve).

Total officers: 13,230, from which 8,649 reserve.

1,442 students at the officers school, from which 717 destined to become reserve officers.

975,000 the effective mobilization force of the troop.

From the comparison of these data, it results that within one year, all the effective numbers are increasing, but especially that of the reserve sub-lieutenants, which increases by almost 3,000; absolutely necessary for the command of the platoons and artillery sections.

3. On 1st January 1916, the above effective forces become:

- 131 generals, from which 80 reserve;
- 1,493 senior officers, from which 608 reserve;
- 14,609 non-commissioned officers, from which 10,475 reserve (captains: 1,422 active-duty and 764 reserve, lieutenants: 1,324 active-duty and 1,926 reserve, sub-lieutenants: 1,388 active-duty and 7,785 reserve).

Total officers: 16,233, from which 11,163 reserve.

3,328 students at the officers school, from which 1,724, destined for reserve officers.

1,080,313 the effective mobilization force of the troop.

Comparing these effective forces with those from 1st January 1915, it results too a significant increase, especially for the reserve sub-lieutenants (over 2,200) and for the students with the destination of reserve officers.

Comparing to the numbers of the effective forces from January 1st 1914, the increase is even more significant, for some categories, more than double.

4. At the moment of the war declaration we had:

17,925 officers, from which 11,562 reserve and 2,218 officer candidates students; with a 1,080,313 mobilizable troop from which: 900,000 trained, 100,000 of those who had been exempted from and 26,000 re-examined, of those who had been exempted from and were later declared fit for service.

5. All the categories of officers and troops (completion and reserve) were regularly concentrated every 30 days, at different times, in order to refresh the instruction (see page 10 and the following of the documents attached to the report No. 2 of the General Staff).

Even the troops and the officers assigned to the different services and the stage units, were concentrated and trained accordingly, for the mission they had at the mobilization.

6. By distributing the number of the lower officers to the whole effective mobilizable force, it results an officer to 87 people, that is to say to a platoon; so the appointment required at the command of all the platoons was accomplished.

7. The effective mobilisable number was raised to 1,080,313; therefore a proportion greater than 10%, approaching 15% of the country's population; therefore quite high, but necessary, relating to the extent of our borders.

8. From the analysis of the table Nr. 2, it appears that at the beginning of 1914, there were in the order of battles for mobilization: 250 battalions, 93 squadrons and 208 batteries.

At the beginning of 1915 we have a significant increase, namely: 311 battalions, 103 squadrons and 234 batteries; and at the decree of the war, we arrive with 378 operating battalions, 5 stahe battalions, 104 squadrons and 299 batteries; that is to say, much increased, and the number of batteries increased significantly, arriving almost at the proportion of a battery to a battalion.

9. From the analysis of the table Nr. 3, it results as follows: on 1st January 1914, the ordinary budget of the Ministry of War is of 81,600,000 million, with the following effective forces number:

4,960 officers, 1,179 students, 5,065 re-enlisted 80,105 troop and 24,834 animals.

10. During 1914 -1915 the ordinary budget increases to 97,800,000 lei, plus an extraordinary budget of 303,000 lei; having an increasing effective forces number of: 5,619 officers, 1,440 students, 5,757 re-enlisted, 98,755 troop and 27,594 animals.

The following commands, units and services are created:

- 1 cavalry brigade command;
- 2 commands of cavalry divisions;
- 4 infantry battalions;
- 1 cavalry regiment;
- 5 field artillery regiments;
- heavy artillery battery, in addition to the other 2 existing ones;
- 75 m/m mountain artillery battery, in addition to 2 others.
- 5 machine-gun sections, at the Rosiori (red uniforms) regiments;
- Infantry sub-officers school;

The superior direction of the artillery establishments, in order to give more intense guidance to the activity of these establishments.

- general staff services at the Intendance and Health Departments;

Changed:

- 5 territorial commands in 5 divisions, with the numbers from 11 to 15;
- 5 train squadrons in 5 divisions;
- 40 reserve battalions in 40 regimental cadres (of three battalions each and one machine-gun section), with a total effective number of: 360 officers, 280 re-enlisted and 3,800 troop.

From the above information, it results an incontestable activity aiming to complete the existing units and new creations in order to meet the demands of a good mobilization.

11. In 1915-1916, the ordinary budget was of 97,800,000 lei, and from the extraordinary one, until the declaration of the war, another 500,000,000 lei were allocated.

The effective force number on August 14th, 1916 is: 7,023 officers, 1,552 students, 7,103 re-enlisted, 119,982 troop and 33,113 horses; all in a significant increase compared to the previous year.

There are created the following: the general command of the stages at the General Staff.

Command of the troops of reinforced places (16th Division);

Other 4 infantry battalions, in addition to those established in 1914, to complete with the 3rd battalion the eight regiments established in 1911 with only 2 battalions.

- 1 bicycle company;
- 1 mountain regiment of 6 batteries, with material of 63 m/m;

- 4 heavy artillery regiments, comprising: 2 regiments of 6 batteries, one of 8 batteries and the 4th of 12 batteries; in total 129 firearms (see table No. 4);

- 6 machine-gun sections, at the cavalry regiments.

With the order No. 367 of the Ministry of War (the General Staff) from 7.I.1916, 49 batteries are created of 6 pieces each, caliber 53 m/m (material removed from the turrets from the Focsani-Nămoloasa-Galați region), destined one for each infantry brigade.

In addition, with the 57 m/m caliber pieces, removed from the fortresses of Bucharest, another 6 batteries are organized, for other 6 newly created brigades.

- 2 divisions of 3 batteries each, 7 batteries at the fortress of Bucharest, 2 sections of position at the Cernavoda bridgehead and 4 sections of position at Turtucaia are created of the latter material.

The annexes 2 and 3 show in detail the organization of these batteries, with the measures taken for their mobilization at the training of its personnel.

Aviation Corps and Aviation Direction of the Ministry of War:

- 5 schools for reserve officers, one for each army corps;
- 1 mountain battery, caliber 75 m/m, in addition to the other three existing.

The General Direction of Ammunition, with the purpose of organizing and implementing the private industry for the needs of the army.

The cadres of the newly established regiments 40 -80 are completed.

It appears that, during this period, there is a significant activity, especially as regards: the heavy artillery, the aviation, the completion of the 40 cadres regiments, with which the Divisions 11-15, the mountain artillery and the infantry accompanying batteries are formed; all these measures were absolutely necessary.

Conclusion

From the detailed study of the documents received from the General Staff, the commission proved a considerable activity on the part of the War Ministry, regarding: the completion of the effectives; creations and transformations of indispensable units and services; guidance of military establishments to an intense work; guidance of the private industry for satisfying the army's needs, by creating the direction of the Ammunition; guidance of

the aviation for the needs of the army and the training of the officers and troops, through periodical concentrations.

[A.M.R., Fund M.St.M., file 301, Fund 948, section III, Information, pp. 45-91]

87. Lists of human losses suffered by the Bessarabian soldiers of Romanian origin from Bender județ (county), rural district (rom. plașa) Căinari during the years 1914-1915.

Full name	Mil. rank	Religion	Civil St.	Suburb	Details	Date
Iabanji Ivan Ivan.	Soldier	Orth.	married	Baccealia	wounded	17.08.1914
Jner Alexei Fedor.	–	Orth.	single	Baccealia	missing	11.03.1915
Moldavan Fedor Nichitin	Soldier	Ort	married	Baccealia	missing	07.03.1915
Negurița Gheras. Vas.	mountain huntman	Orth.	single	Baccealia	wounded	17.10.1914
Pocriciuc Pav. Ivan.	Soldier	Orth.	married	Baccealia	missing	07.03.1915
Roiba Vas. Gheorg.	Soldier	Orth.	married	Baccealia	missing	07.03.1915
Vetric Dmtr. Chiril	Soldier	Orth.	single	Baccealia	missing	26-30.08. 1914
Vradi Dmitri Nichif.	private first class	Orth.	married	Baccealia	wounded	28.11.1914
Dref Emanuil Hrist.	Soldier	Luther.	married	Balmaz	missing	09.08.1914
Cotorga Efim Semen.	Soldier	Orth.	married	Căinari	missing	08.12.1914
Cotorobai Vasili Pavl.	cannoneer	Orth.	single	Căinari	killed	22.11.1914
Cuzmin Alexei Nicol.	Soldier	Orth.	married	Căinari	wounded	28.11.1914

Garnet Constan- tin Filim.	Soldier	Orth.	single	Căinări	wounded	12.01.1915
Mocan Harlamp. Gheorg.	Soldier	Orth.	cisit.	Căinări	wounded	14.11.1914
Topalov Ivan	non- commis- sion- officer	Orth.	Married	Căinări	contused	27.11.1914
Tartan Mac. Ilar.		Orth.	Married	Căinări	wounded	11.03.1915
Băta Nichif. Ivan	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Cărbuna	wounded	07.11.1914
Catanov Filip Alexandrov	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Cărbuna	wounded	23.02.1915
Cazac Gavriil Andr.	Soldier	Orth.	Single	Cărbuna	wounded	17.08.1914
Hudoba Nichita Danii.	Soldier	Orth.	Single	Cărbuna	wounded	04.11.1914
Jical Vladim. Ant.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Cărbuna	missing	29.04.1915
Rața Iustin Vasiliev	Soldier	–	Married	Cărbuna	wounded	29.11.1914
Strijca Andr. Gheorg.	Soldier	Orth.	Single	Cărbuna	wounded	23-28.11. 1914
Florea Mihail Vasiliev	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Canalia	missing	28.11.1914
Lupeca Iv. Fedor.	Soldier	Orth.	Single	Ciuflești	missing	04.11.1914
Nascu Grig. Gavr.	Soldier	Orth.	Single	Ciuflești	missing	24.03.1915
Stambol Grig. Iac.	mountain huntman	Orth.	Married	Ciuflești	missing	2-18.10. 1914
Stambor Iv. Iacovl.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Ciuflești	wounded	04.11.1914
Volcov Petr Dmitr.	private first class	Orth.	Married	Constan- tinovca	missing	26.11.1914
Ciolac Dm. Iliin	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Cureni	dead	25.04.1915
Coroteleadchi Andrei Vavilov	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Cureni	wounded	02.10.1914

Potolea Andrei Isidor.	private first class	Orth.	Single	Cureni	missing	17.10.1914
Overchiev Ant. Petr.	Militia	Orth.	Married	Egorovca Nouă	missing	22.03.1915
Naghel Norpart	Soldier	Cathol.	Married	Emental	wounded	10.12.1914
Beidiuc Iv. Sem.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Gangura	wounded	26.03.1915
Botescul Ivan Afan.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Geamăna	wounded	27.11.1914
Caimaca Anton Petr.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Geamăna	wounded	07.11.1914
Cernii Laz. Vavilon.	mountain huntman	Orth.	Single	Geamăna	missing	22.08.1914
Creitor Chirii Iov.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Geamăna	wounded	27.11.1914
Iacubov Gavriil Nichit	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Larga	wounded	27.09.1914
Şevcenco Anton Nichitin	Soldier	Orth.	Single	Nico- laevscoe	missing	14.11.1914
Birco Sem. Fedor.	Militia	Orth.	-	Puhoi	missing	15.03.1915
Bornas Vladim. Dorof.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Puhoi	wounded	27.09.1914
Furdui Iv. Fedor.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Puhoi	missing	25.04.1915
Mihailov Condrat Mih.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Puhoi	killed	07.11.1914
Modval Efrem Nicol.	mountain huntman	Orth.	Single	Puhoi	killed	17.08.1914
Plocenda Achim Sav.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Puhoi	wounded	28.02.1915
Stici Pavel Ivan.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Puhoi	wounded	07.11.1914
Țaran Zaharia	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Puhoi	wounded	27.09 -24.10. 1914
Titica Nicolai Anan.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Puhoi	wounded	27.02.1915
Jirovan Marc Iv.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Satul Nou	wounded	07.11.1914

Leanga Iv. Efim.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Satul Nou	wounded	14.11.1914
Munteanov Artem Gheorghiev	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Satul Nou	wounded	26.03.1915
Belan Dmitri Pavl.	Soldier	Orth.	Single	Scroafa	wounded	12.08.1914
Diduh Maxim Taras.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Scroafa	missing	20.02.1915
Gusarenco Ivan Pantei	Soldier	Orth.	Single	Scroafa	wounded	27.09 -24.10. 1914
Tatarciuc Ivan Nicol	Soldier	Orth.	Single	Scroafa	missing	14.11.1914
Balan Zahar. Vas.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Surchi- ceni	missing	28.11.1914
Cotrobăi Dmitr. Con.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Zoloti- evca	missing	08.12.1914
Cușnir Vas. Iosif.	Soldier	Orth.	Single	Zoloti- evca	killed	27.09 -24.10. 1914
Purod Lazari Gem.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Zoloti- evca	wounded	17.02.1915
Strelciuc Gheras. Vas.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Zoloti- evca	wounded	16.02.1915
Timoșenco Ivan Iac	Militia	Orth.	Married	Zoloti- evca	wounded	15.02.1915
Certan Iv. Gheorg.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Zotovca	wounded	28.11.1914
Rojco Ivan Dmitr.	Soldier	Orth.	Married	Zotovca	wounded	08.08.1914
Antonov Ignat Sem.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	01.02.1915
Arabaci Petr Petr.	–	Orth.	Married		missing	11.03.1915
Armaș Gheorghi Ivan.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	02.02.1915
Arnaut Radion Petr.	–	Orth.	Married		missing	11.03.1915
Bacancea Ermol. Eman.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		wounded	07.11.1914
Badrajan Nicol. Iv.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	10.10.1914
Baicev Afanasi Stepanov	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	06.02.1915

Barbariuș Dmitri Ignatiev	Militia	Orth.	Married		missing	27.03.1915
Barbaroș Demian	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	06.02.1915
Bejenor Fedor	Private first class	Orth.	–		wounded	04.10.1914
Belan Dmitri Ivan.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		missing	02.12.1914
Bidiuc Semen Vasil.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	02.02.1915
Bilibaum Gheorg. Onis.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		wounded	10.10.1914
Birca Ivan Egorov	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	19.03.1915
Boboc Ivan Petr.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	03.02.1915
Bogdanov Harl. Vas.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	08.04.1915
Boltan Petr Sem.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	13.02.1915
Boroncea Terente Iv.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	08.03.1915
Boruian Trif. Ax.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	10.03.1915
Boșpari Tim. Ivan.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	18.02.1915
Broguța Demid	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	18.02.1915
Bugor Ilia Petr.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	27.03.1915
Burianov Efim	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	03.02.1915
Burlacenco Achim	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	10.11.1914
Caban Ivan Gheorg.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	31.03.1915
Caimacov Petr Iliin	Soldier	Orth.	Single		killed	14.11.1914
Caitor Fedor Artem.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	05.02.1915
Caradori Iosif. Nicol.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	31.01.1915
Caramli Pavel Grig.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	16.01.1915
Caterevscoi Stepan Gavrilov	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	19.03.1915
Catțer Al-dr Tim.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	15.03.1915

Ceaban Andrei Grig.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	06.02.1915
Ceaban Nicolai Rod.	-	Orth.	Married		missing	07.03.1915
Cebaniuc Ivan Ivanovid	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	20.03.1915
Cebatiuc Al-dr Iv.	Militia	Olt	Married		missing	27.01.1915
Cecoi Gheorghe Nichitid	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	29.01.1915
Ceresco Dmitri Serg.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	30.03.1915
Cema Andrei Va vil.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	12.02.1915
Cemat Vasili Anion.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	29.03.1915
Cernei Dionisi Gheorg.	Militia	Orth.	Married		missing	27.03.1915
Chessea Mihail Nicol.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	22.10.1914
Ciredco Sidor	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	09.02.1915
Cohanovschi Egor	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	04.02.1915
Colodorșan Nicolai	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	03.02.1915
Conicenco Zahar Iv.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	07.02.1915
Cotorobai Trofim	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	17.02.1915
Covalenco Iac. Gavr.	Soldier	Ort	Married		missing	10.03.1915
Craiuf Iosif Chiril	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	05.04.1915
Cred Vasili Ivan.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	02.02.1915
Creț Evsuf. Fedor.	non-com-mis-sionedofficer	Orth.	Single		wounded	07.10 1914
Creț Vasili	Soldier	Orth.	Single		missing	16 02 1915

Criulean Vas. Leont	Soldier	Olt	Married		wounded	02.02.1915
Croitor Condr. Cons.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		missing	11.03.1915
Croitor Nichita Iv.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	29.11.1914
Cudenco Ivan Ivan.	Orth.	Single	Married		wounded	11.03.1915
Cuiba Casian Pantei	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	20.01 1915
Cunici Petr Vas.	Soldier	Orth.				26.03.1915
Decusora Gheorghe	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	30.01.1915
Didenco Max. Gngor	Soldier	Orth.			missing	19 03.1915
Dilan Vamava Ilar.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	07.11.1914
Folc Chirius Foma	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	09. 03.1915
Ghilaș Grigori Filip.	Militia	Orth.	Married		missing	25.11.1915
Gorobeț Ivan Grig.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		missing	08 08.1914
Govdari Afan.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	31. 01.1915
Grebeșenco Fedor	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	18. 11.1915
Ignat Ivan Semen.	Militia	Orth.	–		missing	05.02.1915
Ignatov Vas. Ivan.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		missing	07.11.1914
Istrati Andrei Vas	private	Orth.	Married		missing	04.04.1915
Iurco Demenți	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	09 10.1914
Iurco Evdochim	private	Orth.	Married		wounded	17.12 1914
Ivanes Gheorg	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	20.03.1915
Iziuculeț Iosif.	Militia	Orth.	Married		wounded	07.11.1914
Jemovoi Trof	Soldier	Orth.	Single		wounded	09.03.1915
Jetiu Porfir. Step.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	21.01.1915

Laptea Vasili	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	04.02.1915
Maiduc Gheorghe Vărf.	Militia	Orth.	Married		wounded	23.01.1915
Maşenco Al-r Mefod.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	12.12.1914
Miceaevschi Vas. Demid.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	30.01.1915
Minaev Ivan Sem.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	05.02.1915
Mitev Ivan Step.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	30.01.1915
Modvel Silvestr	Soldier	Orth.	Single		missing	02.02.1915
Mostac Iacov	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	04.10.1914
Mustaţ Step. Iosif.	Soldier	Orth.	–		wounded	04.10.1914
Mutov Miron Sevast	Soldier	Orth.	–		wounded	02.02.1915
Necurin Gavril Fedor.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	29.03.1915
Nesterov Iv. Sem.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	27.03.1915
Obobesco SaŃir. Gim.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		killed	07.03.1915
Paşcan Isidor	-	Orth.	Married		missing	20.03.1915
Paul Rogus	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	04.02.1915
Pirţu Ant Vital	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	04.03.1915
Platonov Deom. Gr.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		wounded	15-17.08 1914
Pleşco Dmitri Semenovid	Bugler	Orth.	Single		missing	17.12.1914
Poleacei ucov Andrei Matveev	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	20.03.1915
Ponoguţ Grigori Iv.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	05.10.1914

Popa Ignari Sergheev	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	30.03.1915
Popșci Ivan Andr.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	05.04.1915
Potereal Iv. Iliin	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	08.04.1915
Pritulenco Iacov Vas.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	27.03.1915
Prodous Vasili Timof.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	04.02.1915
Purcel Sa va Evdochimov	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	29.01.1915
Raetchi Const Petr.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	13- 17.08.1914
Raider Isid. Iv.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		missing	15.01 1915
Rațo Dm. Fedor.	private first class	Orth.	Married		wounded	05.12.1914
Rebdev Nichita Ivanovid	private first class	Orth.	Married		missing	27.03 1915
Renchez Ign Trof.	Militia	Orth.	Married		missing	13.11.1914
Rojco Dm. Iac.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		wounded	18.02.1915
Rojco Iv. Gheras.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	
Rudenco Semen Gherasimov	Soldier	Orth.	Single		wounded	14.11.1914
Samson Step. Gheorg.	Soldier	Orth.	-		missing	01.10.1914
Sembu Isid. Sem.	Militia	Orth.	Married		missing	18.02.1915
Serba Vasili	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	03.02.1915
Serbu Andrei	Soldier	Orth.	Married		prizonier	17.12.1914

Soloviev Tar. Fom.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	05.02.1915
Stepanenco Chirii Alexeev	private first class	Orth.	Married		wounded	06.11.1914
Stralțov Marc Terentiev	Soldier	Orth.	Single		missing	30.01.1915
Sturga Ivan TerenL	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	16.02.1915
Sultan Timofei	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	10.02.1915
Șcvarț Pav. Grig.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	08.11.1914
Șeii Savd. NicoL	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	05.12.1914
Șeii Sevastian Ivan.	Soldier	Cathol.	Married		wounded	14.01.1915
Șendre Harlampi Petr.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	31.03.1915
Șevcenco Cuzima Foc	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	10.10.1914
Șolir Vasili	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	17.02.1915
Șprat Gheorghi	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	04.02.1915
Știrba Timofei Ivan.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	29.03.1915
Teșea Vasili Ivanov	Militia	Orth.	Married		wounded	01.02.1915
Topal Nicolai Ivanovid	Militia	Orth.	Married		wounded	17.03.1915
Topilov Iv. Afan.	Soldier	Orth.	Single		killed	27.03.1915
Tretiacov Max. Ef.	non-com-mis-sionedofficer	Orth.	Married		missing	17.12.1914
Țurcan Petr Gavr.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	12.12.1914
Ungurean Gheorghi	Soldier	Orth. Luth.	Married		wounded	09.02.1915

Urs Alexei Fedor.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	16.02.1915
Ursu Ignat Gavr.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		killed	19.03.1915
Usatli Trof. Demian.	Militia	Orth.	Married		missing	27.03.1915
UȚica Stepan	Soldier	Orth.	-		missing	04.10.1914
Vardean Vas. Gheorg.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	27.03.1915
Vasilenco Iv. Carp.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		wounded	10.11.1914
Vdovicenco Iv. Timof.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	21.01.1915
Victorov Grigori	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	18.02.1915
Vidudenco Iv. Andr.	Soldier	Orth.	Married		missing	10.02.1915
Zeiferd Melihim	Soldier	Cathol.	Married		wounded	7-8.03. 1915

[Academy of Sciences of Moldova. History Institute, *Ostași basarabeni în primul război mondial 1914-1918 (Bessarabian soldiers in World War I, 1914-1918)* Documents, coordinator Andrei Emilciuc, Publishing House "Tehnica Info", Chișinău, 2015, vol. I, pp. 205-207]

Chronology

1915

December 21st 1914/ January 3rd 1915. The Russian troops conquer Suceava.

December 24th 1914/January 6th 1915. The Russian troops conquer the city of Câmpulung Moldovenesc.

January. Austria-Hungary concentrates military forces in Transylvania, determining the Romanian General Staff to take preventive measures. In the middle of January, ten infantry regiments, three huntsmen regiments and other units of different weapons were mobilized.

January 13th/26th-15th/29th. Marshal Colmar von der Goltz Pasha, in the service of the Ottoman army, visits Bucharest and has meetings with some Romanian political leaders, including King Ferdinand and Prime Minister Ion I.C. Bratianu. During the talks, von der Goltz fails in his attempt to determine Romania's entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers.

January 22nd/February 4th. Germany declares that it is going to pass to the submarine warfare against the forces of the Entente and proclaims as war zone the rivers limitrophe to the British Isles.

January 24th/February 6th. Romania and Italy sign an agreement with a validity of four months, through which they undertake to inform and help each other in the case of an unprovoked action on the part of the dual monarchy.

January 25th/February 7th-February 7th/20th. The second battle of the Masurian Lakes. Marshal Hindenburg applies the same double-envelopment (pincer) maneuver as in the autumn 1914 confrontations. The two German armies (8th and 10th) defeat the 10th Russian Army, causing heavy losses, including 100,000 prisoners.

February 4th/17th. German Foreign Minister Gottlieb von Jagow promises Romania, in the event of joining the Central Powers, the recovery

of Bessarabia within its borders had in 1812, before being annexed by the Russian Empire.

February 11th/24th-14th/27th. General Paul-Marie-César-Gerald Pau, at the head of a French military delegation, visits Romania. Officially, the mission was charged with handing over French decorations to the Serbian and Russian military. In fact, it had to test the aspirations of the neutral states through which it went, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece being especially aimed. The reception made by the population of Bucharest was impressive (some sources make mention of about 200,000 people who participated during the three days of the delegation's visit), constituting an expression of the pro-Ententist state of mind of the Romanians, of the sympathy France enjoyed.

February 19th/March 4th. Through a memorandum addressed to the ambassadors of France and England from Petrograd, the Russian Empire demands the annexation of Istanbul and of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. The response of the French and English governments is negative.

March 4th/17th. Romania prepares for action the contingents 1909-1915.

February 23rd/March 8th 1915. The Romanian and French governments concluded an agreement, negotiated by the colonel, later general, Vasile Rudeanu, by which the French authorities undertook to deliver to Romania 40 aircraft, 50,000 kg of smokeless powder for artillery, 50 million infantry cartridges, 200,000 artillery projectiles for 75 mm tank gun, plus some strategic raw materials needed in order to manufacture ammunition in the country.

February 26th/March 11th. By the High Decree no. 501 the law of the frontier guards was promulgated. General Teodor Râmniceanu was appointed commander of the Border Guards Corps.

March 1st/14th. The newspaper „Moldova” is published in Bucharest, under the leadership of a committee whose chairman was Petre P. Carp. Virgil Arion was its general manager, and among the signatories we note: Virgil Arion, Dinu Arion, C. Negruzzi, Th. Pogor, Radu Rosetti, Ioan D. Filitti, A. Corteanu, Alexis Nour etc. The publication militates in favour of the liberation of Bessarabia, whose inhabitants were subjected to an extensive process of denationalization, for the alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the only states that could contribute to the materialization of such an objective.

March 5th/18th. Romanian Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu informs Camille Jean Blondel, the French minister in Bucharest, about Romania's

intention to join the Entente, but this is conditioned by the clarification of Italy's intentions, by the conclusion of an agreement with the countries members of the Triple Entente, by the specification of the Austro-Hungarian territories that would be due to Romania, by the conclusion of a military agreement with the countries of the Entente and by the assurance of the military material ordered in France.

March 5th/18th. The 2nd Russian Army conquers the fortified district of Przemyśl, besieged since September 1914, capturing 120,000 Austro-Hungarian military and over 100 cannons.

March 5th/18th. The French-English naval-force, totalling up 58 battle-ships of different types, launches a general attack on the Dardanelles Strait. The attack resulted in a failure, so the Allies concentrated on Lemnos Island, starting on March 26th/April 8th, an expeditionary corps, commanded by General Ian Hamilton.

March 7th/20th. It is granted to the brigade and divisional generals, reaching the statutory retirement age, the right to remain in active service.

March 15th/28th. The Congress of Romanians from abroad, being in the Kingdom, takes place at the Romanian Athenaeum, The Romanians of Transylvania, Bukovina, Banat, Maramureș participated. *Awaken, Romanians!* was struck up, there were speeches of the leaders of the Romanians from the provinces under the domination of the dual monarchy, as well as of some politicians and journalists from the Kingdom. At the end, a motion was voted, demanding concrete actions in order to achieve the national unity.

March 24th/April 6th 1915. In addition to the Ministry of War, an industrial technical commission is set up, being charged with the mobilization of the industry in order to meet the military needs, and with oversight of the execution way of the orders given by the army to the private companies.

April 9th/22nd. The first attack with toxic gases on the western front, at Ypres (Flanders).

April 12th/25th-April 26th/May 9th. The Allied Expeditionary Corps landed at Gallipoli in the Ottoman Empire, but failed to make its way to Istanbul.

April 13th/26th. The secret Treaty of London between Italy, France and the United Kingdom. Italy accepts to enter the war on the side of the Entente in exchange for territorial compensations. The Italian government does not inform the Romanian authorities about its decision.

April 13th/26th. The General Staff mobilized new forces: nine infantry regiments, two mountain huntsmen regiments, 20 cavalry regiments, 11

territorial battalions and six artillery regiments. At the same time, the border guard pickets were reinforced according to the importance of the area.

April 18th/May 1st. The beginning of the great German offensive against the Russian army from Gorlice-Tarnów. The Russian front was broken on April 20th/ May 4th, the Russian army losing about 400,000 soldiers (dead, wounded and prisoners).

April 20th/May 3rd. Italy denounces the treaty of alliance with the Central Powers.

April 24th/May 7th. A German submarine is torpedoing, off the coasts of Ireland, the American liner « Lusitania », which came from New York, causing 1,240 victims. The action worsened the relations between Germany and the United States of America.

April 26th/May 9th-June 12th/25th. The Franco-Anglo-Belgian troops offensive in Artois. The 10th French Army, the 2nd English Army and a Belgian group took part in it. The action ended without achieving particular successes.

May 4th/May 17th. Italy leaves the Triple Alliance.

May 10th/23rd. Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary. The next day, the first Italian troops cross the border.

May 18th/31st. After several months of internal turmoils, the split of the Conservative Party into two groups is made official. One of them was led by Alexandru Marghiloman and was in favour of the Central Powers, and the other, with a pro-ententist orientation, was led by Nicolae Filipescu.

May 19th/June 1st. A large event dedicated to the entry of Italy into war takes place in Bucharest, involving about 20,000 people. It was organized by a number of organizations: „the National Action”; „The Latin Association”, „The Transylvanian Legion”, „The Macedonian-Romanian Culture Society”. From the balcony of the Italian Legation, enthusiastic speeches were delivered by Constantin I. Istrati, Vasile Lucaciu, Al. D. Florescu.

May 21st/June 3rd. The fortified district of Przemyśl is reconquered by the German and Austro-Hungarian troops.

May 23rd/June 5th-May 26th/June 8th. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, a meeting took place during which the territorial concessions to Romania were discussed. Three variants were broached, among which the cession of whole Bukovina, a province in the composition of Austria, and small concessions regarding the status of the Romanians from Transylvania, subjected to a process of forced denationalization by the Budapest authorities.

June 9th/22nd. The Austro-Hungarian and German troops occupy Lemberg (Lviv).

June 10th/23rd-June 24th/July 7th. The first battle of the Isonzo.

June 10th/23rd. Prime Minister Ion I. C. Brătianu rejected the proposals made, through Ottokar Czernin, by Austria-Hungary to enter the war against the Entente, declaring that he could not make a decision against the whole country.

June 22nd/July 5th. The British Prime Minister H. H. Asquith and the Foreign Minister of France, Th. Delcassé, met in Calais (France). At the meeting, an agreement was reached on satisfying Romania's requests for its entry into the war on the side of the Entente.

June 24th/July 7th. The first Chantilly Conference (France), when the powers of the Entente establish the coordination of the military efforts on all the theaters of military actions.

July 5th/18th-July 21st/August 3rd. The second battle of the Isonzo.

July 23rd /August 5th. The German troops enter Warsaw.

July 31st/August 13th-August 9th /22nd. In Bucharest, negotiations are taking place between the Romanian government and the Entente powers, after which it is decided to stop the transit of military materials to the Ottoman Empire through the Romanian territory.

August 7th/20th. Italy declares war on the Ottoman Empire.

August 10th/23rd. The Romanian Aviation Corps was established. It included three groups and a reconnaissance squadron at the disposal of the Great General Staff and four airstations.

August 12th/25th. The German troops occupy Brest-Litovsk.

August 14th/27th. The War Ministry takes measures to cover the border, between Broșteni, in the north of the country, and Vârciorova, in the south. 17 cover groups were constituted, the composition forces being 91 infantry battalions, 24 cavalry squadrons and 56 artillery batteries. The total number will amount to 75,000 soldiers. Covering the frontier with Bulgaria will be realized beginning on February 1916.

August 24th/September 6th. An agreement between Germany and Bulgaria is concluded in the German town of Pleß, Bulgaria agreeing to enter into war against the Entente.

August 27th/September 9th-September 3rd/16th. Demotika conference between Bulgarian and Ottoman authorities takes place. In exchange for the entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, the Ottoman

Empire agrees to cede to Bulgaria a portion of the territory on the left bank of Maritsa River.

September 5th/18th. The German army occupies the city of Vilnius.

September 10th/23rd. The conclusion of the Bulgarian-Ottoman agreement on the entry into war of Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers.

September 12th/25th-October 2nd/15th. The great French-English offensive in Champagne and Artois takes place, involving three French armies (2nd, 4th, 10th) and one English (1st) with a total of 66 infantry divisions, 10 cavalry and over 4,500 heavy and light artillery pieces. Planned at the Chantilly Conference, it did not achieve the expected success. However, the offensive helped the Russian army, the Germans being forced to bring troops from the eastern front.

September 13th/26th. After the split between the conservatives, the group led by Alexandru Marghiloman inaugurated the new club. In his speech on this occasion, the Conservative leader emphasizes that his party will support the neutrality policy implemented by Romania.

September 14th/27th. The Advisory Committee of the Conservative Party (Nicolae Filipescu) assembled, in which, in the context of the measures taken by Bulgaria and Greece, the mobilization of the Romanian army was requested.

September 18th/October 1st. The organization „Unionist Federation” was founded, composed of the „Ententist conservatives” and „the democratic conservatives”. Its aim was to fight for Romania’s entry on the side of the Entente and the union with Transylvania. It included the Conservative Party, led by Nicolae Filipescu, the Conservative Democratic Party, led by Take Ionescu, and the group of Transylvanian Romanians from the Kingdom.

September 22nd/October 5th. The troops of the Entente land in Thessaloniki in order to help Serbia and counteract Bulgaria’s entry into the war. The expeditionary corps was commanded by General Maurice Sarrail and was initially composed of the 156th French Division and the 10th English one. Subsequently, two other French divisions (57th, 122nd) and five English divisions (22nd, 26th, 27th, 28th) joined the initial ones.

September 23rd/October 6th. The offensive of the Austro-Hungarian and German forces on Serbia begins.

September 28th/October 11th. Bulgaria is launching hostilities against Serbia without a declaration of war.

October 1st/14th. Bulgaria declares war on Serbia.

October 1st/14th. Romania gets a loan from the UK amounting to 7 million pounds (176,540,000 lei).

October 3rd/16th-October 21st/November 4th. The Italian troops attack the Austrian army (the third battle of the Isonzo). The Italians aim to conquer Gorizia.

October 10th/23rd. The „Unionist Federation” organized in Bucharest a great event for the entry into the war on the side of the Entente. According to some estimations, 15,000 people took part in it. There were violent conflicts between demonstrators and police, being registered one dead person and more injured.

October 27th/November 10th-November 19th/December 2nd. The Italian troops launch a new offensive against the Austrians (the fourth battle of the Isonzo). The two offensives (the third and the fourth) aimed to reduce the pressure of the Central Powers on Serbia and on the Thessaloniki bridgehead.

October. The Ministry of War and the Great General Staff decide to proceed to the drawing up of a new mobilization plan. The document for the year 1916/1917 provided that the contingents from 1910 to 1919 be included in the active part of the army, the contingents from 1898 to 1909 be included in the reserve, and those from 1887 to 1898 in the militia. The mobilization plan should be finalized in February 1916.

November 3rd/16th. The operations bureau of the Great General Staff of the Army presented to the Prime Minister a note on the military situation of the belligerents at the end of October 1915. The document stipulated, in the case of Romania's entry into the war, the support of half a million Russian soldiers who should act on the right flank of the Romanian army, the necessity to reinforce the expeditionary corps from Thessaloniki, the presence of a contingent of 200,000 Russian soldiers in Dobrudja.

November 11th/24th-November 16th/29th. The Battle of Kosovo. The Serbian army is defeated by the Central Powers and a very difficult retreat through Montenegro and Albania begins. With the help of the British fleet, the Serbian troops (about 150,000 soldiers) are deployed on the island of Corfu, where, on 2nd/15th January 1916, the reorganization begins.

November 15th/28th. The session of the Parliament was opened, being an occasion for heated debates on the country's external conduct, the policy of the Bratianu government, the measures for the preparation and equipping of the army etc.

November 23rd-25th /December 6th-8th. The second Chantilly Conference, which establishes that, in 1916, the offensive must begin simultaneously on the western, Italian and eastern theaters of operations.

December 6th/19th. The Franco-British troops begin the retreat from the Gallipoli area. The action will end on December 27th, 1915/January 9th 1916.

December 9th/22nd. The first sale and purchase agreement is concluded between the central commission for cereals purchases and sales in Romania and a German-Austro-Hungarian consortium. The object of the agreement was the purchase from our country of an amount of 500,000 tons of cereals by Germany and Austria-Hungary.

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