E FRUCTU ARBOR COGNOSCITUR

STUDII DE ANGLISTICĂ ȘI AMERICANISTICĂ ale studenților și masteranzilor din Facultatea de Limbi și Literaturi Străine (2010-2017)

Editor: ROXANA UTALE

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Bd. Mihail Kogălniceanu, 36-46, sector 5, Bucureşti, 050107, România
Telefon: (004) 021.305.46.74; (004) 0726.390.815
E-mail: editura.unibuc@gmail.com; editura@g.unibuc.ro
http://librarie-unibuc.ro
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C U P R I N S

YEATS AND THE CULT OF ART

Alexandra Ileana BACALU

It seems that I must bid the Muse go pack,
Choose Plato and Plotinus for a friend
Until imagination, ear and eye,
Can be content with argument and deal
In abstract things. (Yeats, 129)

I. Introduction

The following paper aims to explore and account for the notion of Art expressed in William Butler Yeats' poems *Sailing to Byzantium*, *Lapis Lazuli*, *The Wilde Swans at Coole*, *Coole Park and Ballylee and The Circus Animals' Desertion*.

Yeats' notion of art has been shaped by the aesthetic doctrine of the Romantic period and the Aestheticism of the 19th century. Yeats himself claimed to be one of the last Romantics and the figure who has laid the most influence on him was Percy Bysshe Shelley. Shelley believed that the mind is endowed with the faculty of Imagination which is able to reveal the «Intellectual Beauty» hiding behind the vesture of Nature. Therefore, Art, which is the expression of the Imagination, serves to the elevation of the mind towards the intelligible world. Consequently, Art is revered for enhancing Nature's qualities, alongside which its aim is to transport man towards the world of pure Ideas. The Romantic Period was followed by an age of Realism which aimed to mirror «the real and the social», thus steering Art away from its idealistic purposes. This leads one to the second of Yeats' influences - the Aesthetic movement of the latter half of the 19th century which aimed to restore Art to its proper place. The Aesthetes claimed that Art is autonomous and argued for the cultivation of its intrinsic qualities in order to bring out «pure beauty» or «pure form». Therefore, Art becomes anchored in the world of pure Intellect and thus the role of Nature as mediator between man and the world of Forms is eliminated. Contrary to the Romantics, the Aesthetes were aware of the shortcomings of Nature and therefore, held that Art and Nature were in opposition to one another and that the former was superior to the latter.

These are the main features of the two aesthetic doctrines which have bearing on Yeats' theory of art and which I have chosen to illustrate through P. B. Shelley's essay *A Defense of Poetry* and Oscar Wilde's *The Decay of Lying*.

However, these aesthetic theories go back to the classical period, to the confrontation between Platonism and Neo-Platonism. Plato's philosophy provides the world-picture which works as a framework for Yeats' aesthetic theory. Plato distinguishes between the intelligible world of pure Intellect and the perceptible world of Substances which is an imperfect copy of the former. Plato believes that Art is an imitation of the world of perceptibles and therefore, it is twice removed from the world of Ideas. Plotinus' answer is that Art is not an imitation of the perceptible world, but an imitation of the intelligible world and therefore, its aim is to realize the intelligible into the perceptible. Therefore, Art is absolved from Plato's condemnation and is believed to be a more direct emanation of Intellect. Hence, I have chosen to begin by touching upon these two classical theories of Art in order to better understand Yeats' Romantic and Aesthetic beliefs according to which Art saves us from the predicament of the imperfection and transience of Life.

II. The Platonic World-View and the Condemnation of Art

In this chapter, we will discuss Plato's notion of art and begin by touching briefly upon his metaphysics and cosmology which are tightly linked to his aesthetics.

Plato's Theory of Forms distinguishes between the intelligible world of Ideas and the perceptible world of Substance, the latter being the physical realization of the former. The perceptible world is mainly understood as Nature, though its definition is not limited to the ensemble of elements that constitutes the natural world, but includes human activity as equally as physical objects - in short, what we would call «reality»[1]. However, to Plato, the perceptible world is only a «copy» or «imitation» of the intelligible one and therefore, it is «imperfect» and «illusory», even «deceptive». These features derive from the fact that Plato, who employs a predominantly transcendental view of the Forms, sees objects as «approximations» to Ideas:

> In spite of all that has been said to the contrary, the Platonic form is not a 'logical universal', and the things, in the natural world or the world of human conduct, to which it stands in a one-many relation are not instances, or what we sometimes call 'particulars', of it. The shape of the plate is an instance not of roundness but of approximation to roundness. Thus the form that is immanent in perceptibles (...) is not pure form, as pure form is understood by mathematical or ethical thought, it is only an approximation to that pure form. (Collingwood 71)

Another proof of the «unreality» or «imperfection» of Nature is the fact that it is subject to continuous change, whereas the world of Ideas is constant and eternal. Here, Plato is influenced by the Heraclitean idea of 'the universal flux' according to which «you cannot step into the same river twice.»

> Over and over again Plato has given us vivid descriptions of the perceptible as a heaving, tossing, restless welter in which a thing no sooner assumes a definite shape than it loses it again. (Collingwood 66)

This is due to the fact that, according to Plato's cosmology, Nature is the articulation of Ideas into Time and Space (with the mention that Space is, in fact, an implication of Matter) and therefore, Nature is a 'process of becoming', rather than an achieved, final state.

> In the perceptible world the total nature of a thing is never realized all at once. An animal, for example, is something to which sleeping and waking are equally natural, but an animal cannot be asleep and awake at once, it can only realize these two parts of its nature at different times, by shifting over from one to the other. In the intelligible world everything realizes its entire nature simultaneously. (Collingwood 74)

Moreover, the irregularity of Nature by comparison to the intelligible world is further stressed when Plato accepts the fact that «approximation» to the Forms can produce matter which has no correspondent in the intelligible world.

Thus, we can say that the Platonic concept of mimesis automatically implies «imperfection» or «illusion» because whatever is «copied» is translated into a different order of existence than the original. In this consists the 'unreality' of imitations and it is the same case with Art.

To Plato, Art is conceived as the imitative representation of Nature. Therefore, just as Nature corrupts the «reality» of the Forms, so does Art corrupt the already questionable «reality» of Nature. Consequently, Art is placed farther away from the intelligible world, in the hierarchy of ontological orders. Even more so, if the object of art deliberately deforms «reality». To Plato, Art comes close to fulfilling its true function only if it is guided by Reason (for only through the Intellect can the intelligible world be accessed), which it does by being objective, so it should only

[1] I use the term 'reality' in the modern sense of the word in order to compare the Greek view of 'nature' with our view of 'reality'. However, the greeks and Plato would say that the perceptible world is less 'real' than the intelligible one.

serve moral purposes. Otherwise, if it is emotional, subjective and seeks pleasure, Art becomes immoral and illusory, banishing us farther away from the Forms. Consequently, if Art only serves to access the Forms through its more or less accurate mirror-like quality and not because of a property inherent to it, in Plato's view, Art does not enjoy autonomy.

However, as stated earlier, even if Plato condemns autonomy in Art, he does recognize the fact that it represents a third order of existence, distinct from reality and from that which transcends it. Even if an object of art is identical to its correspondent in the living world, there is no true identity between them, as the former is anchored into a different type of reality which runs by other laws. To Plato, this accounts for the delusive quality of Art. Nevertheless, Plato's position remains against Art's autonomy and he will find more Beauty in the Universe, rather than in Art.

III. Plotinus and Transcendental Immanentism

Although Plotinus' philosophy derives from Platonism, he does not condemn Art as Plato does. Plotinus believes that the principle of all creation, which he calls «the One», is emanative and therefore, pours itself into all that it creates. Therefore, while still maintaining the view that Form transcends Substance, he also believes that Form is immanent in Substance. This does not mean that matter is an intellectual substance in itself, but that the intelligible participates in the sensible and by apprehending it, we can be transported to the world «Yonder». Plotinus says that we are able to do so because we too are endowed with Form and the Form within us resonates with whatever else in the world is endowed with Intellect:

> And the soul includes a faculty peculiarly addressed to Beauty - one incomparably sure in the appreciation of its own, never in doubt whenever any lovely thing present itself for judgment. Or perhaps the soul acts immediately, affirming the Beautiful where it finds something accordant with the Ideal-Form within itself, using the Idea as a canon of accuracy in its decision. (Plotinus, 19)

However, despite the emanative nature of the creator which reverberates throughout the universe, the principles which are opposite to it are not eliminated from this world-view. Plotinus believes that matter contains the principle of fragmentation and differentiation and therefore, it contrasts «the One» which is characterised by unity. By analogy, matter becomes the source of evil, ugliness and imperfection. Therefore, if imperfection is to be found anywhere, it will be found in the perceptible world. However, the imperfection present in Nature can be «fixed» if Form is imposed upon it, granting it homogeneity, coherence and unity:

> But where the Ideal-Form has entered, it has grouped and coordinated what from a diversity of parts was to become a unity: it has rallied confusion into co-operation: it has made the sum one harmonious coherence: for the Idea is a unity and what it moulds must come to unity as far as multiplicity may. And on what has thus been compacted into unity, Beauty enthrones itself to the parts as to the sum. (Plotinus, 19)

Plotinus believes that Art has the power to endow whatever it touches with Form, because its creator models matter by virtue of the Idea present in his mind. The Idea thus imprinted upon matter can be recognised by the «Ideal-Form» residing in the human mind through «contemplation».

> Suppose two blocks of stone lying side by side: one is unpatterned, quite untouched by art; the other has been minutely wrought by the craftsman's hands into some statue of god or man, a Grace or a Muse, or if a human being, not a portrait but a creation in which the sculptor's art has concentrated all loveliness. Now it must be seen that the stone thus brought under the artist's hand to the beauty of form is beautiful not as stone - for so crude a block would be as pleasant - but in virtue of the form or idea introduced by art. This form is not in the material; it is in the designer before ever it enters the stone. (Plotinus, 20)

However, Plotinus maintains that matter is «recalcitrant» and therefore it cannot be fully disciplined by the «Ideal-Form». He believes that the creative forces residing in Art can equal those found in Nature only if the artist gains full control over matter.

This leads us to the question: did Plotinus place Art above Nature in the hierarchy of ontological orders? The answer is ambiguous. First of all, he does believe that Art is superior, but in its abstract form, rather than in its concrete realization, for the resulting product does not fully come to resemble the Idea: «Beauty, therefore, exists in a far higher state in art; for it does not come over integrally into the work.» (Plotinus, 20) Secondly, when stating that the Arts «are holders of beauty and add where nature is lacking» (Plotinus, 21), he means that Art can indeed bestow Form and therefore Beauty upon Nature, but only where that particular fragment of Nature is lacking in «Ideal-Form». Otherwise, Plotinus seems to suggest that where Form is present in Nature, those fragments of the perceptible are equally or even more beautiful than the products of Art.

Furthermore, Plotinus rejects Plato's view that Art is the imitative representation of Nature: «We must recognise that they give no bare reproduction of the thing seen but go back to the Idea from which Nature itself derives, and, furthermore, that much of their work is all their own.» (Plotinus, 21) Plotinus thus provides an answer to Plato's concern that Art represents an inferior order of existence because in trying to imitate reality, it only creates illusion. Plotinus' answer is that Art is not relative to the object it seems to represent, but relative to the Idea it serves. Therefore, Art is anchored into a different type of reality than Nature, which brings us closer to the intelligible world. In seeming to portray reality, Art portrays the «Ideal-Form» from which that same reality sprung, but in a more accurate way. The Art-abstraction which lives in the mind of the artist and is summoned from the intelligible world is far more beautiful and homogeneous than its realization in Nature. Unfortunately, in practice, not even the artist can subdue matter in order for it to fit his «Ideal-Form». Nevertheless, the variant of reality present in the artist's mind which «reveals itself to contemplation» (Plotinus, 20) and descends from the world «Yonder» seeks to bestow beauty and unity where Form is imperfectly realized in the perceptible world. This is due to the artist's nobler genius which has access to the «Yonder» and for this reason, Plotinus has been proclaimed «the earliest systematic philosopher of the creative imagination.» (Wimsatt, 118)

To conclude, Plotinus grants art autonomy, because he believes that we should not judge it as relative to what it appears to imitate, but as relative to the Idea which it tries to bring into the perceptible world in order to perfect it and, as Plotinus says, «much of its work is all its own.» (Plotinus, 21) Moreover, Plotinus grants the artist creative autonomy, because he creates Art in view of the «Ideal- Form» which dwells in his mind. Thus, Art is a process which transfigures reality, seeking to bring the intelligible into the perceptible, an attempt to realize a particular Form once again into the physical world, this time through a different, more effective medium.

IV. Romantic Neo-Platonism

The Romantic notion of Art is characterized by a strong Neo-Platonic vein which we find articulated in Shelley's *A Defense of Poetry*, where he employs a mimetic theory of art with an expressive, psychological colouring[2]:

> Man is an instrument over which a series of external and internal impressions are driven, like the alternations of an ever-changing wind over an Æolian lyre, which move it by their motion to ever- changing melody. But

[2] Abrams, M.H. *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1953. Print.

> there is a principle within the human being, and perhaps within all sentient beings, which acts otherwise than in the lyre, and produces not melody alone, but harmony, by an internal adjustment of the sounds or motions thus excited to the impressions which excite them. (Shelley)

Shelley believes that poetry reveals the Forms hiding behind the various external and internal stimuli which man perceives. He states that poetry «lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world» (Shelley), that it «lays bare the naked and sleeping beauty, which is the spirit of its forms» (Shelley). Therefore, Shelley's theory comes closer to the Neo-Platonic brand of Platonism, for he believes in Art's capacity to access the intelligible world and transport us to the «Yonder», instead of obscuring the intelligible even further. Like Plotinus, he believes that man is endowed with a «faculty of approximation to the beautiful» (Shelley) which resonates with the intelligible substances residing elsewhere in the world. However, Shelley goes even further and identifies this faculty with the Imagination. Moreover, according to Shelley's psychologically tinted theory, the mind's own contribution of «human passions, and other mental materials» (Abrams, 129) is also contained by the Imagination, which he defines as:

> [...] mind acting upon those thoughts so as to color them with its own light, and composing from them, as from elements, other thoughts, each containing within itself the principle of its own integrity. (Shelley)

Therefore, Imagination is the creative force which transmutes everything it touches into a different order of existence. Shelley states that the products that result from the imaginative apprehension of their objects are not relative to what they derive from, but relative only to themselves. Therefore, Shelley's theory tends towards the belief that Art is autonomous.

> And whether it spreads its own figured curtain, or withdraws life's dark veil from before the scene of things, it equally creates for us a being within our being. (Shelley)

Like Plotinus, Shelley still believes that the ultimate purpose of Art is to lead us towards the «Yonder», which is possible due to the artist's intuition of the Forms. «A poet participates in the eternal, the infinite, and the one. » (Shelley) However, by adding a psychological colouring to his theory, Shelley grants a higher level of autonomy to the artist's creative act, for the latter provides his own input and the process of perceiving and ordering reality takes place within. Art is the expression of the «being within our being» derived from «the combined effect of those objects, and of [the poet's] apprehension of them» painted in the light of its intelligible characteristics. (Shelley) Therefore, the Imagination is shown to be a much more autonomous force than Plotinus' faculty of intuition to «Ideal-Form». However, Art is not granted full autonomy as it still points towards something outside of itself. Nevertheless, the fact that this is the world of perfectly realized substances, does legitimate its autonomy even in this respect. «A poem is the very image of life expressed in its eternal truth. » (Shelley)

Moreover, Shelley reiterates the Neo-Platonic idea according to which Art grants unity and harmony to the heterogeneity of the perceptible world, which is once again portrayed as the source of accident and differentiation which undergoes continuous change. Whatever is captured through Art is saved from alteration and transience and becomes fixed and permanent and can be summoned to the mind of the poet at their will.

> Poetry thus makes immortal all that is best and most beautiful in the world; it arrests the vanishing apparitions which haunt the interlunations of life, and veiling them, or in language or in form [...] Poetry redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in man. (Shelley)

Art elevates the Beauty of Nature, grants harmony where it is lacking and reconciliates contraries, making all graspable to contemplation.

> Poetry turns all things to loveliness; it exalts the beauty of that which is most beautiful, and it adds beauty to that which is most deformed; it marries exultation and horror, grief and pleasure, eternity and change; it subdues to union under its light yoke all irreconcilable things. It transmutes all that it touches, and every form moving within the radiance of its presence is changed by wondrous sympathy to an incarnation of the spirit which it breathes: its secret alchemy turns to potable gold the poisonous waters which flow from death through life. (Shelley)
> All things exist as they are perceived: at least in relation to the percipient. "The mind is its own place, and of itself can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven." But poetry defeats the curse which binds us to be subjected to the accident of surrounding impressions. (Shelley)

Nevertheless, the Romantics did not believe that Nature is inferior to Art, but only that Art enhances Nature's qualities, as they both equally serve towards reconduction.

Furthermore, Shelley gives a definition of poetry in the universal sense of the term, which approximates Plotinus' description of Art as the abstraction living in the mind of the creator. Shelley defines poetry as a way of relating to the world and poets as «those in whom [the faculty of approximation to the beautiful] exists in excess» (Shelley). Therefore, we may notice the Romantic tendency to experience reality through the medium of Art. In the restricted sense, poetry is the expression of the Imagination into language. Shelley believes that language is more susceptible than any other artistic medium to the various nuances of thought and feeling found in the mind of the creator. Therefore, unlike Plotinus, Shelley believes in the possibility of effectively realizing abstraction into matter for «to be a poet is to apprehend the true and the beautiful, in a word, the good which exists in the relation, subsisting, first between existence and perception, and secondly between perception and expression. » (Shelley)

In conclusion, Shelley merges a Neo-Platonic mimetic theory of art with a psychological one. Shelley argues that the ability to apprehend the Forms, as well as the artist's own input belong to the Imagination. Therefore, while Art still points towards the intelligible world, it is granted much more autonomy and is said to enhance Nature's qualities.

V. Aesthetic Autonomy

However, it appears that the Yeatsian vision is more cognate with that of Aestheticism. The Aesthetic movement seeks to anchor Art in the realm of pure Intellect, eliminating intermediate Nature in favour of «pure beauty» or «pure form», which is Art's mission to reveal. Art departs from the imitative representation of Nature and tends towards abstraction. This is believed to achieve a detached elevation of the soul, contrary to the anchoring of Art into passion which is proper to the Romantics. Yeats' modernism derives precisely from the remotest point reached by the Aesthetetes' doctrine of art, as expressed in The Decay of Lying: Wilde absolves Art of any imitative or referential quality and declares that Art points only towards itself. After this categorical – and in fact proto-modernist statement, Wilde nevertheless accepts the fact that Nature «may sometimes be used as part of Art's rough material. » It is from here that Yeats takes over in his own poetic practice, which is informed by the cult of art. The focus is shifted from Art's transcendental properties to Art's immanent qualities. As a consequence, while the Romantics equally praised Nature and saw Art as an enhancement of Nature's qualities, the Aesthetes dismiss Nature and replace it with Art: «People tell us that Art makes us love Nature more than we loved her before; that it reveals her secrets to us; [...] My own experience is that the more we study Art, the less we care for Nature. » (Wilde)

Wilde draws from the Aristotelian idea of the autonomy of Art and of artistic truth according to which Art is not subject to natural, cognitive or moral laws. While in Reality, something can be either true or untrue, the same does not apply to Art. This is what Wilde means when he speaks of «the ancient art of lying», «lying for its own sake» or «lying in Art». «Lying and poetry are arts—arts, as Plato saw, not unconnected with each other. » (Wilde) However, while Plato attributed Art's delusive quality to his belief that it is an inaccurate imitation of the perceptible world, Wilde attributes it to the exact opposite belief that it is non-mimetic. In addition to this, Art is conceived as a disinterested experience whose sole purpose is itself and therefore, it must be met by detachment.

> The only beautiful things, as somebody once said, are the things that do not concern us. As long as a thing is useful or necessary to us, or affects us in any way, either for pain or for pleasure, or appeals strongly to our sympathies, or is a vital part of the environment in which we live, it is outside the proper sphere of art. (Wilde)

In Wilde's opinion, Art must derive from a purely imaginative, creative act. It has to «create life, not copy it» (Wilde) «She is a veil, rather than a mirror. » (Wilde) Wilde commends the Romantic poets in this respect «with the unfortunate exception of Mr. Wordsworth», because they are «universally recognized as being absolutely unreliable. » (Wilde) However, the Aesthete's Imagination differs from that of the Romantic for, although the former is not a «mirror», neither is it a «lamp». While the Romantic Imagination is more spiritual and seeks reconduction towards the intelligible world, the Aesthete's Imagination is focused on immanence and therefore, tends towards defamiliarization, artificiality and detachment.

> Art begins with abstract decoration, with purely imaginative and pleasurable work dealing with what is unreal and non-existent. This is the first stage. Then Life becomes fascinated with this new wonder, and asks to be admitted into the charmed circle. Art takes life as part of her rough material, recreates it, and refashions it in fresh forms, is absolutely indifferent to fact, invents, imagines, dreams, and keeps between herself and reality the impenetrable barrier of beautiful style, of decorative or ideal treatment. (Wilde)

Wilde claims Art's autonomy with respect to Life and believes that Art and Nature are contraries. He believes that Nature is imperfect and that it lacks uniformity, describing it as follows: «What Art really reveals to us is Nature's lack of design, her curious crudities, her extraordinary monotony, her absolutely unfinished condition. » (Wilde) His argument is that Nature is not able to properly execute what it sets out to do. However, Art possesses this ability and therefore, it can perfectly realize whatever it wishes. «Art is our spirited protest, our gallant attempt to teach Nature her proper place. » (Wilde) Wilde states that «Nature hates Mind» (Wilde) and thus sets in opposition the imperfection of Nature with the conscious, ordering force of Intellect.

> [Art] has flowers that no forests know of, birds that no woodland possesses. She makes and unmakes many worlds, and can draw the moon from heaven with a scarlet thread. Hers are the 'forms more real than living man,' and hers the great archetypes of which things that have existence are but unfinished copies. (Wilde)

Wilde claims that Art is more «alive» than Life itself and therefore, grants it priority over the latter. In a reversed mimetic process, Life turns its mirror towards Art and shapes itself according to it. This is the process that brings about the reversal between Life and Art, in an attempt to defeat Life's imperfection.

In conclusion, in contrast to the Romantic Neo-Platonic theory of Art, Aestheticism grants Art full autonomy by focusing away from its transcendental properties towards its immanent qualities. Art and Nature are set it opposition and the former is considered to be superior to the latter. Art dominates Life and exceeds its limits, transmuting everything into its kind.

VI. Yeats and the Cult of Art

As shown, the notion of art conveyed by W. B. Yeats' poems displays characteristics of Neo- Platonic aesthetics, concentrated in his Romanticism, as well as Aesthetic traits. The first are represented by his cosmological picture, his view on imaginative contemplation, his transcendentalism and his belief in the redeeming quality of Art, nevertheless countered by pessimism regarding the success of such an attempt. The second is most strongly represented by his belief that Nature and Art are contraries and that the latter is an autonomous force which must take the upper hand upon the former. We will illustrate and discuss these traits through the following poems: *Sailing to Byzantium*, *The Wilde Swans at Coole*, *Lapis Lazuli, the Circus Animals' Desertion* and *Coole Park and Ballylee*.

First of all, the poem *Coole Park and Ballylee* features the Romantic notion of harmony between mind and Nature: «For Nature's pulled her tragic buskin on/ And all the rant's a mirror of my mood» (Yeats, 170), as well as the Romantic idea that the world of intelligibles reveals itself to the mind through the contemplation of Nature: «Another emblem there! That stormy white/ But seems a concentration of the sky; / And, like the soul, it sails into the sight/ And in the morning's gone, no man knows why; /And is so lovely that it sets to right/ What knowledge or its lack had set awry. » (Yeats, 170-1) This serves to the Art-making process which elevates the mind and bestows Beauty upon everything it touches:

> We were the last romantics - chose for theme
> Traditional sanctity and loveliness;
> Whatever's written in what poets name
> The book of the people; whatever most can bless
> The mind of man or elevate a rhyme; (Yeats, 171)

Although Nature is revered in these lines, the poet is conscious of the fact that it only transiently reveals fragments of intelligibility which need to be arrested in some way. In *The Wild Swans at Coole*, the poet is searching for a way in which to capture the Beauty of Nature and save it from the merciless flux of change:

> I have looked upon those brilliant creatures,
> And now my heart is sore.
> All's changed since I, hearing at twilight,
> The first time on this shore,
> The bell-beat of their wings above my head,
> Trod with a lighter tread. [...]
> But now they drift on the still water
> Mysterious, beautiful;
> Among what rushes will they build,
> By what lake's edge or pool
> Delight men's eyes, when I awake some day
> To find they have flown away? (Yeats, 85-6)

The image of Nature featured in the first stanza of *Sailing to Byzantium* echoes the Neo-Platonic world of fluidity and fragmentation spawned through material realization. The description features the differentiated elements of the natural world: «The young in one another's arms, birds in the trees/ [...] The salmon-falls, the mackerel-crowded seas, / Fish, flesh, or fowl [...] » (Yeats, 128) all of which are «caught in that sensual music» (Yeats, 128), that is, caught in the transience of their

perceptible properties. Here, the suggestion of song and music is used to convey the notion of continuous change and flow, rather than a summoning of the «Yonder» like in later stanzas: «Those dying generations» (Yeats, 128), «Whatever is begotten, born, and dies.» (Yeats, 128) This is the world «Here» characterized by vitality and passion, set in opposition to the «monuments of unageing intellect» (Yeats, 128) which represent the intelligible world or «Intellectual Beauty» realized in the form of Art. They seek a firm imposition of Intellect upon Matter which would defeat its transience and grant it unity.

In the second stanza of *Sailing to Byzantium*, the poet goes on expressing the desire to realize the intelligible into the perceptible world into a single moment of creative intensity. «An aged man is but a paltry thing,/ A tattered coat upon a stick, unless/ Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing/ For every tatter in its mortal dress.» (Yeats, 128) This can be associated with the romantic notion of the spontaneous creative act. George Watson identifies this idea to have been passed on to Yeats by the Aesthetes of the 1890's saying that it also suited the poet's affinity with Blake's own concept of art: «Especially important to him were Pater's stress on the primacy and intensity of the given particular moment [...] Yeats was the more ready to incorporate into his own poetry Pater's emphasis on the «privileged moment», since he would have linked the idea to Blake's view of the transforming power of the creative moment.» (Yeats, 49) It is the same idea we find expressed in *The Circus Animals'* Desertion: «It was a dream itself enchanted me:/ Character isolated by a deed/ To engross the present and dominate memory. » (Yeats, 224) We also find a description of the instantaneous transfiguring power of Art in the following lines from *Coole Park and Ballylee*: «It can be murdered with a spot of ink. » (Yeats, 171)

The notion of the transfiguring quality of Art also appears in the poem *Lapis Lazuli*, which describes the way in which it works. The poem conveys the idea that Art represents a different order of existence from Reality which runs by its own laws, echoing Aristotle's ideas regarding the autonomy of Art. Even the most dreadful tragedies and passions, once transcribed in the medium of Art, are looked upon with «gaiety» and detachment. We remember Shelley's claim that «Poetry turns all things to loveliness; [...] it subdues to union under its light yoke all irreconcilable things», as well as the Aesthetes' detached contemplation.

> All perform their tragic play,
> There struts Hamlet, there is Lear,
> That's Ophelia, that Cordelia;
> Yet they, should the last scene be there,
> The great stage curtain about to drop,
> If worthy their prominent part in the play,
> Do not break up their lines to weep.
> They know that Hamlet and Lear are gay;
> Gaiety transfiguring all that dread.
> All men have aimed at, found and lost;
> Black out; Heaven blazing into the head:
> Tragedy wrought to its uttermost.
> Though Hamlet rambles and Lear rages,
> And all the drop-scenes drop at once
> Upon a hundred thousand stages,
> It cannot grow by an inch or an ounce. (Yeats, 195)

However, we cannot ignore a sense of oscillation in Yeats' poems, his pessimism, the impossibility to attain this state, the hesitation between Life and Art. Wherever «the holy city» is

spoken of in *Sailing to Byzantium*, the moods of «irrealis» are used. The poet's plea is made to the spirits of the world yonder:

> O sages standing in God's holy fire
> As in the gold mosaic of a wall,
> Come from the holy fire, perne in a gyre,
> And be the singing-masters of my soul.
> Consume my heart away; sick with desire
> And fastened to a dying animal
> It knows not what it is; and gather me
> Into the artifice of eternity. (Yeats, 128-9)

The consummation through fire is the artifact-making process that breaks down everything into homogeneous substance in an attempt to defeat the recalcitrance of matter and to forge substance into object, thus imposing Ideal-Form upon Matter: «and gather me/ Into the artifice of eternity.» (Yeats, 129) The poet hesitates between the passion and vitality of the world here, evoking the classical world-picture of the perceptible world imagined as an animal, and the abstract world of intelligible substances. This oscillation can either be attributed to the recalcitrance of matter or to the impossibility of a perfect reconciliation between the two.

Entering the world of intelligibles is a committed act which fuses everything into permanence, which saves everything from the prediction of alteration: «Once out of nature I shall never take/ My bodily form from any natural thing, / But such a form as Grecian goldsmiths make/ Of hammered gold and gold enameling» (Yeats, 129). The last lines seem to express the way in which reconciliation between the two worlds is envisaged, under the guise of an inconsistency: «Or set upon a golden bough to sing/ To lords and ladies of Byzantium/ Of what is past, or passing, or to come.» (Yeats, 129) In fact, these lines express the desire to transfigure the transient into something graspable, to paint the world «Here» in the colours of the world «Yonder», which is possible only through Art and to elevate the process of Art-making to the dimensions of Life, in order to participate in the transient made permanent.

The following lines from *The Circus Animals' Desertion* prove the failure of such an attempt. In addition to this, they clearly show the Romantic strain of Yeats' concept of Art, concentrated in the belief that Art emanates from the world «Yonder» and that the purpose of Art is pictured as an ascent towards this world. Art «grew in pure mind» that is, arises out of the presence of Intellect in the mind of the creator which orders the impressions excited by the perceptible world which is subject to alteration and decay. Perhaps the merge between the Romantic and Aesthetic view of Art is best noticeable here. Yeats gives priority to Art above Life, but without spiritual ascent, the redeeming force of Art cannot be put to use. Therefore, the poet remains stuck in the continuous flux of Life.

> Those masterful images because complete
> Grew in pure mind, but out of what began?
> A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street,
> Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can,
> Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut
> Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder's gone,
> I must lie down where all the ladders start
> In the foul rag and bone shop of the heart. (Yeats, 224)

Yeats' solution to the predicament of the perceptible world is found in Art. The poet seeks to mould Life into Art with the materials emanating from the «Yonder» in order to achieve the perfect

balance between the two worlds. However, such reconciliation is not possible, for according to Yeats, you can either choose one between the two.

VII. Conclusion

In conclusion, we have explored Yeats' particular notion of art and seen how its Romantic and aesthetic features intertwine on the background of a Neo-Platonic world-view.

Yeats believes that by contemplating Nature under the guidance of the Imagination, the intelligible world is revealed to the mind of the artist due to his endowment with «Ideal-Form», which is in harmonious relation to the intellectual substances existing in the universe. However, the perceptible world of Nature is mutable and therefore, it only transiently reveals the intelligible to the mind. Therefore, man is forced to seek a way in which to immortalize these fragments of intelligibility, which he finds in Art. Art directly emanates from the world of pure Intellect and therefore, it contrasts the mutability and transience of the perceptible world. Consequently, the artist seeks to realize the intelligible into the perceptible, to model Life according to Art, in order to defeat the former's shortcomings. This is the solution given to the predicament of Life's imperfection and transience, conveyed by W. B. Yeats' poems. Nevertheless, we sense a feeling of pessimism regarding the possibility of such an endeavor, for either matter is too recalcitrant or the commitment to either the world «Here» or the world «Yonder» is difficult to make. Ultimately, the lyrical persona admits its failure.

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CAWDREY'S *TABLE ALPHABETICALL* AND THE IMPACT OF THE INKHORN CONTROVERSY

Ioana Mihaela BADEA

1) The beginning of monolingual lexicography

Robert Cawdrey's, *A Table Alphabeticall*, was published in 1604 and it is considered the first monolingual English dictionary ever published. It is not that dictionaries did not exist at the time, but lexicography up till then had been bilingual. *A Table Alphabeticall* is as Cawdrey himself states, *a hard-word dictionary.* The dictionary mainly deals with complicated words that stem from languages as Hebrew, Greek, Latin or French, but also with words of general use in the English society. Cawdrey states in the preface of his work that his dictionary is meant for learners of English with the following message:

> "A Table Alphabeticall, conteyning and teaching the true writing, and understanding of hard usuall English wordes, borrowed from the Hebrew, Greeke, Latine, or French. &c. With the interpretation thereof by plaine English words, gathered for the benefit & helpe of Ladies, Gentlewomen, or any other unskilfull persons. Whereby they may the more easilie and better understand many hard English wordes, which they shall heare or read in Scriptures, Sermons, or elswhere, and also be made able to use the same aptly themselves.. .. At London,... 1604".[1]

It is interesting to see why exactly Cawdrey mentions Hebrew first, in favour of the other classical languages "Greeke, Latine, or French". At the time Cawdrey published his *Table*, Hebrew was still regarded with respect, because of its divine nature and source. The emergence of Christianity and monotheism highly placed Hebrew as a language of purity and godly cleanliness, because it was the language of God, and it was one of the first languages to be testified in writing through the multiple copies of the Bible.

Also another significant fact that we should mention regarding Cawdrey's preface is his targeted audience: "Ladies, Gentlewomen, or any other unskilfull persons". This is because in Cawdrey's time, women did not have de benefit of a proper education. Women did not have access to books, or tutors of any sort, because most of them were thought from very young age only how to be good housewives. Women of the working class were kept very busy at the time, by working almost continuously so they did not have time for any personal intellectual development, the only knowledge these women had access to being limited concepts about medicine. Middle class and upper middle class women, on the other hand, had a "plaine" vocabulary, and sufficient familiarity with education, so that Cawdrey's purpose would be grasped with this type public. "Gentlemen" did not require so much tuition in the English language, as women did, because men were constantly exposed to the exterior, and a majority of educated men were already proficient both in Latin and Greek.

Cawdrey's early attempt at English lexicography gives its readers more than 2. 500 words with meanings and explanations. It is important to add that his definitions were not complicated: he did not add glossaries, author names, and other information about the origin of the words he put in

* Licenta, Filologie, Engleza- Germana, Anul III.

[1] DeWitt T. Starnes, Gertrude E. Noyes, and Gabriele Stein. *The English Dictionary from Cawdrey to Johnson: 1604-1755*, John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1991, p. 13.

his dictionary. The simple manner in which the dictionary was written was intended to guide the learners of English to the correct spelling of *hard words,* and also to help readers attain a better understanding of the books and sermons that were popular in the period in which the dictionary was published.

It is significant to underline that, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when an impressive of number of words from the Classical languages had penetrated the English vocabulary; the need for a monolingual dictionary arose more stringently. The bilingual dictionaries already existing since the Renaissance served as natural points of reference and models for this first bilingual dictionary: "Whilst there was an established tradition of bilingual dictionaries in the sixteenth century, especially Latin–English and English–Latin, the need for a monolingual English dictionary arose towards the end of this century" [2].

The fact that Cawdrey introduces no more than 2.500 words with meanings and explanations may seem strange to a modern reader, who expects that a dictionary should contain a more complete list, containing both hard words and common vocabulary. However, the earliest dictionary of the English language begins as hard-word book and not as an attempt of offering readers an exhaustive list of words. It is only at the beginning of the eighteenth century that the concept of "universal dictionaries" becomes possible and dictionaries meant to contain the totality of the words in the English language are compiled[3].

The macro-structure of the dictionary is extremely different from the dictionaries that we are used to today. It is important to underline that, during the Renaissance, while many of the bilingual dictionaries that were compiled were alphabetical; there also existed a good number of topical dictionaries. Topical dictionaries were largely organized with respect to their semantics; dictionaries as John Withals (1553) English-Latin compilation, or the later 17th century *Thesaurus* (1852) by Roget, which is a topical dictionary based on onomasiological order, that is, on an order that starts from meaning in order to get to the expression, not from expression to get to the meaning. The fact that Cawdrey chooses alphabetical organization was to set, in the centuries to come, the structure of the monolingual dictionary as that of an alphabetically-ordered word list. Cawdrey decides to use an A to Z ordering, and lemmatizes all terms with a specific structure, but his organization is not what you would expect of a contemporary dictionary; it only gives a very good head-start for the future lexicographical studies. Cawdrey does not use a different font in order to differentiate between the headword and its explanation or definition, and without a reading guide, the dictionary might come difficult to understand; also, it is hard to distinguish between terms that are headwords and the ones that are lemmatized under it. An interesting phenomenon can be determined in *A Table Alphabeticall,* where, at the beginning of a new letter in the dictionary, there can be noticed a fairly recurrent, but not constant notation: "Under certain letters, the first two letters of the first word are capitalized, e.g. ABandon, BAile, MAcerate, and RAcha. This only occurs at the start of each letter and there does not appear to be any specific reason to this pattern".[4]

There are not many elements that should give the reader more information about one defined word in Cawdrey's *Table.* Still he adds to the words of Greek provenience the symbol **(g)**, "the use of the symbol § to mark recent and unassimilated borrowings from the French"[5] and also the use of **(k)** that determined "a kind of-", so the words that were part of a kind, were marked by this element

[2] Joan C. Beal. *English in Modern times*, Arnold, London, 2004, p. 35.
[3] Ruxandra Vișan, *English Language History 1476 -1755, Attitudes to English*. Bucharest: EUB. 2014, p. 119.
[4] K Melieste, *Codifying the Language*, N.p., 15 Apr. 2012. Web, p. 6.
[5] Anthony Paul Cowie, *The Oxford History of English Lexicography,* Clarendon, Oxford, 2009, p. 135.

– "while opting not label Latin words – possibly because they had become accepted or naturalized."[6] These elements can be exemplified as it follows:

> **§** *Legacie*, a gift by will, or an ambassage.
> *Barnacle*, **(k)** bird.
> *Hipocrite*, **(g)** such a one as in his outward apparrell, countenance and behaviour, pretendeth to be another man, then he is indeede, or a deceiver.[7]

There are many words in Cawdrey's dictionary whose meanings were simply ignored or avoided. For example the word *sex* had only been defined as a kind: "Cawdrey neither properly defines this headword nor lists other senses for it. He bluntly defines it as kind – assumedly referring to a particular kind of gender."[8] At that time, *sex* was more of a taboo term, and maybe that is the reason why Cawdrey decided to avoid its verbal meaning, as Melieste mentions in *Codifying the Language* (2012). Nevertheless, Cawdrey shows no shame in giving one of the most ample definitions in the dictionary to the word *incest*, which he defines as "unlawfull copulation of man and woman within the degrees of kindred, or alliance, forbidden by gods law, whether it be in marriage or otherwise." The same word gains different interpretations in various dictionaries both before and after the publication of Cawdrey's *Table*. For example in Thomas' *Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicanae (1588),* the word is defined as "leacherie committed with one that is nigh of kinne or aliance to him that committeth it: incest: also all manner of pollution.". In a later publication, like Bullokar's *An English Expositor (1616),* the word *incest* is defined as "carnall knowledge betweene neere kindred."

In present-day dictionaries such as *Longman* (2014, 6th edition), the word is defined as follows: "sex between people who are closely related in a family", so it is almost certain that Cawdrey's interpretation of the word had a subjective implication, as opposed to the explanation offered by Bullokar that appears to be more impartial in his provided definition. Definitely, the Biblical overtones that Cawdrey's definition for this term had in the seventeenth century, and the more "impartial", "neutral" definition that this term acquired throughout the ages show the extent to which lexicography has changed. Definition is nowadays seen as a means of providing a neutral, unbiased explanation of the term, without providing moral judgment or subjective overtones to it, as the present-day Longman dictionary shows. However, the first dictionaries did not attempt to offer "neutrality" or "correctness" in their definitions, but to provide not only definitions, but moral guides to their readers. "Neutrality" or "correctness" were definitely not points of reference in Cawdrey's times.

2) The Inkhorn Controversy

As explained in Joan C. Beal's *English in Modern Times*, "the late 16th and early 17th centuries are characterized as a period of exuberant lexical innovation, hardly tempered by the criticism of Latin <<inkhorn>> terms"[9]. The label *inkhorn* comes from the word which meant *inkpot* at the time – which underlines the fact that these terms were not colloquial terms, but written, literary words, which came from the Classical languages from which English had had to borrow.

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[6] K Melieste, *op. cit.,* p.6
[7] Robert, Cawdrey, Robert Cawdrey's *A Table Alphabeticall*, London, 1604.
[8] K Melieste, op. cit., p. 9
[9] Joan C. Beal, *op. cit.*, p. 16-17.

Speaking about the Renaissance Age and about Early Modern English, David Crystal shows in his well-known *Stories of English* that, although it is difficult to precisely quantify the amount of new vocabulary which penetrated English, this was an age where the vocabulary was marked by rapid growth:

> It is difficult to be definite about the rate at which neologisms came into Early Modern English. Tradition linguistic indices, such as the Oxford English Dictionary, have weaknesses because, although there are many more texts available to study, some periods have been covered more thoroughly than others, and the literary biases of the work privilege the later part of the period, when authors such as Spenser, Shakespeare, and Jonson began to write. There is no doubt, that this was an age of particularly rapid vocabulary growth, and that Latin was the dominant source: about two thirds of all borrowing at the time was from that language – a momentum which continued until late in the seventeenth century, when still a third of all borrowing was from Latin."[10]

Inkhorn terms came as a linguistic innovation of the Renaissance era. These terms were the already known "hard words" of the English vocabulary, with a concise Latin (and sometimes Greek) root. In the period there was a flood of these new words, which ended up creating the 'new' English of the time, which had been until then a vast combination of "dialects". A dispute which was labeled by language historians "the inkhorn controversy" raged, as Charles Barber shows, "most strongly in the second half of the sixteenth century and the early years of the seventeenth".[11] This controversy, which took place between those scholars who were in favor of using hard words and those who rejected them also took place because of the "excessive Latinity of their age[12].

The perceived need for an "advancement" of the language can be seen as due to a newly discovered "self-consciousness about the language":[13] "This innovation was to some extent necessary, as English was taking over 'higher' functions which had previously been the domain of Latin (science, religion, medicine, philosophy), and needed a swift and large injection of vocabulary in order to cope."[14]

It is true that the English language had gone through dramatic changes throughout its history, like the Norman Conquest, but this French influence on the vocabulary was more gradual, and, from this point of view, not comparable to the sudden influx of terms from Classical languages that had taken place during the Renaissance. It was from the Classical languages that English borrowed terms in order to supply "gaps" that were perceived to exist in the language. Scholars took, at first, an "active" interest in English, attempting to make it more "copious", by borrowing terms from the Classical languages. Through this 'active' view upon language, English scholars succeeded in supplementing most of the "gaps" that English had:

> In the process of 'enriching' English, especially via Latin, inkhorn language advanced a 'foreign' English which was, above all, associated with an educated elite. While Latin writing was experiencing a cultural decline in the period in favour of the vernacular, the new English served to perpetuate the old class distinctions which were based, in part, on a privileged knowledge of classical languages.[15]

While there were many scholars who enthusiastically heralded the influx of terms from Latin and Greek, there were others, who were completely against the use of inkhorn terms.

[10] David Crystal, *The Stories of English*., The Overlook Press, Woodstock and New York, 2004, p. 289.
[11] Charles Barber, *Early Modern English*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1976, p. 56.
[12] Anthony Paul Cowie, *op. cit.,* p. 139.
[13] Albert C. Baugh and Thomas Cable, *A History of the English Language*, 5th ed., London: Pearson Education, 2002, p. 188
[14] Joan C. Beal, *op. cit*, p. 17.
[15] Lynda Mugglestone, *The Oxford History of English,* Oxford Universit Press, Oxford, 2006, p. 224.

According to Charles Barber, the scholars of the Renaissance can be divided into three categories, concerning their attitudes to inkhorn terms:

- the neologisers, who were in favour of loan words, especially those borrowed from Latin
- the purists, who advocated the use of the existing English words, either by giving them new meanings for technical purposes, or by using them to make new words by compounding and affixation
- the archaisers, who argued that obsolete English words should be revived; dialect words as well as archaisims.[16]

Among the purists, we shall mention Sir John Cheke, a scholar, who would have been considered a man that would encourage the use of terms that came from the old noble languages. However, in a letter written for Sir Thomas Hoby, he makes it clear, that in his view English should remain pure, and unmixed with other languages: "I am of this opinion that our own tung shold be written cleane and pure, unmixt and unmangeled with borowing of other tunges, wherin if we take not heed by tijm, ever borowing and never payeng, she shall be fain to keep her house as bankrupt."[17]

It may be concluded that the *Inkhorn Controversy* was one of the first moments in English history when the use of language was actively discussed. The massive influx of Latin words made some scholars think that English language was becoming "rotten" or "corrupt", because of all the mixing and blending of terms. While this is the time when the first purist attitudes regarding English make themselves known, during the Renaissance, there were also scholars that considered the influx of loanwords necessary, because they thought that English was a truly 'barbaric' language, so that, by including words from noble tongues as Latin, the language would gain a more elegant form. In the end both parties (purists and archaisers on the one hand and neologisers on the other) came to a middle ground, and decided that "the use of unfamiliar words could easily be overdone"[18] , but that there were many borrowed words that should continue to be used. Thus, it is during the Renaissance that scholars become aware of their power concerning lexical decision-making.

Charles Barber shows that these learned words were seen as necessary, but they were not immediately intelligible to those who did not have an access to Classical education:

> Learned loans of this kind, however, had a disadvantage: their meaning was not obvious to a reader who knew no Latin or French; and it was often for the relatively unlearned reader that the translator and populariser was writing.[19]

As Barber underlines, the presence of hard words posed a problem for "the relatively unlearned reader". This is why the influx of hard words – pejoratively labeled inkhorn terms – is to be seen in direct connection with the creation of the first monolingual dictionaries of English. In the following section, we shall present the connection between Robert Cawdrey's dictionary and the inkhorn controversy, focusing on the *Preface*, which Cawdrey borrows from Thomas Wilson's 1560 *Art of Rhetorique*.

[16] Charles Barber, *op. cit.*, 1976, p. 53.
[17] Albert C. Baugh and Thomas Cable, *op. cit.,* p. 202.
[18] Albert C. Baugh and Thomas Cable, *op. cit.,* p. 207.
[19] Charles Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

3) The naturalization of inkhorn terms

The inkhorn terms came to be eventually naturalized. Nevertheless, these strange terms made up the premise for writing the first monolingual dictionaries:

> Cawdrey's dictionary aims to level the 'difference of English' that had arisen in the age of new words. By distributing the wealth of new words to the disadvantaged (entries under the letter A include *aberration*, *adulterate*, *affranchise*, *alienate*, *anarchie*, *anathema*, and *animaduersion*), Cawdrey hoped to advance the use of 'one manner of language' in Renaissance England. [20]

Uniformity was a concern that had begun to preoccupy Renaissance scholars. These were concerned not only with the lexis, but also with orthography, which became an important preoccupation. A stable orthography or 'right writing' as Mulcaster calls it in his works, became a subject of great importance in the sixteenth century. There was still no generally-accepted norm of how words should be written or read. So English had no concrete phonetical and phonological domain of study up until the sixteenth century: "Mulcaster's great virtue is his moderation. He saw the futility of trying to make English spelling phonetic in any scientific sense. He was therefore willing to compromise between the ideal and the practical". [21]

As the title page of Cawdrey's work *A Table Alphabeticall* indicates, his monolingual dictionary is written in order to teach the unskillful persons the new words that were introduced into the language with the major influx of foreign cultural influence:

> A Table Alphabeticall, conteyning and teaching the true writing, and vnderstanding of hard vsuall English wordes, borrowed from the Hebrew, Greeke, Latine, or French. &c. With the interpretation thereof by plaine English words, gathered for the benefit & helpe of Ladies, Gentlewomen, or any other vnskilfull persons. Whereby they may the more easilie and better vnderstand many hard English wordes, which they shall heare or read in Scriptures, Sermons, or elswhere, and also be made able to vse the same aptly themselues. [22]

It seems that Cawdrey understood that certain loanwords might come as complicated for the "unskilfull" English readers and that is why he labelled these terms "hard words". His list of terms was meant to shed light on those words that are not immediately available to those that did not possess the education of the upper classes. N. Osselton, a significant historian of English lexicography, states in his work that the dictionary's purpose was to help less literate readers: [23]

> The emergence of the first English dictionary proper- a separate book solely for English words with English explanations- is however perhaps most usefully to be seen a logical development from yet another alphabetical listing. With the more widespread habit of printing scholarly works in the vernacular (rather than in Latin) a need had arisen to add a short glossary to your book to help less able readers with the new (or newish) words that were now needed. [...] These were the hard-usual words, and the invention of the hard-word dictionary with a unified alphabetical list between one set of covers was to do away with the need for further reduplication of such glossaries of English words appended to the texts in which they were used: better one book on your shelf with explanations of the learned vocabulary of the day than twenty books each with its specialized (but often overlapping) glossary. [24]

Cawdrey takes advantage of such situations and creates his *Table Alphabeticall.* The connection between Cawdrey's work and external texts is made in his title page where he mentions "Sermons and Scriptures".

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[20] Lynda Mugglestone, *op. cit.,* p. 232.
[21] Albert C. Baugh and Thomas Cable, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
[22] Robert, Cawdrey*, op. cit.*.
[23] Anthony Paul Cowie, *op. cit.,* p. 133.
[24] Anthony Paul Cowie, *op. cit.,* p. 132.

The later monolingual dictionaries, that appeared after Cawdrey's *Table Alphabeticall*, partly changed their choice of defined words, but still maintained a focus on hard words, not yet going towards a universal type of dictionary. Only when an all-inclusive dictionary appeared there was also a focus on every day, "ordinary" vocabulary. It is hard to establish when exactly English lexicography became aware of its importance in creating standardized language. However, it is important to see that Cawdrey's dictionary is one of the first steps towards creating a lexicographic text meant to create a standard of English.

Making hard words accessible takes us back to the issue of inkhorn terms, because it is neologisms that Cawdrey concentrates on the most. It was the "strangeness" and "obscurity" of such terms that contributed to the negative perception of inkhorn terms. But once they are explained and defined correctly in a clear and "plain" English language, their strangeness was somewhat attenuated.[25]

While he professes to explain neologisms, Cawdrey suggests to his readers to avoid, as much as possible, the complicated and complex words that he defines in his work, and stick to the simple ones, known even by the not-so educated mass of people. His readers are advised to avoid "any strange ynckhorne termes, but [rather] labour to speake so as is commonly receiued, and so as the most ignorant may well vnderstand them."[26]

Cawdrey also mentions the language that the speakers of English that had contact with different territories might come as strange and hard to comprehend, but he encourages his readers to make the difference and set a clear distinction between what is elegant English and what is rude or Court English. He aims for a mannered and clean use of language and that is the main purpose of his work:

> Also, some far iournied gentlemen, at their returne home, like as they loue to go in forraine apparrell, so they will pouder their talke with ouersea language. He that commeth lately out of France, will talk French English, and neuer blush at the matter. Another chops in with English Italianated, and applyeth the Italian phrase to our English speaking, the which is, as if an Orator, that professeth to vtter his minde in plaine Latine, would needs speake Poetrie, & far fetched colours of strange antiquitie. Doth any wise man think, that wit resteth in strange words, or els standeth it not in wholsome matter, and apt declaring of a mans mind? Do we not speak, because we would haue other to vnderstand vs? or is not the tongue giuen for this end, that one might know what another meaneth?[27]

In the excerpt quoted above, Cawdrey copies almost entirely what Thomas Wilson wrote in his *The Arte of Rhetorique*. His disapproval over the use of inkhorn terms is reflected here, but with the counterpart that a lexicographical work is necessary in order to clarify the "pure" form of the language. Later, Cawdrey states that even those that avoid on purpose using loanwords will ultimately require a dictionary to prove their point of view into simple English words.

Robert Cawdrey's *Table Alphabeticall* therefore stresses the idea that language must be simplified and that at that moment it was unnecessarily complicated because of all the distinctions that could be made: the „learned" versus "rude" or "court" versus "country" language, all these ways of using the English language were all ungrounded varieties for Cawdrey. He sustains the idea of giving up inkhorn terms, but he is not in favour of disregarding them completely, opting only for just using them when needed. Cawdrey thinks that the excessive use of this type of terms was somehow creating barriers in true communication, and that is why hard or inkhorn terms gain a negative connotation in his words addressed to the reader. At this point in time, the two labels for

[25] Ruxandra Vișan, *op. cit.,* p. 143.
[26] Lynda Mugglestone, *op. cit.,* p. 232.
[27] Robert Cawdrey, *op. cit.*

the intricate terms of the language had gotten to have almost the same meaning. As suggested by J.K. Wimsatt, "the inkhorn controversy of the sixteenth century simmered down into the title pages and adresses to the readers of the seventeenth century dictionaries, and English lexicography grew upon <<hard words>> and related curiosities"[28]. The term used by Wimsatt, namely "simmered down", shows that "inkhorn" lost throughout the next century its negative connotation and was gradually replaced by the neutral term of "hard".

Cawdrey's *Adress to the reader* is meant to clarify that inkhorn terms are no longer a threat to the English language, no longer bearing the negativity that Purists and Archaizers endowed them with. The newly-written dictionaries are meant only to define and simplify the complexity raised by the abundant amount of complex words added to the Renaissance English vocabulary. Cawdrey does not write a prescriptive dictionary, but registers words without stigmatizing them, focussing on making a distinction between overly-complicated words and the necessary ones for a learning public.

Cawdrey's *Dictionary* appears at a time when the vocabulary of English had enriched enormously and it fills a growing gap in the context of the introduction of the printing press and of an increase in literacy, namely that of providing the "uneducated" readers with a guide meant to show them the meaning of the borrowings increasingly used in texts they were bound to encounter in their daily interactions. Cawdrey's *Preface* (which borrows heavily from Thomas Wilson, a well-known defender of English purity) does not openly condemn the use of foreign words or succumb to visceral condemnations of inkhorn terms. Although the term "inkhorn" is present in the *Preface*, suggesting that Cawdrey is well aware of the purist tradition of the Renaissance and is disapproving, as many scholars of his times, of the "heterogeneous" register that the use of too much foreign vocabulary would promote, *A Table Alphabeticall* inaugurates what comes to called the "hard word" tradition, which underlines the fact that at the beginning of the seventeenth century, many of the foreign words had been naturalized into English and were accepted as part of the language, no longer being considered exclusively as a threat to the integrity of English, but being envisaged as a necessary addition for the vocabulary of an "educated" person.

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ROMANIAN NOMINALIZATIONS

Florentina-Liliana BELDIMAN

1. Starting points

Grimshaw (1990) established an essential difference between verb-based nouns designating complex events (e-nominals) and verb-based nouns designating result of events (r-nominals). As **e-nominals** have argument structure (a-structure), we may ask whether their a-structure is completely or partly inherited from the corresponding verbs. **R-nominals**, as well as underived nominals, lack a-structure and project on the basis of their lexical conceptual structure. A result nominal designates the output of the process (i.e. the properties of the verbal base are no longer transparent), while the process or event nominals name the event (i.e. the properties of the verbal base are still transparent).

Grimshaw's claims:

1. Nominalization = operation on a-structure which suppresses the external argument of the verb. Suppressed positions are not satisfied by arguments, but may license argument-adjuncts, i.e. a by phrase of a Possessor (Gen(itive)) phrase.[1]

2. Like verbs and unlike r-nominals, e-nominals have obligatory arguments. But since the Agent is a modifier in nominalizations, the obligatoriness of arguments concerns only the (Direct) Object of transitive nominalizations. The status of the two Gens in an English e-nominal (e.g. *their deliberate destruction of the city*) is different because the Object is an obligatory argument in the nominal's a-structure and the Agent can be omitted taking into account that it is merely a modifier (*the deliberate destruction of the city*).

This paper suggests certain revision of Grimshaw's theory on the basis of Romanian data and argues in favour of the following generalizations:

i. The Subject in e-nominals is an argument, not a modifier. E-nominals and corresponding verbs share their a-structure, having analogous l-syntax.
ii. The projection of a-structure is related to the aspectual type for both nouns and verbs.
iii. The analysis confirms that the projection of the Object of transitive verbs is obligatory, adding one qualification, namely, the projection of the Object is required only in [+Telic] (perfective) nominalizations. Romanian data highlight the importance of the aspect parameter in the syntax of nominalization.

1.1. Outline of the paper

In the following sections, we examine two types of verb-based nouns in Romanian, infinitive nominals and supine nominals, which have some distinguishing properties.

The first type of nominalization, the infinitive, which represents the most productive nominalization in Romanian, is formed by the addition of the suffix *–re* to the basic form of the

[1] Gen Subject of an event or result nominal is always a modifier, meaning an optional element.

verb. The second nominalization discussed in this paper is the supine, which is formed by the addition of two suffixes –Vt and –Vs, where V is a stem vowel.

1.2. The forms of the Romanian nominalizations

a) The first type of nominalization, the infinitive (the most productive) is formed by attaching the suffix *–re* to the basic form of the verb, e.g. *mânca* 'eat', *mâncare* 'eat + inf, reading'.

b) The supine is formed by attaching the suffixes *–(*V)*t* and –(V)*s,* where V is a stem vowel (e.g. *mânca* 'eat', *mâncat+ul* 'eat-sup+the , eating').

Romanian nominalizations are described as 'name of the action'; therefore, both are action nominals. As Cornilescu (2000) points out, Romanian nominals behave differently from Romance DPs in general. They may only contain one (nominal) Genitive phrase, consequently, it will be lexicalized only the argument which is obligatory for some particular interpretation.[2] Since only one argument may be overtly expressed in transitive nominalizations, either the Object or the Subject will be lexicalized, it produces the Noun+Object (NO) and Noun+Subject (NS) structures, respectively.

In this paper, we are going to present a class of doublets, which represent nominalizations of the same verb. This class of doublets contains structures of:

a) the infinitive with different suffixes according to the type of the verb that they attach to (e.g. *–are: luare, cantare, admirare, secerare, executare etc; -ere: cădere, conducere, naştere, incendiere, concediere etc; -ire: unire, cheltuire, lovire, înflorire, limpezire etc;-âre amărâre, doborâre, coborâre etc*);
b) the supine with suffixes such as *–s: mers, cules, scris; -at: cântat, executat, îmbrăcat, umblat, mâncat; -it: chituit, zugrăvit, lustruit, citit, albit; -ut: vândut, ţinut);*
c) the participle with the singular feminine form including the following suffixes (e.g. *–să: arsă, zisă; -ată: lăsata; -âtă: (de-a) târâtă*; *-ită: agonisită, ieşită; -ută: bătută; -tă: friptă, ruptă, faptă);*
d) derivates with the suffixes (from a verbal/nominal/adjectival basis): **adă:** *blocadă;* **-aie:** *bătaie;* **-aj:** *arbitraj;* **-andă***: comandă, propagandă; âş: coborâş;* **-ă/â/iciune,** with the neologic doublet **–((ţ)i)une**; -ţion, -ţio**:** *înşelăciune*; **-ărie**: comicărie; **-ărit**: albinărit; **-eală**, with the variant **–ială** (after the vowel) *zugrăveală;* **-elişte**: privelişte; **-erie**: escrocherie; **e/ăt**: rânjet (regressive derivation); **-eţ**: *judeţ (judecată)*; **-ie**: *tâlhărie*; **-ilă**: *sailă (însăilătură)*; **-ing**: doping, dribling; **-inţă** and the neologic doublet **–a/enţă**: *credinţă, ştiinţă, folosinţă, căinţă,* **-iş**: *seceriş, treieriş* (*treierat)*; **-iţă**: *goniţă* (a children's game); **-iu**: *pariu, concediu*; **-lâc**: *haimanalâc*; **-ă/e/imânt/–ment**: acoperământ, *antrenament*; **-a/enie**: *jelanie*; **-oare**: *lăudoare,* **-i/uşag**: *furtişag*; **-şig**: *hicleşig*; **-şug**: *meştesug*; **-itate, -itas**: *activitate*; **-(t)oare**: *vânătoare*, *ninsoare*; **-(tor)iu**: *ajutor, interogatoriu*; **-(a/ă/â/e/i/ut)ură**: *lovitură, strâmbătură, arsură*; **-((a/i/u)ţ)ie**: *contradicţie*, *nutriţie, intervenţie, excursie;* **-uş**: *urcuş;* - "zero"; feminine nouns: *ceartă, rugă, voie*, -or neuter: *abandon, asalt, balans, cioplu, înot, răsuflu, vaiet*.

As was already mentioned, the most productive nominalizations are the infinitives. Taking into account the definition of each nominalization and its behaviour in combination with different structures, some of the nominalizations ending in *–re,* i.e. the infinitive nominals, may include the

[2] Alexandra Cornilescu (2000), *Romanian Nominalizations: case and aspectual structure, University of Bucharest, United Kingdom.*

meaning 'the action of', but also 'its result'.[3] Thus, the infinitive nominal may be synonymous with the other nominal coming from the same verb.

In section 2, we examine the properties of the event and result readings. The nominals that behave according to Grimshaw's theory of event/result are the infinitive nominals, while the supine nominals do not exhibit in the same way. In section 4-5, we present the different aspectual properties of the two nominalizing suffixes and nominals derived from the intransitives (ergative and unergative verbs.

2. Complex event versus result nominalizations

As already stated, the NO structures (infinitive and supine) behave alike and yield e-reading. This means that they are e-nominals. Infinitive NS structures are always r-nominals, while supine NS structures may be an e-nominal, therefore there are no event properties on this structure. Unexpectedly, the supine NS structure shows all the properties of e-nominals and no result properties. There are several diagnostic tests which help in distinguishing between e-readings and r-readings of Romanian nominalizations.

In the following lines, we present the properties of e-nominals and the different behaviour of r-nominals.

2.1. The obligatoriness of the internal argument

The presence of the Object (i.e. the internal argument) is as obligatory as it is for the corresponding verb, where this indicates similarity between verbs and nominals. The absence of the Object leads to ungrammaticality, as in (1), (2):

(1) Exprimarea *(de idei inovatoare) ajută în dezvoltarea proiectului.
'The expressing (of innovative ideas) helps in the development of the project.'
(2) Exprimatul *(de idei) a fost inutil.
'The expressing (of the ideas) was useless.'

2.2. The External argument of a nominal

In Romanian, the only way that the Agent may be expressed is as an argument-adjunct, a *de către* 'by'-phrase, and never by a Gen. As Romanian DP has only one structural (nominal) Gen case position, the agentive *de către* 'by'-phrase is licensed only if the Object is also present. The Object is, thus, obligatory constituent of the e-nominal for the infinitive as well as for the supine.

(3) Exprimarea de sentimente agressive de către pacienţi.
'The expression of aggressive feelings by the patients.'
(4) Examinarea lucrărilor de către juriu.
'The examination of the papers by the jury.'

[3] For example, ***EXECUTÁRE,*** *executări,* s. f. Acțiunea de *a (se) executa* și rezultatul ei; îndeplinire, execuţie; ***EXECÚȚIE,*** execuții, s. f. **1.** Faptul de a executa; executare.

2.3. Only one Gen case position in Romanian

The inclusion of a possessive subject will disambiguate the nominal into an argument-taking interpretation and will make the objects obligatory. This reasoning is in accordance with the observation made by Lebeaux (1986) that if is a "subject" is present, the object of an action nominal is obligatory. But in Romanian, if the Su (Agent) occurs alone in the Gen case, the sentence is ungrammatical. Also, since there is only one Gen case position, the Su and the O cannot both be lexicalized in either the infinitive or supine nominals (see (5b) and (6b) below).

(5) (a) *Cumpărarea lui George a fost utilă.
'George's buying was useful.'
(b) *Cumpărarea lui George a casei a fost inutilă.
'George's buying of the house was useless.'
(6) (a) *Dărâmatul primăriei a fost o greşeală.
'The townhall's demolishing was a mistake.'
(b) *Dărâmatul statului al magazinului a fost o eroare.
'The townhall's demolishing (of the shop) was a mistake.'

2.4.Adjuncts allowed in Romanian nominalizations

Only r-nominals share with underived nouns the ability to license these adjectival space/time adjuncts. Complex e-nominals exclude them. Thus, (7a) and (8a) =e-nominals as indicated by the asp modifiers *frecvent* and *repetat*. *De*-modifiers are excluded (as in 7(b) and 8(b)).

(7) (a) evaluarea frecventă a unor importante documente **la** Craiova
'the frequent evaluation of some important documents in Craiova'
(b) *evaluarea frecventă a unor importante documente **de la** Bucureşti
'the frequent evaluation of some important documents DE at Bucharest'
(8) (a) ascultatul repetat al unor cântece interzise **la** petreceri
'the repeated listening of forbidden songs at parties'
(b) *ascultatul repetat al unor cântece interzise **de la** petreceri
'the repeated listening of forbidden songs DE at parties'

2.5.The representation of the Agent

In this subsection, we point out that even if there is not a second Case position and that the Agent cannot be lexicalized in e-nominals, the implicit Agent (IA) is semantically active in e-nominals. IA in infinitive and supine e-nominals qualifies by typical Agent-oriented adjective (e.g. *intenţionat, deliberat, premeditat*):

(9) Distrugerea deliberată a credinţei (infinitive)
'the deliberate destruction of confession'
(10) Cântatul premeditat al unor versuri frumoase (supine)
'the intended reciting of the beautiful poems'

The IA may be the antecedent of a DP internal anaphor. The IA binds the strong reflexive generic pronoun *sine* 'self' or the emphatic reflexive pronoun *el însuşi*:

(11) (a) Apărarea **de sine/sinelui** vine din nevoia de dreptate.
'Self-defendance springs from the need of justice.'
(b) Apărarea **lui însuşi** înaintea detectivilor este singura grijă a lui George.
'His own defendance before the detectives is Ion's only worry.'

IA may license an adjective predicative adjunct. The predicative adjective agrees with the IA which has θ-features. The preposition *pe* marks the Accusative case for personal nouns and pronouns.

(12) Pe Maria o enervează evaluarea/evaluatul tezelor la examenul de admitere, aşa **încordată**.
'Evaluating the papers at the entrance exam, being as tensed as she is, exasperates Maria.'

2.6.The aspectual properties of the NO and NS nominalizations

Aspectual modifiers (e.g. *constant* 'constant' and *frecvent* 'frequent'), which are characteristic of e-nominals and ruled out with a result reading, are licensed in both infinitive and supine nominalizations:

(13) Evaluarea constantă a documentelor este o obligaţie.
'The constant evaluation of the documents is an obligation.'
(14) Fumatul constant al trabucurilor au distrus sănătatea copiilor săi.
'The constant smoking of cigars has destroyed his/her children's health.'

Asp modifier *constant/frecvent* are not acceptable in the infinitive NS structure, but are licensed in the supine.

(15) (a) *Introducerea frecventă a criticului la roman a plăcut mult.
'The frequent introduction to this novel by this critic was well liked (by everybody).'
(b) Cititul lui cu glas tare **zilnic** i-a corectat pronunţia.
'His constant reading in a loud voice has improved his pronounciation.'

In terms of aspectual structure, NO structures (i.e. infinitive and supine) are interpreted either as transition predicates, that are accomplishments and achievements, or as activities, while the supine NS structure allows only activity reading, being compatible with "for"-phrases (activity modifiers) and not 'in'-phrases (which are accomplishment modifiers).

The NO structures accept *in*-modifiers, verbs such as *a termina, a isprăvi,* but they are also compatible with the type *a trebui X timp pentru Y* 'take X much time to Y'.

(16) (a) Pescuitul lui Ion în ape tulburi ani în şir.
'Ion's fishing in troubled waters for years on end.'
(b) Pescuitul lui Ion în ape tulburi în doi ani.
'Ion's fishing in troubled waters in two years.'

(17) (a) Cântatul lui Ion în baie ore în şir. (supine NS)
'his singing in the bathroom for hours on end'
(b) *cântatul lui în baie în zece minute.
'his singing in the bathroom in ten minutes'
(18) (a) Au terminat deja construirea podului. (infinitive)
'They have already finished the building of the bridge.'
(b) I-au trebuit numai două luni pentru scrierea romanului (infinitive)
'He took only two months of the writing of his novel.'

As opposed to the NO structures, NS structures can only be interpreted as activities, they do not accept *in*-phrases and accept only *for*-phrases. The supine NS always denotes an activity or a process, which is why the supine NS nominals do not require an Object. The presence of an Agent is enough for case-assignment to be checked.

2.7.Control in infinitive NO structures

The aspectual differences are of great importance. One of them is the event control allowed only by event nominals. Nominals behave like passives in allowing control into an infinitival purpose clause.[4] IA has control properties. It may control the Su of a purpose clause.

(19) înfrângerea rapidă a Rusiei pentru a termina concursului (infinitive)
'the rapid defeat of Russia to end to the war'
(20) repetatul poeziei cu glas tare pentru a reţine mai repede (supine)
'repeating the lesson in a loud voice to memorize it faster'

The null pronoun PRO is also remindful in identifying the internal argument. The IA may be controlled if there is a DP in an appropriate syntactic configuration (21), or arbitrary (22). *Sine* 'self' in (22a) implies an arbitrary PRO. If the IA is arbitrary, then it allows: a) generic reading (22a) or b) existential reading (22b).

(21) Pe Maria o interesează numai achiziţionarea unei noi case.
'Ion is interested only in purchasing a new house.'
(22) (a) Cunoaşterea de sine rămâne o problemă importantă.
'Knowledge of oneself remains an important problem.'
(b) Maria a sugerat reducerea salariilor.
'Maria suggested reducing the salaries.'

In Romanian, control does not behave in the same way in all the contexts. Therefore, control in Romanian DPs differs from control in infinitives or in subjunctive clauses. The subjunctive is introduced by the particle *să*. One important problem is that with e-nominal it is difficult to find examples with anaphoric PRO, that is, instances of obligatory control. Thus, even with verbs that show obligatory control (*a începe, a cere*), control is not always obligatory in e-nominals. Therefore, even in these environments, the assumed PRO does not behave like an anaphor:

[4] Linguists as Lasnik (1988) and Williams (1985) adopted the view that the controller is represented by the "event" designated by the clause or the nominal.

(23) (a) ?*Muncitorii au cerut să mărească salariile.
'The workers demanded to raise the wages.'
(b) Muncitorii au cerut mărirea salariilor.
'The workers have demanded the raising of the wages.'
(c) Muncitorii au cerut să înceteze lucrul.
'The workers decided to stop working.'
(d) Muncitorii au cerut încetarea lucrului.
'The workers decided the ceasing of work.'

2.8.Control in supine and infinitive NS structures:

In infinitive NS structures, nominal control properties are lost despite the presence of the Agent. Hence, control is fully allowed in supine NS nominals:

(24) (a) *descrierea minunată a lui Bălcescu pentru a stârni sentimente patriotice
'Bălcescu's wonderful description to stir patriotic feelings.'
(b) Cântatul lui George la cină pentru a-şi înveseli părinţii.
'Ion's singing at breakfast to irritate his mother-in law.'

2.9.The typology of the verbs yielding the NS supine nominals

NS structures are allowed by transitive verbs such as *cânta* 'sing', *scrie* 'write', *picta* 'paint', *culege* 'pick', *semăna* 'sow', *învăţa* 'learn', *mânca* 'eat', *bea* 'drink', *fuma* 'smoke', *suge* 'suck', *murmura* 'murmur', *asculta* 'listen', which accept prototypical objects and have unergative pairs, and by reflexive verbs, like *a se spăla* 'wash (oneself)', *a se revolta* feel revolted at, *a se amuza* amuse (oneself), *a (se) căsători cu/ a (se) mărita cu/ a (se) însura cu* 'marry (oneself) to', which have reflexive/reciprocal interpretation.

Verbs that yield NS structure have both transitive and intransitive uses. On the other hand, transitive verbs allow null prototypical objects.

(25) (a) Ion pictează (tablouri).
'George paints pictures.'
(b) 'pictatul lui Ion în sufragerie.'
Ion's painting in (the) living room.

In the supine NS nominalizations, the reflexive reading is either the only reading or the strongest preferred one. Sometimes, there may be ambiguity between the NO/NS reading (30b).

(26) (a) George se pregateşte pentru teatru.
'George is preparing for the show.'
(b) Pregătitul lui George pentru teatru
'Ion's preparing himself for the show'

For reflexive reading, the clitic *se* is always an Accusative clitic in Romanian, binding DP in Object position, while getting θ-features through agreement with the Subject DP; its functioning always presupposes chains like

(27) NP_i se_i e_i

The structure of the NS supine does not represent a counterexample to the generalization that e-nominals of transitive verbs lexicalize this object. The supine NS structure operates just on unergative verbs. However, Grimshaw's 1990 theory does not account for the absence of the event NS structure with the infinitive nominalization. The Object is not projected in the NS supine nominalization and this view eliminates the postulation of an undesirable caseless object *pro*.

(28) Desenatul/*Desenarea lui Ion la şedinţă enervează pe toată lumea.
'Ion's painting (sup/*inf) at the meeting irritates everybody.'

3. Aspectual features of the two nominalizing affixes:

3.1. The infinitive suffix. The aspectual features of the nominalizations constrain the syntax. There are two properties that characterize the infinitive suffix and the infinitive e-nominals, namely, the infinitive suffix requires the overt presence of the object of the e-nominals and it does not appear in the NS structure, being marked as *atelic*.

There is a similarity between passives and nominalizations in that they represent ergative constructions. The distinction is that nominalizations accept an adjectival predicative adjunct on the implicit agent, while passives do not. The passive nominalizations are telic and do not allow for-phrases in English, while Romanian infinitive nominalizations allow both *in*-phrases and *for*-phrases.

According to Cornilescu (2004), only a particular type of complement vP, meaning an ergative construction, may license the aspectual features of the nominalizations. Also, there is a relation between aspect and case, in that both are checked by case-licensing the object DP.

3.2. Supine suffix. The properties that characterize the supine nominalizations are the following: the first is that only the supine suffix appears in the NS structure and the second is that the supine suffix appears in the NO structure, allowing the [+Telic] readings.

There is also a difference between the infinitive NS structures and supine NS structures: the infinitive cannot license a null object in any construction, it can only license its object though case checking. In the NS nominalizations, the object licenses a-structure and determines the aspectual interpretation, but it is the subject that checks the aspectual features of the nominalizations.

The fact that nominalizations of the same verb-based nouns denote e-nominals with different aspectual and syntactic properties is due to the *semantic contribution of the nominalizing affix (cititul lui Ion,* citirea lui Ion, citirea cărţii, cititul cărţii)*. The infinitive *–re* is [+Telic] and forms perfective nominalizations (transitions), while the supine is [-Telic] and forms activity nominalizations.

4. Nominals derived from the intransitives (ergative and unergative verbs)

The choice between the two affixes depends on the semantics of the verb and the aspectual class to which the verb belongs. Ergative verbs designate transitions (accomplishments, achievements), they are like transitive verbs, so they should be compatible with both suffixes. The examples in (12) show that, while both nominalizations are possible only a few of them are felicitous from a stylistic point of view.

(29)	Ergative	Infinitive	Supine
	A sosi	sosirea	sositul
	A urca	urcarea	urcatul
	A ezita	ezitarea	?ezitatul
	A decade	decăderea	?*decăzutul

All of the examples shown above demonstrate that both nominalizations are possible but only few of them are felicitous from a stylistic point of view. All of them accept [+Telic] infinitive nominalizer, but the supine nominal is also possible because the supine nominal can also express transition in NO structures if the activity is bound by an appropriate Object.

The infinitive nominalizer *–re* [+Telic] is incompatible with ergatives, which are [-Telic] and designate activities. The supine nominalizer [-Telic] is compatible with unergative bases.

(30)	Unergative	Infinitive	Supine
	A râde	*râderea	râsul
	A plânge	*plângerea lui	plânsul

With respect to suffixes: it has been shown that the infinitive nominal suffix *–re* is perfective, while the supine suffix –(V)t is imperfective. The supine suffix can attach to any verb base, while the infinitive suffix acts like a filter, rejecting unergative verbs. The infinitive suffix *–re* is incompatible with unergatives because unergatives are [-Telic], they designate activities, the aspectual property of the infinitive suffix is [+Telic].

Since the infinitive suffix does not combine with unergatives, and the fact that event NS structures should be based on unergatives, it is safe to assume that there is no infinitive NS event nominal.

Conclusions

The Subject in e-nominals is not a modifier, but an argument. E-nominals and corresponding verbs share their a-structure. The projection of a-structure is related to the aspectual type for both nouns and verbs. This analysis shows that the Object of transitive verbs must be projected, and this is required only in [+Telic] (perfective) nominalizations.

The morphological Genitive is always assigned by the definite article in Romanian, on condition that the Gen DP is adjacent to the Gen assigning noun. If there is any constituent between the Gen assigning noun and the Gen DP, the presence of the genitival article *al* is necessary. *Al* is an expletive definite article which simply assigns Genitive case. Mophologically, *al* agrees with the Gen assigning noun, acting like a copy of it.

As Cornilescu (2000) points out, Romanian nominalizations may only contain one (nominal) Genitive phrase, so it will be lexicalized only the argument which is obligatory for some particular interpretation. But in Romanian, if the Su (Agent) occurs alone in the Gen case, the sentence is ungrammatical. The Su and the O cannot both be lexicalized in either the infinitive or supine nominals.

The infinitive suffix and the infinitive e-nominals have two properties: the infinitive suffix requires the overt presence of the object of the e-nominals and it does not appear in the NS structure, being marked as *atelic*. Also, the properties of the supine nominalizations are: only the supine suffix appears in the NS structure and the supine suffix appears in the NO structure, allowing the [+Telic] readings, as happens with the infinitive.

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MUSICAL COSMOGONY: THE CREATION OF TOLKIEN'S WORLD

Andrei CĂLINOAIA, Adriana MARTIN

1. Fantasy and Mythology

The act of creation has always been a primary concern for humans and the endeavour to find the origins of the Universe continues to be a central part of our lives. This quest has given us a legacy of countless stories, all over the world, of how we came to exist, and who was the one to set everything into motion. The concept of a creator is the basis of many religions around the world, but, in Tolkien's view, religion and mythology are entangled (*MAC* 124), and fantasy is an innate feature that lies at the basis of our nature:

> Fantasy remains a human right: we make in our measure and in our derivative mode, because we are made: and not only made, but made in the image and likeness of a Maker. (*MAC* 145)

Therefore Tolkien, in his collection of mythical works, referred to as his *legendarium*, did not leave the act of creation uncovered. We perceive glimpses of how the World came into being in most of his writings, but an extensive account is given in *The Silmarillion*, his "primary and central work" ("J.R.R.T.: A Film Portrait of J.R.R. Tolkien"). Tolkien himself expressed the importance of the cosmogony for his works by saying that "it is proper to attempt to comprehend its structure in its largest extent, from the myth of its Creation" (The *Book of Lost Tales, Part One,* 7).

In this paper, we shall focus on the act of creation and the three processes it implies: the theogony, cosmogony and anthropogony of Tolkien's mythopoeia, his sources of inspiration and how the elements of his universe fall together.

But first, we should discuss the main creator, the writer himself. In his essay "On Fairy Stories", he explains the difference between Imagination and Fantasy. *Imagination* is merely the "mental power of image-making" (*MAC* 138), a faculty each person has, to analyse the world that surrounds us and reorganize it in our own thoughts. But for the image to take an actual physical shape one is in need of a process Tolkien calls *sub-creation*. He uses the prefix "sub" because of his deep-engraved Catholic belief: only God is truly a Creator, anyone else is just re-modeling things that originated in Him. One can not achieve a sub-created product without the aid of *Art*, or what Tolkien calls "the operative link between Imagination and the final result, Sub-creation" (*MAC* 139). If the final result is able to convey "strangeness and wonder in the Expression" (*MAC* 139), if it manages to show things that are not likely to appear in the physical world of the sub-creator, then we can talk about *Fantasy*.

Regarding our world, Tolkien says: "In human art Fantasy is a thing best left to words, to true literature". (*MAC* 140) But were we to descend to the heart of his legendarium and watch the Creator of Ëa, the World of Elves and Dragons and Hobbits, we would find the same process carried out by him. After all, the enchantment that defines Fantasy is the same that resides at the structure of the World. Mankind strives to build new and unseen things, to mimic the art of our Creator. To C.S.Lewis, Tolkien wrote, as he was trying to explain this innate desire of humans: "We make still by the law in which we're made" (*MAC* 144).

Thus, his religious beliefs deeply influenced his writings. It would be incomplete to analyse Tolkien's works without remembering that his universe is *"a fundamentally religious and Catholic work, unconsciously so at first, but consciously in the revision."* (*LJRRT* 142) Thus, he believed that, in the case of religion, myth and truth are one and the same: *"Art has been verified. God is the Lord, of angels, and of men – and of elves. Legend and History have met and fused."* (*MAC* 156)

As in religion, in Tolkien's world there was also a supreme creator, Ilúvatar, that was the source of all existence, the first of whom we learn in Ainulindalë, for the History of Middle-earth begins thus: *"There was Eru, the one, who in Arda is called Ilúvatar"* (*Silmarillion* 3). In his two names, Tolkien enshrouded the significance of his nature, as Eru means in Quenya *"The One*" " or *"He that is Alone"* and the epithet Ilúvatar *"Father of All"* (in earlier versions *"Father for Always"* or *"Sky-Father"*). It is easy to draw a parallel between the Elvish language and Hebrew, in which God is called Yahweh (I AM)[1], suggestive for the notions of universality and continuity.

Before Ilúvatar there was nothing, and his thought emerged from the Void (i.e. nothingness), creating the Timeless Halls, Tolkien's equivalent of Heaven.In Hebrew, the chaotic nothingness was called *tohu-wabohù*; this primary state of being can also be found in the Babylonian mythology (representing the Abis), Egyptian (primordial magma), Greek ("at first Chaos came to be" - Hesiod) (Kernbach 120), as well as in the Norse Myth, as the "Mighty Gap" Ginnungagap.

From this initial nothingness, the thoughts of Ilúvatar brought into being *the Ainur*, the first of his creations. In a parallel with the Christian mythology, they could be compared to the Angels of God, bodiless presences who were the first to see God's Face in the realm of Heaven. Accordingly, the Ainur were called "the Holy Ones", but were finite beings, bound to time and space, and were only able to see a little part of the mind of Ilúvatar. The only thing that made them more than mere fragments of Ilúvatar's mind was the Flame Imperishable or what we may call *free will*. The one who was given the greatest gift, which is the ability to see the most of the Mind of Ilúvatar was Melkor. As the most powerful of the Ainur, he received a small part of "all the gifts of his brethren" (*Silmarillion* 4). There is a close resemblance between him and Lucifer, because, just like the latter, Melkor was the first to rebel and plant discord in the creation of the World. But at the beginning, the thought of evil did not exist in the world or in the heart of any Ainur, which gives the picture of an Eden-like initial state of the world.

2. The Process of Creation – The Music of the Ainur

The actual cosmogonical process of Tolkien's world is represented by the so-called "*Music of the Ainur*", which means that the universe is created through music. Culturally and philosophically, this idea most likely comes from the ancient Greeks' concept of the "Music of the Spheres". This concept claimed that the world was made up of several cosmic spheres, which coexisted in supreme harmony with one another. Moreover, it meant that all the elements of the universe were somehow contained within these Spheres. Behind the creation stands a Supreme Intelligence, i.e. God in all the major religions, which took up this metaphysical structure of creation. In Tolkien's work, this Supreme Intelligence is Ilúvatar. This also implies that, in some way, there is a connection between the intellectual and the physical universes, that, through music, we can somehow perceive the "world's soul", as Plato used to call it. Moreover, the ancients believed that studying music is the key to understanding the universe, as music is the only truly

[1] "And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you." (*Exodus* 3,14)

universal language, which any human being, regardless oftheir education or intellectual training, can perceive in the same way. (*TWT* 20-22)

One should also take note of the manner in which the world is created. Thus, after the singing of the *Three Themes* (the number three also has a symbolical correspondence) and showing the Ainur the shapes of what they had sung, Ilúvatar says: "*Eä*! Let these things Be!" (*Silmarillion* 9) and later on it is stressed that "Ilúvatar had made a new thing: "*Eä*, the World that Is." There are several ways in which this part can be interpreted. First, there is the correlation with the Christian belief of creation by word, the idea of "God the Word", the Word that creates. Secondly, this could also be looked upon as a sort of meta-text, about the power of the artist to create worlds merely by words. A writer has an infinite creative power. In his hands lie the voids of hundreds of worlds to be and countless cosmogonies to happen. All that he has to do is imagine it all (which has a resemblance to the moment when Ilúvatar shows the Ainur the shape of their music), put it down in words and then it Is, it exists, by power of word.

A third interpretation of this is that Tolkien wanted to put a particular emphasis on the linguistic dimension of his work. As Tolkien himself used to say, he rather invented a world to fit the language in than a language for the world: "The invention of languages is the foundation. The 'stories' were made rather to provide a world for the languages than the reverse." (*LJRRT* 165) And indeed, as a dedicated philologist and a professor of Northern languages at Oxford, his main goal when writing his works was not merely to create fantasy, but to restore to the English people its lost Anglo-Saxon mythology, which he believed was an essential part of their identity. (*TWT* 10-13)

3. Musical Cosmogony in Literature and Mythology

The importance of Music in creation and in structuring the world is to be seen in other mythologies as well, even in the far East (i.e.Niui-wa, Chinese goddess of ancient times, is said to have created music as a symbol of the creation of human beings) (Kernbach, 65).

Musical Cosmogony is to be found in another important work of fantasy literature, more exactly in C.S.Lewis' *The Chronicles of Narnia*. Five years after Lewis had published *The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe*, he wrote a prequel (*The Magician's Nephiew*) in which he explained how Narnia came into existence. The chapter *The Founding of Narnia* mirrors Tolkien's *Ainulindalë*. Instead of Ilúvatar, the reader encounters Aslan the Lion, whose voice brings the world into being from an initial state of nothingness ("*In the darkness something was happening at last. A voice had begun to sing*" – *CON* 61).

But the Universe was not shaped by his powers alone, for just as the Ainur sang the themes of Ilúvatar, so was Aslan aided in his act of creation: "*the Voice was suddenly joined by other voices, more voices than you could possibly count. They were in harmony with it, but far higher up the scale: cold, tingling, silvery voices." (CON* 61*)*

Aslan created the celestial bodies ("*the blackness overhead, all at once, was blazing with stars" – CON* 61), the plants and animals, but in his work interfered the White Witch, who brought evil into Narnia from the outside. For Lewis, as well as for Tolkien, the act of creation is, at its core, perfect and uncorrupted by darkness. It is the free will of a sub-creator, be it the White Witch or Melkor, that brings evil in the world at a later stage of its existence. It is no wonder that Melkor is so desperately looking for the Flame Imperishable and the White Witch is craving for Aslan's immortality. They both wish to become themselves masters of the world, therefore it is their hubris that corrupts the initial purity of the world, bringing it to a state of conflict.

The music of Aslan is an important element in Lewis' cosmogony, but in one aspect it differs from that of Tolkien. Aslan is the allegorical representation of Jesus Christ, the Son of God and not God Himself. Ilúvatar, on the other hand, is the whole manifestation of the Divinity. None the less, it is fair to say that neither *The Lord of the Rings* nor *Narnia* would have come to life in the way that they are now, were it not for the exquisite friendship of Tolkien and Lewis. They influenced each other to a great extent, and their friendship is the foundation of their literary work.

4. The Characteristics of Tolkien's Cosmogony

The main characteristic of Tolkien's cosmogony is that it leads to a world where everything functions as a part of the whole, in supreme harmony with each other composing element. We can perceive remnants of the creation not only in the waters of Arda, but also in the destinies of each individual character. Every event and character in Tolkien's mythopoeia completes and builds up on the next, like in the structure of a building, leading to further situations designed and foreseen by Ilúvatar. For example, as Professor Ted Sherman points out regarding the chapter "The Scourging of the Shire" from *The Lord of the Rings*, the conflict between the four hobbits and Saruman is the result of a series of events perfectly designed to lead to that outcome. "*Gandalf is suggesting*[2] *that everything that has happened has happened to prepare the hobbits for what is about to occur. [...] You have to have the Boethian notion of time and human experience. The Boethian notion that everything that happens happens so that what will happen later will have meaning.*" (Of course, one must not mistake this notion for predestination. Ilúvatar might have knowledge and power over everything that happens in Ëa, but his creations have all been given the Flame Imperishable - *free will*.) In this way, Tolkien's legendarium has a circular structure that links all composing elements, from the creation until the end of the known world. Christopher Tolkien explained in the Foreword for the first part of *The Book of Lost Tales*:

> Every person, every feature of the imagined world that seemed significant toits author is then worthy of attention in its own right, Manwë or Fëanor no less than Gandalf or Galadriel, the Silmarils no less than the Rings; the Great Music, the divine hierarchies, the abodes of the Valar, the fates of the Children of Ilúvatar, are essential elements in the perception of the whole. (*The Book of Lost Tales*, *Part One*, 7)

Another important trait of the universe that appears from such a process is that, if anything tries to break from the whole, to 'usurp its role' in the greater scheme of things, it will ultimately end up in being in discord with themselves. This is what happens to Melkor when he tries to create his own song within the Music and this is also what leads to the appearance of evil. The episode about Melkor breaking away from Ilúvatar's plan can also be linked to the biblical theme of Lucifer's downfall, with pride serving as the catalyst in both cases. Also, in both cases, we can see that when the 'fathers of evil' break away from the Creator, neither of them does so consciously or by acknowledging that their deed will give birth to something is alien to the concept of good, and moreover, that it opposes it. It is rather an involuntary turn of events, as the downfall will eventual bring them to become enemies of the Creator and not the other way around. Thus, in *The Silmarillion*, it is expressed very clearly that Melkor, even after his breaking away with Ilúvatar, will still continue to carry out his wishes, though he will not realise it: "And thou, Melkor, shalt see that no theme may be played that hath not its uttermost source in me, nor can any alter the music in my despite. For he that attempteth this shall prove but mine instrument in the devising of things more wonderful, which he himself hath not imagined." (*Silmarillion* 5-6)

[2] "You must settle its affairs yourselves; that is what you have been trained for." ROTK 332

One of the main characteristics of the conflict between good and evil in Tolkien's works is that it consists of two apparently opposite views, but which somehow coexist. As mentioned before, there is the Boethian view of evil, which claims that evil in itself does not actually "exist", but rather, that it is the mere absence of good. (Shippey 159) According to this view, evil cannot create, but merely only pervert, and, more importantly, that initially, evil only sprang out as an exercise of *free will*, of Satan and then of Adam and Eve. This is very easy to track in *The Silmarillion*, especially as it corresponds to the way in which Melkor himself becomes corrupted. Moreover, one can track it further and notice that everything created by Melkor doesn't actually have a substance of its own, but is merely a mockery of the good (e.g. his servants are corrupted Maia spirits or merely shadows, or Orcs are only corrupted Elves). (*TWT* 28) But evil as seen in Tolkien's works is in fact far more complex. Though it is true that Melkor is not really a "creator", the influence and power of evil are actually stressed all throughout the story. In a sense Melkor intervenes in the cosmogony, as his presence is felt both during the initial war and in the shaping of Middle-Earth. Because, before his rebellion against Ilúvatar, he too was among the Ainur who sang the world into creation and, as a result, he had a role in the creation himself. Thus, the second philosophical view on evil which resides in Tolkien's world is the Manichean one, which claims that evil is not interior, but rather a force of its own, which is equal to good and that the world actually represents a battlefield between these two opposite forces. Moreover, it states that opposing evil, both physically and psychologically, is a duty. (Shippey 160) This can actually be seen in the entirety of Tolkien's literature, but perhaps most of all in *The Lord of The Rings* and in *The Silmarillion*.

In earlier versions of *The Silmarillion*, The Music of the Ainur represented, in itself, the creation of Middle-Earth. But after the long process of revising, Tolkien reduced it as only the primary, theoretical stage of the creation – or what he calls *imagination* in his essay "On Fairy Stories". The voices of the Ainur only imagined the World, did not build it physically. In order to finish their work, the Ainur were given the chance to descend from the Timeless Halls and to prepare Arda for the Coming of the Children of Ilúvatar – to perform the *Art* needed for the *Fantasy* to take shape.

Their coming into the world is what started the count of time in Arda, so, in a way, though the world was pre-imagined in the Music, it only appeared as an existing entity after the Ainur began shaping it.

Those who descended were of two kinds, the Valar and the Maiar. The Valar were the most powerful of the Ainur that descended on Earth, the most powerful of them being Melkor. In the *Book of Lost Tales*, Tolkien often refers to them as "Gods", for they indeed remind the reader of the Gods of Ancient civilizations, especially the twelve Olympians of the Greek Pantheon or the *Dii Consentes* of Rome. But a main difference lies in their character: Gods are, in themselves, cruel, mischievous, arrogant, self-centered. But, excluding Melkor, all the Valar kept the features that characterized them from the beginning: their obedience towards Ilúvatar and repulsion for vice. Here one can notice a significant difference between the two mythologies. In the Greek mythology, vice is considered as natural and evil is not necessarily a force which must be opposed, but rather just another facet of the universe. However, in Tolkien's Christian-inspired cosmogony, evil is seen as an intrusion, as a breaking of the rightful order of things.

Regarding the way in which they appeared in Arda, Tolkien wrote that the descended Ainur "took to themselves shape and hue" in order to resemble the Children of Ilúvatar that they had seen in their vision, and wore these physical bodies like garments, with "majesty and splendour." (*Silmarillion* 11), which represents yet another similarity to Christianity.

But there are also Ainur who do not come into Arda, but instead choose to remain with Ilúvatar and reside in the Timeless Halls. These Ainur are not mentioned afterwards by Tolkien. (*TIE* 18)

The influence of ancient mythologies also combines with the biblical perspective. The Ainur that choose to remain with Ilúvatar could resemble the angels as superior beings, staying beside God, but not directly intervening in the affairs of mortals. Therefore, one can notice the manner in which Tolkien fused together elements from different cosmogonies in a new and original way.

5. Elves, Men and Dwarves

The shaping of the Earth was marked by a period of conflict between Melkor and the Valar and this left a mark upon all the creatures of Arda. When one thinks about fantasy, the first thing that comes into mind is not fighting or suffering, but a place to escape, better than our own world. But to Tolkien, this state of benevolence did not fit any story that aimed to credibility: "For creative Fantasy is founded upon the hard recognition that things are so in the world as it appears under the sun" (*MOC* 144). Arda, the Earth, is not a place free of malice, but quite the opposite, as it was shaped by the Valar and destroyed by Melkor, reshaped and destroyed again, a maddening conflict in which the Children of Ilúvatar were born. To the races of Arda, "peril, sorrow, and the shadow of death can bestow dignity, and even sometimes wisdom." (*MOC* 137)

The Ainur do not have any role in the appearance of Men or Elves, which makes the cosmogonical process very complex. The Children of Ilúvatar came with the third theme and were imagined by Ilúvatar alone. The amazement of the Ainur when they saw the future inhabitants of Arda was mixed with joy and love, for now everything they had designed had a purpose: to serve as a home for beings "other than themselves" (*Silmarillion* 7).

The Elves (*Quendi*) were the first to awaken, and resembled the Ainur in the sense that they were immortal. Their bodies could not become weaker with age, but they could die in battle or of grief. After death, the spitirual shape of Elves go to the Halls of Mandos, but their nature is fundamentally linked to the world in which they live, and therefore "do not escape from time, but remain in the world, either discarnate, or being re-born" (*LJRRT* 181)

Humans (Atani), on the other side, came the second and were given the gift of death, and only Ilúvatar knew their fate after the moment of departure. Tolkien indeed viewed death as a blessing in a world becoming more and more evil with time, and the race of Men was given the chance to be free from `circles of the world` (*LJRRT* 212).

In the end, Tolkien believed that "Elves and Men are just different aspects of the Humane, and represent the problem of Death as seen by a finite but willing and self-conscious person." (*LJRRT* 181) This antithetic nature of Men and Elves reveals another of Tolkien's literary themes: "Death is not an Enemy" (*LJRRT* 208)

The Dwarves did not appear in the Music of the Ainur, but were designed by Aulë the Valar, who assumed the role of a creator and shaped them in secret. But, without the Flame Imperishable, Aulë was not able to give free will to the Dwarves; thus, when he realized his mistake, that he should not have assumed the role of a creator, Aulë was ready to destroy them with his own hands. But Ilúvatar took pity on him and gave the Children of Aulë the Flame Imperishable, promising to let them live in Arda. This also touches upon a Christian concept, i.e. that only God may gift beings with free will and thus, any would-be-creator, including Melkor, can only make incomplete or enslaved beings.

6. Vision in Tolkien's World

To illustrate the relationship between the vision the beings of Tolkien's legendarium are endowed with and the way they relate to Time and Space, one should imagine the space-time continuum as a Möbius Strip.

Ilúvatar is an infinite being with an infinite vision, and his creation is very much like a Möbius strip. Time in Ëa runs without pause, in a continuous flow, like the seemingly infinite surface of a Möbius strip. If one holds a Möbius strip in their hands and turns it in every direction, folds and twists it at will, one may see in detail the surface of the strip. This viewer has thus the vision of Ilúvatar, who is capable of knowing his creation from the beginning to its end, of seeing things hidden to a stationary viewer. However, if this first viewer holds the Möbius strip still and a second viewer looks at it from a distance, parts of the strip will be impossible to be seen by the second viewer and his vision will therefore be obstructed and incomplete. Only if the one holding the strip decides to turn it will the hidden parts be revealed. This second vision is the one of the Ainur – though they helped Ilúvatar in the creation of Arda, what will happen towards the beginning of the Dominion of Men is hidden from them, as are the results of many of their actions.

However, if we change the perspective and situate a third viewer directly on a Möbius strip, that person will be able to see only what is ahead of him, which is a surface much like a mountain – while you climb it, what is there to be found beyond the ridge remains unknown. Such is the vision of the Children of Ilúvatar and of the Dwarves: the future is not revealed to them, for they were not involved in the creation of Ëa.

For a stationary viewer, an Elf would be like an ant traveling upon the surface of the strip and being able to return from its point of origin, which is to regain their physical bodies after death and earn the rest of their souls in the Halls of Mandos. A Human, however, would disappear out of sight and never return, for the fate of Men is uncertain after death. The Dwarves, not originally in Ilúvatar's plans, would be like a passing shadow, mere visitors of Arda, not really belonging there, but real enough to make a difference and change the destiny of the World.

7. Of Tom Bombadil

A very curious figure in Tolkien's legendarium, which is all the more curious for not being mentioned at all in the cosmogony is Tom Bombadil. There is however, reason to believe that he is at least in some way connected to the creation of Arda

Of Tom Bombadil's origins we only have some scattered clues, but no real explanation. Originally, Bombadil was the name of the Dutch doll that belonged to Tolkien's son, Michael, and later became the hero of one of Tolkien's poems and soon found its way into his legendarium. When that happened, as Tom Shippey points out, he "became perhaps the most mysterious figure in the world of *The Lord of the Rings*" (*TPR* xi). From all creatures that inhabit Middle-earth, he is not affected by evil (when he puts on the Ring of Sauron, he does not turn invisible), he is without fear and in possession of great power and influence. Nonetheless, "a lot of what he says is nonsense" (Shippey 125), for he speaks in verse often without apparent meaning, and when asked about himself, he always fails to deliver elucidative answers. He says: "Don't you know my name yet? That's the only answer" (*FOTR* 173), and as for his nature:

> But you are young and I am old. Eldest, that's what I am. Mark my words, my friends: Tom was here before the river and the trees; Tom remembers the first raindrop and the first acorn. He made paths before the Big

> People, and saw the little People arriving. He was here before the Kings and the graves and the Barrow-wights. When the Elves passed westward, Tom was here already, before the seas were bent. He knew the dark under the stars when it was fearless – before the Dark Lord came from Outside. (*FOTR* 173)

His identity is unknown even to the elves, as Elrond points out: in the Sindarin tongue he is called Iarwain Ben-adar (old and without father), while the tongues of Men and Dwarves designate him as "Eldest" (Orald, respectively Forn).

This brought forth numerous theories on the nature of Tom Bombadil and his identity is still debated even by Tolkien scholars. Tom Shippey associates him with Adam, as the Divinity's first creation. David Day believes that he is "probably a Maia spirit that came to Middle-earth in the Ages of Starlight" (A Guide to Tolkien 225). It has been suggested that Tom is the Flame Imperishable, while there are other theories that name him "Physical Embodiment of Spirit of the Music of the Ainur".

Ted Sherman dismisses this last theory and he explains that "there's nothing in Tolkien's cosmology to account for a 'Spirit of Arda'", and that Tom is more likely to be a "manifestation of Eru Ilúvatar" himself. If this is the case, as it is believed by many of Tolkien's scholars and readers, then we could talk about some sort of a providence of the Creator over the World, of a lasting physical presence of Him throughout the passing Ages of Arda. Of course, Ilúvatar intervenes directly a few times in the course of the History of the Earth (i.e. the destruction of Númenor, the resurrection of Gandalf or Bilbo finding the One Ring), but his earthly shape may be an indirect way of looking after the inhabitants of Arda and their fate. Bombadil's "watching of the country" (*FOTR* 191) could therefore be Ilúvatar's care of the world he had created.

8. Tolkien's Universe Reflected in Reality

Tolkien's intention was not to create a mere story of a far-away place, but a history of our own people, an account of the circumstances that led to our current existence. Ëa is the Universe, and beyond its limits lies the Void, a place still beyond human reach. The small planet Arda's boundaries are well known, for this is the same with our own Earth, and the inhabitants of Arda are meant to be no others than the modern man's ancestors, our forefathers.

Tolkien himself suggested that mankind's ordinary history starts about some 6000 years after the Third Age, and thus the War of the Ring must have taken place at around 4000 or 5000 BC, and the creation of Arda at 41000 BC. This means that Tolkien's idea of a fictional universe reflected Plato's concept of the ideal world of archetypes, "a world of ideas behind all civilizations and nations of the world." Moreover, this reveals "a world where all our dreams have their origin." (*TWT* 15)

But Tolkien's correlation of Arda with our world doesn't stop here. He takes over Lyle's theory of geological evolution and makes the continental drift a few hundred million years faster. He also somewhat suggests that the sinking of the island of Númenor is the event recorded by humans as the sinking of Atlantis. (*TWT* 16)

This isn't just an attempt by Tolkien to make his world appear more realistic, a venture which he would have certainly admitted as pointless. It was rather his way of telling us that we are too absorbed by the commonness of everyday life to be able to notice the miracles of the things that lie behind the obvious. To this extent, he did not see myth and fantasy as a way of escaping or running away from reality, but rather as a means of engaging more with it, by leaving our materiality behind. (*TWT* 16)

9. Conclusion

The importance of Tolkien's work in general is too large to summarise. Tolkien set out to re-create the Anglo-Saxon mythology, to restore the lost British spiritual identity, as Tolkien himself said: "[I] set myself a task, the arrogance of which I fully recognized and trembled at: being precisely to restore to the English an epic tradition and present them with a mythology of their own." (LJRRT 180) This he achieved admirably, since the mythology that he built has gained universal notoriety.

But his works represent far more than that. Tolkien's creation has an identity of its own, it is a living work, which inspires debates, sparks interests and is constantly read and re-read. Moreover, it is now a basic standard for any work of fantasy. In the dozens of fantasy creations that have sprung up since it was written, it is hard to find at least one which did not have Tolkien's books as a source of inspiration at all. (Mihaela Cernauti-Gorodetchi/Lazu 20)

In conclusion, the cosmogony of Tolkien's world is a fragment of literature exceedingly rich in mythology, religion and imagination, which introduces the most significant work of fantasy in a unique and personal way, while still touching upon essential philosophical and human ideas.

ABBREVIATIONS USED:
CON – *The Chronicles of Narnia*
FOTR – *The Fellowship of the Ring*
MAC – *The Monsters and the Critics*
ROTK – *The Return of the King*
TIE - *Tolkien: The Illustrated Encyclopedia*
TPR – *Tales from the Perilous Realm*
TWT - *The World of Tolkien*
LJRRT – *The Letters of J.R.R.Tolkien* (in this case, the number designates the letter, not the page)

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EXPRESSING "CULTURAL TRAUMA": MAGICAL-REALIST DEVICES IN TONI MORRISON'S *BELOVED*

Alina CIOBOTARU

The oxymoronic term of magical realism is described by many critics as a literary genre or a narrative mode in which the supernatural and the natural, the real and the fantastic are represented as being on the same level. Christopher Warnes defines it as "a mode of narration that naturalizes or normalizes the supernatural"(3). In 1925 the German art historian Franz Roh introduced the term magic realism to describe post-expressionist paintings, and he explained magic as being "the mystery of life" (Bowers 19). Alejo Carpentier, influenced by the surrealist, used Roh's concept to describe reality in Latin America and in his Prologue to the book *The kingdom of this world* (1949) proposed a new term- "marvelous realism" (*lo real maravilloso*) - that expressed the concept of *mestizaje* (the mixture of differing cultural systems) and the unique atmosphere of Latin America. In his prologue, he alludes to a new type of baroque style that is defined as "an artistic style that uses heavy and rich detail and ornamentation" (Bowers 34). The third term, magical realism, was introduced by the critic Angel Flores, and it is described by Maggie Ann Bowers as a narrative mode that "relies most of all upon the matter-of fact, realist tone of its narrative when presenting magical happenings"(3). The magic in magical realism and marvelous realism "refers to any extraordinary occurrence and particularly to anything spiritual or unaccountable by rational science" (Bowers 19).

Maggie Ann Bowers observes that this narrative mode has become increasingly popular and many postmodernist writers have turned to it because it offers "a way to discuss alternative approaches to reality to that of Western philosophy" (1) and that is why, as it is stated in *A Companion to Magical Realism*, recent scholar works have focused "on the ways in which magical realism invoked social practices and ideology, and interacted with issues subtending postcolonial theory" (5-6). In a sense, magical realism is only a mask for the political novel.

What I aim to argue in this paper is that in Toni Morrison's *Beloved* magical realist devices are employed in order to express an interpretation of the cross-cultural identity of the African American people which is different from the claims of the European American view.

The realism of the novel is the reference to an event that took place in 1856, when a female runaway slave called Margaret Gartner slit the throat of her two-year-old daughter and tried unsuccessfully to kill her other sons, in order not to let her children become slaves. Morrison used this story to talk about slavery from the point of view of female slaves and to resurrect a past that no one wanted to remember, as she herself admits, according to Stephen M. Hart(*A companion to Gabriel Garcia Marquez* 89). As Daniel Erickson shows in his book *Ghosts, Metaphor and History in Toni Morrison's "*Beloved" *and Gabriel Garcia Marquez's "*One hundred years of solitude", the ghost in this novel metaphorically represents " the past and the way that the traces of the past persist in the present"(16).

Many critics confuse magical realism with its neighboring genres, such as fantastic literature or allegory. We shall see that in the case of *Beloved* the category within which we can consider the text is that of magical realism. In his book *Magical Realism and the postcolonial novel*, Christopher Warnes argues that it was Amaryll Chanady, in her book *Magical Realism and the*

Fantastic: Resolved versus Unresolved Antinomy, that identified the three distinct features of magical realism: the presence in the text of codes pertaining to different levels of reality, the natural and the supernatural, the antinomy between the two must remain unresolved, and the presence of *authorial reticence* that "must facilitate the co-existence and legitimacy of both codes"(3). Taking this into account, we see that in *Beloved* the supernatural is treated as a normal aspect of life and that for the characters in the book the apparition of a ghost is not considered unusual. Right from the beginning of the novel, Baby Suggs tells Sethe, when she suggest that they should move, that their situation is not an uncommon one and that the hunting of a house by a relative that died in violent circumstances is a way of living for the black community

> What'd be the point?" asked Baby Suggs. "Not a house in the country ain't packed to its rafters with some dead Negro's grief. We lucky this ghost is a baby. My husband's spirit was to come back in here? or yours? Don't talk to me. You lucky. You got three left. Three pulling at your skirts and just one raising hell from the otherside. Be thankful, why don't you? I had eight. Every one of them gone away from me. Four taken, four chased, and all, I expect, worrying somebody's house into evil. (Morrison 5)

Paul D "feels" the presence of a haunting entity in the house, without being warned in advance by Sethe:

> Paul D tied his shoes together, hung them over his shoulder and followed her through the door straight into a pool of red and undulating light that locked him where he stood.
> "You got company?" he whispered, frowning.
> "Off and on," said Sethe.
> "Good God." He backed out the door onto the porch. "What kind of evil you got in here?"
> "It's not evil, just sad. Come on. Just step through." (Morrison 8)

From this point of view, we can speak of the naturalization of the supernatural even from the beginning, as for Sethe and Paul D, as well as for the entire black community, ghosts are considered aspects of everyday life. After Denver tells Paul D that there is a ghost in the house, he does not seem to be moved by this information. He goes on discussing with Sethe and remembers that at Sweet Home there was a "headless bride" that "used to roam them woods regular." (Morrison 13).

Until the end of the novel, the antinomy between the real and the fantastic remains unresolved. The author does not give a certain interpretation for the events that have past, and beloved may or may not be the embodiment of Sethe's two-year-old daughter, as Denver puts it in the end of the novel, when Paul D asks her if she thinks she was her sister: "At times. At times I think she was--more." (Morrison 266). This „more" suggests another line of interpretation, but it is only hinted at. As we can see, in the case of *Beloved,* the antinomy between the real and the supernatural is unresolved as none of the codes pertaining to the level of the real or the supernatural is privileged. The author does not tell us if Beloved was really Sethe's daughter. It is worth mentioning also the fact that in this novel the female characters dispose of supernatural powers of perception, as Baby Suggs hears "The Word" and is able to feel schoolteacher's arrival.

Charles W. Scheel, in his essay "Toni Morrison's *Beloved*: a traumatic book on the trauma of the slavery?", observes that Chanady's third feature is represented in this book as well because the reader is introduce to the story bit by bit and the unanswered questions-yet- "Who done it?" and "Why?" create "a sense of mystery and suspense for the first-time reader"(159). The narrator does not comment upon "the unusual mingling of the realistic and the supernatural codes of events in the narrative"(159) , and he leaves another question unanswered: "why is there a ghost in the house?". Scheels also argues that there are features representative of marvelous realism as well, a cultural notion that he redefines as "a narrative mode different from magical realism" in the sense that "a

realistic code and a mystery code are constantly fused in a poetic, often lyrical discourse, that is permeated by <<authorial exaltation>>"(162). The instances of "authorial exaltation" exemplified by him are emblematic: the "chokecherry tree" on Sethe's back, a metaphor for the scar she ended up with as a result of the savage whipping she undertook, "the elation experienced by the Bluestone –Road community on the occasion of the memorable feast improvised by Sethe,"(162), and the episode in which the neighboring women exorcise what they believe to be the *abiku* child of Sethe. The term *lo real maravilloso* was coined, as I have shown in the begging of my essay, by Alejo Carpentier, who claimed that it can only be found in Latin America. But as we shall see, Morrison has made use of the cultural background of her own people, as for example, the myth of the *abiku* child , "a child from West African Yoruba mythology who returns from the dead to be born again to the same mother"(Bowers 82). I agree with Scheel's observation that in this novel we have both instances of magical realism and of marvelous realism, due to the fact that some of Sethe's portrayals of Sweet Home, the episodes describing the Clearing and others are similar to Carpentier's depictions in his novels, for example *The lost steps,* of the marvelous reality in Latin America. They constitute islands of utopia in a sea of dystopia.

This combination of magical realism with marvelous realism brings us to Christopher Warnes differentiations between "faith-based" magical realist novels and "irreverent magical realist novels", and implicitly, to the distinction made by Roberto Gonzales Echevarria between ontological and epistemological magical realism. According to Maggie Ann Bowers, ontological magical realism is grounded in the cultural context in which it is set, that is in the beliefs, myths and practices of the writer's homeland, whereas the magic in epistemological magical realism is brought about by elements that are not necessarily rooted in the cultural context of the fiction or of the writer, that is to say in what Carpentier defined as the artificiality of the European magic realism, which was not grounded on the cultural context in which it was produced. Morrison's *Beloved*, as we have seen, is an instance of ontological magical realism, just like Gabriel Garcia Marquez's *One hundred years of solitude*. As Maggie Ann Bowers argues, by using the oral storytelling technique and by employing a *Weltanschauung* particular to the African American community, Morrison's fiction "attempts to recreate a communal history for African Americans which links them back to the painful past of slavery and what was done to them" (89).

Warnes argues that, in accordance to the theories linking magical realism to postcolonial studies, faith and irreverence were the two modes of engaging with "causality". He uses the terms of "causality" and "participation", that were first employed by Lévy-Bruhl , to distinguish between a mythic, primitive representation of reality and one that we find in Western cultures. In the first one, faith, causality is "supplemented, extended or overwhelmed (…) with the terms of participations" (11). Magical realism of this kind "seeks to reclaim what has been lost: knowledge, values and traditions, ways of seeing, beliefs" (12), as in the case of Alejo Carpententier's novels *The Kingdom of this world* and *The lost steps*. It is a response to colonialism's "brutal enforcing of a selectively-conceived modernity"(12). The second mode of responding to causality is "irreverence", which uses myths, legends, miracles, superstions etc., in order to show that the western world view is based on assumptions that are not true and that reality is not coherent and easy to understand. It aims to demonstrate that "the truth claims of causality are (…) contingent on consensus, founded on language, and driven by discourse about reality rather than reality itself"(13). I argue that it is this kind of "irreverent" magical realism that first stands out in the novel *Beloved*. The ghost "is the projection within an ideologically riven nation of a subaltern forced to <<disappear>> as a result of lying (in both senses of the term) on the wrong side of the political, gender or race line" (Hart 84). I have specified in the beginning that it can function as a spectral metaphor for the trauma of slavery that keeps haunting Sethe. Daniel Erickson points out

that Beloved is a metaphor for "the perceptation of the emotion as seemingly <<external>> to the mind" (it can be seen in the beginning, where it is used to express the feelings of the people inhabiting the house), but it is also "depicted as a real, existent phenomenon within the world of *Beloved*."(18) Beloved's apparitions cause constant flashbacks that are meant to destroy what Morrison, cited by Stephen M.Hart in his article "Magical Realism in the Americas: Politiced Ghosts in *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, *The house of the Spirits*, and *Beloved"* , calles <<national amnesia>>. The ghost is just a pretext for Morrrison to relate the unspoken reality that the authorial powers in America do not want to remember, the fact that: "White people believed that whatever the manners, under every dark skin was a jungle. Swift unnavigable waters, swinging screaming baboons, sleeping snakes, red gums ready for their sweet white blood. In a way, he thought, they were right." (Morrison 198). Maggie Ann Bowers describes Beloved as a symbol of all women enslaved and of the women that were drowned in the Atlantic "during the middle-crossing journey on the slave ships from Africa" (77). But seeing as this is an ontological realist text, it implicitly is an instance of faith-based magical realism, as for Warnes the two overlap.

Maggie Ann Bowers uses the catch-all term of "magic(al) realism to describe those instances of writing in which we find both magical realism and marvelous realism. As we have demonstrated so far, Toni Morrison uses in fact "magic(al) realist" devices to express the *cultural trauma* (Scheel 161) of the black community to bring into discussion a past that many people would have liked to forget. Following in the foot-steps of the novel's characters, the reader realizes that without remembering and rewriting these historic events, no real cultural healing can take place.

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OTHERNESS IN EMILY DICKINSON'S POETRY

Diana Alexandra CONTEȘ

Otherness, or alterity, refers to the existence of an entity in comparison with which exists the Self. French philosopher Jacques Lacan has been instrumental in the study of the Other. Descartes once said that madness was one with believing oneself to be other than one is. This statemenet would later be contested by Lacan, him affirming that "it is no more crazy to believe oneself to be a king when one is quite poor than it is to believe oneself to be oneself" (Chiesa, 25). The Other frequently protrudes Emily Dickinson's verse and the aim of this thesis is to investigate its function in poems 298, 531, 642, 670 from the *Complete Poems of Emily Dickinson*, published in 1955 (i.e. respectively "Alone, I cannot be," "I Tried to Think a Lonelier Thing," "Me from Myself – to Banish", "One Need not be a Chamber – To be Haunted"). In order to achieve this, we must first try to identify the "I" in her poems. Emily Dickinson wrote in one of her many letters to Thomas Wentworth Higginson that "when I state myself as the representative of the Verse – it does not mean – me – but a supposed person" (Higginson, 5), indicating her awareness insofar as her divided self and her constant change of speakers are concerned. She dedicated herself to the personal lyric, which Gregory Orr defines as being:

> a means of coping, of incorporating the experience of disorder into the elaborate formal orderings of poetry. What makes the personal lyric such an important kind of poem in all sorts of cultures is that it represents a tool to help individuals survive existential crises. The disorders that are ordered by the personal lyric extend across the whole spectrum of human subjectivity, all the way from joy to despair, from love and delight to fear of death and madness. What all these disorderings have in common is the capacity to destabilize the individual self. By translating her joy or despair and her happiness or confusion into language and by ordering it into a poem, the poet restabilizes herself and gives her experience of disorder both shape and significance (Leiter, v).

In her book "Alterity and the Lyric: Heidegger, Levinas, and Emily Dickinson," Hyesook Son corroborates that the voice of the lyric poem is not one leading a monologue, but rather one "engaged in a process of perpetual interchange that denies the sovereignty and independence of either the subject or the Other." She states that the lyric should resonate as "a release from oneself or, more fundamentally, as a relationship with alterity".

Poem 298, "Alone, I cannot be" begins with clear-cut evidence supporting the presence of the other. The title itself brings to mind what Lacan intimates about us not being "isolated, solitary spherical beings, deaf and dumb as planets" (Chiesa, 25), suggesting rather that we only exist in contrast to something else. The poem is abundant in negative constructions, e.g. *no*, *nor*, *not*, *never*, as everything in it is defined by "what it isn`t." Miller describes this as "a kind of negative definition which illuminates the subject of the poem by specifying what it is not, or by contrasting it with more easily named experiences and phenomena" (Leiter, 34). This reveals an incontestable omnipresence of the other, as the thing itself is determined by its other. But who are these "Hosts" that visit the speaker? Bearing in mind that the poem was written in 1826, celebrating the same birth year as yet another 226 poems, one can safely state that they can represent a <recordless> number of muses by whom the poet finds herself visited. The key element in their description lies in the very fact that these "Hosts" need no key, indicating a bodiless state that can pervade anything. They are unbounded by "almanacs," and "climes" suggesting their independency from time and space,

and they defy definition as they carry no “names.” They are only said to have “general Homes, like Gnomes,” a comparison not easily deciphered by modern readers. In order to have some light shed on this, one may consult Noah Webster`s “American Dictionary of the English Language,” a dictionary which Emily Dickinson read for pleasure and wherein she sought many terms to describe variegated thoughts and feelings. Gnomes are defined here as “imaginary beings that inhabit the interior of the earth and are guardians of mines and quarries,” which is to say that as they belong to the inner world and protect its treasures, so the hosts live therein and ripen the fruits of imagination which they subsequently allow to spring into poetry. The writer was assuredly fond of this term, choosing to sign some of her letters to Thomas Wentworth Higginson with “your Gnome” (alternating it with “your Scholar”).

According to Jacques Lacan, one identifies itself on the basis of “alienation upon identification.” The subject’s impossiblity of distinguishing itself from the other results in a cleaving of the thought and a disjunction associated with it. The division of the self is profoundly expressed in “Me from Myself – to banish,” wherein the reader can find antagonists confounding themselves but cannot recognize the voice of the speaker. Be it “Me,” “Myself,” “the Fortress,” “All Heart,” the two interinfluence themselves up to the point of nonrecognition. One could assume that the twofold character in the poem is separated into the Soul and that other “of Consciousness – her awful mate / The Soul cannot be rid –.” The fervent question “How have I peace?” only indicates peace is not (yet) obtained. The rhythm is packed with despair as the struggle goes on and one can clearly tell that “the effect is to intensify the situation, the pain, the impossibility of victory, enemy and friend are one... self consciousness means precisely the encounter of the self with itself... and this is a perpetual struggle” (Juhasz, 140).

In poem 670, the thought of peace is long gone. The suspense-borne image that ends the poem is the primary cause of fear. “I have found the word to every thought / I ever had –,” Emily Dickinson said, and had she failed to find it in her lexicon then, assuredly, she would have had a new term coined in order to describe whatever concept, so the lack of vocabulary is unmistakably not the reason of the undefined “or more” in the poem. The fact that it has no name given can point either to a monstruosity so big it evades even imagination`s confinement or to something the mind has repressed. Even still it isn`t the thing per se that is the most frightening, but rather the fact that it`s been unnamed. Sharon Leiter writes in her Critical Companion: Emily Dickinson: A Literary Reference to her Life and Work that “what should startle most is the fact that it is not something <out there,> but a part of our own being, ourself behind ourself” (160), this is the unaccountable surplus which according to Werner Hamacher, constitues our individuality.

In “I tried to think a Lonelier Thing” (1863), the inner world is no longer home for hidden, repressed terrors, the poem is not anymore about an internal “other” that is feared and avoided as much as possbile. In contrast to this, we now discover an attempt at finding that mind-dwelling creature and turning it into a companion to help the speaker alleviate her loneliness. The inner world is one of incredible vastitude, so what is to say that “within the Clutch of Thought” one could not also find such a companion?

Due to the fact that the speaker’s “Horror’s Twin” is identified as masculine, psychoanalysis would now intervene and point to Emily Dickinson`s confused sexuality or her androgynous nature, noting that she was in love with her brother`s wife. However, the presence of yet another „other” in her poetry is maybe now revealed, namely God. “In the pervasive religious culture of her time, which held a powerful sway over her imagination, Sharon Leiter writes, the archetypal image of lonely suffering was Jesus” (125). From the very first stanza of the poem, the speaker confides in us, the readers, informing us that she feels lonely and that she is searching for a companion in

sufferance. Such a search seems to incorporate the lacanian mirror stage, in which the subject uses the completeness of its mirrored image to gain some compensation for "human helplessness." This other may well be a representation of Jesus as the speaker tries to learn how to suffer. The dive the speaker takes is distinguished as transcendental, as the speaker does not try to avoid suffering, but rather dig deep into the very core of this suffering, in an attempt of gaining what Weisbuch calls "the dangerous, authentic feeling" (Leiter, 160), stripped of language and voice, bare-naked, genuine feeling, one Jesus only could sincerely and wholly experience. Through means of this Imitatio Christi, the speaker could successfully attain "some Polar Expiation" and cleanse himself of what would seem to be the original sin. The speaker seeks God and tries to establish a connection with him. "I almost strove to clasp his Hand" is a clear representation of a physical union. If this other be indeed considered God, the mentioned "Luxury" that "grew" is powerfully motivated, as for any creator – be him a painter, a writer, even God Himelf – the hand is the instrument of creation by which their work materializes.This ardent struggle to reach God and the constant comparing of himself to God has a negative aspect:

> The subject who, when considered as an ego, is nothing but the consequence of an alienating identification with the imaginary other, wants to be where the other is: he loves the ther only insofar as he wants aggressively to be in his place.. Lacan had already pointed this out in his doctoral thesis on self-punishing paranoia: in certain forms of paranoia, by attacking an admired person with whom she ideally identifies, the psychotic is actually attacking herself: in this way she punishes herself for not being able to achieve her ideal image. In self-punishing paranoia, the psychotic "strikes in her victim her own exteriorized ideal. . . . With thesame blow that makes her guilty before the law, [she] has actually struck herself (Lorenzo Chiesa, "Subjectivty and Otherness,A Philosophical Reading of Lacan," page 29).

The other, filtered through the mind of the subject is "stained" this time with the impurities of the latter. In his attempt of gaining the qualities of the other rhrough this mental link, this monstruous being that cannot "achieve his ideal image" (Chiesa, 29), unfortunately transposes his imperfections unto his other, as the impurities of a lense renders an image equally impure. The constructed image of Jesus is presented as "Horror's Twin" – the speaker's twin. "This God" can only pity him, a poor creation. Because the speaker fails to be good enough, his imperfect mind could not possibly contain Jesus in his perfection, but merely a correspondingly imperfect "Creature."

Emily Dickinson was "a great inner spelunker – her own mind and subjectivity – a veritable Carlsbad Caverns of tunnels and chambers and strange spaces full of wonder and mystery and terror" (Leiter, vi). She dives into this inner world and stalwartly breaks down every little thing found herein and puts it back together incorporating it into speech and thus giving it voice. A myriad personae and speakers then heave into mind, e.g. a child, a lover, a wife, a mourner, the Queen of Calvary. Her poems can indeed be filled to the brim with disjunctions and not few times do the voices in them contradict themselves, or even a poem contradict another, but in this very fact lies her greateness: "she would not make herself less a poet by making herself a more consistent one" (Leiter, 141).

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RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: A MODERNIST PERSPECTIVE ON JOSEPH CONRAD'S "VICTORY"

Paula-Andreea COROI

Modernism is the result of late-Victorian anxiety in the face of social change: the taking of a central position of city life, the quick spread of information through media, and most importantly of the insecurity and confusion spurned by the beginning of the First World War. It is a consequence of a new sense of fear and disbelief at the first steps of a new world in the making, while birthing a new sense of literary expression: introspection, more often than not hopeless seeking of answers in the individual. The darker, more obscure aspects of the human psychology and of his fitting into a rapidly changing world are analyzed and displayed in the jocular, freshly ironic even to the point of cynical tone of the modernists.

Before Eliot's *Waste Land* or Joyce and Woolf's introduction of such a particular trademark of modernism as their stream of consciousness technique, the artistic rebellion against the faulty, considerably delusive mirrors of life that realism birthed was sooner felt in such works as Joseph Conrad's. The narrated memoirs of the Anglicized Polish writer, who had spent a larger part of his life at sea, would prove to be among the first stirrings of modernism in England. His works are comprised of tales set within exotic landscapes, which host characters both European and of racial diversity – they offer the impression of British (or otherwise Caucasian) minds exploring worlds that are distant both physically and culturally to the average reader. This alone could stand as an escape from the boundaries of British society; However, Conrad takes this motive one step further in works such as, among others, *Heart of Darkness*, his *Tales of Unrest*, or the novel *Victory*, since the image of Great Britain is wrapped in shades of grey and a feeling of oppression. It is never a direct accusation, yet in *Victory*, when talking about Morrison – an acquaintance of the protagonist – the undisclosed narrator says that he *"*had heard that (Morrison) had written a letter or letters to Heyst, saying that London was cold and gloomy; that he did not like either the men or the things, that he was "as lonely as a crow in a strange country". (…) Finally he went into Dorsetshire to see his people, caught a bad cold, and died with extraordinary precipitation in the bosom of his appalled family." (Joseph Conrad, Victory) Heyst himself has no consideration towards returning to England, since "Not a single soul belonging to him lived anywhere on earth."(JC,V) For these characters, life is concentrated in the archipelago they work in, and the thought of home and of returning to the society they left behind is not a comforting one. As the narrator in the first part of the novel mentions: "Going to Europe was nearly as final as going to Heaven. It removed a man from the world of hazard and adventure."(JC,V)

Victory (1915) is an island story set in Indonesia, which relates the tale of Axel Heyst, a Swedish baron who has made it his principle to never commit or tie himself to any place or person. He incidentally helps a trading brig captain named Morrison keep his ship by loaning him money and, in return, is offered a shareholding in the Tropical Belt Coal Company. Heyst becomes owner of named company after Morrison's death. Although the company falls into bankruptcy, he chooses to remain and live on the island of Samburan, all alone except for his servant. While visiting the nearby town of Sourabaya, Heyst rescues Lena, an English girl violinist, from an ill intended eponymous hotel keeper named Schomberg, whose sole passion is seemingly spreading false

rumors meant to undermine Heyst's image. Lena, the object of Schomberg's attentions, joins Heyst in his self-imposed exile on Samburan. The hotel keeper plots his revenge, which reaches Heyst on Samburan in the form of three desperados lured by the false promise of treasure. The three – the gentlemanly Mr. Jones, his feline mannered, stealthy secretary named Ricardo, and their brutish thrall, Pedro – arrive on Samburan and corner Heyst, believing he is hiding wealth. However, all that is left of all their passions are ash and smoke, as the whole misadventure ends with their tragic deaths – but not before Lena sacrifices her own life to save Heyst's, leaving the world of the living with an innocent smile celebrating her victory.

The novel displays equal shares of action and contemplation of psyche, as The New York Times put it in 1915 in a review that was playfully entitled *A South Sea Hamlet*: "viewed as a whole, it presents that curious and vital mingling of strong, crude action and delicate psychology, the secret of which has been lost for a good 300 years." This early critique accuses the novel of recycling "material as old as the Pharaohs" and of somewhat ridiculous characters that might lack in the believable, such as in the case of the three desperados, or that of Schomberg's wife – Conrad is thus accused of too little realism, but still praised in the matter of psychological analysis of his protagonist. The action in the novel changes pace as it progresses, acquiring at times a strange, yet not unpleasant tension when the whole inner world of *Victory* seems to have its gears set at full speed; all of it except Heyst, who moves at his own, introspective pace.

Man, as a social being, can define himself through the relations to the world inside and outside oneself, and Heyst has a preference for the first while avoiding as much as possible to meddle in outside affairs. This escapism may be accused as unethical, as one has responsibilities as well as freedom in the course of one's life, and choosing to not answer to the calls each should is badly seen by society – which is also seen in the novel, as Heyst is the victim of a heap of misunderstandings and gossip. The things that are (and were, then) considered respectable and normal in a social context can also be examined carefully, with a grain of mistrust, and one can wonder if they are not simply mechanisms meant to keep humans contained within themselves, universal and in order. However, though the prospects may seem bleak, it is probably proven with Lena's victory and Heyst's defeat that the solution is not giving up on the whole social system, but rather seeking balance – while taking care to not overly exert oneself with the more difficult and heavy burdens of the mind and conscience.

The mismatches between the characters of *Victory*, especially the protagonist, Axel Heyst, and their expected social behavior in the context of the times of late Victorian reign will serve as ground for discerning whether the oddities noticed are an early manifestation of modernist thinking, particularly by observing how Conrad treats the matter of social responsibility in his work.

Doing so will not offer quick or easy results, since the points of view in *Victory* are varied and change not only with the style of narration, but even with the novel's inner passing of time. Gossip and suppositions play a major part in helping the reader understand and sympathize with the protagonist. H.L. Mencken writes that Joseph Conrad's stories "are not chronicles of men who conquer fate, nor of men who are unbent and undaunted by fate, but of men who are conquered and undone. Each protagonist is a new Prometheus, with a sardonic ignominy piled upon his helplessness. Each goes down a Greek route to defeat and disaster, leaving nothing behind him save an unanswered question. I can scarcely recall an exception. Kurtz, Lord Jim, Razumov, Nostromo, Captain Whalley, Yanko Goorall, Verloc, Heyst, Gaspar Ruiz, Almayer: one and all they are destroyed and made a mock of by the blind, incomprehensible forces that beset them." (Mencken, 8)

Axel Heyst is not a typical hero: his actions and their consequences point to a unique outlook on life. He is a "puffect g'n'lman. Puffect! But he's a ut-uto-utopist." (JC,V) The hero of

Victory is a man who gave up society. His behavior is strange when compared to some of the characters in the novel: Davidson, a self-proclaimed protector of Heyst, who considers him a genuine gentleman, has a life that is focused on routine. The narrator mentions how "Davidson's existence, too, running the Sissie along the Java Sea and back again, was distinctly monotonous and, in a sense, lonely", only that Heyst's loneliness is of a different kind. It is self-inflicted, and he rarely tries to get away from it. Heyst enjoys solitude and silence, and does not find pleasure in the tastes of the common people. Zangiacomo's orchestra, when playing at Schomberg's hotel, is, to him, "not making music" but rather "murdering silence with a vulgar, ferocious energy", and he rejects the frivolous enjoyment that is spread amongst society.

His enemy is doubled: it lies in the form of society itself, with its harsh judgmental gossip and undesired critique, and in the more (or less) human form of Mr. Jones, Ricardo, and Pedro. These men are also outcasts, yet they do not reject action, but rather enforce it fully to their own purposes. Like Schomberg, they are a full antithesis of Heyst, but not from a mental, philosophy point of view, but rather from the point of view of pure action, activity and livelihood. Though the actions of the three go against the rules of society, at least they take full advantage of their mobility. They do their best to work life to their advantage, whereas Heyst's sole plan in life since late childhood is elegantly "drifting through life without catching on to anything" (JC,V). Heyst's consideration that "all action is bound to be harmful. It is devilish. That is why this world is evil upon the whole" (JC,V) seems correct, since all action he enterprises eventually ends catastrophically: "First, it was the Morrison partnership of mystery, then came the great sensation of the Tropical Belt Coal where indeed varied interests were involved: a real business matter. And then came this elopement, this incongruous phenomenon of self-assertion, the greatest wonder of all, astonishing and amusing"(JC,V), the theft of an unhappy girl. Along the plot of the novel, Heyst goes against his own philosophy several times, with disastrous results. The last worldly affair he takes on is the "kidnapping" of Lena, a member of a female orchestra that plays for a while in Schomberg's hotel. Heyst notices the cruel treatment she is subjected to, the lack of freedom in her own life, and her general unhappiness. With the startling help of Mrs. Schomberg, a woman who "looks too stupid to understand human speech and too scared to shoo a chicken away"(JC,V), the two manage to escape society and retreat to Samburan, Heyst's refuge.

However, the hotelkeeper and Zangiacomo, the girl's manager, do not take this lightly. Schomberg's hatred for Heyst is now fueled by something which can, at last, be taken personally, and he does so at full. The hotelkeeper had tried to seduce Lena, but his repulsive demeanor and his "Teutonic character" had scared and distanced her from him. He cannot comprehend his own fault in the matter, and since Heyst had always been the scapegoat of all his frustrations, this proves to be the perfect occasion for Schomberg's hatred to overflow. He strongly seeks revenge and sees an opportunity of applying it through his new, scary, guest: Mister Jones. Though against his outwardly character, Schomberg is "distinctly mystified and impressed" by the strange apparition at first, but this interest soon turns into horror as he understands the occupation of the men he hosts. He is, for the first time, humiliatingly obedient and careful towards a guest, feeling that his life is in danger. However, he sees an occasion to send the dangerous men to Samburan, to retrieve the girl and so take his revenge on Heyst, and he succeeds. Schomberg uses bait that he sees is the fittest for the likes of Jones: money. Jones, though not perfectly convinced, decides to take the job, and sets sail with Pedro and Ricardo towards Heyst's island, thinking that the man is hiding a treasure.

This is when Heyst is fully attacked, but not physically. His peace of mind is again disturbed, but like never before, not even like the time of Morrison's death. Conrad himself mentions that "It is very obvious that on the arrival of the gentlemanly Mr. Jones, the single-minded Ricardo, and the faithful Pedro, Heyst, the man of universal detachment, loses his mental self-

possession, that fine attitude before the universally irremediable which wears the name of stoicism" (JC, Notes on My Books, 112). Everything he had secured for himself on Samburan, the peaceful living he enjoyed with the girl, with Wang, his Chinese helper, and the quiet, puffing volcano in the distance – an omen, one might say – all of this is threatened when the three strangers arrive on his island, haggard, exhausted, in the poorest condition. Even when they merely seek the help of Heyst, the lone man begins to feel anxiety - he feels out of place and can foresee disaster. The refuge he had created for himself is now threatened, and he feels pushed into his least desired course: action.

Action, to Heyst, is doom, and it is action that Heyst hates most, not responsibility. Heyst does not run from responsibility as it is, he rather embraces is, being, after all, a Baron, and a man of strength of character and fairness. What he runs from is actual involvement. This mentality is to be blamed on the death of his father, an intellectual "expatriated Swede who died in London, dissatisfied with his country and angry with all the world, which had instinctively rejected his wisdom." (JC,V) The young Heyst is strongly impressed by his father, and chooses to "drift" through life: "He did not mean intellectually or sentimentally or morally. He meant to drift altogether and literally, body and soul, like a detached leaf drifting in the wind-currents under the immovable trees of a forest glade; to drift without ever catching on to anything."(JC,V)

Joseph Conrad writes, in his Author's Note for Victory: "Thinking is the great enemy of perfection. The habit of profound reflection, I am compelled to say, is the most pernicious of all the habits formed by the civilized man." (JC, V, Author's Note, 2) This mentality is to be found with Heyst, who advises Lena along such lines: "Thought, action—so many snares! If you begin to think you will be unhappy." (JC,V) It would be understood, then, that avoiding reflectiveness or thoughtful meditation would grant Heyst happiness, alongside separation from the norm and solitude. However, it is clear that he does not consider himself a happy man; Also, seeking happiness would go against his principles, as "he had been used to think clearly and sometimes even profoundly, seeing life outside the flattering optical delusion of everlasting hope, of conventional self-deceptions, of an ever-expected happiness". Heyst's own conduct is a contradiction to his system of thought. He also mentions to Davidson early in the novel, with the latter's first visit after Lena arrives on Samburan, that at one point he thought that "intelligent observation of facts was the best way of cheating the time which is allotted to us" (JC,V). Why should cheating our given time be a purpose? By disconnecting oneself from social responsibility, life, through its gained easiness, turns to a pleasant simplicity - much like the Biedermeier movement of XVIIth century Germany, which implied detachment from one's outside social role and seeking comfort and refuge among one's close friends and family. However, Heyst had not always been immobile in his Samburan sanctuary - his life had been one of traveling, and even though his experiences are not narrated, he often offers hints of his adventures and of his youth. Although his self-imposed exile suggests a limitless preference for solitude, it is written that "It was the very essence of his life to be a solitary achievement, accomplished not by hermit-like withdrawal with its silence and immobility, but by a system of restless wandering, by the detachment of an impermanent dweller amongst changing scenes. In this scheme he had perceived the means of passing through life without suffering and almost without a single care in the world—invulnerable because elusive." (JC,V)

"This shall be my defense against life", Heyst announces. However, this invulnerability is spoiled by the mechanisms he cannot control, the ones he avoids: taking Lena away from Schomberg's hotel would be a simple act with rather happy consequences, but the world moves without Heyst. The machines put into motion by even the best, most selfless intentions – as it was in the case of aiding Morrison, as it is with helping the English girl – work Heyst to bitter conclusions, in concordance to his way of thinking.

The visit of Mr. Jones bears with it a memory of the words that the narrator of the first part of “Victory” told Davidson, when asked what he thought would come of Heyst’s rescue of the girl: “Repentance, I should say”, and he does so casually, unflinching in his playful, prophetic tone. Repentance does work its way up to Samburan, in the shape of the devilish Jones, bringing with him the cruelty of the world. Mr. Jones, when asked how he defines himself, replies to Heyst: “I, my dear sir? In one way I am—yes, I am the world itself, come to pay you a visit. In another sense I am an outcast—almost an outlaw. If you prefer a less materialistic view, I am a sort of fate—the retribution that waits its time.”(JC,V) Jones is thus the world Heyst tried to escape, come to pay him a visit. The protagonist’s belief that he could defy the fates in Samburan was, then, mistaken – the fates cannot be defied, and one’s allotted time cannot be cheated, as “the world is a bad dog” and it is relentless in applying its rules and boundaries.

The island Heyst inhabits is, at this point, filled only with outcasts of the highest quality, symbols of rebellion against commonality. Not one of the characters on Samburan at this point fit into its rules and expectations – not even Wang and his barely mentioned wife – not one of them has committed the sin of letting themselves be dulled by public norm. This is an occasion for each of the individuals to let their true convictions and views of life shine through. Much of the tension of this part of the novel is generated by the dialogues between Heyst, now in a position of vulnerability and weakness, and Jones, a gambler and a hunter. Heyst is alone, save for Lena, whom he does his best to protect. He tries all the while to hide the real situation and his own fears from her, but as much as he can appreciate her intelligence, hidden behind her “veiled grey eyes”, he could not foresee the true extent of her understanding. It is actually Lena who manages to repeatedly save him – Lena, the one who, as Heyst, had drifted through life. She is comparable to Heyst through the prism of control over one’s destiny: while Heyst willingly means to cheat time and reject action, Lena does exactly so, even better than him, yet she does not desire it. She is caught against her will in a whirl that keeps her away from even acknowledging her own position in life. Unlike Heyst, the baron, her origins are humble: "She was almost a child of the streets. Her father was a musician in the orchestras of small theatres. Her mother ran away from him when she was little (…) It was never positive starvation and absolute rags, but it was the hopeless grip of poverty all the time”. (JC,V) She is never completely aware of even her surroundings, having been taken across the land by Zangiacomo, and has no plans for escape or for the future until Heyst steps in to save her. She is the reality of Heyst’s dispositions – without power of thought, as “thinking is the great enemy of perfection”, without power of action, as “all action is (…) devilish”, Lena is the true outcome of Heyst’s philosophy, its very embodiment, since he himself goes against his own teachings multiple times and cannot live up to his standards. Then, wouldn’t Lena be the answer to his implied question? A life without action is, in fact, empty and lacking control. Lena does not feel alive until her escape to Samburan (the island she sees as a new home and refuge, in which she sees rebirth rather than death, as Heyst would). Mr. Jones has a close to sickly apathetical disposition when he feels there is nothing to do or nothing to challenge him. Heyst is only visible to the community when he indulges in activity, and only then is his presence felt or does his life have meaning in the whole. However, his plea to elegance is not meaningless, nor is his fight. His conduct and philosophy demonstrate the stirrings of a new national anxiety in the wake of a new age, and “Victory” stands as "a highly complex allegorical work whose psychological landscape and narrative structure lay the groundwork for the modern novel." (Leonard Orr, Theodore Billy, A Joseph Conrad Companion, 233)

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LEVEL ORDERING IN L2 ENGLISH

Raluca CRÂȘMARIU, Roxana DIN, Gabriela IOSIF

1. Introduction

There is a general debate in the literature with respect to how children acquire a second language (L2). One can identify three main approaches. According to one approach, child L2 learning is qualitatively similar to adult L2 learning, i.e. the way in which children acquire a second language is different from the way in which they acquire their native language: parameter setting, discovery procedures and processing mechanisms are different. The order of emergence of various structures, the inventory of errors, the vulnerable domains are similar to what has been reported for L2 learning in general (see, e.g. White 2003). There is, however, a second approach, which builds on the Critical Period Hypothesis. This approach assumes that child L2 learning is similar to L1 acquisition. The learning process that children go through is different from that of adult L2 learners. More recently, Meisel (2011) argues that 'the most plausible hypothesis is indeed that the grammatical knowledge acquired by cL2 [child L2] learners will resemble aL2 [adult L2] knowledge in some of its properties, but that it should share others with the respective L1 grammars.' (p. 211). The age factor plays an important part; child L2 learning can resemble adult L2 learning and L1 acquisition 'to variable degrees, depending on the age of onset of acquisition.' (p. 211)

In the present study we test these hypotheses against experimental data coming from child L2 English in an L1 Romanian learning context, a learning context which is absent from the available literature. We investigate the L2 learning of derivational morphology, a domain which has not received much attention in child L2 studies. We focus on access to level ordering (Kiparsky 1982, 1983) in the L2 acquisition of morphological rules.

Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the background. Since our study is an L2 learning replica of Gordon's (1994) L1 acquisition study, we will discuss the aim, the method, and the results reported in his paper. Section 3 contains our own study conducted on Romanian L1 children who learn English as their L2: predictions, method, participants, results, and discussion. The conclusions of the study are summarized in Section 4.

2. Background

Gordon (1994) investigates the way in which English children acquire word-formation. In particular, he puts to test the hypothesis according to which children have access to the rules of level-ordering (as described in Kiparsky 1982). The main assumption of his paper is that children have access to universal grammar (UG) in L1 acquisition; certain phenomena, such as level-ordering, are innate in first language acquisition. The study and its results are presented in this section.

Gordon's paper starts from the hypothesis that there is an ordering of rule application in the domain of morphology. Rules are assumed to belong to three levels (Kiparsky 1982) (summarized in Table 1).

Table 1. Level-ordering according to Kiparksy (1982)

	Rules
Level 1	▪ Irregular inflection: *mice, oxen* ▪ Pluralia tantum: *scissors, clothes* ▪ Semantically unpredictable derivational affixes (not productive, host deforming) *-ion, -ous, -ity, -th, in-*
Level 2	▪ Semantically predictable derivational affixes *-ness, -ism, -er, -ist, un-* ▪ Compounding rules
Level 3	Regular inflection (non-deforming, semantically predictable): -s, -ed, -ing

The main idea is that rules pertaining to the three levels cannot be applied randomly. Their application is constrained by the level to which they belong so that rules at a later level cannot be applied before rules at a previous level. That is why, for example, we do not expect to find compounds with regular plurals (e.g. *rats eater), since compounding takes place at level 2 and the regular inflection of an element belongs to level 3. On the other hand, irregular items should be allowed to occur in compounds since irregular inflections belong to level 1 (e.g. mice eater); and this is also the case for *pluralia tantum* (e.g. scissors eater). According to Gordon (1994), there is no semantic reason for the acceptability in compounds of irregular plurals, but not of regular plurals. Also, there is little evidence in the input which would help children place irregular plurals inside compounds and exclude regular plurals from the same compounds.

Given the fact that the input is not informative enough and also the lack of semantic cues with respect to why regular plurals are excluded from compounds, the question that arises is how children can learn these rules. A plausible assumption is that if children form compounds correctly from a very early stage, this can be accounted for in terms of access to innate principles, i.e. level-ordering, which allow the child to form compounds correctly. According to Gordon, there are 3 developmental predictions to be made with respect to plurals within compounds:

1. As soon as the child acquires regular plural morphology, the regular forms should be reduced to singulars inside compounds.
2. As soon as the child stops overregularizing an irregular form, then these forms should be allowed inside compounds.
3. As soon as the child learns that *pluralia tantum* are irregular, then they too should optionally occur inside compounds.

These predictions were evaluated against experimental data coming from 33 English-speaking children with ages between 3;2 and 5;10, divided into three age groups. The goal of the study was to investigate if children can produce compounds like *rat-eater* correctly.

The task included test sentences with irregular plurals, *pluralia tantum* and regular plurals. Both irregular pluralized nouns and *pluralia tantum* were matched with regular nouns: *mouse/rat, man/baby, tooth/bead, foot/hand, goose/duck, clothes/toy, pants/shirt, glasses/shoe, scissors/knife.*

The subjects were tested individually. Each subject was told a story designed in such a way that at the end the child was asked to elicit a compound containing one of the nouns (be it regular, irregular, *pluralia tantum*) and the word 'eater'. This presupposed some training in producing compounds. At this stage the child was given the right form of the compound by the experimenter and he/she was helped in this respect for as many times as it was necessary so that he/she would learn the mechanism. When the experimenter was sure that the child understood what he/she had to do, they proceeded to the main items. At the same time the experimenter had to make sure that the

children knew the difference between singular and plural and that they used these forms appropriately.

The two first predictions were supported by the data. Subjects correctly reduced the pluralized form of the noun inside compounds at all ages. The overregularized irregular nouns were also reduced to singular forms in compounds. In the majority of cases they also reduced to the singular form the irregular form treated as a base (mice-eater), while when producing the correct irregular pattern, the subjects allowed their occurrence inside compounds. As soon as children showed that they knew the irregular forms, they produced them inside compounds. Moreover, they never assumed that irregular plurals behave like regular ones inside compounds. In this case it was noted that the last word in the testing context was sometimes important in determining which form of the irregular noun (singular-plural) was used in the compound.

As for the *pluralia tantum*, the prediction was that they should be optionally allowed in compounds in their plural form. The analysis of responses revealed two patterns: one in which items were reduced to their singular form (*scissor, glass*) and one in which this phenomenon din not happen (*clothes, pants*). The tendency to reduce *glasses* to *glass* declined with age. One explanation for the first pattern is the existence of another referent in the world, which is referred to as 'glass' (drinking glass). It is argued that, at least in the beginning, it might be difficult for a child to make the distinction between them and, thus, he/she might easily make this type of error. At the same time, *scissor* was found with some adults as well.

Summing up, the findings reported in Gordon (1994) show that the child's lexicon is richly structured. The fact that children do not have sufficient input to help them learn the appropriate forms of the compounds provides further evidence that this may represent an innate system of the lexicon. It is argued that children learn, in fact, particular words and morphological rules and are guided by innate principles.

3. The Study

3.1. Goal

The aim of the present study is to test access to level-ordering in L2 learning. Gordon's (1994) study provides evidence that children acquiring English as their L1 form *rat eater* compounds in accordance with Kiparsky's level-ordering hypothesis. Gordon's conclusion is that children do not have sufficient input to help them learn the appropriate forms of compounds but are guided by innate principles. We extend Gordon's study to L2 learning with a view to testing whether Romanian children who are learning English as L2 show the same tacit knowledge of level ordering in their formation of compounds of the rat eater type.

3.2. Predictions

According to the innateness hypothesis (see Avram 2002 for a discussion), children have access to UG in the acquisition of their native language. As seen in the previous section, there is no general consensus with respect to the nature of the learning of a second language by children. In particular, there is no consensus with respect to whether they acquire a second language in a manner similar to the way in which they acquire their native language. If they acquire a second language in a manner similar to the way in which they acquire their L1, level-ordering should be innate in L2. This predicts that:

- Child L2 learners should change regular plurals into singulars inside compounds;
- Child L2 learners should produce compounds containing irregular plurals;
- Child L2 learners should give two response types with *pluralia tantum,* as documented for L1 in Gordon's (1994) study.

On the other hand, if L1 interferes in child L2 learning, we predict some transfer errors. For example, when the meaning of the tested noun is not fully understood or when a morphological rule is not known the L2 learner will call on his/her native grammar for 'help'. One can also predict that the response patterns might differ from the ones reported for L1 in Gordon's (1994) study.

3.3 Method

3.3.1 Participants

We conducted the study in two kindergartens (the 86th Kindergarten, Bucharest and the 251st Kindergarten, Bucharest) and one elementary school (the 92nd Elementary School, Bucharest). The test was conducted over a period of two weeks, between the 16th and 31st of March 2015.

Subjects included fifty Romanian children divided into two groups of twenty-five. Group I included 25 children, age range 5;0 to 6;6 (mean age: 5;6). Group II included 25 children, age range 9;3 to 11;1 (mean age: 10;8). All subjects came from middle-class Romanian families. They were all beginners with a few low-intermediate participants. The ratio male/female was 18/32. The data are given in Appendix 1.

3.3.2 Task

Our study is a replica of Gordon's experiment, which was adapted to second language learners. We designed an elicited production task whose aim was to investigate child L2 learners' knowledge of *rat eater* compounds. The task included 12 test sentences and 4 control items. We tested three conditions: (i) compounds with regular nouns (RN) (1); (ii) compounds with irregular nouns (IR) (2); (iii) compounds with *pluralia tantum* nouns (PT) (3). The control items were compounds with mass terms (4):

(1) apple eater
(2) mice eater
(3) scissors eater
(4) cheese eater

The mass noun category was used as a control in order to see if the children understood how compounds must be formed. Each category included four nouns, as follows: RN: *rat, egg, carrot, doll*; IR: *mice, teeth, geese, feet*; MN: *bread, cheese, corn, honey*; PT: *scissors, glasses, clothes, pants*. The head noun used to form the compound was *eater.* The '*eaters*' were represented by three funny-looking monsters, who liked to eat all sort of things. The monsters were given names in order to make the experiment more attractive to the subjects. The elicitation part took the form of a short story. Each of the monsters was placed in a specific situation in which it had to eat the objects labelled by the noun to be tested. Both singular and plural forms of the nouns were used in the story. At the end of the story the child was required to say how the monster that eats that object is called (e.g. *rat-eater, mice-eater, scissors-eater, bread-eater*).

All subjects were tested individually in a bias-free environment by the authors of this study after official permission was obtained. The subjects were presented with the picture of a monster and told the story while the object depicting the noun to be tested gradually appeared on the screen as if the monster ate it. At the end of this process the subject was required to use the compound noun describing the picture on the screen. The stimuli included a power-point presentation. One example is given in (5) below:

(5) RN1: APPLE

Elicitation part: This is Hairy. He likes fruits. Look, he is eating an apple. He likes to eat apples. He is called an….

Expected answer: an apple eater.

We also included a warm-up section in order to ensure that the subjects understand the task. This section included a cookie-monster that ate cookies, a dog that ate bones and one of the monsters used for the actual test.

Before the test, the subjects were taught the meaning of each noun. Most of them had previous knowledge on how regular plurals are formed in English. They had not been explicitly taught the plurals of irregular nouns or compounding.

The scoring was done on answer sheets that included the warm-up questions and the sixteen stories. They also included the name of the subject, age, date of birth, gender and proficiency level. The paragraphs containing the tested nouns were arranged in random order so as to prevent setting a pattern. Each of the nouns was coded for easier further identification. The answers were recorded by ticking the correct box on the answer sheet or, if the elicitation produced were not available among the proposed answers it would have been hand written in the *other* category. A voice-recording device was also used to record responses as a back-up to manual scoring. An example of the answer sheet used is given in Appendix 2.

3.3.3 Results

The overall results are summarized in Table 2 below:

Table 2. Correct responses

Group	RN	IN	PT	MT
5;0-6;6	43	45	71	82
9;3-11;1	41	79	84	93

For the younger group, a two-way ANOVA without replication reveals significant individual variation (p= .00) as well as a main effect of condition (p = .00), i.e. the responses to the different conditions and the control items were different. Post-hoc t-tests with Bonferroni correction showed that there was no difference between the responses to conditions 1 and 2 (p>.01), i.e. there was no difference between compounds with regular and irregular plurals. But the difference reaches significance between conditions 1 and 3 (p < .01) and between conditions 2 and 3 (p <.01). The responses are significantly better with compounds which contain a *pluralia tantum* noun. The difference between *pluralia tantum* and the control items with mass terms is not significant (p = .02).

Similarly, for the older group a two-way ANOVA without replication revealed a main effect of condition ($p = .00$). But individual variation does not reach significance. Post-hoc t-tests with Bonferroni correction revealed a significant difference between responses to compounds with regular and with irregular plurals ($t(25)= -4.38$, $p = .000$) and between responses to compounds with regular and pluralia tantum ($t(25)=-5.44$, $p=.000$). This shows that the compounds with regular plurals were the most vulnerable ones for the L2 learners in this group. The difference between responses to compounds with irregular plurals and *pluralia tantum* nouns did not reach significance ($t(25)=-1$, $p > .05$). There was no significant difference between responses to compounds with *pluralia tantum* and the control items (mass terms) ($t(25)=1.52$, $p > .05$).

The L2 learners in both groups performed below chance in the first condition. The difference between the two groups in this condition does not reach significance ($p<.05$). The analysis of their responses shows that the L2 learners incorrectly used regular plurals in compounds of the *rat-eater* type. The younger group gave 39 responses which contained a regular plural inside the compound (as in 6). The other 18 responses represented nouns modified by a prepositional phrase (as in 7):

(6) Hairy also likes vegetables. He was in the garden and he found a carrot. He likes to eat carrots. He is a carrots eater.
(7) Hairy also likes vegetables. He was in the garden and he found a carrot. He likes to eat carrots. He is a eater carrot.

The 9;3-11;1 group gave 55 responses which contained a regular plural inside the compound and only 4 responses which contained a noun modified by a prepositional phrase.

With respect to the second condition one notices an obvious difference between the two groups. The younger group randomly used a singular (42) or a plural (45) form (illustrated in 8) inside the compound. In 13 cases, their response included a noun modified by a prepositional phrase (see 9):

(8) a.This is Chubby. He is hungry. He found a tooth. He likes to eat teeth. He is a tooth eater.
b.This is Chubby. He is hungry. He found a tooth. He likes to eat teeth. He is a teeth eater.
(9) This is Chubby. He is hungry. He found a tooth. He likes to eat teeth. He is a eater-tooth.

The older group performed significantly better in this task. The responses to condition 3 are significantly better. The L2 learners in both groups formed a high number of correct compounds with *pluralia tantum* nouns. A two-sample t-test reveals that the difference between the two groups is not significant ($t(43)=-1.25$, $p=.21$). Their response pattern was similar: when they did not use the correct *pluralia tantum* noun inside the compound, they replaced it with the singular form. There was no difference between *pluralia tantum* compounds and the control items with mass terms in either group.

3.4 Discussion

Our prediction was that if child L2 learners acquire a second language in a manner similar to L1 acquisition, they should have tacit knowledge of level-ordering and form compounds in accordance with this rule: (i) they should change regular plurals into singulars inside compounds; (ii) they should produce compounds containing irregular plurals;(iii) they should give two response types with *pluralia tantum,* as documented for L1 in Gordon's (1994) study.

Our data reveal that L2 learners can form compounds of the *rat eater* type from the onset of the learning process. The rate of correct responses to control items was high with both groups. The rate of correct responses was also high with *pluralia tantum* nouns, which indicates that child l2 learners may have tacit knowledge of the level-ordering constraint, on a par with L1 learners. They gave two response types, as shown for L1 in Gordon's (1994) study.

The rate is, however, below chance with regular nouns in both groups, i.e. the L2 learners did not consistently change regular plurals into singulars inside compounds. We interpret the data as showing that the L2 learners have not internalized plural morphology yet and they randomly use the singular or the plural form inside compounds. The older group performed significantly better in condition 2, which indicates that this group has better knowledge of irregular plural forms and, consequently, allows them inside compounds. The reason for which the rate of correct responses to conditions 1 and 2 with the younger group and to condition 1 with the older group is low can be accounted for in terms of lack of knowledge of morphological form.

4. Conclusion

The aim of the present study was to investigate access to UG in child L2 learning. In particular, we investigated to what extent early compounding in child L2 learning is constrained by the level-ordering rule. Our data revealed that child L2 learners' compounds of the *rat eater* type observe this constraint. However, the learners lag behind with respect to knowledge of plural morphology. The results are not surprising. They are in line with several previous studies which revealed access to UG in child L2 learning and with those which showed that learning of morphological forms lags behind rule learning.

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Appendix 1. Participants

Name	Date of Birth	Age	Gender	Proficiency level
T.A.	28.12.2009	5;3	F	Beginner
I.T.	28.05.2009	5;10	F	Beginner
P.L.	09.02.2009	6;1	M	Beginner
O.S.	01.02.2009	6;1	F	Beginner
G.S.	15.09.2009	5;6	F	Beginner
O.E.	14.05.2009	5;10	F	Beginner
C.M.	14.12.2009	5;3	F	Beginner
S.D.	22.12.2008	6;3	M	Beginner

B.D.	17.02.2009	6;1	M	Beginner
S.K.	28.04.2009	5;11	F	Beginner
T.A.	24.09.2008	6;6	M	Beginner
V.I.	11.12.2008	6;3	F	Beginner
P.T.	17.08.2009	5;7	F	Beginner
T.M.	20.10.2009	5;5	F	Beginner
O.C.	13.01.2010	5;2	F	Beginner
N.A.	21.03.2010	5;0	F	Beginner
V.A.	17.08.2009	5;7	F	Beginner
S.S.	28.09.2009	5;6	F	Beginner
P.S.	17.06.2009	5;9	F	Beginner
P.A.	3.05.2009	5;10	M	Beginner
P.I.	31.03.2010	5;0	F	Beginner
G.R.	27.03.2010	5;0	M	Beginner
P.M.	20.03.2010	5;0	M	Beginner
G.R.	14.11.2008	6;4	M	Beginner
I.A.	22.10.2008	6;5	F	Beginner
	Mean age:	5;6		
V.L.	24.02.2005	10;1	F	Beginner
G.AM.	22.12.2005	9;3	F	Beginner
M.A.	19.01.2005	10;2	F	Beginner
O. S.	9.04.2004	10;11	M	Beginner
E.A.	16.08.2004	10;7	M	Low-Intermediate
M.D.	27.07.2004	10;8	M	Low-Intermediate
B.R.	14.08.2004	10;7	M	Beginner
I.C.	30.03.2004	11;0	F	Beginner
V.M.	26.08.2004	10;7	M	Beginner
I.A.	3.01.2005	10;2	M	Beginner
N.G.	9.12.2005	9;3	M	Beginner
D.D.	11.02.2004	11;1	F	Beginner
C.S.	29.10.2004	10;5	F	Beginner
S.A.	17.02.2005	10;1	F	Beginner
S.I.	2.06.2004	10;9	F	Beginner
R.A.	26.01.2005	10;2	M	Beginner
P.I.	31.05.2004	10;10	F	Beginner
C.D.	13.01.2005	10;2	M	Beginner
U.A.	10.07.2005	9;8	F	Low-Intermediate
I.A.	31.10.2004	10;5	F	Beginner
I.S.	30.10.2004	10;5	F	Low-Intermediate
C.A.	1.04.2004	10;11	F	Low-Intermediate
M.A.	17.09.2004	10;6	F	Beginner
G.S.	10.10.2004	10;5	M	Beginner
N.C.	12.08.2004	10;7	F	Beginner
P.M.	17.10.2004	10;5	F	Beginner
	Mean age:	10;8		

Appendix 2. Score sheet

Warm-up

WU1: COOKIE

Look, this is a cookie monster. He likes to eat cookies. He is eating one cookie, two cookies, three cookies, many cookies. He is a cookie eater.

WU2: BONE

Look, this is Spot. He likes to eat bones. He eats one bone, two bones, three bones, many bones. He is a bone eater.

WU3: APPLE

This is Hairy. He likes fruits. Look, he is eating an apple. He likes to eat apples. He is called an (apple eater).

Apple ☐

Apples ☐

Other:……

Test

RN3: CARROT

Hairy also likes vegetables. He was in the garden and he found a carrot. He likes to eat carrots. He is a (carrot eater).

Carrot ☐

Carrots ☐

Other:……

MN2: CHEESE

Grumpy is at the farm. Cheese is his favorite food. He wants to eat some cheese. He is a (cheese eater).

Cheese ☐

Cheeses ☐

Other:……

PT3: CLOTHES

Grumpy didn't find anything to eat today. He goes in the closet and starts eating clothes. They taste so good. Grumpy is a (clothes eater).

Clothes ☐

Clotheses ☐

Other:……

IR2: TOOTH-TEETH

This is Chubby. He is hungry. He found a tooth. He likes to eat teeth. He is a (teeth eater).

Tooth ☐

Teeth ☐

Other:……

MN3: CORN

Hairy is at the farm, where he saw some delicious corn. He likes eating corn. He is a (corn eater).

Corn ☐

Corns ☐

Other:……

Break: Hairy liked eating corn so much that he started popping.

MN4: HONEY

Grumpy sees a bee. He wants some honey. Honey is sooo sweet. He loves eating honey. He is a (honeyeater).

Honey ☐

Honeys ☐

Other:……

PT 1: SCISSORS

Chubby is in the house. He saw a pair of scissors. It looks so tasty! He likes to eat scissors. He is a (scissors eater).

Scissors ☐

Scissorses ☐

Other:……

RN2: EGG

Look, this is Grumpy. Grumpy likes eggs. He is eating an egg right now. He is an (egg eater).

Egg ☐

Eggs ☐

Other:……

MN1: BREAD

Chubby is in the kitchen. He finds some bread. He likes eating bread. He is a (bread eater).

Bread ☐

Breads ☐

Other:……

IR4: FOOT-FEET

Before he goes to bed, Chubby always eats a foot. He likes to eat feet at night. He is a (feet eater).

Foot ☐

Feet ☐

Other:……

RN1: RAT

Grumpy likes animals. He likes to eat them. Look, he saw a rat. He eats rats. He is a (rat eater).

Rat ☐

Rats ☐

Other:……

PT2: GLASSES

Chubby's grandfather wears glasses. Chubby wants to eat the glasses. He is a (glasses eater).

Glasses ☐

Glasseses ☐

Other:……

Break: Chubby is full of glasses. He's got the hiccups.

IR3: GOOSE-GEESE

Grumpy is walking in the park. There are many geese in the park. He likes geese very much. He is a (geese eater).

Goose ☐

Geese ☐

Other:……

RN4: DOLL

Here is Chubby again. Chubby is very strange. He eats all kind of things. He is eating a doll right now. He likes to eat dolls. He is a (doll eater).

Doll ☐

Dolls ☐

Other:……

PT4: PANTS

Grumpy swallowed some pants. He is crazy about eating pants. He is a (pants eater).

Pant ☐

Pants ☐

Other:……

IR1: MOUSE-MICE

Remember Grumpy? Now he saw a mouse. He also likes to eat delicious mice. He is a (mice eater).

Mouse ☐

Mice ☐

Other:……

ANDROGYNY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SELF IN VIRGINIA WOOLF'S *ORLANDO* (1928)

Alina Nicoleta DUMINICĂ

The aim of this paper is to discuss and analyze the exploration of sex, gender, and sexuality, as well as the way in which identity is constructed in relation to societal norms, in Virginia Woolf's mock-biography *Orlando* (1928), with a focus on the main character and his experiences. This approach employs Judith Butler's ideas on gender performativity, as theorized in her work *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1999), and Simone de Beauvoir's description of the "second sex".

The concepts of sex, gender, and sexuality are widely understood in Western societies, as Craps underlines, through the relation between them; a relation which satisfies the binary heterosexual matrix. There is first a (biological) sex which differentiates bodies anatomically into "male" and "female". Gender is based on this given sex and it is defined as being either "masculine" or "feminine", while sexuality should be heterosexual in view of heteronormativity. Therefore, an "intelligible identity", as Butler calls it, can be constructed through preserving "relations of coherence and continuity among sex, gender, and desire" (Craps, 52). Any deviation from the "norm" is considered "unintelligible" and consists an "abject" rather than a "subject" (Butler, 142) because it does not fit the binary gender system; it is an identity "in which gender does not follow from sex" and "the practices of desire do not 'follow' from either sex or gender" (Butler, 24). The androgynous main character of *Orlando* can be, as Craps emphasizes, a good candidate for this category. In Judith Butler's view gender is performative, which means that it is "manufactured through a sustained set of acts" (xv), being the product of society. It is the "doing" rather than the "doer" which is the main and most important element in this relation, due to the fact that the "doer" (or "subject") does not actually exist prior to discourse (Butler, 33). Virginia Woolf's novel, *Orlando*, can be discussed as depicting gender as performative (even as "performance", in this case). The self is not portrayed as unitary, but as a multitude of selves which either merge into one another or are seen in isolation. The experiences of the character, being both male and female, seem to support the idea that gender is socially constructed and gender roles are not, in fact, innate, but they are acquired by complying to a set of societal norms.

From the first line of *Orlando* the idea of sex is brought into focus: "he - for there could be no doubt of his sex, though the fashion of the time did something to disguise it" (Woolf, 13). The narrator's statement, which seems unnaturally emphasized, appears to warn the reader from the very beginning that the sex of the protagonist should be questioned, that there lies some ambiguity in the identity of the character. The young boy with "eyes like drenched violets" (Woolf, 15) may not be exactly who he seems. He may be posing, tricking the reader into thinking his identity can be easily defined. The narration follows the young man in the prime of his life. He becomes the treasurer of Queen Elizabeth I, falls in love with a Russian princess, isolates himself among books, and sometime during the seventeenth century is sent ambassador to Constantinople. During his stay he falls in a deep sleep, some sort of trance, the outcome of which will prove to be crucial for the development of his character. Orlando wakes up; he is no longer a man, but a woman. The protagonist becomes from "subject" "the Other", in de Beauvoir's words, halfway through the

narrative - "he stood upright in complete nakedness before us, and while the trumpets pealed Truth! Truth! Truth! we have no choice left but confess - he was a woman" (Woolf, 132). Even though the sudden change may surprise the reader, Orlando does not seem to give his sex a second thought. "The change of sex, though it altered their future, did nothing whatever to alter their identity", the narrator goes on, " but in future we must, for convention's sake, say 'her' for 'his', and 'she' for 'he'" (Woolf, 133).

It is only when she decides to return to England, that Orlando discovers what being a woman truly implies. She changes her Turkish trousers of ambiguous gender with a lady's dress, and, at the same time, she changes the freedom of androgyny for the constrictions of the gender role which she must comply to as a woman. When she feels "the coil of skirts about her leg" she realizes "with a start the penalties and the privileges of her position" (Woolf, 147). Lady Orlando is treated differently than Orlando used to be treated as a man; the captain is courteous, a poor sailor nearly dies due to the sight of "an inch or two of [her] calf." She finds herself in a situation where she is required to "act" her gender, because she grasps now that "women are not (...) obedient, chaste, scented, and exquisitely apparelled by nature" but they can only acquire these characteristics "by the most tedious discipline" (Woolf, 150). Her conclusion anticipates Simone de Beauvoir's famous statement that "one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman" (de Beauvoir, 273). Orlando must "perform" her gender, she must assemble the fragments which comprise the identity of a woman and act accordingly. These features which society expects a woman to bear are not innate, but must be practiced and attained. Returning to England she faces yet another major impediment which the sex change brings, she cannot inherit her property. She is considered either dead, or married with three kids by a dancer called Rosina Pepita, or a woman, and therefore she cannot possibly own the land of her family. Orlando sees her rights denied by a system which has always viewed woman as inferior. A lawsuit follows due to which she becomes quite famous among the population of London - there is a lady who fights for her rights, and, equally, for her own identity.

Clothes play an important role throughout the novel. They are the instruments which facilitate the performativity (or even performance) reading of gender. Through the garments which the character wears one dimension of her gender identity (being it the masculine or the feminine one) is stressed. However, what lies beneath is beyond the reach of the biographer or the reader, the true identity of the protagonist is androgynous and ambiguous, being impossible to grasp it completely. The outside appearance is a mask, a veil, it is used to confuse its public, to stimulate imagination. At one point the biographer asserts that it is very likely that "it is clothes that wear us and not we them" (Woolf, 180), arguing, however, that the differences between the sexes are more profound and clothes "are but a symbol of something hid deep beneath" (Woolf, 180). Nevertheless, the change of the pieces of clothing is still significant in understanding the gender fluidity presented in the text, as they offer the reader an insight into the manner in which gender operates in the construction of the androgynous identity of the protagonist. While wearing the gender-neutral Turkish coats and trousers and living among the gypsies, or by spending "her morning in a China robe of ambiguous gender" (Woolf, 211), Orlando does not seem to act according to a pre-assigned set of gender roles, enjoying a sort of freedom. It is when she puts on the dress of an English lady when she leaves the gypsies for England that her identity is shaped into the feminine form. The skirts impose certain restrictions - she feels rather passive, delicate. She knows the clothes of a woman constrain her movements more than a man's would (she wonders, rather ironically, if she could swim in them). This change of clothes seems to mold her personality as well - "she was becoming a little more modest, as women are, of her brains, and a little more vain, as women are, of her person" (Woolf, 179). The garments with which the character is attired facilitate a transition

from the androgynous identity to either the male or female sex. Underneath them there is hardly any essential change in Orlando's identity, but a vacillation between the masculine and the feminine is visible in terms of the manner in which the character sees herself in relation to the outside world. Judith Butler underlines that "it becomes impossible to separate out 'gender' from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained" (Butler, 6). Therefore, Orlando must comply to the set of norms which function in the English society over the centuries. She cannot escape the influence of society, and especially in the nineteenth century when the differences between the sexes become more and more evident.

Furthermore, Marcus emphasizes that clothes are also "used to suggest that sexual identity may well be a matter of costume, performance, and disguise" (Marcus, 129). Even after becoming a woman, Orlando engages in a sort of role-play. She dresses either as a woman, either as a man, or as neither of them. Her experience is richer, she understands deeply the sentiments of both sexes, for "her sex changed far more frequently than those who have worn only one set of clothing can conceive" (Woolf, 211). During the eighteenth century she frequently dresses as a man and experiences not only the freedom which the masculine gender role brings, but also the love of other women. She meets Nell, a prostitute, on one of the days when she is dressed as a man. While being with her Orlando starts to feel like she is turning into a "real" man again - "she looked, she felt, she talked like one" (Woolf, 207). The reader witnesses "the literal creation, or bringing into being through performance, of Orlando's masculinity (...) while Orlando performs as a man she is, to all intents and purposes, a man" (Watkins qtd. in Craps, 58). However, Orlando's female instincts reveal the girl's actions towards her as being a show performed in order to "gratify her masculinity". When Orlando admits that she is a woman, Nell's way of talking and acting changes abruptly, because her role is altered. This short episode illustrates the manner in which men and women interact, and how the woman puts herself in an inferior position merely to please her male companion. In front of the masculine figure she is delicate, fragile even, she stands "hoping, trembling, fearing". However, as Craps emphasizes, Woolf's concept of the gender performance as being rather a choice than a necessity does not fully comply with Butler's view that "there is no subject which decides on its gender; rather, gender is part of what decides the subject" (Craps, 61).

Orlando's escapes from the rigid barriers of her gender role come to an end once the nineteenth century begins with heavy clouds overcasting the sky of England. During the nineteenth century the differences between the sexes become clear-cut. The ambiguous clothing of the Elizabethan era, or the liberties provided by the eighteenth century are no longer tolerated, "the sexes drew further and further apart" (Woolf, 219). Even though during the Victorian era the voices of feminism start to be heard, women have a limited set of rights. They live in a men's world, and therefore they must follow the rules set by a patriarchal society. Women are first wives and mothers; they have no right to vote, own property, or even divorce their husbands. Their heavily restricted lives can be mirrored in the crinoline which they have to wear. Orlando has to adopt the inconvenient crinoline, as the custom was at that time, and her movements are even more restricted than before - "no longer could she stride through the garden with her dogs, or run lightly to the high mound and fling herself beneath the oak tree" (Woolf, 233-234). She becomes fearful at every step, she feels the need to follow "the spirit of the age", even though it is "antipathetic to her in the extreme"(Woolf, 233). Therefore, she feels the desperate need to marry. It follows her obsessively, she desires to have someone on whom she can rely in times of need - "each man and each woman has another allotted to it for life, whom it supports, by whom it is supported, till death them do part" (Woolf, 234).

The episode of Orlando's hasty engagement may leave the reader rather confused. Marmaduke Bonthrop Shelmerdine is introduced at a convenient time in the narrative. It is quite plausible that the character itself was created to mend Lady Orlando's broken heart, to fill the empty space left in her soul by the uncaring "spirit of the age" which presses her to find a husband. Shelmerdine's identity is similar to that of the protagonist herself; he is, it seems, androgynous. Their souls connect in an instant, details such as their names, or social position are only a formality, there is already mutual understanding between them. Yet, they doubt each other's identities - "an awful suspicion rushed into both their minds simultaneously." She cries " You're a woman, Shel!", while he responds with a similar exclamation "You're a man, Orlando!" (Woolf, 240). The suspicion continues even later, when the questions are resumed. In Woolf's novel identity is never a certainty, it is a matter of performance and masquerade. But there is no need for an explicit disguise, or an instance of cross-dressing for the reader, and in this case the characters themselves, to challenge the concept of identity.

There seems to be a constant oscillation between Orlando the man and Orlando the woman through the years, "for it was a mixture in her of man and woman, one being uppermost and then the other" (Woolf, 181). Her identity is comprised of both sexes - she is "excessively tender-hearted", but at the same time she does not pay enough attention to her own external appearance as a woman should do. The character is "woman-manly" or "man-womanly", a concept which Virginia Woolf explains in her lengthy essay "A Room of One's Own" (1929). The author burrows in her critical work Coleridge's idea that "a great mind is androgynous", and explains it suggestively through the image of a woman and a man who both get into a taxi which disappears in the scenery of the city. However, differently from the author's critical work, Orlando's meeting of oppositions does not happen exclusively in the mind, she is androgynous both in mind and body.

The biographer fails in fitting Orlando into a definite unitary being, her identity slips through his fingers. It is Woolf's satirical approach to the traditional form of the biography whose purpose is to follow the protagonist from the moment when he is born, and "from deed to deed, from glory to glory, from office to office" (Woolf, 14) to his death. Still, Orlando cannot be pinned down; she is a man, she is a woman, she is in disguise. The biographer feels hopeless - "What is more irritating than to see one's subject, on whom one has lavished so much time and trouble, slipping out of one's grasp altogether" (Woolf, 255). The voice of the narrator appears to echo the voice of the society itself, a society which tries to encapsulate its subjects into a strict binary system. Nevertheless, the narrator explains it himself: "Different though the sexes are, they intermix. In every human being a vacillation from one sex to the other takes place, and often it is only the clothes that keep the male or female likeness, while underneath the sex is the very opposite of what it is above" (Woolf, 181). It is not only the narrator, but Orlando herself who seems to be looking for her own identity. Throughout the whole novel Orlando appears to have been searching for her own identity in literature, by reading and writing. The poem, which the protagonist has been writing for centuries, "The Oak Tree", "comes to embody identity itself" (Marcus, 119). Its stained pages encompass the ardent ideals of an adolescent boy, the reflections of a woman living with the gypsies, unaware of her sex, and the thoughts of an adult woman in constant search for her inner self.

Towards the end of the novel, at the beginning of the twentieth century, there is a significant episode when Orlando is riding in her car. She asks, directly, "Orlando?", looking for her singular essential self who seldom comes. The multiplicity of selves surfaces, one after another, proceeding with their own discourse quite different from the previous one. The biographer tries to keep pace with its character, but he is overwhelmed. He admits it is a difficult task because " the truth is that

when we write of a woman, everything is out of place - culminations and perorations; the accent never falls where it does with a man" (Woolf, 297-298). The essence of the woman is not understood, both the reader and the biographer are mere eavesdroppers, they only listen to a woman talking to herself and cannot draw a precise conclusion on her identity. Just as Luce Irigaray argues, "women constitute a paradox, if not a contradiction, within the discourse of identity itself", they "are the 'sex' which is not 'one'" (Butler, 14).

As Caughie posits "Orlando defies conclusions", for there is no ultimate and definite conclusion one can draw upon identity (Caughie, 42). The experiences of a body are not universal, but subjective, "it is not the body-object described by biologists that actually exists, but the body as lived in by the subject" (de Beauvoir, 65). Just as the biographer himself admits that he does not hold the key to the meaning of life, it is safe to say that identity, similarly to life, can hardly be contained in words. It is the performative act, as Butler calls it, but which is, at the same time, influenced by society, and the world which surrounds the individual. The traditional binary system in inefficient because it does not encompass the complexity of identity, one is not strictly male/ masculine or female/ feminine. There is a combination of the two and a multitude of different selves which seem to operate within the individual.

In conclusion Virginia Woolf's novel, *Orlando: A Biography* (1928) can be discussed through its manner of viewing gender performativity, as theorized by Judith Butler in her volume *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, as well as through its revolutionary ideas on sex, gender, and sexuality. Through the androgynous main character, Woolf challenges the traditional Western binary system, and explores gender fluidity and ambiguity, employing sex-change and cross-dressing.

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COMPARING TWO AUTHORS AND TWO CHARACTERS: FLANNERY O'CONNOR CHANCES ON EDGAR ALLAN POE

Teodora Narcisa GIURGIU

> *Motto*: „The man who has attained consciousness of the present is solitary. The «modern» man has at all times been so, for every step towards fuller consciousness removes him further from his original, purely animal *participation mystique* with the herd, from submersion in a common unconsciousness. Every step forward means tearing oneself loose from the maternal womb of unconsciousness in which the mass of men dwells."
>
> (Jung, „The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man" 1, text emphasis)

The siding of two such writers as Edgar Allan Poe, the canonical figure of American Gothic literature and the forerunner of so many artistic currents dealing with the deepest depths of the human psyche, next to Flannery O'Connor, a modern, puzzling, yet rather shy presence placed in the literary pantheon at the Southern Gothic section, might seem unlikely, ironic, maybe even uncanny – yet, when one considers the two, their personalities (as the public knows them) and their works, the paring becomes almost a matter of predestination.

That one should find traces of Poe's influence on O'Connor's literary outcomes might not represent a huge surprise, yet the extent to which these traces reach and, what is more, the influence the Southern disciple might have upon the re-reading of the master should bring some degree of amazement to contemporary readership.

From an enlarged, universal perspective, the reader should bear in mind that

> there can be no innocent approach of Poe today [also due to] *intertextuality*: Poe's *influence* on generations of writers and film makers alike has been tremendous. There can be no more first time with any one of his masterpieces. (Peiu 16, text emphasis)

From an approach that would take into consideration the very precise locus, and furthermore, from a specific angle, the discovery, as worded by Richard Gray, that

> Poe as a writer of *the human mind* trapped between grotesque nightmares of *the irrational* (as in his best Gothic short stories and poems) and the idealized *triumph of reason*, personified by the brilliant detective [C. Auguste Dupin], has also rendered the romantic American author as a founding father of the Southern Myth. Since the Southern Myth writes the story of *mental confinement* between the two forces governing poetic imagination: the irrational and the rational, Poe – despite his atypical settings, and although he was not even a Southerner by birth – remains a characteristically Southern author (qtd. in Peiu 19, text emphasis)

could come as an epiphany to the reader – as one starts to witness the narrowing down of the distance placed not only by time, but also by space, between the two authors.

Further, Stroe goes on to state that

> Poe's *Mare Tenebrarum* [which] seems to allude to William Blake's cosmological idea of the «Sea of Time and Space» (time here being finite, while space infinite: the two form a «finitely infinite» unity), by which a matrix is meant which is unfathomably deep. („The Titanic Atom: Edgar Allan Poe's Romantic Cosmology in Eureka" 83, text emphasis)

How can this „«finitely infinite» unity" be such buckled so that the two literary figures come close to one each other?

> Poe underlines the distorting nature of time: the world in this view is similar to a palimpsest, on which the names of peoples are wiped away slowly, but surely, in a process similar to what happens to all of historical/temporal knowledge: some elements are lost with no possibility of being recovered whatsoever, while other elements are gained, in an irreversible process, in which cosmic entropy seems to be the absolute queen.(Stroe,*The Titanic Atom: Edgar Allan Poe's Romantic Cosmology in Eureka*, 83)

Thus, it is (finite) time which, through its capacity of selection, retains the essential names, carriers of vital, outlasting information, eliminating all trivial data – hence, unity is achieved and names are placed side by side, where once there was distance.

Covering the road from the archetypal scenery towards the more ecclesiastic format helps in making it clear that Flannery O'Connor, a strongly Southern-rooted person and author, yet aiming at the most general, even truismatic motifs, presents within her luminous Southern Gothic writings the stretch of Poe's shadowy artistic plume. It shall perhaps be interesting to see how much of this path can be made backwards, to uncover how much of a modern, yet deeply Catholic vision can be discovered at an earlier stage, in the dawns of the fantastic literature, a stage marked by a very specific form of mysticism, when „multiple vectors of psychological time and cosmic simplexity" worked to shape a new universe within the human being's frame of mind. (Stroe, *The Pendulum of History Explorations. Explorările Pendulului Istoriei. Towards a Science of Simplexity. Către o ştiinţă a Simplexităţii* 3)

Unexpectedly, there are many similarities between the two writers even contents-wise – and it is interesting to see what Anca Peiu tells us about Tzvetan Todorov's opinion on Edgar Allan Poe's literary features

> Todorov postulates that fantastic literature stems from an essential ambiguity, i.e. a hesitation between the uncanny – which does allow for some rational approach of mysterious dark phenomena decisive for the incidents in the story – and the marvelous – which allows no such interpretation. Todorov builds up his celebrated demonstration proceeding from Poe's classics: the novella The Fall of the House of Usher (1839) and the psychological thriller short story "William Wilson" (1844). It is remarkable that Todorov's interpretation tips the scale towards *the uncanny* in both cases. (Peiu 14-15, text emphasis)

One would argue that in his prose there are strong features belonging to both elements mentioned by Todorov, just as much as there can be both uncanniness and marvel to be found in his short life, hence „[i]n itself, Poe's life (and/in-death) story is rich in puzzling melodrama, mystery, and detection fiction aspects – as if in some hallucinatory mirror of his own fiction and poems." (Peiu 24)

Whilst the events and the setting belong to the *uncanny*, the *marvelous* in Edgar Allan Poe's works, paradoxically, springs out of both story line and in the denouement – which, one might argue, „tips the scale" firmly towards marvel. (Peiu 15)

Such a case in point can be found at the end of „The Story of William Wilson": for whilst the event of the killing can be attributed to the uncanny, and as an acceptable explanation (one of many), William Wilson's action of (self-)murder attributed to heavy intoxication and/or drug abuse, the narrative thread and the outcome stick with the marvelous – how did things come so far would be a typical reaction, the reader finding it almost necessary to go back to a reviewing of the thriller in hope of gaining some insight as to the matter – as well as the voice, whose voice is it that speaks in the first person singular, at the end, after the homicide?

It also stands to common sense, and not only, that a man that might suffer from a certain delusional episode of a pathological nature or that is under the influence of some hallucinogenic substance can hardly switch in a moment back and forth from irrationality

> I was wild with hate and anger; in my arm I felt the strength of a thousand men. In a few moments I had forced him back against the wall, and he was in my power. Quickly, **wildly**, I put my sword's point again and again into his heart (Poe 20; Part Four; text emphasis)

to a state of mental sanity which allows one to give the exact details and analysis of what had just happened

> «I have lost. Yet from now on you are also dead — dead to the World, dead to Heaven, dead to Hope! In me you lived — and, in my death — see by this face, which is your own, how **wholly**, how completely, you have killed — your self! » (Poe 21; Part Four; text emphasis and quotation marks)

Surprisingly or not, in all of Poe's stories, with the advancement of the plot, the psychological strand becomes less and less alien to us, for Edgar Allan Poe is extremely capable in surpassing the reader's consciousness and reaching the limen of the unconscious where the twisted phantasies and the outcomes of his characters' actions become fully acceptable even to the most skeptic of audience.

There is such a solid, almost logical way in which Poe constructs the narrative path and with it, the entire fantastic universe, that madness becomes the most plausible of realities – if not the only plausible reality, taking the reader back to one's personal anxieties, dreams and phantasies, and thus making of the reader an accomplice to the plot, only to have one thrown off and left marveling at the end of the story – or, as Peiu words it „the poet (i.e. *the maker* of this new living world) offers his […] readers the chance to enjoy *a double existence*, in a world of his […] making, as *if* the reader's own." (Peiu 31, text emphasis)

It is not hard to see how Flannery O'Connor steps unhesitatingly in the same direction, though, when turning the attention to her, one „had better let [one's] awareness of the knowledge in her stories grow quietly without forcing it". (Fitzgerald viii)

In O'Connor's writings the *marvelous* appears, as it were, in broad daylight throughout the entire work, mostly via the „heroes" populating it, and this can readily be put into words, though not justified and fully comprehended by the fact that she

> was both Southern – ripe with its manners – and Roman Catholic – replete with its mystery. The blend of these two provided her a rich milieu out of which her worldview develops […] On first encounter with an O'Connor story, the reader is likely to find the work disturbing because the violence is most notably present on the surface. O'Connor can be dismissed by a simple rejection of the crazily distorted characters that stretch credibility (Earley Whitt 5)

– whilst the *uncanny* side of her writings becomes noticeable to the reader in the very end, and brought a step forward towards the rational by extending to all her works

> that important observation that Elizabeth Hardwick made at the time of O'Connor's death: «You'd have to call 'A Good Man Is Hard to Find' a 'funny' story even though six people are killed in it. »(Earley Whitt 5)

Though not striking from the very beginning, that quality of which Tzvetan Todorov said cannot be given „some rational approach" grows slowly with the advancement of the plot, in no way due to the setting, which might at times be perceived as one of the most ordinary types, but

with the piling up of events and conflicts – whether they spring from the inner most side of the characters, or external ones provoked by the world – of such a nature that bewilder not only due to their eeriness, but also their ever-growing numbers, realities which have little to do with any coherency whatsoever – and *Wise Blood* floods with such examples, just as Haze's experience in the night in the house of his childhood, his experience going to the prostitute Leora Watts and with his double, Solace Layfield, Enoch Emory's killing of the „gorilla" and how he stole the suit and went to shake hands with people, Sabbath Hawks with the mummy in her arms behaving as if it were a baby, even Hazel Motes' own death, all come to perplex the reader, incapable of finding any logic to either event or sequence of events. (qtd. in Peiu 14)

The uncanniness of the story creeps in slowly, the reader being almost unawares of it, perhaps due to the amount of *marvelous* within the narrative, as also O'Connor's skillfulness. There are certain elements that appear here and there in the decorum that takes one back to the Gothic settings, such examples being the ruined parental house, where Hazel returns and remains for a night

> [t]he house was as dark as the night and open to it and though he saw that the fence around it had partly fallen and that weeds were growing through the porch floor, he didn't realize all at once that it was only a shell, that there was nothing here but the skeleton of a house (O'Connor 8; chapter 1)

as well as the museum when Hazel goes with Enoch to see the mummy

> Enoch never went immediately to the dark secret center of the park […]
> Hazel Motes turned back to him suddenly and said, «Where's this thing? Let's see it right now and get it over with. Come on. » […]
> He pointed down through the trees. «Muvseevum, » he said. The strange word made him shiver. That was the first time he had ever said it aloud. A piece of gray building was showing where he pointed. It grew larger as they went down the hill, then as they came to the end of the wood and stepped out on the gravel driveway, it seemed to shrink suddenly. It was round and soot-colored. There were columns at the front of it and in between each column there was an eyeless stone woman holding a pot on her head. A concrete band was over the columns and the letters, MVSEVM, were cut into it. Enoch was afraid to pronounce the word again. […]
> They went into a dark room full of glass cases. The glass cases covered the walls and there were three coffin-like ones in the middle of the floor […]
> There were three bowls and a row of blunt weapons and a man in the case. (O'Connor 25-31; chapter 5)

Also pertaining to the uncanny is Hazel's repeated passages when he envisages himself dead – the explanation being that he was marked by the recurrent deaths in his family, and having been to war.

The finale of the novel might be seen as the epitome of the *uncanny* – mostly if one bears in mind Freud's theory on the matter and his examples, one being the story of the Sand-Man and (self-)blinding, the other being the instance of falling in love with a doll, i.e. an inanimate body. The ending to *Wise Blood* may be perceived even as otherworldly, yet not totally unexplainable: Mrs. Flood, a lonely widow, not all together (financially) modest, eventually sees in Hazel the possibility of overcoming her solitude – and in her desire to company, in the end, when facing his dead body, she does not or wishes not to understand that he is no longer alive and ends up experiencing a sort of epiphany – one which Hazel himself might have longed to inspire in others during his lifetime.

O'Connor's prose, if not displaying always the same distorted but airtight logic of construction as Poe's, is fully characterized by apparent common sense deriving from the superficially shady banality of the universe depicted, in what regards the environment and, on the very surface, the people populating it, their actions, words and even thoughts being of the most conventional type – yet, in the end, the reader will be left wanting of an explanation as to whatever

it was that happened throughout the narration which led to the accumulation of a series of awe-inspiring actions and such an uncanny outcome – and here lies the craft of Flannery O'Connor!

Thus, Master Poe apparently directs his works straightforward towards the insurmountable extents of the unconscious, whilst the apostle O'Connor seemingly tackles with the superficial layer of human attention – yet both managing in the end to leave the auditorium perplexed – so far, one gathers that the two, in dealing each with a certain extreme of the human psyche, obtain the same effect, triggering the same reaction on the part of the readers. Therefore the impression would be that, starting from opposite directions, both authors reach the same ending point.

In order to understand how so, one has to look attentively at the basic notions used when talking of the works belonging to the two literary figures under discussion, and therefore, take up for discussion, primarily, the concept of aesthetics, and immediately after that of image, in the broadest sense.

As to aesthetics, much theory has been written, yet, one will choose to reduce the area of debate to the Freudian perspective that „aesthetics is understood to mean not merely the theory of beauty but the theory of the qualities of feeling", hence art directs itself in the most open manner to the sentiment. (Freud, „The 'Uncanny'" 219)

Both Poe and O'Connor have, in their very specific manners, been highly concerned with beauty and its artistic impact.

As Peiu states

> [i]f Poe was seriously concerned about something – it was the so-called […] «art for art's sake.» Among the literary fields of activity in which he was a pioneer there is *aestheticism*. […] the *modern* age of acknowledged artistic conscience in a writer starts with E.A. Poe. (29, text emphasis)

Robert Fitzgerald in his *Introduction* to *Everything that Rises Must Converge* remembers having been at a conference where somebody claimed that he didn't like Flannery O'Connor's writing because

> it lacked a sense of natural beauty and human beauty. Troubled by this, [Fitzgerald] looked in the stories again and took a sentence from „A Good Man Is Hard to Find" […] «The trees were full of silver-white sunlight and the meanest of them sparkled.» Surely even the meanest of them do. […] These were beautiful actions, […] though as brief as beautiful actions usually are. (xi-xii)

One can assert that dramatic, artistic beauty is that which endures, whilst everyday, plain beauty belongs to the ephemeral type – yet, it is the job of the artist to make of that which is fleeting a long-lasting reality – and in this respect, O'Connor is a Master.

Turning to image – the common understanding of it is that of a representation, and an artistic image would be that which art tries to depict, giving the receiver a particular perspective upon the subject chosen. But, in a world where we speak of realities, systems and universes, the concept of image has long been subject to ardent debate as to its nature and function.

Herbert Read in his *Icon and Idea. The Function of Art in the Development of Human Consciousness* argues that

> [t]he artist elaborates images that are images of reality; they are reality because we discover reality only in as much as we crystalize these images that are seized from the Unknown. The Great Chain of Existence is nothing more than a chain of images. (135, translation mine)

Such a statement pushes the idea of image forward, taking it away from the condition of appearance, into that of a (more or less self-)determinative element capable of forming reality. From

this point view, then, the artist would rank as Demiurge – the spring from which images issue in order to compose worlds.

It is interesting to see that, even outside their literary creation, in the lives of both Edgar Allan Poe and Flannery O'Connor, the concept and reality of image, even from a standardized viewpoint, has been very much present.

Poe, „[b]orn of stage acting parents, […] practically used every opportunity to put on his show" – and what is a show if not a display meant to address the audience primarily via visual images? – whilst O'Connor painted, Robert Fitzgerald describing how in the family house, „the Clime house in Milledgeville […] [i]n the hall, in the dinning-room, and in the comfortable small living-room […] the paintings on the walls are all Flannery's". (Peiu 29; Fitzgerald, *Introduction* to *Everything that Rises Must Converge* x-xi)

One gathers that both personalities were very much preoccupied with beauty and with imagery – and it is through their literary works that one fully grasps at their creed: the artful creation of cosmoses by the aesthetical assemblage of iconic instances.

This is most obvious when comparing scenes from „The Story of William Wilson" and *Wise Blood* such as

> [h]ave not the winds carried my name, with my loss of honor, to the ends of the earth? Am I not forever dead to the world? — to its honors, to its flowers, to its golden hopes? And a cloud, heavy and endless — does it not hang forever between my hopes and heaven? (Poe 6; Part One)

and

> [t]he black sky was underpinned with long silver streaks that looked like scaffolding and depth on depth behind it were thousands of stars that all seemed to be moving very slowly as if they were about some vast construction work that involved the whole order of the universe and would take all time to complete. (O'Connor 11; chapter 3)

The dramatic effect obtained in the two passages is strikingly similar and exquisitely fine, proving a resemblance of vision and a common desire to stun the public.

But it also proves how a re-reading of Poe is heavily influenced by a reading of O'Connor, for it is surprising, to say the least, to find religious traces – moreover, Christian marks – in Poe's writing. The story's opening with such mentions as „golden hopes" and „heaven", but also the pathos and imagistic array employed by the narrator, as well as the finale, where the voice proclaims that William Wilson is „also dead – dead to the World, dead to Heaven, dead to Hope!", brings Poe to locus akin to that of O'Connor, the epiphanic nature discovered in the Master's production being *uncanny* and *marvelous* at the same time. (Poe 6; Part One; 21; Part Four)

Even when it comes to the personages, there is a high degree of correspondence – moreover, the very idea of a double that constantly shadows the main character up to the point of madness is of an uncanny linkage and presented in the lights of a very theatrical display:

> [h]is method [i.e. William Wilson, the double], which was to increase the likeness between us, lay both in words and in actions; and he followed his plan very well indeed. It was easy enough to have clothes like mine. He easily learned to walk and move as I did. His voice, of course, could not be as loud as mine, but he made his manner of speaking the same. How greatly this most careful picture of myself troubled me, I will not now attempt to tell. […] I went quietly through the house to Wilson's room. I had long been thinking of another of those plans to hurt him (Poe 11-12; Part Two)

whilst Hazel Motes'

> head turned that way and he saw the man in the glare-blue suit and white hat up on the nose of it [i.e. a car]. He was so struck with how gaunt and thin he looked in the illusion that he stopped preaching. He had never pictured himself that way before. […] He slid down from his own car and moved up closer, never taking his eyes from the bleak figure. […] Haze was standing next to a fat woman who after a minute turned her head and stared at him and then turned it again and stared at the True Prophet. Finally she touched his elbow with hers and grinned at him. «Him and you twins? » she asked. «If you don't hunt it down and kill it, it'll hunt you down and kill you, » Haze answered. (O'Connor 52; chapter 10)

As artisans of images it is thus understood that the two writers are creators of realities – but besides the preoccupation with the aesthetics of the ensemble, Poe and O'Connor display a supreme desire in achieving equipoise, in both the works under discussion as well as throughout their literary trajectory.

> Poe asserts that «[i]n the Original Unity of the First Thing lies the Secondary Cause of All Things, with the Germ of their Inevitable Annihilation». That is to say, everything is created in an invincible harmony of beginning and end, which are the terminal points of the infinite primordial unity. Here, in other words, limitation and the unlimited paradoxically co-exist […].(Stroe, *op. cit.,* 82)

It is not hard to see how the universes created by both Poe and O'Connor are characterized by such an „infinite primordial unity", showing great balance and harmony between beginning and end. (Stroe, *ibid.*)

And since the starting point eludes the human's capacity to control or even remember, combined with the deep need for closure, Death wins its privileged place within existence at large and within the worlds created by the two authors. Yet, such a terminal point does not mean in any way a termination – it does not and cannot limit the „infinite primordial unity" but adds to its continuous renewal – and in „The Story of William Wilson" this is understandable by the narrative voice which surpasses death by telling and retelling its (own) story, whilst in *Wise Blood*, through the revelation experienced by Mrs. Flood when looking into the eye sockets of (the dead) Hazel and feeling „as if she had finally got to the beginning of something she couldn't begin". (Stroe, *ibid*; O'Connor 72; chapter 14)

As a conclusion, one can state that the degree to which one author influences the other, of how much of Poe's pathological pathos infiltrates itself into O'Connor's outcomes, or how much of O'Connor's rational devoutness reaches back into Poe's appreciation, is quite hard to specify, yet, with the paring of the two and with the flux of ideas and concepts going back and forth from one's universe to the other's, in the middle, in the narrow stretch of connection, one finds that puzzling entity with its troubling existence – the human being.

> Man cannot compare himself with any other creature; he is not a monkey, not a cow, not a tree. I am a man. But what is it to be that? Like every other being, I am a splinter of the infinite deity, but I cannot contrast myself with any animal, any plant or any stone. Only a mythical being has a range greater than man's. (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* 4)

It is the human need for lasting icons and outlasting symbols that leads to the creation of myths and crystallization of archetypes – and among the innumerous human prototypes one will further argue that the characters William Wilson and Hazel Motes stand as model figures for that one that finds oneself ever-hunted by an entity so close in resemblance and so constant in its proximity which must necessarily lead one to a balanced state – an end that will bring one to the beginning.

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THE SPATIAL OTHER: THE URBAN AS PRESENCE AND ABSENCE IN WILLIAM FAULKNER AND FLANNERY O'CONNOR

Teodora Narcisa GIURGIU

Motto: „how little of vocabulary man really needed to get comfortably and even efficiently through life … a few simple clichés served his few simple passions and needs and lusts"[2]
(William Faulkner, *Intruder in the Dust*)

With modernity, the Urban has become the norm for human existence. It is the city, the metropolis, which sets the trends, which captures our attention, and defines our passions, and needs, and lusts, thus shaping our sense of reality. Yet, one should never forget the Other, which, in its temporary oblivion, most of the times struggles in agony, and at other, fewer times, finds itself slumbering. This City-Other, forever present, forever attached to the human condition – the Rural – does not fade, but fights its way towards the spotlight, making a stand and attempting to share the stage with the Urban.

It is masters as William Faulkner and disciples like Flannery O'Connor that have depicted the artful manner in which the Rural counterpoints, undermines, insinuates itself into, or simply invades the Urban, forever changing it. And in such a stand, communication can only be the sharpest weapon used.

What kind of rhetorical arsenal Faulkner and O'Connor's characters may employ in order to make it from the margin, the rural, into the urban center, represents an ample topic. But, undoubtedly, the uses of clichés, of double-meanings and the abundance of commonplace statements, intertwined with the finest irony, represent the most important elements of the communicational array. And so skillfully has literary language been used, that not only is the center completely influenced, but actually overthrown in the end.

To make out of a space, be it concrete or abstract, a place, one has to construct borders and boundaries, definite or not, material or metaphysical. In such an attempt, one cannot succeed outside of language. Communication will shape any space, giving it a form, and turning it into a place – language itself represents a *locus* of meaning. Within communication, truisms represent a *common place*, something so banal that most people will forget what that place really stands for, whilst with the use of double-meanings the place, and with it the meaning, will be hidden. Using such strategies, the two writers craftily unveil the process by which the Rural penetrates into the Urban, redefining its borders and remodeling its realities.

A key element in conquering a citadel is perseverance, and for the same reason such rhetoric schemes as employed by Faulkner and O'Connor's characters are repeated, reiteration being the manner in which the intelligence of the interlocutor is destabilized.

Flannery O'Connor's story starts from the title with a truism – „*Good Country People*". This cliché will appear almost obsessively in the text, showing how the rural has put its hallmark on the unconscious of the urban people, and in what a tricky manner. Mrs. Hopewell keeps repeating the expression in such a way that the reader understands there is more to „good" than meets the ear.

[2] William Faulkner, *Intruder in the Dust*, USA: Random House, Inc. 1948, p. 23.

Towards the end, one reaches the conclusion, being told expressly, that „good" is not an equivalent to „decent", but to „simple" with all its negative connotations.

As to how much this semantic commonplace has become part of the urban space, and has helped in overthrowing it, can be seen in the fact that even Joy/Hulga, a PhD in philosophy, has been herself fooled into believing it: and this appears clearly when she asks Manly Pointer, towards the close of the story, „aren't you just good country people?" and he answers „I'm as good as you any day in the week"[3].

But this experience Joy/Hulga goes through is not of a gratuitous nature, it is part of the author's wider plan with regards to her entire artistic outcome and the personae populating it, which can be fully grasped only when going through O'Connor's full body of work, hence Margaret Earley Whitt's remark that „a character in each story [who] would have a moment where he or she would see or come to know the world in a way that possessed a touch of ultimate insight."[4]

The next level of clichés is reached with the use of the names of the characters – each name is a hint as to some important trait or element in the persona's personality or history, and the reader must not only cover the story to the end, but also ponder on the meaning behind each name and the connection among the people populating the story to better grasp the underlying purpose of Flannery O'Connor.

Just below the title we find the name of Mrs. Freeman – a „good country people" sort of person – and although we see her only always attached to Mrs. Hopewell, one can grasp in the end who from the two is in control, who is free of (positivistic) prejudices that deter the mind's capacity of perceiving reality as it truly is and, who finally has the upper hand, thus, in this light, her name becomes clear.

Mrs. Hopewell's case is rather simpler, her own nature helping to the decoding of the meaning in the swiftest manner possible. The truisms she repeats obstinately, marked by a severe tendency towards simplification and embellishment of reality, her belief that positive thinking makes one look beautiful even if one is ugly, her exasperating patience and placidness to any attempt from people to shake her out of her intellectual inertia, all lead to the reader's rapid understanding of the platitude her name represents when correlating it to her character. But O'Connor will not lose the opportunity to take the name and create around it an ironic moment of fine humor, when Manley Pointer will salute her by saying „Mrs. Hopewell […] I hope you are well!"[5]

There are two minor characters the reader can only make acquaintance with via the stories of Mrs. Freeman: Glynese and Caramae. Their role can be understood only when put in contrast with Joy/Hulga, and only through their being „dubbed" by her as Glycerin and Caramel. „Just as the names indicate a polar opposition, the activities follow suit"[6] – the author wishes to underline the female protagonist's features via this complex yet amusing schema, where two nitwits are renamed in the most blatant manner and their absurdly simpleminded, vulgar actions are presented by their mother to an audience where one person is a PhD in philosophy.

The heroine of the story, being the daughter of her mother, can only start out in life by the name of Joy – but as a reflective person, determined to change her lot, even endeavoring to change her own mother in the process, she will acquire a new name – Hulga. She will not renounce her previous one, in fact, she cannot: she is doomed to follow O'Connor's pattern, by which „each story

[3] Flannery O'Connor, *The Complete Stories*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York , 1971, p. 298.
[4] Margaret Earley Whitt, *Understanding Flannery O'Connor*, United States of America: University of South Carolina Press, 1995, p. 4.
[5] Flannery O'Connor, *op.cit.*, p. 286.
[6] Margaret Earley Whitt, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

in turn has its reversal; just as the dependent daughter is asserting herself to separate or be separated from her mother, the mother prevails"[7].

Manley Pointer – the only male character participating directly in the story – „with his phallic name"[8], represents the tool by which the story is twisted around in the end, and Hulga returns to being a helpless girl, showing how intelligence has its weak spot, and by which it is proven that simplicity, either seen as related to the mental or to the spiritual, remains a constant, undiscouraged in its firm existence.

But as Mrs. Hopewell reassures the unsuspecting, unprepared reader, „Nothing is perfect", thus the city dweller has to accept that the boundaries of his or her urban place have been forced and infiltrated, and there is nothing much to do, because „that is life!"[9]. Moreover, „other people have their opinions too", continues Mrs. Hopewell, and with opinions come actions, so the „good country people" are entitled to having their ways within the urban limits.[10]

To the flexibility of Mrs. Hopewell comes, as a counterpoint, the rigidity of Mrs. Freeman, who is a stern first representative of the so-called „country people", more or less *good*, whichever way the term might be decoded. Mrs. Freeman's platitudes always come as an echo to those uttered by Mrs. Hopewell, this being also part of the wider strategy to putting off the counterpart by never expressing an opinion independently, but only as a response to one expressed before by the other person. Moreover, her clichés result in a limitation to Mrs. Hopewell's largely positivistic statements. Her „I always said so myself"[11] comes as a full stop to whatever it was that Mrs. Hopewell had stated before, and though it gives the illusion of agreement, it is in fact Mrs. Freeman's stating that she was one step ahead of everybody else.

The fact is that the two women are engaged in a continual competition with each other, and the aim of this competition is to prove, (to whom – it is not very clear), that each one has the upper hand as to the other.

Mrs. Hopewell tells Mrs. Freeman „you're the wheel behind the wheel"[12], which is an enrichment to „you're behind the wheel", i.e. you are driving, you are in control; but the fact that Mrs. Freeman is depicted herself as a wheel implies that she is not in total control, but is also being manipulated by someone else. To this statement, Mrs. Freeman answers: „It's some that are quicker than others", and with this platitude she wishes to let Mrs. Hopewell know she has understood the innuendo.[13]

The antagonistic tandem of truisms belonging to the two characters is crowned by the set „everybody is different", belonging to Mrs. Hopewell, and „Yes, most people is", by Mrs. Freeman – and, again, one notes how, to the falsely conceding and tiringly positive attitude of Mrs. Hopewell, comes the limiting response of Mrs. Freeman, deceitfully affirmative, by the „yes" in the opening, yet visibly contradicting, by contrasting „everybody" to „most".[14]

But Mrs. Hopewell will not be taken over so easily, because she knows that „it takes all kinds to make the world" and that „good country people are the salt of the earth! ", and even if her daughter will tell her to „[g]et rid of the salt of the earth", she will not listen.[15]

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[7] *Ibidem,* p. 7.
[8] *Ibidem*, p. 77.
[9] Flannery O'Connor, *The Complete Stories*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York , 1971, p. 281.
[10] *Idem.*
[11] *Ibidem*, p. 282.
[12] *Idem.*
[13] *Idem.*
[14] *Idem.*
[15] *Ibidem*, p. 287.

Mrs. Hopewell's flexibility is in fact a sign of weakness: she contradicts herself very often, by the fact that she sees all country people as „good", and one knows that any generalization is the expression of a simple mind, but then, she affirms the world is made of different kinds. Mrs. Hopewell even says „[i]t's very good we aren't all alike", to which Mrs. Freeman's prompt response comes, „[s]ome people are more alike than others".[16] This clearly shows Mrs. Hopewell's inability to hold a fix line, as opposed to Mrs. Freeman, which is extremely consistent in opposing her under the disguise of consent.

But Mrs. Hopewell is hard to destabilize, for her frame of mind rests on such banalities, so much in fashion nowadays, that eliminate any substance and even nuances from life, supplying the empty space with the glittery nonsense of „positive thinking". As already mentioned, she was one to think that „people who looked on the bright side of things would be beautiful even if they were not"[17]. But if one should think that with such a perspective upon life there comes kindness of heart, one is more than naïve, for in the very end of the story, Mrs. Hopewell will state, with regards to country people, that „the world would be better off if we were all that simple"[18], showing how she equaled goodness to stupidity. The reader should not be saddened by such a proof of wickedness, for Mrs. Freeman, echoing yet again Mrs. Hopewell and stating that „[s]ome can't be that simple […] I know I never could"[19], will have saved the situation in more than one way. She balances the state of affairs – from a rhetorical point of view – and shows how the battle between the Rural and the Urban is an ongoing process, with big chances on the part of the former to gain significance in the latter's realities. And, in fact, this is the more true, since Mrs. Hopewell, at this point in the narrative, is not aware that her daughter had been left stranded and completely helpless, without her wooden leg and her spectacles, in the loft of a barn, by Manley Pointer – a „good country people", a simple boy „from out in the country around Willohobie, not even a place, just from near a place"[20].

Another interesting perspective upon triviality and how the Rural tries to pierce into the Urban's space, asserting its worth and genuine nature, is given precisely by Manly Pointer. In his case, the truisms have a more sophisticated sound to them, so much so that even Joy/Hulga falls victim to his speech, in the end. His truisms are not only banalities, but they have double-meanings which come to put off the unaware town-folk.

By saying „[h]e who losest his life shall find it"[21] he is not only creating the illusion of himself as being on a superior, righteous level, but is also luring the unconscious of his interlocutors to give in to him and become his prey, based on the human desire to imitate whatever is considered of high value.

Although Manly Pointer represents the type of rational person, even more – the cynical kind of human – who understands how things are done in this world, something he states very clearly when issuing three commonplace formulas in one sentence and says „I know which end is up and I wasn't born yesterday and I know where I'm going!"[22] – surprisingly, he himself comes with a series of powerfully positivistic samples of thought. Such a display of amour truisms can be seen when, taking Joy/Hulga „on a picnic with no food"[23] – which, from a symbolic point of view, is a very strong message on behalf of Flannery O'Connor – he tells her: „don't you think some people

[16] *Ibidem,* p. 291.
[17] *Ibidem*, p. 284.
[18] *Ibidem*, p. 300.
[19] *Idem.*
[20] *Ibidem*, p. 287.
[21] *Ibidem*, 1971, p. 289.
[22] *Ibidem*, p. 299.
[23] Margaret Earley Whitt, *op. cit*., p. 78;

was meant to meet on account of what all they got in common and all?"[24], a platitude based on popular (mis)understanding of the theory of the halves, belonging to Plato; „You ain't said you loved me none […] You got to say that […] I said it and you got to say it"[25], which rests on the reciprocity principle, it doesn't matter if the feeling is true or not, if I have told you so, you have to reply to me in the same way; „it's what makes you different. You ain't like anybody else."[26], this is a classic among the truisms related to love, because it is most normal that when in love, the beloved one seems unique, different from the rest of the world, but in the story we shall see that Manly Pointer was talking *ad literam* when telling Joy/Hulga that she was different, yet leaves the confusion there in order to trick her, and, unfortunately, the female protagonist falls into the trap set up with the help of skillfully guided communication.

If Mrs. Hopewell were the only one set up by the cunning of the Rural's desire to come center stage, the story would be quite simple. Yet by the fact that Joy/Hulga is in the end the prominent victim, we see how unprepared the citizen is to enjoy his or her status as mainstay of modernity – and also how relative the frontiers of urban space are.

In truth and without a shadow of doubt, extremely perplexing is the fact that the end of Flannery O'Connor's story seems to state the following matters: how the simpleminded urban person and the almost simple rural one will find a harmonious manner to cohabit, making even out of their disagreements a (verbal) duet – hence Mrs. Hopewell and Mrs. Freeman's final exchange of „witty" retorts, how the intellectually and spiritually sophisticated citizen will be punished for attempting to interact with the shrewd country person whilst keeping a superior attitude and being self-involved – and how the reader „is not likely to forget an O'Connor story precisely because it is so strikingly, stridently different"[27].

When we turn to the master-writer, we cannot but notice that the language employed in William Faulkner's writings proves to be of a much more subtle hue, the struggle among the two worlds, the Urban and the Rural, of much greater impetuosity, which turns everything to a much more fluid status. Such a battle and its molten aspect reminds one of the crushing antagonism of the dawns of existence, a process of making, the foundation of the world – and then, looking at Faulkner's writings, one sees the creative godlike figure of the author at work, looming from every narrative corner, as from behind Peabody's words: „«We're going to have a town»"[28].

In his work – *As I Lay Dying* – Faulkner not only portrays the antagonism among the two spheres, but, on a Freudian note, he also shows the fascination behind the battle. Rural and Urban do not only collide, they mesmerize each other. Although the limits among the two places, country and town, are quite clearly cut, the spaces seem to lose themselves one into the other in a most baffling manner.

In order to cope with life and love, be it of a sensual nature, as her love to Whitfield, or of a purely procreative nature, as to Anse, Addie Bundren changes home from the urban to the rural area. Yet, in what regards eternity, she will desire – „as in some *ultimate quest of her home*"[29]– to go back to join her kin in the graveyard in the city of Jefferson, the capital of Yoknapatawpha County.

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[24] Flannery O'Connor, *op.cit.*, p. 292.
[25] *Ibidem*, p. 296.
[26] *Ibidem*, p. 297.
[27] Margaret Earley Whitt, *op.cit.*, p. 5.
[28] William Faulkner, *Requiem for a Nun*, qtd. in Anca Peiu, „(No) «City upon a Hill»: Jefferson, Yoknapatawpha", *Space and the City in American Culture*, no. 1, 2014, p. 69;
[29] Anca Peiu, *op.cit*., p. 70.

On the other hand, Anse Bundren and the children, all of them born and bred in the countryside, will exhibit a forceful attraction towards the city, so much so that they will take the extraordinary journey with the body of the deceased Addie just to make it into the urban space, so much so that Dewey Dell will change her ensemble before entering Jefferson, and, to top it all, Anse will return home with a new set of teeth and also with a new Mrs. Bundren.

But just as war can be waged with words, so can love, in its most broad sense, can use the same set of arms to hit the target it aims at. And as it is well-known, the difference between war and love is, at times, but little, both of these two forces using a certain kind of allure to make their presence acceptable within human existence. The allure bases itself on communication and that is where the mastery of William Faulkner reaches an undeniable aesthetic peak.

As master storyteller, Faulkner would not simply not overlook the power of naming – he made out of every denomination in his work, be it of place or person, a secret code to a highly elaborate encrypted system. The names in his works point to certain historic details or figures, to certain literary or cultural works, they indicate specific qualities of the characters bearing them, they give hints to certain fates and fortunes – or not?

Starting with the very name of the novel – *As I Lay Dying* – the reference is clearly to Agamemnon's words in the Odyssey.[30] The title reveals to the knowledgeable reader the basic elements that lie at the foundation of the book: love and death – intricate, treacherous love and long awaited, relieving death. To whom was love treacherous and whom awaited death is debatable – but the erotic intricacy and mortal relief touches everybody, characters and readers alike.

From the beginning, with the title, one has the impression that the author wished to write a mock-antique tragedy, with a tragic heroine, in agony, fighting to have the right to die, and the chorus surrounding her, exasperating her, then, with her death, the almost endless journey to the burial place of her expressed wish – a journey that has all the elements of a Bildungsroman – one of *un-becoming*, of *un-being*, the journey of the dead protagonist from her chosen rural abode to the urban eternal home of her people.

Even her name – Addie – is a tricky combination of what could be a conglomerate of explanations: as the short version of Adelaide, meaning „nobble sort", it also resembles Eddy that comes from Edward, meaning „guardian of riches", it can be seen as a nickname for „Adam", but also sounds phonetically very close to „eddy"[31].

In the case of the proximity to Adam, the first man (as to the Bible), God's first creation as to a human being, we wonder if Addie does not stand as the anima, as an alter-ego, for the writer, and if so, does the book concern the death of the writer, the death of the artist (generally speaking)?

When thinking of how Addie sounds very much like „eddy"(the common noun) we have to take all its meanings into account. Firstly, an eddy is a whirlpool, a circular current, and in psychoanalysis this stands for the womb, the place where life is created, but also the place where life ends, as „tomb". Secondly, it represents a water running back in opposite direction to the main current, hence Addie is a person fighting against the mainstream, as Anse tells us „[s]he was ever a particular woman"[32].

Her husband's name, Anse Bundren, poses a higher degree of difficulty in deciphering its possible meanings. With regards to his surname, the alliteration Bundren – burden is most obvious,

[30] Wai Chee Dimock. *The Odyssey and As I Lay Dying*. http://oyc.yale.edu/transcript/1274/amst-246. Web. 3 May 2016.
[31] Patrick Hanks; Flavia Hodges, *A Dictionary of First Names*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006. Ebook file.
[32] William Faulkner, *As I Lay Dying*. *The Corrected Text*, Vintage International, New York, 1990, p. 936.

and furthermore stressed by the narrator when expressing directly that „the only burden Anse Bundren's ever had is himself"[33].

As to the given names, paradoxically, Addie has a more masculine ring to it, and by contrast, Anse seems to be the more feminine name, being related to the Dutch diminutive of Anna – Ans, and other names of women that are quite similar. There is also the Germanic Anso – a male's name that derives from „ans", meaning „god"[34].

Whatever the author had in mind will probably remain forever a secret – but it is highly doubtful that William Faulkner chose to make a pair, even if a severely dysfunctional one, by the combining of such two names as Addie – Anse, for no exacting reason.

The names of the five children: Cash, Darl, Jewel, Dewey Dell, Vardaman, all have a more or less simple explanation attached to it, one that becomes rather clear with the advancement of the story.

It is interesting to see where Addie's monologue is placed – as if in the case of an eddy, there is a circular movement and a core in the way the story presents itself, with Addie and her monologue in the middle. It is also most curious how Addie's monologue is placed between Cora's, coming before it, as a prologue, and Whitfield's monologue, coming after, as an epilogue.

Cora's name cunningly resembles the word „core" – and the character bearing the name sees herself as a sort of center of society or essence of goodness, due to her self-assessment as one of the most righteous of people, entitled to pass judgment on others with the sententiousness of a high vestal priestess, hence the etymology of the name, deriving from the ancient Greek word „kore" meaning „maiden"[35].

In the case of Whitfield, one has to consider at least two leads: „whit" as representing a small, indefinite amount – which leads us to think not only of a trifle, but also to the concept of „seed", and the other, related to „Whitsuntide", which represents the celebration of the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the disciples and the festival of harvest. In both cases there is an erotic charge to it[36].

But Faulkner's genius will not stop only at this level, he will construct another, parallel web, of deep thoughts intertwined with covertly elevated clichés, all under the richly embroidered quilt of Old Southern lexicon.

The two characters who utter the highest number of catchphrases are Anse Bundren and Cora Tull. Hypocrite and manipulative, they both manage to make double-meanings out of their truisms.

Anse Bundren, a hillbilly that marries a rather sophisticated town girl, wishes to hide his true nature behind a screen of platitudes, such as „Was there ere such misfortunate man" or „I ain't beholden"[37]. The fact that he keeps on repeating them is of high significance, and reveals his cunning nature: Anse, like any other human being, has moments of misfortune, but, maybe unlike in the cases of other humans, his actions will drive his own fate and his family's destiny to more mishaps. Additionally, he is a man highly indebted to many, but he instinctively knows that through iterating words, mental spaces acquire (new) boundaries and (delusive) realities are being created.

As to his wife, he uses Addie and her death as an excuse for accomplishing all his desires. Again, in order to conceal his true self, he hides behind a mask of recurring trivialities.

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[33] *Ibidem*, p. 756.
[34] Patrick Hanks; Flavia Hodges, *op.cit.*
[35] *Idem.*
[36] *Idem.*
[37] William Faulkner, *As I Lay Dying*. *The Corrected Text*, *op.cit.,* pp. 1556, 1633, 1118, 1131, 2292;

When he keeps on saying that „Her mind was/is set on it“[38], he is preparing the terrain, using Addie's last wish to be buried in Jefferson next to her kin as a verbal carcass to conceal the fact that he wanted to go to town for certain reasons which had nothing to do with his late wife, quite the contrary. Next to „I don't [won't] begrudge her“[39] and „she was ever a particular woman“[40], this is his justification for getting his way, and even showing the world how magnanimous he is for doing so.

In the end, Anse will get what he wants, and in doing so, he will affirm, in a veiled manner, a great principle and most commonplace pattern: The Queen is dead, long live the Queen! When he says „Meet Mrs. Bundren“[41], he is in fact telling his children that life goes on and it is of no use to stop because of anyone other's death. It is of little wonder that the new Mrs. Bundren is herself a town woman.

When one looks at Cora Tull it is obvious that she and Addie form a unity of opposites. Cora Tull's personality is in stark contrast to Addie's – still, together they form a certain kind of unit. This can be seen even from Cora's monologue, although it becomes so much clearer when one „hears“ Addie speak.

Cora's pretense to righteousness, spiritual superiority and commonsense can be seen from the fact that whilst sitting next to Addie, who is on her deathbed, she – Cora – expresses the fear that Addie might get well and then „[f]irst thing we know she'll be up and baking again, and then we wont have any sale for ours at all“[42]; or when she answers to her husband's truism „Well, folks are different“ with „I should hope so“[43]; and with her pondering on Addie's life, crowned with the conclusion that „[s]he has had a hard life, but so does every woman“[44], which coming from a supposedly religious person is a very mean thing to think and say about a moribund. But she reaches the height of hypocrisy in her reflections on religious matters and on how Addie dealt with life and belief, in her monologue preceding Addie's own.

In the case of Faulkner, realities, spaces, characters, situations and places are depicted most poignantly, his piquant style and gift for high irony capturing the complexity of the process in which apparently fixed boundaries and clearly-cut spaces are eternally challenged by the universal confrontation with the Other.

If we are to listen to William Faulkner's words on the poet's, the writer's duties, privileges, and role within society, enunciated in his *Address upon Receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature*, delivered on December 10, 1950 at Stockholm –

> It is his privilege to help man endure by lifting his heart, by reminding him of *the courage and honor and hope and pride* and compassion and pity and sacrifice which have been the glory of his past. *The poet's voice* need not merely be the record of man, it can be one of the props, the pillars to help him endure and prevail.[45]

– and put them side by side, as it were, with his masterpiece *As I Lay Dying*, one cannot help but muse on how exactly the author, when writing the novel, envisaged his part in helping man „endure and prevail“. If one could get a glimpse of Faulkner's perspective, this might represent the starting

[38] *Idem.*
[39] *Ibidem*, pp. 636, 1125
[40] *Ibidem*, p. 936.
[41] *Ibidem*, p. 2649.
[42] *Ibidem*, p. 130.
[43] *Ibidem*, p. 267.
[44] *Ibidem*, p. 1668.
[45] William Faulkner, *Address upon Receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature*, *apud* Anca Peiu, „(No) «City upon a Hill»: Jefferson, Yoknapatawpha“, *Space and the City in American Culture*, no. 1, 2014, p. 68.

point to decode the mysteries of human existence, so finely and majestically presented as only a master of words and ideas is capable of doing.

But there is one thing that invariably strikes the reader as more than obvious when having finished *As I Lay Dying* – and that is the perennial character of human desire – the lasting quality of humans' needs, ambitions, yearnings, despairs – of how in the end, this is what makes each and everyone's own, inner world „endure and prevail". As Anca Peiu stated in „No City upon a Hill", with regards to the surrounding hills of Jefferson city, „*The Pine Hills* on his map are Faulkner's *hills of pining*: of *loss* and *desire*. Of *mourning*, *missing*, and *despair*."[46]

Yet, when two opposite desires meet, one will prevail – and in this case, at a first level of understanding, it seems that Anse's willpower had more fortitude than Addie's.

If one applies a symbolic reading to both texts, Flannery O'Connor's short story and William Faulkner's novel, the translation of the images would be the following: since the Urban shuns and looks down upon the Rural, forcing bitter limitations on it – be they of a geographic nature, economic-wise, or socio-cultural impositions – the Rural has its strategy in fighting back and subverting the reality imposed upon itself, an approach that includes the invasion of the metropolitan territory, and in withdrawal, taking back to the countryside some mortal token – whether it is an entire human being or just specific parts of it, remains one of the author's privilege to decide upon.

‚Albeit what makes the big city glitter is the real gold of money, something is still missing.'[47] – in mediating the Urban, one should not ignore, but incorporate the Rural: a reality strongly present, which is not only attached to its counterpart, but maps its counterpart's representations on a constant basis, a place that is falsely located in conventional second ranks, one that provides the background and the foundation for the urban, that ensures the existence of the metropolis, supplying it with more than just victuals, a reality that cannot be detached, but rather one that will be taken into account and will most probably outlive any conurbation.

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[46] Anca Peiu, *op.cit.,* p. 73.

[47] *Ibidem*, p. 74.

OVERTONES OF GUILT IN EDGAR ALLAN POE'S SHORT STORIES

Raluca-Mihaela GIUROIU

Poe's work is concerned with the contrasting dimensions of human psyche. The themes he explores and the aspects he emphasizes in his short fiction, all related to a complex, atomized human mind, represent a step further for the American literature, but they also draw the shapes of what is now known as the Southern Myth, whose foundation is ascribed to Poe. This American myth, "obsessed with the guilt and burden of the past, riddled with doubt, unease and the sense that, at their best, human beings are radically limited and, at their worst, tortured, grotesque or evil"[1], reflects accurately one of the dimensions of Poe's tales: they deal with split personalities who are obsessed with their past and whose only possible end is self-destruction. A second dimension is related to Gothic and to Poe's ways of speculating it in his tales: Poe created "a sense of an external landscape; but simultaneously the reader is led to wonder constantly whether this landscape is indeed really external or rather a projection of a particular psychological state"[2].

Although he is renowned for his detective stories, my paper is concerned with his Gothic tales. According to D.H. Lawrence, Poe named his stories "tales because they are a concatenation of cause and effect, because he is reducing his own self as a scientist reduces a salt in a crucible. It is an almost chemical analysis of the soul and consciousness"[3]. And, indeed, Poe's tales depict a process of a multilayered decomposition. In Lawrence's literary commentary of Poe, there is one feature of the tales that must be emphasized: their analytic dimension. As they deal with Gothic and, generally, with terror, each tale is an intellectual exercise that rises dilemmas for the reader. On the one hand, none of the narrators of Poe's tales is credible, on the other hand, the tales depict a strange world, of dead-alive characters, of madness and of terrifying materializations of the inner life. As a consequence, their effect upon the reader is "a hesitation experienced by a person who knows only the laws of nature, confronting an apparently supernatural event"[4], namely the fantastic, as Tzvetan Todorov defines it. Todorov also makes a distinction between two important subgenres of the fantastic, the uncanny and the marvelous. With Poe, the reader is on the land of *the uncanny* because "the laws of reality remain intact and permit an explanation of the phenomena described"[5]. In the tales with which this paper is concerned, namely *The Fall of the House of Usher*, *William Wilson* and *The Tell-Tale Heart*, there is a constant tension from the beginning to the end and Poe so cleverly provides logical explanations through the unrest of the narrator that the reader really believes and interprets the events as the respective explanations dictate. The narrator shares his hesitation with the implicit reader but, as he gives rational explanations for himself, the fantastic is "explained".

This is a general frame of Poe's stories, but this paper is concerned with some deeper meanings of his fiction, with the theme of guilt as a reflection of the social and political context of the 19th century America.

[1] R. Gray, *A History of American Literature*, Blackwell Publishing, New York, 2004, p. 118.
[2] D. Punter, G. Byron, *The Gothic*, Blackwell Publishing, New York, 2004, p. 156.
[3] D. H. Lawrence, *Studies in Classic American Literature*, T. Seltzer, New York, 1923, p. 94.
[4] T. Todorov, *A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1975, p. 25.
[5] *Ibidem*, p. 41.

First, in understanding the meaning of guilt from a complex point of view, some details related to the historical background of Poe's stories must be mentioned. The 19th century illustrates a young America which is divided and close to destruction as, in the second half of the century, the Civil War takes place. The problems of slavery and of a protean and multilayered America point to an incomplete, hypochondriac self, marked by an awful stain of guilt.

On the one hand, although America thought that it had reached the possibility to fulfill its Dream by gaining its independence in the previous century, the creed in democracy and in the self-reliant individual was still debatable in the 19th century. The eclectic composition of American society, including the sent away natives, the slaves and a multitude of emigrants, involved complex, multilayered beliefs and cultural necessities. Solutions for such a problem came either from the Puritans, with their absolute creed that the evil is deeply enciphered within the human nature and that the providence has its mechanisms to organize the society, or from the Transcendentalists, that added a mystic significance to the Puritan creed, emphasizing the belief in one's insight and emotion.

On the other hand, the conflict between the pro-slavery North and the anti-slavery South led to a split in the American self and mentality. The problem of slavery made the American democracy seem futile and debatable. The problem of slaves was a serious one because they were seen as objects, properties, devoid of any volition as long as their will is concerned with their liberation: "What is known to the law, hence, what is possible, is that slaves can be declared human only insofar as they err. The accretion of positive or human qualities, yoked as it is to the fact of property, outfits slaves for one thing only: crime. Their only possible act, recognized by society, is a negative one"[6]. Of course, as the quotation reveals, their volition, as the most important feature of human beings, counted only in terms of infringement.

None of these problems got a clear, absolute solution, but they certainly created a gap between the American Dream and the possibilities of such a divided self to fulfill it. The problems of the 19th century and their consequences to the American identity are reflected in Edgar Allan Poe's short stories, which are related to both the impossibility of an individual to make a distinction between the internal mechanisms of his psyche and to the appalling scar on the American skin which is related to the problem of slavery.

Romancing the Shadow starts from depicting the political conditions in which Poe had to write his works, conditions related to the pro-slavery Southern America and anti-slavery Northern America, between which Poe had to find a common point as a writer for the *Southern Literary Messenger*. This common point was the so-called "average racism", which "was not a sociological measurement of actual beliefs but rather a strategic construction designed to overcome political dissension in the emerging mass audience"[7].

This first image of the historical background of Poe's America and of the problems he had to confront with in order to write leads to a more profound analysis in the essay *Poe, Persons and Property*, where Joan Dayan gives an interesting picture of the slaveholder America and compares it to the Pennsylvania system of prison discipline. The idea behind this comparison is that both slaves and criminals have in common a so-called "civil death" as opposed to a "natural death": "Civil death sustained itself through two ruling metaphors: 'corruption of blood' and 'forfeiture of

[6] J. Dayan, *Poe, Persons and Property*, in J. Kennedy, L. Weissberg, *Romancing the Shadow: Poe and Race*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 111.
[7] T. Whalen, *Average Racism. Poe, Slavery and the Wages of Literary Nationalism*, in J. Kennedy, L. Weissberg, *Romancing the Shadow: Poe and Race*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, p. 4.

property'"[8]. The idea is that both the slave and the criminal are rejected by the society because, on the one hand, the criminal loses his/her property and stains his/her blood as he has commited a crime, and, on the other hand, the slave has a *black blood* and he is an object, with no right to have or inherit a property. The point of the collective volume *Romancing the Shadow* is that Poe had so well understood those political realities that he somehow divided his imaginary in black and white in order to reflect the problems of national identity related to the identity of oneself. The split of oneself is the split between two important components which are the basis of the American culture: the culture of the European colonists and the culture of the Negroes.

What I really think related to this idea is that Poe actually divided his fictional world in *the One* and *the Other*, entities understood via Said's concept of *Orientalism*, namely *the dominator* and *the dominated*. Said starts from the relation between the British Empire and its colonies in order to define the way the dominator perceives the dominated one and I think that this is also the case of the slaves in America, from the political point of view. My references to Edward Said's concept have a more discreet purpose, namely to point to the American identity. Filtered through concepts such as *mimicry, border, hybridity* and *liminality*, Said's Orientalism is reshaped and gains meanings that lead to a more complex analysis. So, the Other – "the colonized people, marginalized by colonial discourse" and the One – "the imperial center […] or the empire itself"[9] are both others for one another and their relationship is not exactly one of domination, but of mutual influence. *The Other* copies the features imposed by the dominator (the whites, in the case of America), but he/she maintains one's intrinsic cultural features, at the same time (*mimicry*). From this point of view, the problem with slavery in America was caused by the European colonists' fear of a contamination with another race (this argument is valid in the case of both the Indians and the Negroes).

As a consequence, no matter if *the Other* means in Poe's tales the weak one, the inferior one or the black one, the *genus proximum* of the dominated characters is *the Other*. The *Other* finds onself in an incessant battle with *the One* and this One experiences different types of guilt in connection to his behavior towards the Other.

Starting from *The Fall of the House of Usher*, both the One and the Other are illustrated via different symbols or characters, thing that implies two basic different types of guilt: the *individual guilt* and the *collective guilt*. Both Lady Madeline and Roderick Usher are, on their turn, the One and the Other. They are twins and during their entire life they have experienced a deep, erotic love. In this game of love, both partners dominate and are dominated. What makes them both guilt is their blood. But what matters the most is the perspective from which this guilt is perceived because, in their case, it is the society which projects the guilt upon them, perceiving them as outcasts, and not their consciousness. Surpassing this superficial level, they both experience individual guilt and not because they love each other, but because they torture one another. Usher converted Lady Madeline into a perfect image of himself, which means that he nullified her personality: "He admitted, however, although with hesitation, that much of the peculiar gloom which thus afflicted him could be traced to a more natural and far more palpable origin--to the severe and long-continued illness--indeed to the evidently approaching dissolution--of a tenderly beloved sister, his sole companion for long years, his last and only relative on earth"[10]. If Roderick's mental state is connected to his sister's death, it means that he experiences his own spiritual death because she is him. She behaves like him, she conspires with him and say no word about their incestuous love, she

[8] J. Dayan, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
[9] M. S. D. Alexandru, *Other*, in M. Bottez et al., *Postcolonialism/Postcommunism Dictionary of Key Cultural Terms*, Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, Bucureşti, 2011, p. 231.
[10] E. A. Poe, *The Fall of the House of Usher*, in *Thirty-Two Stories*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2000, p. 93.

is ill like him – she is his double. She accepts to be buried alive because she cannot escape from his domination. On the other hand, Lady Madeline is guilt because of her selfishness: physically dead, she returns as spirit to regain the beloved one and to dominate him till the end of time. Another thing to be emphasized is the fact that they cannot be dead on both physical and spiritual level at the same time until the end of the story. Lady Madeline's mutilated spirit needs a revenge, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Roderick's isolation during the years spent in the house of Usher with Madeline can disappear only if he dies.

On the level of *collective guilt*, the most important symbol of the One is the house of Usher, an ancient, rotten, appalling Gothic house, and the Usher family. These are the symbols of white domination and of the European culture in America, on the point of falling, about to perish. The entire setting, the tarn, the trees and the darkness they suggest, is connected to the black color, so it is a symbol of the culture of slaves. The house of Usher falls because its history is full of collective guilt: the white culture that it symbolizes have tortured and have tried to eliminate the Other. As a consequence, the collective guilt makes the house of Usher be doomed and about to fall.

In this sense, both the individual and the collective guilt in *The Fall of the House of Usher* are sources of the fantastic, strange landscape in the sense that the Gothic elements which depict the setting are projections of this guilt. From the very beginning, as the narrator arrives at the ancient house of his friend, the great density of Gothic details creates tension and dilemmas: "During the whole of a dull, dark, and soundless day in the autumn of the year, when the clouds hung oppressively low in the heavens, I had been passing alone, on horseback, through a singularly dreary tract of country, and at length found myself, as the shades of the evening drew on, within view of the melancholy House of Usher"[11]. In fact, in terms of construction, the tale is structured as a matryoshka doll in the sense that it is composed by what I find appropriate to call *several layers of strangeness* that lead to the core event – Lady Madeline's coming to life and the fall of the house of Usher. The reader participates in the bewildering discoveries of the narrator which start with his arrival at the Usher's house. A first layer is related to the image of the exterior, a setting composed by "decayed trees", "white trunks", "rank sedges", and which constitutes a frame for the house with "bleak walls" and "vacant eye-like windows". Contemplating this breathtaking image, the narrator is overwhelmed: "What was it--I paused to think--what was it that so unnerved me in the contemplation of the House of Usher?"[12] . The second layer is the reversed image of the house and the landscape as reflected in the tarn and the more attentive analysis of the exterior of the house. Then, obviously, there are correspondent layers for all the elements that compose the tale's imagery: the Gothic interior of the house, the frightful appearance of Roderick, the encounter with the weird Lady Madeline, the strange artistic preferences of Roderick, especially the picture and the poem which function as instances of mise *en abyme* in the tale, together with the story of Ethelred, then the vault where Lady Madeline is entombed alive, the tempest and the final moment when Lady Madeline comes to life, murders his brother and the house falls.

I mentioned these aspects because they are all connected to the Gothic imagery and, as the narrator constantly suggests throughout the story, all can be just an illusion of one's perception, thus, here, the Gothic is merely a projection of guilt and of the strange past of Ushers. And there is another important aspect that must be mentioned: as the story is concerned with the incestuous love between Roderick Usher and Lady Madeline, who are also twins, and with the extinction of a generation, of a family, which is the role of the narrator? Obviously, as he succeeds in leaving the

[11] E. A. Poe, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
[12] *Ibidem.*

house before it falls, he is the one who will tell the story but, at the same time, his presence in the company of Ushers is completely odd. As a consequence, taking into consideration the problem of the self, which is complex and built up by contrasting elements, the problem of the narrator might be solved as his presence is interpreted from prof. Anca Peiu's perspective: "The trio Madeline-Roderick-narrator can be viewed as a threefold image of the Freudian id-ego-superego representation of human psyche"[13] . From this point of view and taking into account the idea that the landscape is interpreted as a projection, as an illusion, just like the narrator suggests, these characters are materializations of a split self.

This split or multilayered self is a symbol for the above mentioned forms of guilt. The essential self cannot be recomposed, it is prone to destruction. Its complete destruction functions as a mirror of the punishment for the crime of One against the Other. The tragic and terrifying end of this story is a warning for the cruel America. The split-self in Poe's story is a literary nemesis for the American creed in self-reliant individuals and in the American Dream.

William Wilson, on the other hand, is a story which illustrates in a more direct way the forms of personal and collective guilt, as it deals with the theme of double. This double could point to either the already mentioned split personality, or to a symbol for the two conflicting races in America in the 19th century. But I think that it might be a symbol for both these aspects.

First, it is clear that, in this story, guilt is related to William Wilson's fail to recognize himself, to complete himself, thus to self-sufficiency. The chaotic instincts which materialize in the image of William Wilson receive a constant help from the poor shadow which signifies the reason. But no connection can be made between these two forces in the case of William Wilson. So, being an instinctual individual and denying his consciousness, Wilson becomes a villain, a robber, a monster. Following the same path as in the case of the previous story, there are some traces of racism that can be deciphered in *William Wilson*. In *Romancing the Shadow*, racism in Poe is also stated in terms of property: "All of Poe's fiction is about property and possession and moves rhetorically back and forth between the extremes of affect (heartfelt devotion or undying love) and dispassion (cold mutilation or self-absorbed insensitivity)"[14]. The author of the article in which this idea appears makes a connection between the paroxysm of affect, which is the most important means for drawing psychological insights in Poe's fiction, and the image of the slaves in the 19th century. From the judicial point of view, they were regarded as objects and they were identified as human beings only when they were responsible for crimes, for which they were punished. Thus, the author states: "Poe plays with the working dichotomy that construes both persons and privilege: not only the opposition between natural (read physical) death and unnatural (read legal) death but also the strategic agenda implied in the distinction between natural rights and civil rights"[15]. Taking this opinion into consideration, as William Wilson is a criminal, somebody who must be punished by law, he is dead only from the legal point of view – the *unnatural death*. This means that he still has a chance to redeem himself, as long as he regains his plenitude. When he murders his shadow, his consciousness, his only chance to be a natural creature is lost because his sin is fundamental: "You have conquered, and I yield. Yet, henceforward art thou also dead--dead to the World, to Heaven and to Hope!"[16]. When he separates himself from his consciousness, he loses his civil rights. Then, when he murders his consciousness, he is devoid of natural rights as he loses any chance to be

[13] A. Peiu, *Five Versions of Selfhood in 19th Century American Literature*, C. H. Beck, Bucureşti, 2013, p. 61.
[14] J. Dayan, *op. cit*., p. 112.
[15] *Ibidem*.
[16] E. A. Poe, *William Wilson*, in *Thirty-Two Stories*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2000, p. 119.

redeemed. From this point of view, there is *a guilt related to society and law* and *a guilt related to higher spiritual instances*, to God.

But, as *Romancing the Shadow* deals with the problem of racism, the above mentioned statement implies that in *William Wilson* this symbolical split-self points to the American self, to his black and white structure. If it is so, then William Wilson - the villain might be connected to European, white Americans that are haunted by their awful deeds against the slaves. Slave's resistance and courage are symbolized by William Wilson - the shadow and the message would be that the American culture needs to gather its components by understanding each and every race that lives in America or otherwise the only possibility is self-destruction. The consciousness is William Wilson's *possession* and becomes something *threatening* for him when it interferes in order to prevent him from doing wrong. As a consequence, his consciousness materializes in the form of a spook, of an *almost human* shadow, which functions as the symbol of the slaves, who were somebody's possession and who should be perceived as human beings only if they did something wrong, if they were a threat for society. In these terms, there is also a collective crime, a crime of the whites, represented by William Wilson - the villain, against the blacks or other culturally different people.

Related to the Gothic imagery, it is a means to amplify the guilt and the tortures of the split self in *William Wilson*. Different from the fantastic landscape in *The Fall of the House of Usher*, the place is clearly mentioned: England, Eton, Oxford, Rome. Wilson's childhood is connected to a gigantic, labyrinthine, Gothic school and his youth is related to some habits and elements which also belong to the modern, updated Gothic: "dissolute students", "rooted habits of vice", the "carousal", the "despicable science of gambling", a gallery of vice and of self-destruction. The final scene in Rome depicts an atmosphere of carnival, a world of masks. Such a colorful and mirthful gathering hides deadly corruption and hypocrisy and it could symbolize the means used by the Americans to hide their guilt for their terrible deeds against the blacks.

Another split-self is illustrated in *The Tell-Tale Heart*, a story of the extreme fear and guilt. While the narrators in *The Fall of the House of Usher* and *William Wilson* are images of different sides of a tortured psyche, with *The Tell-Tale Heart* Poe creates a character that represents extreme madness and disorder and who doesn't have any chance to regain his inner self. In comparison with the three characters in *The Fall of the House of Usher* or with the two William Wilsons, who are complementary elements of psyche, so the relation between reason and intellect might had had a chance to be re-established, in *The Tell-Tale Heart* the narrator signifies a broken and lonely consciousness, obsessed with its guilt. The story starts abruptly, with the confession of the insane, dead narrator, whose speech is puzzling: "You fancy me mad. Madmen know nothing. But you should have seen me"[17]. Or, to put it in another way, "If I were mad, I couldn't have been the author of such a perfect crime". Which is not a disclaimer, but rather an accusation and a suggestion of how deep this insanity is within the mind of the character. This is a general strategy Poe uses in his tales in order to gain reader's belief but, as it generally happens in his stories, every statement has a double meaning: on the one hand, it provides logical explanations of the fantastic, weird events, on the other hand, it is an overtone of a tragic end and of the complete loss that dominates the story.

The *Evil Eye* of the victim and "the beating of his hideous heart" are the narrator's obsessions and spooks. His behavior is also related to the *acuteness of the senses* which explains Usher's miserable condition: "And have I not told you that what you mistake for madness is but over acuteness of the senses?--now, I say, there came to my ears a low, dull, quick sound, such as a

[17] E. A. Poe, *The Tell-Tale Heart*, in *Thirty-Two Stories*, Hackett, Indianapolis, 2000, p. 217.

watch makes when enveloped in cotton. I knew that sound well, too. It was the beating of the old man's heart"[18]. This obsession, related to the incessant beating of the heart of the man he murdered, is a sign of his terrifying insanity and illustrates a guilty consciousness that cannot hide the secret of his sin. Those moments when he tries to appear as a self-reliant individual in the eyes of the reader are just ironies towards the American creed in the complete, well-balanced self. Their role is to accumulate a tension and to aggravate the guilt they hide. The narrator repeats to himself: "for what had I to fear?"[19], as the beating of the old man's heart becomes "louder and louder". He is already lost because this hideous murder makes him lose his mind completely.

This is the shortest, but the most tensional story of Poe's literary works analyzed in this paper. Because of this concise structure, the meanings and the questions that the story rises are infinite. This miserable image of the narrator is the perfect illustration of a decomposed, tortured mind. He is guilt for taking away somebody's life, but, more exactly, for losing any chance to complete oneself.

The Gothic imagery is poor in this story, because it is a confession of a destroyed soul. The image of the narrator burying the corpse of the victim under the floor and his attentive movements echoes Roderick Usher's concerns with locking Lady Madeline: "I then took up three planks from the flooring of the chamber, and deposited all between the scantlings. I then replaced the boards so cleverly, so cunningly, that no human eye--not even his--could have detected any thing wrong"[20]. And as in the case of *The Fall of the House of Usher*, this Gothic image of the death and of the burial is a means to amplify the guilt and to transform the reality into a projection of consciousness. In this way, his consciousness punishes him for murder and for self-destruction. He took the life of the Other, as America transformed the Negroes into objects and stole from them the most important things: freedom, equilibrium and memories. The punishment for murder is that incessant beating of the victim's heart, an echo of the tortured spirits of the Negroes who had been punished, hanged, tortured, murdered before the Civil War took place. The punishment for self-destruction is the narrator's complete loss, his complete insanity.

These characters or these multilayered human minds are Poe's panoply of self-destruction as their deeds lead them to a certain type of death – physical, intellectual, spiritual. What I was trying to emphasize in this paper is that these characters are the dark mirror of the American self. They are a suggestion of how weak the human psyche might be, of how complex the life in general might be and, last but not the least, of how self-sufficient the Americans could be, as they ignored and ill-treated their brothers. Their rules and their behavior toward the Negroes led to a cruel battle between the One and the Other, but this was the only solution for making America grow mature and build up anew its self. Edgar Allan Poe, with his allusions, creates in his stories a complex imagery of the American quest for identity and suggests via the terrifying end of his characters that a conflicting and violent America will certainly destroy itself if it continues in this way.

[18] E. A. Poe, *op. cit.*, p. 218.
[19] *Ibidem*.
[20] E. A. Poe, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

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STUDY IN INTERMEDIALITY IN JAN GUILLOU'S NOVEL 'THE EVIL' AND ITS MOVIE ADAPTATION, FOCUSING ON THE MAIN CHARACTER ERIK PONTI AND HIS RELATION TO THE OTHER CHARACTERS

Alexandra Maria IVAN

Dick Higgins, who coined the term "intermedia" in the late 60's, defined it as a change in the way the message was transmitted in order to regain its strength. A defamiliarization achieved through adaptation. Higgins described his concept as a medium which contains characteristics of other media, thus broadening the notion of medium through its hybridization. He insisted on the term intermedia instead of multimedia largely due to the fact that the prefix 'inter' connotes not only the coexistence of media but also their interconnectedness[1].

> The term <<intermedia>> describes the tendency […] to cross the boundaries of recognized media or to fuse the boundaries of art with media that had not previously been considered art forms.[2]

As one the most significant developments of the twentieth century intermediality is interesting to analyze when referring to movies specifically because they are already a multitude of media contained into a single multidimensional form.

Moreover, when we talk about intermediality we need to understand that it is an umbrella term made to encompass more than the transposition of a book into a movie. A name more appropriate for this process would be intermedial transposition, which refers to the transposition of the entire content of a work into a different medium, rather than just parts of it or borrowing just names of well-known characters, and also allows for the main character to retain a narratorial function such as it was in the book throughout the movie adaptation, giving it the impression of the character recounting a story taking place in their past.[3]

In this essay I will use Intermediality as a method of analysing how the book was transposed into a film format and how the main character of the novel and movie, Erik Ponti, is described and portrayed through his relationships with other characters and how the different media create different interpretations of Erik Ponti, both just as valid.

The main focus of this paper is on the relations between the media with emphasis on the result of this interaction between the two media of choice in order to get a comprehensive reading of the main character and fully understand how the movie rendition attempts to reconstruct meaningful narrative descriptions in the book. This analysis made with the aid of intermediality includes intermedial references – texts or quotes that make reference to other media, transmediality and multimodality and remediation.

In order to compare the written word to images from which we draw the conclusions it is important to consider how the interpretations differ from one another. For example, language offers a more clearly defined conclusion, there is not much leeway to be had in the case of literature, but what remains unsaid can be filled in by the reader's imagination. When we speak about images we

[1] Harren Natilee, "The Crux of Fluxus: Intermedia, Rear-guard.", *Living Collections Catalogue,* number 2/2015, source: http://walkerart.org/collections/publications/art-expanded/crux-of-fluxus., (last visited: 18.02.2016)
[2] Breder Hans, *Intermedia: Enacting the Liminal,* Books on Demand Press, Dortmund, 2005, p.51.
[3] Werner Wolf "Literature and Music: Theory", *Handbook of Intermediality*, De Gruyter Publishing House, Boston, 2015.

must admit that they are more vague than the former; the image does not offer the interpretation, it merely suggests it to the viewers through more subtle means as far as description and thoughts are concerned, while the dialogue remains more or less the same.[4]

When the transposing of the book into a movie is concerned the entire vision belongs to Mikael Håfström, who in 2003 released the movie bearing the same name as the novel „Ondskan". Mikael Håfström received an Oscar nomination for his work depicting the hardships endured by the main character, Erik Ponti – the alter ego of Jan Guillou.[5]

But as far as this rendition of the novel is concerned, the author of the novel declared himself to be displeased with how the main character was portrayed[6]:

> Hans enda invändning är att huvudpersonen Erik Ponti – Guillous alter ego – är för sympatiskt tecknad. "För ren", som han säger.
>
> – Erik Ponti är en nallebjörn. Men jag visste att det skulle bli så. Filmmakare är fanatiskt övertygade om att man måste känna sympati för hjälten. Jag tror de har fel. "Ondskan" är en svart berättelse om Erik, som skickats till internatskolan Stjärnsberg, sedan han bivit relegerad från realskolan för sitt våldsamma beteende[7].

Here we notice a discrepancy between the vision of the author and that of the director, a lapse in the complete transposition of the character and his traits. Intermediality is tightly connected to reader response criticism in the way it relies on feedback in order to form a cohesive meaning.

What we need to understand about intermediality is that it depends entirely on the individual who decides how it is done – be it the director of the movie, the author or the artist – and whose perspective on the work is inherently subjective and biased. Adaptation may differ from decade to decade and period to period and from culture to culture. As an example we can take adaptations of Shakespeare's "The Merchant of Venice" which differs in terms of interpretation when we compare a version from before the World War II to one released after. In the former Shylock – the Jew – is portrayed as a greedy tyrant[8], while in the latter version of the adaptation the role garners a depth and a humanization which it lacked. The results are jarring, and the only conclusion which can be drawn is that aside from the original medium in which the work appeared those that follow are irrevocably renditions warped by vision the director depending on which message they are trying to convey or which aspect of the work they are trying to emphasize in their pursuits[9]. As a concrete example we can take the 2004 adaptation of "The Merchant of Venice" directed by Michael Radford in which Al Pacino plays the role of Shylock, adding depth to the character in scenes such as after Jessica, his daughter, leaves[10] Shylock not only mourns her loss but also cries, action not described in the original play; and through his interpretation of the famous monologue in act 3, scene 1 he emphasizes the injustice and hypocrisy in how the Jews were treated by Christians,

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[4] Kafalenos Emma, "Review of Intermediality and Storytelling ", *Style,* no. 1, 2012, p. 116

[5] Elgán Elisabeth, Scobbie Irene (red.), *Historical Dictionary of Sweden,* Rowan& Littlefield Publishing House, Maryland, 2015, p. 58

[6] Redvall Eva , "Jag var ingen god människa", *Sydsvenskan,* 22.04.2005, source: http://www.sydsvenskan.se/kultur--nojen/jag-var-ingen-god-manniska/ (visited 17.02.2016)

[7] "His only objection is that the main character Erik Ponti – Guillou's alter ego – is too sympathetically drawn. "Too pure" he says.

- Erik Ponti is a teddy bear. But I knew it would be so. Filmmakers are fanatically convinced of the need to feel sympathy for the hero. I think they are wrong. "The Evil" is a black story about Erik, who was sent to the Stjärnsberg boarding school, after he was expelled from secondary school for his violent behaviour." [my translation]

[8] Jay Halio, "Introduction", *The Oxford Shaespeare: The Merchant of Venice*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p. 70.

[9] *Ibid*. pp.70-71.

[10] Shakespeare William, *The Oxford Shaespeare: The Merchant of Venice*, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 152-154.

shining a new light upon the character of Shylock and showing his entitlement to exact a cruel revenge upon Antonio. Thus the character of Shylock is changed through the different interpretation of the actor:

> And if you treat us badly, won't we try to get revenge? If we're like you in everything else, we'll resemble you in that respect. If a Jew offends a Christian, what's the Christian's kind and gentle reaction? Revenge. If a Christian offends a Jew, what punishment will he come up with if he follows the Christian example? Of course, the same thing—revenge! I'll treat you as badly as you Christians taught me to—and you'll be lucky if I don't outdo my teachers[11].

All elements which can be analyzed play a role in the adaptation, mainly one of trying to recreate the setting evoked in the book (as it is in our case). The music sets the scene and the scenery is similar if not identical to the one described in the book, if it is a real place. Clothes also play an important role in the renditions, one of allowing the viewer to empathize with the characters or, on the contrary, to set them apart through defamiliarization.

Intermediality is a better way of referring to media with respect to how they interact with each other and with the intention of comparing renditions of the same work to one another, rather than using the term adaptation, which focuses mainly on the structure. The difference between the book and the movie fundamentally depends on the lack of written words used to directly convey through descriptions the intended messages. The focus of the movie will not completely mirror that of the book. To the advantage of the movie, this medium is already a product of a multitude of other media. Images and music serve to suggest either themes or motifs, conferring depth to the film which is easy to be overlooked when one is not doing an in-depth analysis of the movie.
As Ágnes Pethö states in her essay:

> The benefit of thinking of cinema in terms of intermediality consists, however, not only in a more flexible way of looking at the changes occurring within the mediality of cinema, but also – more importantly from the perspective employed by this book – in the way in which the poetics of cinema and specific stylistic effects can be described.[12]

Throughout the essay intermediality will be used as a critical category in order to extract a detailed comparative analysis of the intermedial relation within the selected text and medium. Another important subcategory of intermediality which will be used in drawing the comparison will be adaptation theory. Though instead of focusing on the fidelity issue of the movie – to which extent it stays true to the literary narrative – the focus will instead be on simply emphasizing the differences between the two and offering an unbiased analysis and a possible motivation for the avoidance or addition of certain elements in the book.

> Intermediality has also the potential of becoming one of the major theoretical issues of contemporary thinking about cinema, precisely because it regards film to be a medium in continuous change and interchange, and as such it can address fundamental problems related to the connections between different configurations of communication that have occurred following the multiplication of the forms of moving images themselves, of the cinematic experience moving beyond the walls of the movie theatre, into the streets, into our homes, into the exhibition halls, and into newer and even newer media[13].

[11] *Ibid.* p. 161-162.
[12] Pethö Ágnes, *Cinema and Intermediality: The Passion for the In-Between,* Cambridge Scholars Publishing House, Newcastle upon Tyne 2011, p. 2.
[13] *Ibid.*

Thus intermediality strives not to judge the quality of the adaptations but to analyse its words through the provided critical means. Cinema has proven to be the most complex medium of art yet through its possibility of containing a multitude of other media, and due to its not being constrained by factors such as the impossibility of using more than one setting (such as it is in theater, for example). Cinema is not a direct way of transmitting a message, the relation between the medium itself and the viewer being moderated by the screen, and in accordance to this the narrative must be adapted in order to remain coherent once having passed through the filter of the screen. It must also be taken in consideration that while with a book a reader is able to pause at any given moment (even more so if the book is disposed in chapters), when it comes to movies more often than not it is impossible to pause without breaking the narrative and losing track of the action. This is yet another reason for why the movie does not respect the literary narrative. There is a given tempo to be maintained in a movie and cramming all the informations from the book would inevitably lead to either a very long movie which cannot be viewed without interrupting the flow of the narrative or a movie which seems rushed and ruins the effect of immersion viewers have.

Jan Guillou is one of Sweden's bestselling authors. He was born in Södertälje on the 17th of January 1944, finished high-school in 1964 and afterward started studying law in Stockholm. He worked as a reporter for Aktuellt, a news program in Sweden, and made his breakthrough as a writer in 1971. Nowadays he is a columnist for the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet. He has written over forty books, out of which the most popular is the series about Carl Hamilton - a spy -, which has sold over five million copies.[14]

In the beginning Guillou wrote for the Norstedts publishing house but in 1999 he decided to start his own publishing house, called Pirat Publishing House, together with his partner and the author Liza Marklund[15].

Jan Guillou seems to be a very controversial person. In 1973 he took part in a scandal related to a secret information agency and spent ten months in prison for revealing the secret. He wrote 'The Evil' in 1981, a novel he declared was part autobiographical, which dealt with 'violence in the Swedish daily life'[16] in both his family and the boarding school he attended. The book stirred concern in the readers and since its publication the book became a compulsory reading in schools and it was made into a movie directed by Mikael Håfström.[17] After the movie began being played in cinemas many have come forth saying that the author lied about everything in the novel, among those his mother.

Even now it is uncertain whether the novel he wrote is fiction or not. Guillou himself states that 'The Evil' is not an autobiography but 'an autobiographical novel'[18]. Ever since the movie came out he has been plagued by this question of authenticity and he clarifies that even if the hero has him as an inspiration and even if most of what was written in the novel is real, the book is and will continue to be only a novel, and under no circumstances will it become a source of information

[14] Guillou Jan, *På jakt efter historien: Spioner, reportage, riddare och häxor*, Pirat Publishing House, Stockholm, 2003, p. 12.
[15] Sörbring Karin, ”Guillou startar nytt förlag med succëförfattare”, *Aftonbladet*, 8.06.1999, source: http://wwwc.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/9906/08/guillou.html (visited: 18.02.2016)
[16] Guillou Jan, ”Ville inte att någon annan skulle skrriva min story – sämre”, *Aftonbladet*, 6.09.2009, source: http://www.aftonbladet.se/kultur/article11985552.ab (visited: 17.02.2016)
[17] Redvall Eva, ”Jag var ingen god människa”, *Sydsvenskan,* 22.04.2005, source: http://www.sydsvenskan.se/kultur--nojen/jag-var-ingen-god-manniska/ (visited17.02.2016)
[18] Guillou Jan, ”Ville inte att någon annan skulle skrriva min story – sämre”, *Aftonbladet*, 6.09.2009, source: http://www.aftonbladet.se/kultur/article11985552.ab (visited: 17.02.2016)

about his life and childhood.[19] Regardless, the novel falls under the category of fiction, and if it is considered otherwise by some readers it is in no case a fault that can be attributed to the author.

The portrayal of Erik in both the movie and the book is as follows:

Erik Ponti, the main character, undergoes a character development in both the book and the movie which is rather different when the two chosen media are compared. Through scenes which are either hidden or avoided in the medial transposition of the book, the movie seems to portray a different version of Erik Ponti.

Erik is an abused fourteen year old who lives with his mother, younger brother and step-father. In the movie he is played by actor Andreas Wilson, who at the time the filming took place was twenty-two years old. His age influences the way in which the audience perceives the violence he is subjected to and the violent behavior towards his schoolmates. The shock of seeing such violence is reduced and the cruelty is alleviated through using an older actor, portraying a man who knows how to fight and wants to fight others. The book uncovers the fact that he is in a way forced to fight, and the times he spends at the Stjärnsberg boarding school represents to him not a change in oppressors, but a punishment for his violence towards others. Finding out upon his arrival that he must continue fighting to defend himself comes as a harsh sentence, and his opinion in the matter is clear[20]:

> Jag vill inte slåss, jag vill inte, jag är trott på det där![21]

But in the book Erik's cruelty is dispelled and his situation is drastically different. Right from the beginning the reader is shown that Erik is violent not because he enjoys it, but because he knows no other method of avoiding getting beaten or bullied by others. In the movie Erik's problems with the law are avoided and his character is given a cleaner reputation, being portrayed as an archetypal hero and victim, fighting against a corrupt society. In the same spirit, he refuses to fight the council members, listening to his roommates monologue on Gandhi and how he peacefully freed India, but it seems that he does not perceive the bullies from the council as being oppressors but rather similar to the colleagues he used to fight at his old school. He does not defend himself, and this is what alters how his personality develops.

Throughout the book his development is easy to see, portrayed by his growing independence – both financial and personal. During the summer vacation he returns home to work at a dock in order to earn money for a summer course in England – which showcases a care for his future career after highschool. His scars from previous battles also begin fading, hinting at his giving up fighting and chose to use his intelligence to conquer his enemies. This scene depicting his work and independence disappears in the movie, and instead it is replaced by his return home, subsequently followed by a return to the step-father's old reign of terror and abuse, through which he suffers quietly – a mirror of the time before his departure to the boarding school.

The return to Stjärnsberg and the remaining year he has to spend there is plagued by changes. Erik's friend, Pierre Tanguy, is bullied into leaving school, and Erik himself falls in love with a school cook and waitress – Marja, who ends up being sent back home to Finland when their relationship is brought to light. Erik narrowly avoids expulsion and finishes the semester, a triumph over his enemies and the corrupt system.

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[19] Guillou Jan, *På jakt efter historien: Spioner, reportage, riddare och häxor*, Pirat Publishing House, Stockholm, 2003, p. 60.
[20] Guillou Jan, *Ondskan*, Pirat Publishing House, Stockholm, 1981, p. 66
[21] "I don't want to fight, I don't want to, I'm tired of that!" [my translation]

The road home for Erik is almost a ritual: he sets fire to the school emblem which had been sewn to his blazer, and smokes his last cigarette before quitting. With surgical precision he erases all traces the boarding school left, and leaves the memory of it behind. Once home, he finally takes action and puts an end to the abuse, then promptly gives up fighting as well – the only thing left from his older self, becoming the image of the mature adult he strove for.

In the movie, in the scene of his last fight, Erik promises his mother instead of promising himself to stop fighting, which shows an Erik which does things for other people's sake rather than his own, a character influenced by external stimuli rather than internal.

His relation with his family is turbulent at best, with his step-father abusing him on a daily basis after supper and his mother playing the piano to drown out the noises. His smaller brother is almost an episodic character, being mentioned in the beginning of the novel and briefly when Erik returns home for the summer. He is jealous of what Erik has and threatens to lie to his dad and earn Erik more beatings if he doesn't give him his belongings. His little brother was never abused. This serves to create a comparison that gives depth to the feelings of injustice and loneliness Erik feels. Being the only one ostracized in his family helps flesh out his character and what determines his actions. There is no mention of Erik ever having a brother in the movie, thus erasing this facet of Erik's personality created by the relationship he has with this member of his family.

Though he at first believes his mother to be indifferent to his torment he is shocked to find that she has sold many of her expensive paintings, this spanning a longer period of time, in order to afford his tuition at the boarding school. His relationship with his mother is more developed in the movie, where the sacrifice his mother makes is visible upon his return home. She is sporting a bruise under one eye, sign that she took his place as a victim in order for him to avoid it.

The most important relationship in the novel is Erik's relationship with Pierre Tanguy, his roommate. Pierre is the one who instructs Erik about the unspoken rules of the high school and the 'peer upbringing' system[22]:

> Principerna för kamratuppfostran var att dom yngre på så vis skulle veta sin plats […] [och att] det är så klart att [de] i realskolan måste få stryk[23]

Erik and Pierre are situated at different extremities of the same spectrum. Erik chooses to use violence to protect himself and Pierre chooses to use passivity, a lack of action, when faced with violence. In the movie Erik takes Pierre's path and refuses to fight with the council members, portraying a much cleaner version of himself, rather than in the book, where he not only accepted to fight but also badly injured those he fought against.

Pierre is the one who during one of their many insightful conversations finally manages to convince Erik that he isn't evil as his father or as the headmaster of his previous school said, and that violence in not in the act itself, but in the mind, and the cruelty his father and the council members have is what defines them as evil. These conversations are not portrayed in the movie, a lack of depth which serves to portray Erik as a proud fighter who almost on his own realizes the truth about his situation. Erik also learns from Pierre that if he refuses enough punishments from the council members (refusals for which he is punished with weekends in arrest or doing punishment work) there is nothing more they can do to him. It is during the arrest that Erik begins to study and read more and thus better his grades.

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[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 63-65.

[23] "the principle of the peer upbringing is that the young ones in this way should know their place […] it is clear that those in secondary school should get beaten" [my translation]

Due to time constraints in the movie many of the aspects of Erik's relationship with Pierre end up being either altered of erased from the plot. Pierre ends up being chased away by the bullies, instead of standing up to them and leaving so that they couldn't punish Erik indirectly through him, and Erik is in a short span of time left by both Pierre and his girlfriend Marja, returning Erik to the status of the lonesome hero. Their friendship loses a lot of character and becomes a friendship rather simplified and easy to overlook.

Pierre led Erik on the path of morality through not only their late-night conversations tackling complex concepts but also through his continual refusal to take part in violent activities, even if they sometimes played pretend-wars against stuffed sacks acting as 'enemy soldiers'. In the book Pierre's departure motivates Erik to become a vigilante, donning dark clothes and a cap with three holes in it to avoid expulsion. The movie version instead has Erik choosing to fight the council members for the first time.

In the end what Erik learned from Pierre is that violence is not always the answer, but when no other method works in the fight against violence, one can fight fire with fire only with care and with the purpose of sending a message.

Erik's relationship with Marja suffers many scene and plot modifications in the movie adaptation. Marja is a Finnish girl from Slavolaks who works in the boarding school as a waitress in order to send those few crowns she earns to her family back home. While the climax of their relationship is similar, if not identical, Marja acts differently in the two media.

Erik first meets Marja in the book only after Pierre leaves, while he is going after those who chased Pierre away. He falls in love with her but their affair is short lived, because they are found out and Marja is let go and sent back to Finland. To keep their relationship a secret for longer Erik volunteers to stop hunting the council members, but instead of agreeing Marja urges him to continue, because that was his duty[24]:

> Han förklarade för henne att så länge han hade henne kunde han inte ta risken ännu en gång att gå ut med mössan med de tre hålen, även om Silverhielm fick komma undan på det viset. Hon sa, med sin omutligt kärva logik på sitt klingande sköna språk, att han ju ändå var skyldig sin bästa vän hämnden på Silverhielm.[25]

Thus, she comes as a contrasting personality to that of Pierre's, who always encouraged peacefulness. On the other hand, in the movie, Marja is a quiet girl who like Pierre dislikes violence and praises Erik when he refuses to fight with the council members. These changes in her personality directly affect Erik's behavior during his time in the boarding school. Their relationship also spans for almost the entire movie, with Erik noticing her from his first evening on the premises of the school. In this way their relationship garners not only more depth but also more power of influencing Erik and his actions.

After Marja is dismissed and Erik is facing the threat of expulsion, he decides to take a final stand against the corrupt laws of the boarding school and earn his autonomy. With the help of a lawyer he threatens the headmaster with informing newspapers of the violence of the upperclassmen which is condoned in a mockery of 'peer upbringing'.

Thus in the movie it is not only Marja which takes part in the climax of the plot but also Pierre, which before was just a transient impediment, though not devoid of meaning, in his school

[24] *Ibid.*, p.265

[25] "He explained to her that as long as he had her he couldn't risk going out with the cap with three holes again, even if Silverhielm got away this way. She said, with her uncompromising harsh logic in her beautiful sounding language, that he of course owed to his best friend to take his revenge on Silverhielm" [my translation]

life. Erik is defined through his relationship with Marja in the movie as peaceful, loving, self-assured and bent on revenge, with a personality that only fully develops when he is faced with not only her and Pierre's departure but also his expulsion from the boarding school. In the book the climax takes a lot longer to get to and the pace is more relaxed than in the movie, giving Erik the aspect of a calculated person, but also naïve and almost childish in his repeated claims that he loves Marja and that his love for her will never disappear.

In conclusion the portrayal of Erik Ponti differs, though not greatly, from book to movie, creating two different variants of the main character that are equally valid and self-sufficient.
The book forces the readers into taking a more active part and fill in details or create their own version of certain characters based on their description, while the movie forces the audience into a more passive stance, presenting them with a cohesive version of the book adapted to fit the time constraints of the medium, in which the long descriptions of characters and settings are replaced if not with a similar visual representation with a representation which best fits the vision of the director.

While the movie chooses to portray the vision of the movie director and emphasize different scenes and events through defamiliarization, the book gives most of the times clear descriptions of the characters of the people involved and of the surroundings, giving them a better contour and also including more characters and developing sub-plots.

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ROMANIAN ASPECTUAL VERBS AND THE CORRELATION BETWEEN EXHAUSTIVE CONTROL AND RESTRUCTURING

Elena LĂCĂTUȘ

1. Aim

According to Grano (2015), there is a correlation between exhaustive control verbs and restructuring effects[1] On the basis of data from English, Mandarin Chinese and Greek he shows that verbs like *try*, *begin*, *manage* are part of monoclausal structures, within which they realize a functional head.

In this paper I extend the investigation to Romanian. I examine the behaviour of Romanian aspectual verbs with a view to evaluating the universality of the correlation between exhaustive control and restructuring. I focus on those aspectual verbs which describe the end of an activity and which merge with a supine complement: *a înceta* (cease, stop), *a termina* (end, finish), *a isprăvi* (end, stop), *a sfârși* (end), *a mântui* (end, finish), *a găta* (end, finish), *a conteni* (stop, end):

(1) a. Am terminat de citit cartea.
have finished DE read.SUP book-the
'I have finished reading the book.'
b. Ei au isprăvit de vorbit.
they have finished DE speak.SUP
'They have finished talking.'

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present the theoretical background. I focus on the definition of control from the perspective of the Principles and Parameters model. I distinguish between obligatory and optional control, as well as between partial and exhaustive control (Landau 2000). I briefly present Grano's (2015) correlation according to which verbs of exhaustive control trigger restructuring effects. The control properties of the Romanian aspectual verbs investigated in this paper are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 I show that these verbs induce restructuring effects. The validity of Grano's correlation is evaluated in Section 5.

2. Theoretical background: control and restructuring

2.1 Control theory in a nutshell

Before investigating the status of the Romanian aspectual verbs belonging to the *a termina* 'finish' class as verbs of control, I will briefly look at the following aspects of control theory: a) the definition of control; b) types of control.

Control has been defined as involving obligatory coreference between the null subject of a non-finite complement clause and an argument in the matrix. It capitalizes on the relationship between a null argument, PRO, the element that is controlled, and its antecedent, i.e. its controller. The examples in (2) illustrate a control relation:

[1] For a different point of view see Landau (2000).

(2) a. I tried$_i$ [PRO$_i$ to give up smoking.]
b. Medea$_i$ tried [PRO$_i$ to poison the neighbour's dog.]
c. Odysseus$_i$ planned [PRO$_i$ to hear the sirens.]
(examples from Adger 2003:251)

In the examples in (2) the verbs in the embedded clause are two place predicates. They assign two theta-roles: Agent and Theme. These two theta-roles cannot be assigned to the same argument because of the Theta Criterion, which states that there should be a one-to-one mapping between the number of arguments and the number of theta-roles. For instance, in (2b) the verb *poison* assigns the Theme theta-role to *the neighbour's dog*, and the Agent theta-role to the null pronoun PRO. The subject *Medea* in the main clause cannot receive the extra theta-role because it already has one from the verb *try*. PRO is a null element with no lexical content. PRO only exists in relation to its antecedent with which it is co-indexed. In the example above, *Medea* is the antecedent of PRO, which it controls, i.e. it is the controller of PRO.

2.2 Obligatory control versus non-obligatory control

There are two types of control: obligatory and non-obligatory control. In obligatory control the null subject PRO refers back to the argument of the main clause with which it is co-indexed (3a). In (3b) PRO can have an arbitrary reading.

(3) a. Jean$_i$ tried [PRO$_i$ to run]. Obligatory control
b. Bob$_i$ knows that it is important [PRO$_{i/j}$ to be well- behaved]. Optional control

Structures with obligatory control are further divided into: subject control and object control, based on whether the antecedent of PRO is the subject or the object of the main clause.

(4) a. Bob$_i$ is happy PRO$_i$ to leave. Subject control
b. Mary$_i$ persuaded Bob$_j$ PRO$_{j/*i}$ to leave. Object control

2.3 Exhaustive control and partial control

Landau (2000) identifies two types of obligatory control: exhaustive control and partial control. In exhaustive control configurations, the reference of the controlled argument is exhaustively determined by the controller. In the examples in (5), PRO has the same referent as the controller, *John.*

(5) a. John$_i$ tried PRO$_i$ to open the door.
b. John$_i$ wanted PRO$_i$ to open the door. (Grano 2015:4)

In partial control structures, PRO has to include the controller. According to Grano (2015:6), 'the controlled position, i.e. PRO, is interpreted as a proper superset of the controller'.

(6) a. John$_i$ promised [PRO$_{i\,(+)}$ to open the door].
b. John$_i$ claims [PRO$_{i(+)}$ to solve the problem.] (Grano 2015:4)

According to Landau (2000), aspectual, modal and implicative predicates disallow partial control (7), whereas desiderative, propositional, factive and interrogative predicates allow partial control (8):

(7) a. John began to solve the problem (*together).
b. John had to solve the problem (*together).
c. John managed to solve the problem (*together).
(8) a. John claimed to solve the problem (together).
b. John wanted to solve the problem (together).
c. John enjoyed to solve the problem (together).
(examples from Grano 2015:9)

2.4 Control and restructuring

An important claim that Grano (2015) makes is that exhaustive control verbs are also raising verbs, i.e. they trigger monoclausal raising structures.

Restructuring configurations are biclausal structures which act as transparent domains for clause bound processes (Grano 2015). According to an earlier line of investigation, restructuring verbs merge with an embedded clause in the course of the derivation (Rizzi 1978). According to a more recent approach, restructuring verbs merge with a bare VP or vP, with which they form a monoclausal structure throughout the derivation (Wurmbrand 2015).

Another important distinction targets the nature of the restructuring verb. According to Cinque (2004), restructuring is restricted to functional heads, i.e. they head functional projections in the functional layer of the clause, and they take lexical VPs as their complement. According to Wurmbrand (2004) there is also lexical restructuring. In this case, a lexical verb merges with a small clause complement.

Grano (2015) adopts Cinque's (2004) analysis of restructuring, according to which aspectual verbs are functional heads: 'exhaustive control predicates form inflectional functional heads that give rise to monoclausal raising structures. Partial control structures on the other hand are considered to be lexical verbs that give rise to bi-clausal control structures' (Grano 2015:5). The two configurations are represented in (9) and (10):

(9) Exhaustive control



(10) Partial control



Grano's (2015) analysis has three main ingredients: functional restructuring, control,and raising. If a verb is a verb of exhaustive control, it will trigger restructuring effects. The restructuring verb is a functional head and the highest argument of the non-finite embedded verb raises over the control verb to subject position in the matrix. This is the hypothesis that I will evaluate against the main properties of aspectual verbs in Romanian (the *a termina* 'finish' class).

3. Aspectual verbs and control in Romanian

3.1 Previous studies

Previous analyses of control configurations in Romanian included aspectual verbs in the obligatory control class (Alboiu 2007). She argues that obligatory control constructions in this language behave like raising constructions and that obligatory control is always exhaustive control (EC). Her analysis of obligatory control as *analogous to raising* follows the line of Hornstein's (1999) movement theory of control. In a nutshell, according to this theory obligatory control configurations involve DP movement, on a par with raising configurations, In order to be able to unify raising and control, Hornstein (1999) departs from the main stream in several respects. He has to assume that theta-roles are actually theta-features on verbs, that DPs can move from one theta-position to another theta-position and, as a result, that theta-chains are allowed to include more than one position. The null subject in the controlled clause is no longer PRO, but a deleted copy. Importantly, the difference between raising and control is no longer one of +/- movement. The two constructions differ only with respect to theta-roles:

(11) a. [$_{TP}$ John [$_{vP}$ ~~John~~ tried [$_{IP}$ ~~John~~ to [$_{vP}$ ~~John~~ read the book]]]]
= *Subject Control, two theta-roles*
b. [$_{TP}$ John [$_{vP}$ (John) seem [$_{IP}$ ~~John~~ to [$_{vP}$ ~~John~~ read the book]]]]
= *Subject Raising, one theta-role*

One important argument in favour of a raising analysis of control in Alboiu (2007) is that obligatory control is always exhaustive control. A second piece of evidence is that the shared argument may surface in a number of positions, but only one PF copy instantiation of the DP subject is permitted, in the embedded clause as well, which instantiates backward control:

(12) (**Victor**) începe (**Victor**) [să cînte (**Victor**) la trombon (**Victor**)].
(Victor.NOM) begins (Victor.NOM) [SBJ sing (Victor.NOM) at trombone Victor.NOM)]
'Victor is beginning to play the trombone.'

According to Alboiu's (2007) Hornstein-type analysis, the subject DP first merges in the Spec,vP of the embedded clause and subsequently moves to its second Merge position in Spec,vP of the matrix clause, thus satisfying the external thematic roles of both predicates. Importantly, subject displacement is argued to be independent of the control/raising phenomenon; it is triggered by information structure (the Theme-Rheme sentence partitioning). Therefore, obligatory control does not involve 'raising' of the subject in the sense of overt subject movement, but is taken to involve one single argument which is assigned two theta-roles in the derivation.

This analysis is also adopted in Cotfas (2011:47-48): "We analyse OC predicates as raisers (aspectual and modal verbs) such that OC in Romanian is an instance of raising in accord with

Alboiu (2006, 2007)". Cotfas (2011) brings forth several arguments in favour of treating aspectual verbs as raising verbs: ban on subject and tense mismatch, selection of non-agentive subjects, impossibility of passivization, co-occurrence with idiom chunks and preservation of lower quirky case. This author also shows that though aspectual verbs can combine with volitional adverbs when they select a subjunctive complement, this volitional adverb modifies the embedded predicate, not the aspectual verb in the main clause. According to Cotfas (2011), aspectuals behave as unaccusatives and therefore they evince raising behaviour.

3.2 Aspectual verbs in Romanian and (exhaustive) control

These previous analyses, however, investigated only some aspectual verbs. In terms of distribution, they focused on aspectual verbs with subjunctive and infinitival complements. In what follows, I will be examining the aspectual verbs in the *a termina* 'finish' class which merge with a supine complement.

The aspectual verbs in this class disallow disjoint subjects in their clausal complement:

(13) a. (Eu_i) am terminat de scris PRO_i lucrarea.
I have finished DE write.SUP PRO paper-the
'I have finished writing the paper.'
b. *(Eu) am terminat de scris Vasile lucrarea.
I have finished DE write.SUP Vasile paper-the

They assign an Agent theta-role to their external argument, which is the controller of the null subject in the embedded supine clause. This is reflected in their compatibility with Agent-oriented adverbs, which modify the aspectual verb in the matrix:

(14) Ion a terminat **înadins** de cîntat când a intrat Maria în cameră.
Ion has finished on purpose DE sing.SUP when has entered Maria in room
'Ion stopped singing on purpose when Maria entered the room.'
(15) A terminat **uşor** de scris lucrarea.
has finished easily DE write.SUP paper-the
'He/ She has easily finished writing the paper.'

The fact that the external argument is assigned a theta-role explains why the *a termina* verbs cannot combine with weather verbs, whose subject is non-thematic and non-agentive (16), or why they cannot they take an idiom chunk as their subject (while preserving the idiomatic interpretation) (17):

(16) *A terminat/încetat/sfârșit/contenit de plouat/ de nins.
has finished/stopped/ended/ceased DE rain.SUP/ DE snow.SUP
(17) a. *Ulciorul a încetat de mers de mai multe ori la apă.
pitcher-the has stopped DE go.SUP many times to water
Meaning of idiom: 'The pitcher only goes so often to the well.'
b. *Apa a terminat de trecut, pietrele au terminat de rămas.
water-the has finished DE pass.SUP rocks-the have finished DE stay.SUP
Meaning of idiom: Water flows, rocks remain.

Like any control verbs, they can be embedded under *try*, *persuade, force* (18) and are compatible with the imperative (19):

(18) L-am convins/ forțat pe Ion să termine de scris lucrarea.
him have persuaded/ forced PE Ion SUBJ finish DE write.SUP paper-the
'I have persuaded/ forced Ion to finish writing the paper.'
(19) Termină de scris!
finish.IMP DE write.SUP
'Finish writing!'

This property is also reflected in the semantic constraints on the verb in the complement clause, which has to be Agentive (20). [- control] stative predicates (21) and unaccusatives (22) are banned from the supine complement:

(20) A terminat de desenat câteva cercuri.
has finished DE draw.SUP a few circles
'He /she has finished drawing a few circles'.
(21) *Oaspeţii au gătat de plăcut gazda.
guests-the have finished DE like.SUP host-the
'The guests finished/stopped liking the host.'
(22) *Frunzele au terminat de ruginit în vii.
leaves-the have finished DE rust.SUP in vineyards-the
'*The leaves stopped rusting in the vineyards.'

Control constructions behave differently from raising structures when their complement clause is a passive one. In the case of raising predicates, such as *seem*, the passive complement is synonymous with the active complement of the same sentence, as can be seen in (23) below:

(23) a. Barnett seemed to have read the book.
b. The book seemed to have been read by Barnett.
(examples from Davies and Dubinsky 2004:5)

In the case of a control verb, the synonymy is absent. Moreover, in some cases, the main predicate does not allow an embedded passive, as illustrated in the examples below:

(24) a. The doctor tried to examine Tilman.
b. Tilman tried to be examined by the doctor.
(25) a. Barnett tried to read the book.
b.*The book tried to be read by Barnett.
(examples from Davies and Dubinsky 2004:5)

The supine does not have a passive, therefore this control diagnostic cannot be used in Romanian. The data presented in this section show that the verbs in the *a termina* 'finish' class behave as verbs of control. The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. *A termina* verbs as verbs of control

Test	**A termina**
Presence of thematic subject in the matrix	yes
Compatibility with weather verbs	no
Compatibility with idiom chunks in subject position + retain idiomatic meaning	no
Compatibility with the imperative	yes
Compatibility with agent-oriented adverbs	yes
Can be the complement of *force*, *persuade*, *try*	yes
The verb in the supine must be agentive	yes
Passive predicate in complement clause (passive-active synonymy)	N/A

The *a termina* verbs enter exhaustive control configurations, as illustrated in (26), where PRO is interpreted as identical with the controller, not as a superset which includes the controller:

(26) a. Ion$_i$ **a** **terminat** de scris PRO$_i$ o carte. (exhaustive control)
Ion has finished DE write PRO a book
'Ion has finished writing a book.'
b. *Ion$_i$ **a** **terminat** de scris PRO$_{i+}$ o carte.
Ion has finished DE write.SUP PRO$_{i+}$ a book
'Ion has finished writing a book.'

As mentioned previously in this paper, in partial control configurations, the controlled position includes the controller and other individuals that are salient to the context. This does not happen with the *a termina* verbs. In (27) below, the subject of *a cîştiga meciul* ('win the game') can be interpreted as co-indexed only with *Ion.*

(27) Ion$_i$ a terminat de cîştigat PRO$_i$ meciul.
Ion has finished DE win.SUP PRO game-the
'Ion has finished winning the game.'

4. Romanian aspectual verbs and restructuring

According to Grano's (2015) correlation, aspectual verbs in the *a termina* class should also behave as restructuring verbs. In this section I will argue that the *a termina* aspectuals with a supine, which are exhaustive control predicates, are also restructuring predicates. I use the major restructuring tests discussed in Wurmbrand (2015) and a few other diagnostics relevant to Romanian.

4.1 Clitic climbing

In Romanian the supine clause cannot host clitics of any type (Accusative, Dative, possessive clitics). The clitic raises to the main clause in pre-verbal position (see also Dragomirescu 2013: 34) (28a) or, in the case of the Accusative feminine clitic *o* 'her', in *perfect compus* configurations, to the post-verbal position of the aspectual in the matrix (28b). The clitic cannot occur in the supine complement (28c).

(28) a. Cartea **o** termin/ sfârșesc/ isprăvesc de citit.
book-the it finish DE read.SUP
'I will finish reading the book.'

b. Cartea am terminat-**o** de citit.
book-the have finished it de read.SUP
'I have finished reading the book.'
c. *Am terminat de citit-o.
have finished de read.SUP it

There are two main lines of investigation with respect to clitic position in Romanian. Some studies argue that they merge in a special Clitic Phrase (see, e,g, Alboiu 2002). According to other studies, which assume that clitics merge in the VP, the pre-verbal clitic occupies a position in the left-periphery of the clause, reached via movement, (see, e.g., Avram and Coene 2009). Irrespective of which analysis one adopts, the fact that clitics cannot occur inside the supine complement indicates that the supine is a "truncated" structure which is transparent to restructuring effects.

4.2 Negation

The embedded supine cannot be independently negated, not even with *ne-* , which is normally used with non-finite predicates.

(29) a. *Cartea o termin de **nu** citit/**ne**citit.
book-the it finish de not read.SUP / ne-read.SUP
b. Cartea **nu** o termin de citit.
book-the not it finish de read.SUP
'I will not finish reading the book.'

Romanian is a strict negative concord language (Isac 1999), which allows n-words such as *nimeni* 'nobody', *nimic* 'nothing', *nicăieri* 'nowhere' only in the presence of the syntactic marker *nu*, irrespective of their syntactic position/ function (30). Negation in the matrix does not license n-words in assertive complement clauses (31). With the *a termina* verbs, however, negation with the matrix verb allows n-words in the supine complement, indicating that the structure behaves as if it were monoclausal (32):

(30) *(Nu) a citit nimic.
not has read nothing
'He/ She hasn't read anything.'
(31) * Ion nu a auzit că eu am invitat pe nimeni.
Ion not has heard SUBJ I have invited PE nobody
'Ion hasn't heard that I didn't invite anyone.'
(32) Vasile nu a terminat de citit nimic.
Vasile not has finished DE read.SUP nothing
'Vasile hasn't finished reading anything.'

Besides n-words, Romanian also has a few elements which behave like NPIs in non-negative concord languages, among which *decât* 'only' (Costache 2005). In standard Romanian, *decât* 'only' can appear exclusively in negative sentences (33a). Its presence in the supine is licensed by negation in the matrix (33b):

(33) a. *(Nu) a citit decât una dintre cărţi.
*(not) has read only one of books
'He/she has finished reading only one of the books.'
b. Nu a terminat de citit decât una dintre cărţi.
not has finished DE read.SUP only one of books
'He/ she has finished reading only one of the books.'

4.3 Tense

The temporal interpretation of the embedded supine overlaps with the temporal interpretation of the aspectual verb in the matrix. Tense mismatch between the tense in the main clause and a specific time adverbial in the supine clause results in ungrammaticality.

(34) *Ion a terminat de citit cartea *mâine*.
Ion has finished DE read.SUP book-the tomorrow
'*John has finished reading the book tomorrow.'

Non-deictic adverbs, on the other hand, can appear in the supine and they modify the supine predicate alone:

(35) a. Vecinii au terminat de mers zilnic la doctor.
neighbours-the have finished DE go.SUP daily to doctor
'Our neighbours have finished going to the doctor's every day.'
b. Am terminat de luat medicamente de trei ori pe zi.
have finished DE take.SUP medicines three times a day
'I have finished taking my medicines three times a day.'

4.4 Long object movement

Wurmbrand (2015) discuuse long object movement (LOM) as one of the main restructuring criteria. LOM is an operation which involves the movement of the object of the clausal complement to the matrix subject position as a result of passivization of the matrix. For Romanian, LOM is a relatively controversial restructuring diagnostic. Firstly, sentences such as (36) below are not accepted by all the speakers:

(36) Cartea a fost terminată de citit în trei ore de către toată lumea.
book-the has been finished DE read.SUP in three hours by all world
'The book was finished in three hours by everybody.'
(example from Dragomirescu 2013: 35)

Secondly, in Romanian the reflexive passive is, according to Wurmbrand (2015), ambiguous; it is difficult to determine whether the derivation of these structures involves passivization of the verb in the matrix or passivization of the embedded clause followed by the movement of the clitic to the C-domain of the matrix.

(37) Cartea se termină de citit în trei ore (de către oricine).
book-the SE finishes DE read.SUP in three hours by anyone
'One can finish reading the book in three hours.'
(example from Dragomirescu 2013:35)

However, given that the supine predicate cannot undergo passivization, I think that one can safely analyse SE as merging in the matrix and the whole configuration as an instance of LOM in Romanian.

The data discussed in this section show that indeed, the verbs in the *a termina* class witha supine complement induce restructuring effects. The findings are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. *A termina and restructuring effects*

Test	***A termina* (finish)**
Clitic climbing	Yes
No independent tense interpretation	yes
No independent negation	yes
Negation in the matrix licenses n-words in the supine clause	yes
Negation in the matrix licenses negative polarity items in the supine clause	yes
Long Object movement	Yes/ Further investigation is needed.

5. Conclusions

In this paper I showed that in Romanian the *a termina* verbs with a supine complement are verbs of exhaustive control which pass all the control diagnostic tests. I have also shown that they induce restructuring effects, in accordance with Grano's (2015) correlation between exhaustive control and restructuring. However, according to Grano (2015), restructuring predicates head functional projections. In Romanian, the aspectual verbs in the *a termina* (finish) class assign a theta-role to the external argument, behaving like a lexical verb. This would suggest that the restructuring is of the lexical type. But lexical restructuring has been argued to involve a lexical verb in the main clause which selects a small clause complement, a *v*P (Wurmbrand 2004). The Romanian supine is larger than a *v*P. Further research will have to investigate several aspects, such as: the syntactic status of the supine clause, the lexical versus functional restructuring distinction and how it ties in with the Romanian aspectual verbs.

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AN OVERVIEW OF ANGLO-SAXON KENNINGS

Alina Diana LAZAROVICI

1. Kennings: Examples and definitions

This presentation is meant to expound upon the domain of Anglo-Saxon kennings and take a closer look at available theoretical frameworks that would allow a better understanding of how they function. Previously understudied and highly debated throughout time, their influence on Anglo-Saxon literary creation is undeniably relevant and similarly intriguing. Therefore, a closer look is called for in order to shed more light on the topic and bring possible methods of analysis into focus.

The first thing that needs to be established is a viable definition of the kenning, as this has varied throughout time and has continued to change and evolve. Scholars have focused on different roles that kennings might fulfill in their use, laying emphasis on different constituents. It is therefore difficult to single out one particular definition that would apply to kennings. Constructions such „hronrād[1]", that translates as „road of the whale", meaning „sea", „brēostwylm" (1877), „breast-welling", denoting „tear" or „hildeswat" (2559), „battle sweat", that is understood as „blood", appear frequently in Anglo-Saxon poetry. They are what scholars have labeled under the term „kenning". What they all have in common is the use of an opaque expression in order to convey a concept without directly naming it, simultaneously leading to defamiliarization in terms of style, preservation of rhyme or rhythm where this is the case and also creating a situation in which the audience or reader has to derive the meaning from the given parts.

According to linguists, kennings are linguistic compounds, opaque to interpretation due to the fact that their meaning is not deduced by the meaning of their parts but is rather obtained by the associations created through those parts. They are a characteristic of Germanic literature and represent „the most striking feature of Old English poetic style[2]". This is due to the fact that they were used to preserve and generate prosodical elements desired by the *scop.* This is particularly evidenced in Old Norse poetry, in what was known as *dróttkvætt*, „court metre". A *dróttkvætt* consists of eight lines and is divided into two *helmingar*, four-line stanzas[3]. „Each line consists of six syllables, three of which are stressed[4]". Similarly, these linguistic devices also „interact very well with the verse patterns of Old English[5]". Such compounds are thus present in numerous instances of Old English literary works, including the epic poem „Beowulf". What is generally agreed upon is that they are used to refer to a certain object, phenomenon or person without naming it, by means of substitution and defamiliarization. For example, something as common as a „sword" can be named by calling it „beadoleoma" (1523), meaning „battle light" , or „guðwine" (1810), that translates as „war friend". In this respect, they are similar to metaphors or metonymies, varying with regards to complexity. Consequently, they range from what is known as kenning to kend heiti, the latter being closer to synonyms and metonymies rather than metaphors.

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[1] *Beowulf,* http://www.heorot.dk/beowulf-rede-text.html, 10 (all following *Beowulf* quotes are taken from the same edition).
[2] Vlatko Broz, *Kennings as blend and prisms*, Jezikoslovje 12.2, 2011, p. 166.
[3] Debbie Potts, *Introduction to Skaldic Poetry*, http://www.asnc.cam.ac.uk, p. 6.
[4] *Ibid,* p. 9.
[5] Vlatko Broz, *art. cit*., p. 166.

As can be seen through examples, a *kenning* usually consists of three different elements: a referent, a base word and a determinant. The referent is the object, person or phenomenon that the kenning signifies and substitutes in the text. The base word is „the referent's conceptual representative[6]". Through relations of metaphor or metonymy between the base word and the referent establish the desired association and by the adding of the determinant, the meaning of the expression is pin-pointed. The determinant may be a noun in the genitive case, but this is not mandatory. For example, the referent of „hronrād" (10) is „sea". It is composed of „hron", that means „whale" and „rād" that is „road". Thus, „whale road" or „road of whales" refers to the sea.

According to Potts, the relationship between the referent and the base word is not necessarily one that relies on synonymy:„As a general rule, the relationship between the referent and the base word should not be one of synonymy or one of conceptual equivalence[7]". When this occurs and consequently the relationship is clear between the two, the result is considered to be a kend heiti. With respect to this, a possible example would be the case of „lyftfloga" (2315), meaning „flyer through the air", a construction that cannot be regarded as a kenning because a dragon is literally a creature that flies through the air. While, according to views taken by researchers such as Potts, the construction „lyftfloga" does not count as a *kenning*, a construction such as „bānhūs" (2508), that translates as „house of bone" – „body", which does not rely on a relation of conceptual equivalence, would be seen as different from a *kend heiti*.

Similar to the evolution of the definition of kennings themselves throughout time, attempts to analyze and map them have been developed and proposed, each aiming at both showing how they work and at how they should be interpreted. Even though one may possess an intuitive understanding only by reading a kenning, through certain methods of analysis this may change or shift the focus in terms of meaning. Since *kennings* are not usually metaphors or metonymies in themselves, but rather compounds of both and linguistic circumlocutions, new methods of analysis are required in order to take a closer look at them. One must also keep in mind that these models should be able to show the differences between *kennings* and *kend heitis*, for the sake of efficiency. Secondly, coming back to traditional definitions assigned to the *kenning* throughout time, this chapter will expound upon several of them and analyze them accordingly, as there are disagreements regarding the opinions of scholars on what are necessary and sufficient conditions that would allow a figure of speech to be pin-pointed as a kenning. For Friedrich Klaeber, kennings are „any compounds made of circumlocutory words". [8] This is an extremely vague approach as it does not make any distinction between a kenning or a mere metaphor, only taking into account the process of substitution that characterizes both. Furthermore, there is no distinction between *kenning* and *kend heiti*, thus allowing for both to be placed into the same category despite their differences. Another similar definition was given in 1921 by Rudolf Meissner, stating that a kenning is „any two-membered substitution for a substantive of common speech".[9] The main issue with this definition is the lack of distinction between *kenning* and *kend heiti*, as it does not state the relevance of the semantic relations between the referent and the base word. Without a constraint for synonymy relations between the base word and the referent, the definition remains too broad. As was seen above, a constraint on conceptual equivalence, such as that proposed by Potts, allows us to distinguish between keenings and kend heiti as distinct constructions. Too broad a definition for the construction has been also given by scholars such as Thomas Gardner, who „gives examples such as

[6] Debbie Potts, *art. cit*., p. 9.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] Vlatko Broz, *art. cit*., p. 167.
[9] *Ibid.*

sæbat and sæhengest 'sea-stallion' (= „ship," „boat"), saying that both are poetic and two-membered, which would make them both kennings".[10] The problem with those is that the conceptual identity between the base word and the referent does not allow for them to be read as *kennings*, although they are circumlocutions.

A clearer definition is brought along by Andreas Heusler who restricts the domain by stating that a *kenning* is „eine Metapher mit Ablenkung[11]", which means that it is „a metaphor with an associating link".[12] This definition covers the idea that a kenning is generally made up of two parts and that its basis is a metaphor, which is linked or associated with the referent and thus limited to its desired meaning. However, it must be taken into account that kennings may also be formed on the basis of a metonymy, as will be shown later on in the examples. Metonymy may assume the role of the metaphor or it may act as the determinant, adding to the complexity of the expression. Furthermore, Bruce Mitchell and Fred C. Robinson go on and propose that „the base word is wholly metaphorical, that is when it literally refers to something different from the referent. The base word is the second element of a compound of the noun qualified by a genitive noun[13]". Thus, according to Mitchell and Robinson, examples such as „heofones wyn" (1801), that translates as „heaven's joy", or „heofones gim" (2073), „heaven's gem", both of which mean „sun", would count as kennings. In this case „heofones" is the determinant and represents the genitive qualifier.

As can be seen, there have been broader definitions of the kenning, which rely on the general idea of circumlocution or figurative substitution. Finer definitions of the kenning stress their reliance on either metonymy or metaphor, while definitions that are even more fine-grained distinguish between *kennings* and *kendi heitis* as related, yet separate constructions.

2. Previous frameworks employed in the analysis of kennings

One of the frameworks used to look at *kennings* has been proposed by Lakoff and Turner and is known as metaphoric image-mapping. This „works in just the same way as all other metaphoric mappings – by mapping the structure of one domain onto the structure of another, but here the domains are mental images[14]". In this situation, it is visual representation that comes into play along with historical context and, more precisely, what images would have been used at the time in order to generate the overlay seen in the kenning. This aspect becomes relevant especially when attempting to distinguish between *kenning*s and *kend-heitis* because of its ability to show the associations that could have been made at the time, that may have been slightly different than the way a contemporary reader understands them. In his work regarding kennings, Broz presents the example of „swanrad" (199). Translated as „swan road", it has been argued that the determinant, „swan" would be better regarded as a metaphor for „ship", due to the associations likely to be made in what Broz names, the Anglo-Saxons' „conventional knowledge[15]". Thus, the shape of a ship's prow would be triggered by the comparison with a swan and „swan road" would be read as „ship road", and therefore could be regarded as a kend heiti.

As Broz underlines, there is an process of conceptual mapping that takes place in the creation of this construction: „If we were to see those ships in the way the Anglo-Saxons did, we

[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] Vlatko Broz, *art. cit.*, p. 170.
[15] *Ibid.*

would probably with less effort create a mental image of the ship, and then map the swan – or its neck – onto the ship – or its prow[16]".

However, the main issue of this framework is its high level of subjectivity that can lead to more than one interpretation due to the lack of certainty regarding the Anglo-Saxons' understanding of the world and of their „conventional knowledge". It is impossible to say for sure whether they would have made that association or another one, as determinants have often more than one thing in common with their referents. In the case of „hronrād" (10), for example, the whale can be connected to ship, in terms of size, or with the sea, due to its habitat. Therefore it could be read both as „ship road" and „dwelling of the whale". Due to this uncertainty, metaphoric image-mapping cannot precisely expose the mechanisms behind kennings.

Another method that has been used in the analysis of kennings is Blending Theory. The framework was developed by Fauconnier and Turner and its application is possible for kennings due to their nature as figures of speech used as „creative language[17]". The model aims to show how meaning is constructed in such circumlocutions and is also used for mapping out „novel metaphors, newly coined terms, idioms, jokes, puns, advertisements and so on[18]". Unlike previous attempts, it takes into account the various associations that occur when meaning is being constructed within a kenning. A blend, also known as a conceptual integration network, requires „at least four mental spaces or cognitive domains. At least two of these are 'input spaces'; the others are a generic space, containing conceptual structure that the inputs have in common, and a blended space, where selected elements from the inputs are merged into a new structure[19]". Therefore, the result of the blend is a structure that is composed, constructed and elaborated upon.

3. The relevance of the Prismatic Model

A much simpler, clearer and efficient framework for the study of kennings has been developed in more recent years in order to map out and analyze kennings. This is what is known as the Prismatic Model proposed by Geeraerts, who proposed this model in 1995, in his article „Specialisation and reinterpretation in idioms" in order to account for the semantic complexity of idioms. This model has the advantage of being able to account of including „all descriptive dimensions that are necessary to analyze the internal semantic relationships of *any* idiomatic expressions[20]". However, as linguists such as Langlotz underline, the model is characterized by a level of generality, which makes it more difficult to precisely represent the structure of a specific idiom[21].

Geeraerts' model „distinguishes between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic levels of meaning in the interpretation of composite expressions such as idioms and compounds, and therefore allows a more fine-grained analysis[22]". Prismatic Model „distinguishes between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic levels of meaning in the interpretation of composite expressions such as idioms and compounds, and therefore allows a more fine-grained analysis[23]". The way in

[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 174.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 175.
[20] Andreas Langlotz, *Idiomatic Creativity: A Cognitive-linguistic Model of Idiom-representation and Idiom-variation in English,* Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 2006, p. 109.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] Vlatko Broz, *art. cit.*, p. 178
[23] *Ibid.*

which it functions starts by dividing the layers of meaning from a circumlocution into literal and figurative, thus forming two separate parts of the representation that are further divided into their more basic constituents. Thus, the two main levels that are obtained are the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic level. The first is used to show how the figurative meaning is derived from the literal meaning of the entire given expression. The second one, the syntagmatic, represents the relations between the constituents that form the expression.

The result is a representation that resembles a prism, easier to break down and visualize, therefore providing a clearer understanding of how a circumlocution is constructed and of what relations may occur between its constituents. Another aspect of this model is its requirement for both motivation and isomorphism. Motivation stands for the degree of transparency present in the paradigmatic level, more precisely, for how can the literal meaning of the whole given expression lead to the understanding of the figurative. Isomorphism is required on the syntagmatic level in order to show similar relations between the literal interpretation of the parts and their figurative meaning.

The name of the framework is therefore, quite obviously, derived from the graphic representation that results from the analysis, as can be seen below.



Figure 1: Representation of the Prismatic Model24

The positions represented by the numbers stand for: „1-Expression as a whole in its literal reading; 2-First constituent item in its literal reading; 3-Second constituent item in its literal reading; 4-Expression as a whole in its derived, idiomatic reading; 5-First constituent item in its derived reading; 6-Second constituent item in its derived reading”[25]

4. Applying the Prismatic Model in the representation of kennings and kend heitis

The Prismatic Model lends itself to the analysis of numerous types of compounds, ranging from idiomatic expressions, to insults and complex figures of speech.

For the purposes of this paper, I have selected a number of examples of kennings present in *Beowulf*. Following the framework set by Geeraerts and the way in which it was discussed and applied by Broz, I have attempted to provide a Prismatic Model analysis of these examples.

The first example that I have chosen in that of „seglrad”, which translates as „sail road”. It appears in line 1429, in the epic poem „Beowulf” and it is used as a kenning for „sea”.

[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*



Figure 2: Representation of a kenning, „seglrad" (1429): sail road, sea

As seen earlier on, this construction can be defined and analyzed by means of Geeraerts Prismatic model as follows. To begin with, it is as kenning because the referent, in this case „sea" does not share synonymy or conceptual equivalence in relation to the base word of the compound, „road". The determinant the expression its meaning of „sea" is „sail". Therefore, by starting from the syntagmatic level, the determinant is represented by a metonymy, creating the relation „sail" - „ship" and the base word „road" remains the same. However, by means of another projection seen on the paradigmatic level, the entire compound „road of the ship" or „ship road" is regarded as a kenning for „sea". The opacity of the expression is maintained by the lack of synonymy and identity between „sea" and „road". Consequently, the determinant „sail" is responsible for the derivation.



Figure 3: Representation of a kenning, „hildeswat" (2559): battle sweat, body fluid shed in battle, blood

Another example of a kenning taken from the same source is „Hildeswat" (2559), meaning „battle sweat". This kenning for „blood" can be analyzed in a similar fashion as the previous one. Once again, when analyzed by means of the Prismatic model, this semantically opaque compound shows evidence of various relations on the syntagmatic and paradigmatic level. The base word „sweat" does not hold any synonymy or identity in relation to the referent, „blood". However, by means of metaphor is provides the concept of a liquid and, more precisely, of a body fluid. What

gives the kenning its meaning of „blood" on the paradigmatic level is the association with the determinant, „battle". The resulting expression can be interpreted as „body fluid shed in battle", that is „blood".



Figure 4: Representation of a kenning, „windgeard" (1225), dwelling of wind, place of wind

A similar analysis can be applied to „windgeard" (1225), a kenning for „the place where wind dwells". In this situation, the determinant does not change throughout the representation of the syntagmatic level, yet the base word „yard" becomes a metaphor for what has been interpreted as „dwelling" or simply as „place" or „open space". The resulting compound is, therefore, „wind dwelling" or „place of wind". By means of its semantic opacity, it is also interpreted as a kenning.



Figure 5: Representation of a kend heiti, „beaga bryttan" (35): ring breaker, giver of treasure, king

However, there are also cases in which the referent of a circumlocution is in a relation of synonymy with the base word and the resulting expression is regarded as a kend heiti, rather than a

kenning. An example of kend heiti would be „beaga bryttan" (35), translated as „ring breaker" or „giver of treasure", meaning „king.

Although the structure is similar to that of kennings on the syntagmatic level, where the determinant „ring" is in a relation of metonymy with „treasure", the expression is no longer as opaque on the paradigmatic level, when taken as a whole because a „giver of treasure" can be more easily seen as „king", or, to be more precise, according to Mitchell and Robinson:„kings literally did give and dispense treasure[26]".

5. Conclusion

As can be seen above, the Prismatic Model proposed by Geeraerts and employed by Broz is a relevant way of analyzing figurative constructions such as Anglo-Saxon kennings and allows us to decompose the meaning of these constructions, regarded here as idiomatic.

According to Broz, this model not only provides a tool for understanding how meaning is constructed in *kennings*, but also, by focusing on the relations between constituents and levels of interpretation, it may illustrate the differences between *kennings* and *kend heitis*. As can be seen, the main distinction between a *kenning* and a *kend heiti* is the degree of similarity between the base word and the referent.

Among the examples that I have chosen, I have selected the *kend heiti* „beaga bryttan", that translates as „ring breaker" or „giver of treasure", meaning „king". According to the representation provided with the aid of the Prismatic Model, the meaning of this kend heiti is to be contrasted with the meaning of kennings such as „seglrad" or such as „hildeswat" by means of showing the relations that are present between the referent and the base word on the syntagmatic level, as well as the degree of similarity that is present in the paradigmatic level. As opposed to „sail road" or „battle sweat", which remain sematically opaque, „ring giver" shows a greater degree of transparency. This is due to the fact that Geeraerts' Prismatic Model allows the representation of all the semantic relations that are present in a compound, by focusing both on the deconstructed constituent and on the expression as a whole.

When a relationship of synonymy is established between the base word and the referent, the compound cannot be regarded as a *kenning*, but as a *kend heiti*. By breaking down and taking a closer look at how each level of representation gives rise to a certain type of semantic relation, one is able to establish this difference. Moreover, this does not only provide a better understanding of how meaning is constructed but it may also help in the identification and classification of *kennings* and *kend heitis*.

Although it might not be envisaged as very specific, the Prismatic Model proposed by Geeraerts and employed by Broz provides a clearer interpretation of the meaning of these constructions, and could prove, in my opinion, a useful tool for translators which focus on Anglo-Saxon texts such as „Beowulf". The decomposition which the Prismatic Model relies upon can, for example enable translators to better understand the meaning of kennings in the Source Text and re-compose it in the Target Language, minimizing translation shifts.

[26] Vlatko Broz, *art. cit*., p. 168.

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MONSTERS – A JOURNEY INTO DARKNESS

Adriana MARTIN

1. Introduction

In the history of literature, the way monstrosity was presented and perceived has undergone many various and complex changes. In the old writings, the monsters were mostly defined by their horrifying physical appearance, while *they [had] no capacity for that self-consciousness which spells human identity*[1]. In our times, there has been a growing desire to understand the monster and account for his actions, but this led to another idea, that the monster can be, in fact, anyone in the human race, regardless of appearance.

What creates a monster, what makes him fall into darkness might help us understand more about the human nature. After all, the word monster comes from the Latin *monstrare*, which means to show, but also from *monestrum*, which *encloses the notions of advising, of reminding, above of all warning*[2].

This essay will address the issue of monstrosity in essence versus appearance and the process of becoming a monster by analyzing various representatives from literature and the reasoning that stood at the basis of their evil deeds. A better understanding of what triggers the growth of the seed of evil should also mean a more comprehensive insight into humans' fears and desires and what their outcome could be.

2. Descendants of Cain

From the first moments when humans began to make their thoughts immortal through written words, monsters made their appearance in various shapes and forms, always in conflict or at war with the race of humans. The distinction between monsters, representing evil, and humans, the virtuous few who dared to fight against them used to be extremely obvious – people needed heroes to follow and villains to fear and dread. The latter also served as a lesson, representing a mirror to the human features most despised and worthy of aversion, without the slightest touch of the elevating virtues of humankind. Thus, the fabric of their soul was made entirely evil – one could not imagine them ever being capable of feeling love or mercy or even remorse for their actions, since those were meant for the hero who fought them and him alone. The human hero represented the virtue to follow, while the monster the sin to reject.

It is also usual for the monster to be embodied in a horrendous and repulsive body which would give the physical foundation for fear and hatred. In the Greek and Roman mythologies, "they were nearly always morphological oddities, such as loathsome multi-headed or multi-limbed hybrids, often reptilian"[3], such as the Gorgons and the Sirens, who lured and killed men, the Cerberus who guarded the entrance into the Underworld, the Chimaera, who caused the destruction

[1] Marina Warner, *Managing Monsters.Six Myths of Our Time*, London, Vintage, 1994, p. 57.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 19
[3] D. Felton, "Rejecting and Embracing the Monstrous in Ancient Greece and Rome", in Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. Dendle, *The Ashgate Research Companion*, Ashgate Publishing, 2013, p. 104.

of lands. Of course, their spirit matched their appearance, for "one does not tend to find monsters in Greek myth that are also benevolent"[4]. Nonetheless, their actions are never really explained, their evil is inherited and could not be unrooted.

The eastern writings unveil another type of monsters, the ones whose original form is horrifying to see, but who could change it at will into an imitation of the human figure. In Korea, one of the best known legends is that of Cheoyong[5], who faced a human-shaped demon attacking his wife by singing a beautiful song to cast him away. This points to the idea of evil as a feature that can be found in humans as well. If monsters can take human form, than anyone surrounding us could be such a creature. After all, monsters are a reflection of the human soul, emphasizing exactly what one should fight against and where the root of darkness truly lies.

In the Anglo-Saxon epic *Beowulf*, we are told of the monster Grendel "that the Maker had proscribed him with the race of Cain"[6], the man who first committed a murder against another person, his brother, an act which brought upon him the curse of God ("…a fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the earth"[7]). Since "a monster is something put on display as a warning"[8], Grendel served as a warning for both Beowulf, to fight against his own hubris, and for humans in general, as the sins of Cain are found in all of us and not just in terrifying looking monsters.

Therefore, the monster has always been the physical embodiment of people's fears and a warning for what might come if one does not seek to become virtuous. But through time, the line between monster and human become more difficult to draw, as it became obvious that both sides, good and evil, entwine in order to make up the essence of a human being and that they complement each other, not as black and white, but as the diverse and various hues of a stained glass.

But if humans are always in search of perfection and strive to throw evil away, what causes the birth of a monster? There are various reasons that would make each soul give way to a Grendel or a Medusa or a Cheoyong to ravish the world around, and literature offers plenty of examples.

3. Two sides of the same coin: creation and destruction

Kim Yeong Ha claims, in his novel *I Have the Right to Destroy Myself*, that "there are only two ways to be a god: through creation or murder"[9]. In most religions and popular beliefs, this dual aspect is ubiquitous. Believers praise the Gods for their creations and always bring justifications for their destructive acts. A God is never wrong and the creative and destructive natures seem to be the two sides of the same coin. In our human world, the ones most entitled to claim their similarity to Gods are the geniuses, the ones who have the power to create new and unique things with their own hands, using their own faculty of imagining. Once this right is denied to them, they must turn to the other, in order to satisfy their need to be recognized as superior beings. In this case, destruction seems to be the only alternative for one to leave a trace of their own power into the world - to destroy others if he or she can't be the supreme creator.

The creator's wish to have the right to express himself is a theme vastly used in literature. In J.R.R.Tolkien's legendarium, Melkor, the main villain and the *monster,* is said to have been given

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 104.
[5] *The Song of Cheoyong* - poem found in *Samguk Yusa* (*Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms*).
[6] J.R.R.Tolkien, *Beowulf. A Translation and Commentary*, London, HarperCollins*Publishers*, 2015, p. 16.
[7] Holy Bible, Gen. 4: 12.
[8] Abigail Lee Six and Hannah Thompson, "From Hideous to Hedonist: the Changing Face of the Nineteenth Century Monster", in Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. Dendle, *The Ashgate Research Companion*, Ashgate Publishing, 2013, p. 237.
[9] Yeong Ha Kim, *I Have the Right to Destroy Myself*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2007, p. 10.

by his creator, Ilúvatar, the *greatest gifts of power and knowledge*[10] of all the creatures of the world, as he was also the first being who was given life. The sense of superiority grew inside Melkor until he desired to *increase the power and glory of the part assigned to himself*[11]and bring his own, personal contribution to the creation of the world. He started to seek the Flame Imperishable, which would have allowed him to create living things that he himself had designed, but Ilúvatar prevented him from changing the original vision of the universe. This was the moment when Melkor "was filled with shame, of which came secret anger"[12], and from these resulted the destruction he began to cause after descending into the world. While all his brethren were carrying out the wish of their maker, shaping the world after his vision, Melkor did the opposite, beginning his process of destruction, ravaging all things brought into being by their hands, corrupting and deforming the beauty of the world, molding it after his horrendous vision.

Some may say that his evil nature was born, as was the Devil's, from hubris and from the wish to become even more powerful and beautiful than he already was. This might be true to a certain extent, but the major difference between Lucifer and Melkor was that the latter had an unyielding desire to create, which he could not escape until the end of his existence. Not once did he think that he was doing something that wasn't right and not once did he seek redemption. He was not see himself as a monster, but as a free creator, and his incontrollable genius and wish to give shape to the thoughts in his mind ultimately led to his downfall.

4. "It takes a village to make a monster"[13]

But there are times when a genius character is not given any chance to prove his or her worth because their appearance is so monstrous that they are denied a normal life from the moment they are born. Living in shame, ridicule and pain would make even the meanest of creatures cry out with rage against the world, let alone someone who had exceptional abilities to offer. Such a creature was the Mule, one of the main antagonists in the *Foundation* series by Isaac Asimov, who spoke thus of his childhood*:* "I grew up haphazard, wounded and tortured in mind, full of self-pity and hatred of others. I was known then as a queer child. All avoided me; most out of dislike; some out of fear."[14]

In contrast with his grotesque appearance, he had the power to manipulate the emotions of other human beings – a talent for which the Mule found only one use, and that is to get revenge for the wretched life he had lived: "But the consciousness of power came, and with it, the desire to make up for the miserable position of my earlier life. Maybe you can understand it. Maybe you can try to understand it. It isn't easy to be a freak – to have a mind and an understanding and be a freak. Laughter and cruelty! To be different! To be an outsider!"[15]

What is interesting about The Mule is that his identity is not revealed until the last pages of *Foundation and Empire*. Until then, his character is portrayed in parallel in two distinct ways. Firstly, the ones who did not see his face, but only heard of his exceptional triumphs, imagined him

[10] J.R.R. Tolkien, *The Silmarillion*, London, HarperCollins*Publishers*, 2008, p. 4.
[11] *Ibidem*, p. 4.
[12] *Ibidem*, p. 6.
[13] Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock , "Invisible Monsters: Vision, Horror and Contemporary Culture", in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous*, Ashgate Publishing, 2013, p. 275.
[14] Isaac Asimov, *The Foundation Trilogy* <http://www.angelfire.com/un/corosus/books/Asimov_the_foundation.pdf>, p. 326.
[15] *Ibidem*, pp. 326-327.

”a giant with prodigious strength who could kill with his eyes”[16]. Absolutely terrified of the genius and destructive power of the Mule, they expressed their fear by saying*:* ”I am afraid a monster is grown that will devour all of us.”[17]. With the exact same name was he called by the ones who saw his face, but were oblivious of his powers, such as the crown prince of Neotrantor, who mockingly commanded him: *”Play for us, monster […] Sing of a prince's love, monster”*[18]. Held in awe by those who did not see him and ridiculed by those who did, he was called a monster by everybody but one person – Bayta, the only woman who treated him kindly and the only one whom the Mule cherished. And though he believed she shared his feelings, when she turned against him, he only became more passionate in his attempt to subdue the Universe. His mind was the weapon which compensated for the feebleness of his body and his power to manipulate human feelings compensated for his lack of affection. His satisfaction came only from being above others, as he had been once trampled upon – *”I, the queer, ugly weakling, am the ruler of the Galaxy”*[19].

In his quest for revenge against the world, the Mule did not understand that the gruesomeness of his appearance transferred to that of his character and what was monstrous in appearance became monstrous in essence. His talents could have been put to great use by the Foundation, had the ”alien environment”[20] in which he was forced to suffer because of his ugliness and lack of ”masculine vigor”[21] not turned him against fate and transformed him into a monster – ”I have no sorrow for what I did in my necessity. Let the Galaxy Protect itself as best it can, since it stirred not a whit for my protection when I needed it.”[22]

5. Love as damnation and salvation of the soul

One of the most tragic creative geniuses is Gaston Leroux’s Erik - in *The Phantom of the Opera*, Erik is both the Angel of Music and the Red Death and he is able to entrance at once with his voice, while just a look at his have would suffice for one to be filled with horror. His superior creative power was easy to be seen in his enchanting compositions, inventions, drawings and designs, and he enjoyed being admired for his genius – ”there is nothing he loves so much, after astonishing people, as to prove all the really miraculous ingenuity of his mind”[23].

However, the thing that drew the most attention towards him was not his talent, but his appearance: ”He is extraordinarily thin and his dress-coat hangs on a skeleton frame. His eyes are so deep that you can hardly see the fixed pupils. You just see two big black holes, as in a dead man's skull. His skin, which is stretched across his bones like a drumhead, is not white, but a nasty yellow. His nose is so little worth talking about that you can't see it side-face; and the absence of that nose is a horrible thing to look at. All the hair he has is three or four long dark locks on his forehead and behind his ears.”[24]

So terrifyingly ugly was he that not even his mother would accept him at birth, and after running away from home, he spent his life as a freak attraction in shows. With time, he became the

[16] Donald E. Palumbo, *An Asimov Companion*: *Characters, Places and Terms in the Robot/Empire/Foundation Metaseries*, Jefferson, McFarland, 2016, p. 124.
[17] Isaac Asimov, *The Foundation Trilogy*, p. 263.
[18] *Ibidem*, pp. 304-305.
[19] *Ibidem*, p. 378.
[20] *Ibidem*, p. 381.
[21] *Ibidem*, p. 381.
[22] Isaac Asimov, *The Foundation Trilogy,* p. 381.
[23] Gaston Leroux, *The Phantom of the Opera*, New York, Signet Classics, 2010, p. 203.
[24] *Ibidem*, p. 9.

monster that he was believed to be because of his appearance – after to much suffering and rejection, ”he no longer believed that he had any duty towards the human race”[25], so he used his ingenuity not for creating art, but devices to kill and torture.

Nonetheless, although constantly surrounded by ridicule and fear, and sometimes a step away from death, he managed to survive and tried to find his own secluded place in which he could live away from society. In the cellars of the Opera, he developed his artistic creations, but never really stopped his murderous pursuits, which had become a second nature to him. However, until he saw Christine Daaé, took her as his student and subsequently fell in love with her, his monstrous side had not been completely unleashed. Erik had the power of his voice and the mastery of his art, while the beautiful Christine had everything Erik did not – youth, beauty, vigor and most of all, the irresistible attraction which opposed the repulsion that he provoked.

So when she showed in to Erik's life, he wanted for the first time to be accepted as a human being and to be loved for who he was – not for his creations and regardless of his appearance – ”I am not an Angel, nor a genius, nor a ghost.. I am Erik!”[26]. He dreamed of being able to walk the streets with Christine by his side, a normal family just like any other – no dreams of grandeur such as Melkor had, no care for recognition, just a simple and natural desire to lead a normal life. The thing he did not consider was the feelings of the one he loved and commanded her love as if he would have commanded an orchestra – ”I am not really wicked. Love me and you shall see!”[27] Rejected again, and this time by the woman he loved, Erik went mad with pain, planning the destruction of the opera and the murder of all the people in it, only in order to force Christine to marry him.

The moment he finally felt like a human being was the moment his soul turned away from evil. Just as the rejection of society caused by his looks transformed him into a creature capable of the most despicable deeds, so did Christine's act of kindness change him completely, erasing all intentions of killing and bringing him to the innocent stage of a child discovering for the first time the joys of the world: ”And...and...I...kissed her!... I!...I!...I!...And she did not die!...[…] I felt her tears flow on my forehead...on mine, mine!...[…].I tore off my mask so as not to lose one of her tears...and she did not run away!...And she did not die!... She remained alive, weeping over me, with me. We cried together! I have tasted all the happiness the world can offer!”[28]

Erik was thus a monster just to the extent that no human being had ever ”cried with [him] and mingled [their] tears with [his]”[29]. He did not feel that he belonged to this race, but his desire to be a part of it and to feel the joys of being a human overwhelmed him, destroying all chains that held his monstrosity at bay. And just as love released his monstrosity in all its might, so love made him a human being again. Erik, the Phantom, shows how creation and destruction, good and evil, Heaven and Hell all entwine in a monster whose mind had been designed for greater things than darkness.

6. Monster in disguise

Created by human hands and endowed with feelings and conscience, Mary Shelley's monster fights the ones who deny him the right to be human. First abandoned by his maker, Victor

[25] *Ibidem*, p. 205.
[26] *Ibidem*, p. 121.
[27] *Ibidem*, p. 215.
[28] Gaston Leroux, *The Phantom of the Opera*, Signet Classics, p. 251.
[29] *Ibidem*, p. 251.

Frankenstein, he is then rejected by society for his ”unearthly ugliness”[30] and repaid with violence for his love. It could be said that the murders that followed are not completely unjustified - the monster acts in accordance to the actions of the others – when he is hurt and rejected, he has no choice but fight back meet hatred with hatred. ”The fallen angel becomes a malignant devil”[31], reflecting the hellish society in which he lives. – ”Am I to be thought the only criminal, when all human kind sinned against me?”[32]

Therefore, ”we can take from her work the crucial knowledge that monsters are made, not given”[33], made by people who possess the same features that they deem despicable and which are, after all, monsters in disguise, hiding their evil nature behind a human appearance. It is exactly the contrastive image of human and un-human looks which makes it so difficult to see the true nature of a character. But just as Adam resembles his Maker, the character that the monster resembles most is none other but his creator, Victor Frankenstein. The latter is a monster in disguise, for his true nature is cloaked under a coat of seemingly noble pursuits – creating life, seeking knowledge, understanding truth. In reality, his hubris – his wish to ”unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation”[34] - developed in such a way that it finally gives birth to the monster himself. His incapability to recognize his pride and mistakes make him resemble Lucifer, as he deemed himself too mighty as well before his inevitable fall. And although the monster committed crimes because *”misery made [him] a fiend”*[35], his creator would have been capable of the exact same deeds, for he intended to kill him in his turn. The irony of the monster’s words illustrate the foul nature of the world: ”You accuse me of murder, and yet you would, with a satisfied conscience, destroy your own creature. Oh, praise the eternal justice of man!”[36]

Therefore, the monster is but the physical manifestation of his maker’s evil features, the personification of Victor’s immoral and malicious side. But it is more difficult to recognize Victor as a monster – ”Monsters who manifest their nature, like Frankenstein’s creature, clearly present easier targets than those in disguise”[37].

7. Almost human

In our times, the tendency to dive into the mind of *the other* is more and more pronounced, up to the point where the line between human and monster seems to be indistinguishable. If a man or a woman can become a monster, so can I. If they can earn their redemption, so can I. Therefore, is there any answer to the question whether there is a difference between a monster and a human? For lately, even being human in itself is difficult to be set between boundaries.

If before, the simple fact that one was born in the human race gave them the right to be called human and have certain privileges over the world, now even that is brought into question. In his dialogue with cardinal Carlo Maria Martini, Umberto Eco tackled the problem of humanity and tried to find its limitations: ”If, by chance, a properly trained or genetically manipulated monkey should show that it could type reasonable sentences into a computer, engaging in a dialogue, demonstrating affection, memory, the ability to solve mathematical problems, reactivity to logical

[30] Mary Shelley, *Frankenstein*, London, HarperCollins*Publishers*, 2010, p. 85.
[31] *Ibidem*, p 200.
[32] *Ibidem*, p. 200.
[33] Marina Warner. *Managing Monsters. Six Myths of Our Time*. Vintage, p. 31.
[34] Mary Shelley, *Frankenstein*, HarperCollins*Publishers*, p. 37.
[35] *Ibidem*, p. 86.
[36] Mary Shelley, *Frankenstein*, HarperCollins*Publishers*, p. 87.
[37] Marina Warner, *Managing Monsters. Six Myths of Our Time*, Vintage, p. 22.

principles of identity and perception of the Other – would we then consider it to be almost human? Would we grant it civil rights? Because it thinks and loves?"[38]

Somehow humans have always assumed that, from the beginning of a person's life to their end, no matter how they lived it, his or her rights surpassed all the other creatures'. The right to be human is not earned, and conscience seldom if ever comes into discussion when talking about our right over the other species. The intelligent monkey imagined by Eco would not have any right to be called human even if the only thing differentiating it from one were the way it looked. Regardless of the means through which the monkey would become so similar to a human, its intelligence and feelings would be denied by the misfortune of not being born in our race.

In such circumstances, is it not natural for an intelligent and sentient being to rebel against humankind or to fight for its freedom of expression and for equality? And sometimes, even for its life? After Shelley, more and more science fiction writers, of whom Asimov is the most representative, wrote and continue to write about this issue, which is no longer the domain of the imaginary. Conscious robots, able to think for themselves, to create connections and learn continuously are built in the world's laboratories in shapes which resemble humans more and more. If they became aware of their own self, such as in Asimov's *Robot* series, or if they identify themselves with a conscious, sentient creature, as in Card's *Speaker for the Dead*, then they put the entire humanity at risk. The resemblance of humans and A.I. only strengthens humans' aversion towards them, for "how does one remain safe in a world in which anyone could be a monster?"[39]

In Orson Scott Card's novel *Ender's Game*, the reader is confronted with the question of other races' humanity. Ender Wiggin, trained to fight and command armies since he was six years old, was manipulated and made to fight a war against a race of intelligent beings called the Buggers, "the monsters of our nightmares"[40]. They had attacked Earth a few decades before and ever since then, humans lived in fear of a new offensive. There was no way in which the two races could communicate – human words were incomprehensible to the hive-mind of the aliens, who thought that nothing apart from telepathy could build a link between two creatures. Ender was the only human who realized that they were not hostile, but advanced and affectionate beings who could not find a way to communicate their intentions. Nonetheless, after a final attack on their home planet, the entire race of Buggers was destroyed and only one Hive Queen remained, hidden away from the human race until it found the right moment to show itself to Ender.

The aliens' bug-like appearance seems to fade compared to the image of the murderous human beings, the ones who used Ender as a weapon, annihilating without any pity countless numbers of peaceful creatures with feelings similar to ours, but which were impossible to communicate. The roles are therefore changed, human becomes monster and monster human, in a play of appearance which is deceptive on both sides. The inability to recognize humanity creates monsters – as the last Hive Queen said: "If we had kissed, it would have been the miracle to make us human in each other's eyes. Instead we killed each other"[41].

Therefore, "to redefine monstrosity is simultaneously to rethink humanity"[42], and in the present context, literature urges us to be wise as to whom we consider monster and who actually is one.

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[38] Umberto Eco, Carlo Maria Martini, *Belief or Non-Belief? A Confrontation,* London, A&C Black, 2006, pp. 36-37.
[39] Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, "Invisible Monsters: Vision, Horror and Contemporary Culture", in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous*, Ashgate Publishing, 2013, p. 280.
[40] Orson Scott Card, *Ender's Game*, London, Orbit, 2013, p. 322.
[41] *Ibidem*, p. 324.
[42] Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, "Invisible Monsters: Vision, Horror and Contemporary Culture", in Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. Dendle, *The Ashgate Research Companion*, Ashgate Publishing, 2013, p. 275.

8. The storm of time

Even when one's from our own race we sometimes fail to recognize that he or she is one of us. Such was the curious case of Fitzgerald's Benjamin Button, who was unnaturally born an old man and became younger and younger as time went by. Misunderstood even by his own father after he was born, seen as "grotesque"[43] and as some sort of a "monkey"[44], he came to lose the capacity to understand anything at the end of his life and be mistreated by his own son.

His monstrosity lay in the simple fact that he did not obey the laws of nature, but his life-long inability to integrate bears the fate of every human – "One indirect meaning of this "curious case" is that any age in human life represents a crisis of identity. Because we take it for granted that we should come into this world as babies and die as elderly people. Even if the circuit were the other way round, we would still be very far away from the ghost of a hope for a clue"[45]. Hence, the monstrosity of Benjamin's abnormal life might be symbolic for the storm of age that will undoubtedly throw humans away as time goes by, leaving them in an ever-growing flotsam and jetsam. Time creates monsters, as the abnormal force which does not leave anyone unbroken.

9. Redemption

Monstrosity of the body is not something acquired, since it only represents the features that make one different from another in terms of the ideal image standardized by society. In an ideal world, appearance should not be looked down upon, for it tells nothing of the image of the soul – but since the world is still far from an utopic society in which everybody is equal, everything that is different and out of the ordinary, *the other*, is classified as a monster.

In contrast, the monstrosity of the soul is just a projection of a character's inner desires or a reaction to society's rejection. But everyone is capable of being a monster when he or she is thrown in an antagonistic world or situation. So if monstrosity is a seed found in all creatures, waiting for the moment in which it can grow and blossom, then is it possible for it to be cut once it becomes the leading force in one's life? "For if monsters are made, not given, they can be unmade, too"[46]. Erik set Christine free and then died of a broken heart, but he died human, forgiven in the eyes of the one he loved. Ender spent the remaining of his life blaming himself for the murder of an entire race, but he strived continuously to revive it.

W.H.Auden observed that "Evil … has every advantage but one-it is inferior in imagination. Good can imagine the possibility of becoming evil … but Evil, defiantly chosen, can no longer imagine anything but itself"[47]. So does it also mean that once one chooses, willingly or unwillingly, the downgrading path towards darkness, there is no possible way for him or her to find redemption?

After leading an infamous life in which he ruined both himself and the ones whom he met, Dorian Gray had an attempt to come back to the time when he was not corrupted, but had doubts whether it was or not possible. He had not been born a monster, but he was a terrible work of art molded by the destructive hands of Henry Wotton. Therefore, when he asked himself*:* "Was it

[43] F. Scott Fitzgerald, *The Curious Case of Benjamin Button*, California, Coyote Canion Press, 2008, p. 6.
[44] *Ibidem*, p. 8.
[45] Anca Peiu, "The Mother as Monster: Modern Curious Cases of Naturals and their (Birth) Stories", in *University of Bucharest Review. Series Literary and Cultural Studies*, Bucureşti, Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2014, p. 56.
[46] Marina Warner. *Managing Monsters: Six Myths of Our Time*, London: Vintage, 1994, p. 31.
[47] W.H. Auden, At the End of the Quest, Victor in New York Times, January 2, 1956.

really true that one could never change?"[48], he refused to believe that the corruption of a man is eternal and that there is no redemption or forgiveness for one's acts. The purity of one's soul could be regained if one tried hard enough. But his attempt was futile – after performing an act of kindness, being willing to change and confronting Henry Wotton, the portrait in which all his evilness was hidden did not change, but became even uglier. In the end, death was the only way for Dorian to escape his monster life, the only way in which the ugliness of his soul could be forever erased from the world.

Nonetheless, every monster is defined by the simultaneous presence of good and evil that makes up his essence, a duality which enables them to choose the path towards redemption. But since the presence of evil brings with it consequences difficult to erase, those can sever the link between the monster and its reborn humanity.

10. Conclusion

At the beginning of the history of literature, a great part of the world's texts was influenced and defined by an innate attraction of humans towards the monstrous. The seed of evil first found its embodiment in creatures of horrifying countenance, whose actions matched their appearance – they were a mirror of the dark side of the human soul and a warning not to become a villain.

However, the understanding of monstrosity changed over time, and it became clear that *the other,* represented by the monster, could be in fact anyone, and that good and evil often overlap. Moreover, "nothing or no one is intrinsically or «naturally» monstrous"[49]*,* but evil is born of one's hubris, society's malice, love and the lack of understanding and acceptance of those that are "not us"[50]. The fine line between human and monster can be easily crossed and it is difficult to leave a dark path once one starts walking it. Nonetheless, everybody is the creator of their own destiny and if there is a monster in all humans, there is also some good even in the darkest soul.

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AUGUSTINE'S PASSIONS IN THE POETRY OF EMILY DICKINSON

Andrei NAE

1. The Soul

According to Aristotle and the Aristotelian *de anima* tradition, which was later taken up by Augustine, the human soul (psyche) consisted of three parts organised in a hierarchical way: the vegetative, the sensitive and the rational. The vegetative part of the soul was common to all living beings and accounted for bodily functions, growing, reproduction and other such base characteristics. This part, being the lowest of the soul, was common to all beings, namely plants, animals and humans.

The next part was the sensitive one which accounted for the being's interaction with the world. Its role was to manage the senses and the information provided by them, in the sense that the sensitive part was responsible for the motions occurring in the soul and body as a consequence of an external stimulus. It was also the dwelling place of the imagination. The reason why it was considered to belong to the sensitive part of the soul and not the rational one is that it was related to processes which directly implied external stimuli. The imagination represented the ability of a being to understand the external world by means of perceiving it partially through our senses. A good example in this respect would be the following: The fact that when somebody hears a howl, that person understands that a wolf might be close is accounted for by the work of the imagination. Consequently, this notion of imagination should not be mistaken with the romantic understanding of the concept which implied creativity. The sensitive part of the soul mediates between the other two.

The last and highest part of the soul was the rational one. Because it was only common to humans, it was believed to be that part of man created in the image of God and it was also thought to be what humans have in common with angels. The rational part had two components, namely intellect, which was passive, and will, which was active. The role of reason was to govern the inferior parts of the soul. (Dixon, 30)

The memory, pertaining to the sensitive soul, has the function to retain the impressions provided by external stimuli.

> And men go abroad to admire the heights of mountains, the mighty billows of the sea, the broad tides of rivers, the compass of the ocean, and the circuits of the stars, and pass themselves by; nor wonder that when I spake of all these things, I did not see them with mine eyes, yet could not have spoken of them, unless I then actually saw the mountains, billows, rivers, stars which I had seen, and that ocean which I believe to be, inwardly in my memory, and that, with the same vast spaces between, as if I saw them abroad. Yet did not I by seeing draw them into myself, when with mine eyes I beheld them; nor are they themselves with me, but their images only. And I know by what sense of the body each was impressed upon me. (Augustine, Confessions Book X)

In order for memory to provide man with the images of "mountains, billows, rivers, stars", man has to perceive them first via his senses, an act which is acknowledged by the person. The same principle applies for passion, which I shall explicate in the next section.

2. The Passions

St. Augustine took up this complex schema of the soul and asserted that passions were unruly movements in the sensitive part of the soul, which, if assented to, corrupted reason. Passions were considered object oriented, typical examples of passions being greed, anger, fear and envy. Augustine believed that in a state of grace, as before the Fall of Man, the parts of the soul were in a harmonious relation, but that after the original sin, this harmony was lost and the sensitive part rebelled against reason. Although passions were disturbing movements, Augustine believed that they were essential for our living in the material world and that by employing reason, they can be redirected from transitory earthly things to godly ones. But since the will was weakened by the Fall, humans need the grace of God in order to achieve the governing of will over passions. (Dixon, 60)

Because of man's weakness of will, Augustine came up with the concept of reluctant acts, which in fact can be traced back to Aristotle. To Augustine, the will has two motions, the evaluation and the effective. The first one decides what one should do, while the latter accounts for what one actually does. Augustine's conversion is a good example in this respect, where the author willed to improve his lifestyle but didn't manage to thoroughly. (Knuuttila, 182-183)

To Augustine passions and sin were different concepts. Augustine spoke of three stages beginning from the external stimulus and ending up with sin. The first stage was that of the suggestion when the body perceives the external stimulus. Next there is the taking pleasure in the passion and only finally does reason get to choose between either assenting to the passion or dissenting to it. Only if reason assents to the passion, can we then discuss the committing of sin. This general understanding of sin stems from the allegorical interpretation of the original sin, where the serpent's temptation is the suggestions, Eve's eating the apple is the taking pleasure and Adam's assent – Reason's assent. (Knuuttila, 170-171)

Affections were also considered movements, but not of the inferior part of the soul. Unlike the passions, they were not caused by external stimuli, but rather they were voluntary, which is why they were considered movements of the will. Although being movements of the superior part of the soul, like the passions, they were not righteous by their nature, since a corrupt will would have endorsed wrong affections. (Dixon, 46)

2. Augustine's Passions in the Congregationalist Discourse

As a leading figure of the first great religious awakening, Edwards was faced with the problem of distinguishing between those who were truly converted and those who were not. This problem was not new to the American Puritans, since the 17th Century had also stumbled upon. As mentioned previously, for the settlers of 1620 a solution to this conundrum was what they called preparationism. Edwards took a step further and came up with a theory of passions that was supposed to provide him with the main guidelines in separating the truly converted / regenerate from those who were unregenerate.

According to Jonathan Edwards a clear sign of conversion was the presence of godly emotions in a person. (Talbot, 232) His understanding of emotions pays tribute to Aristotle and Augustine, in the sense that he takes up the content but uses different terminology.

In "Religious Affections" what Aristotle called reason is for Edwards the soul and Aristotle's sensitive part of the soul is the heart. Edwards too defines affections as movements of the soul and, in the line of Augustine, claims that these movements are not bad, but that because of the Fall, they became selfish and self-oriented. Consequently, a mark of a converted person was the

affections that were not directed towards the self and earthly things, but towards God and heavenly things, i.e. conforming to the will of God.

We should remember that in the first subchapters I have mentioned that Augustine claimed that it was reason (or the soul, to use Edwards' terminology), which was the godly part of man, that was meant to guide the affections. But since Edwards was a follower of Calvin in his scepticism about man's godly part, the intellect and the will (both had been seriously altered by the Fall), it was God's will which was supposed to guide man's affections.

The Congregationalist preacher believed that not only positive affections (like love, joy or hope) were a sign of God's Holy Spirit indwelling in man, but also negative ones (like anger, hate, fear). He claims that, since the Bible attests God's having them, there is no reason why man should not have them two. Nonetheless, it was important to make sure that negative passions too are subject to God's will. For example, it was acceptable to hate sin, but not to hate your neighbour.

3. Sorrowful Funerals

In the previous chapter I have set the theoretical background for my endeavour. Now it is time to see how Augustine's theory of the passions influenced the literary production of Emily Dickinson. For the present chapter I shall dwell upon the passion of sorrow and see how this passion is dealt with in "Because I Could not Stop for Death—". Methodologically I shall rely on a step by step close reading of the two poems and interpret the text by taking into consideration the religious context in which Emily Dickinson lived.

> Because I could not stop for Death—
> He kindly stopped for me—
> The Carriage held but just Ourselves—
> And Immortality.

The first two lines of the first poem form a chiasm which is very suggestive with respect to the identity of the persona. "Because I could not stop for Death— / He kindly stopped for me—" sets up an opposition between the poetic persona and Death. Taking this opposition into account, we can conclude that since Death is masculine, then the persona is feminine. Since normally "death" would be referred to by using "it", the fact that the persona uses the masculine pronoun "he" points out to a gender opposition. As we shall see further, the situation of the poem supports this gender-interpretation, since we are practically dealing with an instance of courting.

The reader may find the theoretical background for the association masculine – Reason and feminine – passions in an earlier subchapter: *Reading the Passions*. I would like to state from the very beginning that Death will in fact prove to be only the will, but given the clues provided by the first two lines, I shall for now limit myself to associating death with Reason.

The first lines of the poem also announce the theme - death. One's demise is an event with many religious implications, which is to be analysed in the Augustinian / Calvinist framework I have explained earlier.

St. Augustine finds it theologically wrong to mourn somebody's death, should one believe that that particular person is bound to receive God's redemption. If we are to place this conviction in the Puritan framework, it would mean that not being sorrowful about your own death would have been a clear mark of being one of the elect. Subduing one's sorrow to reason was simply one instance of the general endeavour of having passions controlled by reason, or to put it in Puritan terms, heart controlled by the soul.

Returning to Dickinson's poem, we can see the idea of subduing passions being clearly illustrated by the chiasm of the first two lines. Traditionally reason was associated with masculinity, and passions with femininity. The fact that He, Death, is active (He kindly stopped) and she, the poetic persona, is passive (I could not stop) suggests that we are dealing with an idealized experience of dying, typical of the elect, where Reason governs the whole event without letting passions unfold. We can also observe the contradictory elements attentively arranged in the lines I / He; -ed not stop/stopped.

The next two lines confirm the idea of redemption by mentioning "Immortality". The fact that both the passions and Reason are to be saved goes hand in hand with the Puritan belief, inherited from Augustine via Edwards, that passions are not by nature bad, but rather it is the corruption of the will that manages them wrongfully. An elect will, on the other hand, would be able to manage passions according to the Will of God. Consequently, the passions too are subjects to salvation. Before moving on to the next stanza, I would like to add that we are dealing with an allegory in which death is viewed as courting the poetic persona. Besides the fact that this allegory supports the identity of the persona, it is worth noting that the persona is impressed by Death, as proven by the adjective "kindly". This goes on to suggest not only that the persona is merely not experiencing sorrow and is only neutral, emotionally speaking, with respect to her death, but that she is also glad of it. The text seems to suggest, if I may afford the license of paraphrase, that Death was kind enough to stop for her. However, this joy shouldn't be associated with death only, but rather death is a threshold leading to being along with God. Such a conviction springs from the certainty of being saved after death, and not damned, hence a clear sign of being one of the elect.

We slowly drove—He knew no haste,
And I had put away
My labor and my leisure too,
For His Civility—

The second stanza goes along the line of the first by presenting Death as governing the persona. The first line of the second stanza "We slowly drove—He knew no haste," suggests that their driving slowly is caused by His deciding not to rush. Again, the text puts emphasis on the allegory of courting by commending Death's "Civility". The inevitability of man's death is referred to as Death's irresistible manners. The enumeration, "My labor and my leisure too," is a metonymy for life, which the persona explicitly asserts to have "put away". The use of the past perfect highlights the anteriority of giving up life before "giving in" to Death's civility.

We passed the School, where Children strove
At recess—in the ring—
We passed the Fields of Gazing Grain—
We passed the Setting Sun—

The third stanza is essential for the theme of death, because it represents a therapy whose role was to prevent a person from becoming overwhelmed by sorrow. On their journey, the two walk by a children's school, fields of ripe corn and the setting sun. Each of these three elements can be interpreted as metaphors for the three main stages of life: childhood, maturity and the old age. The mentioning of the three elements in the poem is by no means accidental, but rather it is related to the Stoic therapy against the fear of death.

The Stoics took up Plato's argument, according to which every change caused by growth was a death of the man previous to the change. And so, since man experiences death many times

throughout his life, there is no reason why man should fear any future death. The main consequence of this assertion, which has indeed troubled the Stoics, was that since each change meant another self, then life was nothing but a series of different selves. In order to reach a unitary self, the Stoics advised that one was to use his memory in order to weave the momentary selves together to form a unitary one. (Sorabji, 244-245)

Of course the way the Stoics conceptualized the passions is different from that of Augustine. But there are certain similarities that make the poem written by Emily Dickinson coherent. The Stoics believed that passions were false judgements and so in order to govern them they came up with cognitive theories such as the on illustrated in the paragraph above. What does however bring the Stoics close to Augustine is that rightful judgement was required to avoid / govern passions. It is this rightful judgement that is present in Dickinson's poetry. The reason why the poetic persona doesn't fear Death and welcomes him is that death is no new experience for her and the previous ones seem not to have been terrifying at all. Her walking by the three important momentary selves is on the one hand an allusion to her previous deaths that anticipated the final death she is now experiencing. The idea suggested is the valid theological one that death is like a rite of passage taking man from one stage to the other. The death of the child led to maturity, maturity to being old and the final one from being old to immortality.

Since we are dealing with events of the past, it is safe to assume that Dickinson also weaves her momentary selves into a unitary one, as suggested by the retrospective summary of the chronological order of her life.

At this point of the poem we are once again faced with a conundrum: is the poetic persona consistent with respect to her Augustinian approach to the passions? To answer this question we must look back at the way St. Augustine conceptualized Reason. He, like Aristotle, regarded Reason as consisting of two elements: the intellect, which was passive and will, which was active. By applying this distinction to the poem, it should be obvious that "Death" represents that part of Reason which is will, for he is active, as we have established from the very beginning of the poem. Furthermore, the fact that "Death" – the Will – and the poetic persona are two distinct instances in the poem takes us back to Edwards' understanding of passions where he, exaggerating Calvin's weakness of the will, clearly states that it is the Will of God that should reign in one's life, and not man's corrupt Will. Consequently, we could assert that Death cannot but represent the Will (of God). The fact that the poetic persona follows it is an additional argument for my claim that Death is the Will and is also a sign of being one of the elect, since the persona replaces her own will with that of God. The idea that the will is not the persona's, is clearly suggested by the fact that Death and the persona are two different persons, so they are separated.

Therefore, if the poem features Death as the Will of God, we are left with the poetic persona who incorporates the intellect. Since the poetic persona appears to be one of the elect, the intellect should function in such an evaluative manner so that it would contribute to the governing of the passions. It is at this point that the Stoic thought and the Augustinian one merge, because Augustine too assigned a role to the intellect in governing the passions although he didn't agree with the Stoics' view that passions were false judgements. Consequently, the persona's coming up with the Stoic therapy against the fear of death does not contradict or cancel out the Augustinian approach to the passions. We could even assert that they complete one another.

Or rather—He passed Us—
The Dews drew quivering and chill—
For only Gossamer, my Gown—
My Tippet—only Tulle—

We paused before a House that seemed
A Swelling of the Ground—
The Roof was scarcely visible—
The Cornice—in the Ground—

The next stanza focuses on the prelude to death. The first line of the stanza "We passed the Setting Sun— / Or rather—He passed Us—" suggests their slowing down and the near end of the journey. Her very thin outfit causes the poetic persona to feel chilly, symbolising the approach of the demise. So far the experience of death has been pictured as a ceremony of courting. Now, the ceremony is starting to change from courting to funeral. Even nature seems to take part in it, "The Dews drew quivering and chill—". The image of a beginning funeral progresses in the following stanza where Death and the poetic persona halt. The grave is metaphorically alluded to by a buried house. This metaphor suggests that the grave is a new dwelling place for the life to come. Once again, death is not considered as the end of existence, but rather a rite of passage.

Since then—'tis centuries— and yet
Feels shorter than the Day
I first surmised the Horses' Heads
Were toward Eternity—

At this point the poem becomes highly problematic. So far, the persona's dying was a continuity of events, starting from the point when Death stops for the persona to the point where the two stop again at the grave. The next logical step would be for the burial to take place, but instead the next stanza pictures the persona as already having been buried and experiencing eternity. "Since then—'tis Centuries—and yet" The question that rises is why precisely was the burial omitted. The fact that there is a prelude to the funeral urges us to ask ourselves this question. Obviously the reader can infer the funeral, but why should it not be described at all? Moreover, the poem has six stanzas, each dedicated to a stage in dying. With another supposed stanza for the funeral, the poem would have seven stanzas, suggesting then the end of a circle and alluding to the Genesis.

The answer to this question lies in the persona's attitude towards death. The poem presents the experience of dying as one where passions are governed by reason. The reason why the funeral is missing is that, to Emily Dickinson, religious funerals were highly sensuous and that the passion of sorrow overwhelmed Reason during such events. Had the funeral been introduced in the poem, the persona's attitude towards death would have been disturbed.

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RADICALISM IN CONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY IN JOHN O'SULLIVAN'S MANIFEST DESTINY DOCTRINE

Karina PĂTRĂŞCANU

In terms of political ideologies, there are several strategies that can be employed in order for a people to construct its national identity. In the case of the United States, there has always been the case of a rhetoric that is radical in nature. As such, the nineteenth century doctrine of Manifest Destiny does not constitute a novelty for the American national consciousness, as far as ideology is concerned. On the contrary, the American national identity, which makes for the general subject of this paper, has been formulated from its very beginning in antithetical terms, of *Us* versus *Them*, from various perspectives. Moreover, it has been imbued with a sense of a sacred mission, in what Bercovitch calls a „rhetoric of mission"[1], that is still present in today's American foreign policy. The ideology of the doctrine of the Manifest has been studied extensively, with scholars such as Reginald Horsman pointing to the entrenched belief in the seeming moral superiority of the white man whose mission to civilize the Indian „would be the first American triumph in transforming mankind"[2]. Moreover, Daniel Walker, for example, places the doctrine as a manifestation of American imperialism and ever-growing economic interest in territorial expansion, especially to the West[3]. Therefore, the ideology of the doctrine enters a dialogue of exchange with three defining -isms of American identity, namely territorial expansionism, exceptionalism, and imperialism, all of which originate in Puritan ideals.

For this essay, focused on the American nation in mid nineteenth century, it is important to note that an American population already exists, as it already has a national consciousness, and this is not the case of a nation's very inception as an entity, starting from scratch, but of the way in which the nation sees, understands, solidifies and explains itself as such. Therefore, the aim of this essay is to analyze the way in which Americans of mid nineteenth century continued to construct their national sense of identity using radical ideology, as evidenced primarily in John O'Sullivan's Manifest Destiny doctrine, proposed in his article „Annexation", on the annexation of Texas, published in 1845. To this end, I look at a variety of doctrines and theories, such as Social Darwinism and Utilitarianism, that radicalism draws upon as explained and analyzed by Andrew Heywood in his *Political Ideologies,* which I will use in order to support my arguments. Furthermore, so as to provide with a context for nineteenth century radicalism in American rhetoric, I also look at the radical creed of Puritanism, because as I have previously mentioned, the Manifest Destiny doctrine is heavily informed by, and is, as I will argue, a result of Puritan ideals and sense of mission.

In point of a definition of radicalism, Heywood provides with a key characteristic, namely as an endorser of egoistical individualism, which translates to an absolute faith in the rational, self-interested and self-reliant capacity of the individual[4]. This definition conjures up Emerson's

[1] Sacvan Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2012, p. 8.
[2] Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1981, p. 106.
[3] Daniel Walker, *What Hath God Wrought. The Transformation of America, 1815-1848,* Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 705.
[4] Andrew Heywood, *Political ideologies. An Introduction*, Macmillian Education, Basingstoke, 2003, p.25,. [Accessed [5] Nov. 2015]. Available at: https://muhammadgozyali.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/politics-ideologies.pdf.

philosophy of self-reliance and the self-made man, which was not explicitly delivered or even conceptualized in radical terms, and as such, proves the inherent radical ideology in American thought. Furthermore, supporting the individual's right to self-reliance, radicalism opposes any kind of interference upon people and, by extension, upon any given society, therefore, the state bears a minimal role in the affairs of the nation[5].

At this point, it is necessary to expand on two observations that are of great relevance to the arguments discussed in this essay, and that represent the context of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, and its legacy, respectively. First, that O'Sullivan's doctrine is in fact a political continuation of the eschatological Puritan ideology formulated by John Winthrop in 1630, that regarded the American Puritan community as a "citty [sic] upon a hill"[6], and that essentially sparked American exceptionalism. Indeed, while O'Sullivan can be credited first with coining the term, second, with popularizing it in a later article on the rightful annexation of Oregon, and third, with politicizing the idea behind the term[7], the ideology as such is, nonetheless, fundamentally religious, and had less to do with territorial expansion, than it had with a moral and spiritual duty, given by God to American Puritans, whose destiny was to lead the world into purity and righteousness[8]. The second observation is that Manifest Destiny, in spite of facing strong opposition, both on American territory and outside of it, became a widespread idea that justified expansionist desires and practices. These desires translated into the political realm, evidenced, for example, by the war with Mexico between 1846 and 1848, and the continuous dispossession of the Natives, but they have also transpired in the economic interests of American businessmen:

> Western land speculators, railroad promoters, and small farmers eager for a chance to start over had obvious interests in westward expansion. Many northern workingmen saw westward expansion as guaranteeing economic opportunity and high wages; ... . The New York Morning News, edited, like the Democratic Review, by John L. O'Sullivan, cast westward expansion as an example of the participatory democracy of free settlers.[9]

As such, it can be argued that the doctrine's legacy was in fact Americans' awareness of it, as they have later developed their divine duty into a specific brand of covert imperialism and stronger interference into external issues. Moreover, the doctrine of Manifest Destiny also stood, along with other readings of American identity, at the basis of the frontier myth, formulated by Frederick Jackson Turner, in an 1893 essay called „The Significance of the Frontier in American History", yet another ideology unique to America, that ensured the full occupation of the territory. However, from religion to politics, it is interesting to note that both the origin and the legacy of the Manifest Destiny doctrine are formulated in terms of the opposition between *Us* and *Them.*

If O'Sullivan sees the *Us-Them* dichotomy through the filter of hostility that in great part comes from the *Other*, while the nation must resist „to the intrusion of European interference in the affairs of the American republics"[10], then the situation can be read in terms of the Social Darwinist doctrine of the survival of the fittest[11], as O'Sullivan also states that „we must live on for ever [sic]

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[5] *Ibid*. p. 39.
[6] John Winthrop, *"*A Modell of Christian Charity*",* in *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society,* 7, 1838, 47. [Accessed 7 May 2016]. Available at: https://history.hanover.edu/texts/winthmod.html.
[7] Robert J. Miller, *Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, and Manifest Destiny*, Praeger, Westport, 2006, p. 119.
[8] Sacvan Bercovitch, in *op.cit*., pp. 7-8.
[9] Daniel Walker, in *op.cit.*
[10] John O'Sullivan, "Annexation", *United States Magazine and Democratic Review 17*, 1, 1845, p. 4. [Accessed 14 Jan 2016]. Available at: https://pdcrodas.webs.ull.es/anglo/OSullivanAnnexation.pdf
[11] Andrew Heywood, in *op.cit*., p. 44.

in a state of unpausing struggle"[12]. However, struggle is something radicals view as beneficial to the flourishing of the nation, because meritocracy, which is the infrastructure of the economic and moral development of a nation, ensures that justice is unbiased, and is fulfilled based on each person's work and ability[13]. This characteristic of radicalism is in fact the legacy of the Puritan work ethics[14], and as such, constituted the basis for American identity before O'Sullivan even began formulating the doctrine. Indeed, it seems that here, too, the antithetical radical formulation coincides with the Puritan formation of America as a Paradise, in opposition to the Hell of the decadent Europe[15]. As such, it can be argued that O'Sullivan reinforced the image of a hard-working citizenry, in a country that offers a fair share to chance, and that provides with ample opportunities for anyone not afraid to earn their own living, which constituted the reason why so many people chose America as a site for reinventing themselves, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In order for a nation to truly exist, it is necessary to be observed, as it cannot come into being if its basic elements – people – do not see it, that is, do not seize the opportunity to construct it as nation, shaping it into the awareness of the other nations. Therefore, for a nation to manifest itself, it needs to be doubly observed. First, by people that may already be constituted within the configuration which would allow them to call themselves a nation, which presupposes the formation of a national consciousness[16]. Then, for a nation to complete its sense of being, it is necessary to establish itself in some sort of relation with other nations, to be validated as a political and economic entity, and as such, to secure its relevance. Furthermore, constructing a nation requires, beyond an element of governance and a shared history, some sort of commonality, a cohesion in goals, spirit, desires, because without something that keeps the people together, in one way or another, the sense of nationhood cannot be sustained, or even shaped, in the first place. Reflecting this subtle characteristic of a nation, O'Sullivan claims that „It is time for the common duty of Patriotism to the Country to succeed; ... it is at least time for common sense to acquiesce with decent grace in the inevitable and the irrevocable"[17]. Here, the will of the majority, a democratic characteristic, should represent true patriotism, that which binds the country together, in other words, loyalty to the nation, for the nation. Furthermore, it is interesting to note the fact that „common sense" outplays individual interests, because in classical liberalism „The individual is free insofar as he or she is left alone, not interfered with or coerced by others. As stated earlier, freedom in this sense is the absence of external constraints upon the individual."[18]. Therefore, it is clear that a discrepancy arises, between what O'Sullivan asks of his compatriots, which is a unitary sense of duty, and what radicalism desires for people, which is non-interference upon their individualism. However, a reconciliation between the two can be reached by way of Utilitarian ideology, a doctrine which radicalism draws upon, which proposes a pleasure-utility paradigm, that can be transposed from an individualistic model in order to fit society, fulfilling, at the same time, the democratic values which stand at the base of American society. Therefore, should a specific political, economic or social element be observed to produce happiness within society, by utilitarian practice that element is deemed beneficial and is incorporated as such:

[12] John O'Sullivan, in *op. cit.*, p. 1.
[13] Andrew Heywood, in *op.cit.*, p. 29.
[14] Mircea Eliade, *The Quest. History and Meaning in Religion*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984, p. 94.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 98.
[16] Bogdan Ştefănescu, "Patrii din cuvinte (MS - fragmente)". [Accessed 8 May, 2016]. Available at: http://stefanescu-diec.blogspot.ro/2015/10/bogdan-stefanescu-patrii-din-cuvinte-ms.html. Bogdan Ştefănescu.
[17] John O'Sullivan, in *op. cit.*, p. 1.
[18] Andrew Heywood, in *op. cit.*, p. 29.

> Bentham held that the principle of utility could be applied to society at large and not merely to individual human behaviour. Institutions and legislation can be judged by the yardstick of 'the greatest happiness'. However, this formula has majoritarian implications because it uses the happiness of 'the greatest number' as a standard of what is morally correct, and therefore allows that the interests of the majority outweighs [sic] those of the minority.[19]

Furthermore, Heywood points to the positive understanding of radicalism, in the idea of civil society, which is a „realm of freedom" and which, at the same time, provides with balance within a nation.[20] However, civil society must be based on an element that provides with the means for it to be a support for equilibrium, an element which O'Sullivan identifies within the American nation, namely the duty of patriotism as common sense, thus something intrinsically American. To this end, he urges that the debates and rupture within American society over the Texas annexation should „pass away", as „It is time then that all should cease to treat her as alien, and even adverse– cease to denounce and vilify all and everything connected with her accession–cease to thwart and oppose the remaining steps for its consummation. ... There has been enough of all this."[21].

In radical terms, any kind of interference upon the individual, and by extension upon a nation, is unwanted[22], with the exception of a divine plan, which makes American radicalism stand out. And because radicalism defines American national identity, O'Sullivan points to the hindrance of human external intervention:

> ... the manner in which other nations have undertaken to intrude themselves into it, between us and the proper parties to the case, in a spirit of hostile interference against us, for the avowed object of thwarting our policy and hampering our power, limiting our greatness and checking the fulfillment of our Manifest Destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions. [23]

Here, the divine plan is clearly outlined, reinforcing the Puritan read of the American continent as the „earthly Paradise", a gift offered to them by God, to serve for a moral and spiritual regeneration, into which they were supposed to lead the rest of the world[24]. As such, scaling "property" to mean new territories added to the U.S., and still through a Puritan understanding of property as a sign of being marked by God as one of the chosen elite, upon inspection, Locke's radical idea of natural rights given by God, and as such inalienable, namely „life, liberty and property"[25]seems to occupy O'Sullivan's claim upon Texas. In contrast, Jefferson's natural rights, „life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"[26], rejected property as being natural, or given by God[27], and as such, perhaps „the pursuit of happiness" can be understood in Utilitarian fashion. As such, happiness of a nation is the good of the many, therefore, the pursuit of happiness might be seen as democracy, where happiness refers to political, economic and social practices.

However, the key phrase in this passage, „Manifest Destiny", other than echoing Puritan eschatological and millenarianist beliefs and supporting political and economic interests for decades to come, invites much debate in terms of radicalism and its application as ideology constructing the American nation. The reason for it is that, as already stated, radicalism stands against any form of

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 39.
[21] John O'Sullivan, in *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.
[22] Andrew Heywood, in *op. cit.*, p. 39.
[23] John O'Sullivan, in *op. cit.*, p. 2.
[24] Mircea Eliade, in *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[25] John Locke, apud Andrew Heywood, in *op. cit*. p. 39.
[26] Thomas Jefferson, apud *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*

outside intervention, and as such, the Church seems to lose its grasp on human actions. However, „Manifest Destiny" and „Providence" are phrases that clearly point to a religious significance, a political spirituality even, that constitutes the basis for expansion. Divine intervention does clash with radical ideology, as it is the most invasive kind of intervention. However, in order to mediate between the divine purpose of America and its manifestation in radical terms, it is important to revisit one of the pillars of America's construction, which is the eschatological and millenarianist belief and faith in the New World, that the Puritan settlers had when relocating to the American continent. Territorial expansion is necessary because of the ever growing population, but this reason is secondary and it is also a need, whereas Manifest Destiny is a right, given by God. Expansion, thus Manifest Destiny, is wholly supported both by the Natural Rights theory, rights that „establish the essential conditions for leading a truly human existence"[28], and by the radical doctrine of Social Darwinism. Expansion means not only geographical expansion but that of national identity – whatever form it may hold. Because O'Sullivan imbues this expansionist ideology with religious dimensions, the American expansion is seen as a holy mission, a vision that becomes central to American identity.

Returning to what Heywood articulates as a key characteristic of radicalism, namely minimal interference from the government, it is evident, in O'Sullivan's article, the radical manner in which the political image of Americans is being constructed, virtually rejecting that government which uses force in order to represent the country: „tyranny may retain a military dominion, which is no government in the legitimate sense of the term"[29]. Furthermore, speaking about California, and foreseeing the reaches of his newly formed doctrine of Manifest Destiny, O'Sullivan employs the radical theory of natural rights and the idea that a people, a nation, does not have to be regulated by a body of laws that impose on it. Rather, reason and self-interest prevail and the nation builds its identity on the basis of mutual understanding and objectives, as well as a mutual trust that comes with the realization of the need to coexist. This realization, in turn, leads back to the Darwinist theory of the survival of the fittest, as people cannot survive on their own, and as such constitute themselves into larger groups. But because of their sizes, these groups cannot hold together millions of people without a binding agent, that necessarily goes beyond a judicial authority:

> Their right to independence will be the natural right of self-government belonging to any community strong enough to maintain it–distinct in position, origin and character, and free from any mutual obligations of membership of a common political body, binding it to others by the duty of loyalty and compact of public faith.[30]

As such, radical rejection of a higher power regulating the individual in absolute terms, and by extension, in America's case, the state as member of a federation, is based on the belief in the individual's reason and common sense, ideas that have been uttered by American thinkers and that define American identity in the nineteenth century.

In terms of rhetorical devices that O'Sullivan uses in order to construct his doctrine, what prevails most, and at first glance, from O'Sullivan's article, is the antithetical construction of national identity, the mechanism by which radicalism manufactures its discourse[31], which is formulated in antagonistic sentiment by O'Sullivan. As such, he identifies England, which is „our

[28] *Ibid.*
[29] John O'Sullivan, in *op. cit.*, p. 5.
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] Bogdan Ştefănescu, *Postcommunism/Postcolonialism: Siblings of Subalternaty*, University of Bucharest Publishing House, Bucharest, 2013, p. 172.

old rival and enemy" and France, which „strangely coupled with her against us"[32] as the *Other,* not only in their simple function as a counterbalance for *Us*, but in a relation of hostility. He finds both countries guilty of interfering in American affairs – already a transgression by radical ideology –, by impeding the annexation of Texas, thus directly responsible for the slow realization of a complete American national identity. Therefore, the great future and mission of America are threatened by what radicalism rejects most, namely outsiders:

> The zealous activity with which this effort to defeat us was pushed by the representatives ... fully constituted that case of foreign interference, which Mr. Clay himself declared should, and would unite us all in maintaining the common cause of our country against foreigner and the foe.[33]

What is interesting here is the total and unequivocal rejection of the past, on the part of Americans. Their starting point, Europe, is thus not only forgotten but also turned into an enemy, into the rival *Other*. O'Sullivan implies the erasing of the past, with the people emerging as a tabula rasa that defines itself first and foremost as a difference in the world-wide arrangement of national identities. As such, the past becomes the *Other*, which complicates the issue of identity, because the American identity emerges not unbound, but relative to the past, becoming more of a reaction to Europe. Furthermore, as Heywood identifies it as a doctrine of radicalism, Social Darwinism is employed in the American nation's self-construction, battling with foreign powers, attempting to maintain its uniqueness, its freedom, its identity. Moreover, it is equally important to note that people are expected to sense and act as a unit against hostility targeted at them, that is, they are expected to manifest nationalist sentiments: „We are only astonished ... that the burst of indignation against this unauthorized, insolent and hostile interference against us, has not been more general ... and has not rallied the national spirit and national pride unanimously ... "[34]. Radicalism proposes that government regulates society very little, that society instead rules itself, with minimal intervention in people's lives, or in the nation's affairs. What O'Sullivan calls „Patriotism" is common-sensical, therefore resides in most, if not all, (American) citizens, and as consequence, does not need to be directed by any form of government.

If „Society is therefore seen to be atomistic, composed of a collection of largely self-sufficient individuals, meaning that the characteristics of society can be traced back to the more fundamental features of human nature"[35] and radicals believe in the freedom of the individual, unhindered by outside forces, it stands to reason to apply the same view on freedom to the sum of those individuals and consider the case of the nation. Indeed, the state is marginal to national identity in the sense that its usefulness is not wanted but rather needed, because of the safety or order that it represents and maintains within society[36]. Referring to Texas and its history with Mexico, O'Sullivan points to its separation, in clearly radical terms: „It was not revolution; it was resistance to revolution: and resistance under such circumstances as left independence the necessary resulting state, caused by the abandonment of those with whom her former federal association had existed"[37]. As evidenced, the *Us-Them* dichotomy is once again employed – the child-state, Texas, and its less-than-desirable-caretaker, Mexico – but here it is done so that the annexation of Texas can be justified as a national right, reinforcing the doctrine of Manifest Destiny and the radical

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] Andrew Heywood, in *op.cit*., p. 39.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] John O'Sullivan, in *op. cit*., p. 3.

belief in the capacity of self-reliance and self-government, this time not of individuals, but of groups of individuals.

A step further in the projection of national identity onto the international stage, is exemplified by the inclusive characteristic of *Us*: „... Mexico and ourselves united by closer ties than ever; of mutual friendship and mutual support in resistance to the intrusion of European interference in the affairs of the American republics"[38]. Here, the *Us* versus *Them* dichotomy extends beyond a unitary sense of nationhood, to incorporate yet another nation, against a common *Other*. It is clear, thus, that the border between *Us* and *Them* is fluid, and that *Us* can be understood as a mechanism that provides with the margins of who *Us* is both in a restricted sense, where *Us* is exclusive of all outsiders, as well as in a broader sense, where an *Other* is invited to join *Us*, an inclusive meaning which alienates a larger *Other*, the original *Other*, even further. Thus alliances, here between Mexico and the republics of America, offer such an inclusive sense of *otherness*. Another interesting observation is O'Sullivan's choice of phrasing, which invites to a further discussion on *otherness*, the basis on which radicalism builds itself, and with it, the American nation. As such, even though O'Sullivan talks about a unitary American identity, he also makes reference to the „American republics" and earlier in his article, to „the old Thirteen"[39]. The discussion of otherness in the context of radicalism takes contour in the radical idea of self-government applied to the nation as a whole, not only to individuals. Indeed, the federalist form of government informs the atomistic characteristic of society met in radicalism, where a nation is formed by smaller units. As such, in an attempt at a crass breaking down of the insides of a federal, radical form of government, if individuals form states, and states constitute themselves in a nation, it stands to reason to apply the idea of otherness to each state, as each state must have a self-image even in the least different from other states. However, it seems that at least in America's history, the smaller, state otherness-es do not supersede O'Sullivan's national question, the American nation being thus a cohesive voice, a unitary image of a self, different for the *Other,* which he identifies with everything non-American.

In a further analysis of O'Sullivan's use of radical rhetorical devices in his unwitting rendering of the American national identity, it becomes clear that his discourse is filled with pathos and it occasionally resembles an avalanche of nationalistic proportions: „glorious blazon of our common nationality; and the sweep of our eagle's wing already includes within its circuit the wide extent of her fair and fertile land"[40]. At the same time, the antithetical rhetorical device employed by radicalism peers from behind the lyricism of O'Sullivan's writing. The antithetical rendering of radicalism is not only achieved by the use of the inclusive-exclusive pronoun „our", but also by the use of the eagle imagery, a national symbol, which has more subtle implications in terms of power struggle. In constructing a national identity, imagery and symbols are as important as the ideology upon which that nation is being constructed. In a heartbeat, the „common nationality" becomes evident and the unnamed nation is at once identified, its borders mentally traced, its national sentiment articulated. The symbol of the country, of the national psyche, is not only a bird, employing the idea of freedom, highness – thus superiority –, flexibility, but it is an eagle, no less: a bird of prey, establishing even further the *Us* versus *Them* antagonistic image construction of the American nation. Furthermore, the radical doctrine of Social Darwinism places predators at the top of the food chain, thus establishing the U.S. – by using a predator as the national image – in control or at the very least, at the top of international relations, as a country to be taken into full account:

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

„... a process of natural selection also exists within human society, which is characterized by the principle of «the survival of the fittest». Society was therefore portrayed as a struggle for survival amongst individuals. Those who are best suited by nature to survive, rise to the top, while the less fit fall to the bottom"[41]. As such, O'Sullivan reaffirms a divine destiny of the American nation, constructing a political hierarchy of the world, led by a strong America. Furthermore, in the context of a possible war, and the struggle to obtain Texas, O'Sullivan's observation infuses the nation with an empowering sentiment.

In an even further attempt at exemplifying how rhetorical devices can transcend their face-value dimension, it may be interesting to look at O'Sullivan's hierarchical construction of nationalist sentiment, a construction based on emotion and a yearning for safety and familiarity. As such, it is necessary to look at O'Sullivan's differentiation between *country*, *our country*, and *homeland*:

> She is no longer to us a mere geographical space ... She is no longer to us a mere country on the map. She comes within the dear and sacred designation of Our Country; no longer a «*pays*», she is a part of «*la patrie*»; and that which is at once a sentiment and a virtue, Patriotism, already begins to thrill for her too within the national heart.[42]

An inner hierarchy is thus emerging, with „Our Country" at the top, „pays" at the bottom, and „la patrie" a space that transcends physical boundaries, becoming much more than a *country*, evolving into a *homeland*. In the American formation of identity – and perhaps in the formation of any national identity – the sense of belonging goes beyond buildings and streets. It is apparent, from O'Sullivan's rendering, that it is a certain kind of sentiment that gives the measure of a nation, a common understanding and mental construction of the space inhabited by the community. He calls it „Patriotism", which he places at the center of the American nation, as being, as already evidenced, the duty of any citizen, but which, in the context of a Puritan background and formulation of group identity, becomes, in fact, a destiny.

If countries, and versions of countries, have a hierarchy upon which they function, within the consolidation of a nation, and when geographical expansion is still underway, as was the case at that time for America pushing the frontier, the resulting fragments of the nation can be seen as the smallest group units of society, and perhaps the most intimate: „Let their reception into «the family» be frank, kindly, and cheerful"[43]. Certainly, there are parallels that can be noticed between a family and a nation, such as power relations within their structures, considering that the family is built on the hierarchical model any nation employs, at various levels of intensity, and a conscience of history – albeit vastly diminished in terms of family. As such, the correlation between „la patrie" and „family" gives an almost warm rendering of the American nation, as something already homogenous in spirit, whose members are united by something much deeper than language or history or political ideals. As members of a family stand together, so do members of a nation, all the more so when outside forces attempt to interfere.

Further supporting the idea of the Manifest Destiny doctrine as principal in the making of American national construction in the nineteenth century in radical terms, O'Sullivan closes his article with a dismissal of „idle French talk of *balances of power* on the American Continent." and challenges all to „cast into the opposite scale all the bayonets and cannon, not only of France and England, but of Europe entire", because of the „solid weight of the two hundred and fifty, or three

[41] Andrew Heywood, in *op.cit*., p. 44.
[42] John O'Sullivan, in *op. cit*., p. 1.
[43] *Ibid.*

hundred millions–and American millions–destined to gather beneath the flutter of the stripes and stars, in the fast hastening year of the Lord 1845! "[44]. As such, radicalism is not an ideology that was birthed necessarily out of a political need, all of a sudden, as simply a consequence of European interference into American affairs, but it is rather, the basis for the construction of a collective identity. Europeans overtook the American continent as political entities, but they also crossed the ocean as religious entities. However, both constructed themselves and their respective communities in antagonistic terms, of *Us* versus *Them*, because settlers and colonists brought with them European models of economic and political representation and practices, as well as a European understanding of religion, which at once placed them in an ideological opposition with the Natives.

As such, throughout the paper I have shown how the formation of American identity in the nineteenth century was in fact a radical continuation of the fundamentally radical Puritan ideology that constructed an ideal for the European settlers. I have further shown how O'Sullivan's doctrine of Manifest Destiny translates into radical terms, by employing arguments used by variations of radicalism, such as Social Darwinism and Utilitarianism. Moreover, I have shown how the rhetorical device by which radicalism is constructed, namely antithesis, is a pillar in the formation of the Manifest Destiny doctrine, where it is used in subtle ways in order to construct a national sense of duty. In consequence of all presented in these pages, it becomes clear that the American national identity is constructed in antagonistic terms, thus exercising the radical modus operandi, rejecting not only outside interferences, but old values as well. By rejecting the past, and positioning itself in opposition to it, America seems to construct itself in terms of perpetual renewal, which might explain its obsession with the cult it has built around youth, energy and the new. Moreover, I have shown how the Manifest Destiny doctrine quietly builds the structure for the acquisition of more identity elements, because it presupposes the conquest of international power and unhindered territorial expansion, as well as the fulfillment of a sacred mission.

As such, it is not surprising to conclude that even national identity, which, because of the sheer number of people within a nation, is far more difficult to change, is fluid and prone to variation, transformation and innovation. The legacy of Manifest Destiny continued both in politics, as well as in the social stratum. Not much longer after the Civil War, for example, America entered the war with Spain, that brought it territories, thus enforcing O'Sullivan's doctrine of territorial expansionism, but it also fulfilled the Puritan vision of America as a savior, by entering the war on behalf of Cuba. Throughout the twentieth century, politicians have formulated foreign policies molded on the Manifest Destiny reasoning that American values are needed in other parts of the world[45], values such as democracy, self-reliance and hard work. However, in terms of radical construction of the nation, it stands to reason to argue that the *Us* versus *Them* framework is common to many nations, as identity is formulated relative to the *Other*, especially when that identity already has a divine purpose, as spiritual leader.

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AUTHENTICITY AND SIMULATION IN POST-TOURISM

Adrian SOLOMON

Changes and challenges in post-tourism

A few mutations in tourists' objectives occurred towards the end of the 20th century. One was determined by an urge to repress memories of the genocides that underlie modernity, from the World Wars to Bosnia and Rwanda, and generated a postmodern quest for ahistorical places; accordingly, touristic niches have been developed that focus on themes such as "unspoiled nature" and "savagery" (MacCannell 2003). At the same time, destinations whose historicity is touristically exploitable have devised new ways of catering to the needs of post-tourists, who may seek either accepted simulacra (from Victorianized English cities to Cardo Culinaria, a Roman restaurant in Jerusalem boasting "The First-Century Dining Experience"), or lived, ongoing authenticity, e.g. in Berlin, where "plenty of visitors avoid the big sights altogether" taking, instead of a visit to the Brandenburg Gate, "a Sunday jaunt through Mauerpark's flea market" (Braun & Novy 2010). Whatever the case, the shift from the canonic list of the traditional tourist is evident.

More accurately, what is post-tourism?

> Post-tourism involves the cultivation of an ironic disposition to the tourist site. The post-tourist accepts that the site will be swarming with other tourists and treats this as part of the tourist experience. The Romantic ideal of being alone with the tourist object so that one can possess it fully is abandoned. Post-tourists have come to terms with the commodified world and do not hanker after pre-commodified experience. (Rojek 2003).

Most touristic visits, however, have a broader scope, such as the natural and/or cultural landscape as a whole. In fact, landscapes should be understood synergistically, as a "particular association of their physical and built characteristics with the meanings they have for those who are experiencing them" (Relph 1976). This is what makes them actual tourist destinations, constructed by both locals and visitors. Thus, space and time are arranged and commodified through a process that makes geographies and cultures "intersect and reciprocally inform each other" (Anderson and Gale 1992).

Even before the emergence of a sophisticated, two-sided post-tourist who, while seeking direct contact with locals, does not mind the "simulation of a local culture" (Featherstone 2003), the tourism industry was forced to respond to changing demand. One solution was museumification, which may be either grand-scale, e.g. the Creusot-Montceau Ecomuseum, set up in 1972 in Burgundy, France, where "entire working-class neighborhoods, living metallurgic zones, an entire culture, men, women, and children included – gestures, languages, customs [were] fossilized alive as in a snapshot" (Baudrillard 1994); or confined to Disneyfied showcases of architecture and/or crafts, e.g. El Poble Espanyol of Barcelona (built in 1929) and the Village Museum of Bucharest (1936), both simulated places, displaying simulacra and relocated authentic artifacts respectively.

Time and everyday life are commodified and simulated in both directions: the future, e.g. Future World at Epcot, the Experimental Prototype Community of Tomorrow, a theme park opened in 1982, "comprised of several rides that demonstrate current and future technology"; and the past, e.g. the Land of Legends at Lejre in Denmark, where visitors can experience life in the Stone, Iron or Viking Age, or the pioneer villages of North America cited by Relph (Relph 1976).

Museumification and commodification go hand in hand.

If postmodernism has brought on the disintegration of culture into "pure images without referent or content" (Baudrillard 1994), it follows naturally that what post-tourism offers for consumption consists of "visual signs and sometimes simulacrum" (Urry 2002). The postmodern, third-order simulacrum, an image that "has no relation to any reality whatsoever", being "is its own pure simulacrum" (Baudrillard 1994) and preceding the original, shares the tourist market with second-order simulacra, which undo the bond between image and reality, and first-order simulacra, characteristic of premodern, "cruel" societies, where signs were not arbitrary and the image used to be just an artificial representation of a certain reality.

The post-tourist is not only aware of, but even delighted with the simulacrum, because he knows that the place he is visiting is just "another pastiched surface", a feature of postmodern experience, and that "the apparently authentic fishing village could not exist without the income from tourism" (Urry 2002). Even when he seeks "pure", rather than "apparent", authenticity by mingling with locals, he may find out that little genuineness is left after human intervention in those city- or landscapes. Powerful economic factors commodify "the natural and cultural environments of the destination" as a "recreational resource" (Hughes 1995). As culture has become a commodity, moreover, since "the shameless commodification and commercialization of everything is, after all, one of the hallmarks of our times", sexuality, nature and the authenticity of the product become commercial requirements involving "a bias towards the immediate, the spectacular, the aesthetically acceptable" (Harvey 2001).

Manipulation of space: degrees of authenticity

Destinations that are "purposefully created or developed as tourist attractions" must be distinguished from "accidental" sites (Sharpley 2009). Since place authenticity is so often simulated in tourism, generating second- and third-order simulacra, it is important to establish both a definition and degrees of authenticity. On the face of it, an authentic place may be thought to be one that was *not* created for touristic purposes, even if it may regularly undergo changes to satisfy tourist needs. However, we will regard authenticity as "being inside and belonging to *your* place both as an individual and as a member of a community, and to know this without reflecting upon it" (Relph 1976). This honest, "unselfconscious sense of place", which takes a place for what it is, provides a strong sense of identity. Simply put, place authenticity may be:

1. *Real*, i.e. non-touristic functions predate the touristic function (e.g. De Wallen a.k.a. Red Light District in Amsterdam, Zlatá ulička/the Golden Lane in Prague, the Père Lachaise cemetery in Paris).

De Wallen, Amsterdam © A. Solomon

De Wallen. Following a four-century-old hassle with the authorities and many ups and downs in the level of tolerance, prostitution was legalized in the Netherlands in 2000, and Amsterdam's De Wallen network of streets and alleyways, with their hundreds of sex venues, coffee shops selling light drugs, sex theaters and museums, became one of the city's main tourist attractions. Police controls and law enforcement allow both tourists and locals uninvolved in the sex or drug trade to walk through the neighborhood unthreatened, so "normal" people may be seen there at

any time of day. The intense commodification of sex in every nook and corner has often drawn comparisons between the Red Light District and American open-air shopping malls or Fifth Avenue, the only difference being that what its neon windows have on display is a wide range of human bodies: "commodification of bodies has been perfected to the level of an art form" (Aalbers 2005). Since the prostitutes luring customers from their windows do not only deliver, but also stand for real sex, being unique and real, they may be considered first-order simulacra. At the same time, as they are unfaithful copies that, while revealing a reality, also denature it, their image belongs in the "order of maleficence" (Baudrillard 1994).

2. *Staged*, i.e. assembled/recreated for commercial/tourist purposes (e.g. El Poble Espanyol in Barcelona, the Village Museum in Bucharest, the Venetian Resort Hotel Casino in Las Vegas with its recreation of St. Mark's Square and gondola rides).

El Poble Espanyol. One of the largest open-air museums in the world, it is a simulated "all-Spanish" town, purpose-built to the blueprints of architects and artists who sought inspiration in 1600 Spanish towns. After the 1929 international exhibition closed down, the success of the complex determined the authorities to reverse the decision to demolish it. Today it also hosts more than 40 artisans' workshops, where visitors can both see at work traditional handicraftsmen, from leatherworkers to glassblowers, and buy their products. Authentic craftspersons sell commoditized goods to ambivalent post-tourists in replica houses constructed in a simulated town. Is this a kind of Disneyland?

El Poble Espanyol, Barcelona © A. Solomon

The architecture representing almost all the regions of Spain faithfully reproduces the original models, each house being an individual copy, while the artificially-created, movie-set like town in which all the reproductions are amassed is an invented place, a second-order simulacrum that imitates reality. At Disneyland, where the simulacrum predates the original, the hyperreal dissimulates the fact that there is nothing – i.e. no reality in the traditional acceptation – behind it. So far as the hyperreal is defined as "a real without origin or reality", the argument holds water; nevertheless, Baudrillard carries on with the highly questionable assumption that the whole of America is no longer real, but hyperreal, i.e. simulated, "sheltered" from any distinction between the real and the imaginary, claiming that "Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real" (Baudrillard 1994).

Some post-travelers to Europe find the place dirty, boring and linguistically unintelligible, while the "well-designed" Disney World provides "much more fun", making people happy (Harvey 2001). Certainly, this is not the only reason why Europe attempts to "redesign itself to Disney standards", and destinations become "Disneyfied" to the point of placelessness: chaotic, meaningless, uniformized and "lacking both diverse landscapes and significant places" – it is the outcome of faster communication and me-tooism, but also the expression of a leveling attitude (Relph 1976). Uniformity has spread from repeated industrial landscapes to look-alike resorts and amusement parks.

Postmodern landscapes are places for consumption: they are not for people to live in, nor do they "provide a sense of social identity", because they are simulated – just like Main St. in

EuroDisney (Urry 2002). The paradoxical post-tourist is looking for genuine experiences not only in local flea markets, but also in entirely artificial environments, from virtual worlds to Disneyland, as if to illustrate that "technology can give us more reality than nature can" (Eco 1986).

"Disneyfication" or "Disneyization" is almost an all-weather buzzword, evoked whenever big business interests stand out too much, commodification is perceived as excessive, tastes change for the kitschier to satisfy tourists, the simulacrum tends to detach itself completely from reality, or destinations become ahistorical and/or placeless – in fact on any number of occasions.

3. ***Mixed*** (e.g. Pompeii, La Pedrera in Barcelona, enactments of savagery, i.e. formerly primitive groups earning their living "by charging visitors admission to their sacred shrines, ritual performances, and displays of more or less 'ethnologized' everyday life" – McCannell 2003).

Plaster cast in the original Pompeii marketplace © A. Solomon

Pompeii. Although excavated with an eye to preserving as much as possible the aspect it had right before the AD 79 eruption that buried it, the Roman city welcomes visitors with copies of its famous frescoes, mosaics and statues, because the originals were long ago ferried to the Archeological Museum in Naples, together with the bodies of its ancient inhabitants, having been too exposed both to the elements and to the tourists' unhampered hunt for souvenirs. The exhibited plaster casts of the victims of the eruption are simulacra that both replace and fill the forms of the originals. Authentic (houses, streets, temples, etc.) and simulated (copies of art and people) elements coexist. Interestingly, in 2008 the site was allegedly in danger of Disneyfication, when a heritage councilor suggested limiting the number of visitors in parallel with renting the place for private events to heavyweights such as Google and Microsoft for "astronomical" fees. The idea was at odds with the traditional Italian outlook on national heritage which, in combination with deep-rooted suspicion of commercial dealings undertaken by foreigners, has so far prevented Pompeii from becoming the backdrop for an "American-style theme park" (Nadeau 2008).

Manipulation of time: history or heritage?

An interesting development in the commodification of history and memory is the fashionable concept of "vintage", applicable to anything from clothes to cars to architecture, which valorizes items as simulacra taken out of their original context: a "golden age" that is nothing but the distorted perception of a previous era. The nostalgia for the recent industrial past and a sense of community that have all but disappeared in a fluid, uncertain postmodernity is sublimated into tourist-oriented activities that make previously unprofitable tasks profitable again, as a simulacrum, and turn workers into "exhibition fodder for tourists" (Rojek 2003).

In their turn, tourist destinations are adjusted by "manipulations of history and culture" (Ringer 2003) to suit the visitors' interests and timetables. Tourists on a tight schedule will only seek "a brief comprehensible history that can be easily assimilated – heritage rather than history" (Urry 2002).

Development of tourist-worthy heritage often entails the displacement or simulation of historical artifacts, because "heritage attractions (as all tourist attractions) must be safe, clean and pleasing", the depicted place being "intentionally constructed", as in the case of some "re-imaged" or themed city streets in England, Victorianized through "aesthetic reconstruction" (Hughes 2003). A "heritage style", including "sandblasted walls and Victorian street furniture", has emerged in the wake of de-industrialization in northern England since the 1980s. Once something has become "history", "once the past has been turned into a commodity, it is made safe, sterile and shorn of its capacity to generate risk and danger, subversion and seduction" (Urry 2002). Uncertainty about the future and disappointment with the present state of affairs underlie the perpetual yearning for a "golden age" and benefits the "heritage industry".

A reverse operation may be undertaken to make a gloomy past more acceptable. The appalling coal-mine landscape seen by Orwell on his 1936 investigative trip to northern England, his "mental picture of hell" (Orwell 1937), has been cleaned up and "sanitized" into a posh tourist destination commanded by the Wigan Pier Heritage Centre – a model of heritage industry that attracts more than one million tourists a year (Urry 2002).

Confusion

Post-tourists are not only people who willingly pay to keep a tourist destination or attraction going which enables many locals to earn a living. Both they and those in the tourism business are barbarians in the sense given by Alessandro Baricco: on the face of it, marauders without culture or history who, from fragments of the past, will not rebuild the original, but erect new structures; in their minds, "the Greek column, the monocle, the revolver and the medieval relic are aligned in a single row and stored in the same depository for relics" (Baricco 2009). Authenticity and origins mean nothing to them, because their world makes sense only when those fragments of the past interact with others, setting off a new reality – a barbarian idea that everybody rejects in theory, but readily practices. Heritage towns, pioneer settlements, former industrial communities engaged in performative labor and other such reconstructions "present a cannibalized version of history which is designed to maximize tourist flows" (Rojek 2003).

The clash and concord between a modern world that ironically decries both the loss of a prettified "golden age" and inauthenticity, on the one hand, and the postmodern play with commodification and simulacra that everyone is eager to enjoy, on the other, is a source of confusion, which the variety and unpredictability of tourists' motives will make it hard to dispel.

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REMARKS ON ENGLISH AND ROMANIAN LIGHT VERBS: DYNAMIC *HAVE*

Carmen-Elena STĂNCULESCU

1. Aim of the paper

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the light verb *have* in English may be dynamic or stative, while the light verb *avea*, "have", in Romanian is always stative. In this paper we are going to discuss the light verb constructions of the type *have/ avea* plus a deverbal noun.

1.1. Light verbs constructions

In English, the following verbs are light verbs: *do, give, have, make, take,* etc, while in Romanian the light verbs are: *avea, da*, *face,* etc. We are going to give examples with some of the light verbs used in English and Romanian, see below the comparison between main verb and light verb use:

Main verb use:	Light verbs use:
(1) a. She *talked* with me.	b. She *had a talk* with me.
(2) a. Anne *photographed* the city.	b. Anne *took a photograph* of the city.
(3) a. Sue *kissed* him.	b. Sue *gave* him *a kiss*.
(4) a. Tom *studied* the paper.	b. Tom *made a study* of the paper.
(5) a. Claude *worked* hard.	b. Claude *did a* hard *work*.

Main verb use:	Light verb use:
(1) a. Ana *are* o casă frumoasă.	b. Ana *are o asemănare* cu mama ei.
(2) a. Ion *dă* de băut prietenilor.	b. Ion îi *dă un pupic* Mariei.
(3) a. Ea *face* mâncare.	b. Ea *face o plimbare* cu barca.

In what follows, we are focusing on showing the differences between light verbs *have* and *avea*, and their main uses:

Main verb use:	Light verb use:
(1) a. Anne *joked* with Tim.	b. Anne *had a joke* with Tim.
(2) a. My mother *chatted* with Bill.	b. My mother *had a chat* with Bill.
(3) a. Sue *napped* yesterday.	b. Sue *had/took a nap* yesterday.
(4) a. He *rested*	b. He *had a rest*.
(5) a. She *swam*.	b. She *had a swim*.

Main verb use:	Light verb use:
(1) a. El *comanda* o armată.	b. El *avea comanda* unei armate.
(2) a. Ea *a suferit* mult din cauza sărăciei.	b. Ea *a avut de suferit* din cauza sărăciei.
(3) a. *Îl doare* capul.	b. *Are o durere* de cap.

(4) a. Ana îl *urăşte* pe Ion. b. Ana *are ură* faţă de Ion.
(5) a. Maria îl *invidia* pe fratele ei. b. Maria *are invidie* faţă de fratele ei.

"Tranzitivitatea se înregistrează cu totul excepţional la numele de stare cu corespondent verbal tranzitiv (invidia/ ura/ pizma pe Ion - DRAŞOVEANU 1976 şi DRAŞOVEANU 1997, p. 131- 134, - , a-l invidia/ urî/ pizmui pe Ion" (Stan 2003 : 131).

The light verb constructions are formed by a light verb and a deverbal noun. The light verb can be, in English: *do, give, have, make*, or in Romanian: *avea, da, face*. The deverbal noun can have:

(a) a form which is identical to that of the main verb use, for example:
(1) a. He *had/took a ride* b. He *rode*.
(2) a. El *are comanda* armatei b. El *comanda* armata.
(b) or it can be derived from the verb by affixation, for example:
(1) a. He *had a meeting* with her b. He *met* her.
(2) a. Ea *are* (sentimente de) *iubire* faţă de el. b. Ea îl *iubeşte*.

There are cases:
a) when the verb is morphologically more basic than the noun, for example:
(1) a. *to meet* → *a meeting*; *to know*→ *a know*; *to doze* → *a doze*; *to laugh* → *a laugh*;
b) or the noun is morphologically more basic than the verb, for example:
(2) a. *a bath*→ *to bath*; *a sleep* → *to sleep*; *a work*→ *to work; a gossip*→ *to gossip;*

In some cases there are ambiguity between the two uses: main verb use and the light verb use, for example:
(1) I *had a bath*.
a. I *bathed* in a bath. (activity). b. I have already *had* two baths this day.(only eventive reading).
c. I *owned* a bath. (state/ possession). d. I *possessed* a bath.(only stative reading).

Classification of deverbal nouns. Deverbal nouns can appear in:
a) "dynamic" constructions, for example:
(1) a. He dozed off during the film.
b. He had a doze during the film.

b) "stative" constructions, for example:
(2) a. Ana avea opinii legate de politică.
b. *Ana opina cu privire la politică.
c. Ana îşi dădea cu părerea în ceea ce priveşte politica.
d. Ana avea credinţă în Dumnezeu. Acum nu mai are, de când ia murit soţul de o boală necruţătoare. (only stative reading, even though the noun is deverbal).
e. Ana credea în Dumnezeu. Acum nu mai crede, de când ia murit soţul de o boală necruţătoare. (only stative reading).

Even in Romanian we have deverbal nouns, like, for example, *invidie/ iubire/ credinţă*, but in light verb constructions with *avea*, they cannot have an eventive reading, that this, in Romanian, we don't have the value dynamic assigned to *avea*, as a light verb.

1.1.1. Light verb constructions in English and Romanian + determiners

(1) a. John *had* **a** shave yesterday. (= John *took* **a** shave yesterday).→ light verb use of *have/take*.
b. John shaved.→main verb use/ lexical verb.
c. Someone shaved John.→main use/lexical verb.
(2) a. Ion *a avut o criză de nervi.*
John HAVE. past a nervous breakdown.
"John had a nervous breakdown".

As we can notice from examples (1) and (2) the most usual determiner used in light verb constructions is the indefinite article: ***a***, for the English examples, and the indefinite article, ***o***, for the Romanian counterparts.

1.1.2. Light verb constructions in English and Romanian + modifiers

(1) a. He *had/took a* well-earned *rest*.
b. He rested.
c. Ea *are o* mare *dragoste* pentru el.
She HAVE.3rd sg. a great love for him.
"She loves him".

From these examples we can notice that light verb constructions admit modifiers, usually adjectives, like in our examples: *well-earned*, for English, and *mare*, for the Romanian construction.

1.1.3. Light verb constructions + quantifications

(1) a. My sister has already had three showers today.
b. Monica has already had two meetings with her boss.
c. My aunt has already had four quarrels with her husband.
(2) a. Ana a avut două mari iubiri.
b. Ion a avut două crize de nervi până acum.
c. Monica a avut două probleme de rezolvat (la matematică).

As we can notice from the above examples there is possible to have quantified nouns both in English and Romanian, for example: *three showers, două mari iubiri*.

1.1.4. Different types of light verb constructions
Have + deverbal noun

(1) a. I had a bite from the apple.
b. I bit into the apple.

***Avea* + deverbal noun**

(2) a. Ion are cunoştinţe solide de matematică.
b. Ion ştie matematică./ Ion are cunoştinţe de matematică.
"John knows/understands mathematics".

***Have* + deverbal noun + PP**

(1) a. I had a think [about your problem].
(2) a. I had a think about it. (Huddleston & Pullum, 2002: 296).
(3) a. Ana a avut o problemă cu sora ei.
(4) a. Andrei avea(sentimente de) ură faţă de fratele lui.

In Romanian, the light verb *avea*, is usually constructed in two ways (Romanian Language Dictionary, 2010: 382):

a) *avea* + its abstract complement corresponds with a full verb use, for example:

(1) a. a avea asemănare = a se asemăna = to resemble ….; to have/ to bear resemblance to ….; to have a likeness to ….; to bear likeness to …; to be like ….; to look like.
b. a avea deosebire = a se deosebi= to distinguish; to differ;
c. a avea fiinţă = a fi/a exista/a se naşte = to be/ to exist; to live;
d. a avea întâmplare = a i se întâmpla = to happen; to take place;
e. a avea nădejde = a nădăjdui = to hope (for);
f. a avea presupus/bănueală = a bănui = to suppose; to hope;
g. a avea spor = a spori= to increase; to grow;
h. a avea traiu/viaţă = a trăi = to live/to be alive/to exist;
i. a avea vis = a visa = to dream;

b) *avea* + its abstract complement it corresponds to the construction "a fi" followed by an adjective, for example:

(2) a. a nu avea moarte = a fi nemuritor = to be immortal/undying;
b. a nu avea număr = a fi nenumărat = to be countless;
(1) a. Atât de nesimţitori ne-am face, încât n-am avea deosebire de dobitoacele cele necuvântătoare. (Drăghici, R. 50).
(2) a. Acest somn puternic are cu moartea asemănare. (Barac, A. 50).
(3) a. Păgânii de la D[umne]-zău au fiinţă. (Biblia, 1688, 6 pr.)
(4) a. Atunci lumea cea gândită pentru noi avea fiinţă. (Eminescu, P. 232).
(5) a. Pot să am nădejde în voi? (Creangă, P.20).
(6) a. Când a mai auzit şi despre întâmplarea ce au avut...., nu ştia cum să mulţumească lui moş Nichifor. (Creangă, P.135).
(7) a. Având presupus pentru nişte lucruri……(Antim, p. XXIII).
(8) a. La lucru n-are spor. (Doine, 283).
(9) a. Şi de sânt, şi de am viaţă, dar lumea ce-mi foloseşte? (Konaki, p. 100).
(10) a. Dumnezeu a rânduit, Să ia mândruţa urît, Să aibă traiu necăjit. (Jarnik-Bîrseanu, D. 167).
(11) a. Vis frumos avut-am noaptea. (Eminescu, P. 187).
(12) a. A băut apă vie, şi nu are moarte. (Şez. III, 99).
(13) a. Faclele nu mai aveau numai.(Bălcescu, M.V. 395).

a) ***Avea* as heavy/ full/ lexical verb** (= *a stăpâni/ a poseda/ a ţine*) (Romanian Language Dictionary, 2010: 380):

(1) a. Am auzit că ai o furcă de aur, care toarce singură. (Creangă, P. 96).
(2) a. Amândoi bătrânii dară ortul popii, rămâind în urma lor casa toacă şi o săracie lucie. Copilul…, după ce văzu că nu mai are de nici unele, ….. se puse pe .....plâns. (Ispirescu, L. 287).
(3) a. Are avere. (N. Costin, Let. 87).
(4) a. Pe la noi, cine are bani, bea şi mănâncă, cine nu, se uită şi rabdă. (Creangă, P. 279).
b) The complement of *avea* is an integrate part of the subject:
(5) a. O, ce frumoşi ochi ai! (Eminescu, P. 209, 212).
(6) a. De-ar avea codrul ista gură, să spuie câte a văzut ....., ştiu că am auzi ce ascultă! (Creangă, P. 119).

"În formula semică a numelor de stare se include sensul verbelor operatoare FI, AVEA (satisfacţie, apartenenţă)" (Stan 2003: 44).

"Verbele intranzitive ergative selecteză auxiliarului "a fi" în timp ce verbele intranzitive neergative se conjugă cu auxiliarul "a avea" (Stan 2003: 73-74).

From subsection **1.1.4**, we can conclude that *have* can combine only with a deverbal noun, or it can combine with a deverbal noun plus a PP. This is true for the light verb *avea*, too, so *avea* can combine only with a deverbal noun, or it can combine with a deverbal noun plus a PP.

Then we discussed the types of complements that *avea* can take, and in the last part of this subsection, we gave examples in which *avea* is used as a lexical/ full/ heavy verb.

1.1.5. Have uses/ readings:

(1) a main/full/lexical verb: The hero *had* the heroine before the movie was half over! (Harley 1997: 200)
a possessive verb: John has a book. (Guèron, 1998: 167).
John has blue eyes. (Guèron, 1998: 167).
I have a beautiful house.
(2) an auxiliary verb: Anne has read a book.
(3) a light verb: Anne had a sleep. = Anne slept.
(4) a locative reading: $Calvin_i$ has a pretty blanket on him_i. (All following examples (4 – 8) are from Harley (1997), pp. 196 – 202).
(5) an alienable possession reading: Calvin has a pretty blanket on the table.
(6) an inalienable possession reading: The oak tree has many branches.
(7) an experiencer reading: Tom_i had Bill drop a menhir on him_i.
(8) a causative reading: Anne had John red in the face.
(9) a modal verb: I have to leave.

1.1.6. Avea, "have" uses/ readings :

(1) a main verb: Am o casă frumoasă.
(2) as an auxiliary: Ana a avut de citit o carte.
(3) a light verb: * Ana a avut un somn.
Ana are cunoştinţe superficiale de matematică.
(4) a locative reading: Ana are o bluză frumoasă pe ea.
(5) an alienable possession: Ana are o casă frumoasă.

(6) an inalienable possession: Stejarul are multe ramuri.
(7) an experiencer reading: Bill are o durere de cap îngrozitoare.
(8) a causative reading: Ana l-a avut pe Ion la picioare într-un an.

From subsections **1.1.5.** and **1.1.6.**, we can conclude that in its main use *have/ avea* expresses possession and it is a stative verb.

2. Defining light verbs:

The status of light verbs with respect to the dichotomy: lexical category/ functional category. Light verbs share properties of both lexical and functional categories.

A light verb is a verb which is thematically totally (for example: *suru* in Japanese) or partially incomplete (for example: *saseru* in Japanese; *do* and *have* in English; *avea* in Romanian); it subcategorizes and case – marks a direct object NP, without assigning it a Θ - role. See also Grimshaw and Mester (1988), and Miyagawa (1989).

(1) a. Herbert ran in the park.
b. Herbert ran to the park.
c. Herbert had a run in the park.
d. Herbert had a run *to the park.

(2) a. VP

NP V'
Herbert
V N
Ø run

b. VP

NP V'
V N
have run

The representation in (2 a) corresponds to the transitive use of *run*, while the representation in (2 b) corresponds to the light use of the verb *have* plus a deverbal noun, which is represented by *run*.

The same incorporation structure occurs in Romanian, as we can notice from the below examples (Romanian Language Dictionary 2010: 382):

(3) a. Şi de sânt, şi de am viaţă, dar lumea ce-mi foloseşte? (Konaki, p. 100).
b. Ion trăieşte(, dar degeaba pentru că este în depresie).
c. Dumnezeu a rânduit, Să ia mândruţa urît, Să aibă traiu necăjit. (Jarnik-Bîrseanu, D. 167).
d. Maria trăieşte într-o continuă luptă cu sărăcia.

(4) a. VP

NP V'
El
V N
Ø trai

b. VP

NP V'
V N
avea trai

(4) is the representation of (3 c), so we may notice the light verb construction of *avea* plus a deverbal noun, *trai*. Here incorporation also takes place.

2.1. Light verbs are lexical or functional categories?

Light verbs in English have the following lexical properties:

a) they lexically select their deverbal nouns (for example: *have*), while other light verbs in English don't do that (for example: *give, put; do*):

e.g.: *to have a dance*, "to dance", "a dansa"; *to give someone a piece of advice*, "to advise someone", "a sfătui pe cineva"; *to do some thinking*, "to think about something", "a se gândi la ceva"; *to put the blame on someone*, "to blame someone", "a da vina pe cineva";

or in Romanian:

e.g. *a avea cunoştinţă de ....*, "to know .."; "to be aware of …"; "to be acquainted with .."; "to to have cognizance of …"; "to be privy to … ", versus "a şti"; *a avea cunoştinţe solide/ temeinice de*, "to be well – grounded in", versus "a cunoaşte/ a şti"; *a avea durei de cap*, "a-l durea capul".

b) their DP (that is, their deverbal noun) contributes to the situational aspect of the light verb.

Light verbs in English have the following functional properties:

a) they do not assign a Θ - role to their NP.

b) they do not have their own argument structure, they take the argument structure of a deverbal noun, for example: *Tom has a sleep*,

"Tom sleeps", "Tom doarme", "*Tom are un somn".

So, the light verb *have* in English is a semi – lexical category.

2.2. Dynamic *have* as an unergative verb:

It is a well – known data in the literature that many unergative verbs have transitive light verb counterparts:

1. a. The child laughed.
   b. The child had a laugh.
2. a. Copilul a râs.
   b. *Copilul a avut un râs.

2.2.1. Hale & Keyser' approach (1993)

The lexical structure representation of an unergative verb, like *laugh*, involves incorporation, into an abstract V, of the nominal head N of its NP complement. Hale & Keyser assume that this process is as depicted in (1); that is, the head N of the NP governed by the V is moved and adjoined to the latter. The resulting "compound", of which only the N complement is phonologically realized, corresponds to the denominal verb (Hale & Keyser 1993: 54):

(1)

(Hale & Keyser 1993: 55)

2.2.2. Ciutescu's approach:

Hale and Keyser propose that unergative verbs are essentially transitive, derived by incorporating a noun root in object position into the transitive verb that selects it. Hale and Keyser (1993) propose that the phenomenon of incorporation appears at the level of l-syntax here a head projects the categorical feature and the complement provides the descriptive and the phonological content for the derived V (Ciutescu 2010: 40):

(1)

V		V	
V	N	V	N
	dance	dancei	*t*i

"From a semantic point of view, *light verbs* are considered verbs without any descriptive content, verbs that are semantically bleached". (Ciutescu 2010: 41).

From a syntactic point of view, *light verbs* enter the composition of a wide range of idiomatic expressions, paraphrases. Light verbs also correspond to the functional head *v*, which has mixed lexical/ functional properties, since it is involved in introducing the subject and in assigning Accusative case. (Ciutescu 2010: 42).

Transitive light verbs cannot take an empty object:

(2) a. *He made.
(He made trouble/ mistakes/ fishtraps).
b. *She did.
(She did a jig/ pirouettes). (Hale and Keyser 2002: 91).

We can extend this idea even to the light verb *have* in English, and *avea* in Romanian:

(3) a. *He had.
(cf. He had a bath/ a cry/ a kiss).
b. *El avea.
(cf. El avea autoritate/ răbdare/ cunoştinţe).

Hale and Keyser argue that N is licensed by the semantic features encoded in V, which establish a binding dependency with those of N. This shows that (1) is analysed as in (4) (Ciutescu 2010: 43):

(4)

V	
V{dance}	N{dance}
dance	

(Hale and Keyser 2002: 93).

2.3. *Have* as an aspectual specialized verb in English

1. I had a drive with a Porsche last year. (only eventive reading).
"I drove a Porsche last year". (only eventive reading).

2. *Am avut o plimbare cu un Porsche anul trecut. (*only stative reading).
"Am făcut o plimbare cu un Porsche anul trecut". (only eventive reading).

From these two examples we can see that the *verb have* in English can take a deverbal noun, while, in Romanian, the verb *avea*, "have", can also take a deverbal noun, but in order to express an event/ an action, we use the dynamic Romanian verb *face*. *Avea* expresses only stativity and/ or possession.

3. Approaches to the dynamic verb *have* in English

3.1. Harley's approach:

In light verb constructions the main semantic content is provided by the nominal complement. The verbal part is semantically empty, that is, the aspectual properties of a specific light verb construction can only be attributed to the construction as a whole, not to the light verb itself.

Harley (1998: 224) concludes that it is the denotation of an event by the complement of *have* which determines the eventiveness or lack thereof of the eventive construction: DP complements of *have* which denote an event cause the construction to behave eventively as well, as below:

1. a. Sue had a party. = to party. (only eventive reading).
   b. What Sue did was have a party. (only eventive reading).
   c. Sue is having a party. (only eventive reading).
   d. *Look! Sue has a party. (*only stative reading).

But, there seem to be some problems.

Not all light verbs in English and Romanian behave alike, as we can see by comparing the following sentences:

2. a. Sue had a smoke.
   "Sue smoked".
   b. Sue had a smoke, and then she was happy. (only eventive reading).
   c. Sue is having a smoke. (only eventive reading, an activity).
3. a. *Sue are un fumat. (*eventive reading; *stative reading).
   b. Sue are o ţigară. (only stative, alienable possessive reading).
   c. Sue fumează. (only eventive reading).

There are some cases when the English light verb *have* can take a deverbal noun, as in (2 a; 2 b; 2 c) while its counterpart *avea* from Romanian, can't take a deverbal noun as in (3 a), but there are also some exceptions:

4. a. John has a head.
   b. John has a head and all the body fits with it. (only stative, possession reading).
   c. * John is having a head. (*eventive reading).
5. a. Ion are o durere de cap.
   "Pe Ion îl doare capul".

b. *Ion are o durere de cap. (only stative reading).
c. . Pe Ion îl doare capul. (only stative reading).
"John has a headache".

3.2. Hoekstra's approach:

In what follows, we will discuss dynamic *have.* Dynamic *have* is a use limited to English, so dynamic use of *have* does not occur in Romanian, for example, but only stative use of *have*, that is, *avea*.

Dynamic *have* constructions in English are equal with the light verb *have* in English. In English, it is only about an eventive *have*, and never a stative *have*, when we talk about dynamic *have*; while in Romanian the light verb *avea*, "have" is stative, so it can never be dynamic.

Another important idea is that only in English we can have a specialized preposition for direction, *TO*, while in Romanian this isn't the case.

Hoekstra (p.90) points out that dynamic *have* constructions involve non – inherent, that is, contingent, relationships, and are to be analyzed as abstract TPs.

1) Under the stative reading, the only one available for Romanian light verbs, e.g.: *Maria a avut dreptate*, "Marie was right". Their stativity is confirmed by the possibility of continuing this examples with, e.g.: …*but she doesn't anymore.*

2) Hoekstra's (p. 91) analysis of dynamic *have*: on the eventive reading, available only for English light verbs, e.g.: *Marie had a shower;* this example asserts that at some time in the past, Marie is involved in an activity of "showering". Their eventivity is confirmed by their compatibility with the progressive, as in the following example: *Marie is having a shower.*

Hoekstra (p. 92) points out that an eventive interpretation is available inasmuch as the deverbal noun can be associated with a plausible activity, and here there is the exact case, e.g.*: Anne has a shower.* "Anne is having a shower".

Stative *avea*, "have" in Romanian: *a avea cunoştinţe de ....*"have knowledge of …", while the dynamic *have,* present only in English: *have a dance*, "dance", "a dansa".

Only English has a specialized preposition for the indication of direction, that is, *TO,* as opposed to the specialized preposition in English for location, that is, *AT*.

e.g.: I go TO school every day. (direction).

e.g.: I am AT school every day. (location).

This dynamic preposition, *TO*, is incorporated by the dynamic light verb *have*.

So, in conclusion, we may state that augmented *have* is the result of incorporating a dynamic preposition, which in English is represented by *TO*.

Eventive verbs allow simple present only in a quantificational environment, for example, in the presence of adverbs of quantification such as: *often* and *usually*:

(1) a. Mary often has a shower in the morning.
b. When Mary has a shower, she usually sings.
c. Mary has a shower.
c.[i] Mary owns a shower. (only stative reading).
c.[ii] Mary showers.(only eventive reading). (examples 1a; 1b; 1c are taken from Hoekstra, p. 91).

(2) a. Adesea, Maria îşi face duş dimineaţa.
b. Când îşi face duş, Maria de obicei cântă.
c. Maria are un duş. (possession use).

c.[i] Maria are un duş, şi nu o cadă. (only stative reading; possession use).
c.[ii] Maria îşi face (un) duş. (only eventive reading).

From these sentences we can notice that dynamic *have* in English has a correspondent in the Romanian dynamic verb *face*, but not in its stative homologue *avea*.

From the above approaches, we can conclude that the light verb *have* in English can be dynamic, it expresses an event/ an action, while the Romanian light verb *avea* can only be stative. We can also conclude that both light verbs *have* and *avea* can take deverbal nouns.

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WE DON'T SPEAK THE SAME LANGUAGE! GENDER DIFFERENCES IN LANGUAGE USE

Camelia ȘTEFAN

1. Theoretical Background

In recent years, much emphasis has been made on the distinction between gender and sex. Nowadays, sociolinguists distinguish between sex, a biological term, and gender, a term used to describe socially constructed categories based on sex. The two terms are mutually shaped given that gender builds on sex. While the sex difference is due to nature, the gender difference is a social elaboration ascribed to individuals, based on their biological sex assignments (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet 2003).

West and Zimmerman (1987: 140) emphasize the notion of "doing gender" and point out that "a person's gender is not simply an aspect of what one is, but, more fundamentally, it is something that one *does*, and does recurrently, in interaction with others". Thus, gender is a social achievement constructed through human interaction.

Beginning at birth, one's gender identity is conceptualized through the roles and experiences provided to individuals by social practice. In order to illustrate the biological diversity in the society, gender comprises, in most societies, a binary distinction, namely masculine and feminine. A person may label oneself as feminine or masculine based on ways masculinity and femininity are rooted in various social systems.

Recently there has been a gender revolution in Sweden, proving that gender equality should rather be gender-neutrality. The word *hen* has become an official third personal pronoun, besides the traditional forms *han* 'he' and *hon* 'she'. Although *hen* can be applied to objects, it can also refer to a person who does not specifically identify as male or female, or whose gender is unknown.

Variationist sociolinguistics has come a long way to describe and account for the major impact that gender has had on language. In addition to social class, age and ethnicity, gender is now considered an important social variable that could explain the causes and principles of variation in language usage.

Gender can be correlated with certain linguistic markers in order to show how individuals or groups of speakers could index. As far as English is concerned, there are many ways in which the English language indexes gender exclusively. According to Hopper and LeBaron (1998) and Kessler and McKenna (1978), gender is indexed in English through high or low pitch of voice, intonational cues and by using specific vocabulary. Other features include gender-marked names, terms of address, the explicit mention of gender and references to sexuality and gendered activities. As a result, speakers might incorporate, consciously or subconsciously, these elements of style which could represent a source of variation. This style of variation has given rise to features which can be attributed to one gender or another.

Meyerhoff (2006) has drawn a distinction between gender-exclusive features and gender-preferential features. Although extremely rare, gender-exclusive features are forms used by and to speakers of one particular sex. Consequently, these features are a direct index of gender. Various studies conducted in some tribal societies provide a case in point for the dichotomy of male and

female speech. Data demonstrates that men and women do speak different languages and the differences are not only morphological, but also phonological, syntactic and semantic.

On the other hand, gender-preferential differences are forms used by both sexes, but employed more frequently by some than by others (Meyerhoff 2006). These features indirectly index gender and have given rise to various terms such as "men's language", "women's language", "male speech", "female speech".

Sociolinguistic research into gender discrepancies has led to differing approaches to language and gender, such as the deficit approach, the dominance approach, the difference approach, and the social constructionist approach[1].

A pioneer of gender studies in linguistics, Lakoff (1975: 45) argued that these differences lie in the "marginality and powerlessness of women" in opposition to the power of male speech, which, in turn, is considered the norm. Her work focuses on the deficit approach and attempts at identifying various features of "women's language", in English. Women are thus depicted as deficient to men, less confident, weak and victims of a patriarchy that forces them to act passive and unassertive.

Lakoff's (1975) study on the relationship between gender and language is now widely recognized as a challenging and timely text written from a feminist perspective (Sunderland 2006). For instance, McElhinny (2004: 131) labels Lakoff's arguments as "radical feminism" because it portrays women as an oppressed group. Nevertheless, the survey launched an initial insight into language and gender issues. It became a starting point to vast subsequent studies and a "goad to future research" (Lakoff 1975: 40).

Despite its huge influence, the paper has also triggered controversies, primarily because the deficit model describes female language as powerless and deficient relative to men. Moreover, her observations are based on data gathered by introspection and intuition, rather than quantitative analysis or empirical evidence, something which has attracted further criticism (Coates 1993).

In a later revised edition (Lakoff 2004: 19), states her aims before developing the assumptions put forward:

(i) To demonstrate that *at least* one extralinguistic artifact (i.e. gender) required linguistic representation
(ii) To demonstrate that gender required linguistic representation even in languages like English, where its presence was (perhaps) less clearly felt than in the "exotic" languages
(iii) To use linguistic discrepancies between women and men as a diagnostic of social and psychological inequities between the sexes

According to Lakoff (1975: 49), women's language "shows up in all levels of the grammar of English"

(i) Women use a high rise intonation, with specific emphasis in declarative sentences
(ii) Women are more precise at naming colours, as opposed to men who are better at sport terminology
(iii) Women are less likely to use strong expletives, they are experts at euphemisms
(iv) Women use "empty" adjectives, such as *adorable*, *charming*, *lovely*, *divine*
(v) Women use more question tags, yet they lack full confidence of the assertion
(vi) Women use more polite speech and polite statements, *please*, *will you please…*, *won't you please…*
(vii) Women use conversational implicatures in order to avoid direct orders and requests

[1] Arguably the most widely used theoretical framework in recent studies.

Lakoff (2004: 21) acknowledges that a whole lot has changed since the publication of her work in 1975. Yet, many things have remained essentially the same. Although new terms have been constructed in the meantime, such as *supermom*, *soccer mom* or *mommy track*, they simply reflect that language remains a "window into the mind".

2. Methodology

Having Lakoff's (1975) assumptions as a taking-off point, I have attempted to carry out a comparative analysis with regard to the differences between men and women in using language. The subjects were 20 native speakers of Romanian, mainly college students. The subjects were balanced for gender, i.e. there were 10 men and 10 women, their age varying between 19 and 28 years old.

The subjects were given a questionnaire based on close-ended questions in Romanian. Then they were asked to pick the answer which fits them best from a given number of options. The questions in the survey are given in (1):

1)	Folosesc sintagme precum *gen*, *mă rog...*		
	Deloc	Uneori	Des
2)	Folosesc formule politicoase (*Te deranjează dacă...*, *Aş aprecia dacă*...).		
	Deloc	Uneori	Des
3)	Folosesc răspunsuri scurte (*mda*, *aha*, *îhî*).		
	Deloc	Uneori	Des
4)	Accentuez anumite cuvinte (Ce câine *frumos*!).		
	Deloc	Uneori	Des
5)	Folosesc adjective precum divin, drăguţ, adorabil.		
	Deloc	Uneori	Des
6)	Folosesc o gramatică şi o pronunţie hipercorectă.		
	Deloc	Uneori	Des
7)	Ştiu cum arată culoarea acaju.		
	Da		Nu
8)	Ştiu ce este un *hat-trick*.		
	Da		Nu
9)	Folosesc sintagme precum *Eu cred că...*, *Eu consider că...*		
	Deloc	Uneori	Des
10)	Mă scuz adesea (*Îmi pare rău*, *dar eu cred că...*).		
	Deloc	Uneori	Des

11)	Folosesc comenzi şi cereri indirecte (*Vai*, *este cam rece aici*, *nu?*).
	Deloc Uneori Des
12)	Folosesc cuvinte întăritoare (Sunt *atât* de fericit/ă!).
	Deloc Uneori Des
13)	Evit înjurăturile
	Deloc Uneori Des
14)	De regulă nu spun glume cu succes şi nu le înţeleg.
	Da Nu

3. Results



Fig. 1 Female speakers



Fig. 2 Male speakers

Regarding the first topic, the results show that only 40% of the female speakers use conversational hedges, such as Rom. *gen*[2]. 60% said that they would sometimes use this form in speech. Similarly, 40% of male respondents said they would employ this structure. Although *gen* is a term that is getting more and more popular among young adult colloquial speech, it is associated with a lower educational background.



Fig. 3 Female speakers



Fig. 4 Male speakers

[2] Term which imitates English quotative *like*.

When asked whether they use (super)polite forms, 70% of females respondents answer that they often use them, while 30% use them only sometimes. On the other hand, the percentage is mirrored in male speech. This reinforces the view that women tend to use more polite forms. The more complex the structure is, the politer is the result.



Fig. 5 Female speech



Fig. 6 Male speech

Regarding short answers, it seems that the male speakers use them more frequently (50%) than women (only 30%). One explanation could be that male speech is more pragmatic in nature and that men are less talkative than women.



Fig. 7 Female speech



Fig. 8 Male speech

The so-called "speaking in italics" is characteristic of women, given that 60% of them said they would often add intonational emphasis on words. Yet, no male respondent said he would focus the word often in speech, but 70% of them admitted that they would do it sometimes.



Fig. 9 Female speech



Fig. 10 Male speech

The use of empty adjectives such as *diving*, *adorable* and so on indicate that they are more confined to women's speech, 30%, rather than to men's, since these words are considered "unmasculine" (Lakoff 1975: 53).



Fig. 11 Female speech



Fig. 12 Male speech

The findings show that, in fact, 30 % of the men tend to often use a hypercorrect grammar and pronunciation, as opposed to 10% of the women. However, the study was conducted on college students so the research could be influenced by an over-reporting bias.



Fig. 13 Female speech



Fig. 14 Male speech

In terms of vocabulary selection, both men and women answer the same way when it comes to naming colours. 20% of the respondents said they knew what the colour *grenade* looks like, while 80% of them had no idea.



Fig. 15 Female speech



Fig. 16 Male speech

With sports terminology, words such as *hat-trick* are typical of male language, where 90% of the subjects said they knew the word. On the other hand, given that women are getting more and more interested in sports nowadays, the women's percentage might be on the rise.





Fig. 17 Female speech **Fig. 18 Male speech**

70% of the women tend to overuse qualifiers such as *I think that…* as opposed to 30% of the men. However, overusing this structure could make women sound weaker and incapable of making a decision, in contrast to men who are more direct (Lakoff 1975).





Fig. 19 Female speech **Fig. 20 Male speech**

The results demonstrate that women do apologize more than men. 50% of the female subjects said they would often apologize, as opposed to only 10% of the men. By saying things such as *I'm sorry, but I think that…*, women use non-assertive language. This structure interfaces with politeness, another characteristic of women's language. For men, to apologize could be perceived as a sign of weakness.





Fig. 21 Female speech **Fig. 22 Male speech**

The figures are somewhat similar in regard to using indirect commands and requests. Only 10% of the men and women said they would often use a conversational implicature such as *Isn't it cold in here?*. Nevertheless, 60% of the women use these kinds of structures quite frequently in their speech.



Fig. 23 Female speech



Fig. 24 Male speech

The numbers show that 40% of the women surveyed said that they used intensifiers such as *so* and *very* more often than men. When using these frequently, women's language is seen as deficient and credibility may be reduced (Lakoff 1975).



Fig. 25 Female speech



Fig. 26 Male speech

Women tend to avoid coarse language or expletives. As can be seen, 60% of the women said they would not use indelicate expressions often, unlike men, who would use swear words 40% of the time in their speech. Given that searing is not "talking like a lady", women are the "experts at euphemism" (Lakoff 1975).



Fig. 27 Female speech



Fig. 28 Male speech

The view that women do not tell jokes well is slightly confirmed by the answers. 10% of the women admitted to not telling joke often or understanding them. Nonetheless, no male respondent acknowledged a lack of sense of humor. However, this could be a case of self-report bias.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to shed new light on male and female speech patterns, having Lakoff's (1975) examinations as a starting point. Data has demonstrated that women do talk differently than men when it comes to polite forms, intonational emphasis, empty adjectives, qualifiers, intensifiers and the lack of expletives. The results of the survey partly support Lakoff's assumption. Given the fact that the data are exclusively based on respondents' answers to the questionnaire, there is a bias of self-reporting. Participants may have been biased towards responding in a certain way, thus over-reporting and under-reporting their choice of variants. As a result, there might be a discrepancy between the responses to the questionnaire and the actual usage.

Overall, men and women use the same language at some levels, such as pronunciation, lexicon and grammatical patterns. At the same time, men and women do not speak the same language. Men use language for one set of purposes, women for another, with different pragmatic functions based on what they want to accomplish.

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VISUL AMERICAN SE DESTRAMĂ: RELAȚIA DINTRE UTOPIE ȘI DISTOPIE ÎN *MARELE GATSBY*

Raluca-Nicoleta TĂNASE

Oare utopiile sunt perfecte?

Receptorul asociază cuvântul utopie cu o operă literară care prezintă o societate ale cărei resurse și energii converg spre un singur scop: fericirea fiecărui cetățean. După părerea mea, acest lucru reprezintă încă de la început o supra interpretare pentru că la o analiză mai atentă a oricărei utopii se vor observa două părți componente: una ideologică și un spațiu bine delimitat, care de cele mai multe ori, este reprezentat printr-o insulă tocmai pentru a scoate în evidență izolarea așa-zisei lumi perfecte de cea profanată. Este ca și cum am separa un spațiu sacru de unul profan. Elementul ideologic este mult mai pregnant și el este cel care definește ,,societatea fericită". Spre exemplu, deși nu apare în mod explicit în text, *Utopia* lui Thomas Morus scoate la iveală o lume condusă mai mult sau mai puțin după un regim de extremă stânga, unul totalitar. Desigur, trebuie menționat că sistemul politic din *Utopia* ar fi trebuit să fie varianta ideală a acestui regim. Iată câteva exemple din opera scriitorului englez care m-au dus cu gândul la această afirmație: utopienii se îmbrăcau cu toții la fel, dacă aveau nevoie de orice fel de resurse, mai ales hrana zilnică, aceștia găseau într-un fel de piață centrală toate aceste lucruri, mergeau împreună la munca câmpului, casele lor erau identice: ,,Agricultura este ocupația lor de bază [...]" (Morus 2014:61) Într-un fel sau altul, toate aceste exemple semnalează o societate unificată a cărei identitate este ștearsă. Utopia are tendința de a hiperboliza hedonismul cetățenilor.

Alexandru Ciorănescu reușește în *Viitorul trecutului: utopie și literatură* să analizeze cele două concepte: *utopie* și *distopie* într-un mod obiectiv. Utopia este definită astfel: „Aceste ficțiuni literare sunt produsul pur al imaginației, care se amuză uneori în a susține contrariul realității, astfel încît imposibilitatea lor este cel mai adesea pusă în evidență de circumstanțele înseși ale povestirii." (Ciorănescu 1996:20) Același autor dezvăluie mecanismul unei utopii reușite. Fără îndoială că un asemenea tip de operă implică din partea receptorului o perpetuă paralelă între imaginație și realitate, chiar dacă utopia înseamnă prin definiție anularea oricărui element care s-ar putea înscrie în sfera concretului: „Utopismul împinge șiretlicul cît de departe poate. În aparență s-ar zice că singurul său scop este acela de a păcăli și de a ne vinde închipuirile sale drept o călătorie reală. Rar se întâmplă ca autorul să scape de tentația „realismului". (Ciorănescu 1996:23)

Distopia este denumită prin următoarea sintagmă „utopia negativă": „Utopia negativă nu se deosebește de cealaltă decât prin intenții. Ea nu construiește pentru a construi, ci pentru a demola. Edificiul ei arată ce n-ar trebui să existe." (Ciorănescu 1996:203) Definiția evidențiază doi termeni cheie: *intenții* și *a demola.* Cele două lumi care par să fie antonimice în ceea ce privește intențiile pentru că cea utopică promite să construiască din temelii o nouă lume care are toate coordonatele să elimine principalele surse care aduc nefericire în viața unui om. Distopia este reversul utopiei, însă este mult mai realistă și ancorată în lumea cititorului, ea distruge toate idealurile care duc la bunul mers al unei societăți. Exemple binecunoscute de astfel de opere sunt *1984* de George Orwell și *Minunata lume nouă* de Aldous Huxley. Credința, prietenia, fericirea și iubirea se dizolvă și în locul lor frica este sentimentul care prevalează în inimile personajelor. Eroul din romanul lui Orwell nu

își poate exprima ideile, personalitatea pentru că are neșansa să trăiască într-o societate în care până și gândurile sunt controlate. Prin romanul său, Huxley nu face decât să arate receptorului că până și știința poate avea atât părți pentru care merită să o glorificăm, dar și părți care pot duce societatea în punctul decăderii. Ficțiunile distopice critică de fapt atât prezentul, cât și viitorul și scot în relief că nu există o societate perfectă. Toate utopiile negative au în centrul lor o figură a unui conducător care trebuie adorat, un fel de cult al personalității. Cel mai interesant lucru este că aproape niciun cetățean al vreunei distopii nu îl cunoaște în persoană, ci doar îl știu portretizat prin diverse mijloace, toate înscriindu-se în domeniul artistic; pictura este unul dintre ele. Oricât de greu ne-ar veni să credem, se poate realiza o analogie între relația om-divinitate și cea dintre personajul literar și figura paternă a statului, pentru că ambele relații sunt caraterizate prin punerea pe un plan superior, pe de-o parte pe Dumnezeu și pe de altă parte pe Ford, Mustafa Mond, Fratele cel Mare, cel care a întemeiat pentru prima dată Utopia. Acești conducători totalitari urmăresc să țină în frâu societatea pe care au întemeiat-o asemenea unui regizor sau a unui păpușar. Cetățenii nu sunt decât niște marionete în teatrul lumii. Relațiile dintre personaje, adevărate ființe de hârtie și toate aceste pseudo-divinități sunt foarte bine conturate, întrucât de cele mai multe ori eroii ficțiunilor distopice reprezintă spirite tinere revoltate împotriva predeterminării precum un „tânăr neîmblânzit, haotic, revoltat mai întâi/ de destinul biologic al lumii." (Bogza 2010:127)

O altă definiție a termenului de utopie este oferită și de *Dicționarul de termeni literari.* Aceasta pune accentul pe originea cuvântului, realizând astfel o etimologie, dar punctează și concepția lui Marx asupra termenului. Oricât de ideală ar fi societatea pe care aceste opere vor să o prezinte, există și elemente care o trădează și care arată că nimic nu poate să fie perfect, nici măcar o lume utopică: „Utopie: termenul derivă de la numele insulei despre care vorbește Thomas Morus în cartea sa *De optimoreipublicae statu deque nova insula Utopia* [...] 1516. Această denumire este simbolică, [...] deci „nici un loc, nicăieri" (scriindu-i lui Erasmus, Thomas Morus explică termenul Utopia prin nuquam). Autorul a ales special acest nume insulei sale ideale, pentru a sublinia existența ei ireală. Utopia evocă ținuturi imaginare unde domnește un guvernământ ideal peste un popor fericit [...] Pentru Marx, o utopie este orice concepție asupra societății viitoare care nu se bazează pe mișcarea istorică reală." (Săndulescu 1976:462)

Epoca Jazzului. O epocă utopică

Înainte de a vorbi despre relația dintre utopie și distopie în opera *Marele Gatsby,* sunt importante câteva informații despre cadrul extern în care romanul și-a făcut apariția, pentru că prin lucrarea lui, Fitzgerald surprinde societatea din această epocă.

Legea care interzicea acoolul este adoptată, iar acest lucru determină traficul ilegal. Reinventând o celebră replică din solilocviul lui *Hamlet*, perioada este caracterizată prin sintagma *to drink or not to drink*. Efecte ale legii prohibiției alcoolului se găsesc și în *Marele Gatsby,* dat fiind că personajul principal a comercializat într-un mod ilegal băuturi. Petrecerile lui Gatsby sunt un exemplu elocvent care demonstrează că regulile pot fi încălcate în favoarea hedonismului: „Prohibition**,** legal prevention of the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcoholic beverages in the United States from 1920 to 1933 under the terms of the Eighteenth Amendment. Although the temperance movement, which was widely supported, had succeeded in bringing about this legislation, millions of Americans were willing to drink liquor (distilled spirits) illegally, which gave rise to bootlegging (the illegal production and sale of liquor) and speakeasies (illegal, secretive drinking establishments), both of which were capitalized upon by organized crime. As a result, the Prohibition era also is remembered as a period of gangsterism, characterized by competition and

violent turf battles between criminal gangs." (https://www.britannica.com/event/Prohibition-United-States-history-1920-1933)

Prin eseul "Echoes of the Jazz Age" publicat în 1931 în antologia *Crack-Up,* scriitorul american realizează un portret veridic societății americane din perioada respectivă. Mai mult, lucrarea este realizată la o distanță de câțiva ani după ce utopia jazzului se destramă și amintirea ei îi pare până și scriitorului ca un vis: "[…] and it all seems rosy and romantic to us who were young then, because we will never quite so intensely about our surroundings any more." (Fitzgerald 1956:9)

Fitzgerald descrie epoca jazzului prin cuvinte ca miracol, artă, exces și satiră, într-un cuvânt un vis devenit realitate: "It was an age of miracle, it was an age of art, it was an age of excess, and it was an age of satire." (Fitzgerald 1956:2)

Cuvinte ca petreceri, strălucire, inovație, libertate, tineret, băutură, dans, muzică caracterizează epoca jazzului. Romanul *Z. Un roman despre Zelda Fitzgerald* (apărut la editura Humanitas în traducerea Ancăi Peiu) este o frescă veritabilă pentru America anilor '20, dar un roman care aduce în prim plan povestea dintre Zelda și Scott Fitzgerald, cuplul central atât în plan literar, cât și social. Cei doi devin personaje literare și evoluează pe propria scenă literară. Fără îndoială că imaginile petrecerilor extravagante atrag atenția în momentul citirii acestei opere. Therese Anne Fowler dă voce Zeldei, iar prin ochii personajului se surprinde toată societatea: „Petreceri formidabile, pe la conace formidabile: am făcut cunoștință cu toate vedetele de cinema, cu toți producătorii - Cohan, Ziegfeld - cu toți milionarii suspectați de trafic cu alcool […]" (Fowler 2015:175) „La dans cu Scoot, eu în rochie de seară, el în smooching, pe un ring de dans imens, acoperit cu pânză groasă, la lumina torțelor, în noapte. Șampanie, orchestre, canapele, sărutări." (Fowler 2015:176)

Petrecerile sunt un fel de axis mundi, locul care atrage persoane reprezentative pentru un spectru divers de arte, de la muzică și literatură până la cinematografie. O lume fabuloasă care în spatele acestei cortine luminoase ascunde o latură distopică. Tineri care nu au simțul măsurii ajung să cheltuiască sume imense pe această viață luxoasă, iar nesiguranța financiară nu îi ocolește. Tot în opera despre Zelda, scriitoarea consemnează un pasaj metaforic: „Sentimentul permanent că stăm în picioare pe buza prăpastiei, iar vântul se întețește în spatele nostru. Nu se vede nimic de care să te ții." (Fowler 2015:178) Exercițiul scriitoricesc realizat de Fowler scoate la iveală o lume multifațetată, care este cel mai bine caracterizată prin jocul dintre aparență și esență. În „Prologul: Montgomery, Alabama", se evidențiază vocea Zeldei, iar citatul următor: „Uitați-vă mai bine și veți vedea ceva extraordinar, uluitor, ceva cu totul real și adevărat. Noi n-am fost niciodată ceea ce păream." (Fowler 2015:11) accentuează adevărata realitate a epocii jazzului. La suprafață avem de-a face cu cea mai spectaculoasă și luminoasă perioadă, însă în străfundul ei oamenii nu se scăldau în apele fericirii.

Un alt aspect care caracterizează epoca jazzului, dar și romanul *Marele Gatsby* este obsesia oamenilor pentru tinerețe, vitalitatea specifică vârstei. A atinge vârsta de treizeci de ani nu era o bucurie, lucru pe care îl aflăm dintr-un dialog dintre Zelda și Francis Scott Fitzgerald în *Z. Un roman despre Zelda Fitzgerald*: „-Nemurirea. La treizeci de ani, vitalitatea unui scriitor s-a dus, cu tot cu viziunea sa unică. Tot ceea ce are de zis despre lume să se vadă câtă vreme e încă tânăr, prin ochii săi încă neobosiți, sau măcar neistoviți." (Fowler 2015:189) Iată scopul pe care îl doresc cu ardoare atât scriitorii cât și oamenii. Conservarea tinereții devine un vis utopic în sine.

De asemenea, America anilor '20 este locul propice pentru împlinirea oricărui vis care se putea concretiza într-o carieră. Statele Unite ale Americii devin noul pământ al făgăduinței, arta putea înflori, iar tinerii își puteai croi drumul: „În America, îți poți inventa un drum propriu până-n vârf, în orice domeniu. Și dacă-ți merge, ei bine, chiar reușești" (Fowler 2015:47) Cu toate acestea,

ideea fantastică de a renaște din cenușă ca pasărea Phoenix, trezirea într-o singură clipă în barca celor bogați este un lucru extrem de fragil și de utopic, deoarece realizarea visului american include o mulțime de sacrificii, însă la fel ca orice vis himeric el se destramă. Calderon de la Barca în *Viața e vis*, amintea despre perceperea acestei vieți în diferite forme, însă el punea accentul pe fragilitatea ei: „Ce este viața? Un delir./ Ce este viața? Un coșmar./ [...] căci un vis e viața-n sine/ iară visul, vis e doar." (Calderon de la Barca 2016:143). O altă comparație care se potrivește de minune cu acest *American Dream* este cea pe care o realizează Peiu: „Ceea ce numim „Visul american" (*The American Dream)* reprezintă o țesătură la fel de fragilă ca pânzele Penelopei […]" (Peiu 2016:9), pentru că această asemuire are puterea să ne aducă cu picioarele pe pământ și să nu ne iluzionăm. În fapt, romanul *Marele Gatsby* este un exemplu formidabil, o lecție de viață sau poate este mai mult decât atât, o pildă pentru fiecare cititor care este capabil să deslușească înțelesul mesajului dincolo de aparențe.

După cum afirmă și Anca Peiu în studiul ei *Marele Gatsby - O istorie newyorkeză*, această epocă a jazzului nu este nici pe departe atât de utopică: „este o ficțiune, o proiecție metaforică a unor vremuri prea puțin poetice în sine." (Peiu 2016:5)

Utopie și distopie în *Marele Gatsby*: Intertextualitate. Locuri comune

Fuziunea dintre cele două concepte (utopie și distopie) se poate observa în *Marele Gatsby* de Francis Scott Fitzgerald. La fel ca în *Utopia*, toposul utopic este unul definit, casa lui Gatsby, iar acesta este izolat ca și cum o lume sacră s-ar izola de una profană. West Egg și East Egg devin două coordonate importante care reprezintă două fâșii insulare, una a oamenilor săraci și cealaltă a bogaților, lumea lui Gatsby. Acest loc prinde viață doar seara, iar exuberanța și fericirea țin până în zori. În antiteză cu locuința personajului principal este cea a lui Nick Carraway, după cum însuși el apreciază: „Casa mea era o urâțenie, dar o urâțenie mică-mitică - era ascunsă, așa că aveam vedere către larg, către o parte din peluza vecinului meu și către reconfortanta proximitate a milionarilor - și toate acestea cu numai 80 de dolari pe lună." (Fitzgerald 2016:30) Reședința lui Nick devine un observator, de unde strălucirea și opulența grandiosului său vecin, radiau precum un soare. Interesantă din punct de vedere interpretativ este și structura: „către reconfortanta proximitate a milionarilor" (Fitzgerald 2016:30) pentru că aceasta funcționează ca o barieră între cele două lumi despre care am amintit anterior.

Un alt element care demonstrează că romanul poate fi interpretat drept o utopie sunt numeroasele petreceri scăldate în râuri de șampanie la care oricine aspira să participe și care reușeau într-un fel sau altul să adune oameni importanți ai societății. Casa devine un topos utopic, un axis mundi spre care converg toate energiile. Noaptea făcea ca locuința lui Gatsby să se transforme, să devină un mic orășel care aspira pentru câteva ore la spargerea granițelor temporale, efermeritatea să se dizolve și să fondeze eternitatea: „În nopțile acelea de vară, din casa vecinului meu se auzea muzică. Prin grădinile sale albastre, bărbați și femeiuști, veneau și plecau precum fluturașii de noapte printre șoapte și șampanie, sub stele. [...] În weekenduri, Rolls-Royce-ul său se transformă într-un autobuz care transporta grupuri de oameni către și dinspre oraș, între nouă dimineața și către târziu spre miezul nopții [...]" (Fitzgerald 2016:63)

În funcție de perspectiva reflectorului, casa lui Gatsby și implicit petrecerile pot avea o altă valoare. Pentru Nick Carraway, personajul-narator, cel prin ochii căruia receptorul are acces la acțiunea operei, consideră acest loc unul utopic, un topos al tuturor posibilităților unde numai cei aleși pot avea norocul să vadă gazda. Dacă am schimba perspectiva din care se narează, iar reflectorul ar fi Jay Gatsby, atunci aceste petreceri nu ar însemna numai un spațiu utopic, ci un

cadru pe care el proiectează o mare durere, dragostea neîmplinită pentru Daisy, iar din acest punct de vedere utopia are o nuanță distopică. Pentru Jay petrecerea nu reprezintă doar o simplă distracție hedonistică, ea are o funcție foarte importantă, este ca un far luminos care ar avea rolul să o atragă pe femeia visurilor sale și să o introducă în această lume pentru a vedea că visul american chiar există. Prin urmare, utopia nu este numai un loc al perfecțiunii, ci și un loc care maschează suferința.

Din punctul meu de vedere, distopia își face apariția în finalul romanului, iar scena cea mai relevantă pentru a demonstra acest lucru este cea în care Gatsby este înmormântat. În acest moment nici unul dintre cei care veneau și se bucurau de ocazia de a petrece în această casă nu acceptă invitația de a-și lua la revedere de la acest personaj. Singurul care îi este alături este Nick și tatăl lui. Elementul pe care mizează Fitzgerald în construcția scenei este chiar introducerea personajului care își caută pantofii pierduți prin casă în urma unei petreceri: „Eu sunasem în legătură cu o pereche de pantofi pe care i-am lăsat acolo. Mă întrebam dacă nu ar fi prea mare deranjul să-l puneți pe majordom să mi-i trimită." (Fitzgerald 2016:191)

Ironia amară este ușor de observat, iar utopia alunecă în distopie. Singurătatea este de fapt singura realitate a vieții. Moartea lui Jay echivalează cu prăbușirea minunatei reședințe, care intră în paragină exact ca în opera lui Edgar Allan Poe *Prăbușirea casei Usher*. Năruirea locuinței poate fi interpretată și într-un mod metaforic, pentru că acest lucru oferă o viziune pesimistă asupra lumii. Locul de vis nu există și nici nu a existat vreodată decât pentru cei câțiva oameni care se limitau numai la plăcerile de moment oferite de viață: „Prin urmare, însăși fabuloasa casă a lui Gatsby este sortită năruirii, de la bun început. Ea nu există decât în acest vis monomaniac al stăpânului îmbogățit ca peste noapte, colaborând cu gangsteri agramați (ca Meyer Wolfshiem) și anonimi tâlhari de duzină." (Peiu 2016:6)

Intertextualitatea își face apariția

Anca Peiu reliefează în eseul *Marele Gatsby - O istorie newyorkeză* că titlul inițial pentru opera lui Fitzgerald nu era *Marele Gatsby*, ci *Trimalchio*: „M-am hotărât să păstrez titlul pe care l-am scris pe carte: *Trimalchio in West Egg*. Singurele titluri care mi s-ar mai părea că se potrivesc sunt *Trimalchio* și *On the Road to West Egg* (*Pe drumul spre West Egg*)" (Fitzgerald 2016:23) /„Ca titlu al romanului său, Trimalchio era prima opțiune a lui F. Scott Fitzgerald, care și-a perceput protagonistul ca pe un corespondent modern al clasicului arhetip de parvenit din *Satyricon*, romanul lui Petronius: al sclavului ajuns și cuprins de trufie, ce se vede „de trei ori rege", amuzându-se la una dintre petrecerile sale, cu o grotescă înscenare a înmormântării proprii." (Peiu 2016:8)

Prin urmare, dacă titlul nu ar fi fost schimbat, intenția auctorială de a realiza o legătură cu romanul latinesc ar fi fost una mult mai accentuată. Fitzgerald reușește să reînvie opera lui Petronius, rescriind povestea unui nou Trimalchio, al secolului XX, înconjurat de muzică jazz. Motivul literar al petrecerii îl revalorifică îmbogățindu-l cu o nuanță cavalerească. Gerard Génette este unul dintre teoreticienii literari care vorbesc despre palimpsest. Teoria aceasta presupune existența unui hipotext, în cazul nostru *Satyricon* și a unui hipertext, *Marele Gatsby*. Întocmai ca un hiperlink care la simplul click al utilizatorului se deschide și se ramifică către o altă pagină web, aceaste tipuri de lucrări literare ne trimit printr-un hipercuvânt către o altă operă, până în momentul în care ajungem să deținem propria țesătură livrească. Toate datele se interconectează și desăvârșesc opera literară: „J'appelle donc hypertexte tout text derive d'un texte anterieur par transformation simple (nous dirons mais transformation tout court) ou par transformation indirect: nous dirons imitation." (Génette 1982:201)

Palimpsestul are în alcătuirea sa locuri comune cu opera primă pe care încearcă să o reinventeze. Prin această denumire „locuri comune" înțeleg acele scene importante prin care enciclopedia culturală a receptorului este activată și care îi aduce în atenție numeroase opere cu care poate pune în legătura romanul pe care îl citește. În continuare doresc să analizez astfel de exemple. Motive comune sunt: casa, petrecerile. Casa eroului din romanul antic latin *Satyricon* este un topos utopic la fel ca în cazul lui Gatsby. În această operă unul dintre personajele care atrage atenția oricărui cititor este Trimalchio, dar mai ales petrecerile fastuoase pe care le organizează ori de câte ori are musafiri la cină. Spațiul utopic este limitat, mărginindu-se doar la palatul său, chiar extinzând, aș putea spune că ceea ce ne intereseaă este doar spectacolul de la dineul la care sunt martori Ascyltos și Encolpius. De fapt, doar musafirii și gazda se puteau bucura de plăcerile acestei vieți lipsite de griji. Sclavilor le era rezervată o altfel de viață, iar pe poarta casei se putea citi următoarea inscripție: „Orice sclav care o să iasă afară din porunca stăpânului va primi o sută de lovituri." (Petronius 2003:29), prin urmare acest personaj nu se deosebea cu nimic de Fratele cel Mare sau de Mustafa Mond din operele postmoderne, chiar putem spune că se stabilește o legătură între ele. În acest caz, visul utopic nu este valid pentru toți.

Pentru a susține opțiunea mea de a încadra *Satyricon* în cadrul unei utopii, am ales câteva fragmente drept suport:

> S-a servit apoi o gustare tare aleasă. Ne întinsesem toți pe paturile de masă. În afară de Trimalchio, căruia, după un obicei nou, i se pregătise locul cel mai însemnat. Pe tava cu gustări se afla un măgăruș făcut din bronz de Corint, cu o desagă dublă, care avea într-o parte măsline albe și în cealaltă măsline negre. Măgărușul era acoperit de două farfurii; pe marginile lor se gravaseră numele lui Trimalchio și greutatea argintului din care erau făcute. Podulețe de fier susțineau hârciogi stropiți cu miere și cu mac. (Petronius 2003:33)

Astfel, ierahizarea în această lume este bine delimitată. Enumerația este procedeul stilistic utilizat cu predilecție, iar în cazul acestui paragraf acesta evidențiază opulența unei asemenea mese festive. Structura „[...] pe marginile lor se gravaseră numele lui Trimalchio și greutatea argintului din care erau făcute [...]" accentuează grandoarea. Aceste două citate din lucrarea americană reprezintă un punct de intertextualitate cu opera lui Petronius. Fastul, prezentarea mesei, dar și prezența minunantei invenții care depozitează mult așteptatele licori, amintesc de romanul latinesc: „[...] preparate, îngrămădite pe lângă salatele garnisite în tot felul de forme și fripturile de porc și curcan devenite ca prin magie, aurii." (Petronius 2003:64) „În holul principal, se monta un bar cu un suport de alamă adevărată, care era aprovizionat cu diverse sortimente de gin, lichior și băuturi atât de vechi. [...]" (Petronius 2003:64)

Momente semnificative în această cină a lui Trimalchio sunt și scenele pe care însuși stăpânul acestui mic paradis material le pune în scenă pentru musafiri: „Între timp au pătruns în tricliniu trei copii îmbrăcați în tunici albe, suflecate în sus, dintre care doi au pus pe masă larii, care purtau la gât niște bule. Al treilea trecea pe la mese cu o cupă de vin în mână și striga: - Să ne ajute zeii! Trimalchio ne-a spus că unul dintre ei se numea „Profitul", al doilea „Fericirea", iar al treilea „Câștigul". Apoi s-a adus bustul lui Trimalchio; pentru că îl sărutau toți, ne-a fost rușine să-l ocolim și a trebuit să-l sărutăm și noi." (Petronius 2003:69)

Cele trei nume: „Profitul", „Fericirea", „Câștigul" date copiiilor au valențe simbolice, pentru că fiecare dintre acestea caracterizează ceea ce este reprezentativ pentru personaj. De observat este că două dintre nume fac trimitere la o împlinire de ordin material și nu spiritual. „Fericirea" este deci garantată de „profit" și de „câștig". De asemenea, cele trei substantive pot desemna și un fel de slogan eliptic de predicat după care se conduce lumea lui Trimalchio. Fericirea, Profitul și Câștigul sunt valori care se reactivează la fiecare banchet trimalchiez.

Cele două personaje: Gatsby și Trimalchio se aseamănă chiar și prin statutul social. Trimalchio este un fel de corespondent antic al eroului american învăluit în mister. Amândoi sunt reprezentativi pentru sintagma om îmbogățit peste noapte. Trimalchio fusese sclav eliberat, iar Jay provine dintr-o familie săracă, dar care participă în război, iar mai apoi se îmbogățește din tot felul de afaceri ilicite: „stăpânului îmbogățit ca peste noapte, colaborând cu gangsteri agramați (ca Meyer Wolfshiem) și anonimi tâlhari de duzină." (Peiu 2016:6) Uimitor este că amândoi pot fi asemuiți cu un Midas a cărui atingere transformă orice în aur.

Un alt loc comun care realizează o legătură între romanul antic și cel modern este pasiunea personajelor pentru teatralitate. Petrecerile organizate de cei doi seamănă cu niște piese de teatru atent regizate, iar decorul este ales cu grijă. Plăcerea de a face din propria viață un spectacol pare să fie un element barochist. „Iată însă că tavanul s-a deschis și a început să coboare lin un cerc, desprins de bună seamă de la un butoi mare. Pe tot inelul său atârnau coroane din aur cu vase făcute din alabastru, în care se pusese parfum." (Petronius 2003:68) „Cel puțin o dată la două săptămâni, o firmă specializată sosea cu sute de metri de pânză groasă și luminițe colorate pentru a împodobi imensa grădină a lui Gatsby ca un pom de Crăciun." (Fitzgerald 2016:64)

Este cunoscută plăcerea lui Trimalchio de a pune în scenă momente din viață și mai ales propria înmormântare: „- Ce spui dragă prieten? Ai să clădești monumentul meu așa cum ți-am cerut? Te rog mult să pictezi la picioarele statuii mele cățelușa mea și coroane, și parfumuri, și toate luptele gladiatorului Petraites, ca să-mi placă și mie să trăiesc după moarte, datorită ție, pe lângă toate acestea vreau ca mormântul meu să aibă o sută de picioare în față și două sute de picioare în adâncime. […] Cât privește inscripția, vezi dacă nu ți se pare potrivită una ca aceasta: „*C. Pompeius Trimalchio Maecenatianus"* se odihnește aici [...] Pios, viteaz, leal, s-a ridicat de jos, a lăsat în urma lui treizeci de milioane de sesterți și n-a ascultat vreodată prelegerile filosofilor. [...]" (Petronius 2003:82-83)

Hybrisul este cea mai mare caracteristică a personajului antic, el vrea să râdă de viață, dar și de moarte. Asemenea lui Trimalchio dar mult mai rafinat, Gatsby le oferă invitaților exact ce consideră că au nevoie: muzică, dans și băutură, iar „piesa sa de teatru" pune în scenă ipocrizia oamenilor și superficialitatea lor. El este regizorul care vrea să controleze totul în jurul său.

În concluzie, prin această lucrare doresc să demonstrez că utopia nu este exponentul unei lumi perfecte, pentru că ea ascunde și o latură distopică. Visul american care pare să fie proferat în *Marele Gatsby* este doar o fantasmă, un vis care durează doar un moment. F. Scott Fitzgerald mizează în construcția romanului său pe o dublă fațetare a realității, dar și pe un joc intertextual, reușind să rescrie o operă antică și să reconstruiască din temelii un personaj cât se poate de modern și de reprezentativ pentru epoca jazzului, valorificând elemente antice. Destinul tragic al lui Gatsby, moartea sa, aduc cu sine prăbușirea reședinței sale și spulberarea oricăror iluzii în legătură cu visul american.

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A REINTERPRETATION OF TEMPORALITY IN *THE MASQUE OF THE RED DEATH*: AN ANALYSIS OF THE TIME-DEATH-CONSCIOUSNESS TRIANGLE FROM A PHENOMENOLOGICAL STANDPOINT – DASEIN AS FINITUDE

Andreea TUDOR

The fear of death comes from the fear of life. A man who
lives fully is prepared to die at any time.
(Mark Twain)

In the archetypal visions, time represents a superior force, an abstract entity that organizes the events that occur in the human life. In this schema of thought, time represents the main pawn, serving as the subject of the sentence. It is enough to think of Assyrian mythology or Greek mythology to understand that Time, written with capital letter and Fate, his "twin sister," impersonated in Chronos, Ashima or Mamitu etc., have been the ones to decide over human existence. The cosmic approach is being, though, shaken when Saint Augustine starts to elaborate upon a type of temporality that stands away from the perspective that regarded time as an almighty deity.

This new approach on temporality concentrates on the reality of our consciousness. Thus, the subject of the sentence becomes the self and time becomes an extension of the self, a function that makes the individual aware of his/her existence. Time remains an abstract entity, but its existence is engraved in the human being and, in this new grid, the roles change their places. Time turns out to be an entity created by the self in order to give life meaning.

What is conspicuous regarding *The Masque of the Red Death* is that Poe manages to mingle the two visions. On one hand, I will develop the idea that the narrator of the story is Time, time which recounts the story. I will show that, on the other hand, there are pieces of evidence that attest the fact that the plot constructs itself around a character, Prince Prospero, who fails to comprehend that time is engraved in himself and that he has to surrender, sooner or later, to his own finitude. Due to his checkless stubbornness and pride, Prospero is doomed to receive the visit of the harbinger of time, i.e. death. The Red Death that achieves dominion over everything in the end stands as evidence that men cannot escape death and secluding in an abbey represents only a childish way of denying the mute presence of time in our consciousness, time that is inexorable. Seclusion, shows Poe throughout this story, does not represent an efficient way of avoiding death and cheating time. When the Red Death reaches his chamber, for Prince Prospero will be too late to comprehend that time "darts through him" and he had had to endure his flow, not to fight against it, if we use Merleau-Ponty's terminology.[1]

If read on this phenomenological level, the story may be seen as an account of time consciousness, a tale that keeps in disguise a theory regarding the inexorability of time in Poe's specific gothic style. The arguments I will debate later will gravitate around the idea that the controversial narrator of the story, so much analyzed and disputed on, is nothing else than whatever

[1] Jean-Louis Vieillard Baron. *Problema timpului: şapte studii filosofice*. Trans. Călin Diaconescu. Bucureşti : Paideia, 2000, p. 43.

Prince Prospero's consciousness projects. From a phenomenological point of view, the most plausible variant for the narrator seems to be time. However, adding death and consciousness to our equation, we obtain another possible result for the person of the narrator. If we are wrong and the narrator was not meant to be time, yet, he has to be a *homo viator*, or a pilgrim of time, considering the fact that he is not subject to time and more importantly, to death, as he is not killed in that night and survives to tell the story years or centuries afterwards. Time, Decay, Darkness, The Red Death, God are all possibilities that may find themselves in the posture of the narrator. Whomever Poe intended his narrator to be, a thing remains clear: he had the desire to underline the link between death, time and consciousness throughout the story.

Firstly, a little incursion into the "forests" of phenomenology is needed in order to apply its concepts in Poe's story. Etymologically, phenomenology is the philosophical branch that accounts for the way in which things or phenomena appear. The phenomena we are witnesses to are filtered through our consciousness, thus a major direction of study in phenomenology is represented by the manner in which experience molds the meaning we tend to attribute to things around us. Time represents, undoubtedly, a phenomenon, but unlike other types of phenomena, it cannot be seen, it can only be perceived. Its questionable nature gave rise to many interpretations, but the type of phenomenology time gives birth to, unquestionably proposes an audacious endeavor. The phenomenology of time accounts for the way in which events appear to us in their temporal structures or how we perceive temporality at large. Why do we need to involve other phenomena when discussing time? Can time be discussed singularly?

As a phenomenon that cannot be put under scientific observation, time can be analyzed only through the effects it produces and has to be related to other things or phenomena. To account for this idea, I will invoke the fact that Kant and later on Husserl and Heidegger reached the conclusion that time represents the necessary condition for the other phenomena to occur, either external or internal. Therefore, there is no object of reality that can escape time. Kant explains the supremacy of time over the other phenomena by stating that time is an *ens imaginarium*, i.e. an imaginary being who controls and conditions the other phenomena.[2] Both visions, either Kantian or Heideggerian, underline the presupposition that time lies at the foundation of our understanding of the world. On one hand, Kant will sustain that both time and space are immanent conditions of the other phenomenon to occur and they are vital to the correct reception of the sensible dimension of the world. On the other hand, Heidegger based his whole thesis upon the supposition that time is supereminent. Going back in time, we arrive at the Hegel's affirmation that time, "in its quality of not being, is, and in its quality of being, is not".[3] This characteristic of time makes us wonder if the controversial narrator of *The Masque of The Red Death* is not time itself. Most of the critics sustained that Poe intended death to be the narrator (see Leonardo Cassuto's thesis as presented in Sova[4]). But if we take into consideration the correlation between death and time and the supereminence of time upon the other phenomena, it can easily be assumed that the narrator may be time itself. Another argument in sustaining this idea is that the presence of the narrator in the story seems to be evanescent, seeing and hearing everything, but having no materiality at all and these aspects are in accordance with the things stated by Hegel – "in his quality of being, time is not and in his quality of not being, time is." Time is above Death, which is presented as a character meant to serve the purposes of a higher power. Time "appears" (a term specific to the phenomenological

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 55.
[3] *Ibidem*, p. 183.
[4] Dawn B. Sova, *Critical companion to Edgar Allan Poe- a Literary Reference to His Life and Work.* New York: Facts on File, Inc, 2007, p. 110.

terminology), but as underlined in this story, not in the form of an object, a person or a phenomenon. Using them, time creates the lenses of perceiving life. Paradoxically, although the story seems, apparently, to deal with the theme of death, the depth structures involve an allegorical tale about life and the supereminence of time in the human existence. How time's passage should be perceived by us is a hot-debate (whether it passes through us or we pass through it and, more importantly, how this fact is represented in our story) and will be analyzed in the following lines.

The two visions, apparently, irreconcilables one with the other, may find a bridge of compromise. Time as an *ens imaginarium* indeed passes through us, but, equally, we pass though it, therefore we can speak of a bidirectional relationship. The first thesis – that time passes though us – has its own veracity because even if we, as consciences ceased to exist, time would still exist. At the level of the objective world, consciousness represents one of the most improbable phenomena and the world with its whole range of phenomena would still exist in the absence of the human consciousness. Time, as the preliminary condition for all the other phenomena to occur, as the Kantian and Heideggerian theses claimed, would continue its existence as long as the sensible world exists. The second thesis, the one that spins around consciousness and views it as a filter for the perception of time, represents an equally valid theory in understanding time.

How these two interpretations can be applied to Edgar Allan Poe's text? The way in which time appears in the consciousness of Prince Prospero and the consciousness of Time itself, the possible narrator of the story, and the links between death, time and consciousness represent the themes that will be discussed further with reference to Heidegger's *Being and time*, Lévinas' *Death and time*, Bergson's *Time and free will: An Essay on the immediate data of consciousness.*

Throughout the story, it is conspicuous that only three characters are named: Prince Prospero, The Red Death and Time. This fact may be a hint to the main terms of the equation involved in the phenomenological triad. The transparence of the last two characters (Red Death and Time) makes easier the interpretation, while it can be asserted that the figure of Prince Prospero stands as an emblem for human consciousness. Thus, the triangle of phenomenology can be identified as following: time, death and consciousness. At first sight, to this detail could be easily imputed the character of randomness, but in the schema presented above, it can be observed that it is this precise detail that brings together the fundamental issues of phenomenological movement and this aspect should not be overlooked or considered of little importance in the analysis. The consideration made earlier that the tale discusses, through the theme of death, in disguise, the theme of life, should be correlated with the idea that the main approach of the story is interested in the reactions that the universal consciousness may have when confronted with its own mortality.

Prince Prospero experiences fear or anxiety when he realizes that death is approaching him and in a hubristic manner, he tries to avoid death by secluding himself in an abbey. The story, in this point, has similarities with Boccaccio's *The Decameron.* Prospero is afraid of death and is afraid for his own life. As Heidegger stated, fear has always two components: a fear *of* and a fear *for.*[5] The paradox subsists in the fact that Prince Prospero acknowledges the power of death by running away from it. He determines the true nature of the human self – the *Dasein* in Heidegger's terminology – by running from an intrinsical component of it: death. He denies that man, generically, is "a being-towards-death." In an authentic version of the self, Prospero would have faced up death as the end of *Dasein*, understanding that being is equal with the idea of finitude.[6]

[5] Emmanuel Lévinas. *Moartea şi timpul*. Text stabilit de Jacques Rolland ; trans. Anca Maniuţiu. Cluj: Biblioteca Apostrof, 1996.
[6] Paul Gorner, *Heidegger's Being and Time: an introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 29.

In his desperate attempts to escape death, he loses his consciousness of death and of time. Secluding himself in an abbey, a situation similar to the actions presented in the *Decameron* of Giovanni Boccaccio, he confronts his own relationship with the infinite because as Lévinas points out, "time is not a limitation of being, but its relationship with the infinite".[7] What Prospero does not comprehend represents the fact that time defines us as beings, that time, in Lévinas' words, is nothing but "the way of the mortal being of being".[8] This remark is based on Heideggerian reflections that the meaning of being, of *Dasein* is temporality or *Zeitlichkeit* as he calls it.[9] His temporality follows him even in the abbey, in a masked form – the numbers of the chambers the abbey consists of. The seven rooms can be interpreted as the seven decades of human life, as seven days of the week, as the seven eras of the human kind; the common denominator is the fact they are all linked to temporality. Worthy of mentioning is the fact that in the last chamber, the black one with scarlet panes stands a proof of mortality. The limited time that a person lives and that marks his finitude is symbolically depicted in the story with the aid of an ebony clock. The following excerpt is relevant for the idea presented:

> It was in this apartment, also, that there stood against the western wall, a gigantic clock of ebony. Its pendulum swung to and fro with a dull, heavy, monotonous clang.[10]

The chamber itself could be interpreted as a symbol of death. The presence of the implacable time with its apparatus of measuring – the ebony clock – demonstrates once more the truthfulness of Lévinas assertion that "Death is mortality demanded by the time duration".[11] The fact that we think of time in terms of its instruments of measurements links us to another conclusion drawn by Heidegger that states that our primary access to time is realized by appealing to the clock. This pattern of viewing and perceiving time brings us back to Aristotle who defined time as "the number of movements" (apud Lévinas[12]). The interpretation that sees in the ebony clock the symbol of the span of the human life is reinforced in the closing lines: "The life of the ebony clock went out with that of the last of the gay."[13] The life of the clock is gone, so is the life of the people in the abbey. Moreover, as a devoted art of time, music is present in all the rooms, being in itself duration, in the Bergsonian acceptance of the term, reminding the guests silently, yet noisily, of the flow of time. When the music ends, seeing the embodiment of time itself with a mask, the mundane, the ordinary, the measurable time finds an end too.

In his attempts of defying time and death, the character Prince Prospero stands as proof of the veracity of Lévinas' thesis according to which we think of death in correlation with other people's death.[14] Prospero sees his subjects' deaths and he deludes himself that the pestilence cannot affect him. In order to confront death, he retires in his abbey. The following excerpt underlines this idea and brings to light another important point worthy to be mentioned:

> But the Prince Prospero was happy and dauntless and sagacious. When his dominions were half depopulated, he summoned to his presence thousand hale and light hearted friends from among the knights and dames of the

[7] Emmanuel Levinas, *op.cit.* p.39.
[8] *Ibidem*, p. 73.
[9] Paul Gorner, *op.cit.,* p. 30
[10] Edgar Allan Poe, *Selected Tales*, London: Penguin Popular Classics, p. 194
[11] Emmanuel Lévinas, *op.cit.*, p. 35.
[12] *Ibidem*, p. 49.
[13] E.A. Poe, *op.cit.*, p. 198.
[14] Emmanuel Lévinas, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

> courts and with these retired to the deep seclusion of one of his castellated abbeys. This was an extensive and magnificent structure, the creation of the prince's own eccentric yet august taste.[15]

In his pride, the prince cannot admit death does not take a roundabout way. He is stuck in his egotism, in his "my-ness" (after Lévinas), in his desire to possess life and time, no matter what is outside his abbey ("The external world could take care of itself. In the meantime it was folly to grieve, or to think […..]. Without was the 'Red Death'[16]).

His attitude is somehow similar to that of Ivan Ilych, the protagonist of Tolstoy's *The death of Ivan Ilyich* and of men at large. In its negativity, we tend to think of death only in rapport with others, not with our person. Although the striking of the clock reminds Prince Prospero and his guests of their impending death, their pride hinders them to accept the inevitability of death. Their beings, although prey to death, already beings-in-the-world, in Heideggerian terms, are not conscious of the futility of fighting death. They do not realize that time and *Dasein* exist just through death.[17] In Heidegger, death and time are perceived as specific to being. Prospero does not accept the fact that man is finitude and, in his vanity, he is punished with a death that comes unexpectedly. If we extend the perspective, the entity that controls both time and death, the divine agent, punishes Prospero for the haughtiness of thinking that his position allows him to defeat time and death. His hubris, in Greek mentality, his fatal sin – the thought he can escape time and death – determines the Divine Agent to send a messenger, probably time, in the form of the masked guest, in order to show him that death is the natural ending of any being, either rich or poor. Yet, another grid of interpretation was proposed by the critics. It is connected to our subject and deserves to be mentioned in this analysis. Therefore, if we apply the biblical grid to the text that seems to have some religious allusions made in and an apocalyptical atmosphere created inside its lines, we would easily assume that the narrator is the evil projected in the consciousness of a mad man. This idea is sustained by the gloomy lines in the end, which present not a new Eden, as depicted in the Bible, but an inverted vision of the earthly paradise, more of "a valley of the shadow of death."[18]

A dystopian vision of the end of the world constitutes the conclusion of the narrator:

> And now was acknowledged the presence of the Red Death. He had come as a thief in the night. And one by one dropped the revelers in the blood-bedewed halls of their revel, and died each other in the despairing posture of his fall. [19]

What interpretation should be penciled from these lines? It is conspicuous that neither life, nor Christ rules over the earth imagined by Poe. Decay, darkness and death – the harbingers of evil – become the ruling forces in the end. An inverted trinity is brought to life and an image of a dark paradise arises in the picture: "And Darkness and Decay and the Red Death held illimitable dominion over all." Death seems to be envisioned as the savior, as a counterpart of Christ who is the bringer of life. This pessimistic view can be linked to Kant's theory regarding time. Hammer synthetizes his vision stating that in Kant time contains "no promise, no potential for transformation, excepting that for dying and death".[20] Applying this grid, we may be forced to adopt

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[15] E.A. Poe, *op.cit*., p. 194.
[16] *Ibidem*, p. 194.
[17] Emmanuel Levinas, *op. cit*., p. 86
[18] Patrick Cheney, *Poe's Use of The Tempest and The Bible in The Masque of the Red Death, English Language Notes*, Vol. 20, no.3-4 (March-June), 1983, p. 34.
[19] E.A.Poe, *op. cit*., p. 198.
[20] Espen Hammer, *Philosophy and Temporality from Kant to Critical Theory*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 109.

a certain form of nihilism, as critics remarked when they analyzed Kant's account on time. This negative outlook on the story fits like a glove to Poe's personality and perspectives. This inverted Paradise that we encounter in this story and in many others accounts for the dark views that Poe had regarding the human mind. Even the numbers are used in an inverted form. The number seven (from the seven chambers) makes reference to the biblical value of the number: fullness, completeness, perfection and the communion of man with his Creator, God. Seven are the colors of the rainbow, rainbow that firstly appeared as a sign of God's approval and served as evidence for the new covenant made after the flood in the times of Noah.

The seven chambers represent, indirectly, a sign of silent communion with death, taking into consideration that death represents the new God. The story therefore reveals a pessimistic view upon humankind, trapped in a maze under the eternal law of death. The imprisonment of Prince Prospero in the abbey represents a "disguised form of man's anguish over the pitfall of a temporality which borrows the dimension of time in order to express itself". [21]Prospero wants to live in an eternal present, far away from the hardships brought by the Red Death, but this is a fight against nature, against man's own mortality and against interior and exterior flow of time. Confronted either with Chronos, the short duration or the moment, as the Greeks called it, or with Aion, the long duration, the thing that lasts in rapport with what runs away, Prospero will not win the battle. Plato saw time as a receptacle inside which everything flows, but he himself does not flow.[22] In *The Masque of the Red Death*, all are affected by its flow and their desperate gesture of secluding themselves represents a form of escapism from the flight of "irreparabile tempus." Prospero's use of will in order to escape from death and time becomes a masquerade – a futile attempt to escape something that is inescapable. His final act represents the final communion, the marriage of his troubled soul with death, the inevitable end of the flow of time in men. His indifference regarding death, used as a weapon to delay the latter, serves only as a poor defense against the inevitable. Prospero is obsessed to display indifference towards death, but death is present in the form of the clock – a noisy harbinger of the "Time that flies"[23] and a device constructed by man to measure time and to acknowledge its passage. The view regarding the clock as an instrument measuring the seconds, minutes, hours, days and years towards death makes it a necromantic device.[24]

Prospero resembles Mithridates and in his endeavors, like the latter, he takes his poison regularly, showing actually the amount of attention he pays to death. His obsessive care for death transformed him into an alienated figure with "delirious fancies," but in all his care he makes proof of being an existence, a *Dasein* whose being is care and whose care is time, as Heidegger states.[25] Prospero creates the premises of a character that is omnipresent in all the work of Poe: the paranoiac, the man who is in permanent fear or anguish because the imminence of death entertains a relationship of contradiction with the notion of being-in the-world. The paranoiac acknowledges that death injures his possibility of being, therefore he starts a rapturous fight in order to avoid death. His hubris, his pride may have a deeper explanation, an explanation which can be drawn making a connection with the person of Poe himself, whose *persona* we may think is the same as Prospero. The anguish of death comes in sight, suggests Bloch, when man apprehends he will die

[21] Maryvonne Perrot, *Bachelard şi poetica timpului.* Trans. Contescu-Samfireag L, Ciontescu-Samfireag D, Cluj Napoca: Dacia, 2007, p.83.
[22] Jean Louis Viellard Baron, *op.cit*., p. 175.
[23] Edgar Allan Poe*, op.cit*., p. 194.
[24] Kevin Birth, *Objects of time: how things shape temporality,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 35.
[25] Paul Gorner, *op.cit*., p. 9.

without bringing to an end or fulfilling his work, his mission in the world.[26] Prospero locks himself in the abbey because he has the feeling, when death is approaching, that his purpose in life is not attained yet and in him emerges the desire to conserve his life.

Adding the psychological sapour of interpretation to the story, we can start the action of introspecting a mad man's dream, obsessed with the passage of time and frightened, as pointed out before, because of the imminence of death. If this is the case, the story represents his hallucinatory vision. There are various lexical allusions to the sphere of psychological life. For example, the narrator calls Prospero's friends "dreams" as in the next passage:

> To and fro in the seven chambers there stalked, in fact, a multitude of dreams. And the, for a moment, all is still, and all is silent save the voice of the clock. The dreams are stiff-frozen as they stand.[27]

The narrator goes further and says: "In an assembly of phantasms such as I have painted, it may well be supposed that no ordinary appearance could have excited such sensation."[28] The whole masquerade ball may be read as a figment of the mad imagination of the narrator. The phantasms that wander in his unconsciousness giving birth to such stories are projection of his insanity. In fact, the victory of the Red Death, which is presented without any physicality, without any "tangible form," could be interpreted as the conquest of the imagination over the real or the insane over the sane. The success achieved in behalf of the insanity represents also a death, death of the consciousness and the birth of the unconsciousness, until then buried in the depth structures of the consciousness. Prospero's dreaming brings into attention the consciousness of the dream, which is a non-intentional state, yet an active state of the consciousness.[29] If we make an analogy and see in the text an aesthetical reflection upon the status of art and the contemplation of mortality, we can see in Prospero an *alter ego* of Poe. No matter how hard one can fight death, it will always come unexpectedly and win the battle. Poe, as Prospero, tries to escape through art, but death will always prevail.

Perrot will point out in *Bachelard et la poetique du temps* that the work of art represents the Faustian way of confronting time.[30] Through art, the author tries to find real duration, to find the meaning of time. By means of art, we move off the veil interposed between our consciousness and us.[31] Therefore, the author has the consciousness of death better represented as he removed that veil between him and his consciousness, pulling out the mask of indifference that Prospero displays in order to avoid what is unavoidable. Due to this, the author sees the phenomena as they "appear," as Husserl would say, and accepts their inevitability. Death, interpreted as death of the individual or symbolic death of sanity represents a phenomenon of the end and, at the same time, the end of the phenomenon.[32] Once death has occured, human consciousness does not happen to filter the phenomena anymore because the physical world does not appear to it anymore and the phenomenality which comes with the notion of death comes itself to an end. Therefore, the narrator could not be Prince Prospero as the phenomenon of death interrupts the work of consciousness and its filtering of external phenomena, thus processing the information regarding the masquerade ball could not be the comment of a man who endured death, being it literal or symbolical, but of an

[26] Emmanuel Lévinas, *op.cit*., p. 144.
[27] Edgar Allan Poe, *op.cit*., 194.
[28] *Ibidem*, p. 196.
[29] Jean Louis Viellard-Baron, *op.cit*., p.38.
[30] MaryIvonne Perrot, *op.cit*., p. 36.
[31] Henri Bergson, *op.cit*, p. 33.
[32] Emmanuel Lévinas, *op.cit*., p. 82.

instance that is not the subject of time and death. As time has its origins from the epos of being as "being-towards-death"[33], a conclusion can be drawn: most likely the narrator is Time, an instance unconditioned by other phenomena.

Nonetheless, a Bergsonian approach on the problem of time is a necessary ingression in our discussion. Viellard-Baron contended that a consciousness of time is necessary to get rid of the repetition that characterizes the beings that lack liberty, a fact that stands as proof that time fills us, that it makes us complete.[34] Prospero, although he seems free because he can lock himself in the abbey, is constrained by the rigidity of his consciousness which cannot perceive the essence of time. Hence, time limits him instead of making him free, instead of making him aware of his relationship with the infinite, as underscored by Lévinas.

What Bergson introduces in the understanding of time is the notion of duration. In *Time and Free Will*: *Essay on the immediate data of the consciousness*, Bergson stresses the fact that duration is the immediate datum of the consciousness.[35] The essence of time, in Bergsonian theories, is represented by duration or the lived time. A turning of perspective from outside into the inside of the profound self creates the premises of real duration. The basis from which his whole thesis arises is the psychological time or the interior flow of time that has other ways of functioning, a different system of driving the process of understanding the world around us and a different system of measuring the events we are entrapped in. What matters in this schema is the qualitative nature of time. The true meaning of time does not lie in minutes, hours, days, months, years, seasons, but in lived moments, moments that are not inherently characterized by means of quantity, but of quality. The future represents the essential dimension of duration, an idea that is in correlation with Heidegger's comment regarding consciousness that it starts to become temporal beginning from the future. Bergson's thesis creates its fundament on the idea that every consciousness lives through a past that affects it, without being necessarily recognized as such and through a future that is not here yet. According to this interpretation, Prospero's impotence of projecting a future and his stubbornness of remaining in the present represents an incapability of perceiving duration as the fundamental truth of time, life and death. Even though he does not want to ponder upon the mutability of time and its rapid flow towards death, Prince Prospero lives it. In *L'évolution créatrice*, Bergson develops this idea saying: "The real time, we do not think it, but we live it because life is full of intelligence."[36] However, according to Bergson, finitude and death are not engraved in duration, his vision offering an optimistic perspective upon life and time. The continuity of lived time conserves the past in the present, therefore Prospero's fear regarding death is understandable from the point of view of duration.

J.P. Sartre also discussed the theme of time and his theories have some aspects that deserve to be mentioned here and applied to our text. Sharing the opinions of Husserl and Heidegger regarding past, present and future, Sartre does not view them as contents or containers for contents, but modes of the consciousness, or of the "for-itself" (a term coined by Sartre which encapsulates his variant of the *Dasein*) to express itself and the world. The fact that Prospero blocks his inevitable future indicates an involution of the consciousness or the lack of some structures in his "for-itself." For Merleau-Ponty, the essence of time lies in the awareness of time. Here can be

[33] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Trans. Y. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, New York: Harper and Row, Publisher Inc., 1963, p. 76.
[34] Jean Louis Viellard- Baron, *op.cit*, p. 15.
[35] Henri Bergson, *op.cit*., p. 45.
[36] Henri Bergson, *L'évolution créatrice*. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1941, p. 534.

traced the archetypes of the relationships of the self to self.[37] Later on, in *The Visible and the invisible*, when he revises his theories and moves from phenomenology to ontology, Merleau-Ponty will consider that time represents an independent entity, not a construct of the consciousness. In other words, we discuss about time that is aware of itself. This is the case in our story if we consider the narrator to be Time. Time has its own independence, its system of functioning and has the right to tell the story as the entity that survives life and death.

To draw a conclusion, I would say that the ingression into the phenomenological studies provides a different perspective upon the text that can be interpreted as an account of time consciousness. Its essence can be traced in the intimate experience that either *Dasein*, the existence aware of his mortality, the *for-itself* or the *duration,* has with it and how their depth structures contribute to its perception. The exegesis yields the inference that the meaning of being is temporality. Time represents the key to the other phenomena and the preliminary condition for them to occur. Time could be interpreted not only in the philosophical grid. In the narratological scheme, the dimension of time can have its place as it can play the role of the very controversial narrator. Prospero, although very late, acknowledges that time with its twin, death, represents the bridge between consciousness and the infinity.

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[37] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of perception*, trans. C. Smith, New York: Routledge & Keegan Paul Ltd, 1962, p. 88.