

**THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES
IN BESSARABIA'S KHOTYN COUNTY (1812-1868):
BETWEEN FREEDOM OF WORSHIP
AND THE TSARIST GOVERNMENT'S POLICY**

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Abstract. *The study examines how the Russian Empire annexation of Bessarabia province affected the confessional structure of its northern part, bordered by the Habsburg Empire (from 1867, Austria-Hungary) and the Land of Moldavia (since 1861, Romania). The author demonstrates how, under the impact of colonization and immigration, the quasi-exclusively Orthodox nature of the region alters in intensity to a certain extent. Thus, during the first half of Tsarist rule, significant elements of the confessional structure turned into the Mosaic community, the Roman Catholic one, and certain sects separated from the Orthodox Church. Even though the Russian authorities pursued the “divide et impera” approach nationally, the geopolitical uniqueness of Bessarabia, as well as the Orthodox population’s tolerance, ensured a non-conflicting cohabitation of Christian cults and Mosaic or Lipovans.*

Keywords: *religion, ethnic communities, Bessarabia, Khotyn, worship, Orthodox, Roman-Catholic, Mosaic, Lipovan.*

Rezumat. *Evoluția comunităților religioase în ținutul Hotin al Basarabiei (1812-1868): între libertatea cultului și politica guvernului țarist.* Studiul prezintă felul în care anexarea Basarabiei de către Imperiul Rus a afectat structura confesională a părții de nord a provinciei, situată la granița cu Imperiul Habsburgic (din 1867, Austro-Ungaria) și Țara Moldovei (din 1862, România). Autoarea arată cum, sub impactul colonizărilor și imigrărilor, caracterul cvasi-exclusiv ortodox al regiunii își modifică într-o anumită măsură intensitatea. Astfel, în prima jumătate de stăpânire țaristă, elemente importante ale structurii confesionale au devenit comunitatea mozaică, cea romano-catolică, dar și unele secte desprinse din sânul Bisericii Ortodoxe. Chiar dacă, la nivel central, autoritățile ruse au practicat politica „divide et impera”, specificul geopolitic al Basarabiei, toleranța populației

ortodoxe au determinat o conviețuire neconflictuală atât între cultele creștine, cât și între acestea și cel mozaic ori cel al lipovenilor.

INTRODUCTION

Regional history is inextricably linked to the study of unique socio-cultural processes in which the church and religious life play a vital role. The northern counties of Bessarabia, the province annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812, were notable for their multicultural and religious composition of different nationalities coexisting peacefully: Romanians, Rusyns, Jews, Poles, Armenians, Germans, Greeks, and others. At the same time, it should be noted that in 1715, the territory of Khotyn was seized from the Ruler of Moldavia's authority and transformed into a Turkish raya, along with the Fortress of Khotyn. This had both demographic and religious implications. Until 1757-1758, the Orthodox communities were administered by the diocese of Radauti, before being assigned to the diocese of Proilava (Brăila).¹ After the split from the Land of Moldavia, the Tsarist authorities established the Archdiocese of Chisinau and Khotyn, encompassing the entire territory between the Prut and the Dniester.²

Several different features determined the history of religious life in Bessarabia's northern region. Apart from the influence of Ottoman rule (1715-1806) on the economic and cultural development of the Khotyn district in this part of Moldavia, this region has had a significant Slavic presence since the Middle Ages. In addition, unlike the centre and particularly the south of Bessarabia, no colony was founded in the northern part of the province after 1812, resulting in a less diverse ethnic and religious structure of the population. The study examines the time frame between the annexation of Bessarabia to the tsarist empire and the introduction of the first religious reform measures (1867-1868), under the reign of Tsar Alexander II.

Several studies have been published on the history of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church, the first dating back to the 19th century. Contemporaries, describing the Bessarabian territories based on their observations and according

¹ Nicolae Popovschi, *Istoria Bisericii din Basarabia în veacul al XIX-lea sub ruși. Din negura trecutului: crâmpene de amintiri* [History of the Church in Bessarabia in the 19th century under the Russians. From the fog of the past: crumbs of memories], Ediție îngrijită de Iurie Colesnic, Chișinău, Museum, 2000, p. 25.

² Ștefan Purici, *Istoria Basarabiei. Note de curs* [History of Bessarabia. Course notes], București, Editura Semne, 2011, p. 67.

to local authorities, provided a lot of information about the counties of Bessarabia. In particular, the *Statistics of Bessarabia*³, prepared in 1817 on behalf of the military governor Bakhmetyev by Pavel Svinin, an officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provides detailed information about this topic. The author presents some data on the number of church parishes in the northern Bessarabian territories. A. Afanasyev-Chuzhbinsky presents various aspects of the life of Russian Old Believers – Lipovans, who were known as dissenters in Bessarabia⁴. The author focused on describing the Old Believer communities of Khotyn County in his historical and journalistic essay, which illustrated the ethnonational features of the settlements of the north part of Bessarabia.

Interesting statistical information of the first years of the region's annexation by the Russian Empire can be found in the fundamental work of Alexis Nakko⁵. The researcher praises the measures taken by the new government in the occupied territories, emphasizing that they contributed to the rapid settlement of the Bessarabian counties by people of different religions who fled the Prut during recent wars. General Staff officer A. Zashchuk's descriptions of the Bessarabian region are essential for the study of the region's church and religious life.⁶ The author provides a quantitative description of the ethnic composition of the Bessarabian counties' urban and rural populations

³ [Pavel Svinin], *Statistika Bessarabii. Sostavil nadvornyy sovetnik Svin'in po porucheniiyu voyennogo gubernatora Bakhmet'yeva* [rukopis'; Kishinev, 1817] [Statistics of Bessarabia. Compiled by the court councilor Svinin on behalf of the military governor Bakhmetyev [manuscript; Kishinev, 1817], in Instytut rukopysu Natsyonal'noyi biblioteky Ukrayiny imeni V. I. Vernads'koho [Manuscript Institute of the V. I. Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine], Fond 5, sprava № 667, 187 ark. [Fund 5, case 667, 187 sheets].

⁴ A. Afanas'yev-Chuzhbinskiy, *Poyezdka v Yuzhnuyu Rossiyu* [Trip to South Russia], Часть II, *Ocherki Dnestra* [Essays on the Dniester], Sankt-Peterburg, 1863.

⁵ Aleksei Nakko, *Bessarabskaya oblast'. So vremeni prisoyedineniya yeya k Rossii po Bukarestskomu miru 1812-go goda. V istoricheskom, ekonomicheskom i statisticheskom otnosheniyakh* [rukopis'; Kishinev, 1879] [Bessarabian region. From the time of its accession to Russia according to the Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1812. Historically, economically and statistically [manuscript; Kishinev, 1879]], in http://rarebook.onu.edu.ua:8081/bitstream/store/2173/2/78_3693.pdf (Accessed on 14.10.2020).

⁶ A. Zashchuk, *Materialy dlya geografii i statistiki Rossii, sobrannyye ofitserami General'nogo shtaba. Bessarabskaya oblast'*. Chasti I-II [Materials for geography and statistics of Russia, collected by officers of the General Staff. Bessarabian region. Parts I-II], Sankt Peterburg, 1862.

while also revealing statistical data on the state of the clergy, Orthodox prayer facilities, and religions in the region.

The Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs provides information about the religious denominations of the population in Vol. 3 "Bessarabian region," under the general editorship of A. Artemyev.⁷

Notes of the Bessarabian Regional Statistical Committee edited by A. Yegunov (Vol. 1)⁸ and *Notes of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities* (Vol. 5, 6)⁹ are of great interest. In addition to statistics of population, these volumes contain a description of individual church communities in Bessarabia. *Proceedings of the Bessarabian Provincial Scientific Archival Commission* (Vol. 2, 3) edited by Ion Halippa, which contains solid statistical materials on the history of the region according to the first censuses, must be mentioned among the antebellum publications¹⁰. Arsenii Stadnitskii¹¹, Zamfir Arbore¹², Petre Cazacu¹³, Ștefan Ciobanu¹⁴, Alexandru Boldur¹⁵, Nicolae Popovschi¹⁶ and others have also studied church topics to some extent. The periodical press of the time provides extensive

⁷ A. Artemiev (red.), *Spiski naselennykh mest Rossiyskoy imperii, sostavlennyye i izdavayemyye Tsentral'nyim statisticheskim komitetom Ministerstva vnutrennikh del. Tom 3, Bessarabskaya oblast'* [Lists of inhabited places of the Russian Empire, compiled and published by the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Vol. 3, Bessarabian region], Sankt-Peterburg, 1861.

⁸ A. N. Yegunov (red.), *Zapiski Bessarabskogo oblastnogo statisticheskogo komiteta*, Tom I [Notes of the Bessarabian Regional Statistical Committee, Volume I], Kishinev, 1864.

⁹ *Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostey* [Notes of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities], Odessa, Tom 5, 1863; Tom 6, 1867.

¹⁰ I. N. Halippa (red.), *Trudy Bessarabskoy gubernskoy uchenoy arkhivnoy komissii* [Proceedings of the Bessarabian Provincial Scientific Archive Commission], Kishinev, Tom 2, 1902; Tom 3, 1907.

¹¹ Arsenii, *Issledovaniia i monografii po istorii moldavskoi tserkvi* [Studies and monographs on the history of the Moldavian Church], St. Petersburg, Vaisberg i Gerivunin, 1904.

¹² Zamfir C. Arbure, *Basarabia în secolul al XIX-lea* [Bessarabia in the 19th century], București, 1898.

¹³ Petre Cazacu, *Moldova dintre Prut și Nistru, 1812-1918* [Moldova between the Prut and the Dniester, 1812-1918], Iași, Viața românească, 1924.

¹⁴ Ștefan Ciobanu, *Cultura românească în Basarabia sub stăpanirea rusă* [Romanian culture in Bessarabia under Russian rule], Chișinău, 1923.

¹⁵ Alexandru Boldur, *Autonomia Basarabiei sub stăpânire rusească în 1812-1828. Studiu* [Autonomy of Bessarabia under Russian rule in 1812-1828. Study], Chișinău, Tipografia Eparhială. Cartea Românească, 1929.

¹⁶ Nicolae Popovschi, *op. cit.*

information on Bessarabia's socio-cultural dynamics. The "Chisinau eparchial bulletin" is particularly noteworthy.¹⁷

It should be noted that some of the aforementioned authors' statistical data is contradictory, requiring verification with archival materials and other sources. However, these inaccuracies do not diminish their value as comprehensive resources on the history of the region.

The study of the region's church and religious life in Soviet historiography was done in the context of Bessarabia's socio-cultural development; hence, there are no unique scientific works on this topic. Moldovan soviet historians Yakim Grosul and Ion Budak,¹⁸ as well as Vladimir Kabuzan¹⁹ made brief references to the topic.

With the fall of communism, it became easier to look into Bessarabia's past without being constrained by the ideology of the party. Modern Moldovan and Romanian historians using innovative methodological approaches to investigate the socio-cultural processes in the Bessarabian counties, particularly Anton Moraru²⁰ and Boris Buzilă²¹, are worth mentioning. Many aspects of religious life in the research region are revealed in the volumes of Valentin Tomuleț, which investigate various parts of Bessarabia's history in the nineteenth century.²² The

¹⁷ "Kishinevskiye yeparkhial'nyye vedomosti" [Chisinau eparchial bulletin], Kishinev, 1867, 1880, 1899.

¹⁸ Ya. Grosul, I. Budak, *Ocherki istorii narodnogo khozyaystva Bessarabii (1812-1861 gg.)* [Essays on the history of the national economy of Bessarabia (1812-1861)], Kishinev, 1967.

¹⁹ V. M. Kabuzan, *Narodonaseleniye Bessarabskoy oblasti i levoberezhnikh rayonov Pridnestrov'ya (konets XVIII – pervaya polovina XIX v.)* [Population of the Bessarabian region and left-bank districts of Transnistria (late 18th - first half of the 19th century)], Kishinev, 1974.

²⁰ Anton Moraru, *Istoria românilor. Basarabia și Transnistria (1812-1993)* [The history of the Romanians. Bessarabia and Transnistria (1812-1993)], Chișinău, 1995.

²¹ Boris Buzilă, *Din istoria vieții bisericești din Basarabia (1812-1918; 1918-1944)* [From the history of church life in Bessarabia (1812-1918; 1918-1944)], Chișinău, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1996.

²² Valentin Tomuleț, *Basarabia în epoca modernă (1812-1918) (Instituții, regulamente, termeni)*, vol. I-III [Bessarabia in the modern era (1812-1918) (Institutions, regulations, terms), Vol. I-III], Chișinău, 2011; Idem, *Ținutul Hotin în surse statistice rusești din prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea*, Ediția a II-a, prescurtată [Hotin County in Russian Statistical Sources from the First Half of the 19th Century. Second Edition, shortened], Chișinău, CEP USM, 2018.

works of Lucheria Repida²³ or Vasile Stati approach the Bessarabian topics through “Moldovanism” perspectives.²⁴

The collective work of the Romanian and Moldavian historians Ioan Scurtu, Dumitru Almaş, Armand Goşu, Ion Pavelescu, Gheorghe I. Ioniţă, Ion Şişcanu, Nicolae Enciu, and Gheorghe E. Cojocaru²⁵ substantiates the assessment of the political, social, and cultural effects of the Prut-Dniester interfluvium's accession to the Russian Empire for the region's inhabitants. The evolution of the Orthodox Church in the context of the cultural development of Bessarabia, the role of priests in promoting education among the masses, as well as the religious policy of the Tsarist administration are analysed in the study signed by Mircea Păcurariu²⁶. The studies published by Paul Cernovodeanu²⁷ or Ştefan Purici²⁸ demonstrate a specific interest in reflecting on the researched topic.

There is a growing interest in the history of the region under study in modern Ukrainian historiography. The collective work of Chernivtsi scholars *Bukovyna: A Historical Essay*²⁹, in particular, provides a general description of the faiths in the Khotyn region, part of one of the Bessarabia's former northern counties. One of the chapters of the volume *Khotyn Region*³⁰ briefly mentions the Russian Old Believers who lived in some settlements of Khotyn County.

However, the study of church and religious life in the northern Bessarabian region is impossible without the analytical use of archival and other relevant materials. The materials of the National Archives of the Republic of Moldova

²³ L. Repida, *Suverennaya Moldova: istoriya i sovremennost'*, [Sovereign Moldova: history and modernity], Kishinev, IPF Tsentral'naya tipografiya, 2008.

²⁴ Vasile Stati, *Istoria Moldovei* [History of Moldova], Chişinău, Vivar-Editor, 2002.

²⁵ Ioan Scurtu, Dumitru Almaş, Armand Goşu et al., *Istoria Basarabiei, de la începuturi până în 2003* [History of Bessarabia, from the beginning to 2003], Ediţia a 3-a, revăzută şi adăugită, Bucureşti, Editura Institutului Cultural Român, 2003.

²⁶ Mircea Păcurariu, *Basarabia. Aspecte din istoria Bisericii şi a neamului românesc* [Bessarabia. Aspects from the history of the Church and of the Romanian nation], Iaşi, Editura Mitropoliei Moldovei şi Bucovinei, 1993 (2012).

²⁷ Paul Cernovodeanu, *Basarabia: drama unei provincii istorice româneşti în context politic internaţional 1806-1920* [Bessarabia: the drama of a historical province in the international political context 1806-1920], Bucureşti: Editura Albatros, 1993.

²⁸ Ştefan Purici, *op. cit.*

²⁹ V. Botushansky (Ed.), *Bukovyna: istorychnyy narys* [Bukovina: A Historical Essay], Chernivtsi, 1998.

³⁰ Oleksandr Dobrzhan's'kyy, Yuriy Makar, Oleksandr Masan, *Khotynshchyna: istorychnyy narys* [Khotyn Region: A Historical Essay], Chernivtsi, Molodyy bukovynets', 2002.

(NARM), the State Archives of the Odesa region (DAOO), and the State Archives of the Chernivtsi region (DACHO) are all important resources for this research.

PECULIARITIES OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ETHNO-CONFESSIONAL SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN PART OF BESSARABIA

The Bucharest Peace Treaty of May 16, 1812, opened a new page in the history of Moldavian Principality. The lands between the Dniester and the Prut, including the former Khotyn *raya*, became the property of the Romanov Empire. The entire newly annexed territory, which during the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812 remained a part of Moldavia, "scattered" on the left bank of the Prut, was given the administrative name "Bessarabia", and its inhabitants - the status of subjects of the empire.³¹

The annexation of the Prut-Dniester region to the Romanov Empire contributed to the dynamic growth of the Bessarabian population. There were quite important conditions for this: the presence of a large array of vacant lands, the absence of serfdom in the Bessarabian territory and the religious tolerance of local authorities. Therefore, there was a significant number of refugees - serfs from other provinces of the Russian Empire³² among the numerous flows of migrants.

In contrast to the central part of Bessarabia (Soroca, Iași, Orhei, Chișinău) and the south of the region (Bender, Ismail, Akkerman counties), this area had exhibited some national features. The geographical proximity and the greater freedoms of the inhabitants of Moldavia facilitated the relocation of a significant number of Ukrainians from Habsburg Galicia and Tsarist Podolia to the county of Khotyn. According to demographic calculations, in 1774, about 31,335 people lived on this land in the northern part of Bessarabia, of which 59.9 per cent were Romanians, 35.7 per cent were Ruthenians, 3.6 per cent Jews and 0.8 per cent Roma.³³ Annexation to Russia generated a significant migratory phenomenon (there was no serfdom in Bessarabia, but serfdom reigned throughout the Tsarist Empire), and in 1818 the population of Khotyn County was 47.5 per cent Romanians and 42.6 per cent Ukrainians.³⁴ Russian statistics and official reports from the early 1960s show that in 1862, 163,136 people lived in the northernmost

³¹ National Archive Republic Moldova (NARM), Fond 1, List 1, File. 3995, p. 11-14.

³² Oleksandr Dobrzhans'kyi, Yuriy Makar, Oleksandr Masan, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

³³ Constantin Ungureanu, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

³⁴ V. Kabuzan, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

district of Bessarabia, of which 78,951 (48.4%) were Ukrainians, 54,413 (33.3%) Romanians, 23,572 (14.4%) Jews, 2,912 (1.8%) Russians, 1,707 (1.0%) Poles, 928 (0.6%) Roma, 537 (0.3%) Germans, 71 Armenians, 39 Greeks and 6 Belarusians.³⁵

Data on the evolution of the population regarding religious denominations are very scarce and sometimes inaccurate. Thus, in the middle of the 19th century, out of the total 932,511 inhabitants of Bessarabia³⁶, according to the estimates of the historian Ion Gumenâi, 23,073 Lutherans, 8,000 Catholics, 42,380 Mosaics, 6,389 Lipovans, 2,353 Armenians, 435 Molokans*,³⁷ lived in the province. That is, in the years 1850-1852, the largest community was the Orthodox, which included 852,276 people (91.4%), and 80,235 Bessarabians (8.6%) belonged to other cults and denominations. In Khotyn county, in the 1960s, Orthodox made up about 84 per cent of the total population, while other denominations about 16 per cent, most of whom were Mosaics (14.45%) and Roman Catholics (1, 05%).³⁸

Given the historical past of the region, the new imperial government sought to turn the newly connected lands into a rich province, where there would be a fatherly and generous rule based on Moldavian rights and customs. All reorganization changes were carried out carefully to avoid the negative impact of the neighbouring Ottoman Empire on the diverse population. By allowing the use of Moldovan alongside Russian as the official language of government, the Temporary Government of Bessarabia pursued the goal of convincing the united and neighbouring peoples that the entire internal life of the region was built according to "its own rules."³⁹

It should be emphasized that Bessarabia's border position required Russian tsarism to pursue a balanced policy in the newly connected territory as a basis for

³⁵ Constantin Ungureanu, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

* Sect detached from the Russian Orthodox Church. Due to the fact that during the Orthodox fast the members of the community accepted the consumption of milk, the sect was called the Molocans (moloko - milk).

³⁷ Ion Gumenâi, *Raporturile dintre populația autohtonă a Basarabiei și minoritățile confessionale în prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea* [The relations between the native population of Bessarabia and the confessional minorities in the first half of the 19th century], in George Enache, Arthur Tuluș, Cristian-Dragoș Căldăraru, Eugen Drăgoi (Eds.), *La frontierele civilizațiilor. Basarabia în context geopolitic, economic, cultural și religios* [At the frontiers of civilizations. Bessarabia in a geopolitical, economic, cultural and religious context], Galați, Editura Partener and Galati University Press, 2011, p. 48-49.

³⁸ See Constantin Ungureanu, *op. cit.*, p. 287-288.

³⁹ A. Nakko, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 6.

further imperial domestic policy.

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIFIED PRINCIPLES OF IMPERIAL AUTHORITY

Simultaneously with the beginning of administrative changes in the region, according to the order of Emperor Alexander I, the Chişinău-Khotyn diocese was founded in 1813 under the management of Exarch-Metropolitan Gavriil Bănulescu-Bodoni (1813-1821). Accordingly, the diocese was divided into ten deaneries, which spread among the population of the region the belief in "favourable changes" under the rule of all-Russian monarchs.⁴⁰ Metropolitan Gavriil proceeded to integrate elements of organization and cult practices borrowed from the Russian Church into the "Moldavian" Church. Teachers from Russia were brought in to teach future clergymen in Bessarabia. Priests were required to mention the Russian imperial family during divine service.⁴¹

Archbishop Dmitry Sulima (1821-1844) urged the boyars-landlords to be friendly to courtiers, tsars and ointments who settled on their lands so that they might see the positive changes in their destinies under the sceptre of the all-Russian monarch and become closer to the Russians.⁴² In addition, the Bessarabian clergy had to spread among the inhabitants of the region, especially among Muslims, that the Orthodox faith was better.⁴³

During the first year after the annexation of Bessarabia to the Russian Empire, the social and legal position of all clergy and their widows changed accordingly. It should be noted that the Bessarabian clergy was divided into 'white' (priests, archpriests, archpriests, presbyters, priests, anti-deacons, deacons, as well as deacons-novices, monks, psalmists and others) and 'black' (metropolitans, archbishops, abbots, abbots-novices).⁴⁴ From August 1813, they were exempted from paying state taxes and public duties. The "Statute of the Bessarabian Region" (1818) referred to the Orthodox clergy as a privileged class. Its representatives received the same rights as the Russian clergy and were exempted not only from paying all taxes and duties but also from military service.

⁴⁰ *Ocherk grazhdanskogo ustroystva Bessarabskoy oblasti v 1812-1828 gg.* [Essay of the civil structure of the Bessarabian region in 1812-1828] in *Записки Одесского имперского общества истории и древностей*, Одесса, 1900, Т. XXII, с. 13; "Кишиневские епархиальные ведомости" [Chisinau eparchial bulletin], 1867, № 3, с. 99.

⁴¹ Boris Buzilă, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁴² "Kishinevskiye yeparkhial'nyye vedomosti" [Chisinau eparchial bulletin], 1867, № 3, p. 95.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, № 8, p. 283-284.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

At the same time, the clergy must supervise the condition of bridges, lanterns, etc. It should be also noted that local duties were paid only by Old Believer monks who had no right to own real estate.⁴⁵

The other cults and denominations, on the other hand, experienced a reasonably favourable development until the middle of the 19th century. Unlike the rest of the empire, Bessarabia established a policy of tolerance towards the unorthodox, even allowing them some privileges. Interested, for example, in the colonization of Bessarabia by the Germans, the Tsarist authorities granted various privileges to members of this community, including the freedom to establish Protestant churches, to hire clerics, to practice their own religion without constraint and to establish confessional schools.⁴⁶ Bulgarians and Gagauz, especially in southern Bessarabia, were also guaranteed freedom of worship.⁴⁷ The Mosaics, which in 1856 formed a population of 78,751 people, enjoyed for several decades the fact that Russian anti-Jewish legislation was not applied in Bessarabia and managed to build the great synagogue in Chisinau and set up a confessional school.⁴⁸ The Mosaic community of Bessarabia already had 37 synagogues with 25 rabbis and 89 confessional schools with 235 professors in 1836, according to official data, for a population of 46,287 people.⁴⁹

FORMATION OF POLY-CONFESSIONAL NORTHERN COUNTIES OF BESSARABIA

The first statistical data on the number of churches and clergy in the northern counties of Bessarabia after the region entered the Russian Empire dates back to 1813. In particular, according to archival data at that time in Khotyn, there were 3 churches, 3 priests, and in Khotyn County - 153 churches and 243 clergymen.⁵⁰ According to the statistical data for 1817 published by Ion Halippa,

⁴⁵ *Svod zakonov Rossiyskoy imperii* [Code of laws of the Russian Empire], Sankt Peterburg, 1867, T. 9, c. 59.

⁴⁶ Luminița Fassel, *Das deutsche Schulwesen in Bessarabien (1812-1940)*, München, Verlag Südostdeutsches Kulturwerk, 2000, S. 20.

⁴⁷ Ștefan Purici, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁴⁹ Ion Gumenăi, *Evoluția demografică a minorităților confesionale din Basarabia. Statistici din al doilea sfert al secolului XIX* [The demographic evolution of the confessional minorities in Bessarabia. Statistics from the second quarter of the 19th century], in "Archiva Moldaviae", V, 2013, p. 174.

⁵⁰ NARM, Fond 5, List 2, File 398, p. 15-16.

in Khotyn county there were 240 priests and 46 widows of the clergy, 201 deacons, 157 sacristans.⁵¹ Somewhat different statistics are given for the same year by Pavel Svin'in, who claimed that this northern county had 226 priests, 3 archpriests, and 292 sacristans.⁵² At the same time, according to archival data, 419 representatives of the clergy were recorded in the neighbouring Iasi district, and 635 priests in the Soroca district.⁵³ It should be noted that not all Bessarabia settlements had church wards, therefore there are no data on clergymen. In 1818, for example, only 29 villages out of 58 rural communities in Khotyn County had churches.⁵⁴

The growth of the region's population certainly influenced the dynamics of the number of clergies in each county of Bessarabia. For example, in 1828 in Balti County there were 999 representatives of this social group, including 849 'white' and 133 'black' clergymen, 17 deacons, which was 0.9 per cent of the county's population. Respectively, there were 582 'white' and 39 'black' clergy and 17 deacons in Khotyn County, which was 0.5 per cent of the county's population.⁵⁵ In general, in the two northern Bessarabian counties, according to archival sources, the clergy accounted for 0.7 per cent of the region's population.

It should be emphasized that the vast majority of the population in the northern Bessarabian lands were parishioners of the Eastern Orthodox Church. During the first year of the Russian administration, there were 3 churches in Khotyn and 153 churches in Khotyn County. Accordingly, there are 2 churches in Soroca and 139 churches in Soroca County. At the end of the 1820s, there were 2,100 Orthodox parishioners in Khotyn, 110,230 in Khotyn County, 2,024 in Balti, and 97,308 in Iasi County, 211,662 people in the region. The above-mentioned number of parishioners during this period attended 224 churches in Iasi County, one church in Balti, 186 churches in Khotyn County, and two churches in Khotyn. The 410 church parishes in these three counties accounted for 50.3 per cent of all 815 Bessarabian churches.⁵⁶

The fast growth of the human population following immigration and colonization has resulted in a significant increase in the number of parishioners. According to a *catagraph* made by the Tsarist authorities in 1830, there were 11

⁵¹ I. N. Halippa (red.), *Trudy Bessarabskoy...*, T. III, p. 91-92.

⁵² [Svinin Pavel], *Statistika Bessarabii...*, p.135.

⁵³ Derzhavnyy arkhiv Odes'koy oblasti [State Archive of Odessa Oblast], Fond 1, List 2, File 2, p. 90.

⁵⁴ NARM, Fond 5, List 3, File 554, p. 46.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Fond 2, List 2, File 1199, p. 67.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

stone churches, 171 wooden, one monastery and three Lipovan churches in the county of Khotyn, which had a population of 122,208 people.⁵⁷ However, according to the report submitted by the *ispravnik* of Khotyn County in 1835, there were 175 Orthodox churches, two churches of other Christian denominations and three synagogues in the rural area of this administrative district, served by 1,210 Orthodox priests and three rabbis.⁵⁸ And an official document drawn up in 1836 shows that there were two Orthodox churches, two non-Orthodox Christian churches and one synagogue in the city of Khotyn.⁵⁹

The Orthodox parishioners of the North Bessarabian churches were representatives of various social classes and layers of the population of the region. For example, there were 299 families of Orthodox parishioners in 1820 in the county town of Khotyn where 2028 people lived, including 39 nobles, 168 officials, 130 retired people, 17 state peasants and burghers. And 290 yards of Orthodox parishioners were recorded in the Klishkoutsi, the county's largest village, where 2268 state peasants (free peasants, who lived on their own or landed estates) and 3 nobles lived.⁶⁰

Archival sources at the time noted that irreligious people were absent from Orthodox parishes. At the same time, they emphasized that in the vast majority of churches the parishioners were poor people who could not donate according to the needs of the church. Honorary parishioners included large landowners-landlords, some of whom built churches on their estates and others have constantly supported the parish churches on their own.⁶¹

The Russian government did its utmost to promote and support the Orthodox faith among the inhabitants of the newly incorporated lands. The attitude of the authorities to the beliefs of the local population was quite liberal, as it was allowed to hold services in the Romanian language.⁶² At the same time, appropriate measures were introduced to promote active church attendance by the local population. Thus, for example, by the middle of the 19th century in the Bessarabia lands, local police were required to ensure that shops were not opened

⁵⁷ Ion Gumenăi, *Evoluția demografică...*, p. 167.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

⁶⁰ Derzhavnyy arkhiv Chernivets'koyi oblasti [State Archives of Chernivtsi Oblast – DACHO], Fond 605, List 1, File. 26, p. 11.

⁶¹ “Kishinevskiye yeparkhial'nyye vedomosti” [Chisinau eparchial bulletin], 1868, № 9, p. 61; № 10, p. 62.

⁶² Nicolae Popovschi, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

on Sundays and other holidays until the end of the liturgy in the parish churches.⁶³

At the same time, believers of other denominations were registered among the population of the region. In particular, Roman Catholics, of whom 1226 persons lived in the northern counties in 1828, accounting for 66.3 per cent of all Bessarabian Roman Catholics. Their largest representation is recorded in Khotyn - 569 people and Khotyn County - 484 people (for comparison: in Iasi County - 103 Roman Catholics, in Balti - 70 people).⁶⁴ It should be added that Poles, a small ethnic group in the northern Bessarabian lands, were among the representatives of the Roman Catholic religion. Their small groups settled in Nelipautsi, Markoutsy, Byrnova, Volchinetsi, and Lomachintsi of Khotyn district. In 1835, there were already 108 Poles in Khotyn who were members of the Roman Catholic Church, and 292 people in the county (for comparison: in Soroca County - 45 people, Balti - 96). The trend of dynamic growth of Roman Catholics among the inhabitants of the northern counties was observed throughout the first half of the 19th century. Poles lived mainly in Khotyn county villages in the 1850s, and in addition to the above-mentioned settlements, there were up to 800 people of both sexes in Bulboki, Romankivtsi, and Mykhailivka. For the most part, more than half of them belonged to the Roman Catholic faith.⁶⁵

The Mosaic was ranked second among religious communities in terms of quantity. The peculiarities of Tsarist policy in Bessarabia made the province an attractive region for Jews within Russia and even from neighbouring countries. The proportion of adherents of the Old Testament, the religion of the ancient Jews, increased in ascending order. Thus, 9,115 Jews were already registered in 1827 in 173 settlements of Khotyn County, while 1168 Jews were registered in Khotyn town in 1830, out of 1855 families.⁶⁶ Thus, in the northern part of Bessarabia, the cities of Bălți, Khotyn and the towns of Novoselitsa, Lipcani were inhabited mainly by Jews. By the early 1860s, there were 49,502 Jews in the north part of Bessarabia, representing 12.2 per cent of the area's population. This ethnic group remained the largest in Khotyn County - 20,307 people (for comparison: Soroca County - 13,824 Jews, Iași - 9,816).⁶⁷

⁶³ "Kishinevskiye yeparkhial'nyye vedomosti" [Chisinau eparchial bulletin], 1867, № 12, p. 127; № 13, p. 129.

⁶⁴ NARM, Fond 2, List 1, File 1199, p. 67.

⁶⁵ A. Zashchuk, *op. cit.*, Chasti I, p. 157.

⁶⁶ Ion Gumenăi, *Evoluția demografică...*, p. 169.

⁶⁷ A. N. Yegunov (red.), *Zapiski Bessarabskogo oblastnogo statisticheskogo komiteta*, Tom I, p. 91; *Zapiski Odesskogo obshchestva istorii i drevnostey* [Notes of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities], Tom V, Odessa, 1863, p. 526, 528.

However, there were isolated cases of conversion of residents from one faith to another. This was especially the case for the Jews who were baptized in the Orthodox faith. This can be confirmed by one of the messages to the Chisinau Spiritual Consistory and the Bessarabian regional administration from the charitable 1st district of Iași county of the priest Pidhursky from December 1, 1862, which stated that Srul Pletner, the Atachi burgher from Khotyn County, was baptized and he was given the name Dmitry.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the statistics of the time did not provide a generalized accurate fixation of all Jews.

Armenians - Austrian subjects who rented the estates of landlords and engaged in various trades more actively than the indigenous population made up a relatively modest percentage of the population of North Bessarabia during this era. After accepting Russian citizenship, Armenians received civil status, as did other residents of the region. Furthermore, before the region became a part of the Russian empire, there were only 16 Armenian families in the Khotyn town. In 1817, 170 people (34 families) already lived in the county, and in the 50s of the 19th century, there were 255 people. A smaller number of Armenians was recorded in Bălți and Soroca counties - 32 families. In general, in Bălți, Soroca and Khotyn they accounted for 0.9 per cent of the total population of Bessarabia's northern part.⁶⁹ The Armenians had their own community and church in Khotyn, which was subordinated to the patriarch of all the Armenians. Armenian Catholics settled in Khotyn and its district, as well as in Balti.⁷⁰

Along with the tolerant attitude towards non-orthodox peoples in Bessarabia, not only Old Believers but also representatives of various sects, who were mostly Russians, moved there. They were continuously in the line of sight of the official statistics of that time since they differed from the majority of Eastern Orthodox representatives in terms of religion. As a result, the most numerous in the region were the Old Believers-Popovtsi, or "Lipovans", who lived in the villages of Hrubna, Helishevca and Vitrianka of Khotyn County. They even had a convent in the latter. Old Believers-Lipovans lived separately and did not influence their Romanian or Ukrainian neighbours. In 1835, there were 264 Old Believers in Hrubna, 33 in Helishevca, 5 in Novoselitsa, and 17 schismatics who professed religion but did not recognize the priesthood. According to A. Afanasyev-Chuzhbynsky, the north-Bessarabian dissenters were a closed community, living apart from other inhabitants of the county. However, they

⁶⁸ NARM, Fond 5, List 10, File 321, p. 28.

⁶⁹ DACHO, Fond 40, List 1, File 36, p. 27; NARM, Fond 5, List 2, File 441, p. 52.

⁷⁰ A. Zashchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

maintained fairly close ties with their sects, many of which were located in the Kherson and Tavriya provinces.⁷¹

At the same time, seven monasteries were recorded in the study area. It should be noted that the monastic lands of the northern counties were the property of Moldavian and Jerusalem foreign Orthodox monasteries as well as a small part of the Bessarabian ones. It is worth noting that there is no reliable information on the number of these lands, as their managers - proxies, mostly monks - were not accountable to the local Russian authorities and tried to falsify statistics about their estates. However, it is estimated that they amounted to at least 185,000 hectares, i.e. almost 58.5 per cent of all Bessarabian monastic lands. The largest number of monastic estates was in Soroca County, which occupied 17 per cent of the county area (for comparison: in Balti - 14%, Khotyn - 5%).⁷²

During the first part of the nineteenth century, the number of Lutherans in the northern counties of Bessarabia was the lowest when compared to the number of believers of other religions. According to A. Zashchuk, there were 266 individuals in three counties in the middle of this century, accounting for 1.18 per cent of all Bessarabian parishioners of this religion. Soroca County had the largest representation of them, with 173 people, Iasi County had 74 people, and Khotyn County had 19 people.⁷³ However, there are no members of this faith in the Khotyn district at the beginning of the 1860s.

The main activity of the Bessarabian priests was church service. However, the level of education remained quite low, as mentioned in numerous archival sources of the time. From the very first years of the region's annexation to the Russian Empire, the Metropolitan of Chisinau and Khotyn issued an instruction of March 3, 1815, on the compulsory education of children of priests and clergy, many of whom remained illiterate at the age of ten. Under such circumstances, they could not acquire the rank of deacon and enter the only Chisinau Theological Seminary in Bessarabia at that time. The church authorities required the representatives of all clergy (priests, deacons, deacon-boys, and sacristans) to take care of the education of their own children so that in the future they would be useful to the church and the fatherland. First, the parents-priests had to immediately teach their children to read at home before enrolling them in church schools. If the instructions were disregarded, priests were subjected to a variety

⁷¹ A. Afanas'yev-Chuzhbinskiy, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

⁷² A. N. Yegunov (red.), *Zapiski...*, p. 36-37.

⁷³ A. Zashchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

of punishments, and their children, who did not study to read and to write until the age of 15, were stripped of their spiritual rank and given peasant status.⁷⁴

At the same time, local priests acted as teachers in church schools. The periodicals of that period concluded that the level of teaching and learning in these educational institutions remained quite low. After all, the training took place according to the "Hourglass" and the "Psalter" and it was reduced to the mechanical memorization of book phrases. A striking example of the methodological approach to teaching children literacy at that time was one of the best students of the Stavchany school of Khotyn district. During the year, the student "read" fairly well, but after inserting a previously torn sheet into the "Psalter", according to which the children learned to read, he appeared to have totally forgotten the letters.⁷⁵

Local clergy also supervised two-year parish schools in the region, where, in addition to lessons in Romanian and Russian reading and writing, arithmetic, church singing and catechism were taught. From the second half of the 40s of the 19th century, the northern Bessarabian villages began to be actively organized by priests at churches or deacons of the school of letters. However, they usually existed only on paper, and their students, peasant children, studied in the apartments of psalmist priests or church watchtowers.⁷⁶

The so-called *cheders* were taught in the Jewish classical religious schools, through the study of the Torah (Old Testament) and the Talmud (an explanation of the Torah of the Jewish sages), which were mostly memorized. Because such Jewish educators' institutions were officially prohibited, teachers (*melamed*) formed *cheders* in their own homes.⁷⁷

Thus, the local clergy of the northern counties of Bessarabia during the pre-reform period remained authorized not only to perform sacred religious rites but also to attempt to provide basic education to peasant children. However, everything was carried out at a fairly low level.

⁷⁴ DACHO, Fond 605, List 1, File. 228, p. 1-1v.

⁷⁵ "Kishinevskiye yeparkhial'nyye vedomosti" [Chisinau eparchial bulletin], 1874, № 3, p. 162; № 10, p. 196.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 1881, № 7, p. 207-218.

⁷⁷ See the Jewish educational statistic in A. Zashchuk, *Materialy...* Chasti I, p. 425-428.

CONCLUSIONS

The north part of Bessarabia, annexed to the multinational Russian Empire under the Bucharest Peace Treaty, was a multi-ethnic region. Local authorities' religious tolerance was practised in the area of the northern counties of Balti (Iasi), Soroca, and Khotyn. The introduction of unified policy principles in the region contributed to changes in the socio-legal status of clergy and Orthodox monasteries, an increase in the number of Orthodox churches and a dynamic increase in adherents of the Eastern Orthodox faith and other religions. If the numerical expansion of religious groups occurred during the first two decades of tsarist administration because of large immigration and colonization measures, the subsequent era experienced primarily natural growth. Because the Russian Empire was primarily an Orthodox state, the Orthodox community's numerical superiority was preserved throughout the period studied, both in Bessarabia and in Khotyn County. The increase in the number of followers of the Roman Catholic Church or the Mosaic cult was too insignificant to change the ethnoreligious composition of the province, as well as Khotyn County's population. Religious and multilingual compatriots were generally tolerant of each other, so no serious conflicts on national and religious grounds were recorded in the region.

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ORTHODOX CLERGY AND SPECIAL PURPOSE UNITS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE: FORMS AND FEATURES OF INTERACTION

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Abstract: *The investigation followed the forms, methods, directions, and mechanisms of interaction of the Russian Orthodox Church, particularly its clergy, with the Ministry of Interior's gendarmerie and police bodies, with the institutions and divisions of the military and naval departments, with the prison services of the Ministry of Justice, with the separate corps of border guards of the Ministry of Finance as well as the courier body of the Ministry of War. The gradual increase of this category of Orthodox clergy and the extension of their position and influence on the relevant population is proved based on the examination of sources. Russian Empire clerics of these structures have played a critical role in providing authorities and employees with basic intellectual, moral, and educational training. Their activities ranged from strictly religious obligations to educational and moral-spiritual activity, as well as charity, all of which contributed to the inviolability of autocratic principles. Fulfilling the mission of aligning the Russian Orthodox Church with the political institutions of the Russian autocracy, the clergy of state departments acted as an ideological and educational tool for ensuring the efficient functioning of the branch's control mechanism of the Empire.*

Keywords: *Orthodox clergy, autocracy, special units, military clergy, ideological activities, religious and educational work.*

Rezumat: *Clerul ortodox și unitățile cu scop special ale Imperiului Rus: forme și caracteristici ale interacțiunii. Cercetarea a vizat formele, metodele, direcțiile și mecanismele de interacțiune a Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse, respectiv a clerului ortodox cu jandarmeria și organele de poliție ale Ministerului Afacerilor Interne, cu instituțiile și diviziile departamentelor militare și navale, cu serviciile penitenciare ale Ministerului*

Justiției, cu corpul distinct de gardieni din Ministerul Finanțelor, precum și cu unitatea de curierat a Ministerului de Război. Creșterea numerică, treptată, a acestei categorii de clerici ortodocși ca și rolul și importanța lor în rândul populației influente sunt analizate în temeiul documentelor ruse. Preoții din cadrul acestor structuri ale Imperiului Rus au jucat un rol cheie în instruirea și educarea ideologică și morală a oficialităților și angajaților. Acțiunile lor au contribuit la asigurarea inviolabilității principiilor autocratice, îmbrăcând diferite forme: de la manifestări cu caracter pur religios, la activități educaționale și moral-spirituale ori caritabile. Îndeplinind misiunea de aliniere a Bisericii Ortodoxe Ruse la instituțiile politice ale autocrației ruse, clerul departamentelor de stat a acționat ca un instrument ideologic și educațional în vederea asigurării unei funcționări eficiente a ramificatului mecanism de control al imperiului.

INTRODUCTION

One of the critical tasks of any state is to ensure the long-term and progressive development of society, as well as the ability to preserve national interests, even if it requires adopting force. At the same time, it is critical to ensure that human rights and freedoms are effectively protected. In this regard, the position and values of the clergy, which should operate as a moral guiding force of society, play an essential role, particularly in light of the lack of corresponding mechanisms at the legislative level, certainly compared to past historical times. The above is undeniably important to the Russian Empire of the XIX – early XX century with its autocratic model of public administration as a system in which the disregard for the individual interests of the subjects was a determining element necessary to defend the inviolability of monarchical principles. In light of this, as well as the problem's current social significance, a study of the Orthodox clergy's relations with individual state institutions and special units of some Russian Empire ministries, primarily of power, was conducted, taking into account the meaning of the interaction's characteristics, directions, and value.

The study's historiography includes works of authors from various historical periods, such as Timofey Barsov¹, Vladimir Gagen², Mikhail Gernet³,

¹ T. Barsov, *Ob upravlenii russkim voyennym dukhovenstvom* [On the management of the Russian military clergy], Sankt-Peterburg, 1879. 168 s.

² V. Gagen, *Dukhovno-nravstvennoye i prosvetitel'skoye vozdeystviye na zaklyuchennykh* [Spiritual, moral and educational impact on prisoners], in "Tyuremnyy vestnik" [Prison Herald], 1913, vol. 8-9, s. 1217-1219.

³ M. Gernet, *Istoriya tsarskoy tyurmy* [The history of the imperial prison], Moskva, 1951, vol. 1, 328 s.

Tetiana Gubskaya⁴, Vladimir Rogoza⁵, Mikhail Sizikov⁶, Mikhail Trifanov⁷, etc. Pre-revolutionary works are characterized by the idealization of status and some exaggeration of the social role of the Orthodox clergy (Timofey Barsov, V. Gagen). The lack of mechanisms in the Russian Empire to separate the state from religion, and even more so, its use as an instrument of public policy, was fully reflected in the works of that time. Most vectors of interest are entirely critical in the case of Soviet historians, who are known for not tolerating any religious subject. (Mikhail Gernet, Aleksandr Klibanov).⁸ In their works, to some extent not without the support of an archival source base, the clergy embodied the archaic nature of the imperial era, excessive enrichment, and bureaucracy. Only the studies of the modern period (Tetiana Gubskaya, Mikhail Sizikov, Mikhail Trifanov) provide a more or less impartial picture of the clergy-state institution interaction. Mykola Yeremenko and Ihor Lyman, in particular, researched the history of only one type of Orthodox clergy we studied – military – and on a regional scale (Southern Ukraine, the second third of the 18 – middle of the 19 century).⁹ Konstantin Kapkov's research has a broader perspective, focusing on the coverage of pastoral duties and priestly sacrifice without a specific historical context.¹⁰

⁴ T. Gubskaya, *Voyennoye dukhovenstvo i svyashchenniki Nikolayeva. Istoricheskiye ocherki* [Military clergy and priests of Nikolaev. Historical sketches], Nikolayev, 2006, 212 s.

⁵ V. Rogoza, *Vzaimodeystviye Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi so spetsialnymi strukturami, obespechivavshimi vnutrennyuyu bezopasnost Rossiyskoy imperii* [Interaction of the Russian Orthodox Church with special structures that ensured the internal security of the Russian Empire], in "Gosudarstvo, religiya, tserkov v Rossii i za rubezhom. Informatsionno-analiticheskiy byulleten" [State, religion, church in Russia and abroad. Information and analytical bulletin], Moskva, 2002, vol. 1 (29), http://www.religare.ru/2_2324.html

⁶ M. Sizikov, *Istoriya politsii Rossii (1718–1917). Vyp. 1: Stanovleniye i razvitiye obshchey regulyarnoy politsii v Rossii XVIII v.* [History of the Russian Police (1718–1917). Issue. 1: Formation and development of the general regular police in Russia in the XVIII century], Moskva, 1992, 66 s.

⁷ M. Trifanov, *Feldyegerskaya svyaz Rossii* [Courier service of Russia], Moskva, 1994, 239 s.

⁸ A. Klibanov, *Istoriya religioznogo sektantstva v Rossii (60-e gody XIX veka – 1917 g.)* [The history of religious sectarianism in Russia (60s of the 19th century – 1917)], Moskva, 1965, 348 s.

⁹ M. Yeremenko, I. Lyman, *Viiskove dukhovenstvo na pivdni Ukrainy (1734-1853 rr.)* [Military clergy in the south of Ukraine (1734-1853)], Melitopol, 2014, 436 s.

¹⁰ K. Kapkov, *Ocherki po istorii voyennogo i morskogo dukhovenstva Rossiyskoy imperii XVIII – nachala XX veka: Itogi k 1917 godu* [Essays on the history of the military and naval clergy of the Russian Empire in the 18th – early 20th centuries: Results by 1917], Moskva, 2009, 256 s.

Representatives of modern Western historiography address relevant issues indirectly within the stated topic, such as the social history of the Orthodox clergy (Freeze Gregory)¹¹, its functions and role in some wars involving the Russian Empire, especially with the Ottoman Empire (Anastasiya Pashova, Petar Vodenicharov)¹² and the First World War (Kamila Pawełczyk-Dura).¹³ These studies complement the general picture and provide the most up-to-date view of the mechanisms of using religion for military purposes at the time, based on specific examples and in the context of continental socio-political processes.

Thus, a comprehensive and diverse analysis of the importance and role of different categories of clergy in the activities of various state institutions and special units of the ministries of the Russian Empire has not previously been the subject of any synthetic research.

The periodicals of the time (the Police Bulletin, the Prison Bulletin, etc.) and the regulations codified in the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire formed the source base of this research. The study of this information block, which documented the evolution and distinctiveness of the Orthodox clergy's place in the power structure, has enabled the material provided to be concentrated on a documentary basis.

ORTHODOX CLERGY OVERVIEW DURING THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

The Ministry of Internal Affairs' gendarmerie and police bodies, the military and naval departments, the penitentiary units of the Ministry of Justice, and the separate corps of border guard are among the special units of the Russian Empire's power ministries with which the study is concerned. The Orthodox clergy, as well as the interaction of its representatives with political institutions, were influenced by peculiarities in their internal organization, characteristics of operating, and implementation of their unique roles, all of which contributed to the overall research outcome.

The system of law enforcement agencies and special services of the Russian

¹¹ L. Freeze Gregory, *The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth Century Russia. Crisis, Reform, Counter Reform*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1983. 315 p.; L. Freeze Gregory, *Subversive piety: Religion and the political crisis in late Imperial Russia*, in "Journal of Modern History", 1996, p. 308-350.

¹² A. Pashova, P. Vodenicharov, *The Military Clergy in the Russo-Ottoman War 1877-1878 – East Orthodoxy and Other Confessions*, in "Balkanistic Forum", 2015, vol. 3, p. 94-107.

¹³ K. Pawełczyk-Dura, *The influence of World War I on the activity of the Russian military and naval clergy*, in "Great War: insights and perspective", New York, 2016, s. 47-58.

Empire in the early twentieth century included (in generalized form) the following bodies and departments: police units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, penitentiary units of the Ministry of Justice, convoy guards and courier corps of the Ministry of War, and others. The division of these entities was based on their primary mission — to maintain the state's internal security.

It is important to note that the Orthodox clergy refers to the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church, who, in addition to officially fulfilling the autocracy's ideological tasks, occupied one of the key positions and provided an appropriate ideological and educational influence on the top positions of the empire's above-mentioned special bodies, departments, and agencies.

The prison staff, governed by law and subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, had the largest clergy representation. Thus, in May 1831, the Russian Empire's Committee of Ministers approved the "Instruction on the Rules of Internal Prison Rules", which included, among others, the chapter "On Churches", which established the legal status of prison churches, as well as the order for convicts to attend church services, religious rites, duties of priests, etc. It was expressly specified that the prison authorities must ensure "that there was no obscenity on the part of the detainees during the church service".¹⁴

Similarly, the Guidelines for Priests Serving Prisons and Hospitals of 1831 explicitly stated that church representatives must assist the prison authorities and the prison committee. It was, however, about spiritual and moral influence, with no mention of the judiciary or the police. The task of "informing the authorities if [the priest] notices cruel acts on the part of the guardians"¹⁵ was specified separately.

In the second half of the 19th century, the role of the clergy in the organization of prison life and religious and moral education of prisoners increased. At the same time, given the general political context, the desire of state bodies and agencies to help unite the relevant efforts of the prison administration and priests became quite noticeable. This is evidenced by specific examples of active construction (in some cases – the arrangement in special rooms) of temples and chapels in prisons. The legal status of priests also changed during this time. From now on, they are formally included in the prison administration. This state of affairs was codified in legislation in 1887 when priests were admitted to the ranks of officials in charge of prison management.

¹⁴ M. Gernet, *Istoriya tsarskoy tyurmy ...*, s. 106.

¹⁵ *Rukovodstvennoye nastavleniye svyashchennikam. sluzhashchim pri tyuremnykh zamkakh i bolnitsakh* [A guide for priests in prison castles and hospitals], Vologda, 1851, s. 17-18.

The parishioners of the prison churches were not only convicts but also personnel and even ranks of guards who were subordinated to the military department but could not attend church services separately. It is worth noting that in 1826, all "free" people were allowed to enter the prison churches, and limitations were imposed only after disputes between them and the prisoners became increasingly common. The guards' powers included escorting detainees, suppressing riots in detention centres, and securing prisons from the outside. This determined the terms of their subordination not only to the heads of the military department but also to the head of the Main Prison Department. As of 1886, 530 teams of guard convoys were formed in the Russian Empire, consisting of 100 officers and 11,738 lower ranks.¹⁶

According to official data, in 1891, there were 407 churches in the office of the archpriest of the military and naval clergy (among them: 306 regimental and 24 hospitals, 10 prisons, 12 cathedrals, etc.), with 569 clergymen serving (337 priests, 106 archpriests, 68 psalmists, 55 deacons, two protodeacons).¹⁷ According to Vladimir Gagen, a Russian researcher of the early 20th century, 346 priests, 30 deacons, and 208 psalmists served in 1911 in 273 prison churches and 77 churches located in prisons. There were 40 additional churches in the correctional facilities, operated by 44 priests, four deacons, and 30 psalmists.¹⁸

At the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, prison officials have repeatedly acknowledged that a "smart priest with the gift of speech and the ability to arouse the hearts of prisoners" has the greatest influence on them. Not only sermons and general teachings were practised, but also private conversations. Official reports recorded the zealous service and positive impact of the priests of the Voronezh Disciplinary Battalion, Moscow Military Prison. In the latter, there was at least a weekly general meeting in the corridor. Priests in the Berdychiv and Kherson battalions just developed spiritual communion with the flock since they had no prior experience in this area. The military prison in Riga faced an unusual situation. To meet religious demands, a priest from one of the city's battalions was invited. As a result, he did not have enough time to communicate spiritually and morally with the local prisoners. It is worth noting that music and singing were practised in these institutions in Voronezh and Kherson.

¹⁶ V. Rogoza, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ *Voyennoye dukhovenstvo* [Military clergy], in *Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar* [Encyclopedic Dictionary], Sankt-Peterburg, 1892, vol. 6a, s. 846.

¹⁸ V. Gagen, *op. cit.*, s. 1217.

Guardianship and patronage organizations also conducted religious activities in prisons. In particular, on January 1, 1909, more than 50 such organizations were registered with the Main Prison Administration, whose members organized religious readings, provided books for the prison library, and cared for the spiritual literature needs of convicts, prison administration officials, and guards.¹⁹ In addition, these organizations were quite actively involved in charitable activities such as transferring considerable quantities of money spent on church requirements and additional payments to the clergy. In 1908 alone, these organizations supplied 105,053 rubles for this purpose.²⁰

Through the efforts of the Orthodox clergy of the penitentiary service, schools were established for prisoners and juvenile prisoners, children of prison officials, and guards. At the same time, the priests not only oversaw these schools but also taught them several subjects, the most important of which was God's law. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in particular, during the First World War, there was a further increase in the number of clergy in the penitentiary service of the Russian Empire. In particular, under the instructions of the Ministry of Justice of December 28, 1915, priests were included in the prison council on internal affairs. In addition, the instructions indicated the need for joint prayers for prisoners in the morning, evening, before lunch and dinner. The goals and objectives of religious influence were formulated as follows: "Formation of correct ideas about religion and general civic responsibilities, requiring devotion to the Throne and the Fatherland and obedience to the law, strict observance of relevant laws and respect for institutions of power".²¹

Thus, according to regulations and departmental instructions, the clergy of the penitentiary service provided religious and moral education for prisoners while clearly serving the state interests of the Romanov Empire.

At the same time, in addition to state authorities and various departments, the activities of the clergy from the penitentiary service were also under the constant control and supervision of the top leadership of the ROC. Thus, members of the Holy Synod and eparchial bishops visited prisons from time to time, held services, read sermons, and were engaged in the urgent concerns of prison churches.

In comparison to the Ministry of Justice's prison department, the Orthodox clergy's relationship with the Russian Empire's Ministry of Internal Affairs had

¹⁹ "Tyuremnyy vestnik" [Prison Herald], 1910, no. 2, s. 164.

²⁰ *Ibid*, no. 12, s. 1610.

²¹ V. Rogoza, *op. cit.*

its distinct peculiarities. This was based on the fact that the latter did not have its separate churches or full-time priests and instead relied on a flock of parish clergy and, less frequently, military clergy in the military department's garrisons. The latter was particularly common among retired officers and lower ranks who re-entered the police force while remaining parishioners of a regimental or garrison church.²²

It should be noted that the "Charter of the Deacon, or Policeman" approved in 1782 established not only police principles but also defined the place and role of the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. It was the Orthodox priests, in particular, who were to promote the education of such virtues in the ranks of the police as integrity, a desire to save lives, kindness, and so on.²³

Gradually, police units developed a tradition of celebrating annual church rites and religious holidays, which were usually celebrated on the day of honouring a particular Orthodox saint or shrine, such as Nicholas Ugodnik, Alexander Nevsky, Archangel Michael, St. Alexis, the icon of Kazan of St. George and Alexander Nevsky and others. Relevant holidays, as a rule, were held as processions and necessarily included a solemn prayer and a solemn service with the preaching of moral and spiritual direction.

Orthodox priests also participated in teaching at police schools. When the non-commissioned officers passed the exam for the first-class rank (14th grade of the "Table of Ranks"), they had to demonstrate Catechism knowledge. In this regard, Orthodox priests were included in the examination commissions. It is worth noting that after the events of the revolution of 1905-1907 in several educational institutions, especially newly established, such a subject as "God's Law" was no longer included in the list of compulsory subjects, and the expediency of its teaching depended on the decision of local police chiefs. In 1913, in the "Police Creation Project" prepared by the Ministry of the Interior, in the chapter "Police Schools and Courses", the study of the "Law of God" was not referenced at all.²⁴

The leadership of the ROC paid particular attention to the necessity for priests to conduct moral and spiritual work with detainees held in police units,

²² V. Kuritsyn (ed.), *Istoriya politzii dorevolutsionnoy Rossii (sbornik dokumentov i materialov po istorii gosudarstva i prava). Uchebnoye posobiye* [The history of the police in pre-revolutionary Russia (a collection of documents and materials on the history of state and law). Tutorial], Moskva, 1981, s. 7.

²³ M. Sizikov, *op. cit.*, s. 61.

²⁴ *Proyekt uchrezhdeniya politzii* [Police institution project], Sankt-Peterburg, 1913, s. 107.

namely providing them with religious literature and participation in collective religious readings.²⁵

Following the decree on religious tolerance of April 17, 1905, some changes in the activities of the Orthodox clergy among the Russian Empire's law enforcement forces occurred. In particular, priests began to take an active part in explaining to police officers the peculiarities of different religions. This was because the police ranks granted permission for sectarian temples and houses of worship to hold worship services and prayer meetings. The primary condition was that "the creed be legalized by a government decision and that it should not be among those prohibited by law".²⁶ In other words, the probability of granting a permit in such cases was minimal.

Another area of active interaction of the Orthodox clergy with the gendarmerie and police bodies is educational work aimed at combating drunkenness, as well as prevention of crime in general, education of the population of the empire as law-abiding subjects, loyal to the "king and homeland, and Orthodoxy". Instead, police officers were instructed in 1878 to ensure that "there was no noise, outrage, or obscenity near churches, especially during worship services, as well as during processions".²⁷

It should be noted that the police, in turn, had to "protect the rights of the Orthodox Church". This meant that the police must ensure: 1) that in temples and churches, as well as during processions and other rites, "the proper devotion was not violated in any way, and that no one was hindered or interrupted the Divine Service"; 2) that the population could freely attend church on Sundays and holidays; 3) that on the days of the liturgy alcoholic beverages "from drinking houses, taverns and inns" were not sold; 4) that no loud events be held near churches, especially during the service; 5) that new churches, prayer houses, chapels, etc. should not be arranged without the permission of the higher authorities; 6) that persons who profess the non-Orthodox faith "do not attempt to lure the Orthodox, or to include the opinions and personalities of others into their image".²⁸ Current legislation strictly forbade the setting up of tents to sell food and drink inside church fences and cemeteries.

²⁵ "Tyuremnyy vestnik" [Prison Herald], 1910, no. 1, s. 127.

²⁶ "Vestnik politsii" [Police Bulletin], 1910, no. 42, s. 1029.

²⁷ *Istoriya politsii Rossii: Kratkiy istoricheskiy ocherk* [History of the Russian police: A Brief historical sketch], Moskva, 1998, s. 121.

²⁸ P. Tsvetkov (com.), *Sbornik zakonov i rasporyazheniy pravitelstva: (Sost. po ofits. istochnikam 1857–1894 gg.): Sprav. kn. dlya chinov politsii i dr. uchrezhdeniy i lits* [Collection of laws and government orders: (Compiled from official sources 1857–

There was a particular specificity in the relationship between the Orthodox clergy and the Courier Corps, formed by the decree of Emperor Paul I on December 17, 1796. From January 26, 1808, the Courier Corps was subordinated to the Minister of War and from 1869 to the General Staff.²⁹

From 1815 to 1862, couriers, in connection with the corps' location on the territory of the former barracks of the Life Guards of the Lithuanian Regiment (later – Moscow) (St. Petersburg), visited the regimental church of St. Faithful Grand Duke Aleksandr Nevsky; from 1862 to 1865 – the temple of the Moscow Life Guards Regiment. Only in 1865 was the Feldjeger Corps' church finished and consecrated – the Church of the Presentation of the Lord, which had the status of a parish but was maintained at the expense of the corps. Administratively, until 1894, it was subordinated to the diocesan administration, and on September 6 of that year, it was transferred "to the office of the archpriest of the military and naval department".³⁰

The service of couriers was related not only to secular institutions and ranks but also involved in the tasks of the senior clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. Thus, it was common practice to involve officers and ranks of the Courier Corps in the transportation of church property. They escorted and protected the Golden Cross in the Far East during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905).³¹

Much attention of the Russian Orthodox Church was paid to the religious work of the Separate Border Guard Corps, which had been in departmental affiliation with the Ministry of Finance of the empire since 1893.³² The staff of each brigade provided for the position of a priest (until October 1917, they were in 17 units out of 31). The latter was subordinated to the diocesan bishops and was not part of the department's staff, as priests also worked with the local population, especially in conflict situations, acting as a mediator between the people and the ranks of the border service.

Orthodox priests played a significant role in the military units and army structures of the Russian Empire, forming a separate category of military clergy.

1894): A reference book for police officers and other institutions and individuals], Sankt-Peterburg, 1895, s. 62-63.

²⁹ N. Nikolayev (ed.), *Stoletiye Feldyegerskogo korpusa: 1796–1896: Istoricheskiy ocherk* [Centenary of the Courier Corps: 1796-1896: historical sketch], Sankt-Peterburg, 1896, s. 4, 19-20.

³⁰ Ibid., s. 1-6.

³¹ M. Trifanov, *op. cit.*, s. 120.

³² A. Plekhanov, *Otdelnyy korpus pogranichnoy strazhi. Kratkiy ocherk* [Separate border guard corps. Brief outline], Moskva, 1993, s. 62.

The turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries marked a turning point in the evolution of this category's property status. The decrees of Emperor Paul I of April 4, 9, 22, and 28 and May 9, 1800, in particular, introduced the position of the high priest of the army and navy, who was granted the authority to manage all the guard, army and navy clergy independently.³³ The newly created position was taken by Archpriest Pavel Ozeretskovsky, directly subordinate to the Holy Synod and equal with the diocesan bishops in terms of authority and status. In general, high priests received administrative and disciplinary authority over the military clergy, as well as the right to appoint and dismiss clergy, and military department clergy without the special permission of the Holy Synod (these powers were somewhat limited after the death of Paul I in 1801). Assessing the importance of separating the above category from the Orthodox clergy, it can be stated that this led to the separation of the military clergy from the eparchial clergy.

At the same time, in 1801, it was decided that only army priests should be appointed to priestly positions in hospitals, fortresses, and other similar places, because "they have served in the army for several years, and therefore deserve these dead places". Separate legislation regulated the clergy of churches to receive military commands from the Military Department or other authorities. At the same time, parishioners had to consist exclusively of military ranks. At that time, the Ober-priest of the armies and navies ruled over 32 churches: 16 hospitals, six garrisons at the battalions, two – at the regiments, six – at the fortresses, one – at the port of Sevastopol, and one – at the military-labour brigade of the railways.³⁴

According to Mykola Yeremenko and Ihor Lyman, modern Ukrainian historians, the military clergy played a significant role in the spread of Orthodoxy in the territories annexed to the Russian Empire as a result of a series of wars with Turkey. According to them, it was the "spiritual support of the Orthodox population in the Crimea, where for a long time after joining the Russian Empire, the 'dominant faith' position remained quite weak".³⁵

Subsequently, the system of management of the military clergy was decentralized: in 1816, the position of the second chief priest for the General Staff and the Guard was created; in 1840, this was the third chief priest of the Separate

³³ T. Gubskaya, *Voyennoye dukhovenstvo i svyashchenniki Nikolayeva ...*, s. 17.

³⁴ *Polnoye sobraniye postanovleniy i rasporyazheniy po vedomstvu pravoslavnogo ispovedaniya Rossiyskoy imperii* [Complete collection of decrees and orders for the department of the Orthodox confession of the Russian Empire], Petrograd, 1915, vol. 1 *Tsarstvovaniye gosudarya imperatora Nikolaya I. 1825 (dekabrya 12) – 1835 gg.* [Reign of Emperor Nicholas I. 1825 (December 12) – 1835], s. 136-137.

³⁵ M. Yeremenko, I. Lyman, *op. cit.*, s. 153-154.

Caucasian Corps (47 army priests served in units), and since 1845 he has been in charge of more than 100 churches of the Cossack line troops.³⁶

In the late 1820s and early 1830s, the authorities paid considerable attention to improving the material well-being of military priests and the governing bodies of this category. Initially, in 1827, the Chancellery staff of the Ober-Priest of the Army and Navy was changed. In particular, the Secretary of the Office began to receive 1200 rubles, instead of 500, his newly appointed assistant 750 rubles, 600 rubles instead of 300 for the Registrar, and 400 rubles for the two newly appointed clerks. Various costs (firewood, candles, supplies, etc.) began to be allocated twice as much – 600 rubles instead of 300.³⁷ It should be noted that, during the period of the previous staffing (1800-1827), the number of troops, and, as a consequence, military priests, increased almost fourfold. Moreover, churches and clergy in certain fortresses, hospitals, garrison battalions, two flotillas (the Black Sea and Caspian), etc., were additionally subordinated to the Ober-Priest and military workers' brigades, engineering teams, and some garrisons. Accordingly, the number of cases that passed through the Office increased significantly, reaching more than 2,000 incoming and up to 4,000 outgoing annually.

A few years later, in 1829, the decision was taken to improve the material situation of the military priests by raising their pay (since 1831). The remuneration of the Ober-priest of armies and fleets was increased to 3 thousand rubles per year, that of the senior priests of armies to 2.5 thousand rubles, and that of the main priests of the corps to 1.8 thousand rubles. Priests in all regimental and line battalions began to be paid in accordance with the infantry captains' salaries in the troops in which they served. Senior priests in the divisions were paid a surcharge of 50 rubles per year, and those who were on trips abroad – double payment by banknotes. In making this decision, Emperor Nicholas I expressed confidence in the clergy's "faithful service to the Church and the Throne and ardent diligence in the performance of their sacred duties".³⁸

The enactment of the "Regulations on Pensions and One-Time Benefits" for the "Guards, Army, and Navy Clergy" in 1832 was the final measure of a series of legislative changes aimed at improving the welfare of the "Guards, Army, and Navy Clergy." From now on, all priests who served flawlessly in the Guards, Army, and

³⁶ P. Znamenskiy, *Istoriya russkoy tserkvi (uchebnoye rukovodstvo)* [History of the Russian church (study guide)], Moskva, 2000, s. 333.

³⁷ *Polnoye sobraniye postanovleniy i rasporyazheniy ...*, s. 161-162.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 389.

Navy, line battalions and internal guards, admiralty and port churches, crews, naval and land hospitals, fortress churches, brigades of roads, were entitled to appropriate payments for service in the military and penitentiary institutions. This required more than 20 years of service. For a term of service of 20 to 30 years, the clergyman was entitled to a pension of one-third, two-thirds for 30-35 years, and full pay for 35 years and over. Special warnings have been issued in the event of deteriorating health or incurable disease. Later, the minimum term of compulsory service was reduced to 10 years.³⁹

Nevertheless, the position of military clergy remained unattractive. For a long time, the military priest "remained in duty for life, with very few exceptions, retaining the same rights as when he first entered service". Such attachment to a certain rank had negatively impacted the material condition, all official rights, and the moral condition. Material poverty, especially with a large family, and sometimes the insistent requests of those dissatisfied with their parish clergy forced some military priests to intervene in correcting the needs of foreign parishes, which caused "dissatisfaction on the part of parish priests and complaints from eparchial authorities".⁴⁰

In the 1860s, the regulation of the military clergy intensified. Special rules were issued for teaching the Law of God to the lower ranks in particular. They assigned the duty of conducting Christian faith interviews with lower grades to the regimental priests. Almost simultaneously, all military educational institutions increased the number of lessons based on the Law of God.

"A new regulation on the official rights and salaries of the military clergy", approved in 1887, gave the latter new higher official ranks. The general official rights of this clergy were defined with greater precision and clarity. Priests were given many rights along with other servicemen. Salaries increased significantly, with "priests being entitled to a salary supplement for the first ten years of service in the amount of a quarter of the salary, and half the salary for the next ten years." It is believed that "the new provision also allowed the military clergy to rise in service rights and preferences, as they serve, along with all officer ranks".⁴¹

³⁹ *Polnoye sobraniye zakonov Rossiyskoy imperii* [Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire], Sankt-Peterburg, 1833, vol. VII, no. 5310 (1832), s. 219-222.

⁴⁰ *K voprosu o proshlom i sovremennom sostoyanii voyennogo dukhovenstva* [On the question of the past and present state of the military clergy], in "Vestnik voyennogo dukhovenstva" [Military clergy bulletin], 1890, no. 1, s. 11.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 1890, no. 2, s. 38-40.

On June 12, 1890, the Regulations on the Management of Churches and Clergy of the Military and Naval Departments were approved, introducing the position of "Protopresbyter of the Military and Naval Clergy" (held by Aleksandr Zhelobovsky), to which all regimental, fortress and military churches, hospitals and educational institutions were subordinated.

The military clergy's administrative subordination system followed the same principles as the empire's interaction system between church and secular authorities, with one exception. Thus, the clergy of the military department was not subordinate to the local bishop. According to the "Regulations", the archpriest of the military and naval clergy and the diocesan bishops were appointed by the Holy Synod and approved by the emperor. Divisional deacons (a mediating role between the higher military clergy and the subordinate clergy) were identified as the archpriest's main assistants. At the same time, the deacons were obliged to supervise the temples and clergy under their jurisdiction.⁴² The "Regulations" of 1890, on the other hand, transformed the military clergy's independent standing in respect to diocesan authority, subjecting military priests to the control of the diocesan hierarchy within which they were stationed. As a result, the bishop's authority within his diocese was restored to its full canonical significance, and the possible reasons for the elders' previous indifference to the concerns of the military clergy were removed. The government's attention to the institute of military clergy is evidenced by the fact that in the same year, 1890, the official printed organ of the military clergy began to be published – the Bulletin of the Military Clergy (in 1911-1917 – the Bulletin of the Military and Naval clergy). The magazine published not only official laws, decrees and orders (including military and naval authorities related to the military and naval clergy), but also had an unofficial part, which contained: 1) words and speeches delivered by military clergy at the regimental holidays, or considered beneficial for utterance on the mentioned holidays and in other special cases of military life; 2) articles and notes on theological, canonical, church-historical and liturgical issues; 3) historical and statistical information on stationed, itinerant, camp and naval churches of the naval department; 4) a description of special spiritual celebrations at military churches; 5) various cases from the life and activity of the military clergy; 6) notes, records and memoirs about regimental priests who distinguished themselves in the wars; 7) information on the spiritual,

⁴² *Polnoye sobraniye zakonov Rossiyskoy imperii* [Complete collection of laws of the Russian Empire], Sankt-Peterburg, 1893, vol. X, no. 6934 (1890), s. 470-481.

educational, missionary and teaching activities of the military clergy (in schools, libraries, etc.); 8) various cases of pastoral practice, etc.⁴³

In addition, the clergy were granted the ability to receive orders for years of service via a military department order dated January 31, 1890.⁴⁴

As a result, near the end of the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire eventually established a single structure for the institute of military clergy, which encompassed the following levels: 1) protopresbyter of the military and naval clergy (the status of lieutenant general); 2) chief priests of the districts (status of major general); 3) corps, divisional, brigade and garrison deacons (colonel status); 4) regimental (battalion), hospital and prison priests.

The number of priests in the Russian army was determined by the payrolls approved by the Minister of War. Thus, according to the staff of the ten regiments of the Life Guard in 1856, the presence in each unit of one priest with an annual salary of 253.5 rubles was established. In comparison, the yearly salary of a lieutenant was 307.05 rubles.⁴⁵

The duties of military priests were most fully and clearly defined in 1869 (Book VII of the Code of Military Decrees):

- conducting services in the regimental church on a strictly defined time on all Sundays and holidays;

- preparation of servicemen for confession and reception of the Holy Sacraments, teaching and conducting extracurricular interviews (in coordination with the regimental military command);

- performing sacraments and prayers for servicemen in temples and their homes;

- preparation of the church choir for singing during services;

- conducting instructive conversations of moral and ethical orientation, teaching soldiers the truths of the Orthodox faith and piety, spiritual support of patients in hospitals;

⁴³ *Programma periodicheskogo izdaniya* [Periodicals program], in “Vestnik voyennogo dukhovenstva” [Military clergy bulletin], 1890, no. 1, s. 1-3.

⁴⁴ *Prikaz po voyennomu vedomstvu № 37 ot 31.01.1890 g. O pravakh svyashchen-nosluzhiteley na polucheniye ordenov za vyslugu let* [Order for the military department No. 37 of January 31, 1890 “On the right of the clergy to receive orders for length of service”], in “Vestnik voyennogo dukhovenstva” [Military clergy bulletin], 1890, no. 6, s. 159-160.

⁴⁵ V. Kotkov, Yu. Kotkova, *Voyennoye dukhovenstvo Rossii. Stranitsy istorii: Ucheb. posobiye* [Military clergy of Russia. Pages of history: Study guide], Sankt-Peterburg, 2005, s. 97.

- teaching the Law of God in regimental schools, soldier's children, training teams;
- during mobilization and hostilities, military priests were obliged to follow the assignment with military units and to be unconditionally subordinate to the military command.⁴⁶

CONCLUSIONS

Thus, Orthodoxy served as the ideological and spiritual basis of the Russian Empire and one of the most important factors in determining the subjects' worldview. The Russian Orthodox Church acted as the autocracy's main communicator with ordinary subjects, including the military. The place of this communication was primarily in Orthodox churches, where priests acquainted their parishioners with the imperial manifestos and decrees, carried out spiritual and moral education of personnel in the language of sacred books, and acquainted them with the lives of saints. Through prayers during worship services, the Orthodox clergy were to inspire believers with love for the king and the homeland and the military with the sanctity of their duty and the life sacrifice for the emperor and the empire. In religious conversations and sermons, priests had to reinforce the truths of the Christian faith and love for God and neighbour, respect for the supreme monarchical authority, reveal the importance of the oath, warn against the pernicious consequences of violating the military, imminent condemnation after death, explain the important principles of military service in the service of the king and the Fatherland as Christian virtues, as the way "to the salvation of one's soul" and the opportunity to "get to heaven". Thus, during wars (for example, with Turkey, Japan, or the First World War), the clergy explained to the soldiers their sacred role in defending the Fatherland, as well as the importance and prestige of the position of a soldier called to "defend the faith, homeland, and sovereignty".

Despite modest material support, the severity of military discipline, the constant change of residence, and therefore the inconvenience, often combined with the lack of personal savings, family separation (during war and camp meetings), climate change and damage to health, the life of a military priest was an attractive position for the representatives of the diocesan clergy, especially in

⁴⁶ G. Golov, *Prokhozheniye sluzhby po voyennomu vedomstvu. Kn. VII Svoda voyennykh postanovleniy 1869 goda* [Passage of service in the military department. Book VII of the Code of military orders of 1869], Petrograd, 1917, s. 9.

cases of socio-political crises. As a result, a fairly typical occurrence, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century, was the eparchial clergy's numerous demands for admission to the military department. This tendency can be partly explained by the nature and spirit of the principles that ensured military priests' position and leadership by the heads of military departments. The main forms of interaction of the Orthodox clergy with state institutions and special units of individual ministries of the Russian Empire were: participation in the general moral and ethical education of servicemen and police officers, meeting the religious needs of officials, performing religious rites for prisoners, performing ideological functions, etc. Promoting communication with the priests in the conditions of the unity of the autocracy and the Russian Orthodox Church was an essential tool of policy to ensure the inviolability of the principles and effective functioning of the power units of the institutions of imperial power. At the same time, despite all the specifics of the institution of the Orthodox clergy, invariably the main direction in its activities remained religious and educational work: formation of moral virtues in the parishioners from among the military and servicemen based on Biblical principles and canons of Orthodoxy during worship, prayers, the celebration of secular and church holidays. It should be noted that the military clergy, as a special institution in the Russian Orthodox Church, had a relatively high social status and enjoyed considerable influence among the military.

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THE ROLE OF RIGHT-BANK UKRAINE'S ORTHODOX CLERGY IN THE LOCAL LORE MOVEMENT (SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH - BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURIES)

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Abstract. *The study outlines the place and the role of Right-Bank Ukraine's Orthodox clergy (Kyiv, Volyn, and Podillia provinces) in the local lore movement in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. The Roman Catholic Church and Polish historical science significantly influenced this region, which considered Right-Bank Ukraine to be Poland's eastern provinces. To eliminate Polish influence and justify the annexation of these areas to the Russian Empire and mass Russification in all spheres, the government authorities granted privileges to the Orthodox Church in Right-Bank Ukraine and encouraged the clergy to conduct local lore study. In the middle of the 19th century, Orthodox clergy were actively involved in creating historical and statistical descriptions of the Kyiv, Volyn, and Podillia Orthodox dioceses. The Kyiv Theological Academy, the Volyn, and Podillia Orthodox Theological Seminaries became the main centres of Right-Bank Ukraine's local lore movement. They were centres of regional research in history, archaeology, ethnology, folklore, and museum activity of Right-Bank Ukraine until the early 20th century. In the second half of the 19th - early 20th century, the clergy of Right-Bank Ukraine also published periodicals and scientific collections with their results. As evidenced by the conclusions of this research, these authors did not follow Synod's recommendations and expanded their study. They published not only church descriptions but also the history of provinces, cities, towns, villages, archaeological maps of regions, historical monographs, collections of documents and materials, other local lore studies. This activity has had a favourable impact on the formation and development of the local lore movement.*

Keywords: *Orthodox Church, Right-Bank Ukraine, local lore, scientific research, statistical committees, archaeological societies.*

Rezumat: Rolul clerului ortodox din Ucraina din dreapta Niprului în mișcarea etnografică locală (a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea - începutul secolului al XX-lea). Studiul evidențiază locul și rolul clerului ortodox din Ucraina din dreapta Niprului (provinciile Kiev, Volyn și Podolia) în cultivarea istoriei locale, mișcare specifică celei de a doua jumătăți a secolului al XIX-lea și începutului de secolul XX. Biserica Romano-Catolică și curentul istoric polonez și-au pus amprenta, în mod semnificativ, asupra acestei regiuni pe care au considerat-o parte a provinciilor răsăritene ale Poloniei. Pentru a elimina influența poloneză, justificând totodată anexarea acestor teritorii la Imperiul Rus și rusificarea în masă, afectând toate domeniile, autoritățile guvernamentale au acordat privilegii Bisericii Ortodoxe din Ucraina din dreapta Niprului și au încurajat clerul să investigheze tradițiile locale. La mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea, clerul ortodox a fost implicat activ în descrierea istorică și statistică a eparhiilor ortodoxe din Kiev, Volyn și Podolia. Academia Teologică de la Kiev, seminariile teologice ortodoxe din Volyn și Podolia au devenit principalele centre ale mișcării de cultivare a istoriei locale din Ucraina. Până la începutul secolului al XX-lea, ele au funcționat ca nuclee de cercetare regională în domenii precum istoria, arheologia, etnologia, folclorul și de activitate muzeală pentru Ucraina din dreapta Niprului. În același interval de timp (a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea – începutul secolului al XX-lea), clerul din aceste teritorii a publicat în diverse periodice și colecții de studii rezultatele anchetelor întreprinse. Potrivit concluziilor acestei cercetări, autorii amintitelor anchete nu au respectat recomandările Sinodului și și-au extins aria de cercetare. Ei au publicat nu doar descrieri ale bisericilor, ci și istorii ale provinciilor, orașelor, târgurilor, satelor, hărți arheologice, monografii istorice, colecții de documente și acte, tradiții locale. Această activitate a avut un impact favorabil asupra formării și dezvoltării istoriografiei locale.

INTRODUCTION

As a result of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's second and third divisions of 1793, Right-Bank Ukraine was annexed to the Russian Empire, and the Kyiv, Podillia, and Volyn provinces were established on these lands. Official authorities actively promoted the region's Russification, refusing to acknowledge the Ukrainian language or a separate Ukrainian nation and attempting to eradicate cultural traditions.

The creation of a privileged position for the Orthodox Church, as well as efforts to strengthen its prestige and economic status, was a distinctive characteristic of state policy in Right-Bank Ukraine. This weakened the Roman Catholic Church's influence in the region and made it easier to implement the Russification strategy.

One of the main tasks laid before the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) by the authorities was to resist Polish historical research, which considered Kyiv, Volyn, and Podillia to be Poland's eastern provinces. To this purpose, the Orthodox Church undertook a large-scale project in the mid-nineteenth century to establish historical and statistical descriptions of churches and parishes within dioceses. Such operations should, on the one hand, justify the Russian Empire's historical presence in Right-Bank Ukraine and, on the other side, invalidate Polish propaganda claims.

Local lore study only began in the first half of the nineteenth century in Right-Bank Ukraine, and it was developed, with some exceptions, without the participation of representatives of the Orthodox clergy. However, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the Orthodox clergy was systematically collecting church chronicles, ancient plans and maps, descriptions of places, churches, and monasteries, and compiling descriptions of churches and parishes, first in collaboration with the Russian Geographical Society and later on by diocesan historical and statistical committees.

Local lore study in Right-Bank Ukraine differed from that in other regions of the Russian Empire. First and foremost, it aimed to counteract 19th-century Polish historiography regarding the interpretation of Ukrainian history.

Furthermore, because Podillia and Volyn lacked higher educational institutions, these provinces' theological seminaries became the main centres of the local lore movement.

SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE REVIEW

The legacy of scientists and local historians from the late 19th and early 20th centuries set the foundation of historiography on the participation of Orthodox clergy representatives from Right-Bank Ukraine in the local lore movement. Among the most important, mention should be made on the works of Volodymyr Antonovych, a Ukrainian historian and professor of the Kyiv University, including his review of Yukhym Sitsinsky's book "Historical Information on Parishes and Churches of the Podillia Diocese" and an article on the Podillia Diocesan Historical and Statistical Committee's activities¹, as well as a series of critical essays and

¹ V. Antonovich, *Retsenziia na E. Secinskij Istoricheskie svedeniya o prihodah i cerkvayah Podal'skoj eparhii. I. Kameneckij uezd. Kamenec-Podol'skij, 1895* [Historical Information on Parishes and Churches of the Podillia Diocese. 1. Kamianets-Podilsky 1895], in "Kievskaya starina" [Kyiv Antiquities], 1896, № 5, p. 55-56;

reviews in certain periodicals of the writings of local amateur historians among the Orthodox clergy. Orest Fotynsky and Archpriest Yuhym Sitsinsky², representatives of the local lore movement, conducted a partial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of clergy participation in the local lore movement.

Vasyl Bidnov³, a historian of the Ukrainian church, and Volodymyr Sichynsky and Dmytro Doroshenko⁴, scholars of the Western Ukrainian diaspora, made significant contributions to the historiography of this topic and the extension of the clergy's participation in the local history movement.

Historians of Ukraine's independence period, such as Konstantyn Krainy, Lev Bazhenov, Mykola Kostrytsia, Arsen Zinchenko⁵, and others, studied the

V. Antonovich, *Retsenziia na Trudy Podol'skogo eparhial'nogo istoriko-statisticheskogo komiteta* [Research Papers of Podillia Diocesan Historical and Statistical Committee], vyp. VII, in "Kievskaya starina" [Kyiv Antiquities], 1896, № 5, p. 56-58.

² O. A. Fotinskij, *Istoriya Obshchestva issledovatelej Volyni* [History of the Society of Researchers of Volyn], in "Trudy Obshchestva issledovatelej Volyni" [Research Papers of the Society of Researchers of Volyn], ZHitomir, 1902, t. 1, p. 7-20 ; E.I. Secinskij, *Muzej Podol'skogo cerkovnogo istoriko-arheologicheskogo obshchestva. 2. Opis' predmetov stariny* [Museum of the Podillia Church Historical and Archaeological Society. 2. Inventory of antiquities], in "Trudy Podol'skogo cerkovnogo istoriko-arheologicheskogo obshchestva" [Research Papers of Podillia Diocesan Historical and Statistical Committee], Kamenec-Podol'sk, 1909, vyp. 11, p. 1-105.

³ TsDAVO [Central State Archive of Higher Authorities and Administration of Ukraine], Fond 1072, List 1, File 47, P. 13, *Chernetky materialiv V. O. Bidnova dlia nadrukuvannia v presi pro zhyttia i diial'nist' protoiieria Vasylia Yakovycha Hrechulevycha, pereklad ukrains'koiu movoiu Yevanheliia vid Ioana, pys'menni pam'iatky (1919 r.)* [Drafts of materials of Vasyl Bidnov for publishing about Archpriest Vasyl Hrechulevich life and work, Ukrainian translation of Gospel of John].

⁴ V. Yu. Sichyns'kyj, *Vstup do ukrains'koho kraieznavstva* [Introduction of Ukrainian local lore study], Praga, 1937, 186 c. ; D. Doroshenko, *Ohliad ukrains'koi istoriohrafii* [Survey of Ukrainian historiography], Praga, 1923, 205 p.

⁵ K. K. Krajnij, *Kyivs'ke tserkovno-istorychne ta arkheolohichne tovarystvo. 1872-1920* [Kyiv Church Historical and Archaeological Society. 1872-1920], Kyiv, KM Academia, 2001, 104 p.; M. Yu. Kostrytsia, *Tovarystvo doslidnykiv Volyni: istoriia, diial'nist', postati* [Society of Researchers of Volyn], Zhytomyr, M.A.K., 2001, 360 p.; L. V. Bazhenov, *Istorychne kraieznavstvo Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy XIX – na pochatku XX st.: Stanovlennia. Istoriohrafii. Biobibliohrafii* [Historical local lore study of Right-Bank Ukraine in the 19th - early 20th centuries: Establishment. Historiography. Biobibliography], Khmel'nyts'kyj, Dolia, 1995, 256 p.; A. L. Zinchenko, *Blahovistia natsional'noho dukhu (Ukrains'ka tserkva na Podilli v pershij tretyni XX st.)* [Gospel of national spirit (Ukrainian Church of Podillia in the 1st third of 20th century)], Kyiv, Osvita, 1993, 256 p.

involvement of some representatives of the Orthodox clergy in the local lore movement and concluded that their activities were one of the factors that contributed to the country's national and spiritual revival.

In their works, modern Russian historians Alexander Musin, Irina Komarova⁶, and others addressed the Orthodox clergy's participation in the local lore movement. These works are important in finding the typical characteristics of the local history movement in the Russian Empire and the control of the Russian Orthodox Church. They do not, however, contain resources demonstrating the peculiarities of the clergy's local history activities in Right-Bank Ukraine, which frequently did not meet or even contradicted the official authorities' tasks.

Victor Berdinskikh's work⁷, which explores the role of the parish clergy in the development of local lore in the 19th and early 20th centuries, is significant in the historiography of the topic.

During the research for the study, materials from the Russian State Historical Archive (St. Petersburg), the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine (Kyiv), and the Central State Archive of Ukraine's Higher Authorities and Administration (Kyiv) were used.

METHODS OF RESEARCH

The research is based on the general scientific principles of historicism, objectivity, and consistency, which aim to provide a comprehensive study of facts, events, and phenomena.

The role of the Orthodox clergy in the formation of the national local lore study in Ukraine was investigated using comparative-historical and chronological methods. This allowed the article's content to be presented coherently.

The principles and methods used allowed for a historical analysis of the topic as well as an objective assessment of the processes of establishing and developing local lore structures in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

⁶ A. E. Musin, *Cerkovnaya starina v sovremennoj Rossii* [Church antiquities in modern Russia], Sankt-Peterburg, Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie, 2010, 456 p.; I. I. Komarova, *Nauchno-istoricheskaya deyatel'nost' statisticheskikh komitetov* [Study on History of statistical committees], in "Arheograficheskij sbornik za 1989 g." [Archaeographic collection], Moskva, 1990, P. 80-87.

⁷ V. A. Berdinskikh, *The Parish Clergy and the Development of Local History in Nineteenth-Century Russia* in "Russian Studies in History", vol. 44, no. 4, Spring 2006, pp. 9-18.

GENESIS OF LOCAL LORE MOVEMENT

The ROC's Holy Synod repeatedly issued decrees and orders in the second half of the nineteenth century requiring the creation of historical and statistical descriptions of Orthodox dioceses, parishes, churches, monasteries, and settlements where churches and other religious buildings functioned⁸. Unlike other dioceses of the ROC, the Orthodox clergy of Right-Bank Ukraine was also motivated, including by increased funding for the Orthodox clergy compared to other Ukrainian dioceses⁹. Such measures attempted to strengthen local lore study to counteract the Roman Catholic influence. However, the true purpose of church authorities and imperial power's interest in the history of the diocese of Right-Bank Ukraine was to establish the affiliation of Ukrainian lands and Orthodox believers to Russian Orthodoxy, weaken the influence of the Roman Catholic faith in these regions, and end the hegemony of Polish historiography in regional studies. The role of this religion and its clergy was demonstrated in the book *Roman Catholicism and its eparchy in Podillya* (1872) by Mitrofan Simashkevich, Rector of the Podillia Theological Seminary.

The decrees of the Synod obliged the diocesan authorities to compile and publish descriptions, relying primarily on local theological seminaries, which were defined as scientific and methodological centres that provided a selection of authors, development of research programs, editing of manuscripts, and their publication. At the same time, the Synod and local church authorities depended on parish priests, teachers of theological seminaries, the school of theology, and parish schools to implement the project.¹⁰ Mykhailo Maksymovych, Panteleimon

⁸ RHIA [Russian State Historical Archives in St. Petersburg. Hereinafter], Fond 802, List 16, File 73, p. 1-4, *Sprava pro skladannia tserkovno-istorychnoho i statystychnoho opysu Kyivs'koi ieparkhii. 1852 r.* [File of making church historical and statistical description of Kyiv diocese. 1852.]; RHIA, Fond 802, List 16, File 85, p. 1-5, *Pro skladannia tserkovno-istorychnykh i statystychnykh opysiv ieparkhij. 1861-1873 rr.* [File of making church historical and statistical descriptions of dioceses. 1861-1873.]; A. V. Gavrilov, *Postanovleniia i rasporyazheniia Svyatejshego Sinoda o sohraneni i izuchenii pamyatnikov drevnosti* [Resolutions and orders of the Holy Synod on preservation and study of antiquities], in "Vestnik arheologii i istorii" [Bulletin of Archaeology and history], Sankt-Peterburg, 1886, № 6, p. 58-90.

⁹ H. M. Nadтока, *Pravoslavna tserkva v Ukraini 1900-1917 rr.: sotsial'no-relihiinyj aspekt* [Orthodox Church in Ukraine in 1900-1917: social and religious aspects], Kyiv, 1998, p. 46-47.

¹⁰ V. A. Berdinskih, *Prihodskoe duhovenstvo i razvitie kraevedeniia v XIX veke* [Parish clergy

Kulish, Volodymyr Antonovych, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, figures of the Ukrainian national and cultural revival of the 19th century, laid the foundations of national local lore and historical regionalism. These well-known scholars sought to influence the activities of the Eparchial Archaeological and Statistical Committees and, as honorary members, sought to direct their work toward the Ukrainian national movement.

The Synod's decrees and relevant instructions and scientific programs (for example, "Program for collecting samples of folk language and speech", 1852¹¹, "Program for collecting information on folk superstitions, beliefs, dialects of Southern Russia", 1867¹², etc.) were in effect for over 50 years - until the beginning of the 20th century, when the publication of general historical and statistical descriptions of the Kyiv, Volyn and Podillia Orthodox dioceses was completed. Such a long and consistent action led to the establishment and mass development of local lore study in the second half of the 19th - early 20th century. Secular intellectuals, teaching staff of universities, scientific and public institutions were actively involved in the local lore movement, which led to the local lore movement and regional research becoming an essential component of the spiritual and cultural revival of the Ukrainian nation¹³. The local lore movement in the Right Bank of Ukraine was spread in Moldova, Bukovina, Galicia, and the Polish ethnic lands, as Ivan Franko pointed out in his article "Galician Local Lore"¹⁴ (1892).

An example of the scale of such work is the activity of the Podillia clergy, during 1852-1855, to collect materials, documents, and memoirs on the history of parishes, churches, monasteries to create a description of the Podillia diocese. All priests of parishes, as well as seminarians of senior classes, were involved in this

and the development of local lore study in the 19th century], in "Voprosy istorii" [History issues], Moskva, 1998, № 10, p. 134-138.

¹¹ *Programma dlya sobiraniya obrazcov narodnogo yazyka i slovesnosti* [Program for collecting samples of folk language and speech], in "Podol'skie gubernskie vedomosti" [Podillia province news], 1852, № 17, (Prilozhenie).

¹² *Programma dlya sobiraniya svedenij o narodnyh sueveriyah, pover'yah, govorah YUzhnoj Rossii* [Program for collecting information about folk superstitions, beliefs, dialects of Southern Russia], in "Podol'skie eparhial'nye vedomosti" [Podillia Diocesan Gazette], 1867, № 4.

¹³ L. V. Bazhenov, *Istorychne kraieznavstvo Pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy XIX – na pochatku XX st.*, p. 134-135.

¹⁴ I. Ya. Franko, *Zibrannia tvoriv u 50-y tomakh* [Collection of works (50 volumes)], Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 1986, t. 46, ch. 2, p. 116 – 150.

activity. In the mid-1850s, students Stepan Rudansky, Anatoly Svydnytsky, Kalenyk Sheykovsky, and others at the Podillia Theological Seminary actively helped to collect materials for the description of the Podillia diocese, and after graduation, published such ethnographic works by Anatoly Svydnytsky with the assistance of Panteleimon Kulish - "Easter in Podillia", Stepan Rudansky - "Wedding of Podillia" (1861), and Kalenyk Sheykovsky - a two-volume "Life of Podillia" (1859-1860) in the St. Petersburg pro-Ukrainian magazine "Osnovy". Later they became classics of Ukrainian literature, figures of the national and cultural revival.¹⁵

Having collected historical sources, documents, and materials to create historical and statistical descriptions of dioceses, their authors also studied legends, myths, folk songs, customs, information about life, and peculiarities of rural life. This allowed them to gain a deeper understanding of the Ukrainian mentality, to go beyond the limits set by the church authorities, and to express the obtained information in their works from a pro-Ukrainian standpoint.

"ЕПАРХИАЛЬНЫЕ ВЕДОМОСТИ": BETWEEN PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL LORE EXPERTS

Weekly journals established by the clergy at Orthodox seminaries such as the "Podolskie Eparchialnye Vedomosti" (Podillia Diocesan Gazette) in Kamianets-Podilskyi since 1862, "Volynskie eparkhialnyye vedomosti" (Volyn Diocesan Gazette) in Kremenets since 1865, and "Kievskie Eparchialnye Vedomosti" (Kyiv Diocesan Gazette) in Kyiv played a significant role in the creation of historical and statistical descriptions of Orthodox dioceses. The journals were published systematically until the beginning of the 20th century and included formal and informal parts. The formal part contained the decrees of church and state authorities, a chronicle of events in the Russian Orthodox Church and dioceses, theological materials, personnel transfers of the clergy, etc.; essays about cities, towns, villages, churches, and parishes, were provided in the appendices to each issue of the journal (informal part) which were to become part of the diocese's summary description. Folklore and ethnographic collections, scientific monographs, poetry, novels, and other publications on religious and

¹⁵ L. V. Bazhenov, *Alma mater podil's'koho kraieznavstva. Misto Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyj - tsentr istorichnoi rehionalistyky XIX – pochatku XX st.* [Alma mater of Podillia local lore. Kamianets-Podilsky – the centre of the study of regions' local lore of the 19th - the beginning of 20th centuries], Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyj, 2005. p. 19-21.

secular life were also published there.

Vedomosti published annual binders with up to 1,200 pages. They came to each parish, with an average circulation of 1500-2000 copies per publication, considerably contributing to the popularization of local lore materials as well as the development of national science and culture.

From 1862 to 1906, "Podolskie Eparchialnye Vedomosti" journal was published at the Theological Seminary in Kamianets-Podilskyi. This journal became the basis for the activities of scientific and local lore centres, the way to publish numerous works by scholars and local lore specialists on regional history and culture. Seminary teachers and representatives of urban and rural clergy mainly were the authors of historical and local lore articles. Some of them published their monographs and books in the journal. Thus, Mytrofan Simashkevych published in the journal a series of articles and two monographs: "Roman Catholicism and its hierarchy in Podillia" (1872) and "Historical and ethnographic essay of Podillia" (1875-1876). The informal part of the "Podolskie Eparchialnye Vedomosti" published about 110 historical and statistical descriptions of cities, towns, villages, churches, and parishes of the Podillia province during all its existence.¹⁶

Archpriest Mykhailo Orlovsky was the most popular author of settlements' descriptions. He was an ethnographer, writer, and an honorary member of the Russian Geographical Society (since 1860) and the Russian Free Economic Society (since 1863). During 1862-1882 he published 42 historical and statistical descriptions and essays about all major towns of Podillia in the Podillia Diocesan Gazette¹⁷. His works were the foundation for further research on the history of settlements in the region to this day. In 2007 a collection of works by Mykhailo Orlovsky was published in Khmelnytsky, and the Mykhailo Orlovsky Prize for the best scientific and local lore research was introduced¹⁸.

The scale of ethnographic activity of Mykhailo Orlovsky is evidenced by the fact that he collected and passed on 2000 folk proverbs and sayings to

¹⁶ E. I. Secinskij, S. L. Bednarovskij, *Ukazatel' "Podol'skih eparhial'nyh vedomostej" za 1862-1905* [Index of "Podillia Diocesan Gazette" for 1862-1905], Kamenec-Podol'sk, 1907, 1087 p.

¹⁷ L. V. Bazhenov, *Mistse i znachennia prats' Mykhajla Orlovs'koho v istoriohrafii Podillia-Khmel'nychchyny kintsia XIX – pochatku XX st.* [Place and role of the works of Mykhailo Orlovsky], in *Materialy Druhoi naukovo-praktychnoi konferentsii "Misto Khmel'nyts'kyj v istorii Ukrainy"* [Materials of 2nd Scientific Conference "Khmelnytsky City in the history of Ukraine"], Khmel'nyts'kyj, 2007, p. 3-11.

¹⁸ A. M. Trembits'kyj, S. M. Yesiunin (Eds.), *M. Ya. Orlovs'ky. Vybrani pratsi* [M. Ya. Orlovs'ky. Selected works], Khmel'nyts'kyj, 2007, 276 p.

Panteleimon Kulish in 1861. He passed another 1300 Podillia proverbs and legends on to the editorial board of the famous pro-Ukrainian journal "Kievskaiia starina" (Kyiv Antiquities).

The "Volynskie eparkhialnye vedomosti" journal was one of the organizers of the local lore movement in Volyn in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. During 1860-1880, teachers of the theological seminary in Kremenets and village priests actively published materials in the informal part of the periodical on the historical and statistical description of the diocese. Archpriest Apolonii Sendulsky, a public figure, published the largest number of works in the journal. During 1868-1882 he published 40 historical descriptions and essays about the region's settlements in the "Vedomosti"¹⁹. In 1882, the journal "Kievskaiia starina" which, at that time, was a stronghold of the Ukrainian national and cultural revival, praised his scientific achievements, pointing out that "the Father Apolonii Sendulsky is a wonderful person, an educated priest - a pastor, an outstanding figure-administrator and the most prominent local scholar"²⁰.

Mykola Teodorovich, a teacher of the theological seminary in Kremenets, was the most active author in terms of the number of publications in this journal. He published 1,500 articles about cities, towns, villages, churches, and parishes in the diocesan journal in 1887-1899. These materials made up a unique 5-volume work, consisting of historical and statistical descriptions of the churches and parishes of the Volyn diocese²¹. This fundamental work was then the greatest achievement in the historiography of the study of the Volyn region and has remained relevant to this day. It was republished in 2011 for further use²².

¹⁹ M. P. Man'ko, *Apollonij Sendul's'kyj – kraieznavets' Ostroha i Volyni* [Apollonii Sendulsky - local lore scientist of Ostroh and Volhyn], in "Materialy I-III naukovo-kraieznavchych konferentsij "Ostrih na porozi 900-richchia" [Materials of 1st-3rd Scientific Conferences "Ostrih in anticipation of 900th anniversary], Ostrih, 1992, t. 1, p. 120-122.

²⁰ A. Tarnavskij, *Otec Apollonij Sendul'skij, svyashchennik sela Sivok Ostrozhs'kogo uezda* [Father Apollonii Sendulsky, priest of Sivok village, Ostrog county], in "Kievskaya starina" [Kyiv Antiquities], 1882, t. IV (№ 10), p. 166-170.

²¹ N. I. Teodorovich, *Volyn'. Istoriko-statisticheskoe opisanie cerkvej i prihodov Volynskoj eparhii* [Volyn. Historical and statistical description of churches and parishes of the Volyn diocese], Pochaev, Tip. Pochaevo-Uspenskoj Lavry, 1888-1903, t. 1-5.

²² O. Tymoschuk (Ed.), *Istoriia mist i sil Khmel'nychchyn (za pratsiamy Yukhyma Sitsin-s'koho i Mykoly Teodorovycha* [The history of cities and towns of Khmelnytsky region (According to works of Yukhym Sitsinsky and Mykola Teodorovich)], Khmel'nyts'kyi, Polihrafist-2, 2011, 560 p.

The editorial board of the "Kievskie Eparchialnye Vedomosti" journal was one of the initiators to create a historical and statistical description of the Kyiv Orthodox Diocese in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries. Articles and materials were published there mainly by teachers of the local theological seminary and the Kyiv Theological Academy. Leontii Pokhylevych, a servant of the Kyiv Spiritual Consistory, was one of the most active authors of the journal²³. During ten years of research, he prepared a summary book *Legends of the settlements of the Kyiv province, or statistical, historical, and ecclesiastical notes on the villages, settlements, towns, and cities that belong to the province*.²⁴ This was the first successful attempt to create a description of the Kyiv diocese and its inhabited parts, but as noted in a review of the "Kievskaya starina" journal, the publication did not have a sufficiently serious source base for the study.²⁵

Active research in the 50s – mid-60s of the 19th century provided by the clergy to create historical and statistical descriptions of Orthodox dioceses revealed that many authors were professionally unprepared. To solve this problem, the efforts of the clergy should have been united in organized scientific and public societies, which would take on scientific and methodological guidance and training to complete the creation of descriptions of dioceses. The official authorities were also interested in this process, as they sought to control the local lore movement.²⁶

²³ A. L. Zinchenko, *Pravoslavne dukhivnytstvo v etnosotsial'nykh ta etnorelihiynnykh protse-sakh v Ukraini XIX – pochatku XX stolit'* [Orthodox clergy in ethnosocial and ethno-religious processes in Ukraine in the 19th - early 21th centuries], in *Pokhodzhennia, stanovlennia ta rozvytok ukrains'koho narodu: kol. monohr.*, Kyiv, Kyiv. nats. un-t im. T. Shevchenka, 2010, p. 371-408.

²⁴ L. Pohilevich, *Skazanie o naselennykh mestnostyakh Kievskoj gubernii ili statisticheskie, istoricheskie i cerkovnye zametki o derevnyakh, selakh, mestechkakh i gorodakh, v predelakh gubernii otnosyashchihysya* [Story about the populated areas of the Kyiv province or statistical, historical and church notes about villages, settlements, towns and cities belonging to the province], Kiev, tip. Kievo-Pecher. Lavry, 1864, 763 p.

²⁵ I. K. (Kamanin), *Retsenziia na kn.: L. Pohilevich. Uezdy Kievskij i Radomysl'skij. Statisticheskie i istoricheskie zametki* [Review on the book: L. Pokhilevich. Counties of Kyiv and Radomysl. Statistical and historical notes], in "Kievskaya starina" [Kyiv Antiquities], 1888, t. XXIII, oktyabr' (№ 10), p. 16-17.

²⁶ O. M. Koshel, *Mizh tserkvoiu i naukoiu: Istorychnyj narys diial'nosti Podil's'koho tserkovnoho istoryko-arkheolohichnoho tovarystva (1865-1920)* [Between Church and Science: A Historical Essay on the Activities of the Podillia Church Historical and Archaeological Society (1865-1920)], Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyj, Tsentr podillieznavstva, 1998, p. 15-16.

DIOCESAN COMMITTEES AS CENTERS OF LOCAL LORE MOVEMENT

In 1865, on the initiative of local lore activists and with the approval of the Holy Synod, a "Committee for Church-Historical and Statistical Description of the Podillia Diocese" was established at the Podillia Theological Seminary". Later it became a representative scientific and local lore organization, which existed for 55 years, and fulfilled the primary mission of developing and publishing the generalized works on the history of Podillia and a description of the Podillia diocese.

During the society's existence, clergy representatives made up approximately 85-90 per cent of the overall membership, making the association mostly ecclesiastical. In the 60s and 80s of the 19th century, the committee had 30-40 members and resembled a scientific and public club. However, in 1890 it already had 54 members²⁷, 148 members in 1901²⁸, and 186 in 1914.²⁹ From the 90s of the 19th - early 20th centuries, the society began to grow thanks to the secular scholars and local historians, indicating the recognition of its activities and authority among the general public.

The leading journals of the society were "Podillia Diocesan Gazette" from 1865 to 1906, "Orthodox Podillia" from 1906 to 1914, "Research Papers of the Podillia Diocesan Historical and Statistical Committee" (1876-1903), and "Research Papers of the Podillia Church Historical Archaeological Society" (1904-1916). In total, they included more than 700 monographs, books, essays, articles, documents on history, which are the "golden" fund of Ukrainian historical science and national local lore study until today.

²⁷ *Otchet Podol'skogo eparhial'nogo istoriko-statisticheskogo komiteta za 1890 g.* [Report of the Podillia Diocesan Historical and Statistical Committee for 1890], in "Podol'skie eparhial'nye vedomosti" [Podillia Diocesan Gazette], 1891, № 11, 38 p.

²⁸ *Otchet Podol'skogo eparhial'nogo istoriko-statisticheskogo komiteta za 1901 g.* [Report of the Podillia Diocesan Historical and Statistical Committee for 1901], in "Otdel'nyj ottisk iz Podol'skih eparhial'nyh vedomostej" [A separate imprint of Podillia Diocesan Gazette], Kamenec-Podol'sk, 1902, p.10-15.

²⁹ *Schorichni zvity Podil's'koho ieparkhial'noho istoriko-statystychnoho komitetu i ieparkhial'noho davn'oskhovyscha starozhytnostej (1890-1902)* [Annual Reports of the Podillia Diocesan Historical and Statistical Committee and the Diocesan Antiquities Storehouse (1890-1902)], in *Vidbytky z publikatsij v "Podol'skykh eparkhyal'nykh vedomostiakh", zibrani v odnu knyhu Yu. J. Sitsins'kym* [Imprints from publications in Podillia Diocesan Gazette by Sitsinsky], Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyj, 1914.

A significant milestone in the activities of the committee was the participation in a comprehensive ethnographic expedition of the province in 1869-1870, led by Pavlo Chubynsky³⁰; materials of this expedition are fully covered in "Research Papers of the ethnographic and statistical expedition to the West Russian territory" (1872-1878).

By the scale of collected ethnographic material, this profound seven-volume edition is a valuable source of information for modern ethnologists, folklorists, historians, and local historians.

A positive moment in the society's activities was also the coordination with scientists from the Kyiv University (Volodymyr Antonovych), Kyiv Theological Academy (Mykola Petrov), the Moscow Archaeological Society, the South-Western Department of the Geographical Society in Kyiv in 1872-1876, the editorial board of the "Kievskaja starina" journal, etc.³¹

Members of the society provided significant assistance to Mykhailo Hrushevsky in 1891-1894 during his work with documents and literature of the Antiquities Storehouse in Kamianets and the collection of ancient documents, to create a monograph "Barskoje Starostwo" (1894).³²

An important activity of the Podillia Diocesan Historical and Statistical Committee was the founding of the official historical museum - the diocesan Antiquities Storehouse in 1890.

The Kyiv Theological Academy has been the leading scientific centre in the Ukrainian territory's system of theological training institutions since the 1870s. This happened due to highly qualified teaching staff, including a team of famous scientists, defences of master's and doctoral theses and awarding scientific degrees and titles, publication of annual scientific collections of "Research Papers" and scientific monographs, textbooks, etc.³³

The scientific role of the Kyiv Theological Academy was significantly strengthened when the Church-Archaeological Society was founded at this institution in 1872, as well as the Church-Archaeological Museum. The above-

³⁰ L. V. Bazhenov, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² O. M. Koshel (Ed.), *Epistoliarna spadshyna Yukhyma Sitsins'koho. Lysty do Mykhajla Hrushevs'koho (1891-1927 rr.)* [Epistolary heritage of Yukhym Sitsinsky. Letters for Mykhailo Hrushevsky], Kyiv, 2009, p. 16, 29, 31, 32.

³³ N. A. Shyp, *Osvitnia i naukova diial'nist' Kyivs'koi dukhovnoi akademii (XIX – poch. XX st.)* [Educational and scientific activities of the Kyiv Theological Academy (19th - early 20th centuries)], in *Ukrains'ka mizhnarodna khrystyians'ka asambleia: naukovyj zbirnyk*, Kyiv, 1998, 206 p.

mentioned Society was reorganized into the Church-Historical and Archaeological Society in 1901 and worked until 1919.

Mykola Petrov, a Ukrainian literary scholar, historian, and local lore expert, was one of the founding members of the Church Archaeological Society at the Kyiv Theological Academy and its archaeological museum; he was its permanent scientific secretary. In general, the Society included, on average, 180-190 full members annually, except candidates and correspondents. The Society's core members were professors and associate professors of the academy, including scientists such as Mykola Petrov, Archpriest Fedir Titov, Stepan Golubev, Ivan Malyshevsky, and church archaeologist Petro Lashkarev.³⁴

Important achievements of the Church Archaeological Society, which extended beyond the church topics, included active participation in the organization and conduct of two all-Russian archaeological congresses in Kyiv: the third congress in 1874 and the eleventh congress in 1899, as well as the publication of works such as "Kyiv Academy in the second half of the 17th century" by Mykola Petrov, and a two-volume "Kyiv Metropolitan Petro Mohyla" by Stepan Golubev, etc.

Since its establishment, the Society has become a centre of regional research and an organizer of the local lore movement in Ukraine. It actively cooperated with the Podillia Diocesan Historical and Local Lore Committee and from 1893 with the Volyn Church and Archaeological Society, other local lore centers, and provided practical and methodological assistance to local authors.³⁵

Modest, Archbishop of the Volyn and Zhytomyr Dioceses, played a positive role in establishing local lore centres and supporting their systematic work in Volyn. He was the founder and curator of the diocesan Antiquities Storehouse (museum) and its library, which were established in 1893.

In 1894 the Volyn Church and Archaeological Society were officially opened in Zhytomyr.³⁶ The first professional and social-scientific historical and local lore

³⁴ K. K. Krajnij, *Istoryky Kyievo-Pechers'koi lavry XIX – pochatku XX st.* [Historians of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra of the 19th - early 20th centuries], Kyiv, Pul'sary, 2000, p. 60-79..

³⁵ M. I. Moshak, *Spivpratsia M. Petrova ta Yu. Sitsins'koho na nyvi doslidzhen' Podil's'koi starovyny* [Cooperation of M. Petrov and Yu. Sitsinsky in the field of Podillia antiquities research], in *Materialy IX Podil's'koi istoryko-kraieznavchoi konferentsii* [Materials of 9th Podillia Historical and Local Lore Conference], Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyj, 1995, p. 296-298.

³⁶ TsDIAUK [Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine in Kyiv], Fond 442, List 646, File 51, p. 1, 3: *Pro zasnuvannia v Zhytomyri tserkovno-arkheolohichnoho tovarystva i pry*

society in Volyn brought together 12 honorary members, 42 full members, and six candidates for membership. Four years later, it already had 33 full members and 195 candidates. Over 60 per cent of honorary members, full members, and candidates were clergy.

In the mid-1890s, the idea of establishing single, extensive research and educational organization of a secular nature, which would unite local historians, emerged among the intellectuals of Volyn. Mykola Korobka, an ethnologist and literary scholar, expressed and developed this idea. The Society of Researchers of Volyn was opened in 1900, many members of the Volyn Church-Archaeological Society joined it, including Orest Fotynsky, who became its leader.

Having studied the charter of the Society of Researchers of Volyn, historian Orest Levitsky noted in "Kievskaya starina" journal that this organization "has been granted such rights and powers that none of the existing scientific societies, for example, in Kyiv has".³⁷ Indeed, the authors of this charter took the constituent documents and action program of Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv as an example. The Society of Researchers of Volyn committed to studying flora, fauna, mineralogy, geology, palaeontology, anthropology, geography, demography, customary law, agriculture, crafts, trade, statistics, archaeology, history, topography, numismatology, and other fields.³⁸ During 1901-1920 this Society published 15 volumes of its scientific "Works" devoted to the study of nature, ethnography, and history of the Volyn land. The Volyn Research Society, of which 20 per cent were representatives of the local Orthodox clergy, became a major research institute in the first decades of the twentieth century and made a significant contribution to the development of the local lore study, thanks to the extent of the regional study and the results of its work.

CONCLUSIONS

During the mid-19th - early 20th century, the Orthodox clergy of Kyiv, Volyn, and Podilia was actively involved in local lore studying activities to make historical descriptions of their dioceses, parishes, churches, and settlements. They

n'omu davn'oskhovyscha starozhytnostej (26.04.1893 – 3.03.1894 rr.) [About foundation of the Church Archaeological Society and its Antiquities Storehouse].

³⁷ O. I. Levickij, *Otkrytie Obshchestva issledovatelej Volyni* [Establishment of the Society of Researchers of Volyn], in "Kievskaya starina" [Kyiv Antiquities], 1902, oktyabr', p. 42.

³⁸ *Ustav Obshchestva issledovatelej Volyni* [Charter of the Society of Researchers of Volyn], in *Trudy Obshchestva issledovatelej Volyni* [Research Papers of the Society of Researchers of Volyn], Zhitomir, 1902, t. 1, p. 19.

established diocesan historical and statistical committees, ecclesiastical, historical, archaeological societies, antiquities storehouses (museums), which laid the foundation for developing the local lore movement in Ukraine.

These institutions actively worked on creating general historical descriptions of dioceses and often went beyond the official limits set by Synod's decisions. The result of their activity was not only the descriptions of churches, parishes, and dioceses but also the works on the history of provinces, cities, towns, villages, archaeological maps, historical monographs, books, collections of documents and materials, and other local lore literature.

The establishment and development of the local lore movement took place in the second half of the 19th - early 20th century due to the influence of these processes. Many clergy and graduates of theological institutions rose to prominence as both outstanding scientists (Mykhailo Orlovsky, Mykola Teodorovich, Leontii Pokhilevich, Mykola Petrov, Yukhym Sitsinsky, and others) and spiritual revival figures. They were involved in the foundation of scientific subdivisions of national local lore in Right-Bank Ukraine, such as Podillia, Volyn, and Kyiv studies. Their fundamental works in modern independent Ukraine were organized, republished, and recognized in historiography and are actively in scientific circulation since 1993. In Ukraine, the annual Khmelnytsky Regional Prize named after Yukhym Sitsinsky in the field of historical and local lore is highly respected.

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HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES AND ORGANISATIONS IN UKRAINE

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Abstract: *The main purpose of this article is to consider the dynamics and features of Jewish communities and organisations in Ukraine in the context of current socio-cultural and socio-political processes. This involves the following tasks: to reveal the principles and nature of the so-called "umbrella" Jewish organisations that unite local communities and to reconstruct the dynamics of the Jewish segment in Ukrainian society. The analysis is based on a systematic reconstruction of theoretical models of religious phenomena and their connection with modern research subjects in the field of practical religious studies. The author argues that the activities of Jewish religious organisations and communities are manifested in various spheres of life, particularly education, charity, and social work. At the same time, the article identifies challenges that remain relevant for religious communities and organisations, such as financing initiatives, the assistance in reducing the level of anti-Semitism in the country, and raising the level of Jewish education. The study of the functioning of Jewish religious communities in Ukraine in connection with the development of civic institutions allows to investigate the actualisation of this type of activities, as well as their impact on public life. That is why, in the context of the analysis and the goals formulated in this work, specific examples of the dynamic functioning of Jewish religious communities have been considered.*

Keywords: *Religious communities, Jews, Organisations, anti-Semitism, Ukraine, Religious education, Social work.*

Rezumat: *Istoricul și starea actuală a comunităților și organizațiilor evreiești din Ucraina. Scopul principal al articolului îl constituie examinarea dinamicii și a caracteristicilor comunităților și organizațiilor evreiești din Ucraina, în contextul proceselor socio-culturale și socio-politice actuale. Aceasta implică următoarele obiective: prezentarea principiilor și a naturii așa-numitelor organizații „umbrelă” evreiești, care unesc comunitățile locale, și reconstruirea dinamicii segmentului evreiesc în societatea ucraineană. Analiza se bazează pe o reconstrucție*

sistematică a modelelor teoretice ale fenomenelor religioase și pe legătura acestora cu subiectele moderne de cercetare în domeniul studiilor practicilor religioase. Autoarea susține că activitățile organizațiilor și comunităților religioase evreiești se manifestă în diferite sfere ale vieții, în special în educație, acțiuni caritabile și asistență socială. În egală măsură, articolul identifică provocările care rămân relevante pentru comunitățile și organizațiile religioase, precum inițiativele de finanțare, de asistență în vederea reducerii gradului de antisemitism din țară și de creștere a nivelului de educație în spirit evreiesc. Studiarea funcționării comunităților religioase evreiești din Ucraina, în legătură cu dezvoltarea instituțiilor civice, permite investigarea actualizării acestui tip de activități, ca și impactul lor asupra vieții publice. Iată de ce, în contextul analizei și al obiectivelor formulate în lucrare, au fost luate în considerare exemple specifice de funcționare dinamică a comunităților religioase evreiești.

INTRODUCTION

Religion, as a significant element of culture, plays an important role in preserving national identity and is a factor, asserting the value of one's uniqueness in a pluralistic world. The unity of culture largely depends on the definition of its physical borders. In this regard, of particular importance are practices aimed at "preserving and renewing" the unique features of national culture, with religious identity linked in as part of the corresponding "cultural types" (Sergey Averintsev) or "local civilizations" (Arnold J. Toynbee). Focusing on the importance of taking into account the historical formation of national and religious communities and the current state of society, one should pay attention to the fact that the Ukrainian experience in this aspect is extremely instructive. The specificity of religious life in Ukraine proves that the previous history of the state laid the foundations for an integrated, multinational, multi-religious society, in which the issues of preventing the extremisation of religion were of great importance and attracted the attention of public and political figures.

As is known, the religious map of Ukraine is very rich. It represents more than 37,000 communities of various denominations, including Jewish organisations and communities that take an active part in the hectic social life of Ukraine. The official data on the representation of Jewish religious institutions in Ukraine show a 1% increase in their composition and actual activity since 2015.¹ The re-

¹ Larysa Vladichenko, Sergiy Lysenko, Ivan Papayani, *25-richchia Ukrainskoi nezalezhnosti yak istoriia relihiinykh svobod i svitohliadnoho pliuralizmu: derzhavni instytutsii ta relihiini orhanizatsii u poshuku modelei partnerstva* [25th anniversary of Ukrainian independence as a history of religious freedoms and ideological pluralism: state

port of the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine "on the network of religious organizations in Ukraine" specifies the following Jewish organisations and communities in Ukraine present as of January 1, 2017: "Association of Jewish Religious Organizations of Ukraine" (including 83 organisations, 17 schools, 5 periodicals); "All-Ukrainian Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations" (6 organisations, 2 schools, 1 periodical); "Religious Organizations of Progressive Judaism" (42 organisations, 7 Sunday schools, 1 periodical); "Association of the Chabad Hasidim of Jewish Religious Organizations of Ukraine" (125 organisations, 29 schools, 17 periodicals); and other Jewish religious organisations (48 in total, 8 Sunday schools, no periodicals). The total number of Jewish religious organisations in Ukraine is 304, of which 276 are communities representing 63 schools and 28 periodicals.²

The present article is aimed at presenting an analysis of the history and current state of Jewish communities and organisations in independent Ukraine (1991-2019). The study does not focus on the distinction between community and organisation but rather uses these terms as the self-names of relevant structures. These formal associations can be divided into several groups. The first group comprises communities and organisations created to meet religious needs. The second group includes communities and organisations representing the Ukrainian Jewish community as a national and religious minority. A number of organisations (foundations) can also be identified, whose activities are aimed at supporting, developing and studying Jewish life in Ukraine.

The study of Jewish life in modern Ukraine and Europe, in general, has long been of interest to domestic and foreign researchers. It should be noted that the history and modernity of European Jewry are actively studied by young scholars.

For example, with the assistance of the Leonid Nevzlin Research Center, a number of scientific papers were published on the art of Ukrainian Jews,³ their

institutions and religious organisations in search of partnership models: coll. Science. materials], Collection of scientific materials, Kyiv, Dukh i Litera, 2017, p. 255-257.

² *Zaiavlennye OEOU po sytuatsyy s evreiskoi relyhyoznoi obshchynoi yudeiskoho ortodoksalnoho veroyspovedaniya h. Kolomyi* [The statement of the UJCU on the situation with the Orthodox Jewish religious community in Kolomyia], in <https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/zayavlenie-oeou-po-situaczii-s-evrejskoj-religioznoj-obshhinoj-iudejskogo-ortodoksalnogo-veroispovedaniya-g-kolomyii> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

³ Sergiy Kravtsov, Illya Rodov, Małgorzata Stolarska-Fronia, *From Ausgleich to the Holocaust: Ukrainian and Jewish Artists of Lemberg/Lwów/Lviv*, Weimer and Rostock, Grünberg Verlag, 2019.

participation in revolutions during the existence of tsarist Russia,⁴ and life during the Soviet era.⁵ Over the past ten years, with the assistance of the Leonid Nevzlin Research Center, a number of in-depth studies have been published on various aspects of Jewish life in various regions of Eastern Europe, including those that are now part of Ukraine. Among them are Ilia Lurie's *Hasidic Courtyard in Lubavichi and the Chabad Movement*,⁶ Benjamin Nathans's *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia*.⁷

In addition to Israeli studies, of particular interest are the works of researchers from the University of Michigan, namely Deborah Dash Moore, Zvi Gitelman, and Frederick G.L. Huetwell, who study the issues of the Holocaust and the history of European Jewry in the 20th century. This topic is also covered in the works of Jennifer Evans and Noah Shenker. Various European research institutes study Jewish culture and religion in the context of history, political science, and sociology. Of note is the research of the Central European University in Hungary. The researchers of this centre focus on the study of "Jewish civilization", including philosophy, Yiddish culture, and the analysis of the relationship between the Jewish and Christian populations. As is known, the territory of modern Ukraine, which includes Galicia (a region with a large Jewish population before World War II), was at different times part of Poland, the Russian Empire, and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Within its current borders, Ukraine gained independence only in 1991. That is why when studying the relationship of the Jews with a non-national environment, one often talks about Eastern European Jewry in general. Ashkenazi communities are becoming the subject of study as independent cultural phenomena. At the same time, addressing the problem of recognition of the confessional uniqueness of Jewish communities by political structures and analysing religious policy are carried out taking into account the political and legal context in which these communities existed. A valuable source for learning about the history of the Jewish community in Poland, tsarist Russia, and modern Eastern Europe, is contained in the collective monograph *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in*

⁴ Vladimir Levin, *From Revolution to War: Jewish Politics in Russia, 1907-1914*, Jerusalem, The Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 2016.

⁵ Zvi Gitelman, Yaakov Ro'i, *Revolution, Repression, and Revival: The Soviet-Jewish Experience*, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

⁶ Yllya Lure, *Khasidskiy dvor i dvizhenye Khabad* [Hasidic court and the Chabad movement], Tsentr nauchnykh rabotnikov i prepodavatelei iudayki v vuzakh «Sefer», Moskva, Institut slavianovedeniya Rossiskoy akademii nauk, 2018.

⁷ Benjamin Nathans, *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia*, Jerusalem, The Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 2013.

Modern Russian History,⁸ the joint work *Ukrainian – Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*,⁹ the articles of John-Paul Himka “A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora”,¹⁰ Zvi Gitelman “The Jews of Ukraine and Moldova”,¹¹ and others.

This brief overview of case studies shows that the historical experience of interethnic and interreligious relations in Ukraine cannot be comprehended without considering regional differences and the peculiarities of government policy on the “Jewish question.” By characterising the general attitude of scholars to this issue, one must be aware that that Ukrainian scholars are not as active as their foreign, in particular, to Jewish pogroms or collaboration during World War II. The reason for this is seen in the need to raise the question, in such studies, of who the perpetrators of such a genocide might have been. Kateryna Bartoshevskya drew attention to this circumstance in her article “Lviv. 1918. The Jewish Pogrom”.¹² She noted that the topic of genocide in Jewish pogroms at the time remains insufficiently studied among Ukrainian historians because, in Ukrainian society, there is no request to overcome mutual accusations in connection with the Holodomor and the participation of representatives of various ethnic communities in the establishment of the Bolshevik regime on the territory of Ukraine.

SHORT HISTORY OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN UKRAINIAN LANDS

The history of the Jews on the territory of modern Ukraine is quite long. During its course, the Jewish diaspora had different relations with the inhabitants of the region, sometimes dramatic but more often friendly and even partnering.

⁸ John Doyle Klier, Shlomo Lambroza, *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

⁹ Peter J. Potichnyi, Howard Aster, *Ukrainian – Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, Edmonton, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1990.

¹⁰ John-Paul Himka, *War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora*, in “Spaces of Identity”, Vol. 5, Special Issue: War Crimes, pp. 9-24. <https://doi.org/10.25071/1496-6778.7999> (Accessed on 19.02.2021).

¹¹ Zvi Gitelman, *The Jews of Ukraine and Moldova*, in Miriam Weiner, *Jewish Roots in Ukraine and Moldova: Pages from the Past and Archival Inventories* (The Jewish Genealogy Series), New York – New Jersey, Routes to Roots, 1999.

¹² Katerina Bartoshevs'ka, *L'viv. 1918. Yevrejs'kij pogrom* [Lviv. 1918. The Jewish pogrom] in <https://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2019/12/4/156657/> (Accessed on 19.02.2021).

Certain milestones in this history were the subject of independent academic research in Ukraine and abroad. For further presentation, it seems appropriate to briefly describe the peculiarities of the formation of Jewish life in Ukraine and give some interesting examples. Traditionally, the first Jewish settlements on the territory of modern Ukraine are considered to be originated in the 1st century AD (in the Greek colony of Pontus on the Black Sea), as evidenced by a letter sent to Emperor Gaius Caligula by the Jewish king Agrippa I.¹³ A more detailed description of the Jewish presence is associated with the history of the Khazar Khaganate (7-10 centuries AD), whose ruler Obadiah (780-800) made Judaism the state religion.¹⁴ It is interesting to mention that after the first Khazar-Jewish community appeared in Kyiv in the 10th century, there was at the same time one of the first mentions of the city of Kyiv itself, which is contained in the so-called "Kyiv Letter" from Cairo Geniza, which was signed by the head of the Khazar-Jewish community.¹⁵ As a result of political transformations, Turkic-speaking peoples began to settle in Kyivan Rus. They are often associated with the emergence of Karaite communities in Ukraine, which together with the inhabitants of Crimea and the Crimean Tatars are now recognised as the indigenous people of Crimea.

During the historical period from the 14th to the 17th century, when the lands of Western Ukraine were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Jews were actively resettled to this region¹⁶ from Western Europe. The main activities of the Jewish community included education, charity, "Hebrew Kaddish" activities, establishing offices to interact with the authorities and the government, providing support to the economic activities of community members, who began to develop in the 16th century and flourished in the 17th century, which became the "golden age" for the Jews in this region.¹⁷ No less significant events of that time

¹³ Anatoliy Kolodniy, *Istoriya religiyi v Ukrayini* [The History of religion in Ukraine], Kyiv, Ukrayinskiy Tsentr duhovnoyi kulturi, 1996.

¹⁴ Oleg Bubenok, *Hozari v Istoriyi Shidnoyi Evropi* [Khazars in the history of Eastern Europe], Kyiv, Institut shodoznastva im. A. Yu. Krivskogo NAN Ukrayini, 2019.

¹⁵ *Scanned copy of the original "Kyiv letter" to the digital library of the University of Cambridge*, in <http://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/view/MS-TS-00012-00122/1> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

¹⁶ Lyudmyla Grinevich, Vladyslav Grinevich, *Evreyi v Ukrayini, Entsiklopediya Istoriyi Ukrayini* [Jews in Ukraine, Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine], Tom 3, Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 2005.

¹⁷ Oleg Rafalskiy, *Dzherela z Istoriyi ta kulturi evreyskogo narodu Pravoberezhnoyi Ukrayini u fondah Derzhavnogo arhivu Zhitomirskoyi oblasti* [Sources on the history and culture of the Jewish people of the Right Bank of Ukraine in the funds of the State Archives of Zhytomyr]

were socio-political transformations that partly led to the emergence of Hasidism. This movement was initiated by Israel ben Eliezer (the Baal Shem Tov) and continued by his disciple Dov Ber of Mezeritch, whose teachings were based on the idea of Kabbalah.¹⁸ It is in the territory of Ukraine that the most famous "Hasidic dynasties" arose and developed. However, due to the events of World War II, the members of these communities left Europe and settled around the world. The main centres of these Hasidic movements today are Borough Park in New York-USA, and the cities of Ashdod, Bnei Brak, and Jerusalem in Israel. However, the connection of these communities with Ukraine was not completely interrupted; for example, the city of Uman, where Rabbi Nachman of Breslov was buried, is visited annually by thousands of pilgrims from around the world.

The history of the Jews of Ukraine within the Russian Empire also had important milestones. After the annexation of part of the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to Russia, a new stage began in the political process, which determined the attitude towards the Jews in this region.¹⁹ In the Russian Empire, the Jews continued to live mostly in small towns (shtetls), maintaining their own cultural autonomy and religion. In the 19th century, "anti-Jewish myths" became popular in Russia, which eventually led to serious consequences, such as bloody raids and pogroms in more than 150 settlements. A striking example of such a policy was the Bailis case, in which Menahem Mendel Beilis was accused of ritual murder. Due to the public outcry and protest appeals by international and Ukrainian elites (Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Volodymyr Vernadsky, and others), the case became widely known, and as a result of the trial (1913), Bailis was acquitted.

The history of the Jewish community in Soviet Ukraine also had its bright and sorrowful moments. During World War II, virtually all of the Jewish population remaining in the occupied territories in Ukraine were annihilated. The two places that gained notoriety are Babyn Yar, in which 35,000 Jews were killed in 1941,²⁰ and the Lviv ghetto, which in early 1942 numbered more than 150,000

region], in *Materlali mizhnarodnoyi naukovo-praktichnoyi konferentsiyi "Evreyi v Ukrayini: istoriya i suchasnist"* [Materials of International scientific practical conference "Jews in Ukraine: History and Present"], Zhitomir, Vidavniststvo ZhDU im. I. Franka, 2009.

¹⁸ Zoya Shwed, *Hasidizm* [Hasidism], *Filosofskiy entsiklopedichniy slovník*, Kyiv, Institut filosofiyi imeni Grigoriya Skovorody NAN Ukrayini, Abris, 2002, p. 697.

¹⁹ Adel Kernes, *Evreyskaya rota batki Mahno* [The Jewish unit of Bat'ko Makhno], U-Jew. Project of the United Jewish Community of Ukraine, in <https://ujew.com.ua/history/evrejskaya-rota-batki-maxno> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

²⁰ *Istorichniy narativ Memorialnogo tsentru Golokostu "Babin Yar"* [Historical Narrative of the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Center], in <https://babynyar.org/storage/>

Jews and after the liberation of Lviv in 1944 no more than 2000.²¹ At the same time, many Ukrainians helped the Jewish population, as evidenced by the recognition of 1,755 Ukrainians as the Righteous Among the Nations by the Jewish organisation "Yad Vashem". In the postwar period, religious life in the USSR was under the strict supervision of the police and the Committee for State Security. Some facts of this history are highlighted in the memoirs of Jewish dissidents and Jewish refuseniks such as Natan Sharansky,²² Yosyf Zisels,²³ and others.

THE POSITION OF JEWS IN UKRAINE IN THE ERA OF INDEPENDENCE

As a result of World War II, through persecution and migration, Jews in Ukraine lost almost four-fifths of their membership. Because of this, they moved from the third-largest ethnic group in Ukraine to the tenth (as of 2001).²⁴ However, the presence of the Jewish community in the country has remained considerable due to active involvement in public socio-political processes. This is evidenced by the activity of some of its representatives in the authorities and the political life of Ukraine. They also take an active part in international philanthropic activities. In addition, there are several nationwide religious associations in Ukraine, which include both Orthodox and reformist communities. As of 2014, there were 220 communities in various orthodox associations, 51 in reformist associations, and 26 communities who were independent.²⁵ In recent years, this fig-

main/a7/9f/a79f5d1b95d299fa377952d1c4b88297081d938c50781072bb3f8cb3f381dbc2.pdf (Accessed on 23.02.2021).

²¹ Anatoliy Podolskiy, *Uroki minulogo: Istoriya Golokostu v Ukrayini* [Lessons from the past: The history of the Holocaust in Ukraine], Kyiv, TOV «Sprint-Servis», 2016, p. 32

²² Natan Sharansky, *Fear No Evil: The Classic Memoir of One Man's Triumph over a Police State*, Public Affairs, 1998.

²³ Yosyp Zisels, *Esli ne seychas... Stati, intervyyu, vyistupleniya. 1989–2006 gg.* [If not now ... Articles, interviews, speeches. 1989-2006], Kyiv, Duh i Litera, 2006.

²⁴ *Informatsiyno-analitichni materialy do parlamentskih sluhan na temu: "Rol, znachennya ta vplyv gromadyanskogo suspilstva na formuvannya etnonatsionalnoyi polityki ednosti v Ukrayini"* [Information and analytical materials for the parliamentary hearings on the topic: "The role, significance and influence of civil society on the formation of ethno-national unity policy in Ukraine"], in <http://kompravlud.rada.gov.ua/uploads/documents/32953.pdf> (Accessed on 23.02.2021).

²⁵ Daryna Privalko, *Evreyskaya zhizn v Ukraine: Dostizheniya, trudnosti i prioritety ot padeniya kommunisticheskogo rezhima do 2013 goda* [Jewish life in Ukraine: Achievements, challenges and priorities from the collapse of communism to 2013], in https://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/JPR_Ukraine_report_final_Russian_version.pdf

ure has changed significantly. For example, the United Jewish Community of Ukraine has already 140 members (Chabad charitable foundations, Orthodox and reformist communities, etc.), and the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine (VAAD) has 266 (religious communities, Jewish schools, cultural organisations, etc.).²⁶ As shown by the literature review, the same associations are part of different "umbrella" organisations. Such organisations are effective, since they bring together different purposes and different financing sources.

According to the 2015 official report of the VAAD of Ukraine, there are about 600 Jewish communities and organisations in the country, which are united in 15 "umbrella" structures. At the same time, "more than 200 religious communities are divided into five associations of different sub-confessional denominations. The rest of the communities are secular, universal-public, in particular, urban and regional Jewish communities, as well as charitable, youth, Zionist, veteran, sports, scientific, educational and so on".²⁷

The first and main reason for the change in the number of communities and organisations in Ukraine is that the associations functioning in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (in the cities of Evpatoria, Sevastopol, Simferopol, Yalta) and in some eastern regions of the country (Donetsk, Luhansk) lost or significantly reduced contact with their partners in Ukraine. At the same time, of particular interest is the transfer of Jewish communities from the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to the Kyiv region. These refer to the town of Anatevka, which was founded in 2015 as a "social adaptation project" for refugees from eastern Ukraine. The city began to be constructed in May 2015 and was inhabited by 20 families of displaced persons by September 1.²⁸ Since then, a polyclinic, a school, and a rehabilitation centre have been built in the town, and small charitable enterprises have been set up (for example, to make protective

(Accessed on 6.08.2020).

²⁶ *Obschinnyiy otchet "Deyatelnost Assotsiatsii evreyskikh organizatsiy i obschin Ukrainyi v 2010 godu"* [Community report "Activities of the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine in 2010"], in <http://vaadua.org/otchety> (Accessed 23.02.2021).

²⁷ *Evreyskaya obschina Ukrainyi na fone rossiyskoy agressii i svyazannogo s voynoy ekonomicheskogo krizisa* [The Jewish community of Ukraine against the background of Russian aggression and the war-related economic crisis], in <http://vaadua.org/evreyskaya-obshchina-ukrainy-na-fone-rossiyskoy-agressii-i-svyazannogo-s-voynoy-ekonomicheskogo> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

²⁸ *Anatevka: poslednie prigotovleniya k otkryitiyu* [Anatevka: Last preparations for the opening], in <http://sinagoga.kiev.ua/node/7465> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

clothing for medical staff during the coronavirus pandemic). Residents are engaged in agriculture organised by the Kibbutz principle, and the plan is to build houses for 1,000 people.²⁹ A new synagogue was built in the town for the first time in the history of Ukraine's independence.

Concerning the organisational structure of the Ukrainian Jewish community, the latest report "The Jewish community of Ukraine against the background of Russian aggression and the war-related economic crisis" states that in 2015 in Ukraine there were more than 300,000 people who had the right to repatriation under the Israeli Law of Return.³⁰ Eight out of thirty thousand Jews in Donbas have moved to Israel since 2014,³¹ which is estimated as a reaction to the political and economic situation in the region. About 2-3% of Jews moved to Russia.³²

THE POSITION AND STATUS OF THE JEWISH DIASPORA

An interesting phenomenon in Ukraine is also the so-called "Israeli diaspora".³³ It was first studied in 2009, which resulted in the publication of an analytical report that provided generalisations on the motives for leaving for Israel and the reasons for coming back to Ukraine. Unfortunately, this report does not provide statistics on the number of Israelis living in Ukraine. Representatives of various Jewish organisations put the figure at between 9,000 and 20,000. This discrepancy is explained by the different "demographic tools" used by experts in their estimates.³⁴ This community of Israeli citizens living in Ukraine is not homo-

²⁹ *Anatevka: ubezhische dlya evreev s vostoka Ukrainyi* [Anatevka: A refuge for Jews from eastern Ukraine], in <https://www.bbc.com/russian/av/media-44524083> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

³⁰ *Evreyskaya obshchina Ukrainyi na fone rossiyskoy agressii i svyazannogo s voynoy ekonomicheskogo krizisa* [The Jewish community of Ukraine against the background of Russian aggression and the war-related economic crisis], in <http://vaadua.org/evreyskaya-obshchina-ukrainyi-na-fone-rossiyskoy-agressii-i-svyazannogo-s-voynoy-ekonomicheskogo> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

³¹ Rabin Vishedski, *Mayzhe tretina Evreyiv Donbasu pereyihala v Izrayil vid 2014 roku* [Almost a third of Donbas Jews have moved to Israel since 2014], in <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news/28367185.html> (Accessed on 23.02.2021).

³² *Ibid.*

³³ O. Stegnyy, A. Vasilchenko, *Izrayiltyani v Ukrayini* [Israelis in Ukraine], in <https://www.ukma.edu.ua/index.php/science/tsentri-ta-laboratoriji/ndc-shidnogo-evrejstva/doslidzhennia> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

³⁴ V. Khanin (Zeev), *The Israeli diaspora in Ukraine: Structure, dynamics and identity (material)*, in "Judaica Ukrainica", 2014, No. 3, pp. 81-104.

geneous. First, it can be conditionally divided into three groups: Jews by Halakha, Jews who have the right to repatriation, and relatives of those who have the right to repatriation but are not Jews. Representatives of the latter two groups make up no more than 30% of the total number of those who returned to Ukraine, and this affects the parameters of religious identity, which determines the level of participation in the activities of religious organisations and communities. According to the report, about 57% of respondents recognised Judaism as "their" religion, which suggests the inclusion of several Jews who are not citizens of Ukraine in Jewish life.

Some of those who re-emigrated and members of their families work in the administration of Jewish organisations and religious communities in Ukraine. The total number of such persons is estimated at no more than 10% of the total number of Israelis permanently residing in Ukraine. According to surveys, this segment of the "Israeli diaspora" includes those who plan to return to Israel and those who plan to stay. Each group has representatives who take an active part in the religious community, engage in "Jewish" educational projects, and represent a small part of the religious community. At the same time, as noted by Z. Khanin, belonging to the Jewish community – for instance, visiting a synagogue, communicating with representative offices of the Jewish Agency for Israel, and participating in the activities of local Jewish organisations – "plays the role of a means of self-exclusion from the surrounding social environment".³⁵

As noted earlier, the complex constitution of the Jewish community is multifaceted. The many elements include religious life, educational issues, cultural development, heritage preservation, resistance to anti-Semitism, youth outreach, entrepreneurship, philanthropy, charity, Aliyah (repatriation), and many others. These topics were covered in the report of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research. The report also noted that the main achievements that can be identified in the formation of religious life in Jewish communities during Ukraine's independence were the development of the infrastructure of the religious community and Jewish education, and the establishment of links with international Jewish organisations.³⁶ During this time, wide horizons were opened up for the Jewish community

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Daryna Privalko, *Evreyskaya zhizn v Ukraine: Dostizheniya, trudnosti i prioritety ot padeniya kommunisticheskogo rezhima do 2013 goda* [Jewish life in Ukraine: Achievements, challenges and priorities from the collapse of communism to 2013], in https://www.jpr.org.uk/documents/JPR_Ukraine_report_final_Russian_version.pdf (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

to meet their religious needs in the implementation of religious practices. This refers to such movements as Orthodox Judaism (various Hasidic movements, Chabad), as well as conservative and progressive movements.

Education is known to be an important condition for the Jewish community to preserve its identity. For this reason, various foundations and organisations (such as Or Avner, VAAD) not only support classical Jewish education but also assist in implementing research projects on Jewish studies. The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy has an interesting experience in this regard. In 2012, an interdisciplinary certified Master's Program in Jewish Studies was launched at the Faculty of Humanities with the help of the Pincus Fund for Jewish Education.³⁷ Currently, this program, together with the Ukrainian Association for Jewish Studies, specialises in the history of the Ukrainian population, as well as archaeology and includes the following: language training (Hebrew, Yiddish, Aramaic), a series of historical disciplines, such as "History of the Holocaust and Anti-Semitism", "History of the Jews of the Muslim East", "History of Zionism", as well as archival-museum-library practice. An internship is also held annually at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In our opinion, the activities of such programs contribute to the tolerance of interfaith relations.

The activities of various public organisations, including the International Renaissance Foundation, and the Institute of Human Rights and Prevention of Extremism and Xenophobia, also contributed to this goal and promoted the deepening of international dialogue and the spread of tolerance in society.³⁸ The expert analysis of the level of anti-Semitism in the country in recent years shows positive dynamics, which was reflected, in particular, during the 2019 elections. It is interesting to note the role played by Jewish organisations in developing a strategy to prevent anti-Semitism and xenophobia and wrongful accusations of these crimes.³⁹ The condition for fruitful work in this direction is seen in the conduct of sufficient outreach and awareness-raising work, which should be aimed at disseminating information about the history of Jews in Ukraine and the history of the Shoah. However, overcoming anti-Semitism should also include other forms of ac-

³⁷ *The Pincus Fund for Jewish Education*, in <https://www.pincusfund.org/> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

³⁸ *The Institute of Human Rights and Prevention of Extremism and Xenophobia*, in <https://feldman.ua/ua/ihprex/> (Accessed on 5.08.2020).

³⁹ Daniel Eisenbud, *Ukrainian Jewish Committee: Russian claims of anti-Semitism in Crimea are lies, propaganda*, in "The Jerusalem Post", 2014, in <https://www.jpost.com/International/Ukrainian-Jewish-Committee-Russian-claims-of-anti-Semitism-in-Crimea-are-lies-propaganda-344828> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

tivity, such as close cooperation with local authorities and the establishment of monitoring centres.

As this cultural shift was underway, the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine in 2018 solicited data concerning cultural integration of minorities in different regions. The data indicated that regional administrations, subordinated to the Department of Religious and Ethnic Affairs, do not always make a satisfactory assessment of their cooperation with minorities. Representatives of the authorities complain about the low social activity of minorities and their inability to "articulate their needs".⁴⁰ In our opinion, this may be associated with the fact that representatives of these minorities do not quite understand what the tasks of these executive bodies are and how they can help meet the needs of the minority, such as the restitution of Jewish property or the return of tangible assets. At the same time, it should be emphasised that the disclaimer of the above-mentioned collection states that the terminology used by the authors of the given materials should not be interpreted as an official, that is, "The opinions expressed in the collection belong solely to the authors".⁴¹ Obviously, there is a cooperation between Jewish organisations and public authorities.

THE PROBLEM OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN MODERN UKRAINIAN REALITIES

The preparation and publication of reports on the level of anti-Semitism in Ukraine is a very positive experience in this regard. This practice contributes to the coordination of national policies in terms of guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of citizens. In addition, the availability of such information allows us to get an idea of the dynamics of interethnic relations, public sentiment, and the results of state policy aimed at establishing social harmony. According to a 2019 report by the United Jewish Community of Ukraine,⁴² the level of anti-Semitism has decreased by 27%. If in 2018 there were 90 cases of direct anti-Semitism, in 2019 there were 66 cases, which allowed the Co-President of the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine Josef Zissels to assess the level of anti-

⁴⁰ *Ukrayina – suzir'ya kultur. Zbirnyk* [Ukraine – a constellation of cultures. Collection], Kyiv, Noviy druk, 2018.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Otchet po antisemitizmu v Ukraine za 2019 god* [Report on anti-Semitism in Ukraine for 2019], in <https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/otchet-po-antisemitizmu-v-ukraine-za-2019-god> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

Semitism in Ukraine as the lowest in Europe.⁴³ The level of so-called "domestic anti-Semitism" has also decreased, as mentioned in connection with the rather ambiguous report of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in 2019.⁴⁴ These changes are also recorded in the reports of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and other organisations.⁴⁵

It should be noted that those responsible for compiling the national report take into account the fact that reports of anti-Semitic incidents require fact-checking. Thanks to such work, it is possible to establish cases when in the media or on social networks, anti-Semitic are called those phenomena that, as a matter of fact, do not correspond to this definition.⁴⁶ An example of this is the case in the city of Kolomyia, in February 2020.⁴⁷ The head of the Orthodox Jewish religious community received an official request from the Strategic Investigations Department (SID) of the National Police of Ukraine to provide personal information (home addresses, telephone numbers) about community members and the lists of students of Jewish origin, in higher educational institutions of the Ivano-Frankivsk region, with their personal information, including places of residence. The United Jewish Community of Ukraine (UJCU) conducted a legal analysis of the SID's request and concluded that it "does not violate the current legislation of Ukraine. Besides, such a request *is not anti-Semitism* [emphasis added], according to the definition of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance".⁴⁸ At the same time, the United Jewish

⁴³ *My maemo odin z naymenshih rivniv antisemitizmu v Evropi* [We have one of the lowest levels of anti-Semitism in Europe], in https://zaxid.net/mi_mayemo_odin_z_naymenshih_rivniv_antisemitizmu_v_yevropi_n1508494 (Accessed on 23.02.2021).

⁴⁴ *Chy zrostaє v Ukrayini riven antisemitizmu?* [Is the level of anti-Semitism growing in Ukraine?], in <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e4LYEPGmqkE> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

⁴⁵ *Hate Crime Report*, in <https://hatecrime.osce.org/ukraine> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

⁴⁶ Kateryna Sergatskova, *In one town in Ukraine, police demanded a list of Jews from the head of the Jewish community. We tell you about the history of antisemitism there*, in <https://zaborona.com/en/in-one-town-in-ukraine-police-demanded-a-list-of-jews-from-the-head-of-the-jewish-community-we-tell-you-about-the-history-of-antisemitism-there/> (Accessed 23.02.2021).

⁴⁷ *Zaiavlenye OEOU po sytuatsyy s evreiskoi relyhyoznoi obshchynoi yudeiskoho ortodoksalnogo veroispovedaniya h. Kolomyi* [The statement of the UJCU on the situation with the Orthodox Jewish religious community in Kolomyia], in <https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/zayavlenie-oeou-po-situaczii-s-evrejskoj-religioznoj-obshhinoj-iudejskogo-ortodoksalnogo-veroispovedaniya-g-kolomyii> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

Community of Ukraine said that such an incident could still be considered anti-Semitic if the investigation established that the purpose of gathering information was to harm the Jewish community in the future. The conclusion on this incident can be drawn after the official investigation, which began on May 11, 2020.

Manifestations of intolerance or aggression towards the Jewish community and its representatives, including attacks on Israeli policy are recorded, and such narratives are transmitted to law enforcement agencies.⁴⁹ The policy of preventing anti-Semitism was continued after the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections (which were won by Volodymyr Zelensky and the Sluga Narodu/Servant of the People Party). Close cooperation was established between the authorities and Jewish communities in preventing anti-Semitism, as confirmed by the UJCU report, which recorded a decline in anti-Semitism.⁵⁰ Back in 2007, there were a large number of such events that aroused the concern of the Jewish community, for example, acts of vandalism, outright anti-Semitic insults, etc.⁵¹ It should be noted that the topic of anti-Semitism is closely linked to the influence of far-right political forces,⁵² whose activities take place in modern Ukraine. At the same time, public support for such parties is extremely low, as evidenced by the latest parliamentary elections in 2019, in which the Svoboda party gained 2.15% and did not enter parliament.⁵³ The topic of anti-Semitism in the media sometimes becomes strange. For example, Michael Goldborn in one of his publications speaks of his concern about the fate of the Jewish minority in Ukraine due to the intolerant at-

⁴⁹ "Narkotiki zloy umyisel sionistov" — v parke Kieva nashli antisemitskiy plakat ["Drugs are the evil intent of the Zionists" - an anti-Semitic poster was found in the park of Kiev], in <https://jewishnews.com.ua/society/narkotiki-zloy-umyisel-sionistov-v-parke-kieva-nashli-antisemitskij-plakat> (Accessed 23.02.2021).

⁵⁰ *Antisemitizm v Ukraine. Otchet za 2019 god* [Anti-Semitism in Ukraine. 2019 Annual Report], in <https://jew.org.ua/images/pdf/AntisemitismRUS2019.pdf> (Accessed 25.02.2021).

⁵¹ *Golovniy rabin Ukrayini sturbovaniy zagostrennyam antisemitizmu v Zhitomiri* [Ukraine's chief rabbi is concerned about the escalation of anti-Semitism in Zhytomyr], in <http://khpg.org/1187791599> (Accessed 25.02.2021).

⁵² Adrian Karatnycky, *Ukraine, Anti-Semitism, Racism, and the Far Right*, in <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-anti-semitism-racism-and-the-far-right/> (Accessed 25.02.2021).

⁵³ *Pozachergovi vybory narodnyh deputativ Ukrayini 21 lipnya 2019 roku* [Extraordinary elections of people's deputies of Ukraine on July 21, 2019], in https://cvk.gov.ua/vibory_category/vibori-narodnih-deputativ-ukraini/pozachergovi-vibori-narodnih-deputativ-ukraini-21-lipnya-2019-roku.html (Accessed 25.02.2021).

titude of Ukrainians to gay parades.⁵⁴ The comparison of national and religious minorities with sexual minorities is unjustified, and therefore the accusations of the Groysman government's support of anti-Semitism are unfounded. In addition, one should say a few words about the specifics of religious tourism in Ukraine. As known, Ukraine occupies a special place in the spiritual history of Judaism because Hasidism emerged on its territory, and the spiritual leader of Bratslav Hasidim is buried in the city of Uman. Over the past year, there have been numerous conflicts, in which the confrontation between Hasidic pilgrims and the local population was distinctly antagonistic. See for example:

1. Hasidim made a riot in Uman: The opposing Jewish factions did not like the quarantine fence.⁵⁵

2. In Uman, an internet agitator inciting ethnic hatred was exposed.⁵⁶

3. Another conflict arose between locals and Hasidim over the construction of a synagogue in Uman.⁵⁷

4. Criminal proceedings opened in Uman in connection with the appearance of a sign prohibiting the entry of Hasidim in a local café.⁵⁸

However, thanks to the cooperation of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies with local public organisations, and, when necessary, Israeli law

⁵⁴ Michael Colborne, *Ukraine's Far Right Is Growing Increasingly Violent - Why Aren't Local Jews Concerned?*, in <https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/.premium-ukraine-s-far-right-is-increasingly-violent-why-aren-t-local-jews-concerned-1.6852878> (Accessed 18.06.2021).

⁵⁵ *Hasidy ustroili debosh v Umani: ne ponravilsya karantinnyy zabor* [Hasidim made a riot in Uman: They did not like the quarantine fence], in <https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2020/09/10/7265968/> (Accessed 18.06.2021).

⁵⁶ *V Umani razoblachili internet-agitatora, kotoryy pryzival k mezhnatsionalnoy vrazhde* [In Uman, an internet agitator inciting ethnic hatred was exposed], in <https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-regions/3102954-v-umani-razoblacili-internetagitatora-kotoryj-prizyval-k-mezhnatsionalnoj-vrazhde.html> (Accessed 18.06.2021).

⁵⁷ *V Umani snova konflikt mezhdz mestnyimi zhitelyami i hasidami iz-za stroitelstva sinagogi* [Another conflict between locals and Hasidim over the construction of a synagogue in Uman], in <https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-regions/3099403-v-umani-snova-konflikt-mezdu-mestnymi-zitelami-i-hasidami-izza-stroitelstva-sinagogi.html> (Accessed 18.06.2021).

⁵⁸ *V Umani militsiya vzbudila delo iz-za tablichki o zaprete vhoda hasidam* [Criminal proceedings opened in Uman in connection with the appearance of a sign prohibiting the entry of Hasidim in a local cafe], in <https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-regions/3098097-v-umani-milicia-vzbudila-delo-izza-tablicki-o-zaprete-vhoda-hasidam.html> (Accessed 18.06.2021).

enforcement agencies, it is usually possible to resolve conflicts and, if required, apply coercive measures.

In considering the role of government protection within the Jewish community of Ukraine, one of the largest "umbrella" organisations in Ukraine is the VAAD, established in 1991, whose activities are aimed at the national revival and strengthening of ties between various Jewish organisations. This institution co-founded the Zionist Federation of Ukraine, the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine, the Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, the Congress of National Communities of Ukraine, charitable foundations, etc. The nationwide nature of the VAAD's activities is evidenced by its goals and tasks. These are: "implementation of organizational, financial and professional measures to create a system of social protection for the Jewish communities of Ukraine; cultural and enlightening activities (organization of educational institutions of all levels, lectures, seminars, scientific conferences on Jewish languages, history, culture and traditions); assistance in the revival of religious Jewish communities and the restitution of their religious facilities; assistance in the protection of the honour and ethnic dignity of Jews in Ukraine, resistance to anti-Semitism; support and development of relations with public, cultural, political, religious, youth, sports and other organizations of Israel; coordination and information functions, as well as representative functions of the Association members at the state and international levels".⁵⁹ One of the VAAD's latest activities, together with the Institute of History of Ukraine of the National Academy of Sciences, was participation in the discussion of a project to create a memorial complex at Babyn Yar.

Another important representative and coordinating function of Jewish organisations is that they assist in expanding the scope of social programs aimed at supporting vulnerable groups. The commandment to care is very important in Judaism, which is why Jewish organisations pay much attention to this issue. In Ukraine, there is a "Hesed" project, which provides social security and is considered the most successful in this area. However, not only this international system but also local communities, based on self-financing, organise a number of charitable activities aimed at supporting socially vulnerable groups. The coordination of such activities requires a certain infrastructure. One of the successful examples of meeting social needs is the implementation of projects with the assistance of Hasidic communities

⁵⁹ *Istoriya Assotsiatsii evreyskikh organizatsiy i obschin Ukrainyi* [History of the Association of Jewish Organizations and Communities of Ukraine], in <http://vaadua.org/istoriya-associacii-evreyskikh-organizaciy-i-obshchin-ukrainy> (Accessed on 6.08.2020).

in Kyiv. This includes the organisation and maintenance of a home for the elderly, the provision of food kits to people in need, free legal advice, etc.

Even these small examples show that the development of religious centres in Ukraine differs from what they were during the Soviet history of Ukraine. This is not surprising, since the total policy of the USSR government on the de-religionisation of society put an end to the traditional form of religious communities as common spiritual centres. After the fall of the USSR, Ukraine acquired years of independence and created new conditions for ensuring the forms of manifestation of Jewish identity. The mechanisms developed by the state to ensure the rights and freedoms of citizens made it possible to launch the revival of Jewish life. Jewish communities and organisations currently enjoy a sufficient level of autonomy, as each such association is independently registered with the judiciary, which allows them to independently shape the goals and objectives of activities and forms of their implementation. If conflicts arise within the community, they remain at the level of the community's internal affairs and do not become the subject of public discussion, while property disputes related to restitution are resolved in court.

It should also be noted that state-confessional relations in Ukraine are regulated by the Constitution of Ukraine and other legal measures. Following these documents, none of the confessions in Ukraine receives specific preferences or state funding; they rely on voluntary donations and sale of religious paraphernalia. At the same time, Ukraine is interested in the preservation and development of ethnonational diversity: actively supporting the activities of national minorities, including Jews, their education system, and promoting the organisation of exhibitions, national, and cultural festivals. This is provided by the Law of Ukraine "On National Minorities in Ukraine", which in Article 16 states that the state budget of Ukraine makes special allocations for the development of national minorities.⁶⁰ For example, in Kyiv, there is a Jewish state educational complex, "Simha". The project of the Babyn Yar Holocaust memorial centre is also supported by the state. In cooperation with the Council of Europe Office, a communication platform has been set up in Ukraine, which has become a milestone in the Council of Europe's project "Protecting National Minorities, including Roma, and Minority Languages in Ukraine".⁶¹ Such platforms facilitate the exchange of infor-

⁶⁰ *Zakon Ukrayini «Pro natsionalni menshini v Ukrayini»* [Law of Ukraine "On National Minorities in Ukraine"], in <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2494-12#Text> (Accessed 25.02.2021).

⁶¹ *Zahyst natsionalnyh menshyn, v tomu chisli Romiv, ta mov menshyn v Ukrayini* [Protecting

mation and consultations of national minorities, politics, and possible funding of further outreach efforts. As can be seen, Ukraine has created an appropriate legal framework for the protection of the interests of national minorities. Action is also being taken towards implementing humanitarian policy in support of national minorities, including the Jewish community.

One can identify several major issues and challenges facing Jewish communities and organisations. They include the need to create a single "umbrella" centre that would coordinate work within the Jewish community and represent it among other ethnic minorities in their relations with the state, to maintain and preserve financial stability, to strengthen formal and informal Jewish education, to provide an opportunity to study Jewish history in Ukraine, as well as to prevent anti-Semitism. The successful implementation of these tasks depends on two components. Firstly, these are actions to be taken by the Jewish community members themselves, for example, the "goodwill" of the community members to create a single organisation that can represent the Jewish community as a whole. Furthermore, such a community would work to increase the level of teaching staff involved in teaching Jewish subjects to improve the level of Jewish education. Secondly, such a committee would operate with the authorities (for example, in combating xenophobia and anti-Semitism) and other religious organisations in lobbying for the adoption of such rules of law to promote the financial independence of communities based on domestic resources. Such an effort would seek to impose the rules of law to fairly regulate the sphere of philanthropy within and without the Jewish community. It is clear that the dynamics of the religious life of the Jewish community has both its own peculiarities and common features that are inherent in most religious communities of Ukraine. This gives hope that there will be positive changes in the future, because Ukraine's policy in this area is aimed to provide a practical guarantee under which citizens will be able to exercise their rights to freedom of religion, and religious communities can fully enjoy it.

National Minorities, including Roma, and Minority Languages in Ukraine], in https://www.coe.int/uk/web/kyiv/national-minorities/-/asset_publisher/i6ydYw6ljGNc/content/communication-platform-for-national-minorities-presented-in-zaporizhia-region?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=https%3A%2F%2F (Accessed 25.02.2021).

CONCLUSIONS

Relations between the Jewish population and other nations on the territory of modern Ukraine were not always simple and peaceful. Particularly dramatic was the period during World War II, when large numbers of the Jewish population living in Ukraine were brutally exterminated. The post-war period was no less difficult when the Jewish population came under close Soviet surveillance. Of course, all these circumstances directly affected the number of Jews living on Ukrainian soil. A significant number of Jews emigrated. One of the reasons for the mass departure from the country was the anti-terrorist operation in the east of the country. Therefore, statistics confidently show that the number of Jews in Ukraine tends to decrease.

However, the presence of the Jewish community in the country is palpable today, thanks to active involvement in public socio-political processes. This is confirmed by the activities of some of its representatives in the authorities. In the political life of Ukraine, they take an active part in international philanthropic activities. In addition, there are several national religious associations in Ukraine, which include both Orthodox and reformist communities.

It is worth noting that the Jewish community is making significant efforts to preserve and maintain its own culture and identity in Ukraine.

On the part of Ukraine, considerable attention is paid to the security of national minorities in the country. One of the directions that is actively implemented in domestic politics is the fight against anti-Semitism. In addition, Ukraine is interested in the preservation and development of ethnonational diversity and actively supports the activities of national minorities. These include the Jewish educational system, and the promotion of organisation of exhibitions, festivals of national and cultural societies and more.

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MOLDAVIAN UPRISING OF 1574 IN POLISH SOURCES

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Abstract: *This paper deals with events that took place in Moldavia in 1574. The hospodar Ioan Vodă, refusing to pay a drastically increased tribute to the Ottoman Empire, risked the Sultan's wrath, and thus lost his office. He did not go to Constantinople as the Padishah wanted, but instead decided on an armed confrontation with troops sent to cast him off the throne. However, the conflict was not merely a personal matter for Ioan: it took the form of a nationwide uprising – the hospodar was supported in the struggle by both the upper and lower layers of Moldavian society. At stake was an end to Ottoman domination. Although the chances of defeating the Turks were small, Ioan's troops prevailed for quite some time. A unit of Cossacks who came to Moldavia from the borderlands of the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth, under the leadership of the nobleman Świerczowski, played an essential role in the events described. They constituted one of the most valuable (and perhaps even the most valuable) combat formation in Ioan's army. Another Polish thread also appears here: namely, a commitment made by the border magnates (Olbracht Laski and Prince Ostrogski) to help Ioan. Although these were only promises, it caused considerable anger with Sultan Selim II. Their fate was sealed by the betrayal of one of Ioan's commanders. The defeat was decided by the betrayal of one of the commanders. However, the military disparity between the forces at Ioan's disposal and the potential of the Ottoman Empire suggests that the defeat of the Moldavians was only a matter of time.*

Keywords: *Ioan Vodă, Moldavia, the Ottoman Empire, Cossacks, Świerczowski.*

Rezumat: *Articolul se ocupă de evenimentele care au avut loc în Moldova în 1574. Domnul de atunci, Ioan Vodă cel Viteaz (1572-1574), neîfiind de acord cu dublarea tributului impus de Imperiul Otoman, a riscat mânia sultanului și, astfel, pierderea funcției sale. Acesta a decis o confruntare armată cu trupele trimise să-l alunge de pe tron. Cu toate acestea, s-a dovedit că conflictul nu era problema personală a lui Ioan; a luat forma unei răscoale la nivel național - voievodul a fost susținut în luptă atât de straturile superioare, cât și de cele*

inferioare ale societății moldovenești. Deși șansele de a-i învinge pe turci erau mici, trupele lui Ioan au câștigat o serie de victorii. O formațiune de cazaci sosiți în Moldova din țările de frontieră ale Commonwealth-ului polon-lituanian, sub conducerea nobilului Świerczowski, a jucat un rol important în evenimentele descrise. Ei au constituit una dintre cele mai valoroase (și poate chiar cele mai valoroase) formațiuni de luptă din armata lui Ioan. Aici apare și un alt element polonez. Și anume, o declarație formală de ajutorare a lui Ioan Vodă cel Viteaz a fost făcută de magnații de frontieră Olbracht Łaski și prințul Ostrogski. Deși aceasta era doar o promisiune, a provocat o furie considerabilă sultanului Selim al II-lea. Înfrângerea lui Ioan Vodă a fost decisă prin trădarea unuia dintre comandanți, deși disproporția militară dintre forțele aflate la dispoziția lui Ioan și potențialul Imperiului Otoman sugerează că această înfrângere era doar o chestiune de timp.

INTRODUCTION

In the 16th century, Ottoman sultans selected the hospodar of Moldavia. Each of them had to pay tribute to Constantinople. To become a hospodar of Moldova, the candidate had to persuade Sultan Selim II and his clerks that he would be better than the current hospodar of Moldavia. Usually, that was determined by the promise of higher tribute.

In 1574 hospodar of Moldova was Ioan Vodă cel Cumplit. He had good relations with the Ottomans until the hospodar of Wallachia, Alexandru al II-lea Mircea, argued that his brother Petru would be better than Ioan. He promised to the Ottoman clerks a higher tribute than Ioan. Additionally, it was said Ioan liked Polish people too much, which was not suitable for the Sublime Porte.

Persuaded the Turks sent an envoy (czausz) to Ioan demanding he either pay the same tribute as proposed by Alexander and Petru, or bid the throne in Jassy farewell¹. If the demand was too much for Ioan, he was to see the Sultan in person. However, since the visit would lead to his execution rather than a

¹ He came 21 February 1574 – the day of coronation to the king of Poland Henry de Valois. See Leonard Gorecki, *Opisanie wojny Iwona hospodara wołoskiego z Selimem II cesarzem tureckim, toczonej w roku 1574* [A description of the war of Ioan Hospodar of Wallachia with Selim II of the Ottoman Emperor, fought in 1574], ed. Władysław Syrokomla, St. Petersburg and Mogilev, 1855, p. 9.

Marcin Bielski also gives a record of this and other facts. However, in a briefer form. He does not give many facts at all. That is why the author of this article will usually refer to Gorecki; to Bielski when his description is better than Gorecki's. See Marcin Bielski, *Kronika Marcina Bielskiego* [Chronicle of Marcin Bielski], ed. Kazimierz Józef Turowski, Sanok, 1856, p. 1345 – 1358.

prosperous life in Turkey, he decided not to take advantage of the offer. Before answering, he presented the situation to Moldavian boyars. He told them the proposed amount was excessive for their country². If they decided to pay, Moldovans would face poverty and starvation. He also suggested that succumbing to Selim's demand could have far-reaching consequences in the future – the emboldened Sultan would only continue to increase the tribute. Ioan left the decision to the boyars since it was upon them that the new burden would fall. As an alternative to the Sultan's invitation to visit, Ioan offered war. Admittedly, the envoy announced that Ottoman troops would enter Moldova if Ioan did not appear in Constantinople, but the hospodar was not going there. Ioan's proposal was high stakes: gain independence from the Ottoman's and end the tribute. The other scenario was all too evident. It was offered to the boyars as an opportunity, and they were prepared to risk everything³.

In this paper, we will present events of the year 1574, and attempt to answer whether Ioan had a real chance at gaining independence or if it was a cry of despair or if it was an attempt to get valuable spoils in neighbouring Wallachia.

The basic source of information about the events described in this text is Leonard Gorecki's *Opisanie wojny Iwona hospodara wołoskiego z Selimem II cesarzem tureckim, toczonej w roku 1574*. Marcin Bielski also devoted some space in his chronicle to the Moldavian uprising. Another Polish chronicler Reinhold Heidenstein just mentions the events in Moldavia⁴. In the 17th century, Jędrzej Maksymilian Fredro wrote about them⁵. When it comes to studies, no separate Polish book deals with them.

NEWCOMERS FROM POLAND

The Sultan's messenger was unceremoniously dismissed without any of the customary gifts, although the hospodar managed a few words. He stated that

² Although Gorecki writes Alexandru proposed tribute of 120 thousand red zlotys which would be two times more than Ioan was paying, really after his death it increased from 40 to 50 thousand florins. See Leonard Gorecki, *Ibidem*, p. 9.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 9-11.

⁴ See Reinhold Heidenstein, *Dzieje Polski od śmierci Zygmunta Augusta do roku 1594* [The history of Poland from the death of Zygmunt August to 1594], vol. 1, ed. Michał Gliszczyński, Włodzimierz Spasowicz, St. Petersburg, 1857, p. 160.

⁵ See Jędrzej Maksymilian Fredro, *Dzieje narodu polskiego pod Henrykiem Walezyuszem królem polskim a potem francuzkim* [The history of the Polish nation under Henry Valesius, the Polish king and then the French king], ed. Władysław Syrokomla, Petersburg and Mohylew 1855, p. 94-124.

despite his desire to serve as a loyal vassal, he could not fulfil the Sultan's wishes⁶.

Preparations for the war began. Ioan gathered a fair-sized army, but there was one problem. The majority of his troops were farmers not connected professionally with military life and their guns were also of poor quality, so Ioan sent a message to Poland. Referring to the alliance between the two countries (Poland was to play the role of the protector of Moldavia in it), Polish King Henri de Valois was asked for reinforcements. But he refused. He had no intention of spoiling their good relations with the Sultan. Fearful that a direct occupation by the Ottoman's would threaten Polish security, Valois did not even agree to the minimum plan—allowing Polish volunteer to join and advertising for them⁷. However, some Polish adventurers went to Moldavia on their own.

Having learned that a small Cossack unit was seeking spoils around the mouth of the Dnieper, the hospodar invited them to join his army. Initially fearful of a trick, once Ioan appealed directly to the Cossacks he convinced them to join with the offer of regular pay. This deal seemed all the more tempting given the poor finds on their latest venture for spoils⁸.

The Cossack elders accepted the hospodar's proposal; reconnaissance was sent to capture "tongues" – individuals who could provide information on Ottoman plans⁹. At the head of the one thousand two hundred strong Cossack stood the Polish nobleman Jan Świerczowski – it was still a period when it was not dishonourable for a nobleman to have Cossacks as companions during an expedition. They were a valued combat force, and it was only in later decades that their reputation declined ("bad press", bandits, scooters and drunkards to be guarded so as not cause trouble).

A troop from Poland arrived in Moldavia in the second half of March 1574. Ioan received new soldiers with a lavish feast, expensive presents and food for their horses. However, Świerczowski said they did not come for the money but to fight the enemy of Christianity¹⁰. The expedition was recruited from residents of the Braclaw and Bar district offices (starostwa). In addition to Cossacks, townspeople and representatives of the Podlasie nobility joined. Świerczowski himself supposedly had Masovian roots¹¹.

⁶ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 11-12.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 12-13.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 14-16.

¹¹ Mikhaylo Khrushevski, *Istoriya Ukrainy – Rusi* [The History of Ukraine – Russia], vol. 7, New York, 1956, p. 147-148.

Now Ioan could start the war. According to Gorecki, during the council that took place immediately after the mentioned reception of the Ottoman messenger, Ioan "swore that not only would he not lay down his weapon, but that he would expel the Turkish troops from Wallachia [here it means Moldavia] and devastate their own state, thereby obtaining the conditions of an honest peace."¹² The boyars "declared that their wives, children should gather with whatever possessions and expensive equipment they have at the Hotin [Chocim] fortress and equip their own army with a penny for Ioan. While waiting for the enemy at the Danube, they took an oath that they would stand to the last."¹³

TOTAL WAR

But before that happened, there were clashes with troops who came to Moldavia in March to defend Selim's interests. He assigned the task of dethroning Ioan to Alexandru, hospodar of Wallachia, who initiated the whole affair. After crossing the Milcov River, intervention forces set up a camp, but its fortification was neglected. Świerczowski's Cossacks and six thousand Moldavians commanded by Dumbravă set off towards the camp, followed by heavier units led by Ioan. Before Cossacks and Dumbravă's branch reached the main enemy forces, they encountered and defeated their front guard. The prisoners said that the foe's army consisted of about seven thousand Wallachians, three thousand Turks and three hundred Hungarians. Saddle-horses of Alexandru's soldiers were feeding far away, when the attack started. The surprise was complete. Near the town of Focșani, the Wallachian hospodar's army was surrounded and defeated¹⁴.

However, it should be said that Ioan had considerable strength. It is estimated that he had about twenty thousand soldiers¹⁵. In addition, his subordinates had exceptionally high morale. Both the boyars with their private troops and peasants arrived to face the invaders¹⁶.

Hospodar Alexandru and his brother Petru, a challenger to the Moldavian throne, avoided death. They crossed Lake Cahul and took refuge in the fortress of Brăila. Meanwhile, Ioan distributed the wealth he found at the enemy's camp among

¹² Leonard Gorecki, *Ibidem*, p. 11.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 17-18; Zdzisław Spieralski, *Awantury mołdawskie* [Moldavian Brawls], Warsaw, 1967, p. 135; Marek Plewczyński, *Wojny i wojskowość polska XVI wieku* [Wars and Polish military in the 16th century], vol. 2, Zabrze - Tarnowskie Góry, 2012, p. 288.

¹⁵ Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

¹⁶ Zdzisław Spieralski, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

the bird-pecked corpses. Having seen neither Alexandru nor Petru among the dead, hospodar Ioan began pursuing them after four days of rest. He entered Wallachia in April, conquering castles and fortresses, while treating its inhabitants with the utmost brutality. The capital of Wallachia - Bucharest (București) was also conquered. There Ioan installed a hospodar named Vintilă¹⁷.

Having located Petru and Alexandru's whereabouts, Ioan headed with the army in their direction. Having reached Brăila, he set up camp at a safe distance from the fortress walls beyond the reach of its artillery. Because the fortresses were heavily manned and strategically located, Ioan sought to avoid a direct assault, instead requesting of the fortress commanders that they only wanted „two Moldavian fugitives”¹⁸. If his request was not met, he would use force¹⁹.

The fortress's Ottoman commander sent four inhabitants of Brăila (Turks) to Ioan with a reply. Their message was that the hospodar's demand would not be met and, moreover, he himself was the sultan's subject. In addition, messengers were equipped with props: ten giant cannonballs, as many smaller ones, and two arrows. The message: either Ioan's forces leave or be treated to “delicacies” like those brought by the messengers²⁰.

In response Ioan ordered the messenger's ears and noses cut off, and to hang them upside down where they could be seen from the fortress. Next, he ordered an assault on the neighbouring city, Brăila. The inhabitants were slain and their homes set alight. Being one of the wealthiest cities in the area, Ioan's soldiers found quantities of gold, silver, money and pearls²¹.

At that point, only the castle remained as a holdout. But Świerczowski had convinced Ioan to abandon the siege and go towards Tighina (Bendery) – a city in the Ottomans' area. Once conquered, there too, were cruel murders of the city's inhabitants. Cossacks reinforced with Moldavian troops quickly crushed a detachment of Turks sent from Kilia to Brăila. The remnants of that force took refuge in Tighina, which could be the reason why it was attacked. The castle was not taken²². Next Turkish troops came from Cetatea Albă (Akerman/Białogród).

¹⁷ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 18; Zdzisław Spieralski, *op. cit.*, p. 135; Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 289; *Vademecum bałkanisty. Lata 500-2007* [Balkanist Vademecum. 500 – 2007], ed. Ilona Czamańska, Zdzisław Pentek, Poznań, 2009, p. 271.

¹⁸ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 20-21; Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 289. Spieralski writes that the relief came from both Kilia and Cetatea Albă. See Zdzisław Spieralski, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

Świerczowski pushed them to the steppes of Bugeac. The Cossacks proceeded to attack and burn this city, where they found plenty of riches²³.

BETRAYAL

While in May, the busy troops of Ioan destroyed the leading edge of the Ottoman-Tatar-Wallachian armies, by June the Turks had gathered behind the Danube more serious forces (estimated at twenty to thirty thousand) to decisively crush the rebellion. They were additionally equipped with heavy artillery and siege equipment²⁴.

After summoning the Hotin pârcălab (i.e. the commander of the Hotin fortress) of Ieremia Golia „Cernăuțeanul” (i.e. “of Chernivtsi”), Ioan sent him to make sure that the invading units did not cross the Danube. He ordered his army to cross to the Turkish bank of the river and capture the Galați fortress located there. If the Turks would like to complete the crossing, they will do it here. Ieremia Golia „Cernăuțeanul” (Czarnowicz) was a man in whom Ioan had full confidence²⁵.

However, it turned out that the Turks found the key to Ieremia’s heart. First, they offered him thirty thousand red Hungarian zlotys, if he visited their camp and hear out their offer. There the Wallachian voivode, speaking on behalf of the Turks, laid out Cernăuțeanul’s options in stark terms. Ioan could not win the war with the Sultan. His defeat was only a matter of time. Thus, the only question remaining was whether Cernăuțeanul wanted to stay with Ioan and share his fate, or take the side of the Turks and have a future in bright colours²⁶.

Cernăuțeanul decided to let the Turkish-Wallachian troops pass. It was also important that the whole operation took place “quietly” to not alert the opponent too soon. When the crossing was over, Cernăuțeanul was instructed to inform Ioan. As justification, he stated that the enemy was too numerous to stop. He recommended a quick hit with the whole army and smashing the opponent²⁷.

At that time, Ioan besieged Tighina castle. He convened a meeting whose purpose was to decide whether to continue the siege or break it and do what Cernăuțeanul advised. It was decided to follow the advice of the pârcălab. Meanwhile, the Turks, having crossed the Danube exactly where Ioan had anticipated,

²³ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 21; Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

²⁴ Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 289-290.

²⁵ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 30-31.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 31.

camped north of Lake Cahul. On June 9, the Moldavian army approached at a distance of about twenty-two kilometres. Ioan, following Świerczowski's advice, sent him with the Cossacks and six thousand Moldavian troops under the command of Jeremiah to obtain a "tongue"²⁸.

The Cossacks found a Turkish front guard, which turned out to be quite numerous. Considering that the main forces had to be proportionally more significant, it turned out that the enemy troops were much more numerous than expected – Cernăuțeanul gave incorrect information. This cast a massive shadow on the credibility of the man whom Ioan trusted almost wholly. Wanting to be 100% sure, the hospodar decided to perform a reconnaissance in person. However, from the hill, which was theoretically a convenient observation point, nothing interesting could be spotted²⁹.

Ioan made a mistake. He misjudged the situation, not being convinced that the opponent had the advantage. Contrary to Świerczowski's opinion, he divided his army into thirty troops - separately cavalry, infantry separately, placing two guns in front of each of them³⁰. According to Gorecki, the most valuable formation in his army were the Polish Cossacks. The infantry consisted mainly of villagers armed with "scythes, crooked bows, Turkish swords and sticks"³¹. Immediately before the battle, he climbed the hill again; this time, the enemy army appeared to him in full glory. Confident of Cernăuțeanul's betrayal, Ioan summoned him, but he did not arrive. Ieremia sent a message that he could not come because he was preparing to launch an attack. But it was a sham attack – when he was on the battlefield, he just gave up³².

This event lowered the morale of the other Moldavians, especially given that the Turks used Cernauteanul's horsemen as a shield in their attack. However, Ioan was unmoved. He ordered to strike, but instead of moving forward, the Moldavian army began to retreat. The angry hospodar did not lose his cool, but ordered the artillery to open fire³³.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 31-33; Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 290. Cossacks did not believe Cernăuțeanul. Moldovan peasantry did not believe the boyars at all. But they believed Cossacks. See Marcin Bielski, *op. cit.*, p. 1352-1353.

²⁹ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, pp. 31, 33. There was only one hill in the area. See Marcin Bielski, *op. cit.*, p. 1353.

³⁰ Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 290-291. Information that each detachment was assigned exactly two guns is from Bielski. See Marcin Bielski, *op. cit.*, p. 1353.

³¹ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 33-34.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 34; Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 291.

The Cossacks with great courage attacked the enemy flanks. There were also enough brave warriors among the Moldavians to break through, what began a Turkish retreat. Realizing, though, that the Moldavian forces would soon find themselves in range of hidden Turkish canons, Świerczowski called a halt to the pursuit. Thus, the Moldavians and Cossacks were able to resist a Turkish counter-attack and safely return to their camp³⁴.

There, Ioan set up his soldiers near canons, arches and spears were prepared. However, the Turks attacked with great enthusiasm breaking the defenders' ranks. Despite this, Moldovans moved forward. A bloody battle ensued, in which the various combating sides were so mixed that the artillery became useless. Ioan ordered his troops behind the cannon line, which was done. So, the Turks withdrew, and there was, as if based on an agreement concluded by both parties, a break in battle³⁵.

THE LAST CHORD

A sudden and violent storm paused the fighting and ultimately had a fatal effect on the Moldavians because the rain-soaked guns became unusable. When the fight began again, the newly reinforced Turks forced the Moldovans to retreat, despite fighting bravely³⁶.

Ioan still had a lot of infantry and about 250 Cossacks. The hospodar was not afraid of death but, Świerczowski advised retreating to a safe place, which was done. Initially, they tried to take the guns with them. However, as they would slow the march significantly, it was decided to spoil (to be useless to the Turks) and abandon them³⁷.

Having reached a recently burned village Ioan set up a fortified camp with the earthwork. On June 10, 1574, the Turks arrived there at sunset and surrounded the Moldavians with a tight cordon. The surrounding villages were burned that same night. The fire lit the area so that nobody in the dark could escape or sally from the besieged camp³⁸.

The next day at dawn, mutual shooting began – the defenders had several

³⁴ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 34-35.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 35-36.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 37.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 37-38.

guns at their disposal³⁹. A three-day exchange of fire produced no movement on either side. With no relief in sight for the Moldovans, the Turks suggested that Ioan surrender since defeat was only a matter of time. Having consulted with his soldiers, Ioan was eager to negotiate. Interestingly, as Gorecki writes, the Cossacks preferred death to surrender. In their opinion, the Turkish assurances to Christians were worthless. Surrendering simply meant a more tortuous humiliating death. Moldavians were more eager to bargain, although ready to sacrifice⁴⁰.

While Ioan still had considerable strength his fortifications did not have access to water and thirst became more severe. He was ready to give up to save his troops⁴¹. Summoning the Turks, Ioan announced the terms of his possible surrender. They were to let the Cossacks leave; he was to be taken intact to the Sultan. As for the Moldavians in the camp, we have two divergent versions. Marcin Bielski writes that Ioan did not raise this issue at all - as the Sultan's "inventory", they could be sure that nothing would happen to them. Murdering them meant impoverishment the Padishah. Gorecki's version was similar except that Ioan strongly advocated for the Moldavians troops, from which one can conclude that their safety was his third condition⁴².

He demanded that each of the Ottoman commanders swear seven times that these conditions would be met, which the Turks did very eagerly. Then came a farewell to the soldiers serving under his command. He announced that if he survived, he would return to Moldavia. He gave away the gems and valuables he still had; Cossacks were rewarded in particular. Once in Ottoman captivity, he repeated that the Świerczowski's troop be allowed to return to their homeland with their horses and property, citing the promise made by the Turks. Finally, Ioan offered that any anger the Turks had at the Moldavians be taken out on him. The Turks obliged. Irritated by his haughty demeanour, one of them cut him by the sword in the face and the bosom. Janissaries cut off the head; then tied the body to two camels, who tore him apart. The head was stuck on a spear. But they also appreciated the bravery of Ioan, appealing to Allah to infuse them with his knightly spirit⁴³.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 37. Bielski writes that the defenders sallied several times. See Marcin Bielski, *op. cit.*, p. 1355.

⁴⁰ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 38-39.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 39.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 39-40; Marcin Bielski, *op. cit.*, p. 1356.

⁴³ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 39-41. On the way to the Turkish camp, Ioan was accompanied by a Pole named Osmolski, with whom he had a three-hour conversation. See Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 41. However, the role of this gentleman in the described

It turned out that the Cossacks' predictions were correct, as the conditions regarding the safe departure of Ioan's subordinates were likewise not met. The defeated troops were treacherously attacked as they confidently left camp, knowing nothing about the fate of their commander⁴⁴.

The Cossacks for their part, could not break through the thicket of Ottoman troops, so they returned to the camp where they fought for their lives⁴⁵. Some were killed, some were captured. Gorecki lists the names of the most eminent prisoners; Świerczowski was among them. The Cossacks were offered a new, prosperous life in Turkey if they converted to Islam and swore an oath of allegiance. They refused. After paying a ransom, the Cossacks returned to their homeland⁴⁶. Petru became the new hospodar of Moldavia, the 5th „Schiopul” (Engl. Lame).

POLISH MAGNATES' THREAD

Perhaps the fate of Ioan would have been different if he had received support from the Polish magnates. He had grounds to count on it. Two Eastern Borderlands magnates – Olbracht Łaski and Prince Konstanty Wasyl Ostrogski assured him about it in letters. They declared support in people, horses, food and ammunition. However, they sent nobody and nothing to Moldavia⁴⁷.

Nevertheless, at Padishah's court, there was a realistic expectation of Polish support. Even Royal help was taken into account. A French agent in Turkey wrote about it to his King (Charles IX) on June 4. But they thought the resulting involvement of Henri de Valois would not be a support for Ioan, but for Olbracht Łaski – because of the belief in Turkey that Henri de Valois promised him the throne of Moldavia⁴⁸. And there were reasons to think in this way – Łaski had

situation is not explained. Heidenstein writes about the tearing of the body of Ioan by camels too. See Reinhold Heidenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

⁴⁴ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 41; Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 292; Zdzisław Spieralski, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁴⁵ Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 292; Zdzisław Spieralski, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

⁴⁶ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 42. Bielski writes that only twelve Cossacks were taken prisoners - the same ones whom Gorecki calls "the most eminent". See Marcin Bielski, *op. cit.*, p. 1357-1358.

⁴⁷ Zdzisław Spieralski, *op. cit.*, p. 136; Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

⁴⁸ Zdzisław Spieralski, *op. cit.*, p. 136; cf. François de Noailles Bishop Dax to Catherine de Medici, Istanbul, 8 May 1574, in: *Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor urmare la colecțiunea lui Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki* [Documents regarding the history of Romanians following collection of Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki], supl. 1., vol. 1, p. 1518-1780, ed. Grigore

ambitions to become Moldavian hospodar. He submitted his offer in Constantinople at the same time as Petru Șchiopul. But he was not chosen by the Sultan because he was considered a dangerous person not to be trusted. Also, his proposed tribute could have been less than Petru's.

Nevertheless, Łaski had several reasons to believe he would succeed: First, he had French support that was potentially decisive at the court in Constantinople. Additionally, the French agent Szomberg promised Łaski 100,000 thalers. It was a debt of gratitude for supporting the election of King Henri de Valois of Poland⁴⁹.

Ioan's family found asylum in Poland. This fact and the letters of the abovementioned magnates captured by the Sultan sent him into a rage. He demanded that all the guilty be punished – both those who really helped Ioan and those who just declared help. In a letter provided by envoy Ahmed, he put it as a condition of peace between Poland and the Ottomans. The Sultan demanded the return of the family of Ioan with all the people (including servants) who had taken refuge in Poland. He also wanted the return of any property they removed, part of which, he claimed, was money intended for tribute. The Sultan stressed his commitment to the Polish-Ottoman alliance, stating that if there was ever an attack on Poland, that state would meet with the Selim's anger. However, he underscored his disappointment that the Poles did not show the same loyalty. The Wallachian voivode reported to Sultan that in a critical situation for Ioan, Polish noblemen sent him two hundred people who plundered Cetatea Albă⁵⁰.

Gorecki believed that the Tartar invasion that hit Poland in October 1575 was retaliation for the entry of Cossacks into Moldavia and was taken at the behest

Tocilescu, Alexandru Odobescu, București, 1886, No. LXVI, pp. 33-34; the same to Charles IX, Istanbul, 19 May 1574, *Ibidem*, no. LXVII, p. 34; the same to Henry of Valois, Istanbul, 30 May 1574, *Ibidem*, No. LXVIII, pp. 34-35; see. Ryszard Zieliński, Roman Żelewski, *Olbracht Łaski. Od Kieźmarku do Londynu* [Olbracht Łaski. From Kieźmark to London], Warsaw, 1982, p. 90-91.

⁴⁹ Zdzisław Spieralski, *op. cit.*, p. 134; Marek Plewczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

⁵⁰ Selim II's letter to Polish lords, Constantinople, 31 VII-9 VIII 1574, in: *Katalog rękopisów orientalnych ze zbiorów polskich* [Catalog of Oriental manuscripts from Polish collections], vol. 1, edited by Stefan Strelcyn, Marian Lewicki, Ananiasz Zajączkowski; part. 1., *Katalog dokumentów tureckich: dokumenty do dziejów Polski i krajów ościennych w latach 1455 – 1672* [Catalog of Turkish documents: documents on the history of Poland and neighboring countries in the years 1455 – 1672], ed. Zygmunt Abrahamowicz, Ananiasz Zajączkowski, Warsaw, 1959, p. 212-213; Zdzisław Spieralski, *op. cit.*, p. 136-137; Świętosław Orzelski, *Bezkrólewia ksiąg ośmioro* [Eight books about Interregnum], vol. 2, ed. Włodzimierz Spasowicz, St. Petersburg and Mogilev, 1856, p. 37-39.

of Selim's successor Murad III⁵¹. It also should be said Heidenstein reports that Ioan's wife was given to the Turks⁵².

CONCLUSIONS

It seems that the Moldavian uprising in 1574 had no chance of success. The power of the Ottoman Empire meant that, despite a series of defeats, it was able to deploy more armies that would one day break the resistance of Moldavians. Cernăuțeanul's betrayal only accelerated the course of events. Moreover, a similar situation happened just over a quarter of a century later, when Mihai Viteazul of Wallachia (Michael the Brave, 1593-1601), despite equally impressive victories, was not able to balance the military forces that his opponents had⁵³.

It is surprising the number of victories won by Ioan's army – we should remember that most of his soldiers were poorly armed, i.e. "amateurs". It is possible, therefore, that the determining factor was the presence of the battle-hardened Polish unit. So, could sending additional reinforcements by magnates declaring have helped tip the scale of victory? No, Moldavia was an economically valuable property for the Turks that they certainly would not have let it out of their hands. The case is also made by the fact that Olbracht Łaski, who was aspired to the title of hospodar, sought to obtain the position through "legal" means through the court of Constantinople.

The events of 1574 also had a far less glorious aspect: specifically, the murders and looting in neighbouring Wallachia. In retrospect, it is difficult to discern the motivations of individual participants of the events described in this article. However, it seems that there was some hope for victory by joining Ioan. For some, it was a cry of despair, for others, a means by which to get rich quick. Above all, however, it pushed these people into action during a specific historical situation. The root causes were more impulsive than considered. Deep reflection was not the deciding factor.

⁵¹ Leonard Gorecki, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁵² Reinhold Heidenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 160. Gorecki and Bielski don't write about the Moldavian refugees at all. Orzelski does not confirm the information at Heidenstein's. None of them writes about the further fate of others persons as well as about the treasures and money taken from Moldavia.

⁵³ Another association that comes to mind of the author is World War II, during which German troops surpassing Soviets (in terms of armament, training and quality of command) but were finally unable to cope with far more numerous enemy divisions.

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ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND THE SOBERNESS MOVEMENT OF RUTHENIANS OF BUKOVINA IN THEIR POLYETHNIC ENVIRONMENT IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH - EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

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Abstract: *The study considers the implications of alcohol production and use, as well as the evolution of the abstinence movement among the Ukrainian population of Bukovina in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries in, a polyethnic context. The authors examined the state and local authorities' policies on alcoholic beverage marketing. The reactions of the Ruthenians in Bukovina to anti-alcohol campaigns that occurred among other ethnic groups in the region are explored.*

Keywords: *Bukovina, alcoholism, soberness movement, anti-alcohol struggle, Ruthenians, ethnic communities.*

Rezumat: *Consumul de alcool și mișcarea de abținere la rutenii din Bucovina în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea – începutul secolului XX, în context multiethnic. Studiul abordează problema consumului de alcool și afirmarea mișcării de abținere în rândul populației ucrainene din Bucovina în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea – începutul secolului XX, în context multiethnic. Autorii analizează politica statului și autorităților locale în ceea ce privește comercializarea băuturilor alcoolice. Sunt prezentate reacțiile rutenilor bucovineni în contextul mișcărilor de combatere a alcoolismului ce s-au manifestat la nivelul celorlalte grupuri etnice din Bucovina.*

INTRODUCTION

For almost ten thousand years, the production and consumption of strong beverages have accompanied the development of human civilisation. The first indication of enzyme drink production dates back to 10, 000 BC.¹ This has become a global issue. It has an impact on every aspect of society and each individual manifesting itself in their worldview, social status, lifestyle, psychophysiological state, etc.

Alcohol is an important source of filling the state budget, but it does not always lead to a balanced policy between stimulating its production and limiting consumption. Alcohol products have frequently been and continue to be a source of enrichment for various types of entrepreneurs, traders, intermediaries, for whom the health of the nation and youth are secondary issues. Under such conditions, civil society through voluntary associations, church institutions, cultural figures and activists has taken the initiative and mobilized the healthy forces of society to struggle against alcoholism, which has disintegrated it from within, bringing economic, moral, and physical degradation.

Among the positions mentioned, a historical experience of alcohol production and consumption by the population of Bukovina in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries and the deployment of the fight against this social disaster are of particular interest. It is unique due to the polyethnic composition of the region, where Ruthenians, Romanians, Germans, Jews, Poles played different roles in the production and consumption of alcohol. At the same time, the anti-alcohol movement in Bukovina had much in common with other communities in Europe and around the world. Many occurrences and components detected in the evolution of the Bukovinian abstinence movement can be found in the works of many Western European researchers. For example, Christopher C. H. Cook, an English researcher, studied the dynamics of changes in public awareness and Christian ethics in respect to views about alcoholism, incontinence, and alcohol addiction.² Equally interesting is Gretchen Pierce's study of the resistance of the Mexican population in the early 20th century against anti-alcohol campaigns. In about the same sense, analyzing the most socially positive aspects

¹ Charles H. Patrick, *Alcohol, Culture, and Society*, Duke University Press (reprint edition by AMS Press, New York, 1970), 1952, p. 26–27.

² Christopher C. H. Cook, *Alcohol, Addiction and Christian Ethics*, New York Cambridge University Press, 2006, 221 p.

of alcohol consumption, the authors of a collection published under the supervision of Mack P. Holt discuss the issue of alcohol. However, Iain Gately takes a more systematic approach to the problem, pointing to both the positive aspects of drinking and the negative impact of alcohol on communities, families, the economy, etc. At the same time, he examines how certain governments have managed to establish control over the production, sale and consumption of alcohol in the last two centuries. Thorough work on the issue of alcohol in tsar Russia wrote Boris M. Segal, with some comparisons on the same phenomenon in Irish society.³

The *historiography* of the alcohol production problem and the development of the abstinence movement in Bukovina is not very rich. Among the generalizing works of the past in Bukovina, we note the fundamental studies on the history of the Habsburg monarchy⁴, which outline the social background of alcohol policy and the abstinence movement. Studies by Austrian, Polish, Romanian, and Ukrainian authors give an idea of the demographic and sociocultural development of the polyethnic population of Bukovina⁵ and the formation of civil society in the

³ Boris M. Segal, *Russian Drinking. Use and Abuse of Alcohol in Pre-Revolutionary Russia*, New Brunswick – New Jersey, Rutgers Center of Alcohol Studies, 1987, 383 p.

⁴ A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1815-1918*, London, Macmillan and Co., 1942, 315 p.; Robert A. Kann, David V. Zdeněk, *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526-1918*, Seattle – London, University of Washington Press, 1984, 559 p.

⁵ L. A. Simiginowicz-Staufe, *Die Völkergruppen der Bukowina*, Czernowitz, 1884, 203 s.; G. Kupchanko, *Bukovina i yei russkiye zhiteli*, [Bukovina and its Russian inhabitants], Viden', Prosvishcheniye, 1895, 53 c.; R. F. Kaindl, *Geschichte der Bukowina von den ältesten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart*. Drei Teille in einem Band. Czernowitz, Buchhandlung von R. Eckhardt, 1904, 154 s.; O. M. Żukowski, *Bukowina pod względem topograficznym, statystycznym i historycznym ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem żywiołu polskiego* [Bukovina in terms of topography, statistics and history, with particular emphasis on the Polish element], Czerniowce-Lwów, 1914, 145 s.; H. M. Skoreyko, *Naselennya Bukovyny za avstriys'kymy uryadovymy perepysamy druhoi polovyny XIX – pochatku XX st.: istoriko-demohrafichnyy narys* [The population of Bukovina according to the Austrian government censuses of the second half of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century: historical and demographic essay], Chernivtsi, Prut, 2002, 220 s.; H. K. Kozholyanko, *Etnohrafiya Bukoviny u 3-kh t.* [Ethnography of Bukovina in 3 volumes], Chernivtsi, Zoloti lytavry, 1999. T. 1. 384 s., 2001. T. 2. 424 s., 2004. T. 3. 392 s.; Mihai-Ştefan Ceaşu, *Parlamentarism, partide şi elită politică în Bucovina habsburgică (1848-1918). Contribuţii la istoria parlamentarismului în spaţiul central-est european* [Parliamentarism, parties and political elite in Habsburg Bukovina (1848-1918). Contributions to the history of parliamentarism in Central and Eastern Europe], Iaşi, Editura Junimea, 2004, 605 p.; Constantin Ungureanu, *Bucovina în perioada stăpânirii*

region⁶. The nature and trends of alcohol policy⁷ and the ideological and organizational foundations of the anti-alcohol movement in Europe, the world and individual countries⁸ have also been reflected in scientific research. They outline the European context of the abstinence movement in Bukovina in the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, which was reflected in the works of V. Botushanskyi, B. Savchuk, and I. Poberezhnyk.⁹ Given that human

austriece: (1774-1918): aspecte etnodemografice și confesionale [Bukovina during the Austrian rule: (1774-1918): ethnodemographic and confessional aspects], Chișinău, Editura Civitas, 2003, 304 p.

⁶ K.V. Valyavs'ka, *Svit's'ke zhyttia Bukovyny: sotsial'nyy ta kul'turnyy prostir (1848 – 1914)* [Social life of Bukovina: social and cultural space (1848 - 1914)], Chernivtsi, 2016, 355 s.; A. I. Horuk, *Natsional'no-kul'turnyy rukh polyakiv na Bukovyni (druha polovyna XIX st. – 1914 r.)* [National and cultural movement of Poles in Bukovina (second half of the 19th century - 1914)], Chernivtsi: Zelena Bukovyna, 2005, 240 s.; O.V. Dobrzhans'kyy, *Natsional'nyy rukh ukrayintsiv Bukovyny druhoyi polovyny XIX – pochatku XX st.* [The national movement of Ukrainians in Bukovina in the second half of the 19th – early 20th centuries], Chernivtsi, Zoloti lytavry, 1999, 574 s.; Marian Olaru, *Mișcarea națională a românilor din Bucovina la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea și începutul secolului al XX-lea* [The national movement of Romanians in Bucovina at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century], Rădăuți, Editura Septentrion, 2002, 254 p.; O. Dobrzhans'kyy, N. Masiyan, M. Nykyrsa, *Natsiyyi ta narodnosti Bukovyny u fondakh Derzhavnogo arkhivu Chernivets'koyi oblasti (1775 - 1940)* [Nations and nationalities of Bukovina in the funds of the State Archives of Chernivtsi region (1775 - 1940)], Chernivtsi, “Zoloti lytavry”, 2003, 172 s.; S. Osachuk, *Nimtsi Bukovyny. Istoriya tovarys'koho rukhu (druha polovyna XIX – pochatok XX st.)* [Germans of Bukovina. History of the Associative Movement (second half of the 19th -beginning of the 20th century)], Chernivtsi, Zoloti lytavry, 2002, 288 s.

⁷ K. Bruun, G. Edwards, *Alcohol Control Policies in Public health Perspective*, Lumio-Helsinki, 1975, 106 p.; G. Edwards, P. Anderson, T. Babor, *Alcohol Policy and the Public Good*, Oxford, 1994, 316 p.; D. A. Parker, J. A. Brody, *Risk Factors for Alcoholism and Alcohol Problems among Employed Women and Men*, in National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. Research Monograph No. 8: *Occupational Alcoholism. A Review of Research Issues*, Rockville (MD), 1982, p. 99–127.

⁸ E. Osterberg, T. Karlsson, *Alcohol Policies in EU Member State and Norway. A Collection of Country Report*, Helsinki, 2002, 76 p.; Yu. Ye. Rozvadskiy, *Alkogol'naya politika v yevropeyskoy perspective* [Alcohol Policy in the European Perspective], in “Zhurnal Grodnenskogo meditsinskogo universiteta”, 2005, № 1, p. 21-24.

⁹ V. Botushans'kyy, *Z istoriyi rukhu tverezosti ta antyalkohol'noyi borot'by na Bukovyni (70-ti rr. XIX – pochatok XX st.)* [From the history of the movement of abstinence and anti-alcohol struggle in Bukovina (The 70s of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century)], in “Naukovyy visnyk Chernivets'koho universytetu”, 2010, Vyp. 514-515, p. 28-36; B.

health is one of the main issues of modern public policy, and that the attitude of civil society towards specific social problems, as well as government measures to address them, are relevant in modern democracies, a study of the Bukovinian community in this regard is both relevant and necessary.

The purpose of the study is to clarify the problem of production and consumption of alcohol as well as the development of the abstinence movement among the Ruthenians of Bukovina in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries by comparing it to the experience of other ethnonational communities in the region.

Chronologically, the study covers the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries, a relatively holistic period in the development of alcohol policy and the abstinence movement in Bukovina, which corresponds to similar common European processes and the nature of the region's socio-political development. The conditional lower limit is 1848 when the right of propination was abolished, causing qualitative changes in the production and use of alcohol; the conditional upper limit is 1914, when the First World War broke out, causing fundamental changes in Bukovina's development.

PRECONDITIONS AND FACTORS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL AND THE ABSTINENCE MOVEMENT

The nature of alcohol production and consumption and the development of the abstinence movement in Bukovina were determined by three groups of factors: a) ethnonational structure of the population; b) its socio-economic situation; c) traditional and everyday culture of ethnic communities.

Savchuk, *Korchma: alkohol'na polityka i rukh tverezosti v Zakhidniy Ukrayini u XIX – 30-kh rr. XX st.* [Saloon: alcohol policy and abstinence movement in Western Ukraine in the 19th – the 30s of the 20th century], Ivano-Frankivs'k, Lileya-NV, 2001, 246 s.; I. Poberezhnyk, *Rol' ta mistse alkohol'nykh napoyiv u pobuti ukrayintsiy Bukovyny (druha polovyna XIX – pochatok XX st.)* [The role and place of alcoholic beverages in the life of Ukrainians in Bukovina (second half of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century)] *Pytannya starodavn'oyi ta seredn'ovichnoyi istoriyi, arkheolohiyi y etnolohiyi : zb. nauk. pr.*, Chernivtsi, 2009, T. 2, p. 217-227.

Table 1. The role and place of ethnonational communities in the structure of Bukovina's material production, service and management (data for 1910 in absolute numbers and percentages)¹⁰

Spoken language / Field of employment	German*	Polish	Ruthenian	Romanian	Hungarian	Other
Agriculture and forestry	19732 6,01%	5610 1,71%	156989 47,85%	139831 42,62%	5862 1,79%	76 0,02%
Industry and craft	16739 53,63%	4683 15,00%	5346 17,12%	4289 13,74%	25 0,08%	128 0,41%
Trade and transport	18035 67,92%	2075 7,81%	4001 15,07%	2328 8,77%	30 0,11%	83 0,31%
Free professions and the military	14403 38,78%	3420 9,21%	9504 25,59%	9431 25,40%	116 0,31%	261 0,70%

Members of social categories that labour in difficult conditions and earn lower pay seem to be the most predisposed to alcoholic beverage use. In this regard, the main sources of income for most of the Bukovina population were agriculture and livestock breeding. However, the proportion of people employed in these fields varied greatly between ethnic groups. For example, if 28.63 per cent of the German-speaking community worked in agriculture, livestock farming, or forestry, this group of employees accounted for 35.53 per cent of Poles, 89.28 per cent of Ukrainians, and 89.70 per cent of Romanians, respectively. The low economic and social status of Ruthenians and Romanians had a corresponding effect on the nature of their alcohol intake.

On the other hand, the communities with greater craft and trade power (Germans, Jews, and Poles) naturally dominated the production and sale of alcohol. Jews monopolized small intermediary trade, including alcohol, as early as the 1920s, and began to influence its production as entrepreneurs and tenants. The Germans contributed to the development of brewing in the region as owners and workers of companies. They occupied leading positions in the trade and consumption of beer.¹¹

As can be seen, despite having a relatively small share in the structure of the region's population (34.7%), representatives of the three communities (Germans, Jews, Poles) made up an absolute majority in the financial institutions

¹⁰ *Berufsstatistik nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910 in Österreich*. 10. Heft des Dritten Bandes der Volkszählungsergebnisse. *Galizien und Bukowina*, Wien, Der k.-k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1916, S. 223-224.

* Including Jews.

¹¹ O. Dobrzahans'kyi, N. Masiyan, M. Nykyrsa, *op. cit.*, p. 43-44; B. Savchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 32-40.

and public administration, local government and law enforcement. Thus, at the regional level, they were in charge of regulating anti-alcohol legislation, as well as controlling the production and trade of alcohol, which had a significant impact on the level of consumption.

When scientists examined the problem of alcohol consumption in *European historical retrospect*, they identified an interesting pattern: the lower the economic position and social status of certain segments of the population, the higher the prevalence of alcoholism among them. Low-income people are more likely to consume strong beverages (vodka, rum, "braga"), often of dubious quality. They are more harmful to health and stimulate alcoholism more than wine and beer. The consumption of "premium" alcohol and a postmodern lifestyle were more common among urban residents than among villagers.¹²

Thus, the ethno-social structure of the Bukovina population clearly outlines the main "producers" and "consumers" of alcoholic beverages, as well as potential "performers" of the abstinence campaign.

The cultural traditions, customs, and mentality of the ethnonational communities of Bukovina had a significant influence on alcohol consumption and stimulated or restrained the spread of alcoholism.

Historical and ethnographic studies¹³ testify to the high prevalence of alcoholic beverages, especially vodka, in the Ruthenians of Bukovina's way of living, customs, life, folk art, family (wedding, baptismal, burial and funeral) and calendar rites. The journal *Russkaya Pravda* portrayed this reality through the perspective of their beliefs. The region's strong devotion to alcohol is evident at every opportunity: with "bad food" (digestion); at the birth of a child; during engagements, weddings, baptisms, funerals; at the beginning and completion of household chores (ploughing, sowing, mowing, threshing); when building houses, barns, digging wells; at sale and purchase; when sent to the army, to earn money; when entertaining guests; for every holiday and entertainment; with love and settling quarrels; for the treatment of various diseases; in elections to the public council, regional parliament; on any other occasion or without a cause.¹⁴

¹² S. Klimova, *Alkogolizm: obydenyye teorii. Sotsial'naya real'nost'* [Alcoholism: Ordinary Theories. Social reality], in "Sotsial'naya real'nost'", 2007, No. 2, p. 34, in: <http://corp.fom.ru/uploads/socreal/post-225.pdf>

¹³ T. Hontar, *Narodne kharchuvannya ukrayintsiv Karpat* [Folk food of Ukrainians in the Carpathians], Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 1979, 136 s.; R. F. Kaindl, *op. cit.*; H. K. Kozholyanko, *op. cit.*; G. Kupchanko, *Horilka, abo yako vylechyt-sya ot p'yanstva* [Vodka, or how to cure alcoholism]. Viden', 1889, 16 s.

¹⁴ "Russkaya pravda", Viden', 1888, 1 lystopada.

Alcoholic beverages have become an important part of the Ruthenians' everyday lives; therefore, this condition has profound ethnocultural origins. Alcohol was a medium of social contact and a companion to all public and private matters in their minds, reflecting folk art. They testified that "bad luck" often excused alcoholism as a "temporary" occurrence, but that it was condemned if it threatened health, property preservation, or productive labour.

Along with the ethnonational structure and ethnocultural traditions, the third important factor influencing the level of alcohol consumption and the development of the abstinence movement was the *alcohol policy*. Scientists consider it as a set of legal, economic and physiological factors that determine the availability of alcohol to the individual as well as society's response to the losses caused by alcohol. In both cases, it provides for legislative control over the availability of alcohol (state monopoly, taxes), measures to reduce demand (education, propaganda) and dealing with the effects of its consumption (alcoholism, crime).¹⁵

From the medieval order to a capitalist market with free competition, the Habsburg monarchy's alcohol policy underwent a complex evolution. Propination was linked to its characteristics in Bukovina. This phenomenon occurred in the 16th – 18th centuries because of the landowners' customary monopoly right to produce vodka and beer on their estates. Alcohol products were forcibly distributed among the peasants, or for whom they worked in serfdom, or bought, and therefore consumed this "essential product".¹⁶

According to the decree on the abolition of serfdom on September 7, 1848, the practice of forcibly purchasing vodka and beer by peasants was abolished, but the right to produce and sell them remained unresolved, allowing the former propinators to make further profits. In 1868, the Bukovinian Propination Committee was formed to address the problem. In May 1876, a regional law was approved in response to its request, abolishing the right of propination for ransom. Alcohol production was declared a "free occupation", it could be sold by small traders in the "propination territories" assigned to them¹⁷.

According to the regional law of 1885, the term of redemption of the

¹⁵ G. Edwards, P. Anderson, T. Babor, *op. cit.*; E. Osterberg, T. Karlsson, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ I. Franko, *Shcho to bula panshchyna* [What was serfdom], in *Zibrannya tvoriv u 50 t.*, T. 44, Kn. 2, p. 495-500.

¹⁷ Derzhavnyy arkhiv Chernivets'koyi oblasti [State Archives of Chernivtsi Oblast] (hereinafter – DACHO), Fond 3, Inv. 1, File 5178, s. 6-8.

propination right was set until January 1911.¹⁸ Thus, the production and trade of alcohol began to be regulated by industrial law, and the exclusive right to carry out this activity was passed to the regional government and large cities. Alcohol production was only permitted from April to October, and only during specific hours, according to laws enacted in 1891, 1905, and 1909. It was to be served in glass containers and consumed on the spot in the taverns, while retailers sold the goods for consumption at home.¹⁹

Giving cities the right to produce and sell alcohol and introduce taxes for individuals engaged in this business has been in effect since the end of the 18th century and was finally settled in 1876.²⁰ The size of these taxes was different and increased over time: in Chernivtsi in 1872 one hectolitre of vodka cost 11.5 gold coins; beer – 1.66 gold coins, rum and other beverages were 14-15 gold coins. These figures increased by one-and-a-half times in 1884.²¹ For example, in the city of Suceava one hectolitre of vodka brought to the city treasury 16 kreutsers, while a hectolitre of beer cost 1.7 guilders²²; in Radovka, vodka was taxed at the rate of 5/13 kreutsers, and a hectolitre of beer cost 83 kreutsers.²³

Taxes on the production and sale of alcohol were an important source of revenue for the regional budget. The increase in demand led to an increase in their volumes i.e. from vodka of 15 million crowns in 1880 to 71 million in 1900 and 94 million - in 1910, from beer, respectively, from 42 million to 78 million and 86 million crowns.²⁴

THE GROWTH OF STRONG DRINKS CONSUMPTION AND THE ALCOHOLISM SPREAD

According to source research, the increase in alcohol sales profits was due to increased consumption rather than increased taxes on its sale. The governing bodies had no intention to cut this source of revenue that was filling the state and

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 26-28.

¹⁹ *Perevorot v gostinno-shinkars'kim promislí*, in "Dílo", 1909, 24 grudnya.

²⁰ *Dnevnik zakonov i razporyazheníy dlya gertsogstva Bukoviny. Rochnik 1876*, Chernovtsy, Pechatnya Eckhardt, 1876, p. 7-8.

²¹ *Dnevnik zakonov i razporyazheníy dlya gertsogstva Bukoviny. Rochnik 1884*, Chernovtsy: Pechatnya Eckhardt, 1884, p. 59.

²² *Dnevnik zakonov i razporyazheníy dlya gertsogstva Bukoviny. Rochnik 1876*, p. 120.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 3-4.

²⁴ *Yak zrostayut' narodni tyahari* [How people's burdens grow], "Borba. Ukrayins'kyi sotsial-demokratychnyy robitnychyy orhan", 1911, № 13, s. 7.

regional budgets. According to the statistics, from 1850 to 1854, 32 distilleries in Bukovina produced 24 gallons of alcohol per year (a gallon was 4.54 litres), and from 1910 to 1912, 66 distilleries produced 74 thousand gallons per year. During this period, the region's population grew by 1.4 times, and alcohol consumption by 2.3 times, reaching 8.9 litres of pure alcohol or 22.2 litres of 40-degree vodka per capita, including children and elderly people.²⁵

According to the international classification, countries with a strict alcohol policy were classified as "alcoholic" (the consumption of strong drinks prevailed); countries with a medium level of control, primarily "beer," and countries with a low level of control, primarily "wine," were classified as "non-alcoholic."²⁶ Bukovina belonged to the first group, according to scientists, because per capita beer consumption was 8-12 litres, and wine was consumed from 1,5 - 2 litres²⁷. The data presented in Table 2 allow a comparison with the corresponding indicators in European countries.

Table 2. The alcoholic beverages consumption in European countries in the late 19th - early 20th century (in litres per capita)²⁸

Country / Type of alcohol	Vodka	Beer	Wine
Austria-Hungary	12,5	22	35
Belgium	12	169	4
Britain	8	22	145
Denmark	27	33	1
Italy	2	1	95
Germany	13	107	6
Russia	17	8	3
France	12	22	103
USA	8	47	3
Sweden	7	13	0,5

According to the aforementioned data, numerous European countries had greater total levels of alcohol consumption than Bukovina. The reality, however, is rather different. To begin with, vodka has more negative social effects and causes more psychophysiological harm to the human body than beer and wine. Secondly, official statistics do not accurately reflect reality. At the time, economists testified that "vile" vodka was sold at a higher rate than "good" 40-

²⁵ V. Botushanskyi, *op. cit.*, p. 29-30; B. Savchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 68-70.

²⁶ G. Edwards, *op. cit.*; Yu. E. Rozvadskyi, *op. cit.*, p. 21-22.

²⁷ V. Botushanskyi, *op. cit.*

²⁸ V. Botushanskyi, *op. cit.*; B. Savchuk, *op. cit.*

degree vodka. The bartenders utilized several "recipes" to produce the counterfeit, such as mixing up to 100 litres of vodka with the same quantity of lime, pepper, tobacco, etc.²⁹

According to current regulations, pubs are classified into three categories: specialized "vodka," "beer," and "wine". However, these norms, which regulated their type and relative size in respect to the population, had never been observed before. As a result, there were around 2.2-2.3 thousand similar institutions in Bukovina in the 1890s. According to official statistics published in the "Bukowinaer Rundschau", such an institution throughout Austria-Hungary accounted for an average of 259 persons in 1890, while in Bukovina it accounted for 296 inhabitants or 4,8 institutions per square kilometre.³⁰ This was 1.7 times higher than the officially established norms for cities and 2.7 times higher than the officially established norms for villages, where one saloon was to have, 500 and 800 inhabitants, respectively.

The amount of alcohol intake in certain locations and ethnic groups is not recorded in official data. However, acceptable estimates may be derived by comparing the number of different types of pubs in other communities' suitable residence areas. The highest concentration of pubs could be seen in regions where Rusyns predominated. According to police reports for 1904,³¹ in 24 villages of the Kitsman district (42.7 thousand population), there were 192 taverns selling vodka (89), beer (91) and wine (12)³², i.e. one establishment was for 222 people. The situation was similar in other counties of Rusyns' compact residence: Vyzhnytsya district had 130 saloons for 48.1 thousand inhabitants (one per 370 people), Chernivtsi had 413 for 106.5 thousand (one per 258) and Zastavna had 155 for 50.7 thousand³³ (one per 327 inhabitants).

Statistics show a high level of alcoholism in the region. In particular, in 1901 in Chernivtsi district there were 636 people addicted to alcohol, in Storozhynets there were 754 people, the third part of them were women. According to official data, there were 35-40 alcoholics per 1,000 people but participants in the Anti-Alcohol Conference in Chernivtsi (1901) recognized that the real figures were several times higher.³⁴

²⁹ V. Navrotskyi, *op. cit.*, p. 23-41.

³⁰ "Bukowinaer Rundschau", 24. April, 1892, S. 5.

³¹ DACHO, Fond 3, Inv. 2, File 21121, s. 18-280.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ V. Botushanskyi, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

Alcoholism, especially when combined with moneylending, caused the impoverishment of the Bukovina peasants. Many incidents are documented in the newspapers, such as when, due to "alcohol debt," they handed the saloonkeepers the harvested crops and food, all consumer goods, and even livestock.³⁵ Many peasants lived by the idea of "more to drink away than to earn," according to publicist M. Hrynyshyn, who wrote a feuilleton with the eloquent title "Twelve robbers of our Russian people."³⁶

The press published numerous facts when entire communities found themselves in poverty for several years because saloonkeepers appropriated land and entire estates "for sold vodka"³⁷. For example, in the village Nepolokivtsi of the Kitsman district, a Bloshnitser saloonkeeper demanded a "pair of good oxen" for a cheap "wedding home-made vodka" and immediately sold them at a fair in Chernivtsi for 150 gold coins, which is several times the cost of vodka³⁸. In Oshykhliby village, Kitsman district, which had the most affluent landlords among the surrounding villages, the situation changed with the opening of a tavern, which became the centre of public life. The amount of low-quality 32-34-degree alcohol beverage consumed by 1,800 residents of the community validates the tenant's lawsuit against the local saloonkeeper, R. Rosenzweig, who did not pay the full amount (2,156 crowns) for more than 4,000 litres of vodka delivered from January 1 to February 5, 1903. It turned out that she lent most of the drink, thus the ultimate consumer's price increased by 50 to 80 per cent, to 5 - 6 crowns³⁹.

Alcoholism has been one of the major contributors to Bukovina's deteriorating criminal condition. Attempts to generate money for vodka, as well as its excessive use, had become a major source of criminal, administrative, and immoral behaviour. In 1906, for instance, 65 per cent of criminal offences were committed by people under the influence of alcohol. Except for Sweden and the Netherlands (70-75 per cent), the United Kingdom and the United States (80-87 per cent), this figure remained lower in other European countries.⁴⁰

³⁵ I. Biletskyi, *Dopys z Chun'kova* [Post from Chunkov], in "Bukovyna", 1890, April 12.

³⁶ M. Grinishin, *Dvenadtsat' razboynikov nashogo russkogo naroda* [Twelve robbers of our Russian people], in "Selyanyin", 1896, № 5-6, p. 32.

³⁷ *Narod nash podnosytsya* [Our people are being rising], in "Bukovynski Vyedomosti", 1895, № 17, p. 4.

³⁸ D. Mlaka, *Staryy Les' Chornovol* [Old Les Chornovol], in "Bukovyna", 1901, № 29, p. 3.

³⁹ DACHO, Fond 115, Inv. 2, File 30141, s. 1-2.

⁴⁰ "Dilo", 1909, March 21; A. Tchaikovskiy, *Alkohol' i zakonodavstvo. Pershyy Ukrayins'kyy prosvitn'o-ekonomichnyy konhres (1 i 2 lyutoho 1909 r.). Protokoly i referaty* [Alcohol and legislation. The first Ukrainian educational and economic congress (February 1

Due to a lack of understanding about the negative effects of strong beverages on the human body, it was common practice in Bukovinian families even in the early twentieth century to give children vodka to "improve appetite", to calm down, in case of poisoning and other situations.⁴¹ Statistics showed a high degree of alcoholism among schoolchildren. For example, in one of the schools in Chernivtsi in 1909, 17 students were diagnosed as alcoholics.⁴²

Because of the growth of alcoholism, social tensions rose, and the Ruthenians of Bukovina launched a powerful sobriety campaign.

THE ANTI-ALCOHOL MOVEMENT EVOLUTION

The actions of different social and ethnonational performers who had a similar objective to minimize alcohol use and the detrimental effects of alcoholism characterised the abstinence movement in Bukovina in the second part of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. At the same time, they relied on various ideological principles and organizational forms, methods, and means of achieving it. The two main vectors of the fight against alcoholism are: 1) state-government, reflected in the official policy to control and limit the production, sale and use of alcohol; 2) social, public, with a multi-ethnic character and two branches, namely church, and religious and social.

Government officials of the Habsburg monarchy took measures to liberalize alcohol production and trade on a free-market basis, as well as increase control over its quality and use. It was manifested in the special law for Galicia and Bukovina adopted on July 19, 1877. It forbade "encouraging people to get drunk" in public places, inns (pubs), saloons and on the streets, to give vodka on credit if the consumer did not pay the previous debt. Those who were punished three times for alcoholism could be banned by the county authorities for attending alcoholic establishments during the year. Alcohol addicts faced a month in prison or a fine of 50 zlotys if they broke the legislation, while saloonkeepers faced license revocation.⁴³

and 2, 1909). Minutes and abstracts], Lviv, NTSh Printing House, 1910, p. 309.

⁴¹ B. Savchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁴² V. Botushanskyi, *op. cit.*, p. 30-31.

⁴³ *Zakon z 19 lypanya 1877, kotorym vydayut-sya ustavy dlya vozderzhaniya piyanstva* [The law of July 19, 1877, which issued charters to refrain from alcoholism], in *Vestnyk Zakonov Derzhavnykh dlya Korolevstv y Krayev v Derzhavnoy Dumye zastuplenykh. Rochnyk 1877* [Bulletin of the Laws of the State for the Kingdom and Regions in the State Duma represented. The yearbook. 1877] Vyden', 1877, p. 131-133.

The government decrees of 1853, 1855, and 1858, issued in the aftermath of the abolition of the propagation right, established new regulations for the sale of alcohol and banned efforts to reinstate the order of its coercive sale.⁴⁴ The Imperial Law of 1881 prohibited the selling of alcoholic drinks after midnight, while ministerial decrees restricted the opening hours of pubs on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. A violation of the imperial law could result in a fine of up to 200 crowns or 14-day detention.⁴⁵

At the beginning of the 20th century, along with the regional administration, the Orthodox Church became an active factor in the fight against alcoholism, condemning this anti-social practice through priests⁴⁶. It should be noted that the Church has been involved in the anti-alcohol campaign since the mid-1970s when the Bukovina Metropolitan first sent a pastoral message against alcoholism to priests. Similarly, on March 24, 1902, the Council for the Cultural Land Presentation (Der Landeskulturrath) in Bukovina appealed to the Consistory to ask the priests to carry out explanatory work among the workers of various private institutions, so that they ensure that "their money earned in the sweat of their brow was not used for drinks..."⁴⁷

However, both the taverns visitors and their owners, sometimes even the authorities, ignored the implementation of these regulations. Under such circumstances, the main factor in the anti-alcohol struggle in Bukovina in the second half of the 19th - early 20th century was the abstinence social movement. It was not a holistic phenomenon. Its ecclesiastical and religious and social streams evolved separately. Ethnic communities also acted separately for various religious, mental, and other reasons.

The first organizational and ideological model of abstinence societies appeared in the United States in the early 19th century in the form of a mass reform movement, which involved various social, ethnic, religious, women organizations.⁴⁸ The American Temperance Society, formed in Boston in 1826,

⁴⁴ *Landesregierungs blatt für das Herzogtum Bukowina. Zweite Abteilung. Jahrgang, 1858.* S. 20-21.

⁴⁵ V. Botushanskyi, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁴⁶ *Foaia Ordinăciunilor Consistoriului arhiepiscopesc în afacerile Archiepiscopiei ortodoxe-orientale a Bucovinei. Anul 1902* [Sheet of Ordinances of the Archbishop's Consistory in the affairs of the Eastern Orthodox Archdiocese of Bukovina. The year 1902], Cernăuți, Societatea tipografică bucovineană în Cernăuți, 1903, p. 4.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27-28.

⁴⁸ Anthony Dias Blue, *The Complete Book of Spirits: A Guide to Their History, Production, and Enjoyment*, New York, William Morrow Cookbooks, 2004, p. 23.

was a significant part of the second wave of this movement. It has grown to 5,000 basic organizations with over 1 million members in its eight years of operation. It advocated for limited and moderate alcohol intake, as well as total abstinence. Meetings and protests in favour of abstinence, the establishment of non-alcoholic grocery shops, saloons, so-called abstinence houses, the distribution of pertinent information, and so on were the major forms and means of action.⁴⁹

At the same time, following the North American experience and developing their own ideological and organizational models, the first abstinence associations developed in Western Europe, in particular in Scotland (1826) and Switzerland (1837), and then in Norway (1850), Germany (1883), France (1895), Poland (1902) and other countries. They created extensive organizational structures, attracted tens of thousands of supporters and sought effective models for fighting alcoholism, such as Public Coffee-Houses in England and others.⁵⁰

These models of the abstinence movement, adapted to local realities, were implemented in Bukovina. Its official coordinating and controlling centre was the Austrian Society for Fighting Alcoholism (1884). On behalf of its leadership, ethnographer and public figure Grigoriy Kupchanko developed in 1890 a distinct charter of abstinence societies for the Ukrainians in the Duchy of Bukovina. Their goal was to organize a resolute struggle against the alcoholism spread and its eradication through mass educational work such as speeches, dialogues, and readings about the risks of alcohol and the benefits of abstinence, the organization of non-alcoholic public events, etc.⁵¹

The abstinence movement of the Ruthenians of Bukovina gradually acquired a mass character. The abstinence movement of the Bukovinian Ruthenians evolved in two stages: the first, from the 1870s to the 1880s, when its main organizer was the clergy, who introduced church-religious forms of work; and the second, from the 1890s to the beginning of the 20th century, when the leadership in the anti-alcohol struggle shifted to social factors and acquired socio-political implications.

During the first stage, the abstinence society in rural reading rooms was founded by priests in the mid-70s of the nineteenth century as the major focus of anti-alcohol efforts. In the 1890s, they reached their peak through cooperation

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 45-50.

⁵⁰ James Samuelson, *The History of Drink. A review, social, scientific, and political*. Second Edition, London, 1880, pp. 115, 155-157.

⁵¹ *Ustav Obshchestva tverezosty* [Statutes of the Abstinence Society], in "Russkaya pravda", 1890, № 10, p. 69-70.

with church abstinence fellowships. The main condition for joining them was to take an oath of abstinence for "moderate use" or "complete abstinence" from alcohol for 1-2 years or the rest of the life. The names of those who took the oath were recorded in the "Books of abstinence."⁵²

The main forms and means of action for abstinence fraternities were collective readings and distribution of anti-alcohol literature; propaganda and organization of public events in the form of non-alcoholic church and family holidays, ceremonies, weddings, baptisms, funerals, temple holidays, other family and public celebrations, etc. In the 80s - 90s of the 19th century in Bukovina, abstinence missions became widespread, culminating in acts of "vodka burial" and the establishment of abstinence crosses with inscriptions such as "The Cross defeated paganism - the Cross defeated alcoholism", etc.

A unique phenomenon in the anti-alcohol movement of Bukovina was the activity of the so-called abstinence apostles, who were travelling through cities and villages, spreading anti-alcohol propaganda. The journals and other sources recorded their most famous names: "the preacher of abstinence from Magala Stefan Sainchuk", "the apostle Timush (Vlasiy) was from Putyliv", "Phoma from the mountains", "the prophetess girl Olena Yuriychuk from Hlynysia" and others. They condemned alcoholism, smoking, immorality, and theft in their sermons and encouraged faith and fasting. These "apostles" had a powerful influence on the believers.⁵³

However, in the early 90s of the 19th century, the clergy-led abstinence movement in Bukovina entered a stage of stagnation. It had its beginnings. Peasants accustomed to the traditional way of life were not ready to completely give up alcohol, and the principles of restraint and moderation of its use did not gain popularity. The "sobering up" of dozens of communities has led to a reduction in alcohol consumption, which has provoked strong opposition from barkeepers and tenants. Under such circumstances in the mid-90s of the 19th - early 20th century the abstinence social stream began to dominate. It took the form of public

⁵² DACHO, Fond 3, Inv. 1, File 6041, s. 1-9.

⁵³ A. Manastyrsky, *O nishchite (bednote) nashego naroda. Moim brat'yam-selyanam* [About the poverty of our people. To my peasant brothers], Chernivtsi, 1894, p. 9; B. P. Savchuk, G. V. Bilavich, *Fenomen dvizheniya trezvosti v Bukovine i Khotinskoy uyezde Bessarabskoy gubernii vo vtoroy polovine XIX – nachale XX v.: yevroatlanticheskaya, rusinskaya, rossiyskaya modeli* [The phenomenon of the sobriety movement in Bukovina and the Khotyn district of the Bessarabian guberniya in the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries: Euro-Atlantic, Ruthenian, Russian models], in "Rusin", 2021, No. 63, p. 66-67.

gatherings at which people adopted resolutions and petitions to the authorities, requesting that the taverns' activities be regulated, limited, or banned. Such actions often achieved their goals such as stopping the landowner Edler von Horowitz from building a distillery in the village of Horishni Sherivtsi of Chernivtsi district because it was erected fewer than 100 metres from the school and church, which contradicted the existing legislation.⁵⁴

The periodical press had an important role in the development of the abstinence movement in Bukovina, as it kept the public informed about its progress and shaped public opinion regarding alcohol as an "eternal enemy" who causes great moral, physical and material damage to the Ruthenians. Such materials are found in almost every issue of the journals "Russkaya Pravda" (Vienna, 1888-1892), "Dobri Rady", "Bukovinski Vedomosti", as well as the newspaper "Bukovyna" (1885-1914) and others. Despite ideological differences, they had a common "anti-alcohol credo". Its essence is conveyed by the editorial "Peasant Trouble" in the "Bukovynian Vidomosti" of March 19, 1895: "Vodka kills far more people than wars and diseases"; the priest and the conscious peasant, with the help of the authorities, must act together against the taverns as "nurseries of alcoholism, debauchery and crime".

In Bukovina, there was a general European tendency that the degree of alcohol consumption and the character of the anti-alcohol battle were primarily dictated by the ethnic-social structure of the people. The emergence of salon culture in the form of carnivals, balls, parties, and other social entertainments is documented in depth in studies of social life in the socio-cultural area of Bukovina in the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. They were accompanied by the consumption of gourmet drinks as wine, cognac, champagne in restaurants, cafes and private homes.⁵⁵

There was a clear ethical attitude toward moderate alcohol consumption in the multi-ethnic environment of the Bukovinian elite, which included governmental officials, bureaucrats, landowners, businessmen, bankers, military officers, doctors, and lawyers of Romanian, German, Jewish, and Polish nationalities. The misconduct it caused was considered obscene and subject to public condemnation.

The type and orientation of the anti-alcohol actions of the German and Polish populations of Bukovina were conditioned by imitation of the content, forms, and tactics that grew prevalent in their ethnic areas. The issue of alcohol's

⁵⁴ DACHO, Fond 3, Inv. 2, File 23670, s. 32-35.

⁵⁵ K. V. Valyavska, *op. cit.*

social and physiological effects became particularly significant in Kaiser's Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. Although the beer rituals of student youth remained an important step in the career path, there was a growing dislike for alcohol consumption among the upper strata of society. The public speeches of William II about the dangers of alcohol to the nation's health and power had a considerable impact on the situation. This idea was picked up and began to be popularized by the Social Democrats under the slogan: "Schnapps is a plague for the working class."⁵⁶

These trends influenced the actions of German students in Bukovina, who shared social democratic ideas. Thus, after a series of public anti-alcohol speeches, the participants of the First Congress of German Socialist Students of Bukovina on May 2, 1903, decided that the academic youth of the region were "convinced of the alcohol consumption harmfulness" and therefore supported the idea. It was to become a platform for the creation of the "All-Bukovina Anti-Alcohol Union", which would consolidate all the healthy forces of the region to struggle against alcoholism.⁵⁷

The "Volkspreste" newspaper became the main tribune of anti-alcohol propaganda of the Germans of Bukovina. In the editorial "Down with alcoholism!" On March 24, 1906, a project for the creation of abstinence unions was announced, which would unite different age and social strata of the German and other communities in the region. An appeal "Proletarian parents! Mothers! Don't give your children a drop of alcohol!" published on the front page of a magazine dated August 29, 1908, explained the harmful effects on the human body. The struggle of German deputies on the Chernivtsi City Council to close and limit the activity of taverns in the city, as well as their successes, were reported in its columns.⁵⁸

The abstinence idea was actively promoted by the German-language journal "Czernowitzer Zeitung". Its pages published translations into German of works by the Russian writer Lev Tolstoy on anti-alcohol issues and the experience of anti-alcohol activities in various countries.⁵⁹

The first signs of the negative effects of alcoholism at the level of the Romanian community can be seen in the annual calendars published in the mid of 19th century. For example, in the Calendar for Bukovina for 1844, an article about

⁵⁶ R. Hoffrogge, *op. cit.*

⁵⁷ "Volkspreste", 1903, 2. Mai.

⁵⁸ "Volkspreste", 1908, 24. März; 29. August; 1909, 6. November.

⁵⁹ "Czernowitzer Zeitung", 1889, 14. November.

*Brandy Dragon*⁶⁰ described the lithograph of Johann Ludwig Schmidt (1791-1854), in which a two-headed dragon devours rye with one head and wood with the other, and vodka flows from its tail. Individuals who feed the dragon everything they need are next to it, and another category of people who are victims of alcoholism and even commit suicide. Anti-alcohol propaganda was carried out in Romanian communities in the same way that it was carried out in Ukrainian communities, and many men in the church made an oath to abstain from alcohol in front of a barrel of vodka. At the end of the ceremony, the priest cursed the barrel, which was buried deep in the ground and a cross was placed over the place, which read: "in memory of the refusal to drink vodka."⁶¹

Considering the small size and social composition of the Polish minority in Bukovina, there was probably no need to create separate anti-alcohol institutions. Therefore, active educational activities in this direction were carried out by its national and cultural societies. An important reason for this was the concentration of Poles in Chernivtsi (in 1910 there were 15 thousand people) and in several other cities of the region. Government officials, bureaucrats, technical and humanitarian intellectuals, merchants, entrepreneurs, clergy, landowners and artisans played a significant role in the social structure of the Polish minority, so its intellectual, organizational, and financial potential differed significantly from that of the Ruthenians.

The promotion of a healthy lifestyle, which included limitation of alcohol use and smoking cessation, resonated with the national-patriotic rhetoric of cultural, educational, and charitable activities in Polish society. Its main slogans were to be a "real Pole", to have "Polish pride" and were in line with abstinence. The "Sokil" gymnastics society and the "Gartezhi" scout organization operated on its basis. Summer camps were organized for their members, youngsters acquired views toward a healthy lifestyle and regular gymnastics and sports.⁶²

The multi-ethnic anti-alcohol movement in Bukovina revealed a situation similar to other multicultural environments in Europe, when representatives of different communities communicated closely in the domestic sphere, with saloons

⁶⁰ *Balaurul holerchei* [Brandy Dragon], in "Calendar pentru Bucovina pe anul 1844", Cernăuți, 1843, p. 38.

⁶¹ Paul Brașcanu, *Gheorghe Boncheș, un țăran dornean în Dieta Bucovinei* [Gheorghe Boncheș, a peasant from Dorna in the Bukovina Diet], in "Monitorul de Dorna", 3 aprilie 2016, <http://www.monitoruldedorna.ro/?p=175409> (Accessed on 03 March 2021).

⁶² *Sprawozdanie wydziału polskiego towarzystwa gimnastycznego "Sokół" w Czerniowcach za rok 1909*, Czerniowce, Nakładem towarzystwa, 1910, p. 8-10.

and taverns creating a particularly favourable atmosphere. The authorities' position became a deciding factor in coordinating their anti-alcohol measures. As an example, we note the initiative of the All-Bukovinian Teachers' Conference (August 1895) to establish a regional society, which was to unite the public of the region to fight alcohol. Its decrees emphasized the need to prohibit students from participating in alcohol-related activities; strengthening anti-alcohol awareness in the educational process and in working with parents; and increasing the publication of anti-alcohol literature, etc.⁶³

The tribune to European forums was actively used to protect activists of the abstinence movement in Bukovina from persecution. Thus, 3,000 participants in the Austrian Agricultural Congress, held on November 14, 1897, in Vienna, at the request of a delegate from the region T. Prunkul approved an appeal to the government to stop the pressure on priests and activists fighting alcoholism in Bukovina.⁶⁴

The tribune of the Vienna parliament was also used in this role. In November 1894, the protest of the deputy from Bukovina, Dr Ioan Zurkan, against the dozens of shameful facts of the participants' dispersal, who were to take abstinence oaths, got widespread support throughout the Habsburg monarchy. Similar accusations of alcohol abuse and sale have been made against government and law enforcement officials.⁶⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The production and consumption of alcohol and the abstinence movement in Bukovina in the second half of the 19th - early 20th century proved to be a complex social problem. The social structure of the population, the social status of a person and the ethnonational status of the community largely determine the nature and level of alcohol consumption. The Ruthenians of Bukovina, as a "nation of priest and peasant," confirm the overall image of modern society, namely that the lower the community's standing, the higher the prevalence of alcoholism among its members.

Under these conditions, such a powerful abstinence movement among the Ruthenians of Bukovina, which, because of its small size, could not rely on the

⁶³ "Bukovyna", 1895, April 6.

⁶⁴ "Bukovynski Vedomosti", 1897, November 21.

⁶⁵ Abg. Dr. Zurkan über das Trunkenheitsgesetz, in "Bukowinaer Rundschau", 1894, 27. November, S. 1.

support of the state, patrons or even the national social intellectuals, was worthwhile. However, this rise had genuine beneficial consequences in terms of reducing the negative socio-economic consequences of alcohol consumption and strengthening the internal consolidation of the Ruthenians of Bukovina in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

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“ŻELIGOWSKI’S MUTINY” AS A POLISH WAY TO SOLVE THE “VILNIUS PROBLEM”

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Abstract: *The article describes the facts and examines the Polish-Lithuanian territorial dispute of 1919-1920, which occurred during the time of the formation of independent states in Central and Eastern Europe following World War I. The parade of the newly proclaimed states of the Czechoslovak Republic, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, each of which had territorial claims against its neighbours, created a precedent for a series of frontier military actions. Hungarian-Czechoslovak, Polish-German, Polish-Czechoslovak, Polish-Lithuanian, and Polish-Ukrainian territorial conflicts persisted until 1923, following the signing of the Armistice in 1918. The issue of a territorial dispute between the Second Polish Republic and the Republic of Lithuania over the city of Wilno (Vilnius) and the Vilnius area is explored through the perspective of those historical events. Military actions, including a Polish-inspired "insurrection," continued as a result of a reluctance to follow political agreements and ignore demarcation lines. The goal was to construct a federal state that would act as a deterrent to Russian imperial ambitions in Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. Lithuania, on the other hand, was rather cautious of the idea of forming a state made up of the lands of "Poland-Lithuania-Belarus-Ukraine," even if the borders favoured the Second Polish Republic. Anticipating the dangers of assimilation and the refusal to accept Lithuania without Vilnius, the Lithuanian government seemed uncompromising in its dealings with Poles yet cordial with Russians. As a result, the Polish federalist project failed.*

Keywords: Żeligowski, Poland, Lithuania, Wilno (Vilnius), Territorial dispute, Federalist project.

Rezumat: „Rebeliunea lui Żeligowski” ca soluție poloneză de a rezolva „problema Vilnius”. Articolul descrie faptele și examinează disputa teritorială polono-lituaniană din 1919-1920, izbucnită în perioada de formare a statelor independente în Europa Centrală

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și de Est, consecutivă Primului Război Mondial. Parada nou-proclamatelor state precum Republica Cehoslovacia, Regatul Iugoslaviei, Regatul Ungariei, Republica Populară Vest-Ucraineană – fiecare dintre acestea revendicând teritorii aparținând vecinilor săi – a generat un precedent pentru o serie de acțiuni militare desfășurate la frontiere. Ca urmare a semnării armistițiului din 1918, conflictele teritoriale maghiaro-cehoslovace, polono-germane, polono-cehoslovace, polono-lituaniene și polono-ucrainene au continuat până în 1923. Problema disputei teritoriale dintre a Doua Republică Poloneză și Republica Lituania asupra orașul Wilno (Vilnius) și a zonei adiacente acestuia este explorată din perspectiva evenimentelor istorice. Reticența de a respecta acordurile politice și ignorarea liniilor de demarcație au condus la diverse acțiuni militare, inclusiv la o „insurecție” de inspirație poloneză. Scopul lor a fost acela de a construi un stat federal care să acționeze ca un factor de descurajare a ambițiilor imperiale rusești în Polonia, Lituania, Belarus și Ucraina. Pe de altă parte, Lituania s-a dovedit a fi destul de prudentă cu privire la ideea unui stat care să cuprindă teritorii din „Polonia-Lituania-Belarus-Ucraina”, în condițiile în care granițele favorizau cea de-a Doua Republică Poloneză. Anticipând pericolele asimilării și refuzând ideea unei Lituanii fără orașul Vilnius, guvernul lituanian părea intransigent în relațiile sale cu polonezii, dar cordial cu rușii. În consecință, proiectul federalist polonez avea să eșueze.

INTRODUCTION

In 1918, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Western Ukrainian Republic all proclaimed independence: Lithuania on February 16, Poland on October 7, Czechoslovakia on October 28, Hungary on November 1, and the Western Ukrainian Republic on November 1. Each state asserted territorial claims against its neighbours. Following World War I, there were several territorial disputes between Poland and Lithuania. The major point of contention was for control of Vilnius (Wilno). The “Żeligowski’s Mutiny”, an important historical event that ended the Polish-Lithuanian conflict for Wilno in Poland’s favour, is the subject of the research. This event was much different from the twenty-year confrontation between Poland and Lithuania in the interwar period.

The military operation was conceived by Poland’s Chief of State, Józef Piłsudski, and named after the Polish General of Armour Lucjan Żeligowski (1865 - 1947). The latter’s life, military, political and public activity in Russia was a subject of study for many Polish historians: Wiesław Marczyk, Wojciech Kicman, Tadeusz Krisky-Karski, Stanisław Żurkowski, Barbara Gumowska, Krzysztof J. Galas, Wiesław Łach etc. Dariusz Fabisz created one of the most significant investigations in his work *General Lucjan Żeligowski 1865 - 1947: Political and*

Military Activities (2007).¹ The authors thought Żeligowski was a gifted military tactician and a great patriot of his homeland, but they could not tolerate his support for the Polish communist regime at his advanced age.

The General himself left behind several works: *The War in 1920: Memories and Reflections* was published in 1930 (the second edition – in 1990)², *On the Slavic Idea* was published in London in 1941³, etc. The most striking feature in the Żeligowski memoirs is his dedication to Marshal Piłsudski, with a generally positive attitude towards his military decisions.⁴ The General is depicted in the London edition of *On the Slavic Idea* as a person fanatically devoted to the idea of forming a new world out of Slavic nations.⁵

Polish historian Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski⁶ in his research of recent Polish and Lithuanian history and Lithuanian historian Vanda Daugirdaitė-Sruogienė provided contextual interpretation of the topic.⁷ Articles written by Genadiy Matveev, Daria Lypynska-Nalench, and Tomash Nalench⁸, as well as the book by Russian historian Maria Pavlova⁹ discussed the study of Warsaw and Moscow policy towards Lithuania in 1918 – 1920. The military and diplomatic aspects of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict following World War I, as well as the

¹Dariusz Fabisz, *Generał Lucian Żeligowski (1865–1947). Działalność wojskowa i polityczna* [General Lucian Żeligowski (1865–1947), Military and political activity], Warszawa, Wydawnictwo DiG, 2007.

²Lucian Żeligowski, *Wojna w roku 1920. Wspomnienia i rozważania* [War in 1920. Memories and considerations], Warszawa, Instytut Badania Najnowszej Historji Polski 1990. And others: *Notes from 1920*, as posthumous text, published in London edition, in *Niepodległość: Czasopiśmo poświęcone najnowszemu dziejom Polski* in the 3rd volume in 1951; especially important memoirs of the General *May Coup*, published in *Warsaw of the Second Polish Republic 1918 – 1939* in the 4th volume in 1970; *Zapomnienie prawdy* [Forgetting the truth] (London, 1943) etc.

³Lucian Żeligowski, *O idee słowiańskiej* [About Slavic ideas], Londyn, F. Mildner & Sons, Herbal Hill, London, E.C.1, 1941.

⁴Lucian Żeligowski, *Wojna w roku 1920...*, p. 158.

⁵Lucian Żeligowski, *O ideę słowiańskiej...*, p. 8.

⁶Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski. 1864 – 1945. Okres 1914 – 1939* [Recent political history of Poland. 1864 – 1945. 1914 – 1939 period], Gdańsk, OGryf-S.P.K., 1990.

⁷Vanda Daugirdaitė-Sruogienė, *Lietuvos istorija* [Lithuanian history], Kaunas, Naudota, 1990.

⁸G. Matveev, D. Lipinskaya-Nalench, T. Nalench, *Nachalo* [Beginning], in *Belye pyatna – chernye pyatna. Slozhnyye voprosy v rossiysko-polskikh otnosheniyah*, Moskva, 2010, p. 15–73.

⁹Maria Pavlova, *Litva v politike Varshavy i Moskvy v 1918 – 1926 godah* [Lithuania in the politics of Warsaw and Moscow in 1918 – 1926], Moskva, Aspekt Press, 2016.

opposing sides' political goals, are mirrored in the studies of Polish scholars Piotr Lossovsky, Grzegorz Łukomski and Rafał E. Stolarski.¹⁰ The monograph of Lithuanian historian Regina Žepkaitė¹¹ plays a significant role in Lithuanian historiography. Lithuanian historians in the USA wrote the first collective monograph devoted to this problem in 1998.¹² A study of the Vilnius issue in the context of other border conflicts Poland had, namely in the Province of the Upper Silesia and Gdansk, was conducted by Zbigniew Cesarz.¹³ Tomasz Gajownik¹⁴ focused on a few elements of the Lithuanian special services' operational activities in Poland after World War I. Michał Römer's views and political activity were the focus of Zbigniew Soliak¹⁵ and Ian Savitsky's research.¹⁶ He was Piłsudski's

¹⁰Piotr Łossowski, *Konflikt polsko-litewski 1918 – 1920* [Polish-Lithuanian conflict 1918 – 1920], Warszawa, Książka i Wiedza, 1996, 250 s.; Idem, *Potej i tamtej stronie Niemna. Stosunki polsko-litewskie 1883-1939* [On this and that side of the Neman. Polish-Lithuanian relations 1883–1939], Warszawa, Czytelnik, 1995; Grzegorz Łukomski, *Walka Rzeczypospolitej okresy północno-wschodnie 1918 – 1920. Polityka I działania militarne* [The battle of the Republic of Poland for the north-eastern borderlands in 1918 – 1920. Politics and military actions], Poznań, Wydawn. Nauk. Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, 1994; Idem, *Wojna domowa. Z dziejów konfliktu polsko-litewskiego 1918 – 1920* [Civil War. From the history of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict of 1918 – 1920], Warszawa, Oficyna Wydawnicza ADIUTOR, 1997; Grzegorz Łukomski, Rafał F. Stolarski, *Walka o Wilno. Z dziejów Samoobrony Litwy i Białorusi 1918 – 1919* [Fight for Vilnius. From the history of Self-Defense of Lithuania and Belarus 1918 – 1919], Warszawa, Oficyna Wydawn. Adiutor, 1994.

¹¹Regina Žepkaitė, *Lietuva tarptautiens politicos labirintuose 1918 – 1922* [Lithuania in the labyrinths of international politics 1918–1922], Vilnius, Mintis, 1973.

¹²Alfonsas Eidintas, Vytautas Žalys, Alfred Erich Senn, Edvardas Tuskenis, *Lithuania in European Politics. The Years of First Republic, 1918 – 1940*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1998.

¹³Zbigniew Cesarz, *Polska a Liga Narodów: kwestie terytorialne w latach 1920 – 1925. Studium prawno-polityczny* [Poland and the League of Nations: territorial issues in 1920 – 1925. Legal and political study], Wrocław, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1993.

¹⁴Tomasz Gajownik, *Metody pracy operacyjnej litewskich służb specjalnych w Polsce po I wojnie światowej. Wybrane aspekty* [Methods of operational work performed by the Lithuanian Secret Services in Poland after the First World War. Selected aspects], w "Dzieje Najnowsze: kwartalnik poświęcony historii XX wieku", 2006, No. 1, p. 19–46.

¹⁵Zbigniew Solak, *Między Polską a Litwą: Życie i działalność Michał Romera (1880 – 1970)* [Between Poland and Lithuania: Life and Activities of Michał Römer (1880 – 1970)], Poznań, Arcana, 1983.

¹⁶Jan Sawicki, *Michał Romer a problemy narodościowena ziemiach byłego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego* [Römer and national problems on the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania], Toruń, Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1998.

companion in arms in 1919 – 1920. Roman Dmowski, Piłsudski’s long-time political opponent, had a concept of a nation-state that was described by Roman Vapinskiy.¹⁷ Piotr Eberhardt studied the dilemmas of the Polish Eastern border.¹⁸ In her work *Interethnic relations in the Vilnius region in 1920 – 1939*¹⁹, Joanna Januszevska-Jurkiewicz describes the daily life of the local community and relations between nations residing in Vilnius before World War II.

Józef Lewandowski and Aleksy Deruga studied the federalist concept of Piłsudski’s Polish eastern policy in the 1960s²⁰, which justified the need for a Wilno invasion. The authors studied the period until the summer of 1920 when Piłsudski had complete control of the Polish eastern policy and was the most effective in solving the Wilno matter. Włodzimierz Suleja in his monograph *Józef Piłsudski* (2004, Ukrainian edition in 2018²¹) focused on the elitist context of the early-modern national idea of Piłsudski. Bogusław Medzinski in his *Eastern Policy of Piłsudski*²² considered that the main priority of the Eastern policy of the head of the state was to defeat Russia with the help of the allied parties (Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians). In his research *Polish-Lithuanian conflict over Suwałki-Sejny region in 1918 – 1920* (2009), Stanisław Buchowski analyses the socio-political and military Polish-Lithuanian conflict of 1918 – 1920 in the Suwałki-Sejny region in the context of the formation of Polish national self-awareness.²³

¹⁷Roman Wapiński, *Endecka koncepcja granic Polski 1918 – 1921* [The Endecja Concept of Poland’s Borders 1918 – 1921], in “Biuletyn historii pogranicza”, 2008, No. 9, p. 23–33.

¹⁸Piotr Eberhardt, *Wizje i projekty Polskiej Granicy Wschodniej w latach 1914 – 1921*. [Visions and projects of the Polish Eastern Border in 1914 – 1921], in “Przegląd Wschodni”, 1998, No. 5, 2, p. 348–351.

¹⁹Joanna Januszevska-Jurkiewicz, *Stosunki narodowościowe na Wileńszczyźnie w latach 1920 – 1939* [National relations in the Vilnius region in 1920 – 1939], Katowice, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2010.

²⁰Janusz Lewandowski, *Federalizm. Litwa i Białoruś w polityce obozu belwederskiego (XI 1918 – IV 1920)* [Lithuania and Belarus in the Politics of the Belweder Camp (November 1918 – April 1920)], Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1962; Aleksy Deruga, *Polityka wschodnia Polski w obcym Litwy, Białorusi i Ukrainy (1918 – 1919)* [Poland’s Eastern Policy towards the lands of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine (1918 – 1919)], Warszawa, Książka i Wiedza, 1969.

²¹Włodzimierz Suleja, *Józef Piłsudski*, Wrocław, Ossolineum, 2004 (Ukrainian edition: Suleja Wl., *Yuzef Pilsudskyi*, Kyiv, Dukh i Litera, 2018).

²²Bogusław Międzyński, *Polityka wschodnia Piłsudskiego* [Piłsudski’s Eastern Policy], in “Zeszyty Historyczne”, 1975, Z. 31, p. 3 – 45.

²³Stanisław Buchowski, *Konflikt polsko-litewski o Ziemię Sejneńsko-Suwalską w latach 1918*

In 2010, Polish and Lithuanian historians discussed Polish-Lithuanian interwar relations in the historiography of the Soviet period. At the conference marking the ninetieth anniversary of the signing of the Suwałki Agreement (October 1920), Polish and Lithuanian participants agreed on the need of preventing the conflict between parties and protecting themselves against a third party – Russia/the USSR.

The authoritative view of American historian Timothy Snyder on how one early-modern national notion based on Polish culture evolved into four contemporary ones – Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian²⁴ – provided conceptual emphasis to the author's argument.

Finally, Tomas Balkelis examines how the Great War and its aftermath impacted the Lithuanian state in his book *War, Revolution, and Nation-Making in Lithuania, 1914 – 1923*.²⁵ Violence is seen as an essential part of the formation of the Lithuanian state, nation, and identity. The War, in his opinion, was far more than just a historical event. It transformed people, policies, institutions, and modes of thought in ways that would continue to shape the nation for decades after the conflict subsided.

THE VILNIUS PROBLEM IN LITHUANIAN AND POLISH NATIONAL PROJECTS

At the beginning of the Great War, the city of Wilno was inhabited by Lithuanians, Belarusians, Poles, Jews²⁶ and Russians. Therefore, closer to the end of the war they all wanted to turn the city into their capital and put forward their demands for the city. Lithuanians believed that the city was the birthplace of the Lithuanian nation during the medieval Grand Duchy of Lithuania.²⁷ Although the Poles did not deny it, they considered the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to be connected with the Polish Crown lands. That is why they could not imagine a future Polish national state without Wilno.

Due to this argumentation, patriot socialists and their representative, Piłsudski, developed the political idea of forming a “federation of all border

– 1920, Sejny, Sejneńskie Towarzystwo Opieki nad Zabytkami, 2009.

²⁴ Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999*, New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 2003 (Ukrainian edition 2012).

²⁵ Tomas Balkelis, *War, Revolution, and Nation-Making in Lithuania, 1914–1923*, Oxford, 2018.

²⁶ Joanna Januszewska-Jurkiewsz, *Stosunki narodowościowe na Wileńszczyźnie...* [National relations in the Vilnius region in 1920 – 1939] p. 163–177, 191–205, 204–227, 252–256.

²⁷ Tomasz Gajownik, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

republics from Finland to Georgia”²⁸, which is known as the “eastern policy”²⁹ of Piłsudski, according to Norman Davies. While not all political forces supported it, Wilno was regarded as part of Poland by both the right and the left. To compel the Kaunas government to join Poland, Piłsudski used diplomatic, military, and political means. Roman Dmowski, Piłsudski’s major right-wing opponent, believed an invasion of weak Lithuania was simply a matter of time.³⁰ General Żeligowski, who was also involved in the task of annexing Wilno to Poland, pragmatically proved that “annexationist and federalist conceptions should not be fundamentally opposed...”, since “one does not exclude the other.”³¹ Eventually, when all the other parties rejected the idea of federation, Piłsudski was forced to support Dmowski’s policy.

The conflict between Poland and Lithuania arose at the end of 1918 when Piłsudski announced his plans to incorporate Wilno and its surrounding region into Poland.³² The solution was complicated by the Lithuanian leadership’s categorical disagreement with Piłsudski’s plans and the interests of the third party – Soviet Russia.³³

In the winter of 1919 – 1920, Piłsudski believed that Russia could be defeated on the battlefield and that the Wilno matter would then resolve itself. However, the actions of the appointed commander of the Soviet troops, an ideologist of the revolutionary war, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, ruined his plans. At the same

²⁸Norman Davies, *Ievropa. Istoriia* [Europe. A History], Kyiv, Osnovy, 2000.

²⁹Eugeniusz Mironowicz, *Białorusini i Ukraińcy w polityce obozu piłsudczykowski* [Belorussians and Ukrainians in the politics of the Piłsudski camp], Białystok, Wydawnictwo TransHumana, 2007, p. 26–70, 181–212; Roman Wapiński, *op. cit.*, p. 23–33.

³⁰Piotr Eberhardt, *Wizje i projekty Polskiej Granicy Wschodniej w latach 1914 – 1921* [Visions and projects of the Polish Eastern Border in 1914 – 1921], in “Przegląd Wschodni”, 1998, No 5, 2, p. 348–351.

³¹Kazimierz Świtalski, *Diariusz 1914 – 1935* [Diary. 1919 – 1935], Warszawa, Współdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1992, p. 40; Joanna Januszewska-Jurkiewsz, *Stosunki narodowościowe na Wileńszczyźnie...* [National relations in the Vilnius region in 1920 – 1939], p. 170–184.

³²Roman Wapiński, *Miejsce wschodnich ziem Rzeczypospolitej przedrozbiorowej w polskiej świadomości politycznej lat 1864-1918* [The place of the eastern lands of the pre-partition Commonwealth in the Polish political consciousness in the years 1864-1918], in S. Ciesielski, T. Kulak, K. Matwijowski (red.), *Polska - Kresy - Polacy. Studia historyczne. Prof. Wojciechowi Wrzesińskiemu w 60 rocznicę urodzin uczniowie, współpracownicy, koledzy*, Wrocław 1994, p. 53; Pavlova M., *Litva v politike Varshavy i Moskvy v 1918 – 1926 godah* [Lithuania in the politics of Warsaw and Moscow in 1918 – 1926], p. 6.

³³Norman Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 963.

time, the Entente insisted on the coordination of an armistice line and on solving the Wilno question in favour of Lithuania, which set aside the return of Wilno to Poland and postponed the hope for a renewed Grand Duchy of Lithuania for a while. Despite the political agreement reached in 1920, Piłsudski secretly prepared military operations called "mass protests" in response to political decisions.

UPDATING THE VILNIUS PLAN

The World War and the decline of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century provided a push for the formation of Polish and Lithuanian states on the historical Lithuanian territory. Nevertheless, the process of territorial demarcation between them resulted in a tense local confrontation mainly over the city of Wilno – the ancient capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1915, signs of a potential conflict appeared shortly after the Russian Army withdrew from the Vilnius province in the North-western area, which had been seized by the German Army based on the concept of a "Central Europe." Following the Russian retreat, both sides considered the benefits, waiting for explicit statements regarding Lithuania and Poland. The central states wanted to prevent Polish claims to Wilno after endorsing the proclamation of the Kingdom of Poland.

The Poles decided to follow the central states under certain conditions, receiving in return the consent to form their government and army.³⁴

Observing German affairs closely at the front, Lithuanian politicians declared Lithuanian independence twice. On 11 December 1917, the Council of Lithuania (Taryba) declared independence in Wilno, at the same time accepting the status of a German protectorate. In February 1918, the Taryba once again declared independence, this time without the pledge of loyalty to Germany. German defeat in the West allowed the Taryba in October 1918 to plot a new course. The Red Army's offensive further complicated the difficult task of legitimizing independence and attempting to raise an army. The Lithuanian government, having failed to raise an army, evacuated exposed Wilno for more westerly Kaunas. On 5 January 1919, the Red Army took Wilno.

For Piłsudski, this was the worst possible outcome. His eastern policy, as Medzinski wrote, was aimed at the complete elimination of the Russian threat.³⁵ Therefore, Piłsudski could agree to give Wilno to the Lithuanians only if Lithuania joined Poland in a federation. However, the Lithuanians sought

³⁴G. Matveev, D. Lipinskaya-Nalench, T. Nalench, *op. cit.*, p. 16–20.

³⁵Bogusław Międzyński, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

complete sovereignty.³⁶

At the beginning of 1919, the Red Army invaded Wilno and mounted an offensive on Grodno. Those who were against Bolshevik domination – Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Kyiv Ukrainians were mobilized to confront the Bolshevik invasion. Piłsudski was preparing to lead an army and command the Vilnius military operation. This was only one aspect of the strategy; there was also a political component. Römer, the head of the state, was in charge of bringing it to completion. Its goal was to recommend that Kaunas politicians join Römer's government and mobilize public opinion to conduct a referendum on the creation of a Lithuanian-Belarusian land connection with Poland.

Piłsudski was able to start implementing the Vilnius plan only after solving the problem of Lviv in April 1919, moving the Red Army to a safe distance from the city. On April 19, Polish troops, violating all the so-called “rules” of war, disguised as Red Army men, got into Wilno by rail and started street fights. On 21 April, the Polish Army under General Stanisław Śleszyński seized the city.³⁷ A demarcation line between Poland and Lithuania called the “Foch line” was established on the 26th of April. A July agreement left Wilno on the Polish side and, most importantly, proclaimed the defeat of Römer’s mission.³⁸ Lithuanian Prime Minister Mykolas Slezevicius declined an offer to join Römer’s government due to the unpopularity of this decision among Lithuanian nationalists. This was a huge risk as Slezevicius lost his tactical ally in the person of Piłsudski and his army, but he still had to refuse the Pole’s offer and look for new allies. The forcible solution of the issue made it impossible for Warsaw to cooperate with the Lithuanian and Belarusian political elites.³⁹

Piłsudski’s well-known *Proclamation to the inhabitants of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania* had no expected influence on Lithuanian society.⁴⁰ The intention to regulate political relations with Lithuanians and Belarusians failed.⁴¹

³⁶Piotr Łossowski, *Potej i tamtejstronie Niemna. Stosunki polsko-litewskie 1883-1939* [On this and that side of the Neman. Polish-Lithuanian relations 1883–1939], Warszawa, Czytelnik, 1995, p. 105.

³⁷G. Matveev, D. Lipinskaya-Nalench, T. Nalench, *Nachalo* [Beginning], p. 32.

³⁸Janusz Lewandowski, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

³⁹G. Matveev, D. Lipinskaya-Nalench, T. Nalench, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁴⁰Ivan Homeniuk, *Provisnyky Druhoi svitovoi viiny. Prykordonna konflikt v Tsentralno-Skhidnii Yevropi vid rozpadu imperii do Hliaivitskoi provokatsii* [Predictors of World War II. Border conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe from the collapse of empires to the Gleiwitz incident], Kharkiv, Klub simeinoho dozvillia, 2017, p. 192.

⁴¹Piotr Łossowski, *Stosunki polsko-litewskie w latach 1918 – 1920* [Polish-Lithuanian

However, the head of the state showed confidence that the case would be a success. He encouraged the representative of the Kaunas government, Jurgis Saulys, to cooperate. On August 23, the Polish Sejm passed a law that gave inhabitants of the region the right to freely express their nationality. Negotiations were hampered by the conflict over northern Suwałki and the attempt of a pro-Polish coup in Kaunas on August 22. It aimed to overthrow the government of Taryba and seize Kaunas with its surrounding territories. The Polish Military Organization planned the operation, but it was stopped when Lithuanian intelligence arrested people on the night of August 28 - 29. The uprising in Sejny on 23 - 28 August 1919 was another reason. It aimed to perform a *coup d'état* in Lithuania to replace the Lithuanian government with a pro-Polish cabinet. Therefore, Wilno did not become a link between Poland and Lithuania, as the head of the state thought, but, rather, became the subject of an increasingly uncompromising dispute between them. These circumstances "threatened to paralyze the whole Baltic section"⁴², which was the basis of the federation plans of Piłsudski. This failed intention of the First Marshal (the military rank of Piłsudski since March 19, 1919) was announced by Leon Wasilewski at the Helsinki Conference in January 1920, to create a block of Baltic countries with Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland, and recorded the diplomatic defeat of Piłsudski at the Baltic section. However, the Marshal's firm conviction that Poland's fate in the near future would be decided in the East, forced him to look for an ally in the person of Symon Petliura, a representative of Dnieper Ukraine. Piłsudski decided to take full advantage of this possibility. However, in 1921, during signing the Treaty of Riga, he would betray his former ally in favour of a militarily superior one.⁴³

The Kyiv Offensive conducted by the Polish Army in a tactical alliance with the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic in April - June turned out to be unsuccessful. After a week of fights, Wilno had to be surrendered. Tukhachevsky's forces were supported by Lithuanian troops, which the commander-in-chief saw as the outbreak of the second war against Poland. After the invasion of Wilno, the Red Army gained a great psychological advantage. Motivated soldiers of the Red Army victoriously attacked.

At the Conference in Spa on July 10th, Prime Minister Władysław Grabski,

relations in the years 1918 - 1920], Warszawa, Książka i Wiedza, 1966, p. 80.

⁴²Włodzimierz Suleja, *Yuzef Pilsudskiy*, Kyiv, Dukh i Litera, 2018, p. 279.

⁴³Oleksandr Dotsenko, *Litopys ukrainskoi revoliutsii. Materialy y dokumenty do istorii ukrainskykh revoliutsii* [Chronicle of the Ukrainian revolution. Materials and documents on the history of Ukrainian revolutions], Varshava, 1923, T. 2, Kn. 5 (1917 - 1923), p. 5.

Tadeusz Rozwadowski and, the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, and Stanisław Patek, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, invited allies to help in the fight against Russia. The Polish government was urgently encouraged to return Wilno to Lithuania. Since the Red Army drove the Poles out of Wilno on July 14th, it was suggested that the Polish delegation acknowledge Lithuania’s right to the city, which was recorded in the Soviet-Lithuanian Peace Treaty on July 12th.⁴⁴

After the July agreement, Lithuanian foreign policy drastically changed. Lithuania needed an alliance against the Poles, and the Soviets wanted to secure their flank in the fights against Poland. Negotiations between Lithuania and Soviet Russia started in Moscow on May 9th and finished with signing the treaty on July 12th. Soviet Russia recognized the sovereignty of Lithuania and paid generous compensation for damage caused on its territory during the war.⁴⁵ According to the treaty, the Vilnius province was divided: Russia was satisfied with Vileysky and Disnensky counties and a part of Lidsky and Oshmyansky counties, which were under Polish Army control during negotiations.⁴⁶ While the Red Army units were rapidly approaching Warsaw on August 6th, Lithuania received Wilno, but in fact, the Red Army units left Wilno on August 25th. On August 26th, Lithuanian units took the city, proclaiming it once again the national capital.⁴⁷ The Lithuanian government believed that a Bolshevik victory would both preserve Lithuanian independence and grant Vilnius to Lithuania. This was surely a mistake.⁴⁸

In August, Polish troops halted the Red Army’s advance on the outskirts of Warsaw and drove it out of Poland. Having cleared Volhynia and Eastern Galicia and having pushed Tukhachevsky’s army back to the Nieman on the north, the Polish army removed all obstacles for a victorious march on the east until the enemy was completely defeated. On August 27th, the National Defence Council (Rada Obrony Narodowej) permitted the Polish Army to cross the Curzon Line and on September 8th, to cross the Lithuanian-Polish demarcation line or the Foch Line.

⁴⁴*Sobranie zakononiy i rasporyazheniy pravitelstva za 1920 g. Upravlenie delami Sovnarkoma SSSR* [Collection of laws and orders of the government for 1920. Management of affairs of the Sovnarkom of the USSR], Moskva, 1943, p. 745–754.

⁴⁵Joseph Rothschild, *Skhidno-Tsentralna Yevropa mizh dvoma svitovymy viinamy* [East Central Europe between the two world wars], Kyiv, Mehataip, 2001, p. 447.

⁴⁶*Sobranie zakononiy i rasporyazheniy pravitelstva za 1920 g...*, p. 745–754.

⁴⁷Andrzej Ajnenkiel, *Od aktu 5 listopada do traktatu ryskiego. Kilka refleksji dotyczących kształtowania polskiej granicy wschodniej* [From the Act of 5th November to the Treaty of Riga, 25 years after the Treaty of Riga], in *Traktat Ryski 1921 roku po 75 lat*, Toruń, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, 1998, p. 27.

⁴⁸Timothy Snyder, *Peretvorennia natsii...* [The Reconstruction of Nations...], p. 91.

On September 2nd, hostilities against the Lithuanian Army began. At the end of August, the Lithuanian forces controlled the Suwałki region up to Augustów, and, at the same time, there were cruel battles over Sejny between Polish and Lithuanian armed forces.

However, the situation was not clear. Firstly, on July 10th, the Polish delegation recognized Lithuanian's right to Wilno at the Spa Conference. Secondly, Piłsudski was preparing to appeal the decision on the neutral status of the Lithuanian occupied territories of the Suwałki region together with Wilno at the League of Nations. Thirdly, the advance of the Polish Army to the East beyond the limits established by previous treaties raised the prospect of a conflict with the allies. Therefore, when the Polish and Bolshevik sides started peace negotiations in Riga in September 1920, the Entente demanded that Poland and Lithuania reach an understanding. To gain time, Piłsudski started negotiations with the Lithuanian government at the end of August. Without getting any results, he renewed them on September 30th in Suwałki⁴⁹, ordering Polish negotiators to avoid controversial issues. He was already planning a covert operation to return Wilno to Poland at the time. That is why, the agreements reached on October 7, 1920, to cease hostilities and coordinate an armistice that left the Suwałki Region, Augustów and Sejny on the Polish side of the border and the rest of the disputed territory including Wilno on the Lithuanian side, were considered by the head of the state as a tactical move to conceal plans to capture Wilno. The agreement prevented the Polish forces from launching a formal attack on Wilno. Piłsudski violated his obligations and started preparing an operation to conquer Wilno and its surrounding lands, having begun with an "insurrection" by separate units of the Polish Army.

The regrouping of forces in a north-eastern direction evidences the fact that the operation had been prepared long before the signing of the Suwałki Agreement. On August 29th, the High Command ordered the 41st Suwałki Infantry Regiment and the 4th Cavalry Brigade, which were targeted to remove Lithuanian forces from Suwałki, to regroup. The order also indicated the units that were now considered "irregular": the 212th and 211th Regiments of the Uhlans, the Volunteer Division, and the 1st Lithuanian-Belarusian Infantry Division.⁵⁰ The order noted that the division of the units into regular and irregular was due to the political difficulties connected with further military activities outside the state border.⁵¹ The attack force was to be

⁴⁹Tomasz Gajownik, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁵⁰Grzegorz Łukomski, *Wojna domowa...* [Civil War...], p. 130 – 131.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 54.

made up of a unit of regular Polish Army and the 1st and the 2nd Lithuanian-Belarusian Infantry Divisions. These units were created on October 21st, 1919, composed of inhabitants of former Lithuanian and Belarusian provinces of the Russian Empire. Each division contained four infantry regiments in two brigades and an artillery regiment. The 1st Division also included the Grodno Hussar Regiment. These units had considerable combat experience, and other formations of the Polish Army reinforced those that suffered significant losses.

“ŻELIGOWSKI’S MUTINY” AND THE SOLUTION TO THE “VILNIUS QUESTION”

Piłsudski planned to raise an “insurrection” accompanied by a “spontaneous people’s uprising”, which was to convince Western diplomats of the Poles of Wilno’s refusal to live under Lithuanian rule. Meanwhile, the units of Żeligowski were expected to reach Wilno, take the city and the surrounding lands under their control, and declare an independent state – Central Lithuania. General Lucjan Żeligowski, appointed commander of the 1st Lithuanian-Belarusian Infantry Division, was chosen for the role of main “insurgent”.

Lucjan Żeligowski was born in 1865 in a Lithuanian noble family. His parents were deported to Siberia for taking part in the January uprising of 1863. Żeligowski joined the Imperial Russian Army in 1888 and served as a Major General. He was associated with the independence movement as a member of the Union of Active Struggle, which was founded in Lviv in 1908 by Kazimierz Sosnowski and other organizations, in particular the Combat Organization of the Polish Socialist Party founded by Józef Piłsudski. In 1915, he took part in the formation of the Polish Rifle Brigade in Russia⁵², which after the revolution became known as the Haller’s Army. He insisted that his subordinates have an exceptionally hardened spirit and resistance and that they never lose their national identity.⁵³ He participated in the war with Bolshevik Russia as a commander of the Polish 4th Rifle Division, the 10th Infantry Division, the Task Force, etc.⁵⁴

⁵²Barbara Gumowska, *Opowieść o gen. Broni Lucianie Żeligowskim*, Część 1. Lata 1865 – 1920, Bydgoszcz, 1994, p. 32.

⁵³Dariusz Fabisz, *op. cit.*, p. 45–46; Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski*. T. 2, cz. 1, (1914 – 1939), [Recent political history of Poland. 1864 – 1945. T. 2, Part 1, 1914 – 1939 period], Warszawa, Krajowa agencja wydawnicza, 1990, p. 83.

⁵⁴Dariusz Fabisz, *op. cit.*, p. 39; Krzysztof Jerzy Galas, *Generał broni Lucjan Żeligowski i jego zasługi dla niepodległej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* [General Lucjan Żeligowski and his

When he chose Żeligowski for the role of a rebel, Piłsudski was guided by a sentimental “kinship of their souls.”⁵⁵ Both considered Wilno and the surrounding territories to be Polish lands, and both identified themselves as Lithuanian, apparently emphasizing their affiliation to the Lithuanian gentry of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. With Żeligowski, Piłsudski could not only feel confident about the execution of the order but also counted on his devotion and his deep conviction that the planned operation was right.⁵⁶

The military and moral burden of the operation was on the general himself. Żeligowski had great command experience.⁵⁷ He was awarded two orders of the *Virtuti Militari* of the 3rd and 5th Degree for the August offensive, known as the “Miracle on the Vistula.”⁵⁸

Żeligowski received an invitation to a meeting with the commander-in-chief on September 20, but he arrived at the specified location with his adjutant Stanisław Lepkovsky on September 30. He was informed about the plan to raise an uprising in Wilno while being on the train together with Piłsudski on the 1st of October.⁵⁹ For a while, the General pondered over the words of the Marshal. The next day, he managed to convince the commander-in-chief to change the plan. Officers of the highest ranks supported the General. When, on October 7, Żeligowski announced the plan to a wide range of officers, some of them refused to participate. The officers then in agreement with Żeligowski left their units and went to the regular army. The soldiers were simply informed that it was necessary to take Wilno under Polish control and announce the borders of Poland after the operation.

The General informed others that he could not fully control the situation. He could not influence all the participants of the operation and asked to be replaced

service for the independent Polish Republic], in “*Niepodległość i Pamięć*”, 2009, 16/1 (29), p. 197.

⁵⁵Dariusz Fabisz, *Gen. Żeligowski wyruszył na Wilno pod hasłem «wracamy do domu»* [Gen. Żeligowski marched towards Wilno under the slogan “we are returning home”], in <https://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/dr-dariusz-fabisz-gen-zeligowski-wyruszy-na-wilno-pod-haslem-wracamy-do-domu> (Accessed on 05.04.2019).

⁵⁶Lucian Żeligowski, *Wojna w roku 1920...* [War in 1920...], p. 7–8.

⁵⁷*Niepodległość: Czasopiśmo poświęcone najnowszym dziejom Polski* [Independence: magazine devoted to the recent history of Poland], Londyn, Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1962, T. VII, p. 25.

⁵⁸Krzysztof Jerzy Galas, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

⁵⁹Władysław Łach, *“Bunt” Żeligowskiego. Kulisy przyłączenia Wileńszczyzny do Polski 1920 – 1922* [Żeligowski’s “Mutiny”. Behind the scenes of joining the Vilnius Region to Poland 1920 – 1922], Warszawa, Bellona, 2014, p. 94.

by someone more reputable. The decision was made to appoint General VI. Sikorsky. The condition of the Suwałki Agreement to leave Wilno on the Lithuania side of the line convinced Żeligowski to act decisively. His order as commander-in-chief of the troops of “Central Lithuania” says: “We cannot agree with that.”⁶⁰ The proclaimed communique stated the protection of the right to self-determination of the inhabitants of the fatherland and the duty of the General to lead the soldiers of those lands. Żeligowski also reported that he had left the service and freed himself from the command of the group and that all commanders and soldiers would now obey only his orders. After the occupation of Wilno, the Polish diplomats were informed that the chief of the headquarters Bobitsky and General Żeligowski had resigned from the Polish Army, but in fact, both officers were officially registered in the army.⁶¹

The attack was announced a few hours after the agreement in Suwaki, on the 8th of October at 6 a.m.⁶² They marched under the slogan “We return home and want Wilno to be a Polish city”.⁶³

They marched in a three-column formation. Żeligowski’s units ranged in size from 14 to 17 thousand men. The Lithuanians, whose troops numbered about 19 thousand combatants⁶⁴, failed to resist the attack effectively. A retreat without a fight was announced, a fire was allowed only to cover the evacuation of the Lithuanian institutions. The representative of the Kaunas government in Wilno, Ignacy Jonynas, passed control of the city to the head of the French Entente mission, which was supposed to stop the Poles. However, because he was acting as an insurgent rather than an official representative of the Polish Army, Żeligowski refused to recognize their authority. He nonetheless met with the representatives of the Entente at the Lithuanian Taryba and claimed that Wilno was occupied to protect the rights of the local Polish population.⁶⁵ The representatives of the Entente, the League of Nations, and 200 deputies of the Lithuanian parliament had to leave Wilno by midnight on the 10th of October. On the 12th of October, Żeligowski proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Central Lithuania with Wilno as its capital.

The Entente, the League of Nations, Germany, and even the Polish government officially condemned the actions of the “insurgents”. On March 15, 1923, the

⁶⁰Ivan Homeniuk, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

⁶¹*Ibid.*

⁶²Tomasz Gajownik, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

⁶³ Dariusz Fabisz, *Żeligowski wyruszył na Wilno...*

⁶⁴Ivan Homeniuk, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 209.

League of Nations recognized the annexation of the Vilnius region. In January 1923, the Lithuanians conducted a similar action by fostering the Klaipeda uprising. The Republic of Lithuania did not support the decision, however, and gained a new ally—Soviet Russia.

Lucjan Żeligowski died on July 7, 1947, in France, where he had lived since 1939. He was elected Honorary Chairman of the Society of the North-Eastern Lands of the Rzeczpospolita, which brought together emigrants from Lithuania and Belarus. He positioned himself as an opponent to the Sanation policy, and as a result, earned the favour of the anti-Sanation cabinet of Wł. Sikorski. He was a manic Slavophil⁶⁶ and an ardent supporter of communist Poland. For a time, the Slavophilism of Żeligowski seemed to be an eccentricity until, on March 31, 1944, the General published an open letter calling upon S. Mikolajczyk to “give a friendly hand” to the Soviet troops marching to Berlin. In his response, Cat-Matskevich called his recent friend a bandit and that it would have been better had he died before the war in Wilno. Every new day brought “a new distortion and a new moral quagmire” to the General. Finally, after Yalta, the elderly Żeligowski broke off relations with “Polish London” and became a faithful ally of the Moscow Poles. The rulers of communist Poland incited the General to return to his homeland, but on July 7, 1947, he died. His last wish, to be buried in Poland, was fulfilled by General Stanisław Tatar, who brought Żeligowski’s coffin from France to Poland together with a portion of the valuables of the National Defence Fund, including the secret documents of the Polish Army. The General was buried at the expense of the Polish socialist government⁶⁷.

BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE ŻELIGOWSKI MUTINY: CONCLUSION

Hostilities on the north-eastern part of the front, the occupation of Wilno by staging a “national uprising”, and the creation of “Central Lithuania” all pointed to a high-stakes political game, with Lithuania acting as a centrepiece. Therefore, Piłsudski may have had a specific plan to restore the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, composed of three cantons: ethnic Lithuania with its capital in Kaunas, Central Lithuania with its capital in Wilno, and Belarusian Lithuania with its capital in Minsk.

Piłsudski’s plans for federalization were destroyed after the invasion of Wilno by Żeligowski’s forces. Central Lithuania with its centre in Wilno was the only “independent state” (canton) that was created. Piłsudski failed to unite the

⁶⁶Lucjan Żeligowski, *O idee słowiańskiej...*[About Slavic ideas], p. 8.

⁶⁷Dariusz Fabisz, *Gen. Lucjan Żeligowski...*, p. 333–337; Barbara Gumowska, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

Minsk lands of Belarus and create “Eastern Europe”. The Lithuanians defended their independence and Kaunas. Consequently, the Polish state obtained a half-hearted result: an “independent state” with a centre in Wilno and twelve western counties of Belarus without Minsk.⁶⁸ It was only a half success or a “victory for Endecja’s version of Poland.”⁶⁹

In the spring of 1921, Piłsudski hoped for favourable military conditions to restore the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, primarily due to the separation of Kaunas Lithuania from Soviet Russia as a result of the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian troops’ offensive on Ukraine and Belarus. However, this last attempt to force his federalist plans failed. On May 21, the Marshal expressed regret at the Kalisz camp for the UNR Army’s interned soldiers that instead of building their own state, they had become unwitting participants of his eastern policy. Having understood the impracticality of federalism, Piłsudski never accepted nationalism. The beginning of the 20th century was a period of authoritarian leaders such as Aleksandar Stamboliyski, Nikola Pašić, Augustinas Voldemaras, Antanas Smetona, Józef Piłsudski, and others. Stalin killed millions of Ukrainians in the USSR, referring to them as Russians’ “younger brothers”.

Piłsudski cherished the Polish state cult, believing it to be “a paramount force in the East that everyone, including the Entente, would count on and rely on”. His perception of a state differed from reality. He looked suspiciously at his own citizens who could not recognize “corruption and chaos” in the party and at national minorities who were always ready to betray the Polish state. Therefore, the small population of the Vilnius Voivodeship was Polonised and the Belarusian peasants were subjected to assimilation policy. The Polish policy has never prioritized the development of ethnicities that coexisted with Poland within the same state. Piłsudski never made sure that the world consists of nation-states inhabited by people of a certain ethnicity.

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⁶⁸Jan Szumski, *Zachodnia Białoruś 1944 – 1953. Propaganda i edukacja w służbie ideologii*, Kraków, Arkana, 2010, p. 21–28.

⁶⁹Timothy Snyder, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

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LANDMARKS OF THE VIRAL-METAMORPHIC THEORY. A NEW INTERPRETATION OF RIGHT-WING TOTALITARIANISM (II)*

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Abstract. *The idea of the viral-metamorphic theory was ‘inspired’ by Hanna Arendt’s assertion that totalitarianism is the pathology of modernity. Therefore, totalitarianism is not the opposite of democracy, but a mutant entity derived from it. The totalitarian phenomenon emerges when change occurs and modifies certain essential aspects of democratic thought and action, such as freedom, equality, individualism, social contractualism, rationalism, social justice, the rule of law, etc. Right-wing totalitarianism has syncretically combined several trans-ideologies becoming an ideology in itself, with a unique and utopian view of the world, built of myths, archetypes, symbols, magical thought, and taboos.*

Keywords: *Fascism, Hierarchy, Ideology, Neo-paganism, Political religion, social Darwinism, Totalitarianism, Viral-metamorphic theory.*

Rezumat: Repere ale teoriei viral-metamorfice. O nouă interpretare a totalitarismului de dreapta (II). *Ideea teoriei viral-metamorfice a fost „inspirată” de afirmația Hannei Arendt că totalitarismul este o patologie a modernității. Prin urmare, totalitarismul nu este opusul democrației, ci o entitate mutantă derivată din aceasta. Fenomenul totalitar apare atunci când are loc schimbarea și modifică anumite aspecte esențiale ale gândirii și acțiunii democratice, cum ar fi libertatea, egalitatea, individualismul, contractualismul social, raționalismul, justiția socială, statul de drept etc. Totalitarismul de dreapta a combinat în mod sincretic mai multe trans -ideologii, devenind o ideologie în sine, cu o viziune unică și utopică asupra lumii, construită din mituri, arhetipuri, simboluri, gândire magică și tabuuri.*

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THE TOTALITARIAN IDEOLOGY AS SEEN THROUGH THE METAMORPHIC VIRAL THEORY

Behaviour

Referring to the fundamental characteristics of right-wing totalitarianism, Robert O. Paxton said that fascists are more intelligible by their *actions and behaviour* than by their ideology. Fascist behaviour involves a series of *visceral feelings* and *mobilizing passions*. R. Paxton offered a synthetic definition of fascism, based on its political behavioural characteristic:

*"Fascism may be defined as a form of political behaviour marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion."*¹

This approach is in line with the holistic and national regeneration view of Roger Griffin², as well as the more nuanced position of sociologist

¹Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, London, Allen Lane Publishing House, 2004, p. 218, apud Constantin Iordachi, *Fascism, totalitarianism și religii politice* [Fascism, totalitarianism and Political religions], p. 36, in Idem (Ed.), *Fascismul european 1918-1945. Ideologie, experimente totalitare și religii politice* [European fascism 1918-1945. Ideology, totalitarian experiments and political religions], translated by Andreea Lazăr, Alex Moldovan, Alexandru Polgar, Introduction to the Romanian edition by Constantin Iordachi, Cluj-Napoca, Romanian Institute for Research on Minorities Issues, 2014.

²Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, New York, Saint Martin's Press, 1991; Idem (ed.), *Fascism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995; Idem (ed.), *International Fascism. Theories, Cases, and the New Consensus*, London, Sydney, Auckland, Arnold, Oxford University Press, 1998; Idem, *The Palingenetic Political Community: Rethinking the Legitimization of Totalitarian Regimes in Inter-War Europe*, in *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 3/3, 2002, pp. 24-43; Roger Eatwell, *On defining the „Fascist Minimum”: The centrality of ideology*, in „Journal of Political Ideologies”, Vol. 1, 1996, Issue 3, pp. 303-319; Idem, *Reflections on Fascism and Religion*, in „Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions”, Vol. 4, 2003, Issue 3, pp. 145-166.

Michael Mann³, who links fascist ideology to the specific characteristics of the nation-state. One of the behavioural constants in totalitarian systems and regimes is *violence*. It is found both in individual and collective behaviour, as well as in the relations between the State, the individual, and the social group. Violence is pervasive in multiple forms - physical, mental, direct, indirect, rationalized, institutionalized, irrational, etc., is one of the factors that maintain totalitarianism's integrity and cohesion, alongside propaganda and terror.

The Romanian historian Ion Ciupercă has made an interesting comparative analysis between the police state and the totalitarian state, stating: "On the one hand the police state is, obviously, older than the totalitarian state; on the other hand, the totalitarian state also has the status of a police state and more than that, not to be mistaken with it (...). Since we are discussing the violence that characterizes the police states and, particularly the totalitarian states, it is appropriate to mention a feature that, though potentially detectable in previous regimes, is undeniably present and prevalent in totalitarian regimes: the violence/ terror from below (Zinoviev), 'through the tacit complicity of the population' (Bukovski); the 'spread of despotic behaviour across the entire society... such that one individual becomes the dictator of the other'" ⁴. Starting from the premise that totalitarian systems turn society into a *large prison* (a physical, moral, spiritual prison), the behaviour of individuals also changes in this regard. The perception of behavioural normality is frequently based on existing traditions, attitudes, or societal values. Healthy personalities who are emotionally stable are seen as inward-looking, rational, genuine, spontaneous, creative, integrated, productive, and transparent. They adapt to certain characteristics of contemporary society, such as libertinism, openness, permissiveness, pragmatism, etc. Societal spaces have always been marked by mobility and dynamism as they have evolved. The totalitarian world follows a completely different paradigm, which bears striking similarities to the prison

³Michael Mann, *Fascists*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

⁴I. Ciupercă, *Totalitarismul – fenomen al secolului XX. Repere* [Totalitarianism - a phenomenon of the 20th century. Highlights], Iași, Demiurg Publishing House, 2008, p. 211-212; Philippe Braud, François Burdeau, *Histoire des idées politiques depuis la révolution*, Paris, Editions Montchrestien, 1983, p. 441-443.

system, such as the imposition of a limited framework for human development; both prisoners and people living under a totalitarian regime exhibit the same tendency to revolt, adopting aggressiveness, hostility, impulsiveness, addiction, frustration, anxiety⁵. The authoritarian/totalitarian personality (according to T. Adorno / D. I. Dascălu) of *the new* ideologized, massified, bureaucratized *man* includes direct, metamorphosed, or twisted forms of violence. Due to the anguish induced by the suffocating intensity of modernity, the human being tends to flee freedom. The individuals show a predisposition to giving up their autonomy or independence of the individual self in favour of someone outside of themselves who is believed to be stronger, and from whom they may get the attribute of force. These mechanisms have also been called *masochistic and sadistic tendencies*⁶. Masochistic tendencies are subject to a process of rationalization. Masochistic addiction is considered love or fidelity; feelings of inferiority are seen as the expression of real flaws, suffering as being due to circumstances that cannot be changed. Sadistic tendencies encountered usually in the same individuals appear in three forms more or less related to each other: the sadist's tendency to make others depend on him and to have absolute power over them, the tendency to exploit others, to use them, and the tendency to make others suffer or to see them suffer"⁷. Therefore, totalitarian behaviour falls within the *paradigm of domination/submission*, sustainable through widespread, rationalized, and institutionalized violence.

Politics

One of the defining features of right-wing totalitarianism is its *antinomy* with older political currents and ideologies, whether democratic-pluralist (liberalism, conservatism, social democracy, socialism) or anti-democratic and anti-pluralist (communism).

Generic fascism is anti-liberal. Its call for the regeneration of the

⁵G. Barry Morris, *Human Behavior in an Emerging Totalitarian Society*, in „Canadian Journal of Counselling and Psychotherapy”, vol. 11, no. 1(1976), p. 15-17.

⁶Dan-Ioan Dascălu, *Personalitatea totalitară [Totalitarian personality]*, București, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, 2002, p. 89.

⁷*Ibidem*, p.90.

national community through a heroic struggle against its supposed enemies and the forces that undermine it implies the radical rejection of liberalism in all its aspects: pluralism, tolerance, individualism, gradualism, pacifism, parliamentary democracy, separation of powers, *natural rights* doctrine, egalitarianism, the theory of rectilinear progress, open society, cosmopolitanism, belief in world governance, etc.”⁸ In my opinion, for reasons of political expediency, fascist movements manifested and sometimes functioned as democratic or elective parties. In general, right-wing totalitarianism tends to destroy liberalism on all levels (ideological, political, and economic), with fascist ideology infecting and perverting its Enlightenment origins.

Generic fascism is anti-conservative. Despite its conservative roots, fascist ideology aspires to a new type of *rebirth*, with the sense of a *new order* (It may be influenced by the past but it does not attempt to go back in time). Fascism showed a strong revolutionary inclination, but to come to power, it temporarily allied with conservative forces (army, church, state administration), based on shared adversaries (such as communism and cosmopolitanism) and some common priorities such as the law, order, family⁹. Therefore, I believe that confronted with the ideology of the extreme right, conservatism is not destroyed but rather revolutionized - a paradoxical transformation that gave rise to the term *conservative revolution* for fascism.

Fascism tends to function as a charismatic form of politics. It rejects both the traditional policy of the *Old Regime* and the legal-rational policy of liberalism and socialism, tending to function as *a charismatic form of politics*. The quintessence of this policy is linked to the cult of the leader, but certain forms of fascism (such as The Faisceau of Valois in France) have adopted a technocratic model of a planned society, while others (such as the New French Right) focus on the struggle for cultural dominance of the ideas that support the new order. In fact, all political ideologies, especially when manifested as revolutionary forces, tend to sometimes include a charismatic aspect.

⁸Roger Griffin, *Fascismul. Introducere generală*, p. 134.

⁹*Ibidem*, p. 134-135.

Some researchers, such as Hannah Arendt or Eric Voegelin, use religious terminology in the analysis of fascism, calling it the religion of the immanent (according to H. Arendt), *the secular, civil, lay, political religion*, or *gnosis* of modernity (according to E. Voegelin). The far right, in reality, lacks a true transcendental and metaphysical dimension, and is opposed to any genuine religious belief. The use of a religious or pseudo-religious language by the far-right in its attacks on materialism or communism is a sign of the crisis of modern political ideologies that attempted to provide a *panacea* for the widespread evil of contemporary society (of the twentieth century). The right-wing totalitarian ideology manifested as a new form of devotion passed down to the masses by the leader, who was attributed quasi-divine qualities (omnipotence, omniscience, infallibility, etc.). The aforementioned ideology has the appearance of religion that, however, lacks the moral side (religion of the numinous – according to Rudolf Otto) and aims to materialize the totalitarian utopia through an "anthropological revolution" - leading to the emergence of *the New Man / Übermensch* and the establishment of the new *World-view (Weltanschauung)*.

Fascism is anti-rational. It rejects rationalism, focuses on myths, and opposes reason, which was promoted by humanism, Enlightenment, and positivist tradition. The following are celebrated and deified: self-sacrifice, blind faith, heroic action, mythology, nationalist symbolism, the Leader, the regeneration of history, etc. In my view, rationalism is replaced by the irrational, the unconscious, the atavistic, the instinctual, infecting with the totalitarian-utopian ideology.

Fascism is anti-socialist. Even though the central myth of national rebirth is used to define fascism, it turns out that its various negations (anti-socialism, anti-communism, anti-liberalism, etc.) are only formal, allowing some far-right ideologues to claim that *the new order is not* antisocialist. Although it rejects internationalism and dialectical materialism, fascism claims to be "the rejuvenation of the national community as a way of overcoming class conflict, destruction of the traditional hierarchy, eradication of parasitism, rewarding all the productive members of the new nation, and greater use of capitalism's and technology's energies in a new order where these cease to be exploiting and oppressing. In response to communism,

the fascists claimed that their model was *genuine socialism*, based on corporate economy, national syndicalism, and state planning.”¹⁰ The socialist origins of the far right cannot be denied, but its interaction with nationalism (anti-universalist and particularistic) halted the creation of an *international fascist* movement from the start. Starting from these premises, I think that fascism inherited the revolutionary vision from the leftist groups, absorbing, altering, and merging anarcho-syndicalism into the new corporate doctrine.

Fortunately, the fascist, fascist-like and authoritarian movements did not succeed in carrying out the implementation of the utopian-totalitarian project, because the societies in which they manifested retained many characteristics of pluralism, despite propaganda, violence, terror, repression, and manipulation. Under the pressure of the Second World War, the multiple forms of resistance, and the spectre of the Axis forces being defeated by the UN, the mythical core of the far right disintegrated into reality as fast as it appeared. The heterogeneity of fascism’s social base also led to the demise of this viral-metamorphic ideology, as well as racism, which was put into practice through genocide. The ideological eclecticism of the far right, dominated by the quantitative side and characterized by incoherence, failed to change society sufficiently to grant totalitarian regimes longevity and remains in the collective memory as some kind of *pathology endemic of interwar Europe* – in both time and space.¹¹ Totalitarianism is an expression of the crisis of politics, turning the latter into a simple instrument of terror and violence. However, its excessive and prolonged use destroys even the democratic form of politics.

Anti-pluralist regimes show a series of paradoxes, which usually appear against the imperfect background of democracy: they give the impression of effectiveness, but it is a forced, artificial one, due to the possibility of absolute control; they foster a certain social cohesion by presenting a veneered legitimacy through propaganda and the repetition of lies disguised as truth; they corrupt the good, in general, and the *public good*, in particular, by transforming morality and over-ideologizing all

¹⁰*Ibidem*, p. 136.

¹¹*Ibidem*, p. 137-139.

levels of society.¹²

Totalitarianism forces the disappearance of the multiparty system, as well as the quasi-total overlap between the state and the single party; it 'preaches' the absolute ideologization of political truth; establishes full control of the media, which can only transmit the so-called *official truth*; disintegrates civil society, incorporating it into the total state; combines ideological terror with police terror, etc.¹³

TOTALITARIAN POWER AS A POLITICAL MANIFESTATION OF THE NEGATIONIST, VIRAL-METAMORPHIC IDEOLOGY

This type of political power appears to be the polar opposite of the *open society* model (K. Popper). It opposes humanitarianism, by encouraging the lack of compassion or empathy for others as a "virtue". *The New Man* (*Übermensch*) must abandon the *old morality* (rooted in monotheistic religions), whose core is *Love thy neighbour*, and replace it with *Nietzsche's ethic* based on the *Will to Power*, vitalism, strength, and contempt for the many ('the slaves').

Human autonomy as an individual entity (endowed with reason, conscience, and freedom) is obscured by *totalitarian collectivism*¹⁴ (valid in the case of both far-left and far-right regimes). *The New Man* is a simple component of the *collective entity*, called the *mass society*, which operates as a machine controlled through a program (software) called ideology or political religion. The atomized and ideologized individual is nothing apart from the crowd, because, according to the totalitarian vision, he has "value" only if he fits into the system and obediently serves the State / Single Party / Leader. *Egalitarianism* is seen as one of the fundamental flaws of democracy in anti-pluralist (non-democratic) regimes. Although left-wing totalitarianism claims the idea of equality in a populist and demagogic way, it in

¹²See Vasile Boari, *Criza politicii. Totalitarismul ca expresie a crizei politicii în secolul XX* [The Crisis of Politics. Totalitarianism as an Expression of the Political crisis in the Twentieth century], in „Sfera Politicii”, vol. XIX, 2011, no. 6/160, pp. 33-41.

¹³Raymond Aron, *Démocratie et totalitarism*, Paris, Galimard Publishing House, 1965.

¹⁴Dan Ioan Dascălu, *The Principle of Collectivism in the Totalitarian Educational Systems*, in „Romanian Journal for Multidimensional Education”, vol. 9, 2017, Issue 1, pp. 9-16.

facts annuls it through class struggle or confines it to the oligarchy of a single party (according to the principle of G. Orwell, stated in *Animal Farm* "All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others").¹⁵ Drawing inspiration from radical conservatism (through traits such as reactionary conservatism, elitism, paternalism, etc.), fascism, Nazism, and right-wing authoritarian regimes openly declared and supported social, racial, and ethnic *inequality*. The protectionist function of the state is distorted and metamorphosed into economic and ideological *autarky*, as *politics* (in its pluralistic form) and *open society* are destroyed or transformed into 'mutant entities' (*the third way* between liberalism and socialism, monolithic and massed society). Communism does not protect the individual, but utopian ideas such as class struggle or permanent revolution. *Contractualism*, a fundamental component of the state and power theory since the Enlightenment, has been transformed or abolished by both types of totalitarian regimes. The only depository of truth in "people's democracy" (a paradoxical term, full of nonsense), was the Single Party and not the people. The ethnic identity of the latter became, through internationalism, a form of socioeconomic identity. The "true" people could only be the proletariat, with the other social groups falling into categories such as *tolerated social classes, enemies, potential enemies, future enemies, traitors, reactionary elements, anti-revolutionary elements*, etc. The far right cancels democratic contractualism through exacerbated statism, the (conceptual and functional) overlap between nation, people, race, single party, State, Leader. The National Community (*Volksgemeinschaft* type) acts and behaves according to the principles and rules of Organicism and Integralism, which exclude the idea of a social contract (between free and equal individuals before the law, who defend and guarantee each other's rights).

A very important element is the **relationship between political power and religion**. "The secularization and rationalization of political power determined a relative weakening of its relations with the religious foundation but did not eliminate the sacred component. Power is still veiled in mystery, and myths have sprung around it alluding to an unseen

¹⁵According to George Orwell, *Ferma animalelor [Animal Farm]*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 2012.

reality and mechanisms unknown to ordinary mortals. Even the media's transparency has not been able to dispel the magical atmosphere that surrounds the decision-making mechanisms of politics."¹⁶ Modernization enforced laicization and secularization on society, depriving political authority of the religious attributes of the sacred and the transcendent. At the dawn of modernity, man's covenant with God (the foundation of religion) has been replaced by man's partnership with himself (through *the Social Contract*). The democratic ideology of the Enlightenment, then liberal, tends to replace the religious dogma, which had set the balance of power in the social and political space until the 18th century. Through rationality, Cartesianism, libertarianism, and the embrace of natural rights, the sacred and transcendent become immanent. As a result, democracy appears as a *civil religion*¹⁷, containing "genetic faults" that, in the twentieth century, would result in the birth of the "mutation" known as totalitarianism. Its left-wing form (communism) deifies the proletariat, but, as in Greek mythology, the pantheon of the gods is ever-changing in composition and appearance. The single Party replaces the *pseudo-divine* entity of the working class with pseudo-religion (far-left ideology). At the top of the communist *pantheon's* hierarchy is, of course, the "Great Leader", who mediates and connects the Party with the "mass of believers" (the

¹⁶Petre Mareș, *Politica și political* [Policy and Politics], in Adrian Gorun (coord.), *Political și Puterea* [Politics and Power], București, Editura Expert, f. a., p. 155.

¹⁷"*Civil religion* is a form of sacralisation of politics that generally involves a secular entity, but at times is connected to a supernatural being conceived of as a god; it is not linked to the ideology of any particular political movement, but acknowledges the full autonomy of the individual from the collective; making use of pacific forms of propaganda, it appeals to spontaneous consensus in the observance of ethical commandments and the collective liturgy, and exists side by side with traditional religions and with the various political ideologies. It seeks to present itself as a 'civic creed' which makes the distinction between state and church clear, and which does not associate with any specific denomination." – Emilio Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics: Definitions, interpretations and reflections on the question of secular religion and totalitarianism*, in Constantin Iordachi (Ed.), *Fascismul european: 1918-1945. Ideologie, experimente totalitare și religii politice* [European fascism 1918-1945. Ideology, totalitarian experiments and political religions], Translated by Andrea Lazăr, Alex Moldovan, Alexandru Polgár, Introduction to the Romanian edition by Constantin Iordache, Cluj-Napoca, Romanian Institute for Research on Minorities Issues, 2014, p. 281.

proletariat). The *Will to Power*, racial or statist elitism and radical and militaristic ultra-nationalism replace class struggle in right-wing totalitarianism. It deifies the *National Community, the State, the Race, and the Leader*, conferring onto them quasi / pseudo-divine and supernatural attributes. Both totalitarian forms owe their origins and ties to democracy, even if they deny or modify it. The propaganda of these types of regimes claims that they represent *higher stages* in the development of modern society, using terms such as *people's democracy* or *the third way*. In reality, the so-called "evolution" of democratic forms towards totalitarian forms of power is, in fact, the destruction of political pluralism, of *the open society*, and the liberal economy (by corporatism, statism, and autarky).

The Italian specialist in totalitarianism, Emilio Gentile, stated, "The sacralization of politics is a modern phenomenon. It takes place when politics, after securing its autonomy from traditional religion through the secularization of both culture and the state, acquires a truly religious dimension. For this reason, the sacralization of politics should not be confused with the politicization of traditional religions. In other words, the sacralization of politics is a term that can be applied neither to theocracy nor to the regimes regulated by traditional religions. Consequently, the sacralization of politics differs substantially from the *sacralization of political power* in traditional society, where the holder of political power either identifies with divinity, as in the case of the pharaohs or obtains sacredness from institutionalized religion, as in Christian monarchies."¹⁸

I also consider that the sacred dimension of political power¹⁹, in all its forms (democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian), stems, of course, from the

¹⁸*Ibidem*, p. 279.

¹⁹*Ibidem*. "The term 'the sacralization of politics' means the formation of a *religious dimension in politics that is distinct from, and autonomous of, traditional religious institutions*. The sacralization of politics takes place when politics is conceived, lived and represented through myths, rituals and symbols that demand faith in the sacralized secular entity, dedication among the community of believers, enthusiasm for action, a warlike spirit and sacrifice to secure its defense and its triumph. In such cases, it is possible to speak of religions of politics in that politics itself assumes religious characteristics. The sacralization of politics takes place when a political movement:

original (religious) model. The relationships between *the Creator* and *the apogee of Creation* (man/community/peoples/World) are reflected at both the societal and power levels. The interaction between politics and religion has evolved in a *circular-cyclical pattern* over time. At the beginning of humanity, there was a connection between power and the magical-religious sphere. There followed a dependence, then an interdependence, between political power and religion. The signs of human emancipation from the religious image of the world enforced by ecclesiastical organizations appeared in the period between the Middle Ages and the era of modernity (via Renaissance and Humanism). Human autonomy from the divine/religious intensified, reaching its peak in the Age of Enlightenment, when the brilliant "deity" of Reason found a correspondent in the political field (through *revolutionary democracy*). The rapid changes in society, the economy, the revolutionary waves of the 17th to 19th centuries have induced, in many intellectual, cultural, and political circles in Europe, a mixed feeling of alienation and anxiety (*spleen*), considered specific to humans only, as well as a large "dose" of reactionary conservatism. The violent encounter between the nationalism of the oppressed peoples and the imperialism of the great powers (which was about to implode) reshaped the world on a geopolitical level, through the Great War. After the first global conflagration, the democratic model of power seemed outdated, under multiple pressures (revolutionary socialism, the threat of communism). The fascination with totalitarian ideologies spread rapidly, infecting pluralistic power relations like a *virus*. The masses stubbornly

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- a) Consecrates the primacy of a *collective secular entity*, placing it at the center of a system of beliefs and myths that define the meaning and ultimate goals of social existence, and proscribe the principles that define good and evil.
 - b) Incorporates this conception into a code of ethical and social commandments, which bind the individual to the sacralized entity, compelling the same individual to loyalty and dedication to it.
 - c) Considers its members an elect community and interprets political action as a messianic function aiming toward the fulfillment of a mission.
 - d) Develops a *political liturgy* to worship the sacralized collective entity by way of an institutionalized cult and figures representing it, and through the mystical and symbolic portrayal of a *sacred history*, periodically relieved through the ritual evocations performed by the community of the elect."

demanded "new gods", a *new religion*, or a *new morality* - to satisfy their instinctive and vitalist tendencies. With the emergence of totalitarianism, the link between power and religion appeared to be re-established, but the *New Covenant* (with its false *idols*) unfortunately led humankind into an era of Evil and Conflict rather than an *Era of Peace*. The "religions of the immanent", as Hannah Arendt called the totalitarian systems, turned out to be *deseccrated forms of the sacred*, or expressions of the *numinous*²⁰, as well as *re-sacralized*, coerced, and artificial forms of power.

Totalitarianisms, according to E. Gentile, are *experiments* rather than political regimes and are defined by a combination of elements, such as a new *anthropological revolution* (*New Man/ Übermensch*), *political religion* (ideology), *the single party*, *the system of governance*. Totalitarian experiments work with the help of the following tools: *coercion*, *demagoguery*, *totalitarian pedagogy*, *discrimination* against the outsiders.

- Violence, repression, and terror (synthesized in *coercion*) become legitimate means of enforcing totalitarian power and ideology.

- *Demagoguery* and propaganda take the form of ritualistic forms of celebration of the leader's and the single party cults.

- *Totalitarian pedagogy* is completely submissive to ideology, advocating a behavioural model specific to the collective entity. Obedience, a spirit of sacrifice, militarism, a lack of critical thinking, force, vitalism, the instinctual and the irrational are the foundations of the latter.

- *Discrimination against the outsiders* mixes the exercise of power with various forms of exclusion of the adversary, a prospective enemy, or someone who is not you, through social affiliation, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc. Discriminatory forms cover a wide range of manifestations ranging from exclusion from public space to physical elimination.²¹

Civil (democratic) and political (totalitarian) religions are mimetic, syncretic, and ephemeral in comparison to traditional religion. Civil

²⁰The German historian of religions Rudolf Otto defined the numinous - as a sacred form of the divine, from which the moral side is removed - according to R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational*, German into English translation by Ioan Milea and Silvia Irimia, Florești, Cluj, LIMES Publishing House, 2015.

²¹E. Gentile, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

religions and totalitarianism unconsciously adopt the model and operating system of traditional religions. They also include some of the myths, traditions, and rituals of ancient religions, adapting or metamorphosing them according to their own symbolic and mythological universe. The duration of political religions is relatively short; they usually disappear with the movements that created them. Fascism was the first movement of the twentieth century that called itself political religion. It “affirmed *the primacy of faith and the primacy of myth* in the political militancy of the individual and the masses and explicitly appealed to the irrational as a mobilizing force from a political point of view; it brought mythical thinking to the level of power, officially declaring that this was the only form of collective political consciousness, suitable for the masses, who were incapable, by their very nature, of any form of self-government; it established the figure of *the charismatic leader* as an interpreter of the national consciousness and as a fundamental pivot of the totalitarian state; prescribed a mandatory code of *ethical commandments* for citizens and instituted a collective *political liturgy* to glorify the *deification of the state* and *the cult of the leader*”²². In contact with the sacred totalitarian power, people experience *bipolar emotions* such as fascination/fear, love/hate, respect/contempt, etc.

As early as the 1920s, scholars such as Bertrand Russell or John Maynard Keynes²³, respectively, revealed the political religion of communism, and its Leninist version. B. Russell compares the far left to ancient religions²⁴, finding most similarities with Islam: “Compared to other religions, Bolshevism is more like Mohammedanism than Christianity and Buddhism. The latter two are first of all personal religions, with mystical doctrines, which show the love of contemplation. Islam and Bolshevism have a practical, social, non-spiritual character, both concerned with the conquest and domination of this world”. The militant, revolutionary character and the immanence of the political religion of Communism were, in

²²*Ibidem*, p. 292.

²³J. M. Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion*, London, Macmillan Publishing House, 1929.

²⁴Bertrand Russell, *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1921, p. 114.

Russell's conception, the result of the moral, spiritual and material crisis, established on our continent after the first world conflagration: "The war has left Europe in a state of disillusionment and despair, which seems to be the birth of a new religion, capable of giving people the energy to live fully. Bolshevism offered the new religion. It promised glorious things: the end of injustice for both the poor and the rich, the end of economic slavery and war, the cohesion of social classes, the end of savage capitalism, which made people judge everything in terms of money, and a new world in which people can truly enjoy the results of their work."²⁵

Nazism was a mixture of racial theology, social Darwinism, neo-paganism, anti-Judaism, anti-Christianity. Researchers such as Richard Steigmann-Gall have dismissed National Socialism as a political religion, instead, describing Hitler's regime as religious policy based on the blasphemy of Judeo-Christianity. For political considerations or propaganda purposes, the Nazis avoided publicly denouncing the Christian religion in public. The Third Reich's elites desired to project an image of crusading knights to the German people and the rest of the world.²⁶

Social class/social group individual

A very important element for the stability of a pluralistic society is *social cohesion*. It is "a characteristic of a society based on connections and relationships between social units such as individuals, groups, associations, as well as between territorial units. Sociologist Emile Durkheim used the concept of social cohesion, considering it the future order of society, and defined it as an interdependence characterized by loyalty and solidarity among members of society."²⁷ The aspects often mentioned in the description of social cohesion are the strengthening of social relations, the

²⁵*Ibidem*, p.17.

²⁶Richard Steigmann-Gall, *Nazism and the Rebirth of Political Religion Theory*, in Constantin Iordachi (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 310-327. The conception and attitude of the Nazi regime towards Christianity is treated at length by the same author in his work *The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003.

²⁷Alina Magdalena Manole, *Coeziunea socială – o analiză post-criză* [Social cohesion - a post-crisis analysis], in „Theoretical and applied Economics”, vol. XIX, no. 11 (576), 2012, p. 112.

sharing of values and the existence of a common mode of interpretation, living a common identity and a sense of community, as well as trust between community members". Among the core aspects of social cohesion, there are also affiliation, participation, legitimacy, recognition, inclusion, identity, and axiological coherence.²⁸

The weakening of social cohesion, against the background of the multiple crises of democracy (political, economic, social, moral, spiritual) from the beginning of the twentieth century determined the emergence of totalitarianism. The society, seen as a contractual community, seemed to no longer function. Totalitarian movements used the *cohesive power* of the political myth, which replaced the open society, based on rationalism, with a *mutant, distorted* form, which used, above all, ideological mystification and manipulation. Non-pluralist political systems were based on the *society-community dichotomy*, specific to modernity. The societal space had emerged and developed through a social contract and the community (as a collective entity) was founded on socio-cultural factors (tradition, origin, identity) and, last but not least, on political myths. Left-wing totalitarianism has tended towards a particular type of cohesion, characterized by: the destruction or assimilation of social classes other than the proletariat, the class struggle, the almost total domination of a single layer of society (the "dictatorship of the proletariat"), the cessation or restriction of the mobility of human groups and communities, etc. Right-wing totalitarianism starts from a high level of cohesion, which is achieved through the collective entity known as the *national community*. It functioned on the model of castes (closed groups) and was a synthesis of the State, a single party, a leader, and the people.

Position

Ideology has often been seen as the representative model of a group occupying a strategic position in society. No definite result has been reached on the ideological status of an *inside group* (whose ideology legitimizes its dominance) or an *external group* (whose system of beliefs,

²⁸*Ibidem*, p. 113.

attitudes, and values is a protest against an exclusive or discriminatory hierarchy).

1. Dominant

The approach to ideology as a form of domination belongs to Marx and Engels. The ideas of the ruling class have become the dominant ideas of each era. Over time, ideological theorists have introduced a more general concept called *the structure of domination*.²⁹ Usually, social groups (including classes) develop their own ideologies within structures, characterized by conflict, competition, or domination. Thus, under specific conditions, elitist or dominant ideologies can be adopted by the entire population or by specific dominated groups using a variety of ideological control strategies:

- If they are capable of dividing non-dominant groups, to weaken their cohesion so that they can never manifest opposition, resistance, and dissent (for example totalitarian ideologies, racism, and sexism).

- Prevent and destroy the internal solidarity of non-dominant groups, as well as split the community through individual addressability to members.

- There should be no strong popular alternatives to elite ideologies; otherwise, they are almost unknown or marginalized. The media poorly promotes the anti-racist ideology or discourse. Elites with influence over the media limit or prevent access to public discourse to leaders of non-dominant groups (feminists, anti-racists, radicals) or prefer to discredit and marginalize them.

- Sometimes, elites adopt popular ideologies, but in their own way and according to the interests of the community to which they belong.

- Compared to the great ideologies of the dominant groups, the belief systems of the elites possess means of persuasion such as strategies for manipulating knowledge and opinions, access and control of the media, greater power of persuasion over dangers posed by competing ideologies,³⁰ etc.

²⁹John Gerring, *Ideology: a definitional analysis*, in „Political Research Quarterly”, Vol. 50, 1997, No. 4, pp. 970-971.

³⁰Teun A. Van Dijk, *Ideology...*, pp. 179-184.

2. Subordinate

Ideologies are related to forms of alienation or strong protest against the status quo in society when it comes to far-left and far-right movements. By their viral-metamorphic nature, totalitarian ideological systems fit into older ideologies, which they either destroy or *contaminate*, corrupt and transform into *entities*, which lose all resemblance to the original. For example, fascism, in contact with the *liberal democratic* model, destroys it, both economically (replacing it with corporatism and exacerbated statism) and politically ("disturbed" by the principle of freedom, individualism, or rights of man). Far-right ideology sought to replace the *individual human entity*, endowed with the *Kantian quality of the autonomy of reason*, with a *collective entity*, in which the human being loses its defining traits. The extreme right of the interwar period seized a multitude of elements belonging to conservatism (elitism, reactionary conservatism, paternalism, traditionalism), but radicalized them by applying *Nietzsche's principle of revaluation of all values*. For example, fascist paternalism manifests in the form of the deification of the Leader, who gains near-divine traits such as omnipotence, omniscience, infallibility, premonition, messianism, thaumaturgical qualities, etc. Far-right elites are often above and outside the law. They are at the apex of a caste-like hierarchy and report directly to the leader. If in Hindu society there are three Aryan castes (Brahma - priests, Kṣatria - warriors, Vaiśya - merchants and artisans), the majority of the population being made up of slaves (Sūdra), in fascist society the first two "castes" have cumulative functions (religious - ideological and military), the rest representing the mass of subjects and *believers* of the new political religion. The extreme right adopts reactionary conservatism, but it has no intention of restoring any '*Ancien Régime*' (*monarchical absolutism*), preferring instead to use *Caesarism* as the archetype of dictatorship. Returning to tradition is merely a symbolic pretext for returning to an idealized past, *a golden age*. At the same time, totalitarian ideology (political religion) has proclaimed itself the founder of an improved society of the future, in which common morality would turn into the Will to Power, and the human being would undergo a "new anthropogenesis", resulting in the mutation called *Übermensch*. In contact with fascist ideology, socialism loses its internationalist side, replaced by

organicist and xenophobic ultra-nationalism. The far right, however, holds on to the revolutionary concept and collectivist anarchism.

Hierarchy

Classical ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, benefit from a well-structured and developed internal hierarchical organization. Usually, the set of values contained in an ideology determines the appearance of concrete elements or positions and not the other way around. Thus, the hierarchical organization manifests from the general to the particular, respecting a certain logic of ideological taxonomy. The totalitarian right-wing ideology does not lack an internal hierarchy, but it is differently composed and structured. If in the traditional political currents and doctrines mentioned above the hierarchical organization firstly respects the axiological dimension, fascism modifies the fundamental values of political pluralism, by imposing an absolute *pseudo-truth* (resulting from the interminable repeating the same lie or promise of a perfect world, which will never appear in reality or will remain the product of the symbolic imagination). The far-right ideology has a fairly low cognitive-rational side; it is characterized, above all, by an organized and hierarchical belief system in the form of a political religion of the immanent. Irrational, subconscious, atavistic aspects of the individual psyche, but primarily of the collective psyche, are highlighted. Reason is suppressed, both conceptually and practically, or replaced by a different "logic" aimed solely at promoting the totalitarian goal. Fundamental concepts of democracy such as *The Public Good* and *the General Will* are transformed, in contact with the *totalitarian ideological virus*, into a "*good*", which only benefits a small elite and which becomes an *absolute evil* for *the others* (suspects, enemies, 'scapegoats'). *The general Will* theorized by the Enlightenment disappears, due to the cancelling of the social contract principle, and is replaced by the *quasi/pseudo-divine* will of the Leader, always above common law, justice, and morality (*Führerprinzip*). That's why I can conclude that the totalitarian right-wing ideology is based on a closed *caste-type* hierarchy, in which

the elements that make up the levels of the hierarchical ladder communicate, interact very little, or interact only at the order of the supreme leader at the head of the power pyramid.

CONCLUSIONS

Totalitarian ideology manifests as a belief system that comprises a specific type of religiosity on a socio-cognitive level (secularized, immanentized). Even if they empty, pervert or *aestheticize* democratic political language - transforming it into a demagogic-populist discourse - fascism, Nazism or fascist variants from other countries have been able to preserve and develop the implementation, expression, and ideological reproduction capacity. Far-right ideology takes on a *hermetic quality* by adopting a specific pattern of thought, whether it is illogical, nihilistic, antagonistic, vitalist, taboo, etc. Many, including its leaders and doctrinaires, have labelled it a *philosophy of action*. Therefore, *right-wing extremism* seems more intelligible through the behaviour of its followers than through their ideas or thinking. Thus, the *fascist behavioural sphere* includes traits such as force, violence, visceral feelings, mobilizing passions, sadistic and masochistic tendencies, paranoia, persecution mania, enemy obsession (real or imaginary), aggression, repressed anxiety, extreme hostility, impulsivity, etc.

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IN SEARCH OF UKRAINIAN-POLISH UNDERSTANDING AT THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR II

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Abstract: *The authors have chosen for their study a problem that almost no one has raised for many decades, but which is present in one form or another when it comes to the state of current Ukrainian-Polish relations. The motive that encouraged the authors to prepare this paper was the discovery in Polish foreign and domestic archives of documents that shed light on the search for possible ways to cooperate between the two nations to liberate from occupation and restore their statehood.*

Indeed, the Ukrainian-Polish negotiations in the Romanian capital of Bucharest in January 1940 gave a kind of impetus to the resumption of contacts in this matter between the Ukrainian State Center in Exile and the Polish Emigrant Government. The documents found as well as other materials adjacent to these issues allowed the authors to recreate the history of continuing attempts to resume the Ukrainian-Polish dialogue on liberation from occupation, rebuilding the statehood of the two countries and establishing cooperation after World War II.

Keywords: *World War II, Ukraine, II Rzeczpospolita, Romania, Bucharest, Ukrainian State Center, Polish Emigrant Government, Ukrainian-Polish relations.*

Rezumat: *În căutarea înțelegerii ucraineano-poloneze la începutul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Pentru studiul lor, autorii au ales o problemă prezentă, într-o formă sau alta, când vine vorba de actualele relații ucrainene-poloneze, dar aproape deloc discutată timp de mai multe decenii. Motivul care i-a încurajat pe autori să pregătească această lucrare a fost descoperirea în arhivele străine și interne poloneze a documentelor care aduc la lumină posibilele modalități de cooperare între cele două națiuni dornice să se elibereze de sub ocupație străină și să-și restabilească statalitatea.*

Într-adevăr, negocierile ucraineano-poloneze din capitala României, București, din ianuarie 1940 au dat un anumit impuls reluării contactelor în această chestiune, între Centrul de stat ucrainean în exil și guvernul emigranților polonezi. Documentele găsite,

precum și alte materiale adiacente acestei probleme au permis autorilor să recreeze istoria încercărilor continue de reluare a dialogului ucrainean-polonez privind eliberarea de sub ocupație străină, reconstruirea statalității celor două țări și stabilirea cooperării după al Doilea Război Mondial.

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the USSR and what was called “the world system of socialism” led to significant changes in the modern world order. Among the innumerable manifestations of this process, beyond any doubt for Ukrainians and Poles stands primarily a problem of relations between Ukraine and Poland - both at the international and especially at the human level. In the current circumstances, the importance of the need for mutual understanding in all spheres of life is determined by the conclusions of Polish academics of the XIX century that both states need each other. It has happened that today's Poland is far ahead of Ukraine in domestic development, as well as in the international arena.

However, Poles and Ukrainians in the past, unfortunately, have gone through great trials not so much because of the attitude of their neighbours, but primarily because of misunderstandings between them. Over time, conflict and generated negative stereotypes that are superimposed, grew to the twentieth century to reach its peak and cause in both nations' large losses in mutual counteracting that prevents even now from establishing proper human relations, although the interstate after Ukraine gained independence, before Poland's withdrawal from Soviet control, developed satisfactorily.

After the end of the Great War, several independent states appeared on the political map of Central and Eastern Europe as a result of the collapse of the Habsburg and Romanov empires. Among them are Ukraine and Poland. Each of them overcame considerable difficulties in establishing their statehood, establishing relations with neighbours.

For more than a century, the problem of why Ukraine did not establish itself as a sovereign, independent state among its neighbours has been debated. Poland regained its statehood. In addition to purely Polish ethnic areas, it included territories with a mixed Ukrainian-Polish population or those with an absolute majority of the population of which were Ukrainians.¹

¹ Volodymyr Holovchenko, *Poza mezhamy mozhlyvoho: dyplomatiya UNR u borot'bi za nezalezhnu natsional'nu derzhavu* [Beyond the Possible: UPR diplomacy in the struggle

Since ethnic Ukrainian-Polish borderlands were claimed by both countries, this could not affect the deepening contradictions between them. Moreover, in the process of post-war state formation, two Ukrainian states emerged - the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), with its capital in Kyiv, and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR), in territories previously part of Austria-Hungary, but mostly populated with Ukrainians. Due to the proclamation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, an armed conflict arose between it and the revived Polish state, and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic lost. Even during the conflict, it was called in Poland "The Battle for Lviv", there was a unification of UPR and ZUNR in a single unified state. However, it was more declarative. The act of unification of the two Ukrainian states also did not contribute to the normalization of Ukrainian-Polish relations.²

As for the UPR, Poland recognized it, but only in areas for which it did not claim. In other words, it was about Galicia and the western part of Volyn, as well as Kholmshchyna and Podlasie, which the UPR considered its territories.³ The government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, led by Simon Petliura, faced a difficult choice. In this extremely difficult situation, the latter took the only right step, agreeing on April 21, 1920, in Warsaw, which is still popularly called the Petliura-Pilsudski Agreement.⁴

After the overthrow of the UPR by the Bolsheviks, their authority was established on the territory of Ukraine, which before the fall of the Romanov monarchy belonged to Russia, completely controlled by Russia, now Bolshevik state. The Soviet Ukrainian government, together with the Russian government, signed a peace treaty with Poland on March 18, 1921, on the same territorial basis as the Petliura-Pidsudsky Agreement. However, this did not prevent Soviet

for an independent nation-state] in *Ukrayina dyplomatychna. Naukovyy shchorichnyk* [Ukraine is diplomatic. Scientific Yearbook], Kyiv, 2017, p. 63-80.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*; Stepan Vidnyans'kyy, *Varshavs'kyy dohovir 1920 roku v otsyntsi suchasnoyi ukrayins'koy istoriografii* [The Warsaw Treaty of 1920 in the assessment of modern Ukrainian historiography], in *Ukrayina dyplomatychna. Naukovyy shchorichnyk* [Ukraine is diplomatic. Scientific Yearbook], Kyiv, 2017, p. 95-96; Yuriy Makar, *Ukrayins'kiy dyplomatiyi 100 rokiv* [Ukrainian diplomacy is 100 years old], in *Istoryko-politychni problemy suchasnoho svitu. Zbirnyk naukovykh prats'* [Historical and political problems of the modern world. Collection of scientific works], t. 35-36, Chernivtsi, 2017, p. 84-86.

propaganda from claiming that Petliura had sold Western Ukraine to Poland. The lands of Ukraine, which became part of the established USSR (and this was the vast majority of its territory) have ceased to play any independent role, and not only in interstate relations.⁵

Throughout the interwar of the 20th century, the Polish authorities tried to subdue the Ukrainians who found themselves within its borders and interned the remnants of the UPR Army who came to its territory.

The beginning of the World War II showed to both Ukrainians and Poles that to defend their state interests, it is necessary to look for ways to get closer, and not to adhere to what distinguishes them. It so happened that the Polish government in September 1939 emigrated to Romania. Here it remained until the famous events of the following year. And Bucharest became the centre of concentration of Ukrainian and Polish political emigration, which was facilitated by the presence of the Ukrainian and Polish communities of this state in Romania from the times before the Great War.

After the actual division of Poland between Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR, the Polish government, already being in exile, drew attention to the representation of Ukrainian State centre in exile, representing ousted UPR internationally, though had opportunities and adequate support for this.⁶

Nevertheless, the Polish émigré government set out to restore contacts with the UPR's foreign missions. As for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as Ukraine became known as part of the USSR, which II Rzeczpospolita interpreted as to its enemy⁷, it could not play any role in establishing Ukrainian-Polish relations.

AIMS OF THE STUDY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PROBLEM

In general, much has been written about Ukrainian-Polish relations in the interwar period, as well as during World War II. But in Soviet authors' papers dominated mostly ideological patterns, where were repeated myths about the

⁵ Yuriy Makar, *op. cit.*, p. 86-87.

⁶ Andrzej Wawryniuk, Yuriy Makar, *Malovidomi sproby pol's'ko-ukrayins'koho politychnoho porozuminnia na pochatku Druhoyi svitovoyi viyny* [The little known attempts at Polish-Ukrainian political understanding at the beginning of World War II], in "Zovnishni spravy", 2016, №7, p. 18-24.

⁷ Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Anatolij W. Torkunow (red.), *Białe plamy - czarne plamy. Sprawy trudne w relacjach polsko-rosyjskich (1918-2008)* [White spots - black spots. Difficult matters in Polish-Russian relations (1918-2008)], Warszawa, 2010, s. 99.

happy life of the Ukrainians in brotherly union with the other nations as the part of the USSR. At the same time, in the papers of the authors of that time condemned the behaviour of the authorities of neighbouring states, where local Ukrainians were persecuted. But beyond any, that focus remains the question of activity Ukrainian political leaders in exile.

And life pushed out from Ukraine a large number of Ukrainian politicians, scientists, cultural figures, etc., who first settled mostly in Europe, and later moved to North America. At that time, there were many Ukrainians in the United States and Canada, including those born there. They even raised the issue of Ukrainian statehood at the interstate level. For example, we can mention the member of the Canadian Parliament Michael Luchkowich, who brought the Ukrainian issue to the parliamentary debate. Back in 1931, he acquainted parliamentarians with the situation of Ukrainians in the USSR, Poland, and the activities of Ukrainian state branches in Europe⁸. M. Luchkowich was not the only representative of the Ukrainian diaspora in North America who demanded a positive solution to the Ukrainian issue in Europe. He was supported by other politicians in Canada and the United States. Newspapers in Ukraine, *Ukrainskyi Holos* (Ukrainian Voice), published since 1910, and *Svoboda* (Liberty) in the United States, published since 1893, expressed their support for the independence efforts of UPR and ZUNR politicians in exile.⁹

Since the state-independence movement in sub-Soviet Ukraine was brutally suppressed, in the interwar period it could only develop outside its borders, including in Poland, which, however, recognized only the UPR, as the authors mentioned above. Thus, we could talk about its recognition of Ukrainian statehood in the territory of Soviet Ukraine. The problems of Ukrainians living in the eastern districts of Poland were to be resolved by the authorities of that state by their domestic law and following the international obligations assumed after receiving the 1923 mandate from the League of Nations.¹⁰

Much has been written about how the commitments made by the authorities of the Second Rzeczpospolita to Ukrainians within its borders have been fulfilled - mostly negatively by the Ukrainian side, in particular in the mentioned magazines in the West. As for Poland, it can be said without a doubt

⁸ *A Ukrainian Canadian in Parliament: Memories of Michael Luchkowich*, Toronto, 1965. Appendix B., pp. 71, 81-95, 101-103, 104-105.

⁹ *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Volume V, Toronto, Buffalo, London, 1993, pp. 479, 128.

¹⁰ Andrzej Tadeusz Olszański, *Historia Ukrainy XX w.*, Warszawa, 1992, s. 123-158.

that within its policy the interpretation of the Ukrainian problem was ambiguous. Even high-level politicians considered it appropriate to pursue a unifying policy towards Ukrainian citizens. It seems appropriate to refer to the memoirs of the Polish diplomat and scientist, Count Jan Stanisław Łoś, republished in Ukrainian in 2018.¹¹ Memoirs were written and printed in parts of the interwar period.¹² Later, the authors systematized them into three sections - his reflections on the Ukrainian cause in Poland, his correspondence in this case with Polish and Ukrainian figures and his maxims on establishing satisfactory relations with Ukrainians - citizens of Poland. The leading opinion of the author of the memoirs is a satisfactory attitude towards Ukrainians and establishing contacts with Ukrainian exile structures, including in Poland, which, in his opinion, should not only strengthen its domestic position but also significantly strengthen its position in the international arena due to the behaviour of the then neighbours from the west and the East - Germany and the USSR.¹³

The Ukrainian problem constantly bothered Polish politicians during World War II. It was discussed by members of the Anti-Hitler Coalition at the highest level and ended with the so-called population exchange, which, in our opinion, not only did not resolve it, but to some extent complicated the resettlement of Ukrainians and Poles, and ultimately the establishment of post-war borders. Accordingly, this was talked about after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Scientists on both sides of the border have set out to find ways to overcome long-standing negative stereotypes in interpersonal relationships against the background of the fact that interstate is developing satisfactorily.

With the collapse of the USSR, the situation changed significantly. Ukrainian and Polish scientists during several recent decades put a lot of effort, to find some common tangent, a contribution that would eliminate the negatives of the past in mutual relations. We can, for example, refer to the materials of Ukrainian-Polish scientific seminars in both countries in 1994-2001, with the general title *Ukraine-*

¹¹ Jan Stanisław Łoś, *Ukrayins'ka sprava u spohadakh, lystuvanni y publitsystytsi. Vybrani tvory*. uporyadk. Maciej Marszał i Sylwia Wójtowicz; pislyamova Marek Łoś. Pereklad z pol's'koyi V. Sahan, nauk. red. S. Troyan, A. Kyrydon, Kyiv, 2018, 340 p.; Polish edition: Stanisław Łoś, *Sprawa ukraińska we wspomnieniach, korespondencji i publicystyce*. Wybór pism Stanisław Łoś; wyboru i redakcji naukowej dokonali, wstępem i przypisami opatrzyli Maciej Marszał i Sylwia Wójtowicz; posłowie Marek Łoś, Kraków, 2012, XXI, 410 s.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 19-30 (Ukrainian edition).

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 180-316.

Poland: difficult questions (published). The aim of this research was the relations of Ukrainians with Poles in 1918-1948. Among the topics that were discussed, there was a place and to the search of the issue of mutual understanding during the interwar period, especially during World War II.

In seminars materials' might be met the links to the conversations from the beginning of the war between the representatives of the Polish and Ukrainian public about combining efforts in the liberation struggle. It is, for example, the talks on this subject in April, and then in June-July 1940 between the representatives of the Polish Union of Związek Walki Zbrojnej (ZWZ) Władysława Piechowska and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky.¹⁴ In May of the same year, Lieutenant Colonel Stanisław Pstrokoński arrived in Lviv on behalf of the ZWZ leadership to establish "careful contacts" with Ukrainian national liberation organizations.¹⁵ On August 29 of that year, Polish General Stefan Rowecki, who headed the ZWZ, ordered his subordinates to reach an understanding with Ukrainians and Belarusians "not so much in the area of former Polish statehood, but as opportunities for fraternal defeat before a common enemy."¹⁶

The following year, on July 10, a representative of the Polish underground in Lviv met with a member of the government liquidated by the German occupation authorities, Yaroslav Stetsko, and lawyer Volodymyr Horbov, to discuss the principles of uniting liberation efforts.¹⁷ In October 1941, representatives of the Polish underground met in Warsaw with a member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Borys Levytsky, during which they discussed the possibility and principles of joint resistance to the occupiers.¹⁸ Just

¹⁴ *Polska – Ukraina: trudna odpowiedź. Dokumentacja spotkań historyków (1994-2001). Kronika wydarzeń na Wołyniu i w Galicji Wschodniej (1939-1945)* [Poland – Ukraine: Difficult Answer. Documentation of historians' meetings (1994-2001). Chronicle of events in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia (1939-1945)], Warszawa, Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, 2003, s. 71.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 71-72.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 72; Halina Czarnocka, Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki, Józef Garliński i in. (Eds.), *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach, 1939-1945* [Armia Krajowa in Documents, 1939-1945], t. 1, Londyn, Gryf Printers Ltd., 1970, s. 298-299.

¹⁷ *Polska – Ukraina: trudna odpowiedź*, s. 79; Halina Czarnocka, Józef Garliński, Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki i in. (Eds.), *Armia krajowa w dokumentach, 1939-1945*, t. 2, Londyn, Gryf Printers Ltd., 1973, s. 143-144.

¹⁸ Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie (hereinafter – AAN), *Ukraińskie organizacje polityczne i wojskowe w czasie wojny* [Ukrainian political and military organizations during the war], sygnatura 202 / III - 134, ark. 273.

a month in Lviv rep for the Polish Information and Press Bureau (Informacji i Presy) discussed the same issues with Professor Vladimir Kubyiovych, the Head of the Ukrainian Central Committee.¹⁹

Similar examples can be given from almost all years of the war and after it. Unfortunately, the problem of the reconciliation of Poles with Ukrainians at the interpersonal level is still waiting to be solved. Nowadays, it is constantly present both in scientific research and in political interstate relations. However, it is not thoroughly investigated as it should be. As for bilateral contacts during the war regarding the combined efforts to liberate themselves from occupation, there is no attempt to systematically investigate this issue. It is present but not adequately covered. Both sides mostly focus on mutual accusations - who did more harm and to whom.

However, in addition to the above-mentioned long-term scientific seminar, over the past three decades, scientists on both sides of the border have published many papers in search of mutual interpersonal reconciliation that benefits both peoples. Among the recent publications on this topic should be noted the collective work of Ukrainian and Polish scientists from the Taras Shevchenko University of Kyiv and Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, edited by Walentyn Baluk and Mykola Doroszhko.²⁰ Although it concerns Ukrainian-Polish relations in the present, it nevertheless contains excursions into the past, including events during the twentieth century. In our opinion, documentary research on the signing of the Treaty between the governments of the revived Poland and the Ukrainian People's Republic in April 1920 is of great mutual benefit in defending one's statehood through joint efforts. We mean the publications of 2010 and 2020. The first of them contains studies by Polish and Ukrainian authors with the involvement of many documents. The materials cover the entire last century²¹. The second was issued before the 100th anniversary of the said Agreement and contains Polish and Ukrainian documents with

¹⁹ AAN, *Zespół akt Armii Krajowej. Komenda obszaru Lwów. Sprawozdanie z grudnia 1941 r. o rozmowach z prof. Kubijowiczem* [Collection of files of the Armia Krajowa. Lviv area command. Report from December 1941 on talks with prof. Kubijowicz], sygn. 203/ XV – 3.

²⁰ Valentyn Balyuk, Mykola Doroshko (Eds.), *Ukrayins'ko-pol's'ki vidnosyny v umovakh hibrydnykh zahroz bezpetsi / Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w warunkach hybrydowych zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa* [Ukrainian-Polish relations in the conditions of hybrid security threats], Kyiv-Lublin, 2019, 280 p.

²¹ Tadeusz Krząstek (Ed.), *Pol'shcha ta Ukrayina v borot'bi za nezalezhnist' 1918-1920* [Poland and Ukraine in the struggle for independence 1918-1920], Warszawa, Vipart, 2010, 524 p.

appropriate interpretations.²² Both publications are not limited to the events of that time. The documents published in them give the key to understanding the relations between the two peoples in fact to this day.

It can also be stated that only during the last decade on the Ukrainian²³ and Polish²⁴ sides, scientists are making new attempts to eliminate outdated stereotypes in relations between the two peoples and their ability to interact both for domestic development and for cooperation in the international arena.

The authors of the proposed paper set themselves the goal in finding the origins of attempts to establish cooperation between the Polish authorities in exile and representatives of the Ukrainian national liberation movement at the beginning of World War II. Before that, their motivation was to obtain materials from Polish archives in London, New York and Warsaw.²⁵

Following in the footsteps of us, in collaboration with the Polish scientist

²² Jan Pisuliński, Witalij Skalski, *Sojusz Piłsudski – Petlura. Dokumenty i materiały*, Warszawa, Studium Europy Wschodniej Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2020, 420 s.

²³ Yuriy Makar, Mykhaylo Hornyy, Vitaliy Makar, Anatoliy Salyuk, *Vid deportatsiyi do deportatsiyi. Suspil'no-politychne zhyttya kholms'ko-pidlyas'kykh ukrayintsiv (1915-1945): doslidzhennya, spohady, dokumenty* [From deportation to deportation. Socio-political life of Kholm-Podlasie Ukrainians (1915-1945): research, memoirs, documents], T. 1, Chernivtsi, 2010, 880 s.; Ruslana Davydyuk, *Ukrayins'ka politychna emihratsiya v Pol'shchi: sklad, struktura, hromads'ko-politychni praktyky na terytoriyi Volyns'koho voyevodstva* [Ukrainian political emigration in Poland: composition, structure, socio-political practices in the territory of Volyn Voivodeship], L'viv-Rivne, 2016, 704 s.; Volodymyr Komar, *Kontseptsiya prometeyizmu v politytsi Pol'shchi (1921-1939 rr.): natsional'no-kul'turne ta relihiyne zhyttya* [The concept of Prometheism in Polish politics (1921-1939): national, cultural and religious life], Luts'k, 2015, 404 s., etc.

²⁴ Marek Korwat, Wojciech Materski, *Między pokojem a wojna. Szkice o dyplomacji polskiej s lat 1918-1945* [Between peace and war. Sketches on Polish diplomacy, 1918-1945], Warszawa, 2015, 163 s.; J. Marszałek, J. Kowa, Z. Karpus, *Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie: historia i pamięć* [Polish-Ukrainian relations: history and memory], Toruń, 2008, 304 s.; Barbara Stoczewska, *Ukraina i Ukraińcy w polskiej myśli politycznej. Od końca XIX wieku do wybuchu II wojny światowej* [Ukraine and Ukrainians in Polish political thought. From the end of the 19th century until the outbreak of World War II], Kraków, 2013, 392 s.; Tomasz Stryjek, *Ukraińska idea narodowa okresu międzywojennego* [Ukrainian national idea of the interwar period], Toruń, 2013, 461 s.

²⁵ The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, *Council of Ministers (Cabinet Office)*, sygnatura 15a.; Józef Piłsudski Institute of America, sygnatura 701/9/2; AAN, *Ministerstwo spraw zagranicznych*, sygnatura 607.

Andrzej Wawryniuk, small research was published on this subject in Ukraine.²⁶

BUCHAREST: THE FIRST POLITICAL CONTACTS IN EXILE

The behaviour of the Soviet Union at the beginning of World War II clearly showed that it was not going to abide by previously concluded agreements with neighbouring states, including Poland, which was 1939 divided in September with Hitler's Germany, which, in turn, prompted the Polish emigrant government should pay attention to the exile centres of the overthrown UPR and talk to them about joint efforts to liberate themselves from occupation.

It so happened that at the very beginning of the World War II, the capital of Romania became the place of the first Ukrainian-Polish contacts between the two enslaved peoples at that time to possibly coordinate efforts for the future restoration of their independence.

According to the documents found, attempts of political dialogue between Polish and Ukrainian emigrants in the West began after the outbreak of World War II. The first signal of this dialogue could be considered the information transmitted to the Polish Foreign Ministry by the Polish Embassy in Romania in a letter dated on January 13, 1940. It said that a Polish-Ukrainian meeting was held in Bucharest on January 10-11 of that year, which was attended by well-known Ukrainian public and political figures from Bukovina and Bessarabia, at various times members of the Romanian Parliament, Volodymyr Zalizetsky, Ilko Gavrilyuk, Denis Mayer-Mykhalsky (a lawyer in Bucharest), Yuriy Serbinyuk, by the way, a native of Sadhora (now part of Chernivtsi), as well as representatives of the former UPR mission in Romania Vasyl Trepke, Dmytro Herodot (pseudonym of Dmytro Ivashin) and Colonel Hnat Porokhivskyy. Unfortunately, the authors were unable to find out who specifically participated in the negotiations on the Polish side. But, without a doubt, they were employees of the Polish embassy in Romania and, it is possible, politicians who arrived there together with the evacuated state structures from Poland. According to the authors of the information, "during the political discussion, strong tendencies of Ukrainians to impose close cooperation in Romania (with the Polish side – Ed.), as well as in the international arena, also not to raise irritating moments, were suddenly revealed. There is a noticeable advantage not only against Soviet but also against German accents". It is important to note that, as stated in the document,

²⁶ Andrzej Wawryniuk, Yuriy Makar, *op. cit.*, p. 18-24.

“several common fundamental political theses have been approved”. Of course, both the meeting and the committee set up at it were secret.²⁷

In another document, the Embassy of the Rzeczpospolita in Bucharest wrote about the mentioned meeting: “The initiative of this conference found the most favourable responses from both the representatives of the Ukrainian minority and the local Petliura branch.²⁸ As arises from the discussion, it is a collective invitation (representatives of local Ukrainian immigrants from Dnieper - Ed.) was perceived by Ukrainians as a gesture for unification.”²⁹

Interesting for modern researchers is the description of individual Ukrainian figures who took part in the meeting, given to them by the Embassy of the Rzeczpospolita. In particular, Vladimir Zalozetskyi and Yuri Serbyniuk, editor of *The New Council* in Chernivtsi, were described as the most energetic figures in Bukovina, and at the same time – of the *Ukrainian National Party*, which was equivalent to Galician *Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance*. Besides, Volodymyr Zalozetsky, a former member of the Vienna parliament and several convocations of the Romanian one, was described as “the greatest authority among Bukovinian Ukrainians, while Yuri Serbinyuk (who was recognized by Polish diplomats – Ed.) was the most active propagandist of Bukovinian Ukrainians.”³⁰

The letter from the Polish embassy also contained positive comments about other Ukrainian participants in the meeting. In particular, Ilko Gavrilyuk, a deputy of the former Russian Constituent Assembly (1917), was described as a prominent authority in the Ukrainian environment of Bessarabia. Three other representatives of the Ukrainian side were represented as the members of the Ukrainian emigration: Vasyl Trepke, a former Ukrainian military attaché during the Directory, was appointed head of the *Ukrainian mission*, and Dmytro Herodot was appointed the Head of the *Ukrainian agency in the Balkans*. It is written about Colonel Porokhivskyy that he was the founder of the *Union of Former Military Personnel*.

The Polish Embassy in Bucharest also provided information on the issues raised at the meeting. Among them was “the problem of Polish and Ukrainian minority in Romania, as well as the media cooperation, especially within Romania

²⁷ The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, *Council of Ministers (Cabinet Office)*, sygnatura 15a, ark. 1, 2, 4.

²⁸ The Polish side described the representatives of the State Center of the Ukrainian People's Republic in terms of “the Petliura center”, “a group of Petliurians”, and “the Petliurists”.

²⁹ The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, *Council of Ministers (Cabinet Office)*, sygnatura 15a, ark 3.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

and, if possible, elsewhere among immigrants (obviously Polish and Ukrainian - Ed.)". The quoted document contains an important, in our opinion, mention of the fact that during the meeting the Ukrainians "emphasized the need for appropriate cooperation under the slogan of protecting the statehood of each party."³¹ Among the most important conclusions of the meeting was the statement that "the existence of an independent Ukraine is impossible without a strong Poland, in turn, without an independent Ukraine, Poland will be in constant danger of German-Soviet understanding (to the detriment of the latter - Ed.)". The document also contains an important note that deserves to be quoted: "Mr. Trepke, bypassing the issue of Polish-Ukrainian borders, has noted that the cementing factor of Poland and Ukraine (obviously, relations between them - Ed.) will be not only their common interests but also a sincere understanding that would guarantee the ethnic interests of the Polish people living on Ukrainian territory and all (the people - Ed.) Ukrainian, who will be in the territory of Rzeczpospolita."³² Regarding the territorial borders of the future, Ukraine representative of the Polish Embassy in Romania Łączkowski stated that "Poland is not a country of unlimited pressure to the east, but Ukraine should not think of over-expansion to the west". The Polish diplomat also added that "not Lviv, nor Przemyśl, only Kyiv and the Donetsk basin are the centres of Ukraine."³³

It is not difficult to imagine that the initiative of the Polish embassy was not implemented, as Romania joined Hitler's coalition on November 23, 1940, and the Polish embassy in Bucharest ceased to function in September of that year. Polish interests in Romania was represented by Jerzy Giedroyc as head of the Polish section at the Embassy of Chile.³⁴

From the correspondence of the representatives of the Polish émigré government at that time, it is quite clear that the Ukrainian question was not indifferent to them. Thus, an influential worker Polish émigré Foreign Affairs Zdzisław Miłoszewski, a former officer of the Polish secret services, but after the

³¹ Archiwum i Muzeum im. Generała Sikorskiego w Londynie (AiMSL), *Prezydium Rady Ministrów* (PRM), sygn. 15a, ark. 5, 6.

³² *Ibid.*, ark. 7-9.

³³ *Ibid.* k 10.

³⁴ He is a well-known and extremely popular Polish public and political figure who has been advocating Polish-Ukrainian unification since the interwar period. He continued to do so in exile during and after the war, editing the monthly journal "Kultura" in France (Див.: *Entsyklopediya Ukrayinoznavstva. Slovnykova chastyna* [Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies. Vocabulary part], т. 2; Paris-New York, 1955-1957, p. 475).

war co-organizer of the Federal Central European club in Palestine in a letter dated on May 20, 1940, to Adam Tarnavsky, head of a department of the Foreign Affairs, anticipating developments in Romania recommended to send back employees who could perform secret assignments, lets names them - projects of prometeism³⁵, "pushing the peoples enslaved by Soviet Russia to fight against it"³⁶. In particular, he recommended entrusting the function to Jerzy Giedroyc, who was already there, and as his assistants were advised to be appointed a professional scout Piotr Kurnicki. This is stated in the letter: "Jerzy Giedroyc as a secret commissioner for Prometheus' work in Romania. The assistant is Peter Kurnicki, especially in Ukrainian affairs, but also in general because ... Mr. Kurnicki has wide contacts among leading Prometheus figures. I understand that Mr. Giedroyc also covers Hungary with his competence, where a special commissioner should not be appointed. Giedroyc's task will be to create the necessary network for himself. We have people who are accordingly."³⁷

POLISH VISION OF THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Information and Documentation of the Republic of Poland prepared a document that is defined as "Coverage of current Ukrainian problems". It was addressed to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and was classified as a top-secret. What was the document about that should have been "locked up"? The fact is that at that time Polish politicians in exile realized that Ukrainian independence organizations were convinced that the German occupation authorities did not intend to help them create an independent Ukrainian state, but only tried to use them in their far-reaching plans to conquer Europe, or even more. But, for obvious reasons, Polish politicians did not want the Ukrainian issue to be resolved without their participation. That is why the letter draws attention to the fact that "the French make it easier for Ukrainians to access and contact with the American press". Moreover, the letter states, "that the Ukrainian nationalist camp has refused, partly sincerely and partly insincerely, from a common platform with Germany, is trying by all means to ensure that its representatives become informants and men of trust of French government

³⁵ Andrzej Wawryniuk, Yuriy Makar, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

³⁶ Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego w Nowym Jorku (IJPJN), *Rzqd na emigracji* (RPE), sygnatura 701/9/2, ark. 59.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

circles, and even more English, and the British have their support through semi-official assistance from the Canadian Dominion.”³⁸ According to the authors of the document, in the current situation, the most important task of Polish politics was not the Ukrainian program and the proclaimed Ukrainian independence slogans, but they need to “force the French and British with all our official and unofficial political steps to implement all their plans through us via Ukrainian Committee of Prokopovych and Shulgin, but not with other Ukrainian groups.”³⁹

What is written in the letter explains the principled position of the Polish side regarding the territory of future independent Ukraine, as it was seen by the authorities of this country in exile.

The documents we have studied show that the Polish émigré government, realizing the need for good contacts with the Ukrainian environment in Europe, even worked out a special budget to support the Ukrainian exile government, including funds for the publication of the weekly *Trident*, what followed the end of the publishing of *The Ukrainian word* in Paris.⁴⁰

Another aspect of Volodymyr Solovyi's activity sheds some light on the raised issue. According to the Polish materials found, on October 24, 1940, the Ukrainian embassy in Lisbon was approached by a “Ukrainian figure from the Petliurist group”, in fact, Volodymyr Solovyi. It is known that he came from the Eastern Lemko region, ran in 1930 for the Sejm of the Republic of Poland from the Sanitsky district. At the beginning of the war, he went to Paris and from there to London. Had the powers from the Prime minister of UNR in exile Alexander Shulhyn “to defend among Western allies the Ukrainian interests.”⁴¹

In connection with his appeal Polish Ambassador in Portugal Karol Dubicz - Penther, in turn, appealed to their government to explain himself how to behave in this situation. “Englishmen denied him (Soloviy - Ed.) on a visa to enter England without the permission of London and sent a letter to the Home Office. Since I do not know the current political posture of Mr. Shulhyn and Smal-Stotskyj (Roman - Ed.) and other gentlemen of the group⁴², I ask the Minister to instruct me to send instructions on whether and to what extent to provide him with the assistance of

³⁸ AiMSL, PRM, sygn. 15a, ark. 17.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, ark. 19, 20.

⁴⁰ AiMSL, sygn. 36, ark. 31.

⁴¹ *Entsyklopediya Ukrayinoznnavstva. Slovnnykova chastyna*, T. 8, Paris, 1976, p. 2946-2947.

⁴² The ambassador meant the State Center of the Ukrainian People's Republic, headed by Vyacheslav Prokopovich and Alexander Shulgin.

1000 escudos and I do not know whether to finance his further stay.”⁴³

The Foreign Minister of the Emigrant Government, August Zalewski, in response to the ambassadors to Portugal, asked him “not to allow Soloviy to come here (to London - Ed.)” so that he would not know that the opposition to leaving stemmed from us.”⁴⁴ Another letter, already signed by the Minister of the Interior of the Emigrant Government, Stanislaw Kot, to the Embassy in Brno, sheds light on his attitude to the State Center of the Ukrainian People's Republic in Exile and its figures. In particular, Kot wrote to Ambassador that the arrival of Soloviy to London as a representative of the UPR DC “irrelevant”, while “we should help financially to friendly Ukrainians, especially Prokopovych and Shulgin.”⁴⁵

We also have information that Polish diplomats in the West supported the efforts of Ukrainian exiles to create an armed force in the West. It is said, in particular, in a letter to the Polish Embassy in Stockholm and its Foreign Ministry on the actual negotiations with Alexander Shulgin on with the creation of the Ukrainian Legion from imprisoned Ukrainians.⁴⁶

UKRAINIAN PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATION

Continuing the story of the attempts to establish Polish-Ukrainian contacts at the initial stage of the war, it is worth to mention another document developed by the Polish Emigrant Ministry of the Interior, about which the Minister of Foreign Affairs was informed. The document is dated on April 4, 1941. It says that one of the leaders of the UNR in exile DC Vyacheslav Prokopovych, who was named in the document as the President, wrote on January 29 of that year to Stanisław Kot a letter with a proposal to collaborate. The letter, if implemented could help to work together for the benefit of both parties. Accordingly, the document deserves to be discussed in more detail. Thus, Prokopovych wrote that “he is deeply convinced that, despite the fluidity of war and unfavourable political situation, our common (Ukrainian-Polish - Ed.) efforts should protect the vital interests of our peoples, a stable order and lasting peace in the east of Europe”. In his view, the decisive prerequisite for this would be a “fundamental adjustment of solutions between our people for ethnographic grounds and agreement between

⁴³ AAN, *Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych (MSZ)*, sygn. 607, ark. 365, 366.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 391.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, ark. 885.

⁴⁶ AiMSL, PRM, sygn. 15a, ark. 13.

the two countries in the economic and military spheres. A clear statement from your side would be very desirable. Sincere understanding and its terms, forms of cooperation now and its possible areas could be agreed in further negotiations.”⁴⁷

Vyacheslav Prokopovych then, addressing the Polish government-in-exile, wrote that if they agreed to the preconditions for cooperation set out by him, he, for his part, would be ready for precise talks with any neutral country or place of stay of the Polish government “on the condition that:

- 1) Necessary formalities will be agreed;
- 2) Necessary employees will be present with me;
- 3) I will be guaranteed proper financial opportunities.”⁴⁸

According to the Ukrainian statesman, with the consent of the Polish side, these issues could be agreed with the representatives of the Polish government-in-exile at his place of residence. “The Brotherhood of Arms in 1920, the bloodshed against Moscow together, the experience of many years of cooperation”, he wrote in his letter, “give me hope that today we will overcome all difficulties, find opportunities to restore, mutually beneficial, concerted work to bring to a happy end the years of hard struggle “for our and your freedom.”⁴⁹

We mentioned above the letter of the Polish Foreign Ministry in exile to its Foreign Ministry, as the reaction of the Polish side to Prokopovych's appeal, quite clearly, through the prism of the attack of Hitler's Germany, and then the Soviet Union, on Poland, in which the appeal of the exile prime minister position of protection in the future of the interests of the Polish state, which could in certain circumstances contribute to the development of good neighbourly relations between the two countries. Following Prokopovych, Kot wrote to his colleague Zaleski that, at the suggestion of the Ukrainian representative, “the starting point could be an agreement that would initiate closer military-economic cooperation between Poland and Ukraine, and should be based on a declaration by the Polish government that would reflect a positive attitude to the cause of Ukraine's independence, and would also mean resolving controversial issues on ethnographic grounds”. It is clear from the text of the letter that the former Ukrainian prime minister, and, by the way, not the president of the UPR, as written in the letter, would like to receive from the Polish government in exile assistance, both material and political, to leave France already occupied by German troops,

⁴⁷ AAN, MSZ, sygn. 608, ark. 680-681.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

and to obtain funds to keep a small group of employees and, ultimately, for future activities, because he understood that the support of the Nazis to restore Ukrainian statehood in the future should not be expected. As a result, one Polish minister recommended to another one "to use Prokopovych and his group to spread the slogans of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation."⁵⁰

Analysing the correspondence of the Polish authorities, it is worth noting that their attitude to the Ukrainian issues was to some extent opportunistic, in our opinion, for two reasons. First, 1940-1941 was a period when the Polish government in exile had more than enough of its internal problems. Secondly, it was about possible contacts with representatives of only those political forces that rallied around the Central Committee of the Ukrainian People's Republic in exile. As we can see in the documents, the Polish side was ready to resume the dialogue, which was interrupted by the 1921 Riga Peace Treaty.

Therefore, in a letter from Kot to Zaleski, it could be read: "And Petlurites group that acts under the Prokopovych leadership with the restored initiative of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation can present you to our cost crystallized what branch of Ukrainian wider action if needed. However, regardless of whether the current general political situation allows the Polish government to raise the Ukrainian problem, I consider it expedient to provide support to Prokopovych and his associates, as well as to enable their activities. However, I believe that Switzerland (proposed by Prokopovich - Ed.), in addition to certain advantages, due to communication difficulties and, consequently, a weak propaganda reach in Canada and the United States, is the least suitable for Prokopovych's group to be there. Instead, the United States, which Prokopovych does not mention, is more appropriate for the Petliurists' action than Canada, whose authorities will probably not be able to agree now to a broader Ukrainian action, basically anti-Russian."⁵¹

The letter further discussed how to influence the former Prime Minister of Ukraine to persuade him to expand his activities in the United States, because, as noted, they were the state that should play a key role in "shaping the future map of the world". At the same time, the letter stated that "as can be seen from the reports of the foreign missions of the Republic of Poland, the British authorities (Canada) and the federal authorities of the United States are showing an increased interest in Ukrainians. From this point of view, the lack of a proper reaction from

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, ark. 682.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, ark. 683, 684.

Poland may harm the interests of Poland at the time of resolving the Ukrainian issue, in connection with the elimination of the consequences of this war.”⁵²

On April 30, 1941, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Polish government-in-exile decided on a proposition of Vyacheslav Prokopovych. According to Polish diplomats, the further stay of the Ukrainian People's Republic in France lost its meaning. Accordingly, as for the documents, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested Prokopovych move to London, promising at the same time that the Polish exile government will take the lead in organizing the move and ensure he and his staff home comforts and finance the publishers. Moreover, Prokopovych was informed that appropriate measures had already been taken to relocate him.

It follows from the diplomatic correspondence at the time that the Polish side, bearing in mind the prospect of developing relations with Ukraine, intended, in addition to Great Britain and its capital London, to enlist the support of the United States and Canada. In this case, the émigré government in London even consulted with its ambassador in Washington on which of the two states could best suit Poland's interests.

It is difficult to say how the Polish-Ukrainian negotiations on the development of possible cooperation during and after the war would develop further. However, if we talk only about the relations between the Polish émigré government and the State Center of the UPR in exile and keep in mind the above-mentioned contacts, then in fact in the fall of 1941 it became known about Vyacheslav Prokopovych's serious illness and, consequently, his unwillingness to leave France. The following year, Prokopovych died, and the DC of the Ukrainian People's Republic was headed by Oleksandr Shulhyn, who, in the opinion of the Polish side, “did not have such a strong position in the Ukrainian immigrant community as his former boss”. Therefore, unification attempts on both sides did not wait for the continuation. However, we can afford to assume that this was not the only, and most importantly - not the main reason for the termination of those negotiations.⁵³

CONCLUSIONS

Undoubtedly, the Polish state authorities, even in exile, not only maintained their structure but also maintained fairly stable contacts with the states of the

⁵² *Ibid.*, ark. 683.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, ark. 683, 684.

future Anti-Hitler coalition, which was being formed. Instead, Ukrainian State Center has nothing like this because the government of the Soviet Union, followed by a subordinate of USSR did everything possible to convince the world that only the authority, which operated on the territory under Soviet Ukraine, was the only legal representative of the Ukrainian people, and not some *bourgeois-nationalist thugs* there. The lack of funds to support their activities, and ultimately simply not the physical survival of its members, together with the efforts of the USSR, made the work of Ukrainian exile structures extremely difficult.

In the situation that prevailed at the time, the establishment of Ukrainian-Polish relations in exile lost its relevance in the understanding of the joint struggle against Hitler's Germany or the Soviet Union. The problem of post-war interstate delimitation also hindered the combination of the liberation struggles of both sides.

The attempt to seek Ukrainian-Polish understanding at the initial stage of the World War II testifies to the understanding on both sides of the need for mutual support in the name of defending one's statehood in the conditions of foreign enslavement. Both nations faced a real threat of losing their statehood. However, this threat, so to speak, had significant differences between Ukrainians and Poles.

At the time Ukraine, being part of the Soviet Union, was, in fact, an enslaved territory of Russia, acting under the new name of a federal state that had an agreement with the Polish state from March 1921. Accordingly, Poland would not need to formally negotiate with Ukrainian politicians on a joint struggle to defend the independence of its states. However, two weeks after the outbreak of the war, the Polish government in exile convinced the exile that the 1921 agreement was a mere formality. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the Polish government returned to resume contacts with the Ukrainian emigrant politicians, who rallied around the Central Committee of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Both sides well understood the inequality of each. However, they felt the need for mutual support. This is eloquently confirmed by the documents analysed by us. Due to the circumstances, the continuation of contacts between the two parties was stopped. It was later restored on the territory of occupied Poland and carried out at the level of local military and political leaders.

However, this is a separate, very important topic that requires wider mutual research. Therefore, without going into details, we note that over time the problem of Ukrainian-Polish cooperation in protecting the independence and sovereignty of their state had not lost its relevance. By the way, in connection with the centenary of the *Petliura-Pilsudski 1920 Agreement*, quite large-scale actions took place,

especially in Poland, regarding the actualization of the case, the importance of the Polish-Ukrainian cooperation in the context of modern challenges.

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FUNDING PROVIDED FOR MEDICAL AND SANITARY ASSISTANCE AND TREATMENT OF REPATRIATES IN THE UKRAINIAN SSR (1944-1950)

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Abstract. *This article thoroughly presents the issue of financial support for sanitary treatment, medical examination, and treatment of repatriates who returned to the Ukrainian SSR in 1944-1950. It is argued that an analysis of certain activities of the Soviet repatriation department is somewhat indicative as it allows us to assess the motivations and priorities of the totalitarian state's Government in matters related to the return of the USSR's citizens back home with the status of "displaced persons".*

The authorities acted pragmatically in financing the costs of sanitary and medical needs of returned citizens. In the dynamics of this process, the authors distinguish three separate chronological stages. Namely, (1) the commencement of repatriation process, (2) mass repatriation period, and (3) subsequent repatriation process. At the first stage (autumn, 1944 – spring, 1945), there was no centralised provision of financial costs for carrying out sanitary treatment, medical examination, and treatment of sick repatriates. During the mass repatriation (summer 1945 – spring 1946), the Government provided increased centralised financing of the health needs of repatriated citizens. After the return of the bulk of repatriates to the Ukrainian SSR, the authorities sharply reduced funding for medical and sanitary support for the subsequent repatriation process. From the spring of 1946 until the end of 1949, the Government only funded mandatory anti-epidemic measures.

The structure of the budget expenditures on the health care of repatriates demonstrates that the authorities' apparent priority in this matter was to prevent the spread of epidemic diseases. Instead, the provision of medicine and inpatient treatment of the so-called "internal" diseases were not among their priorities.

Keywords: *World War II, Budget, Health care, Repatriation, Communism, Ukrainian SSR, Medical assistance.*

Rezumat: Finanțarea asistenței medicale și sanitare și a tratamentelor acordate repatriaților în RSS Ucraineană (1944-1950). Acest articol prezintă, în detaliu, problema sprijinului financiar acordat în vederea tratamentului sanitar, examinării medicale și îngrijirii repatriaților în RSS Ucraineană, în 1944-1950. Analiza câtorva activități desfășurate de departamentul sovietic pentru repatriere este, într-o oarecare măsură, sugestivă, deoarece permite evaluarea motivațiilor și priorităților guvernului statului totalitar în chestiuni legate de întoarcerea acasă a cetățenilor URSS având statutul de „persoane strămutate”.

Autoritățile au acționat în mod pragmatic în direcția acoperirii costurilor serviciilor sanitare și medicale necesare cetățenilor repatriați. În dinamica acestui proces, autorii identifică trei etape cronologice distincte, respectiv (1) începerea procesului de repatriere, (2) perioada de repatriere în masă și (3) procesul ulterior de repatriere. În prima etapă (toamna anului 1944 – primăvara anului 1945), nu a existat o centralizare a fondurilor destinate serviciilor sanitare, examinării medicale și tratamentului repatriaților bolnavi. În timpul repatrierii în masă (vara anului 1945 - primăvara anului 1946), guvernul a asigurat o finanțare centralizată, sporită, pentru a răspunde nevoilor de sănătate ale cetățenilor repatriați. După întoarcerea majorității repatriaților în RSS Ucraineană, autoritățile au redus brusc finanțarea destinată sprijinului medical și sanitar, vizând procesul ulterior de repatriere. Din primăvara anului 1946 și până la sfârșitul anului 1949, guvernul a finanțat doar măsurile anti-epidemice obligatorii.

Structura cheltuielilor bugetare pentru îngrijirea sănătății repatriaților demonstrează că, în această chestiune, autoritățile au acordat o aparentă întâietate prevenirii răspândirii bolilor epidemice. În schimb, nu s-au numărat printre priorități furnizarea de medicamente și asigurarea tratamentului pentru așa-numitele „boli interne”.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of repatriation of citizens, who due to various reasons and life circumstances, found themselves outside their countries of origin, became of significant importance during the final periods of the Second World War. The international law provided the definition of "displaced persons" ("DP") for this category of people, among whom were predominantly war prisoners, volunteers, forced labourers, and refugees. At the end of the Second World War, there were about 5,000,000 of such people on the Soviet side only, and over 2,000,000 of those were either ethnic Ukrainians or those who previously lived on the territory of Ukrainian SSR¹. According to the Yalta agreements between the leaders of the

¹ Yana Prymachenko, *Peremishcheni osoby* [Displaced person], in *Entsyklopediya istoriyi Ukrainy* [Encyclopedia of the History of Ukraine], Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 2011, t. 8, p. 129.

USSR, the US and the UK, all the DPs were obliged to return back to their countries after the end of the hostilities. Those people who returned to their homeland, including the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, became known as "repatriates".

One of the most under researched topics with regards to the problem of post-war repatriation back to Ukraine at the final stage of the Second World War and during the first post-war years is the topic of the administration of this line of work by the authorities. First and foremost, it involves financing and control over the budget expenditures for sanitary treatment, medical examination, and general treatment of returning citizens. The indicated issues remain virtually unexplored by now. Those historians who study the problem of the Soviet repatriation in 1944 – early 1950s, including in the Ukrainian SSR traditionally bypass this issue. They often consider it to be insignificant in the context of understanding the fate of returned citizens in the post-war Soviet reality. At best, historians touch upon the general features of the issue of health care for repatriates. Mainly, in the context of the analysis of the repatriation process itself, its organizational matters, and the individual aspects of repatriation in Ukraine. These are the dissertations, monographs, and articles by Andriy Andreev, Serhiy Halchak, Mykhaylo Kunitsky, Nataliya Meleshko, Tetyana Pastushenko or Oleksandr Potyl'chak.²

² Andriy Andreyev, *Ahitatsiyno-propahandyst's'ka diyal'nist' radyans'kykh orhaniv repatriatsiyi sered "peremishchenykh osib" z Ukrayiny (1944-1953 rr.)* [Agitational and propagandistic activities of the Soviet repatriation authorities among the "displaced persons" from Ukraine (1944-1953)], Kyiv, Vydavnytstvo "DIA", 2018, 256 p.; Serhiy Hal'chak, *Orhanizatsiyni zakhody radyans'koyi storony z pidhotovky do repatriatsiyi «peremishchenykh osib»* [Soviet organizational arrangements to prepare for the repatriation of "displaced persons"] in "Storinky voyennoyi istoriyi Ukrayiny" ["Pages of military history of Ukraine"], 2003, vyp. 7, ch. 2, p. 173-182; Serhiy Hal'chak, *Stanovyshche tsyvil'nykh prymusovykh robotnykiv Raykhu v Ukrayini (1945-2010 rr.): istorychni, sotsial'no-pobutovi, pravovi aspekty (na materialakh Volyni ta Podillya)* [Situation of Reich Civilian Forced Workers in Ukraine (1945-2010): historical, social and legal aspects (based on Volyn and Podillya materials)], Vinnytsya, 2012, 512 p.; Mykhaylo Kunyts'kyy, *Prymusova repatriatsiya radyans'kykh hromadyan do SRSR pislya Druhoyi svitovoyi viyny (ukrayins'kyy vektor)* [Forced repatriation of Soviet citizens to the USSR after the Second World War (Ukrainian vector)], Luts'k, VAT "Volyn's'ka oblasna drukarnya", 2007, 248 p.; Nataliya Meleshko, *Systema orhaniv repatriatsiyi "peremishchenykh osib" na terytoriyi Ukrayins'koyi RSR (1944-1953): orhanizatsiya, struktura, funktsionuvannya* [The system of repatriation "displaced persons" in the Ukrainian SSR (1944-1953): organization, structure, functioning], Dys. kand. ist. nauk, 07.00.01, Kyiv, 2014, 257 p.; Tetyana Pastushenko, *Ostarbaytery z Kyivshchyny: verbuvannya, prymusova pratsya, repatriatsiya (1942-1953)* [Oriental workers from Kyiv Region: Recruitment, Forced Labor, Repatriation (1942-1953)],

Since the early 1990s, Russian historians have been actively studying the problem of post-war repatriation to the USSR on the basis of a new source base and methodology. The most famous of these studies are the works of Viktor Zemskov, Aleksey Shevyakov, Pavel Polyan, Mikhail Semiryaga, Aleksandr Bichekhvost, Vladimir Pyankevich, Yuriy Arzamaskin. Igor' Govorov, Yelena Vertyletska, and Igor' Tolstykh³. Their main focus lies within the regional aspects

Kyiv, In-t istoriyi Ukrayiny, 2009, 282 p.; Oleksandr Potyl'chak, Mykhaylo Terent'yev, *Perevirochno-fil'tratsiyni punkty NKVS SRSR dlya "peremishchenykh osib" na Volyni u 1944 rotsi* [Inspection and filtration points of the NKVD of the USSR for "displaced persons" in Volyn in 1944] in *Materialy XXX Vseukrayins'koyi naukovo-praktychnoyi istoriko-krayeznavchoyi konferentsiyi "Mynule i suchasne Volyni ta Polissya. Storinky voyennoyi istoriyi krayu"* (24-25 bereznya 2009, Luts'k) [Proceedings of the XXX All-Ukrainian scientific-practical historical and local lore conference "Past and present of Volyn and Polissya. Pages of military history of the region" (Lutsk, March 24-25, 2009)], Luts'k, 2009, p. 292-297; Aleksandr Potyl'chak, *Proverochno-fil'tratsionnyye punkty NKVD-MVD v sisteme uchrezhdeniy repatriatsii peremeshchennykh lits na teritorii Ukrainy v 1944-1947 godakh* [Checking and filtering points of the NKVD-Ministry of Internal Affairs in the system of institutions for the repatriation of displaced persons on the territory of Ukraine in 1944-1947], in *Istoriik i yego vremya. Pamyati profesora V. B. Konasova* [The historian and his time. In memory of Professor V. B. Konasov], Vologda, 2010, p. 305-316; Oleksandr Potyl'chak, *Perevirochno-fil'tratsiyni punkty NKVS SRSR dlya peremishchenykh osib na terytoriyi Ukrayiny u 1944 rotsi* [Inspection and filtration points of the NKVD of the USSR for displaced persons in the territory of Ukraine in 1944], in "Voyenna istoriya" ["The Military History"], 2010, № 3(51), p. 110-117.

³V. N. Zemskov, *K voprosu o repatriatsii sovetskikh grazhdan 1944-1951 gg.* [To the question of repatriation of Soviet citizens 1944-1951], in "Istoriya SSSR" ["History of the USSR"], 1990, № 4, p. 26-41.; V. N. Zemskov, *Repatriatsiya peremeshchennykh sovetskikh grazhdan* [Repatriation of displaced Soviet citizens], in *Voyna i obshchestvo, 1941-1945*, v 2 kn., kn. 2, Moskva, RAN, In-t rossiyskoy istorii, 2004, p. 331-358; V. N. Zemskov, *Nachal'nyy etap repatriatsii sovetskikh voyennoplennykh i internirovannykh grazhdanskikh lits (vtoraya polovina 1944 g.)* [The initial stage of the repatriation of Soviet prisoners of war and interned civilians (second half of 1944)], in "Geopoliticheskiy zhurnal" ["Geopolitical Journal"], 2013, № 2, p. 272-289; A. A. Shevyakov, *Repatriatsiya sovetskogo mirnogo naselennya i voyennoplennykh, okazavshikhsya v okkupirovannykh zonakh gosudarstv antigitlerovskoy koalitsii* [Repatriation of Soviet civilians and prisoners of war trapped in the occupied zones of the anti-Hitler coalition states], in *Naseleniye Rossii v 1920-1950-ye gody: chislennost', poteri, migratsii* [The population of Russia in the 1920s-1950s: number, losses, migration], Moskva, 1994, p. 195-222; Pavel Polyan, *Zhertvy dvukh diktatur: Zhizn', trud, unizheniya i smert' sovetskikh voyennoplennykh i ostarbayterov na chuzhbine i na*

of the repatriation of Oriental workers and war prisoners.

Western historiography on this topic is represented by the works of Mark Elliott⁴, Nicholas Bethell⁵, Nikolay Tolstoy-Miloslavsky⁶, Wolfgang Jacobmayer⁷, Ulrike Göcken-Heidl⁸, as well as a joint Austrian-Russian project "Hitler's slaves – traitors to Stalin. Aspects of repression against forced labourers and war prisoners".

rodine [Victims of two dictatorships: Life, work, humiliation and death of Soviet prisoners of war and Oriental workers in a foreign land and at home], 2-ye izd., pererab. i dop., Moskva, ROSSPĖN, 2002, 606 p.; Mikhail Semiryaga, *Sud'ba sovetskikh voyennoplennykh* [The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war] in "Voprosy istorii" ["Questions of history"], 1995, № 4, p. 19-33; A. F. Bichekhvost, *Istoriya repatriatsii sovetskikh grazhdan: trudnosti vozvrashcheniya (1944-1953gg.)* [The history of the repatriation of Soviet citizens: the difficulties of returning (1944-1953)], Saratov, Saratovskaya gosudarstvennaya akademiya prava, 2008, 534 p.; V. M. P'yankevich, *Repatriatsii i trud voyennoplennykh kak istochnik vosstanovleniya ekonomiki SSSR posle Vtoroy mirovoy voyny: voprosy istoriografii* [Repatriation and labor of prisoners of war as a source of economic recovery in the USSR after World War II: issues of historiography], Sankt-Peterburg, Nestor, 1999, 29 p.; Yu. N. Arzamaskin, *Deyatel'nost' sovetskikh gosudarstvennykh i voyennykh organov repatriatsii v 1944-1953 gg.* [Activities of the Soviet state and military departments of repatriation in 1944-1953], Dis. d-ra ist. nauk, 07.00.02., Moskva, 2000, 523 p. I. V. Govorov, *Repatriatsiya na Severo-zapade RSFSR 1944-1949 gg.* [Repatriation in the North-West of the RSFSR 1944-1949], Dis. kand. ist. nauk, 07.00.02, Sankt-Peterburg, 1998, 324 p.; Ye. V. Vertiletskaya, *Repatrianty v Sverdlovskoy oblasti v 1944 – nachale 1950-kh gg.* [Repatriates in the Sverdlovsk Region in 1944 – early 1950s], Dis. kand. ist. nauk, 07.00.02., Yekaterinburg, 2004, 244 p.; I. N. Tolstykh, *Repatrianty Novgorodskoy oblasti v 1944-1948 gg.* [Repatriates of the Novgorod Region during 1944-1948], Dis. kand. ist. nauk, 07.00.02., Velikiy Novgorod, 2005, 184 p.

⁴ Mark R. Elliott, *Pawns of Yalta. Soviet Refugees and America's Role in Their Repatriation*, Urbana – Chicago – London, University of Illinois Press, 1982, 287 p.

⁵ N. Bethell, *The last secret: Forcible Repatriation to Russia 1944-1947*, London, 1974, 304 p.

⁶ N. D. Tolstoy, *Zhertvy Yalty* [Victims of Yalta], Moskva, Russkiy put', 1996, 544 p.

⁷ Wolfgang Jacobmeyer, *Vom Zwangsarbeiter zum Heimatlosen Auslaender. Die Displaced Persons in Deutschland 1941-1945* [From forced labourer to homeless foreigner. The Displaced Persons in Germany 1941-1945], in "Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft" ["Critical studies on history"], Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht in Göttingen, 1985, bd. 65, 323 s.

⁸ Ulrike Goeken-Haidl, *Der Weg zurück. Die Repatriierung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener und Zwangsarbeiter während und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* [The way back. The repatriation of Soviet prisoners of war and forced laborers during and after the Second World War], Essen, Klartext-Verl, 2006, 573 s.

The aforementioned Ukrainian and foreign researchers studied various aspects of the post-war repatriation problem, but, with a few exceptions, have not analysed the health component in details. A co-author of this article has several publications devoted to the analysis of the health issues in Ukraine, organisational, infrastructural, resource related, material, and personnel support of health care of Ukrainian-born returned citizens⁹.

For the purposes of this article, we mainly used various levels of financial documents from the repatriation institutions of the Ukrainian SSR (1944-1950). The history told by the "figures" of estimates and financial statements are illustrative, as it allows, to some extent, to assess the motivations and priorities of the totalitarian state in matters related to the repatriation of its citizens with the DP status.

ARGUMENTATION

Upon through examination of the budget documentation and other documents coming from the repatriation department of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR (Radnarkom), it was discovered that at the commencement stage of the repatriation process (autumn 1944 – spring 1945), there was no centralised provision of financial expenses for the sanitary treatment, medical examination and general treatment of the sick repatriates in place. All such expenses were covered through the minimal internal material and financial capacities of the Regional Health Departments and Sanitary Departments of fronts at the locations of Border Repatriation Posts. Due to the small number of returned citizens arriving at the border check-posts (BCP) of the NKVD of the

⁹ Lyubov Dyptan, *Medyko-sanitarne stanovyshche v Ukrayini u 1944-1946 rr. i mihratsiyi naseleennya* [Medical and sanitary situation in Ukraine in 1944-1946 and migration of the population], in "Hileya: naukovyy visnyk" ["Hileya: Scientific Bulletin"], 2017, vyp. 125(10), p. 78-83; Lyubov Dyptan, *Orhanizatsiyne zabezpechennya medyko-sanitar-noho obsluhovuvannya repatriantiv na terytoriyi Ukrayins'koyi RSR u 1944-1947 rr.* [Organizational support for health care of repatriates in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR (1944-1947)], in "Hileya: naukovyy visnyk" ["Hileya: Scientific Bulletin"], 2018, vyp. 130(3), p. 64-69; Lyubov Dyptan, *Medyko-sanitarne zabezpechennya repatriantiv na prykordonnykh perevirochno-fil'tratsiynykh punktakh NKVS SRSR v Ukrayini v 1944-1945 rr.* [Medico-sanitary support for repatriates on the Border Filtration Points of the NKVD of the USSR in Ukraine (1944-1945)], in "Viys'kovo-istorychnyy merydian. Elektronnyy naukovyy fakhovyy zhurnal" [Military-Historical Meridian: Electronic scientific journal], 2018, vyp. 1(19), p. 36-46.

USSR during this period, the administration and staff generally coped with these tasks by carrying out the sanitary treatment of repatriates and filtering primarily epidemiological patients for further treatment. However, with the expansion of the flow of returned citizens in spring 1945, the situation with their health care began to change dramatically. After the expansion, the issue could no longer be resolved without the centralised provision of sanitary facilities, medicine, and financing the cost of sanitation and treatment of repatriated citizens.

However, it turned out that it was not the easiest task to calculate the potential costs of these expenses. On 12 February, 1945, Mykhaylo Zozulenko, the Head of the Repatriation Department of the Radnarkom, sent out the instructions to the heads of the Repatriation Departments of the Regional Executive Committees on the calculations of the estimated costs for the reception and arrangement of repatriated citizens belonging to their regions based on the number of such individuals.¹⁰ Only on 17 March, 1945 (more than a month after receiving the Government's instruction) the Executive Committee of the L'viv Regional Council approved by its Resolution the "Estimates of Expenses for Reception and Arrangement of Repatriated Soviet Citizens in the L'viv Region for 1945", which provided to allocate 1,961,100 roubles for the repatriation of 134,000 inhabitants of L'viv Region. Expectedly, "Sanitary Service (bath, sanitary bypass, medicine)" was also added to the text of the budget. Interestingly enough, the Planning Executive Department of the Executive Committee officials did not include the actual cost of this provision in the budget text.¹¹ In our opinion, there could be only one explanation – at that time, L'viv regional officials had no idea about the real scale of financing such expenses, especially the costs of purchasing medical equipment, medicine, hygiene, and disinfection, so they probably left the final decision on this matter to Kyiv.

In Rivne, the situation was quite different. In the letter dated 22 February, 1945, the Local Executive Committee asked the Repatriation Department of the Radnarkom to provide a sum of only 5,000 roubles for the health care and "cultural service" of 30,000 potential repatriates from Volyn Region. Even considering the fact that the local officials determined the total amount of funds required to secure repatriates from the region in the amount exceeding 2,533,000 roubles. To compare, the vast majority from this amount (2,250,000 roubles) was planned to

¹⁰ *Tsentral'nyy derzhavnyy arkhiv vyshchykh orhaniv vldy ta upravlinnya Ukrayiny, Kyiv* (hereinafter: Ts.D.A.V.O.V.U.K) [Central State Archives of Supreme Authorities and Governments of Ukraine in Kyiv], Fund 2, Register 7, File 3016, f. 27.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, File 3015, f. 27.

be allocated for a one-time cash benefit of 30,000 potential repatriates (75 roubles per person). Whilst the 5,500 roubles were allocated for the purchase of gasoline for four cars of the regional distribution point.¹² Simple calculations demonstrate that for the sanitary treatment and general treatment of returned citizens in the Rivne Region, it was planned to spend only slightly less than 0.2% of the total appropriation amount for the repatriation needs. This ratio of repatriation cost may indicate the priorities of local authorities in this process. However, it could be possible that the Government of the Ukrainian SSR thought somewhat differently.

One could assume that in a few months period (since April 1945), when regional Reception Posts (“RPs”) were established, their leadership had already received instructions from Republican Repatriation Agencies to calculate the estimated costs of their activities, and, in particular, to finance the sanitary treatment and general treatment of the returning compatriots. At least this seems to be the impression when we look at the budget documentation of this period. For example, a three-month budget for the maintenance of the Myronivka RP of the Kyiv Region allocated a total amount of 543,573 roubles for all the expenditures. Considering that Myronivka RP could contain as many as 800 individuals, that constitutes over 181,000 roubles per month. Spending for sanitary treatment of the Myronivka RP (which included washing in the bath once every two days and dispensing 20 grams of soap each time) went under in this budget as “economic expenses” and amounted to over 37,000 roubles. Which also leaves a planned spending of 15,840 roubles for the procurement of medicine.¹³ In total, this accounted for less than 10% of the total RPs costs.

In the draft budget for 1945, it was planned to allocate 25,286,441 roubles for the reception and accommodation of repatriates from the Stalin Region. The amount of 504,000 roubles was provided for the sanitary needs (including bath, hairdresser and disinfection) of 252,000 people (2 roubles per person). For the same number of returned citizens, it was suggested to allocate the sum of 126,000 roubles (on average – 0.50 roubles per repatriate).¹⁴ Thus, the number of regional budget funds allocated for the sanitation and treatment of returned citizens in 1945 amounted to slightly over 6% of the total funding for repatriation costs. A similar trend with the financing of expenditures for sanitation and medical care of repatriates was observed in other regions of the Republic.

¹² *Ibid.*, f. 103.

¹³ *Ibid.*, f. 29.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 63.

For example, Poltava Region RP asked for 160,000 roubles for sanitary treatment and medical care of over 157,000 potential repatriates - residents of the region. At the same time, the actual budget contained funds for the sanitisation of only half of that number. Additionally, only 10,000 roubles were earmarked for the re-equipment of the medical facility and the purchase of the required medicine.¹⁵ In general, in the second quarter (April-June) of 1945, the amount of 600,000 roubles was supposed to be allocated for the purposes of reception and arrangement of repatriates of the Ukrainian SSR, and specifically for sanitary treatment of the returned citizens (Article 11). The total amount of funds for the repatriation in this quarter in the Republic amounted to 28,400,862 roubles. Therefore, the share of expenditures for sanitation and treatment of repatriates was less than 4%.¹⁶

To better understand what this amount was worth in 1945, let us consider a few examples. During the Second World War and in the first post-war years, a standardised (card) food supply was common in the USSR. At the end of 1944, the daily norm of bread for workers was 500-700 g, for military personal and authorities - 300-450 g, for unemployed adults and children - 200-300 g. People could purchase food at fixed and rather low state prices only in exchange for the cards of sufficient amount.¹⁷ In the state trade, 1kg of rye bread cost 0,65-0,75 roubles, wheat - 1,10-1,50 roubles, millet - 1,50-1,85, buckwheat - 3,80-4,05, pasta - 3.20-3.30, meat - 10.50-10.80, butter - 21.50-22.00, refined sugar - 5.0, a litre of refined oil - 13.00 roubles.¹⁸ Limited and clearly insufficient for normal nutrition, standardised food supply was supplemented by products from the markets, where food prices were ten times higher. For example, in May 1944, on Kyiv market, a kilogram of rye flour would cost 30 roubles, wheat - 45, millet - 40, buckwheat - 60, fresh cabbage - 50, onions - 40, beets - 20 roubles. The sellers asked for 130 roubles per kilogram of beef, 400 roubles for lard, 350 - for butter, and 240 - for a litre of oil. A litre of milk would cost 35, and a dozen of eggs - 50 roubles.¹⁹

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 86.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 124.

¹⁷ M. S. Herasymova, *Vplyv radyans'koyi torhivli na povsyakdenne zhyttya naselennya Donbasu v 1945-1953 rr.* [The impact of Soviet trade on the daily life of the population of Donbass during 1945-1953], in "Nauka. Relihiya. Suspil'stvo" ["Science. Religion. Society"], Donetsk, 2011, № 2, p. 42-47.

¹⁸ Viktor Danylenko (Ed.), *Povoyenna Ukrayina: narysy sotsial'noyi istoriyi (dr. pol. 1940-kh - seredyna 1950-kh rr.)* [Postwar Ukraine: Essays on Social History (second half of the 1940s - mid-1950s)], Kyiv, 2010, kn. 1, ch. 1-2. p. 304.

¹⁹ *Tsentral'nyy derzhavnyy arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'yednan' Ukrayiny*, Kyiv (hereinafter: Ts.D.A.H.O.U.K) [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine in Kyiv], Fund

Taking into account such prices for basic products, the wages of most citizens were too low to provide them with necessary food. Only public officials, managers, and deputy heads of enterprises had a monthly salary of 500 to 1.000 roubles.²⁰ Unskilled workers received only 120-150 roubles per month.²¹ The pension of an average city resident ranged from 100 to 250 roubles, and a student scholarship was 100 roubles.²²

At the time, there was a phenomenon of hidden inflation within the country. Stability of the Soviet currency was maintained not by market and economic measures, but rather by financial and administrative coercion. As of 1 July, 1945, about 63,000,000,000 roubles were in circulation among the population, state, and cooperative organisations. This was 3.25 times higher than the money supply of the USSR at the beginning of the war with Germany.²³

After the end of the Second World War, the flow of repatriates to the territory of the Ukrainian SSR has severely increased. Therefore, Republican Repatriation Departments were troubled with arranging not only for fellow countrymen who returned to their homeland but also for transit repatriates – citizens of the USSR – residents of other Soviet Republics. A direct consequence of the expansion in numbers has been an increase in expenses for all the directions of work with repatriates. However, although appropriations have inevitably increased, expenditures per one repatriate have not undergone a significant change, remaining at almost the same extremely low level.

On 27 June, 1945, the Radnarkom approved a Resolution No. 998, which adopted the final estimates for receiving and arranging of repatriates for the second quarter (April-June) of 1945. According to this Resolution, the Government financed

1, Register 23, File 679, f. 55.

²⁰ *Derzhavnyy arkhiv Kyeva* (hereinafter: D.A.K) [State Archives of Kyiv], Fund P-106, Register 6, File 2, f. 112–113.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Fund P-107, Register 1, File 1, f. 46.

²² Serhiy Hal'chenko, *Mis'ke naselennia Tsentral'nykh oblastey Ukrayiny v umovakh normovanoho postachannia (1943–1947 rr.)* [Urban population of the Central regions of Ukraine in the conditions of standardized supply (1943–1947)], *Dys. kand. ist. nauk*, 07.00.01., Cherkasy, 2007, p. 50.

²³ V. Batyrev, *Denezhnoye obrashcheniye vo vtoroy period voyny (analiticheskaya zapiska)* [Money circulation in the second period of the war (analytical note)], in *Po stranitsam arkhivnykh fondov Tsentral'nogo banka Rossiyskoy Federatsii. Denezhnoye obrashcheniye v SSSR perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny v dokumentakh (1941-1945)* [According to the pages of the archives of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. Money circulation in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War in documents (1941-1945)], Moskva, Tsentral'nyy bank RF, 2008, vyp. 5, p. 80.

the sanitary treatment of the group of regional RPs at the rate of 0.50 roubles per person.²⁴ The total cost of sanitary treatment of repatriates in the second quarter of 1945 amounted to 100,000 roubles.²⁵ (see Table 1).

In the third quarter (July-September) of 1945, the financing for the sanitary treatment of repatriates increased further. The total cost of sanitary treatment of repatriates in the third quarter of 1945 amounted to 350,000 roubles²⁶ (see Table 2).

Table 1. *Financing the costs of sanitary treatment of repatriates in the regions of the Ukrainian SSR (April-June, 1945)*²⁷

No.	Region	Amount (roubles)	No.	Region	Amount (roubles)
1	2	3	1	2	3
1.	Volyn	2,500	13.	Odesa	1,800
2.	Voroshilovgrad	3,500	14.	Poltava	7,500
3.	Vinnytsia	3,500	15.	Rivne	1,200
4.	Dnipropetrovsk	8,500	16.	Stalino	12,500
5.	Zhytomyr	2,900	17.	Stanislavsk	3,500
6.	Zaporizhzhya	7,500	18.	Sumy	3,900
7	Izmail	150	19.	Ternopil	3,000
8.	Kamianets-Podilskyi	5,500	20.	Kharkiv	8,000
9.	Kyiv	5,500	21.	Kherson	1,850
10.	Kirovohrad	2,750	22.	Chernihiv	2,000
11.	L'viv	6,500	23.	Chernivtsi	2,500
12.	Mykolaiv	1,250		Total Expense	100,000

Table 2. *Financing the costs of sanitary treatment of repatriates in the regions of the Ukrainian SSR (July-September, 1945)*²⁸

No.	Region	Amount (roubles)	No.	Region	Amount (roubles)
1	2	3	1	2	3
1.	Volyn	8,750	13.	Odesa	6,300
2.	Voroshilovgrad	12,950	14.	Poltava	27,500

²⁴ Ts.D.A.V.O.V.U.K, File 3016, f. 2.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, File 3033, ff. 2, 3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

3.	Vinnitsia	12,250	15.	Rivne	4,200
4.	Dnipropetrovsk	31,500	16.	Stalino	43,750
5.	Zhytomyr	10,150	17.	Stanislavsk	12,250
6.	Zaporizhzhya	26,250	18.	Sumy	13,650
7.	Izmail	525	19.	Ternopil	10,500
8.	Kamianets-Podilskyi	19,250	20.	Kharkiv	28,000
9.	Kyiv	22,500	21.	Kherson	6,475
10.	Kirovohrad	9,625	22.	Chernihiv	7,000
11.	L'viv	22,750	23.	Chernivtsi	2,500
12.	Mykolaiv	4,375		Total Expense	350,000

However, the real wave of repatriates, who began to arrive at the regional RPs at the end of summer and in autumn of 1945 made adjustments to the plans of the Soviet leadership in Ukraine. Further allocation of funds for the sanitary treatment of repatriated citizens in the regions of the Ukrainian SSR has increased significantly. In the fourth quarter (October-December) of 1945, the Government of the Republic allocated 550,000 roubles for such needs²⁹ (see Table 3).

The budget for the sanitary treatment of repatriates at the Myronivka RP of the Kyiv Region for the period from June 1 to 3 December 1945, constituted 12,833 roubles.³⁰ Rivne Regional RP was allocated 12,000 roubles for the same purposes by the Resolution of the RNA of the USSR of 10 August 1945 No. 1230.³¹ 125,000 roubles were allocated for the sanitary treatment of repatriates of the Stalin Region (for 3 RPs in Yasynovata, Krasny Lyman and Volnovaha) in 1945.³² However, in Poltava, only 75,000 roubles were allocated for the sanitary treatment³³ which was clearly not enough, considering that the cost of such service at rates approved by the Regional Health Department six times exceeded the Government tariff and amounted to 3 roubles per person. In this regard, the leadership of the Repatriation Department of the Radnarkom found nothing better than to recommend the Poltava Executive Committee to make the local tariff for the sanitary treatment consistent with the tariff determined by the Republic's budget.³⁴

The general estimate of the cost of purchasing soap for the purposes of sanitary treatment of repatriates in regional RPs of the Ukrainian SSR for the period

²⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 5, 6.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, File 3016, f. 56.

³¹ *Ibid.*, f.168.

³² *Ibid.*, f. 170.

³³ *Ibid.*, File 3033, f. 1.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, File 3016, f. 76.

from 1 February to 30 December 1945, (at the rate of 25 grams per person) was supposed to amount to 26,600 roubles. Effectively, this means purchasing 3,8 tons of soap at the price of 7 roubles per 1 kilogram³⁵.

Table 3. Financing the costs of sanitary treatment of repatriates in the regions of the Ukrainian SSR (October-December, 1945)³⁶

#	Region	Amount (roubles)	#	Region	Amount (roubles)
1	2	3	1	2	3
1.	Volyn	13 750	13.	Odesa	9,900
2.	Voroshilovgrad	20 350	14.	Poltava	40,000
3.	Vinnytsia	19,250	15.	Rivne	6,600
4.	Dnipropetrovsk	45,000	16.	Stalino	68,750
5.	Zhytomyr	15,950	17.	Stanislaviv	19,250
6.	Zaporizhzhya	41,250	18.	Sumy	21,450
7	Izmail	825	19.	Ternopil	16,500
8.	Kamianets-Podilskyi	30,250	20.	Kharkiv	44,000
9.	Kyiv	26,500	21.	Kherson	10,175
10.	Kirovohrad	15,500	22.	Chernihiv	11,000
11.	Lviv	35,750	23.	Chernivtsi	20,000
12.	Mykolaiv	6,875	24.	Kyiv (city)	500
				Total Expense	550,000

The Resolution of the Radnarkom dated 10 August 1945, No. 1230 determined the results of the financing for the purposes of supplying the repatriates with hygienic and sanitary measures with the means from the Republican budget. According to this document, Repatriation Departments of Executive Committees of Regional Councils and RPs, which were created by them, received a total amount of 1,000,000 roubles³⁷ (see Table 4).

The funds were allocated quarterly. In particular, 100,000 roubles were transferred from the Republican budget to the accounts of Regional Repatriation Departments to compensate for the cost of sanitary treatment of repatriates in the second quarter of 1945.³⁸ This amount was increased to 350,000 roubles in the

³⁵ *Ibid.*, file 3015, f. 99.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, file 3015, f. 99.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, File 3033, f. 1.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 2, 3.

third quarter³⁹, and in the fourth quarter it grew even further and amounted to 550,000 roubles.⁴⁰

Table 4. Financing of expenses for the sanitary treatment of repatriates in the regions from the budget of the Ukrainian SSR in 1945⁴¹

#	Region	Amount (roubles)	#	Region	Amount (roubles)
1	2	3	1	2	3
1.	Volyn	25,000	14.	Odesa	18,000
2.	Voroshilovgrad	37,000	15.	Poltava	75,000
3.	Vinnytsia	35,000	16.	Rivne	12,000
4.	Dnipropetrovsk	85,000	17.	Stalino	125,000
5.	Drohobych	20,000	18.	Stanislavsk	35,000
6.	Zhytomyr	29,000	17.	Sumy	39,000
7.	Zaporizhzhya	75,000	18.	Ternopil	30,000
8.	Izmail	1,500	19.	Kharkiv	80,000
9.	Kamianets-Podilskyi	55,000	20.	Kherson	18,500
10.	Kyiv	54,500	21.	Chernihiv	20,000
11.	Kirovohrad	27,500	22.	Chernivtsi	25,000
12.	L'viv	65,000	23.	Kyiv (city)	500
13.	Mykolaiv	12,500		Total Expense	1,000,000

However, the never-ending issue remains, as proper funding did not at all imply that these funds would be used effectively. For example, if we visit the column called “actual expenses in 1945” of the estimate of the Repatriation Department of Radnarkom for 1946 we will see that in the line “sanitation of repatriates” there would be only 589,661 roubles.⁴² Thus, just over 60% of the entire amount (1,000,000 roubles) were allocated for the needs of sanitary treatment of returned citizens. Another vital questions would be the funding for the sanitary treatment of hundreds of thousands returned citizens in 1945. To answer to this question, it should be noted that the Regional Repatriation Departments and RPs were not staffed immediately. Hence, the actual costs of sanitary services for repatriates in the summer and autumn of 1945 were significantly less than

³⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 4.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, File 3033, ff. 5, 6.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, File 4257, f. 20.

budget estimates. The second issue worth considering is that the Republican budget covered only the expenses for sanitary treatment of the persons who went through the process at the Regional RPs. Also, a part of these expenses was attributed by the Executive Committees of the Regional Councils to the accounts of local budgets.⁴³ Besides, sometimes repatriates only registered at the BCP and, without a delay for a long period of time, almost immediately went home. Many of the DPs had previously obtained certificates of sanitisation and medical examination at the BCPs and collection-transfer posts ("CTPs"), financed from the USSR budget. In this case, the cost of servicing the returned citizens, including their sanitary treatment, was minimised. The degradation of the repatriation stage and its subsequent transformation to the episodic return of some displaced citizens caused the reduction in the amount of appropriations for such needs. In particular, according to the draft estimate of the Department of Repatriation Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, for 1946, it was intended to spend 3,500,000 roubles for the sanitary treatment of about one million of potential Ukrainian repatriates who were still outside the USSR.⁴⁴ That would mean that the sanitary treatment of one repatriate should have costed the Republic's budget 3.50 roubles per person. At the same time, officials planned to return about 800,000 of displaced citizens only in the first half of 1946. The estimated budget for the sanitary treatment of this number of individuals was 2,800,000 roubles.⁴⁵ However, these plans of the officials of the Ukrainian SSR Repatriation Department were not destined to be implemented.

On 19 February 1946, Colonel-General Phillip Golikov, the Head of the Repatriation Department, sent a letter to the then Chairman of the Radnarkom Nikolay Khrushchev informing him on a large-scale (50%) reduction in the personnel of the repatriation organs before 1 March 1946. Return of the majority of the repatriates, who were the residents and natives of the Ukrainian SSR was called the main reason for such a decision.⁴⁶ This decision resulted not only in the elimination of several regional RPs, and the subsequent reduction of the staff in specialised departments but also in a sharp decrease in terms of the financing of the whole repatriation system. Therefore, according to the revised and later approved estimate of the Repatriation Department of the Council of Ministers ("CM") of the Ukrainian SSR for 1946, it was planned to allocate 56,000 roubles from the

⁴³ *Ibid.*, f. 21.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 19.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 31.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 35.

Republican budget for the sanitary treatment of repatriates.⁴⁷ This amount was to be distributed between the Repatriation Departments of the Regional Councils and allocated to cover the costs of sanitary treatment of repatriates who continued to go to the regional RPs.⁴⁸

On 8 May 1946, the estimates of the Regional Repatriation Departments were sent to the local authorities. An analysis of these documents shows that 6,000 roubles were allocated to finance the activities of the “repatriation sanitary inspection” of the Repatriation Department of the Executive Committee of the L’viv Regional Council. The Dnepropetrovsk and Stalin Regions were allocated 4,000 roubles each. The Repatriation Department of the Executive Committees of Vinnytsia, Voroshilovgrad, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Poltava, and Kharkiv Regional Councils received 3,000 roubles each. Volyn, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhzhia, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Kyiv, Kirovograd, Sumy, and Ternopil Regions – 2,000 roubles each. Drohobych, Izmail, Rivne, Kherson, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi Regions, and the city of Kyiv – 1,000 roubles each.⁴⁹

When drafting a funding application for the sanitary treatment of returnees in 1947 from the Republican budget, the Department for Repatriation of the CM of the Ukrainian SSR requested the Government to allocate 10,000 roubles. At the same time, on the stage of episodic repatriation as of 1 June 1947, only 300 roubles of these funds were actually spent.⁵⁰ However, in the second half of 1947, the situation changed, as thousands of ethnic Ukrainians – re-emigrants from France, Bulgaria, and other countries were expected to return to the Ukrainian SSR. The Government of the Republic had planned to allocate more than 4 million roubles from local budgets for them by the order of a special decree.⁵¹

In 1948, funding for sanitation of returnees primarily came from two sources, the national and local budgets. 5,000 roubles were paid from the national budget⁵² and 44,000 roubles were allocated from the local budgets for the sanitary treatment of repatriates.⁵³ The distribution of funds largely depended on the number of expected repatriates in certain region. In particular, in 1948, the Repatriation Department of the Executive Committee of the Odesa Regional Council, responsible for carrying out medical examination and sanitary treatment of repatriated,

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 6.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, File 4257, ff. 59-184.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, File 7931, f. 5.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, f. 12.

⁵² *Ibid.*, f. 5.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, File 10020, f. 15.

disinfection of their clothes, and laundry for the repatriates received 4,000 roubles from the local budget, which came in equal parts quarterly.⁵⁴ To cover the sanitation and disinfection costs of Stalin Region, the amount of 14,400 roubles was allocated, whilst Poltava Region obtained 5,100 roubles, Stanislav Region received 4,000 roubles, L'viv Region received 3,000 roubles.⁵⁵ The episodic nature of repatriation in 1948 influenced the distribution of funds. Appropriations of the Republican budget have been fully utilised, but only less than half of the money from the local budgets (20,000 roubles) were actually used.⁵⁶ When planning the financing of sanitary-epidemic measures for 1949, the Government heavily relied on the estimated calculations of the Repatriation Department of USSR, which identified approximate number of 35,000 potential Ukrainian repatriates. The cost of sanitary treatment of one repatriate was set at 1 rouble. Financial expenditures were partly allocated to the Republican and local budgets. In particular, the amount allocated to the budget of the Ukrainian SSR to cover such needs amounted to 36,000 roubles.⁵⁷ Costs by the region were calculated based on the estimated number of potential repatriates in respective regions, both natives and residents. In particular, to cover the costs for the sanitary treatment of family members of repatriates-fishermen from Bulgaria and Romania, the Department of Repatriation of the Executive Committee of the Mykolaiv Regional Council received from the Republican budget an amount of 5,500 roubles in 1949. Exactly half of this money had to be spent on washing services for 1,000 people. The sum of 2,000 roubles was allocated for the purchase of soap and 1,000 roubles were used to pay for the disinfection procedures (1 rouble per person).⁵⁸ The Repatriation Department of the Executive Committee of the Odesa Regional Council received 4,000 roubles for sanitary inspection and treatment of repatriates, washing, and disinfection of bed linen in the hostel where the return citizens were residing back then.⁵⁹

Departments of Repatriation of Executive Committees of Dnipropetrovsk and Izmail Regional Councils received 3,000 roubles for each RP from the Republican budget for sanitary treatment of the returned citizens. In 1949, Izmail Region expected the arrival of 100 families of Ukrainian re-emigrants (mainly fishermen from Bulgaria and Romania). Sanitary examination and disinfection of the re-

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, File 7931, ff. 40, 42.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, ff. 46, 53, 61.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, File 10020, f. 15.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, f. 23.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, File 10020, ff. 78, 80.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 85.

turned citizens, their clothes, linen, and other personal belongings were supposed to be covered at the rate of 30 roubles per family.⁶⁰ Estimates of allocated funds for Vinnytsia, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, and Chernivtsi regional RPs amounted to 2000 roubles per each. While Zhytomyr, Poltava, and Stanislav Regional RPs received 1,500 roubles each. In the Kherson Region, officials planned on spending 1,200 roubles for sanitary treatment of 600 potential returned citizens. Repatriation Departments of the Executive Committees of the Voroshilovgrad, Drohobych, Kyiv and L'viv Regional Councils received 1,000 roubles each for sanitary measures. But in the vast Kharkiv Region, only 900 roubles were allocated for sanitary-epidemic measures from the Republican budget. With the cost of services amounting to 2.50 roubles according to the calculations of the Repatriation Department of the Ukrainian SSR, this money could have cover the needs of only 360 people (which constitutes only 20% of the 1800 potential returnees). The Repatriation Department of the Executive Committee of the Kirovograd Regional Council received the least money out of all. Only 500 roubles were allocated from the budget of the Ukrainian SSR for the sanitary treatment of repatriated.⁶¹

Most of the funds destined for the purposes of receiving and arranging repatriated Ukrainians in 1949 were allocated from local budgets. In particular, 43,000 roubles were allocated for financing sanitary and epidemic measures in the regions of the Republic. Most of the funds were provided to the Repatriation Department of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Executive Committee. The local budget allocated 5,000 roubles for hygiene needs. Whilst Odesa and Stalin Regional Executive Committees received 4,000 roubles each and L'viv, together with Kharkiv Regional Councils approved the financing of 3,000 roubles each. Repatriation Departments of Executive Committees of Volyn, Voroshilovgrad, Drohobych, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Ternopil Regional Councils received 2,000 roubles each from their local budgets to finance the sanitary treatment of repatriates. Regional Budgets of Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Zakarpatiya (Transcarpathian), Zaporizhia, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Rivne, Stanislav, Sumy, Kherson, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi allocated for the same purposes 1,000 roubles. Interestingly enough, budgets of Izmail and Kamianets-Podilskyi Regions did not allocate any funds for sanitary and hygiene needs of repatriates, and these costs were covered by the Republican budget.⁶²

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, ff. 35, 62.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, File 10020, ff. 29-117.

⁶² *Ibid.*, f. 120

On the final, or so-called episodic stage of the movement of repatriates to the territory of the Ukrainian SSR (73 people returned in July 1949, 131 – in August, 133 – in October)⁶³, the organisation of a centralised reception of immigrants turned into an openly useless waste of budget funds. Thus, in 1949, the last four regional receiving and distribution points in Odesa, Kharkiv, L'viv, and the Yasynuvata railway station (Stalin Region) were liquidated.⁶⁴ After the liquidation of the RPs, there was no longer any need to allocate the funds for the centralised sanitary treatment of individual repatriates. From that moment on, their treatment became individual. As a result, in 1950, the cost of sanitary treatment was no longer included in the estimate of the Repatriation Departments of the Ukrainian SSR.⁶⁵

CONCLUSIONS

To summarise the analysis of the activities of the Repatriation Departments of the Ukrainian SSR in financing the costs of sanitary treatment, medical examination, and treatment of sick returned citizens in 1944-1950, we would like to draw the reader's attention to the fact that both the Union and Republican authorities acted pragmatically. Through the process, we distinguish at least three independent stages, characterised by distinct specifications.

At the initial stage of the commencement of repatriation process (autumn 1944 – spring 1945), there was no centralised provision of funds for carrying out sanitary treatment, medical examination, and treatment of sick repatriates. The regional health departments and sanitary front offices border check-posts ("BCP") and Reception Posts ("RPs") covered these needs at the expense of the minimal internal material and financial capacities.

The second stage covered summer of 1945 and spring of 1946. The expansion of the flow of returned citizens and making their return a standardised procedure caused severe changes in their medical service care. This area of work could no longer be supported without the increased centralised funds allocation to cover the costs of sanitation, treatment of repatriated citizens, as well as their provision with sanitary and hygiene products and medicine. However, there was one distinctive feature. Although the amount of appropriations inevitably increased, the costs for one repatriate did not undergo any significant changes, remaining at almost the same minimum level.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, File 9971, f. 102, 171, 172; File 9972, f. 138.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, File 10014, f. 24.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Register 8, File 2232, ff. 3, 4.

The third and final stage that determines the direction of work of the Repatriation Departments of the Ukrainian SSR responsible for the centralised financial support of health needs of the returned individuals covered the period from spring 1946 to the end of 1949. Covering the costs of medical and health care for potential returned citizens was sharply reduced after returning the majority of repatriates. At this time, the Government of the Republic and Executive Committees of Regional Councils financed only the needs of Regional RPs for sanitary treatment of repatriates and disinfection anti-epidemic measures. All other medical expenses, such as the treatment of sick returned citizens, were covered from the budget of the Ministry of Health of the Ukrainian SSR. The overall trend at this stage was the reduction in cost of the repatriates' sanitary treatment, due to a much smaller number of actual returned citizens.

The general structure of the budgetary expenditure for the purposes of the repatriates' healthcare in 1945-1950 (when funds were primarily allocated for sanitary treatment and disinfection) shows that the apparent priority of the authorities in this matter was to prevent the spread of epidemic diseases. Instead, the provision of medicine and inpatient treatment of the so-called "internal" diseases were not among the priorities. These tasks heavily relied on the vertical of the hospitals and inpatient medical institutions of the Ukrainian SSR. In any case, the repatriates did not personally receive any funds from the state for the purposes of sanitation, purchase of medicine or medical treatment. Such costs were covered by appropriating the sums of money to the accounts of Narcomats (Ministries), institutions, and organisations that performed this task on behalf of the Government. In particular, the supply of repatriates with medicine, covering the cost of medical staff was provided by allocating the funds to specialised institutions that performed sanitation tasks on behalf of the Government.

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ANTI-SYSTEMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AND RELIGIOUS BRANDING

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Abstract: *Nation branding concerns the overall perceptions toward a country at the international level. Different countries acquire different branding based on their positive characteristics and advantages, such as economy, culture, politics, governance, tourism, etc. The question that may be posed here is that, whether religious branding, as an important type of branding, can be identified and introduced to the world. Can religion branding be a positive and decisive element in raising a country's profile, enhancing its soft power, and subsequently spreading a positive image of a nation? Currently, the Islamic Republic of Iran has expanded its sphere of influence and power through religious branding, although this power is anti-systemic and at odds with the structure and norms of the international system. By analysing the religious dimension of the branding of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this article concludes that Iran has been able to develop its religious branding in the world, which has an Ummah-centered and global dimension. Such development of branding contradicts the dimensions and components of nation branding and internationally accepted norms, resulting in the international system regarding Iran as an anti-international order and revolutionary country.*

Keywords: *Branding, Religion, Iran, Islamic Republic, Reputation, International system.*

Rezumat: *Țările revoluționare anti-sistemice din sistemul internațional: Republica Islamică Iran și promovarea religioasă. Promovarea națiunii (nation branding) ia în calcul percepțiile generale față de o țară, la nivel internațional. Țări diferite își construiesc imagini diferite pe baza caracteristicilor și avantajelor lor pozitive, precum*

economie, cultură, politică, guvernanta, turism etc. Întrebarea care se pune în acest caz este dacă promovarea religioasă, ca tip important de promovare a imaginii unei țări, poate fi identificată și prezentată lumii. Poate fi promovarea religioasă un element pozitiv și decisiv pentru creșterea imaginii unei țări, sporirea puterii sale blânde (soft power) și, ulterior, pentru răspândirea unei imagini pozitive a unei națiuni? În prezent, Republica Islamică Iran și-a extins sfera de influență și putere prin branding religios, deși această putere este antisistemică și acest tip de branding vine în contradicție cu structura și normele sistemului internațional. Analizând dimensiunea religioasă în măsurarea imaginii naționale a Republicii Islamice Iran, acest articol concluzionează că Iranul a reușit să-și construiască în lume o imagine religioasă, cu dimensiune globală și centrată pe Ummah (comunitatea credincioșilor musulmani). O astfel de evoluție a construirii unei imagini contrazice dimensiunile și componentele brandingului națiunii și normele general acceptate la nivel internațional. De aceea, în cadrul sistemului internațional, Iranul este considerat o țară revoluționară, poziționată împotriva actualei ordini internaționale.

INTRODUCTION

Nation branding is a diplomatic-political term pertaining to the whole image and perception of a country by international stakeholders. Currently, each country enjoys a certain image and makes strategic efforts to promote this image. No region in the world has experienced such ups and downs in its image and brand as the Middle East. While in the construction of a nation brand, political, cultural, social, and sports activities are of importance, most theorists of branding and public diplomacy have considered religion to play a less important role in nation branding. Religion is one of the factors which, along with politics, governance, tourism, economy, and industry can greatly contribute to nation branding and increases the soft power of countries. A glance at the Middle East proves that today's Shiite and Sunni branding and religious wars are used as a form of soft power for the expansion of Middle East countries' sphere of influence and subsequent development of a positive and powerful nation brand.

Today, the structure of the international system and the relations of the Middle East countries with the West¹, especially the US, have fundamentally affected nation branding in these countries. Good relations with the West and, above all, the US, cause these countries to develop a globally positive image, and poor relations with Western countries and failure to make progress in the

¹ In this paper, West refers to an extensive value system (intellectual, economic, political, military, etc.) developed by the United States and major westernized countries.

international system orients these nations toward revolutionary, anti-systemic, and negatively branded nations. Iran is a good example to study in this regard. Before the Islamic Revolution, and during the Cold War in the 60s and 70s, Iran was a powerful and reliable ally of the West. Iranian nation branding was characterized by positive components, such as a developing country with a reliable leader, a stable system, brilliant economy, leading industry, etc. After the Islamic Revolution, Iran became a revolutionary, anti-systemic, and anti-Western country. Since then, Iran has had low status in nation brands ranking and failed to create a favourable international image. Having been affected by Western relations and its negative image in the international system, Iran suffered from sanctions imposed by the Western countries as well.² These sanctions delayed the branding and development of this country in industry, economics, tourism, urban development, education, etc. It is generally acknowledged that, in the age of globalization, without establishing good relations with global powers and moving in the direction of internationally accepted norms, the nation branding and imaging of a country in public diplomacy cannot grow positively and moves toward negative branding. The current investigation is a case study on Iran to prove this claim.

NATION BRANDING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Today, every country has a reputation and image at home and abroad and possesses a specific brand. The national brand refers to the sum of all the perceptions of one nation in the minds of international citizens, including investors, stakeholders, politicians, doctors, ordinary people, etc.³ Some components contribute to building the nation branding of a country and can shape and refine it. They include people, place, culture, language, history, food, fashion, celebrities, economics, international and global activities, sports, etc.⁴ The national brand permanently exists, whether strong or weak, clear or ambiguous, and with or without a conscious effort to shape the national image

² Mehrdad Pahlavani, *Serious impediments to Iran's branding and rebranding*, in <http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/news/1978754/serious-impediments-to-iran-s-branding-and-rebranding> (Accessed on 03.09.2018)

³ Masood Khodadadi, *Challenges of Branding Iran: Perspectives of Iranian Tourism Suppliers*, in "Tourism Planning & Development", 2017, vol. 16:1, pp. 112-117.

⁴ Peeter W. J. Verlegh, *Country Images: Why They Influence Consumers*, in Go F.M., Govers R. (eds.) *International Place Branding Yearbook 2010*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 45-51.

in the minds of international audiences.⁵ Most experts widely acknowledge the existence of national brands, though there is disagreement regarding what the nation's branding refers to and how it is formed. Such confusion has its roots in the conceptualization and different interpretations of the nation brand and the branding process.⁶ Some definitions of this notion based on different levels are as follows.⁷

At the first level, the simplest way to treat the notion of nation branding is to consider it as a visual symbol or a slogan. Bearing this in mind, a brand can easily be located and communicated. At the second level, as an umbrella brand, nation branding may encompass different components of the national brand, such as tourism, exports, military power, etc.⁸ At the third level, nation branding can be regarded as a specific name or as a co-brand. For instance, the name of Samsung is tied to South Korea, creating a co-brand for South Korea. For international audiences, South Korea is associated with Samsung and its advanced IT and electronics industry⁹. At the fourth level, nation branding pertains to the image of a country, its reputation, and position,¹⁰ something similar to the branding of a large corporate.¹¹ At the fifth level, nation branding aims at creating and protecting the competitive characteristics of a nation in the world.¹² At the sixth level, nation branding contributes to the enhancement of a country's soft power¹³,

⁵ Ying Fan, *Branding the nation: What is being branded?* in "Journal of Vacation Marketing", 2006, vol. 12 (1), pp. 5-14.

⁶ Simon Anholt, *Places: Identity, Image and Reputation*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 14

⁷ Arash Beidollahkhani, *Nation branding and national image making: new interdisciplinary perspective for political Science and international relations*, in "Politics quarterly", vol. 49, Issue 4, Winter 2020, pp. 999-1020. <https://dx.doi.org/10.22059/jpq.2019.224197.1006992>

⁸ Keith Dinnie, *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice*, Oxford, UK, Butterworth Heinemann, 2008, p. 200.

⁹ Kim Lee, *Nation branding and sustainable competitiveness of nations*, PhD thesis, University of Twente, 2009, p. 43.

¹⁰ Ying Fan, *Branding the Nation: Towards a Better Understanding*, in "Place Branding and Public Diplomacy", 2010, vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 99-100.

¹¹ Katharina Petra Zeugner-Roth and Adamantios Diamantopoulos, *Advancing the country image construct*, in "Journal of Business Research", 2009, vol. 62, pp. 726-740.

¹² Simon Anholt, *Competitive identity: the new brand management for nations, cities and regions*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 21.

¹³ Ying Fan, *Soft power: The power of attraction or confusion*, in "Place Branding and Public Diplomacy", 2008, vol. 4 (2), p. 150.

and lastly, nation branding is about building a national identity, which may not be entirely obvious, but is actually one of the most complex links and processes.¹⁴ Fig. 1 shows this ranking.




Figure 1- definitions of nation branding as levels

Various definitions of nation branding reflect a significant difference in the focus, intentions, and consequences of enacting nation branding. Based on various definitions and conceptualizations offered by scholars and experts, nation branding encompasses the following components (Fig. 2).

Based on the definitions offered, none of the goals for branding a nation could be achieved without cooperating with global powers. In fact, according to Robert Govers, nation branding and place branding are based on some agreed-upon indices, referring to the effect of a country outside its borders.¹⁵ This effect involves economic, political, security, and geopolitical dimensions. If the presence of a country in the international system is not based on the recognition of the global powers and compliance with international norms, then the nation branding may be

¹⁴ Melissa Aronczyk, *Branding the nation: the global business of national identity*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.

¹⁵ Frank Go, Robert Govers, *International place branding yearbook 2011: Managing reputational risk*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 34.




Figure 2- Components of nation branding

negative, and even the country may fail to develop a favourable places branding.

COUNTRY IMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION

"A country's image is the subjective and objective attitudes of the international audiences toward a nation driven by governments, the media, particular beliefs and public emotions, with functional, normative, aesthetic, and emotional dimensions"¹⁶. More clearly and comprehensively, "A country's image is the mutual and correspondent conceptualization of foreign attitudes towards a country, territory, history and traditions, economy and politics, values and norms, public culture and its political organizations".¹⁷ This picture is formed by interaction with the national identity as well as the citizens' perceptions of the nation's politics, culture, economy, society, etc.¹⁸ Accordingly, while the identity of a country is formed by citizens' perception of themselves and their country,¹⁹

¹⁶ Alexander Buhmann, *Measuring Country Image, Theory, Method, and Effects*, Fribourg, Springer, 2016, pp. 40-41.

¹⁷ Arash Beidollahkhani, *Nation branding and national image making process in Iran's contemporary period*, PhD dissertation, Faculty of law and Political, Tehran university, 2017, pp. 76-78.

¹⁸ James Pamment, *British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and the Digital Revolution*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p. 91.

¹⁹ Wally Olins, *Making a National Brand*, in J. Melissen (Ed.), *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, New York, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2005, pp. 171-172.

the image of a country is constructed by the interaction between citizens' perception of their country and the attitudes of the international audience about that country".²⁰ The Fig. 3 below shows this process.




Figure 3- The process of linking national image with national identity

Often, there is a gap between image and identity. Identity refers to what exists and is real while the image is how something is perceived. Generally, nation branding is related to the image of a country and how it is shaped. It aims at narrowing the gap between a country's identity and its image.

Individuals and countries wish to be recognized on the basis of their own perception and the country's identity. However, their image is formed not by themselves but rather by the perceptions of others, and each person perceives the image of another person separately from the self-image perceived by that person.²¹ Proper management reduces the gap between a country's image and identity. But sometimes, building an international image and reputation of a country is based on some generalizations and subjective stereotypes, yielding an obscure and negative image and identity of that country to most international

²⁰ N. Kaneva, *Nation branding in post-communist Europe: identities, markets, and democracy*, in N. Kaneva (editor), *Branding post-communist nations: Marketizing national identities in the 'new' Europe*, London, Routledge, 2012, p. 11.

²¹ Philip Kotler and David Gertner, *Country as brand, product, and beyond: A place marketing and brand management perspective*, in "Journal of Brand Management", 2002, vol. 9 (4/5), pp. 249-261.

audiences.²² The perception of a country at the international level is largely based on the subjective attitudes and stereotypes of the mainstream media and international organizations, which are mostly owned and directed by global powers.²³ Iran is among the countries with an international negative image and branding in western public opinion and Western media since the Islamic Revolution in the 1980s.²⁴ Much of this attitude results from media, political, economic, international, and legal campaigns created against Iran. Further explanation in the next section follows.

IRAN'S RADICAL CHANGE IN BRANDING AND NATIONAL IMAGE

The image of Iran in the last four decades was very unstable, much like other Middle Eastern countries. The Iranian government was the security, economic, and political ally of the West before the Islamic Revolution. Iran was a symbol of modernism and development in the Middle East in the time of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. Much of Iran's industrial, political, cultural, social, and economic relations were supported by the West and the US. Western and American companies used to implement Iran's massive industrial and development plans. The portrayal of Iran's branding in the Second Pahlavi era in the Western media was positive, and Iran was regarded as a strategic partner of the West in the Middle East.²⁵ In the midst of World War II, most Western theorists and politicians realized the importance of Iran as a bridge to victory.²⁶ After the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of British forces from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the US entered the Persian Gulf and the Middle East as an alternative power. At that time, most of the Arab states of the Middle East, as well as other US allies,

²² Jorge De Vicente, *State Branding in the 21'st century*, Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis, Fletcher international school, Tufts university, 2004, p. 10.

²³ Niall Caldwell and Joao R Freire, *The differences between branding a country, a region and a city: applying the brand box model*, in "Journal of Brand Management", 2004, vol. 12 (1), pp. 50-61.

²⁴ Richard Wike, *Iran's Global Image Mostly Negative, from pew research Center*, in <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/06/18/irans-global-image-mostly-negative/> (Accessed in 18.06. 2015)

²⁵ Christian Emery, *US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution: The Cold War Dynamics of Engagement and Strategic Alliance*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 67.

²⁶ Mohammad Gholi Majd, *Iran under Allied Occupation in World War II: The Bridge to Victory & A Land of Famine*, Lanham, University Press of America, 2016, p. 32.

lacked either the necessary power or stability or were part of the Soviet front. Iran, as a new US ally, shared borders with the Soviet Union and could play an important role in the region against the influence of communism.²⁷ Nixon-Kissinger's strategy of protecting the Persian Gulf security by Iran also expanded Iran's power and increased Western trust in it. It was after the transfer of this role to Iran that the US and the West left the decision to Iran to purchase various weapons. Iran then became the largest importer of weapons from the US. The Point Four Program, along with the Marshall Plan in the 40s and 50s, were other factors that contributed to the growth of the Second Pahlavi government and strengthened its ties with the West.²⁸

During this period, Iran built a positive image as a developing country led by peaceful leadership. Iran enjoyed a positive place branding in the 50s and 70s as a fascinating country with the oldest, richest, and most influential art and cultural heritages in the world.²⁹ A large number of tourists and Orientalist scholars visited Iran annually, writing about it in books, media, magazines, and newspapers. Many Western leaders came to visit Iran, including queens, presidents, political and cultural figures, social figures, and celebrities. Western companies' investment in Iran increased in the 60s and 70s.

Pahlavi's policies and measures greatly contributed to Iran's favourable place branding. Celebrating the 2500th Anniversary of the Persian Empire and inviting heads of states and holding various celebrations and meetings worldwide expanded Pahlavi's positive image.³⁰ Pahlavi's cultural investments and the high costs spent worldwide on improving the cultural image and appeal of Iran's place branding were other measures that led to the expansion of Iran's positive image. In the 50s, Iran was a fascinating country for investors, entrepreneurs, and tourists, and Iran was reflected in media to the international audience as an appealing country in the religious Middle East. However, the Islamic Revolution altered this branding and attractive image.

²⁷ Roham Alvandi, *Iran and the Cold war*, in "Iranian studies", 2014, vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 373-378.

²⁸ Idem, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 101-102.

²⁹ Andrew Scottcooper, *The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran*, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 2016, p. 39.

³⁰ Robert Steele, *British Persian studies and the celebrations of the 2500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire in 1971*, Master thesis of philosophy in faculty of humanities, Manchester, University of Manchester Press, 2014, pp. 35-37.

THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF IRAN: A RADICAL CHANGE IN IRAN'S IMAGE AND NATION BRANDING

The Islamic Revolution of Iran emerged with the purpose of justice, peace, and the establishment of a divine government. Iran's revolution victory, which had its basis on Islamic ideology, began when Western countries were moving toward a worldly and materialistic life based on liberal democratic thought in the late 20th century. Accordingly, the emergence of this revolution turned attentions to Iran.³¹ Iran, as a country that, according to Western intelligence analysis, had left no room for growth of Islamist movements and whose people were tending toward western ideology confounded Western politicians and thinkers. But, neither the Western intelligence agencies nor the Pahlavi regime could grasp the widespread Islamism that had spread in Iran.³² The advent of the Islamic Revolution was sudden and unexpected for Western thinkers, politicians, and analysts and prompted many of them to study and theorize about it. The course of events in the Islamic Revolution of Iran, namely, the hostage-taking at the US Embassy, the West's ambiguity and misunderstanding of the nature of the Islamic Revolution, the spread of radical anti-Israel Shiite Islam, and the Iran-Iraq war injected anti-Western ideology as part of the Islamic Revolution's entity. In the following years, the pace of domestic, regional, and international evolutions highlighted the ideological dimension of the new political system and pessimized Western countries to the Islamic Revolution.³³ The domestic upheavals of the early years of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, including the suppression, mass executions, and ousting of political groups by force, made the Islamic Revolution branding, as well as the image of its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, increasingly negative in the world.³⁴ The West and the US were still willing to interact with the leaders of the Islamic Revolution on regional and strategic issues. However, the ideological anti-west approach adopted by the Islamic revolution, as well as the

³¹ David Armstrong, *Revolutions and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 130.

³² Robert Jervis, *Why intelligence fails: Lessons from the Iranian revolution and the Iraq war*, New York, Cornell University Press, 2010, pp. 43-44.

³³ David Armstrong, *Revolutions...*, p. 139.

³⁴ Chad Nelson, *The evolution of norms: American policy toward revolution in Iran and Egypt*, in "Journal of Human Rights", 2017, vol. 16 (4), p. 500.

Iran-Iraq war, made issues even more complicated. In the next years, the anti-Western nature of the political system developed by the Islamic Revolution in Iran increased the attacks by media in Western countries. Iran's hostility to the US and some Western nations over regional, diplomatic, and domestic issues made Iran's branding and image negative. In the 1990s, after the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the consolidation of the Islamic Republic, a new model of governance was introduced to the world with a religious brand.³⁵ The place branding of Iran in the Western media was no longer built on a magnificent and fascinating culture and a stable country. The negative image resulted from Iran's opposition to an international system that was based on the interests of Western powers.³⁶ Iran developed a new image which defined it as a frightening country, a supporter of terrorism, a repressor, anti-liberalism, and anti-democracy. Some of the internal measures of the Iranian political system further weakened its positive brand and oriented it toward developing a negative religious brand.

RELIGIOUS BRANDING OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC: RELIGIOUS NEGATION

As mentioned earlier, Iran's Islamic Revolution happened at a time when religion was no longer regarded as a nation's symbol, at least in the West.³⁷ Prior to that, discussions on religion and politics had been largely forgotten in the West. However, the revolution in Iran, as one of the most secular countries in the Middle East in the 1970s, changed the attitudes of some scholars. Moreover, the Islamic Revolution awakened much of the political and radical Islamist movements in the Arab world. Basically, religious-based policy-making was the fundamental ideal of radical and fundamentalist Islamic movements that happened in Iran after the Islamic Revolution. Nowadays, the Islamic Republic of Iran presents itself in the world on the basis of religion. Iran's religious branding and that of some Middle Eastern countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia) are referred to as sectarianism by some mainstream media in the West. However, in the Islamic ideology of the Islamic

³⁵ Mara Einstein, *The Evolution of Religious Branding*, in "Social Compass", 2011, vol. 58 (3), pp. 331–338.

³⁶ George Lawson, *Halliday's revenge: revolutions and International Relations*, in "International Affairs", 2011, vol. 87 (5), p. 1077.

³⁷ Lilly Weissbrod, *Religion as National Identity in a Secular Society*, in "Review of Religious Research", 1983, vol. 24, No. 3, p. 201.

Republic, it is regarded as a rational policy with a peace-making orientation, which aims to extend all around the world. Attitudes toward religion in religious countries in the Middle East vary from that of the West, and religious identity and religious branding are part of the educational, cultural, international, and even economic propaganda of the political systems of Middle Eastern countries, including Iran.

Iran's support for the anti-Western Islamic movements around the world is based on the idea of justice and the full support of the Muslim brother, which is in line with the national interest of the Islamic Republic's political system. Currently, the Islamic Republic provides overt support for the movements such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. However, in the Western perspective, these groups are terrorist groups, and Iran is a supporter of terrorism. Iranian public diplomacy is also based on formal and informal support for marginalized groups in Muslim countries based on an ideological-pragmatic view. However, considering that Iran's policies are at odds with those of the US and its allies, Iran's policy is portrayed as being in support of terrorism, leading to Iran's negative place branding as an insecure, underdeveloped, dangerous, and anti-women country. Countries worldwide avoid making deals with Iran, and it tolerates different sanctions. Revolutionary, anti-hegemonic, anti-Western, and religious image has made Iran's branding and its image in the world negative,³⁸ which is even worsened by Western propaganda and mainstream media.

NEGOTIATION WITH THE WEST: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF NATION BRANDING AND POSITIVE IMAGE OF IRAN

In recent years, the nuclear negotiations with P5+1 countries and the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) agreement diminished the challenges between the West and Iran. Meanwhile, many Western countries, including Germany, France, and the UK, as well as their media, partially improved their portrayal of Iran's image.³⁹ Some European channels and media started

³⁸ Robert Snyder, *The U.S. and Third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations*, in "International Studies Quarterly", 1999, vol. 43 (2), pp. 265-290.

³⁹ *US, Britain, France, Germany back business with Iran after nuclear deal*, in <https://www.india.com/business/us-britain-france-germany-back-business-with-iran-after-nuclear-deal-1200152/> (Accessed on 20.05.2016); Ali Fathollah Nejad,

promoting Iran's place branding and characterizing it as a fascinating and unknown destination for tourists.⁴⁰ Some large companies and corporations mentioned Iran as a desirable place to invest.⁴¹ Signing a nuclear deal and compliance with international rules, which are in line with the interests of world powers, automatically improved Iran's nation branding in EU and Western media campaigns.⁴² This reflects the unfair and double standards of the countries on the nations' image and branding. The international system plays an important role in negative or positive views toward a specific country. Based on these double standards, the West and the US display a positive place branding of the Emirates (Dubai, Abu Dhabi, etc.), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia and ignore their financial and weaponry support for terrorist groups because these countries are partners of Western and regional countries and buy and sell weapons and goods and respect international values. However, a country like Iran is considered as supporting terrorism and being a threat to world peace. These countries' low status in human rights ranking is being ignored in order not to interrupt the international flow of selling and purchasing arms and goods.⁴³ After the nuclear deal, Iran's image was somewhat enhanced in the West, but there are still many internal and external problems. These include external problems like

German-Iranian Relations after the Nuclear Deal: Geopolitical and Economic Dimensions, in "Insight Turkey", vol. 18, 2016, No. 1, pp. 57-79.

⁴⁰ Hugh Morris, *Tourism to Iran set to rise sharply after nuclear deal*, in <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/middle-east/iran/articles/how-iran-tourism-industry-boomed-since-the-nuclear-deal/> (Accessed on 11.06.2018).

⁴¹ Amir Paivar, *Investing in Iran after the lifting of sanctions* BBC, in "Persian Business reporter", <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-33639124> (accessed on July 2015).

⁴² Michael Birnbaum and Carol Morello, *European companies beat US to Iran business after nuclear deal reached*, in <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/25/europe-us-iran-business-nuclear-deal-sanctions> (Accessed on 25.09.2015); Riccardo Alcaro, *Europe's Defence of the Iran Nuclear Deal: Less than a Success, More than a Failure*, in "The International Spectator", 2021, 56:1, pp. 55-72, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2021.1876861.

⁴³ Lerna K. Yanik, *Guns and Human Rights: Major Powers, Global Arms Transfers, and Human Rights Violations*, in "Human Rights Quarterly", vol. 28, no. 2, 2006, pp. 357-388; Afrah Nasser, *US Resuming Arms Sales to UAE is Disastrous*, in <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/15/us-resuming-arms-sales-uae-disastrous> (Accessed on 15.04.2021); Giovanna Maletta, *Seeking a Responsible Arms Trade to Reduce Human Suffering in Yemen*, in "The International Spectator", 2021, 56:1, pp. 73-91, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2021.1876862.

contradiction of Iran-US regional and international interests, the election of the new US President (Donald Trump), and the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and imposing double pressure on Iran. Some internal problems affecting Iran's image include the Syrian issue, democracy seeking, human rights movements, and corruption in the Islamic Republic.

CONCLUSIONS

The Islamic Republic, as a revolutionary and rebellious state in the international system, has shown that religion can also be the basis of branding for a country. However, using religion as the basis of public diplomacy must conform to the accepted values of the international system. Otherwise, religion may adversely affect the country's image. Nowadays, the nation branding of Iran is no longer reminiscent of the historical and cultural image of the Second Pahlavi government, but in the present-day public perception, this country with a religious branding is characterized by revolutionary-ism, radical religion-ism, dictatorship and closed space, repression, tyranny, an ailing economy, corruption, etc. Religious branding can prosper even if it does not have an anti-Western and anti-systemic ideology (e.g., Saudi Arabia). Although the nuclear deal and the signing of economic and industrial agreements with some Western countries have helped to some extent to improve Iran's image, Iran's branding in the West is still negative. This is because of the dual and contradictory international standards that determine nation branding and the positive and negative image of a country.

The Islamic Republic's religious branding pursues ideological, economic, political, and cultural goals that are completely rational within Islamic thought. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic, the religious branding of this system is currently internationalized and recognized by the West, though negatively, and has achieved some success in the region. In the ideology of the policy-makers of the Islamic Republic, the increase in the regional and soft power of Iran is defined on the basis of this religious branding. Examples include the spread of Shi'ism in various countries and the support of revolutionary groups and Muslim minorities in other countries. It seems that if the West and, above all, the US can recognize some of the Islamic branding elements in the regional dimension, the security and strategic challenges posed by Islamic Republic's measures will be reduced. The nuclear deal was one of the cases that, while recognizing some of Iran's interests, controlled and diminished some of the anti-systemic measures of the Islamic

Republic of Iran at regional and international levels. The nuclear deal, if not violated by either party, is able to reduce the cost of the Islamic Republic's anti-systemism in the future and brings religious branding into peaceful interactions with the multipolar international system, helping Iran to engage in peace-based international interactions with other countries.

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MEDIA REPORTS AS A TOOL OF HYBRID AND INFORMATION WARFARE (THE CASE OF RT – RUSSIA TODAY)*

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Abstract. *The study looks at how Russian regional hybrid warfare actions on Ukrainian territory serve as occasions for Russian global information warfare and how media messages become information weapons. The goal is to understand how events in the combat zone and the general situation in Ukraine impact basic features of Russian media reports, such as intensity, eventfulness, and intentionality. The research focused on the informative materials of the Russian multilingual international information channel Russia Today (RT). Titles and leads of over 44 thousand short information messages from October 1, 2014, to June 30, 2020, as well as more than 1 thousand extensive analytical materials for the period from October 1, 2018, to June 30, 2020, are analysed. The article demonstrates that RT media influence is deliberate, targeted, and pre-planned, beginning with the first words of the publications, i.e., the title and the lead.*

Keywords: *Media report, Hybrid warfare, Russia, Information warfare, Ukraine, Information occasion, RT.*

* The study has been conducted as part of the scientific and research work *Information Warfare as a New Dimension of Geopolitical Rivalization* carried out by the International Communications and Political Analysis Department (Lesya Ukrainka Eastern European National University, Lutsk, Ukraine – since September 2020 renamed the Lesya Ukrainka Volyn National University) and the National Security Department of the Institute of Security Education and Civic Education of The Pedagogical University of Krakow, Poland (Registration number of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine - 0119 u 001621, May 14 2019).

Rezumat: Rapoartele mass-media ca instrument al războiului hibrid și celui informațional (cazul Russia Today). Studiul analizează modul în care acțiunile războiului hibrid rus pe teritoriul ucrainean servesc drept ocazii pentru războiul informațional global rus și modul în care mesajele mass-media devin arme informaționale. Scopul este de a înțelege modul în care evenimentele din zona de război și situația generală din Ucraina influențează particularitățile de bază ale rapoartelor mass-media rusești, cum ar fi intensitatea, profunzimea și intenționalitatea. Cercetarea s-a concentrat pe materialele informative ale canalului internațional de informații multilingv rus Russia Today (RT). Sunt analizate titluri și clienții potențiali a peste 44 de mii de mesaje de informare scurte, de la 1 octombrie 2014 până la 30 iunie 2020, precum și peste o mie de materiale analitice mai ample pentru perioada 1 octombrie 2018 – 30 iunie 2020. Articolul demonstrează că influența media a RT este deliberată, țintită și în prealabil planificată, începând chiar cu primele cuvinte ale publicațiilor, cum ar fi titlul și subiectul principal.

INTRODUCTION

For both Western military specialists and a wide circle in the West, Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine has generated a conceptual challenge.¹ On the wave of the first reaction, there was a surprise – the West imposed a series of sanctions against Russia, and confusion arose when it became clear that this warfare (actually, information warfare) was being waged not so much against Ukraine as against the Western democracies and Western values. It became obvious the geopolitical interests of Russia required comprehensive information warfare against the West (on a global scale) rather than just local hybrid warfare against Ukraine.²

In this new context, hybrid warfare turns into a local background (by territory, time of deployment) and a collection of consciously and pre-formed local “hybrid” occasions on which full-scale global information warfare can be carried out. Probably, this is what Zdzisław Śliwa et al. mean when they say that the Russian Federation (RF) has started a wave of hybrid wars in the international arena since 2013, manifesting at different levels and with increasing power³.

¹ Ofer Fridman, *The Danger of “Russian Hybrid Warfare”*, in “Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper”, 2017, 17 (5), p. 9, in https://www.cicerofoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Ofer_Fridman_The_Danger_of_Russian_Hybrid_Warfare.pdf (Accessed on 12.05.2020).

² Maria Snegovaya, *Russia Report 1. Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine. Soviet Origins of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare*, Washington, Institute for the Study of War, 2015, in www.understandingwar.org (Accessed on 25.04.2020).

³ Zdzisław Śliwa, Viljar Veebel, Maxime Lebrun, *Russian Ambitions and Hybrid Modes of*

Volodymyr Horbulin also stated that hybrid warfare has become dominant for many years for the Russian Federation and this form of aggressive solution to its geopolitical problems is not limited to Ukraine but evolves in every way possible. The forms of this war become more and more intricate and spread to new war theatres⁴. Because they influence audience perception, political decision-making, and how later historians assess the development of events, the mass media has become a new type of weapon and an integral part of any conflict.⁵ Disclosed information becomes no less powerful a weapon than artillery.⁶

Both concepts – “information warfare” and “hybrid warfare” – (having a relatively long history of practical application) are new terms. According to Sun Tzu, all warfare is based on the use or misuse of information, as well as military prowess.⁷ In the 20th - 21st centuries, information warfare further evolved as a result of mass communications. Martin C. Libicki⁸, G. J. David and T. R. McKeldlin⁹, Edwin Leigh Armistead¹⁰, Christopher Paul¹¹, Scot MacDonald¹² etc. analysed the nature of conflicts in the information age. The definition of “hybrid warfare” was introduced by Frank G. Hoffman¹³ and was later revised/supplemented by Thomas R.

Warfare, in “Sojateadlane (Estonian Journal of Military Studies)”, 2018, Vol. 7, pp. 86–108, in <https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/RussianAmbitions.pdf> (Accessed on 21.03.2020).

⁴ Volodymyr Horbulin, *Hibrydna viyna: vse tilky pochynayetsya* [Hybrid Warfare: Everything is just Beginning], in “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia”, 2016, 25 March, in <http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/gibridna-viyna-vse-tilki-pochinayetsya.html> (Accessed on 14.03.2020).

⁵ Andrew Hoskins, Ben O’Loughlin, *War and Media: the Emergence of Diffused War*, Cambridge, Polity, 2010, pp. 3-6.

⁶ David Patrikarakos, *War in 140 Characters. How Social Media is Reshaping Conflict in the Twenty-First Century*, New York, Basic Books, 2017, pp. 1-17.

⁷ Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

⁸ Martin C. Libicki, *What is Information Warfare?*, Washington, National Defense University, 1995, p. 3-4.

⁹ G. J. David, and T. R. McKeldlin (Eds.), *Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare*. Washington, Potomac, 2009.

¹⁰ Edwin Leigh Armistead, *Information Warfare. Separating Hype from Reality*, Washington, Potomac, 2007.

¹¹ Christopher Paul, *Information Operations: Doctrine and Practice. A Reference Handbook*, New York, Praeger, 2008.

¹² Macdonald Scot, *Propaganda and Information Warfare in the Twenty-First Century*, New York, Routledge, 2007.

¹³ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21 St Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Arlington,

Mockaitis¹⁴, James N. Mattis¹⁵, Thomas Bjerregaard¹⁶, Rob De Wijk¹⁷, etc. The scientific findings prove that media are the linking factor for both concepts.

This study critically examines the peculiarities of the Russian Federation information warfare against Ukraine and, to some extent, against the West (with mass media as one of its tools) when hybrid warfare becomes a fundamental condition for its implementation. The study aims to determine how the general characteristics (intensity, eventfulness, and intentionality) of Russian media reports are influenced by the events in the war zone and the general situation in Ukraine, where the hybrid warfare is waged.

The Russian international multilingual information channel *RT* (formerly, *Russia Today*) is analysed as a case study. *RT* has grown into one of the world's largest providers of news content since its launch in 2005 as an alternative to the Anglo-Saxon media environment.¹⁸ *RT* is carefully tailored for specific national (e.g., the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany) and language (e.g., Arabic, Francophone, and Russian) audiences. Generous state funding allows the media to expand their activities throughout the world and further increase their effectiveness.¹⁹ "Even as Russia insists that *RT* is just another global network like the BBC or France 24, [...] many Western countries regard *RT* as the slickly

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, p. 17.

¹⁴ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *A Hybrid War: The Indonesian Confrontation*, in Mockaitis Thomas R., *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era*, Manchester – New York, Manchester University Press, 1995, pp. 14-44.

¹⁵ James N. Mattis, Frank G. Hoffman, *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, in "United States Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine", Vol. 131, 2005, No. 11, pp. 18-19.

¹⁶ Thomas Bjerregaard, *Hybrid Warfare. A Military Revolution or Revolution in Military Affairs?* Thesis for the Master of Military Art and Science, General Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012.

¹⁷ Rob De Wijk, *Hybrid Conflict and the Changing Nature of Actors*, in Julian Lindley-French, Yves Boyer (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of War*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 358-372.

¹⁸ Aleksey Solomatin, *Kommunikativnyye strategii formirovaniya mezhdunarodnogo imidzha Rossii (na primere telekanala RT-Russia Today)* [Communication Strategies of Russian International Image Formation (the case of RT- Russia Today)], Moscow, Academy of Mediaindustry, 2014.

¹⁹ Andrew Wilson, *Four Types of Russian Propaganda*, Prague, Aspen Institute, 2015; Levan Makhashvili, *The Russian information war and propaganda narratives in the European Union and the EU's Eastern Partnership countries*, in "International Journal of Social Science and Humanity", 2017, Vol. 7 (5), in <http://www.ijssh.org/vol7/840-HF0035.pdf> (Accessed on 26.03.2020).

produced heart of a broad, often covert disinformation campaign designed to sow doubt about democratic institutions and destabilise the West.”²⁰

The paper contributes to a better understanding of information warfare in general and Russia’s information-related activities in particular. It shows how media reports are transformed into information weapons by demonstrating how local orchestrated events in Ukraine are used to shape favourable information environments for Russia. Therefore, the purpose of the paper is to demonstrate the following *hypotheses*: First, the intensity of *RT* publications is directly proportional to the degree of hybrid warfare. Second, *RT* publications have a selective event orientation. Third, *RT* publications have a distinct purpose and a deliberate positioning.

THE CONCEPTS OF HYBRID WARFARE AND INFORMATION WARFARE

The concept of “hybrid warfare” was shaped at the beginning of the 21st century. However, the mixture of different tactics and combats, on the other hand, is not a modern military strategy, as it existed even in the ancient world; the term is newer.²¹ Frank Hoffman popularised the term: “[Hybrid War] incorporates a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”²² He emphasized that hybrid wars differed from prior conflicts in that the lines between them were blurred even at the most basic levels. “Blurring” is the word that laconically describes Hoffman’s concept, and the new warfare is considered a messy grey phenomenon that needs thorough study to prevent future Groznys, Mogadishus, and Bint-Jbeils.²³ Hybrid warfare in

²⁰ Steven Erlanger, *Russia’s RT Network: Is It More BBC or K.G.B.?*, in “New York Times”, 2017, 8 March, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/08/world/europe/russias-rt-network-is-it-more-bbc-or-kgb.html> (Accessed on 11.05.2020).

²¹ Williamson Murray, Peter R. Mansoor (Eds), *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012; Michael Kofman, Matthew Rojansky, *A Closer Look at Russia’s Hybrid War*, in “Kennan Cable”, 2015, 7 April, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190090/5-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf> (Accessed on 12.05.2020).

²² Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21 St Century. The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Arlington, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, p. 17.

²³ Idem, *Hybrid vs. Compound Wars*, in “Armed Forces Journal”, 2009, October 1, in <http://armedforcesjournal.com/hybrid-vs-compound-war/> (Accessed on 12.05.2020) (Accessed on 12.05.2020).

NATO's view is a violent conflict applying combination and simultaneous use of conventional and irregular warfare, involving both state and non-state actors, used adaptively in pursuit of their objectives and not limited to physical battlefield or territory.²⁴ In 2018, at the NATO summit in Brussels, it was agreed to use the term "hybrid" to denote "a wide array of measures, means, and techniques including, but not limited to: disinformation; cyber-attacks; facilitated migration; espionage; manipulation of international law; threats of force (by both irregular armed groups and conventional forces); political subversion; sabotage; terrorism; economic pressure and energy dependency."²⁵

Information warfare, a relatively new doctrinal term in the military lexicon, is understood as "a use and management of information in pursuit of an advantage over an opponent, such as propaganda, disinformation, and gathering assurances that one's own information is accurate."²⁶ It is possible to mobilize and motivate the average person by replacing an objective image in the media with a distorted (manipulated) one.²⁷

The information component should not be merely treated as one of the unconventional means of hybrid warfare; instead, it is worth interpreting the information component as an information occasion (staged events) for the conduct of global information warfare. All this gives rise to a new research problem: the combination of hybrid warfare (including its conventional component) with information warfare. In particular, Ofer Fridman et al. emphasise that in modern hybrid conflicts the role of the informational dimension increases as a virtual space where political goals are promoted at the national and international levels.²⁸ The specific characteristics of hybrid warfare include the use of traditional and modern media tools on any occasion to create narratives that would meet the

²⁴ Jitka Richterová, *NATO & Hybrid Threats*. Background Report, 2016, in https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286344092_NATO_Hybrid_Threats (Accessed on 12.05.2020).

²⁵ Sean Aday, Māris Andžāns, Una Bērziņa-Čerenkova, et al., *Hybrid Threats. A Strategic Communications Perspective*, Riga, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2019, p. 8, in <https://stratcomcoe.org/hybrid-threats-strategic-communications-perspective> (Accessed on 26.04.2020).

²⁶ Daniel Ventre, *Information Warfare* (2nd ed.), San Francisco, Wiley-ISTE, 2016.

²⁷ Viljar Veebel, Raul Markus, *Die Wirtschaftssanktionen als die Mittel der Internationalen Druck*, in "Discussions on Estonian Economic Policy", 2015, Vol. 1, p. 5-6.

²⁸ Ofer Fridman, Vitaly Kabernik, James C. Pearce (Eds.), *Hybrid Conflicts and Information Warfare: New Labels, Old Politics*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019, p. 5.

intentions, goals, interests of the initiator of influence.²⁹ While investigating the Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine, Ukrainian researchers stress the importance of describing and providing information support for any war, including hybrid warfare, “physical actions on the battlefield are constantly accompanied by processes of their discursive comprehension, verbal description, and analysis.”³⁰

Hybrid threats have the malign intent of manipulating the political decision-making processes of a targeted nation by influencing the behaviours and attitudes of key audiences such as media organisations, the public and political leaders.³¹ That is why the analysis of hybrid threats should distinguish between the physical world, where various actions take place, and the conceptual world, where information exists and communication takes place and where people think, understand, and make decisions. Media create and disseminate propaganda at the conceptual level, where cultural differences, misunderstandings, insults, prejudices, and stereotypes play a significant role in harming the target nation while promoting and consolidating the aggressor's interests. “[When] skilfully combined, disinformation, malicious attacks on large-scale information and communication systems, psychological pressure, can be even more dangerous than traditional weapon systems since they are extremely difficult to discover and combat.”³²

In the situations of hybrid war and information, war media are used to deter or to destroy opponents by disinformation, fakes and propaganda. In such context, “Russian propaganda has become an extremely aggressive, well-calculated and effective tool of Moscow's policy internally and abroad.”³³ On the operational level, the purpose of Russian media propaganda is to confuse rather than to persuade or convert – to spread enough versions of reality to leave the target audience struggling to deal with moral and even factual relativity, resigned to the unknowability of the world, and unable to find the cognitive basis for policy

²⁹ Andreas Jacobs, Guillaume Lasconjarias, *NATO's Hybrid Flanks. Handling Unconventional Warfare in the South and the East*, Research Paper, No. 112, Rome, NATO Defense College, 2015, p. 3.

³⁰ Volodymyr Horbulin (ed.), *Svitova hibrydna viyna. Ukrayinskyi front* [World Hybrid Warfare. Ukrainian Front], Kyiv, NISD, 2017, p. 42.

³¹ Keir Giles, *Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West. Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of Power*, Chatham House. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016, p. 6-8.

³² Viljar Veebel, *Russian Propaganda, Disinformation and Estonia's Experience*, Tallinn, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2015, in https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/194051/veebel-russian_disinformation.pdf (Accessed on 14.03.2020).

³³ Alexander Rondeli, *Moscow's Information Campaign and Georgia*, in “GFSIS Expert Opinion”, 2014, Vol. 29, pp. 1-10.

action.³⁴ Scholars also compare it to the older Soviet '4D' strategy – dismiss, distort, distract and dismay³⁵; Putin's Russia reinvents reality by creating and disseminating disinformation, fakes, lies, leaks, and cyber-sabotage and then translates them into political action.³⁶

In a broad sense, information warfare is a struggle for information and information flows shaping public opinion. "By controlling the flow of information, a near-peer competitor can effectively take over a country or force a state to change its policies without ever firing a shot."³⁷ One of the shortcomings of this concept was that information warfare needed a real basis, without which information flows and information influences could not exist regularly. Events generated by hybrid warfare can create such a permanent basis. Russians who had been trained in hybrid warfare in Georgia quickly understood this, and Ukraine became a type of testing ground for the Russian notion of hybrid warfare in practice.

METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW

The above concepts made it possible to identify independent and dependent variables to form and prove the research hypotheses.

Independent variables have been identified based on the "hybrid warfare" concept. In terms of eventfulness, hybrid warfare can be seen as a series of events that impact the conflict or a series of events created by the war that also influence the war's progress. All events can be divided into three groups: holidays (state, national and religious holidays of both sides of the conflict); events related to the war (in the participating countries, as well as international events - meetings, summits, etc.); events at the front (what happens directly on the front line). One

³⁴ Peter Pomerantsev, Michael Weiss, *The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money*, New York, Institute of Modern Russia, 2014, p. 15-16.

³⁵ Ben Nimmo, *Anatomy of an Info-War: How Russia's Propaganda Machine Works, and How to Counter It*, 2015, in <https://www.stopfake.org/en/anatomy-of-an-info-war-how-russia-s-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-to-counter-it/> (Accessed on 12.05.2020).

³⁶ Levan Makhashvili, *The Russian information war and propaganda narratives in the European Union and the EU's Eastern Partnership countries*, in "International Journal of Social Science and Humanity", 2017, Vol. 7 (5), in <http://www.ijssh.org/vol7/840-HF0035.pdf> (Accessed on 26.03.2020).

³⁷ Devon L. Suits, *Growing concern over information warfare continues to shape military*, in "Army News Service", 2019, 5 December, in https://www.army.mil/article/230573/growing_concern_over_information_warfare_continues_to_shape_military (Accessed 3.05.2020).

way or another, all these events impact the war, notably the amount of violence. Each group of events determines an independent variable.

Dependent variables are formed based on the "information warfare" concept considered in terms of information influences. These, in turn, can be characterised by the following indicators: intensity (number of media reports for a certain period); eventfulness (number of media reports as a reaction to certain events); intentionality (quantitative and qualitative indicators of intentions present in the reports and aimed at the object of influence).

The paper analyses information messages about Ukraine on the RT website. (<https://russian.rt.com/trend/334986-ukraina>). The current study is the second part of a larger investigation into Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine. The first phase, which coincided with the start of the war, covered more than 30 thousand news articles with the hashtag #Ukraine from the same web page *News* section (<https://russian.rt.com/news>) for the period from April 1, 2013, to February 3, 2016 (articles for this period are no longer available), and a part of the results was published.³⁸ The current phase of the study covers information messages from October 1, 2014, to June 30, 2020 (more than 44 thousand materials), as well as more extensive analytical materials for the period from October 1, 2018 (site archive does not give access to previous publications) to June 30, 2020 (more than 1 thousand articles). The title, the lead, and the date of publication are analysed for each article.

The standard content and event analyses, as well as the method of data visualisation, in particular the development of line plots with a trend in the form of loess regression, were employed to test hypothesis 1.

Data on the dynamics of Ukrainian troops shelling in the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) / JFO zone (since April 2018 – Joint Forces Operation) during the study period are processed as part of testing hypothesis 2. The data source was made up of daily reports from the Ukrainian news agency UNIAN under the heading Shelling. In this case, the method used was that of data visualisation – line plots with the selection of the trend in the form of a loess regression. In addition, correlation analysis of data sets was used to investigate the synchrony between

³⁸ Bohdan Yuskiv, Sergii Khomych, *Rol media-propahandy v umovakh "hibrydnoyi viyny"*, [The Role of Media Propaganda under Conditions of Hybrid Warfare], in "Aktualni Problemy Mizhnarodnykh Vidnosyn", 2017, Vol. 132, pp. 27-43; Idem, *Ukraińsko-rosyjski konflikt na wschodzie Ukrainy a propaganda w mediach rosyjskich*, in *Na pograniczach. Kultura – literature – media*, Sanok, Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa, 2017, s. 173-191.

the number of shoots and publications, i.e., Pearson correlation and Spearman rank correlation with the correlation tests were calculated.

The verification of hypothesis 3 is related to the analysis of the post-event discourse of *RT* reports, which analyses how *RT* journalists interpret the events of the hybrid war and related events (the attitude of *RT* journalists). The method of intent analysis was applied³⁹ to reconstruct the actual intentions of the interaction subjects. The main task was to compare the intentions of journalists on the main reference subjects presented in the discourse and to identify qualitative differences. This section analyses the communicative intentions of the materials, which should reconstruct the hidden intentions of the authors as a deliberate, meaningful, and organised influence on the audience to impose Russian ideas.

The verification of hypothesis 3 has required, for each article, the identification of reference objects and the disclosure of intentions derived from title structures, i.e., the title and the lead. The evaluation of the material is carried out as a result of the coordinated work of three experts. After coding, the total number of intentions, their relation to certain reference objects, the level of intentional saturation such as the ratio between the number of intentions and the total number of intentions was calculated, and the mode of intentions was defined (positive/negative nature). To assess the difference in the expression and proportions of the particle, the one proportion Z-test and the two-proportions Z-test were used, the relevance of the differences was recorded at $p < 0.01$. The calculations were performed using the software package statistics from the R programming environment.

INTENSITY OF *RT* REPORTS AND HYBRID WARFARE ACTIVITY

The intensity of short information news (reports) clearly illustrates the information picture of the beginning of hybrid warfare. In total, 30,180 articles were analysed in the first phase of our study in 2016, divided into two unequal groups: 260 vs 29,920. The first group is peacetime reports (11 months – from April 2013 to February 2014), but it is less than one per cent of all analysed reports, and more than half of them appeared in the last three months of the period and were devoted

³⁹ Tatiana Ushakova, Natalia Pavlova (Eds.), *Slovo v deystvii. Intent-analiz politicheskogo diskursa*, [Word in Action. Political Discourse Intent Analysis], StPeterburg, Aleteya, 2000; Nataliya Pavlova, Taisiya Grebenshchikova, *Intent-analiz postsobytiynogo diskursa v internete*, [Intent Analysis of Post-event Discourse on the Internet], in "Psikhologicheskoye Issledovaniya", 2017, Vol. 10(52), p. 8.

to Ukraine's European integration and events "on the Maidan" in December 2013 – February 2014. On average, in 2013 there were 1–2 short information messages per week, and at the end of the year – 5 per week. At that time, Ukraine was of little interest to *RT*. The second group includes media reports from the first 24 months of hybrid warfare (the period is only 2 times longer than the previous one), which accounted for more than 99 per cent of the total. In some months, *RT* devoted more than 2,000 reports to Ukraine, or 70 a day. The weekly number of *RT* reports from April 1, 2013, to January 31, 2016, is presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Weekly number of RT media reports about events in Ukraine during 1 April 2013 – 31 January 2016

Following the increase and decrease in the number of publications, information campaigns are timed to meet the war's current objectives. Thus, the active events in Crimea caused a sudden increase in the number of publications in February – March 2014. The subsequent escalation of the military conflict and a series of pro-Russian protests in eastern Ukraine, as well as the proclamation of the "state sovereignty" of the DPR (Donetsk People's Republic) and the LPR

(Luhansk People's Republic), led to reports concerning Donbas. Crimean themes were reduced to a minimum.

Since the beginning of 2016, the number of publications has decreased – hybrid warfare has entered a “sluggish” phase, and information warfare shifted its strategy and focus from “pure” fakes to mixed facts with fakes, with the emphasis on specific, profitable for the RF interpretations of real events, particularly speeches by state leaders.

Figure 2 depicts the dynamics of analytical publication (more extensive media materials) during the current research period.




Figure 2. Weekly number of RT analytical reports on events in Ukraine during October 1, 2018 – June 30, 2020

The figure shows that the number of analytical publications has decreased tenfold, although the scheme and commitment to information campaigns have not changed. However, the strategy of hybrid warfare has changed: the strategy of the Russian “*blitzkrieg*” is no longer justified and the stage of long-range hybrid warfare has begun. The Russian Federation priorities were initially set as follows: “hybrid war in eastern Ukraine – an

imbalance in Ukrainian society," but later changed to "imbalance in all of Ukraine – a hybrid war in eastern Ukraine". In terms of information warfare, it has progressed to the stage of the battle for personalities. The alternatives – P. Poroshenko vs. V. Zelenskyi – were determined by the timing of Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary elections. The relatively rapid increase in the number of publications related to the receipt of the *Tomos* by Ukraine and the reaction to the Ukrainian church's attempts to obtain autocephaly (56 articles) are directed against the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko during the election campaign. Increased attention to Ukraine in late spring and early summer is again associated with the elections, which took place amid the confrontation between the race's two leaders, as well as pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian political forces. In other words, the power of hybrid warfare and the number of publications is slowing down, whereas information influence is not only increasing but also transforming as its "ideological glaze" shifts.

Thus, the main thesis of hypothesis 1 is confirmed: the intensity of *RT* short media materials and analytical publications is directly related to hybrid warfare tasks; the implementation of these tasks determines whether the intensity of information influences in the form of information campaigns increases or decreases.

SELECTIVE EVENT DEPENDENCE OF *RT* REPORTS

The assumption that the intensity of *RT* publications on Ukraine depends on events is obvious. John Kerry, United States Secretary of State, commented on *RT*'s activities: "It was organised to spread Putin's fantasies about what was happening on the scene [...]. Their goal is to propagandise and distort what is happening or not happening in Ukraine"⁴⁰.

To verify the assumption the events were divided into groups: g – common holidays, n – Ukrainian national holidays, r – Ukrainian religious holidays, e – events concerning Ukraine directly and its relations with other countries, u – events and situations of Ukrainian-Russian relations. The visualisation was used to check the hypothesis, and Figure 3 presents the events of each group against

⁴⁰ John Kerry nazvav telekanal *Russia Today* «*Ruporom propahandy*». Redaktsiya vymahaye vybachen [John Kerry called *Russia Today* a "propaganda mouthpiece" and the editorial office demanded an apology], in "Media Sapiens", 2014, April 25, <https://ms.detector.media/profstandarti/post/987/2014-04-25-dzhon-kerri-nazvav-telekanal-russia-today-ruporom-propagandi-redaktsiya-vimagae-vibachen/> (Accessed 3.05.2020).

the background of a weekly schedule of analytical materials. The graphs demonstrate clearly that the events and situations of Ukrainian-Russian relations serve as an information occasion that increases the number of reports.




Figure 3. Number of RT analytical publications against the background of events, 2018-2020

In part, this group includes events that directly affect Ukraine or its relations with other countries. The vast majority of events in this group occur as the result of a hybrid war, or they are the result of actions related to it or the result of resistance to war. The majority of RT analytical publications (during the study period) concern events in Ukraine, with 243 reports, and the state of Russian-Ukrainian relations, with 207 messages.

In terms of the holidays, they do not affect the number of reports: g – unequivocally “no”, n – generally “no”, r – also “no” on Orthodox holidays, while, on the other hand, *RT* simply pays no attention to Catholic holidays.




**Figure 4. Number of RT media reports and shots
in the ATO/JFO zone, 2017-2020**

There is one more group of events – shots/shelling from all types of weapons in the ATO/JFO combat operations zone, which, according to our assumption, could have given rise to regular *RT* publications. An estimated correlation between the weekly number of shots in the ATO / JFO and the number of messages per week was applied. Such estimates were calculated separately for short media reports and analytical materials. In the first case: Pearson correlation – $r = 0.018$, $p = 0.810$; Spearman rank correlation – $\rho = 0.036$, $p = 0.640$. In the second case: Pearson correlation – $r = 0.156$, $p = 0.135$; Spearman rank correlation – $\rho = 0.183$, $p = 0.080$. These results indicate the absence of a linear correlation between the number of publications (short media reports and analytical materials) and the number of shots during the study period. Visualisation is given in Figure 4 and Figure 5; each process has its logic of development not only at the

level of weekly data but also at the level of trends.⁴¹

Figure 5 shows an example of how strategic trends can be interpreted. From October 2018 to July 2019, the intensity of Russian media influence gradually decreased, and the intensity of shots increased. Those trends were tied to the following events of that period. In mid-October 2018, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate annulled the subordination of the Kyiv Metropolitan Church to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Kyiv Metropolitan Church was restored as a canonical territory of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The election of the head of the PCU (Ukrainian Orthodox Church) took place in mid-December 2018. There was also the adoption of the Law of Ukraine *On termination of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation*.




Figure 5. Number of RT analytical publications and shots in the ATO/JFO zone, 2018-2020

The second round of elections of the President of Ukraine was another event at the end of April 2019. The President of the RF signed a Decree simplifying the process

⁴¹ It is essential to mention that the previous study (Yuskiv Bohdan, Khomych Sergii, *Roľ media-propahandy v umovakh "hibrydnoyi viyny"* [The Role of Media Propaganda under Conditions of Hybrid Warfare], in "Aktualni Problemy Mizhnarodnykh Vidnosyn", 2017, Vol. 132, pp. 27-43) proved that there was a certain dependence between the average daily number of shelling of the Armed Forces from heavy weapons plus shots fired by separatists and the frequency of certain words in the RT news. This dependency is more of a correlation than a cause. The explanation is that both media publications and military actions are planned and coordinated in a single centre and are clearly carried out according to the developed plan.

of obtaining Russian citizenship for residents of the occupied districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Finally yet importantly, mention should be made on the inauguration of the new President of Ukraine in May 2019. The situation has changed during the Verkhovna Rada elections: the number of shootings has increased significantly. In the situation of uncertainty about the forces that could come to power in Ukraine after the presidential and parliamentary elections, Russia, not relying on media influence alone, has escalated the hybrid warfare and sought to demonstrate its strength to the new government. Following the parliamentary elections, the intensity of both publications and shelling decreased and reached a minimum. The only exception was the beginning of October 2019 – the so-called period of the “Steinmeier formula”, when, against the background of mass protests of Ukrainians against such a settlement of the war in the Donbas, Russia again decided to demonstrate its strength. Surprisingly, *RT* paid minimal attention to this topic – 3 relatively neutral analytical materials.

As a result, a positive conclusion can be drawn in regards to hypothesis 2: *RT* publications use events that occur during hybrid warfare as information occasions.

OBJECT AND INTENTION ORIENTATION OF *RT* REPORTS

The recipient of media propaganda, particularly Russian propaganda, is viewed as an “object” that is not fully aware/educated, has stereotypical thinking, is unable to draw sound conclusions, and for whom information should be presented in a simplified, emotionally coloured form with the appropriate emphasis. The producer, as a “subject,” inserts hidden meanings into a communication, attempting to express a specific communicative aim, and occasionally exerting a significant manipulative influence.

The communication goal of media reports about Ukraine has an intense psychological focus on the individual consciousness of the mass audience, which researchers refer to as “a monologue of one (in our example – Russian) culture.”⁴² The purpose of this strategy is to destroy the unity and independence of Ukraine.

To build an intentional model of media propaganda based on hybrid warfare,

⁴² Andrey Negryshev, *O roli SMI v mezhekulturnoy kommunikatsii (k postanovke problemy)* [On the Role of the Media in Intercultural Communication (the Problem Formulation)], in “INTER-CULTUR@L-NET”, 2004, Issue 3, in <http://www.my-luni.ru/journal/courses/133/> (Accessed 3.05.2020).

a list of reference objects was created and the intentional profiles of each of them were determined. The intentional space of the propagandist discourse is made up of a collection of reference objects and intentions. This section of the research was based on the title structures of over a thousand analytical papers published between October 1, 2018, and June 30, 2020. Reference objects were chosen among those that were referenced several times in the reports and to which the intents of the subjects of influence were focused. These objects are grouped into four main categories: 1) "They": the Government of Ukraine / authority, the President, the Verkhovna Rada, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian society, the church; 2) "We": Russia, the DPR / LPR / Crimea, pro-Russian forces in Ukraine; 3) "Third-party": Europe, the USA, others (the IMF, the NATO, etc.); 4) "Situation": events in Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the world.

The reference profile of each generalised object comprises the following intentions: "They": discrediting, accusing, criticising, threatening, sarcasm/contempt; "We": self-presentation (in a positive context, active), demonstration of power, support of "our people", refuting accusations; "Third-party": accusations, criticism, support, compassion; "Situation": analysis "+" (positive analysis), analysis "-" (negative attitude), analysis "0" (neutral coverage, statement of facts).

The entire set of analytical materials was expected to indicate the effect of intentional asymmetry towards the negative. However, it turned out that throughout the entire period the share of negative intentions reached 72 per cent, of which 60 per cent were reference objects from the group "They" (Ukraine), as well as 8 per cent of coverage of events in Ukraine. "Third-party" (European countries, the US, other countries) generally acts as the object of intentions in only 9 per cent of cases with emotionally balanced assessments. "We" held 17 per cent of positive analytical materials. This leads to the conclusion that the main goal of *RT* reports about Ukraine is to put the state in a negative light in the eyes of the *RT* audience. The differences between the attention to these reference groups of objects are statistically significant, the yearly and general (for the study period) attention to the group "They (Ukraine)" exceeds the attention to other groups (over 50 per cent). All this is confirmed at the level of significance $p \leq 0.01$ by two-proportional and one-proportional z-tests.

The following conclusions resulted for each reference object:

- "They": for the selected period, the largest number of publications were devoted to the President of Ukraine (198 – 18 per cent of all publications), the government/authorities (196 – 18 per cent), the Armed Forces (88 – 8 per cent). The intentions "sarcasm/contempt" (265 – 25 per cent) and "criticism" (202 – 19 per cent) dominated and they concerned all categories. Criticism and mockery, as

well as ridicule, are common means of propaganda against the opponent, to undermine the enemy's adequacy and strength. As a result, the following attitude is formed: the government/authorities are losers and do everything to make people's lives worse; the Verkhovna Rada is a collection of idiots who adopt clumsy, anti-people laws; one President is the embodiment of aggressive evil, the second is a clown, a puppet; the PCU is a sect of schismatics; Ukrainian society consists of aggressive radicals and nationalists who are destroying the Soviet historical past; the Armed Forces are associated with desertion, corruption, all weapons are solid scrap metal (but at the same time the *RT* intimidates with the Ukrainian army);

– “We”: most of all the news were devoted to the RF, first of all to its leader (184 – 17 per cent), then to pro-Russian forces in Ukraine (50 – 5 per cent), and the LNR/DNR / Crimea (49 – 5 per cent). The following intentions prevailed: “support of ‘our people’” (105 – 10 per cent), “demonstration of power” (54 – 5 per cent). In addition to emphasising the favourable attitude to the LPR / DPR / Crimea and pro-Russian political forces in Ukraine, throughout the selected time, 26 articles were devoted to Kyrylo Vyshynsky, the editor-in-chief of *RIA-Novosti Ukraine*, who was arrested in Ukraine. Additionally, the idea “Russia does not abandon its people” was traced in each article.

– “Third-party”: the EU and European countries were mentioned 35 times (3 per cent), the second place was occupied by the US – 32 messages (3 per cent). The analysis of intentions has shown the following: when the West provides some assistance to Ukraine (consultations on the freedom of speech, provision of weapons), there is criticism (30 – 3 per cent). If the West criticises the actions of the Ukrainian authorities or emphasises monitoring/control (for example, on social networks during the parliamentary elections), the reaction of the RF is “support” (29 – 3 per cent). If Western partners refuse to cooperate (no matter in what area) or, for example, claim slow reforms, Russia shows its sympathy (26 – 2 per cent) by sending the following implicit message: “Ukraine is a burden, a failed state”. Accusations (eight – 1 per cent) are generally addressed to the US for its military assistance.

- “Situation”: the greatest attention of *RT* media reports is focused on the situation in Ukraine (129 – 12 per cent), which is generally portrayed as negative (analysis “–” – 48 or 4.5 per cent) or neutral (analysis “0” – 29 or 3 per cent). The situation in the RF is mentioned only 11 times and the intention is only positive (analysis “+” – 11 or 1 per cent). The situation in Europe is described only 7 times and the intention is generally neutral (analysis “0” – 6 or 0.5 per cent).

These proportions are also statistically relevant at the level of significance $p \leq 0.01$ by the two-proportional and one-proportional z-tests.

As a result, Hypothesis 3 was confirmed. Analytical publications were found to be sufficient in showing the presence of Russian overt objectives toward Ukraine. The goal of RT media coverage was to denigrate, accuse, criticize, and threaten the opponent while demonstrating contempt for him.

CONCLUSIONS

Modern media became an information weapon and an instrument of both information and hybrid warfare, with a high potential for harmful influence on targeted audiences. The RF makes full use of this potential to create narratives that correspond to the intentions, goals, and interests of the influence initiator; to form several variants of “reality”, to confuse the audience, to make people constantly doubt and, as a result, to be unable to distinguish between the facts from the fakes. The article looked at how the intensity, eventfulness, and intentionality of Russian media information broadcasts (in this case, RT) are influenced by events in the war zone and the general situation in Ukraine where hybrid warfare is being waged.

The following conclusions can be drawn: 1) The intensity of *RT* short information materials and analytical publications directly depends on the tasks of hybrid warfare; the increase or decrease in the intensity of information influences are adjusted to the tasks. 2) *RT* publications use events that occur during the hybrid warfare as information occasions; these are the events from Ukraine's internal life, international events and events related to hostilities in the ATO/JFO zone. 3) *RT* publications have a clear object and intention orientation. In all publications about Ukraine (“They”-reports), the intentions of “sarcasm/contempt” and “criticism” dominate; in the “We”-reports the intentions of “support of ‘our people’” and “demonstration of power” prevail. In other words, *RT*'s main communication goal concerning Ukraine is to discredit the state, to demonstrate its inferiority, while emphasising the “power” of the RF.

From a scholarly perspective, the current article opens at least two new avenues of research. First, the huge potential of media to manipulate public opinion of the targeted audience/nation (as to the image of the authorities, domestic and foreign political priorities, etc.), and second, the ability of media to dismiss, distort, distract and dismay the targeted nation to win the war and reach the geopolitical goals.

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A NEO-MERCANTILIST ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDER TRUMP'S RULE

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Abstract: *Liberal economic policies mostly embodied after Second World War constitute the basis of the U.S. political leadership. Relying on their economic superiority, U.S. governments have consistently implemented policies that facilitate the free movement of goods worldwide. However, the 2008 economic crisis in the United States, which then spread across the world, called into question the current liberal economic order. The leader who has probably questioned this system the most is Donald Trump, elected President of the United States in 2016. Trump blamed the decline of U.S. global power on the international political-economic system established by the U.S. itself, both during his election campaign and during his presidency. In this context, it is understood that Trump envisioned reviving the United States through neo-mercantilist policies inspired by the slogan "Make America Great Again." Nevertheless, these policies have adversely affected the international system led by the United States, prompting Trump to take steps to exit what he sees as an obstacle. Furthermore, the policies implemented by the U.S. itself have been perceived negatively even by its allies, causing the U.S. to become isolated in foreign policy.*

Keywords: *United States, Neo-mercantilism, Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Political Economy.*

Rezumat: *O analiză neo-mercantilistă a economiei politice în politica externă a Statelor Unite ale Americii în timpul administrației Trump. Politicile economice liberale aplicate, mai ales, după cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial constituie fundamentul leadership-ului politic al Statelor Unite ale Americii. Bazându-se pe superioritatea lor economică, guvernele SUA au implementat, în mod constant, politici care au facilitat libera circulație a mărfurilor în întreaga lume. Cu toate acestea, criza economică din 2008 din Statele Unite, care s-a răspândit apoi în întreaga lume, a pus sub semnul întrebării actuala ordine economică liberală. Liderul care, probabil, s-a îndoit cel mai mult de acest sistem a fost Donald Trump, ales președinte al Statelor Unite în 2016. Atât în timpul campaniei electorale, cât și*

În timpul președinției sale, Trump a pus declinul puterii globale a SUA pe seama sistemului politico-economic internațional instituit chiar de SUA. În acest context, este explicabil că Trump va urmări revigorarea Statelor Unite prin politici neo-mercantiliste, plasate sub sloganul „Make America Great Again”. Chiar și așa, aceste politici au afectat în mod negativ sistemul internațional condus de Statele Unite, determinându-l pe Trump să ia măsuri în vederea abandonării obligațiilor pe care le considera un obstacol. Mai mult, politicile puse în aplicare de însăși administrația americană au fost percepute negativ chiar și de către aliații SUA, fapt ce a condus la izolarea Statelor Unite în politica externă.

INTRODUCTION

The United Kingdom, regarded as the world's leading country, lost power after the First World War. In turn, with the support of its economic power, the U.S. began to come to the fore in international politics. This historical turning point became even more evident after the Second World War, allowing the U.S. to stand out as a political power as well as its leadership in economic terms. Organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) represented the economic pillar of United States (U.S.) leadership at this point. The United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), both of which the U.S. is a major player¹, have also served as the foundation for America's political and military leadership.

Following to Second World War, the U.S. favoured liberal economic policies in light of its economic power and sought to remove barriers to trade flows around the world through the GATT.² This order lasted for a long time, with neoliberal policies adopted due to the economic crisis of the early 1970s. However, rivals such as Japan and Germany that could challenge the United States' economic power began to emerge in the 1980s. China also followed these countries in the early 2000s. When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was officially

¹ Approximately 70% of the total defense expenditure by NATO members is spent by the USA. See BBC, *Nato summit: What does the US contribute?*, in <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074> (Accessed on 15.01.2021) and America is the largest financier of the UN, contributing 22% to the regular budget and 28% to peacekeeping operations in 2020. See Congressional Research Service, *United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of UN Peacekeeping*, in <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10597.pdf> (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

² David N. Balaam, Bradford Dillman, *Uluslararası Ekonomi Politiğe Giriş* [Introduction to International Political Economy], Nasuh Uslu (Trans.), Ankara, Adres Yayınları, 2015, p. 100.

dissolved at the end of 1991, the United States gained the advantage of becoming the world's only superpower and it has been able to maintain its global political leadership by promoting its economic potential through military power.

On the other hand, it became clear from the early 2000s that the U.S. economic power would not allow it to sustain its current leadership. One of the most important indicators of all this was the economic crisis that broke out in the U.S. in 2008 and then spread all over the world. This has led to questioning the current economic order in the U.S. and around the world.³ In addition to the 2008 economic crisis, there were also some domestic problems in the U.S. The first one was the claim that, while the political classes, in general, did not listen to the middle class's voice very much, Trump did. The second was the claim that Trump turned the elections into a referendum against the ruling class in Washington, to which the public has reacted over the years. Third, Trump was the only candidate who promised to fix the system that the electorate believed was corrupt. Fourth, when Hillary Clinton held campaign rallies with celebrities like Beyoncé and Jay-Z, Trump spoke of the "forgotten" working class in his campaign. This situation, it is claimed, offered the working class the opportunity to take "revenge" on the political elite by voting for Trump. The fifth was the myth of the country's liberation from the "others," reflected in Trump's and his supporters' calls to "take our country back," which is primarily associated with the white male mass.⁴ Donald Trump ran for president of the United States during a global and domestic crisis and was elected. Trump has been critical of the current economic system and the international political and military structure built on it, even during his election campaign, stressing that the current order no longer serves U.S. interests. Trump is aware that the current international economic order is not in U.S. interests because the U.S. economy is losing its competitive advantage over its rivals.

To achieve his campaign goal of "Make America Great Again," Trump considered raising trade tariffs, bringing back industries that had left the country, and reducing commitments to international organizations that he considered a burden on the U.S. It can be stated that this policy, which prioritizes U.S. interests in a commercial sense and is based on defending the U.S. economy from external influences with its protection shields, has mostly a neo-mercantilist tendency. However, rivals such as

³ Andrew Heywood, *Küresel Siyaset* [Global Politics], Nasuh Uslu, Haluk Özdemir (Trans.), Ankara, Adres Yayınları, 2013, p. 146.

⁴ Gregory Krieg, *How did Trump win? Here are 24 theories*, "CNN," in <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/10/politics/why-donald-trump-won/index.html> (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

China, as well as traditional allies such as the European Union (EU), Japan, Mexico, and Canada, have criticized the neo-mercantilist policy, which implies the gain of one side at the expense of the other. This has caused the U.S. to become isolated, especially in foreign policy. In this respect, it can also be stated that Trump has made the U.S. smaller by imprisoning the country in its own shell while trying to achieve his goal of "Make America Great Again." This is, however, an undesirable situation for a state with a goal of global leadership like the U.S.

In this context, this study aims to explain the impact of policies implemented during the Trump era that have mostly neo-mercantilist tendencies on U.S. foreign policy. In doing so, it will be mainly focused on the steps Trump took after he came to power and their effects on U.S. foreign policy. The effects of these policies were examined mostly through Trump's attitude towards the international organizational structure established under U.S. leadership. From this general perspective, the study was divided into two parts. The first chapter focuses on what mercantilism is and the transformation process into neo-mercantilism, while the second chapter uses the neo-mercantilism theory to examine U.S. foreign policy from a political and economic perspective.

NEO-MERCANTILISM

The term mercantilism was used for the first time in the 1750s by French physiocrat Victor de Riqueti (Marquis de Mirabeau). Twenty years later, Adam Smith, the writer of the *Wealth of Nations*, devoted almost a quarter of his work to a systematic analysis of the weaknesses and limitations of mercantilist trade policy; and thus, critics of Smith from the very beginning played an essential role in the emergence of mercantilist thought.⁵ Mercantilism can be defined as the establishment of economic nationalism as a state policy. Moreover, it is primarily related to the flow of goods in the sense of bullion movement or creating a trade balance in favour of the country. It is also a doctrine claiming that power and wealth are closely related and that they are legitimate goals of national policy. In this context, mercantilism asserts that wealth is necessary for power, and on the other hand, power is necessary to achieve wealth.⁶ According to mercantilists,

⁵ Salman Ahmed, Alexander Bick, *Trump's National Security Strategy: A New Brand of Mercantilism?*, "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace," in <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/08/17/trump-s-national-security-strategy-new-brand-of-mercantilism-pub-72816> (Accessed on 01.08.2020), p. 6.

⁶ Jeffrey A. Frieden, David A. Lake, *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global*

power and wealth can be achieved by creating a trade surplus. In addition, creating a trade surplus can only be possible by accumulating precious metals within the country and exporting manufactured goods rather than agricultural products. Owning precious metals has led to dominating the goods, resources, and labour necessary for wealth and power. Therefore, a state's power depended on the amount of gold and silver in its safe deposit box.⁷ As mentioned above, the essence of mercantilism is based on the construction of a national economy through protectionism and state power.⁸

The central contribution of classical mercantilism to the international political economy is to recognize and legitimize the state's role in regulating domestic economic activities and promoting foreign economic expansion, whether by peaceful or military means.⁹ In this context, mercantilism has given priority to the state, national security, and military power in the functioning and organization of the international system. So, the mercantilists also argued that national interests would always differ from the collection of individual interests.¹⁰

Also, it must be pointed out that Colonialism played a central role in mercantilism. The colonies not only provided raw materials to the centre, but also served as a market for their manufactures. Although the ideology was criticized for pursuing beggar-thy-neighbour policies, mercantilists' emphasis on national power played an important role in ensuring state authority and territorial integrity.¹¹ International trade has therefore been defined as a zero-sum game in the era of mercantilist policies. What is meant by this is that a state can only increase its wealth at the expense of the other.¹²

Power and Wealth, Fourth Edition, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 69.; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II*, New York, Academic Press, Inc., 1980, p. 37.

⁷ Anthony Brewer, *Cantillon and Mercantilism*, in "History of Political Economy," Vol. 20, no. 3, 1988, p. 448-449.; Gianni Vaggi, Peter Groenewegen, *A Concise History of Economic Thought: From Mercantilism to Monetarism*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 16.

⁸ Phillip Anthony O'Hara, *Encyclopedia of Political Economy: Volume 1: A-K*, London, Routledge, 2004, p. 470.

⁹ Robert Falkner, *International Political Economy*, London, University of London, 2011, p. 21.

¹⁰ Robert Gilpin, *Uluslararası İlişkilerin Ekonomi Politikası* (Political Economy of International Relations), Fourth Edition, Murat Duran et al. (trans.), Ankara, Kripto Basın Yayın Dağıtım Ltd. Şti., 2014, p. 48-49.; Anthony Payne, *The Genealogy of New Political Economy*, in Anthony Payne (Ed.), *Key Debates in New Political Economy*, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 2.

¹¹ Theodore H. Cohn, *Global Political Economy*, Sixth Edition, Boston, Longman, 2012, p. 19-20.

¹² Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 78.;

Essentially, the neo-mercantilist approach shares the common goal of achieving national prosperity through trade management, like classical mercantilism. However, while classical mercantilism arose in a period when the nation was embodied by a monarch or ruler, neo-mercantilism emerged within the framework of a narrower and more democratic concept of nation. States no longer consider wealth to be the accumulation of gold, but rather the accumulation of trade surpluses and the dominance of global markets by national enterprises.¹³ Neo-mercantilism attempts to define a more complex world in which states, characterized by intense counter-dependency and globalization, use a wide range of distinctive tools (especially economic ones) to protect their societies.¹⁴ Therefore, it could be said that neo-mercantilism focuses on the role that international political relations play in the organization and direction of the world economy.¹⁵

The “neo” prefix was attached to mercantilism for reasons such as the shift from classical mercantilism’s emphasis on military activities to economic development and the acceptance of more market determination on internal prices than classical mercantilism. Essentially, it was claimed that neo-mercantilism is based on the control of capital movement and the reduction of domestic consumption to increase foreign reserves and promote capital development. Many protectionist policies have been adopted for this purpose. The aim is to develop export markets in developed countries and acquire strategic capital while keeping asset ownership in the country. Therefore, it can be pointed out that neo-mercantilism proposes a new policy of protectionism, which is qualitatively distinct from classical mercantilism, which placed statism at the centre of state-building and national power.¹⁶

Neo-mercantilism refers to ingenious policies that reduce countries’ vulnerability against international competition but also do not undermine their free-trade commitments under the GATT. International trade agreements do not explicitly prohibit many of the neo-mercantilist techniques.¹⁷ The most straightforward

Fu-Lai Tony Yu, *Neo-Mercantilist Policy and China’s Rise as a Global Power*, in “Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations”, Vol. 3, 2017, no. 3, p. 1045.

¹³ Philip M. Nichols, *The Neomercantilist Fallacy and the Contextual Reality of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act*, in “Harvard Journal on Legislation”, Vol. 53, 2016, p. 222.

¹⁴ David N. Balaam, Bradford Dillman, *Uluslararası Ekonomi Politîği...*, p. 92.

¹⁵ Björn Hettne, *Neo-Mercantilism: The Pursuit of Regionness*, in “Cooperation and Conflict”, 1993, Vol. 28, no. 3, p. 219.

¹⁶ Donald Chiuba Okeke, Juanee Cilliers, Carel Schoeman, *Neomercantilism as Development Ideology: A Conceptual Approach to Rethink the Space Economy in Africa*, in “African Studies”, Vol. 77, no. 1, 2018, p. 39-40.

¹⁷ David N. Balaam, Bradford Dillman, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

measure among these is unquestionably the tariffs. Developed countries use relatively low tariffs, generally less than 5 per cent, while developing countries impose higher tariffs than many developed countries. Besides, agricultural products are subject to higher tariffs than manufactured goods in almost every country.¹⁸

The increased use of non-tariff barriers is another neo-mercantilist policy implemented within this framework. Non-tariff barriers include regulatory and labelling requirements, as well as government regulations on health and safety standards. They also include rules prohibiting the purchase and distribution of imported goods in certain areas of the national industry. Similarly, import quotas have been imposed to determine how much a particular good can be imported. Another method used to restrict imports is the "Voluntary Export Agreement". In this practice, the importer and the exporter negotiate to determine a quota or make a "gentlemen's agreement". Under this agreement, the exporter "voluntarily" complies with the import restriction of the importer, since it was anticipated that the importer would take further damaging measures to protect its export products.¹⁹

It can be stated that mercantilist thought continues to direct economic policies around the world. Mercantilists accept that the political and economic spheres are directly interrelated. They also place the state in a central position in this relationship. It can be said that mercantilism focuses on the state-centred approaches in the economy as well as protectionist policies aiming at economic development and growth. Although liberal policies based on free trade have received extensive support from economists and continue to drive the modern international trade system, governments, in particular, continue to implement trade protectionism, namely mercantilism, to protect their economies from fierce international competition.²⁰ For example, some of the EU policies, such as imposing subsidies to protect the agricultural sector against the developing world, can also be described as mercantilist. Similarly, China has been criticized for implementing mercantilist policies in such a way as to keep the value of its own currency low against other currencies and increase state-owned investments, exports, and trade surplus. Besides, the U.S., which had difficulty competing with world prices, has also faced similar criticism for introducing the "Buy American" rules for public procurement.²¹

¹⁸ Douglas A. Irvin, *Free Trade Under Fire*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 72-73.

¹⁹ David N. Balaam, Bradford Dillman, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

²⁰ Robert Falkner, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

²¹ Tim Gee, *The World System is Not Neo-Liberal: The Emergence of Structural Mercantilism*, in "Critique", Vol. 37, 2009, no. 2, p. 254-255.

ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONTEXT OF NEO-MERCANTILIST THEORY

Following the Soviet Union's dissolution, the U.S. has become a hegemon state in the international system. Undoubtedly, the U.S.' economic power played an important role in achieving this leadership. Moreover, this power was institutionalized after the Second World War. This institutional structure, represented by organizations such as World Trade Organization (WTO)²², World Bank, and the GATT, played a liberalizing role in world trade in parallel with America's economic superiority.

At this point, according to Krasner's hegemonic system theory, an approach to trade theory in which one of the states in the system is assumed to be more advanced than other trading partner, the costs and benefits of trade openness are not symmetrically reflected in all members of the system. The hegemonic state would prefer an open structure because of its economic and military power, and such a structure would increase the total national income of the hegemonic state. During its global reign, where its relative size and technological leadership have increased, this will also increase its growth rate. Since the opportunity cost of closure is low for a big and developed state, an open structure will further increase its political power.²³

Most importantly, Krasner argued that the hegemonic state could use its economic resources to create an open structure. In terms of positive incentives, it can offer access to its massive domestic market and relatively cheap exports. Essentially, the economic power of a hegemonic state creates an atmosphere of confidence for the stability of the global monetary system. In addition, the currency provides the necessary liquidity for the functioning of the international financial system. So, it can be assumed that trade openness is likely to emerge in a period dominated by a hegemonic state. Moreover, such a state aspires to create a structure characterized by low tariffs and increasing trade rates.²⁴

²² The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of international trade. The WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by most of the countries in the world and approved by their parliaments, are the basis of this organization. The main purpose of the organization is to ensure that trade is carried out as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. See World Trade Organization, *The WTO*, in https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

²³ Stephen D. Krasner, *State Power and the Structure of International Trade*, in "World Politics," Vol. 28, 1976, no. 3, p. 322.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 322-323.

As Robert W. Cox points out, international organizations are the most prominent mechanisms that enable the spread and adoption of world hegemony. International organizations function as a process through which the institutions and ideology of hegemony flourish. In this way, international organizations facilitate the spread of dominant economic and social forces, while also facilitating the adoption of regulations made by them. In this context, institutions such as the IMF, GATT, and the World Bank, the Bretton Woods organizations led by the U.S. that manage the world monetary system and trade relations, are of great importance. It is possible to say that these organizations are essentially designed as tools that facilitate the economic spread of U.S. hegemonic power.²⁵ Therefore, it can be stated that the Bretton Woods institutions are based on exactly such U.S. expansionism. From the constructivist perspective, these institutions shaped behaviour and structures designed in favour of hegemonic power.²⁶

In terms of the international trade system's functioning, it is worth noting that the 1960s were one of the most liberal periods due to the U.S. hegemonic power, especially in the economic sector. During this period, trade levels increased, and traditional regional trade models weakened. However, hegemonic systems theory would predict a slump in indicators, or at least a recession, like today, if U.S. power declines.²⁷

The national security strategies of the U.S. administrations reveal how current governments view the country's political and economic position and its role in the world. As the global environment shifts, these strategies also adapt to these changes over time. However, the sixteen national security strategy documents submitted to Congress from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama point out that some fundamental perspectives remain nearly unchanged. The most important of these is undoubtedly the idea that the U.S. should use its unrivalled power to defend and advance a liberal international order based on the strong alliances in Europe and Asia, open markets, and democracy promotion.²⁸

Nevertheless, the international financial crisis in 2008, which affected nearly the entire world, is believed to have ended the era of neoliberalism and started another phase in modern capitalism, since this crisis has deeply shaken the legitimacy

²⁵ Robert W. Cox, *Gramsci, Hegemony ve Uluslararası İlişkiler: Metot Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme*, Esra Diri (Ed.), in "Uluslararası İlişkilerde Anahtar Metinler" (551-567), İstanbul, Uluslararası İlişkiler Kütüphanesi, 2013, p. 563-564.

²⁶ Tim Gee, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

²⁷ Stephen D. Krasner, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

²⁸ Salman Ahmed, Alexander Bick, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

foundations of neoliberalism, both politically and intellectually.²⁹ In a country considered a pioneer of capitalism, such as the U.S., the outbreak of a crisis triggered by liberalization, largely caused by neoliberal policies, prompted the world economic system to look for different ways. In turn, this brought up mercantilist policies. Thus, not surprisingly, mercantilist policies have become popular again in the U.S. In general, it is possible to explain why mercantilist policies are back on the U.S.' agenda under four headings. The first and foremost, no doubt, is the financial crisis that occurred in 2008. The second is the ideal of reaching a higher trade rate and more inclusive economic growth. The third is the need to cope with the multiple threats in the labour market triggered by globalization, as well as keep up with unprecedented advances in technology. The fourth is the necessity to compete with the alternative model of state capitalism that has emerged with China's rise and its consistent economic growth over the past three decades.³⁰

The trade imbalance with China, regarded as the cause of the U.S.' economic collapse began to be frequently stated in the Trump era from a mercantilist perspective. Trump expressed his views on China in a speech he gave on September 25, 2019, at the United Nations General Assembly.³¹ At the core of this speech lie neo-mercantilist ideas, which mainly emphasize that the trade deficit is harmful. From this point of view, it can be inferred that this is a neo-mercantilist discourse since supporting export surplus is preferable to imports. According to this approach, if we import more than our exports, our competitors eventually will take our business and profits. Thus, trade is reduced to a zero-sum game in which one state's gain causes the other's loss.³²

Although its power has relatively diminished over time, the U.S. still remains the world's unrivalled economic and military power. During his Presidency, Obama confirmed that maintaining U.S. leadership and liberal international order as a national security strategy would best serve U.S. long-term interests. On the other hand, in the National Security Strategy Document, dated May 2010, Obama drew attention to the need for a significant strategic shift in the ways and means

²⁹ Jürgen Kocka, *Kapitalizmin Tarihi* [Capitalism, a Short History], Evrim Tevfik Güney (Trans.), İstanbul, Say Yayınları, 2018, p. 184-185.

³⁰ Salman Ahmed, Alexander Bick, *op. cit.*, p. 5.; Andrew Heywood, *op. cit.*, p. 122-126.

³¹ For speech, please see White House, *Remarks by President Trump to the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly*, in <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-74th-session-united-nations-general-assembly/> (Accessed on 14.08.2020).

³² Paul F. Cwik, *The New Neo-Mercantilism: Currency Manipulation as a Form of Protectionism*, in "Economic Affairs," Vol. 31, 2011, no. 3, p. 9.

of U.S.-world relations to compete and cooperate more effectively with other nations.³³ When Trump came to power, he faced a similar challenge. In this context, according to Ahmed and Bick, Trump had two options. The first was to sustain the U.S.-led international order by introducing different ways and means to strengthen the American position in the system. The second was the abandonment of the existing system to be able to promote interests defined in a narrower framework in the neo-mercantilist sense.³⁴

Trump's election victory came after several decades of trade liberalization, growing social inequalities, and the legitimacy crisis of traditional political elites. Cozzolino claimed that Trump has managed to support an increasingly marginalized and impoverished part of U.S. society by using populist dreams and rhetoric. There were two main campaign slogans, "American workers" and "re-industrialization of the country." In this way, this campaign received support, especially from internal parts of the country, which were exposed to foreign trade competition and severely suffered from unemployment, population loss, and the economic crisis.³⁵ Besides, Trump has discredited multilateral institutions (such as international organizations) for reasons such as the perception that they brought financial costs and cause a trade deficit, both during the election campaign and during the U.S. presidency, and stressed that they are not advantageous to the U.S. On the other hand, he has described allies as laggards who make a habit of counting on the U.S. in terms of their economic or physical security.³⁶ In his speeches both during the election campaign and after he was elected, Trump appears to have preferred to pursue a kind of narrowed U.S. interests in neo-mercantilist terms.

In his speech on July 6, 2017, in Warsaw at Poland's capital, Trump referred to the phrase "community of nations" several times; however, his tweets and remarks in the background were about the need for maintaining a more aggressive stance to protect the U.S. interests. Besides, Trump has consistently stressed that the U.S. is of high value to its traditional allies. Trump also defended trade agreements, some of which are regarded as a transition to a Hobbesian interpretation of

³³ For detailed explanation, please see White House, *National Security Strategy*, in https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (Accessed on 18.01.2021).

³⁴ Salman Ahmed, Alexander Bick, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

³⁵ Adriano Cozzolino, *Trumpism as Nationalist Neoliberalism: A Critical Enquiry into Donald Trump's Political Economy*, in "Interdisciplinary Political Studies," Vol. 4, 2018, no. 1, p. 49.

³⁶ Robert W. Murray, *Whither Multilateralism? The Growing Importance of Regional International Societies in an Emerging Multipolar Era*, in Christian Echle et al. (Eds.), in *Multilateralism in a Changing World Order*, Singapore, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2018, p. 16.

the international system. Besides that, these trade agreements showed that Trump's policies differ from previous ones. These policies are also said to confirm Trump's desire to resurrect a form of economic nationalism.³⁷ In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 2019, Trump also expressed his discomfort with the trade agreements: "In America, the result was 4.2 million lost manufacturing jobs and \$15 trillion in trade deficits over the last quarter-century. The U.S. is now taking that decisive action to end this grave economic injustice. Our goal is simple: We want a balanced trade that is both fair and reciprocal."³⁸

The terms of mercantilism and Trump are often used together. A simple Google search for "Trump" and "mercantilism" yields thousands of results in various categories.³⁹ However, the increasing interest in mercantilization in the U.S. is not solely related to Trump. The interest in mercantilist policies tends to resurface in moments of deep crisis when the relationship between politics and economy is questioned.⁴⁰

In this regard, Trump announced new tariffs after coming to power and initially introduced a 25% tax on steel and a 10% tax on aluminium in 2018. These new tariffs were introduced under the U.S. trade provisions, known as Section 232 Investigations, on the grounds of protecting "vital security interests." However, countries adversely affected by these new tariffs have responded with counter-measures. In this context, in addition to Canada, the EU and China also announced retaliatory tariffs to make the U.S. abandon these new tariffs. This situation was considered the beginning of tit-for-tat protectionism. On the other hand, the U.S. administration thought these tariffs could bring their job opportunities back.⁴¹

It is reasonable to state that international trade is of great importance for the Trump administration since the country's current budget deficit is at the level of

³⁷ Salman Ahmed, Alexander Bick, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

³⁸ White House, *Remarks by President Trump...*

³⁹ For example, on August 19, 2020, a search on Google with the keywords "Trump and mercantilism" found 448,000 results. See *Trump and mercantilism*, https://www.google.com/search?sxsrf=ALeKk004P2Peu228rZyfGkJLx-ux-XWQAIQ%3A1597844344342&ei=eCs9X_7bE8TgUffZlNgP&q=Trump+and+mercantilism&oq=Trump+and+mercantilism&gs_lcp=CgZwc3ktYWIQDDIGCCMQJx-ATUABYAGDtZQpoAHAAeACAAYIjiAGCCZIBazctMZgBAKoBB2d3cy13aXrAAQE&scli-ent=psy-ab&ved=0ahUKEwj-97KESqfrAhVEcBQKHfcsBfsQ4dUDCAw (Accessed on 19.08.2020).

⁴⁰ Salman Ahmed, Alexander Bick, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴¹ Werner Antweiler, *U.S. Neomercantilism*, in <https://wernerantweiler.ca/blog.php?item=2018-06-25> (Accessed on 06.08.2020).

\$ 498.4 billion.⁴² Trump wrote in the Budget scheme of 2018 that the trade agreements he described as “terrible” and inherited from previous administrations swept away the American nation’s welfare and jobs. During running for the Presidency, he even questioned and underestimated the U.S. alliance system. Trump also declared that he would never allow the U.S. to enter any agreement that would limit the country’s ability to manage its own affairs. In this regard, he allowed the U.S. to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)⁴³ negotiations through one of the first decrees issued in January 2017 at the White House. This symbolically significant decision demonstrated the new course of U.S. trade policy and its reluctance to bear the costs of the U.S. global hegemonic position.⁴⁴ The U.S. withdrawal from TPP offered an unexpected opportunity for China, a state that did not hesitate to use multilateral institutions to promote its interests. Following this action, some Southeast Asian elites began to think that the U.S. had lost its strategic position to China and that the Trump administration was less interested in the region, less likely to engage in free trade, and not reliable enough.⁴⁵

After the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP agreement, the White House issued three executive orders to reconsider its foreign trade, trade deficit issues and reactivate its industrial base.⁴⁶ The first order was issued on March 31, 2017. As part of this order, the President urged all executive departments and government agencies to prepare a report on the trade deficit and its causes, unequal obligations and unfair discrimination against U.S. trade, the impact of trade relations on the manufacturing and defence industries, wage increases and employment, and business practices harming to national security. The second decree, on the other hand, sought to protect U.S. revenues from importers’ dumping practices, strengthening the policy of the first decree. In terms of implementing the policy,

⁴² In 2019. See *U.S. Current Account Deficit Widened in 2019*, in <https://www.bea.gov/news/blog/2020-03-19/us-current-account-deficit-widened-2019> (Accessed on 19.08.2020).

⁴³ TPP is a free trade agreement designed to liberalize trade and investment between 12 countries (New Zealand, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, the U.S. and Viet Nam) on the Pacific coast. See New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Trans-Pacific Partnership*, in <https://www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz/> (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁴⁴ Adriano Cozzolino, *op. cit.*, p. 55.; Charles E. Morrison, *Tradition, Trump, and the Future of U.S. Participation in Multilateralism*, Christian Echle et al. (Eds.), in *Multilateralism in a Changing World Order*, Singapore, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2018, p. 35.

⁴⁵ Robert W. Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁴⁶ Adriano Cozzolino, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

the decree called on all administrative agencies to develop a plan that includes importers who risk U.S. revenues and strengthen anti-dumping and compensatory obligations through appropriate legal measures. The third decree is even more meaningful in introducing economic nationalism (neo-mercantilism) and the new populist mentality. This decree is meaningfully titled "Buy American" and "Hire American." The decree is particularly significant as it includes vital issues such as industrial growth, trade relations, immigration, and protectionism for U.S. products. The order's overall goal is to support economic security and national security by increasing the use of goods, products, and materials produced entirely in the United States, as well as to help boost economic growth, create good jobs with adequate salaries, strengthen the middle class, and support the production and defence industries of the United States.⁴⁷

Following U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, Trump targeted this time the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)⁴⁸. He stated that he wanted to revise the agreement several times in terms of imposing new tariffs and "review the rules of origin, namely the specification of whether, and to what extent, the components of a trade good belong to the U.S. and/or the NAFTA area—in this regard, Chinese products would be particularly damaged."⁴⁹ Trump's negative attitude toward NAFTA has led to the belief that the U.S. also openly targeted its very long-lasting allies, Canada and Mexico. Given the pre-Trump American policy, this situation confused the international community.⁵⁰

While the ongoing trade war between the United States and China, as well as the Trump administration's efforts to change NAFTA, have occupied a prominent place on the American agenda, the Trump administration's efforts to weaken the WTO's Appeals Body could have far-reaching consequences. It can be said that this step is a breaking point that negatively affects the global economic leadership of the U.S.⁵¹ The reason for this attitude of the U.S. was the WTO's dispute settlement system,

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 55-56.

⁴⁸ NAFTA, which entered into force in 1994, aims to create a free trade zone between Mexico, Canada and the U.S. As of January 1, 2008, all tariffs and quotas for US exports to Mexico and Canada under NAFTA have been removed. See International Trade Administration, *North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)*, in <https://www.trade.gov/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta> (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁴⁹ Adriano Cozzolino, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁵⁰ Robert W. Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁵¹ Clark Packard, *Trump's Real Trade War Is Being Waged on the WTO*, "Foreign Policy," <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/09/trumps-real-trade-war-is-being-waged-on-the-wto/> (Accessed on 13.08.2020).

which the Trump administration criticized, judging that it was not functioning well. In this context, both Democratic and Republican U.S. administrations have, for years, opposed the way the WTO interpreted global trade rules in judicial decisions. Furthermore, the decisions have led many American trade experts to argue that WTO bureaucrats unfairly stripped the U.S. trade privileges. Washington has also argued that the WTO could not ensure that China, which joined it in 2001, fulfils its commitment to open its economy to the world and did not punish the country's practices that violate the rules of a free-market economy. Trump also opposes China being classified as a developing country by the WTO. This anger, triggered by the causes mentioned above, peaked in 2019 when the U.S. rendered one of the WTO's most influential bodies, the Appellate Body, dysfunctional. Thus, U.S. paralyzed the organization's ability to arbitrate commercial disputes between states. Trump, who targeted the WTO in his election campaign and has been a constant critic of the organization, has tried to bring jobs back to the U.S. from the moment he came to power with his carrot-and-stick policy that has mostly mercantilist motivations. However, it is not plausible to state that he has so far been very successful in his endeavour.⁵²

The timing of the U.S. waging war against the WTO may also be considered very unfortunate. The director of the WTO, Roberto Azevêdo, announced that he would leave his post one year early. This impelled the organization to seek a new director-general to lead the organization that plays a central role in managing global trade at a time when protectionism and trade barriers are on the rise worldwide. On the other hand, while the United States' increased opposition to the WTO is understandable, it is claimed that the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the organization would be disastrous not only for the world but also for the United States' prestige and power. Simultaneously with these steps, pursuing the "America First" policy to increase its share of global trade could undermine the global trade order and motivate other countries to implement similar protectionist policies.⁵³

On the other hand, Trump's zero-sum mercantilist approach also ignores the UN's crucial role in international politics. In his 2018 speech at the UN General Assembly, Trump said, "The U.S. is committed to making the UN more effective and accountable (...) Only when each of us does our part and contributes our share can

⁵² Keith Johnson, *U.S. Effort to Depart WTO Gathers Momentum*, "Foreign Policy," <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/27/world-trade-organization-united-states-departure-china/> (Accessed on 13.08.2020).; Emre Gürkan Abay, *DTÖ Çeyrek Asırlık Tarihinin En Büyük Krizlerinden Birine Hazırlanıyor*, "Anadolu Ajansı," in <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/dto-ceyrek-asirlik-tarihinin-en-buyuk-krizlerinden-birine-hazirlaniyor/1689257> (Accessed on 13.08.2020).

⁵³ Keith Johnson, *op. cit.*

we realize the UN highest aspirations." The UN is an institution that survives mainly through mandatory contributions to its budget. These mandatory contributions help fund the UN's regular budget, covering administrative costs and peacekeeping operations. In total, the U.S. contributed more than 10 billion to the UN in 2018, about a fifth of the U.S. annual foreign aid of \$ 50 billion. In this context, in 2018, while the American contribution to the UN regular budget was 22%, its contribution to peacekeeping operations was 28%. The Trump administration has cut down U.S. financial support to the UN since 2017. First of all, it suspended all funding made to the UN Population Fund in 2017. Furthermore, other UN specialized agencies, such as The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and World Health Organization (WHO)⁵⁴, faced significant financial aid cuts and lost 30% and 20% of the U.S. funding, respectively. Although U.S. aid, in general, has remained steady in recent years, the Trump administration has targeted several specialized agencies, particularly those involved in peacekeeping operations, and has sought to reduce payments to the UN. In the 2021 budget proposal, Trump also reduced aid to the UN peacekeeping efforts and the funding of the Contributions to International Organizations by nearly half a billion dollars (one billion in total) and eliminated the voluntary contributions account for many UN programs.⁵⁵

Trump made one of his loudest speeches targeting the current political system at the UN General Assembly on September 25, 2019. In this speech, he promoted the idea of "America First" and stated that during his Presidency, he would focus primarily on the country's defence resolution, trade, and immigration issues before the establishment of a structure for international cooperation. In this way, he stated that following the restoration of the United States' leadership position, he aimed to build a suitable international structure and explicitly pointed out that the current international structure was unsuitable for American interests. In his speech at the 74th session of the annual gathering of world leaders, Trump affirmed this perspective by saying that "the future belongs to patriots, not to supporters of globalization." In the same speech, Trump backed up his intentions to prioritize U.S. interests based on mercantilist foundations by saying, "The future

⁵⁴ WHO, which started its activities on April 7, 1948, operates with the aim of directing and coordinating international health-related activities within the United Nations system. For detailed information, see the WHO, *About WHO*, in <https://www.who.int/about> (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁵⁵ Amanda Shendruk, Laura Hillard, Diana Roy, *Funding the United Nations: What Impact Do U.S. Contributions Have on UN Agencies and Programs?*, "Council on Foreign Relations," <https://www.cfr.org/article/funding-united-nations-what-impact-do-us-contributions-have-un-agencies-and-programs> (Accessed on 14.08.2020).

belongs to sovereign and independent nations who protect their citizens, respect their neighbours and honour the differences that make each country special and unique." Trump's words at the UN revealed that he was not very keen to take on the responsibility of global leadership adopted by his predecessors.⁵⁶

In addition, the mercantilist approach ignores the benefits of global security architecture, which contributes significantly to global prosperity with the peaceful environment it renders. Trump's discourse on NATO is also based mainly on this misperception. NATO helped Europe's development by reducing the threat of invasion from the Soviet Union during the Cold War and Russia today. Nevertheless, not only did this development benefit millions of European citizens, but it also benefited the United States directly through trade with economically developed Europe. Today, Europe is one of the largest trading partners of the U.S. Contrary to Trump's rhetoric; many Americans would have lost their jobs if not for exports to the European continent.⁵⁷ Hence, Trump's anti-NATO rhetoric⁵⁸ is extremely dangerous, as it exacerbates the Russian Federation's physical threat to

⁵⁶ Anne Gearan, Seung Min Kim, *Trump condemns globalism, touts nationalistic view of foreign affairs at UN*, "The Washington Post," https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-touts-nationalistic-view-of-foreign-affairs-at-un/2019/09/24/e4a8486a-ded2-11e9-8fd3-d943b4ed57e0_story.html (Accessed on 14.08.2020).

⁵⁷ U.S. goods and services trade with the EU were nearly \$1.3 trillion in 2018. Exports totaled \$575 billion, and imports totaled \$684 billion. Together with all member states, the EU ranked first in the U.S. export market in 2018. On the other hand, the EU countries also ranked the second largest supplier of imports to the U.S. in 2018. According to the Department of Commerce, US exports of Goods and Services to the EU financed an estimated 2.6 million jobs in 2015 (1.2 million supported by goods exports and 1.4 million supported by services). For detailed information, see the Office of the United States Trade Representative, *European Union*, <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union> (Accessed on 21.08.2020).

⁵⁸ It has been claimed that President Trump has been secretly expressing his desire to withdraw from NATO for years, the New York Times reported on September 3, 2020. The report alleged that one of the former national security advisers of the Trump administration had said that if Trump was elected, he could withdraw from NATO in the second term. There are also other statements supporting this claim. John R. Bolton, one of Trump's former national security advisers, for example, stated in his book that the president often reiterated his desire to withdraw from the alliance. Bolton also said in an interview with a Spanish newspaper that Trump could make an October surprise by announcing his intention to quit NATO in his second term, just before the election. Also, Michael S. Schmidt, one of the reporters from the New York Times, wrote in his book that John F. Kelly, who was Trump's last Chief of the General Staff, said those around that one of their most challenging tasks was to prevent Trump from leaving NATO. For

millions of Central and Eastern Europeans. Having occupied two of its neighbours in the past two decades (Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014), it is easy to conclude that such statements encourage Putin to further offend his neighbours. While the Trump administration's actions in Ukraine have weakened the anti-Russia Republican platform, Trump's constant praise of Putin has increased the likelihood of the above-mentioned outcome.⁵⁹

The WHO is another organization that Trump wants the U.S. to leave because of similar reasons. Trump's decision to leave the WHO is a continuation of a series of global pacts that he described as disadvantageous to the U.S. In April 2020, Trump sent a letter to the director-general of the WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, demanding that within 30 days, essential steps be taken to establish WHO's independence from China. Subsequently, Trump announced on July 6, 2020, that the U.S. terminated its relationship with the WHO because it could not realize the requested reforms. In this context, the Trump administration notified Congress and the UN that the U.S. officially withdrew from the WHO. The spokesman of the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, said the withdrawal would take effect on July 6, 2021, if the U.S. meets the requirements of giving a one-year notice and its current financial obligations.⁶⁰

Despite all its flaws and limitations, the WHO is crucial in a global health crisis such as a pandemic that necessitates global solutions. On the other hand, leaving the WHO requires withdrawal from other WHO agreements, such as the International Health Regulations. Besides, the WHO was previously identified by the U.S. Department of State as part of the Global Health Strategy to strengthen the detection and fighting off diseases. However, leaving the organization will prevent the U.S. from joining the WHO's global system, which allows epidemic data

detailed information, see Michael Crowley, *Allies and Former U.S. Officials Fear Trump Could Seek NATO Exit in a Second Term*, "New York Times", <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/03/us/politics/trump-nato-withdraw.html> (Accessed on 03.09.2020).

⁵⁹ Charles Szrom, *The Mercantilism of Donald Trump*, "Real Clear World," https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2016/09/23/the_mercantilism_of_donald_trump_112059.html (Accessed on 06.08.2020).

⁶⁰ Zachary Cohen and et al., *Trump administration begins formal withdrawal from the World Health Organization*, CNN, <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/07/politics/us-withdrawing-world-health-organization/index.html> (Accessed on 14.08.2020).; Katie Rogers, Apoorva Mandavilli, *Trump Administration Signals Formal Withdrawal from W.H.O.*, The New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-who.html> (Accessed on 14.08.2020).

and vaccines to be shared. What is more concerning is that the United States' cancellation of aid to the WHO will jeopardize the organization's ability to combat COVID-19 and future epidemics. U.S. financial aid accounts for approximately 15% of the WHO's biennial budget. Furthermore, the U.S. contribution to the organization in the period of 2010-2019 was 893 million dollars. The U.S. has also provided the most considerable funding for the WHO's emergency program. This means that the U.S. withdrawal will reduce critical funding for combating COVID-19. The reduction in funding because of the U.S. withdrawal will reduce the resources available for vaccine development and disease control. This will increase the size and duration of the epidemic and cause the death of many more people. Because the United States is still the most affected country by the epidemic, this situation will endanger its security.⁶¹

Until now, the Trump administration's trade policy has followed a neo-mercantilist course, which can be observed mostly in his attitude towards international agreements (such as TPP, NAFTA). In this context, it is expected that Trump's strategy of establishing bilateral agreements will be a new facet of his economic-nationalist projection on the international stage. On the other hand, given the types of goods imported from China, it is claimed that the tariff policy, which reflects Trump's neo-mercantilist vision, will primarily harm the U.S. economic position.⁶² According to some analysts, a full trade war scenario with Mexico and China - through raising the tariffs to 35 per cent and 35 per cent on non-

⁶¹ Outbreak of the deadly virus. As of December 07, 2020, the number of Covid-19 cases worldwide was 65,870,030 and the number of deaths reached 1.523,583. The number of cases in the U.S. is 14,191,298; the death number is 276,503, however. In other words, approximately 21,5% of the total cases and 18% of the deaths occurred in the U.S. With these numbers, the U.S. by far ranks first both in the number of cases and deaths in the world. For detailed information, see WHO, *WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard*, in <https://covid19.who.int/table> (Accessed on 21.08.2020).; Harold Hongju Koh, Lawrence O. Gostin, *How to Keep the United States in the WHO*, Foreign Policy, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-06-05/how-keep-united-states-who> (Accessed on 14.08.2020).

⁶² U.S. goods imports from China totaled \$539.5 billion in 2018. U.S. imports from China account for 21.2% of overall U.S. imports in 2018. The top import items in 2018 were: Electrical machinery (\$152 billion), machinery (\$117 billion), furniture and bedding (\$35 billion), toys and sports equipment (\$27 billion), and plastics (\$19 billion). See the Office of the United States Trade Representative, *The People's Republic of China*, <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china> (Accessed on 21.08.2020).

oil products - will lead to an increase in inflation and a decrease in the stock market. This will result in a higher debt and equity cost, economic depression, and an increase in unemployment to 4.8 million people in the private sector.⁶³

It is the neo-mercantilist strategy that primarily motivates Trump's behaviour, who has withdrawn or threatened to withdraw from the military and political organizations to health organizations, as well as international economic structures that the United States has established or is in the process of establishing. A broad consensus in favour of free trade will be sacrificed to satisfy local voters under the neo-mercantilist strategy, in which the U.S. role in the world will be mostly transactional and adversarial, and the tools of the U.S. state administration will mainly be adapted toward one narrow definition of self-interest. This policy would make it difficult to maintain the ongoing international cooperation needed to address the international community's common problems or to provide the moral leadership that the United States has sought for the past seventy years on issues such as human rights and democracy.⁶⁴

Other international players have attempted to fill the power gap created by the United States' withdrawal from international organizations as part of Trump's neo-mercantilist-based policy during his presidency. At this point, it can be stated that regional powers, particularly China and Russia, have begun to become increasingly influential in international politics.⁶⁵ The United States' withdrawal from international economic organizations and agreements, or the United States' passive position, appears to have benefited China the most. For example, South-east Asian leaders have interpreted Trump's decision to withdraw from the TPP as a sign that the U.S. no longer values the region and has lost its strategic superiority to China. This, in turn, has offered a major economic opportunity in the region for China, which does not hesitate to take advantage of multilateral economic institutions to serve its own strategic interests.⁶⁶ At this point, it can be asserted that China, coming up with alternative institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank against U.S.-led financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, and implementing ambitious projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative⁶⁷ to spread its economic and ultimately political influence all over the

⁶³ Adriano Cozzolino, *op. cit.*, p. 58-59.

⁶⁴ Salman Ahmed, Alexander Bick, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁶⁵ Robert W. Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁶⁷ The Belt and Road Initiative refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road proposed by the Chinese government. The initiative is an important development strategy initiated to develop economic cooperation between countries on

world, is now heading to fill the gap created by the U.S. in the world.⁶⁸ On the other hand, Trump's initial timid stance toward Russia, as well as the reduction of U.S. commitments to the UN and NATO, has increased Russia's political weight, particularly in international affairs.⁶⁹ Even before Trump came to power, Russia already conducted military interventions primarily in Georgia and Ukraine, which are located in its immediate neighbourhoods, thereby challenging the West under the U.S. leadership. Then, after the uprisings triggered by the Arab Spring spread to Libya and Syria, it first intervened in Syria and then in internal disturbances in Libya. At this point, Russia's role in Syria, in particular, is crucial. Moscow has proven itself as a player of at least equal importance to the U.S. in a region traditionally dominated by the U.S. and has given the U.S. a message implying that Russia will become more involved in global affairs as well.⁷⁰

The policies implemented by the Trump administration were essentially a response to the U.S. problems that accumulated and became inextricable before him. However, Trump focused more on his country, as an underlying part of his campaign promises to fight unemployment and bring jobs back to the U.S. From a neo-mercantilist point of view, to fight unemployment, Trump raised trade barriers to reduce imports and encourage domestic production, as well as pulling the U.S. out of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements or allowing them to operate passively, which he believed had caused fewer job opportunities for Americans and an increase in the budget deficit. This had some international consequences, which he may not have anticipated. Strictly speaking, his decision to withdraw from trade

the Belt and Road routes. Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the above-mentioned initiative in 2013. The Belt and Road Initiative is a global project. However, because it is based on the historic Silk Road, it mainly focuses on countries in Asia, East Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, a region consisting of emerging markets. The initiative is designed to improve the regular free flow of economic elements and efficient allocation of resources. It also aims to promote market integration and establish a regional economic cooperation framework that will benefit all. According to the Belt and Road Portal, more than 100 countries and regions around the world are involved in the Belt and Road Initiative. See Belt and Road, *The Belt and Road Initiative - A Road Map to The Future*, in <https://beltandroad.hktdc.com/en/belt-and-road-basics> (Accessed on 15.01.2021).

⁶⁸ Fu-Lai Tony Yu, *op. cit.*, p. 1057.

⁶⁹ European Parliament, *US-Russia relations: Reaching the point of no return?*, in [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg-DATA/etudes/BRIE/2018/628230/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)628230_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg-DATA/etudes/BRIE/2018/628230/EPRS_BRI(2018)628230_EN.pdf), (Accessed on 18.01.2021), p. 3-4.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

agreements in order to address unemployment and budget deficits, as well as his practice of reducing U.S. commitments to political and military institutions, weakened the institutions that underpin U.S. hegemony, undermining U.S. global leadership. However, this left a void in international institutions and areas where the United States withdrew or reduced its commitments, which was filled by competitors. To be more precise, the neo-mercantilist policies that Trump implemented to rebound the economy at home undermined the U.S. hegemony in the world.

CONCLUSIONS

The United States pursued primarily liberal economic policies, relying on its economic leadership, with organizations established after WWII under the Bretton Woods agreement such as the WTO, IMF, and then GATT. Following the economic crisis of the 1970s, this process was continued with the adoption of neoliberalism. The U.S. remained the world's only superpower with the collapse of the USSR following the Cold War. While struggling economically due to competition from rising powers such as Japan, Germany was able to maintain its dominance, which was based on liberal economic policies and strengthened by its military power. However, the economic crisis that broke out in the U.S. in 2008 and then spread worldwide caused debates, especially in the U.S., about the benefits of the current economic system.

Although the crisis initially appeared to be over, it has been noted that the United States is unlikely to manage the system alone, especially economically. Under these circumstances, Trump, a candidate for the Presidency in 2016, narrowly won the election. Following his election victory, Trump pursued two paths. One of these was to preserve the U.S. position in the current order by making some revisions. The other was to build the foundations of a new order by isolating the U.S. from the current order, which Trump has expressed at every opportunity that does not favour U.S. interests. During his campaign and presidency, Trump claimed that the liberal order that the United States built by itself after WWII no longer served American interests and had instead become a stumbling block.

Trump initially focused on the economy, believing that the current international economic order always resulted in a deficit and, as a result, a decline in comparison to its competitors. In this context, he has turned to implement a neo-mercantilist policy by increasing trade barriers and imposing restrictions against China, which is regarded as its main rival, as well as its traditional allies such as Canada, Mexico, and the EU. This policy, embodied by Trump's slogan "America

First,” led the country to concentrate on domestic issues and while gradually withdrawing from its commitments in international political structures. In this context, the U.S. withdrew from the WHO and the TPP agreement, opened NAFTA up for discussion, reduced its aid to the UN and its specialized agencies, and brought NATO into question by criticizing the excess of U.S. contribution.

Because of his policy, which is primarily motivated by neo-mercantilist understanding, Trump has turned international organizations, primarily established by the United States, into a target. On the one hand, this has weakened U.S. hegemony by undermining the institutions that form the basis of U.S. global domination. On the other hand, the deterioration of these organizations has jeopardized the United States' commitments to its allies who are members of these organizations. For this reason, in the eye of its allies, the U.S. credibility has diminished, too. It can finally be stated that the Trump administration's neo-mercantilist policies have eroded the United States' international commitments and caused it to become isolated in foreign policy.

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PARISIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES

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Abstract: *The author reviewed the volume *Théories des relations internationales*, published by Jean-Jacques Roche (9th edition, 2016, LGDJ, Issy-les-Moulineux Cedex, 160 p.). The main aspects analysed by this author, the concepts he proposed and his interpretations are critically presented.*

Keywords: Jean-Jacques Roche, Book review, International Relations Theories.

Rezumat: *Perspective pariziene privitoare la teoriile relațiilor internaționale. Autorul recenzază volumul *Théories des relations internationales*, publicat de Jean-Jacques Roche (ediția a noua, 2016, LGDJ, Issy-les-Moulineux Cedex, 160 pagini). Principalele aspecte analizate de acest autor, conceptele și interpretările propuse, sunt prezentate de o manieră critică.*

Although the first Department of „International Politics” was established in 1919 at the University of Aberystwyth (UK), International Relations have seen strong assertion as a result of research across the Atlantic. The abundance of works published in English obscures the consistency of interrogations, methodological approaches and perspectives generated by academics and researchers from other geographical, cultural and academic areas. Despite the importance and originality of the reflections on International Relations in the French-speaking world, the specialized bibliography in French is much less known.

The volume of the French political scientist Jean-Jacques Roche is a very useful tool for students and teachers alike, designed to familiarize (or deepen) a more analytical field, oriented towards conceptual articulation, wide methodological openness, interdisciplinarity, such as the theories of International Relations. It is, in other words, a good quality university textbook that can be used as a study guide. Finally, another motivation that was the basis for the elaboration of this review is given by the extremely original perspective offered by its author, an aspect on which we will return below. If we add the clarity of the writing and the precision of the style, we can say, right from the beginning, that we are in front of a work that deserves to be known and read by as many scholars concerned with International Relations.

Jean-Jacques Roche's book *Théories des relations internationales* has already reached its ninth edition, proof of the appreciation it enjoys among a wide range of French and French-speaking readers. Throughout this book, the author highlights the biunivocal influence between theory and international upheavals. The theory remains arid, if not continuously related to real experiences. Aspects such as the interdependencies between Domestic Politics and International Relations, the implications of geopolitical, geostrategic, geo-economic and geo-cultural aspects of International Relations must be considered, both in theory and in political practice. The role of institutions, procedures and information must also be studied, without neglecting the wealth of knowledge, principles and experience gained over centuries of experience. Jean-Jacques Roche shrewdly uses theoretical tools to overcome analytical inaccuracy and the conformity of fashionable ideologies.

A few remarks on this volume are necessary and - hopefully - useful. In the introductory part of the book (pp. 9-16), the author questioned the possibility and finality of a theory of International Relations. Questions of this kind are not superfluous, as the specialized works can prove. The end of the Cold War was a turning point in the field of Theories of International Relations, revealing the limitations of the discipline and its problematic nature.

In fact, the introductory part of the book refers to the discussions related to a "great theory" in the field of International Relations, which was given a first expression by the American Kenneth Waltz, with his *Theory of International Politics* (1979). The French political scientist discusses at length the arguments of Raymond Aron, expounded by him in an article published in 1967 in "*Revue française de science politique*": *Qu'est-ce qu'une théorie des relations*

internationales ? Based on the difficulties he encountered in writing *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (1962), the French political philosopher concluded that there could be no general theory of International Relations due to the “indeterminacy” of diplomatic-strategic conduct and the impossibility of discrimination between endogenous variables of the international system (configuration in power poles) and exogenous variables (economic power relations or internal regimes of states). According to him, only the sociological approach makes it possible to understand in depth the diversity of international systems and to study the behavior of actors in the way they define problems and find solutions to the problems they face. Thus, the scientific approach in International Relations varies not only depending on the idea we have about theory, but also depending on the level of analysis we retain to explain or understand the world.

The architecture of the work is as original as possible. The author organizes the vast material into three main parts, the titles of which may arouse the confusion of the ordinary reader with the Anglo-Saxon bibliography: *L'hégémon réaliste*; State-centered approaches; Non-state-centered approaches. Each part of this triptych comprises several chapters, organized in sequences (or subchapters) that expose, specify, detail, nuance, briefly comment on various theories of International Relations. Representative schools, theories and thinkers are reviewed, arguments, concepts, methods of analysis and their impact on science and on political reality are presented. Everything in a succinct manner, without sacrificing the essential or the significant detail.

The contents of the volume amply illustrate such an assertion. In the first part, dedicated to the “realistic hegemon”, the “disciplinary matrix” is outlined, in the first instance, due to realistic reflection, based on four fundamental paradigms: the state of nature, interest, the central role of the state and the impossibility theorem. After exposing this theoretical armor, essential not only for realism but also for other approaches (even if some of them deny the legitimacy of arguments and the realistic conceptual and methodological framework), various realistic lines of thought are briefly presented, starting with classical realism and assumptions constructed by American or European doctrinaires (Hans J. Morgenthau’s “balance of power”), assuming thegnoseological limits of a young discipline, whose disciplinary outlines still seem uncertain (see the discussion of “sovereignty equivocations” in Raymond Aron). Various “avatars” of realism are then reviewed, generated by a normal interdisciplinary evolution, but also by the need to respond to attacks from

various directions: Kenneth Waltz's neorealism and the creation of the first "great theory" in International Relations; structural realism; liberal realism (oxymoronic formula, which deals with the theory of regimes and the concepts of the best-known author of the "English School", Hedley Bull); neoclassical realism, with its various concerns and accents, ranging from "offensive realism", illustrated especially by John J. Mearsheimer, to "defensive realism"); hegemonic realism, a sequence that considers, for illustration, the argumentative series developed by Robert Gilpin on the Political Economy of International Relations and by Joseph Nye, with his well-known theory of "soft power", a phrase predestined to arouse interest not only among specialists, but also among statesmen with responsibilities in international politics.

The second part of this triptych is intended for theoretical approaches focused on the role of the state in International Relations (*Les approches stato-centrées*). It presents to the reader a melting pot very interesting, perhaps debatable, in places, as long as they are associated and grouped here not only very different theoretical lines, but even schools of thought seemingly distant from each other, not only from an ideational perspective, but also from a methodological point of view. Thus, behaviorist theories are presented alongside the liberal school (with an emphasis on the Kantian tradition and the concept of democratic pax, to which the French political scientist dedicated, as mentioned above, a book), neoliberal institutionalism (focused around Robert O. Keohane's school of "complex interdependence") and theories of cooperation and integration (contractual tradition, functionalism, neofunctionalism, participatory federalism, or intergovernmentalism). Finally, "weak state theories" are also presented in this context. The contribution of the European tradition is revealed by the exposition of the thinking of two remarkable European theorists, Pierre de Senarclens and Samy Cohen.

The last part, *Les approches non stato-centrées*, reveals the same disconcerting juxtaposition of various theoretical strands. Of course, it no longer raises the same doubts on the part of the specialist, because, this time, the challenge of the central role of the state in International Relations is unreservedly shared by exponents of various theoretical trends, ranging from constructivism to various avatars of critical theories. But these are not considered primarily by the author. The cut-out made by the French professor is an original one, even by comparison with textbooks or similar syntheses, elaborated by other scholars of the field. Both the accents and the absences are in the highest degree

representative of the vision projected by the Parisian political scientist regarding the coherence, the extension, and the relevance of the various theoretical schools. Globalism is illustrated by John W. Burton's vision of "world society" or by the allegations of the great sociologist Norbert Elias about a relevant "society of individuals" on the horizon of International Relations. Transnationalism, presented in the same chapter, examines the role of interdependencies in a world in which "networks" or various other representations of International Relations offer theoretical alternatives of great intellectual refinement (such as James Rosenau's specific approach, which starts from the metaphorical concept of "Turbulence", to emphasize the continuing dialectic between continuity and change in world politics). A first part of the next chapter summarizes the approaches of classical imperialism (insisting on its anachronism) and the theory of dependence.

A kind of perplexity may arise in the second part of this chapter, in which under the generic title *L'économie politique internationale* are amalgamated various contributions as invoice, style, content, but - significant fact - and as ideological and ideological expression: the reflections of Robert B Reich, a professor of economics at Harvard and former Secretary of Labor during President Bill Clinton's first term, on the global economy, British author Susan Strange's theses on structural power and "state withdrawal" or the research program of French-speaking political scientist Zaki Laïdi about the detrimental impact of globalization, which generates a loss of meaning and a territorial and ideological uprooting, which projects humanity into a planet less space without relief, in the post-Cold War era, which inaugurates a new "world time"). Finally, in a final chapter, different approaches are added, some of which are of particular interest to historians concerned with International Relations (Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle), others generated by interest in image and imagination, inspired by behaviorism and indebted to the sciences. (Kenneth Boulding, Michael Brecher, R. Jervis), as well as neogramschic approaches (Robert Cox), perhaps more appropriate in the sequence devoted to the imperialist school, to conclude with "middle ground theory", of some constructivist inspiration, but situated by the author at the intersection of reflexivism and constructivism.

This original organization of the material presented by the French political scientist, his insistence on lesser-known authors, his arguments throughout the book, his particular vision of the relevance of theories of International Relations in today's world, and his statements its specific character.

The overall value of this manual also contributes to the good systematization of the subject, the short and clear sequences, the additional explanations (rendered in smaller characters and framed in order to be easily identifiable and, at the same time, not to diminish the coherence and fluency of an easy to read and understand the text). The material thus organized and hierarchized can be much more easily “metabolized” by the reader of the book. Perhaps debatable from the perspective of a different paradigmatic framing, some theoretical affiliations may receive new valences in the light of the arguments put to work by the French scholar. Equally intriguing is the lack of recognition of the specificity of the so-called “English School of International Relations” or the lack of interest in resonant approaches in our age, such as feminism. Instead, bringing to the fore some less assimilated European contributions to the American academic environment (see the chapter *La tradition stato-centrée européenne*, pp. 104-108 or the subchapter *La globalization comme program de recherche*, pp. 133-134, in which discusses Zaki Laïdi’s very provocative theories) should be welcomed with all openness.

But is one theory (or more) possible in the field of International Relations? Under what conditions? How else to end this presentation, if not by resuming the implicit questions that open the book of the French political scientist, during which he tries to justify nuanced, with remarkable professional probity and analytical balance, the usefulness of theoretical approaches.

Jean-Jacques Roche eloquently demonstrates to us that it is possible and desirable at least to judiciously systematize different theoretical approaches. The political scientist from the University of Paris 2 expresses his conviction in the usefulness of systematizing the theories developed so far. Proposing alternative reading grids on the international political reality, the theoretical approaches cannot claim a universalist vocation, they succeed each other quickly and sometimes transform even from within. (Plural) readings of International Relations can, however, the French professor tells us, provide useful help in understanding a changing world: “It will only be a matter of making a quick inventory of the research pursued since International Relations more or less autonomous discipline, to identify the lines of force separating the different currents, to study the evolutions within the same school of thought in order, perhaps, to succeed in suggesting possible bridges between more complementary than truly competitive work” (*Introduction*, p. 16).

But it is not a triumphant reply. With lucidity, the author concludes, in the short summative chapter, on the epistemic precariousness of the theories of International Relations. Echoing the criticisms and reservations he tries to systematize in the Introduction, he reveals, in the Conclusions of the volume, the major divergences that hinder the academic and social acceptance and validation of the discipline. One of the causes lies in the mistrust between the university establishment and the political decision-maker: a mutual contempt undermines the normal tendency to accommodate the theory with political practice. However, the continuous and the paradoxical evolution of the discipline itself is more dissuasive: while the course of world events tends to calm down and simplify, by mitigating antagonisms, theoretical representations seem to take advantage of these periods of calm and endlessly reproduce disciplinary approaches.

Political logic is challenged in the name of economic, social, cultural or religious arguments; state-centered approaches are thus replaced by those that favor new actors, emancipated from any state tutelage. Conversely, in times of political upheaval and strong international tensions, the theoretical framework is greatly simplified, reconsidering the role of approaches that highlight “classical” concepts and visions in the field of International Relations, reassessing the importance of the state, balance of power, concerns for the security sphere, etc. In this way, Theories of International Relations turns out to be a Uroborus devouring its own tail. It is a “Newtonian” movement, in the terms of Jean-Jacques Roche (p. 145), which, starting from the critical requirements, specific to the academic spirit, wanting to go beyond appearances, ends up drowning the records.

Should we see here an act of impiety of the author towards the discipline he serves? Presumption or - worse - passivism or defeatism? Unjustified mistrust regarding the validity of the theoretical field of International Relations? No, not at all. Rational, balanced, lucid, the Parisian political scientist fully understands the turmoil that pervaded the disciplinary field in the post-Cold War period, when the very relevance of such a concern was questioned. But rejecting the fantasies and utopias of an “end of history”, Jean-Jacques Roche understands that a reconsideration of theoretical paradigms in the field of International Relations, a conceptual and methodological rethinking, a renewal of perspective, a strengthening of the credibility of the discipline, an agreement of the exigencies of the international policy with the answers offered by the theoretical reflection.

In fact, concludes Jean-Jacques Roche, “there is a certain pacification of the academic field and the beginning of a process of accumulation of knowledge that

could easily produce areas of consensus and result in the launch of inter-paradigmatic research programs" (p. 148).

It is a tonic conclusion, which highlights a cautious optimism. The French political scientist is probably right. The Cassandras who heralded the end of "great theories" and the emptiness of conceptualization in the field of International Relations were wrong.

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3. Richard Little, Barry Buzan, *Sistemele internaționale...*, p. 79.
4. Christine Sylvester, *Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR*, in "Millennium: Journal of International Studies", 1994, Vol. 23, no. 2, p. 315-334.
5. *Australia-NATO Joint Political Declaration*, in http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_94097.htm (Accessed on 12.11.2012).
6. A. I. Denikin, *Put' russkogo ofitsera* [The Way of a Russian Officer], Moskva, Sovremennik, 1991, p. 58.

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