

SOME ARCHAEOMETRICAL DETERMINATIONS ON A LOT OF CUCUTENIAN CERAMIC MATERIALS OF SITE FETEȘTI-LA SCHIT (ADÂNCATA COMMUNE, SUCEAVA COUNTY)

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Rezumat: În vederea analizării probelor de ceramică preistorică, autorii au folosit un analizor cu dispersie spectrală de raze X, tip EDX 900 HS (Energy Dispersive X-ray Fluorescence (EDX) spectrometry), de mare sensibilitate și rezoluție, pentru a evidenția compoziția chimică a acestor artefacte. În lucrare sunt prezentate rezultatele acestei cercetări experimentale, efectuate pe un lot de probe ceramice provenite din situl arheologic Fetești-La Schit, județul Suceava. În această lucrare, autorii prezintă măsurătorile efectuate asupra unor fragmente ceramice eneolitice (Cucuteni A și B), folosind testul Vickers pentru determinarea microdureității diferitelor tipuri de ceramică arheologică, ca indicator fizic și mecanic al acestor artefacte. Porozitatea, împreună cu alte caracteristici fizico-chimice și mecanice, poate fi folosită în evaluarea calității artefactelor arheologice. Autorii propun un număr mare de tehnici pentru analiza acestei caracteristici și prezintă rezultatele analizei imaginii digitale folosind software specializat.

Abstract: In order to analyze prehistoric pottery samples, the authors used a X ray dispersal spectral analyser, EDX type 900 HS (Energy Dispersive X-ray Fluorescence (EDX) spectrometry), of high sensitivity and resolution, to highlight the chemical composition of these artefacts. In the paper are presented the results of this experimental research, performed on the batch of ceramic samples from the archaeological site Fetești-La Schit, Suceava County. In this paper, the authors present the measurements made on some Copper Age ceramics (Cucuteni A and Cucuteni B), using Vickers hardness test to determine the hardness of different types of archaeological ceramics, as physical and mechanical indicator of these artefacts. Porosity, along with other physicochemical and mechanical characteristics, is a feature that can be used in evaluating the quality of archaeological artefacts. The authors propose a number of high techniques for the analysis of this characteristic and present the results of the digital image analysis using specialized software.

Résumé: En vue de l'analyse des preuves de céramique préhistorique, les auteurs ont utilisé un analyseur avec dispersion spectrale avec des rayons X, type EDX 900 HS (Energy Dispersive X-ray Fluorescence (EDX) spectrometry), de grande sensibilité et résolution, pour mettre en évidence la composition chimique de ces artefacts. On a présenté dans l'ouvrage ci-joint les résultats de cette recherche expérimentale, effectuée sur un échantillon de preuves céramiques venues du site archéologique Fetești-La Schit, département de Suceava. Dans cet ouvrage, les auteurs présentent les mesurages effectués sur des fragments céramiques énéolithiques (Cucuteni A et B), tout en utilisant le teste Vickers pour déterminer la micro dureté des différents types de céramique archéologique, comme indicateur physique et

mécanique de ces artefacts. La porosité, ensemble à des autres caractéristiques physico-chimiques et mécaniques, peut être utilisée dans l'évaluation de la qualité des artefacts archéologiques. Les auteurs proposent un grand nombre de techniques pour l'analyse de cette caractéristique et présentent les résultats de l'analyse de l'image digitale tout en utilisant un software spécialisé.

Keywords: *archaeological ceramic, porosity, mechanical property, prehistoric pottery, spectral analysis, chemical composition, hardness, spectroscopy.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The multilayered archaeological site at Fetești-*La Schit* (figure 1) is known in the archaeological literature for the results of systematic research carried out between 2000-2006, through which important clarifications have been made concerning the vertical and horizontal stratigraphy of the area, the traits of the occupation levels, the characteristics of the constructed and inhabited spaces, the layout and functionality of the archaeological complexes, for all the stages of evolution from this site (Cucuteni A₃, Cucuteni B_{1b}, Cucuteni B_{2a}, Horodiștea-Erbiceni II, Early Getic Latène, Late Middle Ages)¹.

There are three distinct categories of cucutenian pottery (painted, usual and "Cucuteni C"), each with its technological, typological and functional features, very important for the understanding of prehistoric life features of this site.




Fig. 1. The location of the Fetești-*La Schit* settlement.


¹ D. Boghian, S. Ignătescu, I. Mareș, B. P. Niculică, *Les découvertes de Fetești – La Schit parmi les stations cucuteniennes du nord de la Moldavie*, in *Cucuteni. 120 years of research. Time to sum up*, Piatra-Neamț, 2005, p. 333-352; D. Boghian, S. Ignătescu, *Quelques considérations sur un vase Cucuteni B aux représentations anthropomorphes peintes, découvert à Fetești – La Schit (Dép. de Suceava)*, in *Codrul Cosminului*, SN, 13 (23), 2007, p. 3-12.

Therefore, in this paper, we proposed to analyze the chemical composition (*X ray dispersal spectral analyser, EDX type 900 HS (Energy Dispersive X-ray Fluorescence (EDX) spectrometry*), hardness (*Vickers hardness*) and porosity (*system such as stereo-microscope OPTIKA that has a digital camera Q-IMAGING Go 3, connected to a PC*) of the nine ceramic fragments: six Cucuteni A phase - SV61, SV64, SV67, SV68, SV69, SV70, and three Cucuteni B phase - SV74, SV77, SV80 (table 1, figure 2), from the archaeological site of Fetesti-La Schit, representative for the Cucuteni culture (4500-3500 BC), in order to clarify elements of technology and functionality of Aeneolithic (Copper Age) pottery.

Table 1. Samples analyzed

No.	Code	Culture	No.	Code	Culture
1	SV61	Cucuteni A	7	SV74	Cucuteni B
2	SV65		8	SV77	
3	SV67		9	SV88	
4	SV68				
5	SV69				
6	SV70				

Fig. 2. Types of samples



2. SPECTRAL ANALYSIS

Among the archaeological remains, pottery is the era of Copper Age largest category of artefacts². For this reason it is a database of sufficient importance that can be studied from several perspectives.

One of the issues of concern related to ceramics is the chemical composition of the material from which they were modelled³.

An advanced method to achieve quantitative and qualitative analysis of ceramics can be Roentgen radiation emission spectroscopy. Energy dispersive spectroscopy X-ray radiation (X rays) is an analysis technique used for analysis and chemical characterization of a sample in solid, powder or liquid⁴.

Capability of the method is based on a fundamental principle which says that each chemical element has a unique atomic structure.

On the theory of X-rays production is done in high vacuum tubes containing a heat-emitting cathode and an anode metallic electrons on to download high-energy electrons gained by further accelerating voltage, the tens or hundreds Volts, applied between two electrodes.

So, to stimulate the emission of characteristic X radiation of a sample, a beam loaded with energy, such as electrons or protons, or a cannon X-rays, is directed towards the sample to be analyzed. Photons emitted by the sample are captured by a detector, a semiconductor silicon doped with lithium or SDD detector (silicon drift detector), cooled with liquid nitrogen or by modern Peltier effect. X photons produce a semiconductor ionization, free electron pairs in the electric field polarization effect causes current pulses whose size is proportional to the photon energy. If energy dispersive analysis, X photons of different wavelengths reach the detector, converting it each photon in a pulse of electric charge proportional to the photon energy⁵.

All photons of the same radiation energy, radiation should be represented on the spectrum lines. However, for reasons of imprecision device, they appear as peaks

² Mihai Gramaticu, Silviu-Gabriel Stroe, Dumitru Boghian, Sorin Ignătescu, *Spectral analysis on Copper Age ceramics of the site Fetești-La Schit, Suceava county*, in *Annals of "Dunărea de Jos" University of Galați, Mathematics, Physics, Theoretical Mechanics*, Fascicle II, Year I (XXXII), 2009 (http://www.phys.ugal.ro/Annals_Fascicle_2/Year2009/summary%20Annals%20Fasc%202_2009%20CD_ROM.htm), accessed 15 November 2010).

³ R. E. Mistier, *Tape Casting*, in *Ceramics and Glasses: Engineered Materials Handbook*, Vol. 4, S. J. Schneider Jr. (ed.), ASM International, Materials Park, Ohio, 1991, p. 161-165; I. Ruppel, *Extrusion*, in *Ceramics and Glasses: Engineered Materials Handbook*, Vol. 4, S. J. Schneider Jr. (ed.), ASM International, Materials Park, Ohio, 1991, p. 165-172.

⁴ *Instruction Manual Shimadzu Energy Dispersion Fluorescence X-ray Spectrometer* (<http://www.ssi.shimadzu.com/products/product.cfm?product=EDX>; http://www.ssi.shimadzu.com/products/literature/XRAY/edx_series.pdf), accessed 15 November 2010).

⁵ Gh. Gutt, D. D. Palade, Sonia Gutt, F. Klein, K. G. Schmitt-Thomas, *Încercarea și caracterizarea materialelor metalice [Testing and characterization of metallic materials]*, București, Editura Tehnică, 2001, *passim*.

in the form of a bell (Gaussian profile). The spectrum of X-rays emitted from the sample surface is characteristic of the sample composition, the spectrum analysis and could determine the elemental composition, in the mass concentrations of elements⁶.

Analysis of samples was carried out in the Instrumental Analysis Laboratory within the Food Engineering Faculty Suceava, complex investigation of the samples being made on a spectrometer *Shimadzu EDX-900HS* (figure 3).




Figure 3. Configuration of EDX-900HS

With regard to equipment capabilities, spectrometer *Shimadzu EDX-900HS* is able to detect chemical elements from Na up to U.

The method allows a good separation of the mixture components and a precise identification of existing species.

The quantitative-qualitative analysis results have revealed a relatively uniform composition of chemical compounds with some variations from sample to sample (table 2).

Concentrations of the main metallic oxides are shown in figure 3. It can be seen that the oxides content is different for the studied samples due to the raw materials involved and to the specific inorganic pigments used for the colours. Sample SV80 distinguish from the other seven having high Fe_2O_3 , TiO_2 , K_2O , P_2O_5 contents and a lower Al_2O_3 concentration. There is a possibility that this pieces might be from vessel with a different origin and to not be traditional to this archaeological site.

Table 2. Chemical composition of samples analyzed

Sample Analyte	SV61 [%]	SV65 [%]	SV67 [%]	SV68 [%]	SV69 [%]	SV70 [%]	SV74 [%]	SV77 [%]	SV80 [%]
SiO_2	63.875	59.737	61.207	62.483	62.549	68.764	63.427	67.268	66.765
Al_2O_3	22.476	24.393	23.428	23.382	21.616	20.609	20.321	21.268	12.785
CaO	4.732	6.557	4.902	3.872	6.215	3.179	7.199	2.863	-
Fe_2O_3	4.801	5.140	5.064	5.008	4.953	4.015	4.738	4.654	7.102
K_2O	3.139	3.193	3.126	3.385	3.696	2.593	3.384	3.030	5.789
P_2O_5	-	-	1.354	0.914	-	-	-	-	6.254
TiO_2	0.582	0.548	0.572	0.593	0.618	0.554	0.638	0.594	0.745

⁶ *Ibidem.*

<i>BaO</i>	0.161	0.130	0.139	0.172	0.150	0.152	0.088	0.143	0.141
<i>MnO</i>	0.123	0.186	0.099	0.090	0.084	0.062	0.074	0.062	0.282
<i>Cr₂O₃</i>	0.029	0.029	0.026	0.037	0.031	0.029	0.032	0.031	0.030
<i>SrO</i>	0.019	0.022	0.019	0.016	-	-	0.024	0.013	0.034
<i>ZrO₂</i>	0.019	0.016	0.017	0.016	0.021	0.014	0.021	0.024	-
<i>SnO₂</i>	-	0.018	0.018	-	0.018	-	0.020	0.018	0.023
<i>Rb₂O</i>	0.013	0.015	0.014	0.016	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.013	0.014
<i>ZnO</i>	0.011	0.008	0.012	0.012	0.010	0.007	0.012	0.015	-
<i>Y₂O₃</i>	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.004

3. HARDNESS DETERMINATION

The Vickers hardness test was developed in 1924 by Smith and Sandland. The test evaluates hardness in a manner similar to Brinell taking the ratio between the load applied and the surface area of the resulting impression⁷. Microindentation hardness is a measurement of the size of a microindentation made by a diamond pyramid-shaped indenter of specified size and shape pressed into a polished surface by a known load. The surface is normally not etched prior to the indentation. The Vickers indenter has four-fold symmetry but makes a deeper indentation and is more inclined to cause fractures in brittle materials than the Knoop indenter what has only two-fold symmetry and is commonly used on ceramics.

Although microhardness is a widely accepted term, the more accurate name is microindentation hardness. The emphasis on microstructure and microscopic indentation size is largely what distinguishes microindentation hardness from other hardness scales, such as Rockwell and Brinell. Microindentation hardness can be used to measure the hardness of individual grains, very small pieces, and thin layers⁸.

Hardness is not a unique property but a measure of the reaction of the ceramic to the type of disturbing force imposed⁹. In addition to the indentation methods mentioned here, hardness has also been defined in terms of resistance to scratching (e.g. the Mohs scale), plowing, cutting, abrasion, erosion, damping, and rebound (e.g. Shore hardness). There is no definite numerical or even ordinal correspondence between one hardness scale and another.

Microhardness tester is indispensable equipment for metallographic research, product quality control and research and development of new materials. This measurement should be made on a small area without defects, which can provide results with high precision. Most micro hardness testers can perform either Knoop or Vickers hardness tests, only the indenter needs to be changed.


Principle of Vickers hardness test method is forcing an indenter into the sample surface followed by measuring actual surface area of the indentation. Hardness is not

⁷ R. L. Smith, G. E. Sandland, *An Accurate Method of Determining the Hardness of Metals, with Particular Reference to Those of a High Degree of Hardness*, in *Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers*, London, 1922 (102), Vol. I (Jan.), p 623–641.

⁸ Richard E. Chinn, *Ceramography. Preparation and analysis of ceramic microstructures*, ASM International, Materials Park, Ohio, 2002, p. 160-175.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 160.

a fundamental property and its value depends on the combination of yield strength, tensile strength and the modulus of elasticity.



$$HV = \frac{1,8544 \cdot F}{d^2}$$

Fig. 4. Vickers hardness testing

The composition was made, as we saw, on a Shimadzu EDX-900HS spectrometer and for hardness determination was use a Shimadzu HMV micro hardness tester. This micro hardness tester can work with nine types of loads, belonging interval 98.07mN – 19.61 N. The automatic auto-load eliminates individual variations during loading, giving it a high precision¹⁰.

The parameters set for to determine the hardness are action force F of indenter 980 mN and the loading time of 15s. For each sample were made 3 attempts at each hardness in areas that were not influenced by previous attempts.

In order to get good results from the hardness test of the surface preparation of analysis, samples were followed several stages according to the specifications ASTM C 1161¹¹. Test results are presented in table 3¹²:

¹⁰ M. A. Meyers, K. K. Chawla, *Mechanical Behaviour of Materials*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Pres, 2009, p. 214-228.

¹¹ ASTM C1161 Standards – *Standard Test Method for Flexural Strength of Advanced Ceramics at Ambient Temperature* (<http://www.astm.org/Standards/C1161.htm>, accessed 25 November 2010).

¹² Mihai Gramaticu, Traian Lucian Severin, Dumitru Boghian, Sorin Ignătescu, *Hardness determination of archaeological ceramics*, in *Annals of “Dunărea de Jos” University of Galați, Mathematics, Physics, Theoretical Mechanics*, Fascicle II, Year I (XXXII) 2009 (http://www.phys.ugal.ro/Annals_Fascicle_2/Year2009/summary%20Annals%20Fasc%202_2009%20CD_ROM.htm, accessed 15 November 2010).

Table 3. Hardness samples test

No.	Sample type	HV ₁	HV ₂	HV ₃	HV
1	SV 61	230	246	234	236
2	SV 65	318	288	292	299
3	SV 67	291	286	273	283
4	SV 68	311	302	324	312
5	SV 69	325	339	293	319
6	SV 70	311	344	327	327
7	SV 77	318	337	359	338
8	SV 74	232	230	242	244
9	SV 80	213	205	195	204




Fig. 5. Vickers hardness of Cucuteni A samples




Fig. 6. Vickers hardness of Cucuteni B samples

4. POROSITY DETERMINATION

Porosity, which can be considered as secondary "phase" indicates the degree of densification of a ceramic. As a rule of thumb, porosity less than approximately 8% (greater than 92% densified ceramic) means that the pores are discrete, while porosity greater than 8% indicates a continuous network of pores. Porosity measurements by some other methods, such as pycnometry or buoyancy, are sensitive only to open pores and exclude occluded (closed to the surface) pores. Thus, these other porosity methods do not necessarily agree closely with measurements by ceramographic techniques. Porosity decreases strength by two important mechanisms:

- Pores reduce the cross section area of a member.

- Pores act as stress-concentrating notches¹³.

Although several methods are known for determining the porosity¹⁴, for the study of archaeological ceramics porosity from Fetești-La Schit, we made the analysis in the Materials Science Laboratory of Faculties of Mechanical Engineering, Mechatronics and Management of the „Ștefan cel Mare” University of Suceava, using an optical system such as stereo-microscope OPTIKA that has a digital camera Q-IMAGING Go 3, connected to a PC¹⁵. This system has a 254 pixels/inch resolution that allows jpg image capture with 4915200 pixels size. The total image magnification (stereo-microscope + camera) is 100. For accurate determinations those parameters have been kept to the same level during researches.




Fig. 7. Zone and/or interesting details identification



Fig. 8. Marking the elements of the same type on photography

Each ceramic sample has been photographed on both surfaces (exterior and interior of the ceramic recipient) and in transversal section in representative zones for the sample. The image analysis has been obtained using specialized software, graphic imaging editory program GIMP 2.6.6 (open) and a program for analysis, management and archive of metallographic structures with IQmaterials Media Cybernetics license.

¹³ Richard E. Chinn, *Ceramography...*, ASM International, 2002, p. 159.

¹⁴ Lee E. William, W. Mark Rainforth, *Ceramic Microstructures*, University Press Cambridge, Great Britain, 1994, *passim*; Karen G. Harry, Allen Johnson, *A non-destructive technique for measuring ceramic porosity using liquid nitrogen*, in *Journal of Archaeological Science*, Vol. 31, No. 11, November 2004, p. 1567-1575; Gregory C. Rutledge, Joseph L. Lowery, Chia-Ling Pai, *Characterization by Mercury Porosimetry of Nonwoven Fiber Media With Deformation*, in *Journal of Engineered Fiber and Fabrics*, Massachusetts, USA, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2009, p. 1-13.

¹⁵ Mihai Gramaticu, Nicolae Băncescu, Dumitru Boghian, Sorin Ignătescu, *About some methods of determining the porosity and specific structural constituents in archaeological ceramics*, in *Annals of "Dunărea de Jos" University of Galați, Mathematics, Physics, Theoretical Mechanics*, Fascicle II, Year I (XXXII), 2009 (http://www.phys.ugal.ro/Annals_Fascicle_2/Year2009/summary%20Annals%20Fasc%202009%20CD_ROM.htm, accessed 15 November 2010).

The last program called GSA (Geometrical Surface Analyze) actually analyses geometrical structures.




Fig. 9. The analysis chart obtained by GSA program (a) and example of histogram obtained by GIMP program (b)





Fig. 10. Sample SV61. Section view. a – appearance in section as shown in stereomicroscope; b – highlighting porosity using graphical analysis program; c – highlighting porosity using graphical analysis program

GIMP program is used to simplify some GSA program manoeuvres and to make simple analysis. The photographic images obtained are optical analyzed during which are identified the interest zones.

As an example, in figure 7 has been chosen an area of interest containing a pore. In order to determinate the distribution of porosity surface and its size, and to statistically analyze the measurements, it requires marking this type of detail on sample photography. The easiest method in this case has been offered by GIMP program which helps in pointing out the elements of the same type by marking them on photography (figure 8). Next step regards analysis by established criteria (area, medium diameter, dispersion, etc.). For area calculation it have been applied the GSA program facilities. Due to this purpose the marked detail image is imported in GSA program which sets the analysis criteria. In figure 9 is presented the area analysis chart.

By analysis chart data can be calculated the numerical distribution values, it can be drawn the colour or distribution frequencies histogram, it can be determined the hefts, etc. For example, for percentage distribution calculation can be used the areas estimated in mm² or pixels, applying the same formula: $D = V_1 * 100 / V$ where V_1 represents the value determined by analysis, and V is the total value, an image characteristic, constant and dependent of the set value for camera resolution. Same calculation can also be made for chart analysis obtained, values easily obtained by GIMP program, by mentioning that, in this case, calculations can only be made to pixel values. We analyzed same two groups of samples from the cucutenian site Fetești – La Schit and they were called Cucuteni A and Cucuteni B, according to the chronological phase to which they belong. Each sample was analyzed on both surfaces and in section and for each sample was made one sheet. In the following we present one sheet for each group and the final synthesis. Porosity for sample SV61 from Cucuteni A group is presented in figure 10.

Using the porosity evaluation methods we can determine several structural constituents or foreign ingredients from ceramic composition. Examples are given in figures 11 for mineral inclusions, figure 12 for adhesions and figure 13 for deposits.




Fig. 11. Sample SV61, exterior side the arrow marks a mineral inclusion, probably sand (a) and histogram distribution of mineral inclusions in the surface layer (b).

Calculation area occupied by inclusions, in pixels, for the area leads to:

$$S = 100 \cdot A_i/A_t = 288 \cdot 100/4915200 = 0,0058 \%$$

where: A_i – inclusions area; A_t – total area.

High density and compact ceramic, made perhaps using the wheel or rotating equipment. On the exterior side presents decoration in relief of the Cucuteni specific type. On the interior side it has a layer of carbon black colour like edge. Over this layer can be observed are clay like deposits.

Similarly it has been measured the samples porosity from group Cucuteni B, the given example being onto sample SV74 (figure 14-16).




Fig.12. Calculation of the surface occupied by adhesions. After processing images with image analysis program resulted an area occupied by 0,001%




Fig. 13. Highlighting clay deposits by inversion of color in monochromatic light. Black is the deposition.




Fig. 14 The general appearance of the outer surface (a) and inside (b) of sample SV74. It is noted that the areas are well finished, clean, relatively small pore inserts minerals, probably sand. The inner surface of the dish was better finished than the outer surface. On the exterior sedimentary limestone deposits can be observed.



Fig.15. Identification of porosity on the outer surface of the sample 74 and determine their distribution using the program GIMP. $P = 8,126\%$ calculated in pixels at a resolution of 254 pixels an at an increase order 100.




Fig.16. Marking the inner surface porosity of the sample and determine their distribution using the program GIMP. $P = 0.5486\%$ calculated in pixels at a resolution of 254 and an increase order of 100.

Porosity of samples analyzed is summarized in table 4.

Table 4. Porosity of samples analyzed

Group	Sample no.	Porosity [%]		
		Exterior surface	Interior surface	Section
Cucuteni A	SV61	0,00586	7,268	6,07
	SV65	0,31878	5,406	10,22
	SV67	1,126	6,00	2,889
	SV68	2,53	10,531	19,2
	SV69	0,76	7,5966	1,381
	SV70	0,91	3,749	4,05
Cucuteni B	SV74	8,126	0,00292	1,274
	SV77	11,438	4,705	2,426
	SV80	3,623	27,606	2,7689

5. CONCLUSIONS

Our approach is included in the archaeometric research that seeks to multilateral know archaeological ceramics, in this case the Cucuteni culture (Middle Aeneolithic/Copper Age), and complement other such concerns¹⁶.

Spectral analysis of samples from the archaeological site from Fetești-La Schit revealed differences in terms of proportion regarding oxide compounds. These differences may be explained by the choice of different sources of clay for modelling various types of ceramics (pottery incised, painted, usual, "type C")¹⁷. Another possible explanation that should be further investigated is that the vessels from which the samples analyzed were not implemented all the archaeological site has been discovered, but they arrived from the exchange.

Verifying such assumptions would require additional spectral analysis performed and the sources of clay in the archaeological site in question.

Establishing the exact characteristics of the ceramic samples provide a database that can be compared with samples that could be false.

Analysis results suggest that the different kinds of pottery from both phases: Cucuteni A and B have been obtained using different manufacturing technologies for ceramics. Stages of implementation of product ceramics: selection of the clay, ingredients, modelling, and combustion were outstanding, leading to different values

¹⁶ Linda Ellis, *Analysis of Cucuteni-Tripolye und Kurgan Pottery and the Implications for Ceramic*, in *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 8, 1980, 1-2; Eadem, *A Study in Technology and Origins of Complex Society*, BAR, International Studies, 217, Oxford, 1984; Eadem, *Analysis of Precucuteni Ceramics from Târgu Frumos, Romania*, in vol. *Scripta Praehistorica. Miscellanea in honorem nonagenarii magistri Mircea Petrescu Dimbovița oblata*, Ediderunt Victor Spinei, Cornelia-Magda Lazarovici and Dan Monah, Iași, 2005, p. 261-270; D. Anghel, *Aspecte generale ale tehnologiei prelucrării ceramicii, [General aspects of ceramics processing technology]*, in *Buletinul Cercurilor Științifice Studențești*, Alba Iulia, 4, 1998; Gh. Gâță, *A Technological Survey of the Pottery*, in Silvia Marinescu-Bâlcu, Alexandra Bolomey, *Drăgușeni. A Cucutenian Community*, București, Editura Enciclopedică – Wasmuth Verlag, Tübingen, 2000, p. 111-130; ****Ceramica neolitică. O lecție de istorie. Catalog de expoziție, [Neolithic pottery. A history lesson. Exhibition catalog]*, Alba Iulia, Editura Aeternitas, 2007; Ovidiu Cotoi, *Comments regarding the techniques and materials used in the preparation of ceramic paste of the ceramic category "Cucuteni C"*, in *Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Historica*, 11/I, 2007, p.153-160; George Bodi, *Hoisești-La Pod. O așezare cucuteniană pe valea Bahluiului [Hoisești-La Pod. A Cucuteni settlement in the floodplain of the Bahlui river]*, Iași, Editura Pim, 2010, p. 127-147. See also Marino Maggetti, *Phase Analysis and its Significance for Technology and Origin. Archaeological Ceramics*, Washington, Smithsonian Institution, 1982, p. 121-133; Idem, *Il contributo delle analisi chimiche alla conoscenza delle ceramiche antiche*, in T. Mannoni, A. Molinari (Eds.), *Scienze in Archeologia*, Firenze, Edizioni all'Insegna del Giglio, 1990, p. 65-88.

¹⁷ C. H. Schilling, I. A. Aksay, *Slip Casting. Ceramics and Glasses*, Vol. 4, *Engineered Materials Handbook*, C. A. Dostal (ed.), ASM International, Materials Park, Ohio, 1991, p. 153-160.

of hardness, identified by this analysis. Complex study of these samples helps us understand the causes of these values of hardness, setting the ratio between hardness microstructure and composition.

The values obtained for porosity occupies a very wide range, from 0.00292 and 27.606. At least at this stage we can not use this criterion to identify the origin of the samples. Statistical processing of a much larger number of samples may refute this conclusion in the future. Porosity values are highly dependent on raw material quality and processing so that may be used as a criterion for quality assessment. We believe that this criterion could differentiate ceramic materials and crafts areas.

Porosity ranges quite much on the surface. It is a natural phenomenon related to differences between surface roughness inherent to processing and pottery techniques. On the other hand, the section analysis was made in areas unprepared, which greatly influenced the results.

Finally, through further research, we intend to continue archaeometrics investigations for ceramics of the site Fetesti-La Schit, in order to more fully knowing it, in terms of compositional, structural, technological and functional.

THE INVENTORY AND CLASSIFICATION OF TYPES OF DAMAGE TO OBJECTS FROM ETHNOGRAPHIC COLLECTIONS

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Rezumat: *Lucrarea cuprinde o parte din cercetările efectuate în cadrul proiectului Tehnici complexe de investigare, evaluare, conservare și restaurare a materialelor colagenice etnografice, finanțat prin Centrul Național de Management Programe. Sunt prezentate principalele cauze ale deteriorării, factorii de deteriorare și tipurile de deteriorări produse patrimoniului etnografic pe suport colagenic.*

Abstract: *This article includes part of the research carried out within the project 'Complex techniques of investigation, evaluation, conservation and restoration of collagenic ethnographic materials', financed by the National Centre of Management Programs. The main causes of deterioration, factors in degradation and types of damage affecting ethnographic collagenic heritage are presented.*

Résumé: *L'ouvrage ci-joint comprend une partie des recherches effectuées dans le cadre du projet Techniques complexes d'investigation, évaluation, conservation et restauration des matériaux collagéniques, financé par le Centre National de Management Programmes. On y a présenté les principales causes de la détérioration, les facteurs de détérioration et les types de détériorations produites au patrimoine ethnographique sur support collagénique.*

Keywords: *inventory, classification, damage, collagenic materials, heritage, ethnographic.*

Amongst the important creations of popular art in Bucovina, the manufacture of leather occupies a pre-eminent place through the diversity, originality and unusualness of its decorative value. Due to its beauty, ornamental richness and colourful harmony, it has attracted the attention of researchers and lovers of traditional art. The ethnographic section of the Museum Complex Bucovina includes a rich ethnographic heritage comprised of works of decorative and applied art from glass, ceramics, metal, wood, textiles, domestic and household items, furnishings, clothing, leather, religious objects, embroidery, musical instruments, old books, props for winter traditions, hunting trophies, bone and horn pieces, photographs, monuments and sites of ethnographic objects (open-air ethnographic museum).

Procedures in the manufacture of leather in the region of Bucovina

In order to be able to investigate, conserve or restore collagenic heritage objects, knowledge of the old techniques of manufacture is necessary, as much of the degradation that appears is caused by deficiencies in manufacture. Therefore, the main techniques of manufacture of collagenic materials are presented using as support ethnographic museum objects from the region of Bucovina.

In the collective of Bogdănești, Suceava County, tanning solution was prepared from oak, alder and fir bark, which were ripped from the trunks, dried and ground in a mill until they became flour. Several large wooden buckets were then taken and in them were placed a layer of skin and one of bark, alternately, until they were full, after which they were filled with warm water. In the resulting solution, called 'dubala' (a type of tanning solution), the skins were kept six weeks. When taken out, the skins had a reddish colour. The next step was the removal of the hair that is the taking of the hair from the skin: the skin was stretched out on even ground and with a hair brush moistened in melted potash alum (aluminium potassium sulphate), was scrubbed until it obtained a black colour.

Another similar procedure cited by Tudor Pamfile in his work¹ 'Romanian domestic industry' is the following: take a kilogram of red alder bark (*alnus incana*), over which you sprinkle a handful of ash, then pour over two litres of boiled water; leave to cool. This solution is called 'tabaceala' or tanning solution. The skins are introduced into the vessel with the solution and are kept 24 hours until they obtain a light-red hue. They are then taken out and left to dry.

From black alder (*alnus glutinosa*) take a kilogram and a half of bark, which after it has been torn into pieces the size of two fingers, place into a special vessel for the preparation of the tanning solution. Boil two litres of water and pour over the bark. The liquid has a dark-red hue. In Bucovina, there were villages in which the majority of households knew how to tan sheep, goat, fox skins, etc. The tanning of skins was done in the following way: boil salt water (water from a salt source), pour it into a vessel and to leave it to cool. In the warm salt water place oatmeal and a little of the heart of the grain, i.e. grain bran second and mix well. Stretch out the skin on the ground, put the tanning solution on top, then fold in two and leave it three days, after which check that it is tanned. The tanned skin is kept to dry.

Also in the village Bogdănești in Suceava County, exists the following procedure of preparation of skins for sheepskin coat/waistcoat and hats: the skins are raised and then left to dry, after which they are washed with warm water to remove the wool sweat; then wrung out and put in the tanning solution. The tanning solution is made from salted whey. After several days, the skins are taken out, stretched out well and left to dry.

¹Tudor Pamfile, *Industria casnică la Români - Trecutul și starea ei de astăzi, contribuțiuni de artă și tehnică populară* [Romanian domestic industry - past and present state, contributions in art and popular technique], București, Tipografia "Cooperativa" Academia Română, 1910, p. 41-44.

Before cleaning the skin of the rest of the flesh, it's stretched in length with a hook. The skin is suspended on a line secured to a loft nail. It's held by hand from the bottom of the skin, again with the other end in the hook handle.

After it has been cleaned of flesh, the skin is stretched with the help of *skin-stretching frames*. The frames are fitted with a tongue, which goes under a chiselled hole on the frames. The skin is put on the frame, placed in the stiff tongue of the frame and then stretched by hand. The categories of leather used in the manufacture of clothing are of diverse qualities and thicknesses, beginning with the very thick for peasant sandals and ending with thin, elastic leather linings, dyed green, brown, black or red serving in particular as decoration for sheepskin coats/waistcoats and girdles.

Damage to ethnographic leathers

However, leather ethnographic objects can be conserved in much better conditions than archaeological ones, which have several characteristics that increase the risk of deterioration. Many of them occur in un-tanned or semi-tanned skins, being more sensitive to fluctuations in humidity than completely tanned materials. The situation of excessive fat content is also often encountered, due to regular impregnation with oils (the original use of the object or older, inadequate, curative treatments). Ethnographic objects often also contain other elements inclusive of: feathers, fur, hair, unprocessed skin, wood, which attract insects.

With regards to the analysis of the deterioration of the duo tannin-collagen two main causes are distinguished: *hydrolysis* and *oxidation*. Both are influenced by the surrounding environment in which the skin is located: water, heat, light, pH, gases, etc. Both can act on tanning materials as well as on amino acids and collagen peptides. The two main causes of degradation are nonetheless different in their mechanism and result. Recent studies show that the '*hydrolysis*' *decomposition* of vegetable-tanned leather is attributed primarily to the presence of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide from the polluted atmosphere.

Oxidised decomposition is due to the radical high energy effects of light with oxygen, oils and reactions leading to the triggering of an altered internal chemical structure. Tanning agents self decompose in conditions of oxidation and acid-hydrolysis, also the resulting products can lead to oxidative and hydrolytic decomposition of the collagen².

Deterioration factors and the result of their action

1. Faulty manufacture

Almost any stage of the manufacture of leather carried out unsatisfactorily can cause defects in the quality of the objects. We will cite several of the typical, mistaken applications as well as the result that follows them:

- Improper treatment with *chalk*, that leads to the hardening of the leather
- The use of *strong mineral acids* leads to the weakening of the leather's structure

² M. Kite, R. Thomson, *Conservation of Leather and Related Materials*, Oxford, Butterborth-Heinemann, Elsevier, p. 181.

- The use of *iron and copper salts* as colouring agents can accelerate oxidative degradation.

Brittleness can be caused by the deposit between the fibres of the leather of different materials, such as: calcium carbonate or plaster (resulting from treatment with chalk), aluminium, products from damage caused by some of the tanning agents, etc. The second cause of brittleness can be the prolonged treatment of the leather before tanning.

Both the conservation of the leather as well as the softening, the cremation, the bating, when they are not controlled, attack the collagen fibre resulting in brittle leather. The residual of the strong acids next to the accumulation of the iron and copper salts also leads to brittleness³.

- Weak penetration by the tanning agents into the interior of the leather consequently causes foliated peeling and the cleaving of the leather into two layers.



Photo 1. Deterioration due to faulty manufacture.

2. The effects of water and humidity on leather

At relatively normal temperature and humidity there are two types of water present in permeable organic materials such as leather: physically retained water – *free water* and chemically *bound water* at the molecular level.

Bound water is present in the form of several aggregated parts of the structure of the collagen, which the physical and chemical properties influence. The elimination of the bound water alters the arrangement of the intra and intermolecular bonds, producing irreversible stiffening⁴.

Free water is localised in the network of interlacing bonds of collagen. It is weakly tied through hydrogen and van der Waals bonds.

Free water can penetrate the leather and increase the rate of chemical reactions, such as *hydrolysis* and *oxidation*. The loss produces stiffening, still reversible, by an increase in relative humidity, as long as the physical structure of re-accumulation

³ L. Miu, P. Budrugaec, *Evaluarea degradării obiectelor de patrimoniu din piele și pergament* [*Degradation assessment of heritage items made of leather and parchment*], București, Editura Performantica, p. 41.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

wasn't destroyed⁵. Both a reduced *relative humidity*, as well as an increased one can be harmful to the leather, but more serious is the fluctuation between them, determining in the case of organic materials the fluctuating loss or accumulation of humidity to achieve equilibrium with the surrounding environment (exo-, endothermic reaction, which amplifies the deterioration caused by heat). Insufficient humidity leads to dehydration, again in extreme cases to irreversible changes such as contraction, deformity, stiffening, cracking and peeling.

The fluctuation of the humidity content following temperature changes and relative humidity often causes stiffening and leads the leather to become fragile. After the repetition of further cycles of absorption-desorption, the material loses the capacity to absorb water – *hysteresis* – resulting in an inflexible character that can turn into the rearrangement of polymers and their hydrogen bonds, using the space initially destined to bind the water. At the same time, as a result of the numerous polar groups, the collagen is capable of absorbing a large quantity of water that leads to swelling. *The excess of water* can break the chemical bonds between collagen and the tanning materials, can extract the vegetable tannates, aluminium and chalk of a fibrous structure, exposing the collagen to hydrolytic decomposition. Thus, the water increases the rate of chemical reactions and also plays an important role in the phenomenon of photolysis, favouring damage caused by light.

Another aspect of the influence of water is linked to the disappearance of certain components. Several salts from the skin can migrate and form condensed water intensifying the damage. This phenomenon called *sweating* isn't connected to temperature and relative humidity.

The proteins have a maximum stability in their pH isoelectric area. While the new skin is stable at a pH between 3 and 6, for art objects made from leather a pH between 5 and 7 is recommended, because their state of conservation is more precarious and they have a heightened sensitivity.

The content of the water will also dictate the pH of the complex. Through the usual loss of water owing to natural ageing of the material, the pH can fall following an increase in the concentration of any acid present. In alkaline or acidic environments hydrolysis can have a place in the protean chain that leads to the destruction of chemical structures.

A heightened, constant humidity facilitates attack on the microorganisms, which is primarily on dusty surfaces and those treated with chalk. It can also appear on clean leather, to a relative humidity of over 75%, causing staining, relative softening and the weakening of the leather owing to acid deterioration. On furs, the bacteria attack the roots of the fur, causing it to fall out.⁶

⁵A. Bernath, L. Miu, M. Guttmann, *Identifications, Microanalysis, Evaluations and Diagnosis of an Ethnographical Leather Object*, Sibiu, Art2008 Book of Abstracts and CD of the Proceedings, p. 47.

⁶Doina Maria Creangă, *Conservarea, investigarea și restaurarea bunurilor de patrimoniu pe suport din piele [Conservation, investigation and restoration of heritage assets on leather backing]*, Suceava, Editura Universității, 2006, p.124.



Photo 2. Deterioration due to the effects of water and humidity.

3. The effects of fatty materials

Fatty materials have an important role as they lubricate the fibres, maintaining a degree of flexibility and softness, being used both in manufacture and also in the periodic maintenance of leather objects. The most common fats and oils are triglycerides, which are molecules made from a molecule of glycerol, to which adhere three fatty acids, saturated or non-saturated. All non-saturated fatty acids are susceptible to *self-oxidation* (less so the saturated ones), to whose chain reactions are linked complex phenomena, potentially catalysed by oxygen, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide, metals.⁷

The results of deteriorations caused by fatty materials can be recognised thus:

- The follicular layer can become fragile owing to the excess of fat. In this case the fat doesn't work as a lubricant, but on the contrary glues the fibres together.
- Free fatty acids increase the acidity in the leather.
- Free fatty acids attack the copper auxiliaries; also the green products of corrosion can cause harm to the surface of the leather.
- Free fatty acids, solid at room temperature, tend to form a white deposit on the face of the leather – *fat sweat*, (this is often confused with mould, but under the microscope can be confirmed with ease – with a warm spatula the melting of the fat can be observed).
- Drying oils make the leather very coarse, rigid and dark.
- The fat can cause the accumulation of dust and favours biological attack.

⁷ A. Moldoveanu, *Conservarea preventivă a bunurilor culturale* [Preventive Conservation of Cultural Assets], București, 1999, p. 121.



Photo 3. Deterioration due to the effects of fatty materials.

4. *The effects of organic solvents*

The majority of organic solvents succeed in repelling the materials used for treating leathers; again some of them can deteriorate the finish of the surface of these.

Alcohol with a low molecular weight can dry the leather through the absorption of chemically bound water.



Photo 4. Deterioration due to the effects of organic solvents.

5. *The effects of metals*

Iron and ions of copper can accelerate the *oxidation* and *per/pro-oxidation* of the fatty materials (polyunsaturated fatty acids). Iron is a contaminant normally met in the process of tanning and the extract of vegetable tannates.

In a damp environment, products from the corrosion of iron cause *automatic damage* by increasing their volume in the process of hydration.

Products from the corrosion of iron, copper and silver can colour the surface of the leather.



Photo 5. Deterioration due to the effects of metals.

6. *Dust and pollution agents*

Ozone is a powerful agent of *self-oxidation* of unsaturated fatty acids, being the most reactive component amongst atmospheric pollutants. Sulphur dioxide from a polluted atmosphere can, alongside sunlight, become a powerful agent of *oxidation*.

Sulphuric acid from leather, resulting from the absorption of the sulphur dioxide is considered the primary agent of *acid hydrolysis* of historic leather (leading to damage known under the name of 'red rot') and the sulphuric acid formed in conditions of humidity reduces the pH of the leather.

Atmospheric dust absorbs humidity and fatty materials, leading to the drying of the leather. The dust always contains metal particles that have the capacity to act as catalysts of oxidation. The dust also acts as an abrasive material on the face of the leather.



Photo 6. Deterioration due to dust and pollution agents.

7. *Light, ultraviolet radiations*

The deteriorations provoked by light are cumulative and irreversible.

UV radiations are the most aggressive and they accelerate the degradation of organic materials (collagen, tannates, fatty materials, etc.). The colours and pigments that contain iron or copper increase the photosensitivity of collagen. The light can cause the discolouration of the dyed leather.



Photo 7. Deterioration due to light, ultraviolet radiations.

8. *Biological damage*

Biological damage to leather objects is caused mainly by insects, fungi and bacteria. Insects appear especially in dark environments, in which they don't wander frequently between the objects. The most often met harmful species to raw skin, tanned leathers and furs are carpet and skin beetles (the species *Anthrenus*, *Attagenus* and *Daermestide*).

Moths (*Tinea pellionella*, *Tineola bisselliella*) attack and destroy firstly furs and hair, but they are also dangerous to partially tanned leather. The insects produce the greatest havoc at the time of their larval stage.



Photo 8. Deterioration due to biological agents.

9. *Human activity*

Functional damage takes place through wear and tear of objects in use.

The inadequate handling, depositing and display in museum collections, just as the improper conservation and restoration, can be the cause of serious damage.



Photo 9. Deterioration due to human activity.

Collagenic materials are very susceptible to diverse categories of factors of degradation and the effects produced by these are of a significant severity producing important deteriorations on patrimonial collagenic objects. The great richness and diversity of ethnographic patrimonial leather objects, just as the increased degree of susceptibility to different types of attack, make the process of conservation-restoration of ethnographic leather a complex one and a great responsibility for their preservation.

Conclusions

The inventory of types of existing degradation to heritage objects of a collagenic base from ethnographic collections has led to the following conclusions:

1. Collagenic materials are highly susceptible to diverse categories of factors of degradation but the effects produced by these are of an exceptional gravity producing significant deterioration of heritage objects of a collagenic base.

2. The inventory of the main types of degradation present in ethnographic objects of a collagenic base can be classified into three broad groups: physical, chemical and biological. The biological types being the most frequent.

3. Bearing in mind the typological diversity of the heritage objects of a collagenic base and the conservation treatments, there is a need for the following differentiation: 3.1. For leather with fur, two aspects of conservation will be born in mind, namely: - the prevention and arrest of moth attack, this being the main factor of degradation, by finding biocide substances with a high grade of retentivity, which doesn't affect the material base and don't present a grade of toxicity for the conservator; - the finding of solutions for the protection and cleaning of leather used in the making of ethnographic objects, as being white in colour, ornamented coloured threads, they become dirty and stain, being difficult or almost impossible to clean. 3.2. For leather without fur, from the point of view of protection to bear in mind the finding of solutions which create a transparent, reversible skin and which include also a biocide applied by brush to the surface of the object.

4. The results of this phase consisted of the finding of non-invasive methods of investigating ethnographic heritage of a collagenic base and the identification and classification of the main types of degradation.

NEAMT COUNTY BOYARS - PART OF THE MOLDAVIAN ELITE (THE XV-TH TO THE XVII-TH CENTURY)*

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Rezumat: Prin studiul de față ne-am propus identificarea trăsăturilor definitorii ale boierimii moldovene, dacă acestea corespund cu realitățile din Europa acelei vremi, sau în ce măsură diferă. Pentru aceasta, am luat drept reper cazul boierimii din ținutul Neamț în secolele XV-XVII, urmărind atât identificarea posibilelor trăsături distinctive ale acestei categorii social-politice, cât și pe acelea comune spațiului moldovean, dar și european.

În urma demersului nostru, am constatat că boierimii moldovene medievale, inclusiv celei nemțene, îi corespund următoarele trăsături: pe plan juridic – membrii acesteia erau oameni liberi; în plan social erau stăpâni de sate, țărani și robi (țigani sau tătari) și dispuneau de privilegii oferite de domnii Moldovei, câtă vreme aceștia îi slujeau cu credință. Trădarea, numită hiclenie, ducea la pierderea averii și, după caz, a vieții celui ce se făcea vinovat, aspecte semnalate și în ceea ce privește boierimii din ținutul Neamț.

În plan politic, mulți dintre boieri (inclusiv nemțeni) erau cooptați în conducerea statului, ocupând diverse dregătorii, mai mult sau mai puțin importante, în funcție de încrederea de care beneficiau din partea domnului țării.

Sub raport cultural, mulți boieri erau știutori de carte. Din rândurile acestora erau recrutați diecii și grămăticii, membrii cancelariei. În spiritul vremii, unii dintre boieri au fost și ctitori sau miluitori ai unor lăcașuri de cult, precum marele vornic Nestor Ureche.

Prin trăsăturile ei definitorii, identificate în acest studiu, se poate conchide că boierimea din ținutul Neamț s-a integrat perfect restului boierimii moldovene, neexistând indicii că ar fi alcătuit o categorie distinctă în rândul acesteia din urmă.

Abstract: In this study we proposed to identify the defining features of Moldavian boyars, if they correspond with the realities of Europe at that time, or to what extent differ. In order to do this, we took as reference point the case of Neamț boyars in the XV-th – XVII-th centuries seeking both to identify possible distinctive features of this socio-political categories, as well as those common to Moldavian space, but also in Europe.

Following our approach, we found that the medieval Moldavian boyars, including Neamț, corresponds to the following characteristics: at legal standpoint - its members were free men; in social terms they were masters of villages, peasants and slaves (Gypsy or Tartars) and had the privilege offered by the rulers of Moldavia, as long as they served him faithfully. Betrayal, called „hiclenie”, lead to the loss of property and, where appropriate, the life of someone who was guilty, issue also available for boyars in Neamț county.

Politically speaking, many boyars (including those in Neamț) were co-opted in the leadership of the state, holding various positions, more or less important, depending on the confidence of the country rulers. From the cultural point of view, many boyars were scientists. Diacs and grammars were recruited from these boyars, in order to become Chancellery

* This work was supported by the European Social Fund in Romania, under the responsibility of the Managing Authority for the Sectorial Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013 [Grant POSDRU/88/1.5/S/47646], to whom we thank once again !

members. Following the tendencies of the Middle Age, some of the boyars were founders or donors to churches, such as the great governor Nestor Ureche.

By its defining characteristics identified in this study, it can be concluded that nobility of Neamt county Moldavian boyars to rest perfectly integrated, there is no indication that it formed a distinct category among the latter.

Keywords: Boyar; Hiclenie; Ocină; Ruler's Advice (Ruler's Council); Vecin; Voivode

European medieval society, including the Romanian, was characterized by a great diversity, local characteristics¹ as a defining feature, even in the same state. Nevertheless, across Europe, medieval world had a number of common features. Among these features, one can mention the deeply religious spirit of the medieval man², the predominantly rural life (at least until by XI-th – XIII-th centuries, when cities began to develop³), struggling with shortages (famine, drought) and disasters of all kinds, dependency relations (both between nobles and between nobles and oppressed peasants) or strict hierarchy of society. Only in the XII-th century Europe is beginning to have an economic boom⁴. Thus, the bishop Laon of Adalberon, wrote a poem in the eleventh century, to show that the society of his time corresponded to three social „orders”⁵: „oratores” (clergy), „bellatores” (nobles) and „laboratores” (peasants). The last order supported, through his work, the entire social edifice. But current research showed that the tripartite organization of society was exceeded even in the time when the above mentioned bishop noted in his poem, because there were other social categories, impossible to be integrated in this narrow scheme. On the other hand, if we compare Western Europe realities to the Romanian space, it appears that they do not overlap completely⁶.

¹ Ioan Aurel Pop, *Geneza medievală a națiunilor moderne (Secolele XIII-XVI) [Medieval genesis of modern nations (XIII-th – XVI-th centuries)]*, Bucharest, Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing, 1998, p. 194.

² Jacques Le Goff (coord.), *Omul medieval [Medieval man]*, translated by Ingrid Ilinca and Dragos Cojocaru, afterword by Alexander - Florin Platon, Iasi, Polirom, 1999, p.7.

³ Idem, *Pentru un alt Ev mediu. Valori umaniste în cultura și civilizația Evului Mediu [For another Middle Ages. Humanistic values in the culture and civilization of the Middle Ages]*, Volume I, Introductory study, notes and translation by Maria Carpov, Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing, 1986, p. 165.

⁴ Idem, *Banii și viața. Economie și religie în Evul Mediu [Money and lives. Politics and religion in the Middle Ages]*, translated from French by Ecaterina Stănescu, Bucharest, Erasmus Publishing, 1993, p. 39.

⁵ George Duby, *Cele trei ordine sau imaginarul feudalismului [The three orders or feudalism imaginary]*, translation by Elena Tanasescu, Natalia Ionescu and Constanta, Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing, 1998, p. 25.

⁶ As shown, in the Romanian space there was not a classical feudalism, like the Western model, which would have meant the existence of suzerainty-bondage relations between monarch and nobles and between nobles and themselves, crumbling feudal, centralized, feudal anarchy, manorial reserve etc. - see Dinu C. Giurescu, *Caracteristici ale feudalismului românesc [Characteristics of Romanian feudalism]*, in „Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A.D.Xenopol» Iași” [“Yearbook of the History and Archaeology

Mastering land was the economic basis of the nobility in medieval Europe⁷ and the essential criterion of political ascent. Parallel to training land, the two social categories of the medieval world arose: the nobility (for the Romanian space - boyars) and dependent peasants. Understanding the origin of nobility depends on the way the manorial field was made up. Historians who have agreed to the local origin of European nobles relied upon the process of disintegration of village communities in the mid third millennium AD, when part of the congregation members "usurped" the rights of other community members (IX-th –XI-th centuries)⁸, appropriating, in various ways, the best land and, gradually, increased their wealth and became famous nobility.

Other historians who have dealt⁹ with this issue agreed to the allogeneic origin of the nobility, considering that this social class was made up after the penetration of migratory peoples, as conquerors, in the borders of the former Roman Empire, enslaving the conquered populations. Finally, other historians agreed to the theory of the double origin of the medieval nobility, namely, that this is the result of both local and migratory conquerors and they overlap the ruling stratum of village communities, in the process of disintegration.

The Romanian historiography was no exception to the three theories¹⁰ mentioned above; in the XIX-th – XX-th centuries, many Romanian historians engaged in this debate. Beyond the idea disputes arising between Romanian historians on account of the origin of nobility, that are not covered by this study, one considers

Institute <<A.D. Xenopol>>-Iași”], Tome XV, Academy Publishing, 1978, p. 395-402. Next, we use the abbreviation “AIIAI”.

⁷ Radu Manolescu (coord.), *Istoria medie universală [The Medieval Universal History]*, Bucharest, Didactic and Pedagogic Publishing, 1980, p. 6.

⁸ Idem, *Societatea feudală în Europa Apuseană [Feudal society in Western Europe]*, Bucharest, Scientific Publishing, 1974, p. 50.

⁹ Recently, Cosmin Popa-Gorjanu wrote a study of medieval European nobility historiography that emphasizes the wealth of this area, but also the variety of methodological and thematic approaches and - see Cosmin Popa Gorjanu, *Repere în istoriografia nobilimii medievale europene [Highlights in the historiography of medieval European nobility]*, in “Annales Universitatis Apulensis. Series Historica”, 13, Alba Iulia, University “December 1”, 1918, 2009, p. 99. About European land owners see Thomas N. Bisson, *The Medieval Lordship, the “Speculum”*, Vol. 70, no. 4 (October 1995), p. 743-759.

¹⁰ Indigenous origin of Romanian boyars was agreed, among others, by N. Iorga – see *Constatări istorice cu privire la viața agrară a românilor [Historical findings on agrarian life of Romanians]*, Bucharest, 1908. The foreign origin (Slavic) of the Romanian boyars was upheld in particular by P.P. Panaitescu - see *Interpretări românești. Studii de istorie economică și socială [Romanian interpretations. Economic and social history studies]*, second edition, Bucharest, Romanian Encyclopedic Publishing, 1994, p.31. At last, Xenopol claimed that Romanian boyars were formed after the foundation of Romanian medieval states, through acts of donation of the rule against local boyars (indigenous or foreign - the last survivors of migratory nations) - see *Istoria românilor din Dacia Traiană [History of Romanians in Traian's Dacia]*, Third Edition, Volume III, Bucharest, 1930, p. 171-172.

the distinctive features of this medieval social categories in the Romanian space to be of most importance. In order to highlight these features, at least in Valachia and Moldavia, we took as a reference point Neamt county, between XV-th and XVII-th centuries. The main information sources of this study were provided by the national collections of medieval documents¹¹ and the internal funds of National Archives - County Service Iași¹².

The term "boyar" is derived from the „Bolear”, of Turanian Bulgarian origin, being acquired in Romanian, from the South Slavs¹³. This would be likely to give some satisfaction to those who upheld the allogeneic origin of Romanian boyars¹⁴. The historian I.C. Filitti has shown in his work - *Social classes in Romanian past*¹⁵ - that, what distinguished the Romanian nobility from the feudal nobility of Western Europe, was the fact that the letter considered the noble rank as an attribute of the person, which could exist without possession of a feudal domain, and would not be lost with land possession, whereas the boyar status in Valachia and Moldavia was achieved through land donation by the ruler, and not by becoming a knight. As the historians Gheorghe Platon and Alexandru Florin Platon stated, the destiny of this social category was „attached to land ownership structure”¹⁶.

In addition, in these Romanian states that have been already mentioned, we can not talk about a military nobility¹⁷ (knights) as the one in medieval Spain and Portugal, which was made up on be occasion of the Reconquista, or in Hungary - where barons, at least at the begining of the XI-th century, had their origins in ancient nomadic warriors, this having been noted by Elemer Malysz, Hungarian history: „those who have fought on the battlefield on equal terms, lived in the same way in peace”¹⁸. He is wrong, though, when he considers there were no radical differences¹⁹

¹¹ *Documenta Romaniae Historica (DRH)* and *Documents regarding Romanian history (DIR)*.

¹² Next, we use DJIAN logo.

¹³ Alexei Agachi, Igor Cașu, Demir Dragnev, *Dicționar de istorie [History Dictionary]*, second edition, revised and enlarged, Chisinau, Publishing Civitas, 2007, p. 57-58.

¹⁴ P.P. Panaitescu, for example, says Romanian boyars are of Slavic origin - see *Interpretări românești. Studii de istorie economică și socială [Romanian Interpretations. Economic and social history studies]*, second edition, Bucharest, Encyclopedic Publishing, 1994, p.31.

¹⁵ I.C. Filitti, *Clasele sociale în trecutul românesc [Social classes in Romanian past]*, Bucharest, 1925.

¹⁶ Gheorghe Platon, Alexandru Florin Platon, *Boierimea din Moldova în secolul al XIX-lea. Context European, evoluție socială și politică (Date statistice și observații istorice), [Boyars in Moldavia in the XIX-th century. European context, social and political development (Statistical and historical data)]*, Bucharest, Romanian Academy Publishing, 1995, p. 131.

¹⁷ Anne J. Duggan, *Nobles and Nobility in Medieval Europe: Concepts, Origins, Transformations*, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 2000, p. 6.

¹⁸ Elemer Malysz, *Hungarian nobles of medieval Transilvania*, in *History and Society in Central Europe*, vol. 2: *Nobilities in Central and Eastern Europe: Kinship, Property and Privilege*, by Janos M. Bak, Budapest - Krem, 1994, p. 26.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

between the nobles across the Hungarian kingdom, being known that, the Romanian Transylvanian nobility, compared to the Hungarian, enjoyed far fewer rights, suppressed by Ludovic I's Diploma, of 1366²⁰, with the introduction of official religion (catholicism). By that measure, only those people who enjoyed a royal diploma degree were still nobles, thus few Romanians managed to be maintained among the noble class (Drăgoșeștii, Cândeștii or Hunyadi)²¹.

Therefore, as the historian Nicolae Stoicescu²² showed, at least until the XVII-th century, the Romanian boyar ranks were not granted by a personal title, but by the possession of fields, whose ownership was guaranteed by the ruler, the master of the whole country. This way, a boyar was actually a state „employee”, and his noble title was also a function of the state, in fact of the sovereign and not an attribute of the person. Since the XVII-th century, the term „boyar” is often associated with the meaning „official”, as a result of the fact the boyar status is increasingly conditioned on the employment of a position in the state²³, the so-called „governor nobility” („boierie de dregătorie”)²⁴.

However, despite the differences between Western nobility, compared to the Romanian nobility in the Middle Ages, the latter represented, unquestionably, the social and political elite. What were the features of this elite? The Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto wrote in 1919 that the elite is a social category consisting of individuals with the highest rate of appreciation in their branch of activity²⁵. Later, Pareto would nuance this idea, adding that, besides its social connotations, elite has a political connotation, considering that it consists of individuals who exercise managerial functions²⁶. Another Italian sociologist, Gaetano Mosca, noted that the elite is characterized by monopoly and it carries the authority and power²⁷. These ideas are valid for the Romanian space where, as unknown, aristocracy held both political and social prestige because its members were appointed by the ruler in

²⁰Romanian Academy, The Department of Historical and Archaeological Sciences, *Istoria românilor [Romanian History]*, Volume IV, *De la universalitatea creștină către Europa „patriilor” [From the Christian universality to "homelands" Europe]*, the editorial board of volume: Acad. Ștefan Ștefănescu and Acad. Camil Mureșanu, publisher, prof. Dr. Tudor Teoteoi secretar, Bucharest, Encyclopedia Publishing House, 2001, p. 133.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²Nicolae Stoicescu, *Sfatul Domnesc și marii dregători din Țara Românească și Moldova (sec. XIV-XVII) [Ruler's Council and great officials of the Valachia and Moldavia (XIV-th-XVII-th century)]*, Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1968, p. 55.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴Iolanda Țighiliiu, *Boierimea din Țara Românească (secolele XIV-XVII). Componentă și evoluție structurală [Boyars in Valachia (the XIV-th – the XVII-th centuries). Composition and structural changes]*, in „Revista Istorică”, New Series, volume II, no. 11-12, November-December, 1991, p. 651.

²⁵Larousse, *Dicționar de sociologie [Dictionary of Sociology]*, translated by Mariana Țuțuianu, Bucharest, Encyclopedic Universe, 1996, p. 100.

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷Cătălin Zamfir, Lascăr Vlăsceanu, *Dicționar de sociologie [Dictionary of Sociology]*, Bucharest, Babel Publishing House, 1993, p. 215-216.

various central government and local dignitaries (counties²⁸). It can also be said that during the Middle Ages, nobility exercised monopoly over government in the Romanian Principalities.

The most important characteristics of nobility were: on a legal standpoint, its members were free people and on the social standpoint they mastered land. Therefore, one of the key features of Romanian boyars was possession of land area. This was the main criterion for social differentiation. Mastery of the land, though, was conditioned by the boyar's faithfulness to the ruler who, theoretically, was the master of the whole country. Betrayal („hiclenia”) automatically meant confiscation of property of the boyar who was guilty of this. In Neamț county we can mention the cases of two Great Chamberlains, one of the early XVI-th century (Cozma Șarpe), and one of the early XVII-th century (Dumitrache Chiriță). Cozma Șarpe, holding two villages in county Neamt, Șcheia and Zbârcești²⁹, betrayed Ștefăniță voivode, and he was forced to refugiate in Poland, the voivode confiscating him the whole property. Dumitrache Chiriță was the master of the village Vânători³⁰ given by the voivode Constantin Movilă on October, 10-th, 1608, and confiscated by Radu Mihnea for treason on October, 17-th, 1616³¹.

Although possession of land was not complete, as we understand by the concept of property in Modern Age, the ruler was, in fact, mastering "de jure" the whole country, land owners holding multiple rights, including the one that they could dispose the land by sale, donation, inheritance or pledge. However, when the land was sold, the protimisis right prevailed³², that is, the relatives of the one who made the sale had priority in the purchase of the land area for sale, phenomenon which is found not only in the Romanian space, but also in Western Europe, and was reported by the French historian, Marc Bloch since the Interwar Period³³. In this regard, for Neamt county history, the document of July, 30-th, 1604³⁴ is edifying, through which the grandchildren of the boyar Ciolpan („the Old”) received from the Moldavian ruler, Jeremia Movilă, a legal document that empowered them to redeem any part of the

²⁸ N. Grigoraș, *Instituții feudale din Moldova I. Organizarea de stat până la mijlocul secolului al XVIII-lea* [*Feudal institutions in Moldavia. I. State organization by the middle of the XVIII-th century*], Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1971, p. 7.

²⁹ *DIR, A. Moldavia*, XVI-th century, Volume I, doc. no. 41, p. 46-47.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, XVII-th century, Volume II, doc. no. 240, p. 182-183.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Volume IV, doc. no. 83, p. 56-57.

³² Henri H. Stahl, *Contribuții la studiul satelor devălmașe românești* [*Contributions to the study Romanian free villages*], the second edition, revised, Volume II, *Structura internă a satelor devălmașe libere* [*Internal structure of free villages*], Bucharest, Romanian Book, 1998, p. 66-67.

³³ Marc Bloch, *Societatea feudală* [*Feudal Society*], Volume I, *Formarea legăturilor de dependență* [*Formation of dependency links*], translation by Cristiana Macarovici, afterword by Maria Crăciun, Cluj, Dacia Publishing, 1996, p. 159.

³⁴ *DIR, A. Moldavia*, XVII-th century, Volume I, doc. no. 250, p. 175.

village Bodești which would be sold, with or without their knowledge, because this village, was for them, as shown in the document mentioned above, „right legacy”³⁵.

Faithful service in the advantage of the ruler was generously rewarded, noblemen were often rewarded with villages, dependent peasants, slaves, mills, or other advantages. The first known document which refers to such a situation in Neamț county³⁶ dates since Iuga voivode (1399-1400)³⁷.

We talk about a document written between the years 1398-1400³⁸, through which this Iuga gave three villages to Șarban Hândău, that is, Solomonești, on Topolița River, Pântecești and Munteni, on Cracău River, „for jobs accomplished in the service of previous rulers”³⁹. The document presents, therefore, one of the ways in which nobility received land ownership - in this case, acts of donation from the ruler of the country as a reward for various services. After the analysis of documents related to Neamț county land possession, we discover that there is a certain hierarchy, even within this elite, meaning that some boyars could master several villages, while others held only parts of a single village. In Romanian historiography this was reported, the classification being: the great boyars, the middle boyars and the little boyars⁴⁰.

It is very difficult to say which was the share of this social category in the population of Neamț county between the XV-th – XVII-th centuries. First of all, not every boyar who owned lands in Neamț county was necessarily local. Many boyars, who had their residence or place of origin in other lands, held areas in Neamț as well, this being normal at the time. Therefore, when we refer to the nobility of Neamț county, we understand that political and social elite that has ruled over villages in the administrative-territorial unit, no matter if its representatives have also had land ownership in other counties and other, because land ownership⁴¹ was the main criterion according to which nobility was distinguished from other social categories, at least until the mid XVII-th century. Although studies regarding the demographic structure of population in the Middle Ages are very poor, because there was no

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Because Neamț county is documentary certified only later, in 1466 (see *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume II, Volume prepared by Leon Șimanschi and collaborators, Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1976, doc. no. 134, p. 190.), for the period before that date, we prefer to use the expression “Neamț area” instead of “Neamț county”.

³⁷ Constantin C. Giurescu (coord.), *Istoria României în date [Romania's history data]*, Chisinau, Minor editorial-Printing Works “Crai Nou”, 1992, p.379.

³⁸ *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume I, Volume prepared by C. Cihodaru, I. Caproșu and L. Șimanschi, Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1975, doc. no. 7, p. 9. The document was not was not kept in the original form, but only as a late summary, of 1855.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Dinu C. Giurescu noted that most boyars areas were composed of 1-2 villages (lower nobility), less of 3 - 4 villages (middle nobility) and the fewest of more than five villages (the great boyars) - see Dinu C. Giurescu, *Caracteristici ale feudalismului românesc [Characteristics of Romanian feudalism]* in “AIIAI”, Tome XV, Academy Publishing, 1978, p. 401.

⁴¹ Gheorghe Platon, Alexandru Florin Platon, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

census, only scattered information, its is generally accepted that the share of nobility (for Romanian space - boyars) did not exceed 5% of all inhabitants of a country⁴².

Among the great boyars who held land areas in Neamt county in the first half of the XV-th century, Baico can be mentioned. This boyar, possessed seven villages: Dolhești, Negresti, Almășelul, Horaița Roșcani, Almaș and Dobreni, according to a document given by the voivodes Ștefan II and Iliăș on the 12-th of April, 1436⁴³. Unlike Șarban Hândău, who received villages for „jobs” accomplished in the service of the voivode, this Baico had already possessed villages as an inheritance from his ancestors. At that time, the two voivodes confirmed Baico’s possessions („ocini”), for the services to the reign, as well, Alexander the Good and his sons - as stated in the document. Thus, voivode confirmation was another way the boyars kept their villages which they inherited from their predecessors. When changing the rulers, the boyars went to the royal throne to obtain confirmation of their possessions from the new ruler⁴⁴. This aspect reinforces the fact that country's entire land belonged to voivode, that he could distribute it, or to confirm it for his subjects. However, he may seize it, in cases of treason.

In the XV-th century great masters⁴⁵ in Neamt county were: „pan” Mic Crai⁴⁶ (with following villages: Budești, Mălești, Glodeni, Crăești, Obârșia, Bahna, Hlăpești), Ivan Porcu⁴⁷ (with following villages: Porcești, Sârbi, Arămești, Românești, Știubeești, Cornești, Tulești, Căciulești, Bârjoveni, Secuieni, Seliștea lui Manuil, Volosenii, Neburtești, Săseni, Grozești and Mălure), Zeaico⁴⁸ (with following villages: Urecheni, Rătești, Davideni, Curticești, Ceahlăești, Alexăndreni and Huși), „pan” Gostilă⁴⁹ (with following villages: Gostilești, Negoești, Obadia, Făurei,

⁴² If we would use the analogy (although this is not a rigorous method), we could compare the Romanian territory to the Hungarian and Polish space, countries that kept better statistics on population. Thus, in Poland in the second half of the XVIII-th century, the great nobility represented 1.25% of the total population, while small and middle nobility held 3%; therefore, about 4.25%, in line with the average across Europe - see Gheorghe Platon, Alexandru Florin Platon, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁴³ DRH, *A. Moldova*, volumul I, doc. no. 147, p. 202.

⁴⁴ C. Cihodaru, *Forme de proprietate feudală în Moldova [Feudal ownership in Moldavia]*, in “Studii și Cercetări Științifice”, Year VI (1955), no. 3-4, p. 11.

⁴⁵ Because in the Middle Ages, few Romanian boyars held more than five villages (of those over 150 boyars who ruled in Neamt, for example, in the XV-th century, only about 30 of them held more than five villages), we considered that the great masters were those boyars who owned more than five whole villages - also see Daniel Nedeloiu – *Mari proprietari funciari în ținutul Neamț din secolul al XV-lea până la jumătatea secolului al XVIII-lea [Grand landowners in Neamț county of the XV-th century until the middle of the XVIII-th century]*, “Magister”. Romanian History Teachers Association Magazine. APIR-Clio, no. 4, Craiova ARVES Publishing, 2007, p. 50-52.

⁴⁶ DRH, *A. Moldova*, Volume I, prepared by C. Cihodaru, I. Caproșu and L. Șimanschi, Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1975, doc. no. 250, p. 353.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, no. 282, p. 403.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, Volume II, doc. no. 12, p. 13.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, doc. no. 87, p. 124-126.

Bârzotești, Mănești, Bran Cneaja, Vorovești, Balotești, Hășnaș, Spătorești and Gheuroești), and Toader Lucaș⁵⁰ (with following villages: Lăslăoani, Șerbești, Mohorâți, Drăgotești, Petrești, Plăcinteni, Oprișești, Cârna and Răchitiș). It was written that the latter was the nephew of Laslău globnic, as it was found in a document in of Stephen the Great's reign (22 January 1495)⁵¹.

Also, another great boyar who held, inter alia, land areas in Neamț county was Michael chancellor. He ruled the village Vânători in Neamț and other villages in various counties, especially in Suceava, Cernăuți and Hotin in the middle of the XV-th century⁵².

It is noted that some of the names of these boyars have a foreign resonance. In the Interwar Period, the philologist and linguist August Scriban noted that the Romanian name suffixes such as “-is”, “-uș”, “-ău”, or “-aș”, in our case Hândău, Lucaș or Laslău, are of Hungarian origin⁵³. This is likely to confirm his theory of “import” nobility, but it is no less true that some of the boyars who ruled in Neamț had Romanian names - such as Ivan Porcul, Michael chancellor or Gostilă. The presence of these “foreign” names of local boyars can be explained on the one hand, because of the Hungarian rule over eastern-Carpathian area in the mid XIV-th century⁵⁴, but, on the other hand, because of the Romanian intake from Maramures, which came together with the “founders.”

Another observation would be that, although the boyars possessed many villages, only few of them, Michael chancellor, and Ivan Porcul treasurer, held governorship, which leads us to conclusion that land ownership did not automatically give political functions, at least in the first half of the XV-th century.

Internal documents indicate among the land owners both the boyars and the knezes. Ioan Aurel Pop considers that, in fact, both the boyars and the knezes were two layers of the same social class, the boyars being richer and politically influential, while the knezes were the small holders of a few villages⁵⁵. In Neamț county, we can mention, on this occasion, knezes Litu and Șărban, who had been masters of Munteni Scutași village, donated by Alexander the Good on 2-nd of August, 1414⁵⁶.

Another matter concerning the social prestige of the boyars, besides holding villages, and, with them, dependent peasants, (who worked for the boyars, paid “the

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, Volume III, doc. no. 172, p. 314-316.

⁵¹ *Ibid*.

⁵² *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume II, doc. no. 33, p. 46.

⁵³ August Scriban, *Dicționarul limbii românești* [*Romanian language dictionary*], first edition, Iasi, Institute of Graphic Arts "Good Press, 1939, p. 39.

⁵⁴ Constantin C. Giurescu (coord.), *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁵⁵ Ioan Aurel Pop, *Instituții medievale românești. Adunările cneziale și nobiliare (boierești) din Transilvania în secolele XIV-XVI*, [*Romanian medieval institutions. Cnezial and noble meetings (boyar) from Transylvania in the XIV-th to the XVI-th century*], Cluj Napoca, Dacia Publishing, 1991, p. 40.

⁵⁶ *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume I, doc. no. 36, p. 51. Ioan Aurel Pop wrote 1417, instead of 1414, see Ioan Aurel Pop, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

census”, and gave metayage⁵⁷), is that some of these potentates of the time possessed slaves, as well, especially gypsies, grouped into shelters, but also tartars, grouped into huts⁵⁸. Such a boyar is the already mentioned Michael chancellor, who received Vânători village, on Bistrița, “below to Piatra lui Crăciun” and six “gypsy camps” from Ștefan II on the 25-th of January, 1446⁵⁹. In general, however, in the XV-th century gypsy slaves belonged especially to the monasteries and, less to the boyars⁶⁰.

Socially speaking, another sign of differentiation of Romanian people in the Middle Ages (and beyond) was the tenement. Archaeological discoveries in recent decades in Neamt county confirm that boyar houses in the Middle Ages differed very much from those of peasants, both in size and construction material used and in space organization and comfort⁶¹. Archaeologists Lia and Adrian Bătrâna found a boyar residence of the second half of the XIV-th century, during excavations made in the 80's of the last century in the area of Netezi village (Grumăzești commune, Neamt county). The main elements of this house were: the building itself – situated on the surface of the earth, made of stone, with two overlapped rooms, tower-like, a small church, also made of stone, located about 135 meters north of the house⁶², and household structures⁶³. This house belonged, according to the mentioned archaeologists, to the boyar Bratul Netezul – who can be found in Advice Council Room of Moldavia between 1392 and 1399⁶⁴. Unlike boyar homes in the same period, most peasant homes were half-buried and less huts⁶⁵ (buried houses), as shown by the archaeological research in the years 1954 to 1958 in Traian village (Zănești

⁵⁷ *Documente privind relațiile agrare în veacul al XVIII-lea*, [Documents on agrarian relations in the XVIII-th century], Volume II, A. Moldavia, edited by Vasile Mihordea, Ioana Constantinescu and Corneliu Istrati, Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1966, no. 107, p. 173.

⁵⁸ A document from the 8-th of July, 1428, refers to the fact that at that time the ruler Alexander the Good endowed Bistrița Monastery, among others, with 31 gypsy shelters and 12 Tartars huts - see *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume I, no. 75, p. 110.

⁵⁹ *DRH, A. Moldova*, Volume I, no. 260, p. 368-369.

⁶⁰ See the cases of Bistrița Monastery - *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume I, doc. no. 75, p. 110, Monastery of Glade - *DRH, A. Moldova*, Volume I, doc. no. 133, p. 186, Moldovița - *DRH, A. Moldova*, Volume I, doc. no. 132, p. 185, etc.

⁶¹ Lia Bătrâna Adrian Bătrâna, *Reședința feudală de la Netezi (jud. Neamț)* [Feudal residence of Netezi (Neamt county)], in „Studii și cercetări de istorie veche și arheologie”, No. 4, Tome 36, October-December 1985, Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1985, p. 297-315.

⁶² Nicolae Cristian Apetrei, *Reședințele boierești din Țara Românească și Moldova în secolele XIV-XVI* [Boyar residences in Valachia and Moldavia in the XIV-th – the XVI-th centuries], Brăila, Brăila Museum, Istros Publishing, 2009, p. 96.

⁶³ Lia Bătrâna, Adrian Bătrâna, *op.cit.*, p. 298.

⁶⁴ *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume I, no. 2, p. 3, no. 4, p. 6, no. 8, p. 10. See also Constantin Burac, *Ținuturile Țării Moldovei până la mijlocul secolului al XVIII-lea* [Moldavian counties until the middle of the XVIII-th century], Bucharest, Academica Publishing, 2002, p. 35.

⁶⁵ Gh Bichir, *Urme de locuire din epoca feudală la Traian – Zănești (r. Piatra Neamț, reg. Bacău)* [Traces of habitation from medieval times to Trajan - Zănești (r. Piatra Neamț, reg. Bacău)], în „Studii și Cercetări de Istorie Veche”, no. 2, Tome 18, 1967, p. 317.

commune, Neamț county⁶⁶). This discrepancy was also noted after the excavations in the necropolis near the mentioned church, where 177 graves were discovered, of which only 22 contain different clothing accessories or footwear, coins, religious objects, jewelry and iron objects, sign of the social importance those people held⁶⁷.

Politically speaking, as we have already mentioned, some of the boyars, including those holding land in Neamț county, joined the Advice Council Room or held various dignitaries in the central or county government⁶⁸. Such a boyar was Bratul Nedetul, in the late XIV-th century⁶⁹, who, although did not hold a political dignitary, participated in the Advice Council Room of the voivodes Roman I, Ștefan I and Iuga. The boyar Vlad from the White Creek is in the same situation at the beginning of the XV-th century. Vlad, although did not hold a political dignitary, is present in the Advice Council Room between 1414⁷⁰ and 1418⁷¹ during Alexander the Good's reign. This can be explained due to the fact that these boyars enjoyed prestige and authority among the communities from which they came, their presence in the Advice Room, being a result of the fact that they were well known, without necessarily holding a political dignitary⁷².

Among the important dignitaries who owned large areas in Neamț county, one can mention Michael chancellor, who ruled Vânători village – among other villages - in the mid XV-th century, this village being located on Bistrita River, near Pietra lui Crăciun fair. In the XVI-th century⁷³, Andrew chancellor and Neamț fortress commander can be mention, as well. Andrew, possessed an impressive land area, located in the counties Hotin, Soroca, Iasi and Neamț, in 1586⁷⁴. In Neamț, this boyar

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, p. 313-326.

⁶⁷ Lia Bătrâna, Adrian Bătrâna, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

⁶⁸ In addition to “small and great boyars”, mentioned in internal documents, a large military class appears in the XIV-th and XV-th centuries, consisting of “the brave” or “courtiers”, invested by the ruler with land, necessary to support themselves - see also Gheorghe I. Brătianu - *Sfatul Domnesc și Adunarea Stărilor în Principatele Române [Ruler's Council and the Assembly of States in the Romanian principalities]*, Bucharest, Encyclopaedic Publishing House, 1995, p. 46. In Neamț, such a boyar that was Dragoș Viteazul (*DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume I, doc. no. 10, p. 15.), sometimes called “Dragos from Neamț” (*Ibid.*, doc. no. 22, p. 31.), Dragoș, even though he didn't hold any dignitary, appeared in the Ruler's Council between 1392-1431.

⁶⁹ *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume I, doc. no. 2, p. 3.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, no. 36, p. 51.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, no. 41, p. 60.

⁷² In Valachia, these influential boyars in the political life of the state were known as “vlastelini”, some descending from old boyar families, some being relatives of the voivode himself - see Iolanda Țighiliiu, *Boierimea din Țara Românească (secolele XIV-XVII). Compoziția și evoluție structurală*, [*Boyers in Valachia (the XI-th – XVII-th centuries). Composition and structural changes*], in „Revista Istorică”, New Series, volume II, no. 11-12, November-December 1991, p. 660.

⁷³ *Ibid*, Volume II, no. 33, p. 46.

⁷⁴ *DIR, A. Moldavia*, XVI-th century, Volume III (1571-1590), Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1951, no. 374, p. 308-310.

possessed an area which included the following villages: Căcăceni, Broșteni, Lălești which had belonged to Piatra Fair, but sold by the ruler.

In the XVII-th century other high officials would master villages in Neamt county. Thus, between 1602 and 1613, Toader Boul treasurer would take possession of the villages: Frățești⁷⁵, Săcurinți, Răspopești, Tălpălăești⁷⁶, Rătești, Rădeni and Davideni⁷⁷. A similar fact occurs with the Great Governor Nestor Ureche who, between 1604 and 1617, through successive purchases, took possession of the villages: Petricani⁷⁸, half of Ilești, Târpești, Jurjești, half of Siești, Tâmppești⁷⁹, Liești, on Topolița⁸⁰, and half of Dragomirești.

In his turn, the Great Chancellor Nicoară Prăjescu, by various purchases, held 16 entire villages and 10 parts of villages in different counties, including Neamt, where he ruled Razboieni village⁸¹, in 1617. In the second half of the XVII-th century, the strong Cantacuzino family arises with the two brothers Toma and Iordache Cantacuzino, being known for the family's numerous land ownership rulers (both in Neamt and in other counties) but also for the important dignitaries they occupied. These boyars, of Greek origin⁸², were married local girls, thus gaining Moldavian citizenship, and through it, the right to buy estates. First, the Great Treasurer Iordache Cantacuzino, mastered, as shown in a document of 1662⁸³, 18 parts of villages, as follows: Șerbești, Cutujani, Broșteni, Cârliști, Căciulești, Strâmbi, Plopești, Cărbunești, Tâmppești, Potlogeni, Țibucani, Peletiuți, Ungureni and Vârtop, all in Neamt county, not to mention other villages in different counties. His brother, Toma Cantacuzino High Steward and then Great Governor of the Upper Country, came to own a considerable fortune, not less than 16 parts of villages Bodești, Verșești, Căndesti, Negritești, Porcești, Budesti, Buciumi, Tupilați, Popesti, Sârbi, Mărișești, Fedeleșiani⁸⁴, Dăncești⁸⁵, Lăslăoani⁸⁶, Tulești and Galbeni⁸⁷, all in Neamt county.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, A. *Moldavia*, XVII the century, Volume I, no. 49, p. 32-33.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, Volume II, no. 192, p. 150-151.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Volume III, no. 201, p. 126-128.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Volume I, no. 241, p. 170.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, Volume IV, no. 183, p. 144-146.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, Volume I, no. 340, p. 255.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Volume IV, no. 175, p. 135.

⁸² Costandin Sion, *Arhondologia Moldovei. Amintiri și note contimporane. Boierii Moldovei [Moldavian Gentlefolk. Recollections and contemporary notes. Moldavian boyars]*, selected text, glossary and index - Rodica Rotaru, Mircea Anghelescu preface, afterword, notes and comments by Ștefan S. Gorovei, Bucharest, Minerva, 1973, p. 97. See also - Octav-George Lecca - *Familiile boierești române. Istorie și genealogie (după izvoare autentice) [Romanian boyar families. History and genealogy (as authentic sources)]*, with annotations, additions and drawings by Mateiu Caragiale, Alexander Condeescu edition, Bucharest, Romanian Literature Museum, 2000, p. 187.

⁸³ Gh Ghibănescu, *Ispisoace și zapise [Ispisoace and zapise]*, Volume III, Part II, Iasi, Dacia Publishing, 1910, doc. no. 20, p. 29-30.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 49, p. 73-76.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Volume II, Part II, no. 23, p. 43-44.

It is noted that the dignitary had a very important role in terms of increasing personal wealth, through financial resources that it generated, mostly the period when land areas were bought coinciding with the period when that boyar held positions in central or county administration. This can be found in the case of boyars who owned smaller dignitaries, for example, Ionașco of Obârșie, Neamt county, who bought many areas in the White valley, , as long as he served as chief of the small treasurers in the years 1596⁸⁸ and 1609⁸⁹. After 1609, with the loss of the dignity, he is only mentioned as a witness in different setting boundaries, in some litigation⁹⁰, or when the voivode confirmed the principalities acquired by then⁹¹. He is not mentioned as a land purchaser anymore, as before, when he was the chief of small treasurers. Beginning with the XVII-th century, by nobility we understand dignitary gradually, the ruler Dimitrie Cantemir himself, discusses the concept of rank⁹², not of land ownership, regarding the boyar status.

Symbolical speaking, power ideology was reflected by the heraldic coat of arms that some boyar families possessed, like Krupenski family⁹³ in Neamt county, family that would acquire estates in this part of Moldavia beginning with the XVIII-th century. Octav George Lecca describes the family coat of arms as follows: in a red field, shield-shaped, a white rose with five petals and five leaves and another similar rose above the helmet and the crown⁹⁴. It seems that this rose species was Polish, Krupenski family, who obtained Polish citizenship, thus preserving the reminding of the good relations they had with this country since the XVII-th century.

Culturally speaking, in addition to literacy, proven by the fact that many boyars appear as witnesses in the land ownership documents, signed or drafted⁹⁵; they were often familiar to old Slavic, the language in which they wrote chancellery documents between the XIV-th and the XVI-th centuries. As it is known, monasteries played an important role in terms of laic education⁹⁶, boyar sons following courses in monastic schools because they intended to learn writing and mathematics. In close connection to the Church, seen as the dominant institution⁹⁷ in the Middle Ages, the Ruler

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, no. 17, p. 32-35.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, Volume III, Part I, no. 21, p. 31-33.

⁸⁸ *DIR, A. Moldavia*, XVI-th century, Volume IV, no. 183, p. 144-146.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, XVII-th century, Volume II, no. 328, p. 253.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, Volume III, no. 207, p. 132-133.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, Volume IV, no. 419, p. 335.

⁹² Dimitrie Cantemir, *Descrierea Moldovei [Moldavia's description]*, translation of the original Latin text by Gh. Guțu, introduction by Maria Holban, N. Stoicescu historical review, mapping study by Vintilă Mihăilescu, Ioana Constantinescu index, with a note on the D.M. Pippidi edition, Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1973, p.279.

⁹³ Octav George Lecca, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*.

⁹⁵ National Archives - County Service Iași, *Documents*, no. CDLXIV / 21.

⁹⁶ Liviu Pilat, *Între Roma și Bizanț. Societate și putere în Moldova (secolele XIV-XVI) [Between Rome and Byzantium. Politics and power in Moldavia (the XIV-th - the XVI-th centuries)]*, Iași, "Al. I. Cuza" University Publishing, 2008, p. 253.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*.

institution, we find the acts of piety of some boyars, who are founders of religious places (churches and monasteries), together with voivodes; they are also found among those who make donations to such places. For Neamt county this available for the Great Governor Nestor Ureche, which founded the Secu Monastery dedicated to the Beheading of St. John the Baptist⁹⁸ in the autumn of 1602. Secu Monastery, with Neamt and Bistrita Monasteries, had a famous school which trained both clergy and laity, becoming an important cultural center⁹⁹, an important role being acquired by its founder, Nestor Ureche, who has endowed it with all necessary.

Another cultural aspect is what we call today “geneological consciousness”, namely the consciousness of belonging to the same family, which is easily noted from the mere reading of medieval internal documents that refer to land ruling. In these documents there are often mentioned all relative heirs of the land areas the family was endowed with, but also the list of their predecessors. Even if in the period we refer to, this zeal in mentioning all predecessors came from a rather strict necessity (the need to justify the domination of the earth, the main wealth of medieval man), yet, in time, it will lead to the crystallization of a real genealogical consciousness. In his work, *Moldavian Description*, Dimitrie Cantemir fully illustrates the boyar genealogical awareness in the early XVIII-th century, Cantemir being a boyar himself: “Boyar families, as they are mentioned in Moldavian history, all survived until today and, by some miracle of fate, no old Moldavian boyar family has perished so far”¹⁰⁰, the former Moldavian ruler listing then the 75 “Moldavian noble families”.

One of the features of the documents we mentioned is that they reported “the property development”¹⁰¹, the predecessors who held land ownership, both blood and marriage relatives¹⁰², being reminded. The cases when this sequence of forerunners appears in documents referring to boyars in Neamt county, are numerous, so there is no need to insist upon them. We will give an example here, which seems self-evident: a 1619 document referring to Șerbești and Belcești villages, these being held at the time by “Toma, Andriica’ son, his sister Anița, and Dochita, Nastasa’s daughter,

⁹⁸ Alexandru I. Gonța, *Un așezământ de cultură de la Alexandru Lăpușneanu pe Valea Secului înainte de ctitoria lui Nestor Ureche. Schitul lui Zosin [A cultural institution in Secu’s Valley from Alexandru Lăpușneanu before Nestor Ureche’s foundation. Zosin’s Hermitage]*, in the volume *Studii de istorie medievală [Studies of medieval history]*, text selected and prepared for printing of Maria Magdalena Szekely and Ștefan S. Gorovei, with a foreword by Ioan Caproșu, Iasi, Dosoftei Publishing, 1998, p. 212.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 227.

¹⁰⁰ Dimitrie Cantemir, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

¹⁰¹ Mihai Dim. Sturdza (coordinator and author), *Familiiile boierești din Moldova și Țara Românească. Enciclopedie istorică, geneologică și biografică [Boyar families from Moldavia and Valachia. Historical, genealogical and biographical Encyclopaedia]*, Volume I, Abăza - Bogdan, Bucharest, Symmetry Publishing, 2004, p. 4.

¹⁰² Blood relatives who descended from a common ancestor have been called in speciality literature “descendants”, while alliance relatives have been called “afins” - see C.C. Harris, *Relațiile de rudenie [Relative relationships]*, translation from English by Antonia Oprîță, introduction of the Romanian edition by Maria Voinea, Bucharest, DU Style, 1998, p. 27.

Andriica's niece, Crăciun Belcescu's granddaughter"¹⁰³, all these persons being in litigation with their relatives, Toma Brae and Pătrașco. Crăciun Belcescu is first and last mentioned to be alive in a document from 1414¹⁰⁴, during the reign of Alexander the Good. However, he remained in the "conscience" of his family for over 200 years because his descendants have kept the voivodal documents!

Marriages between boyar members took almost always place within this social category, we can rarely find deviations from this principle. Otherwise, the one who chose his or her pair from a lower social class, risked the lost of inheritance. Alexander I. Gonța quoted, in this respect, Irina's situation, disowned by her father, Grigore diac, because she had married a peasant ("vecin")¹⁰⁵.

Although regarded by the Church "bodily poor and emotionally unreliable"¹⁰⁶ and that "she must always be male subdued"¹⁰⁷, the woman is often met in many medieval documents: in order to establish parentage, as seen in the document quoted above, in 1619, as heir of the deceased husband or parent, as "ocini" purchaser, but also endowing monasteries with villages, in the spirit of Christian piety, of that time. A good example is lady Maria, the widow of Dumitrache Chiriță, ex-Grand Chamberlain, who gave Bisericanî monastery Vânători village, situated on Bistrita River, on the 14-th of April, 1620¹⁰⁸, "hoping to receive an eternal reward", as specified in that document.

The historian P.P. Panaitescu observed that in Moldavian women had equal rights with men in terms of inheritance, aspect that represents a Moldavian law particularity, unlike Valachian law, where the community was made up only of men¹⁰⁹. Studying this interesting case, Alexandru I. Gonța concluded that this situation is not found in the law of Moldavia's neighbour countries (Poland, Russia, Hungary, and The Byzantine Empire)¹¹⁰. Everywhere in these countries the inheritance right belonged only to men, and solely when there were no men descendents, the inheritance right could be applied to women. In Medieval Moldavia women came to inherit with their brothers or, where appropriate, with their children. Alexandru I. Gonța believed that this feature of Moldavian is explained due to the influence exerted by the Visigoths in the first centuries AD; these Visigoths have

¹⁰³National Archives - County Service Iași, *Documents*, no. CDLXIV / 29.

¹⁰⁴*DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume I, no. 38, p. 53-55.

¹⁰⁵Alexander I. Gonța, *Satul în Moldova medievală. Instituțiile [The village in Medieval Moldavia. Institutions]*, Bucharest, Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publishing House, 1986, p. 256.

¹⁰⁶George Duby, *Doamnele din veacul al XII-lea [The Ladies of the XII-th century]*, translated from French by Maria Carpov, Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing, 2000, p. 277.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 276.

¹⁰⁸*DIR, A. Moldavia*, XVII-th century, Volume IV, doc. no. 583, p. 463-464.

¹⁰⁹P.P. Panaitescu, *Obștea țărănească în Țara Românească și Moldova: orânduirea feudală [Peasant community of Valachian and Moldavian space: feudal ordering]*, Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1964, p. 177-178.

¹¹⁰Alexandru I. Gonța, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

lived in the present Moldavian area, and their law offered women equal rights to those of men in terms of property heritage¹¹¹.

Such an example in Neamț county is Bilăi's Singlitichia, mentioned in documents of the first quarter of the XVIII-th century, as a possessor of Roznov village, where she is half sharing the property, with her son, Ionașcu. It seems that this village was originally a part of the Târgul Piatra possession, then it was dislocated from the courtyard, being given to Bistrita Monastery by Alexander the Good, according to a later document, dated the 1-st of June, 1595¹¹². At one point, after he had confirmed the village as belonging to the already mentioned monastery, the voivode Petru Șchiopul withdrew the decision, selling it for 500 Tartar zlotys and 8 horses to the High Governor Bilăi, as shown in a document given by the voivode Miron Barnovschi on the 20-th of March, 1627¹¹³. This a surprising decision, because a ruler would rarely withdraw the gift already given to a monastery, and would almost never sell it later! This incident has generated a real dispute between the monks of Bistrița Monastery and Bilăi Governor's widow, Singlitichia, for Roznov village. The two sides have tried during the rulers Radu Mihnea and Miron Barnovschi, and the monks came to the ruler's throne with false documents. Thus, Singlitichia, and her son, Ionascu Bilăi, who had been the fortress commander¹¹⁴, won the trial. On the 21-st of May, 1617, Radu Mihnea voivode gave Ionașcu Bilăi the right to master Roznov village and to bring back his dependent peasants who had fled from the village, "wherever he would find them in my reign"¹¹⁵, as the document stated.

On the 4-th of December, 1619, Gașpar voivode wrote to the mayor of Piatra Fair to leave Bilăi's wife Roznov village aside, because, as the document noted, it "had belonged to Neamț county since Petru Șchiopul's reign". The ruler, Gașpar, ordered that Savin sulger should settle the conflict arisen between Ionașcu Bilăi from Roznov and Crâstea from Mastacăn, concerning an area of Soci village¹¹⁶. Four months later, on the 22-nd of March, 1620, the same voivode reconfirmed Roznov village as belonging to Bilăi's wife, with appropriate space to build a mill on Bistrița river¹¹⁷. It seems that her son, Ionașcu, died shortly afterwards, because Singlitichia Bilăi gave her fortune, that is Roznov village and another village in Tecuci county, to her nephew, Great Chancellor Dumitrașco, in order to take care of her, for the rest of her life¹¹⁸. Another possibility would be that she disinherited her son, Ionașcu, in case he was still alive.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

¹¹² *DIR, A. Moldavia*, XVI-th century, Volume IV, doc. no. 156, p. 125.

¹¹³ *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume XIX (1626-1628), prepared by Haralambie Chirca, Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1969, doc. no. 168, p. 211-216.

¹¹⁴ *DIR, A. Moldavia*, XVII-th century, Volume IV, Bucharest, Academy Publishing, 1956, doc. no. 206, p. 167.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 527, p. 409-410.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, doc. no. 567, p.436-437.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Volume V, doc. no. 429, p.323-324.

Contemporary documents analyses, and historiographical approach of the problem, reveal that boyars in Neamț county, along with the rest of Moldavian boyars, was the most valuable social class in Romanian medieval society. In the period we dealt with (XV-th–XVII-th centuries), this social class represented, as shown, the political elite of society, both locally (on the county level), and centrally, through the presence in the Ruler's Advice or by holding high dignitaries.

By its defining characteristics, mentioned in this study, it can be concluded that the boyars of Neamt county have perfectly integrated to the rest of Moldavian boyars; there is no evidence that they formed a separate group within the already mentioned boyars.

Meanwhile, in the spirit of the age, Neamt county boyars have enjoyed not only the socio-political elite status, but also the cultural elite rank, a position which conferred them an important role in the building and maintenance of religious sites, Secu Monastery for example, but also in terms of being present in the Ruler's Chancery, where chancellors¹¹⁹, grammars and diacs¹²⁰ were employed, recruited among those the litterate.

¹¹⁹ The most important chancellors which have owned villages in Neamț county, the following can be mentioned in this study: Costea chancellor, holding Gocimănești village on the 24-th of February, 1442 - see *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume I, doc. no. 218, p. 306; Michael chancellor, master of Vânători village, on Bistrita, on the 25-th of January, 1446 - see *Ibid*, doc. no. 260, p. 369; Sima chancellor, about whom we know, from a posthumous document, that he received from the rulers Iliș and Ștefan II, Soci and Dușești villages, situated between Cracău river and the springs of White Creek - See *DIR, A. Moldavia*, XVI-th century, Volume I, doc. no. 278, p. 312.

¹²⁰ Some examples in this regard are: Roman diac, son of Stanislav from Neamt, mentioned on the 19-th of February, 1412 - see *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume I, doc. no. 32, p. 46, Nechita diac of Vârtop, noted in a document dated on the 1-st of February, 1610 - see *DIR, A. Moldavia*, XVII-th century, Volume II, doc. no. 365, p. 277, Gheorghe Boțul, diac of Dolhești, (on the 4-th of November, 1616 - see *Ibid*, Volume IV, doc. no. 88, p. 60) or Luchian, diac of Vârtop (on the 5-th of April, 1634 - see *DRH, A. Moldavia*, Volume XXII, doc. no. 100, p. 112).

*Annex: Krupenski family coat of arms*¹²¹



¹²¹ Octav-George Lecca, *Familiile boierești române. Istorie și genealogie (după izvoare autentice)* [*Romanian boyar families. History and genealogy (authentic sources)*], with annotations, additions and drawings by Mateiu Caragiale, Alexander Condeescu edition, Bucharest, Romanian Literature Museum, 2000 p. 372.

LA SOCIÉTÉ ROUMAINE A LA LIMITE DES XVIII^{ÈME} – XIX^{ÈME} SIÈCLES. CONTACTS ET IMAGES FRANÇAISES

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Rezumat: *Societatea românească, multă vreme izolată nu numai de granițe politice, ci și de prejudecăți, a manifestat din a doua jumătate a secolului al XVIII-lea, o receptivitate deosebită pentru valorile culturii europene, în general, și pentru cele de expresie franceză, în particular. Era vorba un alt fel de a fi, de a gândi, un nou model, cel francez, la care românii s-au dovedit extrem de sensibili. Acesta a fost vehiculat de călătorii și diplomații francezi și a fost introdus prin contactele interumane, tipăriturile (periodice, cărți franceze, traduceri), învățământul familial (introducerea limbii franceze), influența ofițerilor armatelor combatante, înființarea consulatului francez la finalul secolului al XVIII-lea.*

Abstract: *The Romanian society, longtime isolated by politic frontiers, but also by the prejudices, manifested from the second half of the XVIII-th century receptivity for the values of the European culture, in general, and for those of French expression, in particular. They met another way of being, of thinking, a new model, the French one on which the Romanians were extremely sensible. This model was introduced by the French voyagers and diplomats, by the contacts between the people, the printed (periodical journals, French books, translations), the familial instruction (the introduction of the French language), the influence of the officers of the combative armies, the foundation of the French consulate at the end of the XVIII-th century.*

Résumé: *La société roumaine, longtemps isolée pas seulement par les frontières politiques, mais aussi par les préjugés, a manifesté dès la seconde moitié du XVIII-ème siècle, une réceptivité tout à fait particulière pour les valeurs de la culture européenne, en général, et pour celles d'expression française, en particulier. Il s'agissait d'une autre manière d'être, de penser, d'un nouveau modèle, celui français auquel les Roumains ont été très sensibles. Celui-ci a été véhiculé par les voyageurs et les diplomates français; il a été introduit par les contacts interhumains, les imprimés (journaux réguliers, livres français, traductions), l'enseignement familial (l'introduction de la langue française), l'influence des officiers des armées combattantes, la création du consulat français à la fin du XVIII-ème siècle.*

Keywords: *Romanian Principalities, France, voyagers, diplomats, consulate, contacts, vision.*

Les relations des étrangers qui sont entrées en contact avec les réalités roumaines de la fin du XVIII-ème siècle et du début du XIX-ème représentent des sources historiques d'importance majeure et offrent une image extrêmement intéressante et nuancée des événements et des faits du milieu desquels ou sur lesquels les expéditeurs communiquaient leurs impressions "à chaud". Les témoignages

documentaires des Français¹, qui soit ont traversé le territoire des Principautés, soit y ont résidé pour une certaine période de temps, présentent un réel intérêt et ont une valeur historique certaine, même si leurs histoires sont parfois superficielles, autrefois sporadiques, et souvent peuvent paraître subjectives et même malveillantes. Paul Cernovodeanu a établi pour les voyageurs français une délimitation entre les différents types de relations: des dissertations avec sujet historique, social ou économique, des rapports dressés à la demande des supérieurs sur échelle hiérarchique, des notes de voyage, des journaux de campagne tenus par les officiers des troupes combattantes au cours des hostilités russo-turques².

Tout en commençant avec la seconde décennie du XVIII-ème siècle, dans les Principautés Roumaines s'est instauré le régime phanariote. Les phanariotes, „des petits despotes dans un monde barbare”³, ont essayé à améliorer la structure administrative des Principautés. Malgré le caractère discontinu du régime⁴, les phanariotes ont été les intermédiaires de la culture moderne, des lumières françaises⁵. Les voyageurs du XVIII-ème siècle ont contribué pleinement à l'augmentation du

¹ M. Berza, *Cuvânt înainte* [Préface] à *Călători străini despre țările române* [Voyageurs étrangers sur les pays roumains], le I-er volume, București, 1968, p. VI; Paul Cernovodeanu, *Importanța corpusului de călători străini pentru istoria Țărilor Române în prima jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea* [L'importance du corpus de voyageurs étrangers pour l'histoire des Pays Roumains dans la première moitié du XIX-ème siècle], en “Revista Istorică”, tome III, no. 11-12, 1992, p. 1091-1092.

² Marian Stroia, *Aspecte ale societății românești în viziunea călătorilor străini (1774-1821)* [Aspects de la société roumaine dans la vision des voyageurs étrangers (1774-1821)], en “Revista de Istorie”, t. 38, no. 5/1985, p. 448-449; Paul Cernovodeanu, *op. cit.*, p. 1099.

³ Doina Calistru, *Influența franceză în spațiul românesc. Modalități de receptare, forme de expresie* [L'influence française dans l'espace roumain. Manières de récepter, formes d'expression], dans le volume *Franța. Model cultural și politic* [La France. Modèle culturel et politique], édité par Alexandru Zub et Dumitru Ivănescu, Editura Junimea, Iași, 2003, p. 29; Paul Cornea, *Lecturi actuale ale luminilor* [Lectures actuelles des lumières], dans le volume *Aproapele și departele* [Le lointain et le prochain], Editura Cartea Românească, 1990, p. 10.

⁴ M. Kogălniceanu, *Cuvânt pentru deschiderea cursului de istorie națională în Academia Mihăileană, rostit în 24 noemvrie 1843* [Préface pour l'ouverture du cours d'histoire nationale à l'Académie Mihăileană], en Cornelia Bodea, *1848 la români. O istorie în date și mărturii* [1848 chez les Roumains. une histoire en dates et témoignages], le II-ème volume, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1998, p. 1189; Henri H. Stahl, *Gânditori și curente de istorie socială românească. Problemele Țărilor Române în „criza orientală”* [Penseurs et courants d'histoire sociale roumaine. Les problèmes des Pays Roumains dans la “crise orientale”], en <http://ebooks.unibuc.ro> Sociologie/neri/3.htm.

⁵ A.D. Xenopol, *Istoria partidelor politice* [L'histoire des partis politiques], I, București, 1911, p. 53; Doina Calistru, *op. cit.* en *loc. cit.*, p. 30-31; Anton Maria del Chiaro, *Revoluțiile Valahiei* [Les révolutions de la Valachie], en “Viața Românească”, Iași, 1929, *apud* Șt. Lemny, *Sensibilitate și istorie în secolul XVIII românesc* [Sensibilité et histoire dans le XVIII-ème siècle roumain], București, Editura Meridiane, 1990, p. 12; Eugen Lovinescu, *Istoria civilizației române moderne* [L'histoire de la civilisation roumaine moderne], București, Editura Științifică, 1972, p. 76.

volume d'informations concernant les Principautés Danubiennes, dans la majorité des cas en contraste avec les réalités connues de l'ouest de l'Europe. Leurs écrits ont préparé l'Europe pour connaître les Roumains, provoquant une sorte de curiosité pour cet espace-ci.

Après 1774, dans les Principautés Roumaines s'est enregistré un grand afflux de voyageurs, animés par intérêts divers et dont les témoignages sont abondants et variés. Des aventuriers, des militaires ou des consuls français – comme c'est le cas de Charles de Peyssonnel, de Jean-Louis Carra, de Louis Emmanuel Henry de Launay, du comte d'Antraigues, d'Alexandre Maurice Blanc de Launette, comte d'Hauterive, de Louis-Alexandre Andraut, comte de Langeron, du prince Charles Joseph de Ligne, de Charles Flury ou de Joseph Parrant – tous ceux qu'on vient de mentionner ont laissé des textes qui témoignent de la période qu'ils ont passé dans les Principautés, de l'image qu'ils se sont formés sur ces provinces de l'Empire Ottoman. Leurs relations ont le plus souvent un caractère mixte, contenant des informations d'ordre général, mais aussi des précisions diverses d'ordre politique qui servaient mieux à leur mission⁶.

En 1779, lorsque le comte Louis Emmanuel d'Antraigues se dirigeait vers la capitale autrichienne dans son chemin vers la France, il a traversé la Moldavie. La valeur des informations fournies par le mémorial de voyage du comte d'Antraigues est extrêmement inégale. Il avait stigmatisé les abus du régime phanariote, a condamné le comportement brutal des troupes russes d'occupation pendant la guerre de 1768-1774. Il a décrit, aussi, des paysages magnifiques, des événements passés pendant le voyage (parfois imaginaires)⁷.

En 1786, dans son chemin de retour de Constantinople en France, le voyageur français Joseph-Gabriel Monnier avait traversé la Valachie. A București, il a été reçu par le prince régnant Nicolae Mavrogheni; il a laissé, aussi, une description de la ville qui n'était pas entourée de murailles, avec des maisons grandes, belles et construites en pierre, avec des ruelles larges et pavées avec des troncs d'arbres⁸.

⁶ Gabriel Leancă, *Cultură politică și univers cultural în relațiile călătorilor francezi prin spațiul românesc (1774-1790)* [Culture politique et univers culturel dans les relations des voyageurs français par l'espace roumain (1774-1790)], en *Cultură politică și politici culturale în România modernă* [Culture politique et politiques culturelles dans la Roumanie moderne], Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași, 2005, p. 102-103; Marian Stroia, *op. cit.*, p. 449; *Călători străini despre Țările Române* [Voyageurs étrangers sur les Pays Roumains], le X-ème volume, la I-ère partie, (volume soigné par Maria Holban, Maria M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu), Editura Academiei Române, București, 2000, p. 6; Larry Wolff, *Inventarea Europei de Est. Harta civilizației în Epoca Luminilor* [L'invention de l'Europe d'Est. La carte de la civilisation à l'Epoque des Lumières], București, Editura Humanitas, 2000, p. 21.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 293-294.

⁸ *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la I-ère partie, p. 784, 786-787.

Charles-Marie, marquis de Salaberry⁹ présentait en *Voyage à Constantinople*, ouvrage publié à Paris en 1799, les Principautés comme “un désert”, état dû aux intrigues et aux impôts demandés par les princes phanariotes. De plus, les Valaques étaient aveugles dès leur naissance parce qu’ils ne connaissaient pas l’Europe d’Ouest¹⁰.

Arrivé dans la capitale de la Moldavie à cause des événements politiques – militaires des années 1788-1790, Charles-Joseph, prince de Ligne¹¹ a resté enchanté de la manière dans laquelle il a été reçu à la cour du “bey Mavrocordat”. Il a été très surpris lorsqu’il a entendu parler le français dans les Principautés. Il a remarqué le luxe des femmes, même si les modèles occidentaux n’avaient pas été acceptés par la société roumaine¹². Observateur fin et avisé, il a fait les Principautés connues grâce à son vaste correspondance avec les plus marquantes personnalités de son époque¹³. Le prince de Ligne condamnait l’état déplorable dans lequel se trouvait la Moldavie, mais proposait, aussi, une solution pour son amélioration; il suggérait l’abolition du régime turco – phanariote et l’instauration d’une sorte de république aristocratique, dirigée par deux boyards indigènes¹⁴.

Ami du prince de Ligne, Roger de Damas a été volontaire dans l’armée russe pendant la guerre de 1787-1791. Damas a lutté sous la commande du général Potemkin, occasion avec laquelle il avait traversé la Valachie et la Moldavie. Ses

⁹ *Călători străini despre Țările Române* [Voyageurs étrangers sur les Pays Roumains], le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie (volume soigné par Maria Holban, Maria M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu), Editura Academiei Române, București, 2001, p. 1001.

¹⁰ Charles-Marie, marquis de Salaberry d’Irumberry, *Voyage à Constantinople, en Italie et aux îles de l’archipel, par l’Allemagne et la Hongrie*, Paris, Imprimerie de Crapelet, 1799, p.110, *apud* Larry Wolff, *op. cit.*, p. 7; Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

¹¹ N. Iorga, *Istoria românilor prin călători* [L’histoire des Roumains par voyageurs], București, Editura Eminescu, 1981, p. 398; Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița a trei imperii* [A la frontière des trois empires], Editura Junimea, 1985, p. 92; Dan Berindei, *Legături și convergențe istorice româno-franceze* [Liaisons et convergences historiques roumaino-françaises], en “Revista de istorie”, tome 32, no. 3/1979, p. 406.

¹² *Ibidem*; Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 32-33; Veniamin Ciobanu, *op. cit.*, p. 94; Gabriel Leancă, *op. cit.*, p. 106-107; Adrian-Silvian Ionescu, *Politică și modă la cumpăna secolelor XVIII-XIX* [Politique et mode à la limite des XVIII-ème – XIX-ème siècles], en “Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «A.D. Xenopol»”, Iași, tome XXXIII, 1996, p. 57-58; *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 915.

¹³ Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la Istoria Românilor* [Documents concernant l’histoire des Roumains], Suppliment I, le III-ème volume, 1709-1812, *Documente culese din Archivele Ministeriului Afacerilor Străine din Paris de A. I. Odobescu publicate sub auspiciile Ministeriului Cultelor și Instrucțiunii Publice și ale Academiei Române* [1709-1812, Documents cueillis des Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Paris par A.I.Odobescu publiés sous les auspices du Ministère des Cultes et de l’Instruction Publique et de l’Académie Roumaine], București, 1889, p. 78; Veniamin Ciobanu, *op. cit.*, p. 174; *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 900.

¹⁴ Hurmuzaki, *op. cit.*, p. 78; Gabriel Leancă, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

mémoires comprennent surtout des informations sur le déroulement de la guerre, les mouvements des troupes¹⁵.

Un autre français qui a séjourné dans les Principautés dans la période qu'on vient de mentionner est Louis-Alexandre Andrault de Langeron, officier russe qui a servi sous la commande du général Grigore Alexandrovici Potemkin dans la guerre russo-turque de 1790-1791. Dans *Le journal des campagnes faites au service de la Russie en 1790 par le général comte de Langeron*, celui-ci a offert des informations concernant la situation géographique des deux Principautés, leur histoire, leur division administrative, les principales villes et rivières, ainsi que la description des fortifications militaires¹⁶. Langeron n'a pas oublié à mentionner que de la Moldavie "l'impératrice d'Allemagne, Marie Thérèse a eu l'adresse de se faire céder une petite partie – la Bucovine – pour prix de son rôle de médiatrice en 1774", mais aussi, que, tout en se rapportant aux réalités de la France ou de l'Allemagne, les villes des Principautés Danubiennes, à l'exception de București et de Iași, n'étaient que "que des gros bourgs"¹⁷.

Les princes régnants des deux Principautés restaient sur le trône "un certain temps – 7 ans ordinairement, mais jamais plus"; cette fonction revenait, par excellence, aux phanariotes, qui, le plus souvent, à l'avance avaient occupé la fonction de drogmans de la Porte¹⁸. En ce qui concerne la population, Langeron a offert une série d'informations concernant les classes sociales existantes dans les Principautés: les paysans qui n'étaient pas des "serfs", mais qui étaient "soumis à des seigneurs qu'on nomme Boyards", qui seraient "au pair des nobles des autres pays". Langeron était frappé par le fait qu'aux cours de certains de ces boyards, on menait une vie extrêmement luxueuse "avec un mélange agréable de goût européen et

¹⁵ *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 888.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 933; Hurmuzaki, *op. cit.*, p. 70-71; Paul Cernovodeanu, *op. cit.*, p. 1103.

¹⁷ *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 933; Hurmuzaki, *op. cit.*, p. 70-71; Gabriel Leancă, *Politica Franței în Principatele Române la începutul secolului al XIX-lea din perspectiva elitei locale* [La politique de la France dans les Principautés Roumaines au début du XIX-ème siècle de la perspective de l'élite locale], dans le volume *Relații internaționale. Lumea diplomației. Lumea conflictului* [Relations internationales. Le monde de la diplomatie. Le monde du conflit], Editura Pim, Iași, 2009, p. 112; Idem, *Cultură politică...*, p. 112; Veniamin Ciobanu, *Statutul juridic al Principatelor Române în viziune europeană (sec. al XVIII-lea)* [Le statut juridique des Principautés Roumaines en vision européenne (le XVIII-ème siècle)], Editura Universității "Alexandru Ioan Cuza", Iași, 1999, p. 160; Idem, *La granița...*, p. 176.

¹⁸ *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 935; Hurmuzaki, *op. cit.*, p. 73-74; George F. Jewsbury, *Anexarea Basarabiei la Rusia: 1774-1828. Studiu asupra expansiunii imperiale* [L'Annexion de la Bessarabie à la Russie : 1774-1828. Etude sur l'expansion impériale], Polirom, 2003, p. 17; N. Iorga, *op. cit.*, p. 437; Gabriel Leancă, *Politica Franței...*, p. 112; Georgeta Penelea, *Țările Române în timpul războiului din 1806-1812 văzute de ofițerii superiori ruși A. de Langeron și P. V. Ciceagov* [Les Pays Roumains pendant la guerre de 1806-1812 vus par les officiers supérieurs russes A. de Langeron et P. V. Ciceagov], en "Revista de istorie", tome 41, no. 7, 1988, p. 677;

asiatique”¹⁹. Il appréciait avec hésitations la population des deux Principautés à environ 1.700.000 habitants. Il plaignait la destinée cruelle des gens du peuple “trop souvent abruti par la tyrannie ou les vexations aussi atroces qu’ingénieuses de ses chefs”²⁰.

Un autre paragraphe des mémoires du comte Louis-Alexandre Andrault de Langeron était dédié à l’état mal des chemins de cette région et à la difficulté avec laquelle on voyageait : il mentionnait le manque d’expérience et la commodité des cochers des stations de poste de la Bessarabie, les chevaux attelés aux voitures à demi sauvages “qui souvent s’emportent et vous versent”, le danger de s’égarer faute des éléments qui indiquent le chemin, l’impossibilité d’utiliser les chemins durant l’hiver, l’état déplorable des chevaux moldaves²¹.

Un autre visiteur des Principautés à la limite des deux siècles a été Armand-Emmanuel-Joseph du Plessis, duc de Richelieu (1766-1822)²². Il a écrit pour ses amis l’histoire de ses aventures dans ces parages; son ouvrage est intitulé *Journal de mon voyage en Allemagne*. Il a rappelé l’hospitalité des boyards de Dorohoi et Botoșani. Il a remarqué l’arbitrage et l’indolence, traits du climat oriental, qui, à son avis, étaient le résultat du régime politique des Principautés. Il a prévu le changement de cette manière de gouverner, le développement de l’économie, la croissance de la population, l’indépendance politique et même l’union de la Moldavie avec la Valachie²³.

Les princes régnants phanariotes ont eu un rôle essentiel dans la pénétration des idées illuministes dans le domaine politique, économique, social et culturel. En leur majorité des anciens drogmans de la Porte, ils ont été obligés à apprendre le français, la langue de la diplomatie du XVIII-ème siècle. Possédant le sentiment de la culture et un vif intérêt pour ce qui se passait en Europe, des gens avec des aptitudes intellectuelles et de vastes connaissances, plusieurs fois avec un niveau culturel beaucoup supérieur à celui des Moldo-Valaques, les phanariotes ont stimulé les traductions et les publications, se sont entourés d’hommes érudits, ont fondé des

¹⁹ *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 936-937; Hurmuzaki, *op. cit.*, p. 74-75; Gabriel Leancă, *Politica Franței...*, p. 112-113; Idem, *Cultură politică...*, p. 112. Georgeta Crăciun, *Călători străini despre Iași în secolele XIV-XIX (Elemente caracteristice)* [Voyageurs étrangers sur Jassy dans les XIV-ème – XIX-ème siècles (Éléments caractéristiques)], en “Studii și articole de istorie”, București, VIII/1966, p. 248; Gh. G. Bezviconi, *Călători ruși în Moldova și Muntenia* [Voyageurs russes en Moldavie et en Valachie], București, 1947, p. 38, 42; Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița...*, p. 176-177.

²⁰ *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 939; Hurmuzaki, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

²¹ *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 948-949; Hurmuzaki, *op. cit.*, p. 97-98; Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița...*, p. 96; Andrei Pippidi, *Călătoriile ducelui de Richelieu prin Moldova* [Les voyages du duc de Richelieu par la Moldavie], en “Revista de istorie”, tome 41, no. 7, 1988, p.

²² *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 922.

²³ Andrei Pippidi, *op. cit.*, p. 689-690.

écoles²⁴. C'était le début de l'euro péanisation des classes supérieures roumaines, quoique ce procès ait été initialement assez superficiel²⁵.

Les phanariotes n'ont pas été seulement les intermédiaires de l'influence française. A ceux-ci on doit les premiers contacts directs, aussi, parce que les premiers français arrivés dans les Principautés ont été soit leurs secrétaires particuliers, soient les professeurs de leurs enfants²⁶. Ces secrétaires français devaient rédiger la correspondance des princes régnants phanariotes avec les agents secrets et les grandes puissances. Ils étaient payés par l'ambassadeur français à Constantinople, avec lequel ils portaient une correspondance chiffrée. On mentionne de ces secrétaires Millo, Linchou, Simian, La Roche, Carra, le comte d'Hauterive, l'abbé Le Chevalier²⁷. On doit mentionner de leur galerie le plus connu émigrant royaliste français établi dans les Principautés au début du XIX-ème siècle, le comte de Belleval, le secrétaire personnel de Constantin Ipsilanti, qui l'avait hérité d'Alexandru Suțu. Un personnage très instruit, sage, intrigant, manqué de scrupules, Belleval prétendait qu'il était comte, qu'il avait activé dans le service de Louis XVI²⁸. Un autre émigrant français célèbre était le marquis de Saint-Aulaire, arrivé en Valachie au début du XIX-ème siècle dans le service de Constantin Ipsilanti²⁹. Un autre français de l'entourage du prince régnant Constantin Ipsilanti, un certain Montesquieu

²⁴ Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 34-35; Paul Cornea, *Originile romantismului românesc. Spiritul public, mișcarea ideilor și literatura între 1780-1840* [Les origines du romantisme roumain. L'esprit public, le mouvement des idées et la littérature entre 1780-1840], București, Editura Minerva, 1972, p. 50, 53; Dan Horia Mazilu, *Noi despre ceilalți. Fals tratat de imagologie* [Nous sur les autres. Faux traité d'imagologie], Polirom, 1999, p. 236; Pompiliu Eliade, *Influența franceză asupra spiritului public în România. Originile. Studiu asupra stării societății românești în vremea domniilor fanariote* [L'influence française sur l'esprit public en Roumanie. Les origines. Etude sur l'état de la société roumaine pendant les règnes phanariotes], București, Editura Univers, 1982, p. 13; Alexandrina Ioniță, *Carte franceză în Moldova până la 1859* [Livre français en Moldavie jusqu'en 1859], Casa Editorială Demiurg, Iași, 2007, p. 49.

²⁵ Keith Hitchins, *Români. 1774-1866* [Les Roumains. 1774-1866], Humanitas, București, 1998, p. 83.

²⁶ Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 36; Alexandru-Florin Platon, *Imaginea Franței în Principatele Române: modalități de receptare (sec. XVIII-XIX)* [L'image de la France dans les Principautés Roumaines : manières de récepter (les XVIII-ème – XIX-ème siècles)], en "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A.D. Xenopol»", XVIII, 1981, p. 203. Alexandrina Ioniță, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

²⁷ Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

²⁸ Hurmuzaki, *Documente privind istoria României* [Documents concernant l'histoire de la Roumanie], nouvelle série, le IV-ème volume, *Rapoarte diplomatice ruse (1797-1806)* [Rapports diplomatiques russes (1797-1806)], București, Editura Științifică, 1974, p. 253, 255.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 628; Dan A. Lăzărescu, *L'influence de la Révolution française sur la mentalité roumaine et sur les structures de la société roumaine*, en *La Révolution française et les Roumains. Impact, images, interprétations*, publiée par Al. Zub, Editura Junimea, Iași, 1989, p. 107.

prétendait qu'il avait servi dans l'armée du prince Condé. Ensemble à sa femme, il a été engagé comme professeur pour les enfants de celui-ci³⁰. En 1802, dans la suite d'Alexandru Moruzi, le prince régnant de la Moldavie, se trouvait, aussi, le français Amoreux, „ancien officier dans le service de la Russie et qui devait être son secrétaire personnel”³¹.

Jean-Louis Carra³², qui a été le précepteur des enfants de Grigore Al. Ghica, le prince régnant de la Moldavie, a écrit le premier livre dans la langue française sur les deux Principautés, intitulée *Histoire de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, avec une dissertation sur l'état actuel de ces deux provinces*. Son ouvrage a été imprimé premièrement à Iași, ensuite à Paris; celui-ci représentait la première synthèse historique sur les Pays Roumains publiée dans la langue française³³. Carra ne trouvait rien de bon aux Roumains. Les paysans habitaient dans des villages misérables. Il a fait des références à l'atmosphère politique d'insécurité, à l'ignorance des gens, à l'orientation des jeunes, à la spoliation de la population par les princes régnants phanariotes. Il a remarqué l'abondance des forêts, le bois desquelles pourrait servir, dans sa vision, à la construction des vaisseaux. Quoiqu'on cultive des céréales à échelle large, la production était extrêmement réduite. L'élevage du bétail était très rentable dès qu'on pratiquait leur export vers Constantinople et les pays allemands³⁴. En ce qui concerne l'état dans lequel se trouvaient les deux provinces danubiennes, Carra affirmait: „si Monsieur Rousseau continue à soutenir que les peuples barbares et sans lois valent de plus qu'un peuple civilisé, je l'inviterai à vivre seulement une année dans les forêts de la Moldavie”³⁵.

Le 26 mai 1782, Carra écrivait au ministre des affaires étrangères, de Vergennes, une mémoire concernant les avantages de la création d'un consulat

³⁰ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, nouvelle série, le IV-ème volume, p. 253.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 462.

³² Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 36-37; Henri H. Stahl, *op. cit.*; Alexandrina Ioniță, *op. cit.*, p. 46; *Reprezentanțele diplomatice ale României* [Les représentantes diplomatiques de la Roumanie], le I-er volume, 1859-1917, Editura Politică, București, 1967, p. 101.

³³ *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la I-ère partie, p. 246; Dan A. Lăzărescu, *Imaginea României prin călători* [L'Image de la Roumanie par voyageurs], le I-er volume, 1716-1789, 1985, Editura Sport -Turism, p. 103.

³⁴ *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la I-ère partie, p. 244-246.

³⁵ Jean-Louis Carra, *Histoire de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, avec une dissertation sur l'état actuel de ces deux provinces*, Iași, 1777, *apud* Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 37; D. Ciurea, *Influența Revoluției Franceze din 1789 în Țările Române* [L'Influence de la Révolution Française de 1789 dans les Pays Roumains], dans le volume *Românii în istoria universală* [Les Roumains dans l'histoire universelle], vol. III/1, Iași, 1988, p. 22; Pompiliu Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 125; Gh. Haupt, *Date cu privire la cunoștințele opiniei publice ruse despre țările românești la începutul secolului al XIX-lea* [Données concernant les connaissances de l'opinion publique russe sur les pays roumains au début du XIX-ème siècle], en “Studii și articole de istorie”, 1956, 1, p. 116; Gabriel Leancă, *Cultură politică...*, p. 104-105, 106; Alexandru-Florin Platon, *op. cit.*, p. 203-204; Dan A. Lăzărescu, *Imaginea României...*, p. 116-117; Veniamin Ciobanu, *Statutul juridic...*, p. 233-234.

français dans les Principautés; on mentionnait l'intérêt politique de la France et l'essor de son commerce³⁶.

Alexandre-Maurice Blanc de Launette, comte d'Hauterive, quittait en 1785 l'ambassade française de Constantinople pour occuper un poste de secrétaire à la cour du prince régnant de la Moldavie, Alexandru Constantin Mavrocordat Firaris³⁷. Agé de 31 années à son arrivée à Iași, il a écrit pendant son séjour moldave l'ouvrage *Tableau de quelques usages de la Moldavie et de l'idiome moldave*. Ultérieurement, il a rédigé *Journal d'un voyage de Constantinople à Jassy*, ainsi que *Renseignements moraux et curieux sur quelques usages des habitants de la Moldavie et sur l'idiome moldave*³⁸.

En *Journal d'un voyage*, le comte français a raconté avec talent et humour les 28 jours de voyage de Constantinople à Iași. Il exprimait ses regrets que la richesse de ces contrées partait vers Constantinople au lieu de revenir au peuple roumain³⁹. Le comte d'Hauterive n'a pas pu s'accommoder avec l'atmosphère de la capitale moldave; la ville d'Iași ne lui a pas fait une bonne impression⁴⁰. En 1785, il a rédigé un mémoire concernant la Moldavie, qu'il a présenté à Alexandru Ipsilanti en 1787. Il y a écrit sur la "féodalité" et la "tyrannie féodale", sur la situation sociale, économique et politique du pays; il a condamné le régime phanariote. Il a remarqué, aussi, les ressemblances qui existaient entre la Moldavie et la Valachie⁴¹.

L'archéologue Jean-Baptiste Le Chevalier a été pour une courte période de temps le secrétaire du prince régnant Alexandru Ipsilanti, pendant le règne de celui-ci en Moldavie. Entre autres, Le Chevalier avait la mission d'informer l'ambassadeur sur les mouvements des troupes de la tsarine de la Russie, Ecaterine II, massées aux frontières de l'empire, sous la commande du knèze Potemkin. A cause des troubles

³⁶ Gabriel Leancă, *Cultură politică...*, p. 105.

³⁷ V. Miordea, *De Hauterive secretar domnesc în Moldova* [De Hauterivesecrétaire du prince régnant en Moldavie], en "Revista istorică", no. 1-3, 1935, p. 35-36; Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița...*, p. 74, 76, 164; Idem, *Jurnal ieșean la sfârșit de veac (1775-1800)* [Journal de Jassy à la fin du siècle (1775-1800)], Editura Junimea, 1980, p. 60-61; Dan Berindei, *op. cit.*, p. 406; Henri H. Stahl, *op. cit.*; *Reprezentanțele diplomatice...*, p. 101; N. Munteanu-Breasta, „Moldova la 1787” în *viziunea contelui d'Hauterive* [“La Moldavie à 1787” dans la vision du comte d'Hauterive], en „Revista de istorie”, tome 41, no. 7, 1988, p. 709.

³⁸ Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 38; Veniamin Ciobanu, *Statutul juridic...*, p. 212-213; Dan A. Lăzărescu, *Imaginea României...*, p. 285.

³⁹ N. Munteanu-Breasta, *op. cit.*, p. 711-712; *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la I-ère partie, p. 684-685.

⁴⁰ Alexandre-Maurice Blanc de Launette, comte d'Hauterive, *Journal inédit d'un voyage de Constantinople à Jassy, capitale de la Moldavie dans l'hiver de 1787*, en *Mémoire sur l'état ancien et actuel de la Moldavie: Présenté à S.A.S. le prince Alexandre Ypsilanti, Hospodar régnant, en 1787, par le conte d'Hauterive*, București, L'Institut d'Arts Graphiques Carol Göbl, 1902, p. 137, *apud* Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița...*, p. 164-165.

⁴¹ Alexandre-Maurice Blanc de Launette, comte d'Hauterive, *op. cit.*, *apud* Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 38; *Călători străini ...*, le X-ème volume, la I-ère partie, p. 690, 692; Gabriel Leancă, *Cultură politică...*, p. 111; N. Iorga, *op. cit.*, p. 382; Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița...*, p. 171.

provoqués par les janissaires turcs qui se trouvaient dans le service de Ipsilanti, qui ont attaqué la Cour princière, Le Chevalier, tout en craignant sa vie, est parti en hâte de Iași le 21 novembre 1787. Le départ précipité de l'archéologue français de la Moldavie a causé le mécontentement de Choiseul, manqué de cette manière d'un informateur précieux justement le moment où un nouveau conflit avait éclaté entre l'Empire Ottoman et la Russie⁴².

Pendant et grâce aux princes régnants phanariotes, la langue française a commencé à être connue dans les Principautés Danubiennes. La troisième langue parlée par l'aristocratie, selon le grec et l'italien, la langue française était utilisée par les boyards par intérêt, mais aussi par esprit d'imitation. Les étrangers qui sont arrivés dans ces parages ont été surpris à entendre parler tant de langages⁴³. Toujours aux princes régnants phanariotes on doit l'introduction des premières publications dans la langue française. Les boyards, à leur tour, par esprit d'imitation ou vanité, se sont constitués des bibliothèques qui contenaient des romans galants et distractifs, mais aussi des œuvres historiques ou philosophiques des grands encyclopédistes⁴⁴. *L'Encyclopédie française* était connue dans les Principautés⁴⁵.

Dès 1790, le répandissement à échelle continentale de la *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*, a déterminé l'apparition dans les Principautés des idées de la bourgeoisie française. Les agents diplomatiques des Principautés signalaient avec inquiétude les progrès de l'"esprit jacobin"; sous l'influence de celui-ci, les boyards lisaient des livres comme *Lettres sur la Souveraineté du peuple*, *Manuel du Citoyen*, *Histoire politique de la Révolution en France*, *Discours de Mirabeau*, *Histoire de la Convocation et des Elections aux Etats Généraux en 1784*⁴⁶. Des brochures comme *De la souveraineté du peuple* (Paris, 1790) ou *Le manuel du citoyen* (Paris, 1791) ont été apportées dans les Principautés par les agents républicains français, et après 1796, par les consuls français, qui jouissaient d'accès libre aux plus hauts niveaux de la société moldave et valaque, dans les salons des grands boyards et des métropolitains⁴⁷.

⁴² *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, 1354-1356; Pompiliu Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 149-150.

⁴³ Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 39; Charles-Marie, marquis de Salaberry d'Irumberry, *op. cit.*, en *loc. cit.*, p. 98; Alexandrina Ioniță, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁴⁴ Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁴⁵ N. Iorga, *Contribuții la istoria literaturii române în veacul al XVIII-lea și al XIX-lea*, I, *Scritori bisericești*, [Contributions à l'histoire de la littérature roumaine au XVIII-ème et au XIX-ème siècle, I, Ecrivains ecclésiastiques] en "Analele Acad. Rom.", sect. lit., ser. II, le vol. XXVIII, 1906, p. 186, *apud* Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 40; Adriana Camariano, *Spiritul revoluționar francez și Voltaire în limba greacă și română* [L'esprit révolutionnaire français et Voltaire dans les langues grecque et roumaine], București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1946, p. 10.

⁴⁶ Alexandru-Florin Platon, *op. cit.*, p. 204; Leonid Boicu, *Principatele Române în raporturile politice internaționale (1792-1821)* [Les Principautés Roumaines dans les Rapports politiques internationales (1792-1821)], édition soignée par Victor Spinei, Institutul European, 2001, p. 43.

⁴⁷ Keith Hitchins, *op. cit.*, p. 167; Adriana Camariano, *op. cit.*, p. 59-63; A. Zub, *La Révolution Française et les Roumains*, Iași, 1989, p. 17-52, 95-117, 147-162.

Les bibliothèques de cette époque-là contenaient, aussi, des œuvres des philosophes français. Constantin Mavrocordat avait dans la bibliothèque plusieurs livres en français. Des Fontaines lui dédiait en 1774 la traduction des œuvres de Virgile. En 1742, ce prince régnant phanariote envoyait à la revue „Le Mercure de France” une esquisse de ses réformes⁴⁸. Il semble que les boyards ont été puissamment influencés par le prince régnant; le voyageur Flachat affirmait qu’Andronachi, le premier secrétaire de Constantin Mavrocordat, avait une bibliothèque grande, des tableaux chers, quelques sculptures⁴⁹.

Quoiqu’on n’ait aucun document qui atteste la contribution des consulats étrangers à l’intensification des relations culturelles entre les Principautés et l’ouest de l’Europe, pour la période de la fin du XVIII-ème siècle et le début de celui suivant, on accepte dans l’historiographie l’idée de la pénétration des livres occidentaux à l’intermédiaire des consulats comme un fait sous-entendu. En échange, on connaît le fait que Flury recevait des gazettes françaises pendant l’occupation de la fonction de consul à București⁵⁰.

Les traductions des écrivains français ont offert une possibilité de plus de contact avec les idées de l’ouest. On a beaucoup traduit, mais de manière inégale comme valeur littéraire. On a traduit de Voltaire des ouvrages politiques et historiques, comme *Essai historique et critique sur les discussions des églises de Pologne*, *Le Tocsin des rois*, *Histoire de Charles XII*, *Enriada*⁵¹. On a traduit, aussi, *Numa Pompilie* de Florian, *Les aventures de Télémaque* de Fénelon, ainsi que des romans⁵² qui ont suscité l’indignation des clercs, qui, plusieurs fois, s’opposaient à leur diffusion.

Comme parmi les obligations des princes régnants valaques et moldaves se retrouvait, aussi, celle de dresser des rapports pour Constantinople, qui devaient contenir les nouveautés de l’Ouest de l’Europe, ils ont encouragé la mode des journaux réguliers. La presse française était lue dans les Principautés: “*Mercure de France*”, “*Journal littéraire*”, “*L’Almanach des Dames*”, “*Journal encyclopédique*”. Les commentaires des articles circulaient au début dans l’entourage du prince régnant, mais le long du temps, ils se sont répandus, aussi, parmi les clercs et les gens

⁴⁸ Nicolae Liu, *Orizont european în iluminismul românesc. Francofonie și cultură franceză* [Horizon européen dans les lumières roumaines. Francophonie et culture française], en “*Revista istorică*”, tome XIX, no. 1-2, 2008, p. 143; Florin Constantiniu, *Constantin Mavrocordat* [Constantin Mavrocordat], București, 1985, p. 94-95.

⁴⁹ Flachat, *Observations sur le commerce et les arts d’une partie de l’Europe, de l’Asie, de l’Afrique et même les Indes orientales*, Lyon, 1766, vol. I, p. 190, *apud* Pompiliu Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 133; Veniamin Ciobanu, *Statutul juridic...*, p. 231-232; *Călători străini despre Țările Române* [Voyageurs étrangers sur les Pays Roumains], le IX-ème volume, (volume soigné par Maria Holban, M.M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, Paul Cernovodeanu), Editura Academiei Române, București, 1997, p. 253.

⁵⁰ Alexandrina Ioniță, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

⁵¹ Alexandru Duțu, *Les lumières en Moldavie et le contexte sud-est européen*, en “*Revue roumaine d’histoire*”, 6, 1967, no. 2, p. 278, 281; Alexandrina Ioniță, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁵² Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 42; Alexandru Duțu, *op. cit.*, p. 284-285.

ordinaires. L'accès aux revues étrangères n'a pas été un apanage princier. A l'intermédiaire des marchands, les abonnements aux gazettes se sont multipliés. En 1779, l'évêque Chesarie de Râmnic s'abonnait par la maison du marchand de Sibiu Constantin Hagi Pop à "Mercure de France"⁵³. Un autre client était le boyard valaque Constantin Otetelișanu, qui demandait au marchand de Sibiu le 18 février 1803, "toutes les gazettes qui y seront venues"⁵⁴.

En 1790, pendant l'occupation russe, apparaissait la première gazette du territoire roumain, "Courier de Moldavie"; seulement cinq numéros de celle-ci sont apparus. Le journal faisait connus les événements de la France dans un style qui laissait s'entrevoir la sympathie pour les demandes révolutionnaires. Le nom du prince Potemkin est lié du nom de cette publication; sa contribution à la popularisation de l'esprit moldave a résidé surtout dans l'édition de cette gazette dans la langue française⁵⁵.

Les boyards, dans leur essai d'imiter le prince régnant, ont appris le français, se sont constitués des bibliothèques avec des œuvres grecques et françaises, ont engagé des précepteurs français pour l'éducation de leurs enfants. Comme les Roumains des Principautés n'avaient pas d'accès aux écoles étrangères, les fils de princes régnants et de boyards ont dû apprendre à la maison et pas toujours avec des professeurs de métier. Beaucoup des Français qui sont arrivés dans les Principautés danubiennes étaient des professeurs improvisés, leur degré de culture étant différent. Le français qu'ils parlaient était dans la majorité des cas, la langue parlée dans leur région d'origine et pas la langue littéraire. On utilisait, d'habitude, la méthode de la mémorisation et de la conversation de salon⁵⁶. Ceux d'Orléans étaient cherchés pour leur manière de prononcer. Plusieurs fois, le professeur des *beizadele* tenait des leçons dans les maisons de boyards, aussi. En 1776, Grigore Al. Ghica engageait un ancien officier français, Ledoul de Sainte Crois comme professeur de langue française pour ces enfants. Bientôt, celui-ci a été engagé par quelques boyards plus importants, aussi; cela représentait une occasion d'entrer en contact avec les réalités roumaines⁵⁷. Le nom de tels professeurs apparaissent consignés dans les documents : Jean-Louis

⁵³ Alexandrina Ioniță, *op. cit.*, p. 52, 54-55, 56; Constantin Șerban, *Aspecte privind ecoul războaielor napoleoniene în Țările Române* [Aspects concernant l'écho des guerres napoléoniennes dans les Pays Roumains], en "Studii și Articole de Istorie", 9, 1967, p. 295-296; Adrian-Silvian Ionescu, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

⁵⁴ Constantin Șerban, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁵⁵ Alexandru-Florin Platon, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

⁵⁶ Alexandrina Ioniță, *op. cit.*, p. 48-49; Henriette Walter, *Limba franceză în timp și spațiu* [La langue française en temps et espace], Iași, Casa Editorială Demiurg, 1998, *passim*; Al. Duțu, *Mișcarea iluministă moldoveană de la sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea* [Le mouvement des lumières moldave de la fin du XVIII-ème siècle], en "Studii. Revista de istorie", tome 19, no. 5, 1966, p. 913; Olivier Dumas, Felicia Dumas, *Enseignement du français et pensions françaises à Iași au XIX-ème siècle*, dans le volume *Franța. Model cultural și politic* [La France. Modèle culturel et politique], édité par Alexandru Zub et Dumitru Ivănescu, Editura Junimea, Iași, 2003, p. 117.

⁵⁷ Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița...*, p. 149-150; Andreas Wolff, *op. cit.*, le II-ème volume, p. 195-196.

Carra, Lorenes, envoyé en 1783 à București par l'ambassadeur français de Constantinople, Jacques Ledoux et Cado de Lille, qui donnaient des leçons dans les maisons des boyards de Iași en 1794, les frères François et Jean-Baptiste Trécourt, précepteurs en Moldavie vers l'année 1796 de Scarlat et Ion, les fils d'Alexandru Callimachi, Martinot, apporté par le prince régnant Alexandru Callimachi en 1798, Clémaron, le précepteur des fils d'Alexandru Moruzi vers 1802, St. Aulaire, le professeur des enfants d'Alexandru Ipsilanti en 1804, Lincourt, le précepteur de la famille Ipsilanti, qui donnait des leçons à Ienăchiță Văcărescu, aussi⁵⁸.

En 1795, Constantin Stamati, un grec originaire de Constantinople, devenu citoyen français, attirait l'attention par trois mémoires consécutives sur la nécessité de la fondation d'un consulat français à Iași ou à București⁵⁹. Des motifs énumérés, on rappelle la nécessité d'attacher les habitants des Principautés de la France, de préparer dans ces parages le chemin pour le commerce français⁶⁰.

Le 7 février 1796, Delacroix, le ministre des Affaires Etrangères proposait au Directorat d'examiner s'il n'est pas dans l'intérêt de la cause publique d'établir un consul général dans les provinces turques d'au-delà du Danube, d'autant plus que la France semblait avatagée dans cette zone du point de vue économique⁶¹. On a envoyé à Constantinople R. Vernignac avec la mission de traiter la question du consulat. On a conclu en ce sens un traité qui n'a pas été ratifié par le Directorat. Sans

⁵⁸ Adriana Camariano, *op. cit.*, p. 7-8; Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 42; Nicolae Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 144; C. Gane, *Trecute vieți...*, p. 157, 165.

⁵⁹ Dan Berindei, *Legături și convergențe istorice...*, p. 406; Idem, *Evoluție și revoluție în istoria modernă a României* [Evolution et révolution dans l'histoire moderne de la Roumanie], en "Revista de istorie", tome 31, no. 8, 1978, p. 1411; Pompiliu Eliade, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria României* [Documents concernant l'histoire de la Roumanie], Supliment I, le II-ème volume, 1781-1814, publicat de Al. I. Odobescu, București, 1885, p. 14, 102; *Reprezentanțele diplomatice...*, p. 101-102; Andrei Oțetea, *Înființarea consulatelor franceze în Țările Române* [La fondation des consulats français dans les Pays Roumains], en "Revista istorică", XVIII, 1932, 10-12, p. 330-331, 333; Gabriel Leancă, *Politica Franței...*, p. 36; Ștefan Lemny, *Les Roumains dans les écrits français du XVIII-ème siècle*, en "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie «A.D. Xenopol»", Iași, XXII, 1985, p. 9; Viorel Panaite, *Negustorii străini „protejați” în Imperiul otoman în secolele XVI-XVII. Observații generale* [Les marchands étrangers "protégés" dans l'Empire Ottoman dans les XVI-ème –XVII-ème siècles. Observations générales], în <http://ebooks.unibuc.ro/istorie/ideologie/index.htm>; Lăcrămioara Iordăchescu, *Statutul reprezentanțelor diplomatice franceze în Principate (1798-1859)* [Le statut des représentations diplomatiques françaises dans les Principautés (1798-1859)], dans le volume *Franța. Model cultural și politic* [La France. Modèles culturels et politiques], édité par Alexandru Zub et Dumitru Ivănescu, Editura Junimea, Iași, 2003, p. 200-201 ;

⁶⁰ Stela Mărieș, *Supușii străini din Moldova în perioada 1781-1862* [Les sujets étrangers de la Moldavie dans la période 1781-1862], Iași, Universitatea „Al. I. Cuza”, 1985, p. 35; Andrei Oțetea, *op. cit.*, p. 334; Veniamin Ciobanu, *Jurnal ieșean...*, p. 73, 114.

⁶¹ Andrei Oțetea, *op. cit.*, p. 7; Lăcrămioara Iordăchescu, *op. cit.*, p. 201; Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le III-ème volume, p. 408-409.

attendre de plus, Vernignac a envoyé à București Emile Gaudin avec le titre d'“agent confidentiel” auprès du Divan de la Valachie. Peu de temps après, Constantin Stamati lui a suivi en qualité d'agent secret. Mais Constantin Stamati n'a pas été accepté par la Porte en qualité de consul général sous le prétexte qu'il avait été “raia”, c'est-à-dire sujet ottoman. Gaudin a été rappelé à Constantinople, où il a remis tous les documents au secrétaire de l'agence française, Montal; Vernignac écrivait à Delacroix sur la révocation de la mission d'Emile Gaudin auprès du prince régnant de la Valachie le 19 juin 1796⁶².

En ces conditions, Parant s'est auto proposé dans la fonction qu'on vient de mentionner. Dans la lettre adressée au ministre des Affaires Etrangères Charles Delacroix, il mentionnait la nécessité de la fondation d'un vice-consulat à Iași, ainsi que les défauts de Constantin Stamati, qui était à son avis, inapte à accomplir une mission semblable⁶³. Constantin Stamati attirait l'attention du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Paris sur la faute qu'on pourrait commettre dans le cas de la nomination de Parant. Son principal argument était le fait que son adversaire était trop jeune et n'avait pas l'expérience et les connaissances nécessaires réclamées par un poste de l'importance de celui-là qu'il désirait⁶⁴.

Parant a transmis à Charles Delacroix un véritable “programme d'activité” qu'il s'engageait à appliquer fidèlement. Le 10 août 1796, Parant, impatient de prendre ses attributions, demandait au nouveau ambassadeur français de la capitale ottomane, Aubert Dubayet les fonds nécessaires à son installation à Iași. Comme à cet endroit-là, il n'y avait aucun établissement français de facture économique ou d'autre type, auquel il puisse s'adresser le cas échéant, il insistait sur le fait que “là où on n'a aucun ami, il est absolument nécessaire d'avoir, au moins de l'argent”⁶⁵. L'ambassadeur n'a pas pu lui mettre à disposition qu'une partie de la somme sollicitée par celui-ci. De plus, il ne pouvait pas l'investir officiellement avec la qualité de vice-consul parce que la Porte ottomane n'avait pas donné son consentement pour la fondation d'un consulat, respectivement vice-consulat à București et Iași. On lui a attribué le titre d'“agent de l'Ambassade de la République Française auprès du prince régnant de la Moldavie”⁶⁶. Si Parant s'est contenté avec une fonction plus modeste que celle qu'il désirait, en échange, il ne pouvait pas se consoler avec la pensée qu'il devait partir à Iași presque sans argent. Il s'est adressé au nouveau ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Directorate, Talleyrand, dans l'espoir qu'il recevra les fonds nécessaires. Arrivé à Iași l'hiver de 1797, dans le “luxe insolent”, Parant a dépensé tous les fonds dont il disposait pour s'installer de manière convenable jusqu'à sa reconnaissance officielle⁶⁷.

⁶² Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le II-ème volume, p. 143.

⁶³ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le III-ème volume, p. 413, 429-430.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 442-443, 444-446, 458-460; Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le II-ème volume, p. 116-117.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 468-469.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 472; Lăcrămioara Iordăchescu, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁶⁷ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le III-ème volume, p. 488; *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 1301-1302.

Flury, qui considérait son subalterne de la capitale moldave un homme “intéressant par ses vertus, mais aussi par ses connaissances extraordinaires pour son âge et son dévouement vraiment héroïque dans la crise dans laquelle il se trouvait” a essayé l’aider. Malheureusement, son intervention auprès Alexandru Callimachi qui visait l’obtention de la part de celui-ci d’un appui matériel et financier pour Parant a échoué. De plus, Parant, à cause de son caractère irascible, était déjà entré en conflit avec l’aristocratie de la ville⁶⁸. Le 8 mars 1798, la Porte a fait sortir les firmans de nomination pour Flury, le consul de București et pour Parant, le consul d’Iași. Maurice Dubois, respectivement Jacques Ledoux étaient les secrétaires des deux consuls⁶⁹.

A la fin du février 1798, on a signalé au vice-consulat d’Iași des cas de peste. Le *serdar*, qui avait des ressentiments envers Parant, a commis contre celui-ci un numéro impressionnant d’“abus”. Parant prétendait que son malheur était due à l’hostilité du fonctionnaire envers la République Française. Comme le prince régnant n’a pas été d’accord avec les persécutions du haut fonctionnaire à l’adresse du vice-consul français parce qu’une attitude semblable pourrait lui créer des problèmes à Constantinople, où la diplomatie française jouissait d’une grande influence. Par conséquent, il a pris en considération la plainte du vice-consul contre le *serdar*, a congédié le dernier et l’a obligé lui demander des excuses publiquement⁷⁰. Parant a été envoyé à Socola, ensemble à tout le personnel du vice-consulat pour empêcher de cette manière la prolifération de l’épidémie. Revenu dans la ville, pendant une audience au prince régnant Alexandru Callimachi, il aurait reproché à celui-ci sur un ton contraire aux usages diplomatiques qu’il aurait été “obligé” à partir de la ville. Le comportement du vice-consul français a offensé le prince régnant⁷¹.

De plus, quelques-uns des Français qui se trouvaient dans la ville, étaient mécontents par l’attitude de Parant. C’est le cas de Bouchet, professeur de langues étrangères engagé dans les maisons de quelques boyards d’Iași; il a interdit à celui-ci de lui faire des visites parce que le professeur l’avait abandonné dans les moments critiques qu’il venait de traverser. Wegierski, l’espion du consul russe Severin dans la capitale moldave, relatait qu’il avait des preuves solides conformément auxquelles le

⁶⁸ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Suppliment I, le II-ème volume, p. 175.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 171-172; Alexandru-Florin Platon, *op. cit.*, p. 207; Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 44; Cristian Ploscaru, *Politica Franței în Principatele Române la începutul secolului al XIX – lea din perspectiva elitei locale* [La politique de la France dans les Principautés Roumaines au début du XIX-ème siècle de la perspective de l’élite locale], en Ionuț Nistor, Paul Nistor (coordonateurs), *Relații internaționale. Lumea diplomației. Lumea conflictului* [Relations internationales. Le monde de la diplomatie. Le monde du conflit], Iași, Editura PIM, 2009, p. 29; Lăcrămioara Iordăchescu, *op. cit.*, p. 201; Pompiliu Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 183-184.

⁷⁰ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Suppliment I, le III-ème volume, p. 490-496; Veniamin Ciobanu, *Jurnal ieșean...*, p. 115; *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 1303.

⁷¹ Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița...*, p. 112-113.

véritable motif de la disgrâce de Bouchet aurait été l'intention de Parant de ne plus lui restituer une certaine somme d'argent qu'il devait à celui-ci depuis quelque temps⁷².

En avril 1798, comme il voulait démontrer au prince régnant qu'il n'était pas capable lui assurer la sécurité, il avait mis en scène une attaque contre sa propre personne justement dans le bâtiment du vice-consulat. Le prince régnant s'est excusé devant la Porte et a démontré que Parant n'aurait pas pu prouver la consommation d'un événement semblable; le but de celui-ci a été sa compromission et celle de ses fonctionnaires. Parant a essayé prouver le contraire; il a montré même qu'il a découvert le coupable, un certain Joseph, un de ses serfs, qu'il a arrêté. Comme Joseph ne reconnaissait rien, Parant l'a obligé à aller à l'église catholique et jurer qu'il était innocent. Le geste du vice-consul a causé l'étonnement des habitants de la ville, parce que celui-ci était en contradiction avec l'athéisme qu'il affichait de manière ostentatoire chaque fois qu'il avait l'occasion⁷³.

Parant a étudié la société moldave de ces temps-là en *Notes sur l'administration et la population de la Moldavie*. Il surprenait très bien la situation du prince régnant: esclave et despote en même temps, mais aussi l'état d'esprit de la principauté: en Moldavie, il n'y avait pas d'esprit public, il n'y avait aucune notion sur la manière de gouverner, aucun sentiment de la liberté⁷⁴. A l'intermédiaire de la navigation sur la mer Noire, Parant entrevoyait la possibilité de la prospérité du commerce français dans cette zone. Parant considérait que les draps, les étoffes de Lyon, les tissus français et le tabac seraient recherchés dans les Principautés. En échange, les Français auraient pu acheter des Principautés de la cire, des peaux, de la viande salée et fumée, du lin et du chanvre, du bois pour la construction des bateaux⁷⁵.

Flury a trouvé en Valachie un milieu plus favorable; comme il était un esprit pratique et intelligent, il s'est débrouillé mieux que Parant à Iași. Il est arrivé une fois qu'un sujet français soit battu et pillé par un officier de la garde princière; décidé à démontrer que la protection française n'était pas parler dans le vent, Flury a demandé que le chef de la garde présente des excuses pour l'offense apportée à la nation française, la dégradation de l'officier en question et la restitution des 250 piastres volés. Autrefois, l'échoppe d'un citoyen de Corfu qui se trouvait sous la protection française a été close; cette fois-ci, Flury, a demandé que le fonctionnaire à l'ordre duquel l'échoppe a été fermée se présente au consulat et retire l'offense apportée au peuple français, le paiement de six piastres par jour comme indemnité pour le citoyen

⁷² Hurmuzaki, *Documente privind istoria României* [Documents concernant l'histoire de la Roumanie], nouvelle série, le I-er volume, p. 132-134, 143, 145; Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița...*, p. 113-114; Idem, *Jurnal ieșean...*, p. 116.

⁷³ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, nouvelle série, le IV-ème volume, p. 150-151, 160; Veniamin Ciobanu, *Jurnal ieșean...*, p. 117.

⁷⁴ Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privind istoria României* [Documents concernant l'histoire de la Roumanie], nouvelle série, publiée par Andrei Oțetea, Suppliment I, le II-ème volume, București, Editura Academiei, 1967, p. 182.

⁷⁵ *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 1314-1315, 1316; Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Suppliment I, le III-ème volume, p. 186, 187.

lésé, ainsi que la réouverture de l'échoppe au nom de la nation française. "Les conditions ont été acceptées et exécutées", écrivait Flury à son gouvernement. Si un citoyen français se soustrayait aux lois du pays, le consul le punissait âprement⁷⁶.

Il a été l'enfant gâté de la société de la capitale valaque. Il a même réussi attirer aux fêtes du consulat les plus importants boyards valaques, avec leurs femmes; c'était quelque chose sans précédent puisque ni le consul russe, ni celui prussien n'ont pas réussi à attirer à leurs fêtes aucune femme de boyard valaque. Le succès de Flury à București a dépassé les attentes⁷⁷ et le respect et la sympathie qu'il a inspirés aux boyards se sont réfléchis indirectement sur le pays qu'il représentait.

Comme en mai 1798, commençait la campagne de Napoléon en Egypte, le sultan a déclaré le 1-er septembre la même année la guerre à la République Française; le lendemain, le chargé avec des affaires étrangères français de Constantinople, Pierre Ruffin, a été arrêté et emprisonné à Yedikule. Alexandru Callimachi a informé Parant que, conformément aux ordres de la Porte, ses attributions étaient suspendues jusqu'à des nouvelles dispositions. Il devait, donc, renoncer à toute activité publique, ne pas quitter sa maison ; de plus, il ne pouvait pas recevoir des visites. Il était surveillé par une garde d'Arnauts qui devaient le protéger, selon les dires du prince régnant Callimachi, des éventuelles insultes que les habitants de la capitale pouvaient lui adresser⁷⁸. Mais Parant soupçonnait que sa situation pouvait s'aggraver: il pourrait être porté à Constantinople ou expulsé. De plus, il avait perdu la liaison avec Flury et avec Ruffin, dont il soupçonnait qu'ils étaient arrêtés; d'ailleurs, cette chose était arrivée vraiment⁷⁹. Parant, Ledoux et sa famille ont été porté à Constantinople. Ils ont été emprisonnés à Edikule, où se trouvait, aussi, Ruffin et où sera porté peu de temps après Flury⁸⁰. De cette manière, les consulats français des Principautés ont été liquidés. Donc, dans une première étape, l'activité "officielle" des consulats n'a pas été de durée. En 1803, la France recommencera l'activité consulaire interrompue à la suite de l'expédition en Egypte; de plus, elle ouvrira un vice-consulat à Galați, aussi⁸¹.

Une autre voie par laquelle se sont répandues dans les Principautés la langue et les manières françaises a été constituée par l'influence que les armées russes ont exercés sur les Moldo-Valaques pendant les guerres, surtout pendant la campagne de 1789 (mais aussi plus tard, en 1806). Les boyards sont entrés en contact avec les officiers russes, plusieurs d'origine française, allemande ou grecque, qui avaient une

⁷⁶ Pompiliu Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 186-187.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 189-190.

⁷⁸ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, nouvelle série, le IV-ème volume, p. 198; *Călători străini...*, le X-ème volume, la II-ème partie, p. 1321-1322; Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le III-ème volume, p. 235.

⁷⁹ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le II-ème volume, p. 196; Pompiliu Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 191; Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le III-ème volume, p. 539-540, 541-542; Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița...*, p. 120-121.

⁸⁰ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le III-ème volume, p. 559-560, 562; Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁸¹ Lăcrămioara Iordăchescu, *op. cit.*, p. 202 ; Veniamin Ciobanu, *La granița...*, p. 123-124; Pompiliu Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 191

éducation cosmopolite. D'ailleurs, vers la moitié du XVIII-ème siècle, la langue française a connu un ample processus de diffusion dans les rangées de la noblesse russe. La grande majorité des fils des nobles, les officiers russes ont eu en famille des précepteurs; qui les ont enseigné la langue française et les ont familiarisés avec la civilisation française. Ils utilisaient la langue française lorsqu'ils parlaient avec les boyards du pays; le long du temps, le français est devenu la langue des salons; elle était parlée par les femmes et les jeunes dans leurs relations avec les Russes. Comme les Russes prononçaient les mots français de manière affectée, parler et prononcer le français comme un officier russe a représenté un idéal pour ceux qui faisaient leurs études à l'étranger, même durant le siècle suivant. Les officiers russes ont séduit, aussi, par la qualité de leurs manières, nommée à cette époque-là "politesse française". Toujours ceux-ci ont introduit les danses françaises, la musique européenne, le jeu de cartes; ils ont organisé des soirées (*soaréle*) avec de telles distractions. A ces fêtes ont commencé à participer les femmes, aussi, qui, par le contact avec la société d'en dehors leur famille, ont commencé être plus émancipées⁸².

Dès la fin du XVIII-ème siècle, le français et le piano sont devenus indispensables pour l'éducation d'une fille. Les dames faisaient de leur mieux pour danser „à la française”. Le cirque français des frères Mahieu de București était fréquenté par le prince régnant et sa femme, par les boyards et leurs familles. Graduellement, les meubles orientaux ont été remplacés avec ceux apportés de l'Europe. Des domestiques étrangers, français sont apparus⁸³. Le résultat de cette occidentalisation de surface a été une course d'après le luxe dans tous les domaines: vêtements, meubles, distractions. Par conséquent, les budgets de plusieurs ménages des boyards ont été gravement affectés; les faillites sont devenues de plus en plus habituelles. Mais il y avait, aussi, des boyards éduqués qui s'impliquaient dans les affaires publiques et d'Etat: c'était le cas du grand boyard Radu Golescu (1746-1818), qui possédait une bibliothèque impressionnante et qui avait offert à ses fils une éducation élitiste, y inclus l'étude des langues française et italienne⁸⁴.

Sans doute, le caractère de langue diplomatique dans l'Europe des XVIII-ème et XIX-ème siècles, a déterminé le choix de la langue française pour rédiger les mémoires des boyards moldaves adressés aux cours européennes pendant plus d'un

⁸² Ovidiu Papadima, *Ipostaze ale iluminismului românesc* [Hypostases des lumières roumaines], București, Editura Minerva, 1976, p. 38; Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 44-45; Pompiliu Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 157-158, 181-190; N. Iorga, *Istoria românilor prin călători...*, p. 437-452; Keith Hitchins, *op. cit.*, p. 83-84; Nicolae Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 136; Constanța Ghițulescu, *Spațiul public / spațiul privat. Țara Românească la 1800* [L'espace public / l'espace privé en Valachie à 1800], en "Studii și materiale de istorie modernă", le XIII-ème volume, 1999, p. 8-9.

⁸³ Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 45-46; Neagu Djuvara, *O scurtă istorie a românilor povestită celor tineri* [Une courte histoire des Roumains racontée aux jeunes], la V-ème édition revue, Humanitas, București, 1999, p. 181.

⁸⁴ Keith Hitchins, *op. cit.*, p. 84; A. Iordache, *Golești: locul și rolul lor în istoria României* [Les Golești : leurs place et rôle dans l'histoire de la Roumanie], București, 1979, p. 13-15.

quart de siècle, de 1775 et jusqu'à Napoléon⁸⁵. Après le 18 Brumaire et surtout après la bataille de Marengo, le parti national de la Valachie s'est orienté vers la France. L'hiver de l'année 1800, les boyards ont décidé à envoyer à Paris celui d'eux qui savait le mieux la langue française: Nicolae Dudesco. Arrivé à Paris avec les voitures pleines de provisions, il est devenu célèbre pour son gaspillage⁸⁶. Il a attiré de sa partie plusieurs personnes importantes de l'entourage de Napoléon: Madame de Staël, Madame Récamier, le général Poniatowski. Il était surnommé "le fou". On dit que vers le milieu de l'été de l'année 1801, il aurait parsemé sur Champs-Élysées une grande quantité de sucre et il aurait invité la noblesse française à une promenade avec les traîneaux. Il était l'hôte de grands banquets, auxquels les dames trouvaient toujours un bijou caché sous leur serviette. Son gaspillage l'avait coûté en quelques années toutes les propriétés⁸⁷.

En 1802, les boyards exilés en Transylvanie ont mené une véritable campagne de requêtes aux cours européennes. Une était adressée à l'empereur de l'Autriche, auquel ils essayaient d'attirer l'attention sur les souffrances d'un peuple tout entier; ils s'intitulaient les représentants de la nation valaque et demandaient des princes régnants sur vie, la réduction du tribut et armée propre⁸⁸. Une autre demande était adressée à Napoléon Bonaparte. Ces demandes se sont gardées seulement en résumé, dans le rapport de Ruffin adressé à Champagny⁸⁹. Le rapport de Ruffin mentionnait, entre autres, la réduction du tribut⁹⁰. Les boyards moldaves ont dressé la même année le projet d'organisation d'une "République aristo-démocratique"; obligés par les besoins internes et pénétrés par l'esprit de la Révolution française, les boyards ont essayé à mener une activité réformatrice, qui devait corriger les maux qui affectaient le pays et leurs propres intérêts. Ils dénonçaient les abus des Turcs⁹¹.

On a essayé par l'étude ci-jointe à passer en revue les premiers contacts culturels franco – roumains, la pénétration et la diffusion de la langue et de la culture française dans la société roumaine de la dernière partie du XVIII-ème siècle et

⁸⁵ Vlad Georgescu, *Mémoires et projets de réforme dans les Principautés roumaines. 1769-1848*, București, 1972, p. 81.

⁸⁶ N. Iorga, *Les voyageurs orientaux en France*, Paris, Librairie J. Gamber, 1927, p. 46, *apud* Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 49; Constantin Șerban, *op. cit.*, p. 294-295.

⁸⁷ Doina Calistru, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁸⁸ Traian Ionescu, *Hatișeriful din 1802 și începutul luptei pentru asigurarea pieței interne a principatelor dunărene* [Le khattichérif de 1802 et le début de la lutte pour assurer le marché interne des principautés danubiennes], en "Studii și articole de istorie", București, I, 1956, p. 40; Pompiliu Eliade, *op. cit.*, p. 203-204.

⁸⁹ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le II-ème volume, p. 226; Traian Ionescu, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

⁹⁰ Hurmuzaki, *Documente...*, Supliment I, le II-ème volume, p. 228; Traian Ionescu, *op. cit.*, p. 49-50.

⁹¹ Emil Vârtosu, *Napoleon Bonaparte și proiectul unei „Republici aristo-democraticești” în Moldova la 1802* [Napoléon Bonaparte et le projet d'une "République aristo-démocratique" en Moldavie à 1802], București, 1947, p. 29; Traian Ionescu, *op. cit.*, p. 39, 40.

jusqu'au début de celui suivant⁹². La société roumaine, longtemps isolée pas seulement par des frontières politiques, mais aussi par des préjugés, a manifesté dans la seconde moitié du XVIII-ème siècle, de la réceptivité pour les valeurs de la culture européenne, en général, et pour celles d'expression française, en particulier. L'entourage de la Cour, les voyageurs étrangers ou les diplomates en passage par les Pays Roumains ou qui ont résidé sur leur territoire pour une certaine période de temps, ont véhiculé une autre manière d'être, de penser, un nouveau modèle, celui français, auquel les Roumains se sont prouvés extrêmement sensibles. Si initialement la visite d'un Français était un grand événement, le long du temps le nombre de ceux qui sont arrivés en ces parages a augmenté. Les précepteurs français sont devenus plus nombreux; ils étaient présents partout dans les maisons des boyards, après avoir premièrement apparus aux cours princières. La nécessité d'entretenir des relations avec les représentants des pouvoirs étrangers a imposé aux princes régnants phanariotes la présence en leur service des secrétaires de langue française, la langue diplomatique de ces temps-là.

Après des contacts interhumains établis de cette manière, la culture et la civilisation françaises dans les Principautés ont eu une autre voie de pénétration, les imprimés: journaux réguliers français, livres français à caractère pédagogique, grammaires, dictionnaires, vocabulaires nécessaires à l'apprentissage de la langue, ainsi que traductions de divers auteurs. En leur qualité d'informateurs de la Porte concernant les événements qui avaient lieu en Europe, les princes régnants phanariotes se sont procurés des gazettes qui apparaissaient dans les autres Etats européens, d'où on pouvait recueillir des nouvelles importantes pour les décisions politiques de la Porte. La langue française, introduite dans l'enseignement familial de la première partie du XVIII-ème siècle, a connu une large diffusion sociale et relativement rapide, tout en partant de l'entourage des princes régnants phanariotes, des grands boyards et arrivant jusqu'aux boyards du second rang, parmi les clercs et les marchands. On doit mentionner, aussi, l'influence des officiers des armées combattantes qui se sont trouvées sur le territoire des Principautés et surtout dans leurs capitales, qui ont contribué à l'abandon graduel de la manière de vivre orientale et l'adoption de celle européenne par les boyards locaux.

La fondation des consulats étrangers le dernier quart du XVIII-ème siècle et en spécial de celui français vers la fin de celui-ci sur le territoire des Principautés, a représenté une autre forme de contact entre la société autochtone et l'Europe, par les influences culturelles et idéologiques qui y ont pénétré sur cette voie. Les lumières, la Révolution française et plus tard les événements de l'époque napoléonienne ont élargi la perspective des Roumains sur eux-mêmes et sur l'Europe.

⁹² Alexandrina Ioniță, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

«QUID EST VERITAS?» ИЛИ ПУТИ СОЗДАНИЯ НАУЧНОЙ БИОГРАФИИ УКРАИНСКОЙ ПИСАТЕЛЬНИЦЫ НАТАЛЕНА КОРОЛЕВЫ

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Rezumat: Prezentul studiu este dedicat cercetării bibliografice a scriitoarei ucrainene de origine spaniolă Carmen Alfonza Fernanda Estrella Natalena de Kastrá Lacherda Medinachelli Fernandes de Kordova și Fidero, cunoscută în literatură drept Natalena Koroleva. Farmecul neoromantismului răzbate din opera sa. Fundamentele acestui farmec se regăsesc în originea sa nobilă, pasiunea sa pentru săpăturile arheologice și Egiptologie, setea de aventură și condițiile dificile de viață în emigrație. Apogeul activității sale literare a fost înregistrat în 1920-1930, când operele sale majore erau deja publicate. Din păcate, în biografia Natalenei Koroleva sunt multe puncte albe. Tocmai aceste chestiuni privesc studiul nostru.

Summary: The present study is dedicated to the biographical research of the Ukrainian writer of Spanish origin Carmen Alfonza Fernanda Estrella Natalena de Kastrá Lacherda Medinachelli Fernandes de Kordova and Fidero known in literature as Natalena Koroleva. The charm of neoromanticism runs through her works. The grounds of this charm lie in her noble origin, her passion for archaeological excavations and Egyptology, thirst for adventure and difficult life conditions in emigration. The surge of the writer's literary activity occurred in 1920-1930th, when her major literary works were published. Unfortunately, there are a lot of blank spots in N. Koroleva's biography. These problems are in the focus of the present research.

Résumé: L'étude ci-jointe est dédiée à la recherche biographique de l'écrivaine ukrainienne d'origine espagnole Carmen Alfonza Fernanda Estrella Natalena de Kastrá Lacherda Medinachelli Fernandes de Kordova et Fidero, connue dans la littérature comme Natalena Koroleva. Le charme du néoromantisme jaillit de ses œuvres. Les fondements de ce charme se retrouvent dans son origine noble, sa passion pour les fouilles archéologiques et l'Egyptologie, sa soif pour l'aventure et les conditions difficiles de vie en émigration. L'apogée de son activité littéraire a été enregistré en 1920-1930, lorsque ses ouvrages majeurs étaient déjà publiés. Malheureusement, dans la biographie de N. Koroleva, il y a beaucoup de points blancs. Ces problèmes concernent justement l'étude ci-jointe.

Keywords: Natalena Koroleva, Ukrainian writer, genealogy, scientific biography.

Вступление

Обретение Украиной независимости в 1991 г. положило начало возрождению ее культуры, истории, восстановлению прерванных традиций. К числу временно «вычеркнутых», но не забытых относится имя украинской писательницы испанского происхождения Наталены Королевы (1888–1966). Эрудит и полиглот, аристократка по духу, грандесса по происхождению, древнейший род которой относился к числу европейской знати, стремительно вошла в украинскую литературу в 1920–1930-е годы. Ее уникальный литературный талант раскрылся в Чехословакии, где она проживала с 1919 г. до самой смерти. Жизнь писательницы, наполненная необыкновенными приключениями, творческим азартом и личной драмой, скорее напоминала удивительную легенду, едва похожую на правду. Жанровое разнообразие ее творчества было подчинено стилю неоромантизма, который вошел в украинскую литературу в начале XX века и наиболее ярко воплотился в творчестве известной украинской писательницы Леси Украинки. Однако в отличие от последней, глубины неоромантизма Н. Королевы были связаны не только с ее увлечением египтологией, археологическими раскопками и жадной приключений, но и коренились в знатности происхождения, героике ее аристократического рода, который объединял историю арабского, славянского и европейского миров. К сожалению, яркое и аполитичное творчество Королевы не вписывалось в доктрину метода соцреализма, поэтому ни в советской Украине, ни послевоенной Чехословакии оно не получило ни должной оценки, ни поддержки. Только в 1960-е годы «хрущевская оттепель» приоткрыла завесу неприятия произведений Наталены Королевы, что позволило братиславскому изданию начать переиздание сборника ее рассказов. По трагическому стечению обстоятельств писательница успела перед самой смертью вычитать лишь гранки, так и не дождавшись выхода в свет ни такой долгожданной книжки, ни гонорара. В последние годы своей жизни Королева пребывала в нищете и одиночестве. Умерла она практически всеми забытая 1 июля 1966 г. в г. Мельник под Прагой, где и похоронена.

Историография проблемы

Кем же была эта талантливая, прозорливая, эпатажная писательница и необыкновенная женщина, оставившая исследователям своего творчества не меньше биографических загадок, чем литературных произведений? Все попытки полностью раскрыть тайны ее жизни равно как постичь глубины ее творчества до сих пор не увенчались успехом, что, однако не уменьшает интереса к биографии Наталены Королевы у ученых разных направлений гуманитарных знаний. Поэтому создание научной биографии писательницы остается до сих пор актуальной научной задачей, дающей ключ к пониманию ее творческого наследия. «Quid est Veritas?» так называется одно из произведений Н. Королевы. Эта сентенция вполне может служить эпиграфом к изучению, а главное, к разгадке биографии писательницы.

Нужно отметить, что в историографии создана уже довольно значительная, но далеко не исчерпывающая источниковедческая база, главным образом, в области филологии. Именно литературоведы первыми открыли для современного читателя богатый мир произведений Наталены Королевы. К первооткрывателям творчества писательницы можно отнести журналиста и критика Олега Бабьшкіна, который во время пребывания в Чехословакии в конце 1950 – начале 1960-х годов, познакомился с писательницей, завязав с ней дружескую переписку. Однако опубликовать письма Королевы стало возможным лишь в 1990 г. уже после смерти журналиста¹. К исследованию биографической канвы Наталены Королевы обращались Валерий Шевчук² и Алексей Мишанич³. Труды последнего ученого положили начало системному изучению творческой деятельности писательницы. Большое значение в обобщении литературы и фактологических данных о биографии Королевы, развертывании дальнейших научных исследований имеет библиографический сборник, выпущенный в 2003 г. группой ученых⁴.

К вопросам изучения биографии Н. Королевы обращались в 1988–2010 годах В. Антофійчук, М. Богачевська-Хомяк, К. Буслаева, И. Голубовская, М. Васьків, М. Ильницький, Ю. Мельникова, И. Остащук, Я. Полищук, И. Тюрменко, Р. Федорив, П. Ямчук и др.⁵. Однако, преимущественно все

¹ О. Бабишкін, *Несподіване, щасливе знайомство*, in „Всесвіт”, 1993, № 2, с. 176–184.

² В. Шевчук, *Загадковий і манливий світ Наталени Королеви*, in *Дорога в тисячу років*, Київ, Рад. письменник, 1990, с. 378–384.

³ О. Мишанич, *Дивосвіти Наталени Королеви*, in *Повернення. Літературно-критичні статті й нариси*, Київ, Обереги, 1997, с. 83–112; *Idem*, *Мрія і любов Наталени Королевої*, in *Україна. Наука і культура*, Київ, Академія наук УРСР, Т-во «Знання» Укр. РСР, 1990, С. 314–319; Його ж: *Наталена Королева (1888–1966)*, in *Історія української літератури ХХ ст.*: У 2 кн, Кн. 1: *Перша половина ХХ ст. Підручник*, За ред. В.Г. Дончика, Київ, Либідь, 1998, с. 354–356.

⁴ *Наталена Королева. Бібліографічний покажчик*, Уклад.: К. Костишина; наук. ред. О. Мишанич; автор передмови В. Передерій, Львів, Видавн. центр ЛНУ ім. І. Франка, 2003, 108 с.: іл., порт., (Українська бібліографія. Нова серія. Чис. 12).

⁵ К. О. Буслаева, *Трансформація античних мотивів і образів у творчості Н.Королевої*: Автореф. дис. канд. філол. наук: 10.01.01, Дніпропетровський національний ун-т, Дніпропетровськ, 2005, 19 с.; М. С. Васіків, *До проблеми вивчення біографії Наталени Королевої та її творчої самоіндефікації*, in *Іван Огієнко і сучасна наука та освіта: Науковий збірник*: Серія філологічна та історична. Вип. III, Кам'янець-Подільський, 2006, с. 200–204; І. В. Голубовська, *Творчість Наталени Королевої в контексті розвитку української літератури першої половини ХХ ст.*: Автореф. дис. канд. філол. наук: 10.01.01, Національний педагогічний ун-т ім. М.П. Драгоманова, Київ, 2003, 20 с.; І. Б. Остащук, *Релігійно-філософський дискурс у романах Наталени Королевої*: Автореф. дис. канд. філол. наук: 10.01.01, Прикарпатський національний ун-т ім. Василя Стефаника, Івано-Франківськ, 2004, 20 с.; Ю. О. Мельникова, *Романічна проблематика християнського міфу у «Quid est Veritas?» («Що є істина?») Наталени Королеви*: Автореф. дис. канд. філол. наук: 10.01.01, Київський національний ун-т ім. Тараса Шевченка, Київ, 2007, 20 с.; І. І. Тюрменко, *Наталена*

исследования интерпретировали информационно-автобиографическую базу, которая была создана самой писательницей. Поэтому все попытки развеять домыслы или приблизиться к раскрытию биографических тайн пока не увенчались успехом. Характер информационного и документального осмысления проблемы дает возможность пока что говорить о гипотезах и предположениях, каждая из которых или опровергает ту или иную версию, или находит биографические неточности.

Большую роль в создании научной биографии писательницы играет введение в научный оборот новых источников. В частности, в исследовании анализировался комплекс документов, найденных в архиве Центра украинской культуры и образования в Виннипеге (Канада) благодаря гранту Канадского Института Украинских Студий. Это – письма Наталены Королевы и ее мужа Василия Королива-Старого к музыканту и композитору Александру Кошицу, переписка писательницы с митрополитом Украинской Православной Церкви в Канаду – Илларионом и ее автобиография. К изучению биографии Королевы также были привлечены материалы из чешского Государственного окружного архива г. Мельника, любезно предоставленные его директором Далибором Статником по запросу посольства Чешской Республики (далее – ЧР) в Украине. Это – предисловие на чешском языке к неизданной автобиографической повести писательницы «Дорогами жизни»⁶. Итак, попробуем реконструировать биографию писательницы и ее генеалогического древа, сопоставляя известные факты ее биографии с данными вышеназванных источников.

Основные вехи жизненного пути писательницы. Критический анализ

Кармен Альфонса Фернанда Эстрелья Наталена де Кастро Лачерда Мединачелли Фернандес де Кордова и Фидеро – такое полное имя Наталены Королевы, которое вопреки испанской традиции, писательница получила по материнской линии. В 1930-х годах считалось, что местом рождения писательницы (очевидно, не без ее участия) была Вольт⁷ (причина такой неточности остается пока что загадкой). Но в последние годы жизни Наталена опровергла эту версию, заявив, что это была Испания. Итак, писательница родилась 3 марта 1888 г. в Сан-Педро-де-Карденья, недалеко от испанского города Бургоса. Девочку называли именем Наталена, которое, по ее словам, не было связано с именем святой, а происходило от французского слова Noele – Рождество, т. е. праздник⁸. После женитьбы родители писательницы поселились

Королева: стан і перспективи дослідження життя та творчості, in “Український історичний журнал”, 2010, № 3, с. 204–212;

⁶ См.: *Наталена Королева. Життя і творчість у документах і матеріалах (до 125-річчя з дня народження)*: Збірка документів, Уклад. та автор передмови І. Тюрменко, НАУ, 2008, 88 с.

⁷ М. Омельченкова, *Наталья Королева*, in “Свобода”, Ч.215, 16 верес, 1935.

⁸ См.: О. Бабишкін, *Несподіване, щасливе знайомство*, с. 179.

в Испании. Ее мама Мария-Клара де Кастро Лачерда Мединачелли умерла при родах. Отец девочки – Юрий-Андриан Дунин-Борковский – по словам Королевы, находился в глубокой депрессии. Он винил в трагедии новорожденную дочь. Отец был ученым, что оправдывало его стремительный отъезд в научную экспедицию сначала в Африку, потом на Цейлон. Только в последние годы жизни Королева призналась, что отец «надолго забыл о своей дочери», а попросту бросил ее. Отец женился второй раз на женщине из знатного чешского рода Лосей. Поскольку у новой семьи не было детей, то он вспомнил о дочери, лишь тогда когда ей исполнилось 16 лет. К сожалению, это не сблизило отца и дочь. Наталена не без горечи отмечала, что она очень рано разошлась с отцом и его женой. У них не было в отношениях враждебности, но «с ними она и не чувствовала себя как в своей семье». Именно поэтому ее опекун, брат матери, дядя Эугенио, настоял на том, чтобы девочка носила материнскую фамилию.

На формирование личности будущей писательницы большое влияние оказали три человека. Это родные по матери: родной брат матери дядя Эугенио (офицер, землевладелец, а в конце жизни – священник) и муж родной сестры мамы, тети Ирис, умершей в 30 лет. Именно дяди, которые имели блестящее образование, сформировали у Королевы основы разносторонних знаний. Они научили девочку иностранным языкам, письму, истории, пению, музыке, фехтованию, верховой езде. Особую любовь они привили к арабской культуре. Как отмечала сама писательница, ее дяди знали арабский язык даже лучше, чем испанский. Королева сама прекрасно владела арабским языком, увлекалась арабской литературой и историей. Дяди объясняли Наталене и философию «особенно стоицизм, поскольку оба обожали Сенеку [уроженца Кордовы]»⁹.

Третьим человеком, который повлиял на формирование непосредственно внутреннего мира писательницы, была бабушка по отцу – Теофила. Именно благодаря бабушке, Королева считала источником своей духовности «греческую Аркадию-Психею» – Украину, хотя подчеркивала, что ее родиной есть Испания. По словам Королевы, Теофила приехала на крестины внучки и вплоть до своей смерти (недолгие пять лет) провела с ней. Можно с уверенностью утверждать, что именно эта женщина привила Королеве любовь к украинской культуре, посвятила в семейные легенды, оставив в ее душе каплю тепла и уважения к отцовскому роду. Хотя в интервью газете «Свобода» (1935) Королева подчеркивала, что любовь к украинской культуре привил ей отец. Однако это утверждение не соотносится с более поздними воспоминаниями, которые, как было указано выше, вообще отрицали роль отца в формировании ее как личности.

По версии Королевы, которую она изложила в интервью газете «Свобода» в 1935 р., род ее бабушки происходил от викинга Вильфреда Швена и данской принцессы Сванельд (в переводе оба слова обозначают лебедь, что нашло

⁹ См.: *Наталена Королева. Життя і творчість у документах і матеріалах*, с.78.

отображение в родовом гербе Дуниных-Борковских). Род Швенов осел в Украине, несмотря на предание, гласящее, что измена своему краю грозит последней в роду женщине смертью в изгнании, на чужбине. «Этой последней в роду буду я» – повторяла писательница, поскольку именно на ней и заканчивался женский род по отцу. По семейному преданию, которое следует воспринимать как гипотезу, один из предков Королевы был связан родственными узами с семьей Ярослава Мудрого (один из потомков Швенов женился на дочери князя – Марии Ярославне, которая приходилась сестрой Анне Ярославне, вышедшей замуж за французского короля Генриха I).

Со временем род Швенов, владея большими имениями, ассимилировался в Украине. Это отразилось на родовой фамилии. Дунины, по словам Королевы, – перефразировано от Дании, откуда происходил род, а Борковские – от территорий, укрытых борами. В средние века Дунины-Борковские были известны тем, что один из его представителей – Василий Дунин-Борковский конкурировал с Иваном Мазепой за владение гетманской булавой. Однако казаки не поддержали Василия, якобы из-за того, что тот отказался «выставлять магарыч». В XIX веке Дунины-Борковские ополячились. Дед Королевы – Адам – принимал участие в антироссийском восстании 1863 г., за что был расстрелян. Графский титул у семьи был отобран, а часть поместий ликвидирована. Бабушка Теофила вынуждена была переехать во Францию, зарабатывая на жизнь уроками музыки. Все же она сумела дать сыну хорошее образование. Андриан учился во Франции, имел французское гражданство, был членом Французской академии наук и другом известного астронома Камилла Фламариона¹⁰. К версии Королевы об отцовской генеалогии следует относиться с осторожностью и критически. Дело в том, некоторые подробности отцовской генеалогии она «пересматривала», кардинально меняла или вообще больше никогда не использовала. Возможно, это было связано с обидой на отца, а возможно это была часть PR-технологий Королевы – создать такую биографию, которая бы сама была похожа на легенду, чем привлечь внимание к своей личности и, следовательно, заинтересовать издателей опубликовать ее произведения. Может быть и другое предположение, которое связано с изменением политической обстановки в Чехословакии и непопулярностью аристократического происхождения Королевы. Так или иначе – эти факты из биографии писательницы, за исключением данных о ее деде и отце, можно считать гипотезой, которую необходимо подтвердить документами.

Материнский род, по утверждению Королевы, вел свое начало из глубины веков. Королева отвергла наличие венгерских корней в ее биографии, предположив, однако, что одним из ее предков мог быть мавр. *«Наш род происходит из Кордовы. И наша родовая фамилия Кордова [...] Я родилась с именем Кордова и мавританская Кордова повлияла на меня»* – так писала

¹⁰ См.: М. Омельченкова, *Наталя Королева*, in “Свобода”, Ч. 215, 16 версн, 1935; *Наталена Королева. Життя і творчість у документах і матеріалах*, с. 79.

Н. Королева в предисловии к неопубликованной повести «Дорогами жизни»¹¹. На древности и знатности ее рода указывал в частном письме от 4–8 мая 1938 г. к известному украинскому дирижеру и композитору Александру Кошицу муж Королевы – публицист, художник и общественный деятель – Василий Королив-Старый: *«Наталія написала повесть на актуальную и свежую тему: «Квод ест веритас»?», в которой попробовала дать биографию своего дальнего родственника – Понтия Пилата. Чтобы не было у Вас какой-то ошибки в мышлении, объясню, что слово «родственник» я употребил в обычном значении – «по крови», а не в каком-то метафорическом. Написав «Предка», и разыскав архивные данные про род Лячерда Медина Чели, неожиданно нашла она в испанских анналах данные, которые свидетельствуют о кровной связи рода Медина Чели так-таки с самым Понтием»* (перевод – И. Т.)¹². Упоминание о «кровной связи» с родом известного римского прокуратора Понтия Пилата было употреблено единственный раз. Больше эта информация никогда и нигде, даже самой писательницей, ни опровергалось, ни подтверждалось. Учитывая, что это известие носит частный характер, можно предположить, что Королева действительно нашла в одном из испанских архивов указание на генеалогическую близость родов. Однако почему же это сенсационное открытие не получило огласки? Ответ может быть один: Н. Королева, пытаясь доказать в своих произведениях невиновность П. Пилата в смерти И. Христа, «пожертвовала» своей генеалогией во имя объективности и правды о далеком родственнике. Это для нее, очевидно, было важнее самой причастности к роду прокуратора?! *«С Пилатом еще хуже, – подчеркивала Королева в письме к О. Бабышкину от 19 сентября 1960 г., – Ибо любой ценой хотят в нем видеть “преступника из трагедии” (который в опере поет басом!). Я изучала много материалов, и в самой Террогане, в Испании, откуда Пилат родом. Был это добросовестный исполнитель закона, который какой бы закон ни был, но если это был закон – Пилата было нельзя ни подкупить, ни уговорить. Даже его враги – при его жизни называли “Справедливым”»* (перевод – И. Т.)¹³. Больше никаких более точных данных об истории генеалогического древа своей матери Королева не раскрыла. Хотя она всегда подчеркивала, что входила в аристократические дома европейской знати и даже имела доступ к папской библиотеке в Ватикане¹⁴. По мнению И. Голубовской, которая изучала творчество писательницы, много событий из жизни Наталены просто нельзя проверить потому, что *«биографам Н. Королевы пришлось бы повторить ее путешествия в Испанию, Италию, Францию, Египет, Персию, Армению, Чехословакию»*¹⁵. Однако эти путешествия все равно не принесли бы желаемого

¹¹ Наталена Королева. *Життя і творчість у документах і матеріалах*, с. 78.

¹² Там же, с. 50.

¹³ О. Бабишкін, *Несподіване, щасливе знайомство*, с. 184.

¹⁴ Там же, с. 176, 179–180.

¹⁵ І. В. Голубовська, *Письменниця про себе: «Автобіографія» Наталени Королевої*, in *Вісн. Житомир. держ. ун-ту ім. І. Франка*, 2002, № 9, с. 98–100.

результата. Если речь идет о создании научной биографии, то важнее найти документы личного характера, что открывает возможность устранить неточности и восстановить недостающие звенья.

По официальной версии, Наталену, очевидно после смерти бабушки, отправили на учебу во Францию, в монастырь Нотр-Дам де Сион, где она получила основательное образование. Однако в 1904 г. отец с мачехой вызвали ее в Киев, где девушка окончила Институт благородных девиц. Впоследствии в автобиографической повести «Без корней» она описала годы проведенные в этом элитном учебном заведении. После окончания Института девушка продолжила обучение в археологическом институте в Петербурге, получила степень доктора археологии. Имея способности к живописи, Королева обучалась в Петербургской Академии искусств, имела выставки в Петербурге и Варшаве.

Неожиданные коррективы в судьбу внесло решение родителей выдать ее замуж за нелюбимого человека. Протест Наталены выразился в решении выступать на театральных сценах, что само по себе было вызывающим в сознании дворянского общества. Имея прекрасный голос, Королева поступила в Михайловский театр Петербурга, сотрудничала с парижским театром, который гастролировал в Петербурге, исполняла на театральных сценах Венеции и Парижа арию Кармен в одноименной опере Ж. Бизе. К тому же она увлеклась египтологией, участвовала в археологических раскопках в Египте, Помпеях, совершила путешествия в Испанию, Францию, Ближний Восток. Пребывая в Испании, прекрасно образованная и обаятельная Наталена, по утверждениям некоторых исследователей, очаровала испанского короля Альфонса XIII, но вынуждена была уехать из страны по настоянию двора¹⁶. К сожалению, проверить документально эти данные нет возможности. Поэтому эту информацию приходится воспринимать в версии самой писательницы.

С 1909 г. Н. Королева начинает свою литературную карьеру. Она публикуется во французских изданиях под псевдонимом «брат Иван». Это было время ее молодости, расцвета таланта, уверенности в своей исключительности. Это была ее «Атлантида», незабываемая «золотая» часть ее жизни, впоследствии безвозвратно утерянная, но которая будет вдохновлять писательницу на создание литературных произведений. В письме к А. Кошицу от 9 ноября 1936 г. Королева писала: *«на праздниках, возможно, смогу выслать вам еще одну книжечку, ибо в том волюмчике, Вы узнаете «тьнь прошлого» и вспомните времена прошедшие, времена молодости. Может, вспомните Вы*

¹⁶ См.: М. С. Васіків, *До проблеми вивчення біографії Наталени Королевої та її творчої самоідентифікації*, с. 200–204. Однако, ученый допустил ошибку, считая, что Королева имела роман с королем Альфонсом XII, который правил между 1874–1885 годами, когда сама писательница еще не родилась.

некоторые забытые детали той «Атлантиды», которая сохраняется где-то в мечтах...» (перевод – И.Т.)¹⁷.

Первая мировая война застала Наталену в Киеве. Вскоре умер ее отец, за самой Королевой была установлена слежка. Уехать из страны она не могла, потому что граница была закрыта. Это подтолкнуло ее записаться сестрой милосердия в действующую российскую армию. Там, на поле сражений, Наталена встретила свою большую любовь и узнала горечь потерь. По версии Королевы, судьба свела ее с офицером российской армии, гражданином Ирана и персидским князем Искандером Гакгаманиш ибн Куруги из рода Ахеменидов, за которого она вышла замуж. Но вскоре ее муж погиб под Варшавой. Гроб с умершим мужем Наталена отправила в Иран, а сама вернулась в Киев. К этому времени она ощутила на себе все ужасы войны: имела пять ранений, получила контузию, из-за чего оглохла на одно ухо и немного прихрамывала из-за травмы ноги. За героизм, проявленный на фронтах войны, Н. Королева была награждена солдатским орденом «За храбрость». Однако сцена для нее была уже навсегда закрыта. *«С такими увечьями про сцену думать было уже нельзя»*, – с грустью вспоминала Н.Королева¹⁸.

Шел 1919 г. Война заканчивалась, но перспектив на будущее не было. Приход большевиков к власти побудил Королеву вместе с мачехой записаться в группу чешских репатриантов для выезда в Чехословакию. По дороге умерла ее мачеха и в Праге 1919 г. Наталена оказалась одна. По данным Королевы знание 6 языков, в том числе и чешского, помогло ей устроиться на работу в Министерство образования Чехословакии. Однако проверить эту информацию не удалось. Запрос советника посольства ЧР в Украине господина Петера Вагнера в соответствующие архивы ЧР не дал результата. Документов, которые бы подтвердили работу Королевы в Министерстве образования, не сохранилось (или не найдено). В Праге Королева знакомится с украинским общественным деятелем и писателем Василием Короливым-Старым, за которого впоследствии выходит замуж (хотя можно предположить, что это был гражданский брак, т.к. даты бракосочетания Королева никогда не называла). Молодая семья покупает дом под Прагой, в г. Мельнике, в котором Наталена прожила до последних лет своей жизни.

С чехословацким периодом связана активная творческая деятельность писательницы. По словам Королевы, именно В. Королив-Старый посоветовал ей работать в украинской литературе. Особенно насыщенными были 1920–1930-е годы. Вначале 1920-х годов Королева подготовила к изданию школьный чешско-украинский словарь под редакцией С. Смаль-Стоцкого, а в 1921 г. опубликовала первый рассказ на украинском языке «Грех». Но уже в 1935–1938 годах писательница издала «шесть томов беллетристики», а за 1938–1939 годы

¹⁷ Наталена Королева. *Життя і творчість у документах і матеріалах*, с. 40.

¹⁸ О. Бабишкін, *Несподіване, щасливе знайомство*, с. 184.

опубликовала три рассказа и закончила большую повесть о Понтии Пилате»¹⁹. Именно в это время вышли ее лучшие произведения: «В дни иные» (1935 г.), «1313» (1935 г.), «Предок» (1935), автобиографическая повесть «Без корней» (1936), «Сон тени» (1938), «Quid est veritas» (1961 г.), сборник рассказов «Иной мир» (1936), «Легенды старо-киевские» (1942). Остались ненапечатанными повести «Последний бег» и «Дорогами жизни». Ее творческая деятельность не могла пройти бесследно в литературной среде. В 1936 г. на конкурсе в Львове Н. Королева была награждена двумя первыми наградами. Занималась она и переводами. В частности, перевод произведений Святой Терезы из Авиллы со старо-кастильского на украинский язык принес ей первую награду Украинского Католического Собора. В. Королив-Старый, подметив такую популярность произведений своей жены, даже искал пути «выхода» на Голливуд с предложением написать либретто для кинофильма «с украинским колоритом»²⁰.

Оценивая роль В. Королива-Старого в жизни Наталены, следует отметить, что это именно он «уговорил» Королеву не только писать по-украински, но и повлиял на формирование ее литературного вкуса, разрабатывал вместе с ней сюжеты, помогал переписывать ее произведения, нес на себе тяготы повседневной, и очень, непростой эмигрантской жизни. «*Наталія сиділа за скриптами, а я як сумасшедший, переписував. Переписав я за две недели 10 печатных листов*» (речь идет о повести «Сон тени»), – признавался он в письме к А. Кошицу от 22 февраля 1937 г.²¹ Дело в том, что В. Королив-Старый, не зная литературного чешского языка, не мог реализовать себя в полной мере как писатель. Поэтому он и «сделал ставку» на талантливую Королеву, которая уже имела опыт публицистической и литературной работы.

Увлеченность творчеством объединяла супругов, т. к. для них это была единственная возможность отойти от «прогрессирующего хамства», связанного с тяготами эмигрантской среды. Концепцией их «выживания» в условиях иной культурной и бытовой среды было творчество. Вокруг все было незнакомым и чужим. Даже технический прогресс не доставлял радости. Прошедшая смена эпох ломала привычные ценности, мораль, обычаи. Понимание невозвратности прошлого отбрасывало супругов на обочину жизни, не позволяло принять новые реалии, заставляло «существовать вне времени». Пережитые стрессы, борьба за существование, занятие тяжелым физическим трудом по хозяйству (как признавалась сама Королева, она готовила обеды, выращивала кролей и птицу, квасила в бочках капусту и огурцы) вынуждали искать путь к спасению. Такой соломинкой для супругов была мечта о лучшей и уже прошедшей «Атлантиде», которую они воплощали в литературных произведениях. Творчество было «пружиной» всей их жизни. «*Пишем, рисуем, фантазируем, много читаем /имеем более 20 журналов/, – и вообще пребываем в состоянии,*

¹⁹ Наталена Королева. *Життя і творчість у документах і матеріалах*, с. 14.

²⁰ См.: Наталена Королева. *Життя і творчість у документах і матеріалах*, с. 47.

²¹ Там же, с. 45.

когда абсолютно день в день не имеем ни одной свободной минутки. К физической работе предъявляем наименьшие требования, а радости, которые имеем, преимущественно – духовные»²² (перевод – И.Т.). Жили супруги достаточно замкнуто: «двое-трое приятелей, которые не поменялись в новом времени [...], несколько хороших [...] книжек, галереи дорогих нам образов, сборники волнующих наши сердца мелодий, и т.д., что и позволяет нам в нашем воображении представить наше время, то прошлое, которое так смешно и непонятно современному поколению и понятно нам» (перевод – И.Т.)²³. Несмотря на жизненные неурядицы, неприятие новой среды, супруги смогли создать свой счастливый, романтический мир. В нем было тепло, уютно и комфортно, ибо в нем была реализованная мечта, воплощенная в жизни литературных героев.

Начало Второй мировой войны принесло новые тяготы и потери. В 1941 г. после очередного допроса в гестапо умер от сердечного приступа ее муж – В. Королив-Старый. С того времени писательница оказалось не только в полном одиночестве, изоляции, но и творческом кризисе. «*Живу как Робинзон на безлюдном острове, даже без Пятницы*», – жаловалась Н. Королева в письме от 15 октября 1957 г. к известному украинскому ученому, Митрополиту Иллариону – Первоиерарху Украинской Православной Церкви в Канаде (Ивану Огиенко)²⁴. Совместных детей у супругов не было. Известно только, что Н. Королева имела двух приемных сыновей. Об одном из них она вспоминала в интервью газете «Свобода» (1935 г.). Очевидно, это был сын ее первого мужа. О нем она упомянула вскользь, отметив, что он молодым убежал на фронт, в 18 лет дослужился до звания старшины, имел награды за храбрость²⁵.

Второй сын Войта был усыновлен Н. Королевой после Второй мировой войны. Оставшись совсем одна, «с пенсией в 300 крон», она вынуждена была подрабатывать на жизнь уроками испанского и итальянского языков в местной школе. Соседский мальчик после смерти отца не ужился с мачехой, которая хотела, чтобы он бросил учебу и начал зарабатывать на жизнь работой. Парень был смысленный, «первый в школе», и Королева взяла его к себе на воспитание, дав возможность доучиться. Об этом она писала в автобиографии, которую составила в 1958 г. по просьбе митрополита Иллариона. Войта «немного подрабатывал тем, что брал немного разной работы на дом. Так мы и жили»²⁶, – вспоминала Королева в автобиографии. Вероятность подселения в дом квартиранта, т.к. жилье состояло из 3-х комнат, подтолкнуло Королеву прописать Войту. Со временем парень женился. Молодые заняли две комнаты, а Королева перешла в комнату, где раньше жил ее приемный сын. Он помогал писательнице ремонтировать дом, подвести в него канализацию и водопровод. Морженка, жена Войты, варила обеды, делала генеральные уборки, стирала

²² Там же, с. 31.

²³ Там же, с. 29.

²⁴ Наталена Королева. *Життя і творчість у документах і матеріалах*, с. 66.

²⁵ См.: там же, с. 19.

²⁶ Там же, с. 71.

белье. Какие на самом деле были отношения в семье – неизвестно. Примерно в то самое время, когда писалась автобиография, Королеву посетил Олег Бабышкин, который оставил очень короткую информацию о жизни писательницы в Мельнике. Не совсем ясно, почему журналист «выпятил» факт одиночества Королевы, подчеркнув, что она торгует пивом в Праге, обойдя факт усыновления чешского мальчика? Возможно, сама Королева не посвятила журналиста в свою личную жизнь, или не хотела, чтобы об этом писали, но есть и другое объяснение – это была часть «литературной биографии» Королевы. Ведь очевидно, что О. Бабышкин описал лишь о том, о чем ему рассказывала сама писательница. По-видимому, журналист не встретил дома приемного сына Наталены (возможно, и другое развитие событий). Не подали информации о Войте Валерий Шевчук и Алексей Мишанич. Таким образом, отношения Королевы с сыном требуют уточнения и дальнейшего исследования, что важно для понимания «мифов» и реальности в описании жизни писательницы.

Выводы

После смерти Королева была похоронена рядом со своим мужем на городском кладбище. К сожалению, уже нет в живых Войты, который бы мог пролить свет на жизнь Наталены в послевоенной Чехословакии. Поэтому остается на сегодня актуальным поиск потомков Войты, его родных и близких, которые бы могли помочь раскрыть «биографические тайны» писательницы. Важность этого поиска усиливается и тем, что до сих пор неизвестна судьба личного архива Королевы. В Государственном окружном архиве г. Мельника его пока не найдено (такой ответ дал его директор, господин Далибор Статник по запросу советника посольства ЧР в Украине Петера Вагнера). Возможно, из-за политических обстоятельств Королева его уничтожила, боясь репрессий. Остается лишь верить, что в архивных фондах ЧР еще сохраняются ненайденные документы из ее личного архива. Как ни жаловалось писательница на свое одиночество, вне общества она оставаться не могла. Ведь она работала в свое время в Министерстве образования Чехословакии, после войны – в школе, платила налоги (о чем она писала в автобиографии), проводила водопровод, прописывала к себе в дом сына и т.д. Поэтому возможно, что часть документов, которые бы опосредствованно раскрывали жизнь писательницы в Чехословакии, все-таки еще сохраняется в архивных фондах разных ведомств. Так или иначе, без документальных подтверждений основных фактов из жизни Наталены Королевы невозможно как создать полноценную научную биографию писательницы, так и понять глубину и многогранность удивительного литературного таланта этой необыкновенной украинской писательницы.

**L'INSTITUTION DU PRETRE MILITAIRE DE BUCOVINE
ET DES PRINCIPALITES ROUMAINES PENDANT
LA SECONDE MOITIE DU XIX^{ÈME} SIECLE
(1850-1878)**

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Rezumat: *Activitatea preotului de oștire, începând din anul 1850 și până în 1878, când s-a sfârșit războiul de independență, a fost una deosebit de fructuoasă. Deși la început s-au făcut pași timizi în organizarea și funcționarea acestei instituții militaro-bisericești, odată cu trecerea timpului, au fost luate măsurile necesare pentru redresarea situației, atât din partea reprezentanților clerului ortodox, cât și din partea reprezentanților puterii de stat. Astfel, s-a creat cadrul legislativ necesar desfășurării asistenței religioase între soldații români, și s-au „înzestrat” unitățile administrative ale oștirii, cu clerici potriviți pentru această misiune, înregistrându-se o colaborare rodnică între Armată și Biserică pentru susținerea cauzei naționale. Articolul de față surprinde activitatea preotului militar în această perioadă deosebit de tumultoasă din istoria României.*

Résumé: *L'activité du prêtre de l'armée depuis 1850 et jusqu'en 1878, quand la guerre d'indépendance a pris fin, a été particulièrement fructueuse. Bien qu'au début, on a pris des mesures timides en ce qui concerne l'organisation et le fonctionnement de cette institution militaire et religieuse, au fil du temps, ont été prises les mesures nécessaires pour redresser la situation, tant par les représentants du clergé orthodoxe, ainsi que par les représentants du pouvoir d'Etat. Ainsi fut créé le cadre juridique nécessaire à la réalisation de l'assistance religieuse entre les soldats roumains, et ils ont «doué» des unités administratives de l'armée avec des clercs pour cette tâche; on a enregistré une collaboration fructueuse entre l'Armée et l'Église pour soutenir la cause nationale. Cet article capte le travail de prêtre militaire dans cette période très mouvementée de l'histoire roumaine.*

Abstract: *Activity of army priest since 1850 and until 1878, when the independence war ended, was a particularly fruitful. Although at first timid steps have been made in the organization and functioning of the military-religious institutions, over time, have been necessary measures to redress the situation, both by representatives of Orthodox clergy and the representatives of state power. Thus was created the legal framework needed to carry out religious assistance between Romanian soldiers, and they "gifted" administrative units of the army with clergy suited for this task, registering a fruitful collaboration between the Army and the Church to support the national cause. This article captures the work of military priest in this very turbulent period in Romanian history.*

Keywords: *Army Priest, Bukovina, Romanian Principalities, independence war, Church.*

Le long de l'histoire tumultueuse du peuple roumain, il y en a eu toujours «une liaison permanente entre la croix et la gloire»¹, entre le credo religieux et celui national, entre les idéaux chrétiens et ceux de progrès et de prospérité, l'Eglise orthodoxe ancestrale occupant toujours une place d'honneur dans la conscience de ceux qui ont défendu, l'arme à la main, la liberté et l'indépendance du pays.

À côté de l'Armée, l'Eglise s'est toujours manifestée comme une institution fondamentale de la société. Entre ses institutions mises au service de la nation roumaine, il y en a eu depuis toujours une collaboration fructueuse dans le domaine de la prospérité nationale autant au Moyen Age, ainsi que pendant les grandes transformations du début du XIX-ème siècle et surtout après 1830 quand on a fondé la milice nationale². Les prêtres ont su maintenir éveillée la conscience patriotique de leurs fidèles, leur insuffler l'amour et le respect pour la foi chrétienne, ainsi que l'attachement pour la patrie et pour les valeurs des précurseurs.

Parce que l'histoire des Roumains a été une série sans fin de luttes pour garder l'identité et la liberté nationales, l'armée de la patrie a constitué un élément décisif pour l'accomplissement de ces buts. Par l'esprit de lutte qui les caractérisait, les prêtres orthodoxes ont contribué à la préparation et au soutien moral de l'armée, au renfort de la conscience pas seulement par le dévouement, mais aussi par l'abnégation et par le sacrifice; de cette manière, ce périple a pu survivre. Au fond, leurs idéaux étaient les mêmes, tous les intérêts ayant un seul but: la promotion des valeurs fondamentales de la nation.

Si on analyse en détail chaque moment important de l'histoire roumaine, on peut facilement observer que, jamais, les démarches de ces deux institutions, l'Armée

¹ Ion Ilinca, Ion Ioniță, Dan Ionescu, Neculai Moghior, *Biserica și armata-Slujire și Jertfă-The Church and the armed forces-Service and Sacrifice* [L'Eglise et l'armée – Office et sacrifice], Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2006, pp.13-16.

² *Istoria militară a poporului român, vol.IV. Epoca revoluțiilor de eliberare națională și socială. De la Revoluția populară din 1784 la cucerirea independenței depline, 1877-1878* [L'histoire militaire du peuple roumain, le IV-ème volume, L'époque des révolutions de libération nationale et sociale. De la Révolution populaire de 1784 à la conquête de l'indépendance complète, 1877-1878], Editura Militară, București, 1987, p.189-203; à voir aussi Anghel Popa, *Renașterea armatei pământene în Moldova, 1829-1859* [La Renaissance de l'armée locale en Moldavie, 1829-1859], Biblioteca Municipală Câmpulung Moldovenesc, 1995; D.I.Georgescu, *Istoria armatei române și a războaielor poporului românesc* [L'histoire de l'armée roumaine et des guerres du peuple roumain], București, f.a.; Constantin Căzănișteanu, *Cu privire la dezvoltarea armatei române moderne în perioada 1830-1859* [Concernant le développement de l'armée roumaine moderne dans la période 1830-1859], dans la volume *File din istoria militară a poporului român. Studii* [Feuilles de l'histoire militaire du peuple roumain. Etudes], IV-ème volume, București, 1977.

et l'Eglise n'ont été divergentes. Les prêtres ont été la pointe de lance de la conscience nationale, et les soldats la lance même. Dès les premiers princes régnants démontés qui avaient pour conseiller les confesseurs des monastères et jusqu'à nos jours, quand l'Etat a des principes solides, la mission religieuse soutenue par des prêtres a constitué l'un des éléments fondamentaux qui a contribué à l'émancipation de la nation roumaine. Voilà pourquoi, les fondateurs de la Roumanie moderne n'ont pas omis ces aspects et ont travaillé pour consolider les liaisons entre les prêtres et les soldats³. En Valachie, le début de l'institution appelée «le prêtre militaire ou d'armée» date depuis 1850⁴ au temps du règne du prince Barbu Dimitrie Știrbei.

On connaît dans l'histoire ses préoccupations pour réorganiser l'armée⁵. On se demande quand même: cette institution est-elle purement roumaine, orthodoxe, ou a-t-elle paru dans la vie publique «d'un côté et de l'autre de Milcov» par filière étrangère empruntée de la pratique d'autres peuples ou confessions?

Il paraît que c'est une question d'emprunt, parce qu'au moment de sa parution dans les Principautés, elle avait déjà une tradition bien solide dans d'autres pays. Sans doute dans l'Eglise romano catholique, l'accompagnement de l'armée par le clergé en missions militaires ou sur le front de bataille est beaucoup plus ancien. Par exemple, quand les armées autrichiennes sont entrées en Bucovine (1775), on a envoyé un prêtre militaire pour les soldats catholiques dans le pays «de la forêt de hêtres», plus précisément à Câmpulung. Il s'appelait Paul Harrach, et c'était une carmélite de la Galicie. Grâce à l'ardeur de cet abbé on a construit une chapelle dans cette ville. Il faut dire que la Bucovine appartenait spirituellement à cette époque-là au diocèse catholique de Bacău, tandis que les officiers et les soldats autrichiens étaient subordonnés du point de vue administratif à l'évêque militaire Heinrich Johann Kerens, qui en 1773, était devenu évêque du diocèse Wiener-Neustadt et depuis 1785 évêque de Saint Polten⁶. Par comparaison, on précise qu'en Roumanie le diocèse militaire a été fondé assez tard, en 1921, ayant pour siège la ville d'Alba Iulia, étant commandée par un évêque au grade de général de brigade, degré dans lequel l'Eglise nommait les prélats capables, ayant des qualités pastorales et missionnaires tout à fait

³Gheorghe Crețu, *Armata și Biserica: două realități, două puternice argumente ale dăinuirii noastre* [L'Armée et l'Eglise: deux réalités, deux arguments puissants de notre existence], dans *Armata și Biserica* [L'Armée et l'Eglise], București, 1996, p.106-107.

⁴Gheorghe Vasilescu, *Asistența religioasă în oastea Țării Românești* [L'assistance religieuse dans l'armée de la Valachie], dans *Armata și Biserica...*, p.129.

⁵N.Iorga, *Viața și domnia lui Barbu Dimitrie Știrbei, domn al Țării Românești, 1849-1856* [La vie et le règne de Barbu Dimitrie Știrbei, prince régnant de la Valachie, 1849-1856], Vălenii de Munte, Tipografia Neamul Românesc, 1910, p.47-54; Cornel I.Scafeș, Vladimir Zodian, *Barbu Știrbei (1849-1856)* [Barbu Știrbei (1849-1856)], Editura Militară, București, 1981, p.105-129.

⁶http://www.pariohiacampulung.ro/La_Chronique_de_la_Paroisse.html

spéciales. Le premier évêque militaire a été Justinian Teculescu qui a conduit cette institution jusqu'en 1924⁷.

Pour la deuxième moitié du XIX-ème siècle, on connaît (sait) l'existence de trois prêtres militaires en Bucovine: D. D. Zulinschi, Chrysant Ranieri et Nicolae Dimitrievici, tous activant au régiment d'Infanterie no.41 Baron Kellner de Lemberg (Lvov). Ils étaient sous la juridiction administrative du Vicariat Apostolique Militaire ayant le siège à Vienne et en même temps sous la juridiction ecclésiastique de l'évêque de Bucovine ayant le siège à Tchernovtsy; dès 1873, le dernier a porté le rang de métropolitaine⁸. Le premier des trois, D. Zulinschi, a activé comme prêtre militaire entre 1851 et 1876, s'occupant à la fois des soldats autrichiens et roumains de cette partie de la Bucovine. À cette époque-là, en 1851, l'abbé Zulinschi s'adressait au Consistoire de Tchernovtsy pour le nommer diacre⁹. Sa doléance a été satisfaite et, peu de temps après, il a été nommé prêtre. Après une période de pratique liturgique, le prêtre Damian a été envoyé à Lemberg pour servir l'armée autrichienne. Mais, peu de temps après, il est entré en conflit avec les dirigeants de l'Eglise de Bucovine, en recevant de la part du Consistoire et de l'évêque Evghenie Hacman, plusieurs lettres de correction¹⁰. Il paraît que ces disputes se rapportaient à l'insoumission aux tâches que les chefs de l'Eglise de Bucovine avaient confiées au prêtre de Lvov. A cette occasion-là, il déclarait, le 31 décembre 1862/12 janvier 1863: «Je ne connais personne, sauf Dieu, comme mon prêtre spirituel, je considère chacun mon confrère, c'est-à-dire: nalu major, ecuale si minor»¹¹. Une bonne période de temps, les choses sont restées telles quelles, mais le conflit a éclaté de nouveau en 1867, quand un autre prêtre, Chrysant Ranieri, est entré en scène. Celui-ci a été nommé prêtre en 1862 au monastère de Sucevița¹² après avoir activé quelque temps à Dragomirna¹³. Ce prêtre de monastère a été envoyé par l'évêque Hacman pour observer la conduite de D. Zulinschi et pour rapporter immédiatement à la chiriarchie tout ce qui n'était pas en ordre.

Ce qui est sûr, c'est que le 30 mars/11 avril 1867, Ranieri envoyait à l'Ordinariat de Tchernovtsy un vaste rapport sur l'activité du prêtre militaire de

⁷ Ștefan Pâslaru, *23 aprilie 1921. Legiferarea organizarii clerului militar* [23 avril 1921. La légifération de l'organisation du clergé militaire], dans «Revista de istorie militară» (on va utiliser l'abréviation *RIM*), no. 3/1993, p. 38.

⁸ Ion Nistor, *Istoria Bisericii din Bucovina și a rolului ei național-cultural în viața românilor bucovineni* [L'Histoire de l'Eglise de la Bucovine et de son rôle national-culturel dans la vie des Roumains de la Bucovine], Editura Casei Școalelor, București, 1916, p.113.

⁹ D.J.A.N. Suceava, Fond de l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe, section 2/2, dossier no.19/1851, f.1

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, section 2/3, dossier no.6/1861, f.2-14v

¹¹ D.J.A.N. Suceava, Fond de l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe, section 2/3, Dossier no.19/1851, f. 15v

¹² *Ibidem*, section 2/2, dossier no.28/1862, f.1-5v

¹³ *Ibidem*, dossier no.18/1849, f.1

Lemberg dans lequel le dernier était gravement accusé¹⁴. Les accusations étaient si graves qu'on le nommait immoral¹⁵ et même hérétique.¹⁶ Du même rapport on apprend qu'il tenait la messe en roumain et en russe¹⁷. A la suite de ces faits présentés par «le frère» Chrysant, le prêtre Zulinschi a été suspendu de son poste de prêtre militaire pour six semaines, et, à sa place, on a nommé justement «son frère», Ranieri¹⁸. Il paraît que, de cette manière, l'évêque Hacman a récompensé les services d'informateur du moine qui, peu de temps avant, activait au monastère de Sucevița.

Peu de temps après, Ranieri revenait chez l'évêque de Tchernovtsy avec la nouvelle que le prêtre militaire révoqué Zulinschi avait quitté Lvov et était parti pour Molodia¹⁹. La suspension n'a pas duré longtemps, car, par l'appui du Vicariat Militaire de Vienne, D. Zulinschi a été remis dans ses droits²⁰. Mais, l'enquête a continué. Pour la correction «du fils égaré», l'évêque Hacman a transmis un questionnaire avec trois questions qui se rapportaient aux dogmes auxquelles le prêtre militaire de Lemberg devait répondre au bout d'un mois. Les questions se voulaient «une mise à l'épreuve canonique» en concordance avec les rigueurs de la confession de la religion orthodoxe. Voilà les thèmes: les qualités de l'Eglise, la résurrection de Jésus Christ et la vénération de la Vierge Marie, mère de Dieu.²¹ Le prêtre a répondu vite, en avouant sa foi «dans une Eglise sainte, catholique et apostolique», attestant la résurrection de Jésus Christ et les décisions des sept Synodes œcuméniques, en finissant par: «en matière de foi on ne peut pas avoir des opinions personnelles; toute opinion personnelle est nulle». En avril 1868, le problème a été classé; de la commission consistoriale faisait partie l'archimandrite Teofil Bendella (1814-1875), le futur métropolite de la Bucovine et de la Dalmatie²².

La même année, le prêtre Damian était à Carlsbad où il conseillait les fidèles chrétiens orthodoxes qui s'y trouvaient. Pour ses services, il a reçu, aussi, une rémunération de 186 florins, de la part de l'Ordinariat de Tchernovtsy, signe que les choses avaient commencé à se dérouler normalement²³. Le prêtre D. D. Zulinschi a activé jusqu'en 1876, quand il est mort. Avant de mourir, il a appelé chez lui le recteur du séminaire gréco oriental de Tchernovtsy, en lui léguant toute sa fortune de 10.000 florins, pour fonder «trois bourses à 200 florins chacune» à l'Université de

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, section 2/3, dossier no.9/1867 f.1-2

¹⁵ Il niait l'importance du jeûne (du carême), il buvait en excès de l'alcool etc.

¹⁶ Il niait la naissance (surnaturelle) du fils du Dieu et la Vierge Marie, il ne l'appelait pas la mère du Dieu – des influences néo-protestantes.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 1v

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, dossier no. 10/1867, f. 1-3

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, dossier no. 11/1867, f. 1

²⁰ D.J.A.N. Suceava, Fonds de l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe de la Bucovine, section 2/3, dossier no. 10/1867, f. 4

²¹ *Ibidem*, dossier no. 15/1868, f. 1-2.

²² *Ibidem*, dossier no. 14/1868, f. 1

²³ *Ibidem*, dossier no. 16/1868, f. 1

Tchernovtsy, pour les étudiants roumains et ruthènes qui y étudiaient. Ce désir du vénérable prêtre a été accompli après sa mort²⁴.

Ainsi, un épisode moins heureux de l'histoire de la Bucovine prenait fin, épisode ayant inévitablement parmi les protagonistes l'évêque Evghenie Hacman aussi, qui a fait beaucoup de mal à l'Eglise Orthodoxe de l'ancienne province roumaine. On trouve après un quart de siècle des informations sur un autre prêtre militaire qui a activé à Lemberg. Il s'agit de l'archiprêtre Nicolae Dimitrievici qui a reçu, le 27 novembre/9 décembre 1898, pour son activité missionnaire tout à fait spéciale, la décoration « La Croix de Chevalier Frantz Iosif »²⁵.

C'est ici que finissent les informations sur les prêtres militaires de la Bucovine de la période à laquelle on s'est rapporté. Il y a sans doute, d'autres clercs qui ont activé dans ce secteur, mais, pour le moment, les documents sur ce sujet se limitent à ces sources. En ce qui concerne le début de l'institution appelée le prêtre militaire dans les Principautés, l'année 1850 a marqué un moment très important. Ainsi, le 2 mai 1850, le grand connétable Nicolae Ghica, «le chef de l'armée de la Valachie» s'est adressé à l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe de l'Ungrovlachie pour donner son consentement à nommer trois prêtres qui fonctionnent auprès de chaque polc de l'armée de garnison de Bucarest, de Craiova et de Brăila.

La réponse du métropolitain Nifon de l'Ungrovlachie a été favorable et on a «le registre de nomination de trois prêtres et six sacristains d'armée», émis le 10 juillet 1850, par le prince Barbu Știrbei. Pour le début, on a officié des messes de garnison à l'Eglise Saint Ioan Zlătari, puis à l'Eglise Saint Michel, et, après un temps, à l'Eglise Saint George de Malmaison, située tout près de la garnison de Bucarest. Les trois prêtres étaient : Radu de l'Eglise Saint Nicolas (Nicolae) Șelari, Ștefan du monastère l'Auberge des Grecs et George de l'Eglise Saint Etienne du Pont du Terre. Pour eux, l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe a procuré six complets de vêtements sacerdotaux, trois séries des livres et d'objets de culte qui ont été confiés au Département de Travaux Militaires. Tous ces trésors sacerdotaux ont coûté à cette époque-là 7777 lei et 5 centimes. La chiriarchie s'est occupée de rémunérer même ces prêtres, en dépensant 9000 lei chaque année pour les salaires des prêtres et 7200 lei pour les salaires des chantres. Pour douer le service religieux de l'armée, la même Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe de l'Ungrovlachie a fait faire à un orfèvre de Bucarest, trois croix en argent qui ont coûté 900 lei. Dans le même but, on a fait trois icônes représentant le Saint Prélat Nicolas, l'Assomption et le Saint Martyre George, les patrons de trois polcs. Pour les pompiers de Bucarest, on a peint la Sainte Martyre

²⁴ « Familia », an XIII, no.2 de 9/21 Janvier 1877, p.24

²⁵ D.J.A.N. Suceava, Fonds de l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe, section 2/3, dossier no. 19/1898, f.1

Varvara. On a décidé que ceux-ci commencent leur office divin le 1-er octobre 1850²⁶.

Entre 1850 et 1860 dans le service religieux de l'armée ont fonctionné d'autres prêtres, aussi: le prêtre Simion de Brăila, l'ancien archiprêtre Hristache, l'ancien (économe) des (arrondissements) Târgu, Marginea et Călmățui de Teleorman, qui a fonctionné à la chapelle de l'Ecole Militaire de Bucarest, le prêtre Christache de l'Eglise Sf. Vineri (Saint Vendredi), les prêtres Gherasim et Justin de l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe, le prêtre Nicolae de l'Eglise Ieni, nommé à la compagnie de pompiers de la capitale, le prêtre Ioanichie, qui a activé à l'Hôpital Militaire de Bucarest, le prêtre Christache de l'Eglise Lucaci de la capitale qui a fonctionné au polc numéro 3 de Craiova²⁷, le prêtre Nicolae Păun²⁸.

En octobre 1850, on a élaboré «Les tâches (les obligations) du prêtre militaire», où on a précisé les obligations du prêtre militaire, de même que les vêtements propres à cette mission: «des chapeaux en feutre civil, de couleur foncée, un ruban noir large de deux doigts tout autour du bord devant les porter tant qu'ils seront au service de l'armée»²⁹. Ces prévisions ont été en vigueur jusqu'au 6 avril 1870, quand le prince Carol I a promulgué, par le décret no. 603, «Le Règlement pour le clergé de l'armée permanente» qui prévoyait la possibilité que chaque régiment ou bataillon ait un prêtre qui s'occupe des problèmes spirituels des soldats, à condition que ceux-ci constituent «un corps à part»³⁰. «Un corps d'armée» était considéré «une troupe de

²⁶ Ilie Manole, *Asistența religioasă în structurile armatei române moderne (1875-1948)* [L'assistance religieuse dans les structures de l'armée roumaine moderne (1875-1948)], thèse de doctorat (en manuscrit), Iași, 1997, p.33-34.

²⁷ Gheorghe Vasilescu, *op.cit.*, p.135-136

²⁸ Décédé en 1860 («Monitorul Oastei»), on va utiliser l'abréviation *MO*, no. 29 de 13 août 1860, p.451-452.

²⁹ Gheorghe Vasilescu, *op.cit.*, p.132-135

³⁰ *MO*, no.13 de 1870, Décret 603/6 avril 1870 p.515-516; Chiru C.Costescu, *Colecțiune de Legi, Regulamente, Acte, Decizii, Circulări, Instrucțiuni, Formulare și Programe, începând de la 1866-1916 și aflate în vigoare la 15 august 1916, privitoare la Biserică, culte, cler, învățământ religios, bunuri bisericești, epitropii parohiale și administrații religioase și pioase, adnotată cu jurisprudența Înaltei Curți de Casație și Justiție, dată până la anul 1916; având și un index alfabetic amănunțit. Aprobată de Consistoriul Superior Bisericesc și de Sf.Sinod* [Collection de Lois, Règlements, Actes, Décisions, Circulaires, Instructions, Formulaire et Programmes, commençant de 1866-1916 et en vigueur le 15 août 1916 concernant l'Eglise, les cultes, le clergé, l'enseignement religieux, les biens ecclésiastiques, les évêchés paroissiaux et les administrations religieuses et pieuses, adnotée avec la jurisprudence de la Haute Cour de Cassation et Justice, donné jusqu'à l'année 1916; ayant un index alphabétique détaillé. Approuvée par le Consistoire Ecclésiastique et par le saint Synode], București, Institutul de Arte Grafice C.Sfetea, 1916, p.350-352; D.Stavarache, Florica Dobre, *125 de ani de la adoptarea primului Regulament al preoților militari în armata română* [125 années de l'adoption du premier Règlement des prêtres militaires dans l'armée roumaine], dans *RIM*, no.2/1995, p.26.

soldats qui avait une administration complète et dont les chefs avaient le droit de correspondre directement avec la Division et le Ministère de Guerre»³¹.

Il y a eu des confesseurs militaires pendant le règne d'Alexandru Ioan Cuza aussi³². Leurs obligations étaient prévues dans l'article «Les devoirs du prêtre dans l'armée», écrit par l'archimandrite Gabriel Rășcanu, ancien prêtre militaire³³. Parmi ceux-ci citons: le prêtre Vasile de l'Eglise Saint Ilie Rahova, le prêtre Matache Protopopescu du cimetière Șerban Vodă, le prêtre Stoian de l'Eglise Schitu Măgureanu, le prêtre Costache Mirodot, le prêtre Nicodim Pop, Silvestru³⁴, Eufrosin Georgescu³⁵, le prêtre Ignatie Sterian³⁶, Ioan Bobulescu, futur évêque à Râmnic ayant le nom de Iosif³⁷, l'économiste Amfilohie Ionescu³⁸, les prêtres Irimia Măcărescu, Mihail Gheorghiescu et Chiriac Nicolau³⁹, Dimitrie Mihăescu au I-er Régiment⁴⁰, le

³¹ Gabriel Rașcan, *Datoriile preotului în armată* [Les devoirs du prêtre dans l'armée], dans «Biserica Ortodoxă Română» (on va utiliser l'abréviation *BOR*), an IV, no.3/décembre, 1877, p.174.

³² M.Păcurariu, *90 de ani de la proclamarea Independenței de Stat a României* [90 ans de la proclamation de l'Indépendance d'Etat de la Roumanie], dans *BOR*, l'an LXXXV, no.5-6, mai-juin, 1967, p.607.

³³ *BOR*, an IV, no.3/décembre 1877, p.173-180

³⁴ Gheorghe Vasilescu, *op. cit.*, p.136

³⁵ *MO*, III, no.3/14 novembre 1862, p.40-41. Il a activé au Bataillon de Génie (*Ibidem*, IV, no.24/10 avril 1863, p.432)

³⁶ En octobre 1861 il a été transféré du Régiment no. 6 au Bataillon de Chasseurs (*Ibidem*, no.59/24 octobre 1861, p.894)

³⁷ Pour ce qu'il y a de sa vie à voir C.Erbiceanu, *Viața și activitatea Prea Sfințitului Iosif Bobulescu* [La vie et l'activité de Sa Sanctité Iosif Bobulescu], dans *BOR*, an.XIX, (1895-1896), p.319-332. Entre 1861-1862 il était prêtre au I Régiment de Ligne (*Ibidem*, p.325-326); Athanasie Mironescu, *Sfânta Episcopie a Eparhiei Râmnicului –Noul Severin în trecut și acum, în al XLI-lea an al domniei Majestății Sale Regelui României Carol I* [Le Saint Evêché de l'Eparchie de Râmnic – Noul Severin dans le passé et de nos jours, dans la XLI-ème année du règne de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Roumanie Carol I], București, Tipografia Gutenberg, 1906, p.168-169.

³⁸ Il a activé en armée depuis 1861. Par le haut décret no.285/16 février 1868, il a été nommé au Régiment II Infanterie « en place vacante (libre) » (*MO*, an IX, no.7/le 26 février 1868, p.102). En octobre 1876, étant congédié de l'armée, il demandait à l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe d'être reparti à une église de Jassy. En fin de compte, il a accepté de prêcher provisoirement à l'Eglise Curelari (DJAN de Jassy, Fonds de l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe de Moldavie et de Suceava, Paquet changements de prêtres, dossier 32/1871, f.476-492). En avril 1877, il a été appelé de nouveau au service de l'armée (*Ibidem*, dossier no.40/1877, f.55), les messes à l'église Curelari étant officieuses par le prêtre de l'Eglise Saint Pantelimon, située à proximité (*Ibidem*, dossier no.32/1871, f. 518 r.-v. et dossier no.40/1877, f.56, 64-65)

³⁹ Scarlat Porcescu, *Participarea slujitorilor, monahilor și monahiilor din Arhiepiscopia Iașilor la lupta pentru independența României* [La participation des sujets, des moines et des religieuses de l'Archevêché de Jassy à la lutte pour l'indépendance de la Roumanie],

prêtre Ioanichie de l'Hôpital Militaire⁴¹, le prêtre Ghenadie Merișescu⁴², le prêtre Veniamin⁴³ et le prêtre Mihalache⁴⁴.

Du début du long règne du roi Carol I-er et jusqu'à la guerre pour l'indépendance de 1877, il y a eu d'autres prêtres qui ont activé dans l'armée du pays: le prêtre Narcis Crețulescu⁴⁵, le prêtre Veniamin Alexandrescu⁴⁶, le prêtre Gavriil

dans „Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei” (on va utiliser l'abréviation *MMS*), l'an LIII, no.5-6, mai - juin 1877 1877, p.402.

⁴⁰ Ce prêtre a été « ordonné confesseur pour l'armée » le 5 février 1860. Le 4 septembre il demandait la bénédiction de l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe pour être nommé prêtre 2 à l'Eglise Le Saint Grand Martyre Teodor de Jassy (D.J.A.N. Jassy, l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe de la Moldavie et de Suceava, Paquet changements de prêtres, dossier no.32/1871, f.85). A la suite de sa demande, on lui a permis d'activer à cette église-là « provisoirement, tant que son régiment y restera » (*Ibidem*, f.86). A partir de 16 juillet 1875, il a été nommé au Régiment 5 de Ligne (*MO*, no.23/23 juillet 1875, p.573).

⁴¹ La Direction des Archives Nationales Historiques Centrales (on va utiliser l'abréviation D.A.N.I.C), fonds le Ministère des Cultes et de l'Instruction Publique, dossier no.247/1860, f.9.

⁴² Il a fonctionné au Régiment 5 de Ligne (*MO*, I, no.29/13 août 1860, p.451-452); en juillet 1876 il a été transféré au Régiment 3 Infanterie (*Ibidem*, no.20/17 juillet 1875, p.511).

⁴³ Il a été nommé à l'Ecole Militaire en novembre 1862 (*Ibidem*, III, no.5/le 28 novembre 1862, p.66).

⁴⁴ En mars 1863 il a été nommé confesseur au « secteur des artisans de la commande du train et des établissements d'artillerie » (*MO*, IV, no.21/18 mars 1863, p.401). Dans la même période, des chantres ont activé au service de l'armée. En juillet 1860, il y avait 4 prêtres et 12 chantres. Parmi ceux-ci, il y avait D. I. Hodocescu et Petre Dumitrescu du I-er Régiment, Nicolae Mărculescu, C. Popescu, A. Mihăescu, Anghel Stănescu, Ion Popescu, Ghiță Constandin, Gr. Dumitrescu (D.A.N.I.C., Fonds Ministère des Cultes et de l'Instruction Publique, dossier no.247/1860, f.5, f.9, 13). La même année, pour payer les prêtres et les chantres, l'Etat dépensait 2250 lei par mois (*Ibidem*, f.7). Jusqu'à la fin de l'année, on a encore engagé d'autres prêtres et chantres, ainsi qu'à la fin de 1860 il y avait 7 prêtres et 13 chantres engagés au service religieux de l'armée (*MO*, I, no.40/22 octobre 1860, p.655-672). En 1865, il y avait 16 prêtres militaires et 16 chantres au service de l'armée (*Ibidem*, an VI, no.2/29 janvier 1865, p.43-92), en 1866 fonctionnaient 14 prêtres militaires (*Ibidem*, an VII, no.8/8avril 1866, p.107-147 et en 1870, 22 confesseurs activaient en armée (*MO*, no.11/1870, p.348-367)

⁴⁵ Le 2 juin 1867, il a été nommé confesseur du Régiment 3 Infanterie, à la place de l'Econome Sabin qui a démissionné (*ibidem*, no.21 de 12 juin 1867, p.382). Sur son activité (1867-1880) à voir D.J.A.N. Vaslui Fonds du Diocèse de Huși, dossier no.25/1880-1898, f.3-3v; *MO*, an XIII no.37/6 septembre 1872, p.686-687 et no.41/6 octobre 1872, p.744; Nestor Vornicescu, *Arhiereul Narcis Crețulescu-Botoșăneanul (1835-1913)* [L'Archiéré Narcis Crețulescu-Botoșăneanul (1835-1913)], dans *MMS*, l'an XXXV(1959), no.5-6, pp.332-343. Le 18 mai 1868, on l'a nommé professeur à la fois (en même temps) à l'Ecole Régimentaire I-er et II-ème degrés (D.J.A.N. Vaslui Fonds du Diocèse de Huși, dossier no.25/1880-1898, f.3). Le 7 juin, il recevait de l'évêque Atanasie Stoenescu de Râmnic, « un épigonation » et des vêtements ayant les figures des Saints Atanasie et Chiril

Rășcanu⁴⁷, le protosynelle Hariton Mateescu⁴⁸, le prêtre Vornicescu, le prêtre Mirodot Ion⁴⁹, l'économiste Costache Savin⁵⁰, le prêtre Ghermano Bozino⁵¹, le prêtre Sava⁵², le prêtre Irinarh Vornicescu⁵³, le prêtre Porfirie Angheliescu⁵⁴ et Irinarh Grădeanu⁵⁵, l'économiste Arghir Arterescu⁵⁶, l'économiste Alexandru Broască⁵⁷, le prêtre Anania Melega, confesseur de I-er Régiment de Călărași dans les années 1868-1876⁵⁸, le prêtre Agatanghel Șuțu, confesseur des hôpitaux et des troupes de la

(ibidem), et le 6 septembre 1872 on l'a nommé confesseur et professeur de religion et de roumain à Brăila, Ismail, Bucarest et Jassy (*Ibidem*; à voir aussi *MO*, an VIII, no.21 de 12 juin 1867, p.382). En juillet 1876, il a été transféré au Régiment 5 Infanterie (*Ibidem*, no.20 de 17 juillet 1876, p.511). Dès le 1-er juin 1877 jusqu'au mois d'octobre, le prêtre Narcis Crețulescu a activé comme « intendant » de l'Eglise Saint Sava de Jassy. Cela résulte de son rapport vers l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe, rapport no.28 de 16 octobre 1877 dans Scarlat Porcescu, *op. cit.* p.403)

⁴⁶ En mai 1867, il a été nommé au Bataillon 2 Chasseurs (*MO*, no.19/29 mai 1867, p.339-340).

Il est mort le 7 février 1878 (*Ibidem*, no.8/15 avril 1878, p.160).

⁴⁷ Il a été nommé au Régiment no.6 à la place du prêtre Amfilohie Ionescu, « qui, par sa conduite dans la société, ne correspondait pas avec la mission qui lui était confiée » (*Ibidem*, no.40/le 23 octobre 1867, p.867).

⁴⁸ Il a activé au Régiment no.1 de lanciers (ibidem, no.28/le 26 juillet 1867, p.669-670). Le 10 novembre 1869, il a été transféré au Régiment de Roșiori (*Ibidem*, XI, no.54/le 29 novembre 1869, p.1070).

⁴⁹ Il a été nommé au Régiment de Chasseurs, (*Ibidem*, XI, no.54/le 29 novembre 1869, p.1070); en août 1870, il a été transféré au Régiment de Călărași (*Ibidem*, no.26/1870, p.103)

⁵⁰ Il a activé au Bataillon 3 Chasseurs (*Ibidem*, XI, no.54/29 novembre 1869, p.1070). Le 16 novembre 1870, on lui a accepté la démission du poste de confesseur de ce bataillon-là (*Ibidem*, no.38/1870, p.439)

⁵¹ Il a activé jusqu'au mois de juillet 1867, quand on l'a destitué pour « conduite incompatible avec sa mission sacrée » (*MO*, an VIII, no.27/le 17 juillet 1867, p.641-642)

⁵² Il a été nommé confesseur au Bataillon 1 de Génie (*Ibidem*, no.32/1870, p.289)

⁵³ *Ibidem*, X, no.27/16 juin 1869, p.534.

⁵⁴ En juin 1869, il a été nommé au Régiment 8 Infanterie (*Ibidem*, X, no.27/16 juin 1869, p.534). À partir de 20 juillet 1875, il a été éloigné du poste de confesseur à cause de ses problèmes de santé (*Ibidem*, no.28/25 septembre 1875, p.715).

⁵⁵ Il a été nommé prêtre au Bataillon 2 Génie (*Ibidem*, no.30/1870, p.233); après une année, il a été transféré au Bataillon 4 Chasseurs (*Ibidem*, no.40/1871, p.978).

⁵⁶ Il a été nommé au Régiment 4 Infanterie (*Ibidem*, an X, no.4/24 janvier 1869, p.44) et a activé jusqu'au mois de mai, de la même année 1869 (*Ibidem*, an X, no.25/27 mai 1869, p.485-486).

⁵⁷ Il a activé au Régiment no.5 (*Ibidem*, IV, no.21/18 mars 1863, p. 404); le 9 octobre 1868, on a accepté sa démission du poste de confesseur du Régiment 4 Infanterie (*Ibidem*, an IX, no.42/12 octobre 1868, p.641).

⁵⁸ « Vers 1868 il devient prêtre militaire » (V.Pocitan, *Ieromonahul Anania Melega* [Le moine Anania Melega], dans *BOR*, an.XLVII, no.1, janvier 1929, p.1169). Il a activé au Régiment 2 lanciers (*MO*, no.15/14 mai 1868, p.180). En août 1870, il a été transféré au Régiment de

garnison de Craiova, en activant dans l'armée entre 1868-1880⁵⁹ et le prêtre Isaia Persiceanu⁶⁰.

Vers la fin de l'année 1873, le Ministère de Guerre faisait une nouvelle proposition vis-à-vis l'assistance religieuse dans l'armée. Par l'adresse no.10713, on conseillait le Saint Synode d'approuver la désignation en chaque département d'un curé de paroisse qui accompagne «les troupes d'armée territoriale en cas de besoin». Dans la séance de 22 novembre, les hauts prélats ont accepté l'idée des autorités de l'Etat roumain en envoyant dans le pays des adresses où l'on précisait le devoir de chaque prélat de déléguer des prêtres qui allaient être rémunérés du budget de l'armée, durant toute la période d'activité religieuse dans l'armée⁶¹.

Les prélats se sont conformés aux décisions de la haute autorité ecclésiastique, ainsi que le 29 décembre 1873, l'évêque de Huși, Iosif, par l'adresse no.832 informait le Ministère des Cultes sur les choix faits dans ce diocèse : pour le département Fălciu on nommait l'économiste Ioan Harnagea de Huși⁶², pour le département Tutova « le sacellaire » Ion Grăjdeanu de Bârlad, pour le département Cahul le prêtre Mihai Gârnețu de Cahul et pour le département Vaslui, le prêtre Dimitrie Galerie de la ville de Vaslui⁶³. La décision de l'évêque était communiquée aux prêtres et aux doyens de Fălciu, Tutova și Cahul⁶⁴. Un autre prêtre nommé pour l'assistance religieuse de l'armée territoriale a été Petru Ștefulescu de l'église «Les Saints Apôtres» de Târgu Jiu. Le 4 février 1874, l'archiprêtre de Gorj, Ștefan Nicolaescu, recommandait à l'évêque de Râmnic la nomination de celui-ci dans cette fonction ce qui, paraît-il, s'est accomplie⁶⁵.

Chevaliers (*Ibidem*, no.26/1870, p.103). C'était un bon prédicateur, il parlait souvent devant les soldats : le discours du jour de Saint Martyre Dimitrie de 1868 quand il a parlé aux soldats, officiers et aux troupes du vice du jeu aux cartes; discours à l'occasion du Nouvel An, 1869; discours d'invitation pour les soldats à étudier dans l'école régimentaire, recommandée par le Ministère de Guerre à Monsieur le Colonel Radov, le 17 janvier 1869 (V. Pocitan, *op. cit.*, p.1169-1171)

⁵⁹ *Alegeri din scrierile mai multor părinți predicatori francezi, contemporani, despre Dogme, Morală, Cult și Mistere* [Fragments choisis des écrits de plusieurs pères prédicateurs français, contemporains sur les Dogmes, la Morale, le Culte et les Mystères], Craiova, 1880, Préface.

⁶⁰ En février 1870, il a été nommé confesseur du Bataillon 4 Chasseurs (*MO*, no.6/1870, p.199).

⁶¹ D.J.A.N. Vaslui, Fonds Diocèse de Huși, dossier no.21/1873-1898, f.2; D.J.A.N. Dolj, Fonds du Doyenné Dolj, dossier no.1/1874, f.12; D.J.A.N. Gorj, Fonds du Doyenné Gorj, dossier no.62/1874, f.1.

⁶² Celui-ci a activé volontaire au service militaire du Régiment 26 Dorobanți pendant 20 ans, entre 1873-1893. À voir D.J.A.N. Vaslui, Fonds du Diocèse de Huși, dossier no.21/1873-1898, f.14.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, f.3.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, f.4 r.-v.

⁶⁵ D.J.A.N. Gorj, Fonds du Doyenné Gorj, dossier no.62/1874, f.2.

En trouvant des incorrections en ce qui concerne le choix des prêtres militaires⁶⁶, plusieurs prélats ont pris attitude et ont communiqué au Saint Synode ce qu'ils avaient constaté en vue de corriger la situation : « On recrute les prêtres de régiments, en cas de nécessité, par les chefs des troupes, sans le savoir et la permission canonique de l'évêque local. Au départ de la troupe d'une localité à l'autre, les prêtres passent aussi d'un diocèse à l'autre sans un acte canonique de leur évêque, qui constate leur position de prêtre et la permission d'officier le service divin. Ces prêtres, en se croyant indépendants de l'autorité ecclésiastique locale, n'accomplissent pas toujours leurs devoirs de prêtres et mènent une vie sans contrôle. Ils sont animés par le désir d'accéder à des hauts rangs ecclésiastiques et, souvent, ils font appel à des personnes importantes, en vue d'intervenir auprès d'évêques pour accomplir leurs désirs et, à cause de cela, ils créent des mécontentements entre l'évêque et ces personnes. Par conséquent, on propose que le Saint Synode règle la position des prêtres attachés aux troupes ». On a désigné comme « rapporteur » l'évêque Atanasie de Râmnic⁶⁷. Comme il s'agissait d'un problème urgent, on a constitué une commission synodale de laquelle faisaient partie le prêtre qu'on vient de mentionner, Ghenadie, ancien évêque d'Argeș et Melchisedec Ștefănescu. Ceux-ci ont fait un « Projet de règlement pour la discipline du chargé militaire »⁶⁸, adopté par le Saint Synode dans la séance de 6 novembre 1874⁶⁹.

Le projet avait huit chapitres où l'on trouvait de prévoyances très importantes pour l'organisation et le fonctionnement de l'institution du confesseur militaire dans les Principautés. Dans le deuxième article, on montrait que l'avis pour l'occupation d'une telle fonction pouvait venir seulement de la part de l'évêque et dans l'article suivant on stipulait le devoir « des prêtres militaires [...] de se conformer aux canons et aux règles établis pour la discipline ecclésiastique et pour la bonne conduite du clergé ». L'article numéro 5 précisait que les prêtres militaires « seront surveillés par l'archiprêtre qui veillera que les prêtres accomplissent strictement leur devoir, soignant religieusement les objets de culte et accomplissant le service religieux ainsi qu'il est établi par le règlement spécial de l'armée, publié dans « MO », no.70/1870 ; se soignant de malades selon le devoir des prêtres s.c. « Les archiprêtres veilleront aussi que la conduite des prêtres militaires corresponde en totalité aux règles morales de la discipline cléricale, établies par les canons et les règlements du Saint Synode. » L'article numéro 7 contenait quelques conseils pour l'activité liturgique des « prêtres militaires ». On décidait ainsi que ceux-ci soient « attachés à une église de la ville où stationnaient les régiments. Dans cette église sera déposée, avec tout l'honneur, l'icône de régiment. Les prêtres militaires vont officier le service divin aux fêtes religieuses les plus importantes dans ces églises avec les prêtres du lieu et tant que le

⁶⁶ BOR, III, no.9/juin 1877, p.20-21.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p.21-23.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, à voir aussi la Bibliothèque M. Eminescu – Jassy, Ms. VI-196.

service religieux le demandera. Ces églises seront désignées par les évêques. Une attention spéciale était accordée « à la promotion dans les rangs honorifiques » des prêtres qui se sont distingués dans leur mission pour des « faits méritoires ». En ce qui concerne la promotion dans les rangs honorifiques des personnes du clergé militaire, les prélats et les évêques vont procéder conformément à l'Article 43 du règlement voté par le Saint Synode pour la discipline ecclésiastique, qui établit la règle suivante : les personnes cléricales qui, par le dévouement pour leur vocation, par des actes de charité ont obtenu une réputation spéciale parmi les chrétiens et à l'autorité du diocèse, l'évêque du diocèse les récompensera avec un rang ecclésiastique pour reconnaître leurs mérites et éveiller l'émulation parmi les prêtres [...]. L'archiprêtre relate à l'évêque les faits, surtout ceux méritoires, accomplis par un prêtre. Quand l'évêque pense récompenser les mérites de celui-ci, il demande toutes les informations gardées dans les actes de la chancellerie sur les mérites de ce prêtre-là, et ensuite il décide de l'avancer. Mais à l'avancement, il faudra respecter toujours l'hierarchie des grades admis par l'Eglise du pays⁷⁰. Les règles imposées par ces prévisions étaient bienvenues; de cette manière, on mettait « de l'ordre » dans l'organisation et le fonctionnement du service religieux de l'armée.

À la même époque, on a encore élaboré des règlements concernant le jeûne chez les soldats. Selon les conseils donnés par la commission du Saint Synode, de laquelle faisait partie l'évêque Melchisedec Ștefănescu aussi, les soldats en mission devaient jeûner les jours suivants: tous les mercredis et les vendredis de l'année; la première et la dernière semaine de Jeûne des Pâques, trois jours avant le Noël, trois jours avant la fête des Saints Apôtres (le 29 juin), trois jours avant l'Assomption, le jour de 20 août (La mort du Saint Jean-Baptiste) et le jour de 14 septembre (L'Exaltation de la Sainte Croix)⁷¹. Il y a eu encore un règlement des autorités d'Etat en 1876 qui prévoyait la possibilité que tous les corps de troupe et les unités territoriales aient un prêtre militaire. Après un an, en 1877, on est revenu avec le règlement que toutes les garnisons «aient des prêtres qui officient le service divin dans leurs unités»⁷². Le Ministère de Guerre était annoncé du nécessaire de prêtres dans le territoire, et celui-ci, par l'intermédiaire du Ministère des Cultes tombait d'accord avec les prélats pour repartir « les personnes clergé » qui officiaient la messe dans l'armée. Le prêtre militaire faisait partie du Grand Etat Majeur, ayant rôle dans la célébration des services religieux, l'enseignement des sciences religieuses dans les écoles militaires, l'assistance religieuse des soldats actifs et de ceux qui étaient dans les ambulances.

⁷⁰ BOR, no.9/juin 1877, p.21-23.

⁷¹ D.J.A.N. Jassy, Fonds Melchisedec Ștefănescu, dossier no.11/1873-1874, f.19.

⁷² Nicu Octavian, *Adeziunea și aportul Bisericii Ortodoxe Române la lupta poporului roman pentru independența națională* [L'adhésion et l'apport de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine à la lutte du peuple roumain pour l'indépendance nationale], dans „Glasul Bisericii”, an XXXVI(1977), no.5, p.317; Scarlat Porcescu, *op.cit.*, p.402.

De cette manière-ci, en 1877, il y avait des confesseurs militaires dans toutes les unités de la même garnison. Après ces prévisions qui donnaient le cadre légal de l'activité des prêtres⁷³ militaires, dix prêtres ont été repartis aux garnisons de tout le pays⁷⁴. Puis, quand les hostilités ont commencé au bord du Danube, il a fallu nommer d'autres prêtres pour l'assistance religieuse des troupes chrétiennes engagées dans le conflit. On a engagé temporairement encore 12 prêtres, laïques et moines : le prêtre Ioan Lăcureanu Protonotarie au I-er Régiment de Ligne⁷⁵, le prêtre Merodat Ion au I-

⁷³ L'archimandrite Ignatie Serion, l'archimandrite Ghenadie Merișescu, le prêtre Sava Dumitrescu et le prêtre Veniamin Alexandrescu (en 1878 le prêtre Nicolae Budeșteanu le remplace; à voir Mircea Păcurariu, *90 de ani de la proclamarea Independenței de Stat a României* [90 années de la proclamation de l'Indépendance d'Etat de la Roumanie], en „Biserica Ortodoxă Română”, an.LXXXV, no.5-6, mai-juin, 1967, p.608); à Bucarest le prêtre Ilie Grigoriu (en mars 1868 a été transféré du poste de confesseur de l'Hôpital Militaire de Jassy, en celui de confesseur au Bataillon I Chasseurs (*MO*, no.10/18 mars 1868, p.213); en novembre de la même année, l'économiste Grigorie a été confirmé «intendant de l'Eglise appelée Mitocu Maicilor de la ville de Jassy» («Foaie oficială bisericească a Sfintei Mitropolii Moldaviei», l'an I, no.4 de 15/27 novembre 1868, p.50); en juillet 1869, il a été nommé à l'Hôpital Militaire de Jassy (*MO*, an XI, no.40/4 août 1869, p.819) et le prêtre Narcis Crețulescu à Jassy (Scarlat Porcescu, *op. cit.*, p.403); le prêtre Agatanghel Guțu à Craiova, il a activé au Régiment 4 Infanterie (*MO*, X/27 mai 1869, p.485-486); en 1876-1877, l'évêque Melchisedec lui a confié la mission de prêtre de régiment à Ismail. Puis il est venu à Craiova étant le confesseur de tous les soldats de cette ville; en avril 1877, il a été confirmé confesseur à l'Hôpital Militaire de Craiova (ibidem, no.9/19 avril 1877, p. 282); pendant la guerre d'Indépendance, il a été «l'homme de confiance du général Cernat» (*Din corespondențele Episcopului Melchisedec*, culese, adnotate și însoțite de o prefață de Const.C.Diculescu [Des correspondances de l'Evêque Melchisedec, cueillies, annotées et accompagnées par une préface de Const.C. Diculescu], București, Tipografia Cărților Bisericești, 1909, p.18; à voir *Alegeri din scrierile mai multor părinți predicatori francezi...*, p.2; « Anuarul Armatei Române pe anul 1877 », București, 1877, p.109, 119); à Galați, le prêtre Ioachim Voluntas (en janvier 1876 il a été nommé au Régiment 8 Ligne (*MO*, no.1/20 janvier 1876, p.30) et le prêtre Neofit Racoviță qui a remplacé l'archimandrite Chiriac Nicolae (dès le 1er juillet 1877 («de Moniteur Officiel de Roumanie», on va utiliser l'abréviation *MO*), no.178/9-21 août 1877, p.4968) et à Brăila le prêtre Irinarh Gârdeanu («Anuarul Armatei Române pe anul 1877», București, 1877, p.109 et « Anuarul Armatei Române pe anul 1878 », p.119; M. Păcurariu, *op. cit.*, p.608; pour les nominations de ces prêtres aux garnisons du pays, à voir *MO*, no.10/4 mai 1877).

⁷⁴ Bucarest, Jassy, Craiova, Galați, Brăila.

⁷⁵ Le 14 avril 1877, le commandant du Régiment I de Ligne s'adressait à l'évêque de Râmnic en vue de lui recommander un prêtre militaire, qui soit payé avec 150 lei par mois. Il paraît qu'on a choisi Ioan Lăcureanu (Gherasim Cristea – Piteșteanu, *Războiul de Independență în documentele Episcopiei Râmnicului și Argeșului* [La guerre d'Indépendance dans les documents de l'Evêché de Râmnic et d'Argeș], travail imprimée sous l'encouragement, la bénédiction et l'aide du très Saint Iosif, l'évêque de Râmnic et d'Argeș, Râmnicu Vâlcea, 1977, doc.1, 7, 8, p.21, 24-25); le 13 octobre 1877, le Ministère de Justice intervenait au

er Régiment (Roșiori), le prêtre Ursu Gavrilă au Régiment 4 Artillerie⁷⁶, le prêtre N. Castriș Régiment 2 Artillerie, l'économiste D. Mihăescu au Régiment 3 Artillerie, le prêtre Neofit Iocovici au Régiment 2 Roșiori, le prêtre I. Ionescu Amfilohie au Bataillon 3 Chasseurs, le prêtre Hariton Mateescu au Régiment 6 Ligne⁷⁷, le prêtre Pafnutie Ionescu au I-er Bataillon Chasseurs et le prêtre Calinic Popovici au Régiment 8 Dorobanți⁷⁸. Le Conseil de Ministres, dans la séance de 9 juillet 1877 approuvait l'ouverture d'un crédit de 283.855 lei. On y prévoyait aussi des dépenses pour la solde des 12 prêtres mentionnés, 180 lei par mois à chacun. La valeur totale, par mois, pour les prêtres engagés temporairement arrivait à 2.160 lei⁷⁹.

Il y en a eu encore d'autres cas où les prêtres ont demandé d'être reçus dans le service de confesseur militaire. Le prêtre Nicolae Galin⁸⁰, de l'Eglise Saint Ilie de Jassy demandait « un poste de prêtre à l'ambulance du champ de guerre où n'importe où l'on avait besoin d'un prêtre⁸¹. Le Ministère de Guerre a demandé des références à

Tribunal d'Argeș pour ajourner son procès (*Documente privind istoria României. Războiul pentru Independență* [Documents concernant l'histoire de la Roumanie. La guerre pour l'Indépendance], on va utiliser l'abréviation *D.R.I.-R.I.*), București, Editura Academiei, vol. VI, doc. 1296, p.665).

⁷⁶ Le 11 mars 1868 (*MO*, no.10/le 18 mars 1868, p.202) et respectivement le 2 septembre 1868, il a été reconnu comme confesseur de l'Hôpital militaire de Jassy (« Foaiea oficială bisericească a Sfintei Mitropolii Moldaviei », l'an I, 1868, no.1 de 1/13 octobre, p.4); en juillet 1869, il était transféré au Régiment I Artillerie (*Ibidem*, no.38/1870, p.438). Il a été décoré avec la médaille « Virtutea Militară » (La « Vertu Militaire ») pour son héroïsme (*MOf*, no.48 de 1/13 mars 1878, p.1311)

⁷⁷ Il a été récompensé pour ses services avec l'ordre « Steaua României » (L'Etoile de la Roumanie) en grade de chevalier (*MOf*, no.61/16-28 mars 1878, p.1735)

⁷⁸ *D.R.I.-R.I.* vol V, p.245; Nicu Octavian, *op.cit.*, p.317. Calinic Popovici était prieur du Monastère Nifon du département de Buzău, et le 13 mai 1877, il demandait le consentement d'« aller au milieu des combattants pour encourager et officier le service divin en tant que prêtre » (*D.R.I.-R.I.*, vol III, doc. 186, p.94-95); sa demande a été admise par le Ministère de Guerre, en l'envoyant au Régiment 8 Dorobanți (*Ibidem*, doc.587, p.301; Constantin I.Stan și Valeriu Nicolescu, *Buzăul și Râmnicu Sărat în războiul Neatârării* [Buzău et Râmnicu Sărat dans la guerre d'Indépendance], Buzău, 2007, p.42; Gabriel Cocora, *Episcopia Buzăului, o vatră de spiritualitate și simțire românească* [L'Evêché de Buzău, une âtre de spiritualité et sentiment roumain], Editura Episcopiei Buzăului, 1986, p.397).

⁷⁹ *MOf*, no.171 de 30 juillet/11 août 1877, p. 4793; Nicu Octavian, *op. cit.*, p.317

⁸⁰ Le prêtre Galin a été nommé à l'Eglise Saint Ilie en octobre 1870. Jusqu'alors, il a activé au Monastère Teodoreni de la ville Burdujeni, du département de Botoșani (D.J.A.N. Jassy, Fonds l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe de la Moldavie et de Suceava, dossier no.32/1871 permutations des prêtres, f.94).

⁸¹ D.J.A.N., Jassy, le Fond du Doyenné Jassy, dossier no.3/1877, f.52.

l'archiprêtre sur ce prêtre⁸²; on ne sait pas exactement quelles références à reçu le prêtre Galin, ni même s'il a jamais occupé le poste de prêtre militaire⁸³.

En dehors de la demande du prêtre Galin de Jassy, il y en a eu, aussi, une sollicitation pour servir l'armée roumaine en tant que confesseur pendant la guerre d'Indépendance. Le prêtre Isihie Donici du Monastère de Neamț, « offrait télégraphiquement ses services à l'armée »⁸⁴. Le Ministère demandait des références sur ce prêtre, aussi. Le 6 septembre 1877, l'archiprêtre de Neamț N. Conta, faisait connaître au Monastère de Neamț qu'il a donné « de bonnes références morales » sur le prêtre Isihie Donici. Le prieur du Monastère de Neamț l'archimandrite Timotei décidait : « On ferra connaître cela au prêtre Isihie »⁸⁵.

On a des informations sur un autre prêtre qui avait demandé au Ministère de Guerre d'être admis comme prêtre militaire. L'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe les demandait le 1-er septembre 1877. À cette occasion, on avançait une adresse au diocèse de Huși en demandant des références sur le prêtre Zaharie Nassie, qui avait terminé « Le Séminaire de ce diocèse ». Du rapport du l'archiprêtre de Tutova, on voit que ce prêtre activait dès 1872 à l'Eglise Saint Nicolas de la commune Murgeni, « plasa » Târgul, le département Tutova « n'ayant aucun cas qui l'empêche canoniquement de servir comme prêtre »⁸⁶. Dans le Doyenné de Turnu Măgurele, il y en a eu une demande semblable, venue par la poste du prêtre Teodor Vlădescu. Le 22 août 1877, l'archiprêtre envoyait un rapport vers le Ministère de Guerre sur « la conduite » de ce prêtre.⁸⁷

Après la fondation de l'Hôpital « Independența » de Craiova, l'évêque Atanasie de Râmnic ordonnait à l'archiprêtre de cette localité de ranger le prêtre Ștefan de l'Eglise le Saint Martyre Mina, « surnommé Petru Boj » s'occuper de l'assistance religieuse des blessés de cet hôpital militaire. En cas de nécessité, on pouvait solliciter d'autres prêtres aux églises des environs.⁸⁸

⁸² L'adresse du Ministère de Guerre ayant le no. 14061/18 septembre 1877 (*Ibidem*, f.50)

⁸³ Scarlat Porcescu, *op. cit.*, p.404

⁸⁴ D.J.A.N., Neamț, le Fond du Monastère de Neamț, dossier no.14/1877, f.5.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*, f.5. Le nom de ce moine paraît encore dans les archives du Monastère de Neamț à la fin de 1879, quand il s'adressait au prieur Timotei pour lui accorder « la subvention » due au IV-e trimestre de 1877 et au I-er trimestre de 1878 ; il avait été parti, pendant ce temps-là, sur le front bulgare. L'impression faite par ce prêtre était défavorable ; il était accusé de « tendance vaniteuse », parce que, dès ce temps-là, « il ne cessait pas d'incommoder le Gouvernement avec des demandes directes et indirectes pour lui accorder une décoration » (*Ibidem*, dossier no.16/1877-1903, f.48, 48v)

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*; en 1880, on rencontre un autre nom de prêtre, Dumitru Galerie, désigné par la Diocèse de Huși dans le poste de confesseur du Régiment 25 Dorobanți, voir *Ibidem* f.6r.-v.

⁸⁷ D.J.A.N. Teleorman, Fonds du Doyenné Turnu Măgurele, dossier no.484/1877, f.32.

⁸⁸ Nestor Vornicescu, *Contribuții aduse de slujitori bisericești pentru Independența de Stat a României, în anii 1877-1878* [Contributions apportées par les sujets ecclésiastiques pour l'Indépendance d'Etat de la Roumanie, dans les années 1877-1878], Editura Mitropoliei

Le même évêque offrait au Régiment 5 (Dorobanți) une « chasuble » de damas en soie, un « épitrachilion », une croix en cuivre jaune et un rituel.⁸⁹ Le 6 novembre 1877 le prélat de Râmnic s'adressait au prêtre de l'Eglise Madona Dudu de Craiova de mettre à sa disposition un « sticharion » et un « phélonion » pour douer les prêtres « qui partent au-delà du Danube au service de l'armée ».⁹⁰

Parallèlement au déclenchement des hostilités, les confesseurs militaires se sont déplacés, à côté des unités auxquelles ils appartenaient, sur les champs de bataille ainsi que, dans les hôpitaux pleins de blessés; personne ne s'occupait de l'assistance religieuse de ceux-ci. À l'initiative du commandant de la I-ère Division territoriale, le 13 septembre 1877, l'évêque Atanasie s'est adressé à l'archiprêtre de Gorj pour designer plusieurs prêtres des « les plus méritoires », pour offrir leurs services de confesseurs aux hôpitaux militaires créés dans son diocèse. C'était un service honorifique, « ceux qui y accomplissaient leur devoir, seront récompensés avec des rangs dans l'hierarchie ecclésiastique ». L'archiprêtre devait « surveiller strictement » leur activité, en rapportant au centre du diocèse les noms de ceux qui étaient désignés à recevoir les ordres de confirmation.⁹¹

Parmi les prêtres désignés à assister religieusement les blessés des hôpitaux militaires, on cite : Ion Mateescu à Ocelele Mari, Dumitru Ieromnimon à Drăgășani, Marin Stănescu, D. Ricman, Badea Constantinescu, Andrei Betar, N. Delcescu et V. Mihăescu à Caracal, Gheorghe Stănescu, Filip Giurescu, Gheorghe Ionescu à Turnu Severin, I. Ceculescu et Constantin Ionescu à Râmnicu Vâlcea.⁹² À côté de ceux-ci, ont activé encore le prêtre Doroftei Ghițulescu du Monastère Căldărușani à l'Hôpital Filantropia⁹³, ainsi que Constantin Stancu Târbănescu, missionnaire à l'Hôpital russe du village Mavrodin, tout près d'Alexandria.⁹⁴

Olteniei, Craiova, 1978, p.55; Gh.Rădulescu, *Correspondență între conducerea Eparhiei Râmnicului Noul Severin și „Comitetul Doamnelor Craiovene creat pentru ajutorarea ostașilor răniți” în 1877-1878* [Correspondance entre la Direction de l'Eparchie de Râmnic Noul Severin et le “Comité des Dames de Craiova créé pour aider les soldats blessés” en 1877-1878], dans „Mitropolia Olteniei”, l'an XXIX, no.4-6, avril-juin 1977, p.357-358.

⁸⁹ *MOF*, no.56/10-22 mars 1878, p.1588

⁹⁰ D.J.A.N. Dolj, Fonds de Tutelle de l'Eglise La Sainte Vierge – Dudu de Craiova, dossier no.54/1877, f.40v.

⁹¹ D.J.A.N. Gorj, Fonds du Doyenné Gorj, dossier no.105/1877-1878, f.25 r.v. et dossier no.169/1877-1879, f.26 v.

⁹² Nestor Vornicescu, *op.cit.*, p.55; Gheorghe Dumitrașcu, *Epopeea Independenței României în conștiința vâlcenilor 1877-1878* [L'Épopée de l'Indépendance Roumaine dans la conscience des habitants de Vâlcea 1877-1878], Editura Almarom, Râmnicu Vâlcea, 2003, p.217.

⁹³ Les archives de l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe de la Valachie, dossier no.1566/1877, f.197.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, f.211.

Un autre confesseur qui a activé dans les hôpitaux de Turnu Măgurele, a été le prêtre Nifon Miricescu, l'ancien chantre II à l'Eglise du Saint Monastère Tismana.⁹⁵ Le 30 mai, il démissionnait du poste de chantre au Monastère Tismana pour aller sur le front⁹⁶, et en juin il demandait la permission de se retirer « pour le reste de sa vie » au Couvent Lainici près de Târgu Jiu.⁹⁷

Pour ses grands mérites, il a été décoré par le prince régnant Carol I avec la médaille «Les Défenseurs de l'Indépendance»⁹⁸. Il y en a eu, aussi, des prêtres semblables qui ont assuré l'assistance religieuse dans les hôpitaux militaires, dans d'autres diocèses.

Le 27 octobre 1877, le Métropolitain de la Moldavie, Iosif Naniescu, ordonnait au doyen de Jassy de faire connaître aux prêtres des Eglises ayant pour patron le Saint Jean Chrysostome et le Saint Lazăr l'obligation de « soigner religieusement » les soldats repartis à l'Hôpital fondé par le Société de bienfaisance pour les soldats blessés.⁹⁹ Les prêtres de ces églises, Constantin et Mihail Constantinescu ont appris les ordres de la chiriarchie, en déclarant qu'ils respecteront « strictement les règles spirituelles à l'Hôpital fondé par l'honorable Société de bienfaisance ».¹⁰⁰

Le 23 décembre 1877, le vice-président Maria Catargiu signalait à l'archiprêtre que les prêtres ci-dessous n'avaient pas accompli leurs tâches, en sollicitant que le service religieux soit officié au moins deux fois par semaine avec «de l'eau bénie et dans la chapelle alternativement».¹⁰¹ Au diocèse de Buzău, on a signalé le cas du prêtre N. Economu, qui s'occupait de l'assistance religieuse à l'hôpital Gherman de la ville. Il a activé jusqu'au 7 février 1878, ayant une solde de 20 lei par mois.¹⁰²

Il y en a eu, aussi, des confesseurs militaires dans l'armée russe. Ceux-ci ont accompagné les unités militaires sur le front bulgare, en s'occupant de l'assistance religieuse des troupes. Il s'agit d'un certain prêtre Avramie attaché à l'Hôpital militaire russe d'Alexandria, en faveur duquel, le 8 juin 1877, intervenait l'inspecteur de l'hôpital Umanschi, pour avoir la permission de « préparer l'eucharistie » nécessaire à la communion des blessés et des malades « guéris » dans l'établissement ci-dessus.¹⁰³ D'autres confesseurs russes activaient, aussi, aux hôpitaux Pantelimon et Cotroceni de Bucarest. Pour que ces prêtres puissent officier certains services divins dans les églises situées auprès de ces hôpitaux, le 17/29 septembre 1877, le consul général de Russie à Bucarest s'est adressé à l'Eglise Métropolitaine Orthodoxe de

⁹⁵ D.J.A.N. Gorj, Fonds du Doyenné Gorj, dossier no.124/1879, f. 11, 11 v.

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, dossier no.169/1877-1879, f.18 v.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, dossier no.124/1879, f.11.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, f.11 v., 12.

⁹⁹ D.J.A.N. Jassy, Fonds du Doyenné Jassy, dossier no.2/1877, f.21.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, f.21 v., 22.

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*, f.28.

¹⁰² D.J.A.N. Buzău, Fonds la Mairie de Buzău, dossier no.2/1878, f.21.

¹⁰³ D.J.A.N. Teleorman, Fonds du Doyenné Turnu Măgurele, dossier no.478/1877, f.81-82.

l'Ungrovalahie; le Métropolitain en a été d'accord et a ordonné aux doyens d'Ilfov et de Plasa de Sus à accomplir le désir du haut dignitaire russe.¹⁰⁴

On a nommé des prêtres aptes à officier les services religieux pour les blessés et les malades d'autres confessions que celle orthodoxe. Il s'agit d'un prêtre luthérien et d'un autre catholique dont la collaboration était sollicitée par l'Hôpital militaire russe fondé dans « les Maisons Ghica » de Jassy.¹⁰⁵

Pour mieux comprendre la manière de déroulement de l'assistance religieuse parmi les soldats roumains à la veille de la guerre d'Indépendance, il faut préciser que, par un ordre de la part du prince régnant, on a fixé des jours de fête chrétienne pour chaque unité militaire de l'armée roumaine.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Les Archives de l'Église Métropolitaine Orthodoxe de la Valachie, dossier no.1566/1877, f.100-101.

¹⁰⁵ D.J.A.N. Jassy, Fonds de la Mairie de Jassy, dossier no. 112/1877, f.10-11 v.

¹⁰⁶ Ainsi, le patron de l'Artillerie a été désigné le Saint Ilie (*Memoriile Regelui Carol I al Romaniei: de un martor ocular* [Les Mémoires du Roi Carol I de la Roumanie: par un témoin oculaire], vol. III, édition soignée par Stelian Neagoe, Editura Scripta: Machiavelli, București, 1994, p.195), le patron du Régiment I Dorobanți était le Saint Jean Le Baptiseur, fêté le 7 janvier; le Régiment III Dorobanți avait pour patron spirituel le Saint Grégoire de Nazians (le 25 janvier); le Régiment II Dorobanți le Saint Jean le Baptiseur (le 7 janvier); le Régiment IV Dorobanți le Saints Archanges Mihail et Gavril; le Régiment V Dorobanți avait pour patron le Saint Antoine le Grand (le 17 janvier); le Régiment VI Dorobanți les Saints Mihail et Gavril; le Régiment VII Dorobanți avait pour patrons spirituels les Saints Petru et Pavel; le Régiment VIII Dorobanți, créé en 1868 avait pour patron le Saint Jean le Baptiseur; le Régiment I de Călărași Le Saint Martyre Victor (le 11 novembre); le Régiment II de Călărași le Saint Grand Martyre George (D.J.A.N. Vâlcea, Fonds de la Préfecture du département de Vâlcea, dossier no. 58/1877, f.20); le Régiment III (Călărași) la Sainte Pieuse Elisabeta (le 24 avril); le Régiment IV (Călărași) le Saint Grand Martyre Gheorghe; le Régiment V (Călărași) le Saint prélat Nicolas; le Régiment VI (Călărași) les Saints Archanges Mihail et Gavril; le Régiment VII (Călărași) le Saint prélat Nicolas; le Régiment VIII (Călărași) le Saint prélat Alexandre (le 30 août). Tous ces jours de fête chrétienne ont été fixés par le haut décret no.134/21 janvier 1875 – *MO*, no.3/5 février 1875, p.50-51; le Bataillon 2 Vânători, créé en 1866, avait pour patrons spirituels les Saints Constantin et Elena (le 21 mai) (Dumitru Stancu, *Contribuția Județului Dâmbovița la războiul pentru dobândirea Independenței de Stat a României 1877-1878* [La contribution du Département Dâmbovița à la guerre pour acquérir l'Indépendance d'Etat de la Roumanie 1877-1878], comprenant 18 cartes, esquisses et photos ayant une présentation faite par l'académicien professeur universitaire Dr Dinu C. Giurescu, Pucioasa, 2004, p.145); Le Régiment 2 Roșiori créé en 1869 à Focșani avait pour patron Saint George (*MO*, no.18/14 juillet 1875, p.479); le Bataillon 4 Vânători avait pour patrons les Saints Apôtres Petru et Pavel (le haut décret no.1597/16 novembre 1870). À voir *Ibidem*, no.22/1870, p.1-2), L'école militaire avait pour patronne la Sainte Varvara fêtée le 4 décembre (*Ibidem*, no.18/1870, p.678), et l'Ecole spéciale de cavalerie avait pour patron le Saint Grand Martyre Dimitrie (*Ibidem*, no.3/5 février 1875, p.50)

Ces jours-ci, on officiait certainement des messes et on prononçait des allocutions enthousiastes qui avaient pour but une mobilisation plus ferme des soldats pour la cause sainte du pays, une augmentation du moral des troupes et une consolidation du sentiment religieux d'appartenance à la communauté orthodoxe.

À côté des confesseurs, des personnes qui ont terminé de différentes écoles théologiques ont participé à la guerre d'Indépendance et ont eu une attitude exemplaire sur le front; celles-ci ont été récompensées avec des médailles à la fin des hostilités militaires. C'est le cas du roumain Vincențiu Grama (1852-1920), né à Râșnov, le fils de Nicolae et d'Ana Grama, qui a terminé l'Institut Théologique de Sibiu en 1875. Avec 14 jeunes de Făgăraș, il a traversé les montagnes la nuit de 2 vers 3 juin 1877 et s'est enrôlé dans l'armée roumaine, le Régiment 2 Infanterie. Pour ses exploits, il a reçu les décorations «Le Passage du Danube», «Les Défenseurs de l'Indépendance» et «La Médaille Commémorative de Campagne» russe.¹⁰⁷

Il a été, aussi, le chef d'orchestre du chœur organisé par quelques jeunes soldats du front bulgare. Arrivé dans le pays, il a été ordonné prêtre, activant dans la paroisse Râușor jusqu'à sa mort, survenue le 5 septembre 1920.¹⁰⁸ Un autre théologien qui a contribué à la victoire de la cause nationale a été l'étudiant en médecine Ion Niculescu qui a terminé le séminaire de Buzău. Celui-ci appartenait au groupe de 14 étudiants en médecine qui se sont offerts comme volontaires au service sanitaire de l'armée. Pour sa présence remarquable et pour son esprit chrétien qui émanaient de toutes ses activités, ses camarades le gâtaient de l'appellatif «Niculescu le Pope».¹⁰⁹

Un autre séminariste qui a lutté dans la guerre d'Indépendance a été Gheorghe Necșulescu de la commune Mozăceni du département d'Argeș. On l'a surnommé «Le Pope Gheorghe Militaire» ou «Notre Prêtre, le Vétéran»; après avoir terminé deux années du séminaire de quatre ans de Curtea d'Argeș, il a étudié à l'Ecole Militaire de Bucarest, ayant le grade de sergent. Dans cette qualité, il a fait partie du Régiment IV Dorobanți, participant aux luttes de Plevna, Smârdan et Vidin et «capturant même un drapeau ennemi». Pour ses exploits, il a été décoré avec six médailles¹¹⁰. À côté de

¹⁰⁷ Florian Tucă, Mircea Cociu, F.Chirea, *Bărbai ai datoriei 1877-1878. Mic dicționar* [Hommes du devoir 1877-1878. Petit dictionnaire], Editura militară, București, 1979, p.125-126.

¹⁰⁸ M. Păcurariu, *op.cit.*, p.608, Détails à idem, «Un voluntar transilvănean în războiul de independență: Vincențiu Grama» [Un volontaire transylvain dans la guerre d'indépendance: Vincențiu Grama] dans «Mitropolia Ardealului», l'an XXII, no.4-6/avril-juin 1977, p.337-358

¹⁰⁹ Gh.Sabin, *Amintiri din Războiul Independenței*, București, 1912, p.19-22.

¹¹⁰ Emilian Corniescu, «Mărtirii noi în legătură cu independența poporului român» [Nouveaux témoignages concernant l'indépendance du peuple roumain], dans *BOR*, an XCV, no.5-6/mai-juin 1977, p.509. Après la guerre il a continué ses études théologiques étant ordonné prêtre à l'âge de 28 ans, par l'évêque d'Argeș, Ghenadie Petrescu. Il est mort en 1947 à l'âge vénérable de 94 ans (ibidem, p.509-510). À voir des détails chez Scarlat Bădescu,

ceux-ci, dans les luttes des «champs bulgares», s'est fait remarqué, aussi, le 24 janvier 1877, le sous-lieutenant George Valentineanu; il a été nommé commandant du peloton 2, compagnie 8, bataillon 2 du Régiment 15 Dorobanți.¹¹¹ Il était fils de prêtre, né à Jassy en 1840. Il a été blessé le 6 septembre 1877, dans l'attaque de la redoute «Grivița 2» et il est mort à l'Hôpital Militaire de Turnu Măgurele, étant décoré post mortem avec «La Vertu Militaire» en or, «Le Passage du Danube» et «Les Défenseurs de l'Indépendance».

Comme on peut apercevoir, l'activité du « prêtre militaire » qui a débuté en 1850 et jusqu'en 1878 quand le conflit armé a pris fin, a été très fructueuse. Si au début, on a fait des progrès timides dans l'organisation et le fonctionnement de l'institution militaire ecclésiastique, avec le temps on a perfectionné et redressé la situation, tant de la part des prêtres orthodoxes, ainsi que des représentants du pouvoir d'Etat. On a créé ainsi le cadre législatif nécessaire au déroulement de l'assistance religieuse parmi les soldats roumains, et l'armée a été « douée » avec des prêtres correspondant à cette mission. Ce qui est sûr, c'est qu'à cette époque-là, on a enregistré une collaboration fructueuse entre l'Armée et l'Eglise; d'un côté les prélats et les supérieurs militaires de l'autre côté ont supervisé de près la manière d'officier le service religieux sur le front et dans les hôpitaux de tout le pays où l'on soignait les blessés et les malades de guerre. Voilà pourquoi dans l'article intitulé «Les obligations du prêtre dans l'armée», paru dans la publication «L'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine» de 1877, l'archimandrite Gavril Rașcanu précisait: «Pendant la guerre, les obligations du prêtre se multiplient; sa présence devient nécessaire partout et toujours: premièrement devant les soldats prêts à lutter, pour leur insuffler du courage et de l'espoir en Dieu; puis, au milieu des blessés pour leur montrer qu'ils ont accompli le devoir le plus important dans l'intérêt de leur patrie; ensuite, au milieu des morts pour «recommander» leurs âmes à Dieu; et enfin devant les soldats responsables des prisonniers pour leur montrer les devoirs du soldat chrétien vis-à-vis l'ennemi devenu prisonnier».¹¹²

Toutes ces tâches ont été accomplies par les prêtres militaires avec beaucoup de responsabilité ; en témoignent les nombreuses décorations reçues par ceux-ci de la part des autorités civiles à la fin de la guerre. Il y en a, sans doute, d'autres théologiens qui se sont impliqués activement contre les Turcs sur le front de Bulgarie dans les années 1877-1878. Les témoignages historiques insuffisants nous empêchent

«Amintiri despre participarea seminaristului Gh.Necșulescu, din Argeș, la războiul de independență» [Souvenirs sur la participation du séminariste Gh. Necșulescu, d'Argeș à la guerre d'indépendance] dans «Mitropolia Olteniei», an XXIX, no.4-6, avril-juin 1977, p.361-363; Dumitru Dobrescu, «Pe urmele veteranilor din 1877 (preotul Gheorghe Necșulescu din Mozăcenii de Argeș)» [Sur les traces des vétérans de 1877 (le prêtre Gheorghe Necșulescu de Mozăcenii d'Argeș)] dans «Glasul Bisericii», an XXXVI, 1977, no.5, p.343-346.

¹¹¹ Florian Tucă, *op.cit.* p.269.

¹¹² BOR, an IV, no.3/décembre 1877, p.173-180.

souvenir leurs faits au service de l'intérêt national. Mais en conclusion, ce qui reste c'est la grande victoire de la nation roumaine, qui, par le succès obtenu à côté de l'armée russe, a réussi à ouvrir la voie vers une société roumaine moderne et vers l'émancipation religieuse des chrétiens des Balkans.

НЕКОТОРЫЕ ДИСКУССИОННЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ ИСТОРИИ ВТОРОЙ МИРОВОЙ ВОЙНЫ

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Rezumat: Cauzele profunde ale celui de-al doilea război mondial au fost generate de consecințele conflagrației mondiale anterioare, încheiate în 1918. „Lumea nedreaptă” a devenit un motiv de nemulțumire, în principal, pentru Germania. După venirea la putere a guvernului condus de Hitler, Germania a fost, în mod vizibil, pregătită pentru reconsiderarea Tratatului de la Versailles, în special în privința aspectului militar. După ocuparea Cehoslovaciei, a urmat, la rând, Polonia. Totuși, Varșovia a reușit să semneze un acord cu Marea Britanie și Franța, în scopul obținerii unui ajutor în caz de agresiune din partea Germaniei. La rândul său, Hitler a propus guvernul sovietic să încheie un pact de neagresiune și să împartă Europa de Est. Având de ales între sistemul de securitate colectivă și tratatul cu Germania, Stalin a decis să negocieze cu Germania. Aceasta se întâmpla pe 19 august 1939. Trei zile mai târziu, ministrul german de Externe a semnat pactul de neagresiune; de fapt, era vorba despre Tratatul de la Moscova de la începutul celui de-al doilea război mondial, de asemenea cunoscut sub numele de Pactul Molotov-Ribbentrop. Pe 17 septembrie 1939, Uniunea Sovietică a intrat în război și a luat parte la ocuparea teritoriilor europene până în 1941, atunci când Hitler a atacat URSS.

Abstract: The root causes of World War II were generated from the consequences of the previous global conflagration that ended in 1918. The „unjust world” became a reason for discontent, mainly, on the part of Germany. After Hitler's government came to power, Germany was openly prepared for reconsideration of the Versailles Treaty, especially in terms of military status. Following the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Poland was next. However, Warsaw managed to sign an agreement with Great Britain and France in order to get help in the case of German aggression. Thus, Hitler proposed to the Soviet government to conclude a non-aggression pact and to divide the East Europe. Choosing from the system of collective security and the treaty with Germany, Stalin decided to negotiate with Germany. It happened on August 19, 1939. Three days later, German Foreign Minister signed the non-aggression pact; in fact, it was the Treaty of Moscow (also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) at the beginning of World War II. On September 17, 1939 the Soviet Union entered the War and took part in occupation of the European territories until 1941, when Hitler attacked the USSR.

Résumé: Les causes profondes de la seconde guerre mondiale ont été générées par les conséquences de la conflagration mondiale antérieure, finie en 1918. “Le monde injuste” est devenu le motif de mécontentement, en principal, pour l'Allemagne. Après l'avènement au pouvoir du gouvernement dirigé par Hitler, l'Allemagne a été de manière visible préparée pour la reconsidération du Traité de Versailles, spécialement en ce qui concerne l'aspect militaire. Après l'occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie, le tour de la Pologne est venu. Pourtant, la Varsovie a réussi à signer un accord avec la Grande Bretagne et la France, dans le but

d'obtenir d'aide en cas d'agression de la part de l'Allemagne. A son tour, Hitler a proposé au gouvernement soviétique la conclusion d'un pacte de non-agression et la division de l'Europe d'Est. Comme il pouvait choisir entre le système de sécurité collective et le traité avec l'Allemagne, Staline a décidé à négocier avec l'Allemagne. Cela se passait le 19 août 1939. Trois jours plus tard, le ministre allemand des Affaires Etrangères a signé le pacte de non-agression; en fait, il s'agissait du Traité de Moscou du début de la seconde guerre mondiale, connu aussi sous le nom du Pacte Molotov – Ribbentrop. Le 17 septembre 1939, l'Union Soviétique est entré en guerre et a pris partie à l'occupation de territoires européens jusqu'en 1941, lorsque Hitler a attaqué l'URSS.

Keywords: *Second World War, Germany, Poland, Soviet Union, Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement, totalitarianism, Nazism, Communism.*

1. Данная работа отвергает тезис о том, что Вторая мировая война началась якобы на Дальнем Востоке в 1937 году, а также идею о том, что была одна война с перерывом в 20 лет (Э. Хобсбаум). Когда мы говорим о Второй мировой войне, то под этим подразумеваем те события (военные, политические, экономические, дипломатические и др.), которые имели место в период с 1 сентября 1939 по 2 сентября 1945 гг., а также последствия этого глобального события.

Весной-летом 1939 г. гитлеровская Германия предъявила Польше территориальные претензии, которые Варшава не могла удовлетворить. Для военного разгрома Польши, Гитлер одобрил идею заключения с СССР Договора о ненападении. Первым шагом в этом направлении было подписание 19 августа 1939 г. в Берлине Торгового соглашения между СССР и Германией. В тот же день, в Москве, произошло событие, которое перевернуло ход истории: на заседании Политбюро ВКП (б) Иосиф Сталин принял решение поддержать Германию в её намерениях разгромить Польшу. Напомним: в это время в Москве проходили трёхсторонние советско-англо-французские переговоры касательно вопроса коллективной безопасности в случае агрессии в Европе. «Вопрос мира или войны, – сказал И. Сталин, – вступает в критическую для нас фазу. Если мы заключим договор о взаимопомощи с Францией и Великобританией, Германия откажется от Польши и станет искать *'modus vivendi'* с западными державами. Война будет предотвращена, но в дальнейшем события могут принять опасный характер для СССР. Если мы примем предложения Германии о заключении с ней Пакта о ненападении, она, конечно, нападёт на Польшу и вмешательство Франции и Англии в эту войну станет неизбежным. В этих условиях у нас будут много шансов остаться в стороне от конфликта и мы сможем надеяться на наше выгодное вступление в войну»¹. И. Сталин доказал, что он хорошо знал о принятом Англией и Францией решении оказать помощь Польше в случае германской агрессии при условии оказания Польшей военного сопротивления. Он выбрал путь «невмешательства в конфликт» и, как доказывает цитируемый документ, не отверг войну, а надеялся

¹ *Другая война. 1939-1945.* Под общ. ред. Ю. Н. Афанасьева, Москва, 1996, с. 73.

на «выгодное вступление» в этот международный конфликт. «Мы сделаем свой выбор, и он ясен, – продолжил И. Сталин. – Мы должны принять немецкие предложения и вежливо отослать обратно англо-французскую миссию. Первым преимуществом, которое мы извлечем, будет уничтожение Польши до самых подступов к Варшаве...»².

И. Сталин сообщил товарищам по Политбюро, что Германия предоставляет СССР полную свободу в Прибалтийском регионе и не возражает по поводу возвращения Бессарабии СССР. После короткого анализа видения им будущей войны, И. Сталин делает вывод: «Таким образом, наша задача заключается в том, чтобы Германия смогла вести войну как можно дольше, с целью, чтобы уставшие и до такой степени изнуренные Англия и Франция были бы не в состоянии разгромить советизированную Германию. Придерживаясь позиции нейтралитета и ожидая своего часа, СССР будет оказывать помощь нынешней Германии, снабжая её сырьём и продовольственными товарами. Но, само собой разумеется, наша помощь не должна превышать определенных размеров для того, чтобы не подрывать нашу экономику и не ослаблять мощь нашей армии»³.

И в конце, главное решение И. Сталина: «Товарищи! В интересах СССР - Родины трудящихся, чтобы война разразилась между Рейхом и капиталистическим англо-французским блоком. Нужно сделать всё, чтобы эта война длилась как можно дольше в целях изнурения двух сторон. Именно по этой причине мы должны согласиться на заключение пакта, предложенного Германией и работать над тем, чтобы эта война, объявленная однажды, продлилась максимальное количество времени...»⁴.

Имея перед собой перспективу выбора между предложением англичан и французов о создании системы коллективной безопасности в Европе и германским предложением о разделе сфер территориальных интересов, И. Сталин избрал путь соглашения с Гитлером. Это означало развязывание войны против Польши, войны, которая очень быстро превратилась бы в мировую. Цинично, И. Сталин предложил тактику оказания Германии той помощи (сырьё, продукты питания, горючее и т.д.), в которой она нуждалась. Всё это было решено с объявленной целью истощения воюющих сторон, после чего СССР должен был вступить в войну с целью советизации Европы. Тщательный анализ данной речи доказывает, что впоследствии советское руководство строго придерживалось линии изложенной И. Сталиным на вышеуказанном совещании.

Учитывая тезисы речи И. Сталина, а также практические действия руководства СССР (мобилизация резервистов и др.), некоторые историки считают, что Вторая мировая война началась именно в момент принятия Сталиным решения о поддержке гитлеровской Германии - 19 августа 1939 г.

² Там же.

³ Там же, с. 74.

⁴ Там же, с. 75.

2. 23 августа 1939 г. в Москву прибыл Министр иностранных дел Германии Йоахим фон Риббентроп и подписал вместе с В.М. Молотовым Договор о ненападении, а также секретный дополнительный Протокол. Советская историография категорически отрицала существование этого документа. Есть и сегодня некоторые историки, которые не признают Протокол. В связи с 70-летием подписания Пакта Молотова-Риббентропа Посольство Российской Федерации в Республике Молдова представила для просмотра фильм «Тайны Секретного протокола», в котором официально признан факт подписания Секретного протокола. При этом ничего не сказано о речи И. Сталина от 19 августа 1939 г., а также проводится мысль о том, что СССР был вынужден подписать указанный протокол, так как Польша представляла угрозу безопасности СССР.

Вместе с тем, некоторые авторы считают, что понятие «Пакт Молотова-Риббентропа» ошибочно, что нужно иначе назвать событие от 23 августа 1939 г. Так, Виктор Суворов утверждает, что «это название вводит в заблуждение и не отражает сути случившегося. Подписанный в Москве пакт - это сговор Гитлера и Сталина о ведении совместной агрессивной войны в Европе. Поэтому данный договор, по существу, был пактом Сталина-Гитлера»⁵. Ссылаясь на международную практику названия пактов и договоров, В. Суворов предлагает следующее: «в соответствии с общепринятыми дипломатическими нормами наиболее точное название пакта - Московский договор 1939 года о начале Второй мировой войны»⁶.

3. 1 сентября 1939 г. Германия напала на Польшу, а 3 сентября Великобритания и Франция объявили войну Германии, превратив её, таким образом, в мировую.

7 сентября И. Сталин провёл с председателем Исполкома Коминтерна Георгием Димитровым беседу, в которой участвовали В. Молотов и А. Жданов. Руководитель СССР сказал, что в начавшуюся в Европе войну ввязались две группы капиталистических стран с целью нового раздела мира и господства над миром. Он сказал, что СССР не против того, чтобы они хорошенько передрались между собой и истощили бы друг друга. По его мнению, хорошо, что руками Германии будет разрушено положение богатых капиталистических стран, в частности - Великобритании. Лично Гитлер, не осознавая и не желая этого, разрушает капиталистическую систему, заметил И. Сталин.

Говоря о Польше, Генеральный секретарь ВКП (б) заявил, что это фашистское государство, которое угнетает украинцев, белорусов и др., и что его уничтожение в современных условиях означает одним буржуазным фашистским государством меньше. Чего плохого в том, спросил И. Сталин, что в результате разгрома Польши социалистическая система распространится на новые территории и населения.

⁵ Виктор Суворов, *Святое дело. Вторая книга трилогии «Последняя республика»*, Москва, 2008, с. 136.

⁶ Там же.

Г. Димитрову были даны указания о подготовке тезисов Президиума Исполкома Коминтерна, которые указывали, что начавшаяся война это борьба капиталистических стран за их империалистические интересы, что для рабочего класса эта война ничего кроме несчастья не несёт⁷.

11 сентября 1939 г. руководство СССР создало два фронта - Белорусский (командующий - М. Ковалёв) и Украинский (командующий - С.К. Тимошенко).

В ночь с 16 на 17 сентября Сталин вызвал к себе посла Германии в СССР Ф. фон Шуленбурга. В присутствии В. Молотова и К. Ворошилова, он заявил, что в 6 часов утра советские войска перейдут границу с Польшей в районе Полоцк-Каменец-Подольский. Для предотвращения различных инцидентов, Сталин попросил немецкую сторону принять необходимые меры для того чтобы её авиация не переходила линию Белосток – Брест-Литовск – Львов.

В тоже время, Владимир Потёмкин, заместитель Комиссара Иностранных дел СССР, вызвал к себе посла Польши в Москве В. Гржибовского для вручения Ноты Советского правительства. Посол Польши отказался принять Ноту; она была вручена Посольству курьером. Таким образом, СССР вступил в войну 17 сентября 1939 г. В течении 12 боевых дней Красная Армия продвинулась на Запад на расстояние 250-350 км, заняв территорию площадью 190 000 км², с населением более 12 млн. человек. Поляки потеряли 3 500 военных и гражданских лиц, а также 20 000 человек были ранены или пропали без вести. По официальным данным, потери Красной армии составили 737 убитых и 1 862 раненых; в советский плен попало 240 000 человек.

Другим важным дискуссионным историографическим вопросом это нападение Германии на СССР, 22 июня 1941 г. и причины потерь Красной армии в 1941-1942 гг. Советская историография утверждала о вероломном нападении Германии на СССР, о внезапности нападения и военном превосходстве германской армии. Суть вопроса состоит в следующем: была ли эта война превентивной (т.е. вынужденной со стороны Германии) или агрессивной. Характер войны представляет собой один из спорных вопросов и в румынской (включая и историков Республики Молдова) историографии. Дискуссия румынских историков ведется вокруг дилеммы: не лучше ли было бы для Румынии оказать военное сопротивление еще в июне 1940 г., чем вступить в войну в июне 1941 г.?

Существует множество документов, доказывающих, что советское руководство прекрасно знало о готовящемся нападении Германии на СССР. Например, премьер министр Великобритании У. Черчилль, в секретном послании направленном И. Сталину, информировал советское руководство о том, что по имеющимся у англичан данным немецкое руководство концентрирует военные силы у границ с СССР. Было множество немецких перебежчиков, которые также утверждали о будущем наступлении Германии.

⁷ *Коминтерн и Вторая мировая война. Часть первая, до 22 июня 1941 года*, Москва, 1994, с. 11.

Очень важные сведения передал советский разведчик Рихард Зорге, работавший под прикрытием в Японии – союзницы Германии, сведения которые указывали точно время вступления Германии в войну против СССР и соблюдения нейтралитета Японией. Таким образом, советское руководство прекрасно было информировано по поводу начала наступления немцев против СССР. Вместе с этим, не было предпринято никаких мер для подготовки отпора.

В. Суворов высказал мнение по поводу трагических потерь Красной армии летом 1941 г. Он считает, что СССР был очень хорошо подготовлен к войне, но не к войне оборонительной, а наступательной. Веским аргументом этой концепции является наступательный план войны СССР против Германии, разработанный весной 1941 г.⁸ Российские историки пытаются найти и другие аргументы, которые объясняют правдиво, каковы были причины потерь в 1941 г. Одним из знаменитых историков - это Марк Солонин, который внёс значительный вклад в осмысление причин, приведших к известным потерям⁹.

Таким образом, в развязывании Второй мировой войны важную роль сыграл сталинский тоталитарный режим. Лично И. Сталин внимательно следил за развитием внешнеполитической обстановки в Европе, одоббив предложение Гитлера о подписании Договора о ненападении, чем способствовал развязыванию германо-польской войны. В соответствии с договорённостью, изложенной в Дополнительном секретном протоколе, 17 сентября 1939 года СССР начал военные действия против независимой Польши, вступив, таким образом, во Вторую мировую войну. Не прошло и двух лет, и Германия напала на СССР. По различным причинам, сталинский режим был не в состоянии оказать немцам должный отпор. Уверен, что в 2011 году, когда исполняются 70 лет со дня начала германо-советской войны, историки России, и не только России, еще раз проанализируют предпосылки, мотивы, ход событий и последствия этого немаловажного эпизода Второй мировой войны.

⁸ Ю.А. Горьков, *Готовил ли Сталин упреждающий удар против Гитлера в 1941 году?*, «Новая и новейшая история», 1993, № 3, с. 41 и сл.

⁹ См., например, Марк Солонин, *Фальшивая история Великой войны*, Москва, Яуза, Эксмо, 2008.

THE INVASION OF IRAN BY THE ALLIES DURING WORLD WAR II

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Rezumat: După ce Germania nazistă i-a atacat pe sovietici la începutul celui de-al doilea Război Mondial, Statele Unite, Marea Britanie și Uniunea Sovietică au luat parte la război de aceeași parte fiind numiți Aliații. Pentru a transporta ajutorul militar pentru Uniunea Sovietică prin Iran, Statele Unite și Marea Britanie au invadat Iranul împreună cu sovieticii și l-au detronat pe șahul Ahmad Reza, care nutrea simpatii pentru Germania. Semnând un tratat în 1942, se obligau să-și evacueze trupele din Iran la șase luni după terminarea războiului. Au publicat o declarație prin care se angajau să protejeze integritatea teritorială a Iranului și au repetat aceste decizii în timpul conferinței pe care au organizat-o la Tehran în 1943. Totuși, în ciuda acestor hotărâri, în Iran a apărut o rivalitate ascunsă între Uniunea Sovietică și Occident. Rivalitatea a devenit evidentă către sfârșitul războiului. Sovieticii nu se vor retrage din Iran. În plus, se vor strădui să împartă Iranul. După unii, criza iraniană din 1946 dintre Occident și sovietici a reprezentat începutul Războiului Rece. Iranul a fost afectat profund de acest proces.

Abstract: When the Nazi Germany attacked the Soviets at the beginning of World War II, the USA, the UK and the Soviet Union took part on the same side and were called the Allies. In order to convey the military aid to the Soviets through Iran, the USA and the UK invaded Iran with the Soviets and dethroned Ahmad Reza Shah, who felt sympathy for Germany. By signing a treaty in 1942, they pledged to evacuate their troops from Iran six months after the war ended. They published a declaration that they would protect Iran's territorial integrity as well as they repeated these decisions during the conference they made in Tehran in 1943. However; despite these decisions, a hidden rivalry began between the USSR and the West in Iran. The rivalry became very clear towards the end of the war. The Soviets wouldn't withdraw from Iran. Additionally, they endeavored to divide Iran. The Iran crisis of 1946 between the West and the Soviets formed the start of the Cold War according to some people. As a country, Iran was highly affected by this process.

Résumé: Lorsque les Nazis Allemands ont attaqué les Soviétiques au début de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, les Etats Unis de l'Amérique, le Royaume Uni et l'Union Soviétique se retrouvaient de la même partie de la barricade et étaient nommés les Alliés. Afin d'offrir d'aide militaire aux Soviétiques par Iran, Les Etats Unis de l'Amérique et le Royaume Uni ont envahi l'Iran avec les Soviétiques et ont détrôné Ahmad Reza Shah, qui sympathisait l'Allemagne. Tout en signant le traité en 1942, ils se sont engagés à évacuer leurs troupes d'Iran six mois après la fin de la guerre. Ils ont publié une déclaration par laquelle ils ont voulu protéger l'intégrité territoriale de l'Iran ; ils ont répété ces décisions pendant la conférence qu'ils ont organisée à Téhéran en 1943. En tout cas, malgré ces décisions, une rivalité cachée a commencé entre l'URSS et l'Ouest en Iran. La rivalité est devenue très claire

vers la fin de la guerre. Les Soviétiques ne voulaient plus se retirer de l'Iran. De plus, ils planifiaient à diviser l'Iran. La crise de l'Iran commençant de 1946 entre l'Ouest et les Soviétiques a représenté le début de la Guerre Froide selon quelques uns. En tant que pays, l'Iran a été extrêmement affecté par ce processus.

Keywords: *Iran, the Allies, the Tehran Conference, the Shah, the Cold War*

Introduction. Iran is a country which was exposed to intense foreign interventions in her many periods of history. In the 19th century, Iran attracts our attention as a rivalry area between the UK and Russia. Following the discovery of petroleum, Iran gained importance since the early 20th century and was divided into spheres of influence between the UK and Russia, and this situation lasted by the end of 1917. When the Bolshevik Revolution broke out in Russia, the Tsardom lost its influence over northern Iran. Although Britain tried to settle in Iran, she was forced to step back due to the opposition of the USA, France and the Soviet Union as well as Iranian people. Being the stage for an early cold war between the Soviets and Britain for a short time, Iran came to a standstill with Reza Khan's Coup as from 1921.

Reza Khan, who first became the minister of defense and then the prime minister, mostly ended the foreign interventions by making use of the rivalry between the Soviets and the British. Without opposing Britain, he followed a balanced foreign policy by signing the treaties of Amity, Neutrality and Non-aggression with the Soviet Union in 1921 and 1927 and gained an important stability in the country. In 1923, when the republic was announced in Turkey, the announcement of republic also in Iran was put on agenda. However, removing the Kacar Dynasty in 1925, Ahmad Reza preferred to be the shah rather than establishing the republic regime.¹ Endeavoring to form a strong central state, Reza Shah was supported by the Ulama (Moslem theologians and scholars) which had the most active influence on the country's policy. He implemented western reforms in the army, bureaucracy, justice and education. He tried to found a modern state by diminishing the influence of the feudal powers. In 1922, he tried regularizing the economy by appointing Dr. Arthur Millspaugh from the USA as Administrator-General of Finances of Iran². When implementing the reforms, he, on the other hand, had to conflict with the Ulama supporting him at the beginning. This process drove the Ulama to a secret illegality, making Reza Shah authoritarian.³ He became the only authority by closing down all political parties- firstly the Communist Party- as from 1927. Believing that the existence of political parties allows foreign countries to intervene in Iran easily, the

¹ Reza Ghods, *Iranian Nationalism and Reza Shah*, in "Middle Eastern Studies", 27, 1991, 1, p. 41.

² Hansen Bradley, *Learning to Tax. The Political Economy of the Opium Trade in Iran, 1921-1941*, in "The Journal of Economic History", 61, 2001, 1, p. 100-101.

³ H. E. Chehabi, *The Pahlavi Period*, in "Iranian Studies", 31, 1998, 3, p. 495.

Shah thought that the way to gain political independence in the international arena was to terminate the influence of the Ulama and political groups.⁴

Until being forced to abandon the administration in 1941, Reza Shah usually worked to keep a balanced foreign policy. Despite the treaties signed with the Soviets, Iran's relations with the Russians remained cold due to Soviets' supporting the communist activities in Iran. In 1933, an important tension took place between Iran and Britain about the percentage that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would pay Iran. Getting closer to the Soviets again against Britain, the Shah managed to extend the duration of "the nonaggression" pact. The Saadabad Pact signed between Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan in 1937 aimed at improving close friendship relationships with the neighbors and deactivating the potential interventions by the Britain and the USSR as well. However; believing that his country was exposed to the British and Soviet threats, Reza Shah felt sympathy for the Nazi Germany, the rival of these two countries. The dictatorship regime of the Shah facilitated this rapprochement.⁵ The Shah also felt close to the Italian fascism and the Japanese militarist system. Prior to World War II, he allowed a large number of German specialists and consultants to be in Iran. In 1939 he had Muhsin Jahansuz killed, claiming that Muhsin would organize an uprising against him. Before that, Reza Shah had accused Muhsin Jahansuz of collaborating with the Soviets although he was a right-winged and democratic person. The Shah's such act was interpreted as the sign of Germany's influence over Iran.⁶ Reza Shah paid back his sympathy for Germany by losing his throne.

Iran and World War II. Iran didn't participate in both world wars officially. She, on the other hand, suffered at least as much as the sides in World War I and II during both wars. It was because Iran was invaded by foreign countries in both World War I and World War II. When World War I broke out, southern Iran was under the British sphere of influence and northern Iran Russia. During the war, pro-German and pro-Ottoman movements and civil uprising exposed the country to a chaos.⁷ While Reza Shah had tendencies towards Germany on the eve Of World War II, it was certain that he had no idea about the fact that Ribbentrop, German Minister of the Exterior told Molotov, Russian Minister of the Exterior on August 24 1939 that Russia was free to attack Iran.⁸ However, on September 4, 1939, three days after the war commenced, Iran declared her neutrality officially. It is clear that this declaration

⁴ M. Reza Ghods, *Government and Society in Iran, 1926-34*, in "Middle Eastern Studies", 27, 1991, 2, p. 219-220, Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Iran's White Revolution: A Study in Political Development*, in "Middle East Studies", 5, 1974, 2, p. 127.

⁵ Justus D. Doenecke, *Iran's Role in Cold War Revisionism*, in "Iranian Studies", 5, 1972, 2, p. 104, John C. Campbell, *The Soviet Union and Middle East: In the General Direction of the Persian Gulf, Part I*, in "Russian Review", 29, 1970, 2, p. 147.

⁶ Stephanie Cronin, *The Politics of Radicalism Within the Iranian Army: The Jahansuz Group of 1939*, in "Iranian Studies", 32, 1999, 1, p. 15.

⁷ Ervand Abrahamian, *Factionalism in Iran: Political Groups in the 14th Parliament (1944-46)*, in "Middle Eastern Studies", 14, 1978, 1, p. 25.

⁸ John C. Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

was made to eliminate any potential attack on Iran by the belligerent states. Additionally, when the war was only in Europe then, the need to make such an immediate declaration strongly signifies that Iran's administration was expecting an intervention.

Despite the declaration of neutrality, Iran could not avoid the foreign invasion during World War II. In 1941, when Germany waged war against the Soviets and Japan against the USA, Iran gained a very strategic importance. Especially, Germany's attack on the Soviets put together a communist state and her ideological rivals- the USA and the UK- on the same side. When the war forced these states into an alliance, Iran became a key geography so that the alliance could run. Convening at Placentia Bay, Newfoundland in August 1941, US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill decided to provide the USSR with economic and military aid. Yet, there were big difficulties in conveying the aid to the Soviets.⁹ The reason for that was the security problem rather than the geographical barriers. The Soviet's Baltic gate was closed due to the German threat and the Far East gate, due to Japan. The Turkish straits and Iran were other alternative ways to establish a connection with the Russian geography. However, the utilization of the Turkish straits was not possible according to the terms that the Treaty of Montreux¹⁰ prescribed. So, there was no other way for the Allies to convey the aid to the Soviets but through Iran.

When the Allies decided to aid the Soviets through Iran, they saw Ahmed Reza Shah as a hindrance to them. It is because the Shah declared his neutrality and didn't want to make an attempt against Germany. Despite this, the Allies didn't take into consideration Iran's neutrality and independence and invaded Iran by force on August 26, 1941. The Soviet Army invaded northern Iran and the British Army and then the US Army southern Iran. Ahmad Reza Shah was obliged to leave his throne on behalf of his son.¹¹ Exiled to the Mauritius Islands by the British, the Shah died in South Africa, where he travelled in 1944. Reza Pahlavi, Ahmad Reza's successor, only 23 years old, was guided by the Allies as they wanted. Meanwhile, the Allies managed to base their invasion of Iran on the law. By signing a treaty with the new Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi on January 29, 1942, they agreed to totally evacuate their soldiers from Iran's territories in six months after the war ended.¹²

⁹ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, (1914-1995)*, Alkım Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, p. 382.

¹⁰ According to the 1936 Montreux Treaty; (Article 19) at a war that Turkey doesn't participate in the passage of the belligerent states' ships through the Turkish straits is forbidden. See, İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları (1920-1945)*, C. I, TTK Yayınları, Ankara, 1983, p. 497.

¹¹ Homa Omid, *Theocracy or Democracy? The Critics of 'Westoxification' and the Politics of Fundamentalism*, in "Third World Quarterly", 13, 1992, 4, p. 675-676, Ronald Ferrier, *Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946* by Louise L 'Estrange Fawcett, in "Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies", University of London, 58, 1995, 1, p. 160.

¹² Kuross A. Samii, *Truman against Stalin in Iran: A Tale of Three Messages*, in "Middle Eastern Studies", 23, 1987, 1, p. 97.

Due to the invasion, important changes happened in Iran's domestic and foreign policy. During the invasion, Iran seemed like Machiavelli's country. Forced by the Allies, the Shah appointed Foroughi, an experienced statesman and a philosopher, as Prime Minister. At the demand of the Allies, Iran waged war against Germany on September 9, 1943 and the same year, the 1942 Treaty was passed through the Iranian Parliament with an overwhelming majority (80 votes to 8).¹³ Immediately after the invasion, the Iranian Army of 124,000 soldiers was reduced to 65,000. But, it was increased to 80,000 soldiers due to the war waged against Germany.¹⁴ During the war a big famine broke out. Cereal products had been conveyed to the Soviets and the food was rationed due to the famine, which caused a civil commotion in Tehran in December 1942. During the commotion, led by the university students, on December 8, 150 shops were burnt, 20 persons were killed, 700 people were injured and 150 people were arrested.¹⁵ Many merchants who took advantage of the war, on the other hand, made a lot of profits from the black market and many rich people appeared after the war as in all wars. The Allies' invasion of Iran affected the social and political life in the country. Intimidated and forced to step back due to the dictatorship regime during the old Shah's administration, the groups became active again. The occupying states gave these groups the green light. Having left the Capital due to the Shah, many wealthy people returned to Tehran. The majority of those immigrating into Tehran were composed of the people coming from the Soviet occupation zone and most of them were the leading people of tribes. They immigrated because they were scared that the Soviets could both seize on and nationalize their property after the war.¹⁶ Making use of the existence of the UK and the USA in Iran, the wealthy were trying to have a right to say in the country's administration and so they were supporting the Allies. In order to prove that their dethroning the Shah was justified, the Allies were feeling sympathy for those who suffered the Shah's regime. Besides, the Supreme Court, guided by the Allies, opened a legal case for investigating the corruption of the Shah.¹⁷ However, the political parties came first among those most affected by the dethroned Shah.

In 1941, when Iran had been invaded, the political party activities which were suspended and forbidden during Ahmad Reza Shah were allowed again. It was a message sent to the political parties in Iran, meaning that Iran would change into democracy. It is apparent that the UK and the USA had influence on taking this decision and thus, they wanted to tolerate the potential opposition against themselves. Though, there is evidence that young Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi didn't have a positive look on it and defended that democracy could not exist in Iran. Averell Harriman, US representative of Tehran spoke with the Shah that the political parties

¹³ A. H. Hamzavi, *Iran and Tehran Conference*, "International Affairs", 20, 1944, 2, p. 195-198.

¹⁴ Ervand Abrahamian, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

¹⁵ Stephen L. McFarland, *Anatomy of Iran Political Crowd: The Tehran Bread Riot of December 1942*, in "International Journal of Middle East Studies", 17, 1985, 1, p. 51.

¹⁶ Helmut Richards, *America's Shah Shahanshah's Iran*, in "MERIP Reports", 40 1975, p. 3.

¹⁷ Ervand Abrahamian, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

and the parliament should be opened after the elections were made. The Shah expressed as follows: “Democracy in Iran is impossible. Iran is a little child. A hand is needed to watch her.”¹⁸ But, the Shah had no power to stand in the Allies’ way. Despite the Shah’s reluctance, political parties were allowed to open and it was the first time that Iran had been so close to constitutional monarchy. Although the activities of political parties were allowed at the end of 1941, the elections were able to be made in November 1943. The most organized parties were the Moderate Democrat Party and the Dowreh Party, appealing to the small-scale merchants. Additionally, the UK-supported National Will Party and the Soviet-supported Tudeh Party were other influential groups. Although some parties made an alliance, 86 deputies out of 136 composing the parliament had been elected by the top-level people. The majority group in the parliament defended the cooperation with the UK and the USA rather than the USSR¹⁹. However; when the marginal deputies in the 14th parliament in 1944 opposed it harshly, the Shah suggested delaying the parliament negotiations by the end of the war. When Bullard, the Britain Ambassador to Tehran, reacted to this, the Shah had to step back. In this period, the Tehran Conference, held during the wartime, was another important event affecting Iran’s domestic politics.

The Tehran Conference. The Tehran Conference at the end of 1943 was one of the most important conventions organized among the Allies. As from 1943, the US forces became involved in the war in northern Africa. A victory was achieved against Germany and in the same year the USSR won the Stalingrad War. These developments were important turning points in the course of the war. Meanwhile, we should repeat that the aid sent to the USSR by the UK and the USA through Iran helped to win the Stalingrad War. The railway route of 808 miles, spanning from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, was only allocated to the Soviets almost throughout the war.²⁰ When Italy collapsed and Germany began to withdraw, the Allies decided to make a series of conferences both to end the war and reshape the postwar world. This process first began in Casablanca and many conferences were organized in many countries and important decisions were taken until the Tehran Conference. But, Stalin, the Soviet leader, could not participate in any of these conferences. The Tehran Conference was a summit conference because Stalin participated in it.

Stalin insisted that the conference, called *Eureka* (meeting) by political circles, should be convened in Tehran and it so happened. It was the first time that Stalin had left the Soviet borders during this conference.²¹ Besides Stalin’s insistence, the most effective reason why the conference was held in Tehran was Iran’s invasion by the countries convening in the conference. Stalin was the first to come to Tehran to attend

¹⁸ Habib Ladjevardi, *The Origins of U.S. Support for an Autocratic Iran*, in “International Journal of Middle East Studies”, 15, 1983, 2, p. 227.

¹⁹ Kuross A. Samii, *op. cit.*, p. 86, Ervand Abrahamian, *op. cit.*, p. 29-35.

²⁰ A. H. Hamzavi, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

²¹ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih*, AÜSBF Yayınları, No: 541, Ankara, 1984, p. 428, Fahir Armaoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

the Conference. On Friday, September 26, the airplane carrying Stalin and the Soviet delegation arrived at Ghalermorgi (Bird Castle) airport. Stalin and Molotov, Soviet Minister of the Exterior, went straight to the Soviet Embassy. One day after Stalin, US President Roosevelt landed at the same airport and settled in the US Embassy. The UK Prime Minister Churchill arrived in Tehran at the same time as President Roosevelt but landed at the Amirabad Airport. One day after arriving in Tehran, the US President Roosevelt accepted Stalin's invitation and visited the Soviet Embassy. Coming to Iran the earliest, Stalin wanted to show that he thought of himself as the host. When Roosevelt found this convenient, the negotiations were mostly made at the Soviet Embassy and Churchill had to accept it.²² During the Tehran Conference, lasting for four days, the Allies took important decisions on the state of the war and the postwar state. However, we did not find necessary to mention them since they are not directly related to the subject. What is important in terms of our subject is the impact of the Tehran Conference on Iran.

First, we need to state that Iran didn't take any side in the Tehran Conference. She neither attended the Conference nor had any impact on the decisions taken. However, the outlooks of these three countries on Iran were important because all of them had invaded Iran by force and they were the countries trying to design the future's world. The Iranian administrators, aware of this state, saw the existence of the world's three leaders as an opportunity and made a great effort to host them very warmly. They were trying to cultivate their friendship by presenting extravagant gifts such as silken carpets to the world's leaders. The Allies, on the one hand, were trying to leave an impression that they would be stuck to the Conference of 1942 and they would evacuate Iran after the war and they, on the other hand, were laying the foundation for the utilization of Iranian petroleum. Hence, they made many negotiations with the Iranian administrators by taking advantage of the Conference. Although accompanied by Molotov, the Soviet Minister of the Exterior and high-ranking military officers, Stalin visited Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi in his palace. Moreover; Molotov with another delegation had long negotiations with the Shah, Prime Minister Soheily, Minister of the Exterior M. Sa'id and Minister of Justice M. Hüseyin Ala at the Soviet Embassy. USA President Roosevelt also had a long negotiation with Sa'id, Iran's Minister of the Exterior. And before Roosevelt left Iran, the Shah gave him a unique historical Isfahan carpet. Likewise, Churchill had another negotiation with the Shah at the library of the Soviet Embassy.²³

The representatives of the Allies in Tehran also made complimentary explanations about Iran. Depending on these explanations, the Iranian Press published several news about the Allies, giving great coverage of news and comments on the sympathy felt for the USA. Particularly, the Atlantic Speech was the source of this sympathy. However, the relations with the UK and USSR were cold due to the events lived in the past. Though, all of the three countries very clearly explained that they would support Iran for providing them with convenience and cooperation. First, the

²² A. H. Hamzavi, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

²³ A. H. Hamzavi, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

UK and the USSR pledged to give Iran seeds and food to remove famine. Additionally, the USA pledged to give Iran financial aid. But, what was the most important to Iran was the declaration made by the Allies. According to the declaration, all of the three countries would protect Iran's territorial integrity and would give Iran economic aid.²⁴ These oral explanations and the published declaration made Iran exceedingly optimistic about the postwar period. Though, unlike what was expected, Iran was face to face with a new frustration. Because the Tehran Conference was made at a time when the Allies felt that they would win the war. Thus, as the victory came closer, the disagreement between them began to appear slowly. Despite the warm atmosphere in Tehran, the things didn't go that way. Moreover, Iran was on the agenda in the first serious crisis breaking out between the Allies.

Iran towards the End of the War. In 1941, when Iran was invaded and Ahmad Reza Shah was dethroned, an important resistance did not happen because the removal of the Shah's despotic administration had shadowed the invasion of the country. The Shah's not allowing the political organizations had prevented the organized resistances from rising. Additionally, the treaty made with the Allies prescribed that they would withdraw from Iran and the developments lived during the Tehran Conference kept low the opposition towards the allies.²⁵ The invasion both offered the political party members new opportunities and encouraged the feudal squires towards the end of the war. Important developments happened among Ulama as well. The leading clergymen²⁶ whose role in politics was annulled in the middle of the 1930s were the group looking forward to the dethroning of the Shah. Likewise, the clergymen had heated quarrels and conflicts about Ayatollahship²⁷, beginning in 1936, and they ended it in order to be active in politics again. Ayatollah Burujirdi was chosen unanimously by the leading clergymen and he settled in the city of Qom in 1944.²⁸ In the last year of the war, there was an activity in all Iranian political groups.

²⁴ Gary R. Hess, *The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War*, in "Political Science Quarterly", 89, 1974, 1, p. 121.

²⁵ A lot of Iranian politicians were pleased with the dethronement of the Shah and thought of it as an opportunity to reach their goals. A few people criticized this and considered it to be an outside interference in Iran's internal affairs. Mohammad Mossadegh, whose name would be very popular ahead, came first among them. See, Andrew F. Westwood, *Politics of Distrust in Iran*, in "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", 358, 1965, p. 127.

²⁶ After becoming the Shah in 1925, Ahmad Reza Han began to restrict the increasing influence of the clergymen over the parliament. In the parliament which convened in 1935, no clergyman was allowed to have seats. He, on the other hand, made use of the conflicts by causing disagreements on the religious leadership. In 1936, when Hairi, the greatest leader, died, the leadership was divided into three. (Khawnsari, Hujjat ve Sadre), Majid Yazdi, *Patterns of Clerical Political Behavior in Postwar Iran, 1941-53*, in "Middle Eastern Studies", 26, 1990, 3, p. 285.

²⁷ The top religious authority.

²⁸ Majid Yazdi, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

Despite the economic problems which had been suffered due to the impact of the war since Iran's invasion by the Allies, there was a political stability in the country. Doubtless, the invasion had an impact on this stability as well. Early in 1945 it was almost certain that the Allies would win the war in Europe. Taking into consideration the fact that according to the Treaty of 1942, the Allies should withdraw from Iran, all political groups had already begun to calculate what they would do in the future. Except for acquiring the political administration in domestic politics, the political groups gave the most importance to the policy Iran would follow in foreign politics. Being the most active group in the country, the patriot democratic groups considered the USSR to be a threat and defended the USA. TUDEH, The Communist Party, along with some liberals and some neutral groups, considered the UK to be an enemy. Other than these, there were also some groups who defended keeping each one of these three states at an equal distance and following a balance policy.²⁹

The activity started by the political groups affected the situation of the governments as well. The activity of the groups resulted from the attitude of the governments, mostly from the prime ministers as well as the internal dynamics in those political groups. The petroleum negotiations made with the foreign country companies were the sensitive spot of all governments. In 1944, the negotiations made with some companies during the prime ministry of Sohely and then Sa'id caused very fierce criticisms. Especially, some bargains were made with the USA-originated Standard Oil, Standard Vacuum of the U.S., Sinclair Oil Company and the British-Dutch originated Royal Dutch Shell of Britain during Prime Minister Sa'id, which caused great reactions. Having to step back due to these reactions, Sa'id was forced to explain that the bargains made with all oil companies were halted by the end of the war.³⁰ All these developments showed that not only the Iranian political groups but also foreign countries were calculating what they would do about the Iran's postwar future. Both these internal reactions and the Allies' attitude had driven Iran to a fragile political process before the war came to an end. As from 1944, the governments could last no longer than a few months.

Following the resignation of Soheily, Sa'id founded the new government in March 1944. It was the first government of the parliament period opened after the elections. The active groups in the parliament approved of him. In addition to the Patriots and the Democrats, the leading individualists such as Mossadegh also supported him. Representing Iran in foreign countries for 12 years, Sa'id had a good command of foreign politics. However, he was called *persona non grata* by the USSR due to the negotiations carried out with the Western countries about petroleum. When the Soviets demanded a treaty on petroleum from him, Sa'id avoided it. Hence, the Soviets launched a campaign against Sa'id via TUDEH. According to the Soviets,

²⁹ Ervand Abrahamian, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

³⁰ TUDEH and anti-West groups' propagandas and actions were effective in the revelation of the secret negotiations carried out with the Western companies by the Government. See in detail, Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

Sa'id was a hidden fascist although seemingly neutral.³¹ Despite hindrances by the British, Sa'id had to resign in November due to the Soviet pressure. The next government after Sa'id wasn't able to be founded easily. The USA and the UK didn't approve of the pro-Soviet people, whereas the USSR didn't want to see a pro-West person as the prime minister. Although the Cold War is believed to have begun between the Soviets and the West after World War II, such interventions in the governments to be founded in Iran shows that in fact the Cold War had already begun in 1944, when World War II had not finished yet.

Following Sa'id's resignation, neutral nominees in the parliament were searched that both sides could accept. Although Mossadegh was thought of as a nominee for a while, he was given up since there were only a few deputies in the parliament, who could support him. After a search of two weeks, Bayat, who was believed to be neutral, was appointed as Prime Minister. Bayat was a member of People's Party of Iran, which was pro-monarchist. He was an experienced politician who became a deputy in all parliaments during the old Shah. Expected to run a neutral administration, he gained the support of all political parties and the Allies at the very beginning. Though, the property of his large family was in Kirmanshah occupied by the UK. So, he could not avoid being accused of being close to the UK. He attempted to found an investigation commission into the secret negotiations carried out with the Western companies during the Sa'id period. This caused him to be accused of being guided by the Soviets. When Sa'id came to power, Bullard, who was Tehran Ambassador of Britain, was complimenting him but after a short time he began to talk about him as "the dummiest man". Due to corruption accusations, the student demonstrations against him and his loss of the majority support in the parliament, in April 1945, he had to resign from his office, which he began in November 1944.³²

It was like an ordeal to found the government and run the administration in Iran in this period. The person who wanted to be the prime minister had to gain the support of the USA, the USSR and the UK, which were the occupiers in his own country, and had to take his actions without opposing their demands. On the other hand, in accordance with the constitution, the government to be founded had to receive vote of confidence in the parliament. However, there was disunity in the Iranian Parliament and no political party had enough seats to found the government, so all these caused the governments to last for a short time. Likewise, the new government could not be founded after Bayat's resignation. Nobody nominated by the groups in the parliament was able to gain the support of the other groups. After a long search in the parliament, they came to an agreement that Ibrahim Hakim al-Mulk, one of the former doctors in the Palace, would found the new government because he was considered to be unpoliticized. Although he was Azerbaijani, most of his friends were Farsi and southerner. Thus, he was expected to gain the support of both northern and southern Iran. The political parties and the Allies supported him half-heartedly. Seen

³¹ Ervand Abrahamian, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 43-45.

as harmless by every circle, Hakimi was quite old and had very weak relationships with the public. In more than one month he was able to complete his government affairs that he began at the end of April. But all his efforts failed. He couldn't receive vote of confidence from the liberal wing in the parliament because they thought that their deputies were not given enough support in the government and the Hakimi government came to an end without becoming official.³³

When the Hakimi Government didn't receive vote of confidence and collapsed, Sadr was appointed to found the new government. The Sadr Government received the vote of confidence from the parliament although it was difficult. When the Sadr Government began to take office, World War II had finished and the evacuation of Iran was being spoken about. In his government Sadr took over both prime ministry and ministry of the interior and appointed the pro-Shah people to the Department of War. This showed that he was thinking of holding all power in his hands after the foreign forces withdrew from Iran. Moreover, his appointing a pro-Britain person as Minister of the Exterior was the proof of whose man he was. Even the USA Ambassador felt uncomfortable about this situation and wanted him to be changed. Announcing the martial law, the Sadr Government took very harsh precautions against the anti-West groups and TUDEH and forbade 48 newspapers to publish. After that, the USSR launched a campaign against the Sadr Government and began to support the separatist movements in Azerbaijan and Mahabad. Believing that Sadr's running the government would cause Iran to disintegrate, a lot of deputies in the parliament no longer supported him, as a result of which Sadr had to resign from his office.³⁴

Following Sadr's resignation, all eyes focused on Hakimi again. Those who did not support him before considered him to be the way out of the crisis. With his neutrality, he was believed to establish balanced relationships with all political groups and foreign countries. Being Azerbaijani-originated, he was thought to prevent the separatist movement that had begun in Azerbaijan. As a Azerbaijani-originated person, his taking office as Prime Minister of Iran could reduce the participation in the movement. However, none of the expectations came true. Unlike what he was expected to do, Hakimi came back with a very radical program. Turkish language was announced as the foreign language and the close observation on the Press and TUDEH was resumed as well that began during the Sadr government. The reconciliation negotiations carried out against the separatist movements during the previous governments were cut off. These groups were announced as anarchist and terrorists and it was explained that no negotiations would be made with them. Implying that the developments in Iran resulted from a hidden Britain-USSR rivalry, Hakimi tried to keep both countries at a distance. His act was interpreted that he was guided by the USA. However, a balanced coalition was established between pro-Soviet, pro-Britain people and pro-Iran in the Hakimi Government. Because the separatist movements grew bigger, the BBC radio announced that Iran's internal problems would be handled in a meeting by a tripartite commission in February 1946.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 45-46.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 47.

This caused a big argument. Asserting that this would bring back the 1907 Nightmare, the leading political groups fiercely opposed the process.³⁵ On the other hand, Russia began to complain about Hakimi's constant anti-Soviet actions. After all these developments, a public opinion came out that Iran's territorial integrity was in danger. The leading politicians, particularly Mossadegh, began to say that the government should change in order to avoid this. In a parliament speech Mossadegh said as follows: "If we ourselves cannot solve the problems, the commission will do it as it wants. The solution to the problems is to negotiate with the USSR directly. Though, Hakimi cannot do this job. If Qavam is appointed as Prime Minister, he can carry out the negotiations with the USSR". Thus, he invited the Qavam Government openly.³⁶ When Mossadegh's idea was adopted by many people, the Hakimi Government had to resign from office on January 20, 1946 and as he prescribed, the new government was founded by Qavam.³⁷ Iran became confronted with many political crises during the the Qavam Government.

The Soviets' Attempts to Divide Iran. During WWII, the 1945-46 events are the beginning of the development which ended the cooperation between the USSR and the Western countries, changing the cooperation into a clash. After the Tehran Conference, both the development lived in the Iran's domestic policy and the activities of the USSR, the USA and Britain in Iran showed that the cooperation during the war would not go on after the war. The USSR had lived a competition with Britain on Iran and now she wanted to change this into an advantage after the war. According to the Soviet calculations, Britain, weakened in WWII, could not be as strong as in the past in Iran. However, the events lived towards the end of war showed that the USA had no intention to leave Iran to the USSR. However, the USA was not as experienced as the USSR in Iran. The Soviets were Iran's neighbor and had historical relations with her from the past. However, Sadr and Hakimi Governments' pro-Soviet acts showed that the relations between the USSR and Iran wouldn't be good after the war as well. Like the period after 1917, Iran regained a bilateral importance in terms of the USSR. First, Iran was a security gate for the Soviets, so the existence of anti-Soviet countries in Iran was unfavorable in terms of the USSR. Second, Iran was an important country of petroleum and the Soviets didn't want these petroleum wells to be under the control of anti-Soviet countries because it was risky.

Even if they did not say it openly, the Soviets had no intention to withdraw from Iran. Though, the 1942 Treaty was a hindrance for the Soviets to remain in Iran. The USA's and Britain's showing their compliance with the treaty by withdrawing their troops would show the Soviets' incompliance with the treaty. The withdrawal of

³⁵ In the year 1907 Iran was divided into three zones of influence by a decision taken between England and Russia. Northern Iran was Russia's zone and southern Iran was England's zone. The midlands were accepted as the neutral zone. See in detail. A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Anglo-Russian Relations through the Centuries*, in "Russian Review", 7, 1948, 2, p. 49-50.

³⁶ Ervand Abrahamian, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

³⁷ Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

the West and the presence of anti-Soviet governments in Iran could cause Iran to be totally lost. To hinder this, the Soviets decided to divide Iran. The ethnical structure of the country created an important opportunity for the Soviets to reach this goal. Since similar separatist movements were tried out after WWI, it was not difficult for the Soviets to play the same game again. Even if the Soviets' attempts didn't bring the expected result, they could hinder the Iran governments from opposing the Soviets and could show how decisive the Soviets were against the West in terms of Iran. Azerbaijan, Mahabad independence movements, and Gilan and Khuzestan commotions were the products of the Soviets' such policies.

At the end of WWII the most effective event that took place in Iran was the movement of Cafer Pisaveri, which is known as Iranian Azerbaijan and whose capital is Tabriz. Although Shiite in religion, the entire region which composed almost one third of the Iranian population, spoke Turkish. In the region where a lot of rebellion attempts were made, the Seyh Khyabani movement was the last event during WWI.³⁸ Guided by the USSR, Pisaveri declared his autonomy in Iranian Azerbaijan at the end of 1945. Almost all region population was Azerbaijani and similar attempts were seen in the past. The movement seemed ethnical on the surface; however, the regime declared there- communism- told the truth. Even if she couldn't control the whole Iran, the USSR could annex the northern region due to the communist administration. This would mean that the USSR could control the northern Iran petroleum.³⁹ However, necessary conditions were not available in Iranian Azerbaijan for a communist administration to be founded. This showed that the Soviets' main aim was to divide Iran rather than make the region communist.

Openly supported by the USSR, Cafer Pisaveri, who declared the independence of Azerbaijani Republic in Iran, had a colorful personality. Born in Tabriz, Pisaveri was quite active in the Iranian communist movement during his youth. In 1921 he immigrated to Baku, the Soviet Azerbaijan. Staying there for almost then years, Pisaveri was among the pioneers of the idea of Great Azerbaijan, which joined Iran's Azerbaijan and Soviet Azerbaijan. After returning to Tehran in 1930, he was arrested by the Ahmad Reza Shah administration. He was put in prison and kept there for 11 years. In 1941, when the Allied States invaded Iran and put Ahmad Reza in exile, Pisaveri was released by benefitting from the amnesty granted for political prisoner. Participating in TUDEH, Iran Communist Party, for a while, Pisaveri began to publish a newspaper entitled Azhir in 1943 and he had a difference of opinion with TUDEH about politics. Despite this, he half-heartedly supported the TUDEH nominees in the 1943 elections. Totally departing from TUDEH in 1945, Pisaveri

³⁸ Although a clergyman growing up in Tabriz Mosque, Seyh Khyabani was one of the top leaders of the Democrat Party working in Iranian Azerbaijan in 1919. Rebellng against the 1919 Anglo-Persian Treaty, he declared independence against the Tehran Administration in Tabriz and founded a government. The movement was similar to that of Cafer Pisaveri in 1946. Homa Katouzian, *The Campaign against the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919*, in "British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies", 25, 1998, 1, p. 36.

³⁹ Fred H. Lawson, *The Iranian Crisis of 1945-1946 and the Spiral Model of International Conflict*, in "International Journal of Middle East Studies", 21, 1989, 3, p. 316.

founded Firgah-i Dimokrat-i Azerbaijan Party and began to defend the disintegration of the region from Iran. Teaching in Turkish in the region's schools came first among the ideas of the Party.⁴⁰ The most important difference between these two communist movements was that TUDEH represented the whole Iran Communism, whereas Pisaveri was working for Azerbaijan region only. Ideologically, Pisaveri adopted Firgah-ı Dimukkrat Leninizm and Communism of Caucasian Model, whereas TUDEH defended European Marxism.⁴¹ This situation proves why the Pisaveri Movement was totally guided by the USSR.

Provoked by the USSR, another independence movement took place in Mahbad region, located in southwestern Iran. A Kurdish-originated communist leader, Muhammad Gazi declared an independent Kurdish Republic in the region immediately after Pisaveri. The Azerbaijan Republic, declared by Pisaveri, adopted a communist regime. Although the conditions were not sufficient, it was logical to some extent. Because Tabriz like Tehran was one of the most important centers of communist movements. However, Mahabad and most of the Kurdish living in the region had no idea about such a system. After all, the aim of the Soviets was not to adapt the revolution theory to Iran. Instead, based on these two ethnical problems, the USSR wanted to remain in Iran permanently and keep an important route under control to reach hot seas. The fact that Muhammad Gazi's Kurdish Republic and Pisaveri's Azerbaijan Republic immediately made an alliance treaty clearly shows that both of these separatist movements were the Soviets' plan.⁴² Via TUDEH, the Soviets also continued to cause commotions to take place in the other regions of Iran. In Gilan, where a Soviet Republic was declared in 1920, new actions against Iran Government started.⁴³ In Khuzestan, southern Iran, where the Arabs lived, the workers working at the petroleum facilities of the British Oil Company were provoked against the Iran Central Administration and the Western countries and pushed to general strikes.⁴⁴

The efforts of the Soviets to divide Iran gradually brought them towards a clash with the USA and Britain after the year 1945. The fact that the Soviets supported Azerbaijan and Kurdistan during their declaration of autonomy and independence was against the agreements signed among the Allies. Because, as mentioned before, with the declaration issued during the Tehran Conference, it was promised that territorial integrity of Iran would be protected. Thus, the act of the Soviets completely annulled this decision. Since the USA and Britain realized the attitude of the Soviets, they supported the Tehran Government in suppressing the efforts for independence, but the

⁴⁰ Ervand Abrahamian, *Communism and Communalism in Iran: The Tudah and the Firgah-i Dimokrat*, in "International Journal of Middle East Studies", 1, 1970, 4, p. 306-308.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 316.

⁴² George Lenczowski, *United States' Support for Iran's Independence and Integrity, 1945-1959*, in "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", 401, America and Middle East, 1972, p. 47.

⁴³ See, Janet Afary, *The Contentious Historiography of the Gilan Republic in Iran: A Critical Exploration*, in "Iranian Studies", 28, 1995, 1, p. 3-24.

⁴⁴ Fahir Armaoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 425.

entrance of Iranian forces into the areas where rebellions took place was blocked by Soviet soldiers. The most striking part of the event was that the efforts for autonomy and independence appeared in the areas in which Soviet soldiers were located. When Iranian Army Forces mobilized to intervene in the events in Azerbaijan and Mahabad, not only were they stopped by the Soviets but their ammunitions in military facilities were also seized. The Soviets also began to send new troops to Iran.⁴⁵ Following these, Iran applied to the USA and Britain for help against the acts of the Soviets. Although Iran's request was getting help from the USA and Britain in military terms against the Soviets, these countries and especially the USA wasn't very eager to do this. But they applied to the Soviets for them to allow the passage of Iran Army Troops into areas where clashes took place. The Soviets, informed these countries that they would only allow one battalion of Iranian Soldiers to pass from Tabriz to the Mahabad area. In spite of this, some of the Iran Army troops sent to the area were stopped by Soviet Soldiers on 19 November 1945 at the Kazvin region.⁴⁶

The fact that the USA and Britain withdrew their soldiers from Iran in compliance with the 1942 treaty and that the Soviets did not, gave rise to events in 1946 which are known as Iran Crisis. Many academic and politic establishments accept the beginning of the Cold War period as these events. Of course, it is not possible to conclude that the Cold War would not have taken place if these events had not happened, but it is a fact that they played an important role in its beginning. However, until the Blocs were established, the Cold War was a struggle between the USA and the USSR and this struggle began in Iran.

The Beginning of the Rivalry between the USA and the USSR in Iran. It is seen that the USA had established relation with Iran in the period before WWII. It is known that some American citizens worked in Iran as missionaries commence from the beginning of the WWII. The first official connection between Iran and America started with the Trade Agreement signed in 1856. While American teachers such as Baskerville who worked in Iran in the College of Tehran between the years 1885-1909 and Dr. Samuel Martin between 1898-1941 were performing their duty, they acted like voluntary ambassadors. While the country was under the pressure imposed by Britain and the Tsarist Russia an inclination towards the USA arose. The movement which started with the 1906 Constitution was supported by American representatives in Iran. However; Britain and Russia felt uncomfortable because of such kind of acts of America. Although W. Morgan Shuster (an American) was appointed by President Taft to organize financial activities in Iran in 1911, the harsh opposition from Britain and Russia caused America to refrain from this. Although it was stated that Shuster wasn't an official representative of the USA and that he would

⁴⁵ George Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

⁴⁶ Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 123-126.

work privately, Britain and Russia didn't accept this either and Shuster's duty was abolished in 1912.⁴⁷

During the Paris Peace Conference after WWI, Iran established close relations with the USA and strongly supported the Wilson Principles. The efforts of Britain to settle in Iran by itself and the 1919 Anglo-Iranian Agreement which would bring this into being was blocked by the open support of Americans to Iran. After the coup in 1921 which was performed by Ahmad Reza Khan, Britain and USSR had lost trust. America's return to an isolation policy gave rise to Iran's perception of America as a safe force. The USA was acting as a country which supported the modernization of Iran. Although some American Petroleum Companies carried out negotiations with Iran, they were rather careful in order not to go into a clash with Britain. The acts carried out in Tehran by America were only found dangerous by Ulama (men of religious). Nevertheless; when Ahmed Reza decreased the effect of Ulama, many American experts were benefitted from in the process of modernization. One of the most important of these experts was Dr. Arthur Milspaugh who organized the economical and financial system of Iran between the years 1922-1927.⁴⁸ This cooperation continued until the end of the 1930's. However, after 1937 when Ahmad Reza started to cooperate more with Germany this caused relations to lose momentum. With the beginning of the WWII a new period started in the relations between USA and Iran.

In 1941, the USA sent soldiers to Iran for the first time to help the USSR. The USSR was not in a position to calculate that this would cause some kind of competition in the future because of the dense pressure Germany applied to it. However; after the beginning of 1943, the change in the course of the war caused both the USA and USSR to make plans on Iran about its future. This hidden rivalry which also included Britain continued until the end of the war. But it mainly continued between the USA and USSR. According to the USSR, since Britain would lose its power, its influence on Iran would also decrease and if America returned to its isolationist policy they would be left alone in the Iran matter. But the activities of America in Iran showed that the result wouldn't be as Soviets expected. During the WWII, America was the one that established the closest relations with Iran among the Allies. That Iran's past with Britain and USSR was not very trustworthy caused Iran to create easier links with America. America tried to seize every opportunity to establish close relations with Iran and while doing so America tried to convince Iran that it wasn't imperialist country. The young Iranian leader Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and the Iranian governments moved in accordance with America. Humanitarian aid given and care shown to Iranians raised American prestige in Iran. With an agreement signed in 1943 it was decided that American officers would work in Iranian Army as trainers. Many American officers, one of the most important whom is Norman

⁴⁷ Kamyar Ghaneabassiri, *U.S. Foreign Policy and Persia, 1856-1921*, in "Iranian Studies", 35, 2002, 1, p. 149-155.

⁴⁸ Chris Paine, Erica Schoenberger, *Iranian Nationalism and the Great Powers: 1872-1954*, in "MERIP Reports, Middle East Research and Information Project", 37, 1975, p. 14.

Schwarzkopf, trained Iran Army troops.⁴⁹ On the other hand, Arthur Millspaugh, who had worked in Iran before, became the mere official who would handle Iran's economy and financial system with the approval of the Iran Parliament on 29 January 1943. General Greely who was in charge of American troops in Iran and the Tehran Ambassador Dreyfus, worked in coordination with Schwarzkopf and Millspaugh in order to reorganize Iran.⁵⁰

The USSR followed America's activities. Even Britain clearly stated that it wasn't pleased with this situation. In addition, American activities weren't welcomed by the Iranian press and they were criticized harshly. The main point of criticism was the closeness of the Shah and governments to the USA and the activities of Millspaugh.⁵¹ Millspaugh's proposal of a 20 yearly plan to improve the economy of Iran was perceived by the USSR as America's plan to establish strong bonds with Iran and to carry on with them after the war. Therefore, the USSR didn't allow Millspaugh to interfere into areas under their occupation and this caused disagreements with the USA and Iran.⁵² The competition between the USA and USSR became denser after 1944. The reason for this was the negotiations that American Petroleum Companies started with the Iran Government. That some English Companies joined these negotiations made Russia feel left out. The USSR felt unease because western petroleum companies asked for some privileges for the Iranian petrol in the north of Iran. The USA wanted the USSR to attend these negotiations in spite of Britain's opposition but this attempt ended to be fruitless. As soon as Sergei I. Kavtaradze who was the foreign representative of USSR and his board joined the negotiations he wanted privileges related to the North Iranian petroleum to be given to the USSR Iran rejected this offer and wanted negotiations to be put off until after the war and this made the USSR to believe that this decision was taken under the effect of the USA. The USSR showed such a reaction to American activities in Iran that Millspaugh had to resign in February 1945.⁵³

In the last year of the WWII, the rivalry became even denser and started to change direction. The attempts of the USSR to divide Iran were a reflection of this competition. The hidden competition became apparent in 1945. One reason for this was that the war in Europe had completely ended. Since the Germany factor which caused the allies to come together no longer existed, their dependence on each other also decreased. With the effect of this, relations turned from cooperation into conflict. Another and maybe more important factor was that administration both in Britain and America had changed hands. Upon the death of the American president Roosevelt in April 1945, Harry Truman became president. It is believed that Roosevelt was lenient

⁴⁹ Habib Ladjevardi, *op. cit.*, p. 229, Chris Paine, Erica Schoenberger, *op. cit.*, p. 16-17.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

⁵¹ Camron Michael Amin, *Selling and Saving "Mother Iran": Gender and the Iranian Press in 1940s*, in "International Journal of Middle East Studies", 33, 2001, 3, p. 337-338.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 337.

⁵³ Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 119-121.

towards the USSR.⁵⁴ It isn't easy to answer the question as to whether Roosevelt would continue with his lenient attitude towards Russia if he had lived. It also isn't difficult to predict that no American President would turn a blind eye to Soviet activities in Russia after his death. It is certain that with Truman the competition between the USA and USSR turned into a clash. Long after he started his duty Roosevelt had sent a letter to the Foreign Minister Byrnes stating that he was fed up with the childish attitude Russia was showing in Iran.⁵⁵ After the elections held in the summer of 1945 in Britain Atlee had replaced Churchill as Prime Minister and Bevin had replaced Eden as Foreign Secretary. Although Churchill and his Conservative Party had an allergy towards Russia, Atlee who was a member of the Labour Party was more flexible.⁵⁶ That Britain was tired after the war and this change of administration had put the USA in front position against the USSR in Iran. Despite this, the USSR had no intention to step back in Iran. In 1946, the USSR showed that it had no intention to withdraw from Iran, and this caused relations between the USA and USSR to head towards a dead end.

The 1946 Crises and Beginning of the Cold War. WWII ended after the Japanese surrendered on 2 September 1945. According to this, the withdrawal of the allies from Iran due to the 1942 Agreement had to start, too. Since the duration of withdrawal was stated as 6 months, all foreign soldiers had to leave Iran by 2 March 1946. But because the USSR didn't comply with this rule caused a crisis between them and the USA, Britain and Iran and according to many diplomacy historians this marked the beginning of the Cold War. Although the crises took place in 1946, that Iran wouldn't withdraw from Iran without any hindrance could be understood from their previous attitude. The Iranian administration which had doubts about this, applied to the USA to learn their real intention. Before the Yalta Conference which would be held in February 1945, Muhammad Shayesteh who was the second Ambassador to the USA wanted America to remind the withdrawal rule to the USSR, but when the USSR said that this item wasn't on its agenda, the USA and Britain didn't show any opposition.⁵⁷ Not wanting an immediate clash with the USSR and that the war was going on was effective in their decision.⁵⁸ The attitude of the USSR was the first indication showing that they weren't planning to withdraw from Iran.

When the Potsdam Conference was held in July 1945 the war in Europe had completely ended. The matter of withdrawal had been put on the agenda with the insistence of the USA and Britain and in spite of the reluctance of the USSR it was decided to withdraw from Iran immediately. Upon this decision, the new American President Truman, announced that the remaining 5000 American soldiers in Iran

⁵⁴ Concerning the foreign policy disparity on Iran between Roosevelt and Truman, see, Kuross A. Samii, *op. cit.*, p. 95-107.

⁵⁵ George Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁵⁶ Mehmet Gönlübol vd., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Siyasal Kitabevi, 9. Baskı, Ankara, 1996, p. 195.

⁵⁷ Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

⁵⁸ Fahir Armaoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 402.

would withdraw from Iran within 60 days.⁵⁹ It is understood that this timetable was created to force the USSR to withdraw, too. But although Britain also made similar explanations, this fell on deaf ears on the USSR side. However; the USSR understood that neither America nor Britain would turn a blind eye to their occupation of Iran after the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. Therefore the USSR tried to create an alibi to stay in Iran. The aforementioned attempts to divide Iran were a result of this. The Soviets wanted to extend their time in Iran under the cover of the Azerbaijan and Mahabad uprisings. Even though the new Foreign Secretary of Britain, Bevin, proposed to deal with the withdrawal issue in a conference, the Soviets didn't show much interest in this.⁶⁰ Although the USSR didn't want to join any conference which included the matter of withdrawal from Iran, the Iran crisis was the most important item in the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference held in November 1945.

During the Moscow Conference, when the American Foreign Minister Byrnes brought the subject of withdrawal from Iran to the table by reminding the 1942 agreement and the Potsdam Conference decision, Foreign Minister Molotov strictly opposed him. Molotov stated that the 1921 Soviet-Iran Agreement gave them this right and showed the complications in the north of Iran as a reason. He said that the Soviet had to stay in Iran for the safety of Azerbaijan's petroleum.⁶¹ After this Byrnes said that Iran would take the matter to the United Nations and tried to force the USSR, but this didn't change the idea of the Soviets and they showed how determined they were. During the conference Molotov stated that western countries were located in many countries and that he couldn't understand why they were against Soviet soldiers in Iran.⁶² Even though Byrnes stated that he wanted to see Stalin regarding the subject, nothing changed on the Russian side.⁶³ The Moscow Conference ended in despair. There had been many disputes between the USSR and the West in many conferences and meetings, but they had always tried to be settled in others. Within this scope, it can be said that the Moscow Conference ended the alliance between the USA and USSR and started a period of clash.

⁵⁹ Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

⁶⁰ England had the privilege to use Iranian petroleum via the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The presence of the Soviets in Iran meant that this privilege would be lost. So, England was concerned about the Soviets' holding her troops in Iran and even she criticized the USA for acting softly against the USSR. See, George Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 48, Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁶¹ Kuross A. Samii, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁶² Justus D. Doenecke, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

⁶³ Like Molotov, Minister of the Exterior, Stalin repeated the Soviet claims at the meeting too. Since Baku petroleum was close to the Iranian border, he drew attention to the dangers that could come from Iran. He said that the danger of fascism hadn't been over and according to the 1942 Treaty the Soviets had the right to hold her troops in Iran until March 15, 1946 and the duration hadn't expired yet. Although there was no danger of fascism at the date when the meeting was held, it is apparent that using this expression, Stalin meant to say the USA and England as the danger. Likewise, after a while, Stalin said in a speech he delivered that the future wars would take place between Communism and Capitalism. Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 133, Kuross A. Samii, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

That the conference did not produce any solution, created concern both in Iran and in Western countries. The insistence of the USSR is not withdrawing from Iran arouse from the fact that English and American soldiers had withdrawn.⁶⁴ The Soviets didn't believe that Britain and America would bring their soldiers back to Iran and go to war against them. The USA did not have any intention of going so further, too. In this case, the only thing left to do was to take the case to the UN. But since the time was not due yet, when Iran applied to the UN on 19 January 1946, they complained that the USSR provoked the Azerbaijan and Mahabad uprisings and interfered in their domestic problems. The UN representative of the USSR, Vyshinsky, refused the claims by stating that they did not interfere in Iran's internal affairs and they used the right that the 1921 Agreement gave to them.⁶⁵ When Iran brought the subject to the UN, the situation in Azerbaijan, Mahabad, Gilan and Khuzestan had deteriorated. The USA didn't want the newly established UN to be unsuccessful in such a sensitive subject. Since the Iran Parliament and especially the Shah realized this, they decided to settle the dispute by negotiating with the USSR, but it wasn't possible for the Hakimi Government which the USSR announced as an enemy to succeed this. Therefore, upon the request of the Shah, Hakimi resigned from prime ministry and Ahmad Qavam who was closer to the Soviets took office. Everybody believed that Qavam could solve Iran's problems with his experience. When he took office, the term of the fourteenth Iran Parliament was about to expire.⁶⁶

There were many problems waiting to be solved ahead of Gavam such as the withdrawal of the Soviets from Iran, the Azerbaijan, Mahabad and Gilan uprisings

⁶⁴ The USA troops had withdrawn totally from Iran before the Moscow Conference was held. There were small troops at the Persian Bay. All logistical materials were given to the UN team delivering aid to China. Though, the trucks, weapons and similar military materials that remained from the USA military troops were given to the Iranian Army on December 26, 1945. Fred H. Lawson, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

⁶⁵ Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

⁶⁶ Qavam was one of the most experienced politicians in Iran. When appointed as Prime Minister in 1946, he was almost 70 years old. In 1909 he lived his first political experience as Deputy Minister of the Interior. He was appointed as Prime Minister when Reza Han became the Minister of Defence with a coup. In the same government Mossadegh was the Minister of Finance. Claimed to plan a coup against Reza Han, who became Prime Minister instead of him in 1923, Qavam was arrested and all his property was seized. After being kept in prison for a while, he was released and he abandoned politics. In the year 1942, when the Allies signed a treaty with Iran, he was appointed as Prime Minister instead of Foroughi. Habib Ladjevardi, *op. cit.*, p. 231. What made him distinguished in this period were both his experience and his tendency towards the Soviets. However, there is no common opinion about whose man Qavam was indeed. According to the Shah, he is the man of the Soviets as much as he could take Iran to Communism. The Soviets, on the other hand, claimed that he was an Anglo-American flatterer. According to the British, Qavam is an old and experienced duck which can successfully swim in stormy seas. "Sly old bird". To some people, Qavam is a puzzle and to some, he is none of the above-mentioned and instead, he is a statesman who tried to protect his state's interests. See, Kuross A. Samii, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

and breaking the effect of TUDEH. It had just been a month since he had taken office when on 19 February 1946 he went to Moscow to negotiate with the Soviets and stayed there as long as three weeks. Within this period he met Stalin twice and Molotov four times.⁶⁷ When he returned to Iran he negotiated with Pishaveri about the Azerbaijan problem and the Western countries perceived this as a directive from Moscow. He added three TUDEH members as Ministers into his cabinet and this gave rise to criticisms that he was settling in the USSR's orbit, but the fact that he established his own party under the name of the Iran Democrat Party was also an indicator showing that he wanted to make TUDEH lose power.

It is understood that Qavam made some promises during his visit to the USSR in exchange for them to give up their plan of dividing Iran. During the visit, the USSR and Iran arrived at an agreement to sign an aviation agreement. After the visit the details of the agreement were negotiated. According to the agreement reached by the USSR Minister of transportation, General Firuz and the Iran minister of finance with the assistance of the leader of TUDEH, the technical maintenance of all Iranian planes would be handled by the USSR. That the USSR wanted a share from Northern Iran Petroleum was also brought forward.⁶⁸ Iran, under the management of Qavam, was getting closer to the USSR to solve its problems and stay away from division. According to Britain and the USA, a possible Soviet hegemony in Iran was not a far possibility. The Shah and Qavam's rivals were uncomfortable, but so far no agreement had been signed with the USSR. While these developments were taking place, the time of withdrawal for the USSR had expired. The Soviets not only did not withdraw but also did not state any date concerning when they would. It is seen that the Soviets acted this way to see the precise attitude of the USA regarding Iran.

The USA started to show this attitude after the time of the agreement expired. According to the 1942 agreement, the Soviets had to withdraw from Iran until 2 March 1946. Until this date the USA tried to persuade the USSR to withdraw. But when they saw that the Soviets had no intention to withdraw, they became harsher. Three days after this date, President Truman sent a warning message to Stalin with the Foreign Minister Byrnes. Stalin did not answer this message so on March 8 another message asking why the first wasn't answered and inviting the Soviets to withdraw as soon as possible was sent. The Soviets did not give a written response but restated their ideas orally.⁶⁹ The USA did not have many options about sanctions to force the Soviets to withdraw. Upon the request of Huseyin Ala who was the new Iranian ambassador to Washington, the USA decided to deal with the matter in the Security Council meeting which would be held on 25 March. This was something the Soviets were not expecting, so they wanted the meeting to be postponed to 10 April, but this was not accepted. News stating that the Soviets would withdraw within 5-6 weeks was published in the Izvestiya newspaper.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

⁶⁸ Habib Ladjevardi, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

⁶⁹ Kuross A. Samii, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

⁷⁰ Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

The UN Security Council was dealing with such an important issue on 25 March 1946 for the first time after its establishment. No matter what decision it reached, it would take its place in history and define the course of international relations from then on. The subject gave rise to heated arguments between the Soviets and other members in the council. However, the Soviets were alone and after a vote of 9 to 2, it was decided that the Soviets withdraw from Iran. After the voting, the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko left the meeting angrily. Of course the Soviets vetoed this decision and this was the first veto attempt in the history of the Security Council.⁷¹ This attempt was also a big disappointment for the hopes of peace after the most destructive war in the world. However, the decision was not a surprise for the Soviets and they were prepared for it. The agreement the USSR signed with Iran on the day of the decision created a huge impact. According to the agreement signed by Qavam and the Soviet ambassador, the USSR would have a 51% share of the petroleum in Northern Iran in exchange for withdrawal from Iran. The agreement also contained a condition which was that the Soviets would establish joint petroleum companies with Iran and accept the uprisings as Iran's internal problem. The date of withdrawal was noted as 6 May. The most striking characteristic of the agreement was that it would be put into force after the approval of the Iranian Parliament.⁷²

The Soviets were in a more advantageous situation after the Qavam-Sadikov agreement in the USA-USSR competition. Believing that they took what they wanted with this agreement, the Soviets started to withdraw their soldiers from Iran at the end of May 1946. Iranian soldiers easily dealt with the Tabriz and Mahabad uprisings after the Soviets stopped supporting these areas and took the situation under control. The USA was following the developments carefully. After the Soviet-Iran Agreement, the Tehran Ambassador Morris was replaced with Allen V. and this caused an activation in the USA's Iran policy.⁷³ The only hope of the USA and Britain was for the Iranian Parliament to refuse this agreement. But since the term of the Iranian Parliament (XIV) had expired, the newly elected Parliament(XV) would approve the agreement. The new Parliament wasn't able to come together effectively until 1947. The USA took action within this time. When the Qavam-Sadikov Agreement came to the parliament for approval, the famous declaration which would affect the polling was declared by America.⁷⁴ The declaration stated that in case there was any intervention by the USSR to Iran because they rejected the petroleum agreement, America would protect the unity of the country. With the effect of this

⁷¹ Kuross A. Samii, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

⁷² Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁷³ Concerning why the USA didn't give importance to Iran in this period, for detailed information see, Richard W. Cottam, The United States, Iran and the Cold War, in "Iranian Studies", 3, 1970, 1, p. 2-22.

⁷⁴ For the text of the USA's support declaration to the Iranian Parliament, see, Gary R. Hess, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

declaration the Iranian Parliament rejected the agreement.⁷⁵ This meant that the competition in Iran was lost by the Soviets, in other words, the Westerners had won in Iran where the first round of the Cold War took place.

Conclusion. Since Iran was occupied by the Allies in 1941, the events which have taken place due to Iran have affected the course of political history significantly. The aid which reached the USSR via Iran and by occupying Iran both made the Soviet resistance against Germany more decisive and played an important role in winning the war. Military aid delivered to the USSR via Iran changed the balance of the war. The occupation also prevented a possible German invasion and the chance to use the petroleum of this country during the war. However, it should not be forgotten that Iran was a neutral country when it was invaded. Iran which faced many the interventions during its history came across the most organized one during WWII.

The occupation also effected the internal political developments of Iran. Iran turned into a democratic management system when Ahmad Reza Shah was taken from office and his son Muhammad Reza replaced him. It is not possible to justify the occupation in any way. However; with this occupation both countries with totalitarian managements were defeated in battlefield and the despotic regime in this country was ended. After the occupation, the activities of political parties started and the Parliament reopened with the effect of Britain and the USA. By giving the public the right of self management, they tried to prevent possible objections to the occupation. Giving permission to TUDEH activities, created a situation in favor of the USSR. The Ulama class had lost power during the Reza Shah period also regained power. However, democracy which came hand in hand with the occupation was never practiced as it deserved to be. Democracy in Iran was always under the management of those who brought it.

One of the most important outcomes of the occupation was that America found the opportunity to establish relations with Iran for the first time. Although, the other allies, Britain and the USSR had been present in Iran before, this was the first chance for the USA. Being in Iran which is one of the world's most important petroleum producing countries was an important advantage for the USA. The fact that Iranians had prejudice against the USSR and Britain because they had intervened in Iran before raised the prestige of America in this country. The friendship between America and the Shah affected the future flow of relations dramatically.⁷⁶ While the USA-Iran relations flourished, the effect of Britain continued to hold the right to run Iran Petroleum via the company Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The fact that the USA followed an effective policy against the USSR, saved Britain from losing its rights in

⁷⁵ In order to be a party to the Treaty which was signed with Russia, only two members of parliament from the TUDEH said "yes" in the voting. Since the treaty did not enter into force, the Government collapsed and the Prime Minister Qavam went to Moscow.

⁷⁶ After World War II, when the word "Shah" was said in Iran and in the world as well, "the man of America" always came to mind. This closeness affected the political history of Iran and the international relations of the Cold War period. See, Helmut Richards, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-22, 24, 26.

Iran. Britain realized that it needed the USA to protect its rights in Iran, so they transferred a part of their authority in this country to the USA. While the influence of Britain in Iran decreased, the influence of the USA increased.

One of the most important results of the occupation of Iran is that the hidden competition between the USA and USSR which started during the war turned into an open clash after the war and this started the cold war. Iran's idea of settling in Iran and ending the existence of Western countries in Iran was perceived by America as a danger concerning not only Iran but also the rest of the Middle Foot. America's decisive and effective attitude stopped the Soviets. That the USSR had to take a step back in Iran because of America's decisive attitude and this relieved both America and Britain in the Middle Foot. The Soviets missed the chance of going to the Middle East via Iran and also came face to face with an Iran which was in cooperation with the West. This was a big loss in the beginning of the Cold War. Due to his allergy to the Soviets, in order to prevent TUDEH the Shah also restricted the activities of the other political parties and this brought the end of borrowed democracy. As a result of anti-totalitarian USSR, pro-American and anti-democratic Shah regime, Iran became a country in which ideological world clashes always showed their face.

ДВИЖЕНИЕ ЗА ПРИСОЕДИНЕНИЕ СЕВЕРО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ СЛОВАКИИ К СОВЕТСКОЙ УКРАИНЕ (1944-1945) В КОНТЕКСТЕ АННЕКСИИ ЗАКАРПАТЬЯ СССР *

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Rezumat: În unele abordări istorice, procesul de soluționare a problemei rutene în anii 1944-1945 (care a condus, în cele din urmă, la transferul acestui teritoriu de la statul cehoslovac la URSS) s-a desfășurat în arealul slovac și, într-un sens mai larg, a influențat „chestiunea ruteană/ucraineană” din Slovacia. Manifestul Mukatchevo din 26 noiembrie 1944 și-a găsit ecoul în rândul populației rutene din estul Slovaciei. Acei locuitori au fost inspirați de Mișcarea pentru încorporarea Slovaciei de Nord-Est la URSS. Totuși, tendința lor unificatoare nu a fost una consistentă și, ulterior, Consiliul Național al Ucrainei de la Priasevcina (care, la început, sprijinise această idee) a convenit asupra platformei programului de guvernare de la Kosice.

Summary: In some historical approaches, the process of solution of Ruthenia question in the years 1944-1945 (which finally led to the transfer of this territory from the Czechoslovak state to the USSR) was developed in the Slovak territories too, and in a broad sense, it also influenced the “Ruthenian/ Ukrainian question” in Slovakia. The Mukatchevo manifest from the 26th of November 1944 has found an echo among the Ruthenian population in the Eastern Slovakia. Those inhabitants were inspired by the Movement for incorporation of the Nord-Eastern Slovakia to the USSR. However, their unifying tendency was not a consistent one and later, the Ukrainian National Council of Priasevcina (which supported this idea in the beginning) agreed the platform of the Kosice government program.

Résumé: En certains abords historiques, le processus de solution du problème ukrainienne des années 1944-1945 (qui a conduit, finalement, au transfert de ce territoire de l'Etat tchécoslovaque à l'URSS) s'est déployé dans la région slovaque et, dans un sens plus large, a influencé “la question ukrainienne” de Slovaquie. Le manifeste Mukatchevo de 26 novembre 1944 a trouvé son écho dans les rangées de la population ukrainienne de l'est de la Slovaquie. Ces habitants-là ont été inspirés par le Mouvement pour l'incorporation de la Slovaquie de nord-est à l'URSS. Pourtant, leur tendance unificatrice n'a pas été une consistante et, ultérieurement, le Conseil National de l'Ukraine de Priasevcina (qui, au début, avait appuyé cette idée) a décidé l'adoption de la plateforme du programme de gouvernement de Kosice.

Keywords: Ruthenian question, Ukrainian, annexation, incorporation, Slovakia, USSR.

* Стаття була розроблена в рамках гранта VEGA № 2/0198/10 „Snahy o integráciu Rusínov a Ukrajincov karpatského regiónu v aktivitách národných rád v rokoch 1944-1947“.

Словакия, бесспорно, принадлежит к тем странам, где славянская идея имела глубокие корни и где одновременно были распространены русофильские настроения, происходящие от идеи славянского братства и близости «великой России», невзирая на то шла ли речь о царской России, советской России или СССР. В данной статье нас будет интересовать Восточная Словакия, где русофильские настроения были распространены в наибольшей степени. Некоторые авторы сходятся во мнении, что особенно наглядно это явление проявилось в северо-восточной части Словакии во время существования первой Словацкой республики (1939–1945 гг.). Безусловно, такое положение дел было результатом недооценки важности или же игнорирования «русинского национального вопроса» словацкими правительственными кругами¹, ассимиляционных устремлений и попыток денационализации русинского этноса, некоторых тоталитарных практик или игнорирования экономических и социальных проблем меньшинства, уничтожения этнической идентичности². Традиционная для русинов живая идея всеславянского единства интерпретировалась властью как просоветская позиция³. На переломе 1943–1944 гг., в связи с приближением советской армии, среди населения особенно заметно распространились «идеи славянской взаимности, освободительной миссии русских, равно как и справедливости коммунизма»⁴.

Отношение к СССР изменилось после прихода фронта на территорию Восточной Словакии. Советские солдаты уже не были теми русскими воинами, которые совершили Брусилковский прорыв во время первой мировой войны. Население встречало советскую армию с распростертыми объятиями, однако вместо братских объятий словаков ожидал «холодный душ» в виде повсеместных грабежей, изнасилования женщин, арестов или даже казней в случае малейшего сопротивления⁵. Нетрудно предположить, что после опыта первых контактов с представителями СССР, по крайней мере, часть населения переживала отрезвление от русофильских настроений. Ситуация особенно обострилась, когда оказалось, что Восточной Словакии угрожает то же, что и Подкарпатской Руси (Закарпатской Украине) после прихода туда фронта. Решение вопроса о Подкарпатской Руси в 1944–1945 гг., который, в конце концов, сводился к передаче данной территории Советскому Союзу, также имело отголоски на территории северо-восточной Словакии и, в более широком

¹ S. Konečný, *Rusíni/Ukrajinci ako fenomén slovenskej politiky*, in *Slovensko-rusínsko-ukrajinské vzťahy od obrodzenia po súčasnosť*, Bratislava, 2000, s. 143.

² M. Gajdoš, S. Konečný, M. Mušínska, *Rusíni/Ukrajinci v zrkadle polstoročia. Niektoré aspekty ich vývoja na Slovensku po roku 1945*, Košice – Užhorod, 1999, s. 34. Смотри также I. Vanat, *K niektorým otázkam zahraničného odboja zakarpatských Ukrajincov počas druhej svetovej vojny*, in *Жовтень і українська культура*, Prešov, 1968, s. 355.

³ S. Konečný, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

⁴ M. Lacko, *K otázke chápania slovanstva v slovenskej spoločnosti 1939-1945*, in D. Hrodek, et al., *Slovanství ve středoevropském prostoru. Iluze, deziluze a realita*, Pardubice, 2004, s. 161.

⁵ Там же, s. 162.

смысле слова, влияло на ситуацию вокруг русинского⁶ или «украинского» вопроса в Словакии.

На переломе 1944–1945 гг. в Подкарпатье (Закарпатье) среди командного состава Красной Армии, советских служб безопасности и местных коммунистов начали распространяться мысли о присоединении Подкарпатской Руси к советской Украине. Конкретное проявление подобных устремлений имело место на первом съезде национальных комитетов Закарпатской Украины, собравшегося 26 ноября 1944 г. в г. Мукачево. В съезде участвовало 663 делегата из Закарпатской Украины, которые проголосовали за манифест призывавший «снова соединить Закарпатскую Украину с ее великой матерью Советской Украиной и отсоединиться от Чехословакии»⁷. Последующие события разворачивались быстро. Местные коммунисты создали самостоятельную Коммунистическую партию Закарпатской Украины и отделились от Коммунистической партии Чехословакии (КПЧ). Национальный Совет Закарпатской Украины перестал сотрудничать с уполномоченным представителем Франтишком Немцем, делегированным правительством Чехословакии (ЧСР) администрировать данной территорией, и, таким образом, лишил пражское правительство возможности распространять и укреплять свою власть на данной территории.

Одновременно в Закарпатье развернулась кампания, в ходе которой население своими подписями выражало согласие с Манифестом от 26 ноября. К концу 1944 г. этот документ якобы подписало около четверти миллиона жителей региона. Выглядело это таким образом, как будто, как утверждал в конце 1944 г. Клемент Готвальд, почти 90% населения высказалось за присоединение к Советскому Союзу. Однако на самом деле все было отнюдь не так однозначно. В приходящих донесениях указывалось на то, что подписи собирались с оказанием давления. Это подтверждал и правительственный делегат Ф. Немец. Под влиянием коммунистов в Закарпатье создалась такая ситуация, что «каждый, кто выступал против присоединения к Советскому Союзу, подвергался жестоким нападкам»⁸. Как подчеркивал М. Гайдош, вполне

⁶ Словацкие русины заселяли северо-восток страны – округа (районы) Стара Любовня, Бардейов, Сабинов, Стропков, Свидник, Гумэннэ, Мэдзилаборсе, Снина, а частично и более дальние, севернее расположенные, округа Восточной Словакии. В 1945 г. эта этническая группа составляла около 100 – 110 тысяч человек или приблизительно 3% населения Словакии. J. Botík, *Etnická história Slovenska*, Bratislava, 2007, s. 123. B. Šprocha, P. Tišliar, *Štruktúra obyvateľstva Slovenska v rokoch 1919 – 1940*, Bratislava, 2009, s. 99, 123-127.

⁷ I. Ванат, *Матеріали до Української Народної Ради Пряшівщини (1945 – 1952)*, Prešov, 2001, s. 13-15.

⁸ K. Kaplan, *Pravda o Československu 1945 – 1948*, Praha, 1990, s. 30-31. См. также S. Vidňanský, M. Gajdoš, *Niektoré osobitosti nastolenia totalitného režimu v Zakarpatskej Ukrajině*, in M. Barnovský (Ed.), *Od diktatúry k diktatúre. Slovensko v rokoch 1945 – 1953*, Bratislava, 1995, s. 80-87.

понятным является тот факт, что в такой ситуации мало кто имел мужество выступить против, в особенности учитывая то, что такие действия явно поддерживались Красной Армией и органами НКВД. В любом случае Москве такие действия были выгодны, так как стратегически важные земли могли облегчить военное наступление в западном направлении и контроль над Центральной Европой⁹.

Ситуация, сложившаяся в Закарпатье, стала неожиданностью для чехословацких деятелей и даже для руководства КПЧ в Москве. Чехословацкие лидеры были не согласны с таким развитием событием, хотя действующий Президент Э. Бенеш размышлял о возможной уступке этих территорий СССР уже в 1939 г. В 1943 г. он снова пообещал Иосифу Сталину передать эти земли Советскому Союзу, чтобы из стратегических соображений образовалась общая граница с СССР. Были выражены также некоторые опасения, что таким образом может быть создан прецедент для словацких коммунистов, вынашивавших во время нелегального существования партии, особенного в 1939–1944 гг., идею создания «советской Словакии» или даже присоединения Словакии к СССР.

Опасения Э. Бенеша и некоторых чехословацких политиков связанные с тем, что закарпатский вариант советизации может получить распространение и закончиться аннексией части словацких территорий не были полностью необоснованными. События в Закарпатье явно повлияли на состояние дел в северо-восточной Словакии и естественно имели большое влияние на политическую активизацию некоторых представителей русинской части населения. Снова стали звучать лозунги о советизации края и распространяться идеи о присоединении северо-восточной Словакии к Закарпатской Украине и, следовательно, к СССР. Согласно мнению некоторых историков, основной проблемой в тот период «была не просоветская ориентация части местной, коммунистически мыслящей, интеллигенции, как часто и единодушно утверждается, хотя нельзя сбрасывать со счетов и этот аспект. Первейшей задачей в том процессе было возвращение чувства единства, т. е. уверенности в том, что в Закарпатье и в северных районах Восточной Словакии живет один этнос, что отражено не только в результатах этнографических исследований, но также подтверждается существующими на протяжении веков кровными и родственными связями, общественными, культурными и литургически-церковными отношениями»¹⁰. Согласиться с данным утверждением можно только отчасти. Население тщательно взвешивало, стоит ли заявлять вслух о своем чувстве единства, тем более в условиях, когда стремительно разворачивались события послевоенного периода и ситуация оставалась нестабильной.

⁹ M. Gajdoš, *Pripojenie Zakarpatskej Ukrajiny k ZSSR a Ukrajinská národná rada Prjaševščiny*, in *Rusíni: otázky dejín a kultúry*, Prešov, 1994, s. 105.

¹⁰ M. Gajdoš, S. Konečný, M. Mušinka, *Rusíni/Ukrajinci v zrkadle polstoročia*, s. 38.

Важным моментом была инициатива, проявленная Временным Комитетом украинцев Прешовского региона¹¹, который на своем первом заседании, состоявшемся в Ужгороде 29 ноября 1944 г., одобрил резолюцию, схожую с предыдущей, мукачевской, и адресовал ее Национальному Совету Закарпатской Украины. В своей резолюции Временный Комитет высказывал пожелание «...присоединить к свободной матери Закарпатской Украине всю прешовскую Украину (северо-восточную Словакию – М. Ш.) с Галицкой Лемковщиной (юго-восточной Польшей – М. Ш.)»¹². Определенную тревогу вызывал и тот факт, что, пользуясь поддержкой советских служб безопасности Закарпатской Украины, на территорию Словакии начали проникать группы агитаторов, усиленно призывавших жителей северо-восточной Словакии присоединиться к Закарпатской Украине. Общую ситуацию в приграничных районах также усложняло то, что Красная Армия захватила шесть населенных пунктов в Восточной Словакии. Кроме этого, Национальный Совет Закарпатской Украины также начал вмешиваться в дела пограничных северо-восточных районов Словакии. «Тот факт, что в Закарпатье сильно надеялись на присоединение северо-восточных районов Словакии, заселенных русинским населением, т. е. так называемой Прешовщины, косвенно подтверждается и записью дискуссии на заседании Центрального Комитета Коммунистической партии Украины, состоявшегося 27 ноября 1944 г., где была произнесена критика по поводу того, что в Национальном Совете Закарпатской Украины не представлены лучшие кадры, которые имеются именно в Прешовщине»¹³.

Похожие тенденции проявлялись среди некоторых членов организации КРАСНО¹⁴, которые в конце 1944 г. инициировали создание так называемого

¹¹ Инициаторы резолюции назывались «Временным Национальным Комитетом прешовских и русских украинцев». См. И. Ванат, *Матеріали до Української Народної Ради Пряшівщини (1945 – 1952)*, s. 19-21.

¹² M. Gajdoš, S. Konečný, M. Mušíňka, *op. cit.*, s. 38-39. Подобное стремление о соединении с Лемковским Рабоче-Крестьянским Советом в Горлицях (в процессе соединения всех регионов заселенных „украинцами“ со советской Украиной) было обнаружено уже в ходе учредительного съезда Украинского Национального Совета Прешовщины 1 марта 1945 г. Лемковский делегат Илья Качур требовал отстаивать интересы польских лемков и «оберегать их на компетентных местах». *Archív Zväzu Rusínov-Ukrajincov (AZR-U) Prešov, f. Ukrajinská národná rada Prjaševščiny (UNRP) 1945 – 1952, k. A-1945 (2), č. 338*. Протокол составлен на первом рабочем заседании делегатов украинского населения Прешовщины 1 марта 1945 г.

¹³ M. Gajdoš, *Pripojenie Zakarpatskej Ukrajiny k ZSSR*, s. 107.

¹⁴ Карпаторусский Союз Народного Освобождения (КРАСНО) – организация сопротивления в Восточной Словакии, основанная в сентябре 1943 г. с целью оказания помощи беженцам из концентрационных лагерей и поддержания антифашистского движения. Одновременно члены организации занимались разведывательной деятельностью и организовывали поставки для партизанских отрядов. Среди основателей КРАСНО были будущие лидеры УНСП (П. Бабей, В. Караман И. Жидовски, П. Жидовски, П. Капишовски и др.).

Украинского Национального Совета Прешовщины (УНСП). На этот шаг организаторов УНСП вдохновила деятельность возникшего Словацкого Национального Совета (СНС), но, прежде всего, возникновение Национального Совета Закарпатской Украины. Официальное создание УНСП произошло позднее – 1 марта 1945 г., на съезде делегатов из районов Восточной Словакии, заселенных преимущественно русинами. Согласно первоначальному замыслу съезд делегатов из так называемых «украинских населенных пунктов и районов» должен был состояться 15 февраля 1945 г. Назначенный срок, однако, был передвинут скорее всего из-за того, что члены предполагаемого комитета проводили в Восточной Словакии агитационную деятельность за присоединение данной территории к Советскому Союзу. Существует реальное предположение, что импульс такой деятельности придавали высокопоставленные командиры Красной Армии¹⁵. В таком смысле высказывался Я. Бобак, указывавший на то, что УНСП возник при поддержке советских служб безопасности, а во главе его был поставлен учитель В. Караман, бывший (согласно Я. Бобаку) сотрудником советского НКВД. Подготовительный комитет стал действовать в соответствии со сценарием, разработанным в СССР, подобному тому, который претворялся в жизнь в Подкарпатской Руси. Комитет постарался развернуть широкое народное движение за присоединение Прешовщины к СССР¹⁶. Сотрудничество УНСП с советскими вооруженными силами следует из того обстоятельства, что его председатель В. Караман обращался с просьбой о помощи к генералу Л. Мехлису, члену военного совета Четвертого украинского фронта, информировал его о ситуации в Прешовщине¹⁷, в то время как офицеры Красной Армии участвовали в рабочих заседаниях УНСП¹⁸.

То, что в северо-восточной Словакии в начале 1945 г. действительно шла агитация населения и сбор подписей под некогда разработанным меморандумом, подтверждается многими фактами. Акции сбора подписей за присоединение к СССР проходили в разных городах и селах региона. Подписи получались разными, часто обманными, способами; было достаточно примеров оказания давления или применения угроз¹⁹. Это было похоже на сбор подписей в поддержку мукачевского Манифеста 26 ноября 1944 г. в Закарпатье.

Такого рода инициативы заходили намного дальше. Н. Хрущев, занимавший тогда пост секретаря Центрального Комитета Коммунистической партии (большевиков) Украины и председателя украинского правительства, в

¹⁵ M. Gajdoš, S. Konečný, M. Mušíňka, *op. cit.*, s. 39-41.

¹⁶ J. Bobák, *Slováci na Podkarpatskej Rusi a ich presídľovanie do Česko-Slovenska v roku 1947*, s. 12.

¹⁷ M. Barnovský, *Historické súvislosti opcie a presídlenia Rusínov-Ukrajincov v roku 1947*, in: M. Gajdoš (Ed.), *Čo dala – vzala našim rodákom optácia. Zborník z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie k 55. výročiu optácie a presídlenia*, Košice – Prešov, 2002, s. 13.

¹⁸ AZR-U Prešov, f. UNRP 1945 – 1952, k. A-1945 (2). Protokoly UNRP.

¹⁹ M. Gajdoš, *Pripojenie Zakarpatskej Ukrajiny k ZSSR*, s. 111.

своих мемуарах вспоминал, что приблизительно в начале 1945 г. его посетили в Киеве представители населенного этническими украинцами района Восточной Словакии и высказали пожелание, чтобы их район был присоединен к Украинской ССР. Н. Хрущев ответил им, что это невозможно, так как подобное действие затронуло бы чехов и в особенности словаков. Делегации было поручено строить социализм при тесном сотрудничестве с КПЧ. После отъезда делегации Н. Хрущев информировал И. Сталина²⁰. Опираясь на многочисленные доказательства, можно полагать, что делегация, посетившая Н. Хрущева, прибыла из Снины в северо-восточной Словакии.

Вероятно, что между командованием Красной Армии, действующей в Восточной Словакии, и политическим руководством СССР не было по данному вопросу достаточной согласованности, или же, можно предположить, что командирам Красной Армией поступило распоряжение прекратить действия в данном направлении. Москва не хотела рисковать возможной потерей репутации в глазах союзников и особенно в глазах формирующегося правительства ЧСР. Партнерские отношения могли быть испорчены и, в первую очередь, могло усложниться решение вопроса о Подкарпатской Руси, считавшейся общей проблемой Чехословакии и СССР, в том числе и из-за активизации общественного мнения. Предположительно, что как раз вследствие этого (как отмечает М. Гайдош) в середине февраля 1945 г. многие агитаторы были вызваны в советское военное управление в Прешове, где их деятельность была подвержена острой критике. Обращалось внимание на то, их действия не согласуются с чехословацко-советским союзническим соглашением и «при данных обстоятельствах являются преждевременными»²¹.

Обозначенные тенденции достигли кульминационной точки во время учредительного съезда УНСР, проведенного 1 марта в Русском Доме в Прешове. УНСР был объявлен национально-политическим органом, представляющим украинское и русское население, проживающее в Восточной Словакии, и должен был защищать и отстаивать права и интересы этой части населения²². Одновременно, учредительный съезд принял резолюцию, в которой поддерживал Манифест первого съезда национальных комитетов Закарпатской Украины в Мукачево, выражал горячую благодарность И. Сталину за освобождение и предоставление права свободно изъяслять национальные интересы, и, что самое главное, предложил присоединить северо-восточные земли Словакии к Украинской ССР²³. Общая атмосфера учредительного съезда и принятие такого рода резолюции во многом

²⁰ І. Ванат, *Матеріали до Української Народної Ради Пряшівщини (1945-1952)*, с. 24-25.

²¹ M. Gajdoš, *op. cit.*, s. 108-109.

²² “Východoslovenská pravda”, 3. marca 1946.

²³ AZR-U Prešov, f. UNRP 1945 – 1952, k. A-1945 (2), č. 338. Протокол составлен на первом рабочем заседании делегатов украинского населения Прешовщины 1 марта 1945 г.

напоминали съезд национальных комитетов Закарпатской Украины, который декларировал объединение Закарпатья с советской Украиной. В интерьере зала, где проводились переговоры, доминировали портреты И. Сталина и местных деятелей. В телеграммах, которые из Прешова были направлены советским представителям (И. Сталину, Н. Хрущеву), командующему четвертого украинского фронта генералу И. Петрову и Национальному Совету Закарпатской Украины, выражалась надежда, что в обозримом будущем весь украинский народ объединится в одном государстве²⁴.

О том, что в северо-восточной Словакии было стремление перенять закарпатский вариант советизации, свидетельствует тот факт, что УНСП в своем печатном органе «Прешовщина» призвала «вооруженных представителей украинского народа» позаботиться о том, чтобы «наши постановления в самом деле воплощались в жизнь, а всякие уклонения от наших постановлений преследовались по закону»²⁵. Очевидным было также желание имитировать создание народных вооруженных дружин, существующих в Закарпатье, с целью осуществления собственных замыслов. Помимо этого, УНСП призывал местное русинское население к вступлению в ряды Красной Армии. Можно с уверенностью согласиться с той точкой зрения, согласно которой в этот период северо-восточной Словакии реально угрожало двоевластие.

Необходимо также подчеркнуть, что между инициаторами создания УНСП были члены коммунистической партии русинской (украинской) национальности, занимавшие в нем высокие должности. И наконец, именно между восточнословацкими коммунистами находились наиболее ревностные поборники идеи присоединения северо-восточной территории Словакии к СССР (чем сеяли между русинским населением значительную политическую неопределенность), хотя руководство КПЧ в Москве и главные функционеры Коммунистической партии Словакии (КПС) явно от них дистанцировались²⁶. Устремления в этом направлении (присоединение некоторых районов к СССР, вплоть до реки Попрад) были, к примеру, отмечены в районе Снины и за ними следила словацкая Национальная безопасность (НБ). Лидеры такой политики (члены КПС) имели, очевидно, связи в Закарпатской Украине. Бесспорно, речь шла о местной или же региональной инициативе, не пользующейся

²⁴ В приветственной телеграмме И. Сталину была выражена надежда, что «недалек день, когда будет уничтожена вековая несправедливость и весь украинский народ объединится в одном государстве». В телеграмме Н. Хрущеву выражалась просьба, чтобы при решении вопроса Закарпатской Украины не забывали, «что в Прешовщине также живут украинцы, которые своим образом жизни и культурой являются кровными братьями закарпатских украинцев. Только сейчас нам выпала редкая возможность свободно определить свою национальную принадлежность. Сердечно просим Вашего содействия». Народному Совету Закарпатской Украины УНСП ответил, чтобы при решении судьбы Закарпатской Украины «не забыли и о нас». Там же.

²⁵ «Prjaševščina», 1. apríla 1945.

²⁶ M. Gajdoš, S. Konečný, M. Mušíinka, *op. cit.*, s. 39-40.

официальной поддержкой центра²⁷. Свидетельством тому является заявление Областной администрации (военной) Оборонной разведки Командования 4. области в Братиславе:

«От освобождения снинского района Красной Армией действует здесь умышленная и организованная агитация за присоединение этого района к ЗУ (Закарпатской Украине – М. Ш.). [...] Данную акцию, в первую очередь, осуществлял председатель Районного Национального Комитета (РНК) Гакош, далее политический референт Областного командования НБ Питель, далее доктор Гоффман, а кроме упомянутых, в с. Папин нотариус Шмига, а в с. Звала лесник Сенко. Председатель РНК и его верные помощники являются полными хозяевами в снинском районе. Для обеспечения их личной безопасности имеют в своем распоряжении полностью им преданную и послушную НБ и так называемую местную милицию или полицию. [...] Председатель РНК и его помощники совершали и сейчас совершают очень частые поездки в ЗУ, в основном в Ужгород, а в Перечине, по свидетельству председателя РНК, достают бензин. Точную цель поездки определить было невозможно, но, по видимому, как следует из показания местных жителей и из логичных соображений, они ездят туда с целью обеспечить присоединения всего снинского района к ЗУ (ранее и сейчас еще постоянно говорят о присоединении вплоть до Попрада). Такое предположение, скоро переросшее в уверенность, подтверждается многочисленными свидетельствами отдельных руководящих лиц Снины. Вышеупомянутый нотариус Шмига из с. Папина заявил сотруднику отделения Финансовой охраны из с. Телеповце, что все подготовлено и что район за районом будут отходить к России. То, что речь шла об умышленной пропаганде за присоединение некоторых районов к ЗУ, видно из того, что в деревнях составлялись списки или же проводилась акция сбора подписей за присоединение к ЗУ. Так в селе Вышна Яблонка Местный Национальный Комитет проводил митинги, на которых звучали речи за присоединение к ЗУ и, помимо этого, проводилась акция сбора подписей. Людей вынуждали подписываться угрозами того, что в случае неподписания они будут наказаны русскими, когда эти земли будут присоединены к ЗУ. Из-за таких угроз люди боялись возможных последствий и подписывались. Бывали случаи, как и в ЗУ, когда людям говорили, чтобы подписывались для того, чтобы получить прожиточный паек, тогда как на самом деле речь шла о присоединении к ЗУ. [...] Несомненно то, что упомянутые лица, которым помогают по деревням учителя, агитируют за присоединение к ЗУ. Весьма вероятно, что в ответ на их „мольбы“ и просьбы русские пограничные части заняли некоторую часть наших

²⁷ S. Konečný, *Zmluva o Zakarpatskej Ukrajine a opcia občianstva ZSSR na Slovensku po druhej svetovej vojne*, in: M. Gajdoš (Ed.), *Čo dala – vzala našim rodákom optácia*, s. 33.

территорий. Также выглядит правдоподобным, что их агитационная деятельность вдохновляется из Ужгорода»²⁸.

Вышеизложенные события вскоре нашли отклик среди политических элит ЧСР. Уже одно предпочтение словацкому языку иностранного и использование фактически непереводаемого понятия „Прешовщина“ раздражало словацкие народные органы, опасавшиеся автономистских и сепаратистских устремлений в восточнословацком регионе. Чехословацкие государственные органы и политические организации начали проявлять инициативу в стабилизации ситуации в Восточной Словакии. Одновременно они были решительно настроены изо всех сил защищать целостность обновленной республики. Что касается Москвы, то при имевшихся обстоятельствах присоединение части Восточной Словакии к СССР ей было не нужно. Советская власть не проявляла интереса к этим территориям, присоединение которых могло скорее повредить ее авторитету, чем помочь на международной сцене. Предполагаем, что это было скорее всего шантаж и давление на Э. Бенеша и на пражское правительство, чтобы как можно быстрее отдать Подкарпатскую Русь Советскому Союзу.

Со своей стороны представители руководства УНСП постепенно стали понимать нереальность присоединения части восточнословацких территорий к СССР, исходя как из международной обстановки, так и из внутривосточной ситуации. Замыслы УНСП было невозможно реализовать из-за того, что после явной потери Подкарпатской Руси целый спектр чехословацких политических сил выступал за территориальную целостность ЧСР. Кроме этого, присоединение части Восточной Словакии к СССР было невозможно из-за этнических соображений, поскольку так называемое украинское или же русинское население не было компактно расселено. Одновременно мог быть создан прецедент для венгерского и польского этнических меньшинств, проживающих в Словакии, чего естественно правительство ЧСР и СНК не могли допустить.

Постепенно инициированное УНСП движение за присоединение территорий к СССР стало ослабевать и в конце концов исчезло. Стабилизация и прояснение ситуации произошло 9 апреля 1945 г., когда в Кошице произошла встреча видных представителей УНСП (В. Карамана, П. Бабея, И. Рогалья-Илькива) с делегатами СНК Г. Гусаком и Т. Тварожком. УНСП проявил желание сотрудничать с СНК в решении вопросов, касающихся русинского (украинского) населения²⁹. Несмотря ни на что, ситуация в северо-восточной

²⁸ Slovenský národný archív (SNA) Bratislava, f. PV – bezp., k. 1, č. 132/1945. *Politické pomery v Sninskom okrese – hlásenie*.

²⁹ M. Gajdoš, *Pripojenie Zakarpatskej Ukrajiny k ZSSR*, s. 110. В апреле 1945 г. УНСП выработал меморандум, который 5 мая 1945 г. был вручен представителям СНК. Меморандум включал целый ряд политических и культурных пожеланий, которые государственные органы должны были реализовать для решения украинского вопроса. УНСП выразил также полную поддержку Кошицкой правительственной

Словакии надежно контролировалась чехословацкими (равно как и советскими) органами безопасности и разведки. Особое внимание уделялось районам, где пропаганда за присоединение к СССР была особенно сильна. Например, глава второго отделения Главного командования Национальной безопасности констатировал: «В районе Снины выявлена агитация за присоединение снинского района к СССР. Об общей ситуации и обо всех событиях украинское командование в Ужгороде имеет очень хорошую информацию. По-видимому, эту информацию украинскому командованию передают наши люди»³⁰.

Несмотря на то, что УНСП дистанцировался от сепаратистских настроений и стал поддерживать кошицкую правительственную программу, высказывания его представителей не было призабыты. Можно с уверенностью утверждать, что главные руководители ЧСР временно придерживались выжидающей тактики, тайно подыскивая подходящий случай для постепенной ликвидации УНСП (это удалось осуществить в начале 1950-х гг.), а также для решения вопроса о части населения, «поддерживающей» его линию (Этот вопрос в дальнейшем был разрешён способом оптации и переселения части русинов в УССР в 1947 г.)³¹.

Не менее важным является вопрос отношения русинского населения северо-восточных районов Словакии к присоединению их региона к СССР или УССР. Утверждается, что «первоначальные стремления УНСП решить вопрос русинов (украинцев) путем присоединения северо-восточной Словакии к Закарпатской Украине не нашли поддержки, хотя в некоторых кругах внутри страны и среди эмигрантов они просуществовали вплоть до 1947 г.»³². В связи с этим М. Гайдош, например, говорит, что в Восточной Словакии, особенно в русинской среде, относительно долго сохранялись настроения, касающиеся присоединения части этого региона к Закарпатской Украине. Это проявилось не только в начальный период деятельности УНСП, но также и позднее при разных других обстоятельствах. Относительно неприглядная ситуация сложилась в связи с демаркацией чехословацко-советской границы. Среди населения ходили разные слухи о возможном присоединении части Восточной Словакии к Закарпатыю³³. В целом русинское население относилось к ЧСР

программе и одновременно потребовал пропорционального представительства украинцев в СНК, в центральных органах государственной власти, в представительных органах СНК и в остальных институтах, органах государственной администрации и судах, особенно в районах с «украинским» населением.

³⁰ SNA Bratislava, f. PV – bezp., k. 1, č. 180/1945. *Situačná správa z územia celého Slovenska 1.7. – 15.8.1945.*

³¹ Более детально: М. Šmigel', Š. Kruško, *Opcia*, Prešov, 2005, s. 21-30.

³² S. Konečný, *Rusini na Slovensku a ich národné vedomie v období socializmu*, in M. Gajdoš, S. Konečný (Eds.), *Etnické minority na Slovensku. História, súčasnosť, súvislosti*, Košice, 1997, s. 72.

³³ SNA Bratislava, f. PV – bezp., k. 1, č. 637/1945. *Situačné hlásenie OVNB Humenné č. 204.dôv./45.*

лояльно, хотя некоторые и проявляли интерес к присоединению к СССР³⁴. Особенно этому способствовала сложная ситуация с продовольствием в регионе. Распространялась пропаганда, что Словацкий Национальный Комитет не заинтересован в этом регионе, потому что он отойдет к СССР³⁵.

Практически по всей Словакии циркулировали слухи, что восточная часть страны до Попрада будет присоединена к СССР или же что русинское население будет переселено в СССР. Это вызвало волнения и протесты в некоторых населенных пунктах, а также протестные действия отдельных людей. Свидетельством тому является письмо греко-католического священника из села Ярабина, которое 4 октября 1945 г. было направлено РНК в Старой Любовне. Священник очень точно характеризует описанные события. Замечательным является то, что отражены взгляды самого населения на вышеописанные события: «Искренне прошу информировать компетентных лиц, что народ в Ярабине возмущен известиями о том, что русины якобы хотят отделиться от ЧСР или что все русины переселяться в Россию или же на Украину, так как будто бы такова воля русинского народа. Русины вообще не хотят в СССР, а если некоторые из них подписали в январе и феврале этого года какой-то меморандум, что они хотят к России, то сделали это по неведению, так как были убеждены учителями и им подобными псевдоинтеллигентами, разъехавшимися по русинским деревням и рассказывавшими там, что собирают в деревнях подписи тех, кто хочет иметь русинские школы, зерно для весенней посевной и т.д.; и никто из них никогда не говорил, чего они на самом деле добивались, иначе никто бы тот ослиный меморандум не подписал. Мои обманутые прихожане просят, чтобы я подчеркнул, что все упомянутые люди, которые своевольно, собственноручно собирали подписи, заслуживают быть объявленными предателями Родины и заслуживают самими быть высланными из ЧСР в СССР, чтобы таким образом получить то, что заслужили и испытать то, чего желали другим..., так как все мои прихожане, равно как и русины из соседних деревень, всегда чувствовали себя чехословаками, всегда боролись за целостность ЧСР и хотят остаться верными гражданами своей дорогой Родины, Чехословацкой Республики. Если будет нужно, все упомянутые подпишут свидетельство, что считают себя словаками, чтобы наконец обрести святой покой и освободиться от вечного страха, что будут или когда-нибудь могут быть переселены в Россию только потому, что родились русинами. Говорят, что не имеют ничего против того, что если кто-то, кому нравится в СССР, добровольно туда переедет, но, что никогда не позволят переселить всех. И без того уже уехало и в ближайшие дни уедет на работу в Чехию в угольных шахтах более 70 молодых людей только потому, что они как-то услышали, что их будут переселять в Россию»³⁶.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, č. 383/1945. *Situačná správa z územia celého Slovenska 15.9. – 15.10.1945.*

³⁵ *Ibidem*, č. 180/1945. *Situačná správa z územia celého Slovenska 1.7. – 15.8.1945.*

³⁶ Štátny archív Levoča – pobočka Stará Ľubovňa, f. *Okresný národný výbor Stará Ľubovňa 1945-1960*, k. 28, č. 795/1945 prez. *List Gréckokatolíckeho farského úradu v Jarabine.*

Как следует из анализа документов, в тот период население Восточной Словакии в первую очередь было занято бытовыми проблемами и преодолением последствий войны в повседневной жизни. Закулисные политические игры и амбиции УНСП тревожили мирных жителей и вносили нестабильность в их жизнь. Приход фронта и прямой контакт с советскими солдатами, равно как и полученная от беженцев информация о ситуации в Закарпатской Украине вынудили обывателей задуматься и тщательно взвесить свое положение в ЧСР.

INFLUENCE OF ETHNIC STEREOTYPES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS

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Rezumat: Având în vedere caracterul multiethnic al statelor balcanice, aspectele naționale reprezintă un interes deosebit atât pentru elitele politice și științifice, cât și pentru populațiile țărilor din sud-estul Europei. Istoria politică a popoarelor din această parte a continentului, din momentul apariției și afirmării națiunilor și până în prezent, este alcătuită din numeroase episoade de luptă pentru emanciparea națională, pentru dezvoltarea și consolidarea statelor independente, respectarea drepturilor minorităților etnice și depășirea tensiunilor interetnice. Prejudecățile și stereotipurile etnice afectează relațiile politice dintre statele balcanice, întrucât primele sunt adeseori modelate de politicile promovate la nivel guvernamental. De asemenea, ele sunt în relație directă cu frontierele și cu relațiile atât între statele sud-est europene, cât și dintre acestea și așa-numitele marile puteri. Autorul trage concluzia potrivit căreia stereotipurile etnice reprezintă și în prezent, pentru numeroasele grupuri majoritare și minoritare din această mică peninsulă, serioase obstacole pe calea apropierii, respectului și toleranței reciproce.

Abstract: In the article author points out that Balkan states are multiethnic that is why ethnic problems have always been in the limelight of governments, citizens and never lost their topicality. Political history of Balkan people, from their origin and consolidation of certain nations until present, has been filled with struggle for the national emancipation, creation and strengthening of their national states, observation of ethnic minorities' rights, solution of inter-ethnic conflicts. Part of ethnic stereotypes, which were formed as a result of existing state policy, was investigated in the development of political relations in the Balkans. These stereotypes were connected with the borders and interrelations of Balkan states with each other and with other countries, the so called great powers. We believe that ethnic stereotypes still hinder many nations and ethnicities on this rather small peninsula from ensuring mutual acknowledgement, respect and tolerant attitude as standard of conduct for everyone.

Résumé: Tout en tenant compte du caractère multiethnique des Etats balkaniques, les aspects nationaux présentent un intérêt tout à fait particulier pour les élites politiques et scientifiques, mais aussi pour les populations des pays du sud-est de l'Europe. L'histoire politique des peuples de cette partie du continent, du moment de l'apparition et l'affirmation des nations et jusqu'à présent, est composée de nombreux épisodes de lutte pour l'émancipation nationale, pour le développement et la consolidation des Etats indépendants, le respect des droits des minorités ethniques et le dépassement des tensions interethniques. Les préjugés et les stéréotypes ethniques affectent les relations politiques entre les Etats balkaniques parce que, le plus souvent, les premiers sont modelés par les politiques promues au niveau gouvernemental. Elles sont en relation directe, aussi, avec les frontières et avec les relations entre les Etats sud-est européens, ainsi que d'entre ceux-ci et les grandes

puissances. L'auteur tire la conclusion que les stéréotypes ethniques représentent même de nos jours, pour les nombreux groupes majoritaires et minoritaires de cette petite péninsule, des obstacles sérieux sur le chemin de l'approchement, du respect et de la tolérance réciproque.

Keywords: *Balkans, ethnic problems, ethnic stereotypes, national consolidation processes, national idea, national states, isolation, self-isolation.*

There are hardly any monoethnic states in the modern world, which is why ethnic problems are always in the limelight of governments, citizens and unfortunately cannot lose their topicality. Political history of Balkan people, from the origin and consolidation of certain nations until present, has been filled with struggle for the national emancipation, creation and strengthening of own national states, observation of ethnic minorities' rights, overcoming of ethnic conflicts. In the article we investigate the role of ethnic stereotypes in the development of political relations in the Balkans which have always been specific and were formed as a result of existing state policy. They are connected with the boundaries and interrelations of Balkan states with each other and with other countries, the so called great forces. In our opinion, ethnic stereotypes still prevent many nations and ethnicities of this rather small peninsula from affirming mutual acknowledgement, respect and tolerant attitude as accepted standard of conduct for everyone.

A lot of foreign and Ukrainian scientists have paid attention to the issues connected with ethnic political studies. In Ukraine the research is conducted by the following prominent scientists: I. Burkut¹, V. Yevtukh², I. Kresina³, O. Lanovenko⁴, L. Nagorna⁵, M. Obushnyi⁶. Among scientists in the western and Balkan states who have been studying national issue through political, economic, legal, ideological and

¹ I. Буркут, *Югославія: перша спроба трансформації*, in *Політологічні та соціологічні студії. Збірник наукових праць* [I. Burkut, *Yugoslavia: First Transformation Effort*, in *Studies in Political Science and Sociology. Collection of scientific works*], Т. II, Чернівці, Прут, 2002, с. 130-139.

² В. Євтух, *Етнополітика в Україні: правничий та культурологічний аспекти* [V. Yevtukh, *Ethnic Policy in Ukraine: Legal and Cultural Aspects*], Київ, Видавництво УАННП „Фенікс”, 1997, 215 с.

³ І. Кресіна, *Українська національна свідомість і сучасні політичні процеси (етнополітологічний аналіз)* [I. Kresina, *Ukrainian National Awareness and Modern Political Processes (ethnic political analysis)*], Київ, 1998, 392 с.

⁴ О. Лановенко, *Вихід один – етносоціокультурна інтеграція* [O. Lanovenko, *Ethnic Sociocultural Integration is the Only Way*], in “Віче”, 1998, № 12, с. 74-84.

⁵ Л. Нагорна, *Українська політична нація; лінії розламу і консолідації* [L. Nagorna, *Ukrainian Political Nation; Breaking Lines and Consolidation*], in “Віче”, 2000, № 1, с. 132-146.

⁶ М. Обушний, *Етнос і нація: проблеми ідентичності* [M. Obyshnyi, *Ethnicity and Nation: Identification Problems*], Київ, Центр духовної культури, 1998, 204 с.

religious perspective we can name G. Balakrishnan⁷, E. Doichinova⁸, St. Grncharov⁹, M. Kalitsyn¹⁰, K. Manchev¹¹, L. Paleshutski¹², G. Panaiotov¹³, I. Tomova¹⁴, M. Hroch¹⁵, A. Khristakudis¹⁶. However, complexity of the problem which is proven by

⁷ Г. Балакришнан, *Национальное воображение*, in Б. Андерсон, О. Бауэр, М. Хрох и др., *Нации и национализм* [G. Balakrishnan, *National Imagination*, in B. Anderson, V. Bauer, M. Hroch and others, *Nations and Nationalism*], Пер. с англ. и нем. Л.Е. Переяславцевой, М.С. Панина, Москва, Праксис, 2002, с. 264-282.

⁸ К. Манчев, Е. Дойчинова, *Мюсюлманското население от Североизточна България в българската и турската политика (1919-1939)* [K. Manchev, E. Doichinova, *Muslim Population of Northern-Eastern Bulgaria in Bulgarian and Turkish Politics (1919-1939)*], in "Исторически преглед", 1991, № 5, с. 66-72.

⁹ Ст. Грънчаров, *Към вопроса за отношенията между България и балканските страни (1900-1903)*, in *Великите сили и балканските взаимоотношения в края на XIX и началото на XX век* [St. Grncharov, *On the Issue of Relations between Bulgaria and Balkan States (1900-1903)*, in *Great Powers and Balkan Interrelations in the End of the 19 – Beginning of the 20 century*], София, 1992, с. 191-219.

¹⁰ М. Калицин, *Образът на „другия“ в османската наративна литература от XV-XVIII в.*, in *Представата за „другия“ на Балканите* [M. Kalitsyn, *Image of "Others" in the Ottoman Fiction in 15-18 Centuries*, in *Perception of "Others" in the Balkans*], София, 1995, с. 41-55.

¹¹ К. Манчев, *Мюсюлманските малцинства и групи в политиката на балканските страни*, in *Аспекти на етнокултурната ситуация в България* [K. Manchev, *Muslim Minority and Groups in Politics in the Balkan Countries*, in *Aspects of Ethnic Cultural Situation in Bulgaria*], София, 1992, с. 20-34; К. Манчев, *Националният въпрос на Балканите* [K. Manchev, *National Issue in the Balkans*], София, Академично издателство "Проф. Марин Дринов", 1999, 364 с..

¹² К. Палешутски, *Националният въпрос в Югославската федерация*, in *Национални проблеми на Балканите: История и съвременност* [K. Paleshutski, *National Issues in the Yugoslavian Federation*, in *National Problems in the Balkans: History and Modernity*], София, 1992, с. 95-137.

¹³ Г. Панайотов, *Съвременни аспекти на националния проблем в Румъния*, in *Национални проблеми на Балканите: История и съвременност* [G. Panaiotov, *Modern Aspects of National Issues in Romania*, in *National Problems in the Balkans: History and Modernity*], София, 1992, с. 262-276.

¹⁴ И. Томова, *Етнически стереотипи и предразсъдъци у българите*, in *Аспекти на етнокултурната ситуация в България* [I. Tomova, *Ethnic Stereotypes and Superstitions Among Bulgarians*, in *Aspects of Ethnic Cultural Situation in Bulgaria*], София, 1992, с. 77-90.

¹⁵ М. Хрох, *От националните движения к полностью сформировавшейся нации: процесс строительства наций в Европе*, in Б. Андерсон, О. Бауэр, М. Хрох и др., *Нации и национализм* [M. Hroch, *From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in Europe*, in B. Anderson, V. Bauer, M. Hroch and others, *Nations and Nationalism*], Пер. с англ. и нем. Л.Е. Переяславцевой, М.С. Панина, Москва, Праксис, 2002, с. 121-145.

¹⁶ А. Христакудис, *Мюсюлманското малцинство в Гърция*, in *Национални проблеми на Балканите: История и съвременност* [A. Khristakudis, *Muslim Minority in Greece*, in *National Problems in the Balkans: History and Modernity*], София, 1992, с. 245-261.

constant ethnic conflicts in different parts of the world stipulates the necessity of further profound investigation of the political phenomenon in order to develop suitable approaches for its understanding and accumulate the experience during the establishment of the new democracies such as Ukraine and Balkan states.

Before the creation of the modern ethnicity and multinationalism there were consequently several great empires in the Balkans – Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, and Habsburg. Romans and Byzantines were characterized as arrogant treating others as barbarians. Population of the Ottoman Empire viewed itself as faithful and others as *giaoours*. In modern age differences between nations changed to the ethnic ground – ethnic origin, history, language, national conscience and identity became equally important with religion and church¹⁷.

Certain nations were formed in the Balkans in different times. National-consolidation process in this part of the world began under the conditions of foreign rule (Ottoman, Habsburg) and evolved after the collapse of both Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Diversity in political order, historical traditions, religious relations, social, economic, political and culture development, relations with Europe, etc. are factors which stipulated different development of national consolidation processes of some Balkan nations. European enlightenment, evolution of science, intellectual elite, national propaganda and national state with its policy had particularly important part in the appearance and further development of national idea.

During the analysis of ethnic policy in the Balkans and other regions it should be taken into consideration that nation isn't eternal category but a product of lengthy and complicated process of historical development in Europe. According to the objective of our paper we can define nation as a big social group which was formed not by one but by many combinations of several types of impartial relations (economic, political, linguistic, culture, religious, geographic, historical, etc.) and their subjective reflection in the collective mind. M. Hroch rightly believes that majority of these connections could change places being particularly important in some countries during the national formation and not important in others. Though there are three constant components: historical memory of common past which is considered to be “destiny” of the group or at least some of its key elements; density and frequency of linguistic or cultural connections which ensure higher level of social communication within the group; equality concept for all group members that are joined in civil society¹⁸.

In the Balkans ethnic usually appeared and established itself in the struggle with foreign which was perceived as something negative and was subjectively reflected in collective mind. In this way were created ethnic stereotypes, myths, superstitions, which were an important part of public opinion and objective factor in the state policy¹⁹.

¹⁷ К. Манчев, *Националният въпрос на Балканите*, с. 338.

¹⁸ М. Хрох, *От национальных движений к полностью сформировавшейся нации: процесс строительства наций в Европе*, с. 122.

¹⁹ И. Томова, *Етнически стереотипи и предразсъдъци у българите*, с. 81.

Ethnic stereotypes cannot appear out of nothing, they have direct connection with the historical reality. In the history of Balkan politics appeared Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Montenegrins, Slovenes, Albanians, Turks, Muslims (Bosnia) and Macedonians. In the course of their evolution all nations were looking for possibilities of national manifestation, emancipation, freedom and national state as a result. Expected division of Ottoman and Habsburg Balkan heritage forced every nation to form the program for the solution of territorial demands. However, every program like this had simultaneously national emancipative and invasive hegemonic elements; all the nations tried to get bigger part from the Balkan pie. And as the most persuasive argument of the modern age was ethnic, every nation was trying to prove its national right which began with self-affirmation at the neighbor's expense. This opinion won and has been dominant ever since for several centuries. Politicians contributed to this fact as historical events were usually seen through national point of view – Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek, Romanian, etc. Mass media and political literature have seconded this opinion. Created in the countries atmosphere of self-aggrandizement and bringing patriotic flare to the people's resistance became favorable ground for the formation of ethnic stereotypes, myths and superstitions²⁰.

In our opinion, among factors which caused the formation of ethnic stereotypes should be mentioned internal exclusivity, lack of information about others, isolation of nations. National idea discarded multinational empires, conglomerate of people and lands, states which despised others; it became the main force that caused Ottoman and Habsburg Empires to collapse. This idea brought to life Balkan national states – Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and eventually Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Macedonia. Principle “a state for every nation” didn't work out in the Balkans and it couldn't be achieved as it is, so that there was a concurrence between nation, territory and state. Each newly-made Balkan national state conducted a liberator's mission and united the nation, at the same time aiming at the fulfillment of certain invasive hegemonic objectives. National emancipation, unification and territorial expansion were the goals which instead of unification, divided the nations and states and set them against each other. After destruction of great empires, national idea caused chauvinism, nationalism and extremism as political thinking, state policy and propaganda. Thus another extremity was formed, reanimation of the principle – the number of nations (and even ethnicities) equals the number of states, set against each other, closed and conflicting. I. Burkut writes that, “Power ethnicization in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia made federation collapse inevitable”²¹.

Discrepancies lead to isolation, limitation of contacts, objective information about others, their history, literature, economics, politics, etc. Information is either given in parts or distorted. This is how the environment is created which feeds ethnic stereotypes, hatred, superstitions accumulated through centuries, strengthens them and promotes. Thus, self-isolation, lack of impartial information are the main

²⁰ Ст. Грънчаров, *Към вопроса за отношенията между България и балканските страни (1900-1903)*, с. 192-196.

²¹ I. Буркут, *Югославия: перша спроба трансформации*, с. 136.

conditions with ensure the tenacity of ethnic stereotypes: empires fall apart, royal heads roll and governments collapse, political parties and ideologies are created and then disbanded, but ethnic stereotypes exist and occasionally destroy everything positive in people's relations²².

In the ethnic stereotypes of the Balkans the historical reality is reflected which created them but it isn't objective. For instance, Bulgarian-Turkish tandem. Perception spread orally in Bulgarian literature and folklore, shows Bulgarians as hard-working, hospitable, brave, with good intentions, fighters for justice, freedom and independence, modest and aspiring for education. Bulgarians have high national self-awareness, their country has interesting history, great kings and patriarchs and it contributed a lot to the world's civilization and culture. At the same time this literature, including the modern one, often points out that Bulgarian national idea has always been fair, that the wars conducted by Bulgaria were justified from its point of view – in the name of national emancipation and unification. There are certainly some self-critical moments – conformity, nihilism, submission before foreigners, etc. In comparison with Turks, Bulgarians consider themselves to be higher, as Turks' image is very negative. Bulgarians believe that the Turks are lazy, apathetic, tardy, uneducated, fanatic, superstitious, cruel and bloodthirsty. And vice versa Turks' image in the Muslim or Turkish interpretation is absolutely different: Muslims are faithful, strong, heroic, apt to power, war for the expansion of Islam is sacred and other people are not faithful, rioters and wretches, Satanists, etc²³.

In connection with the aforementioned tandem, we should also analyze another one – Turkey-Balkans, Muslims-Christians. In the foreground there is a question about the Muslims' destiny in the Balkans after the exile of Ottoman Empire from Europe²⁴. It can be usually stated that policy of Balkan national states regarding their Muslim population is similar and consists of exile, eviction and assimilation. In spite of this fact there is numerous Muslim populations in the Balkans. Thus, new territories in the South-Eastern direction with numerous Muslim populations were joined to Serbia as a result of 1912-1913 war (Vardar Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija). Government in Belgrade didn't acknowledge any minorities and proclaimed that all people on the annexed territory were southern Serbians. After the WORLD WAR1 and collapse of the Habsburg Empire, dense Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also included to the newly created state –Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – Yugoslavia, where they weren't considered as national or religious minority²⁵. Until 1929 Yugoslavian government viewed Muslims as a part of three-named nation – Serbians, Croatians and Slovenians, and from 1929 to 1941 they were considered to be Yugoslavians, which corresponded the Unitarian plans of the king Alexander. After the WORLD WAR2 in the J. Broz-Tito's federation they

²² М. Калицин, *Образът на „другия“ в османската наративна литература от XV-XVIII в.*, с. 44.

²³ И. Томова, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

²⁴ К. Манчев, *Мюсюлманските малцинства и групи в политиката на балканските страни*, с. 22-23.

²⁵ К. Палешутски, *Националният въпрос в Югославската федерация*, с. 96-98.

were seen as undefined Yugoslavians or as Muslims in a cleverer nation. Therefore several decades in a row Bosnian and Herzegovinian Muslims were between Serbians and Croats, which reinforced the ambiguity of their present condition – neither Serbians, nor Croats, but separate Muslim nation in the Balkans²⁶.

Numerous Muslim populations also remain in Bulgaria. There are two kinds of Muslims here: Bulgarian speaking and Turkish speaking; former are Bulgarian Muslims, that live in Rodop region, Loveshko and Pirin district, and latter are Turks in the Northern-Eastern Bulgaria and Kirjal²⁷. Despite the good neighborhood between Christians and Muslims, they have lived as closed communities, isolated from each other for over a century. There are a lot of reasons for the precautions, distrust, dislike and sometimes hatred between them, which have existed for a long time, and there are also new ones multiplied by the official policy of Bulgaria and Turkey²⁸. The same findings can appear during the analysis of history, national psychology, state policy regarding the ethnic minorities in Greece – almost everything is displayed negatively, aimed not at the integration of different ethnic and religious communities but at support of their internal exclusivity, self-isolation, mutual distrust, animosity²⁹.

Similar things can be observed in the west of Bulgaria during the analysis of the tandem Bulgarian-Serbs, Serbs-Albanian, and Serbs-Croats. Serbian ethnic image is “every Serb is a hero”³⁰. There are a lot of reasons for that: powerful medieval Serbian state (Dushanov kingdom); heroic resistance against the Turkish invasion of Balkans (battle in the Kosov field in 1389); own church and patriarchy during the Turkish rule (Ipek patriarchy, 1557-1767); military boundary and religious and educational autonomy in Prechansk during the Austrian rule; two big riots in the first part of the 19 century; creation of own state with specific national program (1844). As a new national state Serbia had always won in all the conflicts and wars – in 1914-1915 Serbs won the war with Austro-Hungary, in 1941 they started bloody war with Hitler and won in 1948, they challenged Stalin and won again. The only exception was Serbian-Bulgarian war in 1885, but Serbs couldn't be blamed for their defeat as it was their king's government which was too partial towards Austria³¹.

All these facts surely promoted the creation of united national image for the Serbs as a freedom-loving nation which has state-building abilities and never bends down in front of anyone. This leaves only one step towards the chauvinistic national idea. It constantly struggles with neighbors' ethnicity and is diligently developed in the folklore, literature, propaganda and politics displaying neighboring nations negatively. Thus, for instance, in 1913 after the Balkan War I, when Serbia invaded Vardar valley and its relations with Bulgaria were so full of tension that it could only

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 101-103.

²⁷ К. Манчев, *Мюсюлманските малцинства...*, с. 20-24.

²⁸ К. Манчев, *Националният въпрос...*, с. 75-77.

²⁹ Г. Панайотов, *Съвременни аспекти на националния проблеми в Румъния*, с. 262-263; А. Христакудис, *Мюсюлманското малцинство в Гърция*, с. 257-259.

³⁰ К. Манчев, *Националният въпрос...*, с. 342.

³¹ К. Палешутски, *Националният въпрос...*, с. 98-111.

mean an upcoming war, a brochure “Serbs and Bulgarians in the past and present” was published in Belgrade. It contained very negative description of Bulgarians as servile nation of Tatar descent, inclined towards cruelty, slyness, treachery, the one that had won only because of Russia and Serbia etc. Simultaneously Serbs were pictured as pureblood Slavs who fall and get up again and again, but never bend down; they saved their faith, nationality, pride during the German and Turkish invasion; they were born to be free and live in the center of Europe; their language could be heard from Subotica to the Iskra river and Sofia; Bulgarian was distorted Serbian language³².

There is surely a lot of literature which contains positive perception of Bulgarian brothers; there is certainly support of Serbian public opinion in favor of Bulgarian unification; but in all the cases national idea of great Serbian nation possesses Serbian society, and government in Belgrade is always trying to implement it. In the southern-eastern and eastern direction this concerns Macedonia and Western Bulgaria, including Vidin, Pernik, Radomir, Kiustendil, etc. Obviously this program causes Bulgarian resistance, which also dreams about Bulgarian Pomoravi expanding to the mouth of the river Morava on Danube. It is understandable that distrust and setting of one state against the other is permanently growing, and self-promotion and chauvinism at the expense of others, praising of native and criticism of foreign things are spreading. However, this can be defined according to G. Balakrishnan as return to the non-ethnic prerequisites of the Ancient world, where natural connections between families and ethnicity created sufficient grounds for political union³³.

The same can be observed during the examination of Serbian-Albanian relations. During the Balkan wars Serbian society was against the idea of creation independent state and at that time publications appeared proving that Albanians were not Serbs, that they weren't ready for the sovereign state and that Albania should belong to Serbia. In fact Serbian politicians didn't manage to prevent the creation of Albanian state, but they managed to annex densely populated by Albanians Kosovo and Metohija, by calling those people (together with Macedonian population) southern Serbs until 1941. Serbian and republican Yugoslavian policy regarding Albania during the World War 2 and after it had invasive hegemonic essence; it was particularly strong about the fact that Albanian union with Yugoslavia was seen as a latent unclear perspective for the creation of Balkan communist federation with the domination of Serbian Yugoslavian republic. In the present time Serbia tried to force Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija give up their autonomous rights and keep the state political status of this province as Serbian.

Besides the problems in the East and Southern-East, Serbia has a serious problem with Croats in the West. In the 19 century Croat nationalist concept was born which implied unification of all southern Slavs (as it was put the heirs of former Ilirs) in Great Croatia. Ideas of great Croatian state were hindered by the Serbian propaganda which viewed Serbs as the state-building element and favored territorial

³² К. Манчев, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

³³ Г. Балакришнан, *Национальное воображение*, с. 274.

expansion which didn't exist in reality but threatened sovereignty of other people, including Croats. It caused a conflict between the supporters of the nationalist ideas in Serbia and Croatia, as they excluded each other in theory. There were no positive forecasts for the victory. Yugoslavism was conceived as an alternative for the confrontation – in the beginning of 20 century idea that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are one nation was particularly popular. On this ground in 1918 a common state, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was created³⁴. Nevertheless, it didn't bring the expected tranquility. The idea didn't prove to be durable and national hegemonic stereotypes became popular again. In 1928 Serbian nationalist shot Croatian deputy in the People's Council in Belgrade, in 1939 Croatian autonomous district was created and Serbs and Croats renewed their struggle with Bosnia, it is now well known that such actions are typical for the relations between Kraina, Slovenia, Bosnia. And everyone considers themselves to be right, positive hero, everyone has national rights, and others, neighbors-rivals are pictured in the negative light³⁵.

This is also typical for the analysis of national stereotypes, myths and beliefs regarding Greece and its neighbors, viz. tandems Greeks-Turks, Greeks-Bulgarians, Greeks-Albanians. Greek national stereotype contains well-developed arrogance – Greece is a country with past grandeur, immediate heir of ancient Hellas and medieval Byzantium, in the Ottoman period it had its own patriarchy in Tsarigrad, and it was the first independent national state in the Balkans which created its great-power ideological program. It should be observed that in Greek ethnic stereotypes two components can always be found: Turkish factor as a threat and competition (Tsarigrad, Smirnen region, Eastern Trackia, Cyprus) on the one hand, and Slavic threat from the North, on the other. That is why it seems natural that contacts and relations with others are mostly negative (distrust, arguments, conflicts and wars – both hot and cold, mythical, etc.)³⁶.

At the same time it should be pointed out that the idea of great power, confrontation, conflicts and megalomania sometimes recoil before the idea of understanding, cooperation and global unification. Two world wars, for example, brought the Yugoslavian society to the union path: the first one did it through the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the second one – through the J. Broz Tito's communist federation. Aspiration for the unification, economic, political and even international integration was rather strong long time after the World War 2, it proved to be strong enough to conquer certain national separatism. Against all odds the moment came when ethnic rioted against extreme centralism, all to achieve in our times confrontation, meaningless wars and ethnic cleansing³⁷.

While Bulgarian national issue had been in the center of Balkan problems before the wars in 1912-1918, after the World War 1 Yugoslavia became the most argumentative one. Besides ethnic problems and conflicts with neighboring countries,

³⁴ К. Манчев, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 313.

³⁶ А. Христукудис, *Мюсюлманското малцинство в Гърция*, с. 245-250.

³⁷ I. Буркут, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

it had its domestic national issue which affected the development of united country. Yugoslavian society gradually reached different decisions: unification as one state with was based on the concept of three-named nation; Serbian hegemony based on the Yugoslavian Unitarianism, which was developed enough in the Serbian point of view; communist federation based on the national equality of certain nations and minorities. However, not single one of these decisions proved to be long-lasting. As mini-empire, conglomeration of nations and minorities gathered in one country, Yugoslavia collapsed under the pressure of national idea, nationalism, separatism and extremism of some nations, republics, districts and regions. In the meantime possibilities for the new experiments aren't exhausted – both hegemony and communist federation are in the past now, confederation as state (or international) commonwealth of different nations hasn't been tried yet. Though resistance of the old system, which was trying to preserve itself with the help of power, hindered the development of this option³⁸. At present it is most likely that former Yugoslavs won't go back to the confederation. So they are left in this case with the principle "the number of minorities equals the number of states" which are separated from each other and closed and which mostly have strained relations between them.

History of the national question in the Balkans proves that national idea caused the formation of nationalism on the certain stage of its development. Nationalism being provoked by national propaganda and state policy turned into separatism and extremism. Arguments between ethnic nationalism and extremism on the multinational territory led not only to confrontation of some nations but to the meaningless wars, ethnic cleansings and mutual destruction. This could be observed in the development of Yugoslavian issue in the modern period as well as during the evolution of Cypriot issue after the World War 2.

History proves that nationalism, which changes into national extremism and causes interethnic wars and cleansings, is a product of society underdeveloped in the spheres of economics, politics and culture. In this case we can draw a parallel with communism, which was easily forced on backward countries. Transformation changes, which have been going on in the Central Europe, defeated communism, and democracy isn't strong enough yet. Certain vacuum was created as a result of these events and it is filled with modern nationalism and extremism. International community represented by the UN deals only with the consequences. It has been a mediator for the suspension of hostilities, passed resolutions, imposed sanctions, sent its forces to the hot-points, but it hasn't been able to prevent wars, cleansings and mutual destruction.

Thus, ethnic stereotypes are very important for the development of political relations in the Balkans. People from all nations and ethnic minorities, who live in the Balkans, have their chauvinistic national stereotypes, myths and superstitions which cancel each other out. Each ethnicity believes that it is great and Balkan Peninsula is small and there isn't room enough for everyone. History shows that the time of multinational empires, ruled by one nation, is gone. At the same time history has

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 138.

discarded chauvinism, hegemonic ideas, nationalism and extremism in the state policy, propaganda, thinking and behavior. Another extremity that the number of nations (and even minorities) equals the number of states with closed borders and confrontation also cannot be considered perfect. So the solution should be sought in the integration, freedom and democracy, in the common right to freely identify themselves, in the mutual acknowledgement, respect as accepted codes of conduct. The way for the acceptable co-existence of separate nations in the Balkans without tension, ethnic cleansings and animosity of different states should be seen in this direction.

USA, RUSSIA AND THE GEOPOLITICAL THEATRE IN THE SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE: THE PLACE OF ROMANIA

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“With America - given the contradictory roles it plays in the world - fated to be the catalyst either for a global community or for global chaos, Americans have the unique historical responsibility to determine which of the two will come to pass. Our choice is between dominating the world and leading it”¹.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Rezumat: *Problemele de bază tratate în acest articol sunt: amenințările existente la adresa intereselor geopolitice și geostrategice ale SUA, în special în sud-estul Europei; resursele de care dispune statul american pentru apărarea acestor interese; principalele caracteristici (elemente) geopolitice ale României; importanța pentru România a alianței cu SUA. Singurele state sau grupuri de state care pot amenința interesele economice sau militare ale SUA provin din Eurasia: China, Rusia, Organizația de cooperare de la Shanghai, Uniunea Europeană. Principalul oponent al SUA în sud-estul Europei este Rusia. Interesul geostrategic fundamental al Rusiei rămâne încercarea de a diviza alianța NATO (în special prin oferirea de avantaje economice Germaniei și Franței) și de a izola Europa de est. În acest fel, prezența militară a SUA în Europa ar deveni problematică. În prezent, SUA dispune de mijloace militare și economice suficiente pentru a evita această situație.*

Problemele geopolitice și geostrategice ale României sunt de două feluri: externe și interne. În plan extern, România are neînțelegeri diplomatice cu Ucraina. Totodată, România nu a putut rezolva, în maniera fostei Republici Federale Germania, o consecință teritorială a celui de-al doilea război mondial: unificarea cu Republica Moldova, stat creat artificial de fosta URSS după cel de-al doilea război mondial. În plan intern, principalele probleme geopolitice ale României sunt următoarele: subdezvoltarea și lipsa de competitivitate economică reală a industriei și agriculturii, scăderea demografică, scăderea nivelului de trai al populației, dotarea necorespunzătoare a forțelor armate (mai ales în materie de aviație).

În lipsa sprijinului SUA pentru România, această țară își va spori gradul de dependență economică față de Rusia.

Abstract: *Core issues addressed in this article are: the existing threats to address the interests of the US geopolitical and geostrategical, particularly in South-Eastern Europe; the resources available to the American State for the protection of those interests; main features (elements) geopolitical of Romania; importance for Romania's Alliance with US. Only states or groups of states that may threaten the economic interests of the U.S. military are originated*

¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, New York, Basic Books, 2004, p. XIII.

from Eurasia: China, Russia, the Organization of Shanghai cooperation, the European Union. The main opponent of the U.S. in South-Eastern Europe is Russia. Geostrategical interests of Russia remains fundamentally the attempt to divide alliance NATO (in particular by providing the economic benefits of Germany and France) and isolate Eastern Europe; in this way, the US military presence in Europe would become problematic. Currently, the US has enough economic and military means in order to avoid this situation.

Geopolitical and geostrategical problems of Romania are of two kinds: external and internal. Externally, Romania has some diplomatic disagreements with Ukraine. At the same time, Romania was not able to resolve in the manner of the former Federal Republic of Germany, a consequence of the Second World War: the unification with the Republic of Moldova, the State created artificially by former USSR after the Second World War. Internally, the main geopolitical problems of Romania are the following: underdevelopment and the absence of real economic competitiveness of industry and agriculture; the demographic decline, lowering the standard of living of population. In the absence of support of the USA for Romania, this country will increase the degree of economic dependence towards Russia.

Résumé: *Les problèmes de base traités dans l'article ci-joint sont: les menaces existantes à l'adresse des intérêts géopolitiques et géostratégiques des Etats Unis de l'Amérique, spécialement au sud-est de l'Europe; les ressources dont dispose l'Etat américain pour défendre ces intérêts; les principales caractéristiques (éléments) géopolitiques de la Roumanie; l'importance pour la Roumanie de l'alliance avec les Etats Unis de l'Amérique. Les seuls Etats ou groupes d'Etats qui peuvent menacer les intérêts économiques ou militaires des Etats Unis de l'Amérique proviennent de l'Eurasie : la Chine, la Russie, l'Organisation de coopération de Shanghai, l'Union Européenne. Le principal adversaire des Etats Unis de l'Amérique dans le sud-est de l'Europe est la Russie. L'intérêt géostratégique fondamental de la Russie reste l'essai de déstabiliser l'alliance OTAN (en spécial par l'offre d'avantages économiques à l'Allemagne et à la France) et d'isoler l'Europe d'est. De cette manière, la présence militaire des Etats Unis de l'Amérique en Europe deviendrait problématique. En présent, les Etats Unis de l'Amérique disposent de moyens militaires et économiques suffisants pour éluder cette situation.*

Les problèmes géopolitiques et géostratégiques de la Roumanie sont de deux types: externes et internes. Sur le plan externe, la Roumanie a des diplomatiques problèmes avec l'Ukraine. En même temps, la Roumanie n'a pas pu résoudre à la manière de l'ancienne République Fédérale Allemagne, une conséquence territoriale de la seconde guerre mondiale: l'union avec la République Moldavie, Etat créé artificiellement par l'ancienne URSS après la seconde guerre mondiale. Sur plan interne, les principaux problèmes géopolitiques de la Roumanie sont les suivants: le sous-développement et le manque de compétitivité économique réelle de l'industrie et de l'agriculture, la diminution démographique, la diminution du niveau de vivre de la population, la dotation inappropriée des forces armées (surtout en matière d'aviation). Faute d'appui des Etats Unis de l'Amérique pour la Roumanie, ce pays augmentera le degré de dépendance économique envers la Russie.

Keywords: *USA, Russia, Romania, South-Eastern Europe, geopolitics, geostrategy.*

The influential American geopolitician (i.e. Zbigniew Brzezinski) is undoubtedly right considering that, in the complex international context at the beginning of the XXI century, the U.S. has a fundamental role in the global security.

Self-isolation², the conquest of this superpower by any military-political or economic coalition or its abandonment to the „American credo” and Western values³, may lead the world to a drastic reduction of the Western civilization influence⁴, and thus, to chaos. Starting from this situation, the basic issues addressed in this article will be the following: the existing threats to the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the U.S., especially in South – Eastern Europe; the resources possessed by the U.S. in order to defend these interests; geopolitical and geostrategic issues of Romania, a South East European state. The article will be accompanied by a series of final conclusions and consistent judgments of value.

Being yet the only military superpower of the world, the U.S. enjoys, naturally, such likes and dislikes. In the geopolitical and geostrategic plan, the U.S. enjoys all the advantages and disadvantages of a marine power. Eurasia is the main (in fact, the only) region of the world that could threaten the U.S. interests. This vast geographic region is the richest area (natural resources, companies etc.) and the most populated region of the world (about 75% of the world population). Except from the U.S., all declared and undeclared nuclear powers of the world are located here. From the same area come the only entities which are at the opposite pole and that could threaten the U.S. economy and military supremacy: the European Union, Russia, China and Japan⁵.

This situation is described, empirically, by Henry Kissinger: „Geopolitically, America is an island off the shores of the large landmass of Eurasia, whose resources and population far exceed those of the United States. The domination by a single power of either of Eurasia’s two principal spheres – Europe or Asia – remains a good definition of strategic danger for America, Cold War or no Cold War. For such a grouping would have the capacity to outstrip America economically and, in the end, military. That danger would have to be resisted even were the dominant power apparently benevolent, for if the intentions ever changed, America would find itself

² *Ibidem*, “But the potential self-isolation of the only superpower could plunge the world into escalating anarchy, made all the more ominous by the dissemination of weaponry of mass destruction”

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*, London, New York et al., Touchstone Books, 1998, p. 305: “Historically American national identity has been defined culturally by the heritage of Western civilization and politically by the principles of the American Creed of which Americans overwhelmingly agree: liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property. In the late twentieth century both components of American identity have come under concentrated and sustained onslaught from a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists”.

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 306-307: “Rejection of the Creed and of Western civilization means the end of the United States of America as we have known it. It also means effectively the end of Western civilization. If the United States is de-Westernized, the West is reduced to Europe and a few lightly populated overseas European settler countries. Without the United States the West becomes a minuscule and declining part of the world’s population on a small and inconsequential peninsula at the extremity of the Eurasian land mass”

⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York, Basic Books, 1997, p. 31.

with a grossly diminished capacity for effective resistance and a growing inability to shape events”⁶.

The main U.S. opponents in Eurasia, at the moment, are Russia and China. These states have managed to overcome, at a formal level, the territorial divergences which separate them (the 21st of July 2008 Treaty)⁷, situation which is in measure to contribute to the enforcement of the Organization for Cooperation from Shanghai (created on the 15th of June, 2001). Among the members are included: Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The aggregated surface of these states represents about 3/5 of the Asian continent, while their population (1.5 billion people) represent about a third of the world’s population. India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan have the status of „observer” in this forum, meanwhile Belarus and Sri Lanka are only „dialogue partners”. Although the declared purposes of the Organization for Cooperation from Shanghai make reference mainly to economical cooperation, fight against terrorism and insurance of a „peaceful, secure and stable” climate in the region⁸, the anti-American potential (at least at the economic level) of this coalition cannot be neglected.

At present, the Chinese economy has become the world’s second economy, after the U.S. The fact itself constitutes a geo-economic threat which could be transformed into a geostrategic one. The creator of „the offensive realism” in International Relationship Theory considers that, in case China becomes a gigantic Hong Kong, it could obtain a „latent power” three times higher than the one of the U.S. This could later facilitate the getting of a decisive military advantage in North – Eastern Asia⁹. The same author (i.e. John J. Mearsheimer), although, considers that both Russia and China do not possess yet a significant capacity in designing power (the possibility of sending military forces outside their national borders). For this particularly reason, these countries „find it hard” to develop an aggressive policy towards other states from that area (i.e. North – Eastern Asia)¹⁰.

Due to the superiority of uncontested, economic dynamism, military, scientific and technological knowledge of American society, there is currently no country of the world able to military confront the U.S.(with real chances of success). Confronting this situation, George Friedman, STRATFOR general director, considers that in the first half of the 21st century there will be attempts to form "coalitions of secondary powers which will try to control the United States". Naturally, the US will try to prevent the formation of this type of coalition¹¹.

⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York et al., Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 813.

⁷ John Chan, *Russia and China settle longstanding territorial disputes*, 2008, in <http://www.countercurrents.org/chan140808.htm>. Accessed in 28.11.2010

⁸ <http://www.sectsc.org/EN/brief.asp> Accessed in 28.11.2010

⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, *Tragedia politicii de forță. Realismul ofensiv și lupta pentru putere*, Filipeștii de Târg (Prahova), Editura Antet XX Press, 2003, p. 283. The original edition: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York, W.W. Norton, 2001.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 271.

¹¹ George Friedman, *Următorii 100 de ani. Previziuni pentru secolul XXI*, traducere din limba engleză Valentina Georgescu, București, Editura Litera, 2009, p. 14. The original edition:

On the European theater, the main threat to the US interests remains Russia, especially after the year 2001, trying to regain its status of former superpower. We believe that the essence of geopolitical strategy (and geo-economic conditions) of Russia on the European theatre was best revealed and (or) surprised by George Friedman: "the basic strategy of Russia will consist in seeking to dissolve NATO and to isolate Eastern Europe. The key of success will be the Germans, followed by the French. Neither of them wants a new confrontation with Russia. They are isolated nations, and Germany is dependent on Russia for natural gas. The Germans try to reduce this dependency and maybe even succeed to some extent, but they will continue to depend on the supply of a substantial quantity of natural gas, without which they cannot manage"¹².

Geostrategically thinking, the European "theater" has a special importance because, intrinsically, the U.S. military interests are related to the NATO interests. In this context, Russia may not endanger the U.S. interests' without endangering the NATO interests. Therefore, Russia logically follows a division policy of NATO.

Russia may divide the NATO'S European allies using on the one hand the anti-Americanism with cultural roots¹³ felt by a part of the elite in Western Europe, and on the other hand providing economic benefits or using various economic pressure types. In addition, we cannot underestimate the systematic subversion undertaken by Russian secret services¹⁴ (post 2002, amplified in the period of ex-President and the current premier Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin)¹⁵ against the U.S. interests in Europe.

In the framework of the economic pressures of the Kremlin, directed against the allies of the U.S., the hydrocarbons play a fundamental role. "Nevazisimaia Gazeta" published in 2006 statistics data on the countries dependent on foreign oil and gas from Russia. In accordance with this statistics, the countries in question were classified into three categories:

1. Energy Satellites of Russia – Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, the Czech Republic, Finland, Bulgaria and the Balkan States.
2. "Relatively independent" countries – Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Romania, Greece, Kazakhstan and Belarus.
3. Energy independent Countries of Russia – Norway, the Netherlands,

The Next 100 Years. A Forecast for the Twenty-first Century, New York, Doubleday Publishing Group, 2009.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 106.

¹³ Russell A. Berman, *Anti-Americanism in Europe. A cultural problem*, Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press publication, no. 527, 2004, passim.

¹⁴ Harry Chapman Pincher, *Treachery. Betrayals, Blunders, and Cover-ups: Six Decades of Espionage Against America and Great Britain*, New York, Random House Publishing Group, 2009, passim

¹⁵ Thierry Wolton, *Le KGB au pouvoir, le système Poutine*, Paris, Buchet-Chastel, 2008, passim.

Denmark, Spain, the United Kingdom, Japan, India, China and the USA¹⁶.

Overall, Europe depends in a 35-40% ratio on the Russian gas¹⁷. Finland depends 100% on the natural gas supplied by Gazprom, Austria in the ratio of 75% and Germany in the proportion of 45%¹⁸. At the level of the year 2006, the EU economy depended in the ratio of 52% on resources import. It is expected that this dependence will have reached 77% by 2020¹⁹. This weakens considerably the EU position in the negotiations for the price of oil and natural gas imported from Russia.

In economic matters, Russia practically uses the so-called technique of "invisible actions", described by Curzio Malaparte (the literary pseudonym of Kurt Erich Suckert) in *Tecnica del colpo di Stato* translated in English as *Coup D'état: The Technique of revolution*. Thus, Russia infiltrates itself in the economies of the east, center and west of Europe. As long as the legislation regarding trading and the activity of the NGOs in the Russian Federation is significantly different from that the occidental one, this state can emit a decree at any time and cancel all the economical advantages of the western firms or NGOs (including the American ones) from its territory.

In the military circle though, Russia isn't as well placed as in the economic one. With all the modernization measures taken by Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Dimitri Anatolievici Medvedev, the Russian army can't (yet!) present itself as a lethal adversary for NATO and the USA, but it can be a serious adversary. In the present, the Russian army is trying to recuperate the technological disadvantage registered compared to the USA army. Thus, the news agency RIA NOVOSTI was announcing on the 23th of September 2010 that Russia wanted to create an agency for the development of innovations in military technology, similar to the famous *Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)*. But we point out that this American agency was created in 1958! DARPA has for the year 2011 a budget of 3.1 billion dollars²⁰.

The aggressive actions of Russia in the economic circle (blackmail with cutting the gas supply for Europe) and in military one (to be seen in the Cecen and Georgian wars) are favoured by the perpetuation of the imperial Russia idea. The imperial Russian ideology is in the present the only ideology with a planetary vocation (conquering "everything from under the sun" - Sun Tzu, Art of War). The situation in the Caucaz denotes the fact that Russia hasn't given up the imperial politics of the

¹⁶ Vasile Nazare, *De la geopolitica forței la geopolitica petrolului* [From the force geopolitics towards the oil geopolitics], in "GeoPolitica. Revistă de Geografie Politică, GeoPolitică și GeoStrategie", anul IV, nr. 16-17, Bucharest, 2006, pp. 179-180.

¹⁷ Valeri Paniușkin, Mihail Zigar, Irina Reznik, *Gazprom. Noua armă a Rusiei* [Gazprom. The new weapon of Russia], translated from Russian into Romanian by Marina Vraciu, Leonte Ivanov and Daria Bighiu, Bucharest, Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2008, p. 294

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

¹⁹ Geantă, Nicoale, *Spațiul ex-sovietic și geopolitica conductelor* [The former Soviet space and the geopolitics of pipelines], în "GeoPolitica. Revistă de Geografie Politică, GeoPolitică și GeoStrategie", anul IV, nr. 16-17, Bucharest, 2006, p. 198.

²⁰ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2010/russia-100923-rianovosti03.htm> Accessed in 02.12.2010

XIX century, not being ready to become a British type of Commonwealth, capable to understand the legitimate interests of the former colonies/semi-colonies. In the current situation, Russia will still search to export the imperial idea, in order to offer its population a reason of satisfaction, in the presence of some acute internal problems (the demographic crisis, the aging of the population, Islam's provocations).

At present, there are a few chances that Russia will give up the imperial idea. We should mention in this sense the type of geopolitics professed by Aleksandr Dugin (www.geopolitika.ru, www.arktogeia.ru). Thanks to its imperial experience, Russia can mobilize in case of need against the West (at least at an ideological level) a multitude of populations more or less undeveloped inside its borders. This fact can be extended upon the Central Asian states, which are about to rejoin its circle of influence. The populations in cause (from the inside the Russian Federation and Central Asia) cultivate Islamic anti-occidental customs and, besides, have instincts and multi secular war customs. In the military plan though, Russia can't try anything serious against the West (and, implicitly, the USA) as long as NATO remains in its current state.

Anyway, the study of military history of the 19th-20th centuries proves the fact that Russia or the USSR couldn't fight with much success against the western military powers without the support of other eastern military powers. The Napoleon wars, the Crimea War (1854-1856) and the two world wars are illustrative examples in this aspect. At present, NATO represents an alliance of western military powers (the most powerful alliance in history!), which have the best military customs and the advanced weapons in the world. Because of this, without the fall of NATO, Russia can't find any western power with which to forge an eventual alliance. In this context, the American strategy with a view to counterattacking the aggressive geopolitical intentions of Russia in Eastern Europe remains to keep NATO in this part of the continent.

Nevertheless, the USA possesses consistent resources - situated outside NATO - to be able to face these threats. The USA has its own military and economic potential, still and has the most powerful economy in the world (strongly followed by the Chinese economy) and still is the only military superpower.

At the economic level, the differences between Russia and the USA are, categorically, in favor of the USA. So, in compliance with the data offered by The Global Competitiveness Index 2010-2011 (made by the World Economic Forum), in a classification made by us for five states with significant economic systems, Sweden takes the 2nd place (score: 5.56), the USA takes the 4th place (score: 5.43), Germany the 5th place (score: 5.39), China the 27th place (score: 4.84), the Russian Federation the 63rd place (score: 4.24)²¹.

At a military plan though, the results are also, net in favor of the USA (in comparison with Russia). George Friedman shows that the military fleet of the USA controls all the world's oceans and all the world's military fleets united are dwarfed by the USA's fleet²². Therewith, the military expenses of the USA are ten times larger

²¹ <http://gcr.weforum.org/gcr2010/> Accessed in 02.12.2010

²² Friedman, George, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

that those of Russia. In compliance with the appreciations of SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), the USA spent in 2009 in the military field 661,041 million dollars (4.3% of GDP, 2008), meanwhile Russia spent in the same year 1,693 billion rubles (61.000 million dollars), representing 3.5% of its GDP (2008)²³.

Leaving behind a part of the economic and military elements of the American power, the most important allies to the USA from Eastern Europe (Poland and Romania) dispose of significant demographic and economic resources.

Thus, Russia had in 2010 a population of 140,041,247 people, holding in this aspect the 9th place in the world. At this index, we point out that Nigeria is on the 8th place and Japan on the 10th place in the world. The growth rate of Russia's population is negative (-0.467%, the 224th place in the world in 2010)²⁴. Poland had in July 2010 a population of 38,482,919 (35th place in the world, on the 34th place being Kenya and on the 36th place Algeria). The growth rate of the population in this state was negative in 2010 (-0,047, 208th place in the world)²⁵. Romania had in July 2010 a population of 22,215,421 people (the 52nd place in the world, right after North Korea and a place in front of Syria). The growth rate of the population was negative that year, -0.147% (215th in the world)²⁶.

Poland and Romania have a significant economic potential. In matters of GDP (the indicator “purchasing power parity”), Poland was placed in 2009 on the 21st place in the world, with 688,300,000,000 USA \$, and Romania was ranged as occupying the 43th place in the world with 254,400,000,000 USA \$. For comparison, No.1 in the world at the same index (level 2009) – the UE is ranked first with 14,430,000,000,000 USA \$, **SUA is the second with 14,120,000,000,000 USA \$**, 3rd is China with 8,818,000,000,000 USA \$, Japan is on the 4th with 4,149,000,000,000 USA \$, India ranks 5 with 3,680,000,000,000 USA \$, Germany on the 6th place with 2,815,000,000,000 USA \$, the UK on the 7th place with 2,123,000,000,000 USA \$, **Russia occupies the 8th place with 2,116,000,000,000 USA \$** and France the 9th place with 2,094,000,000,000 USA \$²⁷.

Aided by the U.S. technology and financial resources, Romania and Poland can develop modern armies, able to withstand successfully to any Russian military challenges. The demographic resources of these countries, together with a possible transfer of American military technology (but also “civil” technology), would create a serious barrier to the eventual military advance of Russia in the area.

²³ <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4> Accessed in 02.12.2010

²⁴ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html> Accessed in 02.12.2010

²⁵ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html> Accessed in 02.12.2010

²⁶ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ro.html> Accessed in 02.12.2010

²⁷ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryName=Poland&countryCode=pl®ionCode=eu&rank=21#pl> Accessed in 02.12.2010

Poland has two strings to one's bow: a true market economy and law institutions which function properly. In Romania, however, these things are still just a goal. Within this context, the U.S. would help Romania in the process of creating a functioning market economy (economic investments included) and in the better functioning of the State. Only in this way, Romania can become a reliable and stable ally for the U.S.

A geopolitical issue not at all insignificant has been represented until now by the special Russian experience after the 1945 into the Romanian problems (*intelligence* matters included). The lower experience in Romanian matters of the United States and NATO can cause considerable slowdown of the process of Romania's integration into NATO structures.

On short and medium term, Romania could provide the U.S. a few inherent advantages. **First**, by controlling Dobrudja (i.e. a province of Romania), NATO restricts the field of action for the military-industrial complex of the Sevastopol (Crimea Peninsula), controlled by Russia²⁸.

Romania has proved over time that is inhabited by a population that has cultural figures representative of humanity (inventors and intellectuals), which have acted as a bridge between the Eastern and Western type civilizations. Well managed, this country can modernize and become a bulwark of Western defense in front of any Russian geopolitical and geo-economical threat. Summarized, geopolitical and geostrategic issues in Romania are of two types: external and internal.

Externally, Romania's geopolitics and geostrategy are decisively influenced by its location at the intersection between the influence spheres of NATO, EU and The Russian Federation. In addition, Romania has a policy of special relations with the Republic of Moldova. Romania has some diplomatic disputes with Ukraine. Moreover, Romania could not solve, in the manner of the former Federal Republic of Germany, a consequence of the Second World War: unification with the Republic of Moldova (the eastern part of the Romanian historical province with the same name), an artificial state created by the former USSR after the Second World War.

Internally speaking, geopolitics in Romania is influenced by a number of parameters regarding to geography, ethnicity, demography, economy, military, culture and religion. Romania's main geopolitical problems are the following: underdevelopment and lack of real economic competitiveness of industry and agriculture; population decline; declining living standards; inadequate equipment of the armed forces (especially in the field of aviation).

Romania is the largest state in South-Eastern Europe – 238,391km², 12th place in Europe²⁹ and 82 in the world³⁰. Most known experts believe that "the Romanian

²⁸ Florin Pintescu, *Geopolitica și geostrategia pontică românească între tradiție și actualitate* [Sea Romanian geopolitics between tradition and actuality], in "GeoPolitica. Revistă de Geografie Politică, GeoPolitică și GeoStrategie", anul III, nr. 14-15, Bucharest, 2005, p. 89.

²⁹ <http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/pdf/ro/cap1.pdf> Accessed in 10.12.2010

³⁰ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html?countryName=Romania&countryCode=ro®ionCode=eu&rank=82#ro> Accessed in 02.12.2010

geopolitical system" included three elements: The Carpathian Mountains, The Danube and The Black Sea³¹. The Carpathian Mountains provide a great economic value (mineral resources, forests, mineral waters etc.). Unfortunately, they have a relative military value because they do not represent a natural barrier for an attacker, because they are placed in the center of the country. If necessary, however, the Carpathians from Romania can be successfully used in the defense military actions. The Danube River in Romania has an important economic and commercial value, and the Black Sea is the only "gate" out of Romania to the open seas and oceans.

Currently, the Romanian economy is typical for a state economy underdeveloped, with a poorly developed industry and agriculture, adversely affected by the current economic crisis. In the industrial sector, Romania has many natural resources, most of them being not sufficient for the national economy: oil, coal (lignite, brown coal), gold, silver, copper and bauxite. However, Romania has over 2,000 mineral water springs, with valences Consumption and Medical Treatment. In addition, Romania has significant reserves of methane gas and salt³².

In terms of land for agriculture, show that 64.1% of them are arable land, 22.6 pastures, 10.4% hayfields and 2.9% vineyards and orchards³³. Although it has very good land for farming, Romania failed to gain significant positions in the world's major exporters of food. Currently, Romania has a population decline (see note 26, above). Proportion of population (0-14 years) decreased from 18.3% in 2000 to 15.3% in 2007. In contrast, the share of elderly increased (65 years and over) from 13.3% in 2000 to 14.9% in 2007³⁴.

The standard of living of the population has experienced since 1990, an almost constant decline. In accordance with data held at UN level (i.e. United Nations Development Program), Human Development Index places Romania on 50th place in the world. Note that this index has three components: life expectancy and health system ("health and long life"), level of education ("knowledge") and the "decent standard of living"³⁵. According to Multidimensional Poverty Index, Romania was in 2008 on the 50th place in the world. For comparison, Norway was placed on the 1st position in the world, Australia on the 2nd, New Zealand 3rd, **USA on the 4th**, Russian Federation on the 65th place³⁶.

The Romanian army is poorly equipped with weapons (especially aviation) for the purposes of fighting carried on a modern battlefield. Romania could - theoretically - buy Gripen aircraft, the Eurofighter or F-16 (the last type is already obsolete). As George Friedman show, currently Romania's problem is that it does not seem able to

³¹ Grigore Posea, *Geopolitica și geopolitică românească* [Geopolitics and Romanian Geopolitics], în Emil I. Emandi, Gh. Buzatu, Vasile S. Cucu (editori), *Geopolitica*, vol. I, Iassy, Glasul Bucovinei Printing House, 1994, pp. 347-348.

³² Vasile Simileanu, Radu Săgeată, *Geopolitica României* (Romania's Geopolitics), Bucharest, Top Form Printing House, 2009, p. 131.

³³ <http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/pdf/ro/cap14.pdf> Accessed in 10.12.2010

³⁴ Vasile Simileanu, Radu Săgeată, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

³⁵ <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ROU.html> Accessed in 10.12.2010

³⁶ <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/38406.html> Accessed in 10.12.2010

afford to buy - for financial reasons - not even 24 F-16, let alone the purchase of modern military vessels³⁷. Given the geopolitical problems of Romania, the alliance with the U.S. is now a *sine qua non* condition for maintaining its problematic independence. As a part of the final conclusion of this study on the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the U.S. and Romania in south-eastern Europe, we insert Paul Kennedy's assertions regarding the permanent character of the rivalry between great powers and the balance of power's relativity, which may change often. At the end of a famous work, the American writer states: „so far as the international system is concerned, wealth and power, or economic strength and military strength, are always relative and should be seen as such. Since they are relative, and since all societies are subject to the inexorable tendency to change, then the international balances can *never* be still, and it is a folly of statesmanship to assume that they ever would be”³⁸.

Any loss by the U.S. in the geopolitical and geostrategic competition for the control of the south-eastern Europe can produce on a short and medium term (up to 10 years) confusion in the American elites (and those from the countries that rely on the U.S.' support), the cooling of relations with the allies in Western Europe and the strengthening of Russia's power. For the long term, however, these effects would mean for the U.S. a nightmare for the American geopoliticians and experts in strategy: the domination of Europe by a single power and the removal of the U.S. economic and military influence on the old continent.

The hypothesis is not fantastic taking into consideration the demographic and economic regress and of the decadence of the culturally assertive Western society, plus a latent anti-Americanism fueled by a non-conformist and (often) unconscious intelligentsia.

In this context it is more suitable for the USA to sustain Poland and Romania in the geopolitical and geostrategy *cordon sanitaire* field, at least until Russia will clarify its intentions: imperialism or democracy? NATO outposts, these countries should play in case of necessity – according to the intrinsic logic of geopolitics and geostrategies – an effective role (not a theoretical one, at the level of the political statements "in principle") at the south-eastern border of this European organization. In any case, Poland and Romania have had many negative historical experiences with Russia, which is why they are vitally interested in the future positive alliance with NATO (and by implication, the U.S.).

The advantages obtained by the U.S. for supporting Poland, a state which is economically consolidated, with political stability, with long cultural and military traditions, with a significant Diaspora in the U.S. are obvious to everyone. The U.S. advantages for supporting Romania are less evident, because this state does not yet

³⁷<http://www.ziuaveche.ro/politica/geopolitica/8085-razboiul-ce-va-sa-vie-optiunea-geopolitica-a-romaniei.html> Accessed in 10.12.2010

³⁸ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York, Vintage Books, 1989, p. 536.

have a market economy worthy of the name, capabilities and military and cultural traditions like Poland.

However, Romania remains in the sphere of Russia's economic influence and intelligence without effective U.S. countermeasures, contrary to the U.S. geopolitical and geostrategic interests. This policy would remove the geographic and geostrategic policy and would extend the *cordon sanitaire* of Russia's geopolitical and geoeconomical future actions. The fact itself would simply become dangerous after reincluding Ukraine and Moldova in its sphere of influence, negating much of the results of the last two decades of the U.S. policy and diplomacy in Romania. In addition, Romania has direct borders with Serbia, a state with which Russia has had since the nineteenth century historical and cultural links that show the obvious public sympathy for Russia. The U.S.'s loss towards geopolitical and geostrategic competition in the south-eastern Europe is tantamount to a disaster for Romania (perhaps irreparably) in the short, medium and long term.

The pathological corruption, the failure (involuntary or interested!) of almost every action *pro bono publico* and intellectual sterility of the Romanian political class action in the past 20 years, made Romania ALMOST "failed" in politico-economic terms of. From the geopolitical point of view, this expression is manifested by loss of control over their strategic economic resources, the existence of an army poorly trained and equipped for the needs of the modern battlefield and an impoverished population and total lack of prospects for a decent living (taking into account western parameters) on short and medium terms. Taking into account this situation, Romania is now a defeated state on the whole line.

History demonstrates that the losers who have no assets cannot even determine friends - let alone the winners - to negotiate with them, being forced to accept unconditional surrender. While currently lacking any advantages, Romania can not seriously negotiate anything, neither with EU nor with Russia.

Lacking the intervention of the "overseas balancer" – the USA (in the opinion of John. J. Mearsheimer), the EU-Russia condominium actions (already virtually present in the country's economy) would place Romania in a delicate situation. Its geopolitical interests (and geo-economic as well) could be neglected by the EU in favor of Russia in exchange for Russian gas and economic resources. Russia (based on the tacit agreement of the EU) will maintain its sphere of influence in the Republic of Moldova, the Romanian historical province. Not to mention here of the fate of the Romanian territory now belonging to Ukraine, lost in favor of the former USSR, northern Bukovina, Hertza land, the former districts of southern Bessarabia. In case this scenario takes place, Romania can not lead an effective state, becoming a mere colony of the EU and (or) of Russia.

In case this scenario took place – which is very likely and possible if the Americans fail in the south-eastern geopolitics of Europe - the real elite of this neo-Latin state (not the political pseudo-elite!) would have only to think for a long time upon the tragic of the Latin proverb *vae victis!*

EDOUARD THOUVENEL
ET L'UNION DES PRINCIPAUTES ROUMAINES
(1856-1859)

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***Rezumat.** Personalitatea lui Edouard Thouvenel, diplomat francez al cărui nume s-a legat cel mai frecvent de realizarea Unirii Principatelor, pe parcursul anilor 1856-1859, este adesea și pe bună dreptate invocată în înțelegerea acestei importante secvențe a istoriei moderne a românilor de la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea. Născut la 11 noiembrie 1818, la Verdun, intrat în diplomație în 1841, însărcinat cu afaceri și ministru plenipotențiar (între 1846-1849), la Atena și apoi la München (în 1851), Edouard Thouvenel a fost numit director al Afacerilor politice în Ministerul Afacerilor Externe al Franței, în februarie 1852. În 1854, din cauza divergențelor avute cu ministrul de externe Drouyn de Lhuys, el va demisiona. Dar cariera îi este salvată chiar de Napoleon al III-lea, care îl numește ambasador la Constantinopol, în plin război al Crimeii (3 mai 1855). Își exercită apoi această funcție timp de cinci ani, 1855-1860, perioadă marcată de Congresul de la Paris, de chestiunea Principatelor Romane și de debutul problemei italiene, care provoacă demisia ministrului de externe în funcțiune, Alexandre Walewski, în decembrie 1859. Succesor deci al lui Walewski, Edouard Thouvenel, a ocupat funcția ministru al Afacerilor Externe pînă în 1862, când își va da demisia. În anii ce au urmat, a fost președinte al Companiei Drumurilor de Fier din Est, apoi mare referender al Senatului, în 1865. Thouvenel se îmbolnăvește în 1866 și moare la 23 octombrie, la numai 48 de ani chiar în momentul în care i se pregătea întoarcerea la Quay d'Orsay.*

***Résumé:** La personnalité d'Edouard Thouvenel, diplomate français dont le nom a été le plus fréquemment lié de la réalisation de l'Union des Principautés, le long des années 1856-1859, est souvent et justement invoquée dans la compréhension de cette séquence importante de l'histoire moderne des Roumains du milieu du XIX-ème siècle. Né le 11 novembre 1818, à Verdun, entré en diplomatie en 1841, chargé avec des affaires et ministre plénipotentiaire (entre 1846-1849) à Athènes et ensuite à München (en 1851), Edouard Thouvenel a été nommé directeur des Affaires politiques dans le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la France en février 1852. En 1854, sa carrière est sauvée par Napoléon III lui-même; celui-ci le nomme ambassadeur à Constantinople en pleine guerre de Crimée (3 mai 1855). Il a exercé cette fonction pendant cinq années, 1855-1860, période marquée par le Congrès de Paris, par la question des Principautés Roumaines et le début du problème italien, qui a provoqué la démission du ministre des Affaires Etrangères en fonction, Alexandre Walewski, en décembre 1859. Donc, successeur de Walewski, Edouard Thouvenel a occupé la fonction de ministre des Affaires Etrangères jusqu'en 1862, lorsqu'il demissionera. Les années à suivre, il a été le président de la Compagnie de Chemins de Fer d'Est, ensuite grand référendaire du Sénat, en 1865. Thouvenel a tombé malade en 1866 et il est mort le 23 octobre, à seulement 48 années, justement au moment où on préparait son retour à Quay d'Orsay.*

Abstract. *The personality of Edouard Thouvenel, a French diplomat whose name was connected most frequently to the achievement of the Union of the Romanian Principalities, between 1856 and 1859, is often and justly invoked for understanding this important sequence of the Romanians' modern history from the middle of the 19th century. Born in November 11, 1818, in Verdun, Edouard Thouvenel entered diplomacy in 1841, then was chargé d'affaires and plenipotentiary minister (between 1846-1849), in Athens and then in Munich (in 1851), and after that he was appointed director of Political Affairs in France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in February 1852. In 1854, because of the divergences he had with the minister of Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys, he resigned. But his career is saved by Napoleon III himself, who appoints him ambassador in Constantinople, while the Crimean War was in full deployment (May 3, 1855). He then exerts this function for five years, between 1855 and 1860, a period marked by the Congress of Paris, by the issue of the Romanian Principalities and the beginning of the Italian issue, which causes the resignation of the then minister of foreign affairs, Alexandre Walewski, in December 1859. So, being a successor of Walewski, Edouard Thouvenel secured the position of minister of External Affairs until 1862, when he resigned. During the years that followed, he was president of the Eastern Railroads Company (Compania Drumurilor de Fier din Est), then grand référendaire of the Senate, in 1865. Thouvenel falls ill in 1866 and dies on October 23, when he was only 48 years old, right when things were being prepared for him to return to Quay d'Orsay.*

Keywords: *Edouard Thouvenel, French diplomat, Congress of Paris, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian Principalities.*



La personnalité d'Edouard Thouvenel, diplomate français dont le nom a été le plus fréquemment lié à la réalisation de l'Union des Principautés, pendant les années 1856-1859, est souvent et à juste titre invoqué pour la compréhension de cette importante séquence de l'histoire moderne des Roumains vers le milieu du 19^{ème} siècle. Les circonstances très importantes et compliquées dans lesquelles Thouvenel a agi ont continué et continuent d'attirer l'attention des historiens, car chaque nouvelle découverte documentaire non seulement accroît son mérite dans les coulisses de la diplomatie de l'Union, mais aussi réduit, en même temps, l'espace de notre incertitude dans la recherche de cette problématique. Certaines études et textes introduisent même

à présent, dans le circuit des arguments, des détails supplémentaires qui attirent notre attention, nous aidant à avancer dans la connaissance du rôle joué par Edouard Thouvenel.*

Dans ce contexte, si nous ajoutons d'autres références aussi, il résulte un portrait dont l'utilité est incontestable et que nous ne nous proposons, pour le moment, que d'esquisser.

Né le 11 novembre 1818, à Verdun, entré dans la diplomatie en 1841, chargé d'affaires et ministre plénipotentiaire (entre 1846-1849), à Athènes et ensuite à München (en 1851), Edouard Thouvenel a été nommé autour du coup d'Etat de Napoléon III, directeur des Affaires politiques dans le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la France, en février 1852. On retient l'aspect que « *doué d'une aptitude innée, il a fait tout au service de la diplomatie.* »¹

Dialecticien de premier ordre, Thouvenel étonnait ses collègues par la qualité de la correspondance officielle qu'il rédigeait. En 1854, à causes de certaines disputes avec le ministre des affaires étrangères Drouyn de Lhuys, Thouvenel va démissionner. Mais sa carrière est sauvée par l'empereur même, qui le nomme ambassadeur à Constantinople, en pleine guerre de Crimée (3 mai 1855). Il exerce ensuite cette fonction pendant une période de cinq années, période marquée par le Congrès de Paris, par la question des Principautés danubiennes et le début des affaires avec l'Italie, qui conduisent à la démission du ministre de l'extérieur en fonction, Alexandre Walewski, dès décembre 1859. Pour le remplacer à Quai d'Orsay, Napoléon III fait maintenant appel à Thouvenel, encore jeune diplomate, mais bien connu pour ses qualités: « *persévérance, initiative et rapidité en actions* »²

Successeur donc de Walewski, Edouard Thouvenel a été le seul ministre des Affaires Etrangères pendant le deuxième Empire qui ne réclamait pas d'ascendance noble. « *Avouant un complexe d'infériorité en tant que jeune bourgeois, ayant à affronter la concurrence de nombreux fils d'aristocrates voués au service*

* Il s'agit, par exemple, de la publication, parue chez nous aussi, de certains extraits du livre de Louis Thouvenel, (« Trois années de la question d'Orient, 1856-1859 ») concernant la mission de son père en Orient, extraits insérés dans le tome *Români la 1859. Unirea Principatelor Române în conștiința europeană* [Les Roumains en 1859. L'Union des Principautés Roumaines dans la conscience européenne], vol. II, (coord. Ion Ardeleanu, Vasile Arimia, Gheorghe Bondoc, Mircea Mușat) Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1984, p. 239-350. Nous mentionons aussi, dans la même catégorie, Gheorghe Platon, *Diplomația europeană și Unirea Principatelor Române. O încercare de reevaluare* [La diplomatie européenne et l'Union des Principautés Roumaines. Une tentative de réévaluation], en « *Vârstele Unirii. De la conștiința etnică la unitatea națională* » [Les Ages de l'Union. De la conscience ethnique à l'unité nationale] (volume édité par Dumitru Ivănescu, Cătălin Turliuc et Florin Cântec), la Fondation Académique « A.D. Xenopol », Iași, 2001.

¹ *Dictionnaire du Second Empire* (sous le direction de Jean Tulard), Fayard, 1995, p. 1260.

² *Ibidem*.

diplomatique, il tenta, écrit son plus récent biographe, de compenser cette infériorité par un déploiement exceptionnel de capacité et d'assiduité »³

Thouvenel réussit ainsi être, peut-être, le plus brillant diplomate du deuxième Empire. «*La seule politique que je veuille suivre, écrit-il au duc de Gramont, au moment de sa prise de fonction, sera celle que l'empereur m'aura tracée et la pensée que j'exprimerai sera toujours celle de Sa Majesté*».⁴

Son expérience la plus récente, de 5 ans à Constantinople, s'est avérée sous tous les aspects décisive. Certes, l'emploi de Constantinople était un peu moins prestigieux que celui de Londres, où Drouyn de Lhuys et Walewski avaient fonctionné avant de devenir chefs de la diplomatie française, mais Thouvenel l'a occupé pendant un moment crucial.

Dans ce contexte, revenant au Congrès de Paris, nous observerons qu'ici ont été négociés, en fait, des aspects essentiels en ce qui nous concerne, la question des réformes en Turquie et celle de l'Union des Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie.⁵

Malgré l'alliance entre la France et l'Angleterre, le représentant de la dernière auprès de la Sublime Porte, Sir Stratford de Redcliffe, avait eu presque un plaisir d'entretenir la rivalité traditionnelle entre les deux pouvoirs en Orient. En échange, les résultats obtenus par Thouvenel pendant sa mission en Orient, où l'objectif minimal n'avait pas été d'obtenir le départ de son collègue anglais, mettent en évidence son allure de grand diplomate. Le fait que sa capacité de travail était considérable, ses qualités intellectuelles indiscutables et sa réputation en Europe assez solide parmi les chanceliers qui se dépêchaient de reconnaître le style et la force de sa dialectique, reflétés dans les dépêches que les représentants français véhiculaient, tout cela semblait suggérer que, une fois ministre, il allait garder longtemps la confiance de l'empereur.⁶

Ces capacités seront pourtant mises à une difficile épreuve par l'avalanche des événements: l'expédition en Liban, les affaires avec l'Extrême Orient (Indochine, Chine, Japon), le début de la guerre de sécession et l'intervention du Mexique, à laquelle Thouvenel se joint seulement après beaucoup de réticences.

Mais pendant sa période de trois ans comme ministre, Thouvenel se trouve impliqué surtout dans le développement de la question italienne. Lors de son arrivée à Quai d'Orsay, le jeune ministre était libre de toutes les préconceptions concernant l'Italie. Il ne s'opposait pas aux idées de l'empereur et avait clairement des amis qui nourrissaient des sentiments de sympathie pour les Italiens: Rouher, la Valette - l'ambassadeur français au Saint Siège, Benedetti - directeur dans le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la France. Entre temps, pourtant, certaines divergences apparaîtront et s'élargiront entre le ministre des Affaires étrangères de la France et Napoléon III. Ce qui a semblé intolérable à Thouvenel a été l'attitude de Napoléon

³ *Les Affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français*, Tome I, Paris, 1984 (sous la direction de Jean Baillou), p. 706; Lynn M. Case, *Edouard Thouvenel et la diplomatie du Second Empire*, Edition A. Pedone, Paris, 1976, p. 407.

⁴ *Les Affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français*,..., p. 707.

⁵ Lynn M. Case, *Edouard Thouvenel et la diplomatie du Second Empire*,..., p. 72-142.

⁶ *Les Affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français*,..., p. 707.

III, lequel essayait lui-même de satisfaire aux ambitions du royaume de Sardaigne, ou même de les anticiper, agissant comme si son ministre avait été incapable de s'adapter à l'ambiguïté de la situation. Pourtant, Cavour lui-même ne doutait pas cela. Encouragé par le prince Napoléon à faire preuve de courage, l'homme d'Etat italien s'imaginait l'empereur comme approuvant tacitement une conduite que son ministre des Affaires étrangères condamnait publiquement. Cavour appréciait que Thouvenel se prêtait à ce jeu: « *par conséquent, précisait-il, en même temps nous serons attentifs à le convaincre que nous ne le prendrons pas pour naïf.* » Pourtant, Napoléon III n'a pas voulu ménager son ministre de la sorte. « *Qu'est-ce que je puis faire ici, se confessait Thouvenel découragé à Talleyrand-Périgord. J'ignore les plans politiques de l'empereur. Je vais dans les ombres, sans buts, sans plans, avançant et parcourant une politique double et jamais expliquée.* »⁷

Pourtant, Thouvenel a commencé son activité de ministre avec l'intention de servir la politique dans laquelle l'empereur s'était engagé. En 1860, il négociera l'annexion de la Savoie et de Nise, mais en septembre, l'expédition de Garibaldi et l'attitude de Cavour vont provoquer la rupture par rapport au gouvernement de Turin.

Si son expérience diplomatique dictait à Thouvenel certaines réserves devant les événements survenus en Italie, celles-ci le conduisaient, pourtant, vers l'obtention de meilleurs résultats. En 1861 il reprend sa relation avec le nouveau royaume italien⁸ et travaille en faveur de sa reconnaissance par les pouvoirs européens. Mais en octobre 1862, lorsque le gouvernement de Turin demande sans ménagements à la France de rappeler ses troupes de Rome, Napoléon III, irrité, opte pour un langage ferme concernant les Italiens. Trop impliqué dans une politique qui l'a situé parmi les italophiles, il ne reste à Thouvenel que de démissionner. Son remplacement par le catholique Drouyn de Lhuys constituait maintenant un message clair adressé au gouvernement italien: Paris ne cédera pas concernant l'occupation de Rome.

Pendant les années suivantes il sera président de la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de l'Est, et ensuite *grand référendaire* du Sénat, en 1865. Thouvenel est atteint en 1866 par une maladie cardiaque et meurt le 23 octobre, même au moment où la Valette et Rouher préparaient son retour à Quay d'Orsay.⁹

En ce qui concerne les Roumains, pendant la période 1856-1859, la société roumaine était dominée par de grandes attentes concernant les possibilités qui pouvaient apparaître dans le contexte international pour la réalisation des objectifs nationaux. Les circonstances générales, ainsi que celles spécifiques, ont fait que le pouvoir vers lequel ces attentes se sont dirigées a été justement la France. La France elle-même a accepté d'appuyer les Roumains et a mis sa confiance en eux, partant de ses propres intérêts en Europe Orientale.¹⁰

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 708.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 709.

⁹ *Dictionnaire du Second Empire*, ..., p. 1260.

¹⁰ Dumitru Vitcu, *O meteahnă încă persistentă: cosmetizarea prin omisiune* [Un défaut encore persistant: la cosmétisation par omission], en « Xenopoliana » VI, 1998, no. 3-4, p. 22; Gheorghe Platon, *Diplomația europeană și Unirea Principatelor Române. O încercare de reevaluare* [La diplomatie européenne et l'Union des Principautés Roumaines. Une

En 1897, Louis Thouvenel, le fils d'Edouard Thouvenel, publiait à Paris le travail «*Trois années de la question d'Orient, 1856-1859*». Le travail a marqué un moment décisif, à notre avis, complétant ce qui avait été connu auparavant, car il reproduit et commente la correspondance reçue ou envoyée par l'ambassadeur français à Constantinople, Edouard Thouvenel (1855-1860), à certaines personnalités du monde diplomatique¹¹, ses appréciations ou observations concernant les événements qui se déroulaient et dans lesquels il était impliqué, mais aussi les constatations de l'auteur, Louis Thouvenel. Les informations fournies sont intéressantes et importantes, car elles apportent l'expression la plus documentée concernant la dispute diplomatique générée autour du problème de l'Union des Principautés Roumaines, déroulée à Constantinople. En même temps, elles expriment et clarifient en grande mesure la position d'Edouard Thouvenel, l'un des plus importants et représentatifs ambassadeurs de la France au moment respectif, impliqué peut-être le plus profondément dans la problématique complexe de l'Union des Principautés Roumaines, justement à cause de la place et du poste qu'il occupait.¹²

Très utile reste, indiscutablement, dans la connaissance de la situation des Principautés, la correspondance entre les consuls français d'Iași et de Bucarest (Victor Place et Léon Beclard) échangée avec l'ambassadeur Thouvenel.¹³

Celui-ci, bien qu'il ne manifestait pas de sentiments très profonds de rapprochement par rapport aux Roumains, et ne croyait pas que l'union des deux Principautés serait possible, sans connaître exactement les raisons de la position

tentative de réévaluation], en «*Vârstele Unirii. De la conștiința etnică la unitatea națională*» [Les âges de l'Union: de la conscience ethnique à l'unité nationale] (vol. éditée par Dumitru Ivănescu, Cătălin Turluc et Florin Cântec), Fundația Academică «A.D. Xenopol», Iași, 2001, p. 59.

¹¹ Le comte Walewski, ministre de l'Extérieur de la France, Benedetti, directeur au Ministère des Affaires Extérieures de la France, le duc de Gramont, ambassadeur à Turin, Talleyrand Périgord, représentant de la France dans la Commission européenne de Bucarest, les consuls français des Principautés - Léon Beclard et Victor Place -, Prokesch-Osten, agent diplomatique autrichien à Constantinople, Buol de Schauenstein, ministre de l'extérieur de l'Autriche.

¹² Gheorghe Platon, *Diplomația europeană și Unirea Principatelor Române...*, p. 61.

¹³ Iulian Oncescu, *Societatea românească în lumina rapoartelor consulare franceze de la Iași și București, în anii premurgători Unirii Principatelor (1856-1859)* [La société roumaine dans la lumière des rapports consulaires français de Iași et de Bucarest, pendant les années qui ont précédé l'Union des Principautés: 1856-1859], dans le vol. «*Franța - model cultural și politic*» [La France: modèle culturel et politique], vol. édité par Alexandru Zub et Dumitru Ivănescu, Editura Junimea, Iași, 2003; Idem, *The French Consular Reports: a Consistent Source of Information on the Romanian Principalities from 1856 to 1859*, en vol. "Europe as viewed from the margins. An east-central European perspective during the long 19th century (editors Ion Stanciu, Silviu Miloiu), Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2006, p. 163-190; *Documente privind Unirea Principatelor* [Documents concernant l'Union des Principautés], vol. VI (collection des documents, introduction, registes, notes et indices par Grigore Chiriță, Valentina Costake et Emilia Poștărița), Editura Academiei, București, 1980.

française, représenterait avec distinction et fermeté les intérêts de son pays. Heureusement, ceux-ci ont coïncidé avec ceux des Roumains.¹⁴

En général, tous les éléments indiquent une situation plus volatile que l'on admet, d'habitude, situation dans laquelle le succès des Roumains n'a eu aucune chance certaine d'elle-même. «*Je confesse que je ne pourrais pas partager votre confiance concernant le résultat du problème de l'Union des Principautés. La Porte et l'Autriche n'ont poursuivi que leurs propres intérêts. Nous voyons ici un intérêt général*», écrivait, par exemple, Benedetti à Thouvenel, le 15 juillet 1856.¹⁵

La victoire diplomatique de la France, obtenue pendant l'été en 1857 à Constantinople, le rappel de l'ambassadeur anglais Stratford Canning et l'éloignement de sa fonction du ministre des affaires étrangères turc, Réchid Pacha, sont dues catégoriquement, dans ce contexte, à Thouvenel.¹⁶ Comme récompense aussi pour tout cela, il sera nommé ensuite ministre des Affaires étrangères (1860-1863), sénateur de l'Empire et sera décoré de la Légion d'honneur.¹⁷

Revenant au problème roumain, après le Congrès de paix de Paris, de 1856, à Thouvenel, comme ambassadeur de la France à Constantinople, était revenue, en essence, la difficile mission de donner une expression concrète à la politique française et d'appuyer l'Union des Principautés de ce centre important de la politique européenne qu'était devenu Constantinople.¹⁸

Le ministre des affaires étrangères de la France, Alexandre Walewski, avait recommandé à Thouvenel de faire de son mieux pour arriver à l'union des Principautés, «*avec ou sans la volonté de la Porte*», et cela était aussi le désir de l'Empereur Napoléon III. Il n'y a, pourtant, aucun doute que l'empereur a imprimé à la politique française aussi son orientation personnelle concernant le problème des Principautés. A la base de celle-ci se trouvaient non seulement les intérêts de la France, mais aussi son orgueil et son inspiration. L'empereur s'est maintenu dans cette direction jusqu'à la rencontre de Osborne. La politique impériale n'est arrivée ainsi à être connue, le plus souvent, ni même à ses diplomates, fait démontré aussi par l'activité de l'ambassadeur français à Constantinople. Edouard Thouvenel constatait, en ce sens, seulement six mois après le Congrès de Paris, que le problème de l'Union des Principautés avait affecté tout le système d'alliances antérieur: la France était maintenant en opposition par rapport à ses anciens alliés de la guerre de Crimée – l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, la Turquie. Pour éviter l'isolement, elle s'est vue contrainte, par conséquent, à se rapprocher de la Russie, la Prusse et la Sardaigne. Celles-ci se sont rapprochées, à leur tour, de la France – selon l'opinion de Thouvenel – non à

¹⁴ Gheorghe Platon, *Diplomația europeană și Unirea Principatelor Române...*, p. 61

¹⁵ *România la 1859. Unirea Principatelor Române în conștiința europeană. Texte străine*, vol. II, ..., p. 254.

¹⁶ T.W. Riker, *Cum s-a înfăptuit România. Studiul unei probleme internaționale, 1856-1866* [La manière dont l'Union a été réalisée. L'étude d'un problème international], Editura Alfa, Iași, 2000, p. 139.

¹⁷ Gheorghe Platon, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 63.

cause de leur bienveillance pour le sort des Principautés, mais pour séparer Paris de ses alliés.¹⁹

Ayant contre elle la Turquie, l'Angleterre et l'Autriche, la France était vraiment obligée de s'allier avec la Russie, et Thouvenel était tout à fait inquiet dans ces circonstances du fait que la question des Principautés pouvait provoquer à la France même une défaite diplomatique, semblable à celle de 1840 dans les conditions de la crise égyptienne.²⁰

Se trouvant à Constantinople, Thouvenel comprenait donc les risques assumés par la France en appuyant la cause des Principautés. « *Une fois de plus, je pense que vous êtes impliqué dans une affaire d'envergure. A mon avis, - écrivait Thouvenel à Benedetti, le 21 juillet 1856 - la conjoncture favorable pour aborder le problème de l'Union des Principautés a duré de la fin des Conférences de Vienne jusqu'à l'ouverture du Congrès de Paris. Maintenant cette chose est très difficile. Pourtant, étant parmi les premiers qui ont avancé alors cette idée, je ne dois pas, à cause de ma responsabilité, cacher aucun des obstacles que j'observe dans la voie de sa réalisation. Donc, je ne vous cacherais pas ce que je ferais si j'étais le maître.* »²¹

Pensant certainement à cette conjoncture sans horizon clair, l'historien américain T.W. Riker décrit Thouvenel utilisant des superlatifs, et le considère un homme diligent, doué des qualités d'un ambassadeur - « *patience, force de caractère, subtilité.* »²²

En mars 1857, fidèle à ses propres observations, Thouvenel exprime ensuite de nouveau la crainte que la France se dirigeait soit vers un échec diplomatique total, soit vers une alliance surprise avec la Russie.²³

En juillet 1857, dans des conditions où la question roumaine devenait ouvertement explosive, par la falsification des élections de Moldavie, Thouvenel se demandait si entre la Turquie, l'Autriche et l'Angleterre existait justement un traité secret en vue d'empêcher l'Union des Principautés.²⁴ Il est rassuré pourtant immédiatement par Benedetti, qui lui communiquait le fait que le gouvernement impérial avait été au début très troublé par cette possibilité et avait entrepris des investigations minutieuses: « *Vous devez savoir, d'abord, - écrivait Benedetti - que M. Bourqueney affirme qu'il n'y a aucun traité, aucune convention ou aucun autre engagement, même sous la forme d'une note ou autre, et ajoute qu'il sait très bien qu'une telle affirmation ne lui permettrait de représenter ni même un jour de plus l'empereur à Vienne, si elle était démentie. Donc il n'y a aucun doute concernant ce sujet* »²⁵.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 64.

²⁰ *Români la 1859. Unirea Principatelor Române în conștiința europeană. Texte străine*, vol. II, ..., p. 256-257, 259-260.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 253.

²² T.W. Riker, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

²³ Gheorghe Platon, *Diplomația europeană și Unirea Principatelor Române...*, p. 66.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 67.

²⁵ *Români la 1859. Unirea Principatelor Române în conștiința europeană. Texte străine*, vol. II, ..., p. 302.

Malgré toutes ces clarifications qui auraient dû lui apporter de la paix, Thouvenel restait en proie au doute. Après l'entente d'Osborne, la politique française change ensuite de nouveau et radicalement, arrivant encore une fois à la possibilité d'une union administrative.²⁶

Thouvenel était maintenant tout à fait déboussolé par le saut enregistré par la position de la France, par rapport à ses opinions, et se disait: «*Je ne sais pas ce que nous avons à gagner si nous entretenons les illusions des Roumains*»²⁷.

A la fin de l'année 1857, Thouvenel arrivait à croire que la question de l'union est même perdue.²⁸ Ainsi, Thouvenel écrivait, le 30 décembre 1857, à Benedetti: «*Je ne doute pas que la question de l'union des Principautés est perdue et je vous ai partagé, dès l'année passée, mes tristes prévisions en ce sens. Ce qui m'ennuie c'est qu'ils sembleraient ne pas se contenter avec le succès que nous avons obtenu après la rupture. En ce qui concerne les Moldaves et les Vlaches, la chute est très difficile, de l'hauteur de leurs fameux quatre points.*»²⁹

Même plus tard, en 1859, Thouvenel considérait que la Convention du 19 août 1858 allait être modifiée, bien qu'au début il avait tendance à croire que cette convention était avantageuse pour les Roumains: «*Evidemment, la combinaison n'est pas très bonne, mais c'est ça le sort des ouvrages collectifs et, enfin, elle est meilleure que j'avais imaginé. (...) Les Moldo-Vlaches me doivent, en tout cas, la titulature de Principautés Unies. En ce qui concerne le reste, je m'en lave les mains*» - relatait Thouvenel à Benedetti le 25 août 1858, avec le scepticisme de celui accablé par les nombreux changements et dangers qu'il pouvait entrevoir.³⁰

«*A mon avis - écrivait Thouvenel à Amédée Outrey (premier dragoman de l'ambassade française à Constantinople), le 18 février 1859 -, la Convention du 19 août de l'année passée peut durer sans modifications, et toute modification ne pourra travailler que dans le sens de l'union. La Porte, agissant adéquatement, regagnerait tout ce que les mauvais conseils lui ont fait perdre*»³¹.

En réalité, comme les choses l'ont démontré par la suite, la convention a survécu bien longtemps en tant que cadre profitable aux Roumains, jusqu'à ce que eux-mêmes aient considéré qu'elle devait être changée par eux-mêmes.

Pendant tout le temps de la crise européenne provoquée par la question roumaine, le diplomate français a agi, évidemment, avec la conviction que l'Autriche ne cédera rien et que le «*nœud des disputes*» se trouve à Vienne: «*Le nœud des discussions se trouve à Vienne et, si l'on ne réussit pas de le délier d'un commun*

²⁶ Leonid Boicu, *Unirea Principatelor Române în dezbaterile forumurilor internaționale* [L'Union des Principautés dans les débats des forums internationaux], dans le vol. «*Unirea Principatelor și puterile europene*» [L'Union des Principautés et les pouvoirs européens], Editura Academiei, București, 1984; T.W. Riker, *op. cit.*, p. 126-136.

²⁷ *România la 1859...* vol II., p. 315; Gheorghe Platon, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

²⁸ Gheorghe Platon, *Diplomația europeană și Unirea Principatelor Române...*, p. 69.

²⁹ *România la 1859. Unirea Principatelor Române în conștiința europeană. Texte străine*, vol. II, ..., p. 320.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 339.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 346.

accord, je ne suggérerai pas qu'il soit coupé. Je doit confesser qu'à la place de l'empereur Franz Joseph je ne céderais pas dans la question de l'union que devant une menace par la guerre et, même dans ce cas-là, j'aimerais avoir une opinion décisive concernant l'élection du prince. La Turquie n'a aucune objection valable à faire. L'Autriche en a dix. Je sais qu'on peut répondre qu'elle ne pourra pas avoir la vallée du Pô et celle du Danube en même temps. C'est, vraiment, mon opinion aussi, mais je crois aussi que, quoi qu'on fasse, si l'Autriche ne gagne pas la première place dans la Vallée du Danube, la Russie sera celle qui regagnera [le fleuve] » - écrivait Thouvenel à Benedetti, dans les mêmes circonstances.³²

Pourtant, l'Union des Principautés a représenté, en dernière instance, une victoire diplomatique de la France et un succès de l'ambassadeur Edouard Thouvenel. Dans ce contexte, Victor Place communiquait, le 25 janvier 1859, à Thouvenel, se référant à la double élection d'Al.I. Cuza: « *C'est le plus étonnant triomphe de la politique française* »³³.

Si nous tenons compte des doutes de Thouvenel, de la fragilité des situations dans lesquelles il a navigué lui-même sans certitudes concernant le parcours, il reste à observer que ce triomphe a été dû à des qualités extrêmes de cette politique: la persévérance et, en même temps, la flexibilité, la prudence et le courage, la confiance en soi et l'inspiration au moment du changement de direction. L'art diplomatique a concouru, évidemment, dans cette politique avec l'habileté déconcertante de l'empereur Napoléon III, le grand maître des combinaisons dans la politique interne et internationale qu'il a été, jusqu'à un certain point. Et dans ce contexte, la chance de l'Union des Principautés, même tellement fragile, a été promptement et entièrement fructifiée par les Roumains, après 1856, dans des circonstances où ils se sont avérés à la hauteur des plus grandes attentes du moment.

³² Gheorghe Platon, *op. cit.*, p. 71; *Români la 1859*, ...vol. II..., p. 249-250.

³³ *Români la 1859. Unirea Principatelor Române în conștiința europeană. Texte străine*, vol. II, ..., p. 249-250.

GRIGORE ALEXANDRU GHICA AND THE NATIONAL BANK OF MOLDAVIA

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Rezumat: În cursul secolului al nouăsprezecelea, necesitatea creării unei bănci a Moldovei a reprezentat un scop esențial în dezvoltarea și modernizarea principatului, ca și în stoparea haosului financiar generat de lipsa creditului, care, la rândul ei, determina ruina progresivă a categoriei sociale a proprietarilor. Folosind o metodă analitică bazată pe o abordare diacronică și pe o varietate de surse, am încercat să prezentăm concis ideile și acțiunile vizând această problemă din partea lui Grigore Alexandru Ghica, atât înainte, cât și după numirea sa ca domnitor.

Abstract: During the nineteenth century, the need for the creation of a Bank of Moldavia signified a major goal in the development and the modernization of the principality, as well as in putting an end to the financial chaos generated by the lack of currency, which in turn led to the progressive ruin of the landowners' class. Using an analytical method based on a diachronic approach and on a variety of sources, we attempted to concisely describe Grigore Alexandru Ghica's ideas and actions related to this problem, both before and after his nomination as Hospodar.

Résumé: Le long du XIX-ème siècle, la nécessité de la création d'une banque de la Moldavie a représenté un but essentiel dans le développement et la modernisation de la principauté, mais aussi dans la finalisation du chaos généré par le manque du crédit, qui, à son tour, déterminait la ruine progressive de la catégorie sociale des propriétaires. Tout en utilisant une méthode analytique basée sur un abord diachronique et sur une variété de sources, on a essayé à présenter de manière concise les idées et les actions visant ce problème de la part de Grigore Alexandru Ghica, avant, mais aussi après sa nomination comme prince régnant.

Keywords: Bank, loan, diplomacy, Russia, Prussia, Nulandt, Austria.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the adverse effects of the Phanariot rule of the Principalities became increasingly present in the economy of these provinces, leading to multiple memos being directed to European powers. Generally written by anti-Ottoman and anti-Phanariot boyars, these texts often included the diminution of the tribute due to the Porte and the elimination of the Ottoman commercial monopoly among their themes. The fact that some of these boyars were

involved in commercial enterprises, while others looked for ways of improving their means of income was, therefore, illustrative for their motivations¹.

On the other hand, the period leading to 1821 saw the rapid development of manufactures and commerce in Moldavia and Wallachia. This, in turn, imposed the necessity of a more coherent and stable financial organization, in order to safeguard and further the modernization process². Also, this need was accentuated by the appalling situation resulting from the usurers' economical practices. Apart from benefitting from the multitude of foreign coins on the market (the „leu” being a fictive currency), by selling them at much higher prices, the usurers frequently borrowed sums of money with interest rates as high as 24%, sometimes even more. In the countryside, the payment was made mostly in products or labour, which came to equal up to 300% the value of the initial loan³.

Taking into account these realities, it can be ascertained that the events of 1821 contributed dramatically to the impulse towards institutional development. The eagerness with which the Romanians aspired to be a part of Europe⁴ was demonstrated by the various projects calling for reform and modernization.

Although it had positive consequences, the financial context which followed the year 1821 came with its own set of problems. The biggest was the increase in the usurers' damaging influence, as they began to undertake new types of activities: payments abroad, deposits, loans granted to treasuries and individuals either on guarantees or on mortgages, mining and import-export operations. Between 1830 and 1860, Moldavia had 21 financial establishments located in Galați and one (the Jew Michel Daniel's) in Iași. Almost all of these belonged to foreigners who benefitted from consular jurisdiction, receiving and borrowing money at low interest rates from abroad; as we have seen, the sums were afterwards lent in the Principalities at extremely high interest rates. Thus, these establishments were almost not at all trusted by locals⁵.

Originating from Occidental Europe, the new impulses towards political, economical and social development found a strong and favourable echo in Moldavia and Wallachia, which was amplified by the signing of the Adrianople treaty in 1829. The stipulations of this document, essential element in the historical context which Apostol Stan defined as “the detachment from the Ottoman market and the attachment to Europe”⁶, were followed by the imposition of the Organic Rule, which had the benefit of organizing the different areas of life in the two countries, in a more efficient and coherent fashion.

¹ Constantin Velichi, *România și renașterea bulgară*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1980, pp. 61-62.

² Alexandru Pintea, Gheorghii Ruscanu, *Băncile în economia românească*, Editura Economică, București, 1995, p. 17.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 13-15.

⁴ Constantin Velichi, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁵ Alexandru Pintea, Gheorghii Ruscanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

⁶ Apostol Stan, *Independența României. Detașarea de piața otomană și ratașarea de Europa (1774-1875)*, Editura Albatros, București, 1998.

The war of 1828-1829 and the subsequent signing of the Adrianople treaty signified the end of the Ottoman economic and commercial monopoly, strengthening in turn the tsar's influence in the Principalities. Another important consequence was the opening created for other foreign powers, such as the British Empire, which found a new market for its manufactured products⁷, and France, which entertained political interests as well, taking into account its immense cultural influence. By 1850, the trade activity between these two powers and the Porte had grown significantly⁸. It is noteworthy, however, that these new ties also played a major role in hindering the development of local commerce in Moldavia and Wallachia, a negative evolution brought along by the advantages contained in the European powers' treaties with the Porte and by the apparition of foreign traders⁹. On the other hand, the influx of European currency into the Ottoman provinces, made possible through foreign industrial or commercial companies¹⁰, can be viewed as a positive consequence. Another one was the growth of Moldavia's commerce: between 1843 and 1847, its exports rose from 26 million lei to 52 million lei¹¹.

Along with Wallachia, the principality was located in a key area for the promotion of economical interests. Following the treaty mentioned above, the two countries' emergence as new markets for goods exchange and transportation implied the necessity of a more coherent systematization of their administrative and economic branches. Based on this viewpoint, the existence of a bank would have certainly created a more stable financial climate, assuring an increased safety of economic and commercial transactions. It is also to be noted that the economic activities before 1850 were already making extensive use of modern banking tools such as bills of exchange, checks, letters of credit and transfer documents¹².

A major and recurrent problem of the period, with which the neighbouring provinces were also struggling, was the lack of hard currency. Therefore, it was only natural that the efforts toward creating a bank become a common tendency in the area. In Bucovina, a first attempt was made in 1841¹³. Around the same time, between 1841 and 1842, Transylvania's Diet debated the formation of a special commission, which was to draft a project to strengthen the circulation of currency. It was, however, only ten years later that Carol Schwarzenberg, the province's new governor, ordered the creation of such a commission at Sibiu, with the task of conceiving the project of a bank¹⁴. It is also to be noted that Transylvania's situation was somewhat better, given the existence of various financial establishments, albeit the fact they belonged

⁷ Alexandru Pinte, Gheorghii Ruscanu, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁸ Constantin Velichi, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

⁹ Alexandru Pinte, Gheorghii Ruscanu, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁰ Constantin Velichi, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

¹¹ Alexandru Pinte, Gheorghii Ruscanu, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 22.

¹³ Ioan Cocuz, Dumitru Cucu, *Băncile și creditul funciar românesc în Bucovina (1840-1918)*, Grupul Editorial Mușatinii România Viitoare, Suceava, 1999, p. 27.

¹⁴ Eugeniu Merce, *Băncile din Transilvania și rolul lor (1848-1918)*, Editura Burg, Sibiu, 2003, pp. 11-12.

to Austrians, Magyars, Saxons and Swabians, who generally refused to collaborate with Romanians¹⁵.

In Moldavia, one of the first to recognize the necessity for the creation of a bank was Nicolae Suțu, who drafted two projects for such establishments in 1834. While the first proposed foreign aid in the foundation of a damping bank, which would grant loans on a term of five years, the second projected the creation of a commercial bank in Galați, which would deal in financial operations such as deposits, discounts, savings and circulation¹⁶.

Besides Nicolae Suțu, it can be ascertained that Grigore Alexandru Ghica, future Prince of Moldavia between 1849 and 1856, was also among the high-ranking personalities who shared the idea of a necessity of a bank. Son of Alecu Ghica, one of the most respected Moldavian boyars, he was appointed in several public positions in the administrations of the princes Ioniță Sandu Sturdza (1822-1828) and especially Mihail Sturdza (1834-1849), his uncle. An important observation related to our subject is that the most important office Grigore Alexandru Ghica held before his appointment as ruler of Moldavia was that of Finance minister.

Nominated in this function on July 18, 1843¹⁷, the hetman quickly became more and more involved and interested in the principality's economic and financial issues, attracting not only the General Assembly's praise¹⁸, but also the admiration of Jacob Dașcov, the Russian consul in Iași¹⁹. If the first congratulated him on the precise and thorough management of the financial issues which emerged in 1843-1844²⁰, the second approved of the honest manner in which Grigore Alexandru Ghica presented the difficulties brought along by Mihail Sturdza's fiscal policy²¹.

Even so, some of his decisions and actions, mostly related to Moldavia's urban development, were not unanimously applauded. In December 1843, he took a negative stance in regard to the complaints made by the furriers of Huși, according to which the Jews were charging them retail prices²². Again, in March 1844 he rejected the request formulated by a deputy of the General Assembly, that all procedures

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 54.

¹⁶ Alexandru Pinteau, Gheorghe Ruscanu, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

¹⁷ Direcția Arhivelor Naționale Istorice Centrale București, fond "Grigore Al. Ghica – Moldova, 1833-1857; 1860", document 12.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, document 13; see also Anastasie Iordache, *Principii Ghica. O familie domnitoare în istoria României*, București, Editura Albatros, 1991, p. 180.

¹⁹ Ioan C. Filitti, *Domniile Române sub Regulamentul Organic 1834-1848*, București, Librăria Socec & Comp. și C. Sfetea, 1915, pp. 527-528.

²⁰ Direcția Arhivelor Naționale Istorice Centrale București, fond "Grigore Al. Ghica – Moldova, 1833-1857; 1860", document 14.

²¹ Ioan C. Filitti, *op. cit.*, p. 528: "He (Grigore Alexandru Ghica) did not hesitate to tell him (Mihail Sturdza) that [...] the financial situation leaves much to be desired. The cash reserve had a budget deficit of 18.000-19.000 ducats, taken by the Prince for the repair of the princely court. The workers at Socola are not paid".

²² Eugen Pavlescu, *Economia breslelor în Moldova*, București, Fundația "Regele Carol I", 1939, p. 461.

related to some “usurpations made [by Mihail Sturdza, our note] through fictive exchanges”, which had caused annual losses of 8000 ducats to the Church of Moldavia, be annulled²³.

It is our opinion that Grigore Alexandru Ghica’s gradual contact with the European ideas and principles of progress played a key role in his increasing commitment on the path of profound structural reforms. After leaving the Finance Department, the future Prince of Moldavia became more and more concerned with the adoption of modern measures, which would greatly contribute to the development of the principality. On January 20, 1846, he was one of the boyars who issued a request to grant a “privilege for the creation of a railroad track between Mihăileni and Galați”²⁴. This group of boyars, whose main area of interest was “goods exchange”, argued for the utility of building such an infrastructure, mentioning that steam power was “the principle of happiness in great countries and the condition for existence of the lesser ones as far as industry and commerce are concerned”²⁵.

From the perspective of our subject, the moment in which Grigore Alexandru Ghica publicly expressed himself in favour of the establishment of a bank of Moldavia came on July 9, 1847. Taking advantage of Leipzig-born Prussian merchant Karl Reinecke’s presence in Iași, he subscribed, along several other boyars, to the request of creating a discount and rural credit bank²⁶; the loans could be granted either on collaterals, or through mortgages²⁷. The new institution, which would be called “Institution allemande particulière de crédit”, had as its main goal to eliminate the necessity of usury, a practice used by most landowners. The essential measure for achieving this consisted of the offer of low-interest loans, with a rate of minimum 2% less than the legal rate, which was 10%²⁸.

The act in question, in fact a mandate, stipulated that the payment of debts would be facilitated by a liquidation system, based on the creation of an absorption house. Other operations than those related to loans and funds transfer were forbidden; the only exception, which concerned the domain of agriculture, was the possibility to distrain the estate of a debtor, in case of loan payment-related difficulties. The boyars who signed the mandate “pledged to contribute to the constitution of the enterprise’s assets, but without fixing the exact sum of each one’s contribution”; moreover, they

²³ Duclos to Guizot, Iași, March 15, 1844, in Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi, *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor*, XVII, *Correspondență diplomatică și rapoarte consulare franceze (1825-1846)*, Nerva Hodoș (ed.), București, 1913, p. 1006.

²⁴ *Dezvoltarea economiei Moldovei între anii 1848-1864. Contribuții*, coord. Valerian Popovici, București, Editura Academiei, 1963, p. 467.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 465.

²⁶ Ioan C. Filitti, *op. cit.*, p. 597.

²⁷ G. Zane, *Cea dintâi Bancă Națională a Moldovei*, in “Arhiva”, year XXXIII, no. 1, 1926, p. 110.

²⁸ Ioan C. Filitti, *op. cit.*, p. 597.

“reserved the right to participate in the draw-up of the statutes and to be represented by the bank’s management and control bodies”²⁹.

Although, from the perspective of modernizing Moldavia’s institutions and stimulating economic life, this initiative was welcome, there were major deficiencies: not taking into account the vagueness of the new institution’s form (“commercial firm”), the mandate did not establish the sum of each contributor to the formation of the bank’s monetary assets and it did not request collaterals from the representative; furthermore, the manner in which the bank would be created was not elaborated, as was also the case with the exact amount of its assets. Another extremely important fact, considered from a political point of view, was that the signers had overlooked the possibility that the bank be placed under the right of extraterritoriality, which would not have only harmed Moldavia’s dignity, but would have also “established the dangerous precedent that the Moldavians’ lawsuits with the bank would be tried in Iași by the consul of Prussia himself or by his dragoman [vice-consul]”³⁰.

All these shortcomings, which clearly demonstrated a lack of experience in this kind of economic initiatives, place under question Grigore Alexandru Ghica’s capabilities in the field, taking into account his previous appointment as Mihail Sturdza’s Finance minister. From a speculative standpoint, we believe that such type of economic endeavour, new for that period, could not exclude principal difficulties related to the way of practically achieving it. The ex-Finance minister’s support to a faulty project demonstrated this.

He was no exception. In 1845, the Wallachian gazette „Curierul Românesc” had published the project of a bank drafted by Costache Bălcescu, but the lack of experience from the part of the forming bourgeoisie prevented its accomplishment. Gheorghe Bibescu, Wallachia’s prince, had also attempted to establish a bank in 1847. We believe that his failure could be linked with a similar situation in 1832, when Russian interests stood in the way of an initiative to create a national bank with Romanian capital in Wallachia. The same could be presumed in the case of the English traders who represented the firm Bell & Anderson and who had intended to open a bank in Bucharest between 1837 and 1838³¹.

But even though Moldavian prince Mihail Sturdza, along with the majority of the boyars, favoured the project of establishing a bank, the events of the year 1848 prevented the accomplishment of the enterprise³². However, its importance continued to be acknowledged, the demands of Moldavian revolutionaries including the creation of a national bank, a commerce bank and a savings house³³. By that time, the boyars had already realized the key role played by foreign capital, as the conditions in both Principalities did not favour the accumulation of the capital needed from within³⁴.

²⁹ Stela Mărieș, *Proiecte privind relațiile economice dintre Prusia și Principatele Române la mijlocul secolului XIX*, in AIIAX, II, tome XXIV, Iași, 1987, p. 404.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 404-405.

³¹ Alexandru Pintea, Gheorghe Ruscanu, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

³² G. Zane, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

³³ Alexandru Pintea, Gheorghe Ruscanu, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 27.

Named as the new ruler of the principality in June 1849, Grigore Alexandru Ghica made considerable efforts to fulfil his own ample reformist platform. Thus, the foundation of the bank of Moldavia emerged inevitably, once again, as an objective in the new prince's agenda, the year 1850 marking the beginning of discussions with Prussian bankers Friedrich Ludwig Nulandt and Friedrich Gustav Oehlschlaeger, whose acquaintance was intermediated by Karl Reinecke. We do not entirely dismiss the possibility that Grigore Alexandru Ghica may have contacted Reinecke to propose the revival of the project, and that Reinecke had instead directed him, for unknown reasons, to the two bankers. What is certain is that on April 23, 1850, they announced their intention to come to Iași, a visit which occurred only in October of that year. The main reason was the necessity of obtaining preliminary assurances in a manner favourable to the creation of the bank, both from German financial circles and from Moldavia's prince³⁵.

In a letter to Grigore Alexandru Ghica, dated October 10, 1850, Wallachia's prince, Barbu Știrbei, announced the conclusion of a deal of his government with the two bankers and also informed his counterpart that they were preparing to pay him a visit as well, accompanied by Meusebach, Prussia's general consul in the Principalities. Referring to the particularities of Wallachia's establishment, Barbu Știrbei mentioned that it would deal neither with loans on neither mortgage nor insurances, but it would simply be a discount bank. The maximal interest rate was 8% per year and the government had the right to borrow up to a sixth from the bank's total assets, with an interest rate of 6%. The issuance of bills was to equal the assets in cash and in case that, after a three-year period, the bank would strengthen its position and extend its operations, the number of issued bills could double.

The advantage given to the bank was of 21 years, with the possibility to modify some of the clauses after an eighteen-month period of activity; the government had the right to appoint a transactions supervisor to the establishment's managers. With the exception of the dividends generated by the profits, from which a sum necessary for the creation of a reserve fund was to be retained, the value of the bank's shares was of "150 conventional Florins", with an interest rate of 5%³⁶.

The two bankers' visit went well, Nulandt being presented to Grigore Alexandru Ghica as extremely able in banking operations, which, together with the enthusiasm of having a bank of Moldavia, prompted the Prince to hasten the arrangements for creating the much-desired establishment³⁷: on October 22, 1850, a victorious Meusebach was leaving Iași³⁸. Extending the scope of possibilities brought on by a successful resolution of the project, baron Sina, a member of the Prussian

³⁵ Stela Mărieș, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

³⁶ Barbu Știrbei to Grigore Alexandru Ghica, București, October 10, 1850, in Nicolae Iorga, *Corespondența lui Știrbei-Vodă*, I, *Corespondența politică*, București, Institutul de Arte Grafice și Editură Minerva, 1904, pp. 36-37.

³⁷ Stela Mărieș, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

³⁸ "Gazeta de Moldavia", no. 80, October 23, 1850.

group, was ready to suggest the creation of branch banks in Galați and Brăila, an idea whose economic importance for the two Principalities was easily to be inferred³⁹.

Referring to Nulandt and Oelschlaeger's visit, Samuel Gardner, the English consul in Iași mentioned that it had coincided with that of Eisenbach, Austria's general consul, and that a project "under the auspices, I presume, of the three governments" could have been seen as a possibility. Expressing his own opinions on the creation of a bank of Moldavia, Samuel Gardner considered that such an act would have inspired more confidence, prompting "needy landowners" to take the establishment by assault, being attracted by the perspective of obtaining much lower interest rates compared to those of the loans they had contracted so far⁴⁰.

Despite the successful resolution of the discussions concerning the bank of Moldavia, the main obstacle to its practical achievement was the refusal of Russia and the Porte, which had been informed about the situation towards the end of 1850. Russia's attitude was, by far, the most relevant: its objection aimed at the foreign assets which would have entered the Principalities, opening the way to the establishment of Prussia's economical and political influence in the area⁴¹, taking into account that the bank would have been placed under Prussian consular jurisdiction⁴². In a letter addressed to Grigore Alexandru Ghica on November 28, the Russian chancellor Nesselrode argued that the conditions of foreign speculators would have made the establishment of a bank of Moldavia impossible⁴³. On the other hand, there were also difficulties coming from local bankers, most of whom were Russian subjects, and whose financial losses would have been obvious and unavoidable. Thus Russia's protectorate did not allow any harm of its interests in the area, reason which prompted the consul in Iași to act immediately⁴⁴.

According to other opinions, the Russian refusal was perceived more as drastic and less as motivated. A letter sent by the French consulate in Iași at the beginning of 1851 mentioned that the Prince had written to baron Meusebach about "difficulties which he could not anticipate" and which "forced him to state, with regret, that he found himself in the position to momentarily give up" the planned enterprise. The same text referred to the letter the Prussian consul in Iași had sent Meusebach, in which the first talked about his meeting with Grigore Alexandru Ghica, who had told him that the problems stemmed from Russia which had stated that the creation of a bank under

³⁹ Constantin Bușe, *Comerțul exterior prin Galați sub regimul de port franc (1837-1883)*, București, Editura Academiei, 1976, p. 84.

⁴⁰ Gardner to Palmerston, Iași, July 12, 1850, in Arhivele Naționale, filiala Iași, fond microfilme Anglia, reel 23, file 828, pages 178-179.

⁴¹ Stela Mărieș, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

⁴² *Memoriile Principelui Nicolae Suțu, mare logofăt al Moldovei 1798-1871*, translation and notes by Georgeta Penelea-Filitti, București, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1997, p. 205, note 1.

⁴³ Anastasie Iordache, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-188.

⁴⁴ G. Zane, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

Prussia's auspices was simply unconceivable⁴⁵. It is our belief that another reason that generated the Russian cabinet's refusal could have been the wish to remind Austria of the help that the tsar had granted to it in 1848; in the context of Vienna's rivalry with Berlin, Sankt Petersburg's goodwill towards the former was once again demonstrated. Therefore, Austria's debt of gratitude towards Russia was maintained.

Russian chancellor Nesselrode's letter to Halcinski, the general consul in the Principalities, was revealing for the attitude adopted by the Sankt Petersburg cabinet in this matter. The author expressed his surprise towards the apparition of „three individuals arrived at Bucharest from the bottom of Germany, without any other titles, nor financial credit, than the patronage of their nation's Consul”, who „offered to establish so-called national loan banks in the Principalities”. Having examined the proposals advanced by Prussia's representatives, Nesselrode believed that they „tend to nothing less than to overthrow the whole administrative and judicial order established in these provinces” and that Russia's duty was to prevent the transformation of the Principalities in a „exploiting field for some foreign speculators, who under the title of bankers [...] would flood the country with worthless or insufficiently guaranteed paper currency”⁴⁶. In any case, the newspaper „Journal de Constantinople” expressed the hope for an eventual success of Grigore Alexandru Ghica's attempt at establishing a bank of Moldavia, the creation of which would largely boost agricultural development⁴⁷.

The diplomatic interests that stood in the way of the establishment of a bank amplified, of course, the difficult domestic financial situation. Referring to the inability of any public collection of funds, the poet Vasile Alecsandri wrote: “in Moldavia [...] except two or three capitalists who practice, more or less, usury, the others are entirely deprived of money”. The precarious state of Moldavia's business environment brought negative consequences on the majority of the landowners and the denomination of „capitalist” referred mostly to persons whose creditors refused or were unable to repay the money they had borrowed⁴⁸.

Vasile Alecsandri's comments fully proved their validity. In 1851, the scarcity of credit in the principality gave rise to speculations concerning a genuine crisis in this domain. Unable to sell the products of the lands they held, many boyars were forced to rely on massive and consistent loans from various bankers or moneylenders, often incurred with interests' rates that rose up to 20%. This worrisome trend showed the increasing threats to the economy, caused by the lack of cash. In turn, these

⁴⁵ Hory to La Hitte, Iași, January 31, 1851, in Arhivele Naționale, filiala Iași, fond microfilme Franța, reel 3, file 9, pages 52-53.

⁴⁶ Nesselrode to Halcinski, Sankt Petersburg, November 21, 1850, in Arhivele Naționale, filiala Iași, fond microfilme Rusia, reel 68, file 591, pages 12-13.

⁴⁷ “Journal de Constantinople”, June 2, 1851, in Arhivele Naționale, filiala Iași, fond microfilme Turcia, reel 20, page 71.

⁴⁸ Vasile Alecsandri to Ion Ghica, Iași, October 29, 1850, in Vasile Alecsandri, *Opere*, VIII, *Correspondență 1834-1860*, Marta Anineanu (ed.), Editura Minerva, București, 1981, p. 167.

threats started to manifest: also in 1851, the failure of debt payment generated the selling of approximately 1400 lands, a hitherto unprecedented situation⁴⁹.

The assessments contained in an article published in the „Gazeta de Moldavia” newspaper are equally relevant in the formation of a broader picture of the situation. Drawing attention on the interest shown by European newspapers towards Moldavia’s economic life, the author observed that the amounts paid „at the factories of the West for the products they provide us” amounted to more than the actual prices of these products. The increase of these values was due especially to the passage of money through the hands of usurers, who seized the opportunity to gain more.

From this perspective, the recommendation of foreign newspapers was to create faster and more efficient ways of sending money to merchants found „in different places of the Principality, to the edge”, ways which would have helped to facilitate the transmission of such amounts abroad, without any kind of intermediation. Accepting the validity of such advice, the author noted, nonetheless: “we would have liked better to find some way to cease the drainage of money that soil workers earn with their own sweat, but in our position that method is a problem which remains to be solved”⁵⁰.

We must also draw attention to the fact that both Grigore Alexandru Ghica and Barbu Știrbei had tried to create banks in their countries also in order to pay the debt due for the Russian occupation. However, in Wallachia’s case, the proposals of the two Prussian bankers had not met the complete approval of its government⁵¹, which leads us to believe that Barbu Știrbei was far more cautious than his Moldavian colleague.

If the contextual diplomatic interests who prevented the creation of the bank foreseeable amplified the already difficult financial situation of Moldavia, they did not succeed in making Grigore Alexandru Ghica give up the project for good. In a letter addressed to Nesselrode on May 1, 1852, the prince referred to the financial issues generated by the absence of a bank, also sending him a project for the creation of one⁵². We cannot know for sure to what extent Russia’s attitude towards the problem had modified, as the answer received by Grigore Alexandru Ghica was not available to us. However, as the Prince’s next actions showed, a certain degree of flexibility of the Russian cabinet can be assumed.

Formulating a series of observations regarding the initiative, Giers, the Russian consul in Iași, wrote about the assurance that Grigore Alexandru Ghica had given him that nothing would have been done without Russia’s agreement. However, given the pressures forced upon him by the boyars, he had agreed to conceive the bank’s project. Although Petre Mavrogheni had been designed as the establishment’s operator and legal representative, whatever sympathies he held with the Russians diminished when the cabinet in Sankt Petersburg learned of his preference for appealing at foreign

⁴⁹ Constantin Bușe, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

⁵⁰ „Gazeta de Moldavia”, no. 60, August 14, 1850.

⁵¹ Alexandru Pinteau, Gheorghe Ruscanu, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁵² Anastasie Iordache, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

capital. The situation did not, however, prevent Giers to recognize the essential role of such a capital in the attempt of creating a bank. Mentioning Grigore Alexandru Ghica's hope that the share of domestic capital would gradually reduce that of the foreign one, the Russian consul in Iași informed that he had told the Prince of the necessity that Moldavians could count among shareholders. The discussion between the two had ended, according to Giers, by the agreement that Grigore Alexandru Ghica would comply to any alterations brought to the project by Russia⁵³.

One action necessary for justifying the creation of a bank was the granting, on September 3, 1852, of a privilege for the creation of a thick cloth factory. By encouraging Moldavia's emerging industry, Grigore Alexandru Ghica had, therefore, reasons to formulate demands for the establishment of a bank, which would help to accelerate the process. Mihail Kogălniceanu, the petitioner, had asked for an eighteen-year exclusive privilege. Connecting the possibility of a favourable answer to the benefits of this privilege, he had also expressed the wish to become the sole provider of thick cloth for Moldavia's militia, gendarmerie, fire corps and frontier guards. His demand was backed by the offer of a 5-10% discount offer for the price of the cloth. However, through the certificate released on October 23, Grigore Alexandru Ghica granted the privilege only for a period of twelve years, with the obligation that the factory start to function within no more than two years from the date of the conceding. Mihail Kogălniceanu's position was further aggravated by the fact that the certificate granted by the prince "allowed the free import of thick cloth"⁵⁴. Grigore Alexandru Ghica did not consent to the request for the exclusive supplying of thick cloth to the militia, either⁵⁵.

On September 5, 1852, the General Council of Moldavia received for analysis and approval the Princely Act no. 82, which comprised the decision to create a bank. The establishment of such an institution was perceived as "one of the essential elements for increasing the industry in the country and for facilitating the use of the locals' private assets". Stipulating that the bank be endowed with the capacity to contract "public loans", to which foreign assets could also participate, Grigore Alexandru Ghica ordered that the analysis of the project to be made in collaboration with a special commission, appointed by the Divan⁵⁶. Nicolae Suțu, Vasile Rosetti and Petre Mavrogheni were to be nominated as its members⁵⁷.

⁵³ Giers to Seniavin, Iași, May 19, 1852, in Arhivele Naționale, filiala Iași, fond microfilme Rusia, reel 67, file 914/II, pages 51-52.

⁵⁴ *Dezvoltarea economiei Moldovei...*, p. 233; see also Gheorghe Ghibănescu, *Surete și izvoade (Documente Kogălnicenești între 1529-1878)*, XXV, Iași, Institutul de Arte Grafice "Presa Bună", 1932, pp. 239-240.

⁵⁵ Gh. Georgescu-Buzău, *Aspecte ale dezvoltării manufacturilor în Țara Românească și Moldova în perioada premergătoare Unirii celor două țări (1829-1859)*, in *Studii privind Unirea Principatelor*, coord. Andrei Oțetea, Nichita Adăniloiaie, Dan Berindei ș. a., București, Editura Academiei, 1960, p. 101.

⁵⁶ *Analele parlamentare ale României*, tome XVII, part II, București, Imprimeria Statului, 1914, p. 186; see also G. Zane, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.

⁵⁷ "Gazeta de Moldavia", no. 68, September 4, 1852.

Taking into account the most important stipulations, as well as the scope of the aspects to be dealt with and approved, we believe that the above-mentioned project was also at the origin of the one granted in 1856, to which we will refer later on. The project's introduction underlined the importance of a bank in a multitude of economic processes, such as the reduction of interests, the acceleration of industrial development, the revival of agriculture and commerce and the increase of land revenues⁵⁸.

The first articles of the project dealt with the deposited collaterals, which could not be returned before the bank was "fully compensated of its loan, with assets, interests and expenses". Eight days after the expiration of the loan payment deadline, the collaterals could be sold through public auction, but the project attempted to prevent the probability of such a situation by stipulating that the bank receive collaterals only from reliable persons, "without suspicion by their social function". If the possibility of a lawsuit between the bank and one of its debtors arose, the project decided the appeal to referees, one representing each side. The two could elect a third, as a super-referee, but he could also be appointed by the Prince. The decisions of the three referees were final and could not be overruled⁵⁹.

As for immobile properties which were "mortgaged at the bank for a loan with damping, or of any other kind", the quarterly deadline of payment was fixed at six months; in case the sum was not paid after fifteen days at the most, the bank had the right to request "the return of the borrowed assets", the referees deciding what measures should be taken and the Appeal Court putting them into practice. From that moment on, the debtor had another thirteen days to comply, after which, in case he did not, the rural paper would publish the decision of auctioning the mortgaged property⁶⁰.

In the matter of the institution's foundation, the project stipulated that its assets would consist of shares, that its name would be "Bank of Moldavia" and that its headquarters were to be in Iași. The share-holders played a key role in electing the administrative board and the managers, the last ones representing their interests "within the settled privileges and limits". The value of a share was fixed at 250 ducats and the starting asset of the new institution was fixed at "a million Austrian-Dutch ducats". In the first two years of operation, the bank could not issue bills which exceeded this value but after this period, it had the possibility to issue "successively and according to its needs up to the double of its basic assets".

The value of the bills started at fifty golden ducats, but a permanent reserve "in cash or in bullions" which equalled a third of the issued bills' value, was compulsory. The bills were excepted from any kind of tax, but the bank was compelled to accept the presence of two government representatives who would protect its rights, overseeing the balance between the value of the reserve and that of the issued bills and being present at "the making of the bank's bills and the storage of the models and

⁵⁸ *Analele parlamentare...*, tome XVII, part II, p. 187.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 188-189.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 190.

printing patterns which were used for this". Also with reference to the bills, the bank had the right to publicly demand the return, within a year, of all those in circulation, so that they could be replaced with new ones. Anyone caught counterfeiting, copying or willingly distributing counterfeit bills was to be tried as „counterfeiter according to the laws of the country”⁶¹.

The bank's operations were varied, being divided into four distinct categories: exchange, discounts, deposits and loans. The last type of operation could be also made on mortgage; in this case, the loan was conditioned by an annual damping, consisting of a “regular payment of a surplus to the due interest”. For a fifteen-year damping, the surplus rate would amount to 12%; a seventeen-year one would lower the rate to 11% and a twenty-two-year one would lower it to 10%. The use of three-fifths of the bank's assets for granting loans showed the significance of this operation among the rest. By such a loan, the maximum mortgage value could not surpass half the value of the property and the Appeal Court had to certify “that the mortgaged property was free of liabilities and complaints related to dowry”.

Although the government could not forcefully obtain a loan, the 25th provision of the project stipulated that the interest rate for loans granted to the state was to be 6%, instead of the usual 8%. Still, the maximum sum for a loan could not amount to more than 100,000 ducats. As for the branches of the bank, the first official one was to be open in Galați; the government was the only one able to consent to the foundation of other branches. The last provision stipulated that the privilege of the bank extended to a twenty-five-year period. If after six years of operation there would be competitors who would offer more advantageous conditions related to the interest, the option of lowering interest rates at the same proportion was mandatory, in order to face that competition⁶².

Choosing Galați for the first branch of the bank was no mere coincidence. At the time, due to the efforts of modernization which had been initiated since 1849, the city had rapidly developed into an important urban centre and also as Moldavia's main harbour on the Danube. This last reason weighed heavily, the commercial importance of Galați immediately justifying the decision to create a branch bank there. On the other hand, the administration of the Covurlui region had been entrusted to Costache Negri, one of Grigore Alexandru Ghica's close assistants, who would later become a prominent figure during the struggle to achieve the union of the two Principalities.

The resumption of the idea of creating a bank of Moldavia through more efficient measures and, apparently, under more favourable circumstances than in past years, proved Grigore Alexandru Ghica's determination and willingness to drive the principality to an economic level that was as close as possible, if not equal, to that of European states. Unfortunately, the reopening of the Eastern Question, in 1853, would postpone by three years the accomplishment of the project.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 191-192.

⁶² *Ibidem*, pp. 192-193.

After the ending of the Crimean War, the talks with Ludwig Friedrich Nulandt were resumed and Grigore Alexandru Ghica's desire was, finally, achieved. Even so, the context in which this was made possible was perhaps more difficult than ever. The presence of Austrian troops in the Principalities, doubled by political pressures for the imposition of an Austrian banker in the matter of the bank, made the Prince's position extremely stressful. However, keeping in mind the imminent expiration of his powers, Grigore Alexandru Ghica decided to ignore the effects that his decisions, taken in Moldavia's best interest, had upon his own perception by foreign states. Taking into account the above-mentioned situation, we believe that it is possible to ascribe a political character to the conflicts concerning the granting of the privilege for the bank.

The decision to grant this privilege to Prussia was officially taken on May 7, 1856, based on the document drafted by the General Council a few days earlier⁶³. In comparison with the one drafted in 1852, the project had several modifications, namely of the value of the shares (two hundred thalers), and of the starting assets' value (ten million thalers). The value of the bearer bills was established as starting from forty zwanzigers, with the condition that the bank holds a permanent reserve that equalled at least a third of the issued bills, following that the rest be insured through "bearer cheques, discounted drafts or other paying securities", during a period which could not exceed three months.

Another difference was the naming of a sole government representative, endowed with the same rights as in the 1852 project. But, if the number and the type of operations remained basically the same, a new provision stipulated the bank's right to take part in "any kind of enterprise having as its goal the public benefit"; therefore, the institution could take part in the competition for the granting of enterprises which generated state revenues. Of course, this right was not exclusive and it couldn't affect any privilege that had already been granted. As for mortgage loans, with or without damping, the only rate maintained was that of 10%, which was tied to a sum to be paid in seventeen years, not twenty-two, as the 1852 project stated. The rate in itself consisted of the 7% interest and the 3% damping. However, if a greater damping value was desired, the period also had to go up according to the ratio of the adopted damping. For the mortgage loans with damping, the fifteenth provision stipulated the duty of the bank to allocate a sum of 3,350,000 thalers⁶⁴.

Another modification concerned the sum that the government could borrow from the bank: the maximum sum amounted to 375,000 thalers and the interest rate of 6% was maintained. A new provision stipulated that, should the bank prosper so that its annual benefit (together with the interest) would surpass 10%, instead of the fixed 8%, it had to diminish the interest of all transactions to 7%, with the exception of the discounted drafts, in case European banks did not immediately consent to the reduction; the same provision fixed the tax of mortgage loans at 7%. The final

⁶³ *Dezvoltarea economiei Moldovei...*, p. 392; see also Stela Mărieș, *op. cit.*, p. 403 and G. Zane, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

⁶⁴ "Gazeta de Moldavia", no. 38, May 14, 1856.

stipulations of the project stated the right of the concessionaire to create an anonymous society through which the privilege would be applied and also the right to compensation for the shareholders if, after the twenty-five-year period, the bank would be shut down⁶⁵.

In face of the accomplished fact⁶⁶, Austria replied, as was to be expected, by an extremely hostile attitude⁶⁷ especially that the decision which favoured Prussia, its arch-rival, had been adopted while its own armies were stationed in Moldavia⁶⁸. Therefore, from that moment on, Austria's representatives initiated a bold and aggressive campaign, seeking to nullify the privilege and also to compel the prince to grant it to the Austrian banker Weikersheim, a Jewish Austrian subject, who lived in Vienna and had come to Moldavia to take part in the talks⁶⁹.

We do not wish to insist here on what shortly became a political and diplomatic conflict between Grigore Alexandru Ghica and the Austrian cabinet. The prince's staunch and dignified stance over the privilege is to be noted⁷⁰; however, strongly pressed by Austrian officials⁷¹, he wrote to Coronini, the supreme commander of the troops in the Principalities, on May 12, 1856, asking him to urge Weikersheim to put forward his conditions as quickly as possible. The haste was caused by Nulandt's imminent departure from Iași, Grigore Alexandru Ghica observing that "my government is morally engaged for five years with his society". Trying to further complicate the Austrian banker's position, the prince added the insufficiency of the resemblance between the two proposals: "his conditions [Weikersheim's, our note] have to be more advantageous, or else the Prussian society has to have the preference, due to its precedents"⁷². A few days later, Weikersheim's insistence for the granting of the privilege was made plain, Grigore Alexandru Ghica writing to Coronini that the Austrian banker had asked him "to deliver him the charter as soon as I had acknowledged his proposals, without even communicating them to the ad hoc council"⁷³.

⁶⁵ Idem, no. 43, May 31, 1856.

⁶⁶ Anastasie Iordache, *Principatele Române în epoca modernă*, II, București, Editura Albatros, p. 289.

⁶⁷ *L'Autriche dans les Principautés Danubiennes*, Paris, Imprimerie et Librairie Centrales des Chemins de Fer, 1858, p. 40.

⁶⁸ Dimitrie Bolintineanu, *Domnii regulamentari și historia celor trei ani de la 11 februarie până astăzi*, București, Tipografia Națională, 1869, pp. 39-40.

⁶⁹ Castaing to Walewski, Iași, May 18, 1856, in Arhivele Naționale, filiala Iași, fond microfilme Franța, reel 41, file 5, pages 67-68 and next.

⁷⁰ Anastasie Iordache, *Principii Ghica...*, pp. 203-204; see also Leonid Boicu, *Adevărul despre un destin politic. Domnitorul Gr. Al. Ghica (1849-1856)*, Iași, Editura Junimea, 1973, pp. 144-145.

⁷¹ Coronini to Grünne, București, May 12, 1856, in Ion I. Nistor, *Coroșdența lui Coronini din Principate. Acte și rapoarte din iunie 1854-martie 1857*, Cernăuți, Institutul de Arte Grafice "Glasul Bucovinei", 1938, p. 1023; see also Leonid Boicu, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143.

⁷² Grigore Alexandru Ghica to Coronini, Iași, May 12, 1856, in *Ibidem*, p. 1024.

⁷³ Grigore Alexandru Ghica to Coronini, Iași, May 16, 1856, in *Ibidem*, p. 1025.

Finally, Austria had to acknowledge its defeat in the argument over the granting of the privilege for the bank, at least in Iași⁷⁴. Coronini's letter, written on May 22, 1856, proved it: the supreme commander talked about the "blind, but systematic and principled animosity towards Austria" shown by a prince under the influence of young utopians⁷⁵. In his turn, Buol, the Foreign Affairs minister, was informed that Austria's support was enough to activate antagonist tendencies from the part of the General Council's members towards Weikersheim's proposals⁷⁶.

After the expiration of Grigore Alexandru Ghica's seven-year term things did not go as well. The half-year delay in the opening of the bank, which coincided with Teodor Balș's term as Moldavia's caimacam, was generated by the expectation of a ratification act of the privilege from the part of the Porte. The bank officially started to function on March 12, 1857. Even so, despite a short period of prosperity, especially in the domain of assets collection and share value rising at 120%, difficulties related to the proper operation of the establishment soon appeared, finally leading to the annulations of the privilege, on June 14, 1858⁷⁷. We won't elaborate on the details here.

To sum up, we believe that Grigore Alexandru Ghica constantly nurtured the idea to create a bank of Moldavia since 1846-1847. After his appointment as prince, having at his disposal the authority and the means to contribute decisively to its economic advancement, he was confronted with obstacles brought along by the international political context. Still, the tenacity he showed, as we have seen, in the matter of endowing Moldavia with a bank, continued to manifest itself, rendering immaterial the charges of weakness and indecision which so often were brought against him.

Promoting new reformist ideas, Grigore Alexandru Ghica attempted and in the end succeeded in overcoming the difficulties which stood in the path of creating the bank of Moldavia. Even if its failure after a year of functioning could be the effect both of the lack of experience of its personnel, as well as the shortcomings of the Moldavian society of the time, the honourable intention which stood at its origin could not and cannot be disputed.

⁷⁴ *Dezvoltarea economiei Moldovei...*, p. 393.

⁷⁵ Coronini to Grünne, Iași, May 22, 1856, in Ion I. Nistor, *op. cit.*, p. 1031.

⁷⁶ Leonid Boicu, *Austria și Principatele Române în vremea războiului Crimeii (1853-1856)*, București, Editura Academiei, 1972, p. 312.

⁷⁷ G. Zane, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

EIN WICHTIGES DOKUMENT WÄHREND DER REVOLUTION VON 1848-1849 IN BUKOWINA¹

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Rezumat: Documentul se publică pentru prima dată, integral în original și în traducere. El cuprinde 9 puncte care se referă la: istoricul acestei zone ca parte integrantă a spațiului dacic și de formare a poporului și limbii române, apoi, timp de peste cinci veacuri în cadrul Principatului Moldova, până în 1774 când teritoriul a fost ocupat, apoi, în 1775 anexat printr-un tratat austro-turc la Imperiul Habsburgic. În cele 9 puncte autorii, ierarhi ai Bisericii Ortodoxe Române din Bucovina, mari boieri, oameni de cultură, deputați în Parlamentul Imperial, pledează cu argumente istorice pentru separarea Bucovinei de Galiția, acordarea statutului de autonomie provincială, păstrarea și dezvoltarea identității sale naționale.

Abstract: The document is published for the first time, completely original and in translation. It has 9 points relating to: the history of this area as part of the Dacian space where the Romanian people and language were formed, then, for over five centuries part of the Principality of Moldova, until 1774 when the territory was occupied, and in 1775 annexed by the Austro-Turkish treaty to the Habsburg Empire. In these 9 points the authors, hierarchs of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Bukovina, great boyars, cultured people, and members of the Imperial Parliament advocate historical arguments for separating Bukovina from Galicia, obtaining autonomous status to the province, preserving, and developing its national identity.

Résumé: Le document ci-joint est publié pour la première fois, intégralement en original et en traduction. Celui-ci comprend 9 points qui font référence à: l'histoire de cette zone comme partie intégrante de l'espace dace et de formation du peuple roumain et de la langue roumaine, ensuite, pendant plus de cinq siècles dans le cadre de la Principauté de la Moldavie, jusqu'en 1774 lorsque le territoire a été occupé, ensuite, en 1775 annexé par un traité autrichien-turc à l'Empire Habsbourgeois. Dans les 9 points, les auteurs, des hiérarques de l'Eglise Orthodoxe Roumaine de la Bucovine, des grands boyards, des hommes de culture, des députés dans le Parlement Impérial, plaident avec des arguments historiques pour la séparation de la Bucovine de la Galice, l'accord du statut d'autonomie provinciale et le développement de son identité nationale.

Keywords: Romanian space, Principality of Moldavia, Bukovina, duchy, national entity, identity, distinct nationality.

¹ Denkschrift an Gesuch des Landes, die dem Parlament von den Bukowinas abgeordneten nach Kremsier in februar 1849 fortgeschritten wurde.

„Codrul Cosminului”, XVI, 2010, No. 2, p. 197-228

Die Rumänen aus Bukowina beanspruchten seinen wichtigen nationalen Anspruch in der Hektik der Ereignisse der Jahre 1848-1849, in fünf wichtigste Programme:

1. *Landespetition* – vorbereitet im März 1848, abgeschlossen im Mai, in Wien eingereicht im Juni gleicher Jahr, dem Kaiserkabinet, gleich vom Präfekt der Bukowina, Gheorghe Isacescu – der nannte es „die Quintessenz der Meinung des ehrlichsten Leute in Bukowina“; die Autoren dieses Dokuments, 255 Unterzeichner, waren Klerus, Adel, Beamte, Kulturmänner, die Hurmuzachesti, der Vater und Söhne, Rumäne, Deutsche, Armenischen, Vertreter aller National-, Linguistisch- und Religiösgruppen, sodass Teodor Balan fand die 12 Punkte die Denkschrift als „Denkschrift ganzer Bevölkerung in Bukowina“².

2. *Humor-Petition*, geschrieben in diesem Ort den 30 Juli 1848, besteht aus 17 Artikel, wurde dem Kaiser in Wien gerichtet, und der Abgeordnete Miron Ciupercovici brachte eine Kopie über dem Tisch des Parlaments ein; dies bat denen die zu Hause blieben „Unterschriften aus alle Bukowina“, weil „wir wollen dass Bukowina unabhängige Provinz bleib, und nicht mehr unter dem Joch der Polnischen bleiben“, weil „wenn wir mit den Polnischen bleiben, dann können wir nur ihre Sklaven bleiben, ebenso wie Siebenbürger und Ungaren“.³

3. *Petition vom 18 August 1848* geschrieben von den Abgeordneter Miron Ciupercovici, Mihai Bodnar, George Timis, neben denen unterschrieben die Bauer Ilie Niculita und Vasile Stirbu; dies besteht aus 26 Ansprüche, und ist nach dem Muster der Landespetition gemacht, aber einschließt die meisten Ansprüche der einfachen Leute mit, seid das wichtigsten Dokument der Bauernabgeordneten⁴.

4. *Manifest der Bauer-Brüder aus Bukowina* gedruckt und im Umlauf gebracht in ganzer Provinz den 5/17 November 1848 von dem Bauernangeordnete Bereich Radauti, Mihai Bodnar. Durch dieses Dokument sind zurückgewiesenen die von Rutenischen gebrachte Beschuldigungen und erklärt der einfachen Leute, warum es erforderlich ist Bukowina von Galiezien trennen und die Bewilligung von Autonomie-Statut⁵.

Diese Dokumente, wie andere, zum Beispiel *Entwurf der Verfassung des Herzogtums Bukowina vom 5 Dezember 1848*, *Petition von Geistlichen und Orthodoxen Ausschusses, adressiert den 9 Oktober 1848 dem Kaiser-Parlament in Wien*, *Appell von 14 April 1848*, *Ode an Klerus aus Bukowina eingereicht den 14 Mai 1848*, die Verkündigung von Januar 1849, wurden von uns veröffentlicht – die auf

² Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale – ANIC [Die zentralen historischen nationalen Archive], Bukarest, Fond Teodor Balan, Dossier 25, *Bucovina în anul 1848* [Bukowina im Jahr 1848], Band 1, S. 61-64.

³ *Ebenda*, S. 67-68.

⁴ *Ebenda*, S. 69-70.

⁵ *Ebenda*, S. 71.

Deutsch nur in Übersetzung in Rumänisch⁶ – und ausführlich kommentiert in eine Synthese-Sammlung in 1993⁷ und kürzlich in 2000, in eine spezielle Studie⁸.

Ich fand es notwendig integral zu veröffentlichen, im Original und in Übersetzung und, am wichtigsten zwischen alle Dokumente von 1848-1849, im Hinblick auf die grundlegenden und nationalen Inanspruchnahme – Trennung der Bukowina von Galizien trennen und die Bewilligung von Autonomie-Statut – Promemoria an Landespetition. Geschrieben von dem Historischen Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi, der – wie analysierte und konstatierte Teodor Balan, am besten Bürger und Kenner der bukowinischen Archiven ist – „er habe das nötigen Alter und umfangreiche historische Informationen“⁹ – der Dokument datiert von 9 Februar 1848, Kremsier und unterschrieben von: Eugen Hacman, Bischof der Bikowina, Constantin Popovici, Theologie-Professor, Ioan Calinciuc, Dogmatik-Professor, Iacob Iculi, Cristof Petrovici, Mihail Zota, Alexandru Goian, Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi, Nicolae Hacman, Theologie-Professor, Iordachi Vasilco und die Angeordnete Anton Kral und Mihail Bodnar.

Der Dokument besteht aus 19 Seiten, aus denen die letzte besteht aus Unterschriften der 10 Mitglieder der Bukowina-Delegation, an denen sind noch Angeordnete zugegeben.

In die 9 Punkte von historische Erklärungen und Beweisführungen, zeigt sich:

Bukowina war nie Teil von Galizien. Die Grenze zwischen Bukowina und Poland war immer in Snyatin. Sie war Teil von Dacia, dann des Fürstentums Moldova. Im Jahr 1775 sie ward „Bezirk Bukowina“, als eine autonome Provinz, und die „Einigkeit“ den 1786 in Galizien wurde ein „Durchweg“ und „was die Historie geschafft hat, nur die Historie ungeschehen kann! Das Patent aus 1790 löste die „erzwungene Vereinigung“ von 1786. Rumänisches Volk weigert sich mit Slawen aus Galizien verschmelzen. Rumänisches Volk kann zu wählen zwischen „Slawen und Aussterben“. Haltung von Bukowina in Galizien bedeutet „ein Angriff gegen dem Recht jeder Nation gerichtet, gegen dem Recht auf Selbsterhaltung, bedeutet „eine getarnte Entstaatlichung“. Rumänisches Volk ist „Lokalelement der Bukowina“ und es „wurde in Gewahrsam genommen von Mutter-Land, Moldova“ und „gesetzlich wurde es weder koordiniert noch untergeordnet eines andere Landes“. Um „eine nachhaltige politische Situation“ zu begründen, sowohl das Parlament und der Thron

⁶ „Suceava“ – Anuarul Muzeului Județean Suceava [Suceava – Das Suceava Kreis Museums Jahrbuch], Band 5/1978, S. 483-492; Band VIII/1981, S. 141-148, 453-462; Band IX/1982, S. 409-417 und Band XX/1993, S. 412-450.

⁷ Mihai Iacobescu, *Din istoria Bucovinei, vol. 1 (1774-1862). De la administrația militară la autonomia provincială* [Aus der Geschichte der Bukowina Band. 1 (1774-1862). Seit der Militärregierung zur provinziellen Autonomie], Rumänische Akademie Verlag, Bukarest, 1993, S. 361-426.

⁸ Idem, *Revoluția de la 1848-1849 din Bucovina. Particularități. Revendicări. Consecințe* [Die Revolution von 1848-1849 in Bukowina. Eigenschaften. Ansprüche. Konsequenzen] in *Revoluția de la 1848-1849 în Europa Centrală* [Die Revolution von 1848-1849 in Mitteleuropa], Cluj (Klausenburg) Hochschulpresse, 2000, S. 205-215.

⁹ ANIC, Bukarest, *loc. cit.*, S. 76.

muss achten und absichern den Rumänen der historischen Recht, weil „nie zwei heterogenen Elementen im Zusammenhang durch dem Gesetz“. Gemeinsamen Interessen fehlen. Die Vereinbarung zwischen diese ist unmöglich. Die katholische Propaganda nur Hass, religiöses Fanatismus gesät und erzeugt erbitterten Widerstand gegen galizischen Missionaren: und „nicht alle Kenner von ruthenische Sprache sind Ruthene“. Die Rumänen sind Orthodoxen. Katholischen Einwanderer sind griechisch-katholisch. Dass dieses „Kreuzung der Rassen und Sprachen“ – ebenso wie die italienisches und französisches Piemont oder wie die deutsche, französische und italienische Schweiz – hat im Nordbereich Ruthenen, löst nicht die historische Wahrheit dass die ganze Bukowina wurde rumänisches Territorium. Daher, ist es notwendig: die Trennung der Bukowina von Galizien, ihre Erhebung in autonome Provinz, unabhängig, mit eigene Legislativ- und Rechtsorganismen, Beendigung der katholischen Proselytismus, Entwicklung der Nationalbildung, Einhaltung und Anwendung der rumänischen Sprache in Verwaltung, Gesetzgebung Aufrechterhaltung und Ausbau der Zusammenhang zwischen Bukowina und Rumänischen Fürstentümer.

Die hohe Wichtigkeit dieses Dokuments berührt aus der Sache dass nach seiner Aussprache im Keiser-Parlament, die meisten Abgeordneten haben Priorität, die Forderung der nationalen der Rumäne in Bukowina gegeben.

Der Dokument ist gänzlich übersetzt von Priester Sorin-Tudor Clipa, dem danken wir auch bei dieser Gelegenheit.

(Kremsier, 1849 Februar 9.)

Dem Constitutionsausschuße zu zuweisen 18.02.49 Februar

R.T.N 4551/229 Praes: 19. Febr.849

Promemoria

zur Bukowinaer Landespetition (Reichstagszahl 183) in Betreff der provinciellen Stellung der Bukowina, überreicht an den Hohen verfassunggebenden Reichstag von der Bukowinaer Landesdeputation.

Hohe Reichsversammlung!

Das Schicksal einer bisher wenig berücksichtigten Prowinz harrt bei der Constituirung Oesterreichs seiner nahen Lösung für eine lange Zukunft entgegen. Bukowina's Bewohner, vom Centrum der Monarchie so weit entlegen, und eben deshalb um das ihnen zu zuteilende Loos desto ängstlicher besorgt, glaubten daher ihre zur Huldigung an den neuen Kaiser nach Ollmütz bestimmte Landes-Deputation auch nach Kremsier an den hohen verfassunggebenden Reichstag sowol zur persönlichen Bezeugung ihrer Verehrung als insbesondere zur näheren Aufklärung

über ihre wenig gekannten Rechte und Interessen entsenden, und auf diese Art der Gefahr einer folgenschweren Entscheidung ihres Schicksals auf der Basis eines Irrthums, einer Unkenntniß oder Indifferenz vorbeugen zu müssen. Folgende Anhaltspunkte dürften bei der Frage über die Constituirung der Bukowina maßgebend und entscheidend sein.

1. Die ganze Geschichte dieses Landes von fast 200 Quadratmeilen stellt ihm das Zeuignis aus, daß es nie und unter keiner Bedingung zu Galizien gehört habe. Schon seit die Geschichte einer Pannonia und Dacia, eines Trajan und Decebalus gedenkt, stand Sarmatien an dem dermaligen Gränzen der Bukowina, eines Theiles der Dacia Trajani, stille. Und seit der Wojewode Bogdan Dragoscho im Jahre 1350 und der Marmarosch mit seinen Romanen in die heutige Moldau zog, und dieses Fürstenthum gründete, stand sein letzter Gränzstein gegen das anstosende Polen bei Sniatyn, auch heute nach dem Gränzorte der Bukowina gegen Galizien. Was aber die Geschichte zusammengefügt, kann auch wieder nur die Geschichte trennen; ein einzelner Mensch, haïße er nun Reichstagabgeordneter oder Minister, scheidert an diesem Trennungswerke unfehlbar, und die warnende Stimme der Geschichte spricht nun eben so vernehmlich, eben so eindringlich für die Gränzen der kleinen Bukowina, wie sie seiner Zeit für die weit grösseren des Iagellonischen Staates gesprochen hat. Belege dafür bietet uns ferner auch das nähere Mittelalter, wo der Wojewode der Moldau mit der Krone Polen wegen des fruchtbaren Gebitstheiles zwischen dem Dnister und dem Pruth, welchen König Sigismund im Jahre 1530 unter dem Vorwande, es gehöre dieser Landstrich ursprünglich zu Pokutien (einem Theile des jetzigen Kolomeer Kreises) ansprach, in erbitterten Streit und offenen Waffenkampf gerieth, der zuletzt mit Hilfe der Osmanen zum Vortheile der Moldau durch traktatenmäßig anerkannte Beibelaßung des stetigen Gebietes bei diesem Wojewodate, dem es seit jeher rechtmäßig gehörte, sein Ziel erreichte. Allein selbst damals während des mehrjährigen erbitterten Kampfes fiel weder einem polnischen Könige noch irgend einem seiner Palatine die Idee oder das Gelüste ein, auf den übrigen weitaus größeren Theil, d. h. auf den eigentlichen Kern der Bukowina auch nur den mindesten Anspruch zu erheben, und noch weniger that sich ein solches Gelüste seither kund, so daß die Moldau fortwährend und ununterbrochen im vertragsmäßig anerkannten ruhigen Besitze der ganzen Bukowina mit Inbegriff der ehemals streitig gewesenenen Pruthebene verblieb. Ja selbst der Rechtstitel der Abtretung der Bukowina an Oesterreich, wie er in der mit der Pforte am 7. Mai 1775 hierüber geschlossenen Convention ausgedrückt ist, erweist neuerdings die uralte Angehörigkeit Bukowina's zu Moldau; denn während die österreichische Regierung bei der fast gleichzeitig stattgefundenen ersten Theilung Polens seine neue Territorialvergrößerung durch Ansprüche der ungarischen Krone auf die rothreussischen Fürstentümer Halicz und Wladimir, und jene der böhmischen auf die schlesischen Lehen: Oswiecim und Zator geltend zu machen suchte, entbehrte sie bezüglich der Bukowina so sehr alles Vorwandes, daß sie in der eben bezogenen Convention sich ausdrücklich blos auf ihr Bedürfniß einer leichten Kommunikationslinie zwischen dem neuerworbenen Galizien und dem ihr schon

früher eigenthumlichen Siebenbürgen berief, und dem gemäß die Bitte um Abtretung der als Verbindungsglied zwischen beiden Prowinzen durch ihre Lage sehr geeigneten Bukowina stellte - eine Bitte, die ihr die Phorte auch wirklich nur als freiwillig gemachtes Geschenk, und nicht kraft einer obliegenden Rechtsverbindlichkeit, die etwa auf alten galizischen Ansprüchen fußte, vollkommen gewährte, „um einem unzweideutigen Beweis von Freundschaft, Zuneigung und freundnachbarlicher Gesinnung zu geben“. Kam sie aber von Rechtswegen die Bukowina zu, so hätte sie, die so mächtige römisch-kaiserliche Majestät, sicher ihre Forderung nicht als Geschenk sich ausgebeten und angenommen, ohne ihres rechtlichen Anspruches auch nur beiläufig zu erwähnen. Aber auch unter österreichischer Herrschaft gehörte Bukowina nie dem Königreiche Galizien als einverleibter Theil an. Schon sofort noch im Jahre 1776 erfolgter förmlicher Besizergreifung von der Bukowina wurde dieselbe als selbständige Provinz unter der Benennung „Bukowinaer Distrikt“ und auf Grundlage des zur Zeit ihrer Uebernahme bestandenen Statusquo unter Oberleitung des Hofkriegsrathes einer eigenen, in Cernowitz residirenden Militär-Administration unterordnet, die durch einen General, einen Stabsauditor und drei Auditore zu Czernowitz, Sereth und Suczawa nach militärischen Vorschriften die Geschäfte leitete, und zugleich im Einvernehmen mit dem fürstlich-moldauischen Divan (Staatsrath), wie auch eingeholter noch eingeholter Genehmigung des Kaisers Joseph II., mit Rücksicht auf die „früheren besonderen Zustände und Verhältnisse dieses Landes“ die eigenthumlichen Grundlagen zu seiner, im Wesentlichen noch fortbetreffenden, theilweise von allen ähnlichen differirenden Verfassung legte. Beispielweise mögen hier das auf moldauischer Basis belassene bäuerliche Verhältniss, die Unzulässigkeit der Patrimonialgerichtsbarkeit außer in geringfügigen Streitsachen, und die durchgängige Einführung des mündlichen Verfahrens als solche Einrichtungen angeführt werden, die sich aller späteren Wechselfälle ungeachtet noch daselbst erhalten haben.

Auf diese im Ganzen mehr skizzierte als wirklich durchgeführte organische Bestimmung folgte eine eigene umständliche, in jeder Hinsicht erschöpfende Verfassung, vom Kaiser Joseph II. am 15 März 1783 ertheilt, wodurch die Bukowina ausdrücklich „als eine politische Provinz“ anerkannt, und alle Verhältnisse und Verwaltungszweige normirt wurden. Doch schon mit Hofdecret vom 16. September 1786 wurde diese Land unter die Civil-Administration gesetzt, und gleichzeitig mit Galizien sowol in politischer als judiciellen Beziehung als ein Kreis dieser Prowinz vereinigt; diese eingeleitete Einverleibung erhielt im weiteren Verlaufe des beabsichtigten Assimilirungsprocesses ihre Fortbildung durch das Patent vom 14. März 1787, welches auch dem Adel der Bukowina eine mit dem galizischen gleichförmige Gestalt gab, und gegen die aufgehobenen einheimischen Titel entsprechende aus der galizischen Adels-Hierarchie bewilligte. Die Vereinigung war indess nur epfemer, da schon nach 4 Jahren am 29. September 1790 Kaiser Leopold mittels Patentes aussprach: „daß jene bloß in der Absicht, die öffentliche Verwaltung zu vereinfachen, im Jahre 1786 erfolgte Vereinigung ferner nichts bestehen könne, indem die Erfahrung gezeigt hat, daß die Verschiedenheit der Sprache, Sitten und Gebräuche der Einwohner eine vollkommene Vereinbarung nicht erwarten läßt, weshalb der

Entschluß gefasst worden sei, die Bukowina insoweit wieder von Galizien abzusondern, daß dieselbe künftig nichts mehr als ein Theil dieses Königsreichs anzusehen sei, die Stände derselben nicht mehr Mitstände der galizischen ausmachen sollen, in Ansehung der Staats - und Rechtsverwaltung aber indessen vorsehungsweise derjenige Zusammenhang mit Galizien zu verbleiben habe, welcher der Bukowina Siherheit und Aufnahme verspricht“. Diesem nach verordnete eben dieses Patent: 1- ten „daß angefangenen vom 1-ten November 1790 die Bukowina unter diese Namen und als eine für sich bestehende Provinz blos durch die gemeinschaftliche Landesverwaltung mit Galizien im Zusammenhange zu stehen habe. 2-tens daß diese Verwaltung fernerhin durch das zu Lemberg festgesetzte Landesgubernium in allen politischen Angelegenheiten zu besorgen sei“. Soweit jedoch das Wort von der That absteht, soweit blieb dieses wohlgerichte, gerechte und weise Patent von seiner Ausführung entfernt: die für sich bestehende, von Galizien abgesonderte Provinz Bukowina blieb im mehrfachen, vorzüglich aber in politischer Beziehung, rein ein Kreis Galiziens, und ihre Selbständigkeit wurde außer bei der Steueraushebung kaum irgend bemerkbar. Nochmehr, die gesezwidrige Praxis erhielt theilweise gesezliche Sanktion durch das, die neue ständische Verfassung Galiziens normirende Patent Kaisers Franz I. vom 13. April 1817, welches im § 3 die Bukowinaer - Stände auffalenderweise als mit den galizischen bisher vereinigt betrachtete, während das obcitirte Patent vom 29. September 1790 klar anordnet, „daß jene nicht mehr Mitstände der galizischen ausmachen sollen“. Bei dem offenbaren partiellen Widerspüche dieser beiden Patente, deren späteres das frühere zwar nicht ausdrücklich aufhebt, aber auch nicht beruft, somit zu ignoriren scheint, wäre man zu Besorgnisse über die provincielle Stellung der Bukowina geneigt, wenn nicht ein Hofkanzlei - Presidialdekret vom 23 – ten Juni 1846 Zahl 4814 / 7 über besonderes Einschreiten der einheimischen Gutsbesizer die fortwährende gesezliche Giltigkeit des die Slbständigkeit der Bukowina als eigenen Provinz anerkennenden Patent vom 29 – ten September 1790 (mit bloßer Ausnahme des die ständische Verfassung derselben betreffenden Absatzes) ausdrücklich anerkannt, und zudem erklärt hätte, „daß bei den Erlässen administrativer Verfügungen für Galizien auf die verfassungsmäßige Stellung der Bukowina und die Eigenthümlichkeit ihrer Verhältnisse Rücksicht genommen, und, ob diese Verfügungen auch für die Bukowina zu gelten haben, oder nicht, durch die Bezeichnung: „mit Inbegriff oder mit Ausschluß der Bukowina“ angedeutet werde, was „insbesondere auf die Verhältnisse zwischen Grundherren und Unterthanen seine Anwendung finde“.

So hatte es die Bizarrerie des Schicksals Bukowina`s gefügt, daß garantirende und aufhebende, experimentirende und stabilisirende, isolirende und einverleibende Erlässe auf ihrem Territorio sich im bunten schnellen Wechsel begegneten, und daß dieses ursprünglich zum Durchgang aus einer Prowinz in die andere übernommene Land auch als Durchzugsgebiet für die verschiedenartigsten Patente und Verordnungen dienen mußte. Maria-Therantias Militär-Administration des „Bukowinaer Distriktes“ machte der neuen Verfassung, die der concetirrende Joseph II. der „politischen Prowinz“ ertheilte, in Kurzem Plaz. Der rastlose Geist Joseph`s II. modelte schon nach drei Jahren selbst an seinem Werke, und noch mehr der weise Leopold II. an

dem seines nächsten Vorgängers. Franz I. gestattete der schlechten Praxis Uebergriffe über die bessere gesetzliche Theorie, diese letztere scheinbar ignorirend. Selbst Ferdinand's des Gütigen vormärzliche Regierung anerkannte die günstige Theorie, und ließ dennoch die ungünstige Praxis walten. Und dem ungeachtet blieb es selbst in diesem Wirrwal widersprechender Maßnahmen unbestritten, daß mit Abrechnung des kürzen Zeitraumes vom 1-ten Nov. 1786 bis dahin 1790, die Bukowina niemals als ein integrierender Bestandtheil mit Galizien einverleibt, niemals in diesem aufgegangen war.

Der historische Boden dieses Landes wäre somit gefunden, er weist auf romanisches Element, welches als solches von seinem Mutterlande, der Moldau, im damaligen *Status quo* übernommen und gesetzlich weder einem andern einverleibt, noch coordinirt und untergeordnet ward. Der historische Boden ist es, auf dem die *hohe Reichsversammlung*, von utopischen, wie von rückstrebende Theorien gleich entfernt, einerseits den Anforderungen des Fortschrittes, und andererseits denen der gegebenen Verhältnisse, die nie ungestraft übersehen werden können, gerechte Rechnung tragen, und einen dauerhaften Bau des Gesamtvaterlandes vollbringen will. Thron und Volk haben ihren Entschluß erklärt, die erste Forderung des historischen Rechtes, die Achtung und Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten, als erste Grundlage, als Eckstein dieses Baues anerkennen und erfüllen zu wollen. Nun, die *Bukowina* fordert nichts als die Anwendung dieses Principes auf sich; sie will weder der bevorzugte Benjamin, noch der verkaufte Joseph in der Völkerfamilie sein. Jede andere Stellung als die einer selbständigen, keiner andern als Theil zugewiesenen Provinz mit eigener Vertretung und Verwaltung wäre bloß eine Abschlagszahlung an der ganzen Schuld, wäre eine Fortsetzung des alten Provisoriums auf unbestimmte Zeit hinaus, wäre bloße Zugabe eines neuen Patentes zu den vielen alten Patenten, wäre die Einimpfung einer constitutionsfeindlichen Gesinnung in die Gemüther, die bei der Nähe der Gränze am Knotenpunkte von drei Kaiserthümern in kritischen Momenten unter dem Einflusse fremder Demagogen und Emissäre sehr leicht zu einer staatsgefährlichen Strebung heranreifen dürfte. Es muß daher schon jetzt in der Constitution der Angelpunkt gefunden werden, der bei der staatlichen Rotation, selbst im Falle einer durch den Drang der Umstände beschleunigten Bewegung des Staatskörpers, dem excentrischen Herausschnellen der einzelnen Staatsglieder aus der normalen politischen Bahn vorzubeugen, und auch die Extremitäten an den Staatsorganismus fest gegliedert zu halten fähig erscheint. Ein solches geistige Binde- und Präservativmittel stellt sich bezüglich der Bukowina bloß in der eigenen unabhängigen Volksrepräsentation und Verwaltung dar, und jedes andere Auskunftsmittel ist lediglich ein Palliativ, eine täuschende Uebertüchtung, mit nichten eine radicale Heilung des Uebels, an dem die *Bukowina* seit ihrem Eintritte in den österreichischen Saatsverband, aller Patente und Hofdekrete ungeachtet, fortwährend litt und noch immer leidet – Beiden, deren Stärke und Dauer in ihr, wie in einem von langjähriger schmerzlicher Krankheit Heimgesuchten, keinen andern Gedanken, als den der radicalen Heilung oder der nationalen Auflösung aufkommen lassen.

2. Halbe Maßregeln sind eine Vertagung des Uebels, während deren sich der Krankheitsstoff ansammelt, um dann mit desto grösserer Gewalt auszubrechen. Eine solche verderbliche halbe Maßregel wäre die Zuweisung der Bukowina als Kreis an Galizien als Provinz: nie können, nie werden sich heterogene, an einander gesezlich gefesselte nationale Elemente friedlich und freundlich neben einander verhalten, weil ihnen neben das gemeinsame Verständniß abgeht. Eine Reibung, eine Spannung, ein Entgegenwirken beider Nationalitäten, der romanischen und slavischen, auf dem Lemberger-Landtage ist unvermeidlich; die Reibung aber erhitzt, die Hize zündet, und der Brand verheert. Gilt dies schon von dem polnischem kultivirterem und entwikelteren, jedoch auf seine ererbte Suprematie nicht leicht verzichtenden Elemente, so muß es mit desto treffenderer Richtigkeit von dem erst neu auftauchenden, sich zu verstärken trachtenden, und wegen seiner unmittelbaren Nachbarschaft mehr bedrohlichen ruthenischen Elemente gelten. Mit diesem hatte die Bukowina schon unter dem vormärzlichen Systeme manchen harten Stauß zu bestehen; ihm, wenn auch nicht ausschließlich, schuldet dieses Land einen nicht unbedeutenden Theil seiner politischen Verwahrlosung, seiner religiösen Hintansezung, seines nationalen Zurückbleibens. Was war somit natürlicher, als daß die Saat des Mißtrauens, der Erbitterung, der offenen und heimlichen Anfeindung, weche dieses Element in der vormärzlichen Epoche mit Vorwiessen und stillschweigender Genehmigung der Provinzialregierung auf Bukowina's ruhigen Fluren säete, nunmehr üppig wuchert und dem Säemann die Antipathie des Volkes zuzieht? Offene und allen Geseze zum Hohne am hellen Tage betriebene Proselytenmacherei, Aufreizung der Gemeinden gegen ihre Pfarrer, Minuendollicitation der geistlichen Stollagebühren zur Anlockung von Pfarrkindern, fraudulöses Nachweisen von Cultusgenossen zur Errichtung von Pfarreien, eigenmächtiges Eindringen in fremde pfarrliche Rechte, in Kirchen und Schulen des nicht unierten Ritus, fortwährendes Discreditiren und Denunciren bei der Regierung aller Höhergestellten, des angefeindeten Cultus, ungerechte Auferlegung von Concurenz und sonstigen Auslagen auf Genossen des andern Ritus, und so viele andere in den politischen Registraturen von Czernowitz und Lemberg nachweisbar zu ersehende Fälle des intolerantesten und engherzigsten Missionswesens, das in einem civilisirte Staate von Christen gegen Christen in Bewegung gesezt ward, sind unter der noch lebende *Bukowinaer* Generation unvertilgbare Motive von Entfremdung, Haß, religiösen Fanatismus und politischer Opposition gegen die aus Galizien entsandten Missionäre ruthenischer Abstammung und griechisch unierten Bekenntnisses, diese unnützen Märtyrer eines verderblichen Apostolates. Wenn nun auch die oberste Anregung, Aneiferung und Leitung dieses Missionswesens unläugbar von der Staatskirche ausging, so musste doch der Haß der einheimischen Bevölkerung sich zunächst und allermeist gegen die in erster Linie fechtenden ruthenischen Plänkler, zugleich aber auch gegen den Theil von Galizien wenden, woher sie kamen und ihre Verstärkung bezogen, und welches als das, die religiösen, nationalen und politischen Operationen gegen die Bukowina leitende Hauptquartier zu betrachten kam. So lange diese gegenseitige nationale Eifersucht und Feindschaft zwischen Romanen und Ruthenen noch währt – und ein Menschenalter gehört

jedenfalls zu ihrem Erlöschen -, kann man diese Elemente zwar auf demselben Landtag vereinigen, allein nicht einander nähern, nicht einigen, und ohne Annäherung der Stämme, ohne Einigkeit ist kein gedeihliches Zusammenwirken, sondern höchstens eine arithmetische Uebereinstimmung, ein fortwährender Zwang, ein physische Prevalenz des einen Stammes gegen den dissentierenden, eine ununterbrochene stets bruchfertige Spannung gedenkbar.

3. Zu den eben angeführten zumeist religiöse und politischen Motiven der anthropathetischen Divergenz Bukowina's trat aber auch ein nationales nicht minder wichtiges. Die Geographie fast aller selbständigen, nicht durch eine chinesische Mauer von einander gesonderten Staaten, nicht minder als die Statistik der einzelnen, in nationaler Hinsicht verschiedenen, und gegenseitig lebhaft verkehrenden Provinzen eines Staates zeigt dem Beobachter an den Staats- und noch mehr an den provinciellen Grenzen ein Verschimmen und Ineinandergehen der Sprache, Sitte und Gebräuche, eine Ort von Kreuzen der Racen und Sprachen mit stärkerem oder schwächerem Hervortreten des einen oder des andern Elementes. Gewöhnlich ist das cultivirtere oder an Zahl überlegene Element das präponderirende in der Mischung, so daß zuweilen das einheimische dagegen verschwindet, und ein solcher Landstrich sich in einer Ort von Zwitterbildung, von scheinbar unkenntlicher, weil an doppelter Nationalität participirender Abstammung befindet: es hat hier gleichsam die Natur den alten Satz: „Non datur saltus“ auf die räumliche Vertheilung der Nationen angewendet. Das italienische Piemont mit französischer, die deutsche Schweiz mit bald französischer bald italienischer, das flämische Belgien mit französischer, das deutsche Triest mit italienischer Sprache etc sind sprachende Beweise dieses Uebergangszustandes. So hat sich denn auch in der Bukowina, in der Pruthebene, und in den gebirgigen Gegenden an Galizien das ruthenische Element, jedoch bei weitem nicht ausschließlich, sondern nur mit vorwiegender Stärke festgesetzt, dergestalt, daß selbst die dort wohnenden Romanen das Ruthenische nebst ihrer Muttersprache, viele sogar ohne die letztere, reden. Aus diesem Grunde aber sogleich auf eine ruthenische Nationalität aller Ruthenischredenden den Schluß zu ziehen, wäre jedenfalls voreilig und irrig. Wenn auch nicht geläugnet werden will, daß von den 100.000 ruthenisch Redenden in der ganzen Bukowina bei 20.000 zu verschiedenen Zeiten, besonders aber während der polnischen Religionsverfolgung im vorigen Jahrhunderte, in die Bukowina aus Galizien und Rothrußland einwanderten, und sich dort bleibend niederließen, so ist dagegen auch nicht zu verkennen, daß die Sprache zwar eines der vorzüglichsten und wichtigsten, bei weitem jedoch nicht das einzige Criterium der Nationalität bildet, sondern Sitten, Gebräuche und Neigungen und besonders die Religion, diesfalls gleich stimmberechtigte Hauptfactoren vorstellen, daß dennoch die Ruthenischredenden 80.000 Romanen durch das bloße Sprechen einer benachbarten Sprache – sei es auch bei weitem mit dem Vergessen der eigenen verbunden – nicht schon auf ihr Nationalität verzichtet, und der ruthenischen sich angeschlossen haben. Und die entgegengesetzte Behauptung ist um so unstatthafter, da der galizische Ruthene in der griechisch katholischen Religion einen Hauptbestandtheil in der Totalität der seine Nationalität kennzeichnenden Eigentümlichkeiten zu sehen gewohnt ist, diese Hauptmerkmal aber aller

Ruthenischsprechenden 80.000 Romanen durchgehends fehlt, und theilweise selbst bei den eingewanderten eigentlichen Ruthenen nicht angetroffen wird, indem die Zahl der griechisch-unirten Ruthenen in der Bukowina laut Conscription v. J. 1846 blos auf höchstens 10.000 sich belauft. Der auf dem eben als falsch nachgewiesenen Kalkul der ruthenischen Nationalität aller Ruthenischredenden gebaute Plan einer Zerstückelung der Bukowina und Einverleibung des ruthenischredenden Theiles mit Galizien, richtet sich dem zufolge selbst. Und überdies meint man denn im Ernst, daß man die Gränzmarken, welche die Jahrhunderte einem Lande gesetzt, und die zu geschichtlichen Heiligthümern eines großen Volkstammes geworden sind, der sich in der Bukowina zur Summe aller übrigen Nationalitäten wie 3:1 verhält, im Augenblicke durch ein bloßes Wort dauerhaft verrücken könne?

4. Das vielgerühmte und vielversprechende Auskunftsmittel der Eintheilung der Provinzen in Reichskreise mit Rücksicht auf die Nationalität und mit autonomer Kreisvertretung ist ebenfalls nicht geeignet die Besorgnisse der Romanen wegen ihrer Zukunft zu verschrecken. Schon an und für sich ist die innige Vereinigung, die dauerende Verschmelzung durchaus heterogener, nach verschiedenen Mittelpunkten und Richtungen gravitirender und nichts als die Nachbarschaft und den sie zu Einem provinciellen Individuum verbindenden Paragraph der Constitution mit einander gemein habender Nationalitäten eine politische Unzucht gegen die Natur, aus der nur ein politisches Monstrum, nie aber ein gefundener, lebensfähiger Organismus entspringen kann. Die Unnatur erwächst aber zur himmelschreienden Sünde, wenn eine kleine Nation mit einer an Zahl zehnfach überwiegenden zu Einem Ganzen verschmolzen, das h. in gemeinschaftlichen Angelegenheiten von widerstreitendem Interesse zur ewigen Minorität, zum ewigen Nachgeben, zur ewigen Inferiorität und Verkrüppelung verurtheilt wird. Diesem Uebel zu steuern, hat man die autonom repräsentirten und seine innern Angelegenheiten selbständig leitenden Reichskreis erfunden, und meint nun hinreichende Abhilfe gegen alle politischen Uebergriffe, besonders rücksichtlich der Nationalität, in der Autonomie des Kreises, die nur in gemeinschaftlichen Angelegenheiten zum Vortheile des Provincial-Landtages beschränkt wird, geboten zu haben. Allein, wenn man bedenkt, daß die gemeinschaftlichen Angelegenheiten eben in der Regel die wichtigeren sind, und die allen Staatsbewohnern gemeinschaftlichen die wichtigsten, weshalb sie die Centralregierung sich selbst vorbehält; wenn man erwägt, daß die gemeinschaftlichen Maßregeln eines Provincial-Landtages z. B. ein polytechnisches Insitut, oder eine Akademie der bildenden Künfte für die ganze Provinz, auf die Förderung oder Veredlung einer Nationalität, und somit auf den Flor oder Ruin eines Kreises, einen eben so entscheidenden, wenn nicht noch stärkern Einfluß nehmen können, als die speciellen Verfügungen des einzelnen Kreises selbst; wenn man ferner berücksichtigt, daß in allen Angelegenheiten von dievergirendem Interesse, deren es bei der Verschiedenheit aller Tendenzen der beiden Nationen wol gar vielegeben dürfte, der zahlreichere Stamm kraft seiner den Ausschlag gebenden Majorität stets die Oberhand über den gering vertretenen kleinen Volksstamm behaupten, und somit alles von ihm Beliebte durchsetzen könnte; wenn man zudem sich gegenwärtig hält, daß der politische Provincialchef, vermög seiner Abhängigkeit von dem und

Verantwortlichkeit gegen den Provincial-Landtag, auf die Wünsche und Beschlüsse desselben die gebührende Rücksicht nehmen muß, daß er also die an ihn gerichteten Beschwerden, Rekurse und Gegenäußerungen der romanischen Kreisvertretung meistens im Sinne des Provincial-Landtages zu entscheiden sich geneigt wird finden lassen; daß folglich der benachtheiligte Kreis, die verkürzte Nationalität stets und unter jeder Bedingung Unrecht behalten wird: so zerfließt das Blendende und Vielverheißende von der hailsamen Wirksamkeit der Kreisautonomie wie Nebel an der Sonne, und was daran noch erübriget, reicht zwar nothdürftig zur Wahrnehmung vieler Kreisinteressen, bei weiten jedoch nicht aus, um ein entsprechend starkes und unheilverhütendes Gegegengewicht gegenüber einer vielfach überlegenen Nationalität zum Vorthheil der eigenen bilden zu können. In dieser Beziehung erscheint der Reichskreis als eine politische Fiktion, mundgerecht gemacht für Sanguiniker.

Und nicht bloße Theorie oder alltzuängstliche Zukunftsseherei bricht in diesen Betrachtungen jeder Vereinigung der Romanen mit Galizien den Stab; nein, eine 62 jährige Erfahrung unter verschiedenen Regenten und unter mannigfaltigen Wechselfällen des Schicksals hat das Heil und Wehe einer solchen Vereinigung vom richtigen Standpunkt betrachten und auf das wahre Maß zurückführen gelehrt. Schmerzlich muß es den Bukowinaer treffen, wenn er die reichen Hilfsquellen und Wolstandskanäle seiner Heimat und das, was sie bei einer wolwollenden und rühhaltslos den Fortschritt anstrebenden Leitung hätte werden können, mit dem vergleicht, was sie geworden ist. Ein gut Theil der Schuld des allseitigen Zurückbleibens dieses Landes kömmt auf Rechnung seiner Einverleibung mit Galizien zu sezen, wenn auch die Provincial-Regierung nicht die oberste und alleinige Schuldträgerin ist. Die gänzliche Verschiedenheit der Nationalität machte den fremdnationalen Beamten das Verständniss der Wünsche und Bedürfnisse der zu administirenden in der Bukowina völlig unzugänglich, weshalb den Romanen mit fremden Maße zugemessen wurde. Die ungeheuere Ausdehnung Galiziens erschwerte die umfassende Uebersicht der Provincialbehörde, deren Blick nur mit Mühe zu dem an der südlichen Extremität gelegenen romanischen Lande durchzudringen vermochte, und zu allen Zeiten waren und sind die Extremitäten mehreren Leiden als die übrigen Körpertheile ausgesetzt; Bukowina machte von dieser Regel kein Ausnahme. Ihr floßen alle Gnaden, alle Vorthteile zu, erst wenn sie in Galizien fast veraltet waren. Galizische Stiftungsplätze und Stipendien werden oft vacant, und oft vergeben, die Bukowina geht ebenso oft leer aus. Ein galizisches Creditsinstitut wird erreicht, allein die Bukowina darf sich daran nicht betheiligen, weil ihre Landtafel an unregelmäßiger Führung leidet; sie bittet um Rectificirung ihrer Tafel, der Bericht hierüber wird vom 6 Jahren schon erstattet, und noch ist die Landtafel nicht regulirt, und noch die Creditsanstalt unzugänglich. Der Bukowinaer Bischof, entbehrend einer Cathedral-Kirche in Czernowitz, wohin von Radautz sein bleibender Siz verlegt würde, bittet im Jahre 1805 um Anweisung der nöthigen Bausumme aus den ungeheueren Ersparnissen des überreichen und eben zur Erhaltung von Kirche und Schule creirten griech. n. u. Religionsfondes; unzähligenmal wird die Bitte wiederholt, Himmel und Erde bestürmt, alle Mittel der Verzweiflung erschöpht, um aus eigenem Vermöge das, was die wenig zahlreiche Römisch- und auch die

sperlichen Griechischkatholischen aus fremdem besizen, gleichfalls zu erringen – eine steinerne Kirche in Czernowitz; die Bitte wird gewährt im Jahre ... 1843 d. h. noch fast vierzig Jahren, nachdem die Generation der ersten Bittsteller im Grabe längst schon den Schlaf des Gerechten schlief. Kirchen -und Schulwesen wurden im höchsten Grunde vernachlässigt, die romanische Sprache durchwegs hintangesezt, keine Volksschulen neu errichtet, und an den wenigen schon *pro forma* errichteten ruthenische oder polnische Lehrer, der Landessprache nicht im geringsten kundig, angestellt, deren Beruf mehr auf Entnationalisierung und religiöse Bekehrung der Eingeborenen, als auf den populären Unterricht sich bezog. Die seit frühere Jahren angestellt gewesenen Volksschullehrer wurden durch Hintanzetzungen, öftere Rügen, ungünstige Versezungen und andern indirecte Mittel zur Niederlegung ihrer Aemter oder zur Uebertritt in den Schooß der Staatskirche genötigt, und ein eigenes Gubernialdecret verbot ausdrücklich die Uebertragung einer Schullehrerstelle an Personen, die nicht zur römisch – oder griechisch-katholischen Kirche gehörten. Ja die Tirannie der Provincialbehörde verstieg sich sogar bis zur Mißachtung der kaiserlichen Autorität selbst: Kaiser Ferdinand hatte im Jahre 1844 mittels a. h. Entschliessung dem Bukowinaer bischöflichen Consitorium über dessen Ansuchen die Uebernahme in eigenen Obsorge von 14 bis dahin dem katholischen Consitorium in Lemberg unterstandenen griech. n. u. Volksschulen bewilliget, und die Uebergaben den betreffenden Behörden auferlägt. Ungeachtet vierjähriger dringender Correspondenz mit dem Lemberger-Gubernium sind jedoch zur Zeit erst zwei Schulen dem Bukowinaer-Bischof überantwortet, die übrigen zwölf stehen noch zur Stunde in der *manus mortua* des Lemberger katholischen Consistoriums, der selbst Ferdinands kaiserliche Hand nichts zu entreissen vermochte. Doch davon zur Genüge, da hier nicht auf Vollständigkeit des jedenfalls sehr reichhaltigen Sündenregisters galizischer Provinzial-Fehlgriffe der Bukowina gegenüber, sondern lediglich auf den Erweis der Unverträglichkeit der romanischen Wolfahrt mit der Einverleibung dieses Landes an Galizien das Absehen gerichtet ist.

5. Der Einwurf, es sei die Bukowina zu klein an Umfang und zu schwach an Mitteln, und um eine selbständige, dem Centralministerium in Wien direkt unterstehende Verwaltung ertragen zu können, verdient bei genauerer Prüfung nicht jenes Gewicht, das ihm auf den ersten Anblick zuzukommen scheint. Denn abgesehen davon, daß die Größe und theilweise die Kostspieligkeit der Verwaltungsorgane jedenfalls dem Umfange, den mäßigen Bedürfnissen und den Hilfsquellen des Landes, mit Uebergehung alles Ueberflussigen und Beschränkung auf das streng Nothwendige, angepaßt werden könnte, so sind selbst die Hilfsquelle der Bukowina zur Deckung ihrer Verwaltungskosten mehr als hinreichend. Wiewol Industrie mit geringen Ausnahmen noch beinahe gänzlich mangelt, so liefern Ackerbau und Viehzucht, dann die Erzeugnisse an Holz und Salz, Eisen, Kupfer und Silber weit über den Bedarf, und die Bevölkerung steht zum Boden bei weitem noch nicht im gehörigen Verhältnisse. Die bisherigen directen und indirecten Steuern ergeben, nach Abschlag aller Regie-Auslagen, einen jährlichen Durchschnittsbetrag von 740.000 f. Cnz und die Zolleinnahme einen von 300.000 f. Cnz. Diese beiden Beträge stellen somit allein ein jähliches reines Einkommen von 1 Million 40.000 f. Cnz dar. Hiezu

kommt aber der wesentliche Umstand, daß die sehr bedeutenden Religionsfondsgüter, welche die grössere Hälfte der Bukowina einnehmen, in dem lezt verfloßenen Jahre unter der gegenwärtigen in mancher Hinsicht gehemmten Verwaltung dennoch einen reinen Ertrag von 224.582 f. Cmz jährlich abwarfen. Mag nun auch dieses Erträgnißquantum durch die seither mittels Patentes vom 7-ten September 1848 eingetretene Aufhebung des Unterthansverbandes und aller bäuerlichen Lasten momentan gelitten haben, so läßt sich dennoch einerseits in der Verbesserung und Vereinfachung der Verwaltung dieser Güter, anderseits aber auch in dem Umstande eine Ausgleichung anhoffen, daß die Religionsfondsherrschaft Radautz mit einem Flächeninhalte von 30 Quadratmeilen, mit 37 Ortschaften und 35.424 Einwohnern, welche seit beinahe 40 Jahren nach Abschlag der Steuern um den geringen Betrag von 18.600 f Cmz an das Militär-Aerar zur Unterbringung des Gestüttes verpachtet, also nur mit diesem Betrage in der obigen Totalsumme veranschlagt ist, selbst unter den jezigen minder günstigen Verhältnissen wenigstens um 60.000 f Cmz verpachtet werden könnte, sohin sich das Einkommen jener Fonde jedenfalls auf ungefähr 264.000 f. Cmz stellen würde. Was aber in finanzieller Hinsicht den entscheidenden Ausschlag gibt, sind die vom Staate an den bisherigen Religionsfondseinkünften seit vielen Jahren bewirkten Ersparnisse, die im Jahre 1841 einen Betrag vom 3.736.806 f Cmz und mit Hinzurechnung der Zinsen pr 96.804 f Cmz einen Totalbetrag von 3.833.610 f Cmz ausmachten, nunmehr aber eine Totalsumme von 4 Millionen fl Cmz darstellen, verzinslichen Staatsgagieren angelegt sind, und von Jahr zu Jahr sich vermehren, da die auf den Religionsfond angewiesenen Ausgaben die Einnahmen desselben bei weitem nicht erreichen, und die griech. n. u. Geistlichkeit in der Bukowina, die den nächsten Anspruch auf Betheilungen aus diesem Fond hätte, statt dessen mit Pfarrsesionen dotiert ist, woraus sie den Haupttheil ihres Unterhaltes zieht. Wenn nun auch voraussichtlich dieser Religionsfond zur Hebung des so sehr zurückgebliebenen und einer durchgreifender Reform entgegenstehenden Schul- und Kirchenwesens fürderhin in stärkere Mitleidenschaft gezogen werden wird, so durften dazu seine jährlichen reinen Einkünfte mehr als hinreichen; aus seinen kapitalisirten Ueberschüssen aber könnten die Zinsen d. h. die Zinsenszinsen des Religionsfondes selbst, vorschußweise in soweit zur Bestreitung der ersten Einrichtungs- und der ferneren laufen den Unterhaltungs-Kosten der eigenen politischen Verwaltung verwendet werden, als die sonstigen Einnahmsquellen des Landes zu diesem Zwecke sich ungenügend erweisen sollten - ein Fall der in senier Unwahrscheinlichkeit kaum je vorauszusetzen ist.

Die Statthaftigkeit eines solchen Vorschüßes von Seiten des Religionsfondes ist übrigens um so weniger bestreitbar, da dieser bereits zu ähnlichen Anlehen an das römisch-katholische und auch an das griechisch-unirte Erzbisthum in Lemberg, aber auch in aderen Fällen in Anspruch genommen wurde, somit diese Fremden zugestandene Begünstigung in höherem Maße dem eigenen Lande bei seiner Constituirung zu Gute kommen muß. Auf solche Art würde der Religionsfond durch seine Zinsen politischen Nützen gewähren, ohne in seinem Hauptstamme und seinen Haupteinkünften seiner eigentlichen religiösen und doctrinellen Bestimmung entzogen zu werden, und Oesterreich würde gewiß nicht Gefahr laufen, gleich so

manch anderem Staate, in dem romanischen Lande eine Kolonie zu besizen, die mehr kostet, als einträgt – also eine in Pension befindliche Prowinz auf Umkosten der Schwesterprovinzen. Gegen das Bedenken der Kleinheit des Umfanges und Kostspieligkeit der Verwaltung, schützt endlich das schlagende Beispiel des gleichfalls kleinen Dalmatiens, welches bei einem nur unbedeutend größeren, nämlich 224 Quadratmeilen betragenden Areale, und bei einem dagegen um etwas geringerer Bevölkerungsstande von 392.000 Einwohnern, bereits seit längerer Zeit sich einer selbständigen provinciellen Verwaltung, einer Wirklichen Existenz als Provinz erfreut, während doch seine Verwaltungsauslagen 52 Procent seines reinen Einkommens verzehren – ein Verhältniß, das bei der wohlfeileren Bukowinaer – Administration sich jedenfalls günstiger gestalten dürfte.

6. Das fernere Bedenken, daß die romanische Nationalität, wenn man sie frei gewähren ließe, durch ihr Uebergewicht die ruthenische beeinträchtigen würde, findet seine Widerlegung in der nichts weniger als intoleranten und propagandistischen Richtung, die das romanische Element überall und nicht am wenigsten in der Bukowina bethätigt; in der steten Versöhnlichkeit und Friedfertigkeit beider daselbst neben - und unter einander lebender Nationen, die erst in dem letzten Jahrzehnt durch wühlerische Misionäre gegen einander gehezt und aufgewiegelt wurden; in der gleichmässigen Vertretung beider Elemente in Kirche und Schule, der gemäß Romanen und Ruthenen friedlich und freundlich neben einander, jeder in seiner Sprache redend in demselben Consistorium sitzen, in derselben Kirche celebrieren, in derselben Schule lehren, in derselben Seminarium erzogen werden; ferner in dem Umstande; daß diese seit jeher dort bestehende Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten vom Bukowinaer- Bischof feierlich und aus freien Stücken durch seine an das Ministerium des Unterrichts gestellte Bitte anerkannt wurde, bei der Gründung neuer, bei der Regelung alter und bei der Reformirung der höheren Schulen dem ruthenischen Elemente gleiche Rehnung zu tragen, wie dem romanischen; endlich in der Anerkennung und gleichen Pflege der ruthenischen Sprache an der dort eben eröffneten Schullehrerbildungsanstalt. Alle diese Umstände sind eben so viele Vorbedeutungen des noch innigeren künftigen Einverständnisses beider nationalen Elemente, wenn sie auch Grundlage der Gleichberechtigung sich neben, und unter einander friedlich und ohne Uebergriffe entwickeln und ausbilden dürfen. Diese wünschenswehrtte Möglichkeit ist jedoch nur dann geboten, wenn die Bukowina in provincieller Beziehung selbständig da steht, und den Ruthenen nicht die Gelegenheit an die Hand gibt, in ihren zahlreichen galizischen Sprachgenossen, und in dem von diesen beschikten, mit ruthenischer Präponderenz ausgerüsteten Provinciallyandtag einen Rückhalt zu erblicken, den sie gegen die eines ähnlichen Rückhaltes ermangelnden Romanen zu mißbrauchen so leicht versucht werden könnten. Es streitet auch daher das obige Bedenken mehr für als gegen die Trennung Bukowina's von Galizien.

7. Einen Hauptgrund für diese Forderung liefert die eigenthümliche Schwierigkeit in Bezug auf die an einem gemeinsamen Provinciallyandtag einzuführende Verhandlungssprache. Das Recht, sich in seiner Muttersprachen auszudrücken, und in Kirche und Staat, vor Gott und Menschen bloß derselben sich zu

bedienen, ist eine directe Anwendung des Princip der Gleichstellung aller Nationalitäten und eines jener Rechte, welche am häufigsten in Anspruch genommen und von jeder Nation gegen etwaige Verkümmern am eifersüchtigsten bewacht werden. War es nun am Reichstage gerecht, daß man keiner Nation eine fremde Verhandlungssprache gesezlich aufzwang, sondern es jeder einzelnen überließ sich aus freien Stücken entweder in ihrer eigenen oder aber in der gangbarsten und den Meisten verständlichen Sprache auszudrücken, so muß dies am Provinciallandtag eben so gerecht, mithin eben so normirt sein. Da ferner gewiß nicht vorauszusezen ist, daß in dem künftigen definitiven Wahlgesez die Kenntniß einer fremden Sprache zur Bedingung der passiven Wahlfähigkeit gestellt werden würde, so liegt die Möglichkeit ganz nahe, daß die Bukowina den Provinciallandtag durch Abgeordnete beschiike, die weder der polnischen noch der ruthenischen Sprache mächtig, sich den übrigen Vertretern verständlich zu machen nicht im Stande wären. Fand aber am Reichstage die deutsche Sprache als die in Oesterreich gangbarste und fast allen Abgeordneten zugängliche, freiwilligen Eingang, so dürfte dieselbe auf dem Lemberger– Landtage als Mittel des Verständnißes allem Anscheine noch nicht denselben Anklang finden, und somit würden die romanischen Vertreter zum ewigen Stillschweigen, zum ewigen Nichtverständniß, zur ewigen Verlegenheit verdammt, und ihre Committenten so gut wie gar nicht vertreten sein. Oder da es Bukowina's Vertretern freistände sich vor dem versammelten Provinciallandtag in ihrer Muttersprache vernehmen zu lassen, meint man durch einen völlig unverstandenen romanischen Vortrag, der im Grunde nichts als lauttönendes Stillschweigen wäre, und an der Wesenheit der Verhandlung und Abstimmung durchaus nichts ändern würde, die sprachliche Schwierigkeit wirklich beseitigt zu haben? Und soll die Bukowina auch in Zukunft immer durch stumme Pantomimendeputirte repräsentirt sein? Oder sollte das Princip der Nationalität dem Principe der Verständlichkeit geopfert, und dem gemäß die Bukowina, um ein Verständniß anzubahnen, gezwungen werden, bei Beschiikung des Provinciallandtages, den übrigen daselbst vorwiegenden Nationalitäten zulieb, auf die ihrige zu verzichten, und auf gesezlich Anordnung gefällig zu sein? Diesen unausweichlichen Schwierigkeiten zu entgehen gibt es nur Ein Mittel, welches darin besteht, daß man sie gar nicht auftauchen läßt, und als solches Mittel stellt sich lendiglich die provincielle Trennung der Bukowina von Galizien dar.

8. Zu all diesen Betrachtungen der Gegenwart gesellt sich auch eine wichtige der Zukunft, deren Würdigung einer weise, auf die leztere eben so gewissenhaft wie auf die erstere bedachten Staatspolitic allerdings obliegt. Oesterreich steht am Eingange des Orients, ein Vorkämpfer des Westens, dem so mächtigen als rührigen nordischen Nachbarstaate gegenüber und Klugheit sowol als Selbsterhaltungspflicht gebieten ihm die Sympathien der Nachbarvölker, vorzüglich der sich auf österreichischem Boden verzweigenden, für einen nahe liegenden Bedürfnißfall vorreäthig anzusammeln. Solche geistige Eroberung auf friedlichem und freundnachbarlichem Wege ist gegenwärtig besonders gegen die Romanen ausführbar, und die Wahrscheinlichkeit sehr gegründet, daß die Donaufürstenthümer, im enthusiastisch begonnenen Ausbau ihrer nationalen Institutionen und in der

Hebung ihres Nationalitätsgefühles gewaltsam gehemmt, ihre Hoffnungen und Wünsche, ihre Sympathie und Schicksale ungesucht und unaufgefordert einer Macht entgegen zu tragen sich versucht viele dürsten, auf deren angränzenden Gebiete sie ihre freien Stammgenossen im Schatten nationaler Institutionen und Verwaltung einer beneidenswerthen Zukunft friedlich und ungestört entgegen reifen sehen. Zur Möglichkeit einer so günstigen Voraussetzung gehört aber, nebst der größtmöglichen Verkehrsfreiheit der Bukowina mit den beiden Fürstenthümern und der Benützung aller Gellegenheiten freundlichen Entgegenkommens und nationalen Unterstützens, hauptsächlich die Hebung der Bukowina in nationaler sowol als jeder andern Beziehung, die jedoch bewiesenermassen ohne ihre völlige provincielle Emancipierung schlechterdings unerreichbar ist.

9. Dieses Trennungsziel verfolgt das ganze Land; dieser Wunsch hat sich allgemein, besonders in den politisch befähigteren Schichten der Bevölkerung durch Wort und Schrift und That, durch Reden, Petitionen und Deputationen schon mehr als einmal, und seit dem Tage, da der Gedanke emancipirt wurde, und frei in die Außenwelt treten dürfte, unverkennbar und unablässig Bahn gebrochen. Die öffentliche Meinung, die allgemeine Stimmung der Bukowina spricht sich offenkundig für ihre Emancipation von Galizien aus, und je mehr diese Frage nach allen Seiten von politisch Urtheilsfähigen beleuchtet wurde, desto gebieterischer erschien die Nothwendigkeit der Trennung aller Augen, desto tiefer drang das Bedürfniß darnach in Mark und Blut des Volkes, insonderheit der gebildeten Klassen desselben. Freilich wenn man der bloßen Zahl den Vorzug vor der Intelligenz und vor allen Vernunftgründen einräumen und annehmen wollte, was vier bloß auf ihre Sonderinteressen erpichte, in äußerster Beschränktheit das allgemeine Interesse völlig außer Achtlassende, den Wald vor lauter Bäumen nicht sehende, und auf das ganze Land den Maßstab eines Dorfes anlegende Bauerndeputirte für die Meinung ihrer Committenten, für den Wunsch des ganzen Landes, für einzig und allein der Bukowina erspriesslich und heilsam ausgeben, sei schon deshalb wahr, weil die das direct Entgegengesetzte Behauptenden nur drei an der Zahl sind; kurz, wenn man dem alten Satze: „Nos numerus sumus“ die höchste und einzige Geltung in der Politik zu gesteht; dann allerdings könnte die durch solche Organe wie die eben charakterisirten repräsentirte Bukowina ihre Hoffnungen kaum erfüllt sehen. Allein selbst dann würde sie auf die Zahl der an den hohen Reichstag von einzelnen Personen und ganzen Gemeinden eingesendeten Petitionen, auf die Zahl der Petenten hinweisen, und den Vortheil der Ueberzahl und das aus der Zahl politisch fließende Recht auch für sich in Anspruch nehmen; selbst dann würde sie darthun, daß alle Klassen, alle Stände, alle Volksschichten laut und einstimmig die romanische Repeal der galizischen Union verlangen, während auf der Gegenseite bloß einige irregeleitete und bornierte, selbst des Lesens und Schreibens unkundige, mit Ideen agrarischen Communismus vollgepfropfte, und sogar auf Petitionen geradezu widersprechenden Inhalts unterfertigte Bauern mit rein egoistischen, das allgemeine Wohl mißachtenden Forderungen stehen, deren Tragweite sie nicht einmal ermessen können – Forderungen, die, würden sie erfüllt, die Freiheit der einen Volksklasse bloß durch die sklavische Unterdrückung der andern erkaufen möchten.

Die übersichtliche Zusammenstellung aller dieser Betrachtungen ergibt folgendes Hauptresultat: Zahl und Intelligenz, Recht und Klugheit, Bedürfnis und Nothwendigkeit sprechen im vereinten Bunde für die Erfüllung der Forderung eines Stammes, dessen Genossen in jüngster Zeit für die Erhaltung der Gesamtmonarchie gegen destructive Tendenzen Gut und Blut, Wohlstand und Glück aufs Spiel gesetzt haben, und dem nun durch Entnationalisierung gelohnt werden würde, wollte man die Bukowina nicht administrativ und repräsentativ frei herstellen. Ja, das Verbleiben dieses Landes bei Galizien wäre ein Aufpfropfen eines fremdartigen Reises auf einen durch und durch verschiedenartigen Stamm, wäre ein Attentat gegen das oberste Recht jeder Nation, gegen das Recht der Selbsterhaltung, wäre eine verdeckte und im Stillen arbeitende, aber unfehlbare Entnationalisierung, wäre die Aussaat ewiger Aufregung in das stille, bisher von keiner politischen Leidenschaft durchwühlte Land. Und zu einem solche Attentate wird, wir hoffen es zuversichtlich, *die hohe Reichsversammlung* in ihrer Weisheit und Gerechtigkeitsliebe die Hand eben so wenig bieten, als sich das Land selbst je damit zufrieden stellen könnte.

Kremsier am 9-ten Februar 1849

Eugen Hackman Bukowiner Bischof,
 Constantin Popovicz Theologie Proffesor,
 Johan Kalinczuk Proffesor der Dogmatik,
 Jacob Mikuli
 Christoph Petrowicz
 Michael Zotta
 Alexander Gojan
 Eudoxius Hurmuzaki
 Nicolai Hackman, Theologie Proffesor

*Ant. Kral, Reichstags-Abgeordneter der Stadt Czernowitz in der Bukowina.
 Jordaki Wasilko und Michael Bodnar Reichstags-Abgeordneten.*

Kremsier, 9 februarie 1949
Comisiei Constituționale, realizat la 18.02.49
R.T.N. 4551/229
Praes: 19 feb. 1849

PROMEMORIU

privind petiția țării (landului) Bucovinei (nr. parlamentar 183), referitor la situația provincială a Bucovinei, înmănat Înalțului Parlament Constituant de către deputații bucovineni.

Înaltă Adunare Parlamentară Imperială!

Soarta de până acum a acestei provincii puțin luată în considerare, așteaptă cu ardoare, chiar imediat după constituirea Austriei, rezolvarea rapidă și despărțirea de un îndelungat viitor potrivit. Locuitorii Bucovinei așa de departe izolați de centrul Monarhiei, și tocmai din această cauză destinul hărăzit lor îi determină să se îngrijească cu atât mai înfricoșați, așadar ei au crezut de cuviință să trimită pe anumiți deputați ai țării (landului), aflați sub jurământ de credință și omagiu față de noul Împărat de la Ollmütz, adresându-se Înalțului Parlament dătător de legi de la Kremsier, atât spre mărturia personală a venerației pe care ei i-o poartă, cât mai ales în spiritul iluminismului progresist mai apropiat asupra drepturilor și intereselor lor și, în acest fel trebuie să prevină pericolul unei hotărâri viitoare grave asupra soartei lor, luată pe baza unei erori, a unei necunoașteri sau indiferențe. Următoarele puncte de reper pot să fie hotărâtoare și decisive în ceea ce privește problema constituirii Bucovinei.

1. Întreaga istorie a acestei țări, de aproximativ 200 mii pătrate, face dovada că niciodată și în nici o situație (condiție) ea nu a aparținut Galiției. De când însă istoria Panoniei și Daciei lui Traian și Decebal ne aduce aminte, Sarmăția se afla liniștită lângă granița de acum a Bucovinei, o parte din Dacia lui Traian (Dacia Traiani). Și de la voievodul Bogdan Dragoș, în anul 1350, și Maramureșul cu românii săi au trecut în Moldova de astăzi, înființându-se acest Voievodat prin fixarea ultimei pietre de hotar către polonii învecinați de la Sniatyn, unde și astăzi se află locul de graniță între Bucovina și Galiția. Ceea ce istoria a împreunat, numai istoria poate să redespărteze; un singur om, el se numește acum deputat în Parlamentul imperial sau ministru, el eșuând negreșit în această operă de separare, și vocea prevestitoare a istoriei vorbește acum tot așa de lămurit, tot așa de insistent despre granițele micii Bucovine, cum la timpul respectiv a vorbit de cu mult mai întinsul stat Iagellonic. Dovadă în acest sens ne oferă mai departe și apropiatul ev mediu, unde voievodul Moldovei și Coroana polonă au intrat în conflict din cauza acestei părți de teritoriu fertil dintre Nistru și Prut, pe care regele Sigismund îl reclama pentru sine în anul 1530, pretextând că această parte de țară ar fi aparținut inițial Pocuției (o parte a

actualului cerc al Colomeei), încât s-a ajuns la aprigă ceartă și război deschis cu armele. În cele din urmă, cu ajutorul osmanilor, lupta s-a terminat în favoarea Moldovei, căci, conform tratatului încheiat, acest teritoriu aflat în litigiu era recunoscut ca fiind parte a Voievodatului Moldovei căruia îi aparținuse din totdeauna de drept și de fapt. Însă chiar pe atunci, în timpul mai multor ani de luptă aprigă nu i-a venit nici unui rege polonez și nici unuia dintre viceregi săi ideea sau pofta față de această parte teritorială rămasă pe mai departe Moldovei, aceasta înseamnă că n-au ridicat nici cea mai mică pretenție asupra adevăratului miez al Bucovinei și încă cu atât mai puțin nu au făcut cunoscută pe atunci o asemenea dorință, așa încât neîncetat și neîntrerupt, conform tratatului, Moldova a rămas liniștită în proprietatea întregii Bucovine ca întruchipare a Câmpiei Prutului aflată odinioară în conflict. Chiar însuși titlul juridic de cedare a Bucovinei la Austria, cum este exprimat apoi în Convenția încheiată cu Poarta la 7 mai 1775, dovedește mai nou străvechea apartenență a Bucovinei la Moldova; căci în timpul regimului austriac, la prima împărțire a Poloniei ce a avut loc aproape în același timp, noua s-a extindere teritorială s-a încercat să se revendice prin pretențiile Coroanei ungare față de Voievodatul (rutean) rușilor roșii al Haliciului și Vladimirului și față de cel al boemilor de pe feudele sileze Oswiecim și Zator, iar referitor la Bucovina renunța la orice pretext, că în Convenția tocmai stabilită se făcea referire expresă numai la necesitatea ei pentru o mai ușoară linie de comunicare între nou-achiziționata Galiție și Transilvania pe care o avea deja de mai înainte în stăpânire, și conform rugăminții (solicitării) de cedare deplină acestei părți teritoriale ca element de legătură între cele două provincii; așadar, prin așezarea ei - cea mai potrivită era Bucovina - ca parte a Moldovei pe care Poarta i-a acordat-o (Austriei) într-adevăr numai ca un cadou făcut de bună voie și nu prin forța unei obligativități juridice incumbate care ar avea la bază vechile petenții galițiene, menționând că privitor la acest teritoriu „să se dea ca dovadă neechivocă de prietenie, simpatie și convingere de bună vecinătate prietenească”. Ei i-a revenit Bucovina pe cale judiciară, așa că puternica Majestate Imperială Romană sigur nu ar fi acceptat și nu s-ar fi rugat ca cerința ei să fie un simplu cadou fără să amintească măcar în treacăt de pretenția ei de drept. Însă chiar sub stăpânirea austriacă Bucovina nu a făcut parte din Regatul Galiției ca un teritoriu anexat. Deja imediat în anul 1776 când a avut loc luarea oficială în posesie a Bucovinei, ea a fost considerată ca „provincie autonomă” sub numele de „Districtul Bucovinei” și în baza existentului Stat-quo din timpul preluării a fost subordonată, sub conducerea superioară a Curții Aulice de Război, unei singure Administrații militare cu reședința la Cernăuți care era condusă după prescripțiile militare, printr-un general, un maior auditorial și trei auditori la Cernăuți, Siret și Suceava, și concomitent de comun acord cu Divanul moldovenesc voievodal (Consiliul de Stat), precum și chiar încuviințarea emisă de împăratul Iosif al II-lea ținând seama de „stările speciale de mai'nainte și de condițiile acestei țări” de particularitățile de bază (respective) a emis în fond Constituția progresistă și parțial cu totul asemănătoare diferență. Ca de exemplu s-a dorit a se păstra în baza situației moldovenești țărănești existente aici un lucru nepermis jurisdicției patrimoniale (senioriale) în afară de chestiunile litigioase neînsemnate, dar introducerea obișnuită a

procedului va fi redată oral și toate vicisitudinile de mai târziu se mențin acolo neluate încă în seamă.

La această dispoziție în întregime mai mult schițată decât într-adevăr realizată organic a urmat o Constituție proprie și completă în orice privință, emisă de împăratul Iosif al II-lea la 15 martie 1873, prin care Bucovina a fost recunoscută expres „ca o provincie politică” și toate condițiile și ramurile administrative au fost normate. Însă deja prin Decretul Curții din 16 septembrie 1786 această țară a fost trecută în Administrația civilă și totodată unită cu Galiția ca un cerc al acestei provincii, atât în relațiile politice cât și în cele juridice; această încorporare introdusă în vederea desfășurării intenționatului proces de asimilare primea perfecționarea sa prin Patenta din 14 martie 1787 care dădea boierilor din Bucovina o configurație egală ca formă cu cea a nobililor galițieni, iar în locul titlului indigen anulat se aprobă unul din ierarhia galițiană. Unirea era totuși numai una efemeră, deoarece după 4 ani, la 29 noiembrie 1790, împăratul Leopold prin intermediul Patentei se pronunța în felul următor: „că numai acea intenție de a se simplifica administrația oficială, unirea ce a avut loc în anul 1786 nu poate să dăinuiască pe mai departe, în timp ce experiența a arătat că diversitatea de limbi, obiceiuri și datini ale locuitorilor nu permite o înțelegere deplină, de aceea ar fi fost luată hotărârea ca Bucovina din nou să se separe până la un punct, că de aici înainte aceeași să nu se mai considere ca o parte a acestui Regat, Dieta aceleiași nu mai trebuie să se mai constituie cu Dieta galițiană, luând în considerare administrația de stat și de drept dar și în același timp are să rămână modul de prevedere a acelei legături cu Galiția, care promite Bucovinei siguranță și succes”. Această Patentă prescria tocmai acestea: 1) „că începând cu 1 noiembrie 1790 Bucovina are să stea sub acest nume și ca o provincie existentă doar pentru sine prin administrarea împreună a (Landului) țării în raport cu Galiția. 2) că această administrație cu privire la chestiunile politice se va face prin grija numitului guvern al țării de la Lemberg”. În măsura în care însă cuvântul renunță la faptă, într-atâta și această bine întemeiată, dreaptă și înțeleaptă Patentă rămâne departe de punerea ei în aplicare: provincia Bucovinei prezentă pentru sine, separată de Galiția, a rămas în mai multe rânduri, mai ales în relația politică, un cerc curat al Galiției și autonomia ei a devenit, în afară de fixarea impozitelor, abia observabilă. Mai mult, practica contrară legii a păstrat parțial sancțiunea legală prin aceea că noua Constituție a Galiției, ce ține de Dietă, reglementată prin Patenta împăratului Franz I la 13 aprilie 1817, care la art. 3 , în mod bătător la ochi considera Dieta Bucovinei ca fiind până atunci unită cu cea galițiană, în timp ce Patenta citată mai sus din 29 septembrie 1790 ordonă clar: „că aceea nu trebuie să se considere împreună cu Dieta galițiană”. La contradicțiile parțial vădite ale acestor două Patente care mai târziu sau mai devreme nu au fost abolite categoric, dar nici luate în seamă, prin urmare ele par a fi ignorate, înclinând asupra grijilor poziției provinciale a Bucovinei, dacă un Decret prezidențial din 23 iunie 1846, nr. 4814/7, despre anumite intervenții ale nobililor indigeni, nu ar fi recunoscut expres valabilitatea legală permanentă cu privire la autonomia Bucovinei ca provincie proprie recunoscută prin Patenta din septembrie 1790 (ca simplă excepție a aceluiași respectiv paragraf din Constituția emisă de Dietă) și în plus nu ar fi lămurit „că la decretul și dispozițiile administrative pentru Galiția s-a luat în considerare

poziția constituțională a Bucovinei și caracterul ei specific și, dacă aceste dispoziții au fost sau nu valabile și pentru Bucovina” prin însemnarea: „cuprinzând sau excluzând amănuntele pentru Bucovina” se arăta solemn ce „aplicare avea îndeosebi între relațiile dintre proprietarii de pământ (nobili) și supușii lor”. Așa sa îmbinat ciudățenia destinului Bucovinei, că garantatele și anulatele, experimentatele și stabilizatoarele, izolatele și anexatele decrete s-au întâlnit pe teritoriul ei într-o schimbare pestră și rapidă, și, că această provincie a trebuit să slujească inițial la trecerea dintr-o provincie într-altă țară curând preluată, dar și ca teritoriu de perindare pentru diversele patente și ordonanțe. Administrația militară a Mariei Tereza pentru „Districtul Bucovinei” a făcut o nouă Constituție pe care concentratorul Iosif al II-lea o acorda în mod concis „provinciei politice”. Spiritul fără odihnă al lui Iosif al II-lea, deja după trei ani a modelat însăși opera sa, și, mai mult, înțeleptul Leopold a urmat predecesorului său celui mai apropiat. Francisc (Franz) I a aprobat practicarea abuzurilor asupra mai buneii teorii legale, ignorând aparent pe acestea mai din urmă. Chiar binevoitorul regim premergător Revoluției din martie 1848 al lui Ferdinand recunoștea teoria favorabilă și cu toate acestea a lăsat să domnească practica nefavorabilă. Și, chiar în acest caz, fără să țină seamă, măsurile contradictorii au rămas necontestate, că socotind intervalul scurt de timp de la 1 noiembrie 1786 până la 1790 Bucovina nu a fost niciodată anexată ca parte integrantă la Galiția și niciodată contopită în aceasta.

Pământul istoric al acestei țări ar fi așadar de găsit, el arată spre elementul roman, care a fost luat în primire de la patria sa Moldova în *Stat-quo*-ul lui de atunci și legal nu a fost anexat nimănui și nici nu a fost coordonat de cineva sau subordonat cuiva. Pământul istoric al acestei țări după Înalta Adunare Parlamentară Imperială este departe atât de teoria utopică cât și de cea regresivă, pe de o parte pretențiile progresului și pe de altă parte situațiile în condițiile date care nu pot fi trecute cu vederea nesancționate, voind să țină socoteală dreaptă și să înfăptuiască o construcție durabilă a patriei întregi. Tronul și poporul au luat hotărârea lămurită, voind să recunoască și să îndeplinească prima revendicare a dreptului istoric, grija (atenția) față de egalitatea în drepturi a națiunilor ca prim pedestal, ca piatră de temelie a acestei construcții. Acum Bucovina nu solicită nimic altceva decât aplicarea acestui principiu față de ea, nu vrea să intre în familia popoarelor nici ca privilegiatul Veniamin și nici ca Iosif cel vândut. Orice altă poziție decât cea a unei provincii autonome, ca parte nerepartizată nimănui, cu o reprezentare și administrație proprie, ar fi doar un acot la întreaga datorie, ar fi o continuare a provizoratului pe o perioadă nedeterminată, ar fi doar un simplu supliment al unei noi Patente la multele Patente vechi, ar fi inoculare în suflete a unei opinii dușmănoase Constituției, care în apropiere de graniță, la punctul nodal a trei Imperii, într-un moment critic sub influența demagogilor și emisarilor străini, poate foarte ușor să coacă o năzuință dăunătoare pentru stat. De aceea acum trebuie să se găsească punctul crucial din Constituție care la rotația statală, chiar în cazul unei mișcări accelerate a corpurilor, presiunea împrejurărilor să prevină ieșirea cu rapiditate excentrică separată a membrilor statului din calea politică normală, și totodată pare să fie capabil să stopeze extremitățile din cadrul organismului de stat profund divizate. Un asemenea mijloc de

prevenire se înfățișează referitor la Bucovina numai în propria reprezentatiune populară și administrație autonomă și orice alt mijloc de informare este numai (paliativ) un calmant, o înșelătoare camuflare cu nici o vindecare radicală a rătăcii de care Bucovina a suferit neîncetat de la intrarea ei în uniunea politică austriacă, cu toate patentele și decretele Curții Aulice nerespectate, și încă mai suferă de ambele elemente a căror tărie și durată în sine o bântuie ca o boală dureroasă de mai mulți ani, încât nici o altă idee decât aceea să i se permită să ia naștere vindecarea radicală și rezolvarea problemei naționale.

2. Jumătățile de măsură sunt amânarea răului în timp ce acesta coace virusul ca mai apoi să erupă cu și mai mare forță. O asemenea jumătate de măsură nimicitoare ar fi repartizarea Bucovinei ca cerc la Galiția, ca provincie niciodată nu va putea să fie eterogenă, niciodată elementele naționale încătușate prin lege nu se vor putea comporta pașnic alături de cele eterogene, deoarece înțelegerea comună a lor se pierde. O neînțelegere, o încordare, o împotrivire a celor două naționalități, romană și slavă, este inevitabilă în Dieta din Lemberg; neînțelegerea, fricțiunea se încinge, fierbințele se aprinde și focul se face neîndurător. Aceasta însă este valabilă și pentru elementele poloneze cultivate și dezvoltate care nu pot renunța ușor la moștenita lor supremație, astfel aspirând cu atât mai mult trebuie să se întâlnească justetea față de ceea ce abia s-a ivit (nou), cu cât amenințatoarele elemente rutene înseamnă și mai mult din cauza imediatei vecinătăți (slave). Deja în timpul sistemelor existente înainte de Revoluția din martie 1848, Bucovina a avut de biruit în mai multe rânduri de luptă crâncenă; acestei lupte, chiar dacă nu exclusiv, i se datorează întârzierea națională, disprețuirea religioasă și decăderea politică a unei părți nu neînsemnate a acestei țări. Ce a fost prin urmare mai firesc decât sămânța suspiciunii, înverșunării, învrăjbirii pe față și pe ascuns, care a semănat acest element, în epoca premergătoare Revoluției din martie 1848, cu știrea și aprobarea tacită a Regimului provincial, pe câmpiile liniștite ale Bucovinei, năpădind tot mai exuberant și semănătorul alegându-se cu antipatia poporului? Toate legile publice de batjocură, ziua în amiaza mare, facerea de prozeliți în funcțiune, instigarea enoriașilor împotriva parohilor lor, *Minuendo* – *Licitatio* licitarea decăzută a taxelor (dărilor) de epitrahil pentru clerici spre ademenirea enoriașilor, dovezi frauduloase de ridicare a cultului enoriașilor din parohii, amestecări samavolnice în drepturile parohiale străine, în Biserica și Școala celor de rit neunit (ortodox), neîncetate discreditări și denunțări, către Regimul celor sus-puși și atotputernici, a unui cult dușmănit, constrângeri nedrepte de concurență și alte cheltuieli și spese pe seama enoriașilor altui rit, și încă multe altele certificate de registraturile politice din Cernăuți și Lemberg și confirmate de vizibilele cazuri de practicare a misionarismului mic de suflet și intolerant, care, într-un stat civilizat, a fost pus în mișcare de creștini împotriva creștinilor, și toate aceste sunt pentru generația bucovineană încă existentă, motive de nezdruccinat ale înstrăinării, urii, fanatismului religios și opoziției politice împotriva misionarilor trimiși din Galiția de origine ruteană și confesiune greco-unită (greco-catolică), acești netrebnici martiri ai unui apostolat primejdios (nemicitor). Chiar dacă acum îndemnul, încurajarea și conducerea superioară a acestui misionarism provine incontestabil de la Biserica de Stat, ura populației indigene trebuie să se întoarcă mai întâi și în cea mai mare măsură

împotriva iscoditorilor și hărăzitorilor ruteni ce luptă în prima linie, dar în același timp și asupra unei părți din Galiția, de unde au venit ei și de unde își primesc întăriri, care în calitate de Cartier general conducător veneau să examineze operațiunile politice naționale și religioase împotriva Bucovinei. Atâta timp cât această reciprocă gelozie națională și această dușmănie dintre români și ruteni continuă încă să dăinuie – și o generație (o viață de om) ține cel puțin de dispariția ei – pot să se reunească aceste elemente într-adevăr în același Parlament numai că nu se pot apropia unul de celălalt, nu se pot uni, și, fără apropierea semințiilor, fără concordie nu există o colaborare folositoare, ci cel mult un acord aritmetic, o constrângere permanentă, o prevalență fizică a unei seminții împotriva celor de altă părere, o neîntreruptă și neîncetată tensiune gata să erupă și care dă de gândit.

3. La des amintitele motive religioase și politice ale divergențelor antipatice din Bucovina se adaugă însă și cel național, nu mai puțin important. Geografia aproape a tuturor statelor independente care nu sunt separate unele de altele printr-un zid chinezesc și nici luate ca statistică separat în privința națională diferită și reciproc vioi-frecventate provincii ale unui stat, arată observatorului că la granițele de Stat și mai mult la cele provinciale există o pierdere și contopire a limbii, obiceiurilor și moravurilor, un loc de răscruce a raselor și limbilor cu exponenți mai tari sau mai slabi, dintr-un element sau altul. De obicei elementul cultivat sau superior numeric, preponderent în amestec așa încât uneori elementul indigen din contră dispăre și un asemenea element ținut într-un loc de hermafroditism (formație hibridă) e în aparență deghizat întrucât originea participantă se află la naționalitățile de două feluri; s-a folosit aici oarecum caracterul vechii propoziții: „*Non datur salus*” la repartizarea spațială a națiunilor. Piemontul italian cu cel franțuzesc, Elveția cea germană cu cea franceză și italiană, Belgia flamandă cu cea franceză, Triestul german cu limba italiană etc. sunt dovezi grăitoare a acestei stări de tranziție. Așa se înfățișează și în Bucovina, în lunca Prutului și în regiunile muntoase ale Galiției elementul rutean, totuși nici pe departe exclusiv, ci numai stabilit cu tărie predominantă astfel încât românii ce locuiesc acolo vorbesc pe lângă limba lor maternă și pe cea ruteană, mulți chiar fără a o mai folosi pe cea maternă. Însă din acest motiv a trage concluzie imediat că toți vorbitorii de limbă ruteană aparțin naționalității rutene ar fi cel puțin pripit și eronat. Chiar dacă nu se va tăgădui faptul că din cei 100.000 de vorbitori ai limbii rutene din întreaga Bucovină, 20.000 din diferite timpuri au imigrat în Bucovina din Galiția și din Rusia-Roșie, în mod deosebit în timpul prigoanei religioase poloneze din secolele precedente, și s-au stabilit acolo, astfel dimpotrivă sigur nu trebuie să se înțeleagă greșit că limba ar fi cea mai importantă și excelentă, ea însă nu înfățișează nici pe departe unicul criteriu al naționalității, ci obiceiurile, tradițiile și datinile și în mod deosebit religia, în acest caz se prezintă imediat factorii principali cu drept de vot, cu toate acestea cei 80.000 de români care vorbesc rutenește prin simpla vorbire a unei limbi învecinate – să fie legată pe mai departe de unitatea limbii proprii – nu au renunțat deja la naționalitatea lor, ci și-au atașat-o pe cea ruteană. Și afirmația contrară este cu atât mai inadmisibilă, deoarece rutenii galițieni sunt văzuți în mod obișnuit ca o parte componentă principală a religiei greco-catolice, în totalitate fiind particularitatea caracteristică a naționalității lor, această

trăsătură caracteristică principală însă lipsește tuturor celor 80.000 de români vorbitori de limbă ruteană, și în parte nu va fi întâlnită nici chiar la propriu-zișii ruteni emigranți, în timp ce numărul greco-uniților ruteni din Bucovina conform conscripției din anul 1846, se urcă curat la cel mult 10.000. Construitul plan de parcelare a Bucovinei și de anexare a părții vorbitoare de limbă ruteană cu Galiția se ia după considerentul că e fals calculul demonstrat asupra naționalității rutene a tuturor vorbitorilor de limbă ruteană. Și în afară de aceasta se scoate așadar în serios faptul că semnele de hotar (granița), care de secole străjuiesc unei țări și care au devenit sanctuare istorice ale unei seminiții, se raportează în Bucovina la suma tuturor celorlalte naționalități în raport cu 3 la 1, ca astfel să poată imediat să modifice durabil granițele printr-un simplu cuvânt?

4. Mult promisul și mult lăudatul mijloc de scoatere din impas a împărțirii provinciei în districte (cercuri) imperiale ținând seama de naționalități și cu o reprezentanță districtuală autonomă este de asemenea nepotrivită să alunge îngrijorarea românilor, având în vedere viitorul lor. Deja în sine și pentru sine unirea profundă este o contopire durabilă în întregime eterogenă, gravitând după diferite puncte centrale și direcții și nimic altceva decât vecinătatea pe care obligatoriul paragraf al Constituției o aduce prin unitatea individului provincial laolaltă cu naționalitățile, pe care le are în mod ordinar, la desfrâu politic împotriva naturii din care nu poate să (izvorască) se nască decât numai un monstru politic și nu un organism viabil. Perversitatea dă naștere însă la păcate strigătoare la cer dacă o mică națiune se contopește într-un întreg cu una de zece ori mai mare numeric, aceasta înseamnă condamnarea ei la o veșnică inferioritate și schilodire, la o veșnică minoritate și la o veșnică cedare în chestii colective de interese contradictorii. Pentru a se stăvili acest rău s-a dat poruncă să se nască reprezentarea autonomă și a sa afacere internă a cercului imperial de sine diriguitor, considerându-se suficientă remedierea împotriva tuturor abuzurilor politice, îndeosebi privitor la naționalități, prin autonomia cercului (ținutului) care numai în treburile comune se rezumă la avantajul Dietei provinciale. Însă dacă s-ar cumpăni faptul că tocmai chestiunile colective sunt de regulă cele mai importante căci și pentru toți locuitorii statului cea mai importantă problemă este cea obștească, fapt pentru care regimul central însuși își rezervă drepturile asupra ei; dacă se chibzuieste că măsurile ce privesc întreaga obște ale unei Diete provinciale, de pildă un Institut politehnic sau o Academie care să formeze viitoarea generație spre încurajarea sau spre înnobilarea unei naționalități și prin urmare spre înflorirea sau spre ruina unui district (ținut), un rol tocmai atât de hotărâtor, dacă încă nu se poate lua în calcul influența mai puternică decât înseși ordonanțele speciale luate aparte ale Districtului, dacă de acum înainte s-ar ține seamă de toate chestiunile intereselor divergente precum și de diversitatea tuturor tendințelor celor două națiuni, probabil s-ar îndrepta în bine absolut multe lucruri, căci neamul numeros în virtutea înclinației sale de majoritate hotărâtoare își impune neîncetat supremația asupra seminițiilor mici, cu reprezentare redusă, și prin urmare poate impune tot ce este agreat de el; dacă în afară de aceasta se păstrează ca în prezent, că șeful politic provincial în virtutea dependenței sale față de majoritate și responsabilitatea sa față de Dieta provincială, trebuie să aibă convenita considerație și

să ia în seamă dorințele și hotărârile acestora, că el deși trebuie să decidă asupra plângerilor, recursurilor și contra manifestărilor adresate lui de către reprezentanta districtuală românească, se lasă a se înclina spre voința Dietei provinciale; că prin urmare păgubitul District, naționalitatea privată de drepturi neîncetat și cu orice condiție până la urmă nu are dreptate; așa își pierde strălucirea mult seducătoarea soluție salvatoare promisă precum și eficacitatea sa salutară ca negura în fața soarelui, și ceea ce încă mai e de prisos nu ajunge în realitate nici pe departe decât sărăcăcios spre percepția multor interese districtuale pentru a putea să se formeze o contrapondere care să corespundă puternic și să prevină nenorocirile vis-a-vis de o naționalitate superioară numeric. În această relație Districtul Imperial apare ca o ficțiune politică, prezentat în mod favorabil pentru persoane cu temperament sanguinic.

Și simpla teorie sau prea neliniștita privire profetică a viitorului în aceste examinări (considerații) nu frânge orice unire a românilor cu Galiția; nu, o experiență de 63 de ani sub diverși regenți și sub diverse vicisitudini eterogene ale sorții a apreciat din punct de vedere just fericirea și durerea unei astfel de uniri și le-a explicat prin adevărata ei măsură. Dureros trebuie să fie lovit bucovineanul când bogatele resurse și căile de bunăstare ale patriei sale pe care le-ar putea avea printr-o sinceră și binevoitoare conducere ce aspiră spre progres, cu care să se pună de acord ceea ce ea a devenit. O bună parte din vină pentru multilaterală rămânere în urmă a țării trebuie pusă pe seama anexării cu Galiția, dacă regimul provincial nu este de asemenea supremul și singurul purtător al vinovăției. Totala diversitate a naționalităților a făcut ca funcționarii străini de națiune să fie total inaccesibili față de doleanțele și nevoile celor din Bucovina încredințați spre administrare, de aceea românii au fost măsurați cu măsuri străine. Uriașa extindere a Galiției a îngreunat cuprinzătoarea privire de ansamblu a autorităților provinciale, a căror privire era în stare să pătrundă cu greu spre extremitatea sudică a țării românești situată aici, și este de obiectat faptul că în toate timpurile au fost și sunt extremități ale mai multor „boli cronice” decât în restul celorlalte părți ale corpului teritorial; Bucovina nu a făcut excepție de la această regulă. Peste ea s-au revărsat toate îndurărilor, toate avantajele, mai ales când ea în Galiția a fost aproape scoasă din uz. Locurile de la instituții și bursele pentru studenți (Stipendiile) galițiene devin deseori vacante și tot deseori repartizate, așa încât Bucovina nu se alege cu nimic. Un Institut de credit galițian nu este de atins, singură Bucovina nu are voie să participe la acesta, deoarece anuarul ei (cartea ei cadastrală) suferă de o conducere neregulată; ea solicită rectificarea graficului ei, și darea de seamă asupra acesteia e deja raportată înainte cu 6 ani, iar anuarul încă nu este reglementat, și mult mai mult Institutul de creditare inaccesibil. Episcopia Bucovinei ducând lipsă de o biserică-catedrală în Cernăuți, unde fusese mutat scaunul episcopal de la Rădăuți, solicita în anul 1805 repartizarea sumei necesare de construire din uriașele economii ale îmbelșugatului *Fond religionar greco-neunit* creat tocmai pentru susținerea Bisericii și a Școlii; rugămintea a fost repetată de nenumărate ori, copleșind cu rugăminți cerul și pământul, epuizând toate mijloacele de exasperare, ca din propria avere să obțină, ceea ce puțin numeroșii romano-catolici precum și sărăcăcioșii greco-catolici posedau deja cu înlesnire din cele străine lor, de asemenea

prin eforturi susținute aprobarea pentru o biserică de piatră în Cernăuți; rugămintea a fost îndeplinită abia în anul ... 1843, aceasta înseamnă aproape patruzeci de ani, timp după care generația primului solicitant se află deja de multă vreme în mormânt, dormind somnul dreptilor. Biserica și sistemul de învățământ au fost neglijate în cel mai înalt mod, limba română fără excepție a fost disprețuită (lăsată deoparte), nu s-a construit nici o școală elementară nouă, iar la puținele școli deja înființate de formă au fost angajați învățători ruteni sau polonezi, fără a cunoaște câtuși de puțin limba țării, încât profesia acestora se referă mai mult la deznaționalizarea și convertire religioasă a indigenilor decât la învățământul popular. Învățătorii ce au fost angajați în anii anteriori au fost constrânși prin disprețuire, prin dese admonestări, prin transferări inconvenabile și prin alte mijloace indirecte, să renunțe la funcțiile lor sau să intre prin convertire în sânul Bisericii de Stat, iar un decret caracteristic al Guvernului interzicea expres transmiterea vreunui post de învățător la persoane care nu aparțin Bisericii Romano-Catolice sau Greco-Catolice. Într-adevăr tirania autorităților provinciale a îndrăznit chiar să disprețuiască însuși autoritatea imperială; căci prin intermediul Înaltei Decizii din anul 1844, emisă de împăratul Ferdinand, i s-au aprobat Consistoriului episcopesc bucovinean petițiile sale în legătură cu preluarea în îngrijire a școlilor elementare greco-neunite subordonate din (18)14 și până atunci Consistoriului catolic din Lemberg și s-a impus remiterea acestora către autoritățile respective. Corespondența urgentă cu Guvernul galițian, neluată în seamă timp de patru ani, a făcut totuși posibil ca două școli să fie predate episcopului Bucovinei, restul în număr de douăsprezece se află încă momentan în mâna moartă (manus mortua) a Consistoriului catolic din Lemberg care n-ar fi în stare să-i smulgă nimic autorității imperiale a lui Ferdinand însuși. Însă despre aceasta s-a dat îndeajuns satisfacție, de vreme ce aici nu s-a avut drept scop intenția de a scoate în evidență neapărat caracterul complet al listei păcatelor comise din abundență de erorile provinciale galițiene față de Bucovina, ci numai pur și simplu dovada incompatibilității bunăstării românești cu anexarea acestei țării la Galiția.

5. Obiecția că Bucovina ar fi prea mică ca întindere și slabă în mijloace și că n-ar putea suporta cheltuielile unei administrații independente subordonate direct Ministerului Central din Viena, la o examinare minuțioasă nu are nici o greutate care pare să i se adreseze la prima vedere. Căci făcând abstracție de faptul că cel puțin mărimea perimetrului se va putea adapta în parte la scumpetea organelor de administrare, trebuințelor potrivite și resurselor economice ale țării, prin scutirea a tot ceea ce e de prisos și restrângerea la ceea ce este necesar, așa ar fi resursele economice ale Bucovinei mai mult decât suficiente pentru acoperirea costurilor ei de administrare. Deși, cu mici excepții, industriei i se simte aproape complet lipsa, așa furnizează agricultura și creșterea vitelor, apoi produsele de lemn și sare, cupru și argint întrec cu mult peste ceea ce e necesar și populația nu stă nici pe departe la pământ în privința cuvenitelor condiții de viață. Impozitele directe și indirecte de până acum au avut ca rezultat, după o scădere (plătire în rate) a tuturor cheltuielilor de regie, o sumă medie de 740.000 florini și perceperea unei taxe vamale de 300.000 de florini. Aceste două sume reprezintă așadar un venit net de 1 milion 40.000 de florini. La acesta se adaugă împrejurarea esențială că bunurile foarte însemnate ale Fondului

religionar, care ocupă mai mult de jumătate din Bucovina și care sub administrația actuală, în multe privințe inhibată, a adus totuși în ultimul an ce a trecut un venit curat de 224.582 florini. Întrucât chiar acest quantum de venituri, prin patenta de atunci, din 7 septembrie 1848, a avut de suferit survenita suspendare a asociației de negociere și momentan toate poverile țărănești, așa se speră pe deoparte în îmbunătățirea și simplificarea administrației acestor bunuri bisericești, pe de altă parte se speră la o compensare, însă chiar și în cadrul împrejurărilor că stăpânirea Fondului religionar din Rădăuți cu o suprafață de 30 de mile pătrate, cu 37 de localități și cu 35.424 locuitori, care a arendat, pentru suma derizorie de 18.600 de florini, armatei statului spre adăpostirea hergheliei, prin urmare este estimată numai cu acea sumă existentă în suma totală de mai sus, pe când singură în condițiile actuale, mai puțin avantajoase, s-ar putea arenda cu cel puțin 60.000 de florini, așadar veniturile acestui Fond se vor putea regla în orice caz la aproximativ 264.000 de florini. Ceea ce determină faptul hotărâtor din punct de vedere financiar sunt economiile pricinuite de către Stat în mai mulți ani la veniturile de până acum ale Fondului religionar, economii care în anul 1841 urcau la suma de 3.736.806 florini, iar cu adăugare la socoteală a dobânzii de 96.804 florini făceau o sumă totală de 3.833.610 florini, de acum înainte însă s-a prezentat o sumă totală de 4 milioane de florini sau titluri de stat (hârtii de valoare) care fiind plasați aduc dobânzi și se înmulțesc an de an, întrucât cheltuielile indicate la Fondul religionar nu pot atinge pe mai departe încasările aceluiași, și clerul greco-neunit din Bucovina, care ar avea următorul drept la împărțirile din acest Fond, a fost dotat din acesta cu sesii parohiale care reprezintă partea principală din care ei își asigură subzistența. Chiar dacă acum, pe cât se poate prevedea acest Fond religionar va avea de trecut un puternic inconvenient spre ridicarea din înapoiere prin aplicarea unei reforme eficace și așteptată pe viitor față de sistemul Școlar și Biserică, așa s-ar putea ca veniturile sale anuale să fie mai mult decât suficiente în acest scop; din excedentele sale capitalizate, dobânzile, adică dobânzile compuse ale Fondului religionar însuși se vor putea întrebuița însă cu titlu de împrumut la acoperirea cheltuielilor primei instituții și mai departe spre suportarea costurilor de întreținere a unei administrații politice proprii numai dacă se arată a fi insuficiente alte surse de venit ale țării spre acest scop, un caz care în improbabilitatea lui este greu a se presupune vreodată. Caracterul legal al unui astfel de împrumut (acon) din partea Fondului religionar este de altfel atât de puțin contestabil, întrucât deja acest prea asemănător împrumut către Arhidioceza romano-catolică și către cea greco-catolică din Lemberg, dar și chiar în alte cazuri a fost luat în considerare, prin urmare avantajarea înfăptuită trebuie să revină în mare măsură propriei țări, la constituirea sa, spre binele ei. În felul acesta Fondului religionar i s-a acordat prin dobânzile sale o utilitate politică fără să fi interzis (afectat) propriile sale destinații religioase și doctrinare din neamul său principal și din veniturile sale principale, și Austria n-ar fi riscat, tot așa încă și alte state, să dețină o colonie într-o țară românească care să o coste mai mult decât îi aduce câștig sau prin urmare o provincie aflată la pensie pe cheltuiala provinciilor surori. Ezitarea față de micimea perimetrului și de scumpetea administrării lui este înlăturată în cele din urmă de convingătorul exemplu al Dalmației, o țară, de asemenea de dimensiuni mici, care la o neînsemnată mărime ce

însunează un areal de 224 mii pătrate și cu o situație demografică ceva și mai mică de 392.000 de locuitori, deja se bucură de multă vreme de o administrație provincială autonomă au unei existențe reale ca provincie, în timp ce chiar instituțiile sale consumă 52 de procente din venitul său net – o condiție care la convenabila administrație bucovineană putea să se înfățișeze în orice caz mai avantajoasă.

6. Gândirea mai îndepărtată că dacă naționalitatea română lăsată în voia sa va prejudicia prin preponderența ei pe cea ruteană își găsește combaterea ei în direcția cu nimic mai puțin intolerantă și propagandistică, care dovedește prin fapte elementul românesc pretutindeni și cu atât mai mult în Bucovina; într-un caracter permanent împăciuitoare și pașnic a ambelor națiuni ce viețuiesc una lângă alta, care chiar în ultimul deceniu au fost ațâțate de către misionarii instigatori una împotriva celeilalte; într-o reprezentare proporțională a ambelor elemente în Biserică și Școală, care, conform românilor și rutenilor, ei viețuiesc pașnic și prietenos unii lângă alții, fiecare vorbind în limba sa, stau împreună în același Consistoriu bisericesc, slujesc în aceeași biserică, învață în aceeași școală și se formează în același Seminar Teologic; mai departe în împrejurarea că această alăturată egalitate în drepturi a naționalităților a fost totdeauna recunoscută în mod solemn de către episcopul Bucovinei prin rugămintele înaintate de bună voie către Ministerul Învățământului, ca la reglementarea veche și la reformarea nouă a școlilor înalte să se țină seama de elementul rutean ca și de cel românesc; în fine să se aibă în vedere recunoașterea și îngrijirea în mod egal față de limba ruteană la Institutul de formare a învățătorilor deja deschis. Toate aceste împrejurări sunt tocmai așa de multe semne ale unui profund asertiment pe viitor a celor două elemente naționale, dacă ele se pot forma și dezvolta unul lângă celălalt, fără abuzuri, având ca bază egalitatea în drepturi. Această posibilitate demnă de dorit se poate oferi numai dacă Bucovina se află într-o relație autonomă și rutenilor nu li se dă prilejul să întrezărească un sprijin în nenumărații tovarăși de limbă (conazionali) din Galiția și în cei trimiși în Dieta provincială o înarmare cu preponderență ruteană spre a putea încerca așa de ușor să abuzeze de un asemenea sprijin împotriva românilor împuținați. Așadar, gândirea de mai sus se bate mai mult pentru decât împotriva separării Bucovinei de Galiția.

7. Un argument esențial pentru această revendicare este oferit de ciudata dificultate privitoare la limba în care se duc tratativele la Dieta comună provincială. Dreptul de a se exprima în limba maternă și de a se folosi de aceeași limbă în Biserică și Stat, înaintea lui Dumnezeu și a oamenilor, este o directă întrebuintă a principiului de punere pe aceeași treaptă a tuturor națiunilor și aceeași justețe este solicitată cel mai frecvent și va fi păzită cel mai gelos de fiecare națiune față de o eventuală degenerare. La Dieta imperială era echitabil faptul că nici o națiune nu a fost constrânsă de lege să folosească o limbă străină, ci fiecare în parte este lăsată să se exprime liber ori în limba proprie, ori în limba uzuală și înțeleasă de cei mai mulți, tot așa de dreaptă trebuie să fie și Dieta provincială a landului (țării), așadar să fie la fel după același standard. Deoarece pe mai departe sigur nu este a se presupune că în viitoare lege electorală definitivă s-ar pune condiția cunoașterii unei limbi străine pentru dreptul pasiv de a alege, respectiv de a vota, așa există foarte aproape posibilitatea ca Bucovina să trimită reprezentanți către Dieta provincială a țării prin

deputați care nu stăpânesc nici limba polonă și nici limba ruteană, nefiind în stare să se facă înțeleși de către restul reprezentanților. Pe când limba germană practică în Austria se găsește la Dieta imperială fiind aproape la îndemâna tuturor deputaților, intrare de bună voie, însă la Dieta landului din Lemberg această limbă nu și-a găsit încă ecoul ca mijloc de înțelegere sub toate aspectele, prin urmare reprezentanții românilor ar fi condamnați la veșnică tăcere, la veșnică neînțelegere, la o veșnică încurcătură jenantă, iar comitetele lor nu ar fi reprezentate nici într-un fel. Sau în asemenea împrejurări reprezentanții Bucovinei se fac auziți izolat în limba lor maternă înaintea întrunirii Dietei provinciale a landului printr-un discurs în limba română absolut neînțeles care în fond nu ar fi decât o tăcere răsunătoare și care n-ar schimba nicidecum realitatea dezbaterii și nici votarea, înlăturând într-adevăr dificultățile de limbă? Trebuie ca Bucovina să fie reprezentată pe viitor mereu prin deputați muți de pantomimă? Sau trebuie sacrificat principiul naționalităților principiului înțelegerii și, conform acestuia Bucovina să fie constrânsă să inițieze o înțelegere la trimiterea chiar acolo a reprezentanților Dietei provinciale a landului de dragul naționalităților predominante, să renunțe la ale sale interese spre a fi serviabilă față de dispoziția legală? Pentru a scăpa de aceste dificultăți neocolite există numai un remediu, care constă în faptul că ele nu se lasă deloc a fi scoase la lumină, și un asemenea remediu drept îl reprezintă numai separarea provincială a Bucovinei de Galiția.

8. La toate aceste considerații ale prezentului act s-a stabilit de asemenea o importanță a viitorului a cărui prețuire incumbă firește o înțeleaptă și chibzuită politică de stat, la cea din urmă tot atât de scrupuloasă ca și la cea dintâi. Austria se află la poarta de intrare a Orientului, ca o apărătoare a Occidentului, care, față de statele vecine nordice așa de puternice și liniștite, impune simpatia popoarelor vecine prin inteligență cât și prin puterea de autoconservare, concentrându-se excelent în caz de nevoie asupra (teritoriilor) ramificatelor pământuri austriece existente. O asemenea cucerire spirituală pe căi pașnice și de prietenie față de vecini este actualmente foarte întemeiată și plauzibilă și, în special față de români e realizabilă, că Principatele Dunărene în entuziasmul extinderii a instituțiilor naționale începute și prin creșterea sentimentului național sunt violent inhibate să încerce să-și împlinească cu multă sete speranțele și dorințele lor, simpatia și soarta lor înaintea unei nepofite și necăutate puteri, la a cărei teritoriu învecinat ei și-ar vedea maturizați conaționali în direcția unui viitor demn de invidiat, pașnic și nestingherit, la umbra instituțiilor naționale și a administrației. La posibilitatea unei o așa de avantajoasă premiză îi aparține pe lângă foarte posibilă libertate de circulație a Bucovinei cu ambele Principate și utilizarea tuturor ocaziilor de bună voință și a sprijinului național, mai cu seamă ridicarea Bucovinei în ceea ce privește relațiile naționale cât și în altele care totuși, după cum a fost dovedit, fără o deplină emancipare este absolut de neatins.

9. Acest obiectiv de separare urmărit de întreaga țară, această dorință exprimată în general și în mod special de mai multe ori în straturile împuternicite politic ale populației prin cuvânt scris și faptă, prin discursuri, petiții și deputați, mai ales din ziua de când cugetarea s-a emancipat, având dreptul de a intra liberă în lumea exterioară și de a-și croi neconținut și evident un drum. Opinia publică, starea de spirit

generală a Bucovinei se pronunță clar pentru emanciparea ei de Galiția și cu cât această problemă se va ilumina din toate părțile de către competențele politice, cu atât mai imperios apare necesitatea separării în ochii tuturor, cu atât a pătruns adânc necesitatea aceasta în sângele și în măduva poporului și mai cu seamă a clasei cultivate. Desigur dacă vrea să se accepte și să se acorde numărului simplu preferința față de inteligență și față de toate motivele raționale, atunci, cel ce e pasionat doar de patru interese particulare, în extrema stare de prostie, neglijează total din interesele generale, pădurea neputând fi văzută din pricina copacilor, în acest caz trebuie să se emită rodnic și folositor pe întreaga țară măsura unui stat și un deputatul pus de țărani pentru părerea Comitetului lor, pentru dorința întregii țări, pentru unica și singura Bucovina; din acest motiv trebuie să fie deja adevărat căci cele ce se pretind direct a se opune sunt trei la număr: scurt, dacă vechea propoziție: „*Nus numerus sumus*” recunoaște unica și cea mai mare în politică; apoi firește că prin asemenea organe, cum tocmai au fost caracterizați reprezentanții Bucovinei, speranțele lor abia se pot vedea îndeplinite. Însă chiar dacă ea s-ar referi la numărul petițiilor trimise către Parlamentul imperial de către persoane singulare și de către întreaga obște, la numărul petițiilor și la avantajul superiorității numerice și s-ar monopoliza recurgându-se pentru sine politic de numărul dreptului fluent chiar atunci ea ar demonstra că toate clasele, toate stările, toate păturile sociale solicită cu glas tare și în unanimitate dezlipirea românească de Uniunea galițiană, pe când în partea opusă se află doar câțiva mărginiți și duși în eroare, ei singuri necunoscători să scrie sau să citească, ticsiți cu idei agrare comuniste și chiar și petițiile țăranilor semnatari au de-a dreptul un conținut contradictoriu pur egoist ce nu ține seamă de bunăstarea generală aflată în revendicări și a cărei proporție ei n-au putut niciodată să și-o imagineze, revendicări pe care le-ar îndeplini, libertatea pe care o clasă socială ar dori să o obțină prin mituire și doar prin asuprașirea sclavagistă a altora.

Alcătuirea sintetică clară a tuturor acestor considerații scoate la iveală următorul rezultat principal: număr și inteligență, drept și înțelepciune, dorință și necesitate glăsuiesc, unite într-un mănunchi, pentru realizarea cerinței unui neam a cărui camarazi s-au sacrificat în ultimul timp pentru păstrarea Monarhiei întregi, fiind împotriva tendințelor distructive punându-și în joc fericirea și bunăstarea lor materială, riscându-și averile, și tocmai acestora li s-a răsplătit așadar prin deznaționalizare, nedorindu-se ca Bucovina să fie așezată liber din punct de vedere administrativ și reprezentativ. Așadar, rămânerea acestei țări la Galiția ar fi de la un capăt la celălalt o prelungire a unei călătorii ciudate spre o seminție diferită, ar fi o lucrare suspect de tacită, însă o negreșită deznaționalizare, ar fi o semănare în taină a unei veșnice tulburări asupra unei țări răscolite, neatinsă până acum de nici o pasiune politică. Și, la un asemenea atentat existent noi sperăm încrezători că Înalta Adunare Parlamentară Imperială în dragostea sa față de dreptate și înțelepciune va pune capăt acestuia și va proceda în așa fel încât țara va fi mulțumită cu această stabilire.

Kremsier, din 9 februarie 1849

(S.S.)

Eugen Hacman, episcopul Bucovinei

Constantin Popovici, profesor de Teologie

Ioan Calinciuc, profesor de Dogmatică

Iacob Niculi

Cristof Petrovici

Mihail Zota

Alexandru Goian

Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi

Nicolai Hacman, profesor de Teologie

Ant. Kral, deputat al oraşului Cernăuţi din Bucovina în Parlamentul Imperial.

Iordachi Vasilco şi Mihail Bondar, deputaţi în Parlamentul Imperial.

Traducere Sorin-Tudor Clipa

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