

**TAX REGISTERS AS A TOOL FOR THE ANALYSIS OF WEALTH
INEQUALITIES IN SELECTED TOWNS OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN
COMMONWEALTH IN THE 17TH CENTURY AND THE BEGINNING OF
THE 18TH CENTURY. OVERVIEW AND RESEARCH PROBLEMS**

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Rezumat: *Registrele fiscale ca instrument pentru analiza inegalității de avere în câteva dintre orașele Uniunii Polono-Lituaniene în secolul al XVII-lea și începutul secolului al XVIII-lea. Prezentare generală și probleme de cercetare*

Articolul cuprinde o analiză a registrelor fiscale din secolele al XVII-lea și al XVIII-lea (taxe municipale și registre de impozite suedeze) folosite pentru a determina utilitatea lor în cercetarea inegalităților de avere. În plus, el definește factorii care determină bogăția și face referire la utilitatea lor în relație cu registrele fiscale.

Abstract: *The article contains an analysis of tax registers from the 17th and the 18th century (municipal tax and Swedish contribution registers) carried out to determine their usefulness for the research of wealth inequalities. Moreover, the paper defines factors determining wealth and discusses their usefulness in relation to tax registers.*

Résumé: *Les registres fiscaux comme outil pour l'analyse des inégalités de fortune dans les villes de l'Union Polonaise-Lituanienne pendant le XVII-ème siècle et le début du XVIII-ème. Présentation générale et questions de recherche*

L'article ci-joint analyse les registres fiscaux du XVII-ème et XVIII-ème siècles (taxes municipales et registres de contributions suédoises) employés pour déterminer leur utilité dans la recherche des inégalités de fortune. De plus, celui-ci identifie les facteurs qui déterminent la fortune et fait référence à leur utilité en relation aux registres fiscaux.

Keywords: *wealth inequalities, tax registers, the Deluge, Great Northern War*

Introduction

Tax registers are an interesting and still relatively poorly explored source of information for the research of social history¹. In order to determine the wealth of inhabitants of modern towns, two types of registers need to be analysed: records of the collection of municipal tax and records of contributions imposed on the Commonwealth's towns by the Swedes during the period of their occupation. Both types of tax were paid in amounts depending on the amassed wealth and were imposed in a similar manner, i.e. by defining an amount to be paid by the entire town (a lump sum) and leaving the division of the amount into rates for individual inhabitants to the discretion of municipal authorities; rate levels serve as an indication of the wealth of individual townsmen. Municipal authorities were also responsible for collecting the taxes. Similar procedure of their imposition is precisely why these two types of taxes have been included in the present discussion.

In this short article, I will focus on answering the question of research possibilities offered by tax registers when it comes to the analysis of wealth inequalities in towns over the period of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century. Moreover, I will point out research problems that may certainly be encountered when dealing with source material of such kind.

Description of the Source

In the present paper, I will analyse tax registers from four towns – Warsaw, Kraków, Poznań, and Lviv² – drawn up in the first half of the 17th century and at the beginning of the 18th century; the year 1702, common for all the four towns, has been selected as an example. The sources reflect the situation in the towns,

¹ The author of the paper is writing her PhD thesis entitled *Townsmen and Taxes. Wealth Inequalities in Selected Towns of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 17th century* at the History Department of the University of Warsaw.

² Warsaw – Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie [The Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw], Warszawa Ekonomiczne (AGAD, WE), no. 832, 1431; Kraków – Archiwum Narodowe [National Archives in Kraków], Aktamiasta Krakowa [Municipal Records of Kraków], no. 2607, 2623, 2717, 2649; Poznań – Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu [National Archives in Poznań], Aktamiasta Poznania [Municipal Records of Poznań], I 1759, I 1765, I 1844, I 1851; Lviv–National Archives of Municipal and Rural Records in Lviv, Municipal Records of Lviv [CDIAUL, AmLw], f. 52, op. 2, nr 777, 782, 795.

right before the Swedish invasion; therefore, they can be used to analyse the wealth of townsmen in times of peace, on the eve of the Second Northern War, referred to as the “Deluge” in Polish historiography, and the Great Northern War.

In order to better understand the research potential of tax registers, it is necessary to provide a detailed description of both types of sources. Municipal tax registers and contribution registers were both drawn up in the form of books; the data is organised by names of streets or larger parts of the town (e.g. quarters in Kraków). Next, the name and surname or only the surname of each taxpayer is provided; in some cases, the register also includes additional differentiating information, for example the profession of an inhabitant of a given building. It was indicated whether the taxpayer was an owner or a tenant of a building. It is important to note that municipal taxes and contributions were paid by both citizens of towns (who owned real estate) and tenants, most of whom formed part of the transient population, which resided in the town temporarily, or were people who could not afford to assume citizenship³. Most taxpayers listed in the registers are men, but, under extraordinary circumstances, female names were registered as well, for instance when the man was away from home or when women ran households by themselves. Actual amounts paid were provided in a column (or several columns) next to the taxpayers’ names⁴.

Naturally, it needs to be remembered that those two types of tax were significantly different. Funds collected through the municipal tax were used to meet the towns’ immediate needs, while the contributions were a war-time tax, imposed by the enemy to fund his army. Polish archives contain Swedish contribution registers from the period of the Second Northern War, called the “Deluge” in the Polish territory (1655-1660), and the Third Northern War, also known under the name of the Great Northern War (1700-1721). During the former, the Swedish king – Charles X Gustav – imposed a war tax on the inhabitants of Warsaw upon seizing the town. It was already at that time when the contribution was divided into two categories: financial contributions and contributions paid in provisions⁵. Such division was maintained during the Great Northern War.

³For more information on the cost of assuming citizenship, see: Janina Bieniarzówna, Jan M. Małecki, *Dzieje Krakowa* [History of Kraków], vol. 2, Kraków 1984, pp. 210-211.

⁴Katarzyna Wagner, “Potop” a wielka Wojna Północna w Warszawie w świetle rejestrów podatkowych - przyczynek do porównania dwóch szwedzkich okupacji [The Deluge and the Great Northern War in Warsaw in light of tax registers], in “Saeculum Christianum” 2013, no. XX, pp. 109-119.

⁵*Descriptio albo comput Kamienic, Dworów, Domów, Kościołów, Klasztorów, Szpitalów, tak w Mieście iako y po Przedmieściach Starej Warszawy w roku 1655 diebus Septembris*

As an aside, it should be noted that as long as the Swedish Army remained within its territory, the responsibility of supplying it with provisions rested with the Swedish State and was regulated by local war-time laws. The situation was different when the army left its country. In order to prevent problems with food supply, a group of commissaries, quartermasters, and a chancellery were created. Their main goal was to supply the army with food, organise transport, collect contributions and tributes in cooperation with civil and military authorities (according to the “war will feed itself” rule), as well as to give soldiers pays during their service⁶. The Swedish process of planning their supply service was influenced by the experience they had gained during Gustav II Adolph’s war in Germany and was later improved in the period when Charles X Gustav’s army stationed in Poland.

The Swedish system of collecting contributions was improved as the Swedes were gaining more experience⁷. Upon entering the town, they demanded a specific sum and set out their conditions in the form of universals hung on the gates of churches and public institutions in two languages: Polish and Latin. Local authorities were asked to provide any necessary information, which is the size of the town, the number of houses, inhabitants, etc. On the basis of this data, Swedes determined the level of wealth of the townsmen and adjusted the amounts to be paid in contributions to individual people⁸. It was also decided that one of the citizens would oversee the collection of the contribution on behalf of the municipal authorities⁹.

Both types of tax sources were also different when it comes to the amounts paid – a single rate of the municipal tax or it’s multiple (double, triple, etc.) was collected when the financial situation of the town demanded it. Contributions, on the other hand, were imposed when the occupant decided it was necessary.

uczyniony – a register of Swedish contributions imposed on Warsaw. *Starożytności Warszawy* [Warsaw’s Antiques] vol. 4, Warsaw, 1856.


⁶ Sven Grauers, *Stosunek szwedzkich i polskich sił zbrojnych podczas Wielkiej Wojny Północnej* [The Relations between Polish and Swedish Armies during the Great Northern War], in “*Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości*” (hereinafter:SMHW), 1976, vol. 20, pp. 124-125.

⁷ The Headquarters of the Swedish Army were usually located in small or large towns, while the army itself stationed in nearby villages. Subsequently, the area was divided into districts; in each district, the occupant’s officials assessed its financial situation. It was necessary to determine the amount that the local population would be obliged to pay.

⁸Sven Grauers, *Stosunek szwedzkich i polskich sił...*[The Relations between Polish and Swedish Armies...], p. 127.

⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.

It also needs to be pointed out that the registers of the municipal tax in Kraków are slightly different from those drawn up in other towns. Instead of streets, they use quarters, also called districts, as the basic registry unit. The dividing lines ran through the Main Square, which was divided by a horizontal and a vertical straight line. This way, four quarters were created: *Castrense* (the Castle Quarter, also called the Municipal Quarter), *Slavcoviense* (the Sławkowski Quarter), *Figulorum* (the Garncarski Quarter), and *Laniorum* (the Rzeźniczy Quarter)¹⁰. I attempted to isolate data on individual streets from each of the quarters, but due to complications appearing in case of the town's outskirts, quarters will be used as the smallest registry units in Kraków.



Map 1. Division of 17th-century Kraków into quarters

Source: own elaboration

¹⁰ The Castrense Quarter encompassed the area stretching from the centre of the Main Square to the city walls, between the streets Bracka and Sienna – the south-eastern corner of historic Kraków; Slavcoviense – between the streets Szewska and Św. Jana, that is the north-western part of the Old Town; Figulorum, adjacent to the Castle Quarter, was located in the south-western part of Kraków, between the streets Bracka and Sienna; Laniorum was situated between the streets Św. Jana and Sienna, in the north-eastern part of the town.

Research Possibilities

When discussing wealth inequalities, or, in other words, wealth concentration in the modern era, one needs to consider the elements defining wealth in the 17th and the 18th century. The answer to this question can be found in tax registers. At the time, wealth was synonymous with owning real estate, especially brick buildings (tenement houses), as well as their location, preferably in a prestigious area, and having tenants, who provided an additional source of income, and working in a well-respected profession. Moreover, such sources can be used to calculate the index of income distribution – the Gini coefficient. The elements of the definition presented here need to be further specified, but considering the scope of this paper and its introductory character, I will focus only on its most significant aspects, that is on the type of buildings, the occupational structure, and the Gini coefficient.

The aforementioned prestigious areas can be determined through the analysis of the places of residence of the 5% and 10% paying the highest amounts of tax in each town. By compiling this information with data from different years, we can also trace any potential changes in the location of zones inhabited by the wealthy. The basic information carried by tax registers from all the towns is the fact that market squares remained areas of prestige throughout the analysed period. Apart from them, each town had one or two streets, usually of commercial character, which could be classified as places of residence of wealthy citizens. Among such streets were Krakowska and Ormiańska in Lviv, Św. Jana in Warsaw or Wielka in Poznań.

Another, probably most obvious, criterion of modern wealth is the infrastructure of the town or, more specifically, the predominance of brick buildings over wooden buildings. As indicated by Jerzy Piekalski, *the technical development of the house served to adapt living conditions to the expectations of merchants and craftsmen, which stemmed from the growing economic potential and the level of awareness*, which means that brick was used in order to comply with the technique of building churches, monasteries, palaces, and castles¹¹. The construction of brick buildings was connected to the economy – the increase of financial potential led to people deciding to erect brick buildings. The dominance of brick or the process of substituting wood with brick was one of the symptoms of a town's development. This is why owning a brick building on a plot located by

¹¹Jerzy Piekalski, *Wczesne domy mieszczan w Europie Środkowej. Geneza – funkcja – forma* [Early Townspeople's Houses in Central Europe. Origin – Function – Form], Wrocław 2004, pp. 193, 209.

the main square or on one of the nearby streets was an indication of an individual's prestigious position in the society.

As shown in the analyses by Maria Bogucka and Henryk Samsonowicz, the initial phases of town planning in medieval Poland focused on those landowners who would prove decisive to the development of the town, which practically meant that the town square – the economic centre of the town – was inhabited by craftsmen¹². The situation was similar in case of the representatives of municipal authorities, who worked in the Town Hall, situated by the main square. The bigger distance there was between the main square and a given area, the poorer and less influential population was given houses and plots of lands there; among such people were the town's poor, the marginalised society, or those working in disgraceful professions (executioners, prostitutes). Such processes led to the creation of "better" and "worse" streets and districts, which in turn allows us to delimit the areas of poverty and wealth in the developing towns¹³. Soon, however, it turned out that the spatial planning model did not correspond to what was happening in reality, because even though people living close to one another had a possibility of engaging in joint activities, there were various factors, for instance the growing number of crafts in towns, that made it impossible to keep representatives of each profession living in clusters¹⁴. Moreover, purchase transactions and inheritance intensified the process of heterogenization of urban space.

In case of the analysed towns, all buildings located by the Main Square were made of brick and registered as tenement houses. This further confirms the assumption that the main square was an elite area, both because of the people who lived there (municipal authorities and craftsmen, both of whom had real influence on the economic development of the town) and because of the brick buildings. The processes taking place in other parts of the town were identical to those observed in all analysed towns, which is why only a table presenting data from Warsaw is included in this paper.

Tab. 1. Types of buildings in 17th-century Warsaw

	1655		1702	
	number	%	number	%
BRICK	152	33,9	246	51,6

¹² Maria Bogucka, Henryk Samsonowicz, *Dzieje miast i mieszczaństwa w Polsce przedrozbiorowe* [History of Towns and Bourgeois in Pre-partition Poland], Wrocław, 1986, p. 91.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴Henryk Samsonowicz, *Szkice o mieście średniowiecznym* [Sketches on a Medieval Town], Warsaw, 2014, pp. 78, 79.

WOOD	275	61,4	230	48,2
SQUARE	8	1,8	1	0,2
GARDEN	13	2,9	.	.
TOTAL	448	100,0	477	100,0

Source: compiled in the basis of AGAD, WE, no. 832, p. 1431.

The analysis of data from all towns shows that throughout the 17th century, there appeared a trend of converting wooden buildings into buildings made of brick. It needs to be remembered, however, that some of the buildings and their bigger elements remained wooden even until the 18th century¹⁵. Nonetheless, brick tenement houses were the dominant element of the architectural landscape of modern towns' *intra muros*, while most buildings in the outskirts were wooden¹⁶. Such trend can be noticed in the infrastructure of Warsaw – in 1655, as much as 80% of buildings in the outskirts were wooden – as well as Lviv or Poznań.

Despite the process of intensive construction, modern towns did have a small number of undeveloped areas, mostly in the suburbs (outside the city walls). The 1655 tax registers for Warsaw included gardens and free squares. That year, there were nine gardens located outside city walls, on Długa Street, while the rest were situated by Krakowskie Przedmieście (also outside the walls). In 1702, gardens were no longer considered independent units obliged to pay the municipal tax and instead were most probably treated as parts of the manor houses built on their premises in the 17th century¹⁷. The squares and plots of land located in the suburbs, mostly by Krakowskie Przedmieście, were also developed after the "Deluge". New buildings were erected due to the trend of increased construction and the housing shortage which befell Warsaw in the second half of the century and which caused significant increase in the density of infrastructure¹⁸.

Moreover, all the towns were given an impulse which invigorated their economic development. The impulse which boosted Warsaw's economy and initiated changes in the town was undoubtedly the fact that in 1569, it was designated as the location of general sejms (and electoral sejms since 1572), and, later on, the fact that the royal court moved to Warsaw from Kraków. Those

¹⁵Jolanta Putkowska, *Architektura Warszawy XVII wieku* [Warsaw's Architecture of the 17th Century], Warsaw, 1991, p. 281.

¹⁶Maria Bogucka, Stefan Kieniewicz (eds.), *Warszawa w latach 1526-1795* [Warsaw in the Years 1526-1795], Warsaw, 1984, p. 106.

¹⁷Jolanta Putkowska, *Architektura Warszawy...*, p. 283.

¹⁸Maria Bogucka, Stefan Kieniewicz (eds.), *Warszawa w latach 1526-1795...*, p. 108.

factors converted Warsaw into the most important political centre in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Moreover, numerous noble families, craftsmen, and artists working for the court came to Warsaw after it had been moved from Kraków. Political factors boosted the town's economic development and, consequently, the development of its urban space and culture¹⁹.

The analysis of the professional structure of taxpayers with highest amounts imposed also provides information on which professions were considered prestigious in the analysed period. In the first half of the 17th century, one of the most profitable and respected professions was merchantry. Interestingly, in the second half of the century and in the 18th century, the top position was taken by craftsmen. This trend was most visible in Poznań, which, in order to rebuild its population after the crisis of mid-17th century, increased the number of craftsmen admitted to the municipal law²⁰.

All towns suffered from the crisis of mid-17th century. It was caused by political and military factors and their immediate epidemiological aftermath. It means that the crisis was triggered both by the war-time damage caused by Swedish and Cossack forces, but also by the fear fuelled by the danger of Moscow (in Lviv) and by the spreading epidemics. In the second half of the 17th century, the financial situation of Poznań, Kraków, and Lviv worsened significantly, while Warsaw, thanks to the fact that it served as the capital, managed to deal with those problems. Nonetheless, in all the towns merchants started to lose their dominance and were replaced by craftsmen, who came to towns in throngs after the crisis caused by epidemics and military operations. Towns needed new citizens in order to develop and most newcomers arriving there in the second half of the century hailed from smaller towns or villages. They were not very wealthy, so many of them probably considered their move to the town to be a chance for improving their financial situation. A separate study should be devoted to the analysis of the professional structure of urban patricianship and patricians who formed part of the municipal authorities.

Tax registers can also be used to carry out more mathematic calculations of wealth inequalities among townsmen living in the territory of the Commonwealth.

¹⁹Maria Bogucka, *Narodziny stolicy. Warszawa w XVI i pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* [The Birth of the Capital. Warsaw in the 16th Century and the First Half of the 17th Century], in *Narodziny stolicy. Warszawa w latach 1596-1668* [The Birth of the Capital. Warsaw in the Years 1596-1668], Warsaw 1997, pp. 37-47; Jolanta Putkowska, *Architektura Warszawy...*, pp. 106-111; *Warszawa w latach 1526-1795...*, p. 177.

²⁰Stanisław Waszak, *Ludność i zabudowa mieszkaniowa miasta Poznania w XVI i XVII wieku* [The Population and Housing of Poznań in the 16th and the 17th Century], in "Przegląd Zachodni", 1953, vol. IX, no. 9-10, pp. 64-136.

We can use a simplified calculation method, which consists in adding up the amounts paid by the wealthiest 5% or 10% of the town's inhabitants and assuming that the remaining sum should be spread among the remaining 90-95% of the population. A more advanced way of determining wealth concentration in modern towns consist in calculating the Gini coefficient, which is a tool for the analysis of economic diversity of modern towns. It was used by, among others, Jan Luiten van Zanden, Guido Alfani²¹, Carole Shammas²², et al²³. It reflects the distribution on the entire scale, not only in the 5-10% of the wealthiest or the poorest. Its value can range from 0 to 1. A coefficient of 0 signifies a wholly even distribution of the parameter between each observation. A coefficient of 1 signifies utter inequality, when one observation encompasses the entire parameter²⁴.

Among all analysed towns, Kraków, Warsaw and Lviv have coefficients characteristic for large towns, as they show significant inequality of wealth among their inhabitants – for example in 1702, the coefficient had the value of 1.78 for Kraków, 0.66 for Warsaw, and 0.6 for Lviv. At the same time, the coefficient for Amsterdam between 1561 and 1808 fluctuated between 0.57 and 0.61 and for towns located in Northern Italy – between 0.65 up to even 0.85. It can therefore be seen that three out of four analysed towns had an index of wealth concentration similar to the coefficient observed in what at the time was one of the biggest towns in Western Europe.

²¹ Guido Alfani, *Economic Inequality in North-western Italy: A Long-Term View (Fourteenth to Eighteenth Century)*, in "The Journal of Economic History" 2015, vol. 75, No. 4, pp. 1058-1096; idem, *Wealth Inequalities and Population Dynamics in Early Modern Northern Italy*, in "Journal of Interdisciplinary History", 2010, vol. XL, No. 4, pp. 513-549; idem, *The effects of plague on the distribution of property: Ivrea, Northern Italy 1630*, in "Population Studies", 2010, vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 61-75.

²² Caroline Shammas, *Constructing a Wealth Distribution from Probate Records*, in "Journal of Interdisciplinary History", 1978, vol. IX, No. 2, pp. 297-307; eadem, *A New Look at Long-Term Trends in Wealth Inequality in the United States*, in "The American Historical Review", 1993, vol. 98, No. 2, pp. 412-431.

²³ R. Jolly, *Inequality in Historical Perspective*, Research Paper No. 2006/32, March 2006, in <http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/rp2006-32.pdf> [access 14 III 2016]; Jan Luiten van Zanden, J. Baten, P. Földvari, B. Van Leeuwen, *The Changing Shape of Global Inequality 1820-2000. Exploring a new dataset – working paper*, in <http://www.basvanleeuwen.net/bestanden/WorldIncomeInequality.pdf> [access 14 III 2016]; B. Milanovic, *Global Inequality and the Global Inequality Extraction Ratio. The Story of the Past Two Centuries – working paper*, in "Explorations in Economic History", 2011, vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 445-614.

²⁴ Michał Kopczyński, *Podstawy statystyki. Podręcznik dla humanistów* [Introduction to Statistics. Manual for Non-Scientific Minds], Warsaw 2005, pp. 55-59.

Research Problems

The main research problem related to working with registers, especially contribution registers, is that the total amount of collected tax does not always coincide with the notes taken down by the tax collector. The most glaring example of such disparities can be found in the 1704 Swedish contribution register for Old Warsaw. The person responsible for making notes regarding the collection of taxes added up the amounts on a given page in the corner of the sheet. Those sums were then compiled in a single document in order to make the calculations easier. The scribe, however, often made mistakes when adding up individual amounts and wrote down wrong sums on the bottom of the sheets. It could have been caused by miscalculations or by other factors, for example the final sum could have included additional amounts paid by the inhabitants of Old Warsaw which were not indicated in the register. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of such events taking place; out of 156 sums (6 months x 25 pages + 2 x 3 months = 156 entries), as many as 69 are incorrect (44%).

The difficulties do not end there. It would seem that after adding up the sums written down by the scribe on the bottom of each page, we will end up with the total amount, which should amount to 56,423 tymfs (złoty) and 29 groszy. The actual sum, however, amounts to 56,303 tymfs (zł) and 29 groszy. Interestingly, when we add up the amounts paid by townsmen each month (including the corrected sums wrongly written down by the scribe), we also do not arrive at the final sum. According to these calculations, the “corrected” sum of amounts on the bottom of each page is lower than the final amount by almost 374 tymfs and amounts to 56,057 tymfs and 28 groszy. It can be seen that it is difficult to trust the scribe. Naturally, one can assume that during the process of creating the register, the scribe collected additional amounts paid with delay by people who were “late.” It is also possible that the missing amount is the tax imposed by the municipal authorities for the utilisation of the Wójtowska and Miejska tenement houses (listed in registers as exempt from tax), which was later added to the final amount, but was not included in the registers. This matter should be subject to further analysis.

Another research problem is the fact that tax registers do not contain any information on the size of the families or the age of their members and the taxpayers themselves, which is why they do not serve as a primary source of demographic research. They are, however, extremely useful for determining wealth concentration in modern towns.

Another problem is connected to the fact that the registers from the beginning of the 18th century, especially the one from Kraków, are much more

general than those drawn up in the 17th century. It can therefore be seen that in the beginning of the 18th century, tax collectors tended to include less information in the registers. The same trend can be observed in case of registers made around the same period, as well as when comparing the register from Kraków to documents from other towns, e.g. Poznań or Warsaw. Despite the lack of certain information as compared to the previous century, the registers from 1702 are still a valuable source for the analysis of wealth inequality and as such should be analysed as well.

Conclusions

To sum up, the information included in tax registers allows us to define and analyse wealth inequalities in the 17th century and in the first years of the 18th century. By comparing the data obtained on the basis of the 1702 registers with older or newer sources, we can determine changes in wealth concentration in big towns of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Moreover, it is possible to analyse social topography of the selected towns, which allows us to indicate zones of poverty and wealth in the urban space.

In the 17th century, there were no longer clusters of population specialised in a given field – purchase transactions, migrations, influx of new inhabitants, especially craftsmen, who were easily accepted into municipal law due to the depopulation of towns, as well as higher social mobility all contributed to the increase of heterogeneity of the urban space. The mobility of the representatives of certain professions, especially merchants, involved changing places of residence depending on the possibilities of pursuing their profession. Moreover, greater awareness of the town, of its advantages and drawbacks, made it possible to introduce changes which influenced the living conditions in a given area. Tax registers also provide information on tenants, women, and partially on foreigners living in each town, which opens wide possibilities of research.

**НОВЫЕ ДОКУМЕНТАЛЬНЫЕ ОТКРЫТИЯ В АРХИВАХ
САНКТ-ПЕТЕРБУРГА.
ВТОРОЕ ДУХОВНОЕ ЗАВЕЩАНИЕ МАРИИ КАНТЕМИР
ОТ 1757 ГОДА И ЕЕ ДУХОВНОЕ ПИСЬМО**

**THE LATEST DOCUMENTARY UNCOVERING
FROM THE SAINT PETERSBURG ARCHIVES.
THE SECOND TESTAMENT (1757) AND THE LETTER
OF MARIA CANTEMIR**

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***Rezumat. Ultima descoperire documentară din arhivele din Sankt Petersburg.
Cel de-al doilea testament (1757) și scrisoarea Mariei Cantemir***

Prezentul articol își propune să prezinte câteva documente care au fost considerate până azi definitiv pierdute; este vorba despre cel de-al doilea testament al Mariei Cantemir și de scrisoarea adresată fraților ei – Sergiu și Matei – și nepoților ei Cantacuzino. Aceste documente au fost descoperite de autor în martie 2016, în arhiva lui L.N. Maikov, la Departamentul de Manuscrise al Institutului de Literatură Rusă („Casa Pușkin”) a Academiei de Științe din Rusia, din Sankt Petersburg.

Imaginile cu textul testamentului, anexate la sfârșitul articolului, reprezintă o copie/transcriere din secolul al XIX-lea a documentului original, datat de specialiști la mijlocul secolului al XVIII-lea.

Importanța acestei descoperiri documentare este inestimabilă, iar publicarea textelor permite elucidarea unor interpretări arbitrare cu privire la viața personală și activitatea socială a Mariei Cantemir. Un alt aspect important al acestei dezvoltări constă în respingerea mai multor mituri privind patrimoniul familiei Cantemir și legăturile sale interne. Potrivit autorului, a cărui opinie se coroborează cu însuși conținutul documentelor, Maria Cantemir a scris cel de-al doilea testament în eventualitatea unei boli grave și nu ca un rezultat al unui tragic și întâmplător eveniment.

Abstract: *This article aims to present some documents that have been until recently considered undeniably lost; it is about Maria Cantemir’s second testament and her letter addressed to her brothers – Sergey and Matthew – and her nephews Cantacuzino. These documents were discovered by the author in March 2016 in the archive of L.N. Maikov, in the*

Department of Manuscripts of the Institute of Russian Literature (Pushkinskii Dom) of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Saint Petersburg.

Images with text of the testament, attached to the end of the article represent a copy/transcript from the nineteenth century to the original document, dated by specialists to middle of the eighteenth century.

The importance of the recently identified documents is invaluable, and the publication of texts allows the elucidation of arbitrary interpretations regarding the personal life and social activity of Maria Cantemir. Another important facet of this disclosure consists in the dismissal of several myths concerning the Cantemir family heritage and their inner relationships. According to the author, whose opinion is corroborated by the content of the documents, Maria Cantemir wrote her second testament in the contingency of a severe disease and not as a result of a tragic and random event.

Résumé: La dernière découverte documentaire des Archives de Sankt Petersburg. Le second testament (1757) et la lettre de Maria Cantemir

L'article ci-joint se proposa à présenter quelques documents qu'on considéra jusqu'aujourd'hui définitivement perdus; il s'agit du second testament de Maria Cantemir et de la lettre que celle-ci adressa à ses frères – Sergiu et Matei – et à ses neveux Cantacuzino. L'auteur découvrit ces documents en mars 2016, dans les archives de L.N. Maikov, au Département de Manuscrits de L'Institut de Littérature Russe ("La Maison Pushkin") de l'Académie de Sciences de Russie de Sankt Petersburg.

Les images avec le texte du testament, attachées à la fin de l'article, représentent une copie/transcription du XIX-ème siècle du document originel qui remonte – selon l'avis des spécialistes – du milieu du XVIII-ème siècle.

L'importance de cette découverte documentaire est inestimable, pendant que la publication des textes permet d'éclaircir des interprétations arbitraires concernant la vie personnelle et l'activité sociale de Maria Cantemir. Un autre aspect important de cette découverte consiste dans la destruction de plusieurs mythes concernant le patrimoine de la famille Cantemir et ses liaisons internes. Selon l'auteur, l'avis duquel se corrobore avec le contenu-même des documents, Maria Cantemir aurait écrit le second testament dans l'éventualité d'une maladie grave et pas comme résultat d'un événement tragique et accidentel.

Keywords: *Maria Cantemir, testament, letter, family relations, patrimony.*

Историк не тот, кто знает, а тот, кто ищет.

Люсьен Февр

Вступление

Завещания или тестаменты являются важным историческим источником частноправового происхождения, которые имеют высокую степень информативности и репрезентативности¹. Правовая природа завещания имеет исключительное значение в исследовании историко-генеалогического аспекта, истории частной и повседневной жизни, ментальности эпохи, персоналий и т. д. Комплексное изучение данного вида источника позволяет осветить вопросы, связанные с «имущественными внутрисемейными личностными отношениями, предоставляет уникальные сведения для характеристики личности завещателя, содержит изложение уроков нравственности и собственного жизненного опыта»², фактически является автобиографическим повествованием событий завещателя.

Вплоть до XVIII века, в России была распространена *духовная* или *духовная грамота*, юридический документ, который содержал распоряжения и указания человека на случай смерти в отношении распределения имущества (движимого и недвижимого) между родственниками и близкими, выражал последнюю волю завещателя по устройству погребения и поминовения, исповедование в грехах, пожертвования церквям и монастырям и др. Завещательные документы были известны так же под названиями – *духовная память*, *духовное завещание*, *душевная грамота*, *изустная запись*, *духовный завет*, *прощальная грамота*, *заветное писание*, *изустная память*, а с конца XVIII века – *завещание*. Собственно, термин *тестament* стал применяться в России лишь с начала XIX века.

Краткий историографический обзор

Появление новых научных дисциплин и методологических подходов в последние десятилетия позволило расширить исследовательское поле в изучении исторических источников. В частности, изучение завещания на

¹ Я.С. Калакура, *Историческое источниковедение* [Historical Chronology], Москва, 2002, с. 367.

² А. Манохин, *Завещания в генеалогии* [Wills in Genealogy] // http://www.litera.ru/html/mathaterials/2004_2101_zavewanie.html

основе применение биографического метода и гендерного подхода персонализирует предмет истории и проливает свет на неизученные аспекты прошлого³. Главным действующим лицом в нашем исследовании будет княжна Мария Кантемир (28. 04. 1700, Яссы – 09. 09. 1757, Москва), старшая дочь Дмитрия Кантемира и Кассандры Кантакузино.

История жизни Марии Кантемир всегда была в некоторой степени загадочной, покрытой тайнами и многочисленными мифами. Согласно мнению авторитетного кантемириста В. И. Цвиркуна, в статье, посвященной Марии Кантемир «на фоне многочисленных научных и публицистических работ последних десятилетий, посвященных жизни и деятельности Дмитрия Кантемира и членов его семейства, публикации, относящиеся к биографии его старшей дочери – Марии, явление крайне редкое»⁴.

Однако, обратившись к данной тематике, мы обнаружили довольно большой интерес. Первые публикации, посвященные Марии Кантемир, появились в конце XIX века и имели огромный читательский резонанс⁵. До настоящего времени многие ученые и литераторы апеллируют к этим произведениям, используют их как базовые в своих работах, ограничиваясь интерпретацией опубликованных сведений. Причем, определенные нелепости кочуют из одной книги в другую с регулярной упорством и последовательностью.

В последующие годы, образ старшей дочери Дмитрия Кантемира, вновь становился предметом интереса. В исторической литературе неоднократно обращались к образу Марии Кантемир⁶, а также литераторы и

³ Л. П. Репина, В. В. Зверева, М. Ю. Парамонова, *История исторического знания* [The history of historical knowledge], Москва, 2004, с. 264.

⁴ В. И. Цвиркун, *Биография Марии Кантемир. Вымыслы и реальность* [Biography of Maria Cantemir. Myths and reality] // *Factorul feminin în istorie. Women's factor in history. Женский фактор в истории: Culegere de studii și documente*, AȘM-USM, Chișinău, 2012.

⁵ Майков Л. Н., *Княжна Мария Кантемирова* [Princess Maria Kantemirova] // *Русская старина* [Russian Antiquity], Москва, 1897, Том 89, январь 1897, с. 49-69; март, с. 401-417; Том 90, июнь, с. 425-451; том 91, август, с. 225-253; Шимко, И., *Личность княжны Марии Дмитриевны Кантемир* [Personality of Princess Marya Dmitrievna Cantemir] // *Журнал Министерства Народного просвещения* [Journal of the Ministry of National Education], Санкт-Петербург, 1891, с. 374-276; Idem, *Новые данные к биографии князя Антиоха Кантемира и его ближайших родственников* [The new data to the biography of Prince Antiochus Cantemir], Санкт-Петербург, 1891.

⁶ Луцевич Л.Ф., *Княжна Мария Кантемир в переписке с братом* [Princess Maria Cantemir in his correspondence with his brother] // *Analele științifice ale Universității de Stat din Moldova* [Scientific Annals of SUM]. Seria „Științe socio-umane”, Chișinău,

билетристы⁷. В современной историографии, отдельного внимания заслуживают работы одного из ведущих кантемирологов В. И. Цвиркуна,

1997, p. 40-47; Майелларо Джина, *Переписка князя А. Д. Кантемира с сестрой Марией на итальянском языке. 1734 – 1744 гг* [Correspondence of Prince A. D. Cantemir with her sister Maria in Italian. 1734 – 1744], Салерно, 2002; *Prințesa Cantemir: portret de epoca și corespondență inedită* [Princess Cantemir: Portrait of the era and unpublished correspondence], Traducere și studii critice de Mariana Vraciu, Leonte Ivanov, Iași, 2005; *Dinastia Cantemireștilor* (Sec. XVII - XVIII) [Cantemir Dynasty], Chișinău, 2008, p. 462-477; Lemny Stefan, *Astrakhan et l'idylle supposée entre Pierre le Grand et Maria Cantemir // L'aventure européenne d'une famille princière au XVIIIe siècle*, Paris, Éditions Complexe, 2009, p. 155-157; Ibidem, *Cantemireștii. Aventura europeană a unei familii princiare din secolul XVIII-lea* [Cantemir Dynasty. The European adventure of a princely family in the XVIII century], București, 2010, p.135-138; Maikov L. N., *Prințesa Maria Cantemir* [Princess Maria Cantemir] // *Epopeea istorică a Cantemireștilor. Antologie: destine legendare în pagini literare*, Ediție îngrijită, traduceri, studiu critic, note și comentarii de Gheorghe Barbă. Cuvânt înainte de Aneta Dobre. Tehnoredactare și Notă asupra ediției de Cristina Antonia Anore, București, Editura Universității din București, 2009, p. 79-98; Ivanov Leonte, *Prințul Antioh și Maria Cantemir în documente de epocă* [Prince Antiochus and Maria Cantemir in the documents of the era], Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” din Iași, 2011; *Enciclopedia personalităților feminine din România* [Encyclopaedia of the Female Personalities from Romania], coord. George Marcu, cuvânt înainte acad. Marius Sala, Editura Meronia, București, 2012.

⁷ Kidel Al., *Maria Cantemir: femeia cea mai cultă din epoca lui Petru cel Mare* [Maria Cantemir: the most educated woman of the era of Peter the Great] // *Viața Basarabiei*, Chișinău, 1934, nr. 6, p. 9-16 + nr. 7-8, p. 49-67; Borș-Bucuța Lucia, *Maria Cantemir (o biografie romanțată)* [Maria Cantemir (A romanticized Biography)], Editura Națională-Ciornei, 1940; Papoiu Lizica, *Dimitrie Cantemir, soția și fiica, spirite înaintate ale epocii lor* [Dimitrie Cantemir, his wife and daughter] // *Femeia*, București, 26, 1973, nr. 10, p. 18; Зеленина Е., *Усадьба Марьино и ее владельцы* [Marino farmstead and its owners] // *Наследники великого города* [Heirs of the great city], Вып. 2, Санкт-Петербург, [Б. и.], 1994, с. 68-72; Danilescu I., *Ar fi putut să fie împărăteasa Rusiei* [Could be Russian empress] // *Dunărea de Jos*, Galați, an. 2, 2003, nr. 19, p. 9 [Despre Maria, fiica lui Dimitrie Cantemir]; Новикова Н., *Любовь Петра I* [Peter I Love] // *Родное Подмосковье* [Native Moscow], Москва, 2005, №35; Сухарева О. В., *Кантемир Мария Дмитриевна* [Maria D. Cantemir] // Сухарева О.В., *Кто был кто в России от Петра I до Павла I* [Who is who in Russia from Peter I to Paul I], Москва, 2005, с. 218-220; Simuț I., *Amanta lui Petru I* [Peter's mistress] // *România Literară*, Numărul 32, 2005; Чиркова Зинаида, *Сподвижник и фавориты – Мария Кантемир. Проклятие визиря* [The Companions and Followers - Maria Cantemir. Curse of the Vizier], Москва, 2006; Друță Ion, *Maria Cantemir: ultima dragoste a lui Petru cel Mare. Epopee istorică*

исследования которого основаны на богатом источниковедческом материале и носят глубокий аргументированный характер. В частности, автор приводит убедительные доводы, которые опровергают мифы о любовных связях Марии Кантемир с императором Петром I⁸. Относительно публикаций известного кантемиролога А. Ешану и В. Ешану⁹, хотелось бы отметить, что в своих работах по биографии Марии Кантемир они ограничиваются опубликованной литературой, особенно активно ссылаются на научно-популярную литературу и не используют документы¹⁰.

în unsprezece tablouri, cu epilog (Piesă) [Maria Cantemir: the last love of Peter the Great], Chişinău, 2008.

⁸ Цвиркун В. И., *Эпистолярное наследие Димитрия Кантемира* [Epistolary heritage of Demetrius Cantemir], Chişinău, 2008; Idem, *File din istoria vieţii şi activităţii politice a lui Dimitrie Cantemir* [Pages from the history of the life and political activity of Dimitrie Cantemir], Chişinău, 2009; Idem, *Димитрий Кантемир. Страницы жизни в письмах и документах* [Dimitry Kantemir. Pages of Life in Letters and Documents], СПб., 2010; Idem, *Мария Кантемир. Мифы и реальность биографии* [Maria Cantemir. Myths and Reality of biography] // *Историческое пространство* [Historical space]. *Проблемы истории стран СНГ*, Москва, Наука, 2012, с.49-59; Idem, *Под сенью двух держав. Жизнь и деятельность Димитрия Кантемира в Турции и России* [Under the shadow of the two powers. Life and work of Dimitrie Cantemir in Turkey and Russia], Издание 2-е. Исправленное и дополненное, Chişinău, „CartDidact”, 2013; Idem, *Cantemirologia - trecut şi prezent. Considerente istoriografice* [Cantemirologia - past and present. Historiographical considerations] // *Academos*, Nr. 4, Chişinău, 2014, p. 89 – 99; Idem, *Pe urmele trecutului* [On the traces of the past] // *Следами минувшего*, Culegere de articole, Chişinău, 2015.

⁹ Eşanu Andrei, Eşanu Valentina, *Maria Cantemir (1700-1757)* [Maria Cantemir (1700-1757)] // *Dinastia Cantemireştilor (sec. XVII-XVIII)*, Chişinău, Ed. Ştiinţa, 2008, p. 462-477; *Neamul Cantemireştilor. Bibliografie* [Cantemir dynasty. Bibliography], coord. A. Eşanu, Chişinău, 2010 (Capitolul IV); Eşanu Andrei, Eşanu Valentina, *Prinţesa Maria Cantemir între ficţiune artistică şi realitate istorică* [Princess Maria Cantemir between artistic fiction and historical reality] // *Academos*, 3 (22), 2011, p. 121-127.

¹⁰ В частности, в параграфе, посвященном Марии Кантемир в сборнике статей *Dinastia Cantemireştilor* (2008), авторы из 43 сносок более 20 раз ссылаются на роман Л. Н. Майкова. Нет ни одного документального источника по теме. Спустя несколько лет, авторы издали очередную статью, посвященную Марии Кантемир, *Maria Cantemir între ficţiune artistică şi realitate istoric*, в которой опровергают некоторые свои предположения из предыдущих публикаций (в частности, о любовных связях императора Петра I и Марии). Однако, этот миф уже был развеян в научной среде, поэтому особой актуальности не имеет. Дискуссии авторов по поводу даты рождения Марии Кантемир, так же не имеет научной доказательной базы и носят

В данном дискурсе, считаем необходимым подчеркнуть, что на развернутом историографическом аспекте, посвященном Марии Кантемир, мы не будем останавливаться, так как это не является задачей нашего исследования. Во-вторых, анализ литературы в целом, показывает, что нет конкретных исследований по документальному изучению **духовных завещаний (1725 и 1757 гг.) и духовного письма Марии Кантемир**, так как указанные документы **не были опубликованы и, в связи с этим, не были доступны исследователям**. В-третьих, большая часть статей основана на широко известных работах, поэтому носит компиляционно-декларативный и библиографический характер. И, наконец, в-четвертых, считаем нужным отметить, что мы не претендуем на полное и разносторонне освещение всех вопросов, касающихся жизни и деятельности Марии Кантемир.

Источники исследования

Целью и задачей данной статьи является введение в научный оборот новых документальных источников, до сих пор не известных в оригинале и, в частности, публикация второго духовного завещания Марии Кантемир от 1757 года и ее духовного письма. Текст завещания является транскрипцией XIX-го века копии оригинального документа середины XVIII-го века. Исследуя тему «Тестаменты и духовные завещания женщин XVII-XIX вв.» в архивах и библиотеках Санкт - Петербурга (март 2016 г.), нами были обнаружены копии документов середины XVIII века, которые до настоящего времени считались безвозвратно утерянными. В частности, речь идет о двух духовных завещаниях (1725 и 1757 годов), духовного и частных письмах Марии Кантемир (1757г.), о ее прошениях на имя императрицы Елизаветы Петровны (1741-1762). Работая в Рукописном Отделе, Института русской литературы Российской Академии Наук Пушкинского Дома в Санкт Петербурге, в *Архиве Л. Н. Майкова*¹¹, нами были найдены *"Подготовительные материалы к очерку "Княжна Мария Кантемирова"*¹², которые содержат ее завещания (2), прошения (2) на имя

декларативный характер (отсутствие документов, интерпретация известных источников, ссылка на опубликованные статьи и романы).

¹¹ Леонид Николаевич Майков (28 марта /9 апреля/ 1839, Санкт-Петербург – 7 /20/ апреля 1900, Санкт-Петербург) – известный исследователь истории русской литературы, действительный член Петербургской Академии наук, президент Русского библиологического общества (РБО), тайный советник.

¹² Майков Л. Н. *Княжна Мария Кантемирова* [Princess Maria Kantemirova] // Русская

императрицы Елизаветы по поводу поместий, принадлежавших семье, ее письма А. Д. Кантемиру (39) и др.¹³ Архив Л. Н. Майкова оказался уникальным хранилищем копий документов Марии Кантемир, сохранившее многие неизвестные страницы, которые могут пролить свет на спорные и дискуссионные вопросы, связанные не только с личной жизнью Марии, но и всей семьи Кантемир и их наследников.

В данном контексте, хотелось бы подчеркнуть, что особый интерес представляют все виды вышеуказанных источников, но особую значимость представляет группа - духовные завещания и духовное письмо, которые неразрывно связаны между собой и взаимно дополняемые. На протяжении многих лет, ученые-кантемирологи искали завещание Марии Кантемир, будучи уверенными, что она оставила только одно завещание. В действительности, их оказалось два. Содержание духовных завещаний и писем, наконец-то, ставит точку в многочисленных дискуссиях и предположениях относительно духовных завещаний Дмитрия Кантемира и его сына Антиоха.

Духовные завещания Марии Кантемир

В представленном исследовании, основываясь на втором духовном завещании и, так называемом духовном письме к своим братьям Сергею, Матвею и племянникам Кантакузино (Cantacuzino)¹⁴, которые юридически были заверены в Юстиц-Коллегии¹⁵, попытаемся ответить на некоторые

старина [Russian Antiquity], Москва, 1897, Том 89, январь 1897, с. 49-69; март, с. 401-417; Том 90, июнь, с. 425-451; том 91, август, с. 225-253.

¹³ Пушкинский Дом, ИРЛИ РАН, Фонд 166, Опись 1, Единица хранения № 55 (Копии. 1725-1758 годов). (Далее: ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55).

¹⁴ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед.хр. 55, л. 9-14.

¹⁵ Юстиц-коллегия (ЮК) – центральное государственное Учреждение в России 18 века. В 1717 г. были установлены ее штаты и был назначен президент. Создана 9 мая 1718 г в Москве, путем соединения старых судебных приказов. Контролировала местные суды и была высшим апелляционным судом по уголовным и гражданским делам. В 1722 г переведена в Петербург. В 1718-1720 гг. ЮК ведала Поместным приказом, в 1719-40 гг. в нее входила крепостная контора, оформлявшая различные акты на владение землей и крепостными; в 1730-1763 гг. ей подчинялся сыскной приказ. С введением губернских учреждений в 1775 г судебные функции ЮК были переданы в местные губернские суды, а управление судами – в Сенат. ЮК еще несколько лет решала старые дела и 27 июля 1786 была закрыта. Президенты ЮК: И. Ю. Трубецкой в 1744, П. Т. Квашнин-Самарин (1744-1753), Н. М. Желябужский (1753-1760),

дискуссионные вопросы в историографии. В частности, в связи с чем было написано завещание, по какой причине – в связи с тяжелой и длительной болезнью или в результате случайных и трагических обстоятельствах, приведших к болезни.

Изучение данных документов, будет ограничено рамками предмета нашего исследования - женской историей. Значимость обнаруженных нами документов является бесценной, так как их содержание позволяет пролить свет на многочисленные вольные интерпретации в исторической литературе относительно некоторых фрагментов из жизни и деятельности Марии Кантемир.

Особенностью второго духовного завещания является его структурность и содержание. По структуре оно довольно объемное, состоит из преамбулы, девяти отдельных пунктов и заключительной части, в которой находим всю информацию о том, каким образом было составлено и юридически оформлено завещание.

Подтверждением правовой силы документа, являются сведения о свидетелях при его составлении: о духовнике («иеромонах Златоустовского монастыря Иосиф Бессонов»), душеприказчике («генерал прокурор Никита Юрьевич Трубецкой»), о писаре («Иван Андреев, сын Соломенов») и точная дата, когда духовная была написана и заверена, княжна Мария Дмитриевна «*въ Москве августа 8 дня 1757 руку приложила*»¹⁶.

По содержанию оно совмещает в себе несколько составляющих: имущественные и хозяйственные распоряжения, в которых Мария Кантемир подробно указывает кому, поименно, и каким образом распределяется движимое и недвижимое имущество, как распорядиться ее оставшимся имуществом, деньгами и драгоценностями, а также имуществом, наследованным от покойного брата Антиоха.

Особый интерес вызывает пункт шестой, в котором Мария дает указание, как должна быть погребена: «*Тело мое грешное погребати без*

И. И. Дивов (1764-1767), А. А. Яковлев (1767-1780). Смотри: *Советская историческая энциклопедия* [Soviet Historical Encyclopedia], том 16, Издательство Советская энциклопедия, Москва, 1976, с. 382. Иванов П. И., *Описание государственного архива старых дел* [Description of the State Archive of old cases], Москва. 1850; *Памятная книжка Московского Архива министерства юстиции* [The memorial book of the Moscow archives of the Ministry of Justice], Москва, 1890; Ерощкин Н.П., *История государственных учреждений России* [The history of Russian state institutions], 2 издание, Москва, 1968.

¹⁶ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 6.

всякой церемонии въ подмосковной моей вотчине въ селе Марьино, (в которомъ я желаю монастырь дивичий построить) при церкви святы равноапостольные Мари Магдалины»¹⁷.

Духовная была зарегистрирована в Юстиц-Коллегии «*въ приходной книге под №36 записан ноября 28 дня 1757 года...У сей духовной Государственной Юстиции-Коллегии печать*»¹⁸. Это очень важная деталь. С 1740 года Юстиц - Коллегия управляла системой нотариальных органов на местах¹⁹. Говоря юридической терминологией, в Юстиц-Коллегии закреплялись имущественные отношения, права, сделки, связанные с переходом прав на отдельные виды имущества (движимое или недвижимое), письменно оформлялись в виде актов. Другими словами, второе духовное завещание, было составлено и оформлено согласно всем юридическим требованиям того времени и традициям. Помимо этого, на наш взгляд именно второе духовное завещание опровергает миф о том, что Мария умерла от несчастного случая. В самом начале она пишет: «*Волоского господаря дочь княжна Маріа княжнь Дмитріева дочь Кантемирова видя я себя въ болезни пишу сію духовную грамоту въ самой сущей чистой памяти. Въ прошлыхъ годахъ о рождения моего находилась я двадцати пяти летъ и одержима была великою болезнию*»²⁰.

Во-первых, из текста очевидно и видимо читается, что она пишет о какой-то хронической болезни, мучавшей ее на протяжении долгих лет. Не маловажным является и то, что в 1757 году Марии было 57 лет. По тем временам это достаточно преклонный возраст для женщины.

Во-вторых, изначально Мария ссылается на первое духовное завещание, которое было написано в 1725 году и связывает события давно минувших лет, спустя 32 года. Важным аргументом в пользу предположения о длительной, возрастной, а возможно наследственной болезни (генетической – Л.З) служит начало духовной, написанной ею в молодые годы, в которой она так же пишет о своей болезни: «*Видя себя въ крайней слабости и опасаясь внезапного часу жития моего конца*»²¹.

¹⁷ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 5.

¹⁸ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л.7об.

¹⁹ *Государственность России* [Russia's Statehood]. Словарь-справочник, книга 4, М, Наука, 2001, с. 462-465.

²⁰ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л.3.

²¹ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 1. Данная проблема является объектом нашего другого исследования. Статья, посвященная анализу и публикации первого духовного завещания, сдана для публикации. At Press.

В конечном итоге, к сожалению, не известно, о какой тяжелой болезни идет речь, если Мария в 25 лет пишет, что смерть может быть «внезапной», а в 57 лет «*вида я себя въ болезни*». Возможно, в этих строках Мария ссылается на свой жизненный опыт. В семье от диабета умерли сестра²² и отец. Мать²³ так же не отличалась отменным здоровьем, умерла в возрасте чуть более тридцати лет. Пережив с детства смерть близких и дорогих людей, Мария наверняка, осознавала, что происходит с ней. Не надо забывать так же, что Мария была образованнейшей женщиной своей эпохи, прекрасно владела четырьмя языками, вращалась в интеллектуальной среде высшего общества, поэтому имела представления о последствиях своей болезни. Она не могла составить завещание без основательных доводов или просто в состоянии паники.

Интересна и другая деталь, объединяющая оба духовных завещания. В обоих документах ни разу не упоминаются сводная по отцу сестра Смарагда – Екатерина. Вероятно, отношения между сестрами были довольно напряженными. Известно, что после смерти Дмитрия Кантемира (1723), Константин Кантемир практически, узурпировал все наследство единолично, открыто игнорируя своих братьев и сестер. Наследство стало предметом раздора на протяжении многих лет в семье между детьми Дмитрия Кантемира от первого брака и его второй супругой, Анастасией Ивановной Трубецкой (4 октября 1700-27 ноября 1755). Судебные тяжбы с мачехой длились на протяжении многих лет. Активное участие в разрешении данной проблемы занимала Мария. В частности, в письме от 1742 года к императрице, Мария пишет на равных условиях со своими братьями: *«Всепрестелейшая державнейшая великая государыня, императрица Елисавета Петровна, самодержица всероссийская, государыня всемилостивейшая. Бьют челомъ покойного государя волоцкого князя Матвей, Сергей, Антиохъ, и сестра ихъ княгиня Марія, князь Дмитриевы дети Кантемировы»*²⁴. В письме они просят решить проблемы имущественно-наследственного характера семьи Кантемир и ссылаются на письмо к императрице Анне Иоанновне, от 1730 года. Подписываются братья и сестра так же вместе: *«Всемилоуивейшая государыня, просимъ вашего императорского величества о семъ нашемъ прошении решение*

²² Смарагда (14.04. 1701, Стамбул - 20.07.1720, Москва). Дочь Дмитрия Кантемира и Кассандры Кантакузен. Умерла в ранней молодости, предположительно от диабета. Похоронена в семейной усыпальнице церкви Святого Николая в Москве.

²³ Кассандра Кантакузен (1682—11 мая 1713, Москва)

²⁴ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 19-20.

учинить. Марта «» дня 1742 году. Матвей Кантемир руку приложилъ. Князь Сергей Кантемиръ и вместо брата князь Антиоха Кантемира руку приложилъ. Княжна Марія Кантемирова руку приложила. раср. IX (Гос. Дела кабинета (1742 г.) № 197, л. 303-304)»²⁵.

Духовное письмо Марии Кантемир

Особую важность и значимость, в обнаруженных нами документах в архиве Л. Н. Майкова, представляет, так называемое, духовное письмо Марии Кантемир к своим братьям. На наш взгляд, эти документы занимают уникальное место в данной группе источников (завещания, духовные грамоты и др.- Л.З.), так как являются прямым дополнением к завещанию и несут огромный информационный блок, отражающий личность завещателя. В частности, в духовном письме, мы находим видение жизни и смерти Марией Кантемир, ее эмоционально-чувственные послы своим близким, родным, друзьям, прислуге и т.д., традиции, обычаи, образ жизни и ментальность эпохи.

Удивительно, что духовное письмо к брату Сергею, обнаруженное нами в архиве, было написано в тот же день, когда завещание, 8 августа 1757. Так же, как и завещание, оно было засвидетельствовано ее духовным отцом, Иосифом Безсоновым, иеромонахом Златоустовского Московского монастыря и оформлено в Юстиц-коллегии «*Дела Юстиць - Коллегия, в № 2.491, д. №14*»²⁶.

В духовном письме Мария обращается к брату Сергею. Начало письма, с первых строк, совпадает с духовным завещанием: **«Государь мой братец князь Сергей Дмитриевич! Как Вам известно, что я нахожусь въ болезни немалое время, чего ради написала я духовную что куды из моего имени употребить, о чемъ и васъ покорно прошу дабы по той моей духовной приложили свой трудъ»**²⁷.

Как видно из текста, она не просто пишет брату Сергею, а подтверждает о том, что давно уже болеет и, что духовная грамота уже написана. Другими словами, она в духовном письме подчеркивает, что основной завещательный документ готов и имеет юридическую силу, но в нем она не изложила все свои посмертные желания и указания. В этом

²⁵ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 20.

²⁶ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 9-12.

²⁷ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 9.

основная разница между духовным завещанием и духовным письмом²⁸.

Завещание она начинает с просьбой строительства монастыря, а в духовном письме указала где и каким образом ее хоронить, поэтому выделяет это желание в письме. Для более ясного представления предлагаем фрагментов из духовного письма к брату Сергею: *«а в той моей духовной о платье моемъ, о посуде фарфоровой и прочей домовою всякой мелочи и объ оставшихъ деньгахъ что куда употребить не написано; того ради васъ государя моего братца покорно прошу тело мое грешное погresti въ подмосковной моей вотчине в селе Марьино между церковью и саду по левую сторону церкви безъ всякой церемонии»*²⁹.

На наш взгляд, эти несколько предложений удивительны по форме изложения и наполнены необыкновенно жизненным содержанием. Письмо написано, практически, за месяц до ее кончины, т. е. в то время, когда она была в глубокой болезни (о чем пишет, как в духовном завещании, так и в духовном письме – Л. 3.) и, возможно, в тяжелом психоэмоциональном состоянии. В то же время, в строках читается абсолютная ясность в мыслях и поступках. Мария не просто думает о смерти, а осознано понимает, что кончин неизбежна и близка. С огромным мужеством и особой интеллигентностью она просит быть похоронена скромно, без почестей и торжественных церемониалов. При жизни, в многочисленных письмах и других документах частного характера, своих духовных завещания и письмах она неоднократно подчеркивала свое происхождения, что она дочь

²⁸ Об этом свидетельствует документ, заверенный посмертно в Юстиц-коллегии в декабре 1758 года, когда племянники Марии получили часть наследства по тетке и дяде своему Антиоху: *«князь Аврамъ да князь Степанъ княжи Константиновы дети Кантакузины по духовной и по завещательному письму покойной светлейшей княжны Марии Дмитриевне Кантемировы при нижеподписавшихся свидетелях приняли у братьевъ покойной ея родных лейбъ – гвардии Преображенского полку у капитановъ – поручиковъ князь Матвея и князь Сергея княже Дмитриевых детей Кантемировъ на надлежащие намъ две части ихъ денегъ изъ дву тысячъ рублевъ тысячу триста тридцать три рубля тридцать три копейки одна треть, изъ оставшей после покойного князь Антиоха Дмитриевича серебряной посуды половину четыре пуда восемь фунтовъ пятьдесятъ восемь золотниковъ съ половиною сполна, изъ скатертей и салфетокъ половину-же, а именно: три скатерти, салфетокъ пять дюжинъ и пять салфетокъ, да изъ скотины жеребца вороного, пять кобыл, трехъ жеребенковъ, въ томъ сию и росписку дали»* // ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л.14.

²⁹ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 9.

господаря Дмитрия Кантемира. Зная свой высокий социальный статус, перед лицом смерти, Мария отбрасывает все земные, житейские формальности и готовится предстать перед Богом как обыкновенная смертная женщина. В этих словах одновременно заключается ее величие и смирение на пороге смерти.

Далее в своем первом духовном письме к брату Сергею она в деталях описывает, каким образом должна быть воздвигнута часовня над ее могилой: **«Надъ теломъ моимъ сделать каменную часовню круглую, мерою внутри той часовни пять аршин, вокруг той часовни снаружи сделать наш герб, покрыть белыми плитами, поставить наверху часовни сделав крестъ медной и вызолотить, в часовне поставить образ Пресвятые Богородицы Ахтырские окладной [...] И кадило купить медное, гробъ поставить среди часовни, и покрыть покрывалом малиновымъ отласнымъ шито золотомъ волоченымъ, а крест положить изъ позумента широкого золотого, а другой покровъ сделать повседневной черной суконной съ бахромой шелковой»**³⁰. В данной отрезке обращает внимание деталь – снаружи часовни **«сделать наш герб»**. Зная, что она будет похоронена вдали от своей семьи, не в семейном склепе в Москве³¹, по-видимому, Мария в деталях продумывала как увековечить и показать свое благородное происхождение Кантемир, чтобы, поминая ее, помнили о всей семье. И хотя по тем временам, к смерти готовились загодя, вызывает так же удивление, насколько реалистично и в подробностях она просит соблюдать определенные требования во время погребения: где должен стоять гроб, каким покрывалом (и в каком цвете – Л. 3.) должно быть покрыто ее тело, куда положить крест и др.

Но особое внимание, на наш взгляд, в духовном письме к брату Сергею заслуживает пожелание оставить в церкви Марьино **«Портретъ, который пожалованъ мне блаженныя и высокой славы достойныя памяти отъ Государя Императора Петра Великого и отъ Государыни Императрицы Екатерины Алексеевны после матери моей носить, оной портрете привнеситъ в село Марьино в церковь к образу Пресвятой богородицы Казанския»**³².

На наш взгляд, этот небольшой фрагмент имеет важное значение в развенчании очередного мифа. В частности, речь идет о портрете императора Петра I в семье Кантемир. В духовном письме Марии говорится о том, что

³⁰ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 9-9об.

³¹ Это условие не было соблюдено братьями.

³² ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 10.

портрет Петра Великого (Sic! Так пишет Мария – Л. З.), был пожалован лично ей императором и императрицей Екатериной I. Она так же подчеркивает свою почетную миссию относительно ношения портрета, *«после матери моей носить»*. Далее, Мария простит портрет *«привнести»* к иконе Казанской Богородицы, в церковь в селе Марьино, там, где она будет похоронена.

Обобщая, смеем заключить, что данное пожалование от императорской семьи говорит о почтительном и уважительном отношении к Марии Кантемир. Если бы она имела какие-либо отношения с императором, то вряд ли бы императрица Екатерина I пожаловала ей этот портрет вместе с императором. Кроме этого, о праве на ношение императорского портрета никто из других членов семьи не упоминается.

В духовном письме к брату Сергею Мария жалуется драгоценности императрице Елизавете Петровне, брату Матвею и его жене Агриппине Яковлевне Лобановой-Ростоцкой: *«жемчужину большую ... всемилостивейшей Государыне [...] брату моему князю Матвею Дмитриевичу перстень золотой съ бриллиантомъ сердечкомъ, осыпанъ мелкими брильянты; невестушке моей княгине Аграфене Яковлевне ручка розовая съ яхонтами что на голове носятъ»*³³.

Духовное письмо, так же как духовное завещание (1757 года) имеет классическую заключительную часть, в которой Мария просит брата исполнить ее последнее пожелание, а ежели он его не выполнит, то держать ему ответ перед высшим судом, Божьим: *«По сему моему завещательному письму покорно прошу учинить непременно, а ежели противъ сего чего учинено не будетъ, то будемъ судиться пред создателемъ нашимъ Богомъ, и тако васъ государь мой братецъ покорно прошу учинить со мною последнюю милость. Симъ окончивъ притомъ и всей моей бедной жизни горести впоследствии пребываю сестра ваша княжна Мария Кантемирова Августа 8 дня.1757 года»*³⁴.

Выводы

Таким образом, из вышеизложенного, видим, что второе духовное завещание Марии Кантемир, было заверено в Юстиц-Коллегии и закреплено, так называемым, духовным письмом к своим братьям Сергею, Матвею и племянникам Кантакузино в один день, 8 августа 1757. На наш взгляд, согласно содержанию этих документов эпохи, Мария Кантемир их

³³ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 9-10.

³⁴ ПД, ИРЛИ РАН, Ф. 166, оп. 1, ед. хр. 55, л. 12.

написала в связи с тяжелой и длительной болезнью. Ряд аргументов свидетельствует о факте, что она умерла не при случайных и трагических обстоятельствах. Мнение, утвердившиеся в литературе, что она умерла, якобы, от падения с кареты, является не состоятельным и мифологизированным.

В заключении, хотелось бы подчеркнуть, что обнаруженные нами документы являются уникальными историческими и юридическими источниками, как по форме, так и содержанию. Публикация этого богатого документального материала и введение его в научный оборот позволит исследователям широко использовать и работать непосредственно с первоисточниками. В данной статье мы ограничились только некоторыми комментариями. В дальнейшем, документы требуют детального и комплексного исследования. Междисциплинарный подход и углубленный анализ уникальных документов позволит выявить не только особенности характера Марии Кантемир, но и попытаться осмыслить ее образ мышления, увидеть мотивацию ее поступков и действий с точки зрения женщины своей эпохи, развеять многочисленные мифы и домыслы о семейно-имущественных и личностных отношениях в семье Кантемир.

Приложение А

8 Августа 1757 года. Духовная грамота княжны Марии Кантемир «№ II. (лист 3)

Во имя святых единосущных животворящих и неразделимых Троицы Отца и Сына и Святого Духа, аминь.

Волоского господаря дочь княжна Маріа княжнь Дмитріева дочь Кантемирова видя я себя въ болезни пишу сію духовную грамоту въ самой сущей чистой памяти. Въ прошлыхъ годахъ отъ рождения моего находилась я двадцати пяти летъ и одержима была великою болезнью; въ той своей болезни просила я у создателя своего Господа Бога и Спаса нашего Ісуса Христа милости, дабы мне Господь Бог дал отъ скорби облегчение, и притомъ обещалась я по исправности своей как буду здорова построить девичий монастырь, токмо за неисправностию своею о построении вновь того монастыря где надлежитъ просить поныне умедлила, того ради сею моею духовную завещаю и съ покорностью моею прошу по смерти моей учинить со мною милость его светлости высокопревосходительного генерала фельдмаршала и обоихъ российскихъ орденовъ кавалера генерала прокурора князь Никиту Юрьевича Трубецкого по сей моей духовной возъиметь [3 об] свой трудъ быть моимъ душеприказчикомъ и приказать

брату моему князь Сергею Дмитриевичу Кантемиру учинить следующее. Къ сей Присей.

1.

О построении вновь по обещанию моему монастыря подать где надлежитъ прошение дабы повелено было построить монастырь въ купленной моей подмосковной вотчине в селе Марьине, Улиткино тоже, на том месте, где мой домъ построить, палаты и ограда каменная во имя святые и равноапостольные Маріи Магдалины и покои жилые деревянные, рыбные пруды; и ежели по указу Ея Императорского величества повелено будет оной монастырь построить, чтобы приказать достроить и монастырь установить, означенному же брату моему князю Сергію Дмитриевичу Кантемиру на строение того монастыря оставляю денег тысячу рублей; а повелено-бы было въ томъ монастыре быть монахинямъ двенадцати человекомъ, да въ искусе желающимъ шести человекомъ, при церкви священнику съ дьякономъ да дву [4] церковникамъ, а для содержания церкви монахинь, былицъ [?] и священника съ причетники оставляю въ проценте три тысячи рублей, да повелено-бъ было отдать къ тому монастырю купленную мою подмосковную вотчину означенное село Марьино, Улитктно тожь, да купленную жъ вотчину дядею моимъ покойнымъ капитаномъ Григориемъ Михайловичемъ Бантышемъ въ Вяземскомъ уезде сельцо Федотково, которыя вотчины за мною справлены и отказаны, московский мой домъ съ каменнымъ и деревяннымъ строениемъ, медная и оловянная всякого звания посуда что явится. ду духовной.

2.

Ежели паче чаяния монастырь построить не допустятъ, то оставшия для монастыря деньги отдать на строение неимущихъ церквей и беднымъ людямъ две тысячи рублей, а другие две тысячи рублей племянникомъ моимъ братьей моихъ детем генерала лейтенанта князь Константина Антиоховича Кантемира сыну князь да генерала маіора князь Константина Степановича Кантакузина детемъ Аврамію да Степану разделить по равнымъ частямъ, а московский дворъ [4 об] и сельцо Федотково брату моему двоюродному подполковнику князь Дмитрію Антиоховичу Кантемиру, медную и оловянную посуду продавъ раздать неимущимъ людямъ, а село Марьино братьямъ моимъ князь Матвею и князь Сергію Дмитриевичамъ и содержать имъ въ томъ селе Марьине святую церковь и священники съ причетники вечно, такъ же какъ при мне было непременно, дать въ ту церковь ихъ серебряной моей посуды блюдо да тарелку серебряныя. ховной княжны [!].

3.

Ежели при животе моемъ въ сельцо Федотково изъ села Щитова Городища не перенесу я церкви и не дострою, то построить по смерти моей, а о строеніи той церкви изъ духовной консистории въ Вяземское духовное правление указъ посланъ, и бревны для того строения приготовлены. Кне Маріи [!]

4.

Вещи мои бриллиантовыя, алмазныя и прочія, которыхъ надеюсь быть ценою до четырехъ тысячъ рублевъ или более, оныя разделить брату моему Сергію Дмитриевичу съ племянниками [5] моими съ вышеобъявленными князь ...³⁵ Кантемиромъ да князьями жъ Авраомомъ да Степаномъ Кантакузиными по равнымъ частямъ. жна ...³⁶ Димитріевны [!].

5.

Оставшую мне после брата моего покойнаго князь Антиоха Дмитриевича Кантемира серебряную посуду, скатерти, салфетки, что ихъ на лицо есть, разделить брату моему князь Сергію Дмитриевичу съ племянниками моими князь Авраомомъ да князь Степаномъ Кантакузинами пополамъ. жна Кантемировой

6.

Тело мое грешное погребати безъ всякой церемоніи въ подмосковной моей вотчине въ селе Марьине, (въ которомъ я желаю монастырь девичій построить) при церкви святыхъ равноапостольныхъ Маріи Магдалины; при погребении и въ милостыню издержать приказано изъ денегъ моихъ брату моему князь Сергію Дмитриевичу сколько потребно будетъ. Священнику тое церкви дать двадцать рублевъ, церковникамъ тое жъ церкви дать давдцать рублевъ ибо они должны въ [5 об] шесть недель читать непрестанно день и ночь псалтырь, сорокоустія на двадцать церквей священникомъ съ причетники по два рубля съ полтиною, на ладанъ, на свечи, на вино церковное, на кутьи по полтора рубля на каждую церковь, да въ годъ поминать отдать на двенадцать церквей по десяти рублевъ на церковь. Марія отецъ Духовный [!].

7.

Всенижайшее Ея Императорского Величества Всемиловивейшую Государыню прошу о пожалованныхъ мне въ вечное владение деревняхъ, что Ея Величество съ ними соизволить. Ежели же оныя деревни не пожалованы будутъ братьямъ моимъ князь Матвею и князь Сергію

³⁵ Лакуна.

³⁶ Лакуна.

Дмитріевичамъ Кантемирамъ дабы оныхъ деревень моихъ прочимъ въ раздачу отдавать было же повелено, а повелено бѣ было темъ деревнямъ быть въ ведомствѣ дворцовомъ вечно. Канте. Златоустовского.

8.

Имеющихся дворцовыхъ моихъ людей (которые въ нынешнюю перепись написаны въ Нижегородскихъ моихъ [6] деревняхъ) отпустила я на волю и написаны имъ отпускные письма, о чемъ отъ меня объявлено въ Московской губернской канцеляріи, и прошу объ нихъ дабы они по моей кончине обижены не были и отпускныя письма отданы бѣ были без всякаго удержанія, а покаместъ они не приищутъ себе пропитанія изъ дому моего ихъ не высылать, но быть имъ в техъ же покояхъ, где они ныне живутъ, и дрова имъ давать, а по кончине моей дать имъ на пропитаніе хлеба, харчу и денежное жалование на полгода дабы въ томъ они не претерпели нужды. мірова монастыря [!].

9.

А о пожиткахъ же моихъ о платьѣ о посудѣ фарфоровой и о прочей домово́й всякой мелочи и объ оставшихъ деньгахъ, куда что употребить, приказано брату моему князь Сергію Дмитріевичу въ Москвѣ августа 8 дня 1757 года. Руку приложила. іеромонахъ Іосифъ Безсоновъ былъ и подписался.

Сія духовная Государственной Юстиции Коллегіи въ конторѣ сего 1757 года октября 3 дня явлена отъ его светлости [6 об] генерала фельдмаршала Действительнаго тайнаго советника и генераль прокурора обоихъ российскихъ орденовъ кавалера и лейбъ-гвардіи маіора князь Никиты Юрьевича Трубецкого для свидетельства и записки, и чрезъ допросы писца сей духовнойслужителя ея Ивана Андреева сына Соломенова и подписавшагося подъ оною свидетеля Златоустовского монастыря іеромонаха Іосифа Безсонова, свидетельствована, а по свидетельству явилась оная учинена по воле означенной завещательницы княжны Кантемировой и руку къ сей Духовной приложила она завещательница сама и писецъ оную писалъ, а свидетель восвидетельстве подписался по ея завещательницыной просьбѣ и при учинении оной была она въ целомъ уме и памяти и спору на сію духовную ни отъ кого никакого не было, котораго и въ Юстицъ конторѣ ни отъ кого не явилось; того ради сего ноября 27 дня 1757 года по указу Ея Императорскаго величества и по определению оной конторы велено сію духовную, взявъ съ нея по силѣ указовъ пошлинъ пятьдесятъ [7] копеекъ, съ нихъ на нужные расходы одну четверть копейки, да за два листа гербовой бумаги четыре рубля записать въ записную

таковымъ духовнымъ, а деньги въ приходную книги, и подписавъ на оной явку и свидетельство, и запечатавъ ее коллежскою печатью за скрепою секретарскою для надлежащего по ней исполненія, отдать его светлости съ роспискою, ибо во оной по разсмотренію Юстиць канторы никакой указомъ противности не усмотрено, понеже она княжна по той своей духовной деревень своихъ въ монастырь действительно не отдала, а только написала, что бы о строеніи монастыря и о даче къ оному деревень просить наследникамъ ея позволенія где по указомъ надлежитъ и ежели въ той просьбе будетъ отказано, то те свои деревни и движимое свое именіе определила она въ разделеніе оставшимъ по ней наследникамъ и раздать на строеніе церквей и на поминовленіе своей души, въ чемъ во всемъ въ силе указовъ имела она завещательница волю, а о действительномъ по оной духовной исполненіи означеннымъ [7 об] наследникамъ бить челомъ где по указомъ надлежитъ, ибо оное до разсмотренія Юстиць канторы не принадлежитъ и по тому определенію со оной духовной пошлины и за гербовую бумагу и на расходъ всего четыре рубля пятьдесятъ копеекъ съ четвертью взяты и въ приходной книге подъ №36 записан ноября 28 дня 1757 года.

Скрепа по листамъ: Секретарь Александръ Игнатъевъ.

У сей духовной Государственной

Юстиць-Коллегіи печать.

Канцеляристъ Никита Назаровъ”.

Источник:

Институт русской литературы Российской Академии Наук Пушкинского Дома в Санкт Петербурге, Отдел Рукописи, Архив Л.Н. Майкова³⁷, "Подготовительные материалы к очерку "Княжна Мария Кантемирова" Фонд 166, Опись 1, Единица хранения № 55 (Копии. 1725-1758 годов).

³⁷ Леонид Николаевич Майков (28 марта /9 апреля/ 1839, Санкт-Петербург – 7 /20/ апреля 1900, Санкт-Петербург) – известный исследователь истории русской литературы, действительный член Петербургской Академии наук, президент Русского библиологического общества (РБО), тайный советник.

Приложение Б

1
3 43

А II.

Во имя святаго Единосузданаго сим-
воворящия и неразрешимаго Странца
Всича и всама и святаго Духа, аминь.
Волоцкого гонимая дочь князя Мавра
князь Дмитрия дочь Кавалерова
видя я себя въ близости души сво-
йшавшю въ самую душу чистую на-
мисти. Въ прошломъ году отъ раж-
Велия моего находивая я Владычица мѣ-
ти лютъ и одержима была вели-
кого болельца; въ той своей болельце
просима я у судачицы своего Копова
Бого и Владычицы Марии и Петра
милости, дабы мнѣ Коповъ Богъ дажъ
отъ окарби облекеніе, и приметъ
свогачица я по поправности своей
какъ буду здѣлова поспраше Копова
милости, такъ же за несправно-
отило своего о поспраше влече того
милости, что и влечитъ проситъ
показанъ увидѣшиа, того ради сво-
мало Копова завещавъ и съ по-
корности моею проси по смерти
моей учинитъ во мнѣ милости со
свѣтло отъ высокопревосходительнаго
генерала фельдмаршала и обичае рес-
ейкичь орденовъ кавалера генерала
прокурора князь Никиты Горавина
Шубинскаго по еси моему душевнѣ воу-

наши деловые книги имели год по
указу надлежит, ибо еще до рас-
смотрения вестных картон не про-
надлежит и по тому определенно
св. оной ученой комиссии и за гер-
бовую бумагу и на расход всего
четыре рубля пятнадцать копеек
есть четвертью взыскать и в приложенной
книжке под № 36 записаны майбря 28
дня 1757 года.

Скромна пометам: Секретарь Ли-
цейский Милославский.

Усей думавной Государственной
Коллегии — коллегии печать.

Канцеляриемъ Николая Назарова.

**ГАЙДУЦКИЕ ЗИМНИЕ ДРАМАТИЧЕСКИЕ ОБРЯДЫ РУМЫН
БУКОВИНЫ
(на основе полевых этнографических исследований)**

**THE HAJDUK (FREEDOM FIGHTER) WINTER DRAMATIC RITES OF
THE ROMANIAN POPULATION IN BUKOVINA
(Based on ethnographic field research)**

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Rezumat: Obiceiuri dramatice haiducești de iarnă ale românilor din Bucovina (pe baza cercetărilor etnografice de teren).

Studiul reflectă unul dintre cele mai interesante elemente ale ritualurilor folclorice ale populației românești din Bucovina – reprezentările teatrale populare haiducești, tradiții ce s-au păstrat până în zilele noastre. Articolul este întocmit pe baza cercetărilor de teren efectuate de-a lungul anilor (1997-2015) și pe baza literaturii de specialitate. Spectacolele populare au fost supuse unei ample analize istorice, cartografice și etnografice. De asemenea, o componentă importantă a investigației este reprezentată de abordarea comparativă a fenomenului interferențelor și influențelor reciproce a celor două culturi vecine: română, ca reprezentantă a spațiului cultural și lingvistic romanic, și ucraineană, reprezentantă a ethosului slav.

Abstract: *The article reflects one of the most interesting elements of folk rituals of the Romanian population in Bukovina – the hajduk (free fighter or outlaw) folk theatrical representations, traditions which have been preserved to our days. The paper is based on the results of long-term field studies (1997-2015) and also on the specific sources. Folk performances have been exposed to an extensive historical, cartographic and ethnographic analysis. Moreover, an important component of the investigation is the comparative approach to the phenomenon of mutual interferences and influences of two neighbouring cultures: the Romanian culture - as a representative of the Latin cultural and linguistic space, and the Ukrainian culture – as a representative of the Slavic ethos.*

Résumé: Coutumes dramatiques des haïdouks d'hiver des Roumains de la Bucovine (conformément aux recherches ethnographiques de terrain)

L'étude ci-jointe réfléchit un des plus intéressants éléments des rituels folkloriques de la population roumaine de la Bucovine – les représentations théâtrales populaires des hajdouks, traditions qui survécurent jusqu'à nos jours. On réalisa cet article tout en partant des études de terrain effectuées le long des années (1997-2015) et de la littérature de spécialité. On soumit les spectacles populaires à une ample analyse historique, cartographique et ethnographique. De plus, l'abord comparatif du phénomène des interférences et des influences réciproques des deux cultures voisines représenta une composante importante de l'investigation: il s'agit de la culture roumaine, comme représentante de l'espace culturel et linguistique roman, et de celle ukrainienne, représentante de l'ethos slave.

Keywords: *Bukovina, Romania, Republic of Moldova, Romanian, Hajduk performances, dramatic rites, folk drama.*

Введение

Комплекс народной обрядности является не только отголоском повседневной жизни людей, но, в принципе, является составной этой жизни. Это зеркало жизни крестьянина: его мировосприятие календарного цикла, семейного уклада, социального поведения и т. п. Социальный и политический аспекты также находят свое отражение, особенно в фольклоре. Исторические народные представления являются специфическим явлением на фоне архаических драматических обрядов румын. В них средствами народного театра отображались общественно значимые моменты исторического прошлого.

Гайдуки (венг. hajdu, hajduki, болг. хайдуги, укр. гайдамаки, гайдуки, опришки, пол. hajduki, серб. хайдуги, мак. ајдутина, рум. haiduci, тур. hayduti, рус. гайдуки) – вооруженные повстанцы, которые боролись против иностранных угнетателей в Восточной Европе. Термин гайдук имеет несколько значений, однако в исследованном нами случае наиболее точным определением было бы: человек вне закона, который занимался грабежом, в значительной части как протест против иностранного владычества или социальной несправедливости, особенно в конце XVIII – начале XIX веков. Термин эквивалентен греческим клефтам, борцам за свободу, крестьян восставших против турецкого владычества.

Этимология слова гайдук, за одной версией, происходит от венгерского hajto, которое первоначально означало погонщика скота. С XVI в. венгерский hajdu, hajduk во множественном числе начали использовать для обозначения нерегулярных отрядов сперва мадьярских воинов, а потом и славянских и румынских крестьян, которые вели партизанскую войну

против Османской и Австрийской империй. Существует также предположение про то, что название берет свое начало от турецкого *haidud*, что означало грабитель, бандит. Впоследствии название перешло к противникам господствующего государственного строя.

Феномен крестьянских протестных насильственных действий (волнения, восстания, гайдуцкое движение) до недавнего времени в историографии стран социалистической системы объяснялся исключительно причиной экономической эксплуатации и классовой борьбы. В случае гайдуцкого движения добавлялся факт чрезмерного угнетения со стороны турецких поработителей, или их ставленников – греков с Фанара (квартала в Стамбуле), фанариотов. На самом деле, явление крестьянского сопротивления более многогранное. Нельзя не согласиться с мнением румынского исследователя из Трансильвании Г. Горуна, который, не отвергая упомянутые причины крестьянских протестных насильственных действий, одновременно дополняет их и такими, как необходимость выживания в неблагоприятных природных условиях, рудиментарная сельскохозяйственная технология, постоянная угроза голода, отсутствие безопасности личности, семьи и пространства обитания, природные катаклизмы, несовершенство правовой регламентации, чрезмерная жесткость бытовых норм, введенных церковью, внешняя военная агрессия и агрессия местной администрации. Кумулятивная энергия комплекса всех перечисленных причин объясняет в большей степени явление повседневного использования насилия в крестьянской среде XVII – XX вв.¹ Подобная точка зрения подтверждается целым рядом исследований европейских ученых (Ж. Лефевра, М. Блока, Ж. Дюби, Э. ле Руа Ладюри и др.).²

Ареал распространения гайдуцких драм

Гайдуцкие народные представления (драмы) отражают период

¹ Gorun Gh., *Dimensiunile violențelor din mediul țărănesc transilvănean din a doua jumătate a secolului al XVIII-lea* [The Dimensions of Violence in Rural Transylvania in the second half of the Eighteenth Century]: http://www.historica-cluj.ro/anuare/AnuarHistorica2002/20.htm#_ftnref2

² Georges Lefebvre, *La révolution française et les paysans*, in "Études sur la Révolution française", Paris, 1954; Marc Bloch, *Les caractères originaux de l'histoire rurale française*, Paris, I, 1952, II, 1956; Georges Duby, *L'économie rurale et la vie des campagnes dans l'Occident médiéval*, ed. II, I-II, Paris, 1962; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou, village occitan, de 1294 à 1324*, Paris, 1985; Wilhelm Abel, *Agrarkrisen und Agrarkonjunktur (XIII – XX Jh.)*, Berlin, 1966; Robert H. Hilton, *The English Peasantry in the Later Middle Ages*, Oxford, 1975; Boris Porșnev, *Les soulèvements populaires en France de 1623 à 1648*, Paris, 1963.

массового гайдуцкого движения, который разворачивался на многих территориях проживания румынского этноса.

На современной территории Буковины и северных районов Республики Молдова гайдуки активно действовали в XVIII – первой половине XIX века, а в то время в украинских селах набирало силу движение опрышков. Гайдуки мелкими группами нападали на обидчиков, отбирали отнятое у народа добро и раздавали бедным крестьянам и горожанам. Однако их действия носили стихийный характер, фактически они боролись только с отдельными наиболее ненавистными для них богачами. Правда, это движение поддерживало простой люд, он отражал попытки румынского народа к освобождению из-под гнета турецких угнетателей, греков-фанариотов и бояр.

В народной обрядности сохранилась память о гайдуках. Об этом свидетельствует факт наличия до наших дней целого комплекса гайдуцких народных спектаклей, проводимых во время зимних праздников и отображающих события того исторического периода: *Груя Новака*, или *Груя и Новак*; *Бужор*, *Пеун* и *Кодряну*, *Жоян / Жиану*. В народных постановках гайдуки как движущая сила борьбы простых людей против социального бесправия изображены мужественными и смелыми, раскрываются преступления господ и их прислужников. Стоит добавить, что этот вид зимних драматических обрядов очень распространен у румынского населения Буковины и, как свидетельствуют полевые материалы, он меньше подлежал трансформации. Неизменными остались персонажи, их одежда и атрибуты.

Проведенный нами анализ ареала распространения гайдуцких драм, фиксирует следующую локацию обрядности:

1) центром распространения обряда *Груя Новака (Груя)* является Новоселицкий и Герцаевский районы Черновицкой области. На территории Глыбокского, Сторожинецкого районов Черновицкой области и Сучавского уезда Румынии обряд менее распространен;

2) центром распространения гайдуцкой драмы *Бужор* является румыноязычные села Черновицкой области (Сторожинецкого, Глыбокского, Герцаевского и Новоселицкого районов). На территории Сучавского уезда народное представление известно, но встречается крайне редко;

3) подтверждается факт локального распространения народных драм *Пеун* и *Кодряну* на территории Сторожинецкого и Глыбокского районов (см. фото № 2, 5). В других зонах Буковины Пеун и Кодрян, как главари гайдуцких отрядов – неизвестны;

4) народная драма *Жоян (Жиану)* - наиболее распространенный гайдуцкий драматический обряд у румын Буковины. Ритуал

распространенный равномерно по всей ее территории.

Стоит отметить, что данный тип драматических обрядов румын не характерен для украинцев Буковины, хотя на уровне отдельных сел существуют случаи заимствования украинцами персонажей этих драм.

Исторические персонажи – герои народных драматизаций

Анализ главных персонажей групп ряженных доказывает, что они отражают конкретные исторические личности, которым принадлежало определенное место в гайдуцком движении, антитурецкой борьбе, кампании Мигая Храброго по объединению Румынских княжеств, в Валашском восстании под руководством Т. Владимиреску.

Фамилия Новак часто встречается как в румынском, так и в балканском фольклоре. Текст "Новак и ворон" ("Novac și corbul") был напечатан В. Александри в сборнике "Румынские народные поэзии". Личности Баба Новака (баба – тур. *отец*) и его сына Груи широко комментируются в румынской литературе. Баба Новак является известным историческим персонажем, национальным героем Сербии. Родился он примерно в 1530 г. в Порече, со временем стал активным воителем против Османской империи, наемником, капитаном гайдуцкого подразделения в армии Мигая Храброго. В 1601 г., будучи послом, был арестован и казнен венгерской администрацией в Клуже. Сегодня памятник, посвященный Бабе Новаку, установленный на месте его казни.

Груя Новак, согласно некоторым источникам, был старшим сыном Новака. После смерти своего отца и Мигая Храброго, вместе с братьями, продолжил антитурецкую борьбу в лесах Олтении. Сохранились народные стихи о нем: "Dinspre munții Lotrului, / Prin strâmtoarea Oltului, / Cine se soboară-n cale, / Către Dunăre la vale? / Colo-n Munții oltenești, / Sus, la curți mari novăcești, / Plimbă-mi-se prin ceardac, / Trist, feciorul lui Novac: / Din ochi negri lăcrământ, / De la inimă oftând." / "С гор Лотра / через низину Олта / Кто спускается / Вниз, к Дунаю? / Там в Олтянских горах / Наверху, в великих поместьях Новака, / Гуляет верандой, / Печальный сын Новака: / Черные глаза в слезах, / Сердце вздыхает".

Бужор – Штефан Бужор был одним из известных предводителей гайдуцких формирований, действовавших на Буковине, Бессарабии и Валахии в конце XVIII – начале XIX вв. Песни и баллады, посвященные ему народными поэтами, исполнялись на застольях помещиков и в сельских кабаках: "Frunză verde de negară / A ieșit Bujor în țară / Pe ciocoi îi bagă-n fiară ..." / "Лист зеленый метлицы / Вышел Бужор в свет / Богачей кидает в

кандалы...".³ О Бужоре писал В. Александри, А. Руссо, Г. Россетти, М. Когэлничану и другие известные румынские писатели. Из источников известно, что он никого не убивал, а только грабил богачей и раздавал добро бедным; постоянно менял место дислокации. Его товарищами были помещики Кантакузино и Катарджи. *Действуя* на Буковине объединился временно с отрядом опришка Дария.⁴ Буковинец по происхождению Дарий (с. Марджиня южной части Буковины), казнен вблизи родного села в 1808 г.⁵ Из-за предательства, в 1810 г. Бужор вместе с товарищами были пойманы и через год казнены в Яссах.

Пэун – предводитель гайдуцкого отряда в первой половине XIX в. До наших дней сохранился текст песни "Песня гайдука Пэуна".⁶ Термин *пэунаш* в румынском языке означает красивый, гордый, сильный молодец. *Пэунашул кодрилор (Пэунаш лесов)* – одно из названий, которая была дана гайдукам.

Жоян / Жиану – гайдуцкий отряд, возглавляемый Янку Жиану (1787-1842 гг.), в первой половине XIX в. развернул свою деятельность в Олтении. Еще при его жизни писали о том, что он блестяще владел разными видами оружия. В апогее своей деятельности его отряд насчитывал 2-3 тысяч гайдуков. Они нападали на турок даже на юге Дуная (сожгли Виден и Плевну). Я. Жиану оказывал благотворительную помощь церквям, возводил здания общественного назначения в Крайове и Каракалле. Во время восстания Т. Владимиреску присоединился к нему вместе со своим отрядом. Был арестован в Бухаресте, когда шел по улице без охраны. Его приговорили к смертной казни и только счастливый случай сохранил ему жизнь. По тогдашним законам, приговоренного к смерти могла спасти девушка знатного рода, которая была готова выйти за него замуж. С нескольких кандидатур он выбрал Султану Гэлэшеску. После этого процесса он изменил свой образ жизни, стал мелким помещиком и умер своей смертью.⁷

³ Драгнев М., *Гайдуки – народные мстители* [Hajduks as a Folk Avengers], Кишинэу, 1962, с. 26-28.

⁴ Ботезату Г., *Хайдучий молдовень дин прима жумэтате а секолулуй XIX* [Moldavian Hajduks from the second part of the XIXth century], in *Анале де штинцифиче але Институтулуй де лимбэ ши литературэ ал АШ дин РССМ*, Вол. X, 1961, п. 250.

⁵ Marian S.Fl., *Poezii populare din Bucovina. Balade românești* [Folk Poetry from Bukovina. Romanian Ballads], Botoșani, 1869, p. 1-4.

⁶ *Cântece bătrânești ale românilor* [Folk Songs of the Romanian Elders], București, Editura Litera, 2011, cântecul nr. 23 "Cântecul lui Păun Haiducul" [The Song of Păun- the Hajduk].

⁷ Paul Barbu, *Haiducul Iancu Jianu: adevăr și legendă* [Iancu Jianu Hajduk: Truth and Legend], București, Editura Casa de Editură și Librărie "Nicolae Bălcescu", 1998:

Кодряну – реальный персонаж, некоторые авторы предполагают, что он был выходцем дворянского рода с Буковины, в результате интриг в Яссах он был вынужден покинуть столицу. Возглавляемый им гайдуцкий отряд скрывался в Оргеевских лесах. Умер в одном из монастырей.⁸ Согласно другой версии, Кодряну, сын молдавского батрака, родился в Могилеве и еще юношей стал гайдуком. Когда подрос, он собрал отряд смелых народных мстителей и навел страх среди бояр. Отбирая у состоятельных людей хлеб, деньги и скот, он раздавал все бедным. Кодряну боролся и против отуреченного господаря Молдавии Илиеша-водэ (1546-1551 гг.), который грабил народ и платил дань султанской Порте. О героической деятельности Кодряну сложено много народных былин.⁹

Среди многих молдавских и румынских исследователей распространено мнение, что гайдуцкие народные драмы генетически связаны с пьесой М. Милло «Янку Жиану – капитан гайдуков», поставленной в 1868-1869 гг. в Кишиневе, хотя существует также предположение, что они возникли раньше (Г. Ботезату).¹⁰ По мнению другого молдавского исследователя – Г. Спэтару, гайдуцкое народное драматическое искусство возникло еще в конце XVIII в.¹¹

Типы гайдуцких драматических обрядов

Как свидетельствуют полевые материалы, по составу участников гайдуцкие народные представления условно можно разделить на две группы: 1) *Груя Новака*; 2) остальные гайдуцкие карнавальные обряды.

Главными действующими лицами второй группы является персонаж, изображающий народного мстителя-гайдука (*Бужор, Жоян, Кодрян* и др.); один-два *гайдука*; *чабан*; *мать* или *любовница* гайдука; *капитан* карательного отряда, *охотник*; один-два *турка* или *солдат*. В некоторых вариантах фигурируют несколько главарей гайдуков (как правило, два-три, чьи имена хорошо известны), *дед* (олицетворял местное население и был на

https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haiduci_%C8%99i_panduri_din_Oltenia

⁸ Яцимирский А.И., *Разбойники Бессарабии в рассказах о них* [Robbers of Bessarabia in the Stories about Them], in *Этнографическое обозрение*, М., 1896, п. 78-80.

⁹ *Гайдук Кодрян* [Codreanu, the Hajduk], Литер. запис В. Галиця, переклад з рум. А. Ренін, М. Талов, Кишинів, 1952.

¹⁰ Ботезату Г., *Фолклорул хайдуческ ын Молдова* [The Hajduk Folklore from Moldova], Кишинэу, Картя Молдовеняскэ, 1967, п. 162.

¹¹ Спэтару Г., *Ын лумя театрулуй популар (Скице)* [In the World of Folk Theater (Essays)], Кишинэу, Литература артистикэ, 1984, п. 40, 46.

стороне гайдуков) и др. Стоит отметить, что представленный нами состав групп наиболее характерен для румыноязычных сел Буковины. Конечно, модификации существовали даже на уровне отдельных населенных пунктов. Это подтверждают полевые материалы:

Банда Бужора (Banda lui Bujor) – *Бужор, капитан, 3 младших офицеров, баба, дед, невеста* и музыканты (с. Подвальное Герцаевского района);

Банда Бужора (Ceata lui Bujor) – *Бужор, 2 гайдуков, капитан, 2 охотника, турок, мать Бужора* (с. Магала Новоселицкого /см. фото № 4/, Байраки Герцаевского районов);

Бужор (Bujor) – *Бужор, чабан, гайдук, охотник, капитан, Новый год, любовница* (с. Бояны Новоселицкого района);

Банда Жиана (Banda Jianului) – *Жиану, Алекса, сестра Жиана, 2 гайдуков, капитан, охотник, Новый год, Старый год* (с. Бояны);

Банда Жиана – *Жиану, гайдук Флоря, гайдук Алекса, гайдук Бужор, охотник, Кристанда, Новый год, Старый год* (с. Верхние и Нижние Петровцы);

Банда Жиана – *Жиану, капитан, госпожа, турок, солдат, чабан, Алекса, Кодряну, 2 ряженных персонажей* (с. Арборе Сучавского уезда)¹²;

Жиены (Jienii) – *Жиану, 2 гайдуков: Кодряну и Тобулток, Смэрэндица* (любовница), *капитан, турок, офицер, охотник, султан* и др. ряженные (с. Форосна Новоселицкого района)¹³;

Банда Пэуна (Banda lui Păun) – *Пеун, дед, капитан, офицер* (с. Верхние и Нижние Петровцы)¹⁴;

Кодрены (Codrenii) или *Банда Кодряну* (Banda lui Codreanu) – *Кодряну, Сортолина* – любовница Кодряну, *чабан, гайдук, охотник, боярин, 2 солдата, Новый год, калфа* и др. ряженные (с. Красноильск Сторожинецкого района)¹⁵.

Разница в составе гайдуцких драм незначительна. Так, зафиксировано, что для румыноязычного населения Буковины характерны 4 персонажа в проведении спектакля *Пэун*. Причем в некоторых населенных пунктах распределение ролей осуществлялся по росту участников: высокий – *капитан*, далее – *офицер, дед*, а самый низкий – *Пэун*. Зафиксировано, что участниками гайдуцких народных драм парни моложе, чем, например, в обряде *Маланка*.

¹² Dolinschi A., Dolinschi G., *Arbore, străveche vatră de etnografie și folclor* [Arbore, an Ancient Hearth of Ethnography and Folklore], București: Eficient, 2001, p. 122-123.

¹³ Спатару Г.И., *Драма популярэ молдовеняскэ (Антоложие)* [Moldavian Folk Drama (Anthology)], Кишинэу, Штиинца, 1976, п. 180.

¹⁴ Tochiță D., *De la lume adunate și-napoi la lume date. Culegere de folclor din Pătrăuții de Sus și Pătrăuții de Jos* [In the Folk Culture found and to the Folk given back. Folk Collection from Nyzhnii Patrautz and Verhni Patrautz], Suceava, 2005, p. 19-21.

¹⁵ Спатару Г.И., *op. cit.*, p. 188.

Традиционной одеждой *гайдука* в народных драмах была безрукавка или тулуп наизнанку. Узнать его можно было за длинными волосами, черными большими усами. На Пэуне – черная баранья шапка (иногда шляпа, украшена перьями павлина), черные кирзовые сапоги. В руках держал трубу, а за поясом – саблю или пистолы. В некоторых селах *гайдуки* носили военную форму. *Дед* и *чабан* – в национальной одежде; *капитан*, *офицеры* – в военном; *турок* – в турецком наряде. В Боянах *Бужор* мог быть в простой крестьянской одежде.

Сюжет гайдуцких драм

Зафиксировано, что в румыноязычных селах Буковины местами проводилось параллельно несколько гайдуцких народных представлений. Иногда число групп разрасталось до шести-семи.

Сценарий, в основном, выглядел так:

- группа поет песню или провозглашает новогоднее поздравление хозяев;
- предводитель гайдуков перед *чабаном* и собратями восхваляет свои подвиги и рассказывает о помощи, предоставленную бедным крестьянам, иногда о нападении его ватаги на *богача-фанариота*. В более ранних текстах часто присутствует эпизод, в котором к воротам *правителя* или *сановного турка* приближается крестьянин;
- прибывает карательный отряд и вступает в схватку с *гайдуками*;
- *атамана гайдуков* берут в плен;
- из заключения его освобождает при помощи подкупа *любовница*, *мать* или *сестра*; в некоторых вариантах он разрывает цепи и вместе со своими соратниками наказывает обидчиков (по другим версиям, *главарь гайдуков* и *капитан карательного отряда* ищут правды у правителя страны);
- заключительное поздравление хозяев.

В составе гайдуцких ватаг или в их ритуальных текстах фигурируют персонажи, олицетворяющие украинских *опрышков*. Чаще всего встречается имя Алексы Довбуша (Алекса). В частности, мотив братания украинских и молдавских гайдуков зафиксирован нами в народной драме *Бужор*, которая разыгрывалась в с. Стальновцы Новоселицкого района. Варианты песен и рассказов о Довбуше зарегистрированные также проф. Г. Бостаном. Они записаны исследователем в румыноязычных и украинских селах в полосе непосредственного межэтнического контакта, в населенных пунктах: Банилов Сторожинецкого, Краснышора, Банило-Солонец, Краснопутна, Ростоки Вижницкого района, Черешенька, Усть-Путила,

Вашковцы Кицманского района, Кельменцах.¹⁶

Случаи заимствования жителями украинских сел гайдуцких драматических обрядов от своих соседей – румын – зафиксированы нами в украинском селе Марицея Сучавского уезда. Здесь молодежь ставила румынскую народную (гайдуцкую) драму *Банда Бужора* на румынском языке.

В драме *Груя и Новак* (*Груя Новака, Банда Груи*) главный персонаж, в отличие от предыдущих гайдуцких драматических обрядов, предстает в образе богатыря. *Груя* является сыном *Новака*, который в постановке представлен старцем. Другие действующие лица: *Новэчаса* – жена *Новака*; *Войкица* – любовница *Груи* (по некоторым версиям, его сестра); *правитель Молдовы*; *Геревич* – богатый боярин; *военачальник* (при *правителе*); *Ницу* – священник, который служит *правителю*; *турецкий султан*; *Смэрэндица* – дочь трактирщика (согласно других версий – *Аница*); 3-4 *турка*. Спектакль начинается с эпизода прихода *турок*, которые захватывают в плен *Войкицу* – любовницу *Груи*. *Груя* отправляется в Царьград освободить свою любимую (или сестру), но по дороге заглядывает в трактир (корчму) и напивается. Пока *Груя* спит, *Аница* сообщает обо всем императору. Как только *гайдук* просыпается, дочь трактирщика снова спаивает его вином. Прибегают *турки* и связывают *Грую*. *Император* оглашает приговор и *турки* ведут его в тюрьму. *Новак* освобождает *Грую*, вместе они расправляются с *турками* и возвращаются домой.

По наблюдениям Г. Спэтару, в Глыбокском, Сторожинецком и Новоселицком районах встречался и более простой вариант драмы, по которому *Новак* со своими тремя братьями в бою побеждают *турецкого пашу*, который издевался над вдовами и девушками. Победа над врагом сопровождалась импровизированными сценками, например допросом *турка* с участием скоморохов и тому подобное.¹⁷

На Буковине тексты драмы *Груя и Новак* имеют несколько сотен строк, в состав группы входят от 10 до 20 персонажей, часто главных действующих лиц сопровождают другие ряженые.

Народная драма Константин Брынковяну

6 января 2009 г. в канун Рождества по старому стилю нам

¹⁶ Бостан Г., *Персонаже украинене ын драма популярэ молдовеняскэ* [Ukrainian Characters in the Moldavian Folk Drama], in “Лимба ши литература молдовеняскэ”, 1967, № 1, с. 7-9.

¹⁷ Спатару Г.И., *Историческая молдавская народная драма* [Historical Moldavian Folk Drama], Отв. ред. К. Попович, Кишинев, Штиинца, 1980, п. 50.

посчастливилось стать зрителями исторической драмы *Брынковены* в селах Ропча Сторожинецкого и Купка Глыбокского районов (см. фото № 2). Исполнители – парни 15-17 лет. Зафиксировано, что в данных населенных пунктах действуют несколько подобных групп.

Картографирование этого этнографического явления доказывает, что центром распространения исторической народной драмы *Брынковены* являются Глыбокский и Сторожинецкий районы Черновицкой области. На территории Сучавского уезда и Новоселицкого района Черновицкой области народное представление известно, но встречается крайне редко.

Сюжет народной драмы основан на реальных событиях – судьбе семьи валашского князя Константина Брынковяну (1654-1714 гг.). Правителем Валахии он стал в 1688 г. При нем столица княжества была перенесена в Бухарест, а для периода правления характерно интенсивное строительство (дворец Могошоая, большое количество монастырей и т.п.), что позволило говорить об особом брынковянском стиле, развитие школьного образования и книгопечатания. В политических отношениях ему пришлось маневрировать между Турцией, Австрией и Россией. Он сблизился с российским императором Петром I и тайно был награжден российским орденом. В 1714 г. султан сместил его с трона и вызвал в Стамбул. Князь был заточен в тюрьме Эдикуле. Затем К. Брынковяну вместе с 4-мя сыновьями вывели на центральную площадь, где перед его глазами, в присутствии султана, были казнены все сыновья. Младший сын – Раду просил отца позволить ему, ради спасения, принять мусульманскую веру. К. Брынковяну не позволил ему это сделать. Затем был казнен и сам князь с его зятем. Их головы на копьях пронесли по улицам турецкой столицы. Одна из причин ужасных пыток – отказ принять ислам, а потому Румынская православная церковь причислила его к лику святых.

Появление народной драмы припадает на рубеж XVIII и XIX веков. Большинство авторов локализуют центр ее возникновения в Трансильвании, однако молдавские варианты литературно выглядят более совершенными. По наблюдениям В. Адэскэлицей, в Радовецкой этнографической зоне эти версии очень похожи на одноименный спектакль В. Александри.¹⁸ В настоящее время драматический обряд в Трансильвании не проводится. На Буковине оно существует до сих пор, про что свидетельствуют результаты полевых исследований. Стоит, однако, заметить, что драма не характерна для румыноязычного населения

¹⁸ Adăscăliței V., *Date noi privind teatrul folcloric Brâncovenii* [New Data on Brancovenii Folk Theatre], in „Revista de etnografie și folclor”, 1967, T. 12, N. 6, p. 426.

бессарабской части Черновицкой области.

Драматический обряд проводится на Рождество, реже на Новый год. Основные действующие лица от села к селу различаются, но главными остаются: *Брынковяну с тремя сыновьями, султан и палач*. Для иллюстрации сказанного приведем несколько примеров:

Сучевены Глыбокского района – *Брынковяну и 3 сына, 2 офицера и палач*;
Йорданешты Глыбокского района – *Мош Крэчун, султан, Брынковяну, Александр* (старший сын Брынковяну), *Михай* (средний сын), *Раду* (младший сын); *палач* (см. фото № 1);

Купка Глыбокского района – *султан, 2 солдата, палач, Брынковяну и 3 сына*.

Следует отметить одну особенность сценария народной драмы. В исторической реальности замучены шесть человек – К. Брынковяну, четверо его сыновей и зять. Во всех вариантах пьесы фигурируют только три сына князя. На наш взгляд, это детерминировано влиянием румынских народных сказок и легенд, где всегда присутствуют три сына. В этом контексте нельзя сбрасывать со счетов магическую символику цифры.

Турки (Turcii)

Историческая народная драма *турки* на территории Черновицкой области была зарегистрирована в с. Мольница Герцаевского района в 1963 г., а также в с. Маршинцы Новоселицкого района на современном этапе (2015 г.). Группа парней обходит односельчан в ночь на Рождество и Новый год. Если в Республике Молдова главные персонажи драмы могли быть в масках, то в Черновицкой области – маски отсутствуют.

Обычно группа состоит из пяти-восьми парней: *турок-султан, турок-охранник султана, турок-воин, дед и баба, кузнец с женой, музыканты* и др. В с. Мольница все *турки* были одеты в военную форму, на мундирах – зеркальца и разноцветные ленты. На плечах – эполеты с бахромой, на эполетах – зеркальца. На груди – ордена и медали, на голове – конусообразные шапки с красными лентами, на ногах – сапоги. Турецкая одежда, конечно, отходит от оригинала. *Дед и баба* выступают в роли шутов. *Турки* танцуют с девушками, которые находятся в гостях у хозяина дома. Основной музыкант – скрипач, в наше время к нему присоединяются гармонист или аккордеонист. Наиболее характерные танцы – *кипэрушул, гусиня, турчяска*.¹⁹

В с. Маршинцы одежда *турок* отличается: кожаные сапоги до колен,

¹⁹ Спатару Г.И., *op. cit.*, p. 70-71.

синие штаны, заправленные в сапоги, синий костюм, на голове – высокая баранья шапка. Сначала они исполняют песни под окном, потом играет музыка и девушек приглашают на танец. В конце обхода устраивается коллективная трапеза у одного из участников группы дома. На св. Василия *турки* снова обходят односельчан, но действия происходят в более шуточной форме, они одеваются посмешнее.

Выводы

Анализ исторической основы гайдуцких народных драматических спектаклей доказывает, что они отражают конкретную историческую и экономическую ситуацию соответствующей эпохи, а также, во многом, видение народной ментальности представителями образованной среды XIX в. Поскольку борьба гайдуков против местных обидчиков простого народа, одновременно и против турецкого ига, в течение большого отрезка времени совпадала с тайным желанием людей и их пониманием социальной справедливости, то они всячески поддерживали такую форму сопротивления. Эти ощущения получили свое отражение в народном устном творчестве. Процесс собирания и обработки фольклорного материала, характерный для периода Просвещения, привел к появлению качественной литературной формы этих обрядов. Это творчество глубоко проникло в народную обрядность благодаря сущностному родству с народным социальным мировоззрением, а также хорошему, праздничному внешнему оформлению спектаклей.

Следует также подчеркнуть большую воспитательную роль драматических спектаклей, которую они сыграли в течение XIX – XX веков. В драмах появляется новое отношение к народу. Крестьяне выступают в них не как «молчаливый фон» исторических событий и безмолвная рабочая единица, а как действующая сила, умеющая отстаивать свои права силовыми методами. Спектакли сформировали новое восприятие понятия социальной справедливости, понятное и приемлемое для большинства крестьян.

Появление в традиционной культуре румын феномена исторической драмы было новой ступенью в ее развитии. Это был уход от хаотических и простых сценариев зооморфного репертуара. Из просветительских интеллектуальных кругов в народные массы вносились новые формы постановок, соответствующих городским театральным традициям. Костюмы героев спектакля становились разнообразными и более приближенными к историческим реалиям изображенного периода.

Поменялась и эстетика спектаклей. Однако на уровне села эти спектакли решали несколько другие проблемы. Они были настоящими увеселительными мероприятиями, зимними праздниками крестьян после трудового календарного цикла. Спектакли носили и характер инициации юношей: парни со своей «бандой» в обязательном порядке посещали дома «своих» девчат и родственников. Юноша, который участвовал в подобном действии, считался принятым в круг парней, имеющих права посещать девчат. Нельзя скидывать со счетов и конкуренцию, существующую между однородными «бандами» в одном и том же селе. Этот фактор играл на формирование престижа парней.

Сегодня гайдуцкие народные драмы представляют интерес как захватывающие театрализованные представления большой этнографической ценности и притягательной силы, которые должны быть учтены в туристическом менеджменте Буковины.



Фото 1. "Брынковений" – с. Йорданешты Глыбокского района (1960-е гг.)



Фото 2. "Кодряну" – с. Ропча Сторожинецкого района (2009)



Фото 3. "Брынковений" – с. Купка Глыбокского района (2009)

Вижорул - 1974



Фото 4. "Бужор" – с. Магала Новоселицкого района (1974)



Фото 5. "Пэунашул" – с. Ропча Сторожинецкого района (2009)

PEASANT WOMEN CRIME IN RUSSIA (The Second Half of the XIX Century – First Half of the XX Century)

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Rezumat. Crimele comise de sătențe în Rusia (a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea – prima jumătate a secolului XX)

Articolul tratează principalele trăsături ale crimei comise în mediul rural de către femei, în perioada următoare reformelor din Rusia. Importanța acestei probleme este dată de relevanța subiectelor care sunt prezentate deopotrivă cu paralela între starea de fapt a societății ruse, în care sunt încă păstrate valorile țărănești și mentalitatea, și starea societății la limita secolelor XIX și XX. Valoarea unei femei în viața rurală era la fel de hotărâtoare ca valoarea unui bărbat. Schimbările radicale ale țării, care au loc în perioada post-reformă, prin prisma comportamentului deviant al femeii, creează o nouă perspectivă ce contribuie la o mai bună înțelegere a trecutului Rusiei și a impactului acestuia asupra prezentului.

Abstract: *The article is devoted to the main features of women's peasant crime during the post-reform period in Russia. The importance of this problem is caused for that relevant topics are presented due to the parallels between the current state of Russian society, in which the peasant values and mentality are still retained, and the state of society at the boundary of XIX - XX centuries. The value of a woman in peasant life was as determinative as the value of a man. The country's radical changes that were taking place in the post-reform period through the prism of the female deviant behaviour create a new perspective, which contributes to a better understanding of Russia's past and its impact on the present.*

Résumé: Les crimes commis par les femmes paysannes en Russie (la seconde moitié du XIX-ème siècle – la première moitié du XX-ème siècle)

L'article ci-joint traite les principaux traits des crimes commis dans le milieu rural par les femmes dans la période suivant les réformes en Russie. L'importance de cette question réside aussi dans la relevance des sujets qu'on y présente, ensemble à la parallèle faite entre l'état réelle de la société russe, où on garde encore les valeurs paysannes et la mentalité, et l'état de la société à la limite des XIX-ème et XX-ème siècles. La valeur d'une femme dans la vie rurale était aussi décisive que la valeur d'un homme. Les changements radicaux du pays, qui arrivèrent dans la période post-réforme, par le prisme du comportement déviant de la

femme, crée une nouvelle perspective qui contribue à une meilleure compréhension du passé de la Russie et de son impacte sur le présent.

Keywords: *peasant society, peasant women, custom law, formal legislation, crime, female criminal.*

Introduction

Studies of gender, "women's history" is out today on the cutting edge in the humanities science around the world as a result of general liberalization of public life, and greater attention to the female community as such. In Russia this interest is enhancing due to the disappearance of the ideological pressure in the country, which was influencing all aspects of life, including scientific research. Crime as a social phenomenon invariably accompanies society throughout its history. The crime has historically been variable and has always been closely linked to economic and social changes in the society.

In recent decades the phenomenon of crime has been given significant attention in western studies, its dynamic analysis and the specific manifestations are the subject of many articles and books, chronologically spanning over several centuries. Historiography of the issue can be found in C. Emsley, L. Knaffa.¹ But there are a few studies made over the recent decades on the crime in pre-revolutionary Russia.² In practice, there are not any meaningful studies on the female peasant crime and the aim of this work is to fill this gap in. It should be emphasized that the understanding of the Russian past requires a deep research on the peasant society. This is due to the fact that, despite the well-known events of the political and social history of Russia in the last century, which have radically changed the way of peasants' life, the mentality and values in their transformed form in some degree, may be largely, are still remain the same.

The value of a woman within all aspects of peasant life was as determinative as the value of a man even taking into consideration the women's dependency. In the post-reform period there were radical socio-political, economic, legal and

¹ Emsley C., Knaffa L. (eds.). *Crime History and History of Crime: Studies in the Historiography of Crime and Criminal Justice in Modern History*, Westport, CT. 1996.

² See for example, С.С. Остроумов [S.S.Ostroumov], *Преступность и ее причины в дореволюционной России* [Crime and its causation in the pre-revolution Russia], Москва [Moscow], Изд-во МГУ [Moscow university press], 1960; Б.Н. Миронов [B.N. Mironov], *Преступность в России в XIX – начале XX века* [Crime in Russia in the XIX – beginning of the XX century], Отечественная история [National history], 1998, № 1, с. 24–42 [p. 24-42].

cultural changes in the country's life. Under the prism of deviant behaviour, these changes appear under a new angle. A 70-year period of the communist regime in Russia, especially in the first decades, was accompanied by a certain return to the past pre-reform period. The "serfdom" in fact in specific form has been revived in villages. Certain parallels can be seen with regard to the situation in Russian society at the boundary of XIX - XX centuries and at the beginning of the XXI century. All the above together makes the topic of this work relevant.

Law and wrongdoing

The question of the peasant crime, particular women's, is quite complex, which is due to several factors: the existence of two different systems of legal relations in the post-reform Russia - customary law and formal law; features of the peasant vision and psychology; the dynamics of the formal provisions of the legislation that changed the views on criminal activities including the legalisation of some. Before proceeding to female criminality, it will be appropriate to give a brief description of law within peasants' environment.

Peasants' legal awareness was significantly determined by customary law. The customary law was informal, imprescriptible set of rules based on customs, which were sanctioned by the state. The customary law was intended to regulate economic and agrarian areas, family and some criminal issues, and defined many moral and ethical aspects of the community members' behaviour.

Customary law, due to local traditions and peculiarity, was quite variable. Customary law was an entire system to include methods of crime investigation (in many cases superstitious), inquiry and punishment, and even methods of crime prevention.³ According to customary law and official legislation approaches to the same phenomena could vary by a number of positions, i.e. ownership right issues.

³ П. И. Астров, [P. I. Astrov], *Об участии сверхъестественной силы в народном судопроизводстве крестьян Елатомского уезда Тамбовской губернии* [*Supernatural power's role in peasant public proceedings in Elatamosk county Tambov province*], Труды этнографического отдела ИОЛЕАЭ. Сборник сведений для изучения быта крестьянского населения России (обычное право, обряды, верования и пр.) [Proceedings of the Ethnographic Department OLEAE. Collection of information to study the life of the peasant population of Russia (customary law, rituals, beliefs and so on)], вып. I [vol.I], Москва, [Moscow] 1889, с. 51–52 [p. 51-52]; Л.Н. Виноградова [L.N. Vinogradova], *Гадания* [*Divinations*], Славянские древности [Slavic antiquities], том 1 [vol. 1], Москва [Moscow], "Международные отношения" ["International relations"], 1995, с. 483 [p. 483]; С.С. Крюкова [S.S. Kryukova], *Русский крестьянин и вещественный мир его правосудия (вторая половина XIX в.)*, [Russian peasant and

In addition, according to peasants' legal awareness land, forest, etc., i.e. anything created by nature, are not usually recognized as someone else's property, so infringement on natural resources was treated very leniently⁴: "God grew forests"⁵. The peasant community has not always distinguished crime from sin⁶. To clarify, people understood sin as a violation of Christian morality and law,

the real world of his justice (the second half of XIX century.), Этнографическое обозрение [Ethnographic Review], 2012, № 3, с. 143 [p. 143]; В. Антипов [V. Antipov], [Суеверные средства, употребляемые крестьянами для открытия преступлений и преступников] [Superstitious methods used by peasants for crime investigation and criminal detection], Живая старина [Living antiquity], 1905, вып. 3–4 [vol. 3-4], с. 552-555 [p. 552-555]; В.В. Тенишев [V.V. Tenishev], *Правосудие в русском крестьянском быту* [Justice in the Russian peasant life], СПб., 1907 [SPb.], с. 152, 156-159 [p. 152, 156-159], *Русские крестьяне. Жизнь. Быт. Нравы* [Russian peasants. Their everyday life and morals], том 7 [vol. 7], "Новгородская губерния" ["Novgorod province], часть 3 [part 3], "Череповецкий уезд" ["Tcherepovets uезд"], СПб. [SPb.], ООО «Навигатор» ["Navigator" LTD.], 2009, с. 29 [p. 29].

⁴ А.С. Белогриц-Котляревский [A.S. Belogrits-Kotljarevskij], *Творческая сила обычая в уголовном праве* [The creative power of custom in criminal law], Ярославль [Jaroslavl'], 1890, с. 29 [p. 29]; *Русские крестьяне. Жизнь. Быт. Нравы* [Russian peasants. Their everyday life and morals], том 2 [vol. 2], "Ярославская губерния" ["Jaroslavl' province"], часть 1 [part 1], "Пошехонский уезд" ["Poshekhoskij uезд"], СПб. [SPb.], ООО «Навигатор» ["Navigator" LTD.], 2006, с. 45 [p. 45], 48; *Ibid.*, том 2 [vol. 2], часть 2 [part 2], СПб. [SPb.], ООО «Навигатор» ["Navigator" LTD.], 2006, с. 268 [p. 268]; *Ibid.*, том 3 [vol. 3], "Калужская губерния" ["Kaluga province"], СПб. [SPb.], изд-во «Деловая полиграфия» ["Delovaja poligraphia" press], 2005, с. 36, 349 [p. 36, 349]; *Быт великорусских крестьян-землепашцев. Описание материалов этнографического бюро князя В.Н. Тенишева. (На примере Владимирской губернии)* [The everyday life of great-peasant cultivators. Description of materials of the Prince V.N. Tenishev ethnographic office (based on an example of the Vladimir Province)], СПб. [SPb.], Изд-во Европейского дома [Evropejskij dom press], 1993, с. 59 [p. 59].

⁵ *Русские крестьяне. Жизнь. Быт. Нравы* [Russian peasants. Their everyday life and morals], том 3 [vol.3], с. 29 [p. 29].

⁶ *Русские крестьяне. Жизнь. Быт. Нравы* [Russian peasants. Their everyday life and morals], том 1 [vol.1], "Костромская и Тверская губернии" ["Kostroma and Tver' provinces], СПб. [SPb.] изд-во «Деловая полиграфия» ["Delovaja poligraphia" press], 2004, с. 420 [p. 420]; *Ibid.*, том 2 [vol. 2], часть 1 [part 1], с. 46, 48, 561 [p. 46, 48, 561]; *Ibid.*, том 2 [vol. 2], часть 2 [part 2], с. 268 [p. 268]; *Ibid.*, том 3 [vol. 3], с. 219, 349 [p. 219, 349]; *Быт великорусских крестьян-землепашцев* [The everyday life of great-peasant cultivators], с. 58 [p.58]; А.А. Титов [A.A. Titov], *Юридические обычаи села Никола-Перевоз Сулотской волости, Ростовского уезда* [Legal customs of the Nikola-Perevoz village of Sulotskoy parish, Rostov Uезд], Ярославль [Jaroslavl'], 1888, с. 93-94 [p. 93-94].

for which the offender is punished by the will of God in this or in the "other world", a higher power can punish with death, disease, paralysis or natural disasters⁷.

Customary and official laws very clearly differ on the issue of female seduction with a promise to marry her. According to the official legislation such an offence was a criminal act, which could have led to from 16 months to two year imprisonment; if a child was born, the father was accountable for it (Articles 1531, 50)⁸. On the other hand, picking up berries before the designated date could be qualified as a serious crime and entail a severe punishment. For example, in the village Hlebaeva (Cherepovets district, Novgorod province) the committee has authorised the timeframe of 25-27 August for picking up cowberries. A widow Drosida Anisimova has violated this regulation and a decision for punishment was made. The widow was made to walk along the streets stripped naked, with a basket of confiscated berries hung around her neck while the villagers were shouting, laughing, singing and banging into pans, pots, etc. After this poor woman's ordeal she was sick for a few days, but did not dare to complain to anyone⁹. The reason for such cruelty shall be seen in the fact that material interests of the entire village were affected as peasants garnered cowberries for the winter, and for some of them it was the subject of trade.

One of the main points of peasants' vision with regard to the issues we consider is their attitude to deception and fraud. False measurements, wrong weight and other deceptions in trade were not considered as criminal acts and were treated as a blessing, smartness and resourcefulness, in accordance with the well-known saying: "That's why the pike is in the sea so the carp stays awake", "If you do not cheat - it won't be sold"¹⁰. The creativity was amazing. Before selling dried mushrooms they were put in a damp place so their weight can be increased by 10-20%. Salt was dissolved in the middle of a butter piece and it wouldn't look any different from proper butter. This trick will add up to 30 % more weight to it.

⁷ Н.И. Толстой [N.I. Tolstoj], *Грех [Sin]*, Славянские древности [Slavic antiquities], том 1 [vol.1], Москва [Moscow], «Международные отношения» ["International relationships"], 1995, с. 544-545 [p. 544-545].

⁸ *Уложение о наказаниях уголовных и исправительных* [The order for Penal code], СПб. [SPb.], 1892, с. 612, 52 [p. 612, 52].

⁹ *Русские крестьяне. Жизнь. Быт. Нравы* [Russian peasants. Their everyday life and morals], том 7 [vol. 7], часть 3 [part 3], с. 32 [p. 32].

¹⁰ *Русские крестьяне. Жизнь. Быт. Нравы* [Russian peasants. Their everyday life and morals], том 2 [vol.2], часть 1 [part 1], с. 45 [p. 45]; *Ibid.*, том 2 [vol. 2], часть 2 [part 2], с. 270 [p. 270]; *Ibid.*, том 3 [vol. 3], с. 349 [p. 349]; *Ibid.*, том 7 [vol. 7], часть 2 [part 2], "Череповецкий уезд" ["Tcherepovets uezd"], СПб. [SPb.], ООО «Навигатор» ["Navigator LTD"], 2009, с. 621 [p. 621]; *Быт [Everyday life]*, с. 59 [p. 59].

In winter butter can be white so it was mixed with mashed potatoes. In the spring when butter becomes more yellowish, it was mixed with carrots. Some women did not hesitate to put a piece of rock in the middle of a large butter piece¹¹.

In the chronicle of one of the parish courts in Cherepovets district Novgorod province a case was recorded when a female peasant sold the same cow to three different people: she has got a deposit from two people and sold the cow to the third one. As it has happened without witnesses she was not punished¹².

There was a trend in peasants' legal awareness that a person would only be considered dishonoured if a case became known to the authorities and have been brought to a trial and punishment. The word "prisoner" was abusive, imprisonment lead to reproach for many years¹³. In 1895 in a village in the Demyansk district of Novgorod province peasants stole a few dozen bags of flour and almost all of the villagers were involved. Many of them managed to hide the stolen goods and only three were brought to justice and were sentenced to a few months in prison. According to public opinion of the villagers only these three punished have "lost honour" and were called fools, thieves and prisoners¹⁴.

The crime rate issue is very complicated. According to B. N. Mironov the crime rate is a rather theoretical concept as the total number of crimes committed has never been known exactly¹⁵. This situation was complicated for peasants due to the existence of two systems of law and unique features of peasant life which would directly affect their law awareness. Among them was uncertainty in the understanding of a permissible level with regard to domestic violence. "Teaching" of a wife and jealousy sometimes reached the level of extreme violence, accompanied by injuries, but according to peasants' vision could only qualify as a minor sin. Therefore, the data of criminal statistics, which can only be approximate, give an additional degree of freedom with regard to peasants' crime.

According to crime statistics, the number of recorded crimes for the period

¹¹ *Русские крестьяне. Жизнь. Быт. Нравы* [Russian peasants. Their everyday life and morals], том 7 [vol. 7], часть 2 [part 2], с. 167 [p. 167].

¹² *Русские крестьяне. Жизнь. Быт. Нравы* [Russian peasants. Their everyday life and morals], том 7 [vol. 7], часть 2 [part 2], с. 113 [p. 113].

¹³ *Русские крестьяне. Жизнь. Быт. Нравы* [Russian peasants. Their everyday life and morals], том 7 [vol. 7], часть 1 [part 1], "Белозерский, Боровичский, Демянский, Кирилловский и Новгородский уезды" ["Beloziorsk, Borovichi, Dem'jansk, Kirillov and Novgorod uezd"], СПб.[SPb.], ООО «Навигатор» ["Navigator LTD"], 2011, с. 87 [p. 87].

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, с. 399-400 [p. 399-400].

¹⁵ Б.Н. Миронов [B.N. Mironov], *Преступность в России в XIX – начале XX века* [Crime in Russia in the XIX – beginning of the XX century], Отечественная история [National history], 1998, № 1, с. 25 [p. 25].

from 1803-1808 until 1911-1913 has increased almost by 12 times, while the population of the country has only increased by 2.9 times. It should be considered that the level of minor crime is underestimated mainly due to underreporting of offenses¹⁶. In 1900 the total number of criminal cases has increased by 48% comparing to 1884, while the country's population growth was 24-25%.

If we look at the individual regions of Russia, the crime rate in Moscow industrial area has increased by 23%, in the centre of Chernozem'e by 22%, in St. Petersburg region by 17%, in Volga-Kama region by 14%. In all these areas, the population growth was left behind the crime increase¹⁷. Since the peasantry emancipation the crime rate was increasing. The patriarchal system deformation led to a weakening of traditional ties and established relationships. The deviant behaviour has been paradoxically acted in conjunction with the old rules, attitudes and superstitions. Realising of self-respect, the willingness to be free from the control of seniors led to the minor crime increase, including youth and women.

But the main factor in the crime growth in the post-reform period was a release of large numbers of people from serfdom. There were more opportunities for private initiatives and enterprise, which broadened the scope of what is permitted and promoted the development of deviant behaviour, including the ones of a criminal nature. An important factor in the crime growth among peasants in the late XIX - early XX century was a deformation of the peasant community, which led to the disintegration of community and the control weakening over its members. There was more freedom for unpunished and uncontrolled acts, deviant behaviour, including crime, was less constrained. The increased chances of being unpunished have provoked the violation of common and traditional social arrangements¹⁸. The transitional nature of post-reform villages led to the destabilization of the established norms, the weakening of the patriarchal system foundations which led to the crime increase¹⁹.

¹⁶ Ibid., с. 27, 30 [p. 27, 30].

¹⁷ М.Н. Гернет [M.N.Gernet], *Общественные причины преступности* [Social causes of crime], М.Н. Гернет [M.N. Gernet]. Избранные произведения [Selected works], Москва [Moscow], Юридическая литература [Yuridicheskaja literature], 1974, с. 43 [p. 43].

¹⁸ Б.Н. Миронов [B.N. Mironov], *Преступность в России в XIX – начале XX века*, [Crime in Russia in the XIX – beginning of the XX century], с. 27, 30, 38 [p.27,30,38]; Б.Н. Миронов [B.N.Mironov], *Социальная история России* [Social history of Russia], 2-е изд. [Second edition], испр. [corr.], СПб. [SPb.], изд-во «Дмитрий Булавин» [“Dmitrij Bulanin” press], 2000, том 2 [vol. 2], с. 96 [p. 96].

¹⁹ *Библиография* [Bibliography], *Этнографическое обозрение* [Ethnographic Review], 1889, № 1, с. 143-144 [p. 143-144]; М. Ратов [M. Ratov], *Женщина перед судом*

Women who kill: from pretexts to blames and victims

Women's crime was aggravated by women not having freedom and rights, which were additional factors for crime acts within peasants' society, including the serious ones. Desperate wives were killing or attempting to kill their spouses²⁰. Murders of spouses were often results of those girls were often getting married at a very young age and their feelings were not taken into consideration²¹. A son found out his father's adultery, had murdered him with his mother being his accomplice; one brother-in-law strangled another brother-in-law following on his wife's request and they carried the dead body together outside the village; a sister stabbed her own sister at night because she was informing about her immoral life²². A woman would kill her sick husband so she does not need to take care of him and feed an extra mouth²³.

Women being physically weaker than men and their lifestyle (housework, cooking) - predetermined the means of committing murders. If men murdering somebody would usually punch in the head, hit with an axe, strangle, then women would use their brain instead of physical force. The crime was planned in advance and poisoning with arsenic, sublimate or some poisonous herbs can be a chosen method²⁴. A convenient way of killing a husband was so-called steaming. Not all

присяжных (мысли и факты) [A woman in front of a jury (thoughts and facts)], Москва [Moscow], 1899, с. 17 [p. 17].

²⁰ Л. Весин [L. Vesin], *Современный великорус в его свадебных обычаях и семейной жизни* [Modern Russian wedding traditions and family life], Русская мысль [Russian thought], 1891, № 10, с. 51 [p. 1]; М.Я. Капустин М.Я.Капустин], *Задачи гигиены в сельской России* [Problems of hygiene in rural Russia], Русская мысль [Russian thought], 1902, № 5, с. 11 [p. 11].

²¹ П.Н. Тарновская [P.N. Tarnovskaja], *Женщины-убийцы* [Female murderers], СПб. [SPb.], 1902, с. 1-3, 94, 95 [p. 1-3, 94, 95].

²² С. Максимов [S. Maksimov], *Народные преступления и несчастья* [National crime and misfortune], Отечественные записки [Fatherland notes], 1869, № 1, с. 50-51 [p. 50-51].

²³ П.Н. Тарновская [P.N.Tarnovskaja], *Женщины-убийцы* [Female murderers], с. 98 [p. 98].

²⁴ М.Н. Гернет [M.N.Gernet], *Преступление и борьба с ним в связи с эволюцией общества* [The crime and the fight against it in connection with the evolution of society], М.Н. Гернет [M.N.Gernet]. Избран. произведения [Selected works], с. 255, 286 [p. 255,286]; П.Н. Тарновская [P.N. Tarnovskaja], *Женщины-убийцы* [Female murderers], с. 194 [p. 194]; *Курские губернские ведомости* [Kursk province gazette], 1895, № 1; С. Максимов [S. Maksimov], *Народные преступления и несчастья* [National crime and misfortune], Отечественные записки [Fatherland notes], 1869, № 1, с. 50-51 [p. 50-51]; *Русские крестьяне. Жизнь. Быт. Нравы* [Russian peasants. Their everyday life and morals], том 7 [vol. 7], часть 2 [part 2], с. 349 [p. 349].

peasants were using bath houses, instead they were frequently washing themselves in home furnaces. When the husband climbed into the furnace, the wife could close the chimney, put something against it and go to a neighbour. On return the wife would have opened the furnace and screamed: the husband steamed himself to death while she was at the neighbour's. To prove such a crime has been extremely difficult²⁵.

The crime motivation could be resulted in peasants supporting holiness and indissolubility of marriage, and the extreme difficulty of divorce²⁶. The female crime researcher K.V. Davydov wrote in 1906 that the number of spouse murders in peasants' society can be reduced by making a divorce process more simple, by letting young girls to get married only when they reach their sexual maturity, by the equation of husband's and wife's rights and by cancelling any restrictions on freedom of movement²⁷.

Victims of women crime were also other family members²⁸. For example, mother-in-law poisoned her daughter-in-law – the younger son's wife. The daughter-in-law came from a poor family, was pretty, adored by her husband, but was obstinate. Six months after the wedding her relationship with the mother-in-law became extremely aggravating, which has led to the tragedy²⁹. There were also murders due to financial reasons, but they were not only specific to peasant society, and a woman has often acted only as an accomplice³⁰.

Under Russian law, an infanticide was a serious offence. For the intentional murder of the child the guilty woman would have lost all her property rights and sentenced to compulsory hard labour (Article 31, 1450, 1451, 1460)³¹. Leaving a new-

²⁵ А.В. Балов [A.V. Balov], *Санитарные недочеты нашей деревни* [Sanitary limitations of our village], Русская мысль [Russian thought], 1903, № 1, с. 21 [p. 21].

²⁶ А.А. Титов [A.A. Titov], *Юридические обычаи...* [Legal custom...], с. 101 [p. 101]; П.Н. Тарновская [P.N. Tarnovskaja], *Женщины-убийцы* [Female murderers], с. 110-111, 180-182 [p. 110-111, 180-182]; Д. Бобров [D. Bobrov], *По поводу бабьих стонов* [About moaning women], Юридический вестник [Legal herald], 1885, № 10, с. 321-322 [p. 321-322].

²⁷ К.В. Давыдов [K.V. Davydov], *Женщина перед уголовным судом* [Woman facing the criminal court], Москва [Moscow], 1906, с. 35 [p. 35].

²⁸ Российский государственный исторический архив [Russian State Historical Archive], (hereafter РГИА), фонд 1405 [fund 1405], оп. 108 [inventory 108], ед.хр. 5678, 8460 [storage units 5678, 8460].

²⁹ П.Н. Тарновская [P.N. Tarnovskaja], *Женщины-убийцы* [Female murderers], с. 140-142 [p. 140-142].

³⁰ *Ibid.*, с. 106-108, 119 [p. 106-108, 119].

³¹ *Уложение о наказаниях уголовных и исправительных* [The order for Penal code], с. 47, 567, 572, 573 [p.47, 567, 572, 573].

born child without care, which would have caused his death, was also counted as infanticide. In this case a punishment under the criminal law would be considered³².

Among the reasons for infanticide defendants in the first instance would blame being feared and ashamed by their parents, relatives and villagers³³. A grandmother could urge her unmarried grand-daughter to commit an infanticide wishing to protect her from being ashamed, disgraced, scorned by neighbours and from troubles of having unwanted offspring³⁴. Traditional cultural stereotypes with regard to behaviour norms in intimate relationships were deeply enrooted in the minds of Russian peasants. The horror feelings that would overwhelm guilty persons, because they could expect shameful punishment such as being publically stripped naked for a joy of others, having their house gates covered in tar, etc., can be easily imagined. Economic issues played an important role as it was extremely difficult to get a job having a baby. Among the reasons of committing a crime guilty people would indicate their confidence of a stillborn child birth, amnesia, unconsciousness³⁵. However, such motives were not credible from the medical point of view³⁶.

If in pre-reform Russia infanticides were relatively uncommon³⁷, after serfdom abolition the number of infanticide crimes has gone up³⁸. Available

³² Ibid., с. 572-573 [p. 572-573].

³³ Государственный архив Курской области [State Archive of the Kursk Region] (hereafter – ГАКО) , фонд 32 [fund 32], оп. 1 [inventory 1], д. 2043, 2051 [file 2043,2051], л. 3 [p. 3]; д. 3147 [file 3147], л. 62 [p. 62]; С. Бородаевский [S. Borodaevskij], *Незаконнорожденные в крестьянской среде* [Illegitimate children in peasant society], Русское богатство [Russian wealth], 1898, № 10.

³⁴ П.Н. Тарновская [P.N. Tarnovskaja], *Женщины-убийцы* [Female murderers], с. 171-172 [p.171-172].

³⁵ ГАКО [ГАКО], фонд 32 [fund 32], оп. 1[inventory 1], д. 3147[file 3147].

³⁶ В. Линденберг [V. Lindenberg], *Материалы к вопросу детоубийств и плодизгнания в Витебской губернии (по данным Витебского Окрусного Суда за десять лет, 1897-1906. Диссертация на степень доктора медицины* [Materials about infanticide problem and abortions in Vitebsk province (according to the Vitebsk District Court for ten years 1897-1906). Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Medicine], Юрьев [Yur'ev], 1910, с. 37-38 [p. 37-38]; М.Н. Гернет [M.N.Gernet], *Детоубийство. Социологическое и сравнительно-юридическое исследование* [Infanticide. Sociological and comparative legal study], Москва [Moscow], 1911, с. 117, 120-121 [p. 117, 120-121].

³⁷ Б.Н. Миронов [B.N.Mironov], *Социальная история России* [Social history of Russia], том 1 [vol. 1], с. 201 [p. 201].

³⁸ А. Любавский [A. Lyubavskij], *О детоубийстве* [Infanticide], Юридический вестник [Legal herald], 1863, вып. 37 [vol. 37], № 7, с. 21-22 [p. 21-22]; Н. Таганцев [N. Tagantsev], *О детоубийстве: Опыт комментария 2 ч. 1451 и 1 ч. 1460 ст. Уложения о наказаниях* [Infanticide: Previous comments 2 part of clause 1451 и 1

statistics on infanticide is far from being accurate, but it allows to draw some conclusions. The vast majority of found guilty in committing infanticide mothers were unmarried women - up to 92% depending on the area, up to 75% were younger than 26 years of age, more than 59% who had their first child, over 83% of those who belonged to peasant society, over 90% of poor and 96% out of illiterate women³⁹, there were about 80% of peasant women prosecuted for infanticide⁴⁰.

These data are in line with "Summary of Russian Criminal Statistics" for 1874-1894: among the convicted of infanticide, the number of unmarried women was almost 10 times higher than married⁴¹. There were 73.6% of unmarried women, 16.8% of married women and 9.6% of widows among those convicted of infanticide in the 1897-1906. This is very different from the categorisation of convicts by marital status done by district courts for all crimes: 42.2% of unmarried women, 46.6% of married women, 12.9% of widows and 0.3% of divorced⁴². District courts were trying to discharge women and replace severe sentences by more lenient ones in cases of infanticide, taking into account inexperience of young girls having their first child, their mental imbalance, shame and fear of relatives, poverty and being cheated up by men⁴³.

If the traditional place of legitimate births were a house or sauna or it could have unexpectedly happened while working in the field or forest, the illegitimate child could also be born in a stable, barn, porch, attic, restroom, on the river or

part of clause 1460. The order for Penal code], Журнал Министерства юстиции [Journal of the Ministry of Justice], 1868, том 36 [vol. 36], с. 260 [p. 260]; И.Я. Фойницкий [I.Я. Fojienitskij], *Женщина-преступница* [Female criminal], Северный вестник [Northern herald], 1893, № 2, с. 133 [p. 133]; *Ibid.*, № 3, с. 115 [p. 115].

³⁹ В. Линденберг [V. Lindenberg], *Материалы к вопросу детоубийств и плодоизгнания...* [Materials about infanticide problem and abortions], с. 53-54 [p. 53-54].

⁴⁰ С.С. Остроумов [S.S.Ostroumov], *Преступность и ее причины в дореволюционной России* [Crime and its causes in the pre-reformed Russia], с. 54 [p. 54].

⁴¹ *Итоги русской уголовной статистики за 20 лет (1874-1894)* [Results of the Russian criminal statistics for 20 years: (1874-1894)], СПб. [SPb.], 1899, с. 157 [p. 157].

⁴² М.Н. Гернет [M.N.Gernet], *Детоубийство. Социологическое и сравнительно-юридическое исследование* [Infanticide. Sociological and comparative legal study], с. 117, 120-121, 154, 156 [p. 117, 120-121, 154, 156].

⁴³ К.В. Давыдов [K.V. Davjydov], *Женщина перед уголовным судом* [Woman facing the criminal court], с. 38-39 [p. 38-39]; Д. Михель, И. Михель [D. Mikhel, I. Mikhel], *Инфантицид глазами образованного российского общества второй половины XIX начала XX в.* [Infanticide from the point of view of educated Russian society in the second part of the XIX – first part of the XX century], *Бытовое насилие в истории российской повседневности (XI–XXI вв.)* [Domestic violence in the history of Russian everyday life (XI-XXI centuries)], СПб. [SPb.], изд-во Европейского ун-та в Санкт-Петербурге [edition of the European University Press in St. Petersburg], 2012, с. 120 [p. 120].

lake banks, on the road in the snow, etc. Places of hiding of the child's dead body have also varied widely: a barn, shed, garden, restroom, forest, cemetery, field, river, marsh or the dead body could be taken to the lover⁴⁴. Infanticide could have been committed not only by women who gave birth to a child, but also by their mothers and women who were doing business on it. A great number of infanticide examples are given in P.N. Tarnovskaya's book⁴⁵.

Another common female crime was arson⁴⁶. This way they were trying to free their anger, retaliated against their husband's cruelty or affairs of their lovers. They would set on fire houses of their rivals, husbands, grooms, who did not keep their promises given; deceived bride would set fire to the house of the happily married woman. Unlike women, men would have not consider such a crime, and if it was not because of the boys accounted for most of the male imprisonment for arson, this type of crime could be exclusively considered a female one⁴⁷. In the archives there are a large number of cases of arson committed by peasant women⁴⁸. There are numbers of arsons examples committed by young peasant girls⁴⁹.

Crime, gender and statistics

According to the criminal statistics peasant women were accounted for nearly 3/4 of all poisonings, murders, arsons and other serious crimes committed by women of all classes⁵⁰. If we compare the data on male and female crime, depending on age, crime numbers committed by 14-21 year old women were

⁴⁴ В. Линденберг [V. Lindenberg], *Материалы к вопросу детоубийств и плодизгнани...* [Materials about infanticide problem and abortions], с. 29-31 [p. 29-31].

⁴⁵ П.Н. Тарновская [P.N. Tarnovskaja], *Женщины-убийцы* [Female murderers].

⁴⁶ См., например [See for example], *Нижегородские губернские ведомости* [Nizhny Novgorod Provincial Gazette], 1880, № 40; *Ibid.*, 1892, № 19, с. 5 [p. 5]; *Yaroslavl' Provincial Gazette*, 1880, № 38.

⁴⁷ С. Максимов [S. Maksimov], *Народные преступления и несчастья* [National crime and misfortune], 1869, № 3, с. 115 [p. 115]; *Нижегородские губернские ведомости* [Nizhny Novgorod Provincial Gazette], 1880, № 3, с. 20 [p. 20]; *Ibid.*, № 44, с. 37 [p. 37].

⁴⁸ РГИА [RGIA], фонд 1405 [fund 1405], оп. 108 [inventory 108], ед. хр. 3161, 7236, 7572, 7976, 10141 и др. [storage units 3161, 7236, 7572, 7976, 10141 and other]; ГАКО [GAKO], фонд 32 [fund 32], оп. 1[inventory 1] , д. 150, 308, 310, 2054, 2382 [file150, 308, 310, 2054, 2382 and other].

⁴⁹ РГИА [RGIA], фонд 1405 [fund 1405], оп. 108 [inventory 108], д. 7825 [file 7825]; *Нижегородские губернские ведомости* [Nizhny Novgorod Provincial Gazette], 1883, № 42, с. 325 [p. 325].

⁵⁰ И.Я. Фойницкий [I.Ja. Fojienitskij], *Женщина-преступница* [Female criminal], *Северный вестник* [Northern herald], 1893, № 3, с. 132-133 [p. 132-133].

higher; men had a higher crime rate for the age group 21-40, and again in the group of 40 years plus women's crime rate was prevailing. There were surprisingly high levels of arsons among young girls under 14 years (8.1% of the total number of female offenders), while boys of the same age were accounted for 4.1% of all male offenders. A number of girls and boys involved in fraud were also quite different (1.3% and 0.1% respectfully)⁵¹.

At the age of 14 to 21 years, the ratio between male and female crime varied depending on the type of crime. A number of men found guilty in murder of their own parents were higher than a number women charged for the same crime - 32.2% and 22.2% respectfully. There was a low involvement of women of the above age found guilty for fraud (4.1%), insulting the authorities (4.6%), adultery (6.5%). A number of men and women involved in some crimes was similar: attempted murder (women - 35.5%, men - 31.3%), theft (15.7% and 11.5% respectfully).

Women were prevailing in committing some of the crimes: crimes against morality (women - 35.8%, men - 10.8%), the murder of spouses and relatives (25.3% and 14.1%), poisoning (19.3% and 13.7%), incest (16.7% and 3.7%). A number of female crimes were accounted to theft (29.9%). The dynamics of crime varied depending on age. 21-25 year old women would be responsible for the most crimes against morality, infanticide, murder of spouses and relatives.

The mature women level of crime was getting down but there were still quite a few cases of different types of murders, injuries, adultery, and incest. The age of 35-40 years had the maximum accountability for theft and fraud, the age of 40-45 years – for religious offenses, theft and arson. Infanticide, adultery and incest were less frequent; while men reached their maximum scores for incest's which were prevailing until old age.

After 45 years of age (up to the very old age) women's prevailing crimes were the ones based on emotional outbursts – authority insults, murders, poisoning, physical injuries, arsons and religious crimes⁵². Going to work away without a passport, and vagrancy, which according to the official legislation were criminal acts are not considered in this article. We also need to take into account that the official legislation related to such actions was gradually changing towards easing.

Emancipation led to the orientation value changes among peasants. The whole atmosphere of life in the post-reform period was full of ideas of enrichment and materialistic well-being. The crime rate was directly linked to the economic situation of the peasantry. Price increase years 1881-1882, 1893, 1907 as well as price decrease years - 1883, 1888, 1894, 1895, 1900-1901 were followed by the

⁵¹ Ibid., c. 135 [p. 135].

⁵² Ibid., c. 135-136 [p. 135-136].

corresponding changes in crime rates. The highest crime rate was in 'hungry' 1891 and 1892. There has been a clear correlation between the years of crop failure and crime raise in Moscow Province. In 33 provinces of European Russia thefts were directly dependent on grain prices⁵³.

The ideology of the post-reform period was the wish to get rich but to get rich quickly, and be out of poverty and misery. The complexity of those times was that traditional patriarchal settings and impacts of modernisation processes were mixing together. The traditional way of life was responsible for the lack of freedom, inequality, oppression of women, and extreme intolerance of public opinion in violation of established rules by women.

In the post-reform period traditional community and family relations were deformed. In this regard, in order to maintain law and order the role of the state has been inevitable increased. On the other hand, social movements have been increasingly activated, their activities were aimed the liberalisation of life that should had a positive impact on the crime reduction: the legalisation of abortion, the simplification of divorce procedures, etc.

Modernisation processes, like any dramatic changes, were extremely hard to perceive, they led to the destruction of the traditional lifestyle, moral and ethical standards as well as dramatically exacerbated economic issues.

Conclusions

Women were particularly vulnerable, and the negative features of the post-reform period affected them quite badly, leading them to extreme. Such factors of peasant life as poverty, social turmoil, a big amount of cultural changes and a marginal state of the majority of peasant women have created a fertile ground for criminal phenomenon. A peasant woman appeared under a different and unexpected angle. She is now not only a right less, humble and uneducated creature. A peasant woman could have had a different face – she could be a cruel criminal, predator and fraudster, she could be unexpectedly intelligent and inventive in planning, committing and concealing of crimes. A peasant woman could have inspired and provoked men to a crime commitment, sometimes staying aside herself; she could put all her passion towards criminal acts. She could have murdered her own child either with tears and a heavy heart or deliberately and staying cool.

⁵³ М.Н. Гернет [M.N. Gernet], *Преступление и борьба с ним в связи с эволюцией общества* [The crime and the fight against it in connection with the evolution of society], с. 274-275 [p. 274-275].

**EXTRALINGUISTISCHE ERSCHEINUNGSVORAUSSETZUNGEN
DER METHODIK DES DEUTSCHUNTERRICHTS IN DER BUKOWINA
(ZWEITE HÄLFTE des XIX Jhs.)**

**THE EXTRALINGUISTIC PRECONDITIONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE GERMAN LANGUAGE TEACHING METHODS IN BUKOVINA
(THE SECOND HALF OF THE XIX CENTURY)**

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Rezumat: *Premisele extralingvistice ale constituirii metodicii predării limbii germane în Bucovina (în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea)*

În articol sunt analizate premisele extralingvistice ale constituirii metodicii predării limbii germane în Bucovina (în a doua jumătate a secolului al XIX-lea). Sunt analizate o serie de lucrări științifice în care se fac în mod indirect referiri la problema studiată. Sunt evidențiate premisele administrativ-teritoriale, național-etnice și educativ-organizaționale ale metodicii predării limbii germane. Autorul trece în revistă o serie de legi generale adoptate în perioada austriacă și care au contribuit la îmbunătățirea cadrului legislativ și la formarea sistemului educațional în Austro-Ungaria în general și în Bucovina în special. S-a demonstrat că, în perioada studiată, limba germană avea statutul unei limbi regionale dominante, iar principiile, metodele, mijloacele didactice aplicate în cazul vorbitorilor de limbă română sau limbă ucraineană erau cele specifice predării limbilor străine.

Abstract: *In this article the extralinguistic preconditions of the establishment of the German language teaching methods in Bukovina (second half of the XIX century) have been studied. The scientific researches that indirectly related to the study subject have been analyzed. It has been delineated the local, national, ethnic, educational, organizational preconditions of the German language teaching methods. The author described numerous enacted general Austrian laws, which enabled improvement of the legal framework and the formation of the educational system in Austria-Hungary in general and Bukovina in particular. It has been proved that German language was dominant regional language within the studied period of time and the approaches, principles, methods and means of teaching for the Ukrainian and Romanian people were the same as ones used in the foreign language teaching.*

Résumé: *Les prémisses extralinguistiques de la constitution de la méthodique de l'enseignement de la langue allemande en Bucovine (pendant la seconde moitié du XIX-ème siècle)*

L'article examine le fond extralinguistique de l'apparition des méthodes de l'apprentissage de la langue allemande sur la territoire de Bucovine (seconde moitié du XIX siècle). On a analysé les travaux scientifiques qui concernent indirectement l'étude de la problématique. On a défini les conditions de fonds administratives et territoriales, ethniques et nationales de l'éducation et de l'organisation des conditions de fond de la méthodologie de l'apprentissage de la langue allemande. L'auteur présente un certain nombre des lois générales autrichiens qui ont été adoptées et qui ont contribué à l'amélioration du cadre juridique et de la formation du système de l'éducation en Autriche-Hongrie en général, et sur la territoire de Bucovine en particulier. On a prouvé que la langue allemande dans la période étudiée a été considérée comme la langue de bord, et les approches, les principes, les méthodes, les outils de formation pour la population parlant la langue ukrainienne et la langue roumaine ont été utilisées comme pour la langue étrangère.

Keywords: *the development of teaching methods, German language, preconditions, general Austrian laws.*

Einführung

Wenn man die Geschichte einer methodischen Richtung betrachtet, ist es vor allem geboten, sich in den extralinguistischen Kontext, in dem sie entsteht und sich entwickelt, zu vertiefen. Dabei muss man nicht nur historische, soziale, politische Faktoren, sondern auch administrativ-territoriale, national-ethnische, bildungs-organisatorische Entwicklungsvoraussetzungen der Methodik des Deutschunterrichts (MDU) berücksichtigen.

Die aktuelle Erkenntnis von der Rolle und Bedeutung der Methodik des Deutschunterrichtes (MDU) in der Bukowina um die Jahrhundertwende bildet einen organischen Bestandteil der Globalisierungstheorie als eine Erweiterung und Vertiefung von historischen Hintergründen und berücksichtigt gleichzeitig die parallel laufenden Differenzierungs- und Regionalisierungsprozesse sowie den Multikulturalismus. Daher ist die steigende Bedeutung des Regionalismus in allen seinen Erscheinungsformen selbstverständlich. Dabei erscheinen die regionalen Besonderheiten der westukrainischen Gebiete heute nicht als Reste der Vergangenheit, sondern stellen ein vielfältiges Phänomen dar, welches ein Ergebnis des Prozesses der Kulturevolution ist.

Die Geschichtsschreibung des Problem

Die Geschichte der Methodik des Deutschunterrichtes in den westukrainischen Gebieten bis 1918 zu der Habsburgermonarchie gehörenden Gebieten wurde in der sowjetischen Zeit, aber auch in den ukrainischen historischen Wissenschaften, sehr wenig erforscht. Dagegen gab es zahlreiche Studien zur Geschichte der Methodik des Deutschunterrichtes im Russischen Reich. Unter den Standardwerken sind beispielsweise die von I. Rachmanow (1947), W. Rauschenbach (1971), O. Miroljubow (1973), G. Wedel (1979).

Die Methodengeschichte im Deutschunterricht in den westeuropäischen Ländern, Großbritannien und den USA wurde u.a. von W. Mackey (1969), P. Rodgers (1986), J. Richards (1991). Z. Murik (1991), H. Neuner, H. Hunfeld, W. Gülen (alle 1993), L. Braun (2001), S. Bornetto (2005) untersucht.

Die Geschichte des Bildungswesens in Österreich-Ungarn war der Forschungsgegenstand von den österreichischen Wissenschaftler E. Schuster (1979), G. Staudinger (1987), M. Loew (1998), I. Mitterer (1992), J. Rinner (1996), E. Olentchouk (1998).

Die Erneuerung der Konzepte des Fremdsprachenunterrichts, auch des Deutschunterrichts, um die Jahrhundertwende wurde durch mehrere Faktoren bedingt: Soziale Entwicklungen, Wirtschaftswachstum, verstärkte Migrationsprozesse, schnelle Entwicklung anderer Wissenschaften. Die Fremdsprachenkenntnisse wurden notwendig, eine logische Folge der sozialen Nachfrage waren die Professionalisierung von Lehrern, die Verbesserung der technischen Ausstattung für den Fremdsprachenunterrichts sowie die Suche nach den innovativen Sprachvermittlungsmethoden und -ansätzen.

Der retrospektiven Analyse der Bildung in der Bukowina sind solche Werke gewidmet: Monographie von O. I. Penischkewytsch „Rozwytok ukrainskoho shkilnytstva na Bukowyni (XVIII – pochatok XX stolittia)“ [„Die Entwicklung des ukrainischen Schulwesens in der Bukowina (XVIII. – Anfang des XX. Jahrhunderts“) (2002); Monographie von I. W. Zhytariuk „Matematychna osvita i nauka Bukowyny ta Pivnichnoi Besarabii u mizhvoienyny period (1918–1940)“ [„Mathematische Ausbildung und Wissenschaft in der Bukowina und in Nordbessarabien in Zwischenkriegszeit (1918–1940)“] (2008); Doktorarbeiten von L. I. Kobyljanska „Stanovlennia i rozvytok ukrainskykh narodnykh shkil na Bukovyni (70-i roky XVIII – pochatok XX st.)“ [„Die Entstehung und Entwicklung von ukrainischen Volksschulen in der Bukowina (70-er Jahre des XVIII. – Anfang des XX. Jhs.)“] (1998 p.), von I. M. Petriuk „Stanovlennia i rozvytok zagalnoi serednioi osvity na Bukovyni (kinets XVIII – pochatok XX st.)“ [„Die Entstehung

und Entwicklung der Mittelschulbildung in der Bukowina (Ende des XVIII. – Anfang des XX. Jhs.)“] (1998) u.a.

Der allgemein Rahmen

Gesellschaftlich-politische, soziokulturelle Voraussetzungen der Entwicklung des Schulwesens wurden von den Wissenschaftlern präzise beschrieben, das objektive Bild der Entwicklung von Bildungsanstalten und Institutionen in der Bukowina wurde wiedergegeben. In den genannten Werken wurden spezifische Bedingungen gezeigt, die mit dem ständigen Wechsel der Staaten, dessen Bestandteil die Bukowina jeweils war, verbunden ist, das Wesen der Bildungspolitik, die Organisation der Bildungsverwaltung im Betrachtungszeitraum. Ausgewählte historiographische Werke zum Thema unserer Forschung dienten als Quellenmaterial und als Bewertungsorientierung für die Schlussfolgerungen. Jedoch wurde in den Werken von erwähnten Autoren keine retrospektive Analyse der Methodik des Deutschunterrichts in den ukrainischsprachigen Schulen der Bukowina angeführt, da es für sie kein Schlüsselproblem war.

Die Übersicht über die mir zugänglichen vorhandenen Quellen macht deutlich, dass die Entwicklung der Methodik des Deutschunterrichts in den westukrainischen Gebieten bisher kaum erforscht war und eine wissenschaftliche Lücke darstellt. Dies betrifft auch die Bukowina und das Schulwesen in diesem östlichsten Kronland der Donaumonarchie. Die Methodik des Deutschunterrichtes in dem multinationalen Kronland – sei es als die der ersten oder der zweiten Fremdsprache – wurde bisher systematisch und umfassend nicht untersucht.

Die allgemeinen Prämissen und deren Impact

Wir berücksichtigen die genannten Faktoren und stellen uns als **Ziel** die Analyse von administrativ-territorialen, bildungs-organisatorischen Entstehungsvoraussetzungen der Methodik des Deutschunterrichts auf dem genannten Territorium und im gewählten Zeitraum.

Für das bessere Verständnis des Forschungsproblems analysieren wir folgende Entwicklungsvoraussetzungen der MDU.

Administrativ-territoriale Voraussetzungen. Ende des XVIII. Jhs. begann die neue Periode in der Geschichte westukrainischer Länder. Zu dieser Zeit war die Europakarte nach dem geopolitischen Interesse großer Länder wieder verändert. Demnach gehörte Galizien zum multikulturellen Österreichischen Reich nach der

ersten (1772) und dritten (1795) Teilung von Polen, und nach der österreichisch-türkischen Konvention von Konstantinopel (1775) gelang unter die Herrschaft des österreichischen Kaisers die Bukowina. Außerdem gehörte zur Österreichischen Monarchie unter der Herrschaft des Königreichs Ungarn ab dem XVII. Jahrhundert Transkarpatien.

Die Inkorporation der westukrainischen Länder zur Österreichischen Monarchie verursachte Modernisierungsreformen, die alle Lebensbereiche betrafen. Verfassungsgesetze von 1867–1869 vollendeten die Bildung des Regierungssystems in Österreich-Ungarn, das mit geringen Veränderungen bis zu seinem Zerfall gilt.

Die Bukowina wurde in Österreich-Ungarn (Stand 1913) auf solche administrative und Schullandkreise geteilt: Czernowitz als autonome Stadt und Landkreis Czernowitz, Gura Humorului, Kimpolung, Kizman, Radautz, Siret, Storozynetz, Wiznitz, Suceava, Zastawna (gehörte zum Landkreis Kizman), Waschkoutz (gehörte zum Landkreis Wiznitz)¹.

Es ist zu bemerken, dass sich die Zahl der administrativen Landkreise im Laufe der Zeit veränderte, so z.B. in 1903–1905 waren in der Bukowina 10 und bis 1914 schon 11 Landkreise². Ihre Vergrößerung wurde durch Lobbyismus, Bevölkerungswachstum und festgelegte Normen, die eine bestimmte Bevölkerungszahl in einem Landkreis vorschrieben, verursacht.

National-ethnische Voraussetzungen. Nach Angaben der österreichischen Volkszählung 1880 war die ethnische Zusammensetzung der Bevölkerung *der Bukowina* so: 42,16 % Ukrainer, 33,43 % – Rumänen³.

Auf solche Weise bildeten Ukrainer nach Angaben der wiederentdeckten Quellen innerhalb der Forschungsperiode einen wesentlichen Teil der Einwohner der Bukowina.

Bildungs-organisatorische Voraussetzungen. Nachdem wir national-ethnische Voraussetzungen geklärt haben, analysieren wir Direktiven, die Kultur- und Bildungsprozesse auf dem Forschungsterritorium innerhalb der bestimmten chronologischen Grenzen betreffen.

Das Gesetz von 1867 führte eine neue Phase in Bildungsgesetzen ein. Es handelte sich darin um die Gleichheit aller Bürger vor dem Gesetz, um die Bewegungs-, Tätigkeitsfreiheit, um das Recht auf Mobilien und Immobilien, seine

¹ *Statische Nachweisung an der Volksschulen und Lehrerbildungsanstalten. Schematismus der Volksschulen und Lehrer in der Bukovina, Czernowitz, 1913, S. 1.*

² John-Paul Himka, *Galicja and Bukovina. A Research Handbook About Western Ukraine, Late 19th and 20th Centuries*, in "Historic Sites Service Occasional Paper", 1990, № 20, p. 9.

³ *Special Orts-Repetorium der Bukowina, Wien, 1885, S. 26*

Meinungen frei zu äußern, Zeitschriften zu veröffentlichen, seinen Glauben zu bekennen, in seiner Muttersprache zu unterrichten und zu lernen, Anträge zu stellen, sich zu einer Absprache zu versammeln, Gesellschaften, Parteien, andere Vereinigungen zu gründen. Es wurde bezeichnet, dass „alle Nationen des Landes gleich sind, und jede Nation das Recht hat, ihre Nationalität und Sprache zu schützen und zu entwickeln“⁴. Das erlassene Gesetz gab die Möglichkeit, die Kultur zu entwickeln und die Traditionen der ukrainischen Nation zu unterstützen, Schulen für ukrainische Schüler zu eröffnen.

1867 gab es viele Innovationen im Bildungssystem, so wurden in diesem Jahr Landesschulräte (LSR) in Galizien und in der Bukowina gegründet, die die Verwaltung über die Bildungsentwicklung in Kronländern übernahmen. Sie waren dem Ministerium für Religion und Bildung (MfRB) von Österreich-Ungarn untergeordnet. Außer dem Landesschulrat funktionierten auch Kreisschulräte.

LSR war die höchste Institution für Aufsichtsangelegenheiten und Schulverwaltung. LSR waren zuständig für: Tätigkeitskontrolle von Kreis- und lokalen (Gemeinde-) Schulräten (Recht auf Inspektionen), pädagogischen Seminaren; Erlass von Schuldirektoren und -lehrern, die von der Gemeinde unterhalten wurden; Erarbeitung der Lehrplänen, Vorbereitung und Approbation von Lehrwerken sowie ihre Veröffentlichung; Jahresbudgetierung für die Unterstützung von Volks- und Mittelschulen; Berichte über den Zustand von Schul- und öffentlichen Angelegenheiten im Lande. Alle Rechtsdokumente – vor allem Innovationen in Schulprogrammen und Lehrwerken – wurden zuerst von LSR, danach von MfRB von Österreich-Ungarn abgestimmt.

LSR sollte sich einmal pro Monat versammeln, aber sein Vorsitzender konnte den Rat bei Bedarf öfter sammeln. Notfalls erließ der Vorsitzende Verordnungen und bestätigte sie in den nächsten Versammlungen.

Der Inspektor vom LSR war verpflichtet, regelmäßig Schulen zu besuchen; er sollte die Umsetzung von allen Regeln der Organisation und Schultätigkeit überwachen. Darüber berichtete es in den Versammlungen von LSR, schriftliche Erklärungen hinzufügend.

Es ist zu bemerken, dass die Pädagogen von Galizien keine Entscheidung fällen und LSR in separate Sektionen nicht teilen konnten: Ukrainisch und Polnisch, während bukowinische Pädagogen das Recht hatten, selbständig über den Lernprozess in allen Fächern, die auf Ukrainisch unterrichtet wurden, zu entscheiden.

⁴ W. Botushanskyy, O. Dobrżanskyy, *Bukovyna: istoryčnyj narys* [Bukowyna: historische Skizzen]. Czerniwzi: Zelena Bukowyna, 1998. – S. 71

Das Gesetz vom 14. Mai 1869 leitete eine neue Phase in der Bildungsgesetzgebung ein. Die Verwaltung von der Bildung ging von der Kirche zum Staat. Der Staat übernahm die Funktion der Verwaltung und Organisation des Lernprozesses, der Personal- und materiellen Unterstützung von Lernanstalten, die Kirche – die Aufsicht für Religionsunterricht. Die Bildung und Erziehung gelang in die Hände der Weltleute, der geistige Einfluss der Kirche wurde beseitigt.

Außerdem wurde 1869 noch ein österreichisches Schulgesetz erlassen, das alle Schüler zur Grundschulbildung verpflichtete, falls sie die Grundschule nicht besuchten (Volksschule), so wurden die Eltern bestraft⁵.

In demselben Jahr erlaubte das österreichische Schulgesetz, Einzelpersonen, Bildungsgesellschaften und religiösen Organisationen private Lehranstalten neben den Staatsschulen zu gründen⁶.

Auf solche Weise trug eine ganze Reihe von erlassenen gesamtösterreichischen Gesetzen zur Verbesserung der Rechtsgrundlage und der Entwicklung des Bildungssystems in Österreich-Ungarn und insbesondere in der Bukowina bei.

Nachdem wir gesamtösterreichische Bildungsdirektiven geklärt haben, gehen wir zur Bestimmung der Stellung der ukrainischen und der deutschen Sprache im Fremdsprachenunterricht (FSU) über.

Aus den Archivadokumenten vom Jahr 1870 erfahren wir, dass Deutsch als zweite Landessprache in nichtdeutschen Schulen fungierte und mindestens 2 Stunden pro Woche gelernt wurde. Seinen Lehrplan bestimmte der Landschulrat aufgrund der Einreichung/des Vorschlags der Schullehrerkollektivs⁷.

Die Frage der Unterrichtssprache wurde in den Werken deutschsprachiger Autoren betroffen. M. Keindil schrieb, dass gesetzgebende Organe und

⁵ *Zakon z dnja 14 maj 1869, kotorym ustanavliwajutsja zasady učenja dotyčno shkol narodnych*, in *Chronologičesky spys zakonow, rosporjasdženyj i pr., kotryy pomeshen sut w ročnyku 1869 perewodow vestnyka zakonow dershavnych dlya Bukowyny*. [Gesetz vom 14. Mai 1869, das Lehransätze in Volksschulen feststellt, in Chronologische Liste der Gesetze, Verordnungen u.a., veröffentlicht 1869 im Informationsblatt der Staatsgesetze für die Bukowina], Czernowitz, 1870, S. 372-384.

⁶ I. Kurljak, *Roswytok klasyčnoji osvity na zachidnoukrajnskykh zemljach (XIX –persha polowyna XX st.)*. [Die Entwicklung der klassischen Ausbildung in westukrainischen Ländern (XIX. – erste Hälfte des XX. Jhs.)]. Dysertazija doktora pedagogičnych nauk, Kyiv, 2000, S. 134.

⁷ Deržavnyj Archiv Černiveckoi Oblasti [Staatsarchiv des Czernowitzer Gebietes], Fond [Findbuch] 211 (Landesschulrates der Bukowyna), Opys [Aktenregister] 1, Sprava [Aktenmappe] 99, (Briefwechsel mit dem Kultus und Bildungsministerium zu den Programmen für Volks- und Mittelschulen, 1870), Arkus [Blatt] 25.

Hochschulanstalten Österreichs eine Rechtsentscheidung über den Unterricht in den Volksschulen in der Muttersprache, die dem Kind verständlich ist, trafen, denn es positive Ergebnisse der Bildung garantierte. So der der Autor, wenn die Nation groß und stark, abgehärtet durch eigene Lebenskraft und Entwicklung ist und ihre Angehörige die Liebe zum eigenen Volk und zu den anderen nebenan lebenden Nationen durchdringt, – umso stärker wird die Union vom gegenseitigen Respekt, von Hilfe und Zusammenarbeit aller Völker, umso mächtiger wird der ganze Staatsorganismus, umso stärker werden seine einzelnen Glieder⁸.

Führen wir einen Auszug aus einem Archivdokument an – Korrespondenz mit den Kreisschulräten der Bukowina über die Pläne für Deutschunterricht in Grundschulen für 1875, genehmigt vom Ministerium für Religion und Bildung, „bezüglich des Deutschunterrichts in Siedlungszentren der Ukrainer oder Polen so gilt ihre Muttersprache als Kommunikationssprache und Deutsch als zweite Landessprache. Der Deutschunterricht begann ab der 2. Klasse, die Grammatik der deutschen Sprache wurde in der Muttersprache der Schüler erklärt, zu den Hauptlernverfahren gehörten schriftliche und mündliche Übersetzungen, was der Meinung von damaligen Lehrern nach eine effiziente Aneignung des Lernstoffes garantierte“⁹.

Es ist interessant, dass bei der Analyse der Lehrprogramme die Fragen für deutsch- und ukrainischsprachige Schüler bei der Deutschprüfung während der Aufnahme in die Mittelschule gleich waren¹⁰. Diese Tatsache beweist die gleichen Aufforderungen im Deutschunterricht sowohl zu den ukrainischsprachigen Schülern, als auch zu den deutschsprachigen, denn es gab keine Differenzierung bei der Aufnahme zur Mittel- oder Hochschule zwischen den Muttersprachlern und Nichtmuttersprachlern. Die Lehrer der ukrainischsprachigen Schulen sollten ihren Schülern Deutsch so beibringen, dass ihr Sprachniveau bei der Aufnahme in eine bestimmte Bildungsanstalt dem von Muttersprachlern entsprach.

⁸ M. Keindil, *Sprachliche Grupierung der Schulgrupierung u. Schulsprengel*, „Bukowiner Schule. Zeitschrift für das Volksschulwesen“, 1908, 2 Heft, V. Jahrgang, S. 65–71.

⁹ Deržavnyj Archiv Černiveckoi Oblasti [Staatsarchiv des Czernowitzer Gebietes], Fond [Findbuch] 211 (Landesschulrates der Bukowyna), Opys [Aktenregister] 1, Sprava [Aktenmappe] 99 (Lehrplan für die zweite und dritte Landsprache. Beginn vom dritten Studienjahr, 1875), Arkus [Blatt] 26-30.

¹⁰ B. Labinska, *Istoryčni narysy z metodyky navčannza inozemnych mov na sachidnoukrajnskykh zemljach (druha polovyna XIX – persha polovyna XX st.). Monographija* [Historische Skizzen zur Methodik des Fremdsprachenunterrichts in den westukrainischen Gebieten (zweite Hälfte des 19. bis erste Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts)], Kyiv, KNLU, 2013, S. 89 – 101.

Wir teilen die Ansicht von M. Korduba, dass ungeachtet dessen, dass laut der österreichischen Gesetze Deutsch und Rumänisch in der Bukowina Landessprachen waren, jedoch hatten sie mehr Priorität seitens der Staats- und Landesmacht, als Ukrainisch. Diese Situation ist unserer Meinung nach vor allem von der Denationalisierungspolitik der Regierung hervorgerufen. Wenn man aber konkrete statistische Angaben anschaut, so zählte man in der Bukowina 1871/75/1880 jeweils 30/24/28 deutsche Schulen, 1876 – 5 polnische Schulen, 58/59/16 ukrainische Schulen, 23/13/26 rumänische Schulen¹¹. Unumstritten ist die Tatsache, dass in der Bukowina ukrainische Schulen funktionierten, wo die Schüler in ihrer Muttersprache unterrichtet wurden. Die Schüler hatten Möglichkeit, ukrainischsprachige Schulen zu besuchen, Ukrainisch zu lernen, die Geschichte ihres Staates zu erfahren.

Bei der Bestimmung der Unterrichtssprache ist es wichtig, den Status der deutschen Sprache für ukrainisch-, polnisch-, rumänischsprachige u.a. Schüler zu verstehen. Da Deutsch zweite Landessprache und Nichtmuttersprache für ukrainisch-, polnisch- und rumänischsprachige Bevölkerung war, erlaubt es uns, sie als Fremdsprache zu bezeichnen. Sinnvoll ist die Meinung von F. Glauning, dass die Muttersprache ein wesentlicher Faktor des Bewusstseins von Schüler ist¹². Der russische Methodist unterstrich, dass der Fremdsprachenunterricht auf jener epistemologischen Einstellung beruhen soll, dass das sprachliche „Weltbild“ einzig für die ganze Menschheit ist und in jeder konkreten Sprache mit verschiedenen Mitteln realisiert wird¹³. Das Erlernen einer Fremdsprache ist nur in der Zusammenarbeit mit der Muttersprache realisierbar, zudem die zweite Sprache der Muttersprache untergeordnet ist¹⁴.

Es ist zu bemerken, dass 1867 der radikale Umbau der Methodik des Deutschunterrichts begann und mit seinem Ersatz durch ukrainische, polnische, rumänische Unterrichtssprache verbunden ist. Demnach wird Deutsch wie auch andere Fremdsprachen zum Lehrfach mit dem bestimmten Ziel. Der

¹¹ *Oesterreiches Statistisches Handbuch für die im Reichsrathe Vertretenen Königreiche und Länder. Erster Jahrgang, 1882*, Wien, 1883, S. 79.

¹² B. Ljapidus, *Nekotoryje teoretičeskije voprosy metodiki obučenija nerodnomu jasyku* [Einige theoretische Fragen der Fremdsprachendidaktik]. In: *Metodika i psihologija obučenija inostrannym jazykam*. Moscow: Russkyy jasyk, 1991. – S. 63.

¹³ H. Kolshanskyy, *Lingwometodičeskije aspekty intenyfikacii obučenija inostrannym jazykam* [Sprachmethodische Aspekte der Intensivierung des Fremdsprachenunterrichts]. Moscow: MGPIIA im. M. Toresa, 1979, S. 10.

¹⁴ H. Kolshanskyy, *Teoretyčeskije problemy bilingwisma* [Theoretische Probleme der Zweisprachigkeit], In *Lingwistika i metodyka*, Moscow: MGPIIA im. M. Toresa, 1967, S. 174–176.

Deutschunterricht begann in der Volksschule, Französisch und Englisch wurden in Mittelschulen verschiedener Arten beigebracht.

Schlussfolgerungen

Auf solche Weise kennzeichnete die Periode 1867–1890 sowohl die Verabschiedung von Verfassungsgesetzen, als auch die Entwicklung vom Bildungssystem. Im Großen und Ganzen war die Politik der österreichischen Regierung bezüglich der Bildungsentwicklung in der Bukowina ziemlich liberal und spielte eine wichtige Rolle für ihr Wachstum. Ungeachtet einer geringen Zahl der ukrainischsprachigen Schulen hatten die ukrainischsprachigen Schüler doch Möglichkeit, in ihrer Muttersprache in der Bukowina unterrichtet zu werden. Erwähnte Voraussetzungen förderten die Entwicklung der Methodik des Deutschunterrichts, die Erarbeitung neuer Lehrprogramme für Deutsch, die Verfassung neuer Lehrwerke, den Einsatz moderner Ansätze, Methoden, Prinzipien des Fremdsprachenunterrichts, die Suche nach neuen Mitteln und Verfahren für die Verbesserung und Erhöhung des Niveaus der Schüler in deutscher Sprache.

Als Perspektive einer weiteren Arbeit in dieser Richtung halten wir die Forschung von Lehrprogrammen, Lehrwerken, Ansätzen, Methoden, Prinzipien, Verfahren und Mitteln des Deutschunterrichts für ukrainischsprachige Bevölkerung vom Jahr 1890 bis 1918.

“THE END OF INNOCENCE”.
THE CHILDREN OF BUKOVINA IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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Rezumat: „Sfârșitul inocenței”. Copiii Bucovinei în timpul Primului Război Mondial.

Interesul pentru experiențele trăite de copii în anii Primului Război Mondial a crescut substantial în ultimele decade. Autobiografiile și memoriile private, documente și tot felul de povestiri prezintă dimensiunea războiului și modul în care l-au perceput copiii. Afectați de întreruperea vieții de acasă și a școlii, de părinții care lipseau și de moarte, acești inocenți au încercat să înțeleagă motivele din spatele evenimentelor care le bulversaseră comunitatea, restructurându-le atitudinile față de familie, frică, joacă și viață. Această lucrare își propune să arate cum au experimentat Marele Război copiii din cea mai estică provincie a monarhiei austriece, cum s-a manifestat omniprezența războiului în viața lor de zi cu zi și cum au fost văzuți combatanții – ruși, austrieci, germani și unguri – de către cei mai tineri locuitori ai Bucovinei

Abstract: Interest in the children’s experiences in World War One has grown substantially in the last decades. Autobiographies and private memories, documents and all kind of stories present the dimension of warfare and how the children perceived it. Affected by disruption to home life and to schooling, by absent parents, and death, these innocents tried to understand the reasons behind the events that stunned their community, restructuring attitudes towards family, fear, play, and life. This paper aims to expose how the children of the most eastern province of the Austrian Monarchy experienced the Great War, how was manifested the pervasiveness of the war to their everyday lives, and how the combatants – Russians, Austrians, Germans, and Hungarians – were seen by the youngest inhabitants of Bukovina.

Résumé: “La fin de l’innocence”. Les enfants de la Bucovine pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale

L’intérêt pour les expériences vécues par les enfants les années de la Première Guerre Mondiale augmenta substantiellement les dernières décennies. Les autobiographies et les mémoires privés, les documents et toutes sortes de récits présentent la dimension de la guerre et la manière dans laquelle les enfants l’aperçurent. Affectés par l’interruption de la vie de chez soi et de l’école, du manque des parents et de la mort, ces innocents essayèrent à

comprendre les motifs derrière les événements qui bouleversèrent leur communauté, en restructurant leurs attitudes envers la famille, la peur, le jeu et la vie. L'ouvrage ci-joint se proposa à montrer comment les enfants de la plus orientale province de la monarchie autrichienne expérimentèrent la Grande Guerre, comment se manifesta l'omniprésence de la guerre dans leur vie quotidienne et comment les plus jeunes habitants de la Bucovine aperçurent les combattants – Russes, Autrichiens, Allemands et Hongrois.

Keywords: Bukovina, children, childhood, WWI, drama, witness, memoir.

Introduction

As a quite prolific theme, the *First World War* has inspired the Romanian historians in their attempt to reconstruct dramatic experiences as faithfully as possible. As it happens, a certain reserve in the approach of a vulnerable segment of society would have confusing effects upon the research. Such is the case of the “children of war”, the main subject of a domain which is frequently viewed as being subordinated to the history of family in general¹. While in Western historiography these types of preoccupations are no longer a novelty, it was only in the last decade that we can speak, within the Romanian area, about the premises of a synthetic and academic re-evaluation of the way our forefathers have spent their childhood².

The history of children in Bukovina still “slips through fingers”, and caution remains a must. As statistic data and official information are often disarming, the solution to overcoming the impasse is to associate the “instruments” of the historian with those of the philologist, especially when the necessary “raw material” is extracted from the media, diaries and autobiographies. First of all, those who write about the children in Bukovina during WWI are all adult. Second, we never deal with descriptions of the child during the war, *stricto sensu*, but with fragments or parts of wider reconstitutions of life. The memory of childhood appears as an autobiography most of the time, so it is bound to variable doses of subjectivity. It is hard to establish the frequency or the amount of fictional elements in such documents, but they are definitely not scarce. In other words, a more or less overt reluctance on behalf of some researchers is to be expected.

¹ Steven Mintz, *Why the History of Children Matters*, “Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth”, No. 5, 2012, p. 17.

² Luminița Dumănescu, *Introducere în istoria copilăriei. Trecutul unei discipline de la Aries la SHCY* [Introduction to the History of Childhood. The Antecedents of a Discipline from Aries to SHCY], in E. Mihalache, A. Cioflâncă (eds.), *In Medias Res. Studii de istorie culturală* [In Medias Res. Studies of Cultural History], Iași, 2007, pp. 24-42.

There is still the urge to investigate such resources, too, as the combination of actual history and subjective essay will often lead to the discovery of historical realities.

Raised and schooled in adversity

A first kind of trauma is represented by the absence of the father, who has become “a soldier in God knows what front where the Austrian empire needs cannon fodder in the war”³. In the *Memoirs* of the poet and novelist Teodor C. Grosu (better known under his pseudonym, Iulian Vesper), the idyllic life in the village of Horodnicul de Sus is suddenly interrupted in August 1914, when the 6-year old child finds out that his parent, “along with numerous other villagers of his age, was conscripted. I would remain alone with my mother, who gave me, the same month, a little brother called Ionică. We received help from my father’s older brother, uncle Ion, until him, too, would be drafted”⁴. At the age of 7, Carol-Ludovic Lemne, son of Rudolf – an imperial clerk at the Lisaura town hall, conscripted in the Austrian army and taken prisoner by Mestecăniş – tries to help his family “in all and every chore”⁵. Nicolae C. Popescu writes in his *Notes of Autobiographical Journal* about himself, coming into the world on December 16, 1916, saying that the event was clouded by the troubles caused by the war, as his “dad is away from home”⁶. Some children, regardless of age, do not hesitate to take chances facing their fears, defying everything, striving to prove that they can respond to the harsh realities of life. The young boy Ioachim Popescu from Cireş Opaiţeni – who later became the author of *Story of My Life* – understands the significance of the rumours “of terror that appeared from everywhere, until one day when the church bells announced the outbreak of World War One. A few days later, every young and healthy man, including my dad, went to war and left only sorrow and tears behind. From that day on, us boys, young as we were, would help mom around the house. We had no news from dad”⁷. Such writings reveal the precocious process of growing up of these children, as they assume early in life the role of the “provider” and “helper” of their mothers and, sometimes, that of the “head” of the family.

³ Nicolae C. Popescu, *Note de jurnal autobiografic* [Notes of Autobiographical Journal], in Ilie Dugan-Opaiţ (ed.), *Familia Dugan din Cireş-Opaiţeni* [Dugan Family from Cireş-Opaiţeni], Rădăuţi, 2009, p. 283.

⁴ Iulian Vesper, *Memorii* [Memoirs], Bucureşti, 1999, p. 12.

⁵ ***, *Când amintirea începe să vorbească. Colegiul Naţional “Ştefan cel Mare” din Suceava la 150 de ani* [When Memory Begins to Speak. “Stefan cel Mare” National College of Suceava at 150 Years], Suceava, 2010, p. 53.

⁶ Nicolae C. Popescu, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

⁷ Ioachim Popescu, *Povestea vieţii mele* [Story of My Life], in Ilie Dugan-Opaiţ (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 301.

Obviously, school is left aside as children fail to attend their classes, especially in the rural areas where working and providing for the bare necessities are a priority. The deterioration of the school buildings, the drafting of the teachers and the everyday insecurity lead to a situation in which in the school year of 1917-1918, from 560 students in the village of Straja, only 36 would attend the classes⁸. In Chernovitz, Aspazia Balășescu refuses to register her son in school and motivates: "I will not let my boy out in the street in times of war"⁹. Reprehended by her husband, who is concerned that "no one knows when the war will be over; Ler's years are passing by, and what he learns here and there does not coincide with the school curriculum", Aspazia decides that the boy would study at home on the manuals they had in the attic: reading manuals, a *comput* (arithmetic) book, the *Small Catechism* and the *Romanian Grammar*¹⁰.

Another cause of trauma is constituted by refuge. Scarred by suffering and violence, children try to understand the anguish, the hopelessness and the panic of the grown-ups. Anița Nandriș-Cudla writes about the summer of 1914, and recounts that on a Sunday morning she saw, at the gate, "two carts, fully loaded with sacks and clothes, and with women and children on top of them", ready to flee, from the path of the Muscovites, along with the retreating Austrian army¹¹. In an essay called *Ecumenical Christmas 1916*, Stefanie Riedl-Ruczkowski also recalls the moment when the well-to-do people of the upper classes left the town of Gura Humorului. But not the others; they were "sacrificed, brought back, while the bridges were blown up and the barns were set on fire". Her family was among the unfortunate that were trapped in a town that was already abandoned by the imperial authorities: "We didn't have enough time to fully understand our situation. We could already hear the grumble of the cannons and the hissing of shrapnel flying in the air. We sought shelter in a basement". For three days, intoxicated with alcohol, the "foreign hordes" had unleashed with no restraint whatsoever, turning into "hyenas" The idyllic and peaceful space of the Bukovinian town is declared as "hostile, and treated accordingly: people got tortured and buildings got burnt. [...] Imagine all the wooden houses covered with dry wooden shingles! They flew around us like fireworks. After wrapping my brother in a blanket, dad put him in a blackcurrant bush and he put a stick with a piece of cloth in my hand so that I could protect myself from the burning

⁸ Vasile Pasailă, *Straja. Vatră de istorie bucovineană din Valea Sucevei* [Straja. Hearth of Bukovinian History of Suceava Valley], București, 2009, p.114.

⁹ Dragoș Vitencu, *Scrisori de la Dumnezeu* [Letters from God], Suceava, 2012, p. 144.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

¹¹ Anița Nandriș-Cudla, *20 de ani în Siberia. Amintiri din viață* [20 Years in Siberia. Memories of Life], București, 2010, p. 27.

fragments. The shingles were flying and carried along the flames. Everything looked hopeless. A woman from the neighbourhood gathered all the children around her and evoked, under the open skies, the litany of the Virgin Mary. The words *Holy Mary, pray for us* resounded in a terrifying manner in the night air"¹².

The changes of positions and troops are doubled by terror; it is a continuous succession of peoples, vices and fears: "One day in late fall we came upon a Russian patrol in the village, then more of them came along. We were really scared at first, then we found out they were harmless"¹³. Russian soldiers are replaced by Austrian ones, and then, "one morning", "several shots" were heard and then "lots of Cossacks" entered the village. They make a big impression on the children due to "their huge hats", "their long spears and their small and fast horses". After only three months, the Austrians occupy once again their old positions and astonish the local population: "We didn't even realize when and where the Cossacks retreated"¹⁴. The fading of the effects of such actions, rather hard actually, can be explained by the nostalgia that appears as we recall the past, as Vesper, as a child, notices one morning, "full of regrets, the disappearance of some of the closest soldiers" whom he never thought possible to ever be separated from. Except that "other came" in their place, and, oddly enough, they were "equally friendly. Our house had seen the passage of all kind of soldiers: Siberians, Kalmyks, Tatars, Hungarians, Austrians and Romanians, both from Transylvania and Banat"¹⁵.

Intertwining of "normality" and "abnormality".

As the war is turning into a state of facts and poverty and misery fail to surprise anyone anymore, children start to see the soldiers as "their own kin", according to their disposition to empathize with the community. During the four years "of the war – writes Ioachim Popescu – the Russians had occupied us three times, but they never harmed anybody, on the contrary, they helped those in need, they shared their ration of bread, sugar, matches or tobacco with the elderly and the smokers. Many of them would trade their flannels, blankets, shirts or tarpaulins for a dozen of eggs and a chunk of butter. The Germans and Hungarians, on the other hand, were mean, they did not befriend anyone, they saw us as enemies despite them being our soldiers (or so we used to say)"¹⁶.

¹² Stefanie Riedl-Ruczkowski, *Ecumenical Christmas 1916*, "Journal of the American Historical Society of Germans from Russia", tome 12, no. 4, 1989, pp. 18-19.

¹³ Ioachim Popescu, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Iulian Vesper, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁶ Ioachim Popescu, *op. cit.*, p. 302.

As for the Christmas of the year 1916, it was celebrated by the Riedl-Ruczkwoskis together with a Russian officer and a couple of his soldiers. Upon request from the commanding officer, with the permission of the father (who was terrorized by the idea that a potential refusal would lead to deportation in Siberia) and with the efforts made by the mother, the grandparents and the cook (native to Russian Poland), they prepared a special meal, adorned the tree, sang carols and recited prayers. The family would receive some gifts (a wooden horse for the boy, a nice doll and some chocolate, cigarettes for the men, combs and soap for the women). On the way to church where the Christmas mess was to be held, the officer allows the women and children who had been asked to clean out the snow to go home, and he offered them bread, cans, sugar, tea and a rouble each. This is the image of the soldiers of the Great Russian nation, who “know how to be generous”¹⁷. The same generosity of the “Muscovite” is shared by the accounts of Domnica Bizovi, who evokes the moment of her family being evacuated from Noua Sulița. In the turmoil caused by the soldiers who entered the yard of the Vaipans and by the eviction note, Veroanca, the lady of the house, “forgot her youngest son Ionică in the crib behind the stove. On her way to the gate it hit her and she started to cry. The Russians allowed her to go back for her child”¹⁸.

The memory of the Petrescu brothers cherishes the image of yet another soldier, a combination of childish innocence and military discipline. While the mother is away in the fields with her oldest son (aged 12 and considered to be a “full-grown lad”, who “drives his horse and carriage wherever is needed”, as he is the “trusted man” of the family)¹⁹, the two youngest are in charge of the house and the animals in the household. The hot weather urges them to the river, for a bath, but only after locking the “door to the house”, after taking their weapons: “rifles and swords made out from wooden shingles”, after taking the dog by the chain. Ioachim writes: “After we cooled nicely, I gave the order for our departure, then *ab marș, țu haus*²⁰ and, in a few minutes, we got home. We were in for a big surprise: a Russian soldier sat on the porch, his shotgun by the wall and his cap aside, as it was a hot day. When we saw him we froze: no, we were not scared, we just needed to decide how to attack him. What were we to do: take him prisoner or let him go? When the soldier saw us armed as we were with the swords, and especially with the dog on the chain, he started to laugh and called us over, and then he petted us on the head and asked us about our names, about our siblings, and so on. First we thought that he wanted to call a truce. We spoke in Romanian,

¹⁷ Stefanie Riedl-Ruczkowski, *op. cit.*

¹⁸ http://www.mareleboian.com/istorie_austr_1918.html.

¹⁹ Ioachim Popescu, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

²⁰ Incorrect German: *ab Marsch zuhaus*, “marching home”.

but it was all Greek to us. Then he asked us for some *yayitsi* (eggs), we ran to the barn and brought him some, he put them in his pocket saying *spassiba* (thank you), and he left. If he asked, we would have even given him the eggs under the hen just to get rid of him”²¹. Such a text, in its naivety, remains a relevant example of the paradox we call the “normality of war”: children would manufacture guns (albeit toy guns), they try to become familiar to their usage and they even see them as indispensable accessories in their journeys. Even the marching order is given in German, which indicates the appurtenance to a certain party; that is the reason for the perplexity they experience when they come face to face with the Russian soldier sitting “on the porch of the house”, and also for the dilemma that his presence determines: “Should we take him prisoner or let him go?”

A strange kind of adaptability turns “the bombarding and the bayonet fighting in the orchards of the village”²² or “the quartering of Russian or German soldiers [...], according to the succession of battles on the immense front lines” into “common sights” for the children. They see “the fruited fields” being “entangled in a web of barbed wire”, they see trenches being dug, they see “the streets crowded with green military cars and horseback riders”, they see “the complicated network of cannons” as they assist “every day to air fights. When smoke balls appeared, one of the airplanes would definitely roll down from the sky. On hidden paths, my mother and I would reach our field and dug the potatoes all day long, as a brown observation balloon kept its watch from the sky, up above the village of Marginea towards the bright blue ridges of the mountains far away”²³. Children get used to “shooting practice taking place on the Osoi, to the unceasing rumble of the cannons, to the alarms at night time, to the refugees from Arbore, Burla, Milișăuți or Iaslovăț who crowded the houses”²⁴. Also “the steadfast beams of the spotlights watching invisible airplanes and the rattling of the machine-guns, followed by the intense silence of the night”²⁵ become part of normality, while “troops in military gear” march on the streets and the “cobweb of telephone wires, woven in trees and stakes and along the fences” leads to “some neighbouring houses”²⁶.

Childhood in the years of the war has some particular features: children herd their cows or gather grass along the road that links Rădăuți to Marginea, and in the meadows of the Sucevița, alongside abandoned ditches and burrows, alongside water-filled trenches and deep stitches claimed by hares. Even their

²¹ Ioachim Popescu, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

²² Iulian Vesper, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

food bags would be filled with shells, unexploded shrapnel, and telephone wire. As they take “a long look to the vehicles, cannons, carts and troops that march towards the mountains while singing their nostalgic songs”²⁷, children would mingle between the quartered soldiers in the yard, between caissons, cars and horses; they know the way to the trenches in front of the village”; with their friends, they creep through the barbed wire; they learn Russian, German or Hungarian words, they learn songs and “mumble them like they were something funny” – like Ionuț in Dragoș Vitencu’s novel, who doesn’t stop repeating *Marusia otravilasia/ V’bolnetsiu i vezut*²⁸.

At the same time, children receive the sympathy of soldiers like *honved*²⁹ Mișka, who shares his slice of bread and plum jam; they receive attention from some of the officers, like the Siberian lieutenant Ivanov, who takes them for a horse ride down and puts cookies in their pockets, or like *Feldwebel*³⁰ Gheorghe Cojocararu from Banat, who takes them in his lap at night and tells them the most beautiful stories³¹. And since Ionuț cannot forget the story of Ivan Turbincă³², he thinks that “among so many Russians, there must be at list one to know about Ivan. If he finds him, he would ask him to send lots of people into his backpack, people whose meanness he had plenty of time to hear about so far”. Nevertheless, the meeting with a “tall soldier, wearing a hat about the size of four human heads, whose chest was crisscrossed by cartridge belts”, who had a “huge bag at his hip”, does not follow the child’s scenario, since “the spook ran to him and raised him in the air with huge hands, like Ionuț had never seen before”. Unaware that such an attitude reflected the “giant’s” nostalgia for the “child he left home in the Caucasus”, Ionuț is frightened as he thinks the Russian wants to “bag him in the haversack, or worse, to throw him in the cauldron where he cooked his meal”. Besides, the Russian’s gesture reminds him of a story old Toader used to tell about “ogres who eat children”. The screeching and scratching the little “wild thing” puts against the supposed Ivan Haversack makes him forget about tenderness, as he mumbles “through his teeth: *Ciort!*”³³

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁸ Incorrect Russian: *Marusia got poisoned/Aand they took her to the hospital*, according to Dragoș Vitencu, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

²⁹ A soldier in the Hungarian infantry.

³⁰ A master sergeant in the Austrian army.

³¹ Iulian Vesper, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

³² Lit. *Ivan Haversack*, short humorous story written in the year 1880 by the Romanian writer Ion Creangă, about the adventures of a Russian soldier in heaven and in hell.

* Russ. *чѐрт*, “devil, demon”.

³³ Dragoș Vitencu, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

Under threat of death

In some cases, the childish innocence mellows the perception on the magnitude of the war, i. e. some children do not apprehend its meaning other than by the stories told by the parent who returns from the front: “By the spring of 1915, father came home for three days and told us about the troubles and dangers he had faced. That is when I finally understood what the war was all about”³⁴); for other children, instead, the military conflict is a personal experience with painful memories. Ioachim Popescu finds a yellow metal tube, three or four centimetres long, sealed at one end and filled with a yellowish solidified powder; he then tries to make a pencil holder out of it. When he places the little tube (actually a shell) on the stove it explodes in his face, causing a serious haemorrhage which will lead to the loss of the eye, due to the negligence and indolence of doctor Keschman from the hospital in Storozhynets’³⁵.

The pauper life conditions between 1916-1918 generated widespread epidemics. Only seven out of the seventeen children in the Bodnărescu household survive the First World War³⁶. Parents try to protect their children by preventing any contact with potential contamination sources. For instance, professor Alexandru Baloșescu from Chernovitz refuses to take his son to town, as “among the disgust towards everything around him, he feared the boy would get some disease from the filth in the streets”³⁷. Nevertheless, little sickly Ler (who “would spend days in bed each year, several times”), succumbs to one of the deadliest epidemics. The new disease, “unknown to the people and called the *Spanish flu*”, puts half of the inhabitants of Chernovitz to bed; it puzzles and frightens everyone with its “nose and mouth bleeding, which doctors cannot stop or at least explain”. But while the majority of the diseased cannot find “any effective cure”, others – with Ler among them – get well “unexpectedly”³⁸. The end is completely different for the children that are considered to be “snitches for the enemy” – no matter which one – or “traitors”. In two monographs about the First World War in Bukovina, Teodor Bălan mentions several cases of torture and even execution of children, such as Sofronia Onciulencu, a 15 year old girl who gets “kicked in the head”³⁹, and Odochia Leiba from Torachi, a 14 year old peasant girl who gets so

³⁴ Ioachim Popescu, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

³⁵ Ilie Dugan-Opaiț, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

³⁷ Dragoș Vitencu, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

³⁹ Teodor Bălan, *Suprimarea mișcărilor naționale din Bucovina pe timpul războiului*

badly clubbed by Saul Linder (a ZGS Führer⁴⁰ from the rangers in Storozhynets'-Putila)", that when "he beat her, she involuntarily wet herself"⁴¹.

From a historical viewpoint, the case of Constantin Storozciuc from Cuciurul Mare is by far the most relevant. The 15 year old boy is entrusted with the household in September 1914, after his mother and siblings take refuge from the Russians in Iordănești; he is left home alone, living alternatively "at home or in an aunt's house, rarely going out in the street"⁴². In October 1914, when accused by an absurd justice officer of "betraying to the Russians the positions of the Austrian army" in exchange of "three roubles and some sugar lumps"⁴³, the child is arrested, "beaten senseless" and imprisoned in the rangers' garrison. The main witnesses to the incident are also children, namely Pentelei and Vasile Ciornohuz, a 9 year old and an 11 year old. Intimidated and terrorized by ranger Ioan Drescher, flogged with a whip (Vasile Ciornohuz receives three strikes, one of them on the hand), they confirm the act of treason⁴⁴, which causes Constantin to be sentenced to death by hanging. This episode would be included by Mircea Streinul in one of his novels where he speaks about the paths of childhood in an "absurd time" when paradise crumbles, wounds never heal and people became "quixotic"⁴⁵.

Once again, in the episode of the massacre of Boian, Vitencu associates sugar with the image of the cruelty and nonsense of the war. Besides, Traian Roșu believes that generally speaking, "the four-year blockade made the scantiness of sugar impossible for the people [...] to resist its mirage"⁴⁶. While such a temptation is hard on an adult, it will certainly transform a child into an instrument, and, consequently, into a victim of the confrontation between the Austrian and the Russian armies. On the first Sunday after Easter, grocer Roll speculates on an orthodox tradition when painted eggshells are thrown in the water to reach the souls of the dead; he persuades some children to throw in the small creek of Hucău

mondial, 1914-1918 [The Suppression of the National Movements in Bukovina during the World War, 1914-1918], Cernăuți, 1923, p. 118.

⁴⁰ ZGS, short for Germ. *Zollgrenzschutz*, "Customs Border Guards".

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Mircea Diaconu, *Mircea Streinul. Viața și opera* [Mircea Streinul. Life and Work], Rădăuți, 1998, p. 12.

⁴⁶ Traian Roșu, *Amintiri în legătură cu unirea Bucovinei și intrarea armatei române* [Memories about the Union of Bukovina and the Romanian Army Entry], in Ion I. Nistor (ed.), *Amintiri răzlețe din timpul Unirii* [Scattered Memories during Union], Cernăuți, 1938, p. 361.

some bottles containing "messages about the manpower and munitions of the enemy that has reached Boian". The Austrians were supposed to collect the information from the river Prut, in the point of confluence. The price he pays the children is "a handful of candy each, with the promise for more candy after the exploit". Unfortunately, the plan is discovered by a Russian soldier, which brings terrible consequences to the whole community. As the three "ten year old" children who throw message bottles in the creek cannot be identified, dozens of other children from the village are gathered and "intimidated": "They aligned the children in one row and shot one in ten children. They arrested the others and threaten that the next day they would shoot one in five children, unless they found out who were the ones who had sent the bottles". The Austrian counter-attack prevented the carnage, while it could not impede the population to be punished: they were forced to walk to Noua Suliță, where they were put in freight cars and sent to "a place called Astrakhan". The return of the Austrian troops to Boian lead to a macabre discovery: "more than three hundred dead young peasants, left unburied"⁴⁷. On the other hand, those who were guilty – according to Count Meran – of the "defeat and dismay of the Austrian army in Bukovina", are sent to "the prisons of Hungary". Closing the convoy that crosses the town, "a barefoot child, about twelve years old, drained by exhaustion and cold, with his hands chocked by the cold irons, was dragged along, as he couldn't walk by himself any more"⁴⁸.

Conclusions

Most like the rest of Europe, Bukovina offers a heterogeneous and polymorphic image of childhood in the turmoil of war, an image that is still dispersed within sources contained in archives, older or newer publications, memoirs, etc. Once organized and analysed through a specific filter, such a material can find its rightful place in the history of the children of Bukovina, adding to the inevitable similitude a specific and distinctive nuance.

There are some characteristics that are general in the relationship between children and war; independently of their ethnicity, religion, birthplace or place of residence, children, as witnesses and actors of conflict have emotion, fear and uncertainty in common. The perception of the child who lives the events is doubled by the retrospective perception of the adult who reflects upon the event, and this is also a universal situation. But there are also some specific situations. While in some sources war becomes a time of adventure and

⁴⁷ Dragoș Vitencu, *op. cit.*, pp.125-127.

⁴⁸ George Rotică, *Mucenicii noștri* [Our Martyrs], in Ion I. Nistor (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 348.

enthusiasm for some children, the majority of testimonies associates was with economic difficulties, with separation (whether permanent or temporary) from the loved ones, with grief, etc. In the memoirs of Bukovina there appears a recurrent image of the child who is confronted with the brutal imposition of a new way of life; the child is directly affected by the separation from, or the loss of the parents and siblings, by refuge, uprooting, poverty, famine, by the destruction of the mere bases of life, family and community, by death and physical injuries caused by weapons and torture, etc.

This portrait of childhood is obviously very different from the optimistic one depicted by some, such as the Swedish writer Ellen Key, at the beginning of the 20th century.⁴⁹ The background that was supposed to inaugurate “the century of the child” by respecting childhood and its laws under the slogan *long live the children*, had changed into suffering, persecution and misery.

⁴⁹ Ellen Keyn, *Secolul copilului* [The Century of the Child], București, 1978.

FOREIGN TRADE RELATIONS OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC (1939 – 1945) WITH THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE¹

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Rezumat: Relațiile comerciale externe ale Republicii Slovace (1939 - 1945) cu țările din Sud-Estul Europei

Comerțul exterior a avut un rol important în economia slovacă. În mod paradoxal, și spre deosebire de epoca actuală când există o balanță pasivă a comerțului, Slovacia acelor timpuri se afla în pericol din cauza nelimitatelor livrări de bunuri proprii către alte țări. Multe dintre produsele slovace își găsiseră locul pe libera piață europeană. Comerțul exterior a reprezentat un aspect foarte important pentru Slovacia, astfel că această politică a continuat prin documentele normative cu relevanță pentru epoca cehoslovacă. Dovada o constituie faptul că, potrivit actului constituțional 1/1939 (de întemeiere a Republicii Slovace) era asumată legea care reglementa comerțul exterior și responsabilitățile sale aferente. De-a lungul acestei perioade, principalul comerț se realiza cu cel de-al Treilea Reich. După stabilirea relațiilor comerciale cu Germania, interesele de afaceri slovace s-au centrat, de asemenea, pe zona Europei de Sud-Est. Țările din Peninsula Balcanică și Ungaria au fost cele mai importante parteneri comerciale ale Republicii Slovace, după Germania și Italia. Dar în decursul relațiilor comerciale cu majoritatea statelor menționate, trendul deteriorării relațiilor economice reciproce s-a confirmat treptat

Abstract: *The important role in the Slovak economy had foreign trade. Paradoxically, the difference within from the present era, when exist passive balance of trade, Slovakia at this time was in danger with unlimited outlet of its goods in to the foreign countries. A lot of Slovak product founded own position on the empty european markets. The foreign trade was very important aspect for Slovakia, so the the policy continued by the legal acts with relevance of the Czechoslovak era. The evidence is, that according with the constitucional act 1/1939 (establishment of the Slovak republic) was assumed the law which provided foreign trade and duties. Through this period the main trade was realised wit the Third Reich. After solving the trade relations with Germany, the Slovak business interests also focused on the area of South-Eastern Europe. Countries of the Balkan Peninsula and Hungary were the most important trading partner of the Slovak Republic after Germany and Italy. But during the*

¹ The paper is the outcome of the VEGA grant Nr. 2/0043/16, "Vzostup a pád hospodárskeho vývoja Slovenska 1942 – 1945".

trade relations with the majority of mentioned countries, the trend of deterioration of mutual economic relations was gradually confirmed.

Résumé: Les relations commerciales externes de la République Slovaque (1939-1945) avec les pays du Sud-est de l'Europe

Le commerce extérieur eut un rôle important dans l'économie slovaque. De manière paradoxale et à l'encontre de l'époque actuelle lorsqu'il existe une balance passive du commerce, la Slovaquie de ces temps-là était en péril à cause des livraisons illimitées de biens propres vers d'autres pays. Beaucoup de produits slovaques trouvèrent leur place sur le marché libre européen. Le commerce extérieur représenta un aspect extrêmement important pour la Slovaquie, de manière que cette politique continua par les documents normatifs avec relevance pour l'époque tchécoslovaque. Le fait que, conformément à l'acte constitutionnel 1/1939 (de création de la République Slovaque) on s'assuma la loi qui régla le commerce extérieur et ses responsabilités afférentes, en constitue la preuve. Pendant cette période, on réalisait le commerce principal avec le Troisième Reich. Après avoir établi des liaisons commerciales avec l'Allemagne, les intérêts d'affaires slovaques se centrèrent, aussi, sur la zone de l'Europe de Sud-est. Les pays de la Péninsule Balkanique et l'Hongrie furent les plus importants partenaires commerciaux de la République Slovaque, après l'Allemagne et l'Italie. Mais le long des relations commerciales avec la majorité des Etats mentionnés, le trend de la détérioration des relations économiques réciproques se confirma au fur et à mesure.

Keywords: *Slovak state, South-Eastern Europe, Third Reich, economic relations, foreign trade*

Introduction

Foreign trade represented a highly important role in the Slovak economy in the years 1939 – 1945. Majority of Slovak products found their place within the emptied European markets with no major difficulties. Since, for Slovakia, foreign trade represented a very important factor, at the very beginning of the state an act which continued the trade treaties of the former Czechoslovak Republic was passed. Doing so, the new state clearly declared rules of the foreign trade policy at its very beginning. It is proved by the fact that along with the Act Nr. 1/1939, which declared the Slovak state, the government also issued a ruling of modification of the trade relations between the Slovak Republic and customs outland. The same day the government issued a ruling of foreign exchange regulations as well, which defined that „všetky doteraz vydané predpisy zostávajú v platnosti a vzťahujú sa aj na styk s krajinami českou a moravskosliezskou“. With the provision of the Act Nr. 2/1939 the Slovak state simultaneously accepted all of the commerce treaties, which were sealed up between Czechoslovak Republic

and other countries. This way the new state clearly declared the foreign trade policy principles in the act of formation.² The government on authority given by the act from 14th of March 1939 on the independent Slovak state defined:

1. The territory of the Slovak state is an independent customs territory;
2. For the customs touch of Slovakia with the customs outland is valid the actual Czecho-Slovak tariff act from 14th of July 1927, Nr. 114, statutory order hereto act Nr. 168, with all the amendments and changes as well as up to now valid Czecho-Slovak customs tariff;

3. Valid Czecho- Slovak business and political contracts and agreements concluded with foreign states are valid for the liaisons between Slovak state and states in question as well until these states acknowledge them as mandatory. Compensatory and contingent agreements of Czecho-Slovakia with other countries are valid for the Slovak state insomuch that, when enclosing them, the import and export possibilities of Slovakia have to be considered;

4. For the business contact between Slovak state and customs outland are all the present Czecho-Slovak restrictions in import and export and all the Czecho-Slovak regulations of the consent of continuance valid. The Minister of Economy can adjust or change these regulations if necessary;

5. The toll in the Slovak territory isn't collected when importing goods made in Czech regions until further modifications. The same is relevant for the export as well.

- the Minister of Finance with the agreement of the Minister of Economy can free the goods with different origin imported into Slovakia from Czech regions of customs,

- at the declare of goods, which are imported from Czech regions, are all the taxes, duties and charges, which are collected when importing goods from other countries, also collected,

- import and export of goods in liaisons with Czech regions is liable to the consent of continuance. Only the charges set by present regulations are collected within this consent of continuance.

6. Import and export licences issued by the Ministry of Commerce in Prague or other Czech ministries for concerns, which have their dwellings in Slovakia, and are yet unused, are valid only if they have approval clause of relevant Slovak ministry;

² Štefan Teren (ed.), *Národohospodár Peter Zaťko spomína* [The economist Peter Zaťko remembers], Liptovský Mikuláš, Tranoscius, 1994, p. 108.

7. This regulation shall enter into force on the 14th of March 1939 and will be executed by the Minister of Economy in accordance with the agreement with relevant ministers.³

Changes and Challenges in the Slovak's Foreign Trade

Immediately after the creation of the state, Slovak national economists also tried to maintain some kind of independence while establishing foreign business ties.⁴ Negotiations with Poland, which ended by the signing of a trade agreement on the 2nd May 1939 in Bratislava, were conducted without consultation with the German side. Berlin's reaction was immediate and two days after the conclusion of the Agreement Germans expressed their disapproval. This fact clearly indicated the future of Slovakia's foreign trade orientation and only after signing a commercial agreement with Germany could the business relationships with other countries be concluded.

On the 10th May 1939, an agreement on tourism was signed and shortly after, on 22nd June 1939 in Bratislava, so was the first real commercial agreement between Germany and Slovakia. The Agreement was signed by a Minister of Foreign Affairs Ferdinand Ďurčanský and an Ambassador Extraordinary for the Slovak part Štefan Polyák. For the German side, the contract was signed by Ernst von Druffel and Günter Bergemann, a head of the German trade delegation. The document had been in force since the 1st July 1939 and provided the legal basis of bilateral economic ties. Duration of its validity was two years and it was automatically extended unless being terminated by either contracting party 6 months before the time specified in the contract.⁵ Reich's territory (Germany, Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and General Government) therefore represented the main business partner of the first Slovak Republic. In 1939 the foreign trade with the Reich's share on a total export and import of Slovakia represented 80%. On the other hand, the share of Slovakia in German foreign trade fluctuated around 2%. In the following years, this ration declined only slightly and after the suppression of the Uprising we can no longer talk about any independent foreign trade.

³ Obchodný styk slovenského štátu s cudzinou [Slovak State business transactions with foreign countries]. in "Slovák", 16 March 1939, p. 2.

⁴ *Národohospodár Peter Zatko spomína...*, p. 93.

⁵ Antónia Štefániková, *O niektorých aspektoch zahraničného obchodu Slovenskej republiky v období rokov 1939 – 1945* [Certain aspects of the Slovak foreign trade during 1939 - 1945], in "Historický časopis", vol. 48, 2000, no. 3, p. 466.

Slovak foreign trade was primarily oriented on export because of the favourable export situation. High numbers of Slovak export formed in 1939 2 billions 200 million Slovak crowns as opposed to the import with 1 billion 555 million Slovak crowns. Active balance of the foreign trade reached 645 million Slovak crowns. A majority of the shown amount aroused when trading with the Third Reich.

In 1940 the foreign trade of the Slovakia showed following numbers. The total turn-over of the foreign trade presented 6.047 billion Slovak crowns. The import represented 2.872 billion crowns and the export 3.175 billion crowns. The asset for the year 1940 was 302 million Slovak crowns. The dominant place in export and import for Slovakia represented the Third Reich during the whole existence of the state. The share of the total foreign trade of Slovakia represented 41.2% of import and 27.1% of export into Germany. To the notable partners belonged the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia with the import share 35.4% and export share 43.5%. The two business partners were followed by: Italy (4.5% - 5.8%), Hungary (4.1% - 5.1%), Romania (4.4% - 3.8%), Yugoslavia (3.3% - 3.8%), Switzerland (0.7% - 2.8%), the Netherlands (0.5% - 2.5%), Turkey (0.7% - 1%), Belgium (0.3% - 0.9%), Bulgaria (0.7% - 0.6%) and Sweden (0.1% - 1%).⁶ The foreign trade took place with other countries as well, but it was only in minimum rate.

In 1940 trade negotiations with foreign countries, where experience from the first year of commercial activity was taken for advantage, were carried out intensely. Most of them were old agreements' revisions and their additions (eg. Germany etc.), new were for example contracts with Finland and the USSR concluded in December 1940.⁷

⁶ Slovenský národný archív, Bratislava (SNA BA), f. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MZV) 1939-1945, box 593: Slovakia's foreign trade in 1940. Until November 1940 the foreign trade with the Third Reich represented 186 million Slovak crowns in liabilities, 70 million crowns in assest with Italy and 71.5 million crowns in assets with Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria. Governor of Slovak National Bank (SNB) Imrich Karvaš's speech on the second General Assembly of the SNB in Bratislava - Economic Report for the year 1940. Antónia Štefániková states in the article *O niektorých aspektoch zahraničného obchodu Slovenskej republiky v období rokov 1939 - 1945* that the import produced 2 billions 872 million Slovak crowns, and the export produced 3 billions 185 million Slovak crowns and 313 million Slovak crowns in assets' balance.

⁷ *Slovenský priemysel roku 1940*. Výročná správa Ústredného združenia slovenského priemyslu [Slovak industry in 1940. Annual Report of the Central Association of Slovak industry], Bratislava, 1941, pp. 71 - 72.

Gradually implemented counter-export actions of Slovak economists restraining abnormal export of Slovak goods manifested in 1941. The above-mentioned fact is confirmed by statistics of Slovak foreign trade for December 1941. According to these findings, the total turnover of the foreign trade represented 571 million Slovak crowns, in which import represented 326 million crowns and export 244 million crowns. The total trade balance for December 1941 represented 82 million Slovak crowns in liabilities.⁸ As regards the business partners, Germany remained dominant with the total import share of 40% and the total export share of 30%. Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which was on the second place of Slovakia's goods' import (27.6%) and export (33.6%), was part of the Third Reich.⁹ Next places in the turn-over of foreign trade belonged to: Italy (8.7% - 8.7%), Switzerland (5.5% - 5.5%), Romania (3.6% - 9.4%) and Hungary (4.4% - 6%).¹⁰ Total turn-over of foreign trade in 1941 featured 6.677 billion Slovak crowns: import – 3.486, export 3.191 billion crowns.

Year 1941 was a third year of war and European countries adapted their economic policies to it. Trade routes to overseas markets, which were in 1940 at least partially open, completely closed in 1941. A South-East route, through Turkey to the Middle East and, in the first half of the year, a route to East across the USSR still remained open. Thus a Danube route, which was fully utilized, became very important.¹¹

In foreign trade relations Slovakia had concluded contracts with almost all European countries except Sweden, Spain, Portugal and France. Trade negotiations with individual countries in 1941 were more detailed and included more specific business areas. Financial issues had come significantly to the forefront and pricing agreements with foreign countries had been concluded.¹²

⁸ SNA BA, f. Government Presidency Office 1939 – 1945, box 87. A statistical overview of the Slovak state's foreign trade in December 1941.

⁹ For the comparison we can point out, that the export from the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia into the Slovak state in the fourth term in 1939 represented a sum of 309 millions and the import 385 million Protectorate crowns. Národní archiv Praha, f. Ministry of Economy and Labour 1942-1945, Nr. 194, box 210.

¹⁰ SNA BA, f. Government Presidency Office 1939 – 1945, box 87. A statistical overview of the Slovak state's foreign trade in December 1941. Till November 1941 the foreign trade of Slovakia represented 6.1 billion Slovak crowns; import 3.2 billions and export 2.9 billions. Governor of Slovak National Bank (SNB) Imrich Karvaš's speech on the third General Assembly of the SNB in Bratislava – Economic Report for the year 1941.

¹¹ *Slovenský priemysel roku 1938*, Výročná správa Ústredného združenia slovenského priemyslu [Slovak industry in 1938. Annual Report of the Central Association of Slovak industry], 1939, p. 87.

¹² *Slovenský priemysel roku 1938...*, p. 91.

In 1942 this sum grew to 9.450 billion crowns: import – 4.748 billions, export – 4.701 billions. Liable balance of the Slovakia's foreign trade formed in 1941 a total sum of 294.9 million Slovak crowns and in 1942 fell to 47 million crowns. On the example of selected months we can characterize the evolution of the liable trade balance in 1942. April: export – 210 million Slovak crowns, import – 265 millions, liability – 55 millions; May: export – 242 millions, import – 384 millions, liability – 142 millions; September: export – 253 millions, import – 366 millions, liability – 113 millions; October: export – 256 millions, import – 331 millions, liability – 75 million Slovak crowns.¹³

According to the annual report of the Central association of Slovak industry, the turn-over of foreign trade in the year 1943 increased by 30% and compared to the two previous years it showed surplus. In the middle of the year 1943 the foreign trade of Slovakia showed positive numbers: export – 419 millions, import – 396 millions, assets – 23 million Slovak crowns.¹⁴

Doing Business in Hungary

After resolving its trade relations with the Reich, the 1st Slovak Republic carried out some dealings and concluded commercial agreements with other countries as well as tried to adapt in the region of South-Eastern Europe.

Hungary, where Slovak wood had been exported and from where agricultural products had been in turn imported for years, was an important business partner in the Slovak economy point of view. Agreement on mutual exchange of goods between the Slovak Republic and the Kingdom of Hungary was signed in November 1939 in Budapest and amended in March and April 1940. The contract did not concern the implementation of private compensations among countries which were authorized by national banks or competent authorities.¹⁵ The Slovak-Hungarian agreement contained import contingents, which were divided into three groups. The first one, a so-called "Dredomy", was designed to export Slovak wood into Hungary and import Hungarian agricultural products. In the second, "industrial" group, an exchange of Slovak industrial articles and Hungarian industrial and agricultural products was carried out. The third group was represented, as in the previous period, by the "Rimamuránsko –

¹³ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin (PA AA Berlin), f. Legation of Bratislava, box 262. A statistical overview of the Slovak state's foreign trade for April, May, September, October 1942.

¹⁴ PA AA Berlin, f. Legation of Bratislava, box 262. A statistical overview of the Slovak state's foreign trade in June 1943.

¹⁵ Antónia Štefániková, *O niektorých aspektoch zahraničného...*, p. 468.

Šalgotarjárska Company” which exported iron ore and some wood species from Slovakia in exchange for the import of Hungarian pigs, lard, bacon and some types of seeds.¹⁶ The foreign trade with Hungary also continued in 1940 in three product groups and the import from Hungary amounted to 118 million Slovak crowns (4.1% of total import). In contrast, the export into Hungary reached an amount of 160 million Slovak crowns (5.1% of an overall export). Therefore, Hungary ranked third in Slovak foreign trade after the German Reich and Italy.¹⁷

Trading with Hungary concerned the negotiations completed at the end of February 1941. The issue of guidance on import and export licenses was a part of those negotiations. According to the agreement, the export and import licenses were issued for a period of three months and their validity could have been extended for another three months. A novelty in Slovak-Hungarian relations was the establishment of a mixed government committee whose task was to monitor the mutual exchange of goods and to detect potential obstacles.¹⁸ The agreement of 28th February 1941 signed in Bratislava also included contingents for the new contract period.

In January 1942 some arrangements were made in the commodity exchange with Hungary when an authorization regulation on export of goods to Hungary bound by a confirmation of Slovak National Bank was introduced. The reason for the introduction of this regulation was that the Hungarian National Bank autonomously changed the exchange rate of Hungarian pengő against the Slovak crown.¹⁹ Interestingly, the foreign trade between the two counties was carried out in a steady manner even in the final period of WWII when business relations with other states were carried out only minimally.

How important was Romania?

The Slovak state was gradually trying to adapt in the foreign trade on Balkan, where it was enclosing business deals with several countries, as well. Last country to recognize the first Slovak Republic before the outbreak of WW II was on the 18th August 1939 the Kingdom of Romania. Political relations between Slovakia and Romania were smooth, which arised from the shared past in former Great Hungary and common struggle for national freedom. Mutually good political

¹⁶ *Slovenský priemysel roku 1939* [Slovak industry in 1939. Annual Report of the Central Association of Slovak industry], 1940, p. 65.

¹⁷ *Slovenský priemysel roku 1940...*, p. 84.

¹⁸ PA AA Berlin, f. GP, box 238. *Hospodárske Rozhl'ady*, p. 120.

¹⁹ Pavol Petruf, *Zahraničná politika Slovenskej republiky 1939 – 1945* [Slovakia's Foreign Policy 1939 - 1945], Bratislava, HÚ SAV, 2011, p. 84.

relations were confirmed by an active cooperation within the Slovak-Romanian Company headed by the Minister for Transport Július Stano. Branches of the company were established in Slovakia, on the 8th April 1943 in Trenčín and on the 10th May 1943 in Prešov. Good cultural and social relations were, of course, strengthened by the relatively strong presence of Slovak minority in Romania based on a long historical tradition.

First Romanian diplomatic representative on Slovak territory was Dinu Hiott, who arrived in Bratislava on the 17th September 1939. In early April 1940 a new Romanian diplomat arrived to Bratislava, an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Nicolas Lahovary. New ambassador was received by President Jozef Tiso on an audience of entry into office on the 15th April 1940. The Romanian envoy had resided in Slovakia until March 1941 when he was reassigned to Bern. His successor was Gheorghe Elefterescu, who previously worked at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new ambassador was received on the 9th April 1941 by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Vojtech Tuka and an audience with the President of the Republic was realized the next day. Slovak Republic was also represented in the Kingdom of Romania by its diplomat, an Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Dr. Ivan Milecz. After obtaining consent from Romanian king Charles II., he travelled to Bucharest on the 2nd September 1939, where he subsequently attended an audience of entry into office on the 14th of September 1939.²⁰ Both countries had established friendly diplomatic relations between each other as demonstrated by many joint events or by granting the highest state awards.

In order to establish good business relations with Romania, a Slovak business delegation travelled to Romania in November 1939 to conclude new business agreement. Business negotiations were successful and a Slovak-Romanian trade agreement was concluded in Bucharest on the 4th December 1939 and was modified on the 5th of June 1940 by an Agreement of Slovak and Romanian National Bank on financial payments.²¹ On the same day in December, an agreement on the prohibition of double taxation waterways transport companies was concluded. It is interesting that both contracts were only approved by Slovak parliament on the 10th September 1942 with a statement that the contracting parties create normative preconditions to facilitate and develop trade

²⁰ Pavol Petruš, *Zahraničná politika Slovenskej republiky 1939 – 1945,...*, pp. 214 – 218.

²¹ SNA BA, f. MH 1938 – 1945, inventory Nr. 27, box 222.

relations, especially business, trade license, export, import or acquisition of movable or immovable property issues.²²

Business with Romania had to be carried out in free foreign exchange, which caused considerable difficulties on the Romanian side and the Romanian authorities preferred to try to impede the importation of Slovak products that Romania could obtain through clearing, for example in Germany. Romanian party tried to resolve those payment difficulties by changes in the payment agreement. To achieve this, Slovakia-Romanian negotiations were held on the 25th October 1940 where the Romanian party pushed changes from mutual payments to clearing payment system. The Slovak party argued that it regularly paid Romania in free foreign exchange for the purchase of fuel and other goods so the foreign exchange that could cover imported goods from Slovakia had been provided to Romania.²³ This is why the Romanian party rather preferred purchasing goods in countries that had concluded clearing payment system with Romania.

According to an official publication *Comerțul exterior al României*, the most important export commodity in Romanian foreign trade of 1940 was kerosene – 62.5% (and in 1941 72.6%) and crops – 18.3% (in 1941 13%). Import was dominated by iron and iron products – 23.4%; machinery, apparatus and engines – 17.4%, vehicles – 10.7%, other metals – 12.7% and textiles – 11.3%. The dominant trade partner of Romania was Germany: import in 1940 – 50.6% (in 1941 – 63.6%), export – 43.6% (in 1941 – 65.4%) together with the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia: import in 1940 – 13.7% (in 1941 – 3.7%), export – 5.6% (in 1941 – 3.3%). The second most important partner of Romania was Italy: import in 1940 – 9.5% (in 1941 – 15.4%), export – 9.4% (in 1941 – 11.6%).²⁴ As the statistics above show, the major business partners were allied countries, the German Reich and Italy.

Romania represented a traditional supplier in trade with Slovakia as well: diesel oil, petroleum distillates²⁵, oilseeds and corn; goods exported on its territory: magnesite, textile semi-finished products, glass products,

²² *Náš medzištátny styk* [Our interstate relations], *Budovateľ*, vol. 4, 11th September 1942, p. 2.

²³ Antónia Štefániková, *O niektorých aspektoch zahraničného...*, pp. 469-470.

²⁴ *Zahraničný obchod Rumunska* [Foreign trade of Romania], *Budovateľ*, vol. 3, 27 December 1941, p. 4.

²⁵ Romanian raw oil materials such as gasoline, petroleum distillate and crude oil sprayed with gasoline formed the main part of the processed raw materials of the State's mineral oil refinery in Dubová. PA AA Berlin, f. GP, box 204. The export of Gbelian oils from State's mineral oil refinery in Dubová into foreign exchange and purchase of Romanian raw oil materials.

electrical engineering and metal industry. In 1940, Romania ranked in import to Slovakia at third place – 125 million Slovak crowns (after Germany and Italy) and at fourth place in export – 121 million Slovak crowns (after Germany, Italy and Hungary). According to the Decree of 18th December 1940, the mutual trade banned the export of the following foods: wheat flour, pasta, semolina, bread, rusks, sugar, spirits, honey, jam, vegetable oils, olives, rice, tea, coffee, cocoa, chocolate, onions, nuts. In November 1940 and February 1941 other types of food were also included among the listed items.²⁶ Lower trade turnover with Romania was anticipated for the future since major parts of its territory were annexed by the USSR, Bulgaria and Hungary. This assumption had been fulfilled as early as in 1941 when commodity exchange dropped in import on 1.9% and in export on 2.3%. Stable level of import was only maintained by mineral oils that were very important for Slovakia.²⁷ Mutual business relations were also reduced by the active participation of Romania in the war against the USSR.

In order to deepen the bilateral economic relations, Romanian Minister of Economy Marinescu visited Slovakia in November 1941.

The regulation of mutual trade and payment relations between the countries was signed on the 14th April 1942. The agreements had validity of one year and determined major commodities of business relations. If one country had high active trade balance, it could regulate import while the price level was equalized. The concluded payment agreement had an unlimited validity, but the contracting party could terminate it with a month's notice. All payments for goods continued to be carried out in free foreign exchange accordingly to the creditor country. Other payments not arising from commodity contact were carried out through a limited clearing according to the agreement of 5th June 1941.²⁸

The Romanian Ministry of Propaganda evaluated the concluded contracts and bilateral economic relations very positively and stated that the mutual

²⁶ PA AA Berlin, f. Gesandtschaft Pressburg, box 238. *Hospodárske Rozhl'ady*, p. 122.

²⁷ Certain problems with raw material imports occurred after the attack on the USSR. Supplies of crude oil were distributed and the allocated quota was barely enough for the usage of half the capacity of Slovak refineries. Insufficient contingent resulted in a general lack of mineral oil in the European market. The interruption of traffic routes in Balkans during the first half of the year made the deliveries of Romanian materials impossible for some time. *Slovenský priemysel roku 1941*. Výročná správa Ústredného združenia slovenského priemyslu [Slovak industry in 1941. Annual Report of the Central Association of Slovak industry], 1942, p. 23.

²⁸ *Hospodárske styky s Rumunskom* [Economic relations with Romania]. *Budovateľ*, vol. 4, 21 August 1942, p. 4.

exchange of goods would achieve substantial growth. But the business relations had recorded some problems, particularly in payment issues, and the improvement of economic relations with Romania in 1942 did not occur, when the import of Romanian goods to Slovakia dropped to 1.3% of the overall Slovak import, but the export from Slovakia to Romania represented 12.5% of total Slovak export. This situation was also influenced by the deteriorating economic situation of Romania, where price measures were starting to be introduced in response to rising prices. It was, for example, an introduction of a special bonuses for mining undertakings for manufactured gold or the adoption of a regulation on the extension of the Act on additional levy by the 1st April 1944. At the same time, prices for tobacco, cigars, cigarettes, cigarette paper, playing cards increased by 50% and the price commissioner ordered a re-increase in sugar prices. Profits from higher prices went straight to the state treasury.

In March 1943, negotiations of the Slovak party with Italy, Hungary and Romania were held in Bratislava. The basic objective of the negotiations was to reach an agreement on the fixed prices of exported products. The Price Agreement with Romania was concluded on the 15th April 1943. The price issue was extremely important as the price levels between both countries were very different. Romanian high export prices complicated the mutual foreign trade and the business in agricultural sector almost completely stopped. So the held negotiations were to improve the existing situation. The new contingent agreement was valid until the 14th April 1944 and anticipated an exchange of goods amounting to 400 million Slovak crowns. Business had still been carried out in free foreign exchange and a balance of commodity exchange had been controlled every quarter year.²⁹

By the agreement of November 1943 had Romania carried out further supplies of agricultural crops, which were intended to drain the claim of Slovakia on a so called special account while also reaching an agreement on expansion of the mutual commodity exchange. The basic export products still remained oil and petroleum distillates, but also arms, cotton yarn and other textile products.

Minister of Economy Gejza Medrický tried to deepen the mutual economic relations which, despite the Agreement on expansion of commodity exchange, did not form the required intensity. The mutual political and economic relations definitively ended by the Romanian declaration of war against Germany on the 24th August 1944.³⁰

²⁹ *Cenový stop so zahraničím* [Price cap with foreign countries]. *Budovateľ*, vol. 5, 23 April 1943, p. 17.

³⁰ Pavol Petruf, *Zahraničná politika Slovenskej republiky 1939 – 1945...*, p. 222.

Slovak's Foreign Trade with Bulgaria

As regards the Balkans region, import of tobacco, oilseeds, hides and rice was carried out from Bulgaria in exchange for Slovak cellulose, wood and so on. Slovak government was informed about the establishment of diplomatic relations on the 5th August 1939 by a Bulgarian Honorary Consul in Bratislava František Michera. The Slovak party was satisfied by the decision, whereas Bulgaria was of important political position in the Balkans.³¹

Economic negotiations between the two countries took place in Sofia in July and August 1940. The aim of the negotiations was to conclude a framework business contract that had to replace a previously established temporary status lasting from the 14th March 1939. Because on the basis of Section 3 of the Government Decree no. 2/1939 of the 14th March 1939 a commercial agreement of Bulgaria with Czechoslovakia and the Agreement on the exchange of goods and payments between the two banks of issue of the 24th October 1939 were temporarily used. A conceptual business contract was agreed upon on the 12th August 1940 under the most favoured nation clause. The contractual parties also agreed on its force from the 1st September 1940. Under the agreement, the exchange of goods between the states was carried out solely through private compensations approved in each particular case by the authorities of both countries. Due to a shortage of time, the delegations failed to sign a veterinary agreement which was then replaced by the Commercial Agreement between Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria of the 29th August 1933.³² Interesting about the economic relations with Bulgaria is that around 800 Bulgarian gardeners worked in Slovakia.

In order to further develop the economic relations an agreement on a mutual exchange of goods between both countries was signed in Sofia on the 4th September 1942 with effect from the 1st September 1942 till the 31st August 1943. The agreement was based on private compensations which were authorized after a previous trade agreement by a Slovak Ministry of Economy and Bulgarian Directorate for Foreign Trade. Special contingents had not been agreed on as any compensatory business had to be approved separately after a mutual agreement. Dominant supplies from Bulgaria were oilseeds, lamb

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

³² SNA BA, f. MH 1938 – 1945, inventory Nr. 27, box 11. Slovak-Bulgarian trade agreement of the 12th August 1940.

leather, tobacco, opium, etc. Slovak deliveries were based on industrial products, chemicals and so on.³³

In the context of economic relations between the two countries, Slovakia has participated in the International Sample Fair in Plovdiv in 1940 and subsequently in 1942. The Fair was divided into Bulgarian and foreign part and the exhibitors presented typical products of their economies there. Slovakia mainly exhibited its industrial products, products of wooden economy and domestic industry.³⁴ Similar "Danube Fair" organized in Bratislava by the Slovak Republic focused on a presentation of products of individual countries and a development of mutual trade relations.

Mutual Slovak-Bulgarian relations had mainly developed in the area of culture or diplomacy and the economic sphere remained in the background despite the desired expectations. On the basis of the initial trade agreement a new agreement was signed on the 8th September 1943 in Bratislava and had been in force until the 31st August 1944.³⁵

Large Room for Growth: Trade with Yugoslavia, Croatia and Turkey

A very interesting fact was a realization of trade relation on the territory of Yugoslavia. Slovak delegation had concluded a trade agreement with Yugoslavia before Germany invaded it. The Slovak state signed a temporary deal about business and payment liaison with Yugoslavia in June 1939. Both sides acknowledged Czechoslovakia – Yugoslavian business precontract and established clearing accounts. During the first several months, the Slovak state registered a liable balance in the system of payments that resulted from a specific restraint from the Yugoslavian part, which resulted in difficulties of the Slovak purchase in Yugoslavia. The change occurred in December 1939, when the Slovakian clearing balance became positive. On the whole, we can quantify the foreign trade between Slovak state and Yugoslavia in 1939 to about 40 million Slovak crowns. Majority of the goods imported from Yugoslavia were grease, tobacco, swines or tropical fruits, on the other hand Slovakia mainly exported cellulose, barley, building material, printing-paper etc.³⁶

In 1940 a new business negotiations started with Yugoslavia. The negotiations took place on the 25th of July 1940 in Belgrade. Consequently, a new

³³ *Náš medzištátny styk...*, p. 2.

³⁴ *Prvý veľtrh Veľkého Bulharska* [The first fair of Great Bulgaria]. *Budovateľ*, vol. 4, 10 April 1942, p. 2.

³⁵ Pavol Petruf, *Zahraničná politika Slovenskej republiky 1939 – 1945...*, p. 233.

³⁶ *Slovenský priemysel roku 1939...*, p. 69.

Commerce and Navigation Treaty with the veterinary agreement and the agreement on the mutual goods exchange was signed on the 3rd of August. Peter Zafko and Ján Országh signed the treaty for the Slovak state and Svetomír Lazarevič for Yugoslavia. The treaty involved a clause on the highest benefits and the expected goods exchange was estimated on 70 million Slovak crowns per year. But in 1940 there was a massive growth of the mutual goods supplies and the import from Yugoslavia reached 94 million and the export from Slovakia 122 million Slovak crowns' worth sum.³⁷ The agreement on the payment liaisons involved a statute on mutual remittance through clearing accounts.³⁸ The enclosed agreements presented a foundation of the business relationships until the defeat of Yugoslavia and also served as a foundation for business relationships between the Slovak state and Croatia. After the defeat of Yugoslavia, there remained a Slovak clearing claim about 20 million Slovak crowns in mutual business. The liquidation of the above-mentioned balance was handled by Croatian State Bank.

After the adaption of Slovak and Croatian diplomatic deputies in individual countries, the mutual relations started to develop relatively intensely. To this contributed a fact, that both countries didn't have any serious disagreement and because they didn't have common borders, there were no territorial claims. Several other important factors contributed to the mutual unity. First, there was a shared guarantee of a formation of both countries, which was the Tird Riech. The leaders of the states and their political leaderships were allied with the Axis' members and their political representatives. Both states signed the Tripartite Pact and together they became a part of building a „new Europe“, which supposed to be a substance of a new power-political organization of the World.³⁹

We can find parallels between the Slovak state and the Independent Croatian state even in the economic area. Both states became a part of a German large economic area and during the whole existence they were more or less forced to satisfy German demands. The more the country was politically and economically fixated to the Reich, the easier was to enforce admissions from its representatives for Berlin, which headed to a fulfillment of Berlin's own interests. The exemplary cases were Slovakia and Croatia – states that were formed as by-products of the German expansive foreign policy.⁴⁰

³⁷ *Slovenský priemysel roku 1940 ...*, p. 86.

³⁸ *Obchodná zmluva s Juhosláviou* [A commercial agreement with Yugoslavia], in “Slovák”, 7 August 1940, p. 8.

³⁹ Pavol Petruš, *Zahraničná politika Slovenskej republiky 1939 – 1945*, p. 241.

⁴⁰ Ľudovít Hallon, *Historický prehľad náboru slovenských pracovných síl 1943 – 1945* [Historical overview of the recruitment of Slovak workers 1943 - 1945]. in *Podoby*

Mutual economical connection in German large area economy ushered in the ambition of both countries⁴¹ to develop their shared economic relations, in which both sides were interested, shortly after the declaration of the Independent Croatian state.

According to the agreed terms Croatia should Supply Slovakia mainly with: tobacco, corn, wine, fish, dried fruit (plums, cherries), jam etc. On the other hand, Slovakia should export into Croatia: fireclay bricks, talc, paper, cellulose, brewing barley, some textile products (ladies' underwear made of synthetic silk), asbestos products, chemicals and other products.

Payments between the both states were carried out through the collecting accounts „A“ and „B“ in Croatian state bank in Zagreb and in Slovak mortgage and communal bank in Bratislava and same accounts in SNB in Bratislava. Through the collecting account „A“ the payments for goods, transportation and incidental expenses arising from trade relations were held. Through the collecting account „B“ the payments for diplomatic envoys were carried and savings of Croatian citizens in Slovakia and Slovak citizens in Croatia were transferred.

The annual trade exchange was estimated on the grounds of previous business experiences of trading with Yugoslavia on the sum between 80 and 100 million Croatian kunas. The exchange rate of Slovak crown and Croatian kuna⁴² was estimated according to the rate of German Mark on the value of 100 crowns – 172 kunas (the exchange rate on Protectorate crown was 100 crowns

nemecko-slovenského „ochranného priateľstva“. *Dokumenty k náboru a nasadeniu slovenských pracovných síl do Nemeckej ríše v rokoch 1939 – 1945* [Forms of German-Slovak “Protective Friendship”. Documents to Recruitment and Deployment of Slovak Workfolks in German Reich from 1939 till 1945], Bratislava – Banská Bystrica, HÚ SAV Bratislava – FHV UMB Banská Bystrica, 2012, pp. 32 – 34; BArch Berlin, f. R 43-II/625. Die Ergebnisse der Erhebung über die ausländischen Arbeiter und Angestellten vom 25. April und 25. September 1941.

⁴¹ Croatia was, as well as Slovakia, mainly an agrarian country, where 80% of population work in agriculture and 20% in industrial trade and third sector (in Slovakia 52% of population worked in agriculture, so the industrial sektor was represented in greater amount), in *Chorvátsky štát je krajinou sedliakov* [Croatian state is a country of peasants], in “Slovák”, 30 Juli 1941, p. 7.

⁴² A new currency in Croatia, *kuna*, was formed after the collapse of Yugoslavia. A hundredth of kuna was called *banica*. The new currency had the exchange rate assimilated to the Yugoslavian dinar and 20 Kn wa equal to 1RM, according to *Kuna – nová chorvátska mena* [Kuna - new Croatian currency], in “Gardista”, 15 May 1941, p. 7.

– 200 kunas).⁴³ Despite the apparent efforts of both sides it soon showed that Croatia due to internal problems was not able to maintain its contractual obligations and the trade exchanges were carried out only with difficulties. Big problem in terms of supply caused Croatians a pillaging by Italy and Germany as well (200 000 Italian soldiers), and the unstable military and political situation in the country.⁴⁴

The economic situation in both countries only confirmed the fact that foreign trade between the two countries was not too intense and even despite some expansion of commodity exchange in 1942, the trade relations were conducted in reduced, and since 1944 in minimal, quantity.

Slovak companies also established a contact with Turkish market where an exchange of Turkish cotton for Slovak sugar, nails, web and structural iron was significant. In 1940, the bilateral trade with Turkey reached the amount of 53 million Slovak crowns of which import from Turkey amounted to 20.5 million and export to 32.5 million Slovak crowns.

On the initiative of the Turkish government, a list of importers and exporters who traded with Slovak Republic was drawn up on the 13th February 1941. Head offices of the Associations of importers and exporters were in Istanbul and Izmir and their branch offices were throughout the whole territory of Turkey.⁴⁵

The foreign trade with the above mentioned countries was still carried out in the first half of 1944, but largely minimized after the outbreak of the Slovak National Uprising.

Conclusions

Ultimately, when evaluating Slovak foreign trade, some facts that helped partially reduce the huge dependence on Germany can be stated. Slovakia, for example, resisted the introduction of the Deutschmark as a second tender on its territory. This had a positive impact on the Slovak economy because it limited the opportunity to buy up the supplies of the national market. Slovak Republic also benefited from a duty-free trade with the Czech lands since a large number of Slovak goods went to the Protectorate. To maintain as much independence of economic policy as possible, clearing accounts with different

⁴³ SNA BA, f. MH 1938 – 1945, box 23: Business contract, payment agreement and veterinary agreement between the Slovak state and the Independent Croatian state.

⁴⁴ Martin Jarinkovič, *Slovensko a Južoslávia v rokoch II. Svetovej vojny* [Slovakia and Yugoslavia during the years of the World War II], Banská Bystrica, 2012, p. 97.

⁴⁵ PA AA Berlin, f. Gesandtschaft Pressburg, box 238. Hospodárske Rozhl'ady, p. 124.

courses and marks were introduced and a double registration of goods was carried out. Slovak economists resisted the excessive centralization of the economy within the limits of German influence and, by falsified balance sheets and statistics, justified the negative handling of German requirements. The Slovak business interests focused on the area of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Beside Germany and Italy, the most important trading partners of the Slovak Republic were Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Croatia and Turkey. Yet, the foreign trade with these countries decreased as the trend of degradation of mutual economic relations was gradually confirmed. This fact arised mainly from the gradual deterioration of the economic situation in individual countries and difficulties in the financial execution of realized transactions, which were related to the intensifying impact of World War II on the states directly or indirectly involved in the devastating military conflict.

THE OCCUPATION OF THE NORTHERN BUKOVINA BY THE USSR (JUNE, 28th –JULY, 3rd 1940). POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBSERVATIONS

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**Rezumat: Ocuparea nordului Bucovinei de către URSS (28 iunie – 3 iulie 1940).
Observații politico-militare**

Articolul trece în revistă și analizează contextul geopolitic și geostrategic internațional care a condus la ocuparea nordului Bucovinei de către URSS în 1940, fără nici un fel de rezistență militară din partea României.

În primul rând, este analizat contextul geopolitic internațional din luna iunie 1940, marcat de desființarea unor alianțe și dispariția sau capitularea unor state pe care se baza sistemul de securitate al României: autodesființarea Micii Înțelegeri (România, Cehoslovacia, Iugoslavia) și a Înțelegerii Balcanice (România, Iugoslavia, Grecia, Turcia) în 1938, dispariția Poloniei ca stat în septembrie 1939 și capitularea Franței la 22 iunie 1940.

În continuare, sunt prezentate acțiunile politico-diplomatice ale URSS de obținere a neutralității Germaniei în ceea ce privește dorința de a ocupa toată Bucovina inițial, sudul Bucovinei ulterior, derulate în intervalul 23 august 1939 – 26 iunie 1940.

Partea a treia a articolului, bazată aproape în întregime pe surse arhivistice, surprinde principalele acțiuni de pregătire militară a URSS în vederea invadării nordului Bucovinei, în cazul în care România nu ar fi cedat acest teritoriu de bunăvoie și ar fi încercat să opună rezistență militară.

În finalul articolului este analizată ipoteza, vehiculată practic până astăzi în istoriografia română, în conformitate cu care ar fi fost mai bine pentru România să opună rezistență militară la ultimatumul sovietic din 26 iunie 1940.

Abstract: The article reviews and analyzes the international geopolitical and geostrategic context, which led to the occupation of Bukovina by the USSR in 1940, without any military resistance from Romania. Firstly, it analyzed the international geopolitical context of June 1940, that was marked by the dissolution of alliances, and the disappearance or surrender of states on which the security system of Romania was based: the self-annulment of the Little Entente (Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) and of the Balkan Entente (Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey) in 1938, the disappearance of Poland as a state in September 1939, and the fall of France on June 22nd, 1940. Following this, the article presented the political-diplomatic actions of USSR for obtaining the German neutrality, regarding the desire to occupy initially the whole Bukovina, then only the

Southern Bucovina from the 23rd of August 1939 to the 26th of June 1940. The third part of the article, based almost entirely on archival sources, captures the main actions of USSR military training to the invasion of Northern Bukovina if Romania would not have willingly ceded these territories and had tried to resist militarily. At the end, the article analyzes the hypothesis, practically circulated today in Romanian historiography, and according to which it would have been better for Romania to oppose an armed resistance to the Soviet ultimatum of June 26th, 1940.

Résumé: L'occupation du nord de la Bucovine par l'URSS (28 juin - 3 juillet 1940). Observations politico-militaires

L'article ci-joint passe en revue et analyse le contexte géopolitique et géostratégique international qui mena à l'occupation du nord de la Bucovine par l'URSS en 1940, sans aucune résistance militaire de la part de la Roumanie.

Premièrement, on y analysa le contexte géopolitique international du mois de juin 1940, marqué par la destruction des alliances et la disparition ou la capitulation des Etats sur lesquels se basa le système de sécurité de la Roumanie: l'auto annulation de la Petite Entente (Roumanie, Tchécoslovaquie, Yougoslavie) et de la l'Entente Balkanique (Roumanie, Yougoslavie, Grèce, Turquie) en 1938, la disparition de la Pologne comme Etat en septembre 1939 et la capitulation de la France le 22 juin 1940.

Ensuite, on y présenta les actions politico-diplomatiques de l'URSS afin d'obtenir la neutralité de l'Allemagne concernant le désir d'occuper initialement la Bucovine, ultérieurement le sud de la Bucovine, déroulées dans l'intervalle 23 août 1939 - 26 juin 1940.

La troisième partie de l'article, fondée presque entièrement sur des sources des archives, surprit les principales actions de formation militaire de l'URSS en vue d'envahir le nord de la Bucovine, le cas où la Roumanie n'aurait cédé ce territoire volontiers et aurait essayé à résister militairement.

A la fin de l'article, on analysa l'hypothèse véhiculée pratiquement jusqu'au aujourd'hui dans l'historiographie roumaine, conformément à laquelle il aurait été mieux que la Roumanie oppose de résistance militaire à l'ultimatum soviétique de 26 juin 1940.

Keywords: *Romania, Bukovina, USSR, Germany, diplomacy, geopolitics, geostrategy, military preparedness*

Introduction

Romania had fought in the World War I on the Triple Entente's side (England, France, Russia) and SUA's side, managing to annex the former Romanian Old Kingdom's three provinces - Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania. Thus, it was created a medium-sized state (295.641 km²) in south-eastern Europe, the so-called "Great Romania", as it was known in the European diplomatic circles since 1920.

The traditional ally of France and Great Britain, Romania had maintained in the interwar period a pacifist policy, being one of the most fervent supporter of the peace treaty of Versailles (1920), which guaranteed its territorial integrity. At the same time, Romania had respected, like no other, the Article 10 of the Pact of the League of Nations, adopted on April 28, 1919. This article especially provided respecting the territorial integrity of the Member States: „The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled¹.

The foresights of this article, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of the states, were completed with Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15, which mainly provided ways of settling the conflicts between states².

Romania, through the activity of its eminent lawyer and diplomat Nicolae Titulescu, had defended the principles of keeping the territorial integrity and maintaining peace between states, included in the Pact of the League of Nations, because three of its neighbors manifested strong revisionist tendencies, desiring change of the borders established in Peace Treaty of Versailles. Thus, neither the USSR recognized the union of Bessarabia with Romania in 1918, nor Hungary the union of Transylvania with Romania, nor Bulgaria the affiliation of the Durostor/Dorostolon and Caliacra/Kaliakra counties to the Romanian state.

The Great Romania's borders had collapsed without a fight in 1940, due to the combined actions of the borders revision policy established in 1920 by the Peace Treaty of Versailles, implemented after 1920 by Germany, Italy, USSR, Hungary and Bulgaria. The loss of northern Bukovina to the USSR, analyzed in this paper, represents a chapter of this drama.

International geopolitical context in June 1940

Romania had in the interwar period 4 pillars which supported its whole foreign policy of defending its borders: the Little Entente, the Balkan Entente, the alliance with Poland and the traditional alliance, after 1919, with France. Further on, we are going to briefly present to the reader how these four pillars collapsed one by one on June 1940.

In order to counterattack the revisionist policy of Hungary, for maintaining peace and their territorial integrity, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia

¹ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art10. Accessed in 26.07.2016.

² *Ibid.*

created the Little Entente in 1920 and 1921³. This organization acted in solidarity on the international arena and came to be unofficially considered as the fifth power in Europe, due to the demographic, economic and military potential of the three states. Practically, the Little Entente had ceased to exist after the Agreements from Munich on September 29, 1938, followed by the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. By disappearance of the Little Entente, Romania had lost an important support on the international arena.

Practically, Romania had lost, in the same year, the second fulcrum on the international arena, which was the Balkan Entente, founded on February 9, 1934 at Athens, by Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. In the first chapter of building of this alliance, were specified:

„Yugoslavia, Greece, Romania and Turkey shall mutually guarantee the security of their Balkan borders”⁴. Aimed at maintaining peace in Balkans and stopping the revision tendencies of Bulgaria, this Entente also ceased to exist *de facto* in 1938. *De jure*, this Entente was operating since February 4, 1940, when the Permanent Council of the Balkan Entente had emitted a communiqué from Beograd, Yugoslavia. In this communiqué was stated that, starting with February 9, 1941, the organization will had prolonged its existence for another 7 years⁵. The outbreak of the World War I in south-eastern Europe had made this initiative being inoperative.

In order to defend its borders against revisionist tendencies of the USSR, Romania concluded on March 3, 1921 at Bucharest, a defensive Convention of Alliance with Poland renewed in the Romania’s capital on March 26, 1921. In addition, it was subsequently signed at Geneva, on February 15, 1932, a guarantee treaty between the two states⁶. The division of the Polish state between Germany and the USSR (1939) had made these agreements too as being inoperative.

France’s capitulation on June 22, 1940 represented a real shock to Romania, whose elites were predominantly Francophile since the 19th century. Moreover, France and Great Britain officially guaranteed Romanian’s borders on

³ The most representative book on this topic is that signed by Eliza Campus, Mica Întelegere [Little Entente], 2nd edition, Romanian Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 1997.

⁴ http://www.rastko.org.rs/istorija/diplomatija/pbs_e.html. Accessed in 26.07.2016.

⁵ Dan Vătăman, *România în relațiile internaționale 1939-1947* [Romania in international relations], 1, Bucharest, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, 2009, p. 82.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-80, with the official, authoritative, Romanian translation of those agreements.

April 13, 1939.

In a situation such this, the whole interwar Romania's foreign system of alliances collapsed and Romania's destiny lied at the discretion of the two powerful revisionist states, who then dominated Europe: Germany and the USSR.

Political-diplomatic actions of USSR for obtaining the German neutrality, in order to get Bukovina

August 23, 1939 represents a fundamental date for the Soviet revisionist policy, of redrawing the borders of south-eastern Europe, because then was concluded the famous Nazi-Soviet non-aggression Pact, known as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, accompanied by a secret protocol with four articles⁸. The 3rd Article of this famous secret protocol stipulated the following: "As regards South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side emphasis its interest for Bessarabia. The German side declares total political disinterest for these regions"⁹.

Politically and military provided by this non-aggression Pact, the Soviet Union decided in 1940 that had to take Bessarabia from Romania, inclusive, if necessary, by force. In this context appeared a novelty: the Soviet Union also wanted to take Bukovina from Romania, the province which, unlike Bessarabia, had never been part of the Russian Empire until 1917. Only Germany's reluctance towards this "novelty" (Bukovina was not included in the secret adjacent protocol of the Pact in 1939) had made USSR claiming only northern Bukovina to Romania. We succinctly present further on, the diplomatic events that lead to the Soviet's ultimatum addressed to Romania in 1940, when the USSR urged Romania to give up Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.

⁷ Alesandru Dușu, Constantin Olteanu, *Războiul de 2194 de zile. 1 septembrie 1939-2 septembrie 1945* [War of 2194 days. 1st of September 1939 – 2nd of September 1945], Bucharest, Tritonic Publishing House, 2011, p. 96.

⁸ On this agreement see especially Domas Krivickas, *The Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact of 1939: Legal and Political Consequences*, in „Lituanus. Lithuanian Quarterly Journal Of Arts and Sciences”, volume 34, No. 2, Summer 1989, Vilnius, <http://www.lituanus.org/>. Accessed in 26.07.2017; Ion Șișcanu, Vitalie Văratice, *Pactul Molotov - Ribbentrop. Culegere de documente* [Molotov – Ribbentrop Pact. Collection of documents], Kishinev, Universitas Publishing House, 1991.

⁹ Vitalie Văratice, *Preliminarii la raptul Basarabiei și a Nordului Bucovinei, 1938 – 1940* [Preliminaries at kidnapping of Bessarabia and North of Bukovina, 1938 – 1940], Bucharest, Libra Press Publishing House, 2000, p. 231; Vătăman, Dan, *România în relațiile internaționale (1939-1947)* [Romania in international relations (1939-1947)], vol. 1, Bucharest, Pro Universitaria Publishing House, 2009, p. 59.

On August 23, 1939, Viaceslav M. Molotov, the Soviet foreign policy leader, had convoked the German ambassador to Moscow, Count Friedrich-Werner von Schulenburg, presenting him that the USSR wants to “solve” the Bessarabia’s problem. In addition, he mentioned that “the Soviet’s claim also extends over Bukovina, which has Ukrainian population”¹⁰. At the same time, the Soviet dignitary showed that the USSR expects that “Germany must not impede the Soviets, but to support them”¹¹.

The German ambassador in Moscow sent the USSR’s requirements to the German Government and, at the second meeting with Molotov, on the evening of June 25, 1940, explained the Germany’s position. Germany was basically agree with the Bessarabia’s annexation, promising “to advise the Romanian leadership to peacefully clarify the Bessarabia’s issue, in accordance to Russian wishes”¹².

Regarding Bukovina, the German diplomat revealed that the USSR’s annexation request represents a “novelty”, that this region was a province of the Austrian Crown and that here lived ethnic Germans, of whose fate the Germany is interested¹³.

Influenced – very likely – by the Germany’s reluctance on the annexation of Bukovina to USSR, I.V. Stalin decided to limit the Soviet’s claims only to just to the northern Bukovina, including the Chernivtsi (Rom. Cernăuți) city. As a consequence, Molotov summoned von Schulenburg again, in the afternoon of June 26, 1940, pointing out that decision. Germany agreed, pledging to convince Romania to cede, in order to avoid war¹⁴.

Diplomatic assured of Germany’s neutrality, the USSR presented in the evening of June 26, 1940 an ultimatum to the Romanian government, which specified the following:

„In 1918, Romania, using Russia’s military weakness, had taken from the Soviet Union a part of its territory – Bessarabia, thus violating the secular unity of Bessarabia (mainly populated by Ukrainians) with the Ukrainian Soviet Republic ... The Soviet Government considers that Bessarabia issue is organically connected with the transmission to the U.R.S.S. of that part of Bukovina whose population is linked, in majority, with the soviet Ukraine through common historical fate, language and national composition. Such an act would be more

¹⁰ *Apud* Aurică Simion, *Dictatul de la Viena* [Dictate from Vienna], 2nd edition, Bucharest, Albatros Publishing House, 1996, p. 160.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 161.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Ioan Scurtu (coordinator), *Istoria Românilor* [The History of the Romanians], vol. 8, Encyclopaedic Publishing House, 2003, p. 568.

just as the transmission of the northern Bukovina to U.R.S.S. could represent, insignificantly, a means of compensation of that great loss which was caused to U.R.S.S and Bukovina's population by the 22 years long domination of Romania in Bessarabia¹⁵.

Lacking Germany's support (King Charles II had consulted in this regard on June 27, 1940 Wilhelm Fabricius, the Germany's ambassador in Bucharest and Manfred von Killinger, the general director of the Special Intelligence Service of the Third Reich)¹⁶, Romania decided to cede Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to USSR on June 28, 1940.

Soviet military preparedness against Romania

The Soviet Union was not sure that Germany will support the annexation of Bukovina and Bessarabia nor that Romania will not try to military oppose to that claim. As a consequence, the Soviet Union started, in the first decade of the month of June 1940, extensive military preparedness for the occupation of Bessarabia and Romania, operation that was entrusted to the 9 and 12 armies from the South Front, led by the famous Georgy Zhukov¹⁷.

The Soviet military preparations directed against Romania, before the ultimatum from June 26 A.C., are recorded in some reports of General Direction of the Police Office, written in the period of 6th of May – 26th of June 1940, always addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of Headquarters and, from case to case, to the Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs. The typed reports, containing between 1-3 pages A4, whose military information will be presented below, are based on information obtained from the Regional Police Inspectorate of Chernivtsi (Rom. Cernăuți)¹⁸ We mention that these reports also contain economic and social information, history of mentalities etc., very important for the researchers who want to study the early period of

¹⁵ Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe [Foreign Ministry Archiv], Bucharest, fund 71, USSR, file 91/1940, pp. 186-188.

¹⁶ Dan Vătăman, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

¹⁷ Ion Șișcanu, Vitalie Văratic, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹⁸ Consiliul Național de Studiere a Arhivelor Securității. Direcția Cercetare, Expoziții, Publicații [National Council for Studying the Securitate's Archives. Research Department, Exhibitions, Publications], *Fond Documentar referitor la Starea de spirit a populației din Basarabia și Bucovina în condițiile anexării teritoriului dintre Prut și Nistru – mai-iulie 1940* [Documentary Found on the mood of the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina under conditions of annexation of territory between Prut and Dniester May-July 1940], file no. 4018, share D 011605, f. 10.

establishment of communism in Polish Galicia.

From these reports it turns out that, undoubtedly, both Poles and Ukrainians from Galicia were dissatisfied with the communist regime, and Ukrainian population had even reached, in the period May – June 1940, to regret the time when Galicia was ruled by Poland. At the same time, in the reports it is shown that the young Poles and Ukrainians had formed resistance movements in Galicia (it is not clear whether this was separately or together), starting to kill Soviet communists nearby the town Lutsk (Pol. Łuck)¹⁹. Especially the young Ukrainians had adopted an extreme attitude towards the Soviet authorities. So, in the report of May 28, 1940, were specified: “On April 13 A.C. there were many arrests among the Ukrainians and Poles nationalists, transporting them within Russia. During the transportation, the Ukrainians have protested, singing Ukrainian and Polish national songs and shouting that, 55 million of Ukrainians could not be destroyed, but rather they, the Ukrainians, will sooner destroy the Russians”²⁰. Reconsidering the history of the 20th century, it is no wonder that the former Galicia (now divided between Poland and Ukraine), it is still a nucleus of the Ukrainian nationalism.

The report of May 6, 1940 contains information related to military activities in the province of Galicia, Polish Province occupied by the USSR in 1939, which can be undoubtedly linked with the USSR’s intention of occupying Bukovina. So, it is proved that in Przemyśl (city in Poland; misspelled in the document as “Przemiszr”) there were massed many Soviet troops, especially infantry, a smaller number of soldiers of the Red Army being camped in villages nearby the city. At the same time, the report also states that at the Galicia’s border (Pol. Galicja, Ukr. Галичина, *Halyčyna*, region divided today by Poland and Ukraine) with Romania and Hungary there were also massed many Russian troops. In addition, the gauge of railways had widened on the distance Lwów (nowadays Lviv)-Tarnopol, today Ternopil (for making it compatible with the one in the USSR; the Russian Federation still uses the broad gauge railways), which could serve at bringing troops and military material within Russia in a very short time. Moreover, it is stated that the Soviet authorities had prohibited to any person of Galicia to travel within USSR (undoubtedly for keeping the military secret), while the persons from the Soviet Union were allowed to travel to Galicia. In addition, the Soviet authorities had taken other measures of keeping the military secret: Soviet soldiers who had occupied Galicia in the previous year had been sent to Finland and Siberia, being replaced by troops

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 68, 122, 123.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

sent from the USSR²¹. We believe that the Soviet authorities had moved the troops which already knew the Galicia (including the former Polish-Romanian border area) and they had been able to establish, in principle, connections with the local population – reason for the eventual military secrets linked to the mission and the reshuffle of troops could be endangered. The military secret could better be kept with troops who neither know the area nor the population.

In a report on May 28, 1940, it was announced that in the surroundings of Lutsk were stationed 10-12.000 Soviet troops, from various arms (infantry, artillery, tanks), and that in the Mlenov town, located 50 km from Lutsk, it was completed the building of a large airport. The same type of airport was being built on 400 hectares, 50 km from Luck, about 2,000 workers being employed in leveling the land²². Interesting are the information from this report based on the testimonies of a French traveler. He saw standing at the train station in Colomeea (Pol. Kołomyja, Eng. Kolomyia) a train loaded with anti-aircraft guns and tractors. Furthermore, he had remarked that when the USSR occupied Poland in 1939, the Soviet soldiers there were discussing a lot about the future occupation of Bessarabia; however, during the writing of this report (May 1940), they were no longer talking about this matter²³. We believe that, in this case too, the Soviet troops were instructed to keep the military secret before the onset of an operation, which is why they no longer spoke about the occupation of Bessarabia.

An extensive report (3 typed pages) on May 30, 1940 expressed that in the barracks from Lwów were many Soviet troops, including recruits brought from Turkestan, artillery and tanks (including flamethrowers tanks). Also, there were camped many troops in Śnyatin (today in Ukraine) and in the surroundings of this city, in Przemyśl, Drohobici (Eng. Drohobych, Ukr. Drogobytch), Sambor (Ukr. Sambir) and in Stryi (Pol. Stryj). At the Galicia and Hungary border, the entire population had been evacuated, and the residents had been replaced with soldiers²⁴.

A series of passenger entered in Romania through the border point Orășeni had informed the Romanian authorities that they had seen many tanks and motorized troops camped (in Galicia, our note)²⁵. In the report it is also stated that the Soviet workers had been enlarged the railways' gauge in Galicia, from the old border of the USSR to Przemyśl (via Lwów) and, at the same time, that month it has been working on its broadening between Lwów and

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

Stanisławów (today Ivano-Frankivsk, in Ukraine)²⁶.

In the report also appears extremely interesting information, according to which **the Soviet soldiers were showing that the Soviet Union would occupy Bessarabia when Romania would enter the war against Hungary**²⁷.

In a report on June 18, 1940 was showed that the Soviet authorities were building an edifice about 100 m length in the point located in front of the Vășcăuți town on Cheremosh (today Vașkivți town, Chernivtsi region, Ukraine). The building in question, supposedly being a future barrack or a hangar for aircrafts, was built near the “Shauer” alcohol factory from “the upper neighborhood” of Vășcăuți town on Cheremosh, works being observed through the binoculars of the city police chief. At the same time, it was specified that the locals of the border hamlet Serafineț were entirely been evacuated by the Soviet authorities, who were building a similar construction, but at a smaller scale, in the Polish locality Załucze²⁸.

The subsequent report narrates about frequent violation of the Romanian air space from Bukovina by Soviet aircrafts, without any kind of response from Romanian aviation. The report on June 22, 1940 shows that the day before, at 7.30 P.M., an unidentified plane passed over the Zastvna city, then headed for the frontier point Orășeni (both located in the Chernivtsi region, Ukraine).

At 8.30 P.M., another Soviet aircraft went into the Romanian air space, coming from the east of Zaleszczyki (today Zalesciki, Ternopil region, Ukraine), then flew over Romanian villages Crisciatic, Zvineache, Prelipce and Ștefănești (today in the Chernivtsi region, Ukraine). After that, it had returned to Galicia, re-entered Galicia, landing after 8 minutes nearby Horodenka city²⁹.

In a report on June 25, 1940 it was specified the fact that in the same day, at 7 A.M., 11 Soviet aircrafts arrived from Zaleszczyki (misspelled ‘Zalestiki’) and flown over the Romanian villages Prelipce, Ștefănești and Babin (today in Ukraine), then headed towards Orășeni. At 9.40 A.M., some of these aircrafts headed to Zaleszczyki, the authors of the report suggesting that at 7 km away from this village would be an aviation base, hidden in the forest. On the same day, two groups of aircrafts (5 and 3 appliances) entered on the Orășeni village’s territory, flying from Snyatin, and a group of 3 aircrafts had flown over the Zastvana city at 12.30 A.M.. also, in the Bukovina’s airline space entered a group of aircrafts that advanced over the Jucica Nouă village. The Soviet aviation “demonstration” (of warning?! intimidation?!) held on June 25, 1940 on the

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

Bukovina air territory ended around 2.40 P.M., when a group of Soviet aircrafts flew over the station of Orășeni, then headed to Dubăuți village (today in the Chernivtsi region, Ukraine) and finally re-entered the Galicia's air territory.

The report's authors believed that on this province's territory military exercises were directed, because bangs were heard, but the weapons which produced them could not be identified³⁰.

June 26, 1940 was an unusual day in terms of frequency of the Chernivtsi Police Inspectorate's reports to the General Direction of the Police, being prepared and sent no less than 3 reports.

In the first of these reports, it was mentioned:

"The almost daily incursions of the Soviet aircrafts on the Romanian territory to a depth of 30 kilometers, caused to population great uneasiness, even panic. The most frightened are the Romanian and German population. The Germans addressed to their Consulate where they obtained reassuring answers, but without being able to explain the Soviet's actions purpose³¹.

The second report stated that on June 26, 1940 4 planes entered the airspace of Bukovina: an unidentified one flew over the Zastvana city, two Soviet planes flew over the Ștefănești and Crisciatic regions (nowadays in Ukraine), and a gray three-engine Soviet plane came from Kutu (Galicia) and flew over the Vijnîța city and over the Bahna-Storojineț village³².

The third report on June 26, 1940 offered, with a delay of 10-14 days, some disturbing information about movements of troops and military equipment from Galicia. So, on June 11, in the railway station of Snyatin, had arrived many wagons with cement and ferrous material for building border fortifications. In June 13, all these materials had been sent back to the USSR. Our conclusion: the Soviet authorities knew that the USSR's borders will expand by occupying Bukovina, which is why there was no point in wasting labor and materials for building fortifications in Galicia, which was going to transform from an border area to an inside area of the USSR.

On June 13, 1940, Soviet officials and officers of Sniatyn, with their families had been forced by the authorities to return to the USSR. In retreat, they were forced to sell their furniture at ridiculously low prices³³. Again, we believe that work the same principle of the military secret: USSR was not sure that Romania will not choose the path of military resistance. Therefore, was no need for officials and troops who perhaps established friendships relations with local people or

³⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 138 and 139.

³¹ *Ibid.*, f. 143.

³² *Ibid.*, f. 144.

³³ *Ibid.*, f. 145.

foreigners passing through this region. All these could jeopardize military secret. On 13 to 14 June Soviet authorities banned civilians from the district traffic roads in Sniatyn since those days were brought artillery, tanks and machine guns and infantry transport, which had been placed in villages near the city³⁴.

Finally, in the days of June 14 to 15 Soviet soldiers were quartered in the villages around the town Sniatyn, which caused panic among the civilian population. The Soviet authorities tried to reassure the population, showing that the soldiers in question had to take part in military maneuvers, but citizens believed that “these troops were brought into other purpose”³⁵.

Also, the report stated that on June 16, had been seen in the railway station in Stanisławów three trains with 50 wagons, one with infantrymen, the second with artillery and the third with parts of airplanes, packed. Travelers, who had reported this situation to Romanian authorities, believed that these trains would move towards the Hungarian border³⁶. We believe that rumor reported by passengers was another typical disinformation launched by the Soviets in order to keep the military secret. We mention that the distance from Stanisławów to border with Bukovina (Romania) was much smaller than the distance between this town and the border with Hungary.

Despite of all Soviet provocation, fortunately, in 1940 Romania did not enter in the war against USSR. One year later, Romania starts to fight USSR in alliance with Germany. This war, „an useless epic”, according to the authorized opinion of Mihail E. Ionescu³⁷ (a historian and a Romanian general!), was disastrous both for the Romanian army and society.

Instead of conclusions: defense or unconditioned surrender?

In Romanian historiography presently persists the opinion, stated by prominent historian George Buzatu³⁸ that it would have been better for Romania to military resist to the Soviet ultimatum on June 26, 1940, thus preserving its

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 146

³⁷ Mihail E. Ionescu, *Campania din Est (1941-1944): O epopee inutilă* [Campaign from East (1941-1944): an useless epic], in Idem, *Romania orientală 160 de ani (1848-2009)* [Eastern Romania 160 years (1848-2009)], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2009, pp. 130-175, with explanations.

³⁸ In this respect, the most important book on this topic is Gheorghe Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial* [From the secret history of the WW2], vol. 2, Bucharest, 1995, especially pp. 247-248.

military honor and fighting to the end of the war alongside its traditional allies, France and England.

We believe that this opinion cannot be, neither politically nor military, supported.

In terms of foreign policy, Romania did not have in 1940 any allies, who could help her diplomatically, situation which was presented at the beginning of this paper.

In terms of internal policy, the country's population (like today) no longer had confidence in the political class, which was absolutely objectively accused of corruption and dishonesty. The history has shown that a population that no longer trusts its own political class will hesitate to unconditionally sacrifice its life and goods in a war.

From the military point of view, Romania did not have any real chance to resistance to the USSR, since its forces were by far inferior in quality and quantity due to the lack of serious concern of the Romania's political leadership towards providing the Romanian army with equipment and armament.

Colonel Dan Prisăcaru highlighted all these shortcomings, in a very well documented book, based on the Romanian military archives. Thus, he proved the following:

“With an army in which the existing ammunition for infantry weapons and artillery, calculated in units of fire, did not ensure, at some important categories, even the consumption for ten days of fights, without motorized troops, antitank artillery and anti-aircraft artillery, with an quantitatively and qualitatively less than mediocre aviation, with no possibilities of production and repair for destroyed/damaged weapons or combat equipment, the resistance could be hold, but the final result, at least in the East was clearly unfavorable to Romanian troops ... Now came the term of 20 years of huge discrepancies between the King's, Presidents of the Council of Ministers, parliamentarians etc speeches, who promised during election campaign that they would support the army and its equipping, but in the subsequent inaction, when being on control, they invoked the lack of funding and other priorities”³⁹.

The author quotes the opinion of General Florea Țenescu, the chief of the Romanian Army's Headquarters, who recommended the acceptance of the Soviet ultimatum at the Crown Council on June 27, 1940:

³⁹ Dan Prisăcaru, *În avanpostul luptei pentru supraviețuire: apărarea națională a României și frontul secret în vâltoarea anilor 1938-1940* [In the outpost for survival: the national defense in Romania and secret front in the turmoil of the years 1938/1940], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2014, p. 359. Undoubtedly, the most documented book on this topic.

“1. The army will do its duty, but the disproportion of forces is overwhelming, in favor of the Soviets; 2. Our army could resist for a while, retreating on the Siret (a river in Moldavia, i.e. the eastern part of Romania, our note), only if it could count on a subsequent major support of a great allied army, set in motion by the creation of a political front that would create a military front’; 3. Without this support, I believe that we should accept the ultimatum, in order to not being force to yield more tomorrow than we are asked today”⁴⁰.

In circumstances such these, we believe that Romania could not but to accept the Soviet ultimatum in June 1940 in expectation of better times for the future, than to destroy the army and the country in a completely unequal battle. We consider that the deadlock Romania was put in June 1940 is overwhelmingly due to its own political leadership’s greed, corruption and incompetence.

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 358.

LA PARTICIPATION DE L'ARMÉE SLOVAQUE A LA CAMPAGNE CONTRE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE EN 1941. PERCEPTIONS ROUMAINES

THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SLOVAK ARMY IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. ROMANIAN PERCEPTIONS

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Rezumat: Participarea armatei slovace la campania împotriva Uniunii Sovietice. Percepții românești

În studiul de față ne-am focusat atenția asupra unor aspecte mai puțin cunoscute în istoriografia românească. Am avut în vedere o analiză sumară a participării Slovaciei la războiul antisovietic în anul 1941 din perspectivă multiplă. În prima parte am analizat relațiile dintre Slovacia și Reich-ului nazist. Ținând cont de rolul pe care Germania îl acorda Slovaciei în acest război am definit obiectivele participării la războiul antisovietic. Un al doilea aspect privește relațiile dintre Slovacia și Ungaria, reflectate în acțiunile politice, angajarea militară și propaganda în jurul acestora făcută de Bratislava. De aceea, am detaliat parțial contribuția militară a Slovaciei la campania din Uniunea Sovietică în anul 1941. În ultimul rând am surprins detalii relative la relațiile Slovaciei cu România, care își defineau atunci obiectivele comune ale participării în război stabilind convergențele și divergențele dintre acestea.

Abstract: *In this study we focused our attention on some less known aspects in the Romanian historiography. We considered a summary analysis of Slovakia's participation in the 1941 war against the Soviet Union from multiple perspectives. In the first part, we analyzed the relationship between Slovakia and the Third Reich. Considering the role that Germany accorded to Slovakia in this war, we defined the goals of involvement in the anti-Soviet war. A second aspect concerns the relations between Slovakia and Hungary, as they were reflected in the political action, the military engagement, and the propaganda around these issues, made by Bratislava. Therefore, we partially detailed the Slovakia's military contribution to the campaign against the Soviet Union in 1941. Finally, we underlined details relative to Slovakia's relationship with Romania, which, at that time, defined the common objectives of participation in war, setting convergences and divergences between them.*

Résumé: *L'étude ci-jointe, nous accordâmes attention à quelques aspects moins connus dans l'historiographie roumaine. Nous y eûmes en vue une analyse sommaire de la*

participation de la Slovaquie à la guerre antisoviétique pendant l'année 1941, mais d'une perspective multiple. La première partie, nous analysâmes les relations entre la Slovaquie et le Reich nazi. Tout en tenant compte du rôle que l'Allemagne accorda à la Slovaquie dans cette guerre, nous définîmes les objectifs de la participation à la guerre antisoviétique. Un second aspect concerne les relations entre la Slovaquie et l'Hongrie, réfléchies dans les actions politiques, l'engagement militaire et la propagande faite par Bratislava. Par conséquent, nous y détaillâmes partiellement la contribution militaire de la Slovaquie à la campagne de l'Union Soviétique de l'année 1941. Et dernièrement, nous y avons surpris des détails concernant les relations de la Slovaquie avec la Roumanie, qui définissaient à cette époque-là les objectifs communs de la participation à la guerre, tout en établissant les convergences et les divergences existant entre celles-ci.

Keywords: *Slovak army, Eastern Front, Soviet Union, Hungary, propaganda.*

Introduction

On traita de manière collatérale dans l'historiographie universelle la campagne militaire de la Slovaquie dirigée contre l'U.R.S.S., en tant que force auxiliaire au cadre du Wehrmacht et satellite de l'Axe, manqué de la capacité de prendre des décisions. L'historiographie roumaine, quoique préoccupée par la question de la guerre à l'Est, garde le silence sur le but, les objectifs et l'effort militaire que le petit allié de l'Axe déposa contre l'Union Soviétique. L'étude ci-jointe analyse les objectifs pour lesquels la Slovaquie entra dans la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique, la manière comme celle-ci organisa la propagande afin de justifier l'agression, la structure de l'armée et les principales opérations militaires où elle fut impliquée pendant la première année de la guerre. Sans exister une collaboration réelle roumaine slovaque du point de vue militaire sur le front ou derrière celui-ci, les deux pays eurent des objectifs convergents. On y analysa la participation de la Slovaquie à la guerre antisoviétique de la perspective des relations entre les deux Etats alliés du Reich nazi, aussi. Les objectifs de la participation de la Slovaquie à la guerre antisoviétique furent indirects, tenant compte de la situation de l'Hongrie qui semblait être le partenaire préféré du Reich. En échange, la Roumanie eut un objectif direct, mais aussi un indirect. Le dernier concernait la frontière avec l'Hongrie, ce qui favorisa l'approchement entre Bucarest et Bratislava.

La Slovaquie au cadre de l'opération Barbarossa

Hitler planifiait une campagne de type *Blitzkrieg* contre l'Union Soviétique qui devait durer quelques mois. Sur ce théâtre d'opérations, les alliés de l'Axe

recevaient le printemps de l'année 1941 de rôles différents. La Roumanie devait assurer tout au plus le flanc Sud par la délivrance de la Bessarabie; on ne lui offrit pas un rôle important au cadre de la grande campagne de conquête de l'"espace vital" d'Est. La Slovaquie eut une importance plus réduite encore dans les plans stratégiques allemands, on la percevait seulement comme une troupe auxiliaire avec missions spécifiques, en fonction du déroulement de la campagne. Le Wehrmacht ne montra pas la disposition d'armer les armées des pays alliés et au début de l'été 1941, ne leur offrit pas un rôle majeur au cadre des opérations en ensemble. Hitler ne voulut pas partager la victoire avec ses petits alliés. Celui-ci adopta un point de vue exclusiviste duquel la Roumanie, la Slovaquie ou l'Hongrie ne firent pas partie. Si la Roumanie était intéressante seulement du point de vue économique – le pétrole et les céréales représentant deux vecteurs importants – la Slovaquie n'eut qu'un rôle limité, manqué d'importance. Hitler ne pensa point résoudre les problèmes des trois pays au niveau de l'année 1941 et ne précisa pas sa position sur la manière dans laquelle l'Europe de la fin du conflit sera reconfigurée. Il trompa ses alliés, les laissa comprendre qu'il satisfera leurs doléances, mais n'exprima pourtant aucun point de vue clair sur la manière de résoudre la question territoriale après avoir obtenu la victoire. Si on tenait compte des plans intentionnels des nazis et de l'idéologie raciale qu'ils ont promue, il est à supposer que les trois pays ne purent pas attendre des résultats importants, à la mesure de leur effort. Pour la Roumanie, la récupération des territoires perdus à l'Est et au Nord en juin 1940 représenta un enjeu, pas le seul, mais pour la Slovaquie ce mobile manquait. Il était clair qu'à Bucarest la campagne contre l'U.R.S.S. suivait, aussi, refaire la frontière perdue en faveur de l'Hongrie. A Bratislava, cela représenta l'unique justification pour participer à une guerre pas populaire. Convaincu de la victoire en 1941, Hitler ne se montra pas disposé à accorder de l'importance aux pays qui n'entraient pas dans ses vues. Par conséquent, il n'arma et ne doué pas les armées de ceux-ci, les considérant des camarades d'armes dans la lutte contre l'Armée Rouge seulement de la perspective propagandiste.

On put apercevoir avant juin 1941 les signes d'une grande offensive dirigée contre l'Union Soviétique, malgré le secret où on fit les démarches politiques et militaires. Pour Bucarest, il était beaucoup plus important de savoir les ressorts de cette campagne, la Roumanie étant directement intéressée de reconquérir les territoires perdus en Est en juin 1940. Tout en préparant la campagne contre l'Union Soviétique, une partie des armées allemandes se concentra à l'Est de la Slovaquie. Le diplomate roumain accrédité à Budapest, R. Crutzescu, rencontra son homologue slovaque le 7 mai 1941 et lui témoigna qu'il avait vu à l'occasion de sa visite à Bratislava de 4-5 mai "une foule de trains qui traversaient la

Slovaquie l'un après l'autre vers la frontière soviétique". Ils discutèrent sur les rumeurs concernant une attaque allemande contre l'U.R.S.S., mais exprimèrent leur croyance qu'on n'arrivera pas à un conflit entre les deux puissances "qui n'ont pas des divergences fondamentales dans la politique externe"¹. Il pourrait sembler curieux qu'un diplomate roumain fasse de confessions à son collègue slovaque sur les préparatifs secrets de guerre de l'alliance dont ils faisaient partie. Dans l'incertitude du moment, les deux ne furent pas informés sur l'invasion qu'on préparait et n'attendaient pas qu'une guerre éclate à cet instant-là. Les préparatifs de guerre furent surpris, aussi, dans la Ruthénie Carpatique. Crutzescu observa que la frontière entre la Slovaquie et l'Hongrie fut fermée et qu'on avait entendu le bruit de l'occupation de la Slovaquie toute entière par l'Hongrie. Ce bruit eut la mission de couvrir la concentration de troupes à la frontière slovaque hongroise, vers la Ruthénie Carpatique où "pourtant, quelque chose se passe"². Quelques jours plus tard, le ministre soviétique de Budapest, N. I. Sharonov informa, à son tour, Moscou qu'on ne peut pas exclure une guerre allemande soviétique si on tient compte des concentrations massives de troupes de la Roumanie, la Slovaquie et l'Hongrie et de la propagande allemande contre "le péril slave" du dernier temps³. A leur tour, les services d'informations soviétiques eurent des données qu'on préparait une offensive militaire allemande sur le territoire de la Slovaquie.

En certains milieux, aussi, circulaient des informations concernant un possible attaque. Au début du mois de mai 1941, le ministre de la Défense de la Slovaquie, le général Ferdinand Čatloš transmet à l'attaché militaire allemand de Bratislava son désir de participer à la lutte commune contre l'Union Soviétique seulement si la Hongrie aurait procédé de la même manière. De plus, le chef de l'armée slovaque formula quelques demandes vagues concernant la réfection des frontières avec l'Hongrie si celle-ci aurait obtenu des compensations territoriales dans les Balkans⁴. A son tour, la Roumanie avait à résoudre avec U.R.S.S. ses propres affaires territoriales en Bessarabie et en Bucovine. Mais cela ne fit pas Ion

¹ ****Problema Transilvană. Disputa teritorială româno-maghiară și U.R.S.S. 1940-1946. Documente din arhivele rusești* [Le Problème Transylvain. La dispute territoriale roumain-hongroise et l'U.R.S.S. 1940-1946. Documents des archives russes], sous la rédaction de Onufrie Vințeler et Diana Tetean, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Eikon, 2014, doc.43. p.183.

² *Ibidem*, doc.43, p.184.

³ *Ibidem*, doc.44, p.190.

⁴ Rolf-Dieter Müller, *Alături de Wehrmacht. „Cruciada împotriva bolșevismului”. Aliați, voluntari, auxiliari 1941-1945* [Auprès du Wehrmacht. "La Croisade contre le bolchevisme". Alliés, volontaires, auxiliaires 1941-1945], traduction Cristina Crâmpîță, București, Editura Militară, 2015, p.102.

Antonescu oublier le problème transylvain. En échange, la Slovaquie aurait entré dans la guerre sans avoir aucun différend avec les Soviétiques et seulement en pensant récupérer les territoires perdues en faveur de l'Hongrie.

L'armée slovaque fut créée en hâte après la dissolution de l'armée tchécoslovaque et surtout après l'agression de l'Hongrie de mars 1939, lorsque celle-ci incorpora la Ruthénie Carpatique. Le long des années 1939-1941, elle bénéficia d'une instruction correspondante grâce à la présence d'une Mission Militaire Allemande sur son territoire et d'une planification plus efficace de son programme d'incorporations. Le Ministre de la Défense, Ferdinand Čatloš disposait de presque 30.000 militaires, divisés en deux divisions d'infanterie et quelques unités auxiliaires. A celles-ci on ajoutait les unités aériennes. En échange, le manque des cadres militaires représenta un problème parce que pendant la période de l'entre-deux-guerres, les Tchèques formèrent la plus grande partie du corps d'officiers. Le remplacement de ceux-ci créa des difficultés aux Slovaques. L'armement de l'armée slovaque était précaire, aussi, parce que les Allemands prirent l'armement lourd de l'ancienne armée tchécoslovaque. De cette manière, quoiqu'il y ait une réserve de 80.000 militaires, on ne pourrait pas les armer et les équiper conformément. On concentra la plus grande partie de l'armée autour Bratislava et sur la frontière avec l'Hongrie, loin du théâtre d'opérations d'Est. D'ailleurs, les sentiments prépondérants dans l'armée slovaque se dirigeaient contre les Hongrois et pas contre les Soviétiques⁵. Un autre problème avec lequel se confronta, dès le début, l'armée slovaque fut le manque d'arsenal moderne et surtout des blindés. Au début de la guerre, l'armée slovaque eut un seul régiment de chars, connu comme le régiment d'attaque ayant le siège à Turčiansky Svätí Martin⁶.

Au début, Hitler n'eut pas l'intention de demander l'appui de l'armée slovaque à la campagne contre l'U.R.S.S. En échange, le Haut Commandement de l'Armée Allemande aurait voulu utiliser les troupes slovaques comme unités

⁵ Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe [Les Archives du Ministère des Affaires Extérieures], (dans les pages suivantes AMAE), Fond 71 Slovacia [Fond 71 Slovaquie], vol. 5, f.354-363.

⁶ Marian Uhrin, *O încercare de comparație a armatei României și a Slovaciei în vara anului 1944* [Un essai de comparaison de l'armée de la Roumanie et de la Slovaquie de l'été 1944], en *****Evenimentele de la 23 august 1944 din România și Insurecția națională slovacă din 29 august 1944. Consecințele lor asupra eliberării României și Slovaciei și a sfârșitului celui de al doilea război mondial* ["Les événements de 23 août 1944 de la Roumanie et l'Insurrection nationale slovaque de 29 août 1944. Leurs conséquences sur la libération de la Roumanie et de la Slovaquie et sur la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale"], Academia Română, Academia Slovacă de Științe, Banská Bystrica – Alba Iulia, 2012, p.64.

auxiliaires avec des missions spéciales, d'occupation et de sûreté du territoire conquis. Le chef du Grand Etat Majeur du Wehrmacht, Franz Halder, visita Bratislava le 19 juin 1941 et à l'intermédiaire de l'ambassadeur allemand, Hans Ludin, informa Tiso officiellement sur l'intention de l'Allemagne d'envahir l'Union Soviétique. De cette manière, Hitler exprima son désir que l'armée slovaque participe aux opérations militaires du front d'Est⁷. Deux jours plus tard, la direction de l'Etat slovaque annonça qu'elle est prête à commencer les opérations militaires. Le matin de 22 juin, le secrétaire de la Légation soviétique de Bratislava, S. A. Afanasiev, apprit de la presse la rupture des liaisons diplomatiques et la cessation de la mission. Après avoir lu les déclarations de Tuka de la gazette "Slovak", celui-ci comprit qu'il était même possible que la Slovaquie prenne partie à la guerre. Comme il ne réussit à contacter personne de la direction de l'Etat slovaque, il rapporta le lendemain à Moscou la rupture officielle des liaisons diplomatiques⁸. La Légation de la Roumanie à Bratislava annonça le 24 juin 1941 que l'état de siège et la concentration de nouveaux contingents furent suivis par les manifestations antisoviétiques devant la Légation U.R.S.S. qui annonçaient l'imminente entrée en guerre de la Slovaquie⁹.

Le premier slovaque, Vojtech Tuka ne consulta ni le Gouvernement ni le Parlement lorsqu'il prit la décision de déclarer la guerre. Tout comme le diplomate soviétique, la population de la Slovaquie en apprit de la presse et du Radio¹⁰. Le 24 juin, le gouvernement de la Slovaquie présidée par Tuka annonça l'entrée de son pays dans la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique. Le même jour, le président Jozef Tiso et Vojtech Tuka envoyèrent à Berlin un télégramme par lequel ils exprimaient leur confiance dans la victoire et montraient leur loyauté envers l'Allemagne¹¹. Un

⁷ Milică Moldoveanu, *Cehoslovacia* [La Tchécoslovaquie], en *Rezistența europeană în anii celui de al doilea război mondial 1938-1945* [La Résistance européenne pendant les années de la seconde guerre mondiale 1938-1945], volume 1, *Țările din Europa Centrală și de Sud-Est* [Les Pays de l'Europe Centrale et de Sud-Est], București, Editura Militară, 1973, p.78.

⁸ Dagmar Čierná-Lantoyová, *Variácie kontaktov medzi Bratislavou a Moskou v rococh 1939 – 1945* [Divers contacts entre Bratislava et Moscou pendant les années 1939-1945], en "*Slovenská republika 1939-1945 v medzinárodných súvislostiach*" ["La République Slovaque 1939-1945 en contexte international"], Bratislava, Edita Ivančková kol., 2012, p.126.

⁹ AMAE., *Fond Al doilea război mondial* [Fond La deuxième guerre mondiale], vol. 311. *Slovacia 1941-1944* [Slovaquie 1941-1944], f.1.

¹⁰ Joseph A.Mikus, *La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe (Histoire politique de 1918 à 1950)*, Paris, Les Iles d'Or, 1955, p.175-176.

¹¹ František Cséfalvay, Lubica Kázmerová, *Slovenská republika 1939-1945. Chronologia najdôležitejších udalostí* [La République Slovaque 1939-1945. La Chronologie des plus

adepte décidée de l'intervention contre l'URSS, Tuka y exprima son intention de collaborer avec toutes les forces matérielles et morales dont la Slovaquie disposait afin de soutenir la campagne allemande. A son tour, Tiso réitéra l'idée de la lutte commune pour défendre la civilisation européenne: "lorsqu'on menace pas seulement la culture slovaque, mais aussi la culture et la civilisation européenne", toutes les forces doivent participer. Il parlait, aussi, au nom de la solidarité slave; leur libération du régime bolchévique fit partie toujours de son discours propagandiste¹². La propagande coordonnée par le ministre Alexander Mach parlait, aussi, de la solidarité des troupes slovaques qui luttent ensemble à l'armée allemande pour la défense de la civilisation européenne¹³.

Dans toute la région Est de la Slovaquie furent introduites des mesures spéciales, de guerre. On mit la presse toute entière au service de la propagande guerrière, on introduit des mesures économiques exceptionnelles par la rationalisation de l'alimentation de la population, on fit des préparatifs contre les bombardements aériens, on imposa à toutes les catégories de population des mesures spéciales afin d'apporter leur contribution à l'effort commun¹⁴. On prit, aussi, des mesures pour assurer la sécurité contre les sabotages des partisans communistes ou antifascistes slovaques. De plus, on observa attentivement l'activité de la Légation soviétique de Bratislava les mois précédant l'attaque. On mobilisa l'armée slovaque et on l'agrandit avec les effectifs de réservistes. Le territoire de la Slovaquie reçut d'un jour à l'autre un rôle stratégique important pour les plans militaires de la campagne contre l'Union Soviétique. Quoiqu'elle n'ait pas de frontière directe avec U.R.S.S., la Slovaquie représenta un nœud de liaison entre les troupes du flanc Sud et celles de celui central. A cause de l'infrastructure précaire de la Ruthénie Carpatique, les troupes hongroises et celles allemandes cantonnées en Hongrie ne pouvaient arriver sur le front soviétique que sur le territoire de la Roumanie, ou plus rapidement, sur celui de la Slovaquie. De plus, la Slovaquie contribua à l'effort commun avec sa production d'armement et de munitions. On pouvait apercevoir sur le Danube, aussi, des préparatifs intenses, les troupes

importants événements], Bratislava, Historický ústav SAV, 2007, p.66.

¹² Pavol Petruf, *Zahraničná politika Slovenskej republiky (1939-1945)* [La politique extérieure de l'Etat slovaque (1939-1945)], en "*Slovenská republika 1939-1945 v medzinárodných súvislostiach*" ["La République Slovaque 1939-1945 en contexte international"], Bratislava, Edita Ivančková kol., 2012, p.50.

¹³ František Cséfalvay, Lúbia Kázmerová, *op. cit.*, p.67.

¹⁴ Serviciul Arhivelor Naționale Istorică Centrale [Le Service des Archives Nationales Historiques Centrales] (dans les pages à suivre SANIC), Fond Ministerul Propagandei Naționale. Presa externă [Fond Ministère de la Propagande Nationale. La Presse Externe], 1216, f.41-43.

allemandes qui circulaient par Bratislava dans leur chemin vers la Roumanie bloquèrent le trafic de marchandises et de passagers¹⁵.

Deux jours plus tard après le déclenchement de la guerre, l'armée slovaque entra en lutte, sous la direction de Ferdinand Čatloš et de son chef d'Etat Majeur, Štefan Tatarko. Le Ministère de la Défense appela sous les armes tous les militaires en réserve. 54.754 militaires et 2.104 officiers des 65.000 militaires et 2314 officiers furent mobilisés; leur majorité arriva au Nord-Est de la Slovaquie jusqu'au 30 juin. L'armée slovaque était formée de deux divisions d'infanterie, deux régiments d'artillerie et des unités auxiliaires. On y ajoutait les forces aériennes du général A. Pulanich, composées de trois escadrilles de chasse et trois d'observation¹⁶. A peine en août on conclut la réorganisation de l'armée slovaque qui actionna sur le front d'Est. L'armée slovaque participa sur le front Est avec un effectif moyen (la troupe plus la réserve du front) de 50.000 militaires; on y atteint le chiffre maximal l'automne de l'année 1941.

Une fois la guerre déclenchée, L'Allemagne, mais aussi l'Italie saluèrent le désir de la Slovaquie de prendre partie à l'effort commun. A son tour, le gouvernement roumain félicita, le 2 juin 1941, celui slovaque pour avoir entré dans la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique¹⁷. Le 5 juillet, le Chef de la Légation de la Roumanie à Bratislava, Gheorghe Elefterescu, envoya au premier Vojtech Tuka une lettre de félicitation de la part du gouvernement de la Roumanie à l'occasion de l'entrée de la Slovaquie dans la guerre, tout en exprimant sa satisfaction que les deux pays ont la chance de lutter en commun "pour la défense de la civilisation"¹⁸. La réaction de l'Hongrie à la déclaration de guerre de la Slovaquie fut prompte, aussi. La Légation roumaine transmit à Bucarest le texte suivant, concernant la position de l'Hongrie vis-à-vis le début de la guerre: "L'entrée en guerre de la Slovaquie deux jours après la Roumanie fit penser le gouvernement hongrois (...). Mais la duplicité hongroise attend un motif de plus qu'on trouva, par bonheur, dans les raids des avions russes au-dessus la localité Kassa"¹⁹. L'attaque des avions sans signes et considérés par la propagande hongroise être soviétiques représenta le prétexte de l'entrée en guerre. L'exemple de la Slovaquie fournit le mobile, mais le véritable ressort de cette complicité fut l'entrée de la

¹⁵ Zoltán Katreba, *Vy užitie Slovenské ho územia pre nástup nemeckých vojsk proti Sovietskemu zväzuv roku 1941* [L'utilisation du territoire slovaque pour aligner l'armée allemande contre l'Union Soviétique en 1941], en "Slovensko vo Vojnách a v konfliktoch v. 20 storoč" ["La Slovaquie dans les guerres et les conflits du XX-ème siècle"], Bratislava, 2003, p.155.

¹⁶ František Cséfalvay, Lubica Kázmerová, *op.cit.*, p.66-67.

¹⁷ La gazette "Slovak" répondit à la félicitation tout en publiant le texte roumain dans le numéro de 5 juillet, AMAE., Fond 71 Slovacia, vol. 11, f.303.

¹⁸ SANIC, Fond Ministerul Propagandei Naționale. Presa externă, 1216, f.48.

¹⁹ AMAE, Fond 71 Slovacia, vol. 11, f.306.

Roumanie dans la guerre antisoviétique.

La participation de l'armée slovaque sur le front d'Est en 1941

Le gros de l'armée commandée par Ferdinand Čatloš, composée de deux divisions d'infanterie et de troupes de corps avanča en Ukraine. Faiblement douées de chars, la majorité provenant de Tchécoslovaquie, les troupes slovaques souffrirent de pertes difficiles dans les luttes avec l'Armée Rouge. La première unité qui passa la frontière soviétique fut le Groupe d'armée rapide Pílfusek, comme il resta connu, une unité d'élite, avec 3500 soldats douée avec des blindés légers de modèle tchécoslovaque. Celle-ci avanča le premier jour vers le Nord, auprès de la rivière San sur la ligne Dinow-Lipa-Wojtkowa et arriva à Ustryzki Dolne et Kroscienko. Au passage de la rivière San, celle-ci entra pour la première fois en lutte avec les troupes soviétiques, réussit à conquérir neuf casemates jusqu'à 29 juin et délivra le chemin vers Sadkovice. Dès cette époque-là, à cause du manque de l'équipement motorisé, les troupes slovaques souffrirent les premières pertes²⁰. Le 7 juillet, on arrêta le Groupe d'armée rapide pour le compléter et le réorganiser; celui-ci reçut le nom la Brigade Rapide, avec un effectif de 117 officiers et 3380 soldats²¹. Le gros de l'armée slovaque resta en arrière et reçut des missions de sécurité. Entre temps, la Brigade Pílfusek avanča derrière les troupes allemandes sur la ligne Liov-Ternopol-Vinnița et entra dans la composition de la 17-ème Armée allemande dans la Bataille Uman, ayant le rôle de chasser les troupes soviétiques qui restèrent derrière. Le 22 juillet, celle-ci s'impliqua dans les luttes difficiles dans la bataille de Lipovec, au Nord de Boug et souffrit de pertes considérables (75 morts et 167 blessés)²². Après avoir souffert de nouvelles pertes difficiles dans les luttes de Berdicev et Jitomir, on retira l'armée slovaque pour la refaire, plus de 30.000 militaires rentrèrent dans le pays.

L'esprit de lutte de l'armée slovaque fut puissamment érodé par les difficultés des luttes avec l'Armée Rouge, mais aussi par la supériorité avec laquelle les militaires allemands la traitèrent²³. Les premières confrontations auxquelles participa l'armée slovaque représentèrent une triste expérience.

²⁰ J. Bystrický, *Ťaženie slovenskej armády na východnom fronte v roku 1941* [La campagne de l'armée slovaque sur le front d'est pendant l'année 1941], en "Vojenská História" ["L'Histoire militaire"], Bratislava, 2/1998, p.54.

²¹ František Cséfalvay, Lubica Kázmerová, *op. cit.*, p.68.

²² J. Bystrický, *op. cit.*, p.54.

²³ Milică Moldoveanu, *Statul "independent" slovac* [L'Etat "indépendant" slovaque], en "Regimurile fasciste și totalitare din Europa" ["Les Régimes fascistes et totalitaires de l'Europe"], Volume 3, București, Editura Militară, 1979, p.50.

L'officier allemand qui faisait la liaison entre les deux commandements exprima sa désillusion vis-à-vis la manière de lutter des Slovaques, étant content qu'il y échappe sans être blessé "parce que les moyens d'assistance sanitaire des Slovaques remontent de l'âge de Marie Thérèse"²⁴. Le mépris des Allemands vis-à-vis l'allié slovaque se répétera le cas des autres alliés, aussi. Les Allemands refusèrent une nouvelle offensive de l'armée slovaque et lui demandèrent se retirer pour recevoir de l'armement allemand. Le commandement allemand se montra mécontent de la contribution militaire des Slovaques et de la manière de lutter de ceux-ci; par conséquent, au début du mois d'août, on retira la majorité des militaires dans le pays pour réfection et dotation avec technique militaire allemande. Le commandant de l'unité motorisée slovaque, Rudolf Pílfusek, fut impliqué dans une enquête: on le soupçonnait qu'il aurait délibéré une attaque contre les Soviétiques afin de se livrer à ceux-ci. Il était vrai que plusieurs soldats, engagés dans les premières luttes, se livrèrent aux Soviétiques très facilement. Finalement, les autorités y nièrent toute complicité de Rudolf Pílfusek²⁵.

"Slovenské vzdušné zbrane" (SVZ), les forces aériennes slovaques, formèrent une autre unité militaire importante. On les divisa toujours en deux groupes, un envoyé sur le front d'Est et un autre pour assurer la sécurité de la zone métropolitaine de la capitale. L'aviation slovaque continua l'offensive auprès des Allemands avec plus de succès en Ukraine. L'escadrille slovaque, avec des appareils toujours de production tchécoslovaque participa ensemble à Luftwaffe à plusieurs opérations militaires sur le territoire ukrainien. Les avions de chasse slovaques contribuèrent à des actions d'observation et de liaison. Jusqu'en octobre, l'aviation slovaque, à son tour, souffrit des pertes importantes et stoppa temporairement son activité²⁶. Pendant cet instant de pause, le monseigneur Tiso entreprit une inspection de cinq jours dans les régions où luttèrent des militaires slovaques, occasion de visiter, aussi, le cimetière des soldats slovaques tombés de Lvov²⁷.

Les mois de juillet de d'août on réorganisa l'armée en deux unités indépendantes – la Division I Rapide dirigée par le colonel Jozef Turanec et la Division II de sécurité, dirigée par le colonel Augustin Malár – qui revinrent du front d'Est après la date de 9 août. A peine maintenant, revinrent, aussi, les réserves de militaires qui sont restés derrière; le total des militaires engagés dans l'Union Soviétique arriva à 35.623. De 12 août, le général Antonín Pulanich prit la

²⁴ Rolf-Dieter Müller, *op. cit.*, p.102.

²⁵ AMAE, Fond 71 Al doilea război mondial, vol. 311, f.13-14.

²⁶ Petre Otu, *Relații militare româno-slovace (1940-1944)* [Relations militaires roumaines slovaques (1940-1944)], en *Structuri politice în secolul XX* [Structures politiques au XX-ème siècle], coord. Constantin Hlihor, București, Editura Curtea Veche, 2000, p.376.

²⁷ AMAE, Fond 71 Al doilea război mondial, vol. 311, f. 19.

direction de l'armée slovaque du front d'Est²⁸.

Mieux préparée, la Division I Rapide entra pour la première fois en lutte en septembre 1941, à sud de Kiev, où elle fit partie du Corps d'armée 34 allemand, qui assurait le bord droit du Dniepr, sur un front ayant une longueur de 30 km. entre Kiev et Dnepropetrovsk²⁹. Les troupes slovaques eurent le rôle de protéger deux ponts sur le Dniepr et d'aménager des fortifications le long du fleuve. On utilisa le reste des forces militaires slovaques pour assurer la sécurité du territoire conquis et ils entrèrent en lutte contre les troupes de partisans soviétiques. Par ces contributions, l'armée slovaque participa à la grande bataille de Kiev³⁰.

Le 30 septembre, on encadra la Division I Rapide dans la subordination du Groupe 1 de chars dirigés par le maréchal Erich von Manstein avançant vers la Mer Azov. La Brigade Rapide resta sur le front après sa modernisation et sa transformation dans une division avec 10.000 militaires; elle fut transférée le 6 octobre à Orechov. Assise en arc de cercle, la Division slovaque assurait la sécurité au Nord de la localité Polog pour ne pas permettre à l'armée soviétique de contre-attaquer. En novembre, elle reçut l'ordre d'assurer la défense de la rive de la mer entre Mariupol et Taganrog³¹. La contre-offensive soviétique de la région Rostov surprit la division slovaque dans les luttes pour la défense de la vallée de la rivière Tuzlov (au Nord de Rostov) et le 1-er décembre 1941 sur le bord de la rivière Mius, à l'Ouest de la localité Golodajevka (à 60 km. nord de Taganrog)³². Cette fois-ci, les militaires slovaques firent la preuve de leur professionnalisme et luttèrent bien. D'ailleurs, Ion Antonescu envoya au président Tiso une lettre de félicitation pour la manière dans laquelle la Division Rapide lutta dans les luttes de Rostov³³.

²⁸ František Cséfalvay, Lubica Kázmerová, *op. cit.*, p.70 .

²⁹ Stanislav Mičev, Ján Stanislav, *Insurecția Națională Slovacă – una din componentele rezistenței antifasciste europene* [L'Insurrection Nationale Slovaque – une des composantes de la résistance antifasciste européenne], en „***Evenimentele de la 23 august 1944 din România și Insurecția națională slovacă din 29 august 1944. Consecințele lor asupra eliberării României și Slovaciei și a sfârșitului celui de al doilea război mondial” [“***Les événements de 23 août 1944 de la Roumanie et l'Insurrection nationale slovaque de 29 août 1944. Leurs conséquences sur la libération de la Roumanie et de la Slovaquie et sur la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale”], Banská Bystrica – Alba Iulia, Academia Română, Academia Slovacă de Științe, 2012, p.15.

³⁰ Les Slovaques réussirent à faire sortir de la lutte 1660 soldats soviétiques et firent couler un navire de guerre. František Cséfalvay, Lubica Kázmerová, *op. cit.*, p.72-73.

³¹ Josef Bystrický, *Evoluția pe frontul din România anului 1944 în relație cu Slovacia* [L'évolution sur le front de la Roumanie de l'année 1944 en relation avec la Slovaquie], en “***Evenimentele de la 23 august 1944 din România și Insurecția națională slovacă din 29 august 1944...”, p.75.

³² *Ibidem*, p.76.

³³ AMAE, Fond 71, vol. II, f.210.

On plaça la seconde unité militaire slovaque, la II-ème Division de sécurité dans la région Jitomir et on l'utilisa à éliminer les zones de résistance que le Wehrmacht laissa derrière. La Division actionna contre les partisans soviétiques qui restèrent derrière le front, aux alentours de la ville Jitomir et ensuite dans la région Minsk³⁴. De 25 septembre, la Division occupa des positions sur la ligne Starokonstantinov – Şepetovka, remplaçant une division allemande. Son rôle fut celui de surveiller le camp de prisonniers de Şepetovka³⁵. En octobre, elle participa à la liquidation de quatre groupes de partisans des villages des alentours³⁶.

La Division Rapide passa l'hiver 1941-1942 sur positions dans la région de la rivière Mius. La Division avança facilement et reçut des instructions de sûreté à la Mer Azov derrière les troupes allemandes. De cette manière, pendant l'hiver, après l'échec allemand devant Moscou et la stabilisation du front, la Division Rapide reçut un secteur de front large de 10 km, étant flanquée par une division de chasseurs de montagne allemands et une unité Waffen SS.³⁷ L'armée roumaine, aussi, se trouvait sur le territoire soviétique. Après la bataille d'Odessa, les troupes roumaines revinrent dans le pays, mais la collaboration sur le front ne finit pas. Des unités importantes luttèrent pour conquérir les chemins d'accès dans la Péninsule Crimée, pendant que des autres assuraient des secteurs sur la rive de la Mer Azov. La situation du front changea radicalement à la fin de l'année 1941: dans les conditions de la faillite du Blitzkrieg, les alliés de l'Allemagne, à leur tour, durent redéfinir leurs objectifs.

Les objectifs de la campagne et la propagande

Le régime politique de Bratislava se trouva devant une situation pour laquelle la Slovaquie n'était pas préparée. La campagne militaire de l'armée slovaque suivait un objectif indirect, concernant la relation avec l'Hongrie. Par conséquent, elle dut masquer le véritable but de la participation à la guerre antisoviétique. Les cercles officiels slovaques se pressèrent réjouir que l'Hongrie n'entra pas dans la guerre contre l'U.R.S.S. "contents du maintien de la duplicité hongroise, contrastant avec la loyauté de la Slovaquie"³⁸. Les leaders nazis, ayant à leur tête Hitler, eurent plusieurs rencontres avec les dirigeants des pays alliés auxquels ils laissèrent comprendre, l'été de l'année 1941, que la guerre d'Est était comme gagnée et qu'on va mettre les bases de la domination sur ce vaste territoire. Hitler expliqua que

³⁴ Rolf-Dieter Müller, *op. cit.*, p.103.

³⁵ František Cséfalvay, Lubica Kázmerová, *op. cit.*, p.73.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p.75.

³⁷ Rolf-Dieter Müller, *op. cit.*, p.103.

³⁸ AMAE, Fond Al doilea război mondial, vol. 311. Slovacia 1941-1944, f.5.

“maintenant on doit diviser la gigantesque tarte commune conformément à nos besoins pour être capables: premièrement, la dominer; secondairement, l'administrer, et troisièmement l'exploiter”³⁹. Ces espoirs exagérés des leaders de la coalition de l'Axe purent créer des illusions dans diverses capitales que leurs problèmes seront résolus et qu'on pourra même obtenir de plus.

Une fois la campagne militaire commencée, Ferdinand Čatloš demanda l'armée à lutter contre le péril communiste et déclara que l'armée slovaque luttera contre le bolchevisme et pas contre le peuple russe ou contre le slavisme afin d'éviter les sensibilités nationales. Le 26 juin 1941, les armées slovaques arrivaient en Pologne, où firent la jonction avec l'Armée 17 allemande, dirigée par le général Karl Heinrich von Stülpnagel. Ferdinand Čatloš parla le 26 juin de la nécessité de s'engager dans la guerre pour un avenir meilleur de la nouvelle Europe et du peuple russe, pendant que la gazette de la Garde Hlinka, “Gardista”, célèbre pour le discours antisémite, exagéra le caractère et les intérêts du monde juif de la politique soviétique⁴⁰. Le 4 juillet, le président Tiso soutint un discours devant l'armée slovaque qu'il engagea joindre le front antibolchévique pour défendre la culture nationale, l'État et la société slovaque d'un ennemi étiqueté comme manqué de Dieu, manqué d'amour, de culture et de morale, de la joie de vivre et de bénédiction. “Ralliez-vous à la brave armée allemande et aux peuples européens chrétiens afin d'éviter que les peuples chrétiens ne tombent sous l'enfer bolchévique” furent les mots qui complétèrent son discours⁴¹.

Lors de la première visite du président J. Tiso et de la délégation slovaque au Grand Quartier Général de l'armée allemande après le déclenchement de la guerre, ils furent assurés que le sacrifice de l'armée slovaque ne sera pas oublié. L'échange d'amabilités et d'ordres militaires fit les dirigeants slovaques rentrer à Bratislava sûrs des garanties que les Allemands donnèrent. “La manière dans laquelle on donna cette assurance fit les dirigeants slovaques à réaliser que ni l'indépendance, ni l'intégrité territoriale ne sont menacées, mais aussi qu'ils peuvent espérer résoudre leurs revendications envers l'Hongrie”⁴². Le ministre roumain de Budapest reçut de la part de son homologue des assurances que la garantie qu'Hitler donna avait convaincu les Slovaques⁴³. Le 23 juin 1941, il rapporta que “mon camarade slovaque, aussi, pense que l'Hongrie n'est pas pressée de rompre les relations avec l'U.R.S.S. comme elle procéda jadis avec les

³⁹ Apud Eugen Preda, “*Săritura de pisică*” [“Le saut du chat”], București, Editura Militară, 1976, p. 40.

⁴⁰ Dagmar Čierná-Lantoyová, *op.cit.*, p.127.

⁴¹ Apud Pavol Petruf, *op. cit.*, p.51.

⁴² AMAE, Fond Al doilea război mondial, vol. 311. Slovacia 1941-1944., f.17.

⁴³ Loc. cit., f.20.

autres ennemis de l'Allemagne"⁴⁴.

La participation de la Slovaquie à la campagne contre l'Union Soviétique fut plutôt le résultat de sa dépendance envers le troisième Reich, mais elle suivit aussi un intérêt national. La dépendance de l'Allemagne obligea la Slovaquie à participer à une guerre qu'elle ne voulait pas. Tiso reconnut devant ses collaborateurs que la guerre contre la Russie "n'était nullement faite dans l'intérêt de la Slovaquie et qu'il fallait se borner à donner aux Allemands ce qu'on pouvait éviter de donner"⁴⁵. Sans avoir des prétentions territoriales de l'U.R.S.S., le régime politique de Bratislava utilisa une propagande anticommuniste, ainsi que des formules du langage religieux chrétien pour justifier "la croisade contre le bolchevisme". Au départ de l'armée slovaque sur le front soviétique, le nonce papal accrédité à Bratislava mit en évidence dans un discours le caractère clérical du fascisme slovaque: "je suis heureux de pouvoir transmettre au Saint Père seulement les meilleures nouvelles de cet exemplaire Etat slovaque, qui continue d'accomplir son programme chrétien, national exprimé par la devise: Pour Dieu et la Nation"⁴⁶. La propagande anticommuniste dirigée par Alexandr Mach chercha à justifier l'intervention des troupes slovaques. Comme dans le cas de la Roumanie, la Slovaquie entra en guerre sans avoir que des garanties formelles qu'à la fin du conflit elle aura "sa part de la victoire". Mais la Slovaquie n'avait pas à récupérer seulement des territoires de l'Union Soviétique, mais aussi de l'Hongrie de manière que l'intervention n'était pas de tout justifiée. Mais une fois pris dans l'engrenage du Reich, les trois pays devaient gagner la confiance d'Hitler par leur propre contribution à l'effort de guerre.

Pour les Allemands, le fait que ses petits alliés du bassin du Danube étaient hostiles représenta un problème. Cette réalité pouvait créer des difficultés dans les plans militaires allemands. Afin d'éviter une rencontre entre les troupes slovaques et celles hongroises, les unités de la petite république ne furent pas informées dès le début sur les plans militaires. Les armées hongroise, roumaine et slovaque luttaient sous la direction d'O.K.W. et étaient séparées par l'armée allemande ou par des divisions italiennes. Quoiqu'ils n'opèrent pas dans les mêmes zones, les liaisons entre les commandants des armées roumaine et slovaque étaient étroites, même à la suggestion des Allemands. Mais leurs objectifs étaient totalement différents. Si l'armée roumaine entra dans la guerre pour délivrer les territoires occupés par l'Union Soviétique, l'armée slovaque n'eut pas un objectif semblable. Par conséquent, on eut besoin d'une propagande constante au sein de la société et de l'armée slovaque pour la motiver. Après avoir

⁴⁴ Loc. cit., f.79.

⁴⁵ Joseph A.Mikus, *op. cit.*, p.176.

⁴⁶ Apud Rolf-Dieter Müller, *op. cit.*, p.103.

passé le Dniestr et surtout après la marche des troupes roumaines vers l'intérieur de l'U.R.S.S., la propagande devint nécessaire pour les Roumains, aussi. Les Slovaques déclaraient qu'écraser le bolchevisme était le but des deux armées prises dans l'engrenage de la politique allemande. Chaque armée lutta "sur son front, loin l'une de l'autre, mais malgré cette distance, l'idée commune et le devoir de guerre lia à nos dirigeants: paralyser à jamais le danger de l'invasion rouge". Après le passage du Dniestr par les troupes roumaines et les opérations militaires pour vaincre l'Armée Rouge, la propagande roumaine et slovaque développèrent le thème commun de la lutte contre le communisme afin de justifier leur participation sur un front où elles n'avaient à obtenir aucun objectif territorial. "Notre lutte contre le bolchevisme continue ininterrompue" était la phrase que les Slovaques exploitèrent. "Cette phrase donna à la lutte roumaine une supériorité idéale et morale qui approcha de plus l'esprit de nos armées". Les dirigeants roumains déclarèrent que "nous ne luttons pas pour de nouveaux territoires, mais pour anéantir le bolchevisme. De même, la lutte slovaque sur le front Est n'a pas un sens matériel. Notre lutte a seulement un sens idéal et humain"⁴⁷.

Parallèlement au début des hostilités militaires sur le front d'Est, la presse de Slovaquie en offrit d'amples espaces à la participation des troupes militaires slovaques. Par conséquent, quelques-uns des matériaux de propagande que le Ministère de ressort de Roumanie y envoya furent publiés avec retard. En échange, la gazette de langue allemande "Grenzbote" traita, aussi, la participation de l'armée roumaine sur le front. Un article dédié à la libération de la ville Tchernovtsy décrivait, en termes facilement exagérés, les luttes données au Nord de la Bucovine. Le correspondant spécial de ce journal transmettait, le 7 juillet 1941, de Bucarest qu'"on incendia presque toutes les maisons de Tchernovtsy et qu'on fit un bain de sang. Des centaines de cadavres civiles gisent dans les cours ou dans les caves. On jeta la cathédrale en air. La ville fut détruite". Le caractère antisoviétique des articles et le rôle décisif des armées de l'Axe dans le sauvetage de l'Europe par le fléau bolchevique ressortent de la presse, soumise à la propagande. Et pas dernièrement, l'ancienne théorie de l'association des Juifs avec le bolchevisme n'y manquait pas⁴⁸. La Bessarabie, à son tour, trouva sa place dans les pages des gazettes slovaques: on y retrouve les mêmes termes de condamnation des désastres que le régime communiste y provoqua et du retour de la province comprise entre le Prout et le Dniestr entre les frontières nationales⁴⁹.

Mais les deux Etats avaient, aussi, un autre objectif commun, plus pragmatique et qui tenait toujours de la victoire commune contre l'Union Soviétique. Tant Antonescu que Tiso espéraient obtenir la confiance et le soutien

⁴⁷ S.A.N.I.C. Fond Ministerul Propagandei Naționale. Presa externă, 1216, f.132-133

⁴⁸ Loc. cit. 1216, f.51-53.

⁴⁹ Loc. cit., 1216, f.68-69.

allemand pour récupérer les territoires perdus en faveur de l’Hongrie. Au début des hostilités, la propagande slovaque parlait très évasivement sur les intérêts communs roumains slovaques “sur le front de paix, aussi”. Les allusions faisant référence à la reconfiguration de l’Europe le cas d’une éventuelle victoire allemande devaient inclure les revendications des deux pays, aussi. L’édification de “l’Europe saine et tranquille” qui réunisse tous les Etats nationaux, la création de “la nouvelle Europe” où ceux-ci devaient matérialiser leurs idéaux nationaux, étaient seulement des boutades de la propagande; mais tant la Roumanie, que la Slovaquie voulaient refaire leurs frontières et visaient l’Hongrie. Comme Adolf Hitler fut extrêmement ambigu en promettre quelque chose de concret, laissant ces problèmes pour la fin voulue de la guerre, il donna l’illusion à Bucarest, mais aussi à Bratislava, que leurs revendications auront gain de cause, même si on ne précisa rien de concret. Les Allemands connaissaient très bien cela lorsqu’ils placèrent les armées des trois pays dans la structure générale du front d’Est. Comme Ion Antonescu gagna la confiance de Hitler, la propagande slovaque regardait vers le général, devenu entretemps maréchal, comme vers un grand dirigeant. Avec une certaine envie, les Slovaques reconnaissaient que “le Führer mit même les divisions allemandes qui opèrent sur le front roumain sous la commande du Général Antonescu. Il s’agissait de la meilleure appréciation des qualités militaires du Général Antonescu. Les Allemands, qui réalisaient mieux que n’importe qui que signifie la tactique et la direction d’une guerre moderne, certainement, n’auraient mis la destinée de leurs soldats et même la destinée d’un front si important comme celui de Bessarabie dans des mains incompetentes. Une nouvelle arrivée de Berlin, conformément à laquelle le Général Antonescu reçut une haute décoration allemande, confirma que la direction des opérations sous la commande du Général Antonescu fut un succès complet”⁵⁰.

Une fois conclues les opérations qui menèrent à la délivrance de la Bessarabie et du Nord de la Bucovine, la presse slovaque changea facilement le ton. Elle publia des articles sur divers travaux scientifiques où on justifiait les prétentions de la Roumanie sur ces territoires. La propagande roumaine tint au courant en permanence l’opinion publique de la Slovaquie sur le problème de la Bessarabie et de la Bucovine, mais on n’oublia ni la question qui approchait les deux pays. De cette manière, on publia dans un numéro de 17 août de la gazette “Gardista” un compte-rendu sur l’ouvrage de Simion Mehedinți concernant la Transylvanie⁵¹. L’attaché de presse de la Roumanie à Bratislava, Moise Baltă fit preuve de professionnalisme et informa périodiquement et très exactement le Ministère de la Propagande Nationale sur tout matériel apparu dans la presse slovaque qui

⁵⁰ Loc. cit. 1216, f.132-133.

⁵¹ Loc. cit., f.115.

concernait la Roumanie. Ses rapports étaient hebdomadaires, on y annexait chaque article, avec un résumé dans la langue roumaine. De plus, celui-ci fournit aux journaux "Slovak", "Gardista" et "Grenzboten" les articles envoyés de Bucarest et expédia sa réponse, une fois ces articles imprimés.

Les Hongrois, pour ne pas perdre un avantage tactique, sollicitèrent aux Allemands d'apporter leur propre contribution à la défaite des Soviétiques. Le commandement militaire hongrois comprit que la participation de la Roumanie à l'effort de guerre lui aurait apporté un capital de confiance qu'on pourrait utiliser contre l'Hongrie. Par conséquent, elle voulait apporter sa contribution à la campagne contre l'Union Soviétique. László Bárdossy reconnut après la guerre que la participation de l'Hongrie contre l'Union Soviétique était vouée à protéger les frontières de l'Hongrie obtenues après les deux accords de Vienne: "justement pour cela nous sentîmes qu'il était nécessaire de participer à la guerre, pour ne pas perdre les parties gagnées du Nord de l'Hongrie et de la Ruthénie Carpatique le cas où la campagne allemande aurait été victorieuse". Et Miklós Kállay compléta: "l'unique motif pour lequel nous entrâmes dans la guerre et nous envoyâmes une armée contre les Russes fut celui que les Roumains s'y étaient impliqués déjà de toutes leurs forces contre les Russes, pendant que nous ne fîmes rien et nous risquâmes de cette manière à perdre la protection de Allemands et la Transylvanie". Horthy voulait plus d'implication dans la guerre. Dès le mois d'avril, celui-ci écrivit à Hitler qu'il participerait auprès le Wehrmacht contre l'Union Soviétique si à la fin du conflit l'Hongrie recevrait de plus la partie Sud de la Transylvanie. Les Hongrois eurent des souteneurs parmi les leaders nazis, aussi. Dans une discussion avec Keitel, celui-ci leur promit en échange de leur participation à la guerre une partie de l'Yougoslavie et "les terres situées aux pieds des montagnes Carpates, jusqu'à Dniestr"⁵². Un conflit couvé y va éclater, qui eut des échos et changea le caractère de la propagande des trois pays. Ils commencèrent s'accuser réciproquement du manque d'esprit de combativité sur le front. Chacun chercha à démontrer aux Allemands que leur propre contribution fut la plus importante. La Slovaquie et la Roumanie unirent leurs efforts pour contrecarrer les Hongrois. De cette manière, elles exagérèrent leur propre contribution. Mais l'évolution de la guerre va acquérir une tournure que les trois pays n'anticipèrent pas en juin 1941. La faillite du *Blitzkrieg* et l'entrée des Etats-Unis dans la guerre les mirent devant des perspectives tout à fait différentes.

⁵² Apud Larry L. Watts, *Aliți incompatibili. România, Finlanda, Ungaria și al Treilea Reich* [Alliés incompatibles. La Roumanie, la Finlande, l'Hongrie et le Troisième Reich], București, Editura RAO, 2012, p.185.

Conclusions

La participation de l'armée slovaque à l'opération Barbarossa n'a pas une grande importance à l'échelle du grand drame qui se déployait sur le théâtre d'opérations d'Est. Mais pour le petit pays carpatique, l'effort militaire déposé fut significatif. Sa contribution, apparemment négligeable, fit partie d'une stratégie gigantesque que le Reich nazi conçut. Mais les leaders de Berlin ne prirent pas en calcul l'effort que les pays alliés firent pour vaincre l'Union Soviétique. Les ambitions du Reich dépassaient beaucoup celles de la Roumanie, de la Slovaquie ou de l'Hongrie. Celles-ci firent leurs propres calculs en vue d'établir la contribution apportée à la fin de la guerre. Celles-ci organisèrent un système de propagande qui justifie la présence sur le territoire soviétique et qui fasse allusion à leurs véritables intentions. Le discours antisoviétique était purement propagandiste. Mais l'échafaudage propagandiste tout entier soutenu par Alexander Mach ou par Mihai Antonescu fit pourtant allusions aux véritables intentions. La Roumanie eut un objectif clair dans la réfection des frontières perdues l'été de l'année 1940. Cela ne signifiait pas seulement la délivrance des territoires d'Est, mais aussi celle de la partie de la Transylvanie cédée à l'Hongrie en août 1940. Les dirigeants du pays espéraient que sa contribution militaire et économique va équivaloir avec cet objectif. La Slovaquie eut un objectif semblable. Mais la participation de l'Hongrie à l'effort commun compliqua tous les calculs faits à Bratislava ou à Bucarest. Les espoirs de la Slovaquie se liaient d'un objectif mineur et d'un autre majeur. Celui mineur était de garder l'indépendance vis-à-vis les intentions claires de l'Hongrie d'occuper le pays tout entier. Celui majeur eut en vue la réfection de l'intégrité territoriale telle qu'elle fut avant l'arbitrage de Vienne de novembre 1938. Ces intentions se trouvèrent en contradiction avec les projets politiques hongrois. Son plan mineur était de garder les territoires obtenus à la suite des arbitrages de Vienne de 1938 et 1940. Le plan majeur de la politique hongroise était de refaire l'Hongrie du Saint Etienne, ce qui signifierait occuper la Slovaquie toute entière, ainsi que toute la Transylvanie. A cet endroit, ils se heurtaient des objectifs slovaques et roumains. Comme la guerre ne prit pas fin à la fin de l'année 1941, les événements politico militaires des années suivantes vont compliquer les perspectives.

ОСВЕЩЕНИЕ ЯЛТИНСКОЙ КОНФЕРЕНЦИИ В РУМЫНСКОЙ ИСТОРИОГРАФИИ

THE YALTA CONFERENCE AS REFLECTED IN ROMANIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

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Rezumat: Reflectarea Conferinței de la Yalta în istoriografia română

În acest articol autorul a încercat să prezinte opiniile istoricilor români în problema Conferinței de la Yalta, expuse în a doua jumătate a sec. al XX-lea – începutul sec. al XXI-lea. În istoriografia română postbelică de până la căderea dictaturii lui Ceaușescu, conferința dată este prezentată în ansamblu pozitiv, în calitate de eveniment care a stabilit temelia ordinii internaționale contemporane. Însă, la hotarul secolelor XX-XXI în istoriografia română predomină o atitudine critică față de hotărârile de la Yalta, fiind promovată ideea conform căreia acestea din urmă au consfințit satelizarea și comunizarea Europei de Est de către Uniunea Sovietică.

Abstract: The Yalta Conference as reflected in Romanian Historiography

In this article the author has attempted to present the opinions of the Romanian historians on the Yalta Conference, expounded in the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. In the postwar Romanian historiography until the fall of the Ceausescu dictatorship the mentioned conference is presented as generally positive, as an event that set the foundation of contemporary international order. However, at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, in Romanian historiography prevails a critical attitude towards Yalta decisions, promoting the thesis that they have generated the satellization and communization of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.

Résumé: La réflexion de la conférence de Yalta dans l'historiographie roumaine

Dans l'article ci-joint, l'auteur tenta de présenter les opinions des historiens roumains concernant la Conférence de Yalta, exposées dans la deuxième moitié du XX-ème - le début du XXI-ème siècle. Dans l'historiographie roumaine d'après-guerre jusqu'à la chute de la dictature Ceaușescu, on présenta, en ensemble, la conférence respective comme positive, en tant qu'événement qui posa les fondements de l'ordre international contemporain. Cependant, au début du XX-ème – XXI-ème siècles, une attitude critique envers les décisions de Yalta s'imposa dans l'historiographie roumaine; de plus, on promut l'idée conformément

à laquelle celles-ci mirent les bases de la satellisation et de la communisation de l'Europe d'Est par l'Union Soviétique.

Keywords: *Yalta Conference, Romanian historians, Romanian historiography.*

Вступление

В данной статье автор предпринял попытку представить мнения румынских историков по Ялтинской конференции, высказанные во 2-й половине XX-го – начале XXI веков. В послевоенной румынской историографии до падения диктатуры Чаушеску данная конференция представлена в целом положительно, как заложившая устои современного миропорядка. Однако на рубеже XX-XXI веков в румынской историографии господствует критическое отношение к решениям Ялты и высказывается тезис о том, что именно они привели к сателлизации и коммунизации Восточной Европы Советским Союзом.

Послевоенная румынская историография (1945-1989 гг.)

Хронологически, работы румынских историков по теме Ялтинской конференции следует разделить на два периода – до и после свержения Н. Чаушеску. До декабря 1989 г. подготовка, ход и решения конференции освещались в румынской историографии нейтрально-положительно. Примером этому служат работы Леонида Логин¹. Автор пишет, что «конференция имела выдающиеся значение для доведения войны до победы над нацистской Германией и милитаристской Японией», а также в деле организации послевоенного мироустройства. Его оценки значения конференции исключительно положительные².

В целом придерживается данной концепции по «Ялте» и один из крупнейших историков по проблеме участия Румынии во ВМВ Константин Кирицеску, получивший широкую известность ещё в межвоенное время. В своей монографии он посвятил отдельную главу Ялтинской конференции³

¹ L. Loghin, *Al doilea război mondial. Acțiuni militare, politice și diplomatice. Cronologie* [World War II. Military, Political and Diplomatic Actions. Chronology], București, 1984; Idem, *Mari conferințe internaționale (1939-1945)* [Major International Conferences (1939-1945)], București, 1989.

² L. Loghin, *op. cit.*, pp. 441, 442-443.

³ C. I. Kirițescu, *România în al doilea război mondial* [Romania in World War II], vol. 2,

и её влиянию на Румынию. Данный историк уверен, что «конференция имела особое значение» в деле окончательного разгрома врага и в установлении нового миропорядка⁴. При этом он придерживается мнения, что в действительности имел место раздел Европы на сферы влияния: советскую и западную⁵.

Оценки ялтинских решений румынскими историками на рубеже XX-XXI веков

В румынской исторической литературе почти нет отдельных работ, посвящённых Ялтинской конференции. Единственным исключением является книга бывшего диссидента Николая Бачу, вышедшая в годы «холодной войны» на Западе на французском языке и в 1996 г. изданная в Бухаресте. Само название – «Ялта и распятие Румынии» – изначально раскрывает её концептуальную сущность. Автор утверждает, что «Ялта была более чем преступление, это было ошибкой»⁶.

Естественно, данная тема присутствует в ряде общих работ, посвящённых истории международных отношений, и в некоторых публикациях румынских историков по теме участия Румынии во Второй мировой войне (ВМВ). После падения режима Чаушеску, эта проблематика в основном присутствует в контексте последствий ялтинских решений для стран Восточной Европы, в целом, и Румынии, в частности. С некоторыми исключениями, с учётом «местной специфики», в современной румынской историографии в той или иной вариациях воспроизводятся и тиражируются западные мифы о Крымской конференции в духе *a la Beevor*⁷.

Что касается пост-декабрьских 1989 г. интерпретаций Крымской конференции, то в них господствует тезис, что Ялта ничего не предоставила Румынии, став лишь этапом на пути передела мира. Румыния и другие государства были отданы Черчиллем и Рузвельтом на произвол Москве⁸.

București, 1996, pp. 328-332.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 328.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 331-332.

⁶ N. Baci, *Yalta și crucificarea României* [Yalta and crucifixion of Romania], București, 1996, p. 178.

⁷ См.: Э. Бивор, *Падение Берлина. 1945* [Fall of Berlin. 1945]. Москва, 2004 // <http://militera.lib.ru/research/beevor2/06.html>.

⁸ I. Scurtu, Gh. Buzatu, *Istoria românilor în secolul XX (1918-1948)* [The History of the Romanians in the Twentieth Century], București, 1999, pp. 494-496, 501-502; N. Baci,

«За исключением вопроса о Польше и Югославии в Ялте, не обсуждались вопросы Восточной Европы... Проблема Румынии не подверглась ни обсуждению, ни решению. Её судьба была заранее решена»⁹, утверждает Н. Бачу. Он считает, что «решение [Рузвельта] отдать Европу в руки русским было принято ещё в 1943 г.»¹⁰.

Когда описываются переговоры «Большой тройки» и принятые на конференции решения, нередко имеет место своеобразная помесь реально произошедшего с выдуманным. Нам не встретилась ни одна работа, в которой делались бы ссылки на опубликованные документы или хотя бы на воспоминания участников.

Так, например, Л. Мирон утверждает, что «Сталин выжидал благоприятного момента» для открытия конференции, «затягивая время встречи до того, пока военные успехи его армии на Восточном фронте не предоставили ему силовое превосходство над англо-американцами». Он также «проявил отсутствие вежливости», не встретив лично Рузвельта, для которого «это явилось неприятной неожиданностью»¹¹. Аналогичного мнения придерживается и Н. Бачу, утверждая, что это «было преднамеренным унижением Америки»¹².

В этом контексте отмечается, что каждая из трёх великих держав преследовала свои цели. Великобритания стремилась сохранить свою колониальную империю, Советский Союз желал закрепить свои позиции на уже завоёванных территориях, а Соединённые Штаты грезил о справедливом послевоенном мире. Рузвельт представлен как наивный, плохо подготовленный, тяжело больной, истощённый и даже умирающий человек¹³. Его главная цель состояла в том, чтобы обеспечить участие СССР в ООН, что ему и удалось, но ценой предоставления права вето при голосовании в Совете Безопасности его постоянным членам. Это серьёзно ослабило Организацию Объединённых Наций. Другой его целью было подключить СССР к борьбе против Японии.

Yalta și crucificarea României, pp. 185-189; L. Miron, *Cum l-a târât Stalin pe Roosevelt tocmai până la Ialta* [How did Stalin drag Roosevelt just up to Yalta], in „*Historia. Revistă de istorie*”, 2005, nr. 7, p. 21.

⁹ N. Baci, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-39, 167.

¹¹ L. Miron, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹² N. Baci, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

¹³ C. Vlad, *Franklin Roosevelt cade în capcana lui Stalin* [Franklin Roosevelt falls into Stalin's trap], in „*Historia. Revistă de istorie*”, 2003, nr.12, p. 68; N. Baci, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

Вот что о подобных обвинениях пишет Р. Шервуд - один из наиболее серьезных, на наш взгляд, исследователей американской внешней политики времён ВМВ: «Всё больше укреплялось мнение, что Рузвельт пошёл на различные „уступки“ русским в Ялте, и наиболее умеренные критики приписывают это тому, что он был уже смертельно болен. Подробные протоколы конференции... не подтверждают этого мнения. Рузвельт полностью сохранил все свои умственные силы»¹⁴. Бывший в то время государственным секретарём Эдвард Стеттиниус после войны также отмечал, что «вопреки этим утверждениям, достигнутые в Ялте соглашения свидетельствуют о том, что Советский Союз сделал больше уступок Соединённым Штатам и Великобритании, чем эти державы – Советскому Союзу»¹⁵. Биограф Рузвельта Дж. Бернс пишет, что «русские не запрашивали в Ялте такого, чего их собственная мощь в Азии не позволила бы им получить собственными усилиями»¹⁶.

Американские историки Е. Снелл, Ф. Погью, Д. Флеминг и др. так же считают подобного рода утверждения полностью абсурдными и ничем не подтвержденными¹⁷. Французский историк Пьер де Сенарклен отмечает в этом плане: «Черчилль и Рузвельт в ходе конференции не уступили ничего существенного, и Ялтинские соглашения были заключены в целом вполне в соответствии с целями Запада»¹⁸. Прежде всего, напомним, что данные договорённости не были секретными, за исключением обязательства Советского Союза о вступлении в войну против Японии.

С нашей точки зрения, Рузвельт вёл несравненно более реалистичную политику, чем его преемники. В своём послании конгрессу 6 января 1945 г. он отметил, что по мере приближения победы в войне «мы неизбежно больше осознаём разногласия между победителями». Вместе с тем, как здравомыслящий политик, он признавал, что сотрудничество с СССР

¹⁴ Р. Шервуд, *Рузвельт и Гопкинс глазами очевидца* [Roosevelt and Hopkins through the Eyes of a Witness], Т. 2, Москва, 1958, с. 570.

¹⁵ Э. Стеттиниус, «Аргонавт» [“Argonaut”], in *От «Барбароссы» до «Терминала». Взгляд с Запада* [From the “Barbarossa” to “Terminal”. Looking from the West], Москва, 1988, с. 358.

¹⁶ Цит. по: А. И. Уткин, *Дипломатия Франклина Рузвельта* [Franklin Roosevelt's Diplomacy], Свердловск, 1990, с. 504.

¹⁷ См.: О. А. Ржешевский, *Война и история. Буржуазная историография США о второй мировой войне* [War and History. US Bourgeois Historiography on the Second World War], Москва, 1984, с. 152-153.

¹⁸ Цит. по: D. Zamfirescu, *Ialta și debutul exilului românesc* [Yalta and the beginning of Romanian Exile], in „Dosarele istoriei”, 2006, nr. 11, pp. 39-40.

соответствует интересам США и поэтому следует не обострять с ним разногласия, а идти на взаимные компромиссы: «США и Советский Союз, – говорил президент, – разделяет идеологическая бездна, но объединяет мост государственных интересов»¹⁹. В Ялте президент очень умело и гибко, но одновременно энергично, отстаивал интересы своей страны.

В румынской исторической науке имеются также и положительные оценки Ялты. Так, К. Попа, на примере американской и российской историографии подробно анализирует различные точки зрения по данному вопросу и отмечает, что по причине «раздела Европы», после войны политические противники Рузвельта и некоторые «ревизионистские» историки необоснованно обвинили его в «секретном сговоре» со Сталиным и «капитуляции» перед ним²⁰. В том же духе, отмечает Н. Ликсандру, был решен и вопрос об образовании ООН и её функционировании (в частности, о способе голосования в Совете Безопасности)²¹.

Однако, по большей части распространяется тезис о том, что Советский Союз согласился присоединиться к ООН лишь с (секретным) условием, что постоянные члены Совбеза получают право вето, получив, таким образом, больше полномочий для контроля над миром. Утверждается также, что «к удивлению Черчилля и Рузвельта, Сталин согласился с правом “вето”, при условии приёма в ООН Украины и Белоруссии»²².

Рузвельт принял условия Сталина²³, надеясь, что в будущем, посредством ООН, сумеет ограничить советские претензии. Господствуют утверждения, что Ялта означала предательство, так как нерешительность Америки и Великобритании поощрили расширение советской сферы влияния на Азию, а также по причине того, что Сталин нарушил соглашение, создав советский блок. В этом контексте, в румынской исторической литературе доминирует высказанный Г. Киссинджером тезис, что «Ялта стала символом позора с точки зрения формирования облика

¹⁹ В. И. Лан, *США в военные и послевоенные годы* [US in War and Post-War Years], Москва, 1978, сс. 105, 112.

²⁰ См.: С. Попа, *Instaurarea regimurilor comuniste în Europa Centrală și de Sud-Est (1944-1947). Curente în istoriografia americană și rusă* [Establishment of Communist Regimes in Central and South-Eastern Europe (1944-1947). Currents in US and Russian Historiography], in „Revista istorică”, Academia Română, 2000, nr. 3-4.

²¹ N. Lixandru, *Cum s-au născut Națiunile Unite* [How was born the United Nations], in „Historia. Revistă de istorie”, 2005, nr. 7, p. 28.

²² L. Miron, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

²³ *Ibid.*

послевоенного мира»²⁴.

Также нередко утверждается, что большинство населения востока Европы рассматривало Ялтинскую конференцию как предательство со стороны Запада²⁵. Так как Красная Армия разгромила силы нацистов в большей части Восточной Европы, Сталин достиг того, к чему стремился – захватил обширную сферу влияния, превратив её в буферную зону. В этом плане свобода малых наций была принесена в жертву стабильности. Это означало, что Литва, Латвия и Эстония были вынуждены остаться в составе СССР. Так, В. Пали уверен, что англо-американцы пришли к парадоксальной ситуации, когда «выиграв войну на поле боя, проиграли мир Советам»²⁶.

Одним из наиболее известных проводников данной точки зрения являлся Георге Бузату. В одной из своих работ об участии Румынии во ВМВ он посвятил отдельную главу Ялтинской конференции, назвав её «Румыния в “тени” Ялты»²⁷. Автор утверждал, что победители (имея ввиду западные страны) победили фашистские государства, но «упустили возможность выиграть мир»²⁸.

В другой его работе, Крымской конференции также посвящена отдельная глава: «Ялта и Румыния: мифы и реалии»²⁹. Ссылаясь на ряд американских историков, Бузату отмечает, что Ялта означала раздел мира между победителями и представляла собой решающий шаг к «холодной войне». Он был уверен, что мнение о том, что данная конференция являлась благом для мира – это миф³⁰.

Первоначально, отмечает автор, румынское общество и правые политические партии с энтузиазмом восприняли «Декларацию об освобождённой Европе». Левые же силы, во главе с коммунистами, осмыслили конференцию как сигнал к захвату власти. Однако, в конечном итоге, что касается Румынии, «Ялта способствовала установлению сталинского правительства П. Гроза» и имела тяжелейшие

²⁴ Г. Киссинджер, *Дипломатия*, Москва, 1997, с. 369.

²⁵ http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conferin%C8%9Ba_de_la_Ialta;
http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tr%C4%83darea_occidental%C4%83.

²⁶ V. Pali, *România la Conferința de pace de la Paris* [Romania at the Paris Peace Conference], in „Revista istorică”, Academia Română, 2008, nr. 5-6, p. 544.

²⁷ Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945* [Romania and World War of 1939-1945], Iași, 1995, p. 257-278.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

²⁹ I. Scurtu, Gh. Buzatu, *op. cit.*, pp. 497-502.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 497.

отрицательные последствия³¹.

Некоторые румынские историки приходят к неподтверждённым документально заключениям. Так, Виорика Мойсук пишет, что «восточные границы Польши были нарезаны в результате секретного советско-американского соглашения, заключённого в Ялте: в обмен на участие в войне против Японии, в качестве компенсации, СССР получал границу 1904 г., юг острова Сахалин и Курильский архипелаг, брал в аренду Порт-Артур и Маньчжурскую ж/д». «Декларация об освобождённой Европе» предусматривала “свободные выборы”, однако эта идея вступала в противоречие с принципом раздела сфер влияния и господства между великими, по той простой причине, что в “советской зоне” не ставился вопрос свободных выборов и соблюдения воли избирателей»³².

Л. Мирон также уверен в том, что территория Польши была в Ялте разрублена³³. И даже больше: «в обмен лишь на простое обещание вступления в войну против Японии, Рузвельт отблагодарил Сталина возможностью господства на Азиатском континенте (будто бы гегемонии в Европе ему было мало)». «Невероятно, но Рузвельт подарил Красному Зверю южную половину острова Сахалин, Курилы, порты Дайрен и Порт-Артур, всю ж/д сеть Маньчжурии... Триумф Сталина достиг апогея». И далее автор выражает недоумение столь серьёзными уступками, которые невозможно ничем оправдать, так как Япония находилась на пороге капитуляции³⁴.

Корнелий Влад убеждает читателя, что на конференции Сталин «обещал Рузвельту, что после войны обеспечит свободу религии, частной собственности и большую демократию в СССР, которому вернёт имя: Россия. Опьянённый этими невиданными обещаниями, Рузвельт позволил Сталину установить послевоенные границы Польши и восстановить контроль над прибалтийскими странами». И далее: в составе американской делегации в Крыму находился советский агент Alger Hiss и, хотя Франклин Делано Рузвельт знал об этом, ничего не предпринял. Более того, оказывается «НКВД считало Г. Гопкинса чем-то вроде своего добровольного агента»³⁵.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 498, 502.

³² V. Moisuc, *Istoria relațiilor internaționale până la mijlocul secolului al XX-lea* [The History of International Relations until the Middle of the Twentieth Century], București, 2007, p. 288.

³³ L. Miron, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

³⁵ C. Vlad, *op. cit.*, pp. 67, 68.

Л. Мирон не сомневается, что, хотя раздел Европейского континента произошёл ранее, «создание этих пространств, а также территориальные уступки, сделанные в пользу СССР, были узаконены ялтинскими секретными соглашениями. Более того, эти два видных представителя западной демократии “узаконили” советские аннексии 1939-1940 гг., строго соблюдая даже русско-нацистские протоколы. Ялтинскими соглашениями Черчилль и Рузвельт широко открыли большевизму путь в Центральную и Восточную Европу, способствовал этим не только ликвидации свободы, но и грубейшей советизации целых народов... Секретные соглашения от 11 февраля 1945 г. легли в основу раскола Германии и раскололи Европу и мир на Восток – Запад»³⁶.

Вот что ответил в полемике со своими западными коллегами на подобные утверждения крупнейший английский историк международных отношений XX в. А. Дж. П. Тейлор: «Впоследствии Ялтинская конференция характеризовалась отрицательно. Сталин якобы обманул западные державы. Но вернее было бы сказать, что они сами себя обманули. Они воображали, что Советская Россия разгромит Германию для них, а затем отступит в пределы собственных границ – на худой конец тех, какие существовали в 1941, а не в 1939 г. Но у СССР были другие намерения. Когда рухнула власть немцев в Восточной Европе, в образовавшийся вакуум двинулась советская власть – это было неизбежным следствием победы. В политическом отношении русские во многом вели себя в Восточной Европе так же, как американцы и англичане на западе: сами заключали перемирие со странами-сателлитами, как поступили в Италии англичане и американцы. Они отстраняли от власти антикоммунистов, но англичане и американцы такие же меры принимали в Италии и Франции против коммунистов»³⁷.

С этих же позиций оценивают Крымскую конференцию и некоторые румынские историки. Так, академик Фл. Константиniu считал идею о разделе Европы на сферы влияния на Ялтинской конференции мифом³⁸. Д. Замфиреску замечает по этому поводу: «Прочтение документов заставляет нас с обыкновенной интеллектуальной порядочностью утверждать, что в

³⁶ L. Miron, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

³⁷ А. Дж. П. Тейлор, *Вторая мировая война: Два взгляда* [The Second World War: Two views], Москва, 1995 (militera.lib.ru/h/taylor/index.html).

³⁸ См. Fl. Constantiniu, *Acordul de procentaj și Ialta (O lămurire pentru dl. Gabriel Andreescu)* [The Percentages Agreement and Yalta. (An Explanation for Mr. Gabriel Andreescu)], in „Dosarele istoriei”, 2004, nr. 9, p. 2.

Ялте не происходило никакого раздела мира или даже Европы». Автор приписывает распространение мифа о разделе мира в Ялте частично французской доктрине и в ещё большей степени – официальной советской, а впоследствии, российской³⁹.

Если в сущности можно согласиться с Замфиреску, то его утверждение по поводу советской/российской доктрины элементарно не соответствует действительности, так как в СССР/России и официальные власти, и большинство исследователей именно то и делали, что опровергали тезис о «разделе мира». Указанный автор, в подтверждение своего тезиса, приводит мнения ряда французских специалистов. Так, Жан Елейнштейн пишет, что «Ялта не лежит в основе раздела мира. Она узаконила лишь то, что сила оружия и перипетии войны в действительности уже установили».

Елен Каррер д'Энкосс раскрывает следующие логические аргументы: «Учитывая ход военных действий и ялтинский политический диалог, разве можно всерьёз утверждать, что Запад сдал восток Европы СССР?». Её идеи поддержаны Пьером де Сенаркленом: «Раздел Европы и мира не вытекает из решений Ялтинской конференции, а из несоблюдения достигнутых на ней договорённостей... Он является следствием идеологических и политических антагонизмов». Приведём также слова Филиппа Моро Дефоржа, мнение которого разделяет и Д. Замфиреску: «Вопреки специфически французскому мифу о том, будто бы в Ялте делили мир, данное собрание вне сомнений является последним событием, пронизанным духом Великого Союза»⁴⁰.

В заключение следует отметить, что в этой статье в сжатом виде автор постарался представить мнения румынских историков по Ялтинской конференции. Можем сделать вывод, что румынская историография неоднозначно оценивает саму конференцию и её значимость для послевоенной Европы. В последние десятилетия проявились как более политизированный подход к освещению хода и результатов Ялтинской конференции, так и более взвешенные интерпретации, основанные на документальных источниках.

³⁹ D. Zamfirescu, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

A NEW & FASCINATING WORK ON TRABZON MONUMENTS¹

Throughout history, Trabzon has been hosting and sheltering numerous civilizations. Due its rich past and preserved culture, the city could have brought much of its heritage to the present day. Trabzon's heritage and natural beauty may well exceed one's expectations. It is placed on the route of Historical Silk Road, as a port initially reached by ships and then by camel caravans throughout Macka district, Zigana Mountain Chains, Bayburt and Erzurum cities, as a passage for travelers and commodities. The city also was a stage for everyone who intended to go Central Asia or China. Because of this reason, the city of Trabzon has been settled since Antiquity, being mentioned by Xenophon and Arrianus. Trabzon housed numerous monuments of different civilizations due its long past.

In the first years of Turkish Republic (1923), due to the construction of Ankara-Erzurum Railway, Trabzon lost its commercial gravity but has always protected its historical and cultural importance. Edged by the angry waves of the Black Sea, blue and greenness are close friends and woven like embroidery frame, championing a unique city in Anatolia. Despite cursory preservation of its monuments, Trabzon is currently an open air museum for fine art researchers, archeologists, historians and anthropologists. All those scientific branches could find something appropriate for their works or unearth a new invention bringing a different aspect to the known realities.

Professor Vasile M. Demciuc from the Suceava University/Romania paid several visits to Trabzon over the last decade. During these visits, he worked on Byzantine Monuments in the city and its vicinity. His work entitled *Trapezunt – Byzantine fascination and spiritual landmark* is an accumulation of information focusing on detailed features of Byzantine period monuments in Trabzon. The book consists of almost all distinctive monuments in the city; it starts with a comprehensive historical

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explanation of the city. During his studies on Trapezunt, the author tried to see all related sources including Greek and Turkish works regarding the city. That is why his work has a comprehensive bibliography and a lot to contribute new findings into the history of the city.

The first monument the book tackled with is the Monastery of Vazelon located in Macka sub-district of Trabzon. I remember, four years ago we had climbed up the said monastery together with Professor Vasile M. Demciuc and worked in the ruins all the day. There was a small chapel in front of the monastery in which some pieces of frescoes were still visible. In his book, Professor Demciuc adds a drawing of the chapel and gives distinctive information about remaining fresco pieces of small chapel. He also gives the measures of the chapel and monastery defining main areas which accessible through ruins. One of the most important information regarding the Monastery of Vazelon and its chapel is the drawing showing internal perspective of building. The aim of the drawing is to mark the fresco narrative of the Chapel by numbers. Despite his hard work arranging an internal plan for such a ruined construction, the author had done a fascinating job.

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Professor Demciuc’s book is 310 pages, including a Trabzon map and important Byzantine monuments marked on; it also has a rich bibliography. Finally, it is clear that *Trapezunt – Byzantine fascination and spiritual landmark* is an exciting book written after a rigorous survey process and brings out some new findings regarding the city of Trabzon and its monuments.

İsmail KÖSE,

Karadeniz Technical University, Trabzon / Turkey

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This book is about a ruler who, in order to achieve his objectives in the internal and external policy is able to do everything, even almost completely break off cooperation with the chamber of deputies during the general parliaments, what was undoubtedly seen at that time as one of the foundations of mixed monarchy system of the Republic of Poland. The author very well highlighted some moments where transylvanian king "collaborated" with the nobility, but with each such case she indicated that this was not due to the kindness of the king, but other causes that were largely favorable to the monarch.

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chapter where Ewa Dubas-Urbanowicz concentrated on attempts of Zborowski family to regain its political position before 1576. Everything started from dissatisfaction with the neglecting of them during distributing authorities by Batory at the beginning of the reign. Zborowski thought that they deserved many offices because they contributed to that Stefan Batory was enthroned. However only one of the brothers named Jan became Castellan of Gniezno nad Court Hetman of the Crown. There are three essential periods in relations between monarch and Zborowski house. First, after 1580 (then died Piotr Zborowski, the leader of family). Since then all brothers, except Jan, escalated the conflict with the king using methods which were a threat to inner peace and politics of Republic of Poland. Second date is 1583. In this year was born an idea (Stefan Batory and Jan Zamoyski) concerning a political destroying of Zborowski house, that is Samuel, Krzysztof and probably Andrzej.

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In my opinion, the whole book has a pessimistic overtone. No efforts of the king to improve the functioning of the state, where he had to rule, striving with all the power in foreign policy by all possible means to regain Transylvania and if it would be only possible also the whole Hungary (about what it is difficult to have a resentment to the king in his situation), complete ignoring of an existing law (convocations of the senate), the dispute throughout his whole reign with Zborowski family, and ending with the leaving of the Republic of Poland in complete political ruin, with the great divisions of the society, during the III interregnum.

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perhaps as a ruler of the Republic of Poland, and Zborowski family was pushed forward against the king only in revenge.

A huge number of sources, including those foreign (for example austrian and lithuanian) and studies shows good preparation of the author to write selected topic. It is very important that at this book we can find not only polish sources. It helps readers with understanding a political situation in Republic of Poland by showing an external opinion about Poland and Lithuania in XVI century. Readable page and annotation layout should also be counted as a plus of this book. It is very intelligible for people who did not study history or were not interested in it. In the thesis I was unable to provide more extensive information contained in the last chapter, which dealt with the role of the Zborowski family in the deepening of political split of Polish-Lithuanian state. Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz did not put up everytime enough information about convocations of the senate or assemblies of council after the general parliaments. She reduces to showing sometimes what the topic of assembly was and points some people who took part in it. In my opinion there should be more details about a subject of conversations and a list of people who were there ought to be longer and more detailed. In some parts of book, I found mistakes.

Sometimes the author wrote wrong specific date. Once wrote something what surprised me. According to it Jan Zamoyski in some moment forgot that without cooperation with the nobles it is hard to lead to "create political construction". I think this thesis is wrong and Zamoyski could not forget about it. Undoubtedly, presented by the author issue will broaden knowledge about the reign of Stefan Batory, which, when it particularly comes to internal policy, was often presented in a cursory and usually the most positive way. Surely this book has a scientific character and I encourage to read it everybody who is interested in history, want to get to know something more about polish history or desires to get interesting book.

Tomasz CIZIO,

The Cardinal Wyszyński University in Warsaw

SYNTHESIS ON THE EDUCATION IN BUKOVINA DURING THE AUSTRIAN RULE³

Constantin Ungureanu (born April 17, 1968, Cupca village, Hliboca District, Chernivtsi region, graduate of the Faculty of History of the "Ion Creanga" University in Chernivtsi), is a prominent researcher in the history of Bukovina, who completed his PhD in 1997 on the *Ethno-demographic evolution of Bukovina during 1774-1850*. Author of more than 100 studies and scientific articles mainly on the history of Bukovina during the Austrian Rule, published in specialized journals and collective volumes in Romania, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine - has benefited by several documentation and research scholarships in Germany (Munich and Augsburg) and Austria (Vienna). His most important works on the history of Bucovina are: *Bucovina during the Austrian Rule, 1774 - 1918. Ethnic demographics and religious aspects*, Chisinau, Civitas Publishing, 2003, 304 p. *Primary Education in Bukovina (1774-1918)*, Chisinau, Civitas Publishing, 2007, 336 p. He is currently employed as a coordinating scientific researcher at the History Institute of Moldova Science Academy.

This paper successfully completes his previous research on the evolution of education in Bukovina under the Austrian rule. The book uses an exhaustive bibliography comprising a plurality of funds from the *State Archive of Chernivtsi Region, Bucharest National Archives, National Archives - Suceava Department* and various sources, yearbooks, school statistics (in German and Romanian), periodicals, general and specialized papers (Romanian, German, Austrian and Ukrainian).

The work of Mr. Constantin Ungureanu - *Education in Bukovina during the Austrian Rule (1774-1918)* is remarkable for its excellent structure and quantitative and qualitative symmetry of chapters. The book contains an extensive *Introduction*, in accordance with academic rules; five chapters (pursuing in parallel the chronological and thematic evolution of all levels of education on the territory of Austrian Bukovina); a *Conclusion* (which contains summary information about primary, secondary and higher

³ Constantin Ungureanu, *Sistemul de învățământ din Bucovina în perioada stăpânirii austriece (1774-1918)*, Chișinău, S. n., 2015, p.456.

education); annexes consisting of 70 statistical tables and the description of Chernivtsi University Senate during the Austrian rule; bibliography (judiciously structured); a summary in German and English.

The value of Mr. Constantin Ungureanu's work is given by the following:

- richness of unpublished sources used (over 15 funds from Chernivtsi Region Archives; seven funds from the National Archives of Romania, three funds from the National Archives - Suceava Department and the unprecedented work - the manuscript of George Tofan, *Public Education in Bukovina*).

- use of numerous collections of documents, yearbooks and school statistics (90% German and 10% Romanian).

- periodicals (falling chronologically between the last decades of the nineteenth century and the 2000s) published in: Bucharest, Suceava, Radauti, Chernivtsi, Chisinau, Vienna, Augsburg, Stuttgart etc.

- an impressive number of general and special works (mostly German and Romanian).

- highlighting the place and role of education at all levels in the Duchy of Bukovina, in the school and higher education system of Cisleithania.

- outlining the multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-confessional specificity of education in Bukovina during 1774-1918.

- he established an analytic-synthetic and highly accurate description of the mosaic-like picture of nationalities and their importance in the development of education, culture and spirituality in Bucovina.

Although at first glance the style the book is written in appears to be technical, due to the enormous amount of facts and figures, these elements are actually very relevant considering the fact that they are a product of the historical and statistical interpretation of mostly unpublished or inaccessible information (being written in German).

The monographic work *The Educational System in Bucovina during the Austrian Rule (1774-1918)* is a very valuable contribution to the historiography of Bucovina, benefiting by the double cultural-linguistic Romanian-German quality.

The author believes that at the beginning of the Austrian rule the education level in Bucovina had outrun that of the rest of Moldova, in that this territory had a multitude of schools dependent on churches and monasteries (notably the *Episcopal School of Radauti* and *Putna Theological*

Academy). However, most of the population remains quasi-illiterate in the early stages of evolution of Bukovina under the Austrian rule.

During the military administration (1774-1786), the education system was reorganized and nationalized. Gradually, the old Moldovan schools were closed, new ones were opened in German and Romanian teaching. At the end of the military administration, the education system in Bukovina was still underdeveloped.

During the Galician administration (1786-1848), education in Bucovina was characterized by stagnation. There followed a brief period of progress (1786-1793), after which the education system had regressed again. The most important educational institution teaching in Romanian was the Clerical School of Chernivtsi (functional between 1786 and 1818). It was a notably unfortunate time period for the Romanian education in the province during 1815-1844, when primary schools were under the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Consistory of Lemberg.

Between 1848-1869 the network of primary schools in Bucovina had significantly developed, the number of educational institutions tripled compared to the year 1850. However, enrollment rate remained at a very low level. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the number of students was between 7300 and 8300.

During the sixth-seventh decades of the above-mentioned century, the Austrian Parliament adopted a number of important laws on the modernization of society and the economy. These laws included education, so that the separation of education from church authority was proclaimed in 1869. In 1873 the Bukovina Diet adopted the legislation which established the types of schools and how they functioned.

At the end of the Austrian rule, the Provincial School Board was made up of 16 people, divided by nationality: six Germans, four Romanians, four Ukrainians, 1 Polish and a Jew.

A highlight of education in Bucovina is the establishment in 1875 of the Franz-Josephs Universität Czernowitz, as a counterweight to the universities in Romania - Iasi (1860) and Bucharest (1864).

Before the beginning of World War I, the primary education in the duchy was superior to the one in Bessarabia, Romania and even to Transylvania and Banat (during this time period, only 62% of Romanian children of school age were enrolled in primary education, whereas in Bucovina there were 95%).

The work of Mr. Constantin Ungureanu is a highly important landmark for the studies of cultural history of the Duchy of Bukovina, as part of Cisleithania and the dualistic Empire, remarkable for the clarity of analysis, scientific accuracy, use of a large variety of sources and also for the interconnection between history, demography and statistics.

Vlad GAFIȚA,
Stefan cel Mare University of Suceava

A NEW & FASCINATING WORK ON TRABZON MONUMENTS¹

Throughout history, Trabzon has been hosting and sheltering numerous civilizations. Due its rich past and preserved culture, the city could have brought much of its heritage to the present day. Trabzon's heritage and natural beauty may well exceed one's expectations. It is placed on the route of Historical Silk Road, as a port initially reached by ships and then by camel caravans throughout Macka district, Zigana Mountain Chains, Bayburt and Erzurum cities, as a passage for travelers and commodities. The city also was a stage for everyone who intended to go Central Asia or China. Because of this reason, the city of Trabzon has been settled since Antiquity, being mentioned by Xenophon and Arrianus. Trabzon housed numerous monuments of different civilizations due its long past.

In the first years of Turkish Republic (1923), due to the construction of Ankara-Erzurum Railway, Trabzon lost its commercial gravity but has always protected its historical and cultural importance. Edged by the angry waves of the Black Sea, blue and greenness are close friends and woven like embroidery frame, championing a unique city in Anatolia. Despite cursory preservation of its monuments, Trabzon is currently an open air museum for fine art researchers, archeologists, historians and anthropologists. All those scientific branches could find something appropriate for their works or unearth a new invention bringing a different aspect to the known realities.

Professor Vasile M. Demciuc from the Suceava University/Romania paid several visits to Trabzon over the last decade. During these visits, he worked on Byzantine Monuments in the city and its vicinity. His work entitled *Trapezunt - Byzantine fascination and spiritual landmark* is an accumulation of information focusing on detailed features of Byzantine period monuments in Trabzon. The book consists of almost all distinctive monuments in the city; it starts with a comprehensive historical

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The first monument the book tackled with is the Monastery of Vazelon located in Macka sub-district of Trabzon. I remember, four years ago we had climbed up the said monastery together with Professor Vasile M. Demciuc and worked in the ruins all the day. There was a small chapel in front of the monastery in which some pieces of frescoes were still visible. In his book, Professor Demciuc adds a drawing of the chapel and gives distinctive information about remaining fresco pieces of small chapel. He also gives the measures of the chapel and monastery defining main areas which accessible through ruins. One of the most important information regarding the Monastery of Vazelon and its chapel is the drawing showing internal perspective of building. The aim of the drawing is to mark the fresco narrative of the Chapel by numbers. Despite his hard work arranging an internal plan for such a ruined construction, the author had done a fascinating job.

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During the sixth-seventh decades of the above-mentioned century, the Austrian Parliament adopted a number of important laws on the modernization of society and the economy. These laws included education, so that the separation of education from church authority was proclaimed in 1869. In 1873 the Bukovina Diet adopted the legislation which established the types of schools and how they functioned.

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The work of Mr. Constantin Ungureanu is a highly important landmark for the studies of cultural history of the Duchy of Bukovina, as part of Cisleithania and the dualistic Empire, remarkable for the clarity of analysis, scientific accuracy, use of a large variety of sources and also for the interconnection between history, demography and statistics.

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A NEW & FASCINATING WORK ON TRABZON MONUMENTS¹

Throughout history, Trabzon has been hosting and sheltering numerous civilizations. Due its rich past and preserved culture, the city could have brought much of its heritage to the present day. Trabzon's heritage and natural beauty may well exceed one's expectations. It is placed on the route of Historical Silk Road, as a port initially reached by ships and then by camel caravans throughout Macka district, Zigana Mountain Chains, Bayburt and Erzurum cities, as a passage for travelers and commodities. The city also was a stage for everyone who intended to go Central Asia or China. Because of this reason, the city of Trabzon has been settled since Antiquity, being mentioned by Xenophon and Arrianus. Trabzon housed numerous monuments of different civilizations due its long past.

In the first years of Turkish Republic (1923), due to the construction of Ankara-Erzurum Railway, Trabzon lost its commercial gravity but has always protected its historical and cultural importance. Edged by the angry waves of the Black Sea, blue and greenness are close friends and woven like embroidery frame, championing a unique city in Anatolia. Despite cursory preservation of its monuments, Trabzon is currently an open air museum for fine art researchers, archeologists, historians and anthropologists. All those scientific branches could find something appropriate for their works or unearth a new invention bringing a different aspect to the known realities.

Professor Vasile M. Demciuc from the Suceava University/Romania paid several visits to Trabzon over the last decade. During these visits, he worked on Byzantine Monuments in the city and its vicinity. His work entitled *Trapezunt – Byzantine fascination and spiritual landmark* is an accumulation of information focusing on detailed features of Byzantine period monuments in Trabzon. The book consists of almost all distinctive monuments in the city; it starts with a comprehensive historical

¹ Vasile M. Demciuc, *Trapezunt: fascinație și reper spiritual bizantin*, București, Editura Basilica, 2014, p.310.

explanation of the city. During his studies on Trapezunt, the author tried to see all related sources including Greek and Turkish works regarding the city. That is why his work has a comprehensive bibliography and a lot to contribute new findings into the history of the city.

The first monument the book tackled with is the Monastery of Vazelon located in Macka sub-district of Trabzon. I remember, four years ago we had climbed up the said monastery together with Professor Vasile M. Demciuc and worked in the ruins all the day. There was a small chapel in front of the monastery in which some pieces of frescoes were still visible. In his book, Professor Demciuc adds a drawing of the chapel and gives distinctive information about remaining fresco pieces of small chapel. He also gives the measures of the chapel and monastery defining main areas which accessible through ruins. One of the most important information regarding the Monastery of Vazelon and its chapel is the drawing showing internal perspective of building. The aim of the drawing is to mark the fresco narrative of the Chapel by numbers. Despite his hard work arranging an internal plan for such a ruined construction, the author had done a fascinating job.

The famous Monastery of Sumela is the second monument analyzed in the book. It was built clinging to a cliff face, on a sharp sloping rock in the Altındere Valley National Park, at the borders of Macka district. It is located on the Historical Silk Road, at the north eastern side of Turkey, and at 43 kms away from Trabzon. As it was dedicated to Mother of Jesus, Virgin Mary, the local people call it Mother Mary Monastery ("Meryemana Manastırı"). Its original name is "Panaghia tou Melas" meaning "The Virgin of Black Rock". There has been ongoing restoration works in Sumela since 1990's. At the beginning of 2016, because of growing danger of falling rock pieces from the top, no visitors are allowed to enter into the monastery. This case makes Professor Demciuc's book more important than ever because it is delivering vital information about the internal features of building. However, he spared special time on the monastery and tried to unearth some new findings regarding the building. Sumela is the most famous monastery bearing almost 200 fresco scenes which mostly visible and distinguishable at present. Focusing on the history of the Monastery, Professor Demciuc gives impressive knowledge regarding the building.

In addition, the author focuses on the monuments located mostly in the center of Trabzon. Many of these monuments were converted into mosques during Ottoman period and they are still in use. Professor

Demciuc enriched his book with drawings including outer and inner perspectives of these buildings. The drawings are splendid works and give an idea about the monument. The “Haghia Sophia” is also included in the book; during the last years, it has been reconverted into mosque while being a museum. The inner and outer drawings and knowledge regarding “Haghia Sophia” worth to talk about. At the last pages of the book there are color pictures showing some of the monuments explained in the book.

Professor Demciuc’s book is 310 pages, including a Trabzon map and important Byzantine monuments marked on; it also has a rich bibliography. Finally, it is clear that *Trapezunt – Byzantine fascination and spiritual landmark* is an exciting book written after a rigorous survey process and brings out some new findings regarding the city of Trabzon and its monuments.

İsmail KÖSE,

Karadeniz Technical University, Trabzon / Turkey

THE RZECZPOSPOLITA POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE MID-SIXTEENTH CENTURY: THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DEBATE CONTINUES²

The subject of the review is a book written by PhD. Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz under the title: *O nowy kształt Rzeczypospolitej: kryzys polityczny w państwie w latach 1576-1586*. The author is a lecturer at the University of Białystok at the History and Social Faculty. In her historical studies she is interested in the modern and common history of Poland from

² Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz, *O nowy kształt Rzeczypospolitej: kryzys polityczny w państwie w latach 1576-1586* [The new shape of the Republic: the political crisis in the country between 1576-1586], Warszawa, Wydawnictwo DiG, 2013, 250 s.

the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, including the operation of parliament and politics of the Republic of Poland. The reviewed item concerns the political crisis in Polish-Lithuanian state during the reign of Stefan Batory, particularly with regard to his internal policy. It was divided into four chapters, each of which contains political forces affecting the political situation in Polish-Lithuanian state (the king, the nobility, Jan Zamoyski and Zborowski family).

This book is about a ruler who, in order to achieve his objectives in the internal and external policy is able to do everything, even almost completely break off cooperation with the chamber of deputies during the general parliaments, what was undoubtedly seen at that time as one of the foundations of mixed monarchy system of the Republic of Poland. The author very well highlighted some moments where transylvanian king "collaborated" with the nobility, but with each such case she indicated that this was not due to the kindness of the king, but other causes that were largely favorable to the monarch.

Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz underlined in her thesis, that in a large extent to the image of the ruler, who was insensitive to attempts of repairing the state by the chamber of deputies, had an influence Jan Zamoyski, who helped him as he could betraying at the same to his convictions and betraying the idea of the needs to reform the state (including the initiated ones during enforcement movement) as also the noble society, to whom he owed among other the position he has achieved in the state.

A very important issue in the book was to show that the noble guild all the time of Stefan Batory reign did not fight against the ruler himself, but with the situation in the country (no possibilities of reforms). Until the end they believed that their demands will be fulfilled, but as the author pointed out, since the parliament in 1582, the nobility has been losing confidence to the transylvanian ruler. An extremely important argument portrayed in the book is that the members of the lower house of the Old Polish Parliament were not mindless group of people, who could be exploited by the opposition oligarchs (including the Zborowski family) for their own purposes using their passwords. On the contrary, the nobility took the opportunity to strengthen their struggle for changes in the state using for that the influential people.

The author also presented the disastrous role of the Zborowski family in deepening political crisis of the state. It was shown especially in the last

chapter where Ewa Dubas-Urbanowicz concentrated on attempts of Zborowski family to regain its political position before 1576. Everything started from dissatisfaction with the neglecting of them during distributing authorities by Batory at the beginning of the reign. Zborowski thought that they deserved many offices because they contributed to that Stefan Batory was enthroned. However only one of the brothers named Jan became Castellan of Gniezno nad Court Hetman of the Crown. There are three essential periods in relations between monarch and Zborowski house. First, after 1580 (then died Piotr Zborowski, the leader of family). Since then all brothers, except Jan, escalated the conflict with the king using methods which were a threat to inner peace and politics of Republic of Poland. Second date is 1583. In this year was born an idea (Stefan Batory and Jan Zamoyski) concerning a political destroying of Zborowski house, that is Samuel, Krzysztof and probably Andrzej.

Last date is 1584 when Samuel was decapitated and Zborowski family has lost irreparably its political position in country. After that brothers united (except Jan) to fight against king. Final settlement come up next year when Krzysztof had a trial during general parliament. It's all decided about hatred against the ruler, and any subsequent action directed against the own king, what resulted in even greater aggravation of the social and political tearing of the state, which broke out with a full power at the end of 1586.

In my opinion, the whole book has a pessimistic overtone. No efforts of the king to improve the functioning of the state, where he had to rule, striving with all the power in foreign policy by all possible means to regain Transylvania and if it would be only possible also the whole Hungary (about what it is difficult to have a resentment to the king in his situation), complete ignoring of an existing law (convocations of the senate), the dispute throughout his whole reign with Zborowski family, and ending with the leaving of the Republic of Poland in complete political ruin, with the great divisions of the society, during the III interregnum.

The author, however, also noted the benefits of the monarch reign, (including the Moscow defeat to the east and guaranteeing the peace for long years), what certainly proves that this book was not written unilaterally to only defame Stefan Batory.

At the end Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz pointed out that only the king and the nobles aspired to political change in the country. Zamoyski was only interested in increasing his position in the state and planning for his future,

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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