

EVOLUTION OF THE WESTPHALIAN ORDER UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE WORLD WARS: HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ASPECTS

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Abstract. *The two anniversaries – the centennial of the end of World War I, with the organization of peace conferences, and the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II, with the corresponding 1945 peace conferences and the creation of the United Nations, – have both led the historians to update their studies on the impact of the two global armed conflicts on the world order. The Great War of 1914-1918 and World War II of 1939-1945 have brought substantial transformations on the international arena. They led to the reformation of the whole system of international relations and initiated new structures of the post-war world. The Versailles-Washington system completed the post-war peaceful settlement process and the transition from war to peace, preparing the conditions for the stabilization of a democratic system in the field of international relations. Overall, this order was marked by severe internal contradictions and lasted only two decades. The Yalta-Potsdam Peace System was a significant global result of World War II. It became a key modernization of the Westphalian world order, and four and a half decades later ended the era of its almost 350-year existence. Studying these aspects is vital for minimizing the potential risks and threats in the evolution of the modern system of international relations.*

Keywords: *Westphalia, World Order, World War, International System, Versailles-Washington, Yalta-Potsdam, Propaganda, Manipulation, Post-Westphalian.*

Rezumat: *Evoluția sistemului de la Westfalia sub impactul războaielor mondiale: aspecte privind istoria și relațiile internaționale. Cele două aniversări – centenarul sfârșitului Primului Război Mondial, alături de organizarea conferințelor de pace, și aniversarea a 75 de ani de la încheierea celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial, cu aferentele conferințe de pace din 1945 și cu momentul creării Națiunilor Unite, – i-au determinat pe istorici să își actualizeze studiile privitoare la impactul celor două conflicte armate globale asupra ordinii mondiale. Marele Război din 1914-1918 și al Doilea Război Mondial din 1939-1945 au generat mutații importante pe arena internațională. Acestea au dus la reformarea*

întregului sistem de relații internaționale și la crearea unor noi structuri ale lumii postbelice. Prin instituirea sistemului Versailles-Washington au fost finalizate procesul de soluționare pașnică de după Marea Conflagrație și trecerea de la război la pace, pregătindu-se premisele pentru stabilizarea unui sistem democratic în domeniul relațiilor internaționale. În general, marcată de contradicții interne severe, această stare de lucruri a rezistat numai două decenii. Sistemul de pace Yalta-Potsdam a fost un rezultat major al celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. El a devenit un instrument-cheie în modernizarea ordinii mondiale westfaliene, iar după patru decenii și jumătate i-a încheiat existența de aproape 350 de ani. Studiarea acestor aspecte este importantă pentru minimizarea potențialelor riscuri și amenințări în evoluția sistemului modern de relații internaționale.

INTRODUCTION

The 20th century came into history as a period of profound epochal change that affected almost all areas of social life. In less than a century, the international relations system has undergone dramatic shifts three times. The first two times happened at the dawn of the previous century, in the first half of the twentieth century. It was triggered by the world wars - the global conflicts of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, which reshaped not only borders in Europe and the world, but also the fate of individuals and entire nations. And the final third time it happened at the end of the 20th century: the breakup of the communist system and the USSR, which have entirely changed the direction of political, economic, social, cultural development of several countries and, most importantly, the order of international relations as a whole. It is worth noting that the profound political transformations that took place in the twentieth century were incomplete, and the effects of the changes caused by the end of the Cold War and the formation of the post-Westphalian world are only noticeable at the beginning of the present century.

Not only have world wars become the next change in the Westphalian world order but they have also radically caused the globalization and transformation of international relations with the collapse of the USSR, the end of the communist era, the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world, the gradual crystallization of a multipolar international system at the end of the twentieth century. It is necessary to point out that during the "short" interval from 1914-1991 - to the 20th century, the state-centred multipolar international Westphalian system has undergone some crucial changes. For the first time, this happened under the influence of the First World War. First of all, we mean the collapse of empires and the rapid transformation of the world which led to its geopolitical structure change and the

emergence of several important international actors, including the USSR, Weimar Germany, Central and Southern Europe, Turkey, along with the existing ones (USA, UK, France, Italy, Japan). Second, the United States went beyond the frames of the policy of isolationism and became actively involved in international processes outside the Americas. Third, the globalization of international relations has led to the creation of the first world's international organization – the League of Nations. World War II led to a new change in the Westphalian world order. This manifested itself, first of all, in the transition from a multipolar to a bipolar world; the impact of a new nuclear factor on international policy; the collapse of the colonial system; the growing importance of regional and global integration processes; universalization and instrumentalization of international relations in the context of unprecedented influence on the global (such as the UN, October 24, 1945) and regional international organizations. Finally, the third amendment of the Westphalian world order under the influence of the collapse of the communist system, the collapse of the USSR, the end of the Cold War and the destruction of the bipolar international system led to the globalization of international relations and their structural changes in the genesis and formation of the modern post-bipolar world.

The centennial of the end of World War I and the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II became a significant informational occasion for a new, unbiased view in the context of a retrospective analysis of the problems of war and peace, war and politics, war and diplomacy, war and society, war and culture etc. The study of the causes, consequences and lessons of the world wars becomes especially relevant in the context of the threat of destruction of the international legal framework of the modern post-bipolar system of international relations, in particular, due to the emergence of new "hot" spots on the planet. These are, for example, the wars waged by the Russian Federation against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (since 2014); the revolutionary and armed events of the so-called Arab Spring; the military, political, diplomatic, economic confrontation of various influential international actors of modernity (in particular, the United States, Russia, Turkey) in Syria, Libya and, in general, in the geopolitical space of the Great Middle East.¹ The causal relationships that connect local events to worldwide events and

¹ Володимир Горбулін (coord.), *Світова гібридна війна: український фронт* [World Hybrid War: The Ukrainian Front], Київ, НІСД, 2017, 496 с.; Євген Магда, *Гібридна війна: вижити і перемогти* [Hybrid War: Survive and Win], Харків, Біват, 2015, 304 с.; Jurij Felsztinski, Michał Stanczew, *Trzecia wojna światowa? Bitwa o Ukrainę* [The Third World War? Battle for Ukraine], Warszawa, Wyd-wo Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, 2015, 432 s.; Marcel H. Van Herpen, *Wojny Putina. Czeczenia, Gruzja, Ukraina*

processes, first clearly identified on the eve of the Great War (the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the outbreak of World War I in 1914) remain relevant today. It is clear that these processes have aroused and will continue to bear an objective interest for researchers and experts since their practical implications are tangible for the vast majority of the inhabitants, from both relevant sub-regions and the global world community as a whole.

The main trends identification of socio-political development of the century is impossible without a turn to the events of the past century, first of all – the world wars. They established several megatrends of global development and international relations in the 20th century, some of which have become modern. That is why among contemporary researchers, the problems of the First and Second World Wars remain more than relevant. Proof of this is the recent publication of some new studies by local and foreign scientists. In last years, several scientific conferences, seminars, and round tables have taken place on the beginning, the course and the end of the world wars. Major collective monographs were published, including *The Great War of 1914-1918: Origins, Character, Consequences*, *World War I in the Focus of History*, *World Wars in the History and Destiny of Humanity (to the centennial of the end of World War I and the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II)* and others.² The works of historians from

2014 [Putin's wars. Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine 2014], Warszawa, Wyd-wo Prószyński Media, 2014, 408 s.; Agata Kleczkowska, *Wojna hybrydowa – uwagi z perspektywy prawa międzynarodowego publicznego* [Hybrid war – remarks from the perspective of public international law], in "Sprawy międzynarodowe", 2015, No. 2, S. 93 – 110.

² Олександр Рєєнт (coord.), *Велика війна 1914–1918 рр. і Україна* [The Great War and Ukraine], in 2 Books, Book 1, *Історичні нариси* [Historical Essays], Київ, ТОВ «Видавництво «КЛІО», 2014, 784 с.; *Первая мировая война, Версальская система и современность* [The First World War, the Versailles system and modernity], Санкт-Петербург, 2012, 350 с.; Сергей Троян (coord.), *Мировые войны в истории человечества (к 100-летию начала Первой и 75-летию начала Второй мировых войн)* [World Wars in the History of Mankind (on the 100th Anniversary of the Beginning of the First and 75th Anniversary of the Beginning of the Second World War)], Київ, НІКА-Центр, 2016, 256 с.; Сергій Троян (coord.), *Перша світова війна і революції: вектори соціокультурних трансформацій* [The First World War and the Revolutions: Vectors of Sociocultural Transformations], Київ, Кондор-Видавництво, 2017, 212 с.; Сергій Троян (coord.), *Перша світова війна у фокусі «плинної нестабільності»: міжнародна і внутрішня політика* [World War I in the Focus of "Volatile Instability": International and Domestic Politics], Київ, Видавничий дім «Кондор», 2019, 280 с.; Сергій Троян (coord.), *Перша світова війна у фокусі історії (дипломатичні та політичні колізії Великої війни)* [World War I in the Focus of History (Diplomatic and

different countries and scientific schools (such as Colin Gray³, Antony Beevor⁴, Marius Volos⁵, Eric Hobsbawm⁶, Mykhailo Koval⁷, Florin Constantiniu⁸, Jörn Leonard⁹, Hart Liddell¹⁰, Rees Laurence¹¹, Andrii Martinov¹², Herfried Münkler¹³,

Political Conflicts of the Great War]], Київ, Кондор-Видавництво, 2016, 296 с.; Сергій Троян (coord.), *Світові війни в історії та долі людства (до 100-річчя початку Першої і 75-річчя початку Другої світових воєн)* [World Wars in the History and Destiny of Humanity (to the 100th Anniversary of the First and 75th Anniversary of the Second World War)], Київ, ДП «Пріоритет», 2014, 312 с.; Сергій Троян (coord.), *Велика війна 1914–1918 рр.: витоки, характер, наслідки* [The Great War of 1914–1918: Origins, Character, Consequences], Київ, Видавничий дім «Кондор», 2018, 536 с.; Constantin Hlihor, Grigory Davidovich Shkundin, Vasile Soare, Alexander Sergeevich Stikalin (eds.), *Rusia și România în timpul Primului Război Mondial* [Russia and Romania during the First World War], București, Ed. Top Form, 2018, 501 p.

³ Colin Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations. An Introduction to the Strategic History*, London and New York, Routledge, 2007, 306 p.

⁴ Энтони Бивор, *Вторая мировая война* [The Second World War], Москва, Колибри, 2014, 992 с.

⁵ Мариуш Волос, Григорий Шкундин (coord.), *Народы Габсбургской монархии в 1914 – 1920 гг.: от национальных движений к созданию национальных государств* [Peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1914-1920: from National Movements to the Creation of National States], Vol. 1, Москва, Квадрига, 2012, 456 с.

⁶ Эрик Хобсбаум, *Разломанное время. Культура и общество в двадцатом веке* [Broken time. Culture and Society in the Twentieth Century], Москва, Издательство АСТ: CORPUS, 2017, 384 с.

⁷ Михайло Коваль, *Друга світова війна 1939–1945* [The Second World War 1939-1945], Київ, В-во «Наукова думка», 2004, 688 с.

⁸ Florin Constantiniu, *1941. Hitler, Stalin și România: România și geneza Operațiunii „Barbarossa”* [1941. Hitler, Stalin and Romania: Romania and the genesis of Operation "Barbarossa"], București, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 2002, 215 p.

⁹ Jörn Leonhard, *Die Büchse der Pandora. Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges* [Pandora's Box. History of the First World War], München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2014, 1157 s.

¹⁰ Гарт Лидделл, *История Первой мировой войны* [History of the First World War], Москва, АСТ, 2014, 574 с.

¹¹ Піз Лоренс, *Друга світова війна за зачиненими дверима* [World War II behind the Closed Doors], Київ, Темпора, 2010, 444 с.

¹² Андрій Мартинов, *Перша світова війна в сучасній німецькомовній історіографії: теми й концептуальні ідеї досліджень* [World War I in Contemporary German Historiography: Topics and Conceptual Ideas of Research], in "Міжнародні зв'язки України: наукові пошуки і знахідки", 2016, Вип. 25, с. 397 – 423.

¹³ Herfried Münkler, *Der Große Krieg. Die Welt 1914 bis 1918* [The Great War. The World 1914-1918], Berlin, Rowohlt, 2013, 928 s.

Michael S. Neiberg¹⁴, Dumitru Preda¹⁵, Ioan Scurtu¹⁶, Timothy D. Snyder¹⁷, Serhiy Troyan, Volodymyr Fisanov¹⁸, Peter Hart¹⁹, Andrzej Hvalba²⁰, Max Hastings²¹ and many others²²) were dedicated to virtually all aspects of the 20th-century global

¹⁴ Michael S. Neiberg, *Taniec furii. Wybuch pierwszej wojny światowej oczami Europejczyków* [Dance of Fury. The outbreak of the First World War through the eyes of Europeans], Kraków, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2013, 352 s.

¹⁵ Dumitru Preda, *România și Antanta. Avatarurile unei mici puteri într-un război de coaliție 1916–1917* [Romania and Antanta. The avatars of a small power in a coalition war 1916–1917], Iași, Institutul European, 1998, 224 p.

¹⁶ Ioan Scurtu, *Marea Unire din 1918 în context european* [The Great Union of 1918 in the European context], București, Editura Academiei Române, 2003, 447 p.; Ioan Scurtu (coord.), *Istoria Românilor (1918-1940)* [History of the Romanians (1918-1940)], Vol. VIII, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2003, 856 p.; Ioan Scurtu, *Declarația privind unirea Basarabiei cu România* [Declaration regarding the union of Bessarabia with Romania], in "Studii și Comunicări/DIS", 2018, No. 11 (XI), P. 45-56.

¹⁷ Тимоті Снайдер, *Криваві землі. Європа між Гітлером і Сталіном* [Bloody Lands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin], Київ, Лаурис, 2018, 492 с.

¹⁸ Владимир Фисанов, Сергей Троян, *Немецкая Mitteleuropa: историческая ретроспектива (немецкие планы создания Серединной Европы конца XIX — начала XX века)* [German Mitteleuropa: historical retrospective (German plans for the creation of Mid-Europe of the late XIX - early XX centuries)], Saarbrücken, LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2013, 96 c.

¹⁹ Peter Hart, *I Wojna Światowa 1914–1918. Historia militarna* [World War I 1914-1918. Military history], Poznań, Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, 2014, 603 s.

²⁰ Andrzej Chwalba, *Samobójstwo Europy. Wielka wojna 1914–1918* [Suicide of Europe. Great War 1914-1918], Kraków, Wyd-wo Literackie, 2014, 656 s.

²¹ Макс Хейстингс, *Первая мировая война. Катастрофа 1914 года* [World War I. The Disaster of 1914], Москва, Альпина нон-фикшн, 2017, 604 с.

²² Андрей Болтаевский, *Первая мировая война: дипломатическая предыстория, крупнейшие военные операции и внешнеполитические итоги* [First World War: Diplomatic Pre-History, Military Operations and Foreign Policy Results], Москва, Издательство Спутник+, 2016, 258 с.; Андрій Галушка, *Змова диктаторів. Поділ Європи між Гітлером і Сталіном 1939-1941* [Conspiracy of Dictators. The Division of Europe between Hitler and Stalin 1939-1941], Харків, Клуб сімейного дозвілля, 2018, 368 с.; Вахтанг Кіпіані, *Друга світова Непридумані історії (Не) наша жива інша* [Second World War True Stories (Not) Ours Living Other], Київ: Віват, 2019, 304 с.; Nicolae Enciu, *Marea Unire din 1918: o strălucită victorie a geografiei asupra istoriei nedrepte* [The Great Union of 1918: a brilliant victory of geography over the unjust history], in "Revista Limba Română", 2018, No. 1-2, anul XXVIII, P. 216-231.; Petre Otu, *Pace și război în spațiul românesc. Secolul al XX-lea* [Peace and War on the Romanian Territory. The 20th Century], București, Editura Militară, 2016, 435 p.; Stanisław Łoś, «Świat się w mych oczach dwukrotnie zawałił...»: wspomnienia [„The

armed conflicts, including the regional dimension of Central and Eastern Europe.

In the context of the suggested scientific exploration, the fundamental researches of Western authors are essential, in particular those of Bear F. Braumoeller²³, Barry Buzan and George Lawson²⁴, Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl and Alexandru Balas²⁵, Amitav Acharya²⁶, Bertrand Badie²⁷, Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan²⁸, dedicated to the systems of international relations and the peculiarities of their changes during the 17th-20th centuries (from Westphalia to post-Westphalia). At the same time, we generally follow the approaches of the noted scholars to the understanding and essential characteristics of these world systems, their changes under the influence of the military, economic, colonial, political, regional and target processes. In particular, "within this model, the international system is characterized by cooperation and conflict between viable and rational states in an anarchic environment, which reflects the pluralist norms of interaction in diplomacy, law and multilateralism. A Westphalian system is, therefore, said to rest upon the sovereignty of political units, territoriality, and non-intervention."²⁹ At the same time, it is necessary to take into account a very valid remark or clarification by Benno Teschke, a British researcher: "The logic of inter-dynastic relations structured early modern European politics until the regionally very uneven 19th-century transition to international modernity."³⁰

world has collapsed twice in my eyes...": memories], Kraków, Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej; Warszawa, Muzeum Historii Polski, 2017, 683 s.

²³ Bear F. Braumoeller, *The Great Powers and the International System: Systemic Theory in Empirical Perspective*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 276 p.

²⁴ Barry Buzan, George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations* (Cambridge studies in international relations; 135), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 396 p.

²⁵ Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl, Alexandru Balas, *The Puzzle of Peace. The Evolution of Peace in the International System*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, 247 p.

²⁶ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018, 215 p.

²⁷ Bertrand Badie, *New Perspectives on the International Order. No Longer Alone in This World*, London, Palgrave Maximilian, 2019, 140 p.

²⁸ Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations. Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2019, 383 p.

²⁹ Edward Newman, *Failed states and international order: constructing a post-Westphalian world*, in *Contemporary security policy*, 2009, Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 422.

³⁰ Benno Teschke, *Theorizing the Westphalian system of states: international relations from absolutism to capitalism*, in "European Journal of International Relations", 2002, 8(1), p. 6.

The purpose of scientific exploration is to study the impact of the First and Second World Wars on the dramatic changes in the systems of the Westphalian world order. In general, this article highlights the current emphasis in the study of complex and sometimes very contradictory issues of the period, outlined by the British Prime Minister W. Churchill as "An era of the New Thirty Years War 1914–1945", and expands the field of fruitful scientific discussion of this issue. The purpose is to inspire new scientific research on the history, politics, international relations etc. of the First and Second World Wars and their impact on the modern world and the features of the evolution of international relations.

THE GREAT WAR AND THE NEW CONFIGURATION OF WORLD POWERS

The fateful events that radically affected the modernization shifts in international relations, which were based on the state-centric paradigm of the Westphalian world order, were the world wars of the 20th century.

The Great War of 1914–1918 entered history as the first global armed conflict of two coalitions of states at war, the results of which in turn led to dramatic changes of an international nature. World War I of 1914–1918, known to the contemporaries as the Great War, was a reflection of profound modernization transformations of a global and internal nature in different countries. It should be emphasized that the changes brought by the world war of 1914–1918 remain noticeable to this day, which is especially evident in the field of propaganda and manipulation of the public consciousness. Preparation of the population for war began almost simultaneously with the creation of military-political coalitions at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At the beginning of the twentieth century, in the countries of the future world conflict, the genre of the military-utopian novel became very popular. The authors, according to national (state) affiliation, portrayed the coming war as an inevitable conflict that would lead to the renewal of the existing system and victory of a particular state. In the military utopias of that time, the war was a prerequisite for the improvement of future life, and the moral superiority of one of the parties was the key to victory. In fact, these novels served several purposes: promoting war as a way of resolving conflicts of interest, as a pledge to renew the world order, as well as performing some propaganda function. They created the necessary image of the enemy and the moral opposition between "we" and "they", "ours" and "strangers", and this is just the tip of the iceberg of war and political propaganda launched on the eve of World War.

The Great War of 1914-1918 was the first major crisis of the modern era, much larger and more destructive than previous wars. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan aptly noted that it was not provoked by ideological tensions or the direct economic crisis: "Its main driving force was the balance of power."³¹ It was a growing confrontation in the struggle for the redistribution of colonies in the situation of the increasing power and searching for their "place under the sun" of Germany, Japan and the USA.

The creation of two triple military-political alliances - the German Empire, Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1879-1882 (the Triple Alliance) and the coalition of France, the Russian Empire and Great Britain (the Entente) during 1893-1907 testified for the moral readiness of the governments of these states for the future open confrontation.³² Domestic politics aimed at popularizing specific ideas, including the superiority of one "civilization" over another, only confirms this thesis. The political and economic confrontation between these blocs against the background of the struggle for the redistribution of the world quickly led to the exacerbation of contradictions in almost all regions of the world, and especially in Europe. It was here that a symbolic powder keg exploded - a political-diplomatic struggle in the Balkans escalated into an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The Kaiser of Germany came to the side of the Danube monarchy, and Serbia was supported by the Entente states. The crisis of July 1914, a "cold" phase of the bloc confrontation in early August, went into the "hot" period of a long war, best known as the Great War or the World War I.

The first global armed conflict ended in the defeat of the states of the German bloc. On September 29, 1918, Bulgaria capitulated and concluded a truce with the Entente command. On October 30, Turkey surrendered and signed the Armistice of Mudros. At the time of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire under pressure from national liberation movements and due to war failures, on November 3, 1918, the Habsburg dynasty signed the terms of the truce. On October 4, 1918, German Chancellor M. Badensky sent the first proposal for a ceasefire to President W. Wilson. The German government proposed a "democratic peace" based on "14 points" by US President W. Wilson. However, the winning states

³¹ Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

³² René Girault, *Diplomatie européenne : Nations et impérialisme* [European Diplomacy: Nations and Imperialism, 1871-1914], 1871-1914, Paris, Masson/Armand Colin, 1979, 253 p.; Френсис Берти, *За кулисами Антанты. Дневник британского посла в Париже, 1914-1919* [The diary of Lord Bertie of Thame, 1914-1918], Москва, Государственная публичная историческая библиотека России, 2014, 400 с.

demanded the complete surrender of Germany. In November, a revolution began in the country, and the monarchy was overthrown.

The Union Forces of Commander-in-chief Marshall Ferdinand Foch signed the armistice, which ended World War I, in the forest of Compiègne on November 11, 1918. A 36-day Compiègne Armistice resulted, whose main conditions were: evacuation of German troops from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Alsace and Lorraine within 15 days; occupation by the Entente of the cities of Mainz, Koblenz, Cologne; disarmament and removal to ports of Allied or Neutral States of the entire German Navy; Germany's rejection of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty; the transfer of all German weapons to the victors and the return of prisoners to their homeland³³ was signed by the representatives of the Allies and the German Generality, under the leadership of the Reichstag MP M. Herzberger. It is symbolic that the end of World War was announced at 11 o'clock on the same day by 11 artillery rounds. This is how World War I ended. In all, 38 countries with a population of more than 1 billion people took part in it. The total number of armies reached 70 million. During the war, there were 20 million deaths and 21 million wounded. The total number of deaths includes 9.7 million military personnel and about 10 million civilians. The Entente Powers (also known as the Allies) lost about 5.7 million soldiers while the Central Powers lost about 4 million.³⁴

The World War I of 1914–1918 was characterized by several fundamental features that were visible for hundred years and which witnessed a new major modernization of Westphalia after the Napoleonic wars and the decisions of the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815. The Great War revolutionized the world on an unprecedented scale, Europe in particular. It led to the explosion of revolutions and revolutionary movements in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, Finland, Ukraine, India, China, and Mexico. One of the results of the Great War was the collapse and demise of four empires - Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman. The former imperial periphery, or some of its cores, first became a revolutionary mobile segment of the post-war world order (e.g. Finland, Ukraine, Hungary etc.), and then either acquired national and international entities (e.g. Poland, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes etc.) or became part of other states (Ukraine) or an element of the League of Nations' mandate system (former colonies of the German and Ottoman empires).

³³ *Международная политика новейшего времени в договорах, нотах и декларациях* [International Politics of Modern Time in Agreement, Notes and Declarations], ч. 2, М., 1926, с. 194-197.

³⁴ Nadège Mougel, *World War I casualties*, REPERES, CVCE, 2011, p. 1.

The first global armed conflict confirmed the dominant trend at that time: the change in the international system was only the result of a large-scale war. Given this, the Great War of 1914–1918 was a logical extension of a chain of events: Thirty Years' War – Westphalian System of International Relations – Napoleonic Wars – Vienna International System – World War I – Versailles-Washington international world, but had a different reputation as compared to its predecessors.³⁵ Definitely, the first post-war global international organization, the League of Nations, has assumed the obligation and responsibility of preserving, securing and maintaining world peace, preventing a new global war as a means of resolving conflicts and contradictions of an interstate nature. However, due to the imperfection of the proposed mechanism for the prevention of military conflicts, it failed to achieve its objectives. This eventually led to its elimination after the end of World War II and the creation of a new international UN organization, whose activities today are often criticized for the inconsistency of existing mechanisms for prevention and resolution of global and local conflicts with contemporary realities.

World War I is organically combined, because of the nature of trends in the evolution of the world and the development of international relations, with the interwar twentieth century with its numerous wars, armed conflicts and annexations, and with World War II. It is reasonable to speak not about two world wars, but about a single Thirty Years' world war of the 20th century, which has also covered the years from 1914 to 1945. Despite all the tragedy, the Great War created the conditions for new transformational shifts in almost all spheres of society. At the same time, it has deepened the rifts between the victors and the vanquished and in the camp of the victorious states - the discontent and opposition of the peoples who have only partially or completely failed to realize their state aspirations. In addition, the end of the world war was the beginning of the confrontation with Soviet Russia, and then the USSR, etc., which as a result quickly

³⁵ Colin Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations. An Introduction to the Strategic History*, London and New York, Routledge, 2007, 306 p.; Bear F. Braumoeller, *The Great Powers and the International System: Systemic Theory in Empirical Perspective*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 276 p.; Barry Buzan, George Lawson, *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations* (Cambridge studies in international relations; 135), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 396 p.; Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl, Alexandru Balas, *The Puzzle of Peace. The Evolution of Peace in the International System*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, 247 p.; Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, *The Making of Global International Relations. Origins and Evolution of IR at its Centenary*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2019, 383 p.

signalled the instability of the new world order.

In general, the end of the Great War brought the world to a new stage in the development of economic and financial relations, the political and international system. The hundred-year-old Vienna's international system was replaced by the Versailles-Washington international order. Generally, with some modifications, the Westphalian model of the world was still preserved. It was based on the following fundamental laws: 1) the Westphalian world consists of sovereign states and lacks a supreme planetary authority; 2) Westphalia's international order functions to respect the sovereign equality of the states and their non-interference in each other's affairs; 3) in the Westphalian world order, the sovereign state has all the power in its territory; 4) in Westphalia's model framework, international law acts as the law of treaties between sovereign states; 5) in the structure of the Westphalian world, only sovereign states are subjects of international law and recognized international actors.

It became the least lengthy chronological segment of the evolution of international relations and entered the annals of history as an Interwar Period.

The aggravation of the contradictions between the leading states of the interwar period after the global economic crisis, the dissatisfaction of several great powers with the results of World War I (first of all, the USSR, Germany, Italy, Japan), the condemnation of the aggressive policies of Germany, Japan, Italy by the victorious states, the failure of the League of Nations to secure peace and to prevent slipping into another global armed conflict resulted in a struggle for a re-division of the world again. Marshal Ferdinand Foch's prophetic words about the system of treaties that resulted from the consolidation of the victory of the Entente states in World War I were prophetically correct: "This is not a peace, but a truce for twenty years."³⁶

UNSECURE SECURITY: INTERWAR PEACE

The World War II of 1939–1945 became the most significant and most devastating conflict in human history – hostilities took place in the territory of 40 states, and the military expenditures of the participating countries amounted to \$1 trillion 117 billion.³⁷ Among the causes of World War II were the contradictions

³⁶ Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: The Gathering Storm*, Vol. 1. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948, p. 113.

³⁷ Борис Скрынченко, *Развитие военной экономики в 20-м веке* [The Development of Military Economy in the 20th Century], in "Вестник Московского университета

of the interwar world, embedded in the Versailles-Washington system. These deep contradictions were expressed in the confrontation between the two groups of states plus one: the victorious nations of the First World War, that found themselves in the camp of the losers, and the Soviet Union.

The principles of international politics declared after the end of World War I, first consecrated by the Charter of the League of Nations, have been violated in the next decade. Since the late 1920s, the world community has been following the tactical political steps of Germany and the USSR, designed to conceal their strategic goals: spreading their influence to the rest of the world. It is worth noting that, at the same time, the victorious countries of World War I were not fully aware of the threat to the entire international security system in general of those states.

In late 1933, the Soviet government outlined the basic principles of its foreign policy.³⁸ They provided for compliance of neutrality, non-interference in any military conflicts, a pacification policy towards Germany and Japan (to certain limits) and concrete steps to create a collective security system in Europe under the auspices of the League of Nations.

In November 1933, the USSR received recognition from the United States. Diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. In September 1934, the Soviet Union was accepted into the League of Nations, which created favourable conditions for its integration into international politics. The USSR responded to the proposal made by the French Foreign Minister, L. Barthes, to conclude a collective security system in Europe.³⁹ On May 2, 1935, a Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance in case of aggression was signed in Paris. But even at the formal level, its effectiveness was limited by the absence of a separate military convention. In the same year, the USSR signed a similar treaty with Czechoslovakia, but here, too, a separate article made the USSR's military aid dependent on France's assistance.

Despite the declared "openness" of the USSR, the idea of collective security was not fully realized. The Western powers were wary of the Soviet Union. Strengthening authoritarianism, the personal power of Stalin and the consolidating one-party rule provoked the opposition of traditional Western politicians, some of whom saw Nazi Germany as a bastion against Bolshevism. At that time, ideological

имени С.Ю. Витте", Серия 1, *Экономика и управление*, 2015, № 1 (12), с. 59.

³⁸ *Документы внешней политики СССР* [Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR], Vol. 16, 1 января – 31 декабря 1933 г., М., 1970, pp. 318, 349.

³⁹ "Правда" [Truth], 1934, 28 мая; *Документы внешней политики СССР* [Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR], Vol. 18, 1 января – 31 декабря 1935 г. М., 1973, p. 309-312.

differences between the political regimes of these countries were more evident than their similarities. Therefore, in March 1938, when the USSR initiated an international community conference to devise practical measures to prevent the threat of a new war as an answer to suggestions of Great Britain and France, Britain refused to participate. An explanation was that such measures could lead to the formation of blocs in Europe and undermine the prospects for peace. Instead, the USSR approached Germany and, in March 1938, signed an economic agreement on trade exchange with it⁴⁰ that had devastating consequences for the mass consciousness of the Soviet population, which at the beginning of the German-Soviet War in 1941 could not understand how the ally turned into the main enemy. The mass repression of the 1930s played a negative role for the reputation of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the Western counterparts, which led to concerns about the Red Army's fighting capacity and the reliability of the Soviet regime.

The precariousness of the international security system compelled states to take more decisive steps to prevent the recurrence of the tragedy of 1914-1918. In 1939, the last attempt was made to create a collective security system in Europe. The USSR, after much hesitation, annexed the guarantees of the Western powers to Poland. In April 1939, Great Britain and France proposed to begin trilateral negotiations and invited Germany to establish close relations. Not too far behind was Great Britain, which at the same time negotiated with Hitler in Moscow. In such a situation, in April 1939, negotiations began between Great Britain, France and the USSR.

The Soviet side offered to conclude a tripartite agreement on mutual assistance, including military, in the case of an aggressor's attack on any of the three parties. Western powers have avoided solving this issue, promising to think. It was not possible to sign a separate military convention, and the responsibility for disrupting the negotiations fell on all participants. At the same time, at the end of July 1939, talks between the USSR and Germany were resumed. The Soviet side sought to sign an economic agreement, through the mediation of Germany to resolve the armed conflict with Japan in the Far East, and both sides were also not opposed to a mutually beneficial solution of territorial issues in Europe. On August 19, 1939, a Soviet-German trade agreement was signed, which, in addition to providing credit, expanded the Soviet Union's capabilities in exporting food products and importing new equipment. Also, during the official Soviet-German talks in Moscow, the German side stated that any economic, political, and territorial

⁴⁰ Walter Laqueur, *Russia and Germany. A century of conflict*, Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1965, p. 174.

interests of the USSR would be satisfied. Representatives of Germany also informed Moscow of plans to launch hostilities against Poland after August 25, 1939. On August 23, 1939, German Foreign Minister J. von Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow with an agreed text of the treaty. It was signed on the night of August 23-24, 1939 and published the next day. The Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between the USSR and Germany was to regulate relations between the two states for ten years. An essential part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the Secret Protocol on the Delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.

Contrary to Soviet aspirations, the Treaty of August 23, 1939, did not create a reliable and effective barrier against Hitler's aggression against the Soviet Union. On the contrary, if before 1939–1940 there were several states from the Barents to the Black Sea that acted as a kind of buffer between Germany and the USSR, a confrontation between their armed forces happened on the eve of the German attack on June 22, 1941. In fact, neglecting the security of other countries led to severe and unpredictable consequences: the Soviet army and the Soviet society were utterly unprepared for such events. The latter had colossal losses, both territorial and human, in the first months of the war. The signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and a secret protocol was one of Stalin's most controversial and ambiguous political steps. However, he considered the agreement a victory because he allegedly managed to outplay Hitler politically. By the way, the Nazi elite considered the deal a great win. Hitler even said that now the whole world was in his pocket. Despite the state importance of the agreement of August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union, answering to the request of the German side and accelerating its ratification, went so far as to reduce the share of this agreement from interstate to intergovernmental documents. On August 31, the Supreme Council of the USSR, and on September 1, the German Reichstag ratified the treaty.

World War II began on September 1, 1939, with Nazi Germany's attack on Poland. According to the "Fall Weiss" (Plan White) plan, approved in early April 1939, Germany threw 62 divisions against Poland, including 7 of tanks and 2,000 aircraft. The Polish army numbered 1 million 750 thousand soldiers and 400 aircraft.⁴¹ On September 6, the Polish government fled Warsaw and, on September 17, it moved to Romania. On September 28, the Nazi captured Warsaw. As British historian B. H. Liddell Hart wrote, "in the East, a hopelessly outdated army was quickly dismembered by tank units operating under the guise of superior aviation

⁴¹ Б. Г. Лиддел Гарт, *Вторая мировая война* [The Second World War], Москва АСТ, СПб.: Terra Fantastica, 1999. с. 37-38.

forces using new methods of warfare."⁴²

On September 17, under the terms of a secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the Soviet troops crossed the border and began advancing through Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. This day became the day of the Soviet Union's entry to World War II. The Polish state virtually ceased to exist (by analogy with the end of the eighteenth century, when the Rzecz Pospolita was liquidated as a result of three divisions, the 1939 September events are famous as the "fourth division of Poland"). The Treaty of Friendship and Borders signed with Germany on September 28, 1939, became a legal consolidation of the Soviet-German borderline, which was formed as a result of the implementation of the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. During the second half of September-November 1939, the USSR officially legalized the entry of new territories, which were transferred to the Ukrainian and Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republics.

WORLD WAR II AS THE FACTOR OF GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES

World War II began as an invasion. Germany, Italy and Japan sought to expand their territories, to conquer new markets and sources of raw materials. In these circumstances, the USSR tried to subordinate the spheres of influence that the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of August 23, 1939, provided. Since June 22, 1941 - from the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR - World War II has entered a new phase. The three historical, political, military and diplomatic processes that would be considered central were the following: first, the collapse of the Soviet-German military-political, diplomatic and economic union and the war between Germany and the USSR; second, the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition, the cornerstone of which was the joint action of the countries of the Great Trinity - Great Britain, USSR, USA; third, the war against militaristic Japan and the fighting of anti-Hitler coalition states in the Asia-Pacific region.

The military and political actions of the countries participating in World War II were supported by the widespread use of propaganda aimed at involving the population in support of ideological postulates to win the war.

For more than six years of war, the governments of the belligerent countries have used various means of manipulating collective consciousness, actively engaging visual, textual and audio messages. The development of the film industry, the emergence of colour films and photography had only contributed to the affirmation in the minds of the masses of the enemy's image. For almost 75 years

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

after the end of WW II, the terms "Fascism" and "Nazism" are abusive for most of the population of the world, including the people of the post-Soviet republics.

It should be emphasized that the defeat of Germany and Japan and their satellites were the result of concerted and victorious foreign policy, diplomacy and military interaction of the great powers that were embodied in the decisions of several international conferences, in particular those of Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, San Francisco, and Potsdam. This played a unique role in creating the foundation for the post-war system of international relations in the world and its peaceful settlement.

International relations were still set up as the system of states, and many of the primary institutions remained in force. By contrast, the Second World War generated several significant changes to the material and ideational structure of global international relations. At the same time, after the end of WW II, changes have occurred in the international arena and in the nature of the evolution of international relations to bipolar in the context of the widespread Cold War. Those changes indicated the further development of the Westphalian world under the influence of political, economic and cultural globalization. The United States and the Soviet Union were the big winners of the Second World War. They functioned as the two dominant centres of military power and ideological competition.

According to leading Western scholars, the Cold War order that emerged quickly in the years after 1945 is commonly summed up by the term "bipolarity", and in some ways, there is a good case for doing so. The United States and the Soviet Union were the big winners of the Second World War. These two states quickly transformed into the two dominant centres of military power and ideological competition. It can be emphasized that the ceasefire lines between them in Europe and Northeast Asia have become the boundaries that defined the new world order. This was an East-West formation defined as a global ideological competition between liberal-democratic capitalism and a totalitarian communist economy. The development of large arsenals of nuclear weapon quickly differentiated these two 'superpowers' from great powers. The traditional set of great powers all faded into the second rank of merely great powers, or even worse. The two superpowers occupied, disarmed and subordinated Germany and Japan. While they quickly recovered economic strength, during the first decades after the war, they mostly lost not only the political will and the international legitimacy but also the political independence from the great powers. The so-called "German problem" was solved by dividing the country between the Soviet and US blocs. Britain was also among the winners and briefly played a role as the third superpower. However, GB's great power status was quickly reduced by its economic weakness and the loss of the empire. Europe fell from the core of world

politics and the balance of power, becoming the main prize in the rivalry between the superpowers. The main focus of the remaining powers in Western Europe has shifted from playing the game of global empires to finding a path for regional integration and keeping the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to protect them. Japan became America's subordinate ally and forward base in the western Pacific.⁴³

There is also a case against using bipolarity. The polarity theory distinguishes only between great powers and the rest; it neglects the distinction between great powers and superpowers, which arguably remains of considerable consequence to how GIS works. Following this thinking, during the Cold War GIS had two superpowers and several great powers: China, the European Community, arguably Japan. The same error was repeated after the implosion of the Soviet Union. Unipolarity was widely declared, but in fact, the structure consisted of one superpower and four great powers. There is a massive structural difference between a system with only superpowers and minor or regional powers and one in which great powers are standing between the superpower(s) and the rest.⁴⁴

However, while bipolarity tells a compelling story, it was not the only story that defined this era. In a long historical perspective, bipolarity may not even be the main story. The key developments were the bipolarity package, the Cold War and nuclear weapons on the one hand, and decolonization on the other. The first of these played a significant role in the core of IR, but the second did not. Decolonization severely affected IR at the periphery. While bipolarity defined two superpowers and their camps, and two rival ideologies for the future of modernity, decolonization defined a Third World, and a position of non-alignment, outside the bipolar structure. Bipolarity mainly tells the story of the core powers, privileging the core and marginalizing the periphery. However, to be honest, since 1945 decolonization changed global international relations: the international society remained the core of the periphery in terms of dominant and subordinate economic positions, but the so-called colonial periphery now had its proper political status and voice. After 1945, the sharp separation between international relations, as happened among the states of the "civilized" core, and the colonial ties, as happened between the metropolitan core and the colonial periphery, collapsed, and these two elements increasingly merged into a single story. The determining factor in the international relations of the second half of the 20th century was the peaceful and armed struggle for independence.

⁴³ Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 113-114.

⁴⁴ Barry Buzan, *The United States and the Great Powers*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004, 222 p.

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan aptly remarked, "The Cold War and the decolonization occurred side by side and have crossed each other in a myriad of ways"⁴⁵. Nevertheless, during this period, the periphery remained broadly weak and dependent on the core. During this time, international relations became truly global in the sense that all peoples – or, more accurately, all governments – now participated independently. However, international global ties were still dominated by the West, and the Third World was still weakly placed at the centre-periphery of the global economy.

However, though there were many significant changes, there were changes in the system of international relations, not changes to the system itself. International relations were still set up as a system of states, and many of the primary defining institutions remained in force.

Radical changes in the system of international world order took place only at the end of the twentieth century. Further development of the world community showed the absence of resistance to internal and external challenges within the system itself, which ended with the collapse of the socialist system and the USSR in the late 1980s - early 1990s, drawing a line under the Cold War era. It has also shown the fundamental impact of globalization on all world processes and in such context on the international sphere by the entry of the world into the era of post-Westphalian international relations. New challenges for today's global community and the post-Westphalian world, in particular, are the threats posed by international terrorism, hybrid / unconventional wars, the disruption of the balance of power and the principles of international law globally. The "rethinking of the sovereignty"⁴⁶ as the primary category of classical Westphalia along with its above-noticed characteristics, the essential evolution under the influence of the world wars of the 20th century eventually led to the transformation of the international world order into a modern post-Westphalian world system.

CONCLUSIONS

The end and consequences of the First and Second World Wars resulted in substantial transformations in the international arena. They led to the reformation of the entire field of international relations and laid the foundations first

⁴⁵ Amitav Acharya, Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁴⁶ Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford, Ramesh Thakur (Eds.), *Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia?*, Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2008, 357 p.

of the Versailles-Washington (1919–1939) and then of the Yalta-Potsdam (1945–1991) systems. Although both armed conflicts led to another modification of the Westphalian order and marked the beginning of its severe erosion, the Westphalian model of the world has generally survived.

At the same time, after the Second World War, several factors testified to the obvious structural and systemic changes in the Westphalian world order. First, the tendency to limit the field of activity of states as leading international actors in the context of the organizational instrumentation of world politics, which began as a result of the First World War, has been preserved and strengthened. An essential place in the international arena is occupied by international organizations of both global and regional nature. First of all, it is about the creation of the UN on October 24, 1945, which for 75 years has remained the main international and organizational instrument in compliance with the principles of international law by all players of world politics, and also, the strengthening of peace. Secondly, the role of integration processes in different regions of the world has increased. For example, European states created in the 1950s three Communities - coal and steel, nuclear energy, and a common market, which has already become the basis for the organizational integration of twelve Western European countries into the European Union in a post-bipolar world order. For the next decades, it expanded and nowadays it became one of the leading international actors in the world.

Even though, after the end of World War II, the new world of international relations was not, for the first time, the result of a major/global armed clash of hostile coalitions of states, changes in the nature and manifestations of international threats and conflicts in the post-bipolar era confirm the relevance of the lessons of the world wars of the twentieth century to minimize the risks and threats in the evolution of modern systems of international relations.