





**COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TEMPORAL
REPRESENTATIONS IN THE FOLK CALENDAR
OF ROMANIANS AND UKRAINIANS OF BUKOVINA**

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Abstract. *The study draws the readers' attention to the comparative analysis of the traditional concept of time for Romanians and Ukrainians in Bukovina, based on extensive research conducted by ethnographers during the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries. Temporal representations are reflected at the structural level, investigating the units of measurement for time: year, season, month, days of the week, day-night alternation. The authors highlighted the ways of establishing the popular calendar, including the role played by climatic conditions, the seasonal evolution of flora and fauna in structuring the time.*

Keywords: *Time, Folk calendar, Romanians, Ukrainians, Bukovina, Year, Season, Month, Week, Day.*

Rezumat: *Analiza comparativă a reprezentărilor temporale în calendarul popular al românilor și ucrainenilor din Bucovina. Studiul supune atenției cititorilor analiza comparativă a conceptului tradițional de timp la românii și ucrainenii din Bucovina, în baza unor cercetări de amploare realizate de specialiștii în etnografie pe parcursul secolelor XIX-XXI. Reprezentările temporale sunt reflectate la nivel structural, investigându-se unitățile de măsură pentru timp: anul, sezonul, luna, zilele săptămânii, alternanța zi-noapte. Autorii au evidențiat modalitățile de constituire a calendarului popular, prezentând inclusiv rolul jucat de condițiile climatice, de evoluția sezonieră a florei și faunei în structurarea timpului.*

INTRODUCTION

Time, as a generic form of being that incorporates the length of interactions and the sequence of changes in its states, is an anisotropic condition for altering material reality's states. In this paradigm, it synchronises with various natural systems. The interdependence of time and forms of human activity requires taking into consideration the historical and social components of human relations. Among the elemental biological or psychological essences of time, one may also debate the ethnological and sociological expressions of time, which are based on the quantity of information about a particular people, location, and period of existence. In this case, time acts as one of the main categories (along with space) of the traditional picture of the world, combining mythological (cyclical nature) and historical (linearity of human life) perceptions of time. This world vision is structurally enshrined in the folk calendar. Due to the finite length of human existence, time used to be an essential social category with economic value and individual concern.

The practical component of the study led researchers to the concept of measurement gaps between units of duration and intervals between occurrences. Regular events serve as the benchmark for time units, such as the Sun movement in the sky or the Moon phases.

The calendar could be measured by appropriate units, independent and mutually subordinate, integrated and disjointed, having different characteristics, depending on the degree of integration. The research contrasts the temporal representations of Romanians and Ukrainians of Bukovina in their traditional culture.

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW AND SOURCE BASE

Methodology. Many Romanian ethnologists investigated this topic in their publications. It is worth noting that Ion Ghinoiu's work¹, which is recognised for folk customs, is well known in the Romanian agriculture calendar for the whole year. In his writings on calendar holidays, he extensively studies the mythical component. The clear organisation of holidays in the calendar cycle is thoroughly described in Antoaneta Olteanu's work *Calendars of the Romanian people*², with

¹ Ion Ghinoiu, *Obiceiuri populare de peste an. Dicționar* [Folk customs during the year. Handbook], București, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1997, 286 p.

² Antoaneta Olteanu, *Calendarele poporului român* [Romanian folk calendars], București, Paideia, 2001, 741 p.

details on all of its main components.

Mention should also be made of two works by Romulus Vulcănescu³, which analyse the mythological basis in the conventional worldview, including themes that became the target of this research. Folklore, and hence the emotional component, is scrupulously studied in the work of Nicolae Băieșu.⁴ In detailing the local features of the worldviews of the Romanians of Bukovina, the results of Antoni Moysey, one of the authors of this article,⁵ must be acknowledged. A comparative analysis of temporal representations with Ukrainian neighbours was conducted using the texts of Aleksandr Zashchuk⁶, George Kozholeanko⁷, Aleksandr Kurochkin⁸, Nikita Tolstoi⁹, Mykhailo Tyvodar¹⁰, and Igor Chekhovsky.¹¹

Source base. To study temporal representations of the Romanian population in a specific location, ethnographic anthologies of famous researchers of the

³ Romulus Vulcănescu, *Coloana cerului* [Vault of heaven], București, Editura Academiei, 1972, 270 p.; R. Vulcănescu, *Mitologie română* [Romanian mythology], București, Editura Academiei, 1985, 712 p.

⁴ Nicolae Băieșu, *Poezia obiceiurilor calendaristice* [Poetry of calendar rites], Chișinău, Știința, 1975, 464 p.

⁵ Antoni Moysey, *Mahiya i mantyka u narodnomu kalendari skhidnoromans'koho naselelnya Bukovyny* [Magic and mantica in the folk calendar of the eastern Romanian population of Bukovina], Chernivtsi, Druk Art, 2008, 320 p.; Antoni Moysey, *Ahrarni zvychai ta obryady u narodnomu kalendari skhidnoromans'koho naselelnya Bukovyny* [Agrarian customs and rites in the folk calendar of the Eastern Romanian population of Bukovina], Chernivtsi, Druk Art, 2010, 320 p.

⁶ Aleksandr Zashchuk, *Materialy dlya geografii i statistiki Rossii. Bessarabskaia oblasti* [Materials for geography and statistics of Russia. Bessarabian region], Sankt-Peterburg, 1862.

⁷ George Kozholeanko, *Etnografia Bukovyny* [Ethnography of Bukovina], Chernivtsi, Zoloti Lytavry, T. 1, 1999; T. 2, 2001; T. 3, 2004.

⁸ Aleksandr Kurochkin, *Kalendarnyye obychai i obryady* [Calendar customs and rituals], in N. S. Polishchuk, A. P. Ponomarev (Eds.), *Ukraintsy* [Ukrainians], Moskva, Nauka, 2000, p. 391-430.

⁹ Nikita Tolstoi, *Ocherki slavyanskogo yazychestva* [Essays on Slavic paganism], Moskva, Indrik, 2003, 624 p.

¹⁰ Mykhailo Tyvodar, *Tradytsiynе skotarstvo Ukrayins'kykh Karpat druhoyi polovyny 19 – pershoyi polovyny 20 st.: istoryko-etnolohichne doslidzhennya* [Traditional cattle breeding of the Ukrainian Carpathians of the second half of the 19th - first half of the 20th century: historical and ethnological research], Uzhhorod, Karpaty, 1994, 340 p.

¹¹ Igor Chekhovsky, *Demonolohichni viruvannya i narodnyy kalendar ukrayintiv Karpat-s'kohi rehionu* [Demonological beliefs and the folk calendar of Ukrainians in the Carpathian region], Chernivtsi, Zelena Bukovyna, 2001, 304 p.

traditional Romanian culture of Bukovina were used: Simion Fl. Marian¹², Dimitrie Dan¹³, Artur Gorovei¹⁴, Tudor Pamfile¹⁵, and the representative of a sociological school, Dimitrie Gusti¹⁶. The monographic studies of local villages by Vasile Diaconu¹⁷, Dragoș Tochiță¹⁸, and Ioan Iețcu¹⁹ were a great source of knowledge as well. It should be noted that the fundamental study included in the collection *Holidays and customs*²⁰ provides answers to questionnaires used in constructing the Romanian Ethnographic Atlas, and is thus a crucial source for such research.

FOLK BELIEFS ABOUT THE LIMITS OF THE YEAR / SEASON

The season, or the time of year, is the most extended unit of time in a year, as established by folk tradition. The off-season borders are blurred and preserve regional individuality in popular tradition. In the second half of the 19th century,

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- ¹² Simion Fl. Marian, *Sărbătorile la români. Studiu etnografic* [Romanian Holidays. Ethnographic study], Ediție îngrijită și introducere de I. Datcu, București, 2001, Vol. I–III.
- ¹³ Dimitrie Dan, *Credințe populare bucovinene* [Bukovinian folk beliefs], in "Gazeta Bucovinei" [Bukovinian Gazette], 1894, No. 30, p. 1–2; No. 63, p. 1–2; No. 67, p. 1–2; No. 70, p. 1–2; No. 74, p. 1–2; No. 79, p. 1–2; No. 84, p. 1–2; No. 97, p. 1–2; No. 99, p. 1–2; 1895, No. 2, p. 1–2; No. 5, p. 1–2; No. 12, p. 1–2; No. 17, p. 1–2; No. 19, p. 1–2; No. 23, p. 1–2; No. 30–31, p. 2; No. 32, p. 1–2; No. 37, p. 1–2; No. 40, p. 1–2; No. 43, p. 1–2.
- ¹⁴ Artur Gorovei, *Credinți și superstiții ale poporului român* [Beliefs and superstitions of the Romanian people], Ediție îngrijită de I. Datcu, București, Grai și Suflet, Cultura Națională, 1995, 334 p.
- ¹⁵ Tudor Pamfile, *Sărbătorile la români. Studiu etnografic* [Romanian Holidays. Ethnographic study], Ediție și introducere de I. Datcu, București, Editura Saeculum I.O., 1997, 431 p.
- ¹⁶ Filon Lucău-Dănilă, Dumitru Rusan, *Fundu Moldovei, o așezare din ținutul Câmpulungului bucovinean* [Fundu Moldovei, a settlement in the Câmpulung district of Bukovina], Câmpulung Moldovenesc, Societatea pentru Cultură "Dimitrie Gusti", 2000, 461 p.
- ¹⁷ Vasile Diaconu, *Etnografie și folclor pe Suha Bucovineană. Obiceiuri și credințe* [Ethnography and folklore of the Sukha-Bukovina valley. Customs and beliefs], Iași, Unirea, 2002, 490 p.
- ¹⁸ Dragoș Tochiță, *De la lume adunate și-napoi la lume date. Culegere de folclor din Pătrăuții de Sus și Pătrăuții de Jos* [From the people gathered and back to the people given. Folklore collection from Pătrăuții de Sus and Pătrăuții de Jos], Suceava, Alt Univers, 2005, 94 p.
- ¹⁹ Ioan Iețcu (coord.), *Părteștii de Jos 1415-2000. 585 de ani de atestare documentară* [Părteștii de Jos 1415-2000. 585 years of documentary attestation], Suceava, Cuvântul nostru, 2000, 408 p.
- ²⁰ Ion Ghinoiu (coord.), *Sărbători și obiceiuri. Răspunsurile la chestionarele Atlasului Etnografic Român* [Holidays and customs. Answers to the questionnaires of the Romanian Ethnographic Atlas], București, vol. I, 2001, vol. II, 2002, vol. III, 2003, vol. IV, 2004, vol. V, 2009.

spring began either on March 1st or at the end of the days of Baba Odochia (Baba Dochia), namely on St. Alexei (March 17th) and lasted until St. Onufrii (June 12th),²¹ according to the folklore of the Romanians of Bukovina. Summer lasted from St. Onufrii day to the Second Day of Mother of God (September 8th) or St. Paraskeva day. According to popular belief, “summer turns to autumn” from the day of Pantelius-traveler (Pintelei-călătorul) – July 27th. Autumn begins with the Second Day of Mother of God and lasts until St. Nicholas day (December 6/19).²² Winter starts from the day of St. Nicholas, or Ovid (Vovidenie) or Christmas fasting (Arbore, Vatra Dornei, Calafindești, Vicovul de Jos - Suceava County).²³ Such a gradation of time units is fixed in folklore: “Am un copac cu douăsprezece ramuri, în fiecare ramură câte patru cuiburi, în fiecare cuib câte șapte ouă, în fiecare ou câte douăzeci și patru de pui” / “I have a tree with twelve branches, in each branch four nests, in each nest seven eggs, in each egg twenty-four chicks.”²⁴

Seasonal boundaries are about the same for Ukrainians in Bukovina as for Romanians. The transitivity of the Epiphany feast, which corresponds to the shift from Winter to Spring, was investigated; Spring lasts until the Holy Trinity (in the Carpathians – until the Ascension)²⁵; summer lasts until the day of St. Macrina, sister of St. Vasyl the Great²⁶; autumn lasts until the Saturday of St. Demetrius (Grandfather’s)²⁷, or Presentation of the Virgin Mary or The Entry of the Most Holy Theotokos into the Temple (*Cuciurul Mare – Storojineț, Chernivtsi*).²⁸ In Lenkivtsi (Chernivtsi district), the population says that “winter goes to Nikolai with a nail”, so the real frost occurs after St. Nicolas day.

In the Romanian folk calendar, the year’s division into two holidays, St. George and St. Dmitry, continued to demonstrate that the preceding year featured two major seasons. In particular, livestock breeders and other country people, such as shepherds and hired workers, observed this customary split of the year. This tradition exists among Bulgarians, Serbs and Macedonians, and partly among Eastern Slavic people.²⁹

²¹ Dimitrie Dan, *op. cit.*, 1894, nr. 84, p. 1; 1895, nr. 43, p. 1; Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 72.

²² Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 72; Ion Ghinoiu (coord.) *Sărbători și obiceiuri ...*, T. IV, p. 371-376.

²³ Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*; Tudor Pamfile, *op. cit.*, p. 215-216.

²⁴ Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*

²⁵ Mikhaïlo Tyvodar, *op. cit.*, p. 378-379.

²⁶ George Kozholeanko, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 181, 245, 280.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 313.

²⁸ Igor Chekhovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 152-153.

²⁹ Nikita Tolstoi, *op. cit.*, p. 27-28.

Weather conditions and the behaviour of animals and birds often determine the beginning of a new season. For example, in Bukovina, the spring onset coincided with the emergence of snakes and reptiles from the ground, the beginning of the activation of flies and red butterflies, the blooming of snowdrops, the arrival of swallows and storks. Conversely, people believed that winter was approaching when the birds flew away.³⁰

FOLK NAMES OF MONTHS

Months. Weather conditions and the state of vegetation caused folklore names of months in the Romanian calendar. Sometimes they follow the Roman tradition:

- *Indrea* – December, ancient name 'Andrei' (Andrew);
- *Gerar* – January, frosty;
- *Faur* – February, from Latin 'febr(u)arius';
- *Mărțișor* – March, willow bud or from Latin 'martius';
- *Prier* – April from Latin. 'aprilis';
- *Florar* – May, = floral;
- *Cireșar* – June, cherry-month;
- *Cuptor* – July, the oven, from Latin 'coctorium';
- *Gustar* – August, from Latin 'august';
- *Secerar* – August, harvest;
- *Răpciune* – September, the name of the herb potion;
- *Brumărel* – October, from "brume" – frost, diminutive;
- *Brumar* – November, from "brume" – hoarfrost, frost.

The features of the months can be found in folklore, as shown by the Bukovinian proverb: "Fie orișicât de rece, / Numai făurar de-ar trece" / "It doesn't matter how cold it is, / if February passes". Or: "Prier priește / Dară și jupește" / "Prier (April) is favourable / But it also peels the skin out" which means that although there is mild weather in April, there is also the possibility of sudden chilling and frost.³¹

The names of months also describe the people's worldview, which depends on the natural conditions of Ukrainians in Bukovina as well as other regions of Ukraine. For example, January (*crackling, snowman, glacier = triskun, snihovyk, l'odovyk*), February (*twirling, wintering, bokogriy = kruten', zymbor, bokohriy*), March (*Hutsul maret, birch, sochen, juicer, dripper = maret's u hutsuliv, berezol'*,

³⁰ Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 73.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

sochen', *sokovyk*, *kapel'nyk*), April (*April*, *red*, *snowman*, *chirping*, *Aquarius* = *tsviten'*, *krasnets'*, *snihozhin*, *dzyurchal'nyk*, *vodoliy*), May (*May*, *herbalist*, *songbird* = *may*, *travnyk*, *pisennyk*), June (*red*, *worm* – associated with the ripening of berries, fruits, flowers = *krasnyk*, *chervets'*), July (*July*, *hay*, *mowing*, *thunderstorm*= *lypets'*, *sinokis*, *kosen'*, *hrozovyk*), August (*kopen*, *cuttings*= *kopen'*, *zhyvets'*), September (*September*, *howl*, “*Baba’s summer*”= *veresnets'*, *revun*, «*babine lito*»), October is the month of yellow leaves (*podzernik*, *October*, *wedding-month* = *podzernyk*, *kostrychnyk*, *vesil'nyk*), November (*podolist*), December (*gloomy*, *urinary* = *khmuren' mochavets'*). As a result, a similar phenomenon may be observed: all the names of months indicate the natural coherence of Ukrainian tradition with nature and the seasonal work of farmers.

Essentially the same applies to the folklore of Ukrainians, which combines temporal ideas about the months. Hutsul tales belong to the Bukovina region: “January is cutting above, and you stay close to the stove. January cuts and freezes, and the owner carries firewood from the forest”; “February lets in water; Marot picks it up; February asks if you’re wearing shoes”. Ukrainian sayings and other phraseological units related to months: “Dry March is a wet May, there will be paradise in the barn!”; “Warm April is a wet May, there will be paradise in the barn!”; “Give it to the oxen, and run to the stove yourself” (May); “In July the yard is empty, the field is full of gifts”; “December has come – cold weather has brought.”³²

FOLK SIGNS AND YIELD PREDICTIONS DURING THE YEAR

The farmer’s knowledge of nature and his surveillance habits create a system of signs and divinations in his worldview, which should help him predict future weather disasters and accidents during the year, a particular season and, in general, a better life. These signs were and continue to be an integral part of the worldview of the Romanians of Bukovina. Among these, those that focus on the behaviour of animals, insects, plants, fixed folk signs and others should be highlighted.

The behaviour of the bear on *Sritenia* (the Meeting) determined the duration of winter or the rapid approach of spring³³; people believed that “when ants build large anthills in autumn, winter will be hard” (*Câmpulung Moldovenesc – Suceava*); “If wasps have made a nest in the ground – you should expect a warm

³² “Hutsul's'ky y kalyendar” [Hutsul’s calendar], Issue 14, 2009, p. 3-25.

³³ Dimitrie Dan, *op. cit.*, 1894, nr. 79, p. 1-2; Filon Lucău-Dănilă, Dumitru Rusan, *op. cit.*, p. 387; Ioan Iețcu, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

winter, and if in beeches, spruces or other trees it might be cold”³⁴; Vedennia fest has such proverbs: “If hail falls on Easter – the year will be productive”; “The weather during the day will be the same throughout the winter” (*Tătăruși – Suceava*).³⁵ In autumn, the winter duration was determined by the length of up-rooted parsley³⁶ and the height and width of the pig’s spleen³⁷. The Romanians of Bukovina also had a way of predicting the weather on charcoal³⁸.

The Ukrainians experienced a similar situation: on Stritennia, it was said, “if a rooster does not drink water on the ground, an ox will not graze grass on Yuri”; “On Evdokia water flows, on Yuri grass grows”; “If it rains on Yuri, there will be bread even for a fool”; “On Yuri comes frost – means that oats will be made a lot”; on Talalei-Ogirochnyk (02.06) it was mentioned: “if the earth is dry on this day, there will be a harsh winter, and if it is wet, there will be a mild winter”; on Eustachia (03.10) it was popular to predict future weather by the winds: the northern one foretells winter-cold, the southern one forecasts heat, the western one predicts rain, and the eastern one good weather; on St. Kozma and Demyan day people cut branches from the oak: when the oak has no juice predicts that there will be a harsh winter and when the ground on Kozma freezes, there will be a warm winter.³⁹

WEEKDAYS IN THE IMAGINATION OF ROMANIANS AND UKRAINIANS OF BUKOVINA

The folk tradition of Romanians regarding the days of the week is clearly defined and has a functional essence. Monday and Thursday are pretty positive and have close characteristics; Tuesday and Saturday are also similar but have some negative meanings. The first pair means the favourable days when you must start planning or doing anything initially, while the second represents the bad days. The third pair includes Wednesday and Friday, which are considered the best working days, particularly Friday, which in the worldview of the Romanian farmer holds even the same quality and importance as Sunday. Unlike the Ukrainians of Bukovina, who imagine that the days of the week have masculine and feminine genders, the Romanians believe that the days are entirely feminine, each dedicated to and inherent in one of the saints. According to the folk tradition,

³⁴ Vasile Diaconu, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

³⁵ Artur Gorovei, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

³⁶ Dimitrie Dan, *op. cit.*, 1894, nr. 74, p. 2.

³⁷ Dragoș Tochiță, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

³⁸ Antony Moysey, *Mahiya i mantyka...*, p. 64-73.

³⁹ “Hutsul's'kyy kalyendar” [Hutsul’s calendar], Issue 14, 2009, p. 5, 7, 11, 13, 21, 23.

it performs or motivates or prohibits performing certain types of work. For Ukrainians, every day of the week has its qualitative characteristics, correlated with other calendar days. Monday is a difficult day, Wednesday and Friday are women's days, and Sunday is a day of obligatory rest.

As a result of a long evolution of people's worldviews, there are now two ways to count the days: from Monday to Sunday and from Sunday to Saturday. The origin of these Slavic names for the weekdays is interpreted as the number of the days following Sunday. Monday is the first day after Sunday, Tuesday is the second day. Wednesday is the average in a series of "Sundays". Thursday is the fourth, and Friday is the fifth day. They also have notions of "good" and "bad" days. The same day was evaluated as positive for one sign and harmful for another. For example, women's or men's day, first or last, fasting or modest, was also considered in their concurrence with church holidays – Christmas, Epiphany, Annunciation, natural or life events.⁴⁰

Monday was thought to be an excellent day to start any business. One needed to rejoice so that the joy would linger all week, and they fasted on Monday for good luck.⁴¹ In Kupka of the former Hlyboka district, people believed that fasting would bring happiness, save a person from eye diseases, and the cattle would also be healthy. At the same time, bans are typical for Monday. You cannot borrow or give something away from the farm because there will be losses all week long. In the Suha River valley, it was believed that if money was borrowed on Monday, the family would quarrel for a week⁴²; nor could the ashes be taken out of the house, for the birds of prey would steal the chickens⁴³; modest food with a high risk of disease for humans and animals (Suceava County) was not recommended⁴⁴. Bessarabian Romanians in the 19th century would not offer fire, cheese or butter on this day to avoid poverty. It was also forbidden to make calculations, which could lead to loss.⁴⁵

Ukrainians in Bukovina were also banned from participating in a transaction on Monday. In some parts of the region, starting a business on this day was considered a bad sign. It was considered a difficult day.⁴⁶ Even today, in the Vikno

⁴⁰ *Hodyna narodoznavstva. „Narodnyy kalendar”* [Hour of ethnography. "Folk Calendar"], http://www.library.sokal.lviv.ua/crb scenarij_narodnyy%20kalendar.html

⁴¹ Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 75-76.

⁴² Artur Gorovei, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁴³ Eugenia Aglaia Iacob, *Oameni și datini din Roșcanii Sucevii* [People and customs from Roșcanii Suceava], Iași, Princeps, 2006, p. 239.

⁴⁴ Artur Gorovei, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

⁴⁵ Aleksandr Zashchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 485-487.

⁴⁶ George Kozholeanko, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 43.

village of Chernivtsi district, it is believed that money cannot be borrowed on Monday because there will be no money for the whole week. Such a ban is still maintained in Chernivtsi.

Tuesday has probably the most bans: starting important work;⁴⁷ going on a long journey because it will bring misfortune; weaving fabric; washing oneself (especially one's hair); sewing shirts; getting engaged, having a wedding, etc. Aleksandr Zashchuk recorded the same prohibitions among the Romanians of Bessarabia in the middle of the 19th century. They were justified by the belief that, on this day, God began to create Heaven and Earth.⁴⁸ Together with Monday and Thursday, Ukrainians considered Tuesday a man's "masculine" day. Still, unlike the first two, it was firmly established in the folk calendar as a sign of the easy, lucky, cheerful and happy day. It was considered the best time, in particular, for sowing, harvesting, carting, threshing, cloth polishing.⁴⁹

On Wednesday, it was forbidden to wash, eat non-vegetarian food, which might cause disease and various misfortunes for people⁵⁰, and remove the ashes from the house.⁵¹ The attitude to Wednesday is ambivalent in the folk calendar of Ukrainians. As on Friday, people used to fast (fasting on Wednesday would enable access to the kingdom of heaven), and fasting days were often called the easiest. In addition, it was believed that Wednesday was a special day when God created the Sun, Moon and Stars. As a result, the Sun will appear for at least 5 minutes, and only on Wednesday. However, a considerable collection of bans has been documented in several communities. It was impossible to wash hair and comb the braids because "Wednesday has 40 daughters, and each will pull a strand of your hair out", "Wednesday has 77 sisters, it is necessary to give each a strand of hair."⁵²

Any work on Thursday was allowed; the prohibitions applied only to the period of Holy Thursdays between Easter and Ascension.⁵³ Thursday was called men's day in the Ukrainian villages of Bukovina, and it was considered a favourable and easy day for all kinds of human affairs.

Friday was considered the holiest day of the week in some parts of Bukovina. It was forbidden to sew, wash, sweep, and take out the house garbage and perform fieldwork on Friday because they believed that St. Friday would punish

⁴⁷ Artur Gorovei, *op. cit.*, p. 137; Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 75-76.

⁴⁸ Aleksandr Zashchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 485-487.

⁴⁹ *Hodyna narodoznavstva...*

⁵⁰ Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 75-76.

⁵¹ Eugenia Aglaia Iacob, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

⁵² *Hodyna narodoznavstva...*

⁵³ Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 75-76.

such 'outlaws'.⁵⁴ In Hăinești, eggs were not taken from the henhouse that day because it was thought that 'the outlaw' would get smallpox.⁵⁵ For Ukrainians, Friday restrictions concerned mainly weaving and, above all, spinning. There was also a personification in the image of Paraskeva Friday. Ukrainians believed that she could appear to the women who had turned that day at night, push the spindles through the window, and threaten them not to spin again. There was also a ban on baking bread. But in general, this day had a positive meaning; it was clean, easy to start anything.⁵⁶

Saturdays may well be worked, but not for sewing shirts since they believed the shirt owner would die shortly.⁵⁷ This ban also existed among the Romanians of Bessarabia.⁵⁸ On Saturday, they were wary of travelling⁵⁹, as well as bleaching and anointing with clay so as not to "grease the mouths of the dead with clay" (*Straja, Suceava*). In Kupka, the former Hlyboka district, they tried not to start a new job on Saturday.⁶⁰ For Ukrainians, Saturday was considered unlucky for needlework because "the world was rolling", smearing the house, washing clothes were discouraged activities. It was not allowed to cut nails on Saturday: "you will come across an evil force on Sunday"; it was a "good deal" to wash your face on this day: "you will be good-looking to all the people!"⁶¹

Sunday was a day of rest and celebrations. It was also a good time for wedding ceremonies, games and no work time. Such rules were taken into account even at the state level of governmental regulations and confirmed by historical evidence. At the beginning of the 18th century, the chronicler Ion Neculce says in his work titled *Some words heard from old and ancient people but not recorded in chronicles* about how Stephen the Great (1457-1504), who used to go to the liturgy, felt a powerful voice ordering to harness the oxen to the plough before

⁵⁴ Vasile Diaconu, *op. cit.*, p. 339, 352; Eugenia Aglaia Iacob, *op. cit.*, p. 239; Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 75-76.

⁵⁵ Petru Herescu, *Superstiții* [Superstitions], in „Șezătoarea” [Parties], 1894-1895, p. 49-50.

⁵⁶ *Hodyna narodoznavstva...*

⁵⁷ Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 75-76; S. Mihăilescu, *Superstiții* [Superstitions], in „Șezătoarea” [Parties], 1893-1894, p. 195-198.

⁵⁸ Aleksandr Zashchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 485-487.

⁵⁹ Simion Fl. Marian, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 75-76; S. Mihăilescu, *op. cit.*, p. 195-198; Simion Teodorescu Kirileanu, *Credinți populare asupra gospodăriei* [Folk beliefs associated with farming], in "Gazeta săteanului" [Farmer's newspaper], 1897-1898, p. 505.

⁶⁰ Petru Ciobanu, Reveca Prelipcean, Vasile Slănină, *Cupca, un sat din Bucovina. Monografie istorică. Partea I (anii 1429-1944)* [Kupka, a village in Bukovina. Historical monograph. Part. 1 (1429-1944)], Câmpulung Moldovenesc, 2004, p. 310.

⁶¹ *Hodyna narodoznavstva...*

church on Sunday morning. The ruler was furious and ordered that the villain be brought before him. But it turned out that the more affluent brother did not give the poor man time to plough on any other day. The prince ordered that the plough be given to this man. Neculce's narrative demonstrates how seriously Romanians took the respect of traditions.⁶²

Similarly, Ukrainians were banned from doing any work around the house on Sundays, and their most common motivation was: "that is a sin". One of the probable repercussions of breaking the rule may be injury, illness, unhappiness in the family. But in some places doing certain types of work was considered not only permissible but also ritually necessary. This included the first cattle grazing on the field, the beginning of ploughing, construction, and so on. In addition, it was on Sunday habit of collective neighbourly assistance called "toloki", during which almost all types of work must be done. Various parties and dances were arranged on such Sunday evenings.⁶³

St. Joimăriță, in the mythological representations of Romanians, appeared in the image of a disgusting straight-haired woman with a large head and teeth who lived in a secluded forest. She punished young women who worked on the day assigned to her. The Romanians of Bukovina thought Good Friday was a grandmother, a goodhearted older woman. According to folk tradition, saint Tuesday is one of the most dangerous creatures. She looks like a goat with a human head. She could change her image and become anyone, including a young man, a grandmother, or somebody else. She lives in the mountains and severely punishes young women who laboured her day (drinks blood and tickles to death).⁶⁴

Simion Fl. Marian documented a special prayer from the Romanians of Bukovina, popularly called „the prayer of the week” (*Rugăciunea săptămânei*), in which the inhabitants of Tereblecea village of the former Hlyboka district were addressed every seven days.⁶⁵

The structure of the days. Romanian peasants got used to a certain number of periods during the day. Thus, according to folk tradition, it was conventionally divided into:

- Sunrise;
- Forenoon (time after sunrise and until dawn, when the sun rose “on the

⁶² Ion Neculce, *O samă de cuvinte* [Some words], in „Letopisețul Țării Moldovei” [Chronicle of the Moldavian principality], Chișinău, 2006, p. 269.

⁶³ *Hodyna narodoznavstva...*

⁶⁴ Simion Fl. Marian, *Botanică românească ...*, p. 92–94.

⁶⁵ Idem, *Sărbătorile la români ...*, Vol. I, p. 79.

one spear”);

- Small breakfast – about 8-9 a.m., when the sun rose “three spears up”;
- “*amproor*” – about 9-10 a.m.;
- Large breakfast - breakfast time before lunch;
- noon – 12 o’clock;
- small dinner – at 16.00;
- dinner – at 20.00–21.00 o’clock.

The day’s structure for the Ukrainians of Bukovina was similar to the Romanian population. Farmers used to traditionally determine the day or night by the singing of roosters. The second song had the meaning of the third hour a. m., the third one and the cooing of geese meant the beginning of dawn. They used to tell time by the stars. The evening star (*luceafărul*, shepherd’s star) announced the night, and the morning star marked the beginning of a new day.⁶⁶

Some people also knew the “forest clock”, applicable to them in practice. One of its variants was recorded in 1887:

- *the tit chirps at half-past one or two in the morning;*
- *the birch bark (black-headed) sings between the two o’clock and a half past two;*
- *the lark sings from half-past two till three o’clock;*
- *the birch (red-breasted) sings between three and a half to four;*
- *the blackbird sings between half-past three and four;*
- *the tit chirps from half-past four to five;*
- *the sparrow chirps between five and six o’clock.*⁶⁷

Many customs and beliefs are associated with periods of the day. Aleksandr Zashchuk paid attention in his research to the following ideas of the Romanians of Bessarabia in the 19th century. A woman was not allowed to weave threads or work with wool; otherwise, “the family would not be together”, nor did she sweep the house, put out waste products so that fate would not separate her from her family and household. Before drinking the water brought home at night, three pieces of burning sticks were thrown into the water because of the belief in an evil spirit living there. The burning embers, together with the prayer, destroyed its evil influence. When a Moldavian young man saw the moon, he would show coins to the moon and say: “Same as we have met, leave me, please!” If he had no money at that time, he might have had less money for the rest of the year.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79-81.

⁶⁷ “*Revista pădurilor*” [Journal of Forests], 1887, p. 240-241.

⁶⁸ Aleksandr Zashchuk, *op. cit.*, p. 485-487.

GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF THE FOLK CALENDAR

The scientific research and articles about the genesis and evolution of the folk calendar from the study of ethnographers such as Ion Ghinoiu, Antoaneta Olteanu, Romulus Vulcănescu, Ion Ciubotaru, Ion Cuceu, Nicolae Băieșu, Gheorghe Spataru, Iulian Filip, etc. recorded several significant external influences on the Romanian calendar. The Dacian calendar has the most visible impact, although there is little recorded evidence about it. Jordan, a Gothic historian, was the sole documented source that acknowledged the Dacians' astrological expertise. It claimed that Deceneus (Dacian high priest and adviser to King Burebista) demonstrated the theory of the 12 signs of the zodiac, showed the motion of the planets and all the astronomical mysteries: how the moon's orbit increases and decreases, how many times the Sun is larger than the Earth.

This information supplements sources of archaeological origin. Scientists have found the most interesting archaeological facts near the capital Sarmisegetuza in the sanctuary of the Getae-Dacian calendar. Some researchers compare it to the Stonehenge complex (UK). A unique building has been preserved in the open area above the capital, having a round shape and consisting of 180 stone pillars. According to some scientists, this stone complex used to serve as a Sun-movement observatory. The circle is divided by thirty thicker columns into 30 groups. Examining the structure of this original calendar, the researchers concluded that the year of the Dacians consisted of two half-years of 180 days, or 12 equal months, each of which was divided into five periods of 6 days. Even more striking is the composition of stone pillars inside a circle of 68 wooden items, with a horseshoe-shaped structure of 34 wooden elements in the centre. This device allowed the Dacian astronomers to make adjustments every 34 years, reducing the error to a small value (1.77 days in 34 solar years). Due to its similarity to modern European chronology (T. Zlatkovskaya, H. Daicovici, etc.), many researchers believe that the Dacians independently created their calendar. However, it should be emphasised that this theory has been subjected to criticism.⁶⁹

Due to the lack of information, researchers are not unanimous about the Dacian calendar nature and some of its features. The fundamental issue, which has long been debated, is whether the Dacian calendar belongs to the solar, uranium-solar, lunar, or lunisolar planetary systems. Recently, the prevailing position is that the Dacian calendar belongs to the lunisolar system. Thus, Dan Oltean's argu-

⁶⁹ Dan Oltean, *Religia dacilor* [Religion of the Dacians], București, Saeculum, 2002, 479 p.

ments are based on the results of archaeological research, namely on the criteria of proportions, orientation and types of temples in the analysis of sanctuaries of this period and on the consideration of the holidays in the Romanian folk calendar. The coherence between the lunar and solar calendars is based, in his opinion, on the Meton 19-year cycle, which is confirmed by the quantitative structure of the Sarmisegetuza sanctuary № 6, the Costești sanctuary № 4, and inscriptions on the sanctuaries' walls. It did not go unnoticed that the Dacians used their calendar simultaneously as the Babylonians, Greeks, Jews, Celts, Muslims and others, demonstrating that it was nothing unusual about this phenomenon.

As with the Celts and other calendars, the Dacian lunar year was divided into two seasons. The appearance of the new moon in the western sky and the full moon in the eastern sky used to cause the calendar's major holidays. Each year their number fluctuated within the range of 24. They have included two major solstices. The solar calendar was also divided into two seasons.⁷⁰

For the Dacians, the beginning of the year was on December 22nd. The Dacian New Year differed from that of the Greeks, who celebrated it on the summer solstice, and from that of the Celts, who observed it on November 1st and were quite similar to the Romans. From 153 BC, the Roman New Year was moved to January 1st. And, as a result of Caesar's calendar reform in 46 BC, the date of January 1st has been accepted as the first day of the year.

Different calendars' historical influences can be observed in the Romanian national calendar. The agrarian one began on March 9th and was associated with the day of the Vernal Equinox and the death of Baba Dochia, associated with the Neolithic goddess Terra Mater, the shepherd Mother of the Earth. Sângeorz (St. George) day was postponed to April 23rd. The God of Vegetation, patron of horses, cows, sheep, and sown deer, was associated with the indigenous God – the Thracian Knight. The viticulture New Year has been celebrated on February 2nd, etc. The biblical New Year, which was celebrated on September 1st in honour of the world's creation in 5508 BC, was included in this list of feast days. Until the 18th century, the church and the prince's court used BC to date acts and documents.

The New Year, which Romanians celebrated during the winter solstice, was the most prevalent social event. It holds the impact of Moș Crăciun (Santa Clause), who had a position in both the Dacian and Roman calendars. The Christian world has celebrated the New Year on Crăciun Day for more than a millennium. It was used in Rome until the 18th century, France until 1564, and Russia before 1699. People in the Romanian principalities celebrated it until the 19th century.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

The Dacian civilisation did not vanish. It left an imprint on the Romanian people's traditions and culture. One of the most unforgettable reminiscences of the Dacian calendar is the celebration of the Zilele Babei Days (Old Woman's Days). It generally occurs at the start of the agricultural year (first days of March). Some researchers find Dacian rituals about mountains in celebrating "Nedei". According to the special rite, people, men and women, stand up on the day of the Summer Solstice. They used to light the road with torches and climb up to the mountain together in the evening, stop-near the top and light a fire, sat there till morning, going to the highest top of the hill to see the sunrise. After that, they danced, eat a favourite food, and celebrated with songs.

The cult of Grandfathers (cultul moșilor) is associated with the Dacian heritage, such as Moș Crăciun, Moș Ajun and others. The same role is played by the Wolf symbol, which is integrated into the entire cult of Sheep and Wolf-days in the folk calendar and is represented in numerous funeral rituals. It is close to the symbol of the bird, which means the soul's manifestation as it departs the body. Quite common is the rite of inviting rain Caloian, as well as Paparuda. They are well-known in the Bukovina region also. The custom of cheerfully watching over the deceased, during which members of the feast joked, played, were dressed in unusual clothes, etc. All these mentioned rites bear the imprint of the spiritual culture of the Getae-Dacians.

The Ukrainian traditional calendar has received an all-Slavic influence. In addition, it has experienced various substantial alterations during its history. Today it is a fusion of the religious (Orthodox), civil and the actual national calendars, as the Romanian national calendar. Holidays often coincide or around the same time as in the church-calendar tradition. However, they have a different genesis, functions and orientations, fused by centuries-old folk tradition into a single set of rituals, stable stereotypes of behaviour, as well as a holistic system of beliefs, signs, and meteorological premiums.⁷¹ Archaeological finds show that the folk calendar in Ukraine formed over thousands of years as a result of many factors.⁷² Social and historical changes have led to the emergence of individual texts, mythologies and semantics of different "historical depth". Innovations and borrowings led to rethinking, recoding of previous calendar artefacts, and forming multi-

⁷¹ Olena Chebanyuk, *Narodnyy kalendar u tradytsiyniy kartiny svitu ukrainsyv* [Folk calendar in the traditional picture of the world of Ukrainians], in „Narodna tvorchist' ta etnografiya” [Folk art and ethnography], No. 6, 2008, p. 41-42.

⁷² Andrei Zelinskii, *Konstruktivniye printsypy drevnerusskogo kalendaria* [Constructive principles of the Old Russian calendar], in "Kontext. Literaturno-teoreticheskiye issledovaniya" [The context. Literary theoretical studies], Moskva, Nauka, 1978, p. 62-65.

ple temporal layers.⁷³

There was a system of worldview knowledge in the dimension of the season in the oral folk tradition of the Eastern Romanian population of Bukovina. In the late 19th century, Simion Fl. Marian noticed: "If we ask the Romanian on the third Monday after Easter when the Green Holidays will be this year, he will answer clearly without hesitation: it will come in four weeks and six days" from today. According to common belief, an older type of calendar holiday was employed in the tradition of Bukovinian Romanians until the 1930s and 1940s of the 20th century. Along with the mass distribution of printed church calendars, raising the general educational level of the population, there was no need to use archaic methods of counting the time of a year.

The Ukrainians of the Carpathians region used in everyday life the calculation of time by weeks, based on holidays, as noted by researcher Olena Chebanyuk. For example, they had an Easter week, a Christmas, Green Sunday, Shrovetide, Epiphany, etc. These feasts were also synthetic and multifunctional formations that people employed until the middle of the 20th century. This point of view is founded on ideological and practical everyday syncretism, which formed due to the historical process.⁷⁴

Time in traditional Romanian culture was frequently perceived in philosophical terms. Various proverbs about time support this point of view. For example: "Time is born of time", "Time will find everything and destroy it all", "Time has no limits", "Don't waste time so that it doesn't lose you", "A man, who is constantly looking for time, loses it". This also applies to the famous analogy of human existence to 10-week periods. And proverbs such as: "Time passes, not returns", "You will not catch up with the healed time", "The time will pass, and we would no more be here", "Time is not an ox: you do not push it", etc. are widespread among Ukrainians.

CONCLUSIONS

As a consequence, it is possible to infer that the traditional calendar of the Romanians of Bukovina, as well as the Ukrainians of this region, is the outcome of a historical worldview and culture. This refers to both broad information relating to astronomical observations and detailed research of natural processes and applying this knowledge in daily life. The practical value of this knowledge is closely connected with their main occupations: farming and cattle breeding. Gaps

⁷³ Olena Chebanyuk, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

in people's understanding of natural phenomena were filled with magic and faith in mighty saints responsible for certain days of the week. People took various taboos extremely seriously when these situations were brought to their attention. Even though the folk calendar of Romanians and Ukrainians of Bukovina is based on the Christian worldview, order and hierarchy, a significant part of the folk calendar is an organic component of folk tradition: interpretation of holidays, fasts, seasons and their ritual content. The lengthy practice of perceiving time as a real-life category gave rise to a philosophical attitude toward it.

Different influences cause the specific differences in the calendar system of Romanians and Ukrainians of Bukovina throughout history. The Romanian calendar tradition has received many influences from the Dacians, Greeks, Romans and other practices. Although they reside in the ethnic contact zone, all of the primary aspects of the all-Ukrainian area have been kept in the calendar as temporal representations of the Ukrainians of Bukovina. There is also a pan-Slavic influence. These effects are visible in the name of the month. In traditional perceptions, the everyday mythology, names, and interpretations of the saints who patronise them differently have left an imprint on the days of the week.

Because of the same Orthodox religion and the homogeneity of economic activity in the traditional calendar of Romanians and Ukrainians of Bukovina, the majority of temporal representations coincide.

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**THE ENTENTE'S SECOND INTER-UNION MISSION
UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF JOSEPH BARTHÉLEMY
(FEBRUARY 20 – MARCH 3, 1919)**

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Abstract: *The article examines the activities of the second Entente peacekeeping mission in Eastern Galicia under French General Joseph Barthélemy, analyses the reasons for its establishment and highlights the consequences of its diplomatic efforts for both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian armed conflict of 1918–1919. It was proved that, in addition to their formal duties, the mission members were given important instructions on how further to penetrate and, subsequently, to strengthen the Entente's positions in the Galician region. Furthermore, the aim was to devise counter-measures to the revolutionary movement and socialist ideas in the newly created states of Eastern Europe. Its equally crucial purpose was to investigate the circumstances surrounding the Polish-Ukrainian conflict and examine the prospect of using Polish and Ukrainian troops in the fight against Bolshevik Russia. Despite the informative nature of the mission, its members began negotiations with Ukrainians and Poles in January, but the talks did not result in a real ceasefire around Lviv. It should be highlighted that Joseph Barthélemy's mission did not only fail to reconcile the parties involved in the war but rather incited them to fight each other. At the same time, it promised the Ukrainians the political support of the Entente and the Poles – the Drohobych-Boryslav basin, which was under Ukrainian control. With such recommendations, it was clear that a truce was unlikely. Not wanting to lose rich oil lands that were a substantial source of income, the State Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic refused to agree to the demarcation line proposed by Joseph Barthélemy unconditionally.*

Keywords: *Peacekeeping mission, Joseph Barthélemy, Western Ukrainian People's Republic, Poland, Entente, Eastern Galicia.*

Rezumat: *Articolul examinează activitățile celei de-a doua misiuni de menținere a păcii în Galiția de Est, derulată de Antanta sub conducerea generalului francez Joseph Barthélemy, analizează motivele înființării ei și evidențiază consecințele eforturilor diplomatice întreprinse în favoarea ambelor părți implicate în conflictul militar polono-ucrainean din 1918-1919. S-a dovedit că, pe lângă sarcinile oficiale, membrii misiunii aveau instrucțiuni importante cu privire la modul de intrare și, ulterior, de consolidare a pozițiilor Antantei în regiunea Galiției. În plus, misiunea trebuia să dezvolte măsuri de combatere a mișcării revoluționare și a ideilor socialiste din statele nou create în Europa de Est. Cea mai notabilă sarcină a misiunii a fost studierea circumstanțelor conflictului polono-ucrainean, deopotrivă cu evaluarea perspectivelor de utilizare a trupelor poloneze și ucrainene în lupta împotriva Rusiei bolșevice. În ciuda caracterului informativ al misiunii, în luna ianuarie, membrii acesteia au început negocierile cu ucrainenii și polonezii, fără a se ajunge la o reală încetare a focului în confruntările din jurul Lvovului. Trebuie subliniat faptul că misiunea lui Joseph Barthélemy nu numai că nu a reușit să reconcilieze părțile beligerante, ci, dimpotrivă, a incitat și mai mult pe una împotriva celeilalte. În același timp, misiunea le-a promis ucrainenilor sprijinul politic al Antantei, iar polonezilor bazinul Drohobych-Boryslav, aflat sub control ucrainean. Era evident că aceste recomandări aveau să facă dificilă încheierea unui armistițiu. Nedorind să piardă teritorii bogate în rezerve petroliere, care reprezentau o sursă semnificativă de venit, Secretariatul de stat al Republicii Populare a Ucrainei de Vest a refuzat să accepte, necondiționat, linia de demarcație propusă de Joseph Barthélemy.*

INTRODUCTION

Ukraine is currently engaged in the process of establishing its statehood. Relationships with other countries and international organisations and institutions are at the heart of this process. In this context, it is vital to investigate the issues of peacekeeping missions during the 1918-1919 Polish-Ukrainian war. It is, therefore, essential to explore further into the subject of the Entente's policy of resolving the Polish-Ukrainian armed confrontation during this period. After all, historical experience is vital for Ukraine in the current reality of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the efforts of international organisations to bring it to an end.

Memoirs are an indispensable source for the study of this problem. The testimonies of eyewitnesses and memoirs of Carton de Wiart¹, Mykhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko and Mykhailo Lozynsky², which concerned the analysis of

¹ Adrian Carton de Wiart, *Happy Odyssey. The Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1950, 287 p.

² Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918 – 1919* [The Ukrainian-

the negotiations of the second inter-union mission at the beginning of the Entente, drew attention to the hostilities that preceded and resulted from these unsuccessful agreements on the territory of the region. Tangentially, the events are also mentioned in the volumes of memoirs of some contemporaries (Stepan Shukhevych³, Ivan Karpynets⁴, Ruben Fahn⁵) with the process of organising Galicia after the end of the Great War.

Valuable is the information gleaned from periodicals of central and county authorities and party-political life of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic (ZO UPR), the Polish government in Eastern Galicia: "Gazeta Lwowska" ("Lviv Newspaper"), "Chwila" ("Minute"), "Kurjer Częstochowski" ("Kurier Czestockhovski"), "Република" ("Republic"), "Вперед" ("Forward"), "Стрілець" ("Sagittarius"), "Наша мета" ("Our goal"), "Дрогобицький листок" ("Drohobych leaf"). The preconditions, course, and results of J. Barthélemy's Second Inter-Allied Entente Mission in Eastern Galicia in February-March 1919 and the circumstances following the failure of the official European mission's negotiations with Ukraine were all documented in this collection of documents.

The topic was addressed by researchers from the Ukrainian diaspora: Vasyl Kuchabsky⁶, Lev Shankovsky⁷, and Sydir Yaroslavyn⁸. Ukrainian historians such

Polish War of 1918–19], Praha, 1929, 72 s.; Idem, *Spohady ukrainskoho komandarma. Na Ukraini, 1918-1920. Ukrainsko-polska viina. Na Ukraini, 1919. Zymovyi pokhid, 1920* [Memoirs of a Ukrainian Commander. In Ukraine, 1918-1920. Ukrainian-Polish War. In Ukraine, 1919. Winter Campaign, 1920], Kyiv, 2002, 460 s.; Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna v rr. 1918 – 1920* [Galicia in the Years 1918 – 1920], Viden, 1922, 228 s.; Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna na Myrovii konferentsii v Paryzhi* [Galicia at the Peace Conference in Paris], Kamianets-Podilskyi, 1919, 31 s.

³ Stepan Shukhevych, *Spomyny z Ukrainskoi Halytskoi Armii (1918 – 1920). Ch. 1 (vid lystopada 1918 do kvitnia 1919)* [Memoirs from the Ukrainian Galician Army (1918 – 1920). Part 1 (from November 1918 to April 1919)], Lviv, 1929, 176 s.

⁴ Ivan Karpynets, *Istoriia 8-oi Halytskoi bryhady* [History of the 8th Galician Brigade], in *Litopys "Chervonoi Kalyny"* [Chronicle of the "Red Viburnum"], Lviv, 1933, no. 7-8, s. 33-34.

⁵ Ruben Fahn, *Istoriia Yevreiskoi natsionalnoi avtonomii v period Zakhidno-Ukrainskoi Respubliky* [History of Jewish National Autonomy in the Period of the Western Ukrainian Republic], Lviv, 2019, 272 s.

⁶ Vasyl Kuchabskyi, *Zakhidna Ukraina u borotbi z Polshcheiu ta bilshovyzmom u 1918 – 1923 rokakh* [Western Ukraine in Conflict with Poland and Bolshevism, 1918–1923], Lviv, 2005, 448 s.

⁷ Lev Shankovskyi, *Ukrainska Halytska Armiia: voienno-istorychna studiia* [Ukrainian Army of Galicia: a Study in Military History], Vinnipeh, 1974, 396 s.

⁸ Sydir Yaroslavyn, *Vyzvolna borotba na Zakhidno-ukrainskykh zemliakh u 1918 – 1923 rr.* [The Liberation Struggle in the Western Ukrainian Lands in 1918 – 1923],

as Oleksandr Karpenko, Mykola Lytvyn, Kim Naumenko, Stepan Makarchuk⁹, Hanna-Melania Tychka¹⁰, Orest Krasivskyi¹¹, Roman Tymchenko¹², Vadym Adadurov¹³, Borys Tyshchuk¹⁴, Andriy Korolko¹⁵, Polish historians Maciej Kozłowski, Michał Klimiecki, Marek Kazimierz Kamiński, Rafał Galuba¹⁶, France

Filadelfia, 1956, 182 s.

- ⁹ Oleksandr Karpenko (ed.), *Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodna Respublika. 1918 – 1923. Istoriiia* [Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic. 1918 – 1923. History], Ivano-Frankivsk, 2001, 628 s.; Mykola Lytvyn, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918-1919* [Ukrainian-Polish War 1918-1919], Lviv, 1998, 488 s.; Mykola Lytvyn, Kim Naumenko, *Istoriiia halytskoho striletstva* [History of Galician Shooters], Lviv, 1991, 198 s.; Stepan Makarchuk, *Ukrainska respublika halychan* [Ukrainian Republic of Galician Ukrainians], Lviv, 1997, 192 s.
- ¹⁰ Hanna-Melania Tychka, *Skhidna Halychyna u politytsi Frantsii (1918–1919): dys. kand. ist. nauk* [Eastern Galicia in the Politics of France (1918–1919): dis. cand. of hist. sciences], Lviv, 2018.
- ¹¹ Orest Krasivskyi, *Halychyna v pershii chverti XX st.: Problemy polsko-ukrainskykh vidnosyn* [Galicia in the First Quarter of the XXth Century: Problems of Polish-Ukrainian Relations], Lviv, 2000, 416 s.
- ¹² Roman Tymchenko, *Vidnosyny Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliky i Zakhidno-Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliky (lystopad 1918 – kviten 1920 rr.)* [Relations between the Ukrainian Peoples Republic and the Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic (November 1918 – April 1920)], Kyiv, 2013, 347 s.
- ¹³ Vadym Adadurov, *Polityka Frantsii stosovno ukrainsko-polskoho konfliktu za Skhidnu Halychynu v period z lystopada 1918 po berezen 1919 rr.* [French Policy on the Ukrainian-Polish Conflict over Eastern Galicia in the Period from November 1918 to March 1919], in *Ukraina v mynulomu* [Ukraine in the Past], Kyiv, Lviv, 1995, Vol. 7, s. 18-32.
- ¹⁴ Borys Tyshchuk, *Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodna Respublika (1918 – 1923): Istoriiia derzhavy i prava* [Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic (1918 – 1923): History of State and Law], Lviv, 2004, 392 s.
- ¹⁵ Andrii Korolko, *Rumunska okupatsiia Pokuttia i Halytskoi Hutsulshchyny (traven – serpen 1919 r.): peredumovy, perebih, naslidky* [Romanian Occupation of Pokutia and Galician Gutsulshchyna (May-August 1919): Background, Course, Consequences], in "Naukovyi chasopys Natsionalnoho pedahohichnoho universytetu imeni M. P. Drahomanova. Seriiia Istorychni nauky" [Scientific Journal of National Pedagogical Dragomanov University. Historical Sciences], 2016, Vol. 14, s. 195-210; Stepan Borchuk, Andrii Korolko, Aleksandr Reient, *Accession of part of Eastern Galicia to Romania in 1919: military and political aspects*, in "Codrul Cosminului", 2020, vol. 26, no. 1, p. 169-187, <https://doi.org/10.4316/CC.2020.01.010>
- ¹⁶ Maciej Kozłowski, *Między Sanem a Zbruczem. Walki o Lwów i Galicję Wschodnią, 1918 – 1919* [Between the Rivers Sian and Zbruch. Battles for Lviv and Eastern Galicia, 1918 – 1919], Krakow, 1990, 311 s.; Michał Klimecki, *Polsko-ukraińska wojna o wschodnią Galicję 1918-1919 r. Polskie spojrzenie* [Polish-Ukrainian War for Eastern Galicia 1918-

historians Daniel Murat¹⁷, Mylène Mihout¹⁸, Cyril Grange¹⁹, American and England historians John M. Thompson²⁰, Ilya Prizel²¹, Norman Davies²² and Romanians historians Dumitru Preda, Vasile Alexandrescu, Costică Prodan²³, Valeriu Avram, Lucian Drăghici, Gabriel-George Pătrașcu, Ion Rîșnoveanu²⁴ have all written on this subject.

The proposed scientific article describes the activities of the Second Entente Peacekeeping Mission, led by Joseph Barthélemy, a continuation of his first mission, and took place in Lviv from January 25 to February 11, 1919. The above activities are devoted to the scientific articles of one of the proposed study's authors, Yevhen Lyzen.²⁵

1919. Polish View], in "Ukraina: kulturna spadshchyna, natsionalna svidomist, derzhavnist" [Ukraine: Cultural Heritage, National Consciousness, Statehood], 2009, no. 18, s. 373-384; Marek Kazimierz Kamiński, *Konflikt polsko-czeski 1918-1921* [Polish-Czech conflict 1918-1921], Warszawa, Neriton, 2001, 476 p.; Rafał Galuba, „*Niech nas rozsądzi miecz i krew*”. *Konflikt polsko-ukraiński o Galicję Wschodnią w latach 1918-1919* ["Let us be judged by sword and blood." The Polish-Ukrainian conflict over Eastern Galicia in 1918-1919], Poznań, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2004, 335 p.

¹⁷ Daniel Murat, *L'Intervention de l'État dans le secteur pétrolier en France* [State Intervention in the Oil Sector in France], Paris, Edition Technip, 1969, 331 p.

¹⁸ Mylène Mihout, *Les capitaux nordistes en quête de nouveaux horizons: « le groupe pétrolier du Nord » & le pétrole galicien (1911-1928)* [Northern Capital in Search of New Horizons: "The Northern Oil Group" & Galician Oil (1911-1928)], in "Revue du Nord", 1993, tome 75, No. 300, p. 421-441.

¹⁹ Cyril Grange, *Les classes privilégiées dans l'espace parisien (1903-1987)* [The Privileged Classes in the Parisian Area (1903-1987)], in "Espace, Populations, Sociétés", 1993, No. 1, p. 11-21.

²⁰ John M. Thompson, *Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1967, 438 p.

²¹ Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 443 p.

²² Norman Davies, *Polish National Mythologies*, in Geoffrey Hosking, George Schöpflin (Eds.), *Myths and Nationhood*, New York, Routledge, 1997, p. 141-157.

²³ Dumitru Preda, Vasile Alexandrescu, Costică Prodan, *În apărarea României Mari. Campania armatei române din 1918-1919* [In Defense of Greater Romania. The Campaign of the Romanian Army from 1918-1919], București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1994, 336 p.

²⁴ Valeriu Avram, Lucian Drăghici, Gabriel-George Pătrașcu, Ion Rîșnoveanu, *Războiul de Întregire (1916-1919). Comandanți militari români [War of Integration (1916-1919). Romanian Military Commanders]*, București, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, 2016, 320 p.

²⁵ Yevhen Lyzen, *Diialnist myrotvorchoi misii J. Barthélemy u vrehuliuvanni polsko-ukrain-skoho viiskovoho konfliktu u liutomu-berezni 1919 r.* [The Activity of the Peaceful

The main objectives of Joseph Barthélemy's first mission, on the one hand, were to investigate the circumstances surrounding the November 1918 Jewish pogrom in Lviv, the true extent of Polish-Ukrainian hostility, and the French government's military assistance to Poland. An essential aim of Barthélemy's second mission, on the other hand, was to end hostilities between the warring sides as soon as possible, to negotiate a temporary truce and a demarcation line.

ARGUMENTATION

The second mission, led by Joseph Barthélemy, only began after the Ukrainian general offensive threatened the Polish-occupied city of Lviv in mid-February 1919. In a highly hopeless position, a coalition expedition commanded by Joseph Barthélemy set off on February 17, 1919, at 10 a.m. by special train from Warsaw to Lviv. It also included Lieutenant-General Carton de Wiart, prof. Robert Howard Lord, Col. Harry Smith, Major de Létoile, Lieutenant Lamarck, Lieutenant Forster and Lieutenant Pergolesi. This mission represented France, Great Britain, the United States and Italy and was under the patronage of Joseph Noulens. As can be seen, the mission was not solely French-English, and it was given inter-Union character. Polish officers Andrzej Hempel, Roman Michalowski, Zigmund Mycelsky and Stefan Shchepanovsky were also officially assigned to Joseph Barthélemy's mission during his stay in Lviv.²⁶

Mission by Joseph Barthélemy in the Resolution the Polish-Ukrainian Armed Conflict of the February-March of 1919], in "Vcheni zapysky Tavriiskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni V. I. Vernadskoho. Serii: Istorychni nauky" [Scientific Notes of Tavriya National University Named after Vl. Vernadsky. Series: Historical Sciences], 2019, Tom 30 (69), № 2, s. 130–134; Idem, *Persha misiia Antanty pid kerivnytstvom J. Barthélemy (25 sichnia – 11 liutoho 1919 r.)* [The First Mission of the Entente Under the Leadership of J. Barthélemy (January 25 - February 11, 1919)], in "Naukovyi visnyk Uzhhorodskoho universytetu. Serii: Istoriia" [Scientific Bulletin of Uzhhorod University. Series: History], 2020, No. 2 (43), s. 130–137; Idem, *Dialnist myrotvorchoy misii J. Barthélemy v pratsiakh M. Lozynskoho* [Activities of J. Barthélemy's Peacekeeping Mission in the Works of M. Lozynsky], in "Materialy Mizhnarodnoi naukovoï konferentsii do 100-richchia utvorennia Zakhidno-Ukrainskoi Narodnoi Respubliky. Halychyna. Naukovyi i kulturno-prosvitnii kraieznavchyi chasopys" [Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference Dedicated to the 100th Anniversary of the Formation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. Galicia. Scientific and cultural-educational local lore journal], 2019, No. 32, s. 226–232.

²⁶ *Misya Konferencyi pokojowej przybywa do Lwowa* [The mission of the Peace Conference comes to Lviv], in "Chwila" [Moment], 1919, 17 lutego, no. 35, s. 1.

Thus began the second stage of Joseph Barthélemy's activity in Eastern Galicia. It should be noted that the only task of the new mission under the leadership of the French general was to conclude a Polish-Ukrainian temporary truce in Eastern Galicia. After all, leaving the western part of Eastern Galicia under Poland was in the interests of the Entente, notably France.²⁷

Already on the second day of the Vovchukhiv offensive operation on February 18, 1919, the initial team of the Ukrainian Galician Army (NC UGA), led by Colonel Victor Kurmanovych, received a telegram from the Supreme Council of the Entente, demanding an immediate end to fighting near the Przemyśl-Lviv railway line to allow the Barthélemy mission to arrive in Lviv. On February 20, the UGA National Committee received the Entente mission's second request from Lviv to provide passage from Lviv to the village of Khodoriv for negotiations with the UGA leadership on a ceasefire; it was stated that any refusal to meet this requirement would be considered an act of hostility against the Entente.²⁸ Thus, during the decisive phase of the struggle for Lviv, Barthélemy's mission demanded an end to hostilities on the Polish-Ukrainian front so that it could negotiate with both sides in the military conflict.²⁹

Therefore, as noted above, on February 20, 1919, at 6:45 p.m., Joseph Barthélemy's mission arrived in Lviv with an official order to achieve a truce between Poland and the UPR and went to Potocki Square.³⁰ The peacekeepers immediately began work. On February 21, 1919, members of the mission Mole and Forster, together with Polish officer Bolesław Zaleski, went to the village of Zboivska in the northern part of the Lviv Front. Carton de Wiart visited a military hospital in Lviv, where he spoke with Polish and Ukrainian soldiers about their attitudes towards the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.³¹ On the same day, members of the mission interviewed three Ukrainian officers who the Polish UGA troops had captured in Lviv.³² Entente delegates met with representatives of the Red Cross to

²⁷ Vasyl Kuchabskyi, *op. cit.*, s. 274.

²⁸ Lev Shankovskyi, *op. cit.*, s. 122.

²⁹ Sydir Yaroslavyn, *op. cit.*, s. 36.

³⁰ *Misya koalicyi we Lwowie* [Mission of the coalition in Lviv], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 21 lutego, no. 43, s. 3.

³¹ *Z pobytu misyi koalicyjnej we Lwowe* [From the coalition mission's stay in Lviv], in "Chwila" [Moment], 1919, 22 lutego, no. 40, s. 3.

³² *Z ostatniej chwili (Z kwatery misyi. Delegaci misyi na froncie w Zboiskach)* [In the latest news (From the mission's quarters. Mission delegates at the front in Zboiska)], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 22 lutego, no. 44, s. 3.

discuss the humanitarian situation in the city.³³

Given the difficulties associated with conducting remote negotiations with the Ukrainian side or their absence altogether, members of the mission of Joseph Barthélemy decided to personally visit the leadership of the UGA, which was at that time in the town of Khodoriv.³⁴ Mykhailo Omelyanovych-Pavlenko recalled the arrival of the Entente mission to the UGA National Committee: “On February 22, at noon, Colonel Victor Kurmanovych and the officers of the headquarters met the deputies of the almighty union of states at that time.”³⁵

Since General Joseph Barthélemy was considered an opponent of the UPR, Mykhailo Omelyanovych-Pavlenko asked Victor Kurmanovych to advise the Entente delegation that Carton de Wiart should chair the meeting for a better course of negotiations. The delegates of the Western states accepted this proposal, and the first meeting began at 12.15 in the room of the operational department of the UGA NC headquarters. It is worth noting that fighting on the Polish-Ukrainian front continued during the negotiations. After a few minutes of silence, Carton de Wiart addressed Mykhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko: “We, all four deputies of the Entente states – England, America, France and Italy – declare to you that on February 18 we addressed you with a request to hang weapons in order for our mission to arrive from Przemyśl to Lviv. Instead, you responded with a general battle on the entire front. We ask you: is this a challenge against the Entente states? If not, we immediately demand that you stop the general battle you have begun. We offer you 5 minutes to answer.”³⁶ Mykhailo Omelyanovych-Pavlenko replied that he was only the commander of the UGA troops, of which he was extremely proud. Moreover, above him was the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which was the only one able to resolve this issue finally. Surprisingly, this answer satisfied the members of the Entente mission, and it was decided to wait for information from the city of Stanisławow, the ZO UPR’s then capital.

Subsequently, General Joseph Barthélemy made proposals for a cessation of hostilities. He stated that the Entente states desired an agreement between the opponents, which required the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a temporary demarcation line. According to it, the Ukrainian army was offered to retreat to the East beyond the line that ran along the Bug River, the western

³³ *Koalitsiina misiia u Lvovi* [Coalition mission in Lviv], in “Nasha meta” [Our goal], 1919, 23 liutoho, no. 3, s. 3.

³⁴ Hanna-Melania Tychka, *op. cit.*, s. 95.

³⁵ Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918 – 1919 ...*, s. 44.

³⁶ *Ibid*, c. 45.

borders of Lviv, Peremyshlyany, and Bibrsk counties, and further along the Stry River. In this way, the city of Lviv, the Drohobych-Boryslav oil region, and most of Eastern Galicia were ceded to Poland.³⁷ As Mykhalo Lozynsky rightly remarked, this was “a unilateral order that the commission decided to impose on Ukrainians on the premise of an agreement with the Poles.”³⁸ At around 2.30 p.m., on February 22, a telegram arrived from the city of Stanisławów stating that no answers could be sent at the proposed time and that on the morning of February 23, DS ZO UPR would provide its decision. The Entente mission did not object and was sent to Lviv.³⁹ On the same day, some members who did not take part in the Khodorkovsky talks visited the Lviv Front for information purposes.⁴⁰

Undoubtedly, such conditions were unacceptable for the Ukrainian side, given the successful development of the Vovchukhiv military offensive operation, the blockade of the city of Lviv and the complete stability of the front in other areas. It should be noted that Ukrainians were represented only by the military, who even opposed a temporary truce in the whole offensive. Unlike the military, Yevhen Petrushevych ordered the leaders of the Galician delegation in Lviv, Colonels Myron Tarnavsky and Lev Bachynsky, to sign an armistice agreement. On February 23, 1919, preparatory work was carried out, and on February 24, the newspaper “Republika” stated that “at 12.25 an agreement was signed between the Ukrainian and Polish troops, consisting of seven points,” and that “all military actions cease” at 6 a.m. “This agreement was signed by Colonel Myron Tarnavsky, Lev Bachynsky and Father Bonn, on the Ukrainian side, and Colonel Mieczysław Kulinsky, Major Jerzy Hempel and Major Wacław Maryansky, on the Polish side. According to this document, the Lviv-Sykhiv road was to remain free of hostilities to maintain communication between the parties involved in the Polish-Ukrainian confrontation. The military was forbidden from being on the front lines, and inspection checkpoints were put up. The Poles were allowed to only send three trains from Przemyśl to Lviv with food.⁴¹ The prospect conditioned such actions by the UPR’s political leadership for assistance from the Entente and the belief in its position that Poland should arise only on unquestionably Polish areas (Chapter VIII of the Treaty of Versailles – *Authors*). Since Eastern Galicia is Ukrainian land,

³⁷ Mykola Lytvyn, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918-1919 ...*, s. 265.

³⁸ Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna v pp. 1918 – 1920 ...*, s. 81.

³⁹ Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918 – 1919 ...*, s. 45.

⁴⁰ *Deliehaty koalitsiinoi misii po tamtim botsi* [Delegates of the coalition mission on the other side], in “Nasha meta” [Our goal], 1919, 25 liutoho, no. 4, s. 1.

⁴¹ *Umova pro zavishannia oruzhzhia na Hal. fronti* [Condition for surrender of weapons on the Galician front], in “*Republyka*” [Republic], 1919, 26 liutoho, no. 21, c. 2.

the ZOUNR government hoped that the Entente would order the Poles to end the war of aggression against the Eastern Galicians. In this regard, Mykhalo Lozynsky noted: "This faith of Ukrainians was a great disappointment."⁴²

Accordingly, on February 25, at 6 a.m., the Council of State Secretaries of the Ukrainian People's Republic ordered the cessation of all combat operations. At that time, Ukrainian troops were advancing on Lviv, and the Poles occupied only a strip along the Przemyśl-Lviv railway. It should be noted that the fighting stopped as the situation of the Polish army became critical, and the Ukrainians expected to capture the capital of Eastern Galicia soon.⁴³ On the same day, officers of the coalition mission, appointed to monitor compliance with the cessation of hostilities, went to pre-determined places on the Polish-Ukrainian front line.⁴⁴ Polish historian Witold Hupert, referring to the temporary ceasefire, wrote that it was of great strategic importance to the Poles. Within five days, they managed to deliver weapons, ammunition, and reinforcements and strengthen the fighting positions to the besieged UGA Lviv.⁴⁵ One example is that the first railway transport with American flour arrived in Lviv on the morning of February 25, 1919, due to the mediation of the Entente; the echelon consisted of 40 cars.⁴⁶

Negotiations with Joseph Barthélemy's mission proceeded on February 25, 1919, in Lviv, where a Ukrainian People's Republic delegation, consisting of civilian leaders, diplomats, and soldiers, arrived. The members of the delegation were Osyp Burachynsky, Stepan Vytvytsky, Mykhalo Lozynsky, Volodymyr Temnytsky, Colonels Kost Slyusarchuk and Witold Fidler, Ataman Theodor Rozhankovsky, translator Fr. Franz Xavier Bonn, while general management was carried out by Volodymyr Okhrymovych.⁴⁷

Adam Skarbek led the Polish mission. On the same day, the program of meetings was agreed as follows: first, the Entente representatives would meet a delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, followed by a joint meeting with the Poles. If no agreement could be reached in the negotiations between the

⁴² Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna na Myrovii konferentsii v Paryzhi ...*, s. 12.

⁴³ Roman Tymchenko, *op. cit.*, s. 199-200.

⁴⁴ *V spravi umovy z 1. liutoho 1919* [In the case of agreement from February 1, 1919], in "Vpered" [Forward], 1919, 27 liutoho, no. 66, s. 1.

⁴⁵ Ivan Karpynets, *op. cit.*, c. 33.

⁴⁶ *Z ostatniej chwili (Mąka amerykańska)* [In the latest news (American flour)], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv Gazette], 1919, 25 lutego, no. 46, s. 4.

⁴⁷ *Perehovory z misiieiu Antanty* [Negotiations with the mission of the Entente], in "Strilets" [Rifleman], 1919, 5 bereznia, no. 10, s. 5.

warring parties, Barthélemy's mission was to propose its armistice terms.⁴⁸

After the conference, the Entente mission initiated direct talks between the Polish and Ukrainian delegates. The main discussion revolved around the demarcation line proposed by Joseph Barthélemy. The Ukrainian delegation advocated a temporary demarcation line along the San River, emphasising that the state border between the UPR and Poland should run much further west, according to the ethnic boundary of the two peoples. At the same time, the Polish side defended the demarcation line along the Zbruch River. During the discussion, it offered its own compromise option: the line Berestechko – Busk – Peremyshlyany – Rohatyn – Halych – Kalush – Mount Popadya.⁴⁹ This position was most likely taken to show later that the Poles were willing to compromise. They knew that the Ukrainians would not agree to such a demarcation option since the UGA would require to abandon a substantial part of the eastern Galician territory it had controlled for several months. Obviously, no armistice was appropriate for both sides in the war; thus, each put tight territorial demands on the other.

Under such conditions, Barthélemy's mission decided to ultimately push the opponents to accept their compromise version of the truce. The coalition mission summoned the Polish and Ukrainian representatives on February 28, 1919, at 3:40 p.m., and dictated the terms of the armistice, to which they were to respond by March 5, 1919, at 8 p.m.⁵⁰ General Joseph Barthélemy presented a demarcation line along which almost a third of Eastern Galicia, including Lviv and the Drohobych-Boryslav oil basin, would be seized by Poland. Representatives of the Entente assured that it was a temporary line of demarcation, and the Paris Peace Conference (PMC) would establish the final border. In turn, US representative Robert Lord pointed out that the Poles will better manage the oil basin and use its fields more rationally. At the same time, the Entente mission promised that if the Galician government agreed to it, the Entente would recognise ZOUNR and provide all possible assistance.⁵¹

It is worth noting that before handing over the draft truce to the conflicting parties, Joseph Barthélemy delivered a speech for the representatives of the UPR, in which he vividly described, on the one hand, the growing strength of Poles,

⁴⁸ Borys Tyshchuk, *op. cit.*, s. 278.

⁴⁹ *Perehovory z misiieiu Antanty* [Negotiations with the mission of the Entente], in "Strilets" [Rifleman], 1919, 12 bereznia, no. 11, s. 5-6.

⁵⁰ Taras Hunczak (ed.), *Ukraine and Poland in Documents. 1918 – 1922. Part I*, New York, Paris, Sydney, Toronto, 1983, p. 86.

⁵¹ Sydir Yaroslavyn, *op. cit.*, s. 36.

including Józef Haller's army, and the Entente's wrath, if Ukrainians do not accept the terms of the Entente, and on the other – the commitment of the allied powers, if the Galicians agree to their proposals.⁵² Based on this project, Poland was to receive not only the tiny parts of Eastern Galicia that it had conquered, but the UPR was also to cede large areas of Galician territory, which the UGA held firmly in its hands, along with oil fields near Drohobych and Boryslav. And these were the main elements of the UPR's revenue budget. In general, Galicians had to cede 1/3 of the territory of Eastern Galicia.⁵³ General Joseph Barthélemy demanded that the delegates of the Entente be heard because then it would recognise the sovereignty of the UPR. Incidentally, Poland's political and military forces assured that they were making compromises because it was legal for them to demand a demarcation line along the Zbruch River.⁵⁴

The fact that he assured the Polish delegation that the temporary demarcation line did not deprive Poland of the right to capture the whole of Eastern Galicia also testifies to a particular bias in General Joseph Barthélemy's views. In fact, this was the essence of his plan to "settle the Polish-Ukrainian conflict."

At that time, Symon Petliura was in Eastern Galicia. On February 24, 1919, he arrived in Stanisławów, where he met the representatives of the civil and military authorities of the Ukrainian People's Republic. On February 26, 1919, a festive dinner took place, at which Yevhen Petrushevych made a toast in honour of the state development of the Ukrainian People's Republic and Symon Petliura. In response, the Chief Ataman of the Ukrainian People's Republic stressed the great importance of Eastern Galicia in building a united Ukraine, expressed hope that "thanks to the unity of all Ukrainian lands we will defeat enemies and ensure freedom for future generations of the Ukrainian people," and raised a toast to the unity of Ukrainian lands.⁵⁵

On February 27, 1919, the diplomatic mission of the Entente, learning of Symon Petliura's stay in Eastern Galicia, decided to meet him in the city of Khodoriv, as well as the delegates of the UPR, Yevhen Petrushevych and Sydir Golubovych.⁵⁶ Symon Petliura agreed to support Joseph Barthélemy on the condition that the Entente recognises the UPR and ZO UPR and assists Ukrainians

⁵² Lev Shankovskyi, *op. cit.*, s. 122-123.

⁵³ Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna na Myrovii konferentsii v Paryzhi ...*, s. 13.

⁵⁴ Stepan Makarchuk, *op. cit.*, s. 126.

⁵⁵ *Pobut holov Dyrektorii u Stanyslavovi* [The life of the leaders of the Directory in Stanislaviv], in "Strilets" [Rifleman], 1919, 5 bereznia, no. 10, s. 2.

⁵⁶ *Negotiations with the Mission of the Entente* [Negotiations with the Mission of the Entente], in "Republic" [Republic], 1919, March 1, no. 24, p. 1.

in the fight against the Bolsheviks. Symon Petliura advised the members of the Galician delegation to accept the proposals of General Joseph Barthélemy, as this would open the way to the recognition of the UPR in Europe and would allow them to receive aid with ammunition and military goods to continue the struggle for Ukraine's independence.⁵⁷ "Even then, Petliura was ready to make concessions at the expense of Eastern Galicia," said Mykhalo Lozynsky, "to obtain peace with Poland and the recognition of the Entente for them."⁵⁸ Symon Petliura insisted on a temporary territorial concession to the Poles, which allowed the Allies to recognise the UPR and set favourable conditions for support. Such steps were due to the critical situation on the front with the main enemy of Ukrainians from the Dnieper region (Greater Ukraine). In mid-February 1919, the Bolshevik army launched a large-scale offensive against the UPR Active Army and captured the city of Fastiv. Soon the Kyiv group of Russian troops occupied the cities of Bila Tserkva and Korosten and advanced on Zhytomyr. In March, the Bolsheviks were already in Kozyatyn, Berdychiv, and Vinnytsia. The Directory's army retreated further south and southwest.

According to Polish Commissioner Roman Michalowski, members of the Entente mission also had a positive impression that Symon Petliura was ready to accept the terms of the Entente mission.⁵⁹

Thus, Symon Petliura wanted to be "protected from behind" to fight the Bolsheviks. His desire coincided with the intentions of the Entente. However, most ZO UPR officials did not agree to cede territory to Poland because they considered this state their main enemy. This view eventually prevailed. Sydir Golubovych stated that national interests preclude the possibility of handing over a part of the disputed territory. Thus, Symon Petliura's plans to enlist the support of the Entente failed.⁶⁰

General Joseph Barthélemy made great efforts to end the war – of course, on his terms, calling primarily on the Ukrainians to make various concessions. As an experienced soldier, he realised that the situation on the front was critical for the Poles. However, the Galician Ukrainians only agreed to the demarcation line along the San River with the return of the city of Lviv. Of course, they were influenced by the successes on the front. However, as Prof. Robert Lord of the

⁵⁷ Oleksandr Klymchuk (ed.), *Symon Vasylovych Petliura. Statti* [Symon Vasylovych Petliura. Articles], Kyiv, 1993, s. 226.

⁵⁸ Mykhalo Lozynskyi, *Halychyna v pp. 1918 – 1920 ...*, s. 77.

⁵⁹ Stepan Makarchuk, *op. cit.*, s. 126.

⁶⁰ Ruben Fahn, *op. cit.*, s. 145.

Polish delegation in Lviv stated before departing for the city of Khodorkovsky, the line along the San River would not be taken into account by the mission, and the oil basin would be the oil basin fall back to Poland.⁶¹ On the last day of the Khodorkovsky talks, Joseph Barthélemy also failed to break the resistance of the Ukrainian delegation. According to mission member Robert Foster, “this attempt at a truce was a mistake because under its terms Ukrainians had to abandon their oil centres, leave Lviv and give up half of Galicia.”⁶²

To summarise the mission’s operations, it should be noted that negotiations with Joseph Barthélemy’s mission in Lviv proved ineffective. Handing the project to the delegates of the UPR Osyp Burachynsky, Stepan Vytvytsky and Mykhalo Lozynsky, Joseph Barthélemy warned them that although the situation at the front is currently in favour of the UPR, Poland might soon launch an offensive with the help of Józef Haller’s army.⁶³ The draft armistice of the Entente mission had four documents: two explanatory notes, an agreement and a delimitation map. Their essence was reduced to the cessation of hostilities since the signing of the armistice, the retreat of troops beyond the so-called Bartholomew demarcation line; this position concerned only Ukrainians and the release of prisoners and internees. A special appendix stated that Poles should sell half of their oil production to the Ukrainian side.⁶⁴

Furthermore, the project stipulated that “Ukrainian forces must withdraw beyond the proposed line within 14 days; there should be no concentration of troops in the three-kilometre strip on both sides of the line; release all prisoners of war, internees and hostages, and do not violate property rights.”⁶⁵ In a special

⁶¹ Derzhavnyi arkhiv Lvivskoi oblasti, f. 257 *Lvivske naukove tovarystvo z vyvchennia oborony Lvova ta Pivdenno-skhidnykh voievodstv u 1918 – 1920 roky* [Lviv Scientific Society for the Study of the Defense of Lviv and South-Eastern Voivodeships in 1918-1920], op. 2, spr. 228 *Protokoly zasidan derzhavnoho sekretariatu ZUNR 17.01.1919 – 23.05.1919 rr.* [Minutes of meetings of the State Secretariat of the Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic January 17, 1919 – May 23, 1919], ark. 3.

⁶² Yaroslav Yosypyshyna, *Symon Petliura: Polshcha y Antanta. U 70-richchia trahedii 1926–1996: zb. materialiv pro vidznachennia 70-richchia zahybeli Symona Petliury* [Symon Petliura: Poland and the Entente. To the 70th anniversary of the tragedy of 1926-1996: Collection of materials for the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the death of Symon Petliura], Kyiv, 1997, s. 75.

⁶³ Yaroslav Isaievych, Mykola Lytvyn, Ivan Pater, Ihor Soliar (Eds.), *Zakhidno-Ukrainska narodna respublika. 1918–1923. Uriady. Postati* [Western Ukrainian Peoples Republic. 1918–1923. Governments. Famous figures], Lviv, 2009, s. 161.

⁶⁴ Mykhalo Lozynskiy, *Halychyna v pp. 1918 – 1920 ...*, s. 78-80.

⁶⁵ Stepan Makarchuk, *op. cit.*, s. 126.

memorial to the Ukrainian and Polish sides, the general warned that his competence comprised the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a temporary truce. Then the problem would be resolved by the PMC. At 7 p.m. on February 28, 1919, the Ukrainian delegation went to Khodoriv to agree with the ZO UPR government, leaving only Major Alfonse Erle in Lviv.⁶⁶

The Entente Mission gave the conflicting parties four days to reflect, from March 1, 1919, at 8 a.m. until March 5, 1919, 8 a.m., after which the representatives of Poland and the ZO UPR were required to provide an official response. At the same time, if one of the parties chose to resume hostilities, it had to warn the mission members no later than 12 hours before they started. The mission members stressed that this decision would have a temporary effect, and the PMC will adopt the final political and territorial settlement of the conflict in Eastern Galicia.⁶⁷

Despite the pressure of Joseph Barthélemy's mission and the desire of the leadership of the UPR to maintain good relations with the Entente, the State Secretariat of the UPR rejected these conditions. The delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, leaving Lviv via Khodoriv, in agreement with the Ukrainian government and the UGA command, decided to denounce the armistice agreement of February 25, 1919, and instructed the UGA to resume hostilities at the front.

In connection with the resumption of hostilities on March 1, 1919, Joseph Barthélemy, who was waiting for a certain date in Lviv, sent an ultimatum telegram to Mykhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko: if the Ukrainian side does not ceasefire, it will take responsibility for breaking the ceasefire, and the mission will leave the city of Lviv on March 2. Sydir Golubovych, the head of the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, noted in a radiogram that Joseph Barthélemy's mission, in its activities and proposals, took into account only the interests of the Polish side, intending to give Poland half of the territory of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Despite a sincere desire to live in peace with their neighbours, Ukrainians must defend themselves. Sydir Golubovych suggested sending another independent mission to Galicia.⁶⁸

Thus, the Ukrainian delegation, returning from Lviv to Stanisławow via Khodoriv, late at night on February 28, instructed the UGA to resume hostilities as part of the Vovchukhiv military offensive. The headquarters immediately carried out the order of the Ukrainian People's Republic government "To the Galician

⁶⁶ Taras Hunczak (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁶⁷ *U wstępu do zawieszenia broni* [On the eve of the ceasefire], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 2 marca, no. 51, s. 1.

⁶⁸ Mykola Lytvyn, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918-1919 ...*, s. 269.

Army”, dated March 1, 1919, and signed by Mykhailo Omelyanovich-Pavlenko and Victor Kurmanovych. All officers and soldiers were called to redouble their energy in the fight against the Poles: “negotiations offered us a final demarcation line, which is an image of our most sacred feelings, because, based on this line, Kaminka-Strumylova, Lviv, Drohobych and from these areas to the large west areas of Ukrainian territory should remain in the hands of Poles until the final decision in Paris... To arms, comrade commanders, sergeants, shooters and Cossacks! Let iron and blood judge us.”⁶⁹ At 18.00 on March 1, 1919, NK UGA reported a coalition mission to resume hostilities against the Poles.

By radio telegram on March 1, 1919, Joseph Barthélemy summoned the Ukrainian delegates until 00.00 to explain non-compliance with the agreements on the temporary cessation of hostilities. The Ukrainian side reported to the Entente mission in a telegram that for purely military reasons, the UGA commander was forced to resume hostilities, which had ceased on February 26, 1919, and was implementing the decision of the UPR government. The DS ZO UPR agreed to submit its official statement within the specified period following previous agreements, i.e. by March 4, 1919.

For their part, members of the Barthélemy mission noted, “the failure of the Ukrainians to cease hostilities is directed against all the great Entente powers, so the UPR authorities are directly responsible for such contemptuous steps before the Entente for further war with the Poles”. At the same time, representatives of the mission informed the Ukrainian delegation that if it does not change its decision by midnight, the Entente mission will leave Lviv on March 2 at 11.00 a.m.⁷⁰ By this time, no response was received from the Ukrainians, so the official continuation of hostilities on the Ukrainian side took place on March 1 at 4.30 p.m. On March 2, 1919, combat operations of the enemy armies resumed.⁷¹ On March 1, 1919, on behalf of Tadeusz Rozwadowski, an almost identical order for the resumption of hostilities was issued, in which he appealed to the Polish army and the inhabitants of Lviv: “Polish troops are forced to continue the war against a treacherous and insidious enemy. I call on civilians to calm down and persevere because the entire Polish people are behind us.”⁷²

⁶⁹ Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918 – 1919 ...* s. 49-50.

⁷⁰ *Z ostatniej chwili (Wyjazd misji ze Lwowa)* [In the latest news (Departure of the mission from the city of Lviv)], in “Gazeta Lwowska” [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 4 marca, no. 52, s. 4.

⁷¹ Lev Shankovskiy, *op. cit.*, s. 123.

⁷² *Ukraińcy zerwali zawieszenie broni. Dowództwo Wojsk Polskich na Galicyę wschodnią* [Ukrainians violated the ceasefire. Command of the Polish army for Eastern Galicia], in “Gazeta Lwowska” [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 4 marca, no. 52, s. 1.

On March 2, 1919, the Council of State Secretaries of the Ukrainian People's Republic convened in Stanisławow. After a report from the Lviv delegation, it rejected the Entente mission's proposal without discussion. At the same time, a decision was made on four points: 1) to protest to the Entente states about the unacceptable commitments proposed by the mission of Joseph Barthélemy, which forced them to continue the war against Poland to protect their land; 2) to request the creation of a new Entente mission to investigate the Polish-Ukrainian territorial dispute; 3) to have the government publish a statement on the Ukrainian delegation's negotiations with the Entente mission; 4) to make a public request to the people to defend the Ukrainian land.⁷³

The Entente delegation left Lviv at 11.00 a.m. on March 3, 1919, aboard the regular train № 28, draped with the flags of the Entente countries, for Warsaw.⁷⁴ In his interview with the Polish press, Joseph Barthélemy emphasised: "France and England are sympathetic to you; we would like to see you big and strong, with a powerful army as a counterweight to Germany."⁷⁵ Joseph Barthélemy, leaving Lviv, stated, "the resumption of hostilities is zero for relations between Ukrainians and Western countries." A crowd of people gathered on the platform of the Lviv railway station to say goodbye to the Entente mission.⁷⁶

Of the mission in Lviv, only Colonel Harry Smith remained, tasked with reporting on the further situation in Lviv and its surroundings, and if necessary, speaking on behalf of the Entente.⁷⁷ Shortly afterwards, on March 8, Colonel Harry Smith took a special train to Paris; on the way, he was to meet General Joseph Barthélemy, who, at that time, had left Warsaw for the same place. English Major King, who remained in place, brought this order of Harry Smith to Lviv.⁷⁸

Therefore, as expected, negotiations between opponents of the Polish-

⁷³ *Perehovory z misiieiu Antanty* [Negotiations with the mission of the Entente], in "Strilets" [Rifleman], 12 bereznia, no. 11, s. 5-6.

⁷⁴ *Propozycja Ukraińców* [Offer of Ukrainians], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 1 czerwieca, no. 125, s. 5; *Ostrzeliwanie misji ententy przez Ukraińców* [Departure of the Entente mission through the Ukrainians], in "Kurjer Częstochowski" [Courier Czestochowa], 1919, 5 marca, no. 3, s. 2.

⁷⁵ Stepan Makarchuk, *op. cit.*, s. 123.

⁷⁶ *Zerwanie stosunków koalicyi z Ukraincami* [Breaking coalition relations with Ukrainians], in "Chwila" [Moment], 1919, 4 marca, no. 50, s. 1.

⁷⁷ *Misya koalicyjna opuściła Lwów* [The coalition mission left Lviv], in "Chwila" [Moment], 1919, 3 marca. no. 49, s. 1.

⁷⁸ *Z ostatniej chwili (Wyjazd pułk. Smytha do Paryża)* [In the latest news (Departure of colonel Smith to Paris)], in "Gazeta Lwowska" [Lviv newspaper], 1919, 9 marca, no. 57, s. 4.

Ukrainian military conflict were unsuccessful. This was inevitable because the conditions proposed by Joseph Barthélemy's mission, as the English historian Harold Timperley wrote, did not correspond to either the ethnographic principle or the parties' position to front confrontation.⁷⁹

While in Warsaw for a short time, Joseph Barthélemy immediately left for Poznań, where he reported to the head of the Entente Inter-Union Mission in Poland, Joseph Noulens, on the failure of the peace talks caused by the Ukrainians.⁸⁰

In this context, Joseph Noulens, in expressing his indignation, mostly blamed Symon Petliura. On March 10, 1919, the Bartholomew Mission left Poland for Paris. On March 12, 1919, as soon as they arrived in the French capital, Joseph Barthélemy, Carton de Wiart, and Robert Lord compiled a report for the Jules Cambon Commission. According to their statements, the situation near Lviv was critical for the Poles and threatened to defeat the Ukrainians. The loss of the city of Lviv, they said, would harm Poland and be interpreted as the defeat of the Entente, which would immediately strengthen the position of the Bolsheviks and the agency hired by Germany to conspire against the Entente in Eastern Europe. In these circumstances, the Polish Affairs Committee drew the attention of the High Council to the need to transfer Yosef Haller's troops to Poland.⁸¹ On March 14, 1919, Jules Cambon's commission, based on another report by the Entente delegation of Generals Joseph Barthélemy, Carton de Wiart, and Lieutenant Robert Foster, recommended sending General Józef Haller's army and a large number of weapons to Poland as soon as possible, citing the plight of the Poles and the threat of losing Lviv. As a result, the commission informed the Supreme Council of the need to transfer Józef Haller's army to Eastern Galicia immediately and stressed the need to use allied contingents of nearby troops.

Ukrainian and Polish scholars hold dramatically divergent views on the actions of Joseph Barthélemy's mission and the behaviour of Ukrainian People's Republic politicians. For example, according to Ivan Lysyak-Rudnytsky, a well-

⁷⁹ Oleksandr Karpenko (ed.), *Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodna Respublika. 1918 – 1923. Istoriiia ...*, s. 409.

⁸⁰ *Gen. Berthelemy wyjechał w ważnej misji do Poznania* [General Barthelemy left on an important mission to the city of Poznan], in "Kurjer Częstochowski" [Courier Czestochowa], 1919, 7 marca, no. 5, s. 2.

⁸¹ Oleksandr Karpenko, Kateryna Mytsan (com.), *Zakhidno-Ukrainska Narodna Respublika 1918–1923. Dokumenty i materialy: u 5-kh tomakh* [West Ukrainian Peoples Republic 1918–1923. Documents and Materials: in 5 volumes], Ivano-Frankivsk, 2009, Vol. 5 (1) *Zovnishnia polityka i mizhnarodne stanovyshe. 1918–1919 rr.* [Foreign Policy and International Situation. 1918–1919], s. 105.

known Ukrainian historian in the diaspora, Joseph Barthélemy's proposal was a real opportunity to resolve the Polish-Ukrainian war. The Western Front of the Ukrainian People's Republic was liquidated with its adoption. The main burden of the struggle was shifted to the East, where the Directory's troops tried their best to restrain the onslaught of Bolshevik troops. The arrival of a well-organised UGA to help the Dnieper region would give Ukrainians a military advantage on the Eastern Front. In addition, the preservation of the territory of the UPR, although significantly reduced by the Barthélemy line, would provide the UPR with a well-organised civilian rear for military operations in the East of the state.⁸² In this regard, historian Vadym Adadurov argues that the rupture of the armistice harmed the leadership of the UPR, which adopted the fatalist strategy of either all or nothing.⁸³

Mykhaylo Kapustyansky, a military and political figure in the Ukrainian People's Republic, believed that there were only two political and military opportunities in this situation: "Either with the Bolsheviks against the Entente or with the Entente against the Bolsheviks... There is no other way out." He stressed that it was necessary to choose a "union with the Entente", since Joseph Barthélemy planned to use the UGA army on the anti-Bolshevik front after the armistice with Poland⁸⁴ Vasil Kuchabsky considered the rejection of the Entente's proposals to be a mistake since it caused Marshal Ferdinand Foch to have a negative attitude about the ZO UPR and accelerated the entry of Józef Haller's troops in Poland.⁸⁵ Modern Polish historians Macej Kozłowski, Michał Wzozek and Michał Klimecki consider the act of power of the ZO UPR to be suicidal. Thus, the dictation of General Joseph Barthélemy, in particular his proposed terms of the armistice, should be analysed in terms of the Ukrainian conciliar strategy, and not only through the prism of the Polish-Ukrainian military conflict, which was merely a side effect of the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people.⁸⁶

In the context of the Allied mission, it must be acknowledged that the mission of Joseph Barthélemy and the Entente placed psychological barriers to the realisation of their plans. In a typically French effort to create a "strong Poland," yet leaving behind Lviv and the Drohobych-Boryslav oil basin, General Joseph Barthélemy formulated his demands in such a way that the Ukrainian side could

⁸² Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytskyi, *Polsko-ukrainski stosunki. Tiahar istorii* [Polish-Ukrainian Relations. The Burden of History], in *Istorychni ese. V 2 t.* [Historical Essays. In Two Volumes], Kyiv, 1994, vol. 1, s. 103.

⁸³ Vadym Adadurov, *op. cit.*, s. 30.

⁸⁴ Lev Shankovskiy, *op. cit.*, s. 66-67.

⁸⁵ Orest Krasivskiy, *op. cit.*, s. 97.

⁸⁶ Lev Shankovskiy, *op. cit.*, s. 175-176.

not accept them psychologically. One can agree with the opinion of some historians that if the demarcation line had been proposed along the lines of the front at that time, the Ukrainian side would indeed have accepted it. Moreover, in March 1919, a united Ukrainian army with the help of the Entente would defeat the main enemy of the independent UPR – Bolshevik Russia. However, suppose the dictates of Joseph Barthélemy are viewed from a historical retrospective. In that case, it becomes clear that the ZO UPR had no choice but to accept the conditions proposed by the Entente mission. This was probably the last chance for the desired understanding with the Entente.⁸⁷

Thus, the attempts of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic to find an understanding with the Entente proved futile, as the Entente considered the East Galician case only in the context of its global interests. The failure of the decisive Khodorkovsky armistice negotiations under the auspices of the PMC was a crucial moment in the Polish-Ukrainian war "because it marked a radical shift in the policy of the Entente leadership in favour of Poland. First, it accelerated the deployment of Józef Haller's army to Poland, whose presence resulted in a decision to conclude the war in Poland's favour."⁸⁸

CONCLUSIONS

The efforts of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic to reach an agreement with the Entente were useless because the Entente only evaluated the East Galician problem in the context of its worldwide objectives. The failure of the pivotal Khodorkovsky armistice talks under the auspices of the PMC was a key moment in the Polish-Ukrainian war "because it showed a significant shift in the Entente leadership's stance in favour of Poland. First and foremost, it sped the deployment of Józef Haller's army to Poland, whose presence resulted in a decision to conclude the war in Poland's favour.

Consequently, both missions led by Joseph Barthélemy, despite the enormous amount of work done, did not fulfil their primary task, namely the temporary cessation of the Polish-Ukrainian war. However, these delegations indirectly influenced the fate of the UPR, as their members actively spread in their future reports and speeches the unattractive image of Ukrainians as potential Bolsheviks, which later became one of the preconditions for the decision of the

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, s. 344-345.

⁸⁸ Mykola Lytvyn, *Ukrainsko-polska viina 1918-1919 ...*, s. 270.

Supreme Soviet on June 25, 1919, that allowed Poles to occupy the entire territory of Eastern Galicia along the river Zbruch.

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BELARUS' ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE AND RUSSIA. TRENDS, DYNAMICS, CHALLENGES (2014–2021)

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Abstract. *The impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war in eastern Ukraine and the ongoing political crisis in Belarus were examined, as well as the key trends, forms, and features of Ukrainian-Belarusian and Belarusian-Russian economic cooperation in 2014–2021. The dynamics of foreign commerce, investment, production, and cooperation, as well as other elements that contributed to the development of the collaboration or slowed bilateral interaction, are given special emphasis. In the framework of contemporary events in Belarus, differences in foreign policy have aggravated Ukrainian-Belarusian interstate ties and accentuated the integrative tendency of Belarus-Russia relations.*

Keywords: *Economic relations, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Cooperation, Integration, Production, Investment, Political crisis, Trade.*

Rezumat. Relațiile economice ale Belarusului cu Ucraina și Rusia. Tendințe, dinamică, provocări (2014-2021). *Autoarea analizează principalele tendințe, forme și particularități ale cooperării economice ucraineano-belaruse și belaruso-ruse în anii 2014-2021, impactul războiului ruso-ucrainean în estul Ucrainei și al actualei crize politice din Belarus. Studiul se concentrează pe dinamica comerțului exterior, investițiilor, producției și cooperării, factori care au contribuit la dezvoltarea colaborării sau au încetinit interacțiunea bilaterală. Diferențele în politica externă au exacerbă relațiile interstatale ucrainene-belaruse și au accentuat tendința integrativă a relațiilor Belarus-Rusia în contextul evenimentelor curente din Belarus.*

INTRODUCTION

Russia's role in the post-Soviet region has been growing ever since 2008, as Russia seeks to establish a new geopolitical area of influence. Relations between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation are developing in all respects, particularly since the start of the domestic political crisis in Belarus. The above-mentioned in-depth integration mechanism is currently in use within the Union State. At the same time, the quality of the Moscow-Minsk partnership has a direct impact on Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. The closer collaboration between Russia and Belarus is generating challenges in Minsk and Kyiv's cooperation. Ukraine is concerned about how closely the integration of Belarus and Russia will unfold, as this will affect the security of its borders and, therefore, national security.

Today, the economic component is the only link between Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Ukrainian-Belarusian cooperation, on the one hand, and Belarusian-Russian cooperation, on the other, take a variety of forms in terms of foreign policy. Ukraine is on the path of European integration and aspires to join the EU and NATO. Belarus and Russia are members of post-Soviet integration organisations. Since 1999, they have been bound under the Union State Treaty. Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014, its annexation of Crimea, and Russia's eight-year-long war in eastern Ukraine were among the major factors that changed relations between Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, as well as regional and global security conditions in Europe.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PROBLEM

The works of Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian specialists became the historiographical foundation of the investigated subject. These issues are also discussed in the publications of European and American scientists. Stepan Vasylyshyn¹, a Ternopil historian, deserves credit for his dissertation research, which disclosed the political and economic dimensions of the dialogue between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus. Hennadiy Maksak's works², done both individually and in collaboration with Belarusian scholars, particularly scientist Denis

¹ Stepan Vasylyshyn, *Ukrayins'ko-bilorus'ki vidnosyny (1991–2014 rr.)* [Ukrainian-Belarusian relations (1991–2014)], Dys. kand. istor. nauk: spets.: 07.00.02 "Vsesvitnya istoriya", Ternopil', 2019, 298 s.

² Hennadiy Maksak, *Ukrayins'ka i Belarus' v novykh realyakh: mezhdubezopasnost'yu y ekonomyky. Analitychnyy dokument Rady zovnishn'oyi polityky "Ukrayins'ka pryzma"*

Yurchak³ and international analyst Yauheni Preiherman⁴, are of significant interest. Olena Betliy⁵, Tetyana Zosymenko⁶ and others are among the Ukrainian authors whose works have primarily contributed to the theoretical understanding of Ukrainian-Belarusian relations.

As evidenced in 2019, great attention was previously paid to the topics investigated⁷, particularly the trade and economic relations between Ukraine and Belarus in the monograph *Belarus: socio-economic aspects of development (late 80's of XX – early XXI century)*.⁸

The work of Belarusian historian Denis Yurchak⁹ stands out in the context of this study because it highlights the peculiarities of the political dialogue be-

[Ukraine and Belarus in new realities: between security and economy. Analytical document of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”], Berezen', 2016, <http://prismua.org/ua/belarus-ua> (Accessed on 20.11.2020).

³ Hennadiy Maksak, Denis Yurchak, *Sotrudnichestvo Respubliki Belarus' i Ukrainy v novykh geopoliticheskikh usloviyakh* [Cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine in new geopolitical conditions], Minsk, 2014, 40 s.

⁴ Yauheni Preiherman, Hennadiy Maksak, *Belorussko-ukrainskiye otnosheniya v kontekste vnutripoliticheskogo krizisa v Belarusi* [Belarusian-Ukrainian relations in the context of the internal political crisis in Belarus], Kyiv, Dekabr', 2020, 22 s.

⁵ Olena Betliy, Yauheni Preiherman, *Audyt zovnishn'oyi polityky Ukrayiny: Ukrayina – Bilorus'* [Audit of foreign policy of Ukraine: Ukraine – Belarus], “Dyskusiyna zapyska” [Discussion note], Kyiv, 2016, 55 s.

⁶ Tetyana Zosymenko, *Ukrayina-Bilorus'. Analitychnyy dokument Rady zovnishn'oyi polityky “Ukrayins'ka pryзма”* [Ukraine-Belarus. Analytical document of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”], Sichen', 2021, <http://prismua.org/ukraine-belarus/> (Accessed on 26.03.2021).

⁷ Oksana Valion, *Interstate cooperation of Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus at the present stage: a trade-economic aspect*, “Ukrayina-Yevropa-Svit”, Ternopil', TNPU im. V. Hnatyuka, 2019, Vyp. 22, p. 23-32; Lesia Aleksiievets, Oksana Valion, *Trade and Economic Cooperation Between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus: Historical Discourse (1991–2020)*, “Ukrayins'kyi istorychnyy zhurnal”, 2021, No. 4, p. 114-126.

⁸ Oksana Valion, *Bilorus': sotsial'no-ekonomichni aspekty rozvytku (kin. 80-kh rr. XX – poch. XXI st.)* [Belarus: socio-economic aspects of development (late 80's of 20th – early 21st century)], Ternopil', Aston, 2014, 274 s.

⁹ Denis Yurchak, *Belarus' – Ukraina: 20 let mezhgosudarstvennykh otnosheniy* [Belarus – Ukraine: 20 years of interstate relations], Vitebsk, UO “VGU im. P. M. Masherova”, 2012, 280 s.; Denis Yurchak, *Belorussko-ukrainskiye otnosheniya v 1991–2017 gg.* [Belarusian-Ukrainian relations in 1991–2017], “Postsovetskiye issledovaniya” [Post-Soviet Studies], 2018, T. 1, No. 1, p. 79-89.

tween Belarus and Ukraine, the dynamics of mutual trade between the two countries, the impact of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis on bilateral relations, and other issues. Belarusian researcher Hryhoriy Astapenya reveals the current dynamics of Belarusian-Russian relations in political, economic and military dimensions.¹⁰ Of interest in the context of the analysis of the features and specifics of economic relations between Belarus and Russia are the publications of Belarusian scientists and analysts Dmitriy Demichev¹¹, Yuri Shevtsov¹², Arseny Sivitski and Yuriy Tsarik¹³ etc. It is worth noting the large-scale and comprehensive seven-volume work on the history of Belarus: *Republic of Belarus – 25 years of creation and accomplishment*¹⁴, prepared by specialists of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus.

Among the Russian authors who have written about Russian-Belarusian relations and integration, the analytical investigations of Aleksey Shurubovich¹⁵, Ksenia Boryshpolets, Stanislav Chernyavsky¹⁶ and Irina Selivanova¹⁷ are worth mentioning.

¹⁰ Grigoriy Astapenya, *Belorussko-rossiyskiye otnosheniya s perspektivy Minska: formal'nyy soyuz i fakticheskaya dezintegratsiya* [Belarusian-Russian relations from the perspective of Minsk: formal union and actual disintegration], "Nowa Polityka Wschodnia" [The New East Politic], 2016, No. 2 (11), p. 43-56.

¹¹ Dmitriy Demichev, *Torgovo-ekonomicheskkiye otnosheniya Respubliki Belarus' i Ukrainy* [Trade and economic relations of the Republic of Belarus and Ukraine], "Ekonomicheskii zhurnal" [Economic journal], 2000, No. 4, p. 75-83.

¹² Yuri Shevtsov, *Obyedinennaya natsiya. Fenomen Belarusi* [United Nation. The phenomenon of Belarus], Minsk, Izdatel'stvo "Yevropa", 2005, 256 s.

¹³ Arseny Sivitski, Yuriy Tsarik, *Belarus' v EAES: god spustya* [Belarus in the EAEC: a year later], Minsk, Tsentr strategicheskikh i vneshnepoliticheskikh issledovaniy, Minsk, 2016, 18 s., http://csfps.by/files/belarus_in_the_eaec.pdf (Accessed on 15.10.2020).

¹⁴ N. Abramchuk (Ed.), *Ekonomicheskoye razvitiye. T. 3* [Economic development, Vol. 3], in *Respublika Belarus' – 25 let sozidaniya i sversheniy. V 7 t.* [Republic of Belarus – 25 years of creation and achievements. In 7 volumes], Minsk, "Belaruskaya navuka", 2020, 795 s.

¹⁵ Aleksey Shurubovich, *Tendentsii i problemy rossiysko-belorusskikh ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy. Nauchnyy doklad* [Trends and problems of Russian-Belarusian economic relations: Scientific report], Moskva, Institut ekonomiki RAN, 2017, 60 s.

¹⁶ Ksenia Boryshpolets, Stanislav Chernyavskiy, *Rossiysko-belorusskiye otnosheniya: ugrozy real'nyye i mnimyje* [Russian-Belarusian relations: real and imaginary threats], "Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya" [World Economy and International Relations], 2012, No. 11, p. 57-63.

¹⁷ Irina Selivanova, *Ekonomicheskaya integratsiya Rossii i Belorussii i yeye vliyaniye na razvitiye narodnogo khozyaystva Belorussii* [Economic integration of Russia and Belarus and its impact on the development of the national economy of Belarus], Vyp. 2, *Belorussiya i Rossiya: obshchestva i gosudarstva*, 1998, <https://www.yabloko.ru/Themes/Belarus/belarus-25.html> (Accessed on 18.02.2021).

The historiographical discourse of European and American scholars and analysts is primarily concerned with the aspects of Belarus' foreign policy, as well as the place and role of Russia in it. Of considerable interest is the work of Paul Hansbury *Domestic Constraints on Foreign Policy Change in Belarus*¹⁸, in which the author examines changes in the foreign policy of Belarus during 2016–2019. Many topical aspects of Belarus' foreign policy, including the Belarusian-Russian one, have been criticized in publications by researchers from foreign NGOs, including the American Jamestown Foundation (Grigory Ioffe¹⁹, Vladimir Sokor²⁰) and the British Chatham House (James Nixey²¹ and Mathieu Boulègue).²² The work of Polish researcher Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga²³, who analyses the current state of Russian-Belarusian relations, focuses on Russia's influence on Belarus' economy, security, defence, and foreign policy coordination and deserves special attention. The publications of other foreign scholars have become invaluable in the development of the issue: Anthony J. Evans, Terence Tse, Zhigao Liu, Michael Dunford, Weidong Liu, Andrew Wilson and Chloe Bruce.²⁴ The Ukrainian-Belarusian di-

¹⁸ Paul Hansbury, *Domestic Constraints on Foreign Policy Change in Belarus*, "Journal of Belarusian Studies", 2021, Vol. 11, Issue 1, p. 27-55, https://brill.com/view/journals/bela/11/1/article-p27_3.xml (Accessed on 20.10.2021).

¹⁹ Grigory Ioffe, *Europe's Sanctions and Belarus: A Hammer and the Nail*, July 7, 2021, <https://jamestown.org/program/europes-sanctions-and-belarus-a-hammer-and-the-nail/> (Accessed on 11.09.2021); Grigory Ioffe, *Belarusian-Russian Economic Dependency and Trade Wars: Is There a Contradiction?*, October 25, 2021, <https://jamestown.org/program/belarusian-russian-economic-dependency-and-trade-wars-is-there-a-contradiction> (Accessed on 12.11.2021).

²⁰ Vladimir Sokor, *Lukashenka Says No to Russian Military Base and Deeper Integration with Russia*, August 24, 2021, <https://jamestown.org/program/lukashenka-says-no-to-russian-military-base-and-deeper-integration-with-russia> (Accessed on 18.09.2021).

²¹ James Nixey, *Belarus Policy: Time to Play Hardball*, August 12, 2020, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/08/belarus-policy-time-play-hardball> (Accessed on 12.11.2021).

²² Mathieu Boulègue, *Russia's Assets and Liabilities in Belarus*, November 18, 2020, 16 s., <https://cepa.org/russias-assets-and-liabilities-in-belarus> (Accessed on 17.08.2021).

²³ Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, *Wsparcie drogą do podporządkowania. Rosja wobec Białorusi* [Support as a way to compliance. Russia towards Belarus], No. 34, Warszawa, Maj 2013, 32 s., <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/punkt-widzenia/2013-05-06/wsparcie-droga-do-podporzadkowania-rosja-wobec-bialorusi> (Accessed on 12.07.2021).

²⁴ Anthony J. Evans, Terence Tse, *A strategic plan for the East Belarus mechanical engineering cluster*, "International Journal of Competitiveness", Vol. 1, No. 3, 2018, p. 221-237; Zhigao Liu, Michael Dunford, Weidong Liu, *Coupling national geo-political economic*

rection and Russia's influence on bilateral relations during the crisis were reflected in the intelligence of Piotr Żochowski, Tadeusz Iwański²⁵, Bohdan Nahaylo²⁶, and Alexander Smith.²⁷ In the context of this topic, the most well-known Belarusian and Russian researchers of the study theme, who have been published in foreign scientific journals or volumes, were also used.²⁸

POLITICAL CONTEXT

In 2014, the Republic of Belarus adopted a flexible approach to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which lasted until August 2020. The use of Minsk as a platform for international negotiations in the settlement of the military conflict in eastern

strategies and the Belt and Road Initiative: The China-Belarus Great Stone Industrial Park, "Political Geography", Vol. 84, Jan. 2021, p. 1–13; Wilson Andrew, *Belarus Wants Out*, March 20, 2014, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/belarus/2014-03-20/belarus-wants-out> (Accessed on 17.05.2021); Bruce Chloë, *Friction or Fiction? The Gas Factor in Russian–Belarusian Relations, Russia and Eurasia Programme*, Rep Bp, 05/01 May 2005, 14 s., [Russia%20and%20Eurasia/bp0501gas.pdf](https://www.eurasia.com/bp0501gas.pdf) (Accessed on 19.04.2021).

²⁵ Piotr Żochowski, Tadeusz Iwański, *Ukraine-Belarus: a spiralling crisis*, June 14, 2021, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2021-06-14/ukraine-belarus-a-spiralling-crisis> (Accessed on 15.08.2021).

²⁶ Bohdan Nahaylo, *Escalating Belarus border crisis could pose a security threat to Ukraine*, November 15, 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/escalating-belarus-border-crisis-could-pose-a-security-threat-to-ukraine> (Accessed on 28.11.2021).

²⁷ Alexander Smith, *Putin faces pressure over Belarus border crisis and Ukraine troop buildup*, November 16, 2021, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-faces-pressure-belarus-border-crisis-ukraine-troop-build-rcna5674> (Accessed on 30.11.2021).

²⁸ Vyacheslav Shutsilin, Andrey Filiptsou, Yuliya Vashkevich, *Industrial Development, Structural Changes, and Industrial Policy in Belarus*, in Bruno S. Sergi (Ed.), *Entrepreneurship and Global Economic Growth*, Vol. 1., Emerald Publishing Limited, 2020, p. 63–72; Aliaksei Bykau, Stanislau Vysotski, *What Belarus Produces, Exports, and Imports: Analyzing Trade in Value Added*, in *Ibid.*, p. 235–248; Alexei Danilchenko, Elena Bertosh, Pavel Artsemyeu, Roman Osipov, *Foreign Investments and TNCs*, in *Ibid.*, p. 249–267; Vladimir Shimov, Aliaksei Bykau, Tatyana Khvalko, *Economic Growth in Belarus: Analysis, Forecasts, and Scenarios*, in *Ibid.*, p. 307–321; Alla Pranevich, Aksana Shkutsko, *Foreign Economic Policy of Belarus: Integration and Multivector*, in *Ibid.*, p. 323–340; Uladzimir Parkhimenka, *Future of the Belarusian IT Sector: From IT Outsourcing to Industry 4.0?*, in *Ibid.*, p. 41–62; Nelly Bekus, *Belarus's Winding Path to a Post-Soviet Identity*, "Current History", October 2019, p. 258–264.

Ukraine, as well as Alexander Lukashenko's personal assurances concerning the prevention of hostilities on Belarusian territory, attested to Belarus' neutral position. According to Ukrainian expert Hennadiy Maksak, Belarus' policy towards Ukraine has created opportunities for an effective bilateral format of political and economic cooperation.²⁹ Minsk's new role as a hub for international diplomacy was extremely important in the context of security for both Ukraine and Belarus.³⁰ Pavlo Usov, head of the Warsaw Center for Political Analysis and Forecasting, said Lukashenko had "tried to use the Ukrainian factor to unfreeze relations with the West".³¹ Minsk's interest in improving contacts, particularly with the United States, is driven by a desire to balance its eastern vector and feel safer. All this provided grounds for deepening the interstate dialogue between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus.

However, Belarus' foreign policy has triggered Russia's discontent and desire to exert influence over Minsk's international affairs.³² According to Paul Hansbury, the Kremlin interpreted these as acts of disloyalty that could lead to Belarus leaving Russia's "sphere of influence".³³ There was a growing awareness of the differences between the interests of the two countries and the desire to reduce control over Russia³⁴, but Belarus remained part of Russia's sphere of influence. According to Mathieu Boulègue, the Belarusian elite was aware that the Kremlin's aggressive policy towards its "near abroad" was detrimental to their interests.³⁵

The multi-vector policy pursued by Minsk from 2014 to summer 2020, which was to reduce dependence on traditional export positions and markets by diversifying the product range, was a necessary condition for ensuring the economic security of the Republic of Belarus.³⁶ However, mass protests over the non-recognition of the results of the presidential election in Belarus on August 9, 2020, as well as the violent dispersal of protesters, their arrests and imprisonment, led to a lack of acceptance of the legitimacy of Alexander Lukashenko's new presidential term. The extradition of a Russian Wagners' group to Moscow in July 2020,

²⁹ Hennadiy Maksak, *Ukraina i Belarus' ...*

³⁰ Olena Betliy, Yauheni Preiherman, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

³¹ Liliya Rzhets'ka, Volodymyr Dorokhov, *Rodych, yakyy stav vorohom. Chomu svaryat'sya Ukrayina i Bilorus'?*, Berezen' 27, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/uk/rodych-yakyy-stav-vorohom-chomu-svariatsia-ukraina-i-bilorus/a-57022047> (Accessed on 16.07.2021).

³² Paul Hansbury, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

³³ Mathieu Boulègue, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

³⁴ Andrew Wilson, *op. cit.*

³⁵ Mathieu Boulègue, *op. cit.*

³⁶ Alla Pranevich, Aksana Shkutsko, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

who were detained by the Belarusian State Security Committee in Minsk, has triggered a new wave of tension in Ukrainian-Belarusian relations. People accused of committing crimes during the Donbas war were among them.³⁷ According to Ukrainian experts, this decision foreshadowed Belarus' choice of partners.³⁸ As a result, Ukraine did not acknowledge the presidential legitimacy of Alexander Lukashenko and joined the EU's sanctions against official Minsk. As a result, political relations between Ukraine and Belarus have been suspended, while trade and economic relations continue to be maintained.

In addition, Ukrainian-Belarusian relations worsened after the Belarusian authorities landed a Ryanair plane in Minsk and detained journalist and blogger Roman Protasevich. Ukraine cancelled flights to Belarus and then refused Belarusian planes access to Ukrainian airspace to fly to other countries.³⁹ The EU and the US have not only closed their airspace for Belarusian aircraft but also imposed specific economic sanctions. Against the background of Belarus' international isolation, its closer rapprochement with Russia has taken place, which is increasingly consolidating Minsk in the geopolitical, economic, and military spheres of the Kremlin's influence, threatening Belarusian sovereignty.

UKRAINIAN-BELARUSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Long-term economic contacts between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus are based on pragmatic and mutually beneficial interests, the desire to preserve pre-existing economic and cooperative ties and the ability to implement local goals.⁴⁰ The geographical position of both neighbouring countries, traditions of economic partnership, and multiple direction interests in production all contribute to bilateral cooperation.⁴¹ The leading tendency in Ukrainian-Belarusian relations since the independence of Ukraine has been that, despite political differences over other approaches to social development and another foreign policy, the economic component of cooperation has consistently dominated.⁴² Even in the face of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, trade and economic cooperation was the "glue" that held Ukraine and Belarus together, according to Olena Betliy and

³⁷ Piotr Żochowski, Tadeusz Iwański, *op. cit.*

³⁸ Yaugeni Preiherman, Hennadiy Maksak, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

³⁹ Lesia Aleksiiivets, Oksana Valion, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁴⁰ Denis Yurchak, *Belarus' – Ukraina...*, p. 166.; Dmitriy Demichev, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁴¹ O. Valion, *Bilorus': sotsial'no-ekonomichni...*, p. 189.; Idem, *Interstate cooperation*, p. 24.

⁴² Denis Yurchak, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

Yauheni Preiherman.⁴³

It has to be noted that the events in Ukraine in late 2013 – early 2014 significantly reduced the volume of bilateral trade and economic transactions. Another reason for the negative trend of declining indicators of Ukrainian-Belarusian economic cooperation was the “financial war” that Russia launched against Ukraine, using the mechanisms of the Customs Union and involving all member states of this integration association, including Belarus.⁴⁴ As a result, a record volume of interstate trade was established in 2012, reaching \$7.8 billion.⁴⁵ It amounted to \$5.8 billion in 2014 and \$3.4 billion in 2015. Such indicators were influenced by the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Donbas, which were Belarus’ main trading partners among the regions of Ukraine.

For several years, bilateral cooperation has managed to increase the dynamics of foreign trade. The trade volume between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus increased during 2016–2019, reaching \$3.8 billion in 2016, \$4.5 billion in 2017, \$5.3 billion in 2018, and \$5.5 billion in 2019.⁴⁶ According to the financial results of 2020, the trade turnover was \$4.4 billion, which is 20.7 per cent less than in 2019. At the same time, the Republic of Belarus has a positive trade balance with Ukraine, while Ukraine has a traditionally negative trade balance.

According to the results of the first half of 2021, the Republic of Belarus ranked second among CIS countries and sixth among China, Germany, Russia, Poland, USA⁴⁷, while Ukraine ranked second among all trading partners of the Republic of Belarus in terms of trade and exports.⁴⁸

The main item of Belarusian exports to Ukraine in the study period is petroleum products, which in 2015 accounted for more than 70 per cent of total supplies from Belarus⁴⁹, while in 2020 – 35 per cent. Other critical goods of Ukrainian imports from Belarus in 2020 were bitumen – 60 per cent and mineral fertilizers – 34 per cent⁵⁰. To a lesser extent, tractors, trucks, electricity, fibreboard, etc., come to Ukraine from Belarus.

⁴³ Olena Betliy, Yauheni, Preiherman, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁴⁴ Stepan Vasylyshyn, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁴⁵ Hennadiy Maksak, Denis Yurchak, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁴⁶ *Trade and economic cooperation. Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Belarus*, <https://belarus.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobotnictvo/ekonomichne-spivrobotnictvo> (Accessed on 15.10.2021).

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁸ *Trade and economic relations. Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in Ukraine...*

⁴⁹ Hennadiy Maksak, *Ukrayna y Belarus' ...*

⁵⁰ Tetyana Zosymenko, *op. cit.*

In recent years, Ukraine has been exporting to the Republic of Belarus mainly agricultural and food products, agricultural machinery, rolling stock parts, copper wire, corners, non-alloy steel profiles,⁵¹ etc. According to experts, given that many commodities imports from Belarus have become, in fact, critical for Ukrainian companies, the inability to supply can lead to serious negative consequences felt throughout the Ukrainian economy.⁵²

It should be noted, that from July 1, 2019, Ukraine began importing electricity from Belarus, since foreign supplies were more cost-competitive for Ukrainian producers. With the opening of the Belarusian NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) in November 2020, electricity imports have gained additional opportunities. However, his opponents pointed out that electricity supplies from Belarus and Russia pose potential threats to energy dependence and reduced domestic electricity production, as well as European integration, in particular, in terms of preparing for the synchronization of the domestic energy system with the European one in 2023.⁵³

Investment cooperation is currently used in the context of Ukrainian-Belarusian economic cooperation. Thus, the Republic of Belarus has invested in the economy of Ukraine \$141.7 million as of March 31, 2021. The volume of Ukrainian investments in the economy of the Republic of Belarus amounted to \$2.4 million as of March 31, 2021.⁵⁴

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, mutual economic sanctions and Western restrictions against Russia, in particular, have created new opportunities for Ukrainian-Belarusian cooperation. The re-export of Ukrainian goods to Russia (via Belarus) and the increase in air traffic between Minsk and Ukrainian cities are two of the new niches that have emerged in this regard.⁵⁵ At the same time, Belarus served as a platform for the penetration of Ukrainian goods into the market of the Eurasian Economic Union. Although Ukraine is important for Belarus to gain access to the EU market, this is facilitated by the Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine

⁵¹ *Trade and Economic Relations...*, *op. cit.*

⁵² Yaugeni Preiherman, Hennadiy Maksak, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁵³ Dmytro Sydorov, Yaroslav Samolyuk, *Elektroenerhiya iz-za kordonu: yak Ukrayina pershi pivroku importuye elektroenerhiyu* [Electricity from abroad: how Ukraine imports electricity for the first six months], 29 sichnya 2020, <https://expro.com.ua/statti/energiya-z-za-kordonu-yak-ukrana-persh-pvroku-mportu-elektroenergyu> (Accessed on 17.08.2021).

⁵⁴ *Trade and economic cooperation. Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Belarus*, <https://belarus.mfa.gov.ua/spivrobotnictvo/ekonomichne-spivrobotnictvo> (Accessed on 15.10.2021).

⁵⁵ Olena Betliy, Yauheni Preiherman, *op. cit.*, p. 27-28.

and the EU, which entered into force on January 1, 2016.

The successful forms of trade and economic cooperation between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus are production cooperation and the use of joint ventures, which allow the transition from simple sale of goods to the joint production of high value-added products. Such a way of dealing opens new prospects for the further development of bilateral economic cooperation.⁵⁶ Therefore, Ukraine has a well-developed distribution staff of Belarusian exporters from more than a hundred companies. Such flagships of the Belarusian economy as BelAZ, MTZ, MAZ and Atlant have an extensive network of dealer structures in the regions. There are 314 enterprises with Ukrainian capital in Belarus, including 115 joint ventures and 199 foreign organizations. Currently, there are thirteen assembly plants of Belarusian equipment in Ukraine.⁵⁷

Currently, there are contradictions between Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus, due to the synthetic barriers making that generate different trade and economic activities, which, however, are not radical trade restrictions, but would be particularly unfavourable for both parties. At the very end, they fit into the general context of ambiguous bilateral relations between Kyiv and Minsk. With the onset of the political crisis in Belarus, Ukraine sees Russia's support for the Lukashenko regime as an increased threat to its security.⁵⁸ Recent events such as migration crisis, accumulation of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border⁵⁹, threats of Minsk to deploy new Russian S-400⁶⁰ air defence systems and intervene in the conflict on Russia's side in case of aggravation of the situation in Donbas (or somewhere on the Ukrainian-Russian border) indicate a potential hazard.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Stepan Vasylyshyn, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

⁵⁷ *Trade and economic cooperation, op. cit.*

⁵⁸ Piotr Żochowski, Tadeusz Iwański, *Ukraine-Belarus: a spiralling crisis*, June 14, 2021, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2021-06-14/ukraine-belarus-a-spiralling-crisis> (Accessed on 19.08.2021).

⁵⁹ Alexander Smith, *Putin faces pressure over Belarus border crisis and Ukraine troop buildup*, November 16, 2021, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/putin-faces-pressure-belarus-border-crisis-ukraine-troop-build-rcna5674> (Accessed on 19.11.2021).

⁶⁰ Lisa Yasko, *Belarus dictator poses growing threat to Ukraine*, September 14, 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/belarus-dictator-poses-growing-threat-to-ukraine> (Accessed on 10.10.2021).

⁶¹ Bohdan Nahaylo, *Escalating Belarus border crisis could pose a security threat to Ukraine*, November 15, 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/escalating-belarus-border-crisis-could-pose-a-security-threat-to-ukraine> (Accessed on 19.11.2021).

Thus, while Ukrainian-Belarusian economic collaboration continues in the context of Belarus' domestic political crises, the general situation of interstate relations affects the tone of bilateral cooperation.

ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN BELARUS AND RUSSIA

Relations between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation stood out as a priority of the republic's foreign policy, one of the basic integration tasks within the Russian Federation, and also as another regional integration initiative of modern Belarus.

According to Belarusian analysts, both integration and disintegration processes are currently taking place in bilateral relations.⁶² The divergence of interests between Minsk and Moscow was largely due to Belarus' refusal to assist the Kremlin in the international arena. Moscow saw the intensification of Minsk's Western foreign policy as a potential threat to Russia's interests that could undermine Russia's influence in Belarus.⁶³

It is worth noting that the favourable geographical location of Belarus in the centre of Europe makes it attractive to the Russian Federation in military, transit, and economic terms. According to Russian researcher Aleksey Shurubovich, the expanding cooperation is in Russia's primarily strategic geopolitical and geo-economics interest, whereas economic interest is first for Belarus.⁶⁴

British⁶⁵ and Polish⁶⁶ scholars emphasize the leading role of the geopolitical importance of Belarus as a transit corridor between Poland and Russia. Belarusian researcher Anastasiia Vasilchenko emphasizes the geo-economics aspect of Belarus as a crossroads of global business clusters for the European Union, Russia, and Asia-Pacific (with its promising development of a new Silk Road).⁶⁷ Scientist Yuri Shevtsov also notes a two-Belarusian-Russian pragmatic basis,⁶⁸ while expert

⁶² Grigoriy Astapenya, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁶³ Arseny Sivitski, Yuriy Tsarik, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁶⁴ Aleksey Shurubovich, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶⁵ Anthony J. Evans, Terence Tse, *op. cit.*, p. 222.

⁶⁶ Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁶⁷ Anastasiia Vasylichenko, *Transit potential of Republic of Belarus: current state and development prospects*, in "SHS Web of Conferences", No. 67, 2019, https://www.shs-conferences.org/articles/shsconf/pdf/2019/08/shsconf_NTI-UkrSURT2019_02011.pdf (Accessed on 13.04.2021).

⁶⁸ Yuriy Shevtsov, *op. cit.*, p. 213-214.

Mathieu Boulègue remarks that Russia's strategy has always been to control Belarus rather than integrate it as a partner, by exploiting its comparative advantages.⁶⁹

The Russian Federation is a leading foreign trade and investment partner of Belarus. It traditionally accounts for about half of all Belarusian foreign trade. In particular, in 2016, it accounted for 51.2 per cent of the republic's foreign trade turnover, including 46.2 per cent of exports and 55.4 per cent of imports.⁷⁰ In 2020, the Russian share was 47.9 per cent, including exports – 45.2 per cent, and imports – 50.2 per cent.⁷¹ Belarus is one of Russia's "top five" trading partners. In 2016, Belarus ranked fourth among Russia's foreign trade partners (after China, Germany and the Netherlands). In particular, it accounted for about 5.4 per cent of Russia's total foreign trade.⁷² In 2020, Belarus became the third-largest trading partner of Russia (after China and Germany).

During 2014–2020, the bilateral Belarusian-Russian trade turnover displayed the following dynamics: in 2014 – \$37.3 billion, in 2015 – \$27.5, in 2016 – \$26.1, in 2017 – \$32.4, in 2018 – \$35.6, in 2019 – \$35.5⁷³, in 2020 – \$29.5 billion.⁷⁴ The factors and options that contributed to the reduction of foreign trade between Belarus and Russia in 2020 include the reduction of energy supplies to Belarus in the first half of 2020 due to lower hydrocarbon prices and the impact of the sanitary and epidemiological situation, as well as border closure due to the pandemic.

A characteristic feature of the trade activities of Belarus and Russia is the presence of the first negative balance of trade in goods: in 2014 – 7.0, in 2015 – 6.7, in 2016 – 4.3, in 2017 – 6.7, in 2018 – 9.6, in 2019 – 8.4, in 2020 – 3.3 (\$ billion). These dynamics are caused by Russia's dominance in energy exports (they account for about 50 per cent). Accordingly, the decrease in energy supplies causes a reduction in Belarus' negative balance.

Because the Republic of Belarus has a partially open economy, the share of exports in GDP has fluctuated between 50-80 per cent for many years.⁷⁵ According

⁶⁹ Mathieu Boulègue, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁷⁰ Aleksey Shurubovich, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁷¹ *Belarus' i sotrudnichestvo s Rossiyey v ekonomicheskoy sfere* [Belarus and cooperation with Russia in the economic sphere] <https://mfa.gov.by/bilateral/russia/regions/economy/>

⁷² Aleksey Shurubovich, *op. cit.*, p. 7-8.

⁷³ *Belarus' v tsifrakh. Statisticheskiy spravochnik* [Belarus in numbers. Statistical handbook], Minsk, 2020, p. 60-65.

⁷⁴ *Belarus' i sotrudnichestvo s Rossiyey...*

⁷⁵ Aliaksei Bykau, Stanislau Vysotski, *op. cit.*, p. 236; N. Abramchuk (Ed.), *Ekonomicheskoye razvitiye*, T. 3, p. 173.

to this indicator, Belarus is ahead of many European countries.⁷⁶ A significant part of Belarusian exports is still sold in the Russian Federation, which occupies a leading position in mechanical engineering and food wastes. At the same time, in recent years, Belarusian exports to Russia have shown a tendency to increase food products and reduce the number of machinery and vehicles.

While exports of Belarusian services to Russia in 2014 amounted to \$2.2 billion, imports totalled \$1.4 billion and \$2.4 billion in 2020. The United States imports services from Russia totalled \$1.4 billion. It is worth noting that the services sector accounts for the majority of Belarus' GDP and is growing.⁷⁷ Belarus places great importance on exporting computer services, which leads to significant economic growth.⁷⁸ The central IT centre of the country, High Technology Park, produces 49.1 per cent of software exports to European countries, 44 per cent in the US and Canada, and only 4.1 per cent in Russia and other CIS countries.⁷⁹

An important component of bilateral cooperation is investment cooperation. Russia is the largest investor in Belarus, both in terms of total investment and in terms of local investment and net investment on a net basis. In particular, the volume of foreign investment from Russia was \$6.2 billion in 2014, while the USA foreign investment was \$4.1 billion in 2018 and \$4.5 billion in 2019.⁸⁰ According to Belstat (Belorussian Statistics Centre), the volume of investments from Russia to Belarus in 2020 amounted to \$3.6 billion and decreased by 20.4 per cent in comparison to 2019. The United Kingdom ranks second only to Russia in terms of investment in Belarus and invested \$1.8 billion in 2019, while Russia contributed \$4.5 billion.⁸¹ The volume of investments from Belarus to Russia in 2020 reached \$3.1 billion, a 12.3 per cent reduction from 2019. Belarus' main investment in Russia is debt instruments (3.0 billion).⁸²

Significant investment returns include the acquisition of *Beltransgaz* shares

⁷⁶ Vladimir Shimov, Aliaksei Bykau, Tatyana Khavalko, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

⁷⁷ Vyacheslav Shutsilin, Andrey Filiptsov, Yuliya Vashkevich, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁷⁸ Uladzimir Parkhimenka, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁷⁹ *IT v Belarusi* [IT in Belarus], <https://www.belarus.by/ru/business/doing-business/it-belarus> (Accessed on 12.05.2021).

⁸⁰ *Belarus' v tsifrah ...*, p. 66.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁸² Yuriy Zolotarev, *Torgovyi oborot – 2020: pyat'desyat na pyat'desyat. Pochti polovina vneshetorgovogo oborota prikhoditsya na Rossiyu* [Trade turnover – 2020: fifty to fifty. Almost half of foreign trade turnover falls on Russia], Mart 16, <https://neg.by/novosti/otkrytyj-torgovyj-oborot---2020-50-na-50> (Accessed on 14.05.2021).

by Russia's Gazprom in 2007 and 2011.⁸³ A major investment of Belarusian business in Russia is the purchase in 2016 by an investor from Belarus of 20 per cent of *Uralkaliy* shares. According to Polish researcher Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, Russia is demanding broader steps to privatize Belarusian companies. Alexander Lukashenko tries to avoid these requirements, fearing dominance in the corporate sector and losing his ability to run the economy.⁸⁴

A large-scale investment project with Russian participation was the construction of the Belarusian NPP with a capacity of 2.4 GW in Ostrovets, Grodno region. Its first power unit has been operational since November 7, 2020. The second will open in 2022, with Russia paying a cost of ten billion dollars.

Belarusian investments in Russia are much lower than Russian investments in Belarus. In general, the dynamics of mutual investments and mutual trade between Belarus and Russia coincide, indicating a relationship between these areas of cooperation.⁸⁵ It is interesting to note that, since 2015, Belarus has transformed into a hub for the re-export to Russia of European and Western products subject to Kremlin countersanctions.⁸⁶

The intensification of Belarusian-Chinese cooperation since 2014 to diversify Belarus' foreign policy⁸⁷ and foreign economic relations, as well as the goal to reduce Belarus' dependence on Russian gas and oil, has influenced the Belarusian-Russian dialogue.⁸⁸ Economic cooperation between Ukraine and Belarus might be claimed to serve these goals as well.

For many years, close relations with Russia have allowed for the purchase of Russian energy at a discount. Also, additional financial and economic assistance has been provided to Belarus, which has aided the country's economic development. According to Belarusian researcher Kateryna Bornukova, based on IMF data, Russian subsidies in good years reached 10 per cent of Belarus' total GDP.⁸⁹ They took various forms including oil and gas subsidies, financial loans,

⁸³ Alexei Danilchenko, Elena Bertosh, Pavel Artsemyeu, Roman Osipov, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

⁸⁴ Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁸⁵ Aleksey Shurubovich, *op. cit.*, p. 23, 26.

⁸⁶ Mathieu Boulègue, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁸⁷ Yuriy Tsarik, Arseny Sivitski, Nikita Savkov, *Belarus' – Kitay: dostizheniya, problemy i perspektivy strategicheskogo partnerstva* [Belarus – China: Achievements, Problems and Prospects for Strategic Partnership], Minsk, 2020, p. 3.

⁸⁸ Zhigao Liu, Michael Dunford, Weidong Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

⁸⁹ Katerina Bornukova, *Rossiia nam pomozhet? Ob ekonomicheskoy pomoshchi i interesakh nashego glavnogo partnera* [Would Russia help us? On economic aid and the interests of our main partner], Oktyabr' 21, 2020, <https://people.onliner.by/opinions/>

Russia's debt relief for Belarus, duty-free exports of Belarusian products to the Russian market, which allowed Belarusian companies to strengthen, launch modernization processes, and increase the competitiveness of Belarusian products. In addition, the raw materials that Belarus received from Russia at reduced prices were exported to foreign markets as refined products.

Russia's economic preferences for Belarus have been part of an integration dialogue between states, each side pursuing its own goals. Belarusian political scientist Andrei Egorov notes that Russia leads by maintaining control over the post-Soviet space, and Belarus was selling integration for immediate economic benefits.⁹⁰ Austrian expert Chloë Bruce remarks that Russia's energy subsidies have helped raise living standards in Belarus by contributing to the country's economic level⁹¹, while other researchers believe that economic growth in Belarus depends on world commodity prices and demand in the Russian market factors⁹². Although Russian Federation support for Belarus has declined significantly in recent years, the country's dependence on Russia remains high.

Oil and gas tensions over prices, tariffs, and terms of Russian supplies to Belarus have repeatedly hampered the integration process between the two nations over the years, resulting in deteriorating relations. In particular, in 2016 – early 2017 there was an aggravation of Belarusian-Russian relations in the energy sector, as well as in 2018 due to Russia's tax manoeuvre, which led to higher oil prices for Belarus and lowered export duties on petroleum products, which are the main source of a budget surplus and are aimed at repaying external debt.⁹³ The Belarusian government has said that the tax manoeuvre will cost \$300 million in 2019, rising to around \$2 billion in 2024, equivalent to 4 per cent of GDP.⁹⁴ As a result, oil and gas prices for Belarus are gradually approaching world prices. Despite repeated claims that, as a member of the Union State, it has the right to buy

2020/10/21/rossiya-nam-pomozhet (Accessed on 11.11.2020).

⁹⁰ Arina Polzik, *25 let integratsii. Chto Belarus' poluchayet i teryayet ot sblizheniya s Rossiyey* [25 years of integration. What Belarus gains and loses in case of rapprochement with Russia], *Sentyabr'* 9, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/ru/25-let-integratsii-cto-belarus-poluchaet-i-terjaet-ot-sblizhenija-s-rossiej/a-59132841> (Accessed on 18.10.2021).

⁹¹ Chloë Bruce, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁹² Vladimir Shimov, Alexei Bykau, Tatyana Khvalko, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

⁹³ *Lukashenko obvinil RF v ispol'zovanii nalogovogo manevra dlya davleniya na Belorussiyu* [Lukashenko accused Russia of using tax maneuver to put pressure on Belarus], Jan. 24, 2020, <https://www.interfax.ru/business/692552> (Accessed on 5.02.2021).

⁹⁴ *The prospect of Union between Russia and Belarus*, "Strategic Comments", 2019, Vol. 25, No. 2, p. IV-VI, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2019.1601444> (Accessed on 7.12.2020).

Russian gas at domestic prices, Belarus has failed to do so.⁹⁵ In particular, the price of Russian gas for Belarus in 2022 will remain at the last year's level (\$128.5 per thousand cubic meters) despite Belarusian officials insisting on the price as for the Smolensk region (\$67).⁹⁶ However, even the current price is the cheapest when compared to other countries that buy Russian gas.

In addition, barriers and restrictions on imports of goods and services from a partner country occur in bilateral trade and economic activities. Withdrawals are particularly common within the Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Belarus; in 2016, there were more than 600 withdrawals.⁹⁷ Russia has launched import substitution programs, which will further reduce imports to the Russian market, including Belarus. There are concerns about the divergence of economic systems between the two countries, primarily due to the implementation of the Belarusian economic model, which is based on the dominant role of the state in the economy.⁹⁸ According to Nelly Beckus, Lukashenko's economic model has evolved into a hybrid system based on large state-owned industrial enterprises that have learned how to work in a liberalised economy.⁹⁹ Russia supports the running of the Belarusian economic model, which in turn supports the stability of the political system.¹⁰⁰

It should be noted that the overall economic situation in each of the states affects the relations between Belarus and Russia. Because of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, Western countries imposed economic sanctions on Russia, which negatively affected bilateral relations. At the same time, Minsk's neutral position in the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict set against the context of normalisation of relations with the West and strengthening of the strategic partnership with China caused concern in Moscow and added conflict to the Belarusian-Russian dialogue.

In this regard, Belarusian political scientist Arseny Sivitski emphasizes that the tension in Belarusian-Russian relations, which had been growing in recent years, hit a new high in December 2019 and escalated into open conflict. After all, the Kremlin has openly stated its integration ambitions for Belarus, linking the

⁹⁵ Mathieu Boulègue, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁹⁶ *Tsena gaza dlya Belarusi na 2022 g. sokhranitsya na prezhnem urovne – Putin* [Gas price for Belarus in 2022 will remain at the same level – Putin says], Sentyabr' 9, 2021, <https://nangs.org/news/markets/gas/tsena-gaza-dlya-belarusi-na-2022g-sokhranitsya-na-prezhnem-urovne-putin> (Accessed on 19.10.2021).

⁹⁷ Grigoriy Astapenya, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁹⁸ Aleksey Shurubovich, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁹⁹ Nelly Bekus, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

¹⁰⁰ Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

issue of discounts on energy (oil and gas) with the further deepening of integration between Russia and Belarus within the *Union State*.¹⁰¹ The conditions imposed by Russia regarding the establishment of a joint currency and supranational bodies, as part of deeper integration, were unacceptable for Belarus.

Following the presidential election on August 9, 2020, the West and Ukraine did not recognize the legitimacy of Alexander Lukashenko's new presidential term and imposed sanctions against official Minsk. It led to a closer rapprochement between Belarus and Russia. The Kremlin's support for the Belarusian regime and the international isolation of Belarus have contributed to the signing of Belarusian-Russian integration agreements, which have not been concluded in recent years.

On November 4, 2021, at a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State, a decree *On the main directions of implementation provisions of the Treaty implementation on the Establishment of the Union State for 2021–2023* was signed.¹⁰² The package of 28 union programs provides for the integration of monetary systems, general principles of collecting indirect taxes, common approaches to pensions and social security, counter-terrorism, mutual access to public procurement and public procurement, harmonisation of payment systems and monetary policy, and gas, etc.¹⁰³ Therefore, with the signing of allied integration programs and the increase of Russia's military presence in Belarus, Minsk is increasingly falling under the Kremlin's economic and military control.

Thus, bilateral economic relations between Belarus and the Russian Federation are collaboration rather than equality. On the one hand, they remain highly active, as evidenced by the volume of trade and investment, production and scientific and technical cooperation, interregional cooperation and more. On the other hand, Belarus depends on Russian energy resources as well as market, financial and economic assistance, which serve as instruments of pressure on the partner. The multi-vector policy pursued by Belarus from 2014 to the summer of 2020 allowed diversifying foreign economic activity, searching for new markets, alternative energy supplies, etc. The challenges that the two countries face today

¹⁰¹ Arseny Sivitski, *Belarus': Ul'timatum Kremlya* [Belarus: The Ultimatum Of The Kremlin], <http://prismua.org/pdf> (Accessed on 13.02.2021).

¹⁰² Sergey Romashenko, *Moskva i Minsk utverdili 28 soyuznykh programm* [Moscow and Minsk approved 28 union programs], Noyabr' 4, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/ru/glavy-rossii-i-belarusi-utverdili-28-sojuznyh-programm/a-59726060> (Accessed on 15.11.2021).

¹⁰³ Andriy Stets', *Lukashenko i Putin pidpysaly "intehratsiynyy dekret"* [Lukashenko and Putin sign "integration decree"], Lystopad, 4, 2021, https://zaxid.net/lukashenko_i_putin_pidpisali_integratsiyniy_dekret_n1529673 (Accessed on 11.11.2021).

compel them to work together more closely. As a consequence, the Belarusian-Russian integration example is currently being applied.

CONCLUSIONS

From the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014 to the Belarusian domestic political crisis in the summer of 2020, the foreign policy of the Republic of Belarus has changed. Minsk acted as a mediator in the talks on resolving the situation in Donbas. Belarus' position as a regional security provider has contributed to the reset of relations with the EU and the United States, resulting in the lifting of Western sanctions and the intensification of interstate relations. At the same time, such a policy of Minsk resulted in Russian pressure; in the economic dimension between the states, there were oil and gas disputes, trade restrictions and coercion to deeper integration. In turn, Minsk's multi-vector nature enabled it to find a balance between geopolitical players in the region, to become a guarantor of security on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, and to develop a mutually beneficial economic partnership.

Ukraine and Belarus are foreign trade partners worth billions of dollars. Long-term economic cooperation between the states is based on mutually beneficial and pragmatic principles. Both countries understand the importance of bilateral trade and economic ties. However, the political crisis in Belarus has strained relations with neighbours. As a result, while political relations were severed, trade and economic ties persisted. Ukraine imports several critical Belarusian goods, including petroleum products, bitumen, fertilizers and electricity. For Belarus, the Ukrainian market is a premium, as evidenced by trade volumes, a positive trade balance, investment and cooperation. Despite dynamic, albeit cautious, trade cooperation, today's Ukrainian-Belarusian border, which is more than 1,000 km long, is not as secure as it has been before the summer of 2020. Belarus is an ally of the Russian Federation, so the use of Belarusian territory as a theatre of hostilities against Ukraine cannot be taken into account by Kyiv. Issues such as Belarus' official recognition of Crimea as Russian or the creation of Russian military bases in Belarus, as well as the latter's intervention in the conflict on the side of Russia if the situation in Ukraine worsens, are painfully and deeply perceived.

By joining the EU's sanctions against the Belarusian regime, Ukraine has not yet supported the sectoral economic sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom over imports of goods critical

to the Ukrainian economy. However, the basic line of modern Ukrainian-Belarusian relations encourages Ukraine to consider various options for bilateral cooperation. There must be new opportunities for diversification and replacement of Belarusian goods in the Ukrainian territory. Further Ukrainian-Belarusian relations will depend on resolving the political crisis in Belarus. Two points should be highlighted since they will have a further impact on bilateral economic cooperation: the evolution of the Ukrainian economy towards integration into the European Economic Area and the convergence of Belarusian and Russian economies in the context of closer integration between the two countries.

Relations between Belarus and Russia have become strategic. Russia is the largest market for the Belarusian economy, a source of cheap energy resources, and provides financial support to Belarus. At the same time, the countries have different economic potentials, which reflect in the volume of bilateral trade, the presence of a traditionally negative trade balance for Belarus, less Belarusian investment activity in the Russian economic landscape, and others. Despite the differences, the two countries are members of the Joint integration associations in the post-Soviet space, the main of which is the Union State of Belarus and Russia. In this context, their goals, objectives, and vectors of development are interrelated. For Russia, control over Belarus is important given strategic factors. Integration ties with Belarus add to Russia's international status as an influential regional player.

The internal political crisis in Belarus has led to its international isolation and contributed to closer Belarusian-Russian rapprochement. With the signing of union programs in 2021, integration processes, particularly in the field of the economy, have reached a new level and will most likely be strengthened in the future.

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‘BEVERAGES’ VERSUS ‘FLAGS’: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DISPUTES OVER HANS ISLAND AND THE IMIA/KARDAK ISLETS THROUGH CONFLICT THEORY

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Abstract: Referring to the constructive and destructive pillars of the conflict theory, the article aims to demonstrate that, despite the apparent similarities between the two land claim disputes, they are fundamentally different. In this regard, after analyzing the elements that define both conflicts, the paper presents the Hans Island dispute as a constructive antagonism and the Imia / Kardak Islets crisis as a destructive one. Although the replacement of symbolic drinks and flags characterizes both conflicts, the first case indicates the importance of geo-economic aspects, while the second clearly illustrates geopolitical competition. The authors see the Hans Island dispute as a means of maintaining the status quo and the Imia / Kardak Islands as a way of changing the state of affairs. By doing so, the paper tries to present how the circumstances in which the two conflicts evolved proved to be favourable or constructive in one case and unfavourable, respectively destructive in the other.

Keywords: Hans Island, Imia/Kardak Islets, Conflict theory, Constructive conflict, Destructive conflict.

Rezumat: „Băuturi” versus „steaguri”: o analiză comparativă a disputelor asupra insulelor Hans și Imia/Kardak din perspectiva teoriei conflictului. Referindu-se la pilonii constructivi și distructivi ai teoriei conflictului, articolul își propune să demonstreze că, în ciuda aparențelor asemănări între cele două dispute revendicative de natură teritorială, acestea sunt fundamental diferite. Astfel, după analizarea elementelor care definesc ambele conflicte, lucrarea prezintă disputa legată de Insula Hans ca un antagonism constructiv, iar criza insulelor Imia / Kardak ca o disensiune distructivă. Deși utilizarea simbolică a „băuturilor” și „steagurilor” caracterizează ambele conflicte, primul

caz indică importanța aspectelor geo-economice, în timp ce al doilea ilustrează clar o competiție geopolitică. Autorul vede în disputa asupra insulei Hans un mijloc de menținere a status quo-ului, iar în cea asupra insulelor Imia / Kardak o modalitate de schimbare a stării de fapt. Procedând astfel, lucrarea încearcă să prezinte cum circumstanțele în care au evoluat cele două conflicte s-au dovedit într-un caz favorabile sau constructive, iar în celălalt nefavorabile, respectiv distructive.

INTRODUCTION

Hans Island has been the only land claim dispute between Canada and Denmark for decades. Even though it was a “frozen dispute” before the ‘Arctic Age’,¹ the ongoing ambiguity of the island’s sovereignty status has triggered both parties to claim ownership over the tiny, uninhabited island since 1973. Its potential oil and gas deposits and location at what may become a transition point along emerging polar trading routes in the climate change era have also enticed the two countries to pursue their sovereignty claims. To mark their claims, both Canada and Denmark have left bottles of famous national beverages – whiskey and schnapps, respectively – on the island. The struggle between the two countries has even been a subject of interest and interpretation in the media. Nevertheless, the conflict has not resulted in a classical territorial dispute. On the contrary, the two parties of the low-level conflict have indicated their desire to find a common solution thanks to the island’s increasing geoeconomic value.

Unlike the Hans Island situation, the scramble for the Imia/Kardak Islets has been an example of a classical territorial dispute. It could even be identified as an international crisis because of the involvement of third parties in the conflict. As the two principal parties of the conflict, Greece and Turkey have come to the brink of war over the issue since the islets have been a key object of the geopolitical competition the two countries are pursuing in the Aegean Sea. Thus, even though there have been similarities between the Hans Island dispute and the Imia/Kardak crisis in terms of the parties involved, the objectives, and the means in the conflicts, each has its own, quite distinct characteristics. In terms of the elements of conflict, there are particularly notable differences in the issues, orientations, and environments of the disputes.

¹ This popular term regarding the Arctic was used by Oran R. Young in 1986 to point the dramatic transformation of the Arctic and to reveal that the world was entering the age of the Arctic. See Oran R. Young, *The Age of the Arctic*, in “Foreign Policy”, 1986, No. 61, p. 160, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148707>

This paper attempts to clarify in which circumstances the disputes over Hans Island and the Imia/Kardak Islets could be differentiated. It aims to indicate that though there are many similarities between two land claim disputes, they are distinctive in terms of particular elements of conflict theory. Consequently, pulling from conflict theory, this paper asserts that whereas the Hans Island dispute is a *constructive conflict*, the Imia/Kardak crisis is a *destructive conflict*. To begin, I will present and analyze a literature review regarding conflict theory. Its actors, levels, components, and elements will be laid out to elucidate how they are essential for making a comparative analysis of the disputes over Hans Island and the Imia/Kardak Islets. Second, I will enumerate the reasons for the beginnings of both disputes in their respective historical contexts. Lastly, I will discuss the similarities and differences between both cases in light of the aforementioned elements of conflict theory. The paper envisages filling a gap that exists in the current literature on the topic by providing a comparative analysis of the disputed islands that concludes that they refer to two distinct pillars of conflict theory.

CONCEPTUAL MAPPING

The term *conflict* is defined as a social situation in which at least two actors struggle to obtain a limited collection of scarce resources at the same time.² Both the actions and the behaviors of the particular actors can be included in conflict analysis.³ Defining conflict as a situation in which parties pursue their perceived conflicting goals by undermining their opponent's (or opponents') goal-seeking credentials, Sandole proposes that the conflict process can be subdivided into distinct phases: initiation, escalation, maintenance, settlement, and transformation.⁴ Accordingly, it happens between goals pursued by actors.⁵ Deutsch characterizes actors of conflict as individuals, groups, or organizations.⁶ Vitaly important is that

² Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*, London, Sage Publications, 2002, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴ Dennis J. D. Sandole, *Paradigms, Theories, and Metaphors in Conflict and Conflict Resolution: Coherence or Confusion?*, in D. J. D. Sandole, H. van der Merwe (Eds.), *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993, p. 6.

⁵ Johan Galtung, *Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution: The Need for Transdisciplinarity*, in "Transcultural Psychiatry", 2010, Vol 47, No. 1, p. 21.

⁶ Morton Deutsch, *Cooperation and Conflict: A Personal Perspective on the History of the Social Psychological Study of Conflict Resolution*, in M. A. West, D. Tjosvold, K. G. Smith

conflict requires a comprehensive understanding “at the levels of interpersonal interaction, within countries, between nations and between whole regions or civilizations which conceptualized as micro, meso, macro, and mega,” respectively.⁷ Within this paper, the macro-level or interstate conflict is most suitable and thus applied.

In addition to the parties involved, there are three significant components of conflict theory, each of which has phases during which conflict may occur. Galtung depicts this scheme as a triangle whose three corners are labeled “attitudes,” “behavior,” and “the context of conflict,” respectively.⁸ It is at the corner of behavior that destructive or constructive action emerges. It is worth noting here that conflict behavior and changing positions are interrelated. As a consequence of this relatedness, the conflict process is directed by two reactions: whereas destructive action leads to incompatibility and conflict formation, constructive action catalyzes the formation of shared institutions and compatibility.⁹

Conflict theory examines the analogy between person-to-person conflicts and state-to-state relations by aiming to provide a general understanding.¹⁰ In the light of this goal, it is crucial to define exactly how and when conflict occurs. Deutsch argues that conflict occurs once incompatible activities exist.¹¹ It may emanate from opposing interests, goals, values, or beliefs between its actors.¹² These sources enable participants to decide on what direction – constructive or destructive – they will take. It is this constructive or destructive orientation that determines the outcome of the conflict.¹³

Nearly all conflicts comprise both cooperative and competitive elements.¹⁴ Cooperative elements include effective communication, friendliness, coordination on some common efforts, similarity in beliefs and values, reciprocal recognition of

(Eds.), *The Essentials of Teamworking: International Perspectives*, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2005.

⁷ Johan Galtung, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁸ Idem, *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization*, London, Sage, 1996.

⁹ Peter Wallensteen, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹¹ Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973.

¹² Morton Deutsch, *Cooperation and Conflict...*, p. 2.

¹³ Morton Deutsch, *Cooperation and Competition*, in M. Deutsch, P. T. Coleman, E. C. Marcus (eds), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2nd ed., 2006, p. 23.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

parties, willingness to enhance the other's power, and providing common solutions for mutual problems defined as conflicting interests, whereas competitive elements include the opposite.¹⁵ Thus, should the conflicting parties opt for cooperative elements, they will all win. Otherwise, in competitive circumstances, they will all face a zero-sum game.

While studying conflicts in hopes of proposing solutions to them, conflict analysts and potential third parties find it necessary to first understand who the parties are and what the issues, objectives, means, orientations, and environments are.¹⁶ Within this study, the presentation and analysis of the similarities and differences between the disputes over Hans Island and the Imia/Kardak Islets will be structured following these lines.

ANALOGOUS, YET QUITE DIFFERENT, DISPUTES

Many territorial disputes currently exist and are monitored across the world. While some disputes are solved through the involved parties coming to a common agreement, others lead to confrontational behaviors and even war. Yet, war is often the least desirable choice for the involved parties. Instead, the optimal choice is to convince the other parties to reach a common solution. The two disputed areas discussed in this paper have analogous components and are often understood as similar territorial disputes at first glance, although they are quite different. But before discussing their differences, I will first outline the contexts of both disputes.

The Hans Island dispute is the sole land-based territorial dispute in the Arctic region.¹⁷ For this reason, it is of vital regional importance. The uninhabited island is located midway between Ellesmere Island and northwest Greenland.¹⁸ Disagreement over the island began¹⁹ with the delimitation of maritime boundaries

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁶ Dennis J. D. Sandole, *A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution: A Three Pillar Approach*, in "Peace and Conflict Studies", Vol. 5, 1998, No. 2, Article 4.

¹⁷ Michael Byers, *Creative Thinking on Sovereignty*, in "Policy Options", 2014, Vol. 35, March 3, in <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/opening-eyes/creative-thinking-on-sovereignty/> (Accessed on 01.04.2021).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Michael R. Mitchell, *Arctic Sovereignty: Using the Hans Island Dispute as a Diplomatic Laboratory*, in "Conflict Analysis", April 1, 2014, in <https://doi.org/10.13140/2.1.1027.0089> (Accessed on 10.08.2021), See *Delimitation Treaty*, December 17, 1973, in <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20950/volume-950-I-13550-English.pdf> (Accessed on 02.04.2021)

between Canada and Denmark in 1973. The ownership of Hans Island has remained unclear since then. For decades, Hans Island has been legally claimed by both parties. Whereas it was a frozen dispute, recently it has come to the fore since it is believed that there may be potential oil and gas deposits underneath the island and that Arctic shipping routes will soon be redirected to go past it.²⁰

More precisely, the dispute reentered mainstream political discourse in 1984 when Canadian troops visited the island and left a flag and a symbolic bottle of Canadian whiskey. In response, Denmark's minister Tom Hoyem visited the island and replaced the whiskey bottle with a bottle of Danish schnapps. In addition, both countries have sent in their military troops to strengthen their presence on the island, since claiming of title requires occupation of territory.²¹ Yet, no armed clash has occurred so far. Conversely, since 2005, both parties have realized that the best way to solve the dispute would be to work in a coordinated manner.²² To this end, Canada and Denmark agreed to establish a joint task force to solve the dispute in 2018.²³

Similarly, there has been a territorial dispute over the Imia/Kardak Islets since the 1990s. The dispute broke out when the Turkish freighter *Figen Akat* radioed for help and a Greek tug responded in return for the salvage fees, only for the captain of the freighter to deny its help, claiming that he was aground on *Turkish* territory and that *Turkish* tugs were coming to help him.²⁴ The issue's flame was predominantly fanned by the provocative media interpretations that followed within both countries. Since the incident, opposing flag-planting cases by military troops have taken place. As there is ambiguity regarding whom the islets

²⁰ Godfrey Baldacchino, *Solution Protocols to Festering Island Disputes*, Routledge, 2017.

²¹ Michael Byers, *International Law and the Arctic: Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 10.

²² Christopher Stevenson, *Hans Off! The Struggle for Hans Island and the Potential Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution*, in "Boston College International & Comparative Law Review", 2007, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 263.

²³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, *Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark (with Greenland) Announce the Establishment of a Joint Task Force on Boundary Issues*, May 23, 2018, in <https://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsID=E624A67D-1317-4AC6-8F28-30F5234E9759> (Accessed on 04.04.2021); Kevin McGwin, *Denmark, Canada agree to settle the Hans Island dispute*, May 24, 2018, in <https://www.arctictoday.com/denmark-canada-agree-come-agreement-disputed-island/> (Accessed on 07.04.2021).

²⁴ Michael R. Hickok, *Falling Toward War in the Aegean. A Case Study of the Imia/Kardak Affair*, in http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2001_sensemaking_workshop/pdf/war_in_the_aegean.pdf (Accessed on 10.04.2021).

formally belong, both parties have claimed them. Greece has claimed that Imia/Kardak is part of the Dodecanese, over which it has sovereignty according to the Lausanne Treaty, the Italo-Turkish Agreements, and the Paris Peace Treaty²⁵. On the other hand, Turkey's sovereignty claims are based on the fact that sovereignty over these specific uninhabited islets is not explicitly mentioned within these very treaties.²⁶

Triggered by destructive actions, the regional crisis grew into an international crisis.²⁷ One of the reasons for the increasing tension is that the islets were of great strategic importance for both parties, located around four miles off the coast of Turkey and Greek territory.²⁸ Another reason for which the Imia/Kardak crisis is of vital importance is that it marks the first time that Turkey has questioned the legal status of some of the islands in the Aegean Sea.²⁹ And as a consequence of the crisis, the parties involved in the conflict have come to the brink of war. What is important here is that both Greece and Turkey have taken such militant stances over the issue because of their symbolic role in the sovereignty struggle between the two countries regarding their conflicting agendas for delineating their respective continental shelves, territorial seas, and air space in the Aegean Sea.³⁰ The crisis could be interpreted as a tiny – but urgent – iteration of the classical geopolitical competition between Greece and Turkey. For instance, the media and politicians of both sides refer to the islets as “Turkish Soil” or “Greek Soil,” demonstrating how symbolically powerful islets are.³¹ The nature of the conflict is one of changing the

²⁵ Murat Bayar, Andreas Kotelis, *Democratic Peace or Hegemonic Stability? The Imia/Kardak Case*, in “Turkish Studies”, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 256.

²⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece, *Turkish Claims*, in <https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims.html> (Accessed on 12.04.2021), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, *The Kardak Dispute*, in <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-kardak-dispute.en.mfa> (Accessed on 12.04.2021).

²⁷ Gülden S. Ayman, *The Kardak (Imia) Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations*, in “Hellenic Studies”, 2001, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 61.

²⁸ Emily A. Georgiades, *The Imia Islets: A Beginning to the Maritime Delimitation of the Aegean Sea Dispute*, in “Ocean and Coastal Law”, 2011, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 125.

²⁹ Theodore Koukis, Ilan Kelman, Emel N. Ganapati, *Greece-Turkey Disaster Diplomacy from Disaster Risk Reduction*, in “International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction”, 17, 2016, p. 25; Fotios Moustakis, Michael Sheehan, *Greek Security Policy after the Cold War*, in “Contemporary Security Policy”, 2000, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 108, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260008404270>

³⁰ Gülden S. Ayman, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

³¹ Alexis Heraclides, *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean: Imagined Enemies*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, New York/Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

status quo. To illustrate, recent statements from the then Turkish ruling elites were interpreted as challenging the overall status quo in the Aegean Sea.³² The dispute has temporarily been settled thanks to the intervention of third parties such as the USA and the European Union (EU)³³, although it remains “frozen.”

Parties

Hans Island and Imia/Kardak Islets are both uninhabited and thus have no resident parties. In both conflict cases, there are two main actors: Canada and Denmark in the former and Greece and Turkey in the latter. Thus, in terms of the number of main actors, they are similar. Yet, the conflicts differ in terms of their potential third parties and mediators. For instance, there are multiple potential third parties for the Hans Island dispute. In terms of international organizations, both the Arctic Council and NATO could be taken into consideration as significant potential third parties, as both Canada and Denmark are members. Since there haven't been any military threats over Hans Island, the option of NATO could be underestimated. However, the Arctic Council is of vital importance when it comes to facilitating cooperation among its members – including Canada and Denmark – as an inter-governmental forum. On the other hand, NATO, the USA, and the EU could be evaluated as potential mediators between Greece and Turkey. In fact, during the Imia/Kardak crisis, NATO was one of the actors to ask both Turkey and Greece to refrain from a military conflict.³⁴ Furthermore, despite their limited involvement, the USA and the EU have tried to appease both sides, keeping them away from potential military confrontation.

Issues

The term *issues* refer to what the parties are fighting about, or over which claims they are conflicting.³⁵ Where points to facts, values, and interests while depicting the issues behind a conflict.³⁶ Some other scholars designate issues such as rights, political power, control over resources, preferences, values, beliefs, and

³² Charitini Dipla, Georgios Kostakos, Nikolas Ziogas, *The Status of the Greek Islets “Imia”*, in <http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2008/10/96imia.pdf> (Accessed on 13.04. 2021).

³³ Theodore Koukis, Ilan Kelman, Emel N. Ganapati, *op. cit.*, p. 25; Erdem Denk, *Disputed Islets and Rocks in the Aegean Sea*, in “The Turkish Yearbook”, 1999, Vol. 29, p. 131.

³⁴ Murat Bayar, Andreas Kotelis, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

³⁵ Dennis J. D. Sandole, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

³⁶ Paul Wehr, *Conflict Regulation: Westview Special Studies in Peace, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1979, p. 20.

the nature of the relationship between the parties.³⁷ In this context, the issues are essential for grasping how the two conflicts have evolved.

One of the conflicting issues – territorial claims – is analogous between the Hans Island and Imia/Kardak situations. In terms of similar territorial claims, they can be identified as classical conflicts. To illustrate, Hans Island is claimed by both Canada and Denmark. While Canada's claims are based on its acquisition of all of Great Britain's Arctic possession in 1880, Denmark's claims are based on its ownership of Greenland, which the Permanent Court of International Justice granted it in 1933.³⁸ Similarly, while Greece's sovereignty claims over Imia/Kardak are based on some agreements including the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey argues that Imia/Kardak islets were not specifically mentioned within the documents in question.³⁹

As for the differences in issues between the two conflicts, it is essential to first mention that the sovereignty claims over Hans Island are closely linked to the shifting landscape of the Arctic region. Proverbially, because of climate change, the Arctic has become a focal point of global politics. As a consequence of the receding ice cap, numerous Arctic routes are opening, and potential hydrocarbon sources in the region are becoming accessible.⁴⁰ With this in mind, interest in the Arctic is rising thanks to its potential resources beneath the Arctic waters.⁴¹ Thus, the dispute over Hans Island is motivated by a potential "control over resources," as Deutsch mentions.⁴² In this context, it could be assessed through a geoeconomic framework. In comparison, the conflicting issue between Greece and Turkey over the Imia/Kardak Islets is a question of "control over territory." Thus, it is more logical to evaluate the Imia/Kardak crisis through a geopolitical framework. Put differently, once Rapoport's framework of conflicting issues is taken into consideration, the crisis over the islets could be best understood as a struggle to gain "political power."⁴³

Objectives

Whenever a conflict occurs, the objectives of the parties are substantial to

³⁷ Anatol Rapoport, *Conflict in Man-Made Environment*, Harmondsworth, Eng.; Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1974; Morton Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³⁸ Christopher Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p. 265; Michael Byers, *International Law ...*, p. 11.

³⁹ Murat Bayar, Andreas Kotelis, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

⁴⁰ Michael R. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴¹ Rob Huebert, *Return of the "Vikings": The Canadian-Danish dispute over Hans Island. New challenges for control of the Canadian North*, in F. Berkes, R. Huebert, H. Fast, M. Manseau, A. Diduck (Eds.), *Breaking Ice: Renewable resource and ocean management in the Canadian North*, Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 2005.

⁴² Morton Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 15-16.

⁴³ Anatol Rapoport, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

elucidate what the parties aim to reach. Thus, it is crucial to figure out the expectations of the parties so that conflict could be sufficiently analyzed. Here, there are key questions to be answered to comprehend the objectives of a conflict. Are parties within a zero-sum game or do they prefer a win-win game? How do their objectives relate to the *status quo*?

Beginning with the dispute over Hans Island, through a geoeconomics – rather than geopolitical – assessment of the region, it can be ascertained that there is no potential for a zero-sum game, though there certainly is potential for a win-win one. Even if there have been some instances of symbolic, opposing flag-planting, no serious military confrontation has occurred so far. Instead, the dispute has been sort of a funny game between Canada and Denmark, with each country placing its patriotic beverage – Canadian whiskey or Danish schnapps – on the island, inspiring some to speak of an emerging “whiskey war” in the region.⁴⁴ In comparison to military competition, each party’s firm commitment to initiate joint cooperative discussions to solve the issue has been more preferable. Similar claims regarding ownership of the island and common understandings between the two parties point to a homogenous perception of reality.⁴⁵ Worth noting is that Canada and Denmark decided to agree on resolving the status of the island in 2005 as a significant step in these peace dialogues.⁴⁶ Thus, once the objectives of the parties are taken into consideration, it can be deduced that dispute over the island has taken place in a ‘status-quo maintaining’ manner. Both Canada and Denmark have wished to avoid challenging military reactions over Hans Island. In this respect, mutual gains are a preferable solution to the Hans Island dispute. Instead of a *zero-sum* game, both sides of the dispute are prone to examine a *positive-sum* game.

Similar to those of Canada and Denmark in the Hans Island dispute, the primary objective of Greece and Turkey in the Imia/Kardak crisis has been claiming territorial sovereignty over the islets. Yet unlike the Hans Island dispute, the Imia/Kardak dispute has become a high-level conflict because of numerous con-

⁴⁴ Jeremy Bender, *2 Countries have been fighting over an uninhabited by leaving each other bottles of alcohol for over 3 decades*, in “Business Insider”, Jan 10, 2016, in <https://www.businessinsider.com/canada-and-denmark-whiskey-war-over-hans-island-2016-1> (Accessed on 17.04.2021).

⁴⁵ Michael R. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁴⁶ Dan Levin, *Canada and Denmark Fight Over Island With Whisky and Schnapps*, in “The New York Times”, Nov 7, 2016, in <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/08/world/what-in-the-world/canada-denmark-hans-island-whisky-schnapps.html> (Accessed on 17.04.2021).

flicting issues – especially related to sovereignty in the Aegean – plaguing the relations between Greece and Turkey, which deteriorated in the 1990s.⁴⁷ As one of these issues, the Imia/Kardak crisis brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war in 1996.⁴⁸ Unlike the symbolic beverage placements in the Hans Island dispute, there was a more aggressive flag-planting combat over Imia/Kardak. According to Burton's conceptualization of classical conflicts as conflicts over territory, the Imia/Kardak dispute is an example of a classical conflict.⁴⁹ Thus, the Imia/Kardak crisis has better be analyzed through a *zero-sum* game. Put differently, it has been a destructive conflict because of the confrontational process. In contrast to the Hans Island dispute which demonstrates a desire to maintain the status quo, the Imia/Kardak crisis has indicated its push to change the status quo.

Means

Parties benefit from means to pursue their objectives.⁵⁰ They are utilized in all conflicts. Here, some structured opposing identifications are applied. Thus, they are simply related to the way they define each other. Rapoport indicates how conflicting parties identify each other as “enemies to be destroyed,” “opponents to be outwitted,” and/or “opponents to be persuaded,” depending on their level of conflict.⁵¹ Applying this framework to Hans Island, it could be deduced that the most suitable choice is that the two parties identify each other as “opponents to be persuaded.” In other words, there has been a such significant amount of dialogue between the two parties that they could easily be persuaded to pursue a mutually beneficial, common solution. They have been working collaboratively with each other for years. To illustrate, in 2005, both parties agreed to resolve the dispute to prevent Russia's aggressive presence in the region.⁵² Additionally, in 2008, a mixed group of Canadian and Danish scientists built a weather station on Hans Island, a testimony to their peaceful collaboration with one another.⁵³

⁴⁷ Michael R. Hickok, *The Imia-Kardak Affair, 1995-96. A Case of inadvertent conflict*, in “European Security”, 1998, Vol. 7, No. 4, p. 121.

⁴⁸ Fotios Moustakis, Michael Sheehan, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁴⁹ John W. Burton, *Peace Theory: Preconditions of Disarmament*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.

⁵⁰ Dennis J. D. Sandole, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁵¹ Anatol Rapoport, *op. cit.*, p. 180-183.

⁵² *The Whisky War on Hans Island You Must Know*, March 20, 2019, in <https://usaspiritsratings.com/en/blog/insights-1/the-whisky-war-on-hans-island-you-must-know-96.htm> (Accessed on 17.04.2021).

⁵³ *Ibid.*

On the other side, there has been a far more heated debate between Greece and Turkey over the Imia/Kardak Islets. Referring to Rapoport's categories,⁵⁴ the conflicting issue between them could be depicted as a "fight". Correspondingly, the parties' perceptions of one another fall closer to the "enemies to be destroyed" option. Here, media representations play a key role. As stated before, it was primarily because of the media involvement in the Imia/Kardak issue that it started to blow up into a crisis.⁵⁵ Military intervention was even proposed by magazines within both countries. Moreover, the journalists working for the Turkish magazine *Hürriyet* have been directly involved in exacerbating the conflict, going to the Imia/Kardak islets by helicopter to replace the Greek flag with the Turkish one and even arguing that Turkey should have sent warships to the region.⁵⁶ In response, through radio broadcasts, the Greek media has defined this initiative as "provocative" and pressured Greek authorities to immediately respond.⁵⁷ Notably, Greek newspapers such as *Eleftherotypia*, *Apogevmatini*, *Kathimerini*, and *Ta Nea* have not hesitated to apply such "provocative language," either.⁵⁸ In this context, media, as a substantial part of the means, has played a provocative role during the crisis to manipulate the behaviors of the ruling elites. The media's inflammatory interpretations have fomented political unrest and brought both countries to the brink of war.⁵⁹ In a nutshell, reciprocal media outputs enabled parties to implement their objectives regarding the Imia/Kardak crisis, which has evolved into a destructive conflict.

Orientations

Orientation means the intention of the parties to achieve their objectives during the conflict.⁶⁰ Here, the analysis of the parties' orientations is crucial for figuring out how they are perceived and how they behave during conflicts. Are they competitive or cooperative? For instance, a competitive orientation understands conflict through adversarial acts and confrontation, and evaluates it via *zero-sum* games; in comparison, a cooperative orientation seeks out non-adversarial and non-

⁵⁴ Anatol Rapoport, *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ Murat Bayar, Andreas Kotelis, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

⁵⁷ Michael R. Hickok, *The Imia-Kardak Affair, 1995-96...*, p. 126.

⁵⁸ Ioanna Kostarella, *Framing the Other: Turkey in the Greek Press*, in "GMJ: Mediterranean Edition", Spring 2007, Vol. 2, No. 1.

⁵⁹ Neslihan Ozguness, Georgios Terzis, *Constraints and Remedies for Journalists Reporting National Conflict: the case of Greece and Turkey*, in "Journalism Studies", Vol. 1, No. 3, 2000, pp. 405-426, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700050081759>

⁶⁰ Dennis J. D. Sandole, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

confrontational paths forward and prefers to find *win-win* solutions.⁶¹

Sandole applies the paradigms of *Idealpolitik* and *Realpolitik* to these orientations.⁶² Accordingly, a state influenced by the *Realpolitik* paradigm is prone to competitive orientation, while the one influenced by *Idealpolitik* is prone to cooperative orientation. Whereas the former may be more interested in destructive outcomes, the latter may opt for constructive outcomes. Within this paper, relations between Canada and Denmark have been interpreted through *Idealpolitik*, and those between Greece and Turkey have been understood via *Realpolitik*. On Hans Island, Canada and Denmark have preferred cooperation and coordination so far. Their presence within the Arctic Council and willingness to solve the dispute over the island through joint initiatives attest to their *Idealpolitik* orientation. The fact that all the Arctic states have been prone to benefit from opportunities existing in the Arctic incentivizes them to pay particular attention to geoeconomic insights and rights. As Wallensteen argues, the ongoing discovery of economic assets—such as hydrocarbons and transportation routes—in the region has encouraged the Arctic states to opt for *peacemaking* and *Kapitalpolitik* as political problem-solving instruments.⁶³ Consequently, *absolute gains* or *positive-sum* games are preferred by the Arctic states in the region, hence the applicability of *Idealpolitik* as the best explanation of relations between them. On the contrary, relations between Greece and Turkey are better examined via *Realpolitik*. For decades, both countries have been in geopolitical competition, especially in the Aegean Sea. Thus, many of the conflicts between them were predominantly influenced by their *Realpolitik* orientation, with the Imia/Kardak crisis serving as a representative example.

Environments

Consideration of the environment in which a conflict occurs enables conflict analysts to propose how it could be resolved. Equally important is the existence in the given political environment of any mechanisms that could resolve the conflict between the parties. Fortunately, the Arctic Council has served as one such mechanism in the Arctic. Focusing on sustainable development and environmental protection, the Council promotes cooperation, coordination, and interaction among its members.⁶⁴ Throughout the years, the Council has grown

⁶¹ Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict...*, p. 17.

⁶² Dennis J. D. Sandole, *op. cit.*

⁶³ Peter Wallensteen, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁶⁴ *Ottawa Declaration*, Arctic Council, 1996, in https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF (Accessed on 20.04.2021)

from a policy-shaping body into a crucial policy-making one. Binding agreements adopted under the auspices of the Council have been supportive for exemplification of this body. The Council has been fruitful in providing a common ground for its members, whose priorities in the region differ. In this capacity, it plays a mediator role in the region. With this in mind, it is an indisputable fact that the Council implicitly influences the environment in which the parties of the Hans Island dispute are included.

Science diplomacy pursued within the Arctic region also influences the conflict environment between Canada and Denmark. Its role is crucial in the Arctic since the region has been witnessing global threats such as climate change. Science diplomacy aims to promote scientific cooperation to help individual states overcome common threats.⁶⁵ The impact of science diplomacy on the Hans Island dispute can be easily observed. Both countries assign scientists a significant role to scope out and provide common solutions regarding the dispute. As a consequence, science diplomacy strengthens collaboration and fosters cooperative mechanisms, two prominent components of conflict environment.

However, no such cooperative mechanism has existed between Greece and Turkey, especially regarding the Imia/Kardak crisis. Even NATO's and the EU's appeasement attempts had been limited and impartial during the crisis. Competition between parties has been intensifying in the region for years, leading to many disputes that have brought the country to the brink of war, including those over airspace and continental shelves in the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, and Imia/Kardak.⁶⁶ As a consequence, geopolitical competition has been triggering the issue of bilateral relations rather than cooperation.

CONCLUSIONS

Applying conflict theory, this paper examines the territorial disputes over Hans Island and the Imia/Kardak Islets. It aims to clarify that despite some similarities, there are many distinct characteristics between the two particular disputes. These differences are explained by two significant pillars of conflict theory: constructive and destructive conflict. In this respect, it is clear that whereas the Hans Island dispute is a constructive conflict, the Imia/Kardak crisis is a destructive

⁶⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. France, *Science Diplomacy for France. Report 2013*.

⁶⁶ Michael R. Hickok, *op. cit.*; Bahar Rumelili, *Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: The Case of Greek-Turkish Relations*, in "Journal of Common Market Studies", 2007, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 105-26.

conflict, once the situation of both conflicts is taken into consideration. Moreover, although they are both land-claimed territorial disputes between regional actors, they are differentiated from one another by the objectives, means, orientations, and environments framed as considerable elements of their respective conflicts.

The Hans Island dispute between Canada and Denmark has been a low-level territorial conflict so far. Even if it is a sovereignty issue between the two countries, there has been no serious military confrontation between them. On the contrary, only the symbolic replacing of beverages has occurred. Yet, the official status of the island remains ambiguous, and the increasing geoeconomic value of the Arctic since the 2000s has rekindled the countries' interest in obtaining sovereignty over the island. In particular, Hans Island's potential undersea hydrocarbons and the new polar trade routes traversing the island's waters have piqued Canada and Denmark's interest. Thus, as opposed to geopolitical competition, common interests have fostered cooperative mechanisms between Canada and Denmark. For instance, science diplomacy provides a crucial cooperative ground for both. Here, it is assumed that *Idealpolitik* or *Kapitalpolitik* orientations have been influencing the actors. Since the desires and needs of both are compatible, a *positive-sum* may be the best explanatory instrument between them. Thus, the issue points to behaviors that maintain the status quo. Consequently, the sovereignty struggle over the island will be resolved by a common solution regarding its status. Recent developments indicate just how willing both countries are to agree.

On the other hand, the Imia/Kardak issue has been a high-level international crisis and has even brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. The issue is a vital manifestation of the sovereignty struggle between the two countries within the Aegean Sea. Thus, it is best interpreted as a destructive conflict. Unlike the current geoeconomic perception strengthening the collaboration among the Arctic states, the Imia/Kardak dispute has traditional geopolitical components and resembles a classical territorial dispute. In this respect, the dispute has an orientation towards changing the status quo. Additionally, *Realpolitik's* impact on both Greece and Turkey has been dominant during the crisis. Bilateral media interpretations regarding the issue have been the main agent catalyzing antagonistic viewpoints and behaviors. As a consequence, the *zero-sum* choice of both sides has triggered geopolitical competition in the region. Accordingly, both sides would have preferred to fight if third parties had not interfered to defuse the crisis.

Through this comparative analysis of the territorial disputes over two significant islands, this paper concludes that and demonstrates how both disputes are quite different in terms of conflict components. This information can inform

decision-makers and enable them to better pursue conflict resolution goals regarding both islands.

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THE ROLE OF MILITARY AVIATION IN THE OCCUPATION OF CRIMEA (2014)

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Abstract. *The occupation of Crimea has become one of the most severe military-political crises of the last decade. The Russian Federation carried out this operation as hybrid war. Along with the widespread use of methods and tools of information warfare, Russia used the units of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Crimea and the forces additionally transferred to the peninsula. One of the main ways of moving those forces was by aerial military transport. In addition, helicopters were deployed to block the Ukrainian garrisons in Crimea.*

During the Crimean crisis, Ukrainian military aviation, much like other components of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, remained utterly passive. The only manifestation of active resistance was the relocation of several aircraft and helicopters from the Saki-Novofedorivka airfield to the mainland of Ukraine (the equipment was removed until early June 2014). Instead, the Russian Federation's Armed Forces promptly stationed a powerful aviation group (three Air Force regiments and two Navy aircraft) in occupied Crimea.

Keywords: *Air Forces, Crimea, hybrid war, military aviation, Russia, Ukraine.*

Rezumat: Rolul aviației militare în ocuparea Crimeii (2014). *Ocuparea Crimeii a devenit una dintre cele mai severe crize militare-politice din ultimul deceniu. Federația Rusă a efectuat această operațiune ca un război hibrid. Împreună cu utilizarea pe scară largă a metodelor și a instrumentelor de război de informații, Rusia a folosit unitățile Flotei Mării Negre staționate în Crimeea, precum și forțele transferate suplimentar în peninsula. Una dintre principalele modalități de deplasare a acestor forțe a fost transportul militar aerian. Totodată, au fost utilizate elicoptere pentru a bloca garnizoanele ucrainene din Crimeea.*

În timpul crizei din Crimeea, aviația militară ucraineană, la fel ca și alte componente ale forțelor armate ucrainene, a rămas complet pasivă. Singura manifestare a rezistenței active a fost relocarea mai multor aeronave și elicoptere din aeroportul Saki-Novofedorivka în interiorul Ucrainei (echipamentele au fost strămutate până la începutul lunii iunie 2014). În schimb, forțele armate ale Federației Ruse au amplasat cu promptitudine un puternic grup de aviație (trei regimente ale Forțelor Aeriene și două aeronave marine) în Crimeea ocupată.

INTRODUCTION

The armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, also known as the Russian-Ukrainian war, has significantly affected European and world political processes since 2014. At the same time, it attracted researchers' interest as the first full-scale armed conflict in Europe since the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Although the intensity of hostilities has significantly decreased recently (compared to 2014-2015), military actions along the front line in eastern Ukraine continue, and the prospects for a peaceful resolution remain uncertain. The issue of Russia's annexation of Crimea and occupation of a part of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions remains unresolved.

The Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea (more precisely, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, separate administrative entities under Ukrainian law) in February 2014 sparked the Russian-Ukrainian war. Despite Russian claims that the annexation was "peaceful" and based on the "will" of the local population, the operation was essentially military and resulted in the forceful occupation by Russian forces of a part of Ukraine's internationally recognised territory. Many studies, particularly those by Oleksandr Marusiak, use these facts considerably. The overall historical aspect of the occupation of Crimea has been adequately addressed in the studies of Pavlo Hai-Nyzhnyk, Yaroslav Mykolaenko, Gennadiy Zhyrov, Paul A. Eden, and others; thus, it will not be highlighted further. Taras Berezovets' study, which examines in detail the mechanisms and technologies of the hybrid war waged by Russian Federation troops on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, deserves special attention.

The first article (aside from those released by news agencies) on the role of aviation in the occupation of Crimea was written by Oleksandr Kotlobovskiy and Rostyslav Maraiev. It covers Russian troops' military actions (with a focus on aviation) during the peninsula's annexation, specifically the use of military transport aircraft to transfer forces to the Hvardiiske airfield and the use of helicopters to capture the Feodosiia Marine Battalion and other Ukrainian military units. The main focus is on the fate of the Ukrainian aircraft units stationed in Crimea.

Foreign publications describing the role of aviation during the Crimean Crisis initially focused on the chronology of events. For example, in 2014, this type of material was published in the periodicals *Air Forces Monthly* and *Combat Aircraft*

Monthly.¹ The authors tried to keep a close eye on the developments on the peninsula and keep Western readers informed. Among later publications, Vladimir Trendafilovskiy's study on the deployment of the Ukrainian 10th Marine Aviation Brigade from Crimea to the mainland of Ukraine deserves special mention.²

As for Russian sources, the most significant one is "Brothers Armed. Military aspects of the crisis in Ukraine" – the series published by the Centre of Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST). Two articles of the series stand out. The first one is Dmitry Boltentkov's work covering the history of the Russian troops' deployment in Crimea.³ The second one is Anton Lavrov's article, which exclusively focused on the aviation component of the Crimean occupation campaign.⁴ The facts mentioned in the paper indicate the Russian Armed Forces' direct and active involvement in the military actions on the peninsula. The author lists the units of land forces, airborne troops, and marines that took part in the occupation of Crimea. However, the article does not contain precise information about the aviation component of the invading force – the author only mentions the presence of Russian transport aircraft for the transfer of troops and helicopters to Crimea to block the Ukrainian ships and garrisons.

This study aims to analyse the military component of the occupation of the peninsula, namely the presence of military aircraft, from both Russia and Ukraine. The term "Ukrainian military aviation" refers to the aviation of all security forces of Ukraine, including the Air Force, Army Air Force, Naval Aviation, aviation of the State Border Guard Service, and the State Emergency Service. On the Russian side, Air Force and Navy aircraft have been deployed to occupy Crimea.

Although a peninsula from a geographical point of view, Crimea is an island from the military-strategic perspective. It is connected to the mainland only by the

¹ *Crisis in Crimea*, in "Air Forces Monthly", 2014, No. 4, p. 5; *Russian forces take over Ukraine air base in Crimea*, in "Air Forces Monthly", 2014, No. 5, p. 5; S. Büttner, P. Roegies, *Crisis in Crimea*, in "Combat Aircraft Monthly", 2014, No. 5, p. 66-71; I. Voukadinov, *Crisis on Crimean Peninsula*, in "Air Forces Monthly", 2014, No. 5, p. 85-87; B. Taghavaee, *Be'lbeq. Ukraine's last Crimean fighter base*, in "Air Forces Monthly", 2014, No. 5, p. 91-94.

² V. Trendafilovski, *Crimea's Unsung Heroes*, in "Air Forces Monthly", 2015, No. 9, p. 76-81; V. Trendafilovski, *Ukraińscy lotnicy morscy – milczący bohaterowie z Krymu* [Ukrainian naval aviators – silent heroes from Crimea], in "Lotnictwo", 2015, No. 11, p. 70-80.

³ D. Boltentkov, *Home of the Black Sea Fleet: History and Disposition of Russian Forces in Crimea*, in "Brothers Armed. Military aspects of the crisis in Ukraine", Minneapolis, East View Press, 2015, p. 136-158.

⁴ A. Lavrov, *Russian Again: The Military Operation for Crimea*, in "Brothers Armed. Military aspects of the crisis in Ukraine", Minneapolis, East View Press, 2015, p. 158-179.

narrow Perekop Isthmus, which can be easily blocked. Therefore, the Navy played a decisive role in planning military operations in Crimea (for example – the Crimean war of 1853-1856), as well as aviation since the middle of the twentieth century (for example – the occupation of the peninsula by German and Romanian troops in 1941-1942 and the liberation of Crimea by the Red Army in 1944). Thus, in planning the operation to occupy Crimea, the Russian military leadership understood that it would be impossible to quickly increase the Russian military contingent on the peninsula and seize critical points in Crimea without the use of transport aviation. On the other hand, the Ukrainian military aviation stationed in Crimea would undoubtedly have fought, but that never happened.

AVIATION UNITS IN CRIMEA ON THE EVE OF THE CRISIS

Two countries' aviation forces – Ukraine and the Russian Federation – were stationed on Crimea's territory at the start of 2014. The "Crimea" tactical group of the Air Command "South" served as the foundation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces' aviation group on the peninsula. It was previously part of the Air Force, but it has been operationally subordinated to the Ukrainian Navy since September 1, 2012, and was led by Major General Oleh Strutsynskyi. This group's primary mission was to provide air defence for strategic facilities in Crimea. Accordingly, five main units were formed:⁵ the 204th Tactical Aviation Brigade at Belbek airport (near Sevastopol) armed with MiG-29 fighters; the 50th Anti-aircraft Missile Regiment in Feodosiya, which included two divisions of S-300PS long-range anti-aircraft missile systems; the 174th Anti-aircraft Missile Regiment in Sevastopol – three S-300PS divisions; the 55th Anti-aircraft Missile Regiment in Yevpatoriia – three divisions of "Buk-M1" medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems; the 40th Separate Radio Engineering Brigade, headquartered in Sevastopol, and approximately ten radar units were positioned along the Crimean coast.

The "Crimean" tactical group also included several smaller units and the State Aviation Research and Testing Centre.⁶ This centre, located at the Kirovske airfield, was engaged in testing new and modernised aircraft and training test pilots.

⁵ *Vtraty ukrainskoi armii v Krymu* [Losses of the Ukrainian army in Crimea], in <http://pohlyad.com/news/n/43101> (Accessed 20.03.2021).

⁶ *Derzhavnyi aviatsiynyi naukovo-vyprobuvalnyi tsentr* [State Aviation Research and Testing Center], in <https://mil.in.ua/uk/derzhavnyy-aviaciynny-naukovo-vyprob/> (Accessed 20.03.2021).

The 204th Tactical Aviation Brigade's – the main aviation unit – formally had 45 MiG-29 fighters and four L-39M1 training planes. However, most fighters were defective due to chronic underfunding, and L-39M1 planes were used to maintain pilot skills.⁷ The number of combat-ready aircraft apparently did not exceed 10-15 planes. Thus, Babak Taghavaee claims that in the 204th Brigade there were nine MiG-29s, three MiG-29UB combat-capable training aircraft, and four L-39M1s.⁸ And according to Anton Lavrov, fewer than ten planes were suitable for flying, including four or six MiG-29s and four L-39M1s.⁹ The numbers given by Oleksandr Kotlobovskiy and Rostyslav Maraiev are even lower: according to their data, only four MiG-29s and one L-39M1 were capable of fighting in the 204th Brigade.¹⁰

Another Ukrainian aviation unit in Crimea was the 10th Marine Aviation Brigade stationed at the Saki-Novofedorivka airfield. Formed in 2004 as a result of the reorganisation and reduction of the Ukrainian Navy, it united all aircraft of the Ukrainian Navy. The Brigade consisted of two squadrons (aeroplanes and helicopters), specialised support units and a parachute rescue team.¹¹ Formally, the Brigade had 13 aircraft (ten Be-12 amphibious patrol aircraft and three transport aircraft – two An-26s and one An-2) and 19 helicopters (nine Ka-27s, four Ka-29s, four Mi-14s, and two Mi-8s). However, only three aircraft (two An-26s and one Be-12) and five helicopters (three Mi-14s and two Ka-27s) were operational.¹²

The aircraft of the other Ukrainian military and paramilitary agencies – the Land Forces, the State Border Guard Service, and the State Emergency Service – were not permanently stationed in Crimea. However, their helicopters and aeroplanes periodically were used on the peninsula – for example, to participate in military exercises or tests. Furthermore, at the beginning of 2014, two aviation units were located near Crimea. In particular, the 299th Tactical Aviation Brigade armed with Su-25 attack aircraft was stationed at the Mykolaiv-Kulbakine airfield.¹³ It is the only unit in the Air Force of Ukraine equipped with close air

⁷ B. Taghavaee, *Be'lbeek. Ukraine's last...*, p. 93.

⁸ B. Taghavaee, *Ukraine's Defenders; MiG-29s of the Ukrainian Air Force*, in "Combat Aircraft Monthly", 2014, No. 5, p. 77.

⁹ A. Lavrov, *Russian Again...*, p. 159.

¹⁰ A. Kotlobovskiy, R. Maraiev. *Nevozmoznaya vojna...*, c. 1.

¹¹ A. Kharuk, *Lotnictwo morskie Ukrainy...*, p. 191.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 194-195.

¹³ A. Golz, R. Cooper, *Ukraine's attack workhorse*, in "Combat Aircraft Monthly", 2017, No. 6, p. 75.

support aircraft. The 11th Army Aviation Brigade of the Land Forces was stationed at the Kherson–Chornobaivka airfield armed with Mi-24 attack helicopters and Mi-8 transport helicopters.¹⁴ The primary purpose of this unit was to interact with the 79th airmobile Brigade (Mykolaiv). In addition, a separate aviation squadron of the State Border Guard Service (DA 42NG patrol aircraft, An-24RV transport aircraft, and helicopters Mi-8) was deployed in Odesa. It provided air patrolling of the state border and the maritime exclusive economic zone.

As a result of the constant lack of funding, the Air Force of Ukraine was in poor condition on the day before the Russian invasion. According to Sean Wilson, 15-20 MiG-29 and 16 Su-27 fighters, 10-12 Su-24M bombers, and Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft, and 14-18 Su-25 attack aircraft were combat-capable in early 2014.¹⁵ The most recent was built in 1991, and most of them had not been modernised.

Following the interstate agreements, Russian troops, or more precisely, the Black Sea Fleet units, were present in Crimea. The Constitution of Ukraine (Article 17), adopted on June 28, 1996, prohibits the deployment of foreign military bases on the territory of Ukraine.¹⁶ The Russian Black Sea Fleet, on the other hand, was granted an exception. After several years of negotiations, an agreement on the conditions for the Russian Fleet to be based in Ukraine was signed on May 28, 1997.¹⁷ The agreement's term was set at 20 years – until 2017. On the same day, another agreement¹⁸ was reached, which included the right of the Black Sea Fleet to use Hvardiiske as an airfield in Crimea (13 km north of Simferopol and Kacha (in Sevastopol)). Finally, on April 21, 2010, an agreement was made that prolonged

¹⁴ S. Zagdański, *Ukraińskie śmigłowcy armijne* [Ukrainian army helicopters], in “Lotnictwo”, 2014, No. 1, p. 73.

¹⁵ S. Wilson, *Before the revolution Ukraine's Air Force*, in “Air Forces Monthly”, 2014, No. 5, p. 78-84.

¹⁶ *Konstytutsiia Ukrainy* [Constitution of Ukraine], in <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80#Text> (Accessed 25.03.2021).

¹⁷ *Uhoda mizh Ukrainoiu ta Rosiiskoiu Federatsiieiu pro status ta umovy perebuvannia Chornomorskoho flotu Rosiiskoi Federatsii na terytorii Ukrainy vid 28.05.1997 r.* [Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the status and conditions of stay of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine dated May 28, 1997], in https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_076#Text (Accessed 25.03.2021).

¹⁸ *Uhoda mizh Ukrainoiu ta Rosiiskoiu Federatsiieiu pro parametry podilu Chornomorskoho flotu vid 28.05.1997 r.* [Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the parameters of the division of the Black Sea Fleet dated 28.05.1997], in https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_075#Text (Accessed 25.03.2021).

the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea until 2042.¹⁹

According to the agreements signed on May 24, 1997, the modernisation of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in Crimea remained under the consideration of the Ukrainian side. Ukraine blocked all Russian attempts to improve the air forces units located at Crimean airfields for some time. Therefore, obsolete types of aircraft that had already been withdrawn from service in all the other parts of Russian military aviation, such as Su-17M4 fighter-bombers and Be-12 anti-submarine aircraft, continued to be operated by the Black Sea Fleet aviation. In 2000 Ukraine unblocked the process of renewing the Black Sea Fleet aviation in Crimea. In particular, that allowed replacing Su-17M4 aircraft with more modern Su-24 bombers and Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft.²⁰ Colonel Hennadii Zahonov commanded the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, and the commander of the 7057th Air Base was Lieutenant Colonel Anatolii Stepanov.²¹

During the reorganisation of the Black Sea Fleet in December 2011, all aviation units stationed in Crimea were integrated into a single structure, the 7057th Air Base.²² It included three squadrons, two of which were deployed at the Kacha airfield (a mixed aviation group comprised of An-26 transport aircraft and Be-12 anti-submarine aircraft, a helicopter group consisting of approximately 20 helicopters Ka-27 and Mi-8), and the third – an assault squadron – in Hvardiiske (Su-24 bombers and Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft).²³

Russia concentrated a much more powerful aviation group in the Southern Military District near Crimea, the territories of Krasnodar and Stavropol, and the Rostov region. Several bases of the 4th Air Force and Air Defence Command were located there, including the airfields of Krymsk, Millerovo, Primorsko-Akhtarsk,

¹⁹ *Uhoda mizh Ukrainoiu ta Rosiiskoiu Federatsiieiu z pytan perebuvannia Chornomorskoho flotu Rosiiskoi Federatsii na terytorii Ukrainy vid 21.04.2010 r.* [Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the stay of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine dated April 21, 2010], in https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_359#Text (Accessed 25.03.2021).

²⁰ Drushlyakov V., *Kryl'ya Chernomorskogo flota Rossii* [Wings of the Russian Black Sea Fleet], in "Vzlyot", 2006, No. 12, c. 22.

²¹ D. Boltenkov, *Home of the Black Sea Fleet...*, p. 147.

²² *Edinaya baza morskoy aviacii sozdana na Chernomorskom flote RF* [A unified naval aviation base created at the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation], in <https://ria.ru/20111219/520805971.html>. [A unified naval aviation base created at the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation], in <https://ria.ru/20111219/520805971.html> (Accessed 25.03.2021).

²³ I. Voukadinov, *Crisis on Crimean...*, p. 87.

Budionnovsk, and others. Each of these bases roughly matched the Ukrainian tactical aviation brigade in terms of quantity, but the real combat potential was significantly higher. Russia substantially renewed the structure of those units in the years preceding the occupation of Crimea. As of the beginning of 2014, more than 200 pieces of aircraft - new and modernised planes and helicopters (50% of the entire fleet) were operated in the units of the 4th Command. Over forty of them arrived in 2013. In particular, the share of new helicopters in army aviation (which played a significant role in the campaign to occupy Crimea) reached 90%.²⁴ At the very least, the military aviation facility at Korenovsk airfield is an example of a thorough approach to fleet renewal. It acquired new Mi-28N attack helicopters in 2010, Mi-8AMTSh transport helicopters started arriving in 2011, the first Mi-35M arrived in 2012, and by spring 2013 the base had received 16 Ka-52 helicopters.²⁵ Thus, outdated helicopters such as attack Mi-24 and transport Mi-8 of early modifications were wholly replaced in Korenovsk. Meanwhile, such aircraft remained in service with Ukraine's army aviation, with no plans to replace them.

AVIATION'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE OCCUPATION OF CRIMEA

The Russian-planned operation to seize Crimea required the rapid transfer of additional military units to the peninsula, as the forces of the 810th separate Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet deployed in Crimea were insufficient to block all Ukrainian garrisons. Such a transfer could be conducted only with the help of military transport aircraft. On February 26, 2014, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin ordered a "surprise inspection of operational readiness" of the Western Military District troops and, to a lesser extent, the Central Military District. As part of this "inspection", about 40 Il-76 military transport planes took off from Ulyanovsk Air Base on February 26 and 27. More than 10 of them landed at the Anapa Airport on the Caucasus coast, near Crimea.²⁶ The active phase of the operation to seize Crimea began at 4:30 a.m. on February 27, when about 50-100 gunmen seized Crimean Parliament in Simferopol and raised a Russian flag over the building.²⁷

²⁴ *Dolya novykh vertoletov v armejskoj aviacii YuVO sostavlyayet bolee 90%* [The share of new helicopters in the army aviation of the SMD is more than 90%], in <https://sc.mil.ru/social/sport/news/more.htm?id=11975125@egNews> (Accessed 26.03.2021).

²⁵ *Ka-52 – teper' i na Kubani* [Ka-52 – now in the Kuban], in "Vzlyot", 2013, No. 4, c. 38.

²⁶ A. Lavrov, *Russian Again...*, p. 162.

²⁷ P. Hai-Nyzhnyk, *Okupatsiia ta aneksiia Krymu Rosiiskoiu Federatsiieiu...*, c. 112.

On the morning of February 28, at least 13 Russian Il-76 planes landed at the Hvardiiske airfield deploying about 2000 paratroopers.²⁸ According to other sources, about 8 Il-76 aircraft landed at the airport that day.²⁹

The invading forces were transferred by air and partly by sea, via amphibious assault ships of the Black Sea Fleet and ferries of the Kerch Sea ferry system, due to the availability of airfields on the peninsula controlled by the Black Sea Fleet, allowing them to avoid the traditional parachute landing. In total, 11 battalion tactical groups of airborne troops comprising nearly 6000 people were transferred to Crimea. About half of the forces were involved in the peninsula occupation.³⁰ Ukrainian air defence and fighter aircraft remained passive without receiving any explicit instructions from the country's military-political leadership. The only reaction was the deployment of two Su-27 fighters from mainland Ukraine. The planes were in the air a few hours after the Russians had started landing but did not interfere with the actions of the Russians.³¹ According to other sources, there were at least two cases of interception of Russian aircraft by Ukrainian Su-27 fighters: on the night of March 1, they forced Il-76 aircraft to leave Ukrainian airspace, and on the night of March 2, two Russian fighters were "forced out".³²

The Ukrainian air defence's passivity allowed the Russians to deploy attack helicopters to Crimea. The Black Sea Fleet's aircraft stationed in Crimea did not have such aircraft, but they were needed to block the Ukrainian garrisons and ships. On the morning of February 28, a group of Russian helicopters (eight Mi-35Ms and three Mi-8s) flying from the side of Anapa violated the state border of Ukraine in the Kerch region. They landed at the Black Sea Fleet's airfield Kacha.³³ From February 28 to March 11, the State Border Guard Service registered 14 occurrences of violations of Ukraine's state border in Crimea by groups or single units of Russian aircraft. Unauthorised landings at Crimean airfields were made by 48 planes and helicopters.³⁴ These statistics may be incomplete.

One of the priority tasks assigned to the Russian troops operating without identification marks (the so-called "green men") was to block the Belbek airfield. At about 15:00 on February 28, a convoy consisting of three Russian armoured

²⁸ *Crisis in Crimea...*, p. 5.

²⁹ Büttner, P. Roegies, *Crisis in Crimea...*, p. 69.

³⁰ M. Depczyński, *Zmiany w rosyjskich Wojskach Powietrznodesantowych* [Changes in the Russian Airborne Forces], in "Nowa Technika Wojskowa", 2021, No. 3, p. 25.

³¹ A. Lavrov, *Russian Again...*, p. 165.

³² A. Kotlobovskyi, R. Maraiev. *Nevozmozhnaya vojna...*, c. 22.

³³ Büttner, P. Roegies, *Crisis in Crimea...*, p. 70.

³⁴ P. Hai-Nyzhnyk, *Okupatsiia ta aneksiia Krymu Rosiiskoiu Federatsiieiu...*, c. 118.

personnel carriers and ten trucks arrived at this airfield. The “green men” entered the facility through unguarded technical gates and blocked the runway, the aircraft parking zone, and the ammunition depot. Around the same time, a company of Russian soldiers seized Simferopol civil airport and its dispatch office. On March 1, the Russians blocked all three Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile regiments and several air-defence radar posts.³⁵ Novofedorivka airfield, where the 10th Marine Aviation Brigade was located, had also been secured. Attention should be paid to the fact that on February 27, the 204th Tactical Aviation Brigade announced a high alert and informed about a possible relocation to another airfield but did not receive an execution order.³⁶

According to Acting Minister of Defence of Ukraine Ihor Teniukh, at the time of the Russian invasion, Ukraine had 15000 servicemen, but only 1500-2000 of them were ready to carry out the order to use weapons.³⁷ On March 1, 2014, Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov appointed Rear Admiral Denys Berezovsky as Commander of the Ukrainian Navy. This was a key position because all Ukrainian troops in Crimea were directly or operatively subordinated to him. However, the next day Denys Berezovsky betrayed the oath by siding with the aggressor. He ordered the Ukrainian military units in Crimea not to resist Russian Federation troops and to lay down their arms.³⁸

The further fate of the Ukrainian air units blocked in Crimea depended entirely on the initiative of their commanders and the decision of the personnel. The commanders of both air brigades stationed on the peninsula did not obey Berezovsky's order and tried to oppose the Russians, and their chosen tactics proved superior. The 10th Marine Aviation Brigade commander, Colonel Ihor Bedzai, attempted to protect the equipment from being captured by the Russians by flying all the capable aircraft (three) and helicopters (four) to the mainland of Ukraine. The destinations were Odesa International Airport and Mykolaiv-Kulbakine Air Base. The latter was chosen since it was closer to Novofedorivka.³⁹ A favourable moment came on March 3, when the weather was appropriate. At

³⁵ A. Lavrov, *Russian Again...*, p. 165-166.

³⁶ M. Gawęda, *MiG-29 w konflikcie o Donbas* [MiG-29 in conflict over Donbas], in “Lotnictwo Aviation International”, 2018, No. 2, p. 60.

³⁷ P. Hai-Nyzhnyk, *Okupatsiia ta aneksiia Krymu Rosiiskoiu Federatsiieiu...*, c. 115.

³⁸ *Berezovskyi buv vidstoronenyi shche vrantsi – za nakaz ne chynyty oporu viiskam RF i sklasyt zbroiu* [Berezovsky was removed in the morning – for the order not to resist the troops of the RF and to lay down the weapon], in <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/03/2/7017112/> (Accessed 02.04.2021).

³⁹ V. Trendafilovski, *Crimea's Unsung Heroes...*, p. 76.

10:45 four helicopters (Ka-27PL, Mi-14PS, and two Mi-14PLs) began to warm up the engines and in a few minutes one after another took off from the sites in the northern part of the base. In five minutes, two An-26s were taken to the runway and flew toward the sea with a two-minute interval. Then the Be-12PL took off in the opposite direction.⁴⁰ The whole operation lasted no more than 20 minutes, and Russian troops blocking the airfield could not prevent it. To intercept Ukrainian helicopters, the Russians sent two Mi-35Ms from Hvardiiske airfield, but they were unable to detect their targets because the Ukrainian helicopters were flying at low altitudes along the coastline, keeping radio silence. All four helicopters and three planes landed safely in Kulbakine. On March 7, another Ka-27PL helicopter was moved from Novofedorivka to Kulbakine, and again the Russians were unable to prevent it.⁴¹ As a result of the active position of the commander of the 10th Marine Aviation Brigade and his subordinates, all serviceable planes and helicopters were able to be evacuated to the mainland of Ukraine. That was Ukraine's first victory in its battle against Russian aggression.

The situation was evolving differently at the Belbek airfield, where the 204th Tactical Aviation Brigade was stationed. Colonel Yulii Mamchur, Brigade Commander, resorted to psychological warfare on March 4 by leading a group of unarmed personnel to the parking grounds of Russian-controlled planes. Ukrainian military marched while singing the national anthem beneath the State and Brigade flags.⁴² Mamchur gained notoriety as a result of this effort, but it provided little practical advantage as all of the 204th Brigade's planes remained under Russian control.⁴³

Ukraine's military-political leadership responded to Russia's occupation of Crimea by urging the international community to condemn Russia's aggression. Military actions were taken in a variety of directions. To begin, the Ukrainian side made every effort to retain the garrisons and military sites in Crimea under its control, which had been isolated and obstructed by the Russians. On March 4, Crimean separatist leadership issued an ultimatum demanding that Ukrainians choose sides with the separatists, abandon their bases and ships, or face being assaulted by "self-defence detachments." However, the Ukrainian side decided not to respond to this ultimatum.⁴⁴ Secondly, the air defence system in the south of

⁴⁰ V. Trendafilovski, *Ukraińscy lotnicy morscy...*, p. 70-72.

⁴¹ A. Kharuk, *Lotnictwo morskie Ukrainy...*, p. 193-194.

⁴² A. Kotlovovskiy, R. Maraiev. *Nevozmozhnaya vojna...*, c. 22.

⁴³ *Russian forces take over...*, p. 5.

⁴⁴ A. Lavrov, *Russian Again...*, p. 169.

Ukraine had to be restored. Four Su-27 fighters from the 801st Tactical Aviation Brigade were redeployed from Myrhorod to Kulbakine airfield for this purpose.⁴⁵ Thirdly, the Armed Forces of Ukraine on mainland Ukraine were placed on alert, anticipating a surge in Russian aggression. For military aviation, it meant intensifying training flights and putting at least a part of the available planes and helicopters on alert as soon as possible.

Despite the aggravation of the situation and the inability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to repel full-scale Russian aggression, the Ukrainian command did not attempt to fly military aircraft or helicopters in the airspace over Crimea. Instead, helicopters of the State Emergency Service continued to operate in the area.

The incident on March 6, 2014, when the Mi-8 helicopter of this service landed on the site of the Sevastopol aircraft repair plant on the shore of Krugla bay, became widely known. The helicopter took a group of journalists to Sevastopol, but its crew was detained by “unknown persons”, and two Russian Mi-35Ms that had taken off from Kacha airfield appeared over the site. Eventually, the incident was settled peacefully, and the helicopter transporting journalists took off for mainland Ukraine that evening. Two Russian Mi-35Ms accompanied it.⁴⁶ State Emergency Service Mi-8 helicopters flew over Crimea, and later – for example, on March 8, such a helicopter delivered a diesel generator to the garrison in Feodosiya where the Ukrainian Marine Battalion had been blocked.

The State Border Guard Service’s aviation was another active participant. On March 8, one of its DA 42NG planes came upon small-arms fire while patrolling over the Perekop Isthmus. The helicopter flew down to a very low altitude and was able to avoid getting shot with a sharp turn.

On March 15, Russia launched military operations along the border between occupied Crimea and mainland Ukraine. At about 1 p.m., about 120 paratroopers from two groups of Mi-8 helicopters (four and six helicopters) landed near Strilkove town. They took control of the nearby gas infrastructure. Strilkove is located on the Spit of Arbatska Strilka and does not belong to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea but rather the Kherson region. The State Border Guard Service Units and the Armed Forces of Ukraine blocked the paratroopers. Russian Mi-35M attack helicopters with suspended missile blocks performed demonstration flights near Ukrainian checkpoints. The Russian occupation of the Strilkove district lasted until December 2014.

⁴⁵ V. Trendafilovski, *Ukraine Crisis Report*, in “Air Forces Monthly”, 2014, No. 6, P. 6.

⁴⁶ Büttner, P. Roegies, *Crisis in Crimea...*, p. 71.

For two weeks, the situation in Crimea remained uncertain. Russia continued to deploy additional troops to the peninsula, including those armed with heavy weaponry (artillery, multiple launcher systems, and mobile coastal anti-ship missile systems). Ukraine's previously minimal odds of retaking Crimea by force have now become close to none. On the other hand, the Russian Federation strived to complete the process of incorporating the occupied territories as soon as possible. On March 16, 2014, a "referendum" was held in Crimea on the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which was organised in violation of Ukraine's Constitution and the position of the UN Security Council. On March 18, an agreement for the admission of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation was signed in Moscow. The position of Ukrainian forces in Crimea had deteriorated to the point that the Russian government saw every reason to seize Ukrainian garrisons and ships by force.

The Russians began taking intense action on March 19. Special Forces units took control of several command posts, including the Ukrainian Navy headquarters (where Navy Commander Rear Admiral Serhii Haiduk had been appointed to replace deserter Berezovskyi) and a reserve command post of the "Crimea" tactical group.⁴⁷ Ukrainian garrisons and ships were taken over one by one, mostly without resistance. Ukrainian Airbases Belbek and Novofedorivka were captured on March 22. In other cases, the Russians became forced to use the aircraft. On March 24, two Mi-35M and two Mi-8 helicopters were involved in the capture of the military Marine Battalion in the town of Feodosiya. The next day, two Mi-35Ms engaged in the last attack on the Ukrainian ship in Crimea, the minesweeper "Cherkasy." The helicopters did not deploy ammunition on either occasion, putting psychological pressure on the Ukrainian troops.⁴⁸ It is worth noting that all aircraft were transferred from Russia in all cases (whether troops were deployed to Crimea or helicopters were used to blockade Ukrainian garrisons). There is no evidence of the use of aircraft or helicopters from the 7057th Air Base. This unit appeared to be solely responsible for logistical support. These functions proved crucial in assisting the troops that took part in the occupation. It was no surprise that all personnel at the 7057th Air Base were awarded medals "For the occupation of Crimea".⁴⁹

⁴⁷ A. Lavrov, *Russian Again...*, p. 175.

⁴⁸ A. Kotlobovskiy, R. Maraiev. *Nevozmozhnaya vojna...*, c. 1.

⁴⁹ *7057-ma aviabaza morskoi aviatsii ChF RF u povnomu skladi bula nahorodzhena medaliamy za okupatsiiu Krymu* [The entire 7057th naval air base of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation was awarded medals for the occupation of Crimea], in

CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION OF CRIMEA ON MILITARY AVIATION

On March 24, 2014, Acting President of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchinov ordered the evacuation of the Ukrainian troops from occupied Crimea to the mainland of Ukraine.⁵⁰ Both Ukrainian air brigades were evacuated by land to the nearest airbase Kulbakine in Crimea. More than half of the 10th Marine Aviation Brigade personnel, which at that time totalled 850 people, remained loyal to Ukraine and retreated to the mainland. This process ended on April 9. However, at Novofedorivka, 89 technicians were still engaged in preparing aircraft and other equipment for shipment.⁵¹ Major Stanislav Karachevskiy, a serviceman of the 10th Marine Aviation Brigade, was killed while preparing to leave for the mainland of Ukraine. On April 6, he was shot dead by a Russian Marine. The murder took place outside of the service at the dormitory where Major Karachevsky lived.⁵²

The last soldiers of the tactical group "Crimea" left the peninsula on April 11, except for technical specialists who provided equipment evacuation.⁵³ Many personnel (mainly locals) chose to remain in Crimea and join the Russian army.

Road transport has been used to move aircraft and helicopters from Crimea. Groups of technicians partially dismantled some parts of planes and helicopters. For example, they disconnected wing consoles and keels and removed engines and radars from the MiG-29. The fuselage was loaded onto a dedicated trailer while the remaining components were transported separately. One fighter took three to five days to dismantle.⁵⁴

<https://informnapalm.org/ua/7057-ma-aviabaza-morskoi-aviatsii-chf-rf-u-p/>
(Accessed 05.04.2021).

⁵⁰ A. Kharuk, *Lotnictwo morskie Ukrainy...*, p. 195.

⁵¹ V. Trendafilovski, *Ukraińscy lotnicy morscy...*, p. 73.

⁵² M. Kosheliev, *Kryvava aneksiia bez "zhodnoho postrilu"* [Bloody annexation without "a single shot"], in <https://hromadske.ua/posts/richnycya-aneksii-krimu> (Accessed 05.04.2021).

⁵³ *Okupovanu terytoriiu zalyshaie taktychna hrupa "Krym" Povitrianykh Syl ZSU* [The occupied territory is left by the tactical group "Crimea" of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine], in https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-polytics/1646985-okupovanu_teritoriyu_zalishae_taktichna_grupa_krim_povitryanih_sil_zsu_1928239.html (Accessed 03.04.2021).

⁵⁴ *"V Khersoni stalo dykhaty lehshе": yak zalyshala Krym 204 Sevastopolska bryhada taktychnoi aviatsii* ["It became easier to breathe in Kherson": how the 204th Sevastopol Tactical Aviation Brigade left Crimea], in <https://www.armyfm.com.ua/v-hersoni->

The evacuation of aircraft lasted until early June 2014, when the Russian Federation suspended it under the pretext of the Anti-Terrorist Operation in eastern Ukraine. By that time, 82 aircraft had been evacuated from Crimea – 59 planes and 23 helicopters. Six aircraft (five Be-12s and one An-2) and 14 helicopters (seven Ka-27s, four Ka-29s, two Mi-8s, and one Mi-14) belonged to the 10th Marine Aviation Brigade. Only four unusable Be-12s and one Mi-8 were not able to be removed in time.⁵⁵ The 204th Tactical Aviation Brigade managed to evacuate 43 MiG-29 and MiG-29UB fighters (including seven aircraft from the former aerobatic team “Ukrainian Falcons” that were under conservation at the Kirovske airfield) and one L-39M1. The Brigade had 12 aircraft left in Crimea – seven MiG-29s, two MiG-29UBs, and three L-39M1s.⁵⁶ The rest of the evacuated aircraft – nine different types of planes and seven helicopters – belonged to the State Aviation Research Centre.

The evacuated units’ operational readiness had to be restored as soon as possible. The situation was more manageable with the 10th Marine Aviation Brigade because several of its planes and helicopters had returned from Crimea in flying conditions in early March. Two other aircraft were quickly restored: search and rescue amphibious Be-12PS and light transport aircraft An-2 evacuated by ground transport. However, restoring the helicopters was more difficult since, before the occupation of Crimea, Ka-27 and Mi-14 aircraft were repaired at the factory in Sevastopol.⁵⁷ On April 24, the crews of the 10th Brigade resumed An-26 and Be-12 training flights. In addition, in September 2014, planes Be-12 and helicopters Ka-27 took part in the multinational exercises “Sea Breeze 2014”.⁵⁸

It was significantly difficult to restore even the 204th Tactical Aviation Brigade’s bare combat capacity – after all, none of its aircraft taken out of Crimea was suitable for flight. In April 2014, as a temporary measure, a group of pilots from this Brigade was relocated to Vasylkiv, near Kyiv, where the 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade was stationed. On April 11, pilots from the 204th Brigade began flights uti-

dihati-stalo-legshe-yak-zalishala-krim-204-sevastopolska-brigada-taktichnoi-aviacii/ (Accessed 03.04.2021).

⁵⁵ V. Trendafilovski, *Crimea's Unsung Heroes...*, p. 79.

⁵⁶ *Polkovnyk Mamchur: nam ne povernuly dvanadtsiat boiovykh litakiv* [Colonel Mamchur: Twelve combat airplanes were not returned to us], in http://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-other_news/1676146-polkovnik_mamchur_nam_ne_povernuli_12_boiovih_litakiv_1948277.html (Accessed 03.04.2021).

⁵⁷ V. Trendafilovski, *Ukraińscy lotnicy morscy...*, p. 74.

⁵⁸ “Si Bryz – 2014”. *Morska y aviatsiina fazy* [“Sea Breeze – 2014”. Marine and aviation phases], in <https://odessactrs.livejournal.com/31788.html> (Accessed 03.04.2021).

lizing this unit's MiG-29 to improve their flying abilities. The first MiG-29 mounted in Kulbakine after the evacuation from Crimea flew on July 31, 2014. The first MiG-29UB took off the next day.⁵⁹ However, the vast majority of fighters taken out of Crimea could not be restored by the technical staff of the Brigade – they needed repairing at the aircraft repair factory. Therefore, the process of restoring the combat capability of the 204th Tactical Aviation Brigade took several years.

The Russian Federation quickly created a potent aviation group in Crimea. Already in March 2014, four Su-27 fighters assigned from the 3rd Guards Mixed Air Regiment (Krymsk airbase) took up combat duty at the Gvardiiske airfield. And on June 1, 2014, the territory of the occupied Crimea was officially included in the area of responsibility of the 4th Air Force and Air Defence Command.⁶⁰ In July, the four Su-27 fighters were replaced by three new Su-30M2 fighters relocated to the former Belbek airfield in Ukraine. It was the first stage of the 38th Fighter Regiment formation in August 2014, later improved by five planes Su-27P and one Su-27UB transferred from the 159th Fighter Regiment (Besovets Air Base in Northern Russia), and upgraded Su-27SMs and two Su-27UBs arrived on December 12 from the Far East. Aircraft delivery continued, and as of 2016, the regiment had 31 aircraft (12 Su-27s, 12 Su-27SMs, two Su-27UBs, and five Su-30M2s).⁶¹ In November 2014, the 37th Mixed Air Regiment (12 bombers Su-24M and 12 attack aircraft Su-25SM) was formed at the Hvardiiske airfield, and in December the 39th Helicopter Regiment was formed at the Dzhankoi Airfield. Its first squadron received 12 Ka-52 helicopters, its second acquired 12 Mi-35Ms and four Mi-28Ns, and its third squadron received 12 Mi-8AMTShs.⁶² To command the regiments, the headquarters of the 27th Mixed Aviation Division were established at Belbek airfield.⁶³

The 7057th Air Base of the Black Sea Fleet was decommissioned on July 1, 2013, and two regiments were formed instead. The 43rd Separate Naval Assault

⁵⁹ M. Gawęda, *MiG-29 w konflikcie o Donbas...*, p. 60.

⁶⁰ V. Trendafilovski, *Russian military aviation in Crimea*, in "Air International", 2018, 2, p. 43.

⁶¹ D. Tomenchuk, *Aviatsiia RF na tymchasovo okupovanii terytorii AR Krym ta bilia kordonu z Ukrainoiu* [Russian aviation in the temporarily occupied territory of the AR of Crimea and near the border with Ukraine], in <http://militaryaviation.in.ua/uk/2018/12/04/aviatsiyi-rf-na-timchasovo-okupovaniy-teritoriyi-ar-krim-ta-bilya-kordonu-z-ukrayinoyu/> (Accessed 05.04.2021).

⁶² V. Trendafilovski, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁶³ *Glavkom VVS: v Krymu razvernuta smeshannaya aviadiviziya* [Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force: a mixed air division has been deployed in Crimea], in <https://ria.ru/20150430/1061935898.html> (Accessed 05.04.2021).

Air Regiment was deployed at the former Ukrainian Saki-Novofedorivka airfield. By 2016, the old Su-24 bombers had been replaced by Su-24M bombers and new Su-30SM multi-purpose aircraft. The 318th Separate Mixed Air-Regiment was formed with An-26, Be-12 planes and helicopters stationed at Kachi.⁶⁴ As a consequence, the Russian Federation dispatched a formidable aviation force (five regiments) in Crimea, consisting of 110 combat aircraft and 60 helicopters.⁶⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The Russian Federation's occupation of Crimea in February-March 2014 was carried out with the active employment of aircraft. At the outset, the operations of military transport aircraft were crucial – their task was to bring additional military contingents to the peninsula. Later, until the order to evacuate Ukrainian troops from Crimea was given, helicopters, mainly attack helicopters, played the crucial role, exerting psychological pressure on the blocked Ukrainian garrisons and ship crews. Because the Ukrainian side did not reply with armed resistance, jet combat aircraft were also never deployed.

Ukrainian aviation remained largely inactive throughout the occupation of Crimea, except for the 10th Marine Aviation Brigade flying planes and helicopters to Ukraine's mainland. The contributing factors were the command's indecision, the large part of the personnel's wait-and-see approach (residents), and the aircraft's inadequate condition (most planes and helicopters were unsuitable for flying).

Following the evacuation of the aviation units from Crimea, the Ukrainian side had to devote a significant amount of time and effort to restore at least a partial combat capability. On the other hand, Russia relying on its resources soon transformed Crimea into a kind of "unsinkable aircraft carrier", deploying several aviation regiments equipped with modern aeroplanes and helicopters.

⁶⁴ V. Trendafilovski, *op. cit.*, p. 45-47.

⁶⁵ *Informe ucraniano sobre la militarización de Crimea*, in <http://fuerzasmilitares.es/informe-ucraniano-sobre-la-militarizacion-de-crimea> (Accessed 05.04.2021).

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ROMANIA AND REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA IN 2010-2021. GEOCULTURAL, GEOECONOMIC AND GEOSTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

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Abstract. *The bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova are decisively influenced not only by the history of the neo-Latin ethnic groups in the two countries but also by the policies of the European Union, NATO, and Russia.*

The first part of this article analyses the evolution of bilateral relations between the two states in 2010-2021, focusing on the main agreements concluded and official state visits. The second part analyses the historical, linguistic and religious issues that affect the feeling of self-perception of the ethnic identity of the neo-Latin ethnos in the Republic of Moldova. The third part highlights the main data of the economic cooperation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The final part of the article highlights the unique role of the separatist region of Transnistria, which decisively influences the geostrategic component of the relations between the two states.

Keywords: *Romania, Republic of Moldova, bilateral relations, European Union, Russia, NATO, geoculture, geoeconomy, geostrategy*

Rezumat. România și Republica Moldova în anii 2010-2021. Considerații geoculturale, geoeconomice și geostrategice. *Relațiile diplomatice dintre România și Republica Moldova sunt decisiv influențate nu numai de către istoria grupurilor etnice neolatine din cele două țări, dar și de către politicile Uniunii Europene, NATO și Rusiei.*

Prima parte a articolului analizează evoluția relațiilor bilaterale dintre cele două state în perioada 2010-2021, punându-se accentul pe principalele acorduri încheiate și vizite reciproce la nivel înalt. Partea a doua pune în discuție problemele istorice, lingvistice și religioase care afectează sentimentul auto-perceperii identității etnice a ethnosului neolatine din Republica Moldova. Partea a treia pune în evidență principalele date ale cooperării economice dintre cele două state și perspectivele acesteia. Partea finală subliniază rolul

special al regiunii separatiste Transnistria, care influențează în chip decisive relațiile geostrategice dintre cele două state.

INTRODUCTION

Bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova have particular geopolitical relevance because of three reasons. First, Romania is a member of NATO and the European Union. The Republic of Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the EU in 2014. Starting with December 2017, a NATO civil liaison office in Chișinău was established.¹ Secondly, the Russian Federation is trying to keep a minimal influence in the already famous “near abroad”² (i.e., the former 11 Soviet republics, as was the case with the Republic of Moldova until 1991). Thirdly, Romanians and Moldovans have a common historical past and speak practically the same language.

This article continues personal analysis and reflections on this topic, published in 2011-2019³, completed with new statistical data and relevant speciality literature.

¹ *Relations with the Republic of Moldova*, in https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49727.htm (Accessed on 20.06.2021)

² This English syntagma originated from the Russian expression “ближнее зарубежье” (i.e., *blizhneye zarubezhye* = “near beyond border”). In this respect, see especially Gerard Toal, *Near Abroad. Putin, the West, and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus*, Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 3, 9.

³ Florin Pintescu, *Relațiile bilaterale dintre Republica Moldova și România în perioada 2000-2010. Considerații geoeconomice și geostrategice* [Bilateral relations between the Republic of Moldova and Romania in the period 2000-2010], in “Revista moldovenească de drept internațional și relații internaționale”, Chișinău, no. 3 (21), 2011, pp. 33-43; Idem, *Republica Moldova între Roma și Constantinopol sau mitul eternei reîntoarceri: o problemă geopolitică perenă* [The Republic of Moldova between Rome and Constantinople or the myth of eternal return: a perennial geopolitical problem], în “Jurnalul Libertății de Conștiință /Journal for Freedom of Conscience”, no. 4, 2016, Editions IARSIC, Les Arcs, France, pp. 389-402; Idem, *România și Republica Moldova, state de frontieră. Asemănări, deosebiri, perspective* [Romania and the Republic of Moldova, frontier states. Similarities, differences, perspectives], in Valentin Beniuc, Corneliu Popovici et al (Eds.), *Statalitatea Moldovei: continuitatea istorică și perspectivele dezvoltării. Materialele conferinței științifice internaționale 24-25 martie 2017*, Chișinău, Institutul de relații internaționale din Moldova, 2017, pp. 102-118; Idem, *Politicile SUA, Germaniei și Rusiei în spațiul românesc (1990-2018). Considerații geoeconomice, geoculturale și geostrategice* [Policies of the USA, Germany and Russia

POLITICAL BILATERAL RELATIONS

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, events in Romania and the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic quickly followed one another. On April 27, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic adopted the “tricolour” (red, yellow, and blue, like Romania’s flag!) as the national flag. Finally, on August 27, 1991, the new state’s independence was proclaimed in the same Parliament.⁴

Along with Poland, Slovenia, Vietnam and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Romania was among the first states in the world to recognise the independence of the Republic of Moldova on August 28, 1991.⁵ In 1990-1991, several Romanian parliamentarians and politicians from the Republic of Moldova (especially former Prime Minister Mircea Druc, May 25, 1990 – May 28, 1991) had even campaigned for the union of the two countries. This union was agreed at one point by the Prime Minister of Romania Petre Roman (December 26, 1989 – October 16, 1991).⁶ The pro-unionist actions in 1990-1991 of politicians in Bucharest and Chişinău (followed including by popular rallies) could not be coordinated with each other.⁷

Three events practically annulled the impact of these actions: the signing of the Romanian-Soviet Treaty of April 5, 1991⁸, which almost recognised the borders of the former USSR and made inoperative, from the point of view of

in the Romanian space (1990-2018). Geoeconomical, Geocultural and Geostrategic Considerations], Târgovişte, Cetatea de Scaun, 2019, esp. pp. 206-219.

⁴ Vasile Stati, *Istoria Moldovei* [The History of Moldova], Chişinău, Vivar-Editor, 2002, p. 382; Victor Stepaniuc, *Statalitatea poporului moldovenesc. Aspecte istorice, politico-juridice* [The statehood of the Moldovan people. Historical, politico-legal aspects], Chişinău, Tipografia Centrală, 2005, p. 362; Sergiu Nazaria (Coord.), *Istoria Moldovei* [The History of Moldova], Vol. 3, *Moldova în perioada contemporană (1917 – începutul sec. al XXI-lea)* [Moldova in the contemporary period (1917 – the beginning of the 21st century)], Chişinău, Tipografia Centrală, 2016, pp. 533-538.

⁵ Vasile Stati, *Istoria Moldovei*, p. 382.

⁶ Viorel Patrichi, *Mircea Druc sau lupta cu ultimul imperiu* [Mircea Druc or the fight with the last empire], Bucureşti, Zamolxis, 1998, p. 451.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 452.

⁸ Florin Anghel, *La margini și sfârșit de imperiu: Tratatul româno-sovietic din 5 aprilie 1991 și consecințele pentru Republica Moldova* [At the edges and at the end of an empire: The Romanian-Soviet Treaty from April 5, 1991, and its consequences for the Republic of Moldova], in “Polis. Revistă de Științe Politice”, vol. II, no. 3 (5), New Series, September 2014, pp. 89-97. See especially pp. 93-95.

international law, the idea of the Union; the military conflict in Transnistria (March 2 – July 21, 1992), which led to the creation of the secessionist region the *Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic*⁹; the (re)launch in the Republic of Moldova of the doctrine of “Moldovanism” on February 5, 1994.¹⁰ This doctrine had a maximum period of assertion in 2001-2009.¹¹

Romania’s union with the Republic of Moldova has practically become a “taboo” subject after 1994 in the official relations between the two states. Therefore, especially since 2001, Romanian decision-makers have pragmatically approached relations with their counterparts in Chisinau, being involved in numerous state visits. After 2010, bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova took on a new dimension due to the emergence of the following elements: the launch in 2009, at the summit in Prague of the Eastern Partnership, a cooperation formula in which the EU included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine¹²; the signing by Moldova in 2014 of the Association Agreement with the EU (see above).

In this respect, after 2010, the official politics of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the following: “The development of the bilateral relations with the Republic of Moldova is a priority of Romania’s foreign policy, which derives primarily from the communion of history, language, traditions and culture.

As a consequence, the fundamentals of the relations – closely interconnected – are the following:

1. support for the European perspective of the Republic of Moldova and
2. intensified bilateral cooperation.”¹³

⁹ Ion Coștaș, *Transnistria 1989-1992. Cronica unui război „nedeclarat”* [Transnistria 1989-1992. Chronicle of an “undeclared” war], București, RAO, 2012. See esp. chapters 31-36, pp. 391-490.

¹⁰ Anatol Petrencu, *Falsurile și primejdia pseudoteoriei națiunii civice moldovenesti* [Fakes and dangerous of the Moldovan civic nation pseudo-theory], in „Limba Română. Revistă de Știință și Cultură”, no. 5-6, XXXI, 2021, <https://limbaromana.md/index.php?go=articole&n=4174> (Accessed on 22.11.2021).

¹¹ The doctrine of Moldovanism equates citizenship with ethnicity, trying to prove that there is a “Moldovan nation” made up of Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauzians, distinct from the Romanian one. See Dan Dungăciu, *Moldovenism sovietic* [Soviet Moldovanism], in Dan Dungăciu (Coord.), *Enciclopedia relațiilor internaționale* [Encyclopedia of International Relations], Vol. 1, A-M, Bucharest, RAO, 2017, pp. 585-586.

¹² *Eastern Partnership*, https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/eastern-partnership/419/eastern-partnership_en (Accessed on 22.06.2021).

¹³ *The Republic of Moldova*, <https://www.mae.ro/en/node/2110> (Accessed on 22.06.2021).

On April 27, 2010, the Strategic Partnership between Romania and the Republic of Moldova was signed in Bucharest. This document emphasised the political, economic, and cultural dimensions of the European integration of the last country¹⁴.

Between January 2010 and December 2021, the number of reciprocal state visits was quite impressive: 17 visits at the level of presidents of state (10 in Romania, 6 in the Republic of Moldova, 1 in a neutral location) and 23 visits at the level of prime ministers (11 in Romania, 11 in Moldova, 1 in a neutral country).¹⁵ These official visits were accompanied by the conclusion of bilateral treaties between the two states, covering the economic, cultural, scientific, or military fields. In 1990-2018, 168 such bilateral treaties were concluded or renewed, of which 91 in the period 2010-2018.¹⁶

During 2010-2021, the Republic of Moldova was led by five presidents. The interim president Gheorghe Ghimpu (September 11, 2009 – December 28, 2010), a supporter of the union with Romania, maintained good relations with it. During the interim President Marian Lupu (December 30, 2010 – March 23, 2012), a follower of the doctrine of “Moldovanism”, relations between the two states were cold. Romanian-Moldovan bilateral relations had an upward curve during the time of President Nicolae Timofti (2012-2016) and a less favourable period during the officially pro-Russian president Igor Dodon (2016-2020). Starting with December 24, 2020, when Maia Sandu became President of the Republic of Moldova, the relations between the two states grow into excellent.

This evolution was marked by two visits undertaken by the President of Romania, Klaus Werner Iohannis, to the Republic of Moldova (December 29, 2020, and August 27, 2021). During the first visit, the bilateral relations were re-launched. During the second visit¹⁷, the 30 years of independence of the Republic

¹⁴ *Declarație comună privind instituirea unui Parteneriat Strategic între Republica Moldova și România privind integrarea europeană a Republicii Moldova* [Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Moldova and Romania on the European Integration of the Republic of Moldova] <https://mfa.gov.md/img/docs/0001739.pdf> (Accessed on 23.06.2021).

¹⁵ *Principalele vizite bilaterale* [The main bilateral visits], <https://romania.mfa.gov.md/ro/content/principalele-vizite-bilaterale>; *Relații politice* [Political relations], <https://chisinau.mae.ro/node/167> (Accessed on 23.06.2021).

¹⁶ *Lista tratatelor bilaterale încheiate de către Republica Moldova*, https://mfa.gov.md/sites/default/files/lista_tratatelor_bilaterale_incheiate_de_republica_moldova_002.pdf, pp. 152-173 (Accessed on 23.06.2021).

¹⁷ *VIDEO. Președintele Iohannis, la ceremonia militară dedicată împlinirii a 30 de ani de la declararea independenței Republicii Moldova* [VIDEO. President Iohannis at the military

of Moldova were marked by a military ceremony attended by the Presidents of Romania, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, and Ukraine. President Maia Sandu paid two state visits to Romania (April 21, 2021, and November 23, 2021). On the last visit, the two presidents signed in Bucharest the updated “Roadmap on the priority areas of cooperation Romania – the Republic of Moldova”.¹⁸ The two central ideas of this document are the following: Romania’s support for the European integration of the Republic of Moldova; “strengthening the language, history and culture community between Romania and the Republic of Moldova”.¹⁹

Andrey Devyatkov considers that Romania’s support for the European integration of the Republic of Moldova is a good policy for Romania. “Bucharest sees the Europeanization of Moldova as in its strategic interest. It focuses now not only on identity issues but also on economic and soft power efforts to bring Chisinau closer to Europe”.²⁰ We agree with this author and further present to the reader significant data in this regard.

GEOCULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The famous term geoculture has been imposed in geopolitical analyses due to the creator of another renowned syntagma “Modern World-System”. In an influential book published in 1992, Immanuel Wallerstein shows the following: “The rejection of liberalism as an ideology (both in its Wilsonian and Leninist forms) – after 1990, our note – was no small episode. It represented a fundamental break with the intellectual premises of what I am calling the geoculture of the capitalist world-economy. Some describe the geoculture as the superstructure of this

ceremony dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the declaration of independence of the Republic of Moldova], <https://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2021/08/27/video-presedintele-iohannis-la-ceremonia-militara-dedicata-implinirii-a-30-de-ani-de-la-declararea-independentei-republicii-moldova--769764> (Accessed on 24.06.2021).

¹⁸ *Relații politice*, <https://chisinau.mae.ro/node/167> (Accessed on 24.06.2021).

¹⁹ *Primirea de către ministrul afacerilor externe Bogdan Aurescu a viceprim-ministrului, ministrul afacerilor externe și integrării europene al Republicii Moldova, Nicolae Popescu* [Reception by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Bogdan Aurescu of the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, Nicolae Popescu], <https://www.mae.ro/node/57203> (Accessed on 25.11.2021).

²⁰ Andrey Devyatkov, *Dynamics of Russian Power in Moldova*, in “Moldova monthly”, March 22, 2017, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/03/dynamics-russian-power-mold> (Accessed on 24.06.2021).

world-economy. I prefer to think of it as its underside, the part that is more hidden from view and therefore more difficult to assess, but the part without which the rest would be not nourished. I term it the geoculture by analogy with geopolitics, not because it is supra-local or supra-national but because it represents the cultural framework within which the world-system operates".²¹

Starting from this definition, we consider that there is a complex "cultural framework" that influences the nowadays relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, this being given by three elements: history, language, and religion. The sum of these elements most influences the self-perception of the ethnic identity of a people. Historically and geographically speaking, the current Republic of Moldova is the eastern part of the medieval principality of Moldova (often referred to in historical sources as Bessarabia), conventionally created in 1352-1353. In 1812-1918, Bessarabia was part of the Russian Empire, and in 1918-1940, it was part of the Kingdom of Romania. Between August 2, 1940, and September 27, 1991, Bessarabia became the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, except for a short period from September 3, 1941, to September 4, 1944, when it was part of the so-called Bessarabian government (Rom. *Guvernământul Basarabiei*), a part of the Kingdom of Romania. Starting with September 28, 1991, the sovereign state of the Republic of Moldova appears in the international arena.

The appeal to history is complicated because between October 12, 1924, and August 1, 1940, there was the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Autonomous Republic, which included present-day Transnistria and several districts in the present-day Odesa region, Ukraine.

Consequently, Romanian and pro-Romanian historians in the Republic of Moldova insist on the common elements of the history of the neo-Latin ethnic group in Romania and the Republic of Moldova.²² On the other hand, historians in Russia and pro-Russian historians in the Republic of Moldova insist on a distinct historical evolution of the Latin ethnos in the Republic of Moldova compared to the Latin ethnos in Romania.²³ In addition, the latest historians are more or fewer

²¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Introduction: the lessons of the 1980s*, in Idem, *Geopolitics and geoculture. Essays on the changing world-system*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 11.

²² The most representative 3 titles are the following: Alexandru Boldur, *Istoria Basarabiei* [The History of Bessarabia], București, Victor Frunză, 1992 – a classical book; Ștefan Purici, *Istoria Basarabiei* [The History of Bessarabia], București, Semne, 2011; Anatol Petrencu (Ed.), *O istorie a Basarabiei* [A History of Bessarabia], Chișinău, Serebia, 2015.

²³ The most representative 3 titles are the following: Vasile Stati, *Istoria Moldovei* [The History of Moldova], Chișinău, Vivar-Editor, 2002; Victor Stepaniuc, *Statalitatea*

followers of the theses of “Soviet Moldovanism” (see above), “European Moldovanism”²⁴ and “Moldovan civic nation”.²⁵

Linguistically, things are best defined by Charles King, a professor at Georgetown University: “The idea of the Moldovans as a distinct nation, in the normal sense of the term, is today problematic. The language they speak is Romanian, even though it has long been called *Moldovan* by men and women in the countryside and is still referred to by that name in the constitution of the post-Soviet republic. (...) There are today, in this sense, two culturally «Romanian» states in eastern Europe, even though both are also home to a wide variety of ethnic minorities – Hungarians, Ukrainians, Russians, Roma, Turks. (...) Both history and history-makers have produced an uncertain sense of distinctiveness among today’s Moldovans. Most freely admit that they speak something akin to Romanian (indeed, there is now nothing to distinguish the two languages in their literary forms). Still, most refuse to describe their nationality as «just» Romanian”.²⁶ The

poporului moldovenesc. Aspecte istorice, politico-juridice [The statehood of the Moldovan people. Historical, politico-legal aspects], Chişinău, Tipografia Centrală, 2005; Sergiu Nazaria (Coord.), *Istoria Moldovei* [The History of Moldova], vol. 1-3, Chişinău, Tipografia Centrală, 2016.

²⁴ The thesis of European Moldovanism recommends that the Republic of Moldova to support an equidistant position both towards Romania and towards Russia, supporting the integration of the Republic of Moldova in the European Union, without appealing for Romania’s support. Dan Dungaciuc, *Moldovenism europeanist* [European Moldovanism], in Dan Dungaciuc (Coord.), *Enciclopedia relațiilor internaționale* [Encyclopedia of International Relations], vol. 1, A-M, Bucharest, RAO, 2017, p. 583-585.

²⁵ It represents practically a completion and improvement of the thesis of European Moldovanism, starting from the idea that on the territory of the Republic of Moldova there are no interethnic conflicts, there is instead an accentuated bilingualism, the non-Russian ethnics using the Russian language as a *lingua franca*. Therefore, to keep interethnic peace and social harmony, the concept of “Moldovan civic nation”, made up of all citizens of the Republic of Moldova, regardless of ethnicity, should be strengthened. This thesis was launched by two quite influential books: Arcadie Barbăroşie, Oazu Nantoi (Coord.), *Integrarea grupurilor etnice și consolidarea națiunii civice în Republica Moldova* [Integration of ethnic groups and consolidation of the civic nation in the Republic of Moldova], Chişinău, Institute for Public Policies, 2012; Iulian Groza, Mathias Jopp et al., *Consolidarea coeziunii sociale și a unei identități comune în Republica Moldova. Probleme cheie și recomandări practice* [Consolidating social cohesion and a common identity in the Republic of Moldova. Key issues and practical recommendations], Chişinău, 2017.

²⁶ Charles King, *The Moldovans. Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture*, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 2000, p. 6.

representatives of “Soviet Moldovanism” have a different opinion on this issue. Philologist and historian Vasile Stati, an influential philologist of this camp, even published a *Moldovan-Romanian Dictionary*.²⁷

In a study published in 2016,²⁸ I showed that, from a religious point of view, the Republic of Moldova is a “torn country” (according to Samuel P. Huntington’s famous idea), between the Metropolis of Chişinău and all Moldova, subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate and the Metropolis of Bessarabia, subordinated to the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate. The Metropolis of Chişinău and all Moldova is more potent than that of Bessarabia. Thus, according to official statistics of the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate from 2010, it had 610 parishes, 24 monasteries, 5 sketes (4 males, 1 female), 730 regular priests and 60 full-time deacons.²⁹ According to the official data of the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate, The Metropolis of Bessarabia had in 2019 135 parishes and 2 subsidiaries and 13 monasteries.³⁰

Obviously, this “situation on the ground” gives a kind of geocultural advantage for the followers of “Moldovan” theories and, implicitly, for Russophiles in the Republic of Moldova. It is not surprising that this dichotomy in the field of historical and linguistic theories, as well as in the area of religious reality on the ground, created a diffuse sense of self-perception of the ethnic identity of Moldovans and their pro-Romanian or pro-Russian preferences. Thus, according to the 2014 population census, 2,068,058 inhabitants out of 2,754,719 declared themselves Moldovans (73.7%) and only 192,800 (6.9%) declared themselves Romanians.³¹ Also, according to an opinion poll from 2017, “more than half of the citizens of Moldova would prefer to simply put an end to the very existence of their state: In November 2017, 21.8% were ready to vote for merging their country with Romania and 33% for union with Russia”.³²

²⁷ Vasile Stati, *Dicţionar moldovenesc-românesc* [Moldovan-Romanian Dictionary], the second revised and completed edition, Chişinău, 2011.

²⁸ Florin Pintescu, *Republica Moldova între Roma şi Constantinopol*.

²⁹ *Kishinevskaya yeparkhiya* [Chisinau diocese] <http://www.patriarchia.ru/md/db/text/1560538.html> (Accessed on 23.07.2021).

³⁰ *Activităţile externe ale Patriarhiei Române; comunităţile bisericeşti externe; Biroul Protocol 2019* [The external activities of the Romanian Patriarchate; external church communities; Protocol Office 2019], <http://patriarhia.ro/activitatile-externe-ale-patriarhiei-romane-comunitatile-bisericesti-externe-biroul-protocol-2019-2871.html> (Accessed on 23.07.2021).

³¹ *Rezultatele Recensământului Populaţiei şi al Locuinţelor 2014 (RPL2014)* [Population and Housing Census Results 2014 (PHC2014)] <https://statistica.gov.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=479> (Accessed on 23.07.2021).

³² Theodor Tudoroiu, *Brexit, President Trump, and the Changing Geopolitics of Eastern*

Anyway, in the last decade, Romania has offered to the Republic of Moldova very effective cultural support that considerably diminished the Russian cultural influence in this country. Romania officially supports young people from the Republic of Moldova to study in Romania, offering them scholarships, accommodation, and other material incentives. Regarding this geocultural initiative, the Romanian state pays about 20 million Euros every year to offer 5,000 scholarships to students from the Republic of Moldova who study in Romania.³³ So far, the Romanian state has provided 29 million Euros, non-refundable money, for the modernisation of 934 kindergartens in the Republic of Moldova. In addition, 196 minibuses were donated to be used only by students from schools in the Republic of Moldova.³⁴

Experts believe that there are reasonable chances that bilateral cultural relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova will experience significant development in the following years.

GEOECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

After the implosion of the Soviet Union, many international relations experts believed that economic rivalries would replace the classic geopolitical rivalries between the great powers. Following this trend, Edward Luttwak invents a new term, geoeconomics. We further set out his views on this term. "This new version of the ancient rivalry of states, I have called 'geoeconomics'. In it, investment capital for industry provided or guided by the state is the equivalent of firepower; product development subsidised by the state is the equivalent of weapon innovation; and market penetration supported by the state replaces military bases and garrisons on foreign soil, as well as diplomatic influence. The very same things – investment, research and development, and marketing campaigns – are also done every day by private firms for their own purely commercial reasons. But when the state intervenes to encourage, help or direct these very same activities, it is no longer plain vanilla economics that is going on, but rather geoeconomics".³⁵

Europe, Palgrave Macmillan (eBook), 2018, p. 220.

³³ Dan Dungaciu, Petrișor Peiu, *Reunirea. Realități, costuri, beneficii* [Reunification. Realities, costs, benefits], București-Chișinău, Litera, 2017, p. 203.

³⁴ *Srijin financiar acordat Republicii Moldova* [Financial support provided to the Republic of Moldova], <http://chisinau.mae.ro/node/777> (Accessed on 25.07.2021).

³⁵ Edward Luttwak, *Turbo-Capitalism. Winners and Losers in the Global Economy*, Frome – London, Orion Business Book, 1999, p. 128-129.

We consider that this definition is suitable for the analysis of the external economic relations of the Republic of Moldova, in the context in which three notable influences are exerted on it: the influence of Russia, which considers that this state is part of its “near abroad”; The European Union, which concluded an Association Agreement in 2014; Romania, for reasons related to geoculture (for all these related things, see above).

Russia is now exercising its economic influence in the Republic of Moldova, primarily through the famous Gazprom, which practically controls Moldovagaz, Moldova’s national gas distribution company. Nothing spectacular in this, as Per Högselius pointed out, “Gazprom now owns the Belarusian and the Armenian gas transport infrastructure and the German gas distributor Wingas. It also holds between 25% and 50% of the main gas companies in Serbia, Moldova, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia and Finland”.³⁶ However, as Andrey Devyatkov pointed out in 2017, the economic influence of the Russian Federation on the Republic of Moldova decreased because of the Western economic aid for this state. “Several factors have undermined Russian power in Moldova. First, the Moldovan government is dependent on Western financial assistance, especially since 2010. This assistance is channelled through programs from European Union (EU), other financial institutions, and bilateral deals with Western countries. It now amounts to 300-400 million euros per year. (...) This financial aid has increased Western influence tremendously. Russia is not ready to compete with the West in this area”.³⁷

Taking advantage of the economic aid of the EU, of the western states and institutions, which helped to diminish the Russian influence on the economy of the Republic of Moldova, Romania launched a comprehensive program of economic support of this state. On April 27, 2010, a Technical and Financial Assistance Agreement, which Romania was to provide to the Republic of Moldova, was initiated in Bucharest. The program was founded based on a non-reimbursable amount of 100 million Euros, which the government in Bucharest was to grant to the one in Chişinău.³⁸

In October 2021, the construction of the Iaşi-Ungheni-Chişinău gas pipeline was completed (150 km, of which 110 km in the Republic of Moldova). This gas pipeline can carry about 2.2 billion cubic meters of gas annually in Moldova from Romania, satisfying approximately 75% of Moldova’s needs (including the

³⁶ Per Högselius, *Energy and Geopolitics*, Routledge, London – New York, 2019, p. 145.

³⁷ Andrey Devyatkov, *Dynamics of Russian Power in Moldova*.

³⁸ *Relații economice* [Economic relations], <http://chisinau.mae.ro/node/168> (Accessed on 26.07.2021).

Transnistrian region) in warmer weather and 60% in cold weather. This project was completed based on grants from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank (EUR 41 million) and the EU (EUR 10 million).³⁹ In the second half of 2021, the National Company for Road Infrastructure Management (CNAIR) started a large-scale action to build a new road bridge over the Prut at Ungheni and to rehabilitate four other road bridges over the same river, which connect the following localities: Sculeni (Romania) – Sculeni, Albița (Romania) – Leușeni, Oancea (Romania) – Cahul and Galați (Romania) – Giurgiulești.⁴⁰ Romania’s economic support for the Republic of Moldova is currently based on the updated “Roadmap on the priority areas of cooperation Romania – the Republic of Moldova”, signed on November 23, 2021, by the two presidents, Klaus Werner Iohannis and Maia Sandu (see above). This document has provisions on economic cooperation between the two states in the following areas: energy interconnection; reimbursable financial support; transport infrastructure; regional and territorial cooperation; cooperation in the field of public finances and European funds; agriculture; trade and investment cooperation; official development assistance.⁴¹

Romania can hope to successfully support the irreversible economic commitment of the Republic of Moldova to the EU, with two conditions: its economy to experience favourable growth trends in the coming years; be supported by the EU in this endeavour.

GEOSTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The famous scientist Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzeziński was one of the “brand”

³⁹ *Gazoductul Iași-Ungheni-Chișinău este pe deplin funcțional* [The Iasi-Ungheni-Chisinau gas pipeline is fully operational], <http://www.infotag.md/finances-ro/294504/> (Accessed on 27.10.2021).

⁴⁰ Marcela Ștefănescu, *CNAIR reabiliteaza cinci poduri de peste Prut si construiește unul nou, la Ungheni* [CNAIR is rehabilitating five bridges across the Prut and is building a new one in Ungheni], <https://t-times.ro/index.php/categorii/international/cnair-reabiliteaza-cinci-poduri-de-pest-prut-si-construiește-unul-nou-la-ungheni> (Accessed on 27.07.2021).

⁴¹ Oana Ghiță, *Foaia de parcurs privind domeniile prioritare de cooperare dintre România și Republica Moldova - actualizată* [Roadmap on priority areas for cooperation between Romania and the Republic of Moldova - updated], <https://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2021/11/23/foaia-de-parcurs-privind-domeniile-prioritare-de-cooperare-dintre-romania-si-republica-moldova-actualizata--819252> (Accessed on 23.11.2021).

geostrategy followers, and his considerations on this term are still nowadays valid. "The words geopolitical, strategic, and geostrategic are used to convey the following meanings: geopolitical reflects the combination of geographic and political factors determining the condition of a state or region and emphasising the impact of geography on politics; strategic refers to the comprehensive and planned application of measures to achieve a central goal or to vital assets of military significance; and geostrategic merges strategic consideration with geopolitical ones".⁴²

In the following, we will briefly analyse the current situation of bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova, considering this definition. Geographically, Romania is a NATO state located on the eastern border of this organisation, neighbouring Ukraine (with which Russia is *de facto* at war), and Moldova is part of what Russia considers to be its "near abroad". Given the geoculturally justified possibility of a union of the two states (so far hypothetical), Russia is vitally interested in either having a friendly policy with both states or controlling their policies in the worst scenario. From a military point of view, there can be no rational comparison between Russia, Romania, and the Republic of Moldova. Romania is a NATO state, but Moldova is a neutral state (proclaiming even a "permanent neutrality"), according to Article 11 of its Constitution⁴³.

For over a century, the Russians have rightly been considered chess experts. Therefore, they only need brute military force as a last resort to prevent a hypothetical union of Romania with the Republic of Moldova. In the geostrategic game of chess that Russia plays against the two countries, they have imposed the Transnistrian secessionist region as queen since 1992. Transnistria (i.e., Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, unrecognised state) still plays a significant role as queen in this chess game. Nicholas Dima brilliantly describes its position in Russia's strategy: "to keep Moldova under control, Romania at bay, and Ukraine under threat".⁴⁴

Anyway, Russia has in Transnistria 1,500 soldiers included in the „Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria” guarding the weapons depot (from

⁴² Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan. Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US – Soviet Contest*, Boston, The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986, p. xiv.

⁴³ *Constituția Republicii Moldova* [Constitution of the Republic of Moldova], <https://www.parlament.md/CadrulLegal/Constitution/tabid/151/language/ro-RO/Default.aspx> (Accessed on 28.07.2021).

⁴⁴ Nicholas Dima, *The Moldavian-Dnestr Republic: A Geo-Political Game*, in "The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies", 24 (1), 1999, p. 37, Apud Theodor Tudoroiu, *Brexit, President Trump, and the Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe*, p. 225.

the former Soviet times) at Cobasna, the largest in south-eastern Europe.⁴⁵ Russia's control of Transnistria offers the following cumulative advantages to this state: it formally prevents the accession of the Republic of Moldova to NATO and the European Union and informally the union of this state with Romania; poses an additional military threat to Ukraine from Russia; can be transformed into a new Kaliningrad in Europe, from where Russian military power can be projected to Ukraine, Romania and the Balkans; is an excellent means of propaganda of Russia among ethnic Russians abroad, showing that Russia does not abandon them when needed, etc.⁴⁶ We recommend to readers two works signed by the Polish researcher Jakub Pieńkowski on the region's distinct character (administration, economy, transport, etc.) very little known in Western Europe.⁴⁷ There is also a fact very little taken into account by researchers, not to mention the general public: for Russia, Transnistria is an excellent means of geocultural propaganda against Romania. In Transnistria, there were no less than 189 ghettos and concentration camps in which Jews from Bukovina and Bessarabia were deported during the regime of Marshal Antonescu (1941-1944).⁴⁸

Given these particular circumstances, Romania and the Republic of Moldova can only counter Russia's geostrategic advantages (given by their military strength and ... by the control of Transnistria!) relying on the help of allies, the European Union and NATO. And this last possibility only might work if they are not divided by Russia!

However, international relations experts rightly believe that revisionist

⁴⁵ Isaac Evans, *Lingering Soviet Weapons Depot Raises Ukrainian Fears of Russian Encirclement*, in <https://theowp.org/lingering-soviet-weapons-depot-raises-ukrainian-fears-of-russian-encirclement/> (Accessed on 20.12.2021).

⁴⁶ More details in Theodor Tudoroiu, *Brexit, President Trump...*, p. 226. See also Paul D. Quinlan, *The Impact of the Crisis in Ukraine in 2014 on Moldova, from the Perspective of a Historian*, in "Codrul Cosminului", XXVI, 2020, No. 2, pp. 384-392.

⁴⁷ Jakub Pieńkowski, *The Knotted Rails – Economic Situation and Geopolitical Determinants of Moldovan Railways*, in „Codrul Cosminului”, XVIII, 2012, no. 1, pp. 89-106, <http://codrulcosminului.usv.ro/CC18/1/kuba.pdf>; Kamil Całus, Marcin Kosienkowski, Piotr Oleksy, Jakub Pieńkowski, Robert Rajczyk, *Naddniestrze. Historia – polityka – gospodarka* [Transnistria. History. Politics. Economy], Poznań, EastWest Analytics, 2014.

⁴⁸ Sergiu Nazaria, *Holocaust. File din istorie (pe teritoriul Moldovei și în regiunile limitrofe ale Ucrainei, 1941–1944)* [Holocaust. History files (on the territory of Moldova and in the neighboring regions of Ukraine, 1941–1944)], Chișinău, Tipografia Centrală, 2005. On this topic see also Matatias Carp, *Cartea Neagră. Le Livre noir de la destruction des Juifs de Roumanie 1940-1944*, traduit du Roumain, annoté et présenté par Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine, Lonrai, Les Éditions Denoël, 2009, esp. pp. 293-632.

states (Russia is specially designated in this category) will continue to defend their interests, including by force, if necessary.⁴⁹ The conclusions of another expert, although extremely interesting, are not reassuring for geostrategically vulnerable countries: Russia and China will try to change the international order, anyway. "If, however, we take into account the complex, diffuse ways the cmp* was formed, transformed, and managed by overlapping Western empires, we would conclude that neither Russia nor China could be the next hegemon, even if either country wanted to be, for the simple reason that such an outcome is not possible today and won't be possible for a long time hence. ... Dewesternization means that the control and management of cmp is now in dispute – and it is precisely this dispute that engenders not a new unipolar order (where Russia and China are dangerous) because they want to be the next hegemons, according to Western media, but the multipolar world order we are all witnessing.⁵⁰

Therefore, we conclude this analysis by asking ourselves (not entirely) rhetorically: will the EU and NATO militarily defend Romania and the Republic of Moldova... in the case of...?

CONCLUSIONS

The bilateral relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova had an ascending trend in 2010 – November 2016, a slightly descending one in December 2016 – December 2020, becoming excellent starting with January 2021.

These relations are and will most likely be influenced slightly differently compared to other bilateral relationships by several geocultural, geoeconomic and geostrategic considerations.

From a geocultural point of view, it will matter a lot whether, in the near future, the sign of equality between the historical, ethnic and cultural identity of "Romanians" and "Moldovans" will be made and whether the Republic of Moldova will maintain its orientation towards European Union's values.

From a geoeconomic point of view, if the two countries continue their current economic cooperation projects and record decent economic growth rates,

⁴⁹ Daniel Woodley, *Globalization and Capitalist Geopolitics. Sovereignty and State Power in a Multipolar World*, London – New York, Routledge, 2015, p. 14.

* Colonial matrix of power – Fl. P.

⁵⁰ Walter D. Mignolo, *On Pluriversity and Multipolar World Order. Decoloniality after Decolonization; Dewesternization after the Cold War*, in Bernd Reiter (Ed.), *Constructing the Pluriverse. The Geopolitics of Knowledge*, Durham – London, Duke University Press, 2018, p. 102.

the future of their bilateral relations will be assured.

From a geostrategic point of view, the relations between Romania and the Republic of Moldova will be significantly influenced in the future by the relations between the EU and NATO on the one hand, Russia on the other hand.

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**DOCUMENTING THE PAST.
A NEW RETROSPECTIVE ON POLITICAL LIFE IN HABSBURG
BUKOVINA (1848–1861)***

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Abstract: *Autonomy in the Habsburg Empire has a long and complex history. Some saw it as a central goal for the people of the provinces, while others considered it a more or less functional political exercise. The book that two authors from Iasi propose to readers makes a timely and significant contribution to the knowledge of the history of Bukovina. Based on a series of documents discovered in the Romanian archives, the study offers a retrospective of the struggle for autonomy in Bukovina, highlighting crucial moments and remarkable personalities. Identifying the approaches of the existing historical literature, the authors enrich the documentary framework necessary to understand the historical itinerary covered by the imperial province, insisting on the struggle for autonomy as a process indispensable for the preservation of an unassimilated identity within the Habsburg Monarchy.*

Keywords: *Sources, Provincial Autonomy, Administration, Territorial structure, Identity, Petition.*

Rezumat: *În Imperiul Habsburgic, "autonomia" are o istorie lungă și complexă. Unii au văzut-o ca pe un obiectiv central pentru locuitorii provinciilor, iar alții au considerat-o un exercițiu politic, mai mult sau mai puțin funcțional. Cartea pe care doi autori ieșeni o propun cititorilor aduce o contribuție oportună și semnificativă la cunoașterea istoriei Bucovinei. Pe baza unei serii de documente descoperite în arhivele românești, studiul oferă o retrospectivă a luptei pentru autonomie în Bucovina, evidențind momente cruciale și*

* Review on: Mihai-Ștefan Ceaușu, Ion Lihaciu, *Autonomia Bucovinei (1848-1861). Studiu și documente* [Autonomy of Bukovina (1848-1861). Study and documents], Iași, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2021, 374 p.

personalități remarcabile. Identificând abordările literaturii istorice existente, autorii îmbogățesc cadrul documentar necesar înțelegerii itinerariului istoric parcurs de provincia imperială, insistând asupra luptei pentru autonomie ca proces indispensabil pentru păstrarea unei identități neasimilate în interiorul monarhiei habsburgice.

Despite a “relative abundance” of writings on the history of Bukovina, only a few used a “rich documentary base” or have brought new archival documents into the historiographical field. In this regard, we can mention the Romanian, German, Austrian, Ukrainian contributions or those belonging to Jewish authors or from cultural spaces interested in the history of Bukovina. A list of these works can be found in the five volumes of Erich Beck, entitled *Bibliographie zur Landeskunde der Bukowina*, published in Harrassowitz Verlag.¹

One of the authors, Mihai-Ștefan Ceașu, is well-known in the World of Clio’s Servants for the publication of numerous studies and articles dedicated to the History of Bukovina (in Romanian, German, and English), as well as for his collaborations on volumes of the history of the Habsburg or Austrian Monarchy, especially concerning the eastern part of this empire. His name also appears in the numerous scientific projects coordinated as Head of Department at the Institute “A. D. Xenopol” from Iași or as a collaborator to prestigious institutes and universities in Romania and abroad. The second author, Ion Lihaciu, is an Associate Professor, a member of numerous national and international scientific projects, author, co-author and editor of relevant studies in history, history of culture, linguistics, and a very active presence in several European cultural journals. The combination of the two authors’ efforts resulted in an important volume for understanding the history of Bukovina. The book has the following content: I. Foreword; II. The provincial autonomy of Bukovina between desideratum and achievement. Case study; III. Documents; Annexes; and Index of Names.

¹ Erich Beck, *Bibliographie zur Landeskunde der Bukowina: Literatur bis zum Jahre 1965*, München, Verlag des Südostdeutschen Kulturwerkes, 1966, 378 p.; Idem, *Bibliographie zur Kultur und Landeskunde der Bukowina: Literatur aus den Jahren 1966-1975*, Dortmund, Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa, 1985, 534 p.; Idem, *Bibliographie zur Kultur und Landeskunde der Bukowina 1976-1990*, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1999, 843 p.; Idem, *Bibliographie zur Kultur- und Landeskunde der Bukowina, 1991-1995*, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006, 895 p.; Idem, *Bibliographie zur Kultur und Landeskunde der Bukowina, 1996-1999*, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2010, 858 p.

Using the 27 documents reproduced in the third chapter, the authors briefly review the key moments that marked the province's history after the surrender of the north-western part of Moldova, later called Bukovina. The new Habsburg land was legally founded by the Convention of May 7, 1775, and resumed in the Convention on Borders of July 2, 1776, concluded between the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire. After "taking possession" of the territories, the imperial authorities endeavoured to keep the new "acquisition" separate from the rest of the Monarchy, preserving its "political individuality." That is why the new province was directly subordinated to the central institutions, creating an inexpensive and supple Military Administration of Bukovina meant to solve current administrative, legal or other problems. This state of affairs lasted until 1786, when the first administrator, Baron Gabriel von Spleny, was appointed. He remained in office until April 6, 1778, when Baron Karl von Enzenberg replaced him. The two generals "will prove to be good and capable administrators, using their talent and competence to promote the policy of the Vienna Court" (p. 15). The state tradition and nobility of the Romanians in Bukovina determined the imperial authorities to recognise their status as a "political nation" from the beginning of Austrian rule (p. 16). Even divided into the great and the minor nobles, this nobility formed the society's elite in Bukovina. However, according to Josephine principles, it was rejected from the governing act due to distrust of local elites and "especially for fear that driven by its interests, the group, it could have hindered or even prevented the application in Bukovina. of structural reforms" (p. 19). To these considerations, the authors add the low level of information and skills acquired through education and instruction and the lack of knowledge of the German language. That explains why the Austrian officers replaced the Moldovan governors.

The notable merit of the authors is to present the numerous reforming or ameliorating measures concerning the administration of Bukovina, applied by both Baron von Spleny and Baron von Enzenberg. When the socio-political situation was tenuous in the province - the authors point out this idea - the administrators of Bukovina at the local level and those in Vienna made some concessions to the requests from the local inhabitants. Such tensions arose when several ideas of organising the province - the complete annexation or division between Transylvania and Galicia - were circulated. In these circumstances, the representative of all the social categories in Bukovina, Vasile Balș, submitted a memorandum presenting the crucial demands of the Bukovinians. It was "the first important political manifestation of the Romanians in Bukovina after 1775" (p. 27). Despite all the support from Count Hadik, who warmly recommended the adoption of the claims in the memorandum, Joseph II continued to prepare for the

annexation of Bukovina to Galicia. Following these initiatives added to other factors, the emperor changed his decision on May 20, 1781, keeping Bukovina under the administration of the Aulic War Council. After the 1783 voyage, Emperor Joseph II retained his position. However, his desire to centralise and reduce the number of state officials created the preconditions for the future loss of the political-administrative individuality of Bukovina (p. 29). Following the monarch's visit to Bukovina and Galicia in July-August 1786, he finally abandoned the idea of turning the province into a military border area, choosing to introduce the civilian administration. The decision to annex Bukovina to Galicia provoked the opposition of the Romanian elite, which fought (until 1849, then until 1861) for regaining autonomy.

A brief overview of the main events with historical significance, up to 1848, can be listed: the abolition of the old titles of Moldavian nobility (mazil, boyar) and the introduction of those of knight, baron, count etc., on March 14, 1787; the memorandum of the spring of 1790, by which the people of Bukovina demanded from the emperor Leopold II, with arguments, the provincial autonomy; the imperial patent of September 12, 1790, published in Lemberg, by which the removal of the Bukovina nobility from the Galician ranks and the right to a diet of its own (p. 33) - never fully applied - announced the transformation of Bukovina into an independent province (fact considered by the authors of the book as a "milestone in the separation from Galicia, which appeals to the argumentation of the petitions of the Bukovinians from 1848-1849 and, later, in 1860-1861" (p. 34); the appointment of Vasile Balș to the highest political-administrative position, that of district captain; at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, respectively on April 13, 1817, the annulment of the separation of Bukovina from Galicia, by the decision of Emperor Franz I, and the return to political-administrative subordination, according to the 1787 patent.

Numerous and profound changes, generated and accelerated by the emergence and affirmation of the regional identity consciousness, simultaneously with the national one, marked the evolution from the decades until the revolution of 1848-1849 (p. 35-36). The local elite focused on obtaining provincial autonomy, the Romanians believing that will more easily achieve their goals in a Bukovina separated from Galicia. The favourable political climate, created after the removal of Metternich, and the participation of some young Bukovinians in the revolutionary actions in Vienna (i. e., Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki), strengthened the initiatives and revolutionary ideas in Bukovina. The Orthodox clergy, the great landowners, and the "intelligence" (supported by the masses, especially the peasants who wanted to be relieved of their duties) were at the forefront of the

revolutionary movement. On March 18, 1848, after Lemberg, the city of Czernowitz was engulfed in revolutionary unrest. Here, as in other localities of the empire, a Civic Guard and an Academic Legion were formed, which perished day and night on the streets to guarantee the peace of the inhabitants (p. 41). Under the influence of the events in Vienna, in Czernowitz and the province, numerous tensions broke out. Against the background of the changes caused by the removal of all forms of absolutism, on May 16/28, 1848, a large gathering of Orthodox priests from the Diocese of Bukovina took place, calling for a better administration of the Orthodox Religious Fund of Bukovina, removal of compromised officials, cancellation of the dismissal of Prof. Ion Calinciuc etc. The series of claims of the Bukovinians included the oldest desideratum: the administrative autonomy of the province and the separation from Galicia. In late May and early June 1848, the local elite sent the emperor a memorandum. This document contains the main political, cultural, spiritual, and economic demands known as the *Petition of the Land of Bukovina*. Gheorghe Hurmuzaki, Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, and Johann Karl Umlauf von Frankwell significantly contributed to its preparation. In addition to the "Diet" and "Autonomy", other demands included: the recognition of political and religious equality of all denominations, the election of the Bishop of Bukovina by a national synod of laypeople and clergy, the establishment of a committee of secular and clerical representatives to administer the Church Fund (under the control of the Bukovina Diet), the establishment of a department of Romanian language and literature in Czernowitz etc. All these requests came to the attention of the Constituent Assembly in Vienna, which debated them, responding favourably to some of them.

With remarkable meticulousness, the authors present the elections based on the law of June 1, 1848, which took place between June 13 and 26, 1848. In addition, they analyse the pro-Galician position manifested by several peasant deputies of Romanian origin (pp. 49-54) and the pro-autonomist activity of Miron Ciupercovici, Mihai Bodnar, and Anton Kral (pp. 55-61). Following the change in the relationship between the autonomists and pro-Galicians, after Ciupercovici's resignation, deputies Ion Dolenciuc, Vasile Murgoci, Vasile Cârste and Gheorghe Timiș sent to the Imperial Diet, on December 15, 1848, a memorandum requesting the maintenance of "union" with Galicia, which was in contradiction with the *Petition of the Land of Bukovina*. In response, on January 20, 1849, the Autonomist Deputation presented Franz Joseph with an address in German and Romanian. The emperor assured that it would be resolved positively, according to the principle of "equal right" of all nations of the Monarchy. In the wake of the transformations produced by the revolution, the project of a five-part federal state

(Polish Austria, Czech Austria, Slovenian Austria, Italian Austria and German Austria) emerged. It jeopardised the autonomy of Bukovina, which would join Galicia and the Polish part of Austria. Therefore, on February 9, 1849, the Bukovinian Deputation submitted a *Memorandum to the Petition of the Land* to the Constituent Assembly meeting in Kremsier (p. 63). Numerous efforts by the autonomous deputies convinced the Imperial Diet of Kremsier to decide on the status of Bukovina. They were based on the arguments found in the four pro-autonomy and four anti-autonomy memoranda, recommending to the Constituent Assembly plenary to accept "Bukovina's inclusion in the draft of the Constitution as one of the 14 constituent provinces of the Austrian Empire" (p. 68). The seven Bukovinians deputies were also consulted: Anton Kral, Mihai Bodnar and Miron Ciupercovici spoke in favour of autonomy and Ion Dolenciuc, Vasile Murgoci, Vasile Cârste and Gheorghe Timiș against it. The latter subscribed to a subsequent protest by pointing the finger, which was against the establishment of Bukovina as an autonomous province (Kronland). The Constitution of March 4, 1849, proclaimed the province's autonomy.

Until the establishment of the neo-absolutist regime, the head of the administration of Bukovina, Eduard Bach, proposed another administrative and political division of the province, naming the new units according to some constituencies. Starting from the provisions of the Imperial Constitution, a version of the Provincial Constitution was drafted (p. 71), which specified the areas of competence of the Bukovina Diet and how it works. The city of Czernowitz was designated as the capital. The provincial constitution, the electoral law and the administrative-territorial division were approved by the Council of Ministers and sanctioned by the emperor on September 29, 1850. According to the final form, the six districts or prefectures (Czernowitz, Kotzman, Wiznitz, Radautz, Kimpolung and Suczawa) were to be led by a district captain or prefect, assisted by commissioners and a secretary. The authors point out that, despite the annulment of many of the rights gained by the revolution, the political and administrative autonomy of Bukovina has been preserved and strengthened (p. 73). In the following years, the institutional organisation of the Government of Bukovina became more significant. In 1854, a new administrative organisation divided Bukovina into 15 districts and the municipality of Czernowitz, which had its legal status. In the same period, the Country Tribunal was established in Czernowitz, having responsibilities in legal matters, trade, industry and mining.

Notable are the aspects that Mihai-Ștefan Ceaușu and Ion Lihaciu deal with on several pages (pp. 77-85), regarding the Country Diet, the Provincial Constitution draft, the election of deputies and the composition of constituencies,

the norm of representation, the right to vote and its exercise, the duration of the mandate, the role of the Country Committee, the coat of arms of Bukovina. The authors also insist on the efforts of Goluchowski, who became Minister of the Interior, to form a "Great Galicia" – dominated by the Poles – which would include Bukovina, along with the Duchy of Krakow. Due to the international political situation, the great financial crisis affecting the empire and the desire to gain the trust of financial circles, the Government of Bukovina was dissolved on April 26, 1860, and the province became part of the Kingdom of Galicia as a simple administrative district. The reaction of the Bukovinian elite as well as of the ordinary people proved to be of vehement dissatisfaction. A memorandum was addressed to the emperor, at the end of March 1860, among the signatories being Leon and Dumitru de Capri, Nicolae von Buchental, Ioan von Miculi, Dumitru von Perjul, Anton Lukasiewicz, archpriest Vasile Drabişca. The opposition of the Romanian elite in Bukovina could be easily understood, especially since during the period of autonomy when the Bukovinian society experienced a period of flourishing, materialised in the development of trade, the increase of the number of trivial and primary schools, the opening of the Gymnasiums in Czernowitz and Suczawa, the creation of the Land's Library, the establishment of a museum, the existence of a pedagogical school and a music school in Czernowitz. At the beginning of the summer of 1860, on the occasion of the meeting of the enlarged Imperial Council, the Bukovinians' requests were ignored by Alexandru Nicolae von Petrino, their representative in them mentioned political body. Even so, they asked for help from the other two Romanian deputies – Andrei Şaguna and Alexandru von Mocioni – who verbally presented the situation in Bukovina.

In September 1860, during the discussions on the political status of Bukovina, Alexandru von Mocioni pleaded in the Imperial Council in favour of the autonomy of the province, while Alexandru Nicolae von Petrino took an opposite position. As a result, the Federalist Constitution of October 20, 1860, based on historical law, did not provide for the organisation of the Duchy of Bukovina as a state (p.93). Proponents of the autonomist idea faced difficulties generated mainly by the initiatives of Goluchowski, such as censorship of correspondence, surveillance or detention for various reasons. The Bukovinians compiled a new and extensive petition, on November 10, 1860, signed by dozens of personalities, including Eudoxiu von Hurmuzaki, Wilhelm von Alth, Joseph Lepszey, Ion Calinciuc, Iordaki von Vasilco, Ioan von Costin, Gustav Marin, Gheorghe von Hurmuzaki. Instead of the dismissed Rechberg-Goluchowski federalist cabinet, a government led by the leader of the German Liberals, Anton von Schmerling, was installed, boosting the efforts of the autonomists. After numerous other petitions

and memoirs, the autonomist movement in Bukovina became visible both in the empire's ruling circles and in German publications in Vienna (p. 96). The Hurmuzaki boyars were at the forefront of the movement. Their efforts were successfully crowned by the Imperial Constitution of February 26, 1861, in which Bukovina obtained the status of an autonomous province with a representative in the Imperial Council of Vienna. The Diet became the most important political body in the province, consisting of 30 deputies, 29 of whom were elected from three major constituencies, thus gaining a six-year consecutive term. Any 30-year-old male, Austrian citizen, fully able to exercise his civil rights, could be elected to the Diet. The Duchy of Bukovina was ruled from the province's capital, Czernowitz, the Government of Bukovina acting effectively from April 22, 1861. On April 23, 1861, in Czernowitz, Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki and Iordaki Vasilco were honoured "as artisans of regaining the autonomy of Bukovina" (pp. 104-105). The authors' conclusion regarding this case study highlights how "the much-desired goal of the Romanian political elite in Bukovina, which also benefited from the support of other provincial nationalities, was transposed into political practice" (p. 105).

Chapter III, entitled *Documents*, contains 27 various texts illustrating the autonomy of Bukovina. These are collected from the archival funds at the Central National Historical Archives Service of Bucharest, the "Government of Bukovina" Fund, at the Ministry of Interior [of Austria] or the County Service of the National Archives Suceava, the "Documents" collection, which are photocopies of the German originals in Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien; the publications such as *Zur Begründung der Bukowinaer Landes-Petition*, Wien, Druck von Carl Gerold und Sohn, 1848 and *Emanzipationsruf der Bukowina, Durch eine Deputation unterstützt*, Wien, Druck von Carl Gerolds Sohn, 1861; the periodicals "Bucovina. Gazetă românească pentru politică, religie și literatură / Romanische Zeitung für Politik, Kirche und Literatur" [Bukovina. Romanian Gazette for Politics, Religion and Literature], Czernowitz, March 4/16, 1849, "Supliment la Gazeta românească/Supplement zur Romanischen Zeitung" [Supplement to the Romanian Gazette], no. 4, of 4/16 March 1849. Among the cited documents, the authors reproduce the *Petition of the Land of Bukovina, Memorandum to the "Petition of the Land", The Bukovinian Petition submitted to Emperor Franz Joseph*, signed by 250 inhabitants of all social classes, addresses such as the one issued by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Czernowitz for Anton von Schmerling, various notes from some Galician officials, reports. In German and Romanian, the texts are enriched with explanatory notes on their location, brief biographical data about some Bukovinians or Austrian officials, the meaning of words specific to the epoch, or the clarification of a historical or linguistic context.

The Annexes reproduce images of documents considered relevant by the authors for the subject in question. The paper ends with the Index of Names. Probably, from the perspective of making a complete working tool, a Toponymic Index would have been appropriate as well.

The challenging journey from idea to deed for obtaining the autonomy of Bukovina highlights the effort of several generations of Romanian boyars, politicians and ordinary people who capitalised on any favourable moment in the life of the province and the Habsburg Empire to preserve the individuality of Bukovina, an “acquisition” constantly threatened by the policy of colonisation of the imperial authorities. Among the well-known names involved in the materialisation of this cause are the boyars of the Hurmuzaki family, whose presence on the political and cultural scene of the province for almost a century has left deep traces. In this context, the Cernauca estate was the meeting place of many Romanian revolutionaries from Moldova and Transylvania. There, the ideas of “independence” and “unity” of Romanians were forged, inspiring *The Wishes of the National Party of Moldova*, a program published by Mihail Kogălniceanu, on August 15, 1848, in Czernowitz. He named the unification of Moldova and Wallachia “the key to the vault without which the entire national edifice would collapse.”²

Reflecting the seriousness of two leading specialists in the field of history, history of culture and philology – Mihai-Ștefan Ceașu and Ion Lihaciu – the book imposes itself by rigorously investigating historical sources, synthesising relevant scientific information, accurately translating documents from German into Romanian, and respecting the principle *sine ira et studio*. In other words, we are dealing with a significant contribution to the scientific dialogue between Romanian, Austro-German, Ukrainian and Russian historiographies on the history of Bukovina.

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