

FIGHT FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE DURING THE FIRST POLISH INTERREGNUM (1572-1573)

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Abstract: *As the Reformation progressed in the 16th century, Poland became increasingly populated by representatives of Protestant denominations. Because political elites and nobility disagreed on religious matters, the issue of religious tolerance required appropriate formal and legal solutions. That was particularly important during the first interregnum following the death of King Sigismund Augustus, when the spectre of anarchy loomed over the state. The Warsaw Confederation Act was introduced during the Convocation Sejm to preserve order in the country during the interregnum. This document also included provisions on religious tolerance, which remained a source of dispute for both supporters and opponents of religious peace for many years.*

This article addresses the first stage of the struggle for formal recognition of religious tolerance, which occurred between the death of the last monarch of the Jagiellonian dynasty (7 July 1572) and the end of the session of the Convocation Sejm during the first interregnum (28 January 1573). The study was built on 16th-century historiography - the works of Marcin Bielski, Świętosław Orzelski and Reinhold Heidenstein. The paper aims to reconstruct the events that led to the creation of the Warsaw Confederation Act. Moreover, the sources reflect the atmosphere prevailing in the country at that time, which is undoubtedly significant in capturing the topic under consideration.

The paper is a three-part inquiry that, aside from research methodologies, displays the historical context in the introduction while the remainder of the text is a comparative analysis of the source material, from which relevant conclusions were drawn.

Keywords: *Convocation Sejm, Warsaw Confederation, Polish-Lithuanian Common-*

wealth, Interregnum, religious tolerance, Reinhold Heidenstein, Świętosław Orzelski, Marcin Bielski

Rezumat: Lupta pentru libertate religioasă în timpul primului Interregnum polonez (1572-1573). *Pe măsură ce Reforma se răspândise în secolul al XVI-lea, reprezentanții confesiunilor protestante deveniseră din ce în ce mai numeroși în Polonia. Deoarece elitele politice și nobilimea nu căzuseră de acord asupra unor chestiuni religioase, problema toleranței religioase a necesitat introducerea unor soluții formale și legale adecvate. Acest fapt s-a ilustrat ca fiind deosebit de important în timpul primului interregnum polonez, de după moartea regelui Sigismund Augustus, când spectrul anarhiei plana asupra statului. Actul Confederației de la Varșovia a fost adoptat în vremea convocării Seim-ului, în vederea menținerii ordinii în țară în timpul interregnum-ului. Documentul includea diverse prevederi privind toleranța religioasă, rămânând timp de mulți ani o sursă de dispută atât pentru susținătorii, cât și pentru oponenții păcii religioase.*

Articolul abordează prima etapă a luptei pentru recunoașterea formală a toleranței religioase, care a avut loc între moartea ultimului monarh al dinastiei Jageloniene (7 iulie 1572) și sfârșitul sesiunii Seimului convocat în timpul primului interregnum (28 ianuarie 1573). Demersul științific se bazează preponderent pe lucrările unor reprezentanți de marcă ai istoriografiei polone din secolul al XVI-lea – Marcin Bielski, Świętosław Orzelski și Reinhold Heidenstein. Lucrarea noastră își propune să reconstituie evenimentele care au dus la crearea Actului Confederației de la Varșovia. Sursele consultate reflectă atmosfera care predomina în țară la acea vreme, fapt semnificativ pentru înțelegerea subiectului în discuție.

Articolul este, practic, o investigație în trei părți care, în afară de metodologiile de cercetare, reliefează în introducere contextul istoric, restul textului fiind o analiză comparativă a materialului sursă, pe baza căreia au fost obținute concluzii relevante.

INTRODUCTION

In the 14th century, following the incorporation of the Kingdom of Galicia-Volhynia into Poland by Casimir III the Great, the country became home to large numbers of Orthodox Christians. Casimir, the last king of the Piast dynasty, decided to respect religious distinctness, hoping that he would win the support of the Russian elites for his territorial ambitions. This decision laid the foundations for centuries of religious tolerance in Poland, which made this country, and later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, stand out from other European Catholic countries. In the course of history, not only Orthodox Christians but also Crimean Karaites, Jews, Tatars and Armenians have enjoyed peaceful religious coexistence in Poland. In the 16th century, due to the development of the Reformation in Europe, representatives of different Protestant denominations added to

Poland's religious mix. As a result, the country's political elites and the nobility became religiously diverse, which, in turn, called for appropriate formal and legal solutions. This need became especially pressing in the time of the first *interregnum* after the death of Sigismund II Augustus when the threat of anarchy loomed over the country. The fear of a potential civil war or an international conflict was so strong at that time that political actors were often ready for various compromises, in religion, as well as other areas to maintain peace. That led to the formulation of the Act of the Warsaw Confederation at the Convocation Sejm, which included clauses guaranteeing religious tolerance. These clauses later became the major bone of contention in the conflict between the supporters and opponents of religious peace.

The first phase of the battle for legal sanctioning of religious tolerance occurred between the death of the last Jagiellonian king (July 7, 1572) and the conclusion of the Convocation Sejm session of the first *interregnum* (January 28, 1573). The reconstruction of the events that led to the creation of the Act of the Warsaw Confederation is made possible by 16th-century historiography, i. e. works by Marcin Bielski, Świętosław Orzelski and Reinhold Heidenstein. The aim of this article, in addition to retracing the course of the above-mentioned events, is also to capture their atmosphere. A comparative analysis of the sources has allowed the creation of a detailed description, which is undeniably an important contribution to the scientific queries into the long-lasting fight for the legal sanctioning of religious tolerance in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The article is based on summarized fragments of sources written by the above-mentioned chroniclers, selected in such a way as to reconstruct the described events in the most detailed way by complementing each other. The source excerpts were not only cited, but also compared, showing the similarities and differences between them, as well as the problems emphasized by each of the authors. However, the research considerations would not be complete without referring to the scientific literature dealing with the subject covered by this research.

There are numerous publications on the question of the Warsaw Confederation and religious tolerance in Polish historiography. One of the most famous works on this matter was written by Józef Siemieński¹ during the interwar period. The subject he addressed was developed by Mirosław Korolko in the second

¹ Józef Siemieński, *Drugi akt konfederacji warszawskiej 1573 roku. Przyczynek archiwalny do historii ustroju Polski* [The second act of the Warsaw Confederation in 1573. Archival contribution to the history of the Polish political system], Kraków, Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1930.

half of the 20th century. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning Janusz Tazbir, an outstanding specialist in this field, whose works were published in the second half of the 20th and 21st centuries. Religious issues in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth are also addressed by Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz, who is specialized in the history of the political system of this country. The above-mentioned authors of scientific publications are not the only Polish historians who examined the matter of the religious situation in the Polish-Lithuanian state. However, historical heritage is so abundant that addressing this issue in a single scientific article is nearly impossible.

In terms of foreign historiography, the scientific heritage on the topic is not as extensive as that of Polish historians. Norman Davies, a British researcher addressed the issue of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the first volume of *God's Playground. A history of Poland* and the book *Europe*. It is worth noting that the first of these two publications has been widely praised by the scientific historical community as one of the best foreign-language books on Polish history. In addition, in 2001 Daniel Stone published a work illustrating the history of the Polish-Lithuanian state.

RESEARCH PROBLEM ANALYSIS

When the last king of the Jagiellonian dynasty was approaching the end of his life, Poland's political elites were conscious of the country's internal instability. The king did not have a male heir, so his contemporaries were aware that after his death, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would face a *viritim* election² preceded by an *interregnum*. The prospect of the *interregnum* was very concerning for society, as described by Andrzej Lubieniecki, a witness of those events: "*The citizens of our states, both noblemen and common people, having lost their hope for the king's heir, were awaiting the interregnum just as anyone with a guilty conscience would await the Doomsday. When the king's death was close, anytime a few clergymen, or lay people, or senators, or the nobility, or even merchants gathered, they never failed to speak about the looming interregnum, and it*

² The Viritim Election is a king's election in which every nobleman has the right to vote. The final formula of this procedure was established during the Convocation Sejm in 1573. Henri de Valois was the first king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth elected according to the established rules (May 11, 1573). Sebastian Adamkiewicz, *Skąd się wzięła elekcja viritim?* [Where did the viritim election come from?], <https://histmag.org/Skad-sie-wziela-elekcja-viritim-1661> (Accessed on 30.08.2022).

was always done with great fear and anxiety."³

The specificity and uniqueness of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's political system, which, as we know, provided the nobility with a 'golden liberty,' may well have contributed to this concern. The nobility was therefore concerned that a foreigner would be elected king and would not understand how the country functioned. Such a king, moreover, might not accept the status quo and try to change it, thus strengthening his power, which would obviously threaten the interests of the nobility.

Another reason for anxiety, connected to some degree with the first, was the religious situation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The possibility that a fanatic Catholic would be elected king worried members of other religious denominations, as the potential bigotry of the future king might result in his not respecting the nobles' liberty, part of which was religious freedom. There was then the possibility of religious conflict, which in turn could spark a civil war.

There is no doubt that contemporary political activists were aware of this threat, as is proven by the conciliatory attitude of some influential Catholics towards Protestants and the resulting settlements designed to keep the country safe.

These were the problems that the society of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had to face after July 7, 1572. The king's death, although expected, shattered the sense of security of the country's high-ranking inhabitants, causing anxiety or even panic among them. Reinhold Heidenstein, who later became the secretary of the Royal Chancellery of Stephen Báthory and Sigismund III Vasa, described the common views of the time. According to him, there were conflicting opinions about the last king of the Jagiellonian dynasty among the people of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, both servants who loved Sigismund II and those who hated him shared the same fear and concern for the fate of the country.⁴

According to Heidenstein, this fear arose due to the country's new and previously unknown situation. Although Heidenstein mentions the *interregnum* after the death of Louis I of Hungary, he underlines that how the king's successor was to be elected had already been agreed upon. "*Succeeding monarchs*, Heidenstein's history of Poland reads, *were also elected, but neither after Louis's*

³ Stanisław Płaza, *Wielkie bezkrólewia* [The Great Interregna], Kraków, Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1988, p. 2.

⁴ Reinhold Heidenstein, *Rajnolda Hejdensztejna sekretarza królewskiego dzieje Polski od śmierci Zygmunta Augusta do roku 1594* [The King's Secretary Reinhold Heidenstein's history of Poland from the death of Sigismund II Augustus to the year 1594], Vol. 1, Petersburg, 1857, p. 11.

death nor later, did anybody ever think about passing the crown to a foreigner.”⁵ This account clearly shows that it was not only the last king of the Jagiellonian dynasty dying heirless which worried people but also the possibility that a foreigner would rule Poland. People moreover feared a lack of agreement at Sejms and the prospect that the country’s territorial integrity would be threatened.⁶

Another contemporary chronicler, Witosaw Orzelski, provides a similar account. By addressing this issue, he pointed out that the majority of the late king’s most distinguished servants remained secretive despite profiting from the monarch’s favour. Because of this, it was barely possible to find willing people who would fulfil the duty regarding the monarch’s body. Furthermore, once the problem was solved, the news of Sigismund Augustus’s death caused chaos. People who anticipated the impending danger as a threat to their country were overwhelmed by fear, thus began accumulating weapons. This state of affairs significantly influenced the economic situation of the Polish-Lithuanian state due to an increase in the number of loans, as well as a rising shortage of military equipment available for purchase. In addition, the author of the source also drew attention to the correlation between the debt burden and an increase in the prices of weapons. Merchants and artisans engaged in warfare trade became highly desired during the interregnum than during peacetime because they were part of the production chain.⁷

Similar sentiments are described in Marcin Bielski’s *Chronicle of Poland*. At the beginning of the source fragment regarding the situation after the death of the last king of the Jagiellonian dynasty, the author mentions the concern which overtook almost the whole society. He attributes people’s omnipresent fear to the fact that the country was surrounded by enemies. Although according to the chronicler, the country might have faced external threats at any minute, God had blessed it with people who guarded internal peace. For that, the author expresses his gratitude to the Creator.⁸

It is easy to notice that Orzelski and Bielski’s accounts are somehow com-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Świętosław Orzelski, *Bezkrólewia ksiąg ośmioro czyli dzieje Polski od zgonu Zygmunta Augusta r. 1572 aż do r. 1576* [Eight books of the interregnum, i.e. the history of Poland from the death of Sigismund II Augustus in 1572 to the year 1576], Vol. 1, Petersburg-Mohylew, 1856.

⁸ Joachim Bielski, *Kronika polska Marcina Bielskiego. Księgi VI Interregnum* [The Polish chronicle by Marcin Bielski. The 6th Interregnum Books], Vol. 18, no. 6, Warsaw, 1632, p. 7.

plementary to Heidenstein's description of the situation, as both sources describe not only the feelings of the inhabitants of the Commonwealth at the time of the first *interregnum* but also the consequences of the omnipresent fear. Orzelski's text deals directly with trade transactions in various weapons and war equipment. The population arming themselves shows how society perceived the security issues. What exactly they feared we learn from Heidenstein, who writes that "*The Sejm sittings were turbulent, and the neighbours' strength or greed could herald a terrible future for many.*"⁹ Today we know that after Sigismund II Augustus's death, there was no serious external threat to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. We are also aware that the more serious problem was internal political and religious antagonisms. This, however, does not mean that the fear people felt was groundless; in the case of internal conflict, it was likely that an external danger would appear, which Poland's subsequent history has amply demonstrated.

Luckily, this was only a potential situation which did not occur then. Nevertheless, the concern with the fragility of the internal peace was accompanied by a fear that the country's territorial integrity could be violated. Therefore, the representatives of the ruling elites who shared these sentiments strove to preserve the agreement.

This omnipresent anxiety was additionally fuelled by contemporary journalistic writing, which generally expressed the opinion that the public order had been shaken and the superpower status of the Commonwealth was coming to an end. People wrote that "*The king's demise took away the basic guarantee of peace and the country's security.*"¹⁰ The sources also mention officials losing their power and the effective discontinuation of a lawful state.

Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz rightly observes in one of her monographs that this situation, unknown before, posed new, pressing problems for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The basic one was devising a system for selecting a new monarch and then considering all of the candidates. Only after that would it be possible to conduct the election. At the same time, it was essential to maintain internal order and guard the country's external borders. These issues were often raised at both local and regional conventions of the nobility conducted until the Convocation Sejm.¹¹

⁹ Reinhold Heidenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁰ Stanisław Płaza, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹¹ Ewa Dubas-Urwanowicz, *Koronne zjazdy szlacheckie w dwóch pierwszych bezkrólestwach po śmierci Zygmunta Augusta* [Crown Conventions of the Nobility During the First Two Interregna after Sigismund II Augustus's Death], Białystok, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 1998, p. 15-16.

Due to the thematic scope of this paper, only one of these assemblies will be mentioned here – one during which a certain political and religious matter was brought for consideration, which later turned out to be very important for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This assembly was held in Łowicz between July 16 and July 25, 1572.

According to Orzelski, the Primate Jakub Uchański, having learnt about King Sigismund II Augustus's deteriorating health, convened the nobility of the Wielkopolska region. The assembly, which started on 16 July, was attended both by those nobles from Wielkopolska whom the Primate wanted to see at the convention and those he knew would be able to come fast. Orzelski details the duration of the convention and mentions that it was extended by five days due to the long wait of the Małopolska participants. He also states that it was mainly the less important matters which were settled at the Łowicz Convention (and these only hastily) while solving the more important issues was postponed, which proved to be detrimental as time passed.¹²

Another account from that time reads: *"This convention brought the following advantages: people warned each other [against dangers –K. W.], it gave them new hope for the stabilisation of the situation in the country, those who did not take an active part in the convention learnt about the necessity of being alert to dangers, and several other things were done to retain both the internal and external peace at the borders."*¹³

The Łowicz Convention also brought to light a conflict over the office of the *interrex*, i. e. the person who would rule the country instead of a king during the *interregnum*. The Catholic senators from the Wielkopolska region wanted this function to be entrusted to the highest-ranking senator-clergyman, i. e. the Primate. Jan Firlej, the Grand Marshal of the Crown, was of a different opinion – he believed that it was he, the highest-ranking lay senator, who should serve as *interrex*. The fact that Firlej was the informal leader of Poland's Calvinists in all

¹² Świętosław Orzelski, *op. cit.*, p. 3-4.

¹³ *Respons JMści księdza Arcybiskupa Gnieźnieńskiego od IMści Panów Rad Wielkiej Polski, dany JMści. posłom, którzy w Knyszynie byli* [The response of the Archbishop of Gniezno to the members of the Councils of the Great Poland handed to Delegates who were in Knyszyn], in Teodor Wierzbowski, *Uchańsciana czyli zbiór dokumentów wyjaśniających życie i działalność Jakuba Uchańskiego arcybiskupa gnieźnieńskiego, legata urodzonego, Królestwa Polskiego prymasa i pierwszego księcia* ['Uchańsciana', i. e. a collection of documents explaining the life and activity of Jakub Uchański, the Archbishop of Gniezno, the Legate, the Primate and the first Prince of the Kingdom of Poland], Vol. 4, Warsaw, Drukarnia K. Kowalewskiego, 1892, p. 270-273.

probability affected his standpoint on this matter.

Meanwhile, the faction of the Grand Marshal of the Crown was weakened by the activity of his fellow believer, Voivod of Sandomierz Piotr Zborowski. Eventually, the office of *interrex* was granted to Primate Uchański, which was finally confirmed at the Koło Convention in October 1572.¹⁴

This dispute did not escape the attention of contemporary historians, and although the solution had already been adopted, it was replayed at the Convocation Sejm, held from January 6 to January 29, 1573. Marcin Bielski writes in his chronicle that after hearing and sending away the delegations of Tatars, Lithuanians, the Prussian Prince and the Prince of Slutsk, the Sejm participants started solving the country's problems. However, the debate was obstructed by representatives of the knights' circle, who only wanted decisions regarding the time and place of the election to be made. This led to a disagreement with senators, at which point the nobility protested against giving power to the *interrex*. They did not question the Archbishop of Gniezno's precedence among all clergymen but thought – in line with the privilege issued by Casimir III the Great – that none of the bishops should serve as a Papal Legate or a Cardinal. The contemporary supporters of this law asserted that even their ancestors had thought such a concentration of church functions in the hands of one person threatened the nobility's liberty. On the other hand, those who opposed the Primate's rule at the Convocation Sejm believed that his role as *interrex* posed the worst threat to the liberty of nobility.

They argued that extending the period of interregnum for as long as possible lay in Uchański's interest because, by the time a new monarch was elected, the regal prerogatives would stay in his hands. The Archbishop of Gniezno would therefore be able to appoint a marshal of his choice, who would have undivided power over the country for the whole period of the *interregnum*. The nobles also feared that the Primate, having such broad prerogatives, would deprive them of the right to choose the king and grant it solely to himself. They, therefore, wrote a protest against the Archbishop of Gniezno's serving as *interrex* in the Warsaw Town Books.¹⁵

It is not clear, however, whether such a situation could have taken place at all since the prerogatives of the *interrex* were limited. He had the right to repre-

¹⁴ Mirosław Korolko, Janusz Tazbir, *Konfederacja warszawska 1573 roku. Wielka karta polskiej tolerancji* [The Warsaw Confederation of 1573. A big charter of Polish tolerance], Warsaw, 1980, p. 49.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

sent the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the international arena, but when it came to the country's internal affairs, he had administrative powers only. He could also convene and preside over a Convocation or Election Sejm, but otherwise, his prerogatives were limited by the confederations of the nobility, with whom he had to share his power based on their class privileges.¹⁶ Therefore, it is clear that the Primate had limited power to deliberately extend the *interregnum* or appoint his own officials. Taking all this into consideration, the above-mentioned fears of the nobility seem exaggerated. And here the question arises: was the nobility truly afraid of such potential danger, or were the accusations against the Archbishop of Gniezno merely an element of anti-Uchański propaganda?

Primate Uchański's defence speech may be found in the sources documenting these events. Reinhold Heidenstein's work contains a quote from the public proclamation in which the Archbishop of Gniezno defended his prerogatives. According to this source, Uchański observed that restless people who were inclined to start social unrest thought it right that after the monarch's death, all the offices should be cancelled, including the temporary rule of the *interrex*. He emphasised that his short-term service as the head of the country should not breed hatred, as he, in contrast to what ill-intentioned people said about him, did not intend to appropriate the regal power. He also stressed that even the rule of a king should not be met with aversion, and reminded his audience that the temporary rule of an *interrex* was not absolute, but depended on the Senate. Therefore, he asserted, there was no reason to suspect him of guile or surround him with hatred. Despite these arguments, he said, his opponents tried hard to humiliate him, which, if they succeeded, would make it much easier to ruin other state offices and bring anarchy to the Commonwealth.¹⁷

According to the sources, further, in his speech, the Archbishop of Gniezno referred to history, arguing that it was common practice in many countries that the power during an *interregnum* was performed by a 'leading [person – R. H.] in the Senate'.¹⁸ In pagan countries, it was a lay person, whereas in Christian countries it was a clergyman. Then Uchański presented an outline of Poland's history, focusing on the process that led to the country's adoption of Christianity. He also

¹⁶ Łukasz Piernikarczyk, *Interrex = międzykról* [Interrex = the King in Between], in <https://polskiedzieje.pl/tablice-historyczne/interrex-krol-tymaczosowy.html> (Accessed on 30.05.2022).

¹⁷ Reinhold Heidenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

spoke about regal privileges that gave him the right to act as *interrex*.¹⁹

The conflict around the Primate's temporary rule was solved in the following way: he was granted the power to convene Sejms after the king's death and to appoint and crown the new king. The Grand Marshal of the Crown, on the other hand, was given the right to publicly announce the new monarch after he had been appointed by the *interrex* by universal consent.²⁰

When this disagreement was settled, the proper debate of the convocation started. Until then, as Orzelski writes, "*The time had passed without any results.*"²¹ First, all the matters connected to the election were agreed upon, which, however, is not the subject of this paper. Then, as the chronicler relates, several questions regarding future law were addressed. It was decided that all those not complying with the law should be regarded as traitors and enemies of the country. The authors of this proposal intended, for example, for all those who wanted to either inflict capital punishment on people for religious reasons or confiscate their assets or force them into exile for the same reasons, to be regarded as enemies of the Commonwealth. The supporters of this solution declared that they would not help the supreme authority to act against the representatives of any religious denomination. Furthermore, they declared their readiness to put anyone who would do anything like that on trial and decided that the possessions of particular churches should be given away only to their followers. As regards any controversial issues between clergymen and secular groups, it was decided that they would be settled by the future Ordinary Sejm.²²

Bielski devoted much less attention to this issue in his chronicle. However, despite the lack of details about the solutions connected to the clauses on inter-religious peace, his account states that "*It was decided that the agreement on religious issues would be made, but [Catholic – K. W.] clergymen protested against it.*"²³ The conflict around the religious confederation formulated at the Convocation Sejm is also replayed in Heidenstein's work. According to this source, the Castellans of Sandomierz and Biecz, Hieronim Ossoliński and Stanisław Szafraniec, together with Jakub Niemojewski and other supporters of the Reformation, decided to force through a resolution on religious peace similar to the one adopted in the German Empire.²⁴ They demanded that noblemen decide

¹⁹ Joachim Bielski, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

²⁰ Reinhold Heidenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 51-52.

²¹ Świętosław Orzelski, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 28-29.

²³ Joachim Bielski, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

²⁴ Heidenstein meant here the provisions of the Peace of Augsburg from 1555, which

about the religious affiliation of their lands, just like the sovereigns of the German principalities. Supporters of this solution wanted to maintain peace between representatives of different denominations in the country. Because they feared the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would suffer the same fate as other European kingdoms plagued by religious wars. The supporters of this solution opted to agree on its details in a private conversation and then presenting it at a public meeting. The Bishop of Kujawy, Stanisław Karnkowski, as well as Hieronim Ossoliński, Jakub Niemojewski and other senators and representatives of the nobility unnamed in the source, were delegated to a commission whose aim was to write the clauses of the resolution referring to religious peace. The document was drafted by Bishop Karnkowski, and then signed by both Catholic and Protestant senators as well as some delegates from particular voivodships. Heidenstein further writes how this document was received by the Archbishop of Gniezno. Primate Uchański hesitated for a long time before he finally opposed the provisions of the settlement. He justified this decision with his binding oath of loyalty to the Pope, the significance of his office and his feeling of duty towards the church. At the same time, the Primate declared that he would not neglect anything that could help maintain internal peace in the Commonwealth, and expressed his readiness, if necessary, to sacrifice everything and to embrace any suffering for the Catholic faith.

Thanks to Reinhold Heidenstein, it is also known that the bishops agreed with their superior, including Bishop Karnkowski, although he had formulated the clauses of the rejected agreement. The only one among the bishops who supported the settlement was Franciszek Krasiński, the Bishop of Kraków. Heidenstein rightly observes that in this situation, all attempts to reach an agreement on religious tolerance had failed to resolve the dispute.²⁵

The rejected provisions were designed to guarantee the continuation of the peaceful coexistence of representatives of different faiths in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The supporters of the agreement argued for a ban on waging religiously motivated wars, and for giving the nobility the right to decide about the faith of their subjects. However, reaching a compromise on this matter was still a long way ahead. The Act of the Warsaw Confederation was redrafted at the Election Sejm in 1573, and the provisions on religious tolerance were moved to the section of commitments to be confirmed by the new king.

granted the right to the rulers of German principalities to decide about the faith on their territories.

²⁵ Reinhold Heidenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 52-53.

This did not, however, end the fight for the legitimisation of religious tolerance, which continued long into the reign of Stephen Báthory.

RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

The circumstances surrounding the death of the last monarch of the Jagiellonian dynasty in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth made his passing unusual, given the historical context of Europe at the time. At its core, there was undoubtedly Casimir the Great's stance on the religious denominations. He did not only recognize the need to respect worshippers of different religions on the territories annexed to Poland but also gave shelter to Jews, who were persecuted in the western part of the continent. This initiated a series of social changes, which led to the peaceful coexistence of different denominations. The nobility gradually received various state privileges during the Middle Ages and in the modern era. They also desired to have the option of choice in this area of their lives. Thus, the topic of religion was also associated with the so-called "golden freedom of the nobility". Such an opinion became one of the most important arguments for the supporters of the Warsaw Confederation Act. It was also essential to maintain domestic peace, and the founders of the Warsaw Confederation Act were ready to compromise on religious matters to achieve this purpose. Their conciliatory stance protected the country from a religious war even in such dramatic and uncertain circumstances as the interregnum of 1572-1573.

Other European countries experienced a different situation. A religious war occurred in the German Empire between 1552 and 1555, which ended with the Peace treaty of Augsburg between Emperor Charles V and the Protestant princes of the Reich. Although the peace treaty reduced inter-religious tensions, it did not solve all problems. Among other issues, it did not address the issue of equal rights for Anabaptists and Calvinists, who could fall victim to persecution from both Catholics and Lutherans. Furthermore, there were religious conflicts in France at that time, which took a tragic turn. One of the most famous examples is the so-called Night of St. Bartholomew, or the slaughter of Parisian Huguenots carried out by Catholics in August 1572. Religious wars were also waged in England, Scotland, the Netherlands and the Habsburg Empire. The Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) happened at a time when religious disputes were at their peak.

The Commonwealth, a country with a tradition of religious tolerance shaped over centuries, was unique in the Europe of its time. It is, therefore, understandable that the nobility, who valued their 'golden liberty', were afraid of an intolerant ruler who might have caused bloodshed through a lack of un-

derstanding and bigotry. However, the nobles' desire to avoid such a situation was motivated by more than just class solidarity. Those who had some political awareness were also afraid of a civil war, and, as Andrzej Lubieniecki relates, common people shared these concerns as well.

When analysing the sources dealing with religious issues in the period from the death of Sigismund II Augustus to the Convocation Sejm of the first *interregnum*, it is easy to notice that each contemporary author focused on a different aspect of the problem. Orzelski described the provisions of the Act of the Warsaw Confederation prepared during the Convocation Sejm, Bielski concentrated on the conflict around the Act, and Heidenstein focused on the process of creating and signing the document. The work of these historians has enabled a relatively detailed description of the provisions of religious peace and the fight for their ratification. What all these three sources have in common is a depiction of an atmosphere of fear and anxiety.

Religious issues were so important during the first *interregnum* that they affected important state decisions, such as the appointment of the *interrex*. Looking into the events that occurred later, after the period under investigation in this article, it should be observed that religious matters also had some effect on the election of the king.

The reconstruction of these events, which was possible based on contemporary historiography, demonstrates that both supporters and opponents of religious tolerance were very determined. It also highlights the complexities of such research since the provisions in consideration have had an impact on religious freedom, and also on internal security. Therefore, the universal fear of religious wars, similar to those that ravaged other parts of Europe in the modern era, was justified. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a country diverse both ethnically and religiously, avoided the destiny of other European countries such as France or the German Empire largely due to the determination and political awareness of supporters of the inter-religious agreement.

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THE GENESIS OF BUKOVINA LOCAL LORE STUDIES DURING THE AUSTRIAN MILITARY RULE (1775-1786)

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Abstract: *This article analyses the first published works dedicated to Bukovinian studies during the military rule of the region in 1775–1786. Bukovina's insights have been recorded in European academic journals, with the help of prominent scientists such as August Ludwig von Schlözer and Friedrich Gottlieb Canzler.*

The peculiarity of the Bukovinian studies at the time was that the Austrian military or employees of various ranks prepared almost all information materials required by the state's highest officials on specific management decisions rather than publish them in academic or popular journals. Nevertheless, those works served as a necessary foundation for developing local lore research in Bukovina.

General major Gabriel Freiherr von Splény's memos regarding the territory were taken into account, as they documented the region's position throughout the occupation. The works of Major Friedrich von Mieg, Engineer Johann Budinszky, and Nobleman Vasile Balș contain interesting information on Bukovina. Although these reports were kept in the Vienna archives for a long time and were published only after more than a hundred years, in the late 19th century, they are rightfully considered among the first works on local lore studies about Bukovina of the Austrian period. These works contributed to the later development of local lore studies of Bukovina.

Keywords: *Austria, Bukovina, local lore studies, military administration, Gabriel Freiherr von Splény, Friedrich von Mieg, Vasile Balș, Johann Budinszky.*

Rezumat: *Geneza cercetărilor de istorie locală a Bucovinei în timpul administrației militare austriece (1775-1786). Acest articol analizează primele publicații*

dedicate cercetărilor istoriei locale în timpul stăpânirii militare a Bucovinei din anii 1775–1786. Observațiile privitoare la Bucovina au fost publicate în reviste academice europene, reputații oameni de știință August Ludwig von Schlözer și Friedrich Gottlieb Canzler jucând un rol esențial în acest sens.

Specificul studiilor bucovinene din acea epocă consta în faptul că aproape toate materialele erau pregătite de militari austrieci sau de funcționari de diferite grade, mai degrabă pentru a informa conducătorii statului în vederea adoptării unor decizii specifice, decât pentru a fi publicate în reviste științifice sau de popularizare. Cu toate acestea, respectivele lucrări au creat temelia necesară pentru dezvoltarea cercetărilor istoriei orizontului local din Bucovina.

Au fost prezentate rapoartele întocmite de generalul-maior Gabriel Freiherr von Splény cu privire la teritoriul anexat, în care situația regiunii în timpul ocupației a fost prezentată din diverse perspective. Informații interesante despre Bucovina sunt conținute în lucrările maiorului Friedrich von Mieg, inginerului Johann Budinszky, nobilului Vasile Balș. Deși aceste rapoarte au fost păstrate multă vreme în arhivele din Viena, fiind publicate după mai bine de o sută de ani, la sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea, ele aparțin de bună dreptate primelor lucrări de istorie locală despre Bucovina, în perioada austriacă. Datorită acestor lucrări, studiile regionale privind Bucovina au continuat să se dezvolte cu succes în perioadele ulterioare.

INTRODUCTION

The rapid development of local lore studies in Western Europe and North America marked the 19th century. This branch has become an important component of scientific research and education in many countries. Local lore studies originated in England and France as early as the 16–17th centuries. “In both countries, it grew out of an interest in nobility, castles, coinage, parishes, armorial bearings, and lineages”.¹ Such studies continued and expanded considerably in subsequent centuries.

Much attention was paid to local lore studies in Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. Particularly popular in Germany was the concept of a “small homeland”, which arose in the context of the formation of regional self-consciousness after the unification of Germany in 1871. The study of local lore has been raised to the rank of national discipline. Local lore studies are now taught in primary schools in Germany and are among the most important disciplines there. The Association of State and Local History, which sought to unite the efforts of local

¹ Carol Kammen, *On Doing Local History*, Walnut Creek–Lanham–New York–Oxford, AltaMira Press, 2003, p. 11.

historians of individual states to deepen the study of local history, was established in the USA in 1904.²

Almost identical processes occurred in the development of local lore studies in Austria-Hungary. An ambitious local history project to publish 24 volumes of *Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild* was implemented between 1886 and 1902. A separate book was planned for each crown land. Volume 20 contains extensive information on the history, demography, and nature of the Duchy of Bukovina's crownland.³ It was based on extensive exploration and research work in the late 19th – early 20th century. Dozens of works were published each year in Bukovina on the history of the region's settlements, ethnic and social groups, monasteries and churches, the development of individual industries and occupations of the population, statistics, ethnology and folklore studies. The local lore studies were included in the list of compulsory subjects in gymnasiums. Textbooks and manuals on Austria-Hungary and Bukovina local lore studies were published and associations were formed to promote research and popularize Bukovina. Both university scientists with degrees and amateurs seeking to expand their understanding of their native land conducted these searches.

However, this situation did not occur immediately. During the Austrian period, Bukovinian studies went through several stages of development, overcoming many organisational and academic obstacles along the way.

This article concentrates on the birth and first steps of Bukovina local lore studies, from the time of joining Austria in 1774-1775 until 1786 when the region was under the control of the military administration. The following research objectives have been defined according to the stated goal: to analyse the appearance of the first publications on Bukovinian studies in academic journals in the 1880s – 1890s; to identify constraints for the development of local lore studies during the specified period; to determine the most important directions and features of local lore research during the given period.

HISTORIOGRAPHY ANALYSIS

The academic literature has not yet sufficiently addressed this issue. Among the studies related to the topic, one can name the works of Johann Polek, the fund custodian of the Chernivtsi University library, who listed some results on local

² Carol Kammen, Amy H. Wilson (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Local History*, 2nd ed., Lanham–New York–Toronto–Plymouth, AltaMira Press, 2013, p. 23.

³ *Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie in Wort und Bild*, Bd. XX, Wien, 1899, 532 S.

lore studies at the time, arranging them chronologically.⁴ Furthermore, in the late 18th century, Johann Polek was actively involved in the search for and publication of reports on local lore studies about Bukovina. His efforts led to the publication of works by Gabriel Freiherr von Splény, Friedrich von Mieg, Johann Budinszky, and others. These publications typically would include brief comments. The bibliographic index of Erich Beck's *Local Lore Studies of Bukovina*, which organises literature under subject headings, is essential to this study.⁵

A fragment of the publication about Bukovina from the 1790 journal "Neues Magazin für die Neuere Geschichte, Erd-und Völkerkunde als eine Fortsetzung des Büschingischen" was incorporated into Rudolf Wagner's collection of documents *Revolutionary Years 1848/1849 in the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria (including Bukovina). Records of the Austrian Period*.⁶

The bilingual German-Romanian publication *Bukovina in the First Geographical, Historical, Economic and Demographic Descriptions*⁷, as well as previously published reports about Bukovina by Gabriel Freiherr von Splény, Vasile Balș, etc. deserve to be mentioned. Radu Grigorovici wrote the introduction, afterword, notes and comments to the edition, and Dimitrie Vatamaniuc wrote the foreword. In 2019, the Romanian Cultural Centre "Eudoxiu Hurmuzachi" republished this book in Chernivtsi.⁸

The works of various authors of that period – Gabriel Freiherr von Splény⁹

⁴ Johann Polek, *Repertorium der landeskundlichen Literatur des Herzogtums Bukowina*, Czernowitz, Pardini, 1892, 186 S.; Johann Polek, *Rückblick auf die Forschungen zur Landes- und Volkskunde der Bukowina seit 1773*, in „Jahrbuch des Bukowiner Landes-Museums“. 1893, S. 3-20.

⁵ Erich Beck, *Bibliographie zur Landeskunde der Bukowina. Literatur bis zum Jahre 1965*, München, 1966.

⁶ Gabriel Freiherr von Splény, *Description de la Bukovine*, in *Die Revolutionsjahre 1848/49 im Königreich Galizien-Lodomerien (einschließlich Bukowina). Dokumente aus Österreichischer Zeit*, München, 1983, S. 105–126.

⁷ *Bucovina în primele descrieri geografice, istorice, economice și demografice* [Bukovina in the First Geographical, Historical, Economic and Demographic Descriptions], București, Editura Academiei Române, 1998.

⁸ *Bucovina în primele descrieri geografice, istorice, economice și demografice* [Bukovina in the First Geographical, Historical, Economic and Demographic Descriptions], Cernăuți, 2019.

⁹ Ferdinand Ziegler, *Der Zustand der Bukowina zur Zeit der österreichischen Occupation. Dargestellt im Spiegel der erste Deutschrift des kommandieren Generals Freih. v. Splény*, Czernowitz, 1888; Johann Polek (Hrsg.), *General Splény's Beschreibung des Bukowiner Distrikts*, Czernowitz, Pardini, 1893; Gabriel Spleni, *Opys Bukovyny* [Description of

and Vasile Balș¹⁰ – are also worth mentioning. However, they only examined the local lore studies of Bukovina during the specified period partially, through the perspective of each author's research.

Local lore studies from the military rule period contain a lot of important information about Bukovina used by researchers from various countries. They gave a brief description of these works. The analyses of Ștefan Purici¹¹, Constantin Ungureanu¹², Mihai Iacobescu¹³, Mihai-Ștefan Ceașu¹⁴, Vasyl Botushanskyi¹⁵, Arkadiy Zhukovskiy¹⁶, Oleksandr Dobrzhanskyi¹⁷, Mykhailo Nykyforak¹⁸, Emanuel Turczynski¹⁹, Kurt Scharr²⁰ and others are also noteworthy. *Description of Bukovina* by Gabriel Freiherr von Splény was most often used in the works of

Bukovina], Pereklad z nimetskoi, peredmova i komentar O. D. Ohuia, M. M. Saika, Chernivtsi, Ruta, 1995.

¹⁰ Mihai-Ștefan Ceașu, *Vasile Balș, un iosefinist bucovinian* [Vasile Balș, a Bukovinian Josephinist], in "Anuarul Museului Bucovina", XVII-XIX, 1990-1992, p. 407-418; Mihai-Ștefan Ceașu, *Un iluminist bucovinian: boierul Vasile Balș (1756-1832)* [Bukovinian Enlightener: Nobleman Vasile Balș (1756-1832)], Iași, Editura Junimea, 2007, 461 p.

¹¹ Ștefan Purici, *Mișcarea națională românească în Bucovina între anii 1775-1861* [The Romanian National Movement in Bukovina in 1775-1861], Suceava, 1998.

¹² Constantin Ungureanu, *Bucovina în perioada stăpânirii austriece (1774-1918): aspecte etnodemografice și confesionale* [Bukovina during the Austrian Rule (1774-1918): Ethnic, Demographic and Confessional Aspects], Chișinău, 2003.

¹³ Mihai Iacobescu, *Din istoria Bucovinei* [From History of Bukovina], Vol. 1 (1774-1862), București, 1993.

¹⁴ Mihai-Ștefan Ceașu, *Bucovina Habsburgică de la anexare la Congresul de la Viena* [Habsburg Bukovina from Annexation to the Congress of Vienna], Iași, 1998.

¹⁵ V. Botushanskyi (Red.), *Bukovyna. Istorychnyi narys* [Bukovina. Historical Outline], Chernivtsi, 1998; Vasyl Botushanskyi, *Pryiednannia Bukovyny do Avstrii v konteksti avstro-turetsko-rosiiskykh vidnosyn* [Annexation of Bukovina to Austria in the Context of Austro-Turkish-Russian Relations], in *Bukovyna v konteksti yevropeiskykh mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn (Z davnykh chasiv do seredyiny XIX st.)*, Chernivtsi, 2005, p. 169-245.

¹⁶ Arkadii Zhukovskiy, *Istoriia Bukovyny* [History of Bukovina], Ch. 1, Chernivtsi, 1991.

¹⁷ Oleksandr Dobrzhanskyi, *Systema orhaniv vlady Bukovyny u skladi Avstriiskoy (Avstro-Uhorskoj) imperii* [The System of Government in Bukovina as Part of Austrian (Austria-Hungary) Empire], in *Istoriia rozvytku orhaniv vlady na terytorii Chernivetskoj oblasti*, Chernivtsi, 2014, p. 189-244.

¹⁸ Mykhailo Nykyforak, *Bukovyna v derzhavno-pravovii systemi Avstrii (1774-1918 rr.)* [Bukovina in the State and Legal System of Austria (1774-1918)], Chernivtsi, 2004.

¹⁹ Emanuel Turczynski, *Geschichte der Bukowina in der Neuzeit*, Wiesbaden, 1993.

²⁰ Kurt Scharr, *Die Landschaft Bukowina. Das Werden einer Region an der Peripherie 1774-1918*, Wien, 2010.

modern authors. It emphasizes the importance of knowledge in comprehending the circumstances surrounding Bukovina's annexation to Austria.

It is worth emphasizing once more that the appearance of the first works on local lore studies about Bukovina in the historical literature during the military administration was not adequately analysed as a separate phenomenon that testified to the emergence of Bukovinian studies of the Austrian period. Furthermore, the topic of local lore studies' emergence in Bukovina at the indicated time is relevant and significant from the standpoints of the need for scientific understanding and the necessity for the development of the modern local lore studies movement. This last one ought to be built on a solid foundation of prior research.

FIRST ARTICLES ON BUKOVINIAN STUDIES IN ACADEMIC JOURNALS

The origin of local lore studies in Bukovina was closely connected with the region's historical events that took place in the 1770s. As is well known, the Austrian authorities considered annexing the northern part of Moldavia after the capture of Galicia in 1772, confining it between Galicia and Transylvania and limiting direct connections between these two parts of the monarchy. Emperor Joseph II tasked a study of this territory in terms of the benefits of joining Austria. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774, two groups of military men were assigned to the northern part of Moldavia in 1773. The first group came from Transylvania, led by Lieutenant Colonel (at that time) Karl Enzenberg. The second entered Moldavia from Galicia and first explored the Dniester region (Podnistrovyya) in Khotyn and Kamianets-Podilskyi. This group included Captain Lieutenant Hoffman, Captain Lieutenant Garbach, and Captain Lieutenant Kuzersdorf. Friedrich von Mieg, captain of the general staff, was the most famous of them, leading the mapping of the territory between the Dniester, Cheremosh and Prut at the final stage of the exploration.

Both groups prepared many messages and cartographic materials about the region, which was to be annexed by Austria, for the emperor and the state's highest officials. Some of them resembled works of local lore studies in that they described the indicated territory, its population, natural resources, economic relations, etc.

In general, the information provided by these groups convinced Emperor Joseph II of the feasibility and necessity of annexing the northern part of Moldavia to Austria. The Austrian troops occupied this territory in August 1774, and it officially became a part of the Habsburg Empire after the agreement with Turkey

was signed in Constantinople in May 1775. The Austrians chose the ancient name of Bukovina, which originated from the beech forests that occupied a significant part of the region, and was found in historical documents dating back to the early 15th century.

Austrian authorities on the newly annexed territory, which lasted until 1786 when Bukovina joined the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, established a military administration. General Gabriel Freiherr von Splény was the region's first ruler between 1775 and 1778, and General Karl Enzenberg followed him from 1778 to 1786. The military rule became a distinct period in the history of the region. However, it was not long before the first works on local lore studies about Bukovina were published.

References to local lore studies from this historical period were made, including those published during the period of military administration as well as those written as informative notes for Austria's top leadership but published much later, in some cases more than a century later.

The article *Historical and Geographical Description of the Bukovinian Region Given by the Turks to Hungary* was the first one on the topic published in 1781 in the journal "Correspondence of August Ludwig Schlözer, Mainly Historical and Political Content".²¹ Editors indicated that an officer of the imperial royal army who spent several years in Bukovina published the article. The article was short but contained a lot of exciting material. At the same time, there were many inaccuracies. According to the title of the article, the author was convinced that Bukovina would become an integral part of the Kingdom of Hungary before being incorporated into Transylvania. However, that was not the case. In general, judging by the text, the author was a Hungarian sympathizer.

Analysing the name Bukovina, the author provided a plausible explanation that involved the beech forests, which occupied a significant part of the region. Unaware of the Ruthenian language, the author mentioned that Bukovina means "beech forest" in Polish (Buchenwald). As a result, it gave the region its name.

However, according to another impressive explanation, and which the author thought was the most likely, the name derived from a region in southern Bukovina and the prince who held it. The author wrote that there was a locality called Casa Bucsoja on the banks of the Moldova River, which meant the Bucsoja's farm, and Bucsoja might have been the prince who owned certain territories in

²¹ *Historische-geographische Beschreibung der an Ungern von den Türken abgetretenen Landschaft Bukowina*, in "August Ludwig Schlözer's Briefwechsel meist historischen und politischen Inhalts", 1781, Achter Teil, Heft XLV, S. 145-153.

the north of Moldavia. It appears that this Bucsoja is where the term Bukovina originates.²² The theory is far-fetched and unscientific, but it is interesting that even in the late 19th century, certain interpretations of this theory could be found in reference books.²³

The paper presented the administrative division of the region, which took place at the beginning of the 1780s. The author rightly noted that the area had been divided into two districts: upper or northern, the centre of which was Chernivtsi (Chernivtsi district). This district occupied the territory from the Dniester to the Siret River. The lower one, or southern, stretched to the border of Transylvania with a centre in Suceava (Suceava district). These two districts were divided into several more sections called 'okols' (ranges). A certain number of villages belonged to each of these okols.²⁴

The author briefly discussed the region's history. He noted that this territory was part of Transalpine Dacia during the Roman Empire. The province's territory fell under the rule of various peoples who later invaded from the north and east: Sarmatians, Huns, Goths, etc. It is emphasised that the region was part of both Hungary and Transylvania, before becoming a part of Moldavia and Turkey.

Some additional description of the nature of Bukovina was provided. In particular, the abundance of water resources was noted; the Cheremosh, Dniester, Prut, Siret, Moldova, and Golden Bistritsa rivers were described.

The availability of numerous forests and minerals in the mountains was also mentioned. The author did not forget the widespread legend of the time that a large amount of gold was found on the Prut banks. He noted that the locals never showed any desire for mining but he suspected that this was due to heavy Turkish domination.

The author mentioned the low educational level of ordinary people and their unwillingness to get an education. When free primary schools for Jews were opened, he exemplified, many residents' families said they would instead move to Turkey or Moldavia instead of sending their children to school.²⁵ In this regard, August Ludwig Schlözer noted in the Russian Chronicle that there were reports of how Grand Duke Yaroslav founded the first schools in Little Rus around 1030 and had to take children from their parents by force to educate them.²⁶

²² Johann Polek, *Die Erwerbung der Bukowina durch Österreich*, Czernowitz, 1889, S. 54.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Historische-geographische Beschreibung der an Ungern...*, S. 146.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, S. 150-151.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, S. 151.

The author presented very interesting characteristics of the population's upper strata. He identified three social groups: Boyars, Răzeși* and Ruptași**. The author considered răzeși to be barons and remarked that the boyars, a small group who owned significant land, were comparable to West European counts. There were roughly 150 families of Răzeși. Of course, this comparison was rather far-fetched. Ruptașii, the third group, belonged to the lowest class of nobility and enjoyed some social privileges but were not particularly wealthy.²⁷

The region's cities and towns, including Chernivtsi, Sadagora, Vyzhnytsia, Suceava, and Siret, were also described in the report. According to the author, Chernivtsi underwent a significant construction boom during Austrian rule, and the city served as the regional military command centre.

As for Suceava, the author noted that this "old city, fortified with walls and ditches, located in Lower Bukovina on the region's border, was once the capital of the country and the residence of the Moldavian princes. It was a very important place in every sense because even today, you can find a large, abandoned castle residence, a powerful mountain castle, 17 incredibly attractive old churches that are in ruins, and an incredible number of the most valuable abandoned public buildings. This city, once so beautiful, was said to have been devastated by the Turks and Tatars. However, since its location was very convenient for trade, the current government was making every effort to help this city gradually rise again. It is noteworthy that 200 Moldavian, 131 Armenian, 80 Greek and 116 Jewish families settled there in 1779."²⁸

The author also referred to the sights of Rădăuți, the centre of the Orthodox diocese, and Casa Bucsoja, "a large scattered village, on the banks of the Moldova River, which, some argue, gave the name to Bukovina".²⁹

This article was submitted to the journal on January 16, 1781. August Ludwig Schlözer mentioned in the journal's concluding note that another, more detailed report on Bukovina had been received in the journal the same year and promised to publish it soon. This was done the following year, in 1782, in the new journal "Stats-Anzeigen", which August Ludwig Schlözer began publishing in Göttingen. The article was also published without the author's name, but

* "Răzeși" is the name given to free peasants.

** The "Ruptași" were a privileged group from a fiscal point of view in the Principality of Moldavia. They were comparable to merchants and the petty bourgeoisie.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, S. 152.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, S. 153.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

researchers later discovered that it was a memorandum sent in 1773 by Karl Enzenberg to Emperor Joseph II.³⁰ It was called *From and to Bukovina*, with the subtitle: *In September 1781*.³¹ Perhaps, the subtitle referred to the time Karl Enzenberg's work was accepted for publication in the journal. The report consisted of two parts. The first one was Karl Enzenberg's note of 1773. It gave answers to five questions raised by Emperor Joseph II to Karl Enzenberg's group to find out the viability of annexing northern Moldavia to Austria. These questions focused on whether it was possible to build a road from Transylvania through Dorna to Câmpulung and on to Galicia to connect the two provinces of Austria, as well as the benefits and problems that might entail the annexation of this territory.

Two general staff officers prepared the answers, which were finalised by Karl Enzenberg. He noted that the possibilities of building a road are favourable, and the annexation will strengthen the eastern border of Austria. The water and land routes of communication of Bukovina were also described. It was mentioned that 30 thousand families lived in the region then. However, many of the inhabitants fled their homes due to the hostilities. Enzenberg drew attention to the influential social group in the area – the boyars. He was confident that they would take a positive view of the annexation of the region to Austria. It was calculated that the whole region and the population, could be estimated at 20 780 000 florins.³² In general, Karl Enzenberg convincingly argued that it had been highly beneficial for Austria to annex this region, stressing the richness of its natural and human resources.

The list of settlements in Bukovina was presented in alphabetical order, compiled by the general staff officers, and introduced in the second part of the article. It was noted that there were five cities in Bukovina (Chernivtsi, Sadagora, Siret, Suceava, Vyzhnytsia), 235 villages, 28 monasteries, and 51 settlements with scattered (single) houses.³³ This list was prepared during Karl Enzenberg's service as the region's military administrator, which was much later than the first part of the article.

Thus, the first two articles about Bukovina published in academic journals were associated with the name of August Ludwig Schlözer, who was not only a well-known expert in ancient Russian chronicles and the father of the so-called

³⁰ Johann Polek, *Die Erwerbung der Bukowina...*, S. 14.

³¹ *Von und aus der Bukowina. Im Sept. 1781*, in "Stats-Anzeigen. Herausgegeben von A. L. Schlözer", Band 1, Heft 1-4, 1782, S. 38-58.

³² *Ibid.*, S. 46.

³³ *Ibid.*, S. 55-58.

“Norman theory” of the state’s origin in the Eastern Slavs but also a scholar of diverse interests. This publisher was directly involved in the first publications about Bukovina in academic journals. The aforementioned articles were produced to spread information and were published in 1781 and 1782. The main idea was to provide some general information about the territory, which became part of the Austrian state just a few years before.

As mentioned above, General Gabriel Freiherr von Splény had been appointed the region’s first military leader after Bukovina’s annexation to Austria. He prepared and sent to the state’s top leadership several messages describing the situation in Bukovina at the indicated time during his term in office. His name was associated with the third chronological journal publication on the Bukovinian local lore studies in the late 18th century. The material was published in 1790, after the end of military rule, in the periodical “Neues Magazin für die neuere Geschichte, Erd- und Völkerkunde”, in Leipzig, by Friedrich Gottlieb Canzler, a famous German historian, geographer, and economist.³⁴ However, this publication was associated with the period of military rule, as it contained an excerpt from General Gabriel Freiherr von Splény’s description of the Bukovina district (which will be discussed later) and fragments of the report of the secretary of the Court Chancellery, Bernhard von Jenisch. The latter spoke fluent Turkish and was sent to Bukovina while determining the border with Turkey in 1775. The article was published in French, with a brief introduction in German. The preface noted that Hungary owned Bukovina, then the Moldavian Principality and Turkey for some time, and explained why and how the region was annexed to Austria. The message contained brief information about the region’s history, geography, population and social structure, economy, culture, crafts and trade, administration and legal relations. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine where in the text the actual message of Gabriel Freiherr von Splény is and where Bernhard von Jenisch’s information is. Although some study was conducted in the archives of Vienna’s higher education institutions to prepare the publication, it is still unclear who was responsible for its layout. According to the publisher’s detailed notes, Friedrich Gottlieb Canzler himself could have done this.

The editorial to the article’s afterword stated the following: “This is how Bukovina looked when it fell into the hands of the Austrian government. The story of what has been changed and made since that era would be an important correspondence to this essay, which we expected from the history friends.”³⁵

³⁴ *Déscription de la Bukowina*, in “Neues Magazin für die neuere Geschichte, Erd- und Völkerkunde”. Herausgegeben von Friedrich Gottlieb Canzler, 1790, S. 287-308.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, S. 308.

The publisher also mentioned that he had not published all of the article's footnotes and promised to publish annexes in the future.³⁶ This, however, has never happened.

In fact, in the last quarter of the 18th century, only these three works on local lore studies of Bukovina during military rule were published in academic journals. They, however, testify to the awakening of interest in Bukovina in the academia of Europe, the desire to comprehend the region's position at the time of its annexation to Austria and the first attempts to upgrade the social structure in this territory.

WORKS ON LOCAL LORE STUDIES ABOUT BUKOVINA DURING MILITARY ADMINISTRATION PUBLISHED IN THE LATE 19TH CENTURY

Analysing the Bukovinian studies during the military rule, one should remember that, despite the above, much more was done at that time. They were not made public because they contained information obtained by Austrian officials or the military for the state's top leadership. They had been kept in the Vienna archives for a long time and became known to the public only after more than a hundred years, in the late 19th century. Nevertheless, these reports formed a specific basis for understanding the history, geography, economics, demography, religion, the system of government, the situation of the Bukovina settlements, etc. Therefore, they should also be explicitly linked to local lore studies of the 1770-1780s.

General Gabriel Freiherr von Splény's memos were typical in this regard. Two of them are the most famous. The first memo was written on December 10, 1774. Ferdinand Zieglauer, Professor of Chernivtsi University, in his work *The Situation of Bukovina during the Austrian Occupation* reported about it for the first time in 1888.³⁷ However, instead of publishing Gabriel Freiherr von Splény's memo as a separate document, the professor included it in his presentation, citing fragments of the report. The researcher found the region's description at the time of its accession to Austria to be the most valuable in the memo. In this memorandum, Gabriel Freiherr von Splény did not yet use the name Bukovina but instead identified the territory as "Galician Border Generalship".

The second and more complete memo from Gabriel Freiherr von Splény,

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Ferdinand Zieglauer, *Der Zustand der Bukowina zur Zeit der österreichischen Occupation. Dargestellt im Spiegel der erste Deutschrift des kommandieren Generals Freih. v. Splény, Czernowitz, 1888, S. 41.*

dated approximately late August – early September of 1775, entered history under the name *Bukovina District Description*.³⁸ The fragment of this memo was published in French in “Neues Magazin für die neuere Geschichte, Erd- und Völkerkunde”, in 1790.

Johann Polek published in 1893 *The Bukovina District Description* with the subtitle *in its past and to this day still existing state, together with suggestions on how in the future it would be possible to improve the former status of the region in politics and economy*.³⁹ Gabriel Freiherr von Splény's work consisted of three parts. The first one, “From the Past Situation of the Bukovina District,” described the region at the time of joining Austria. In particular, the geographical and economic description of the area was made, and the most important settlements and the nature of the nation were characterised. Gabriel Splény considered the overwhelming majority of the population of the region to be Moldavians because this territory joined Austria from the Moldavian principality.

Chapter 6 of part 3, describing the previous reign, was the most interesting. Gabriel Freiherr von Splény quite fully illustrated the system of administrative management of the region, the powers of individual officials, the sanitary services, the judicial administration, the position of the clergy and legal proceedings over it, the existence of various taxes, regalia and cameralia, and the associated features of the social structure of the population. Describing the previous reign, the author wrote quite critically about the customs and practices that prevailed in the region. He noted, “Since all these administrative personnel, starting from the headman, excluding only Arnauts, did not receive any salary from the prince, it is easy to imagine how these officials performed their service and suppressed the people.”⁴⁰

In part two, he proposed several reforms that needed to be carried out in Bukovina to improve the region's management. In part 3, the General-major discussed how to develop the region's economy, particularly agriculture, crafts and trade. However, just a few proposals were implemented in subsequent years.

The “Table of Localities of the Bukovina District” was placed as an appendix to the *Bukovina District Description*. Johann Polek also published it for the first time in 1893.⁴¹ It contained the names of settlements, indicating the number of living families and the social structure of the inhabitants. In particular, the nobility

³⁸ Gabriel Splény, *Opys Bukovyny* [Description of Bukovina]..., p. 6.

³⁹ *General Splény's Beschreibung der Bukowina*..., S. 167.

⁴⁰ Gabriel Splény, *Opys Bukovyny* [Description of Bukovina]..., p. 37.

⁴¹ Johann Polek, *Ortschaftsverzeichnis der Bukowina aus dem Jahre 1775*, in “Jahrbuch des Bukowiner Landes-Museums”, 1893, S. 27-44.

stood out, which included boyars, Mazils* and the gentry. In addition, priests, peasants, and court employees – Umblătorii**, Arnăuții***, Baranii****, Calarașii***** were recorded separately. There was also data concerning merchants, Armenians, Jews, and Gypsies.

There are 290 settlements in the Table made by Gabriel Freiherr von Splény. The total population consisted of 17,047 families. However, the list also included settlements that were returned to Turkey after delimiting the borders under the Balamutka Convention on July 2, 1776. It is also worth noting that the number of settlements in Splény and Enzenberg's information differs because there was no unified approach to what a village, a farm, or a settlement with single houses meant. This was regulated in Austrian statistics only in the second half of the 19th century.

Publishing the *Bukovina District Description*, Johann Polek also added the appendix "Remarks" to the work of Gabriel Freiherr von Splény, made by an unknown author and found along with the manuscript.⁴² According to Johann Polek, Bernhard Jenisch made these remarks. Perhaps they were used in Friedrich Gottlieb Canzler's journal publication in 1790. The corrections were clarifying and supplementing. In particular, the author of the "Remarks" pointed out that "The geographical classification in this description (by Gabriel Splény) still refers to the mapping and location of the imperial borders made by Major Mieg; but now, after the completion of the demarcation carried out jointly with the commissioner of the Ottoman Porte, much has disappeared."⁴³ In particular, Gabriel Splény attributed the Golden Bistritsa to streams. The author of the remarks noted that it was a rather large river.⁴⁴ The number of settlements was calculated incorrectly as well.

In addition to Gabriel Freiherr von Splény, Major Friedrich Mieg also made interesting reports about Bukovina. As already noted, he mapped the northern part of Bukovina and then participated in the delimitation of the border between

* "Mazil" - Small boyar or descendant of a small boyar (without public office).

** "Umblător" (= Walker) – a soldier from a corps of couriers of the Moldavian princes.

*** "Arnăut" – mercenary soldier (of Albanian origin) employed in the royal guard in the Romanian principalities; armed servant.

**** "Barani" – officials who collected taxes from the population.

***** "Calarași" – military corps of auxiliary servants of the prince.

⁴² *Anmerkungen über die Beschreibung des Bukowiner Districts, welche von Herrn Generalen Baron von Splény ist verfaßet worden*, in *General Splény's Beschreibung der Bukowina*, Czernowitz, 1893, S. 159-165.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, S. 159.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, S. 161.

Turkey and Austria in Bukovina. Three years of observations resulted in his work *Topographic Description of the Bukovina District with Military Annotations*, prepared in the winter of 1775-1776. Johann Polek first published it in 1897.⁴⁵

Friedrich Mieg consistently described the region's population in this work, noting that at the time of accession, there were 14,989 families, or approximately 70 thousand people, living in three cities (Chernivtsi, Siret, Suceava) and 263 other settlements. Friedrich Mieg did not particularly delve into the ethnic composition of the population, only identifying Vlachs, some Hungarians and Bosnians, as well as Gypsies and Jews. Nothing was mentioned about the Rusyns; perhaps, based on the Orthodox religion, he assigned them all to the Vlachs.

Friedrich Mieg divided the region's inhabitants into pastoralists and farmers according to their occupation, also noting that part of the population was engaged in destructive deforestation. He called for a complete cessation of such activities. He also emphasized the prospect of cultivating fruits and emphasized how the people could prosper by engaging in agricultural production. Friedrich Mieg paid attention to describing rivers and water resources, mountains, forests, mineral resources and extracting industries, wood processing, and trade in his work. He also mentioned the profitability of the salt trade with Ukrainian Podolia, and the possibility of buying grain from Ukrainian peasants. He was one of the first to express his opinion on the expediency and profitability of timber rafting on the Cheremosh and the possibilities of navigation on the Dniester and Prut.

The military memo was a separate part of the work, where the author reflected on how to protect this territory in case of possible wars with neighbouring states.

The study made by Johann Budinszky, *Bukovina district description, which reflects the geographical, physical, economic, commercial, military and spiritual situation, together with some remarks on how certain points should be improved in the future*, is extremely interesting for understanding the position of Bukovina almost ten years after joining Austria⁴⁶, presented to the Galician General Command in January 1783 and also published by Johann Polek in the late 19th century.

Johann Budinszky was a county engineer in Bereg County in Transcarpathia and lived in Mukachevo in the early 1780s. He was appointed head of the cartographic commission for regulating land holdings in Bukovina in the autumn of

⁴⁵ Major Friedrich von Mieg, *Topographische Beschreibung der Bukowina*. Herausgegeben von der Dr. J. Polek, in "Jahrbuch des Bukowiner Landes-Museums", 1897, S. 3-37.

⁴⁶ *Die Bukowina zu Anfang des Jahres 1783. Nach einer Denkschrift des Mappierungs-direktors Johann Budinszky*, Czernowitz, 1894, S. 64.

1783. The commission worked until 1783 and managed to process land holdings in 40 settlements of Bukovina fully. It was closed by the decision of Joseph II due to a lack of funds. Johann Budinszky prepared the above publication based on the work done, his observations and using the documents available at that time, including the *Description* by Gabriel Freiherr von Splény. The remarks about the population of Bukovina were of particular interest. The author rightly noted that there had been no accurate population count in Bukovina. Only the number of families was given. The study presented accurate demographic statistics for 40 settlements that the commission managed to examine. In particular, it was noted that 848 inhabitants lived in Kitsman, 1745 people lived in Mamaivtsi together with Revna and Burdei in 1782, in Zastavna there were 1035 people, 852 in Valeva, 1250 in Verenchanka, 1077 in Rădăuți, etc. Thus, there were more inhabitants in some villages at that time than in the future district centres of Kitsman, Rădăuți, and Zastavna.

Johann Budinszky described the appearance, clothing, and food of the population of Bukovina, noticing specific everyday differences between the social groups of mazils and peasants. The large majority of the region's population was Orthodox, and the less they were taught about religion, the more loyal they were to it.

In the 1780s, the future status of Bukovina was debated at the highest levels of government in Austria. Bukovinian boyars defended the idea of maintaining a separate status for Bukovina. Vasile Balș, although born in Iași, became a vivid spokesman of such interests, he had repeatedly visited Bukovina since 1776, and later he was appointed to work in the military administration of the region. He was well versed in the aspirations of the local aristocracy and prepared and sent a comprehensive report *Description of Bukovina and its internal situation* to Count Andreas Hadik, the head of the Aulic War Council in Vienna. Johann Polek initially published it in the appendix of the work *Journeys of Emperor Joseph II to Galicia and Bukovina* in 1895.⁴⁷

Although Vasile Balș's memo had the character of a political and journalistic treatise, it contained a lot of local history information about Bukovina. First, Vasile Balș quite holistically showed the social structure of the Bukovinian society. He wrote with enthusiasm about the boyars, believing that they could be a progressive force in society, driving reforms in the region.⁴⁸ At the same time, he was quite critical of the mazils and believed that they should pay taxes like other unprivileged strata. Vasile Balș, as the representative of boyars, negatively assessed the

⁴⁷ Basilius Balsh, *Beschreibung der Bukowina und deren innern Verhältniss*, in "Jahresbericht des Bukowiner Landes-Museums", 1895, S. 103-112.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, S. 104-105.

efficiency of the peasants, accusing them of idleness, unwillingness to develop their economy, the poor performance of duties, and alcohol consumption. He also paid much attention to the description of the Orthodox Church in Bukovina, the structure of church management, its economic situation, and numerous cases of abuse. He made proposals for reforming church management.

Vasile Balș's reflections on the region's economy were quite interesting. He sharply opposed the predatory deforestation by peasants, proposed to intensify border trade, and emphasised the need to support the development of various crafts. In general, Vasile Balș's memo quite logically complemented the local lore studies written between 1775 and 1786.

CONCLUSIONS

During the military rule in Bukovina, the first works on local lore studies were published. They were mostly military men who took part in the annexation of the region to Austria, most of whom were foreigners, except Vasile Balș. The information contained in these works was primarily general, and it included both the description of the natural characteristics of the region as well as the economy, administration, population, and social and ethnic structure. The factual content of these messages was based on personal observations of the authors or testimonies obtained during their professional activity in Bukovina. A lot of information was speculative, inaccurate and not scientifically substantiated. This was especially true of social relations and the population's ethnic composition.

The main challenges in the development of local lore research included the population's low levels of education, a lack of secondary and higher education institutions, insufficient attention from the educated strata to the newly annexed territory, and the absence of people professionally engaged in historical, geographical and other research. Nevertheless, these early works served as an important basis for subsequent local lore research, allowing comparisons of the situation in Bukovina before and after its annexation to Austria. They initiated local lore studies topics, which were pursued in the following periods and are still relevant now. They all explored the history of towns and villages, the demography of Bukovina, the peculiarities of the social and ethnic structure of the population, the history of individual industries, the church and the functioning of church institutions, the development of education, and the management system. It is difficult to conceive a comprehensive picture of the evolution of Bukovinian studies in Austria (Austria-Hungary) in the late 18th – early 20th century without the study of these works. They have now become an

important source of Bukovina's history during its annexation to Austria and the region's early years of military administration.

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JEWS AND THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF THE 19TH – EARLY 20TH CENTURIES

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Abstract: *The article examines the relationship between Ukrainian and Jewish elites in the Ukrainian lands during the 19th and early 20th centuries from a theoretical standpoint. It explains why Ukrainian and Jewish national movements did not reach a beneficial compromise in the Ukrainian territories. The article includes the viewpoints of important Ukrainian political philosophers such as Panteleimon Kulish, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Mykola Mikhnovskyi, and others on the Jewish issue and chances for Ukrainian-Jewish collaboration on the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires' Ukrainian territories. The authors analyse the assimilation that Jewish intellectuals faced after exposure to the Russian and Ukrainian cultures and accession to political organisations. They also draw parallels between Zionism and the Ukrainian national movement. In conclusion, the article emphasizes the importance of a mutually beneficial and transparent Ukrainian-Jewish dialogue, considering the prior positive cooperation.*

Keywords: *Jewish, Ukrainian, Movement, Cooperation, Conflicts, Assimilation.*

Rezumat: *Evreii și mișcarea națională de eliberare ucraineană din secolul al XIX-lea și începutul secolului XX. Articolul sintetizează la nivel conceptual problema relațiilor dintre elitele ucrainene și cele evreiești din regiunile ucrainene, în secolul al XIX-*

lea și începutul secolului XX. Autorii încearcă să explice de ce în teritoriile ucrainene nu s-a găsit un compromis reciproc avantajos între mișcarea națională ucraineană și cea evreiască. Sunt expuse opiniile unor reprezentanți de marcă ai gândirii politice ucrainene, precum Panteleimon Kulish, Mihail Hrușevski, Mykola Mikhnovsky și alții, cu privire la problema evreiască și perspectivele cooperării ucraineano-evreiești în teritoriile ucrainene din cadrul Austro-Ungariei și Imperiului Rus. Studiul analizează problema asimilării intelectualilor de origine evreiască sub impactul culturilor rusă și ucraineană și aderarea lor la organizațiile politice. Autorii schițează, de asemenea, paralele între sionism și mișcarea națională ucraineană. În final, este subliniată necesitatea stabilirii unui dialog sincer ucraineano-evreiesc, ținând cont de experiența pozitivă a cooperării din trecut.

INTRODUCTION

The Jewish population of every great nation of Europe and North America played a significant role in the rise of modern national and state ideas in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Karl Marx, a German Jew, formulated the teachings of scientific socialism. His teachings became the basis of German Social Democracy – which supported centralization and promoted the greatness of the Imperial German state in the mid-19th century. The Jewish presence was very significant in the social-democratic movement of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Many prominent activists of the largest workers' unions in Central Europe were of Jewish descent. During this time, the socialist movements in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Russia followed a similar pattern. The presence of another ethnic element did not harm these movements but, on the contrary, positively affected them. Assimilated Jews joined these movements primarily to master the essential aspects of national self-awareness attributed to the majority of the population. Its mandatory element was the adoption of the values of a large, centralised state and attitude to global values beyond the „national prejudices” of „small nations”. As for Eastern Europe (Ukraine in particular), the participation of local Jewish minorities in establishing new political communities was minimal. The majority of Ukrainian Jews in the Russian-ruled part of Ukrainian lands followed the values of the Russian state and the dominant all-Russian Imperial culture. While involved in conflicts with other state nations, Jews have often become an element in the Ukrainian ethnic context prone to persecution. During WWI, for example, the Russian occupation authorities in Lviv accused Galician Jews of conspiracy.¹

¹ Alexander Prusin, *Nationalizing a Borderland. War, Ethnicity, and Anti-Jewish Violence in East Galicia, 1914–1920*, Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 2016, 198 p.

In the southwestern part of the Russian Empire, the social order has mostly stayed the same for over 300 years. The traditional patriarchal community, based on a non-market economy and socio-class demarcation that extended to ethnolinguistic groups, was a breeding ground for intercultural antagonism. Because the peasantry was assumed to be Ukrainian, merchants and creditors to be Jewish, artisans to be German, and landowners to be Polish, a violent conflict was bound to erupt, inevitably damaging ethnic groups. Ethnic-national relations have barely changed from the 14th and 17th centuries by the mid-nineteenth century.

During this period, ethnic groups lived in closed communities, having little contact. They co-existed according to the laws developed in the Middle Ages. Jewish communities in cities and towns operated using their legal systems and were isolated from the Ukrainian and Polish communities in public life. These groups kept their distance from opposing national communities to avoid assimilation. For a Jew, their Jewish community – a ghetto in a Ukrainian city – was extraterritorial, a “miniature Israel”. The worlds of Jews and non-Jews existed separately. The deep-rooted “outsiders”/ “brethren” mental trope in times of economic hardship during revolutions and wars culminated in massive Jewish pogroms committed not only by representatives of the ruling class but also by the Ukrainian masses.

The topic of Jewish-Ukrainian relations was considered taboo during the Soviet era in communist historiography. Everything changed in 1991 after Ukraine gained independence. However, people occasionally come face to face with derogatory stereotypes. For instance, diasporic Ukrainian historians tried to justify their actions by accusing Ukrainian People's Republic troops and leadership of anti-Semitism. In the 2000s, frontal studies of Jewish-Ukrainian relations during the Bolshevik revolution and the 1920s were initiated in Ukraine and worldwide. Several studies by Ukrainian Centre of Judaic Studies historian Serhiy Hirik² stand out. Dozens of publications of the “Dukh i litera” publishing house led by Leonid Finberg are dedicated to the times of Jewish cultural revival. During the last quar-

² Serhiy Hirik (red.), *Evrey Ukrainy: Revoliutsiia i pislirevoliutsiina modernizatsiia. Polityka. Kultura. Suspilstvo: zbirka statei* [Jews of Ukraine: Revolution and post-revolutionary modernization. Policy. Culture. Society: a collection of articles], Kyiv, Laurus, 2018. 198 s.; Serhiy Hirik, *Indigenization before Indigenization. The Integration of “National Cadres” into the Party and State Apparatus of the UkrSSR and BSSR (1919–1923)*, in “Russian Studies in History”, vol. 56, 2017, no. 4, p. 294–304; Serhiy Hirik, *Evreyskyi natsional-komunizm i fenomen radianskoï bahatopartiinosti (1918–1928)* [Jewish National Communism and the Phenomenon of Soviet Multipartyism (1918–1928)], in *Evrey v etnichnyi mozaitsi ukrainskykh zemel*, Kharkiv, KhNU im. V. N. Karazina, 2015, S. 99–106.

ter of the 20th century, many North American researchers conducted several social and cultural studies of the Jewish-Ukrainian problem³.

This article addresses the problem of establishing a dialogue between Jewish and Ukrainian intellectuals in the 19th and early 20th centuries, in the era of the Ukrainian national revival within Russian-governed territory.

THE JEWISH QUESTION AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE UKRAINIAN MOVEMENT IN THE DAYS OF THE CYRIL AND METHODIUS BROTHERHOOD

The rise of the intellectual elite and the Ukrainian movement through the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood increased Ukrainians' interest in developing relationships with other ethnic groups. The Jewish community was the third largest group after the Russians and the Poles. The first Ukrainian socio-political journal, "Osnova", has published numerous editions on Ukrainian-Jewish relations. The journal's editorial staff was embroiled in a constant debate with the Jewish Russian-language "Zion" journal. On the Ukrainian side, the leaders of the Ukrainian national cause were Panteleimon Kulish and Mykola Kostomarov. They defended Ukrainians' right as a national group to play a leading role in the development of Ukrainian territories. They sought Jewish community recognition as well as support for Ukrainians' aspirations for reform. However, no constructive dialogue at the elite level was achieved. The dispute was conducted from a position of power and the respective national truths, demanding historical accuracy from each other's arguments rather than attempting to find a future compromise. Those who pleaded for the Jewish side recalled the Jewish pogroms of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the horrific losses of the Jewish population during the Cossack and Haydamak rampages in the 17th and 18th centuries. Ukrainians claimed financial extortion and leaving communities in debt. Each side insisted on their arguments. Both were unwilling to consider the present and future, choosing to focus solely on the tragic facets of the two nations' relations. Regrettably, despite the suggestion of Canadian-Ukrainian historian Roman Serbyn twenty

³ Ivan-Pavlo Himka, *Ukrainsko-evreiski vzaïemyny: vid istorii do pamiati* [Ukrainian-Jewish Relations: from History to Memory], Kyiv, Dukh i Litera, 2019, 384 s.; I. M. Pohrebynska, M. M. Hon, *Evrey v Zakhidnoukrainskiy Narodniy Respublitsi (do problemy ukrainsko-evreiskykh vidnosyn)* [Jews in the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (on the Problem of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations)], Kyiv, 1997, 84 s.; Henry Abramson, *Prayer for the Government. Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999, 255 p.

years ago, the contents of this constructive discussion were not fully released.⁴

The Ukrainian revival's leaders were unable to set the right tone, nor were they able to stimulate the interest of the local Jewish population in the benefits given to their people by the Ukrainian revival. Mykola Kostomarov, same as Ivan Sikorskyi later, seriously considered the possibility of Jewish ritual murder of Ukrainian Christians during the Beilis trial⁵. He contributed many pieces to the „Kievskaya starina” journal in the late 18th century on anti-Jewish pogroms in Ukraine's Left Bank, citing materials from the Hetmanate's court books, the territory of modern-day Poltava, Chernihiv, and Sumy on the Left Bank of Ukraine, which a Cossack Hetman governed in the 17th – 18th centuries⁶. In his private life, Kostomarov also displayed some degree of antisemitism, using hateful rhetoric in several of his memoirs.

The Jewish population exhibited almost no interest in the Ukrainian movement whereas one can see the influence of the Ukrainian school in contemporary Polish literature, tendencies to romanticise the Cossack movement in literature, and the emergence of the myth of the Union of Lublin as the pinnacle of Polish–Ukrainian political relations. Religious and mystical Judaism excluded activists like Micha Czajkowski, Tomasz Padura, and Juliusz Sowacki from the Jewish intellectual environment. They were the forerunners of humanist Ukrainophilism, making the ideological transition to full-fledged support of the Ukrainian movement. This included people of Polish origin, such as Paulin Świącicki, Volodymyr Antonovych, and Tadeusz Rylski. During the uprisings of 1830 and 1863, the Poles sought an ally to oppose the Russian tsar and chose Ukrainians.

In our opinion, the search for union, mutual understanding, and a compromise was eventually possible in the process of Jewish assimilation in the Russian and Austro–Hungarian empires. From the mid-19th century onwards, such processes were happening at increasing rates, but the outflow of Jews was directed at stronger national groups – Russian, Polish, and German/Austrian. The Ukrainians, who aimed to become a similar reservoir of cadre replenishment for imperial nations, could not expect a large influx of assimilated Jews. At the same time, the Ukrainian linguistic and cultural element was not alien to the Jews. An average

⁴ Roman Serbyn, *The “Sion” – “Osnova” Controversy of 1861–1862*, in Howard Aster, Peter J. Potichnyj (Eds.), *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1990, pp. 85–110.

⁵ The notorious 1913 trial of Kyivan Jew Menahem Mendel Beilis, who was accused of ritual murder of an Orthodox Christian boy by the Tsarist authorities.

⁶ N. Kostomarov, *Zhydotrepanye v nachale XVIII veka* [Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the Early 18th century], in “Kievskaya starina”, Vol. V, 1883, № 1, s. 1-26; № 3, s. 477-492.

Jewish citizen understood, knew, and used the Ukrainian language very well, as mentioned by Yevhen Chykalenko in his memoirs. He wrote that back in the 1870s, the Ukrainian language was heard from local Jews at the Ananiev bazaar, a county town in the Kherson province, nearly as often as Yiddish⁷. However, ten years later, after the urban centres had undergone the process of Russification, Jews spoke primarily Russian. Moreover, Jews became Ukrainian assimilators, establishing themselves amongst the Russian intelligentsia and using every opportunity to influence public opinion.

FOCUS ON THE STRONGER SIDE: JEWS AND UKRAINIANS DURING THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT'S POLITICAL PERIOD

From the beginning of modern times, the community inevitably began to dissolve in the age of intensified industrialization. The Jews readily adapted to the cultural environment. The most active and progressive members left their traditional habitat, adjusting to the dominant culture and nationality as soon as possible. Initially, they mimicked the dominant imperial nations: the Germans, the French, the British, the Austrian Germans, and the Russians. With the national question on the agenda of Eastern Europe, Jews, feeling the power of new forces rising, quickly reoriented themselves, becoming Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Croats, etc. Volodymyr Zhabotynskyi, one of the ideologists of Zionism, picked up this tendency⁸. The Ukrainian movement could have done more to impress Jewish intellectuals. However, it lacked political and social power, stability, discipline and a vital cultural component. The people of the Bible did not see these virtues in farmers who served others, the upper strata of society, who were representatives of other nations.

However, this was not always the case. As soon as Ukrainians started transitioning from farming to becoming a political factor, representatives of other ethnic-national groups in Ukrainian regions (including Jews) began to take notice. In this regard, it is interesting to recall the events of the mid-17th century, when the Cossacks became a powerful force, culminating in the creation of a quasi-state, the Cossack Hetmanate. Some Jews, despite mass pogroms by the Cossacks, also joined the war with Poland on their side. About 10 per cent of Cossack officers were of Jewish descent (the Hertsyk, Markevych, Novytskyi families, etc.). The diversity did

⁷ Yevhen Chykalenko, *Spohady (1861-1907)* [Memoirs (1861-1907)], New York, Vydavnytstvo UVAN, 1955, 504 s.

⁸ For details, see: V. Zhabotynskyi, *Vybrani statti z natsionalnoho pytannia* [Selected Papers on the National Question], Kyiv, 1991, 136 s.

not end there. Pylyp Orlyk, for example, had Czech roots, Myloradovych was of Serbian descent, and Kapnist had Hellenic heritage. According to Ernest Renan, nationality is an everyday plebiscite, and identity is determined not by blood or ancestry but by one's preference and conscious choice.⁹ The Hertsyk family, formerly of Jewish descent, experienced an upward spiralling ascent in the Cossack army, becoming general officers and distinguishing themselves even further as patrons of Ukrainian Orthodox culture. Poltava's Colonel Pavlo Hertsyk built the All-Saints Church in the Near Caves of the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra – one of the most significant monuments of the Mazepa Baroque. Members of his family were Cossack generals in the Mazepa period and were uncommonly loyal, sporting staunch autonomist views, unlike the vast majority of officers of Ukrainian origin. They were among the first ones to go into Ukrainian political emigration, losing their opportunity to pursue a career in the Russian state, as did the Ukrainian Skoropadskyi, Apostol, Halahan families, etc.¹⁰ Although, ultimately, this is an example of typical assimilation, loss of one's identity, and adoption of borrowed cultural values. When Jewish individuals integrated into Ukrainian society, they automatically abandoned all traces of their previous cultural identity.

However, most of the time, and especially after the decline of the Hetmanate in the late 18th – early 20th centuries, the Ukrainian population was deprived of a political factor, becoming a nation of peasant communities. That is why the Jews in the modern period preferred to negotiate with the Poles and the Russians as the dominant authoritative forces in Ukrainian territories. They fully recognized the right of the Russian state to rule Ukrainian governorates and even encouraged Ukrainians to abandon their traditional name for the Jewish population – “Yids”. Mykhailo Hrushevsky¹¹ and Ahatanhel Krymskyi noted the novelty of the term “Jews”, among others. They agreed to use the word “Jews” instead of “Yids” when referring to the Jewish people to help establish a consensus between the two nations. After all, “Ukrainians” as a national term was also relatively new. Jewish intellectuals saw the word “Yid” as an insult because it was frequently used with negative connotations among Russians. Although Ukrainians, as residents of the old

⁹ Ernest Renan, “*What is a Nation?*”, text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882, in Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*, Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992.

¹⁰ V. V. Tomazov, *Hertsyky* [The Hertsyk Family], in *Entsyklopediya istoriy Ukrainy*, T. 2, Kyiv, Naukova dumka, 2005, s. 96.

¹¹ Vitalii Telvak, *Iudaika v tvorcheskom nasledii Mikhaila Hrushevskogo (istoriograficheskaia i politicheskaia praktiky)* [Judaica in the Creative Heritage of Mykhailo Hrushevsky (Historiographic and Political Practices)], in *Materyaly Odynnadtsatoi Ezhehodnoi Mezhdunarodnoi Mezhdystsyplynarnoi konferentsyy po yudayke. Akademycheskaia seryia*, Moskva, 2004, vypusk 16, chast 2, s. 113-124.

Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, have become accustomed to it as a neutral term. Interestingly, representatives of the Jewish movement did not demand the same from the Poles.

Yevhen Chykalenko and the “Rada” members tried to overcome these prejudices by using the word “Yid” only in a positive context and instead resorting to the word “Jews” only when referring to assimilated pro-Russian Jews. The spreading of the new name “Jews” in the Russian Empire testified to the beginning of the assimilation processes among Jews, who were transforming from a nation of artisans and rural “Yids” into an urban community using Russian for communication and education, but with sentimental ties to the Jewish community of the past. Usage of the word “Yid” by the Ukrainian population began to be associated with antisemitism due to Russian Jews’ perception of Ukrainian territory not as a separate entity but as an integral part of the Russian Empire. Although, the cultural elite among Russian Jews may have been unaware of this.

As the Ukrainian movement strengthened, Ukrainian-Jewish relations improved radically. The difference in the attitude of Jews towards Ukrainians was especially noticeable in Galicia, where they supported the creation of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic. More noticeably, 2,000 people from the Jewish community joined a regiment in the Ukrainian Galician Army¹². In general, however, in the 19th century and later in the 20th, the Jewish elite did not seriously consider the idea of a Ukrainian state. Representatives of the Ukrainian movement were also to blame, as they made little effort to spark Jewish interest in the Ukrainian cause.

Discriminatory laws of the Russian Empire against Jews (eviction, restrictions on the right to education, holding administrative positions, etc.) made this national group most prone to revolutionary resistance of the tsar. All radical Russian parties (Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and Socialist-Revolutionaries) consisted mainly of Jewish people. On the other hand, a significant percentage of Jews attained membership in liberal parties. Through voluntary Russification, they also contributed to the Russification of Ukrainians. In general, “non-natives” became one of the greatest detractors of various “nationalisms”. Let us consider, for example, Peter Struve, who was German, or Joseph Stalin, the Georgian. Jews who abandoned their nationality and identified themselves as Russians were also at the forefront of this movement and often exhibited traits of Ukrainophobia.

¹² For details, see: P. Hutsal, *Zhydivskiyi (evreiskiyi) kurin* [The Jewish Regiment], in *Ternopil'skyi entsyklopedychnyi slovnyk*, Ternopil, “Zbruch”, 2004, tom 1; Marten Feller, *Evrei v Ukrainskii Halytskii Armii (UHA). Zhydivskiyi kurin* [Jews in the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA). The Jewish Regiment], <http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n48texts/feller.html> (Accessed on 27.03.2021).

Many Jews who became great authors made substantial contributions to Russian culture (e.g., Osip Mandelstam, Boris Pasternak, Joseph Brodsky). Russians also adopted many negative stereotypes about Ukrainians from the Russified Jews. It can be said that the cultural achievements of Russian Jews were much more significant than those of Ukrainians. For example, at the beginning of the previous century, a heavily illustrated multivolume *Jewish Encyclopaedia* was published in the Russian Empire¹³. Instead, Ukrainian activists only managed to publish two volumes of the famous “Ukrainian people of the past and present” encyclopaedia on the eve of the revolution¹⁴.

SEARCH FOR A UKRAINIAN–JEWISH CONSENSUS ON THE EVE OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

Some members of the Jewish intelligentsia, which has already become part of the Russian cultural project, have partially supported the Ukrainian movement. Among the members of the Kyiv community of the 1860s and 1870s, were many Jews who were selflessly supportive of the Ukrainian cultural identity and, in fact, alongside Volodymyr Antonovych and Oleksandr Konyskyi, were the first ideologically independent activists in the political sense. Wilhelm Berenstam was an ardent Ukrainian by political choice. He had to leave Kiev because of his Ukrainianophilia but he continued to teach for two decades in Pskov and St. Peterburg. At the end of his life, he returned to Kiev, rejoined the “Old Community”¹⁵ and was the most dedicated visitor to its meetings since then. Banker Vsevolod Rubinstein provided significant financial support to the “Community”.

The gendarmerie reports demonstrate that the Ukrainian movement was spearheaded not so much by “ethnic Little Russians” but by Jews instead (the “Old Community” also included members that were of German, Swedish, Polish and Russian descent: Illia Shrah, Sofii Lindfors (Rusova), Tadeusz Rylski, Borys

¹³ The Encyclopaedia was published in 1908–1913 in 16 volumes in St. Petersburg by the Society for Jewish Scientific Publications and the Brockhaus–Efron Publishing House. The basis and model for it was the 12–volume *The Jewish Encyclopedia* (London; New York, 1901–1906), published a few years earlier. The authors of the *Jewish Encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron* considerably supplemented and improved on the information in it.

¹⁴ F. K. Volkov et al. (Eds.), *Ukraynyskyi narod v eho proshlom y nastoiashchem* [Ukrainian people in his past and present], T. 1–2, Sankt-Peterburg, 1914–1916.

¹⁵ N. M. Sydorenko, *Berenstam Vil'iam Lyudvygovych*, in *Entsyklopediya Suchasnoyi Ukrayiny*, T. 2, Kyiv, Polihrafknyha, 2003, s. 514.

Poznanskyi, Kost Mykhalchuk, Oleksandr Rusov). The gendarmes did not try too hard to comprehend these issues. To them, the word “Jew” did not hold any ethnic distinction and was used to classify all those who threatened the “one and indivisible” Russian Empire. Viacheslav Lypynskyi, who was of Polish descent, created the concept of a political nation – patriotic devotion to the land. This concept also worked for Ukrainian Jews. Notably, the “not quite Ukrainians” were often the most politically conscious supporters of the Ukrainian cause. Could this be considered a coincidence? Perhaps not. The Ukrainian movement was established through cultural awareness, which was only achievable for people of good education who were constantly engaged in intellectual discourse. Contrary to the dominant cultural groups, the Ukrainian masses did not often have access to these tools.

A new generation of those who already identified politically as Ukrainians rather than Ukrainophiles began to seek opportunities for political cooperation with the Ukrainian Jews. Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s first socio-political article in the Lviv “Pravda” journal in the late 1880s was devoted to “Ukrainian Yids”¹⁶. He was one of the first to use this definition, which paved the way for including the Jewish component in the Ukrainian movement. Serhiy Yefremov’s first Ukrainian-language article in Russia’s “Kievskie otkliki” journal dealt with the Jewish pogroms perpetrated in Kyiv by the Russian Black Hundred on October 17, 1905.¹⁷ Progressive National Democrats sought to persuade Jewish activists to join the Ukrainian movement and to renounce their pro-Russian orientation.

There was also the opposing conviction, which incited anti-Ukrainian attitude among Jews, preserving the historical status quo and permitting both nations to exist in separate, unrelated cultural environments. Mykola Mikhnovskyyi, the author of the first Ukrainian independent program in the Upper Dnipro region, saw Jews as a lightning rod for the Ukrainian political and cultural troubles at the time. After the First Russian Revolution, Mykola Mikhnovskyyi advised Ukrainians to maintain a joint anti-Jewish front with Pyotr Stolypin’s Black Hundreds¹⁸. Olena

¹⁶ Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *Ukrainski zhydy* [Ukrainian Jews], in M. S. Hrushevsky, *Tvory u 50-y tomakh*, Lviv, Svit, 2003, T. 5, s. 339 – 350.

¹⁷ Later, Serhiy Yefremov repeatedly addressed the Jewish question again: S. Yefremov, *Drahomanov i evreiska sprava* [Drahomanov and the Jewish Question], in “Rada”, 1908, 6 noiab., 7 noiab., 8 noiab., 12 noiab.; S. Yefremov, *Ekspertyza* [Examination], in “Rada”, 1913, 24 okt.; S. Yefremov, *Yeretychna knyha: Vl. Zhabotynskyi. Felyetony. Stor. 286. SPb. 1913* [The Heretic Book: Vl. Zhabotynskyi. Feuilletons. 286 p., St. Petersburg. 1913], in “Rada”, 1913, 31 maia.; S. Yefremov, *Z nashoho zhyttia* [Of Our Life], in “Rada”, 1913, 20 okt.

¹⁸ Yevhen Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk (1907-1917)* [Diary (1907–1917)], Kyiv, Tempora,

Pchilka pursued a similar belief in her "Ridnyi krai" journal, polemising with the "assimilated" literature professor Volodymyr Peretz, who tried to prove the usefulness of involving Jews in the Ukrainian national cause¹⁹. Volodymyr Peretz, who was of Jewish descent, was the first professor of philology at the Saint Volodymyr Imperial University of Kyiv to focus his work on the old Ukrainian literature of the 16th – 18th centuries. He founded a literary seminar that became the basis of the school of historians of literature. The scholars later worked fruitfully within the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Among his students were Mykola Zerov, Viktor Petrov, Pavlo Fylypovych and Mykhailo Drai-Khmara. Peretz was also the founder of the philological section of the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kyiv. While in Leningrad, he founded and became chairman of the Leningrad branch of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. Some Ukrainian intellectuals shared the belief that the Jewish question could be resolved by force by putting pressure on the Jewish minority, alienating it, pushing it within the narrow ghetto instead of seeking compromises and understanding, and making Ukrainian public life and state rule more appealing to the Jews.

Yevhen Chykalenko sought to reject the negative prejudice. He was not biased against Poles, Russians, or Jews, as was typical for some Ukrainian political activists from the Upper Dnipro region. He did not mind their participation in the Ukrainian movement. Critical of the assimilative policy of Jewish journalists and activists of Russian parties of Jewish origin, he expressed a positive attitude to the "Ukrainians and Jews" collaboration, criticised the xenophobic views of Olena Pchilka, Mykola Mikhnovskyi, Oleksandr Borodai and others, earning his "Yiddish father" nickname. Interestingly, Yevhen Chykalenko, like most activists of the Ukrainian movement at the time, considered it necessary to preserve the word "Yids" to describe Ukrainian Jews and disagreed that the usage of this term was derogatory or symptomatic of Ukrainian Judeophobia. He even went as far as introducing the following practice in the "Rada": Jews-nationalists with whom they sympathized were to be referred to as „Yids," while assimilated Jews were to be referred to as "Jews."²⁰

Yevhen Chykalenko tried to pursue pro-Jewish rhetoric in the "Rada". However, the atmosphere of traditional distrust on the part of Jews and Ukrainians persevered. The short-sightedness of some Russified Jewish intellectuals facilitated this prejudice. People of Jewish descent, who often disapproved of the idea

2004, T. 1, s. 31. For comparison, see: *Lyst Mykoly Mikhnovskoho - advokata prysiazhnoho* [Letter by Juryman's Attorney Mykola Mikhnovskyi], in "Rada", 1908, 18 okt.

¹⁹ Yevhen Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk (1907-1917)* [Diary (1907–1917)], s. 31.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, s. 46-47.

of Ukrainian literary revival and ridiculed the “Rada” newspaper and the Ukrainian language, edited many of Kyiv’s liberal newspapers “Kievskie mysli”, “Kievskie vesti”, etc. This situation, in which assimilated members of one ethnic group supported the assimilation of another, can be explained by the purely pragmatic intentions of Russian-speaking journalists of Jewish descent. If they recognized the ability of the Ukrainian language to serve the broad needs of the Ukrainian public, many of them would have been forced to switch to the Ukrainian language in their line of work.

ZIONISM AND THE JEWISH LEFT PARTY MOVEMENT AND UKRAINIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Zionism – a movement to build a Jewish state in its historical homeland was a natural ally of the Ukrainian Social Democracy, which shared a similar ultimate goal. Zionism originated in Austria-Hungary and Germany and was perhaps most prevalent in Russia, where it was difficult for Jews to pursue careers in politics and liberal professions. There is proof that it was the Zionist movement in Austria-Hungary and Russia to spark the idea of establishing a Ukrainian state amongst the Ukrainian elite. Vasyl Shchurat mentioned in his memoirs the personal acquaintance of Ivan Franko and Theodor Herzl in Vienna in the early 1890s.²¹ According to him, both allegedly were mutually sympathetic to the national movements of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples.

Interestingly, Lev Yurkevich, leader of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party (USDLP), who supported Ukrainian independence, was hindering his own beliefs with his orthodox Marxism, which led him to prioritise class over nationality and classify the idea of an independent Ukraine as Ukrainian Zionist propaganda²². It is no coincidence that during communist totalitarianism, accusations of Zionism became the most damning along with those of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism”.

The USDLP established close cooperation with the Jewish socialist parties, which were more widespread in Ukrainian cities than the Ukrainian socialist

²¹ For details, see: Vasyl Shchurat, *Dr. Ivan Franko* [Dr. Ivan Franko], in “Frankoznavchi studii”, 2001, Vypusk Pershyi, s. 252-270; Vasyl Shchurat, *Ivan Franko u moikh spomy-nakh* [My Memories of Ivan Franko], in *Ivan Franko u spohadakh suchasnykiv*, Lviv, Knyzhkovo-zhurnalne vydavnytstvo, 1956, 596 s.

²² For details, see: L. Rybalka [alias Lev Yurkevich], *Russkye sotsyal-demokraty i natsio-nalnyi vopros* [Russian Social Democrats and the National Question], Geneva, Izdanie redaktsii ukrainskoy sotsial-demokraticheskoy gazety “Borotba”, 1917.

movement itself. In Kyiv and other places, there were more diversified Jewish socialist groups than Ukrainian ones (mainly the „Bund” and the „Poale Zion”), and they were naturally more interested in the Russian Social Democrats. The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) was more established than the smaller USDLP. Ukrainian cities were under the dominant influence of Russian culture, which resulted in workers often moving to Ukraine from ethnic Russian regions. Instead, the Polish Socialist Party (PSP), on the other hand, sought to cooperate with the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) and the Ukrainian Socialist Party (USP). The former was born out of the PSP and mainly consisted of descendants of the Ukrainianised Polish nobility.

Ukrainian socialists have also transcended their national prejudices. There were many Ukrainians of Jewish descent in the ranks of the USDLP. Maksym Gechter was a prolific publicist of the “Rada”. Osyp Hermaise was a member of the Central Council, a prominent researcher of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement in general and RUP in particular, Mykhailo Hrushevsky’s right hand in the Historical Section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. At that time, the Jewish intelligentsia also focused on Ukrainian culture. For example, Lev Idzon became one of the first researchers of Volodymyr Vynnychenko’s works. Rozaliia Lifshitz, V. Vynnychenko’s wife, who was of Jewish descent, knowingly married a Ukrainian writer, studied the Ukrainian language (despite hailing from ethnic Russian territory), and selflessly preserved her husband’s legacy after his death²³.

USDLP also initiated the nomination of Jewish party representatives to the Central Council and enlisted Jewish politicians into the General Secretariat. People of Jewish descent often held positions of finance ministers in numerous of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) governments.

Many Jewish community members joined the Ukrainian Socialist-Federalist Party (USFP). USFP member Solomon Goldelman, a prominent attorney from Kyiv with some pre-revolutionary experience, was a member of diplomatic missions during the revolution and author of many UPR laws, including those related to interethnic relations. After the defeat of the liberation movement, Goldelman promoted the idea of Ukraine’s independence to the Western world. He wrote one of the first scientific works on the UPR’s policy of enforcing the civil rights of Ukraine’s Jewish population²⁴.

²³ For details, see: Nadiia Myronets, *Epistoliarnyi dialoh Volodymyra Vynnychenka z Rozaliieiu Lifshyts (1911–1918)* [Volodymyr Vynnychenko’s Epistolary Dialogue with Rozaliia Lifshitz (1911–1918)], in “Slovo i chas”, 2007, № 9, s. 48–56.

²⁴ For details, see: Solomon Goldelman, *Lysty zhydivskoho sotsial-demokrata pro Ukrainu*.

JEWES AND BOLSHEVIKS DURING THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

Even in the resulting historical circumstances, a strong Ukrainian-Jewish political union could not happen in terms of recognizing Ukrainian statehood and ensuring Jewish autonomy to the greatest extent possible. The bet on the strongest prevailed again. The appeal of Bolshevism's presumed cosmopolitan orientation towards internationalism and the world revolution was too strong. Leadership positions in the new political elite tempted people of Jewish ancestry. They were the most mobile stratum of the unattached population (only assimilated Jews are considered here), partook in revolutionary activism, and brought new values to society in the political and cultural spheres. This idea required renouncing one's identity – Jewish religion, language, and even national self-identification. For example, Jewish communists changed their surnames to Russian pseudonyms. The leaders of the RSDLP by place of birth were mostly Ukrainian: Leon Trotsky (Lev Bronstein) was from the outskirts of Bobrynets (located in the Kirovohrad region today). A famous philosopher Semen Semkovskiy, his cousin, became a member of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was committed to developing Ukrainian culture and used the Ukrainian language extensively in his writings. Hryhorii Zinoviev (Apfelbaum–Radomyslskiy), born in Yelisavetgrad (modern Kropyvnytskyi), Semen Urytskiy was the son of a Cherkasy merchant of the Second Guild. Jews applied a pendulum principle (we were oppressed, so now it is our turn to oppress others), establishing punitive squads to oppress the Ukrainian peasantry, and doing so only fuelled domestic antisemitism, which has mostly subsided by then.

The Ukrainian People's Republic granted civil rights to Jews not previously provided in the constitutions of other states. These included personal autonomy and establishing an autonomous Jewish ministry under the joint Ministry of National Relations (which only existed for Ukrainian society's three most prominent communities: the Russians, the Poles and the Jews). It was a tribute to the times of the Kahal when their community, not the city officials or Polish/Ukrainian authorities, judged the Jews. Yiddish was recognized as one of the official languages of Ukraine, and all Jewish cultural initiatives – theatre, school, literature, etc. were supported. However, the promises of the losing party in a war meant little. Under Symon Petliura, Pinhas Krasnyi was in public service, and under the Bolsheviks, he

Materialy do istorii ukrainsko-zhydivskykh vidnosyn za chasiv revoliutsii [A Jewish Social Democrat's Letters about Ukraine. Materials on the History of Ukrainian–Jewish Relations During the Revolution], Viden, Hamoin, 1921, 81 s.; S. I. Goldelman, *Zhydivska natsionalna avtonomiia na Ukraini (1917-1920)* [Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine (1917–1920)], München, 1963, 109 s.

began to criticize the government he had previously served²⁵. Andrii Nikovskyy described in the “Nova Rada” how Jewish youth would shoot Ukrainian soldiers in the back from the windows of Kyiv houses. Influenced by Bolshevik propaganda, the predominantly Jewish Podil²⁶ attempted to storm the Central Council. The Red Guard forces that led the charge had a significant percentage of the local and foreign Jewish population. These events caused new tension between the two peoples, which were “symmetrical” in nature. Therefore, the infamous Proskuriv Jewish pogrom performed by the UPR army has to be considered in the context of mutual ethnic cleansing that took place during the time of war.

However, the bet of some Jews on the “stronger” turned out to be a great tragedy for the Jewish people. During the period of Ukrainianisation, Jewish culture experienced a significant boost. A Jewish culture section, a Yiddish archival commission (the first word later replaced with “Jewish”), a Jewish theatre, and even a circus in Kyiv was opened at the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences²⁷. Il’ya Galant, an employee of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, was an outstanding historian who collected and published plenty of documentary materials on the history of Jewish pogroms in Ukraine from ancient times to the early 20th century²⁸ and studied the origin and spread of Hasidism in Ukraine. There were six Jewish schools in Kyiv, more than Polish institutions, and almost as many as Russian ones. Yiddish literature gained popularity at that time. People of Jewish descent actively pursued employment in Ukrainian culture, becoming respected Ukrainian writers. Some Jewish women became wives of classics of Ukrainian literature. Raisa Troyanker was a remarkable poet of the Executed Renaissance who wrote great Ukrainian poetry.²⁹

²⁵ Serhiy Yefremov, *Shchodennyky, 1923-1929* [Diaries, 1923–1929], Kyiv, ZAT Hazeta “RADA”, 1997, s. 496.

²⁶ A district of downtown Kyiv, next to the Dnipro River.

²⁷ Ahatanhel Krymskyi was formally the Chairman, Il’ya Galant was the de facto leader, other members included – D. Brodskyi, D. Vainshtein, V. Ivanytskyi, V. Rybinskyi. The Commission published a digest, for reference see: I. V. Galant (Ed.), *Zbirnyk prats zhydivskoi istorychno-arkheohrafichnoi komisii* [Collection of Works of the Jewish Historical and Archaeographic Commission], Kn. I, Kyiv, Drukarnia Vseukrainskoi Akademii Nauk, 1928.

²⁸ For details, see his following works: Il’ya Galant, *K istoriy Umanskoj rezni* [The History of the Uman Massacre] (1895); Il’ya Galant, *Molitva v pamiat Umanskoj rezni i pismo, kasaiushcheesia toho zhe sobytiya* [A Prayer in the Memory of the Uman Massacre and a Letter Concerning the Same Event](1895); Il’ya Galant, *K istorii poselenyia evreev v Polshu i Rusi voobshche i v Podolii v chastnosti* [The History of Jewish Settlement in Poland and the Rus’ in General and in Podillia in Particular] (1897) and many others.

²⁹ For details, see: Ivan Turchak, *Poetessa yz Umany* [A Poetess from Uman], in “Raduha”,

All these achievements started fading immediately after the government began eradicating the “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” and ended in the post-war period with the mass extermination of everything Jewish-related under the pretences of “rootless cosmopolitanism”.

For any totalitarian force, the survival policy is to incite national enmity, setting one ethnic group against another – Armenians against Azerbaijanis, Poles against Ukrainians, Jews against Ukrainians, etc. One takes only negative facts, as there are always plenty of them, and inserts them into a particular system, which seems to irrefutably prove the “zoological antisemitism” of Petliura’s followers – i.e., all Ukrainians.

The Russian–Bolshevik red state machine did not spare any financial expenses to achieve this end and, unsurprisingly, prevailed in its goal. Symon Petliura became just an ordinary anti-Semite in the opinion of the world public, despite not being directly involved in orchestrating any of the Jewish pogroms and punishing his subordinates for perpetrating them. In contrast, Scholem Schwarzbard, an agent of the Russian State Political Directorate (SPD), was not punished and was even acquitted by a French court.

Later, the Soviet ideological apparatus accused the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA) of collaborating with the Nazis and participating in Jewish extermination to defame the Ukrainian state idea. The truth was, however, that there were no cases of Judeophobia among the soldiers involved in the liberation movement of WWII. It is unnecessary to attribute horrific acts of ethnic violence to the whole of the Ukrainian national movement or to portray them as its essential element. However, some agencies of the USSR exploited these misconceptions to achieve their agenda.

The fate of the Ukrainian peasantry was painfully similar to the fate of the Jewish people in Ukraine. Both have been devastated by famines, deportations, persecutions by The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, and mass repression. Today, visiting the Jewish cemeteries of Sataniv, Pidhaitsi, Sambir, and Bohuslav, examining epitaphs and artistic carvings in Hebrew on thousands of tombstones, seeing overgrown and abandoned enormous Renaissance synagogues in Zhovkva, Dubno, Lutsk, Pidhaitsi and Sataniv, one can comprehend the

1988, № 11, s. 172; O. O. Manuykin, V. T. Polishchuk, *Z litopysu dukhovnoho yednannia (Cherkashchyna u doli i tvorchosti rosiiskykh, evreiskykh i polskykh pysmennykiv)* [The Chronicle of Spiritual Unity (Cherkasy Region Reflected in the Work and Fate of Russian, Jewish and Polish Writers)], Cherkasy, 1993, s. 22-24; Vladymyr Semenov, *Surovaia lirika Raisy Troianker* [The Harsh Lyrics of Raisa Troyanker], in "Vecherniy Murmansk", 2005, № 10, 22 ianvaria.

magnitude of cultural tradition that the Ukrainian land has lost, most likely irrevocably³⁰. Ukraine was home to Sholem Aleichem, Golda Meir, and multiple Nobel laureates in physics. Back in the 1960s, the Jewish population of Kyiv ranged from 200,000 to 400,000. Heli Sniehirov describes Jewish culture and folklore as part of the urban landscape³¹.

Who benefited from the simplification of the national landscape? Only those seeking further depersonalization on their way to the heights of human progress. However, the absorption of seemingly less successful cultures never enriched human civilization. On the contrary, it impoverished and degraded “great” nations through a purely technical, cold and calculated outlook.

CONCLUSIONS

Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the historical perspective of the 18th-20th century took place in the paradigm of relations between an ethnic group with financial economic levers in its hands and a non-state ethnic group that was exposed to economic exploitation by the dominating nations: Russians, Poles, Hungarians, and Austrians. The Jewish population faced the challenge of mediating between the rulers and the oppressed nation, which inevitably led to tension and prejudice. During the national liberation movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, both sides tried to find an understanding based on the recognition of Ukrainians as a titular nation in the space from Transcarpathia to the Don and the Kuban. The idea that Ukraine was independent of the Jewish population could not, however, be adequately substantiated. Partly since the Ukrainians, in a cultural sense, could not dislodge the cultural influence of the ruling nations of Ukraine in 1914-1917. The low mobilisation capacity of Ukrainian society, the lack of sufficient development of Ukrainian culture and the absence of a powerful political stratum obstructed further collaboration between the two peoples. The armed defeat of the Ukrainian People's Republic in the war with for-

³⁰ For details, see: Rachel Wischnizer, *Mutual Influences Between Eastern and Western Europe in Synagogue Architecture from the 12th to the 18th Century*, in Joseph Gutmann (comp.) *The Synagogue: Studies in Origins, Archaeology and Architecture*, New York, Ktav Publishing House, 1975, pp. 265-308; George Loukomski, *Jewish Art in the European synagogues (From the Middle Ages to the 18th Century)*, London-New York, 1947; David Dawidowicz, *The synagogues of Poland and their destruction*, Jerusalem, 1960; Thomas C. Hubka, *Wooden synagogues of Poland and Ukraine. Lecture delivered on the Third Seminar of Jewish Art*, Jerusalem, 1991.

³¹ G. I. Snegirev, *Roman-donos* [A Denunciatory Novel], Kyiv, Dukh i litera, 2000, 504 s.

eign forces reinforced negative stereotypes in Jewish-Ukrainian relations. However, there were considerable tendencies toward cultural reconciliation on both sides. Unfortunately, establishing a communist totalitarian society in Russia/USSR in the 1920s hindered any positive development.

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THE LEGIONARY REBELLION IN THE DIPLOMATIC REPORTS OF IVAN MILECZ

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Abstract: *The study of diplomatic records revealed new details concerning the Nazi Reich's satellites in the setting of early 1941 Central Europe. It is well known today that Hitler played a decisive role in the conflict between Ion Antonescu and the Legionary Movement. However, new findings concerning the events in Romania in January 1941 continue to provide conflicting results. This investigation focuses on the reports of Ivan Milecz, the Slovak diplomat accredited in Bucharest, which were not known to previous historians. The problem of sources poses a major challenge to historians in their efforts to reconstruct the past. Although he was not well informed, Milecz managed to relay details about the legionary rebellion in Bucharest. These reports had a double significance for Bratislava. They were not merely information but political suggestions for the top power struggle in Slovakia. Their study contributes to a more complete picture of the nature of the January 1941 events for both Romania and Slovakia.*

Keywords: *Ivan Milecz, Legionary Rebellion, diplomatic reports, Slovakia, Hitler.*

Rezumat: *Rebeliunea legionară în rapoartele diplomatice ale lui Ivan Milecz. Studiul rapoartelor diplomatice dezvăluie noi ipostaze în care se găseau sateliții Reich-ului nazist, creionând mai precis tabloul general al Europei centrale la începutul anului 1941. Istoricii au demonstrat că, în conflictul dintre Ion Antonescu și Mișcarea Legionară, cuvântul decisiv i-a aparținut lui Hitler, care a înclinat balanța în favoarea fostului general, apoi mareșal al României. Noi dezvăluiri asupra evenimentelor petrecute în România în ianuarie 1941 continuă să ofere însă informații contradictorii. Investigația autorului se centrează pe rapoartele diplomatului slovac acreditat la București, Ivan Milecz, necunoscute până în prezent de către istoricii care au analizat problema. Deși nu era bine informat, diplomatul a reușit să trimită superiorilor săi detalii ale rebeliunii legionare de la București, cu o dublă*

semnificație pentru Bratislava. Acestea nu aveau doar rolul de informare, ci au devenit sugestii politice pentru lupta care se dădea la vârful puterii din Slovacia. Analiza rapoartelor ajută la conturarea unei imagini mai complete asupra naturii evenimentelor din ianuarie 1941.

INTRODUCTION

Small states that came under German domination in the early years of World War II suffered from German interference in domestic politics, even to the point of internal armed conflict. The leaders of these states had to accept collaboration with the Germans and tolerate their repressive policies. However, a particular political practice cannot be generalised. The cases of Romania and Slovakia have many similarities, but also several differences. The events that bloodied Romania in January 1941 are very well known¹. They were highlighted in both internal documents and diplomatic reports. However, until today, the information sent by Ivan Milecz, the Minister Plenipotentiary of Slovakia in Bucharest has not been brought to the forefront. These pieces of information are kept in the custody of the National Archives in Bratislava and contain a series of notes and reports issued between January 22nd and February 6th, 1941. They were intended to decipher the sources of the struggle for power in Romania for the Foreign Office in Bratislava. The political scene in Bratislava was divided between two opposing parties. The struggle for power between Ion Antonescu and the Legionary Movement echoed loudly in Slovakia. Given that the Slovak political scene was also divided into two antagonistic parties, the events in Romania proved suggestive for the Slovaks. President Jozef Tiso and conservative groups opposed the Hlinka Guard, a radical organisation close to Nazi circles. On the one hand, President Jozef Tiso was in favour of a pragmatic collaboration with Germany, which would have allowed him as much independence as possible. On the other hand, Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and the Hlinka Guard wanted to integrate more deeply into the sphere of influence of National Socialism.

¹ Dana Honciuc-Beldiman, *Statul Național Legionar. Septembrie 1940 – ianuarie 1941. Cadrul legislativ* [Legionary National State. September 1940 – January 1941. Legislative Framework], Bucharest, The National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, 2005; Luiza Lazăr, *Ion Antonescu și Mișcarea Legionară – parteneri sau adversari la conducerea statului național legionar, 14 septembrie 1940 – 21 ianuarie 1941* [Ion Antonescu and the Legionary Movement – Partners or Opponents to the Leadership of National Legionary State], in “Orizonturi istoriografice”, Vol. I, No. 1, Iași, Demiurg Publishing House, 2010, p. 190 – 209.

Slovakia was born on March 14th, 1939, following the collapse of Czechoslovakia. Contradictions between President Jozef Tiso and the Hlinka Guard were not so visible from the beginning. The two political camps collaborated to gain power in Slovakia and supported the country's independence. The hostility between Tiso and the Hlinka Guard grew as time went on. Tensions reached a critical point in January 1941 when Alexander Mach, commander of the Hlinka Guard and the country's Minister of the Interior, resigned. The president relied on the vast majority of members of the Slovak People's Party, the Catholic intelligentsia and clergy, and the military to sustain the nationalist and conservative spirit in the country. Vojtech Tuka and the Hlinka Guard relied on the paramilitary organisations within the Party and the administration, and the organisation of the Germans in Slovakia. The various radical structures had entered the party and the administration, forming the backbone of the state apparatus. A direct confrontation between the two diverging camps would have been much more destructive for the Slovak state. Slovak historiography was defined after 1992 when Slovak researchers studied the political regime of Jozef Tiso in various aspects.² Slovak fascism has not caught the attention of Western historians as much, given its "Cinderella" status in the studies of fascism. The Hlinka Guard, the Nazi-like political organisation, has become even less studied than Tiso's regime.³

In its turn, Romania was in a similar situation. The National Legionary State established on September 14th, 1940, was a compromise between General Ion Antonescu and the Legionary Movement led by Horia Sima. General Antonescu relied on the military circles, the administrative and police apparatus, and the

² For Slovakia, see Peter Sokolovič, *Hlinkova Garda, 1938-1945* [Hlinka Guard, 1938-1945], Bratislava, Ústav Pamäti Národa, 2009; Róbert Letz, *Slovenské dejiny*, Vol. V, 1938-1945 [Slovak History. Vol. V, 1938-1945], Bratislava, Literárne informačné centrum, 2012; Svätoslav Mathé, *Prvá Slovenská Republika. Politologický náčrt* [The first Slovak Republic. Political Science Sketch], Bratislava, Post Scriptum, 2010; Ivan Kamenec, *The Slovak State, 1939-1945*, in Mikulaš Teich, Dušan Kováč, Martin D. Brown (Eds.), *Slovakia in History*, Cambridge University Press, 2011; Anton Hruboň, *Fašizmus náš slovenský* [Our Slovakian Fascism], Bratislava, Vydavateľstvo Premedia, 2021.

³ Jelinek Yeshuayu, *The Parish Republic: Hlinka's Slovak People's Party 1939-1945*, Boulder 1976; Thomas Anselm Lorman, *The Christian Social Roots of Jozef Tiso's*, in Rebecca Haynes Martin Rady (eds.), *In the Shadow of Hitler. Personalities of the Right in Central and Eastern Europe*, London, New York, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011; James Mace Ward, *Priest, Politician, Collaborator. Josef Tiso and the Making of Fascist Slovakia*, Ithaca, London, Cornell University Press, 2013.

state political services, also capitalising on the trust of the political parties, although the latter remained formally outside the law. The Legionary Movement was supported by the nationalist intelligentsia, the lower ranks in the army and the police, the young people in the administrative apparatus, and also the compromised elements from the periphery of society. The “marriage” between the General and the Legion was under the patronage of the German Reich and its representatives in Romania. The Wehrmacht and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported Antonescu, while the NSDAP, the Gestapo and its secret services were on the side of the legionnaires. The Antonescu-Sima dualism survived as long as the two parties needed to prepare to strike the decisive blow against each other. The contradictions between the two leaders, as well as between the interest groups that gravitated around them, were irremediable from the beginning and reached their peak in January 1941. As far as the historiography on Romanian fascism is concerned, the researchers have been more inclined to deal with the Legionary Movement in the interwar years until the events of January 1941. The period of National-Legionary rule has benefited from analysis, but attention has been focused on Ion Antonescu’s regime, with the Legion led by Horia Sima being considered only as a secondary partner in government.⁴ At the same time, Romanian historiography has neglected the issue of Romanian-Slovak bilateral relations. These are mentioned only in a general context, without any analysis that would make them specific, but the researcher Jana Bauerová has dealt with these relations in various aspects, using Slovak archival sources, mainly the diplomatic reports of Ivan Milecz, the Slovak diplomat accredited in Bucharest.⁵

This is why the comparison between Ion Antonescu and Jozef Tiso, on the one hand, respectively the Legionary Movement and the Hlinka Guard, on the other, give Milecz’s reports a particular relevance. Our investigation seeks to highlight how the Slovak diplomat managed to pass on the information, without placing himself in one of the two opposing camps. Without revealing his

⁴ For Romania, see Armin Heinen, *Legiunea “Arhanghelul Mihail”. Mișcare socială și organizație politică. O contribuție la problema fascismului internațional* [Archangel Michael Legion. Social Movement and Political Organization. A Contribution to the Problem of International Fascism], Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 1999; Hans Rogger; Eugen Weber (coord.), *Dreapta europeană. Profil istoric* [European Right. A Historical Profile], Bucharest, Minerva Publishing House, 1995; Dennis Deletant, *Aliatul uitat la lui Hitler. Ion Antonescu și regimul său. 1940-1944* [Hitler’s Forgotten Ally. Antonescu and his regime], Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2008.

⁵ Jana Bauerová, *Slovensko a Rumunsko v rokoch 1939-1944* [Slovakia and Romania between 1939-1944], Filozofická Fakulta Trnavskej Univerzity v Trnave, 2014.

orientation to either political side, Milecz found himself in a delicate situation. Coming from the old Czechoslovak diplomacy, the Slovak diplomat was a partisan of President Tiso but directly subordinated to Vojtech Tuka, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Consequently, he did not know on whose side the balance could tip, but he understood that Germany's role could be decisive both in Bucharest and in Bratislava.⁶ This study details the diplomatic reports signed by Ivan Milecz without correcting the errors, which have been mentioned in the footnotes to show the exact position of the Slovak diplomat during those complicated days. The reports have been condensed for a clear presentation of ideas, avoiding repetitions, and have solely used the comparison approach to highlight the similarities between the political systems of Romania and Slovakia.

IVAN MILECZ AND THE JANUARY 1941 POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUGGLE IN ROMANIA

The outbreak of the legionary rebellion surprised the Slovak diplomat in quasi-isolation. His reports show how unclear the situation was and how little reliable information was disseminated in Romania at the time. He returned with further clarifications in each informative note, despite not having accurate data. Milecz strove to create the impression that he had acquired information from government sources close to General Antonescu, but he did not name them. In the confusion of those days, he managed to have a meeting with Alexandru Cretzianu, at the Romanian Foreign Office, on the afternoon of January 22nd. The Romanian official informed him that Antonescu had been dissatisfied with the legionnaires for a long time and was preparing to eliminate "anarchic elements" from the structures of leadership. Although the Slovak diplomat had no news about the course of events, he assumed correctly that the final decision would be taken by Hitler. Despite not knowing anything about Hitler and Antonescu's Berchtesgaden talks, he assumed that the meeting would be decisive in the Bucharest conflict.⁷

Only after the fighting stopped did Milecz manage to send several reports and informative notes on the situation in Romania. In the absence of definite information, he had to come back with additions and suppletion. Thus, on January

⁶ Augustín Maťovčík, *Slovenský biografický slovník. Zväzok IV* [Slovak Biographical Dictionary, Vol. IV], M–Q, Martin, Matica Slovenská, 1990, p. 185.

⁷ Slovenský Národný Archív, Bratislava, Ministerstvo Zahraničných vecí 1939–1945 [Slovak National Archive, Bratislava, Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (hereinafter SNA MZV), škat. 505 B, doc. 112/1941.

23rd, Milecz described the first details in his report, marked “secret”. He noted that the beginning of the “second legionary revolution”⁸ took place in the afternoon of the 21st. His additions to the document submitted the day before were not likely to clarify things, testifying to the fact that he was still poorly informed.⁹ He was attempting to validate the claim that the unpopular economic measures implemented by the legionnaire commissaries were among the causes of the conflict between Ion Antonescu and the Legionary Movement. The assassination of Major Döring and Antonescu’s decision to replace the legionary ministers, led by General Constantin Petrovicescu, who was replaced by General Dumitru Popescu¹⁰, did not escape him either. It was the first document in which he labelled the events as anarchic and warned that the legionnaires indulged in murder and destruction, going as far as threatening foreign private property. He announced that the legionnaires refused to hand over the occupied buildings, such as the headquarters in Rome Street or the Capital Police Prefecture, although they were summoned by Antonescu to comply. Since during those days, no other important publication could appear except the legionary press, Milecz used manifestos or pro-legionary newspapers to collect information. Various sources reported that, during the days of the rebellion, the newspapers did not appear regularly, except for the legionary ones, which published truncated information containing only the Legion’s point of view.¹¹ Even General Antonescu’s January 21st Appeal was never published. Thus, Milecz had a difficult time finding information for himself. He noted that the assassination of Major Döring was attributed to the Jews and the British Intelligence Service using a Greek agent.¹²

⁸ This opinion was correlated with the events of September 3-4, 1940, described by legionnaires as a revolution.

⁹ In reality, events took a turn for the worse following the radio broadcast of the Minister of Labour, Vasile Iasinschi’s speech on January 19. See Radu Florian Bruja, *Extrema dreaptă în Bucovina* [Far Right in Bukovina], Târgoviște, Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House, 2012, p. 374.

¹⁰ The assassination of the German major was the pretext for replacing Constantin Petrovicescu with general Dumitru Popescu, the military commander of the Capital, an active general, unsympathetic of the Legion. Ottmar Trașcă, Ana-Maria Stan, *Rebeliunea legionară în arhive străine (germane, maghiare, franceze)* [Legionary Rebellion in Foreign Archives. (German, Hungarian, French)], Bucharest, Albatros Publishing House, 2002, doc. 25, p. 227.

¹¹ Ioan Hudită, *Jurnal politic (7 septembrie 1940 – 8 februarie 1941)* [Political Journal (September 7, 1940 – February 6, 1941)], introductory study and notes by Dan Berindei, Iași, European Institute, 2000, p.235.

¹² The action of Dimissorialetri Sarandos, a Greek infiltrated by the British secret service,

Milecz understood that the army's intervention had ended the legionary resistance, but only after Horia Sima sent a clear message of cessation of hostilities on the morning of January 23rd.¹³ The Slovak diplomat stated, rather subtly, that external forces who wanted to concentrate Romania's entire leadership in the hands of a single person were behind the power struggles. He reaffirmed the idea that the Berchtesgaden meeting between Hitler and Antonescu could be the key to the outcome of the struggle in Romania.¹⁴

One day later, on January 24th, Milecz called again with a briefing, citing General Antonescu's Appeal to the country and Horia Sima's cease-fire order, emphasizing again that the general relied on the friendship and alliance of Germany and Italy and that Romania fitted into their policy. Through these texts, he showed that the "legionary revolution" had ended in accord with Germany's wishes. Milecz commented that Antonescu proposed the creation of a new legionary movement, led by the general himself, to avoid further manifestations that would take the country to the brink of anarchy.¹⁵

In the following days, he delivered further information to Bratislava, enclosing exact details on the nature of the events. Milecz considered, on January 25th, that the government reconfiguration imposed by Antonescu led to the outset of the power struggle. This started with a peaceful demonstration on January 19th, in Bucharest, against the change of General Petrovicescu and Alexandru Ghica, the head of police, from office. Antonescu justified the change by claiming that the two had failed to ensure internal order and peace and were supposedly responsible for the assassination of the German major. At this point, he clarified that the violence began throughout the country on January 21st, with legionnaires

who killed Helmut Döring, the head of the Transport Department of the German Military Mission in Romania, has remained unsettled until today. Ottmar Trașcă, Ana-Maria Stan, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

¹³ Although Horia Sima issued an "Order to all legionnaires" on the morning of January 23 to cease resistance, fighting continued throughout the day. See A. Simion, *Regimul politic din România în perioada septembrie 1940 - ianuarie 1941* [The Political Regime in Romania between September 1940-January 1941], Cluj-Napoca, Dacia Publishing House, 1976, p. 268.

¹⁴ SNA MZV, șkat. 505 B, doc. 119/41.

¹⁵ SNA MVZ, șkat. 505 B, doc. 134/41. Joachim von Ribbentrop made the suggestion which was published in one of General Antonescu's *Addresses* to the Country. Gh. Buzatu, *Mareșalul Antonescu în fața Istoriei*, Documente, mărturii și comentarii editate în colaborare cu Stela Cheptea, V. F. Dobrinescu, I. Saizu [Marshal Antonescu in Front of History. Documents, Testimonials, Comments edited in collaboration with Stela Cheptea, V. F. Dobrinescu, I. Saizu], vol. 1, Iași, 1990, p. 191.

occupying numerous institutions and Prefecture headquarters and the struggle for power was accompanied by robberies and murders. Milecz did not possess details about what had happened on Romanian territory, merely noting that the legionnaires had taken control of the centre and some suburbs of the capital city. The diplomat mentioned in the same document the general's failed attempt to negotiate with the leadership of the Legion, which prompted the army to intervene and calm the situation, while the blame was placed entirely on Horia Sima, General Petrovicescu and Al. Ghica.¹⁶

FROM 'LEGIONARY REVOLUTION' TO 'LEGIONARY REBELLION'

On January 26th, the Slovak diplomat sent back home the most extensive report on the events, which he further defined as the "Legionary revolution". He also attached a translation of General Antonescu's January 25th manifesto concluding that the army's sacrifice and the general's efforts to restore order were appreciated in Berlin.¹⁷ The Slovak diplomat considered the manifesto very important and said of Antonescu that he was a determined and very honest man, who always spoke the truth. From this report, he drew some conclusions about the events. The "Revolution" was the first internal battle that Antonescu was forced to fight. Milecz concluded that the legionary revolution was compromised and defeated from the beginning precisely because of its anarchic nature. He mentioned those who were allegedly responsible for the situation thus created and arrested. Nicolae Malaxa, the affluent owner of some metallurgical and armament factories, a former collaborator of King Carol, who supported the legionnaires with money and offered them the house on Alexandru Alley, was at the top of the list.¹⁸ Milecz then revealed a series of documents that compromised the

¹⁶ A summary of the documents can be found in Jana Bauerová, *op. cit.*, p. 86-87.

¹⁷ General Erik Hansen, commander of the German Military Mission in Romania, supported Antonescu before von Ribbentrop and Hitler and acted to liquidate the rebellion. He detailed his position to Soviet investigators after the war. See *Erik Hansen își amintește* [Erik Hansen remembers], Bragadiru, Miidecărți Publishing House, 2019, p. 42-45.

¹⁸ His son claims that the building on Alexandru Alley was allegedly occupied abusively by the legionnaires on January 21 because it had a good view of the entire neighborhood. The army fired on the house and managed to drive out the rebels, while Nicolae Malaxa was arrested. Marian Conovici, Silvia Iliescu, Octavian Silivestru, *Țara, Legiunea, Căpitanul. Mișcarea Legionară în documente de istorie orală* [The Country, the Legion, the Captain. Legionary Movement in Oral History Documents], Bucharest, Humanitas Publishing House, 2008, p. 265-266.

Legionary Movement and Horia Sima personally. He concluded that the outcome of the rebellion was decided beforehand, following the meeting between Hitler and Antonescu. In this report, he also announced that Sima had been arrested and that Antonescu had established a military dictatorship.¹⁹

To paint a more accurate picture of the same political context in Slovakia, the diplomat insisted that Hitler had determined the power struggle in Romania. The legionary rebellion's example, with emphasis on murders and violence in the latest reports, and Antonescu's harsh measures against the rebels could also serve as illustrative examples for the radicals in Slovakia, who were planning a political coup against President Tiso. Hitler had supported moderate politicians in both countries, according to Milecz, who could ensure internal order and the smooth running of the economy. The Romanian precedent had resonated throughout Slovakia, and leaders such as Tuka or Alexander Mach, the head of the Hlinka Guard, were in the position of Horia Sima, fearful that a firm attitude against Tiso would compromise them in Berlin.²⁰ The Slovak press also picked up the echo of the legionary rebellion in Romania. The "Slovák" gazette, close to President Tiso's circles, published lengthy details of the events. Titles such as *Rozkaz generala Antonesca: V Rumunsku sa musí obnoviť pokoj a poriadok* ('General Antonescu's order: Order and peace must be restored in Romania') from January 23rd or *V Rumunsku je pokoj* ('There is peace in Romania') from January 25th were meant to calm down the tense moods from Slovakia.²¹ Following the events in Bucharest, even the most radical members of the Hlinka Guard concluded, without blaming Ion Antonescu or the Romanian legionnaires, that the premises of the conflict in Romania had to be analysed and that the Slovaks should thereupon prevent them. To avoid the fate of the Legionary Movement, the Hlinka Guard conformed to Tiso's authority, realizing that they did not enjoy support in Berlin.²²

For that matter, Milecz reported that Romania simply faced a change of government, not a change of regime. He appreciated that calm and quietude were imposed over the entire country. The soldiers who replaced the legionnaires were the guarantee of internal order. On the other hand, there was no change in foreign policy.²³ Although it is obvious that the Slovak diplomat understood that the

¹⁹ The rumor of the arrest of the legionary leaders circulated in Romania in those days. SNA MZV, škat. 505 B, doc. 144/41.

²⁰ Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (hereinafter AMAE), Fund 71 Slovakia, vol. 11, f. 200.

²¹ Jana Bauerová, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

²² AMAE, Fund 71 Slovakia, vol. 11, f. 200-203.

²³ Jana Bauerová, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

outcome of the events in Bucharest was also a signal for Slovakia, where Tiso managed to secure the trust of Berlin at the expense of the Hlinka Guard, he refrained from any comparison with what had happened in Romania.

The report on January 28th detailed the appointment of the new government and the internal political situation. The Slovak diplomat sent the list of the new cabinet – the ministers and secretaries of state – under the presidency of Ion Antonescu, who was also ad-interim of the Foreign Office. Upon the occasion, Milecz underlined that it was not a party government, but one that sought to bring calm and discipline to internal political life and that this government did not change anything to the country's external orientation. It was only in this report that he used for the first time the term 'rebels' for the legionnaires and mentioned that their entire leadership had fled across the border. At the same time, he gave the first details about the confiscations of weapons and ammunition from the legionnaires carried out by the military authorities.²⁴ The next day he announced a preliminary assessment of the "legionary revolution", similar to the documents he sent to Bratislava starting on January 23rd. He noted that 370 people were killed and 444 were injured in Bucharest alone. This preliminary assessment also reported that 14 soldiers were killed and 46 wounded in the battles with the legionnaires. He also mentioned 32 deaths outside Bucharest.²⁵ He further talked about the amounts of money and goods confiscated and reminded of the previous notes, with additions, mentioning that the list of goods consisted of lei, marks, francs, dinars, leva, American dollars, sums owned by the legionary quaestor Ilie Stângă.²⁶

Meticulously, Milecz continued to provide information about the rebellion and its aftermath. A second, much larger assessment was sent on January 31st. Milecz assured that the entire country was calm, although still concerned despite

²⁴ He mentioned the sum of 34 million lei found on legionnaire Stoicescu. SNA MZV, škat. 505 B, doc. 152/41.

²⁵ A statistic by the Ministry of the Interior came up with the following figures: 261 dead (120 of them were Jews) and 377 wounded. Ilarion Țiu, *Mișcarea Legionară după Corneliu Codreanu*, vol. II, *Regimul Antonescu (ianuarie 1941 – august 1944)* [The Legionary Movement after Corneliu Codreanu, vol II, Antonescu's Regime (January 1941 – August 1944)], Bucharest, Vreema Publishing House, 2007, p. 36.

²⁶ SNA MVZ, škat. 505 B, doc. 159/41. Police Quaestor Ilie Stângă had commissioned Colonel Ștefan Zăvoianu to form the team that arrested some of the Carlist ministers in the fall of 1940. Because of his actions, Ilie Stângă came to the attention of General Antonescu, who had reasons to arrest him after the rebellion. Ottmar Trașcă, Ana-Maria Stan, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

reports about the arrests of legionnaires and the confiscation of weapons. To be more convincing, he mentioned the devastations committed by legionnaires in Dudești Street.²⁷ Without indicating his source, Milecz stated that he was received at the Romanian Foreign Office, where he was informed about the new realities in Romania. There he was notified of the acts of violence and cruelty committed during the days of the rebellion, labelled as terrorist acts. Milecz also mentioned other crimes perpetrated by the legionnaires during their government, reminding of the cases of Iorga and Madgearu or the assassinations at Jilava, from November 1940. He remained nonetheless assured that there had been no change in the country's foreign policy and that the army remained loyal to Antonescu. He concluded that in Berlin Antonescu was the single viable option because he wanted order in the country. At the same time, he believed that economic relations were the most important issue in Berlin's eyes.²⁸ Since the Hlinka Guard would soon take a step back, the details provided by Milecz are not insignificant. As in the case of Slovakia, the diplomat placed economic issues at the forefront of relations with Germany.

Milecz supported President Tiso's cause, but could not reveal his options to Vojtech Tuka. The numerous details, albeit many erroneous, and the return to the same conclusion in almost every document suggest that his reports were more than mere briefing notes. Milecz favoured his point of view on the matter, which was motivated by the understanding that the political decision would ultimately be made in Berlin. And the denouement, followed in detail until February, presented Antonescu as Berlin's option.

Ivan Milecz continued to provide information about the consequences of the rebellion. He dispatched a new report on the internal political conditions in Romania on February 3rd. He showed that the country's peace and calm were restored, but the situation remained confusing. Police and gendarmerie patrols were on the streets to maintain order and peace. He had noticed the three police cordons that secured the University area in the afternoon of February 2nd. He pointed out that dozens of people were arrested and numerous weapons and ammunition were confiscated as a result of the searches carried out on January 31st and February 1st.²⁹ Milecz even spoke about the execution of three people

²⁷ See details in Jean Ancel, *Contribuții la istoria României, Problema evreiască*, vol 1, *Partea întâi, 1933-1944* [Contributions to the Romanian History. The Jewish Question], Bucharest, Hasefer Publishing House, 2001, p. 407-436.

²⁸ SNA MZV, șkat. 505 B, doc. 336/41.

²⁹ The new German minister in Bucharest, Manfred von Killinger, warned Berlin that Ion

caught with weapons that they had refused to hand over on the authorities' order.³⁰ On February 6th, he returned with revised figures for the dead and injured, estimating 144 Jews, 118 of whom were victims of the Legionnaires.³¹ He resumed the same day with a final concise report on the outbreak of the events of January 20th, discussing Antonescu's accusations against Ghica and Petrovicescu, the two legionnaires dismissed because they could not ensure internal order. Milecz described the beginning of the legionary demonstration on the evening of January 20th, organized by Viorel Trifa and Dumitru Groza, emphasizing how peaceful it was initially. The legionnaires then took over the headquarters of the Police Prefecture and the Telephones' Palace. Radu Mironovici refused to hand over the occupied institutions the next day and armed the legionnaires. Antonescu allegedly tried to negotiate through the military and the gendarmerie. He then recalled the legionnaires Roșca and Stănicel,³² who occupied the headquarters in Rome Street and the increased tensions followed by the opening of fire. To prevent bloodshed, Antonescu supposedly gave an ultimatum, valid for 12 hours, until January 22nd. He then described the massacres on Văcărești and Dudești streets. He also recalled the destruction caused in those days when the precise number of participants and victims remained unknown.³³

The events in Romania echoed loudly in Slovakia, and the way the conflict was resolved was a convincing example. Antonescu's heavy blow to the Legionary Movement was an example of what could have happened in Slovakia if the Hlinka Guard had opted for open conflict with President Tiso. Vojtech Tuka and Alexander Mach were warned that the Romanian example stood as proof that the Nazi Reich required order in Europe and was not tolerant of anarchic manifestations of the imposition of the National Socialist ideology. The tone of the

Antonescu intended to punish in an exemplary manner the legionnaire leaders involved in the events. Radu-Dan Vlad (Ed.), *Evenimentele din ianuarie 1941 în Arhivele Germane și Române*, vol. II [The Events of January 1941 in the Germans and Romanians Archives], Bucharest, Majadahonda Publishing House, 1999, doc. 41, p. 107-108.

³⁰ SNA MVZ, șkat. 505 B, doc. 379/41. In all, over 13,400 legionnaires were arrested, but more than half were soon released. Ilarion Țiu, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

³¹ Like in many other cases the information was inexact. SNA MZV, șkat. 505 B, doc. 402/41.

³² In reality, Roșca was in the Public Guards barracks, while Stelian Stănicel was at the legionary headquarters in Rome Street. The two coordinated the resistance against the army between 21-23 January and managed to leave the country after the events. Ottmar Trașcă, Ana-Maria Stan, *op. cit.*, p.382.

³³ SNA MZV, șkat. 505 B, doc. 403/41.

Hlinka Guard propagandists changed. They continued to laud the National-Legionary principles, similar to the National-Socialist ones, which they wished as a model for Slovakia. However, to satisfy the German susceptibilities, they chose to portray the Romanian model as one of German inspiration. The Slovak press wrote that the legionnaires fell into place in the life of the state, without mentioning the repression directed against them. However, taking a step back, the members of the Hlinka Guard did not suffer any affliction. If the legionnaire leaders escaped punishment by fleeing to Germany, the Hlinka leaders remained in the country accepting to collaborate with Tiso, under the conditions imposed by the Slovak president.

CONCLUSIONS

Antagonizing political forces competed for power in Bucharest and Bratislava. They were, however, steered directly from Berlin in both states. In Romania, Ion Antonescu and the conservative and nationalist political and intellectual circles were preferred over the Legionary Movement. In Slovakia, the Germans opted for President Tiso and the conservative circles around him. Although it took a step back, the Hlinka Guard was not removed from power. The Hlinka Guard was considered ideologically close to the Legionary Movement. The blow struck by the Germans in removing the legionnaires from power was an example for the members of the Hlinka organisation. Its leaders took a step back, learned from the Romanian example and escaped the repression Antonescu used against the legionnaires. The reports of the Slovak diplomat in Bucharest were not known to most members of the Hlinka Guard, but their conclusions were understood by Tuka and Mach.

The Slovak diplomat's reports and notes ought to be understood from two perspectives. Firstly, he corrected himself with each document he sent back home, adding to or detailing how the events happened. Therefore, it seems that he kept repeating himself or delivering irrelevant details. Secondly, he did not highlight any of his documents to suggest which facts were most important. Only one document is labelled as "secret", while the rest are labelled as "confidential," according to Milecz. However, given the information he provided, one could discern some definite suggestions for the political orientation of Bratislava's political leaders. Therefore, one can clearly notice, as a conclusion to the Slovak diplomat's messages, that he constantly stated how the final decision was reached at Berchtesgaden, and that Germany was the deciding factor, that was satisfied with Antonescu's attitude. He then insisted on the nature of the events in Romania,

implying that the Legionary Movement and its members could not ensure the internal order that Germany desired. At the same time, he exposed several crimes and transgressions committed by legionnaires between January 21-23, labelled as “terrorist”, despite first defining the events as a “legionary revolution”.

Last but not least, his reports disclosed consistent details about the damage caused by the legionnaires and about their victims, as well as the measures taken by Antonescu after January 23rd. The precedent set by the legionary rebellion, with its emphasis on crimes and violence in his late reports, as well as Antonescu’s harsh measures against the rebels could serve as illustrative examples for radicals in Slovakia if they attempt to remove President Tiso from power. The figures of those arrested (including Horia Sima, who, in reality, had fled the country with the support of the Germans) served as a warning to others who could find themselves in a similar position. The allusion was obvious to the members of the Hlinka Guard. Therefore, Milecz’s reports served not only as observation and information but also as political suggestions for the power struggle raging in Bratislava.

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POLITICAL ACTIONISM ON THE FOOTBALL FIELDS OF THE WORLD AS A FORM OF A POLITICAL PROTEST

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Abstract. *Political protests during sporting events are aimed at attracting wide public attention, gaining significant media coverage and turning football fields into places of high performance during important matches. The actionists demonstrate peace, carnival spirit and certain insecurity; despite this, they confront and constitute considerable concern to the ruling elite of the states. The analysis covered nonviolent protests on football fields around the world from 1976 to 2018. This article examines political activism, namely political actionism on football fields around the world (namely, streaking) as a form of political protest. The investigation follows two approaches: first, despite being entertaining, protests at football matches are a way to voice views and positions 'uncomfortable' to the authority, and second, they may undermine the authority and damage its power. Streaking may generate more public protests in support of actionists or their convictions.*

Keywords: *political protest, political activism, political actionism, streaker, challenge, threat, ruling elite.*

Rezumat: *Acțiunismul politic pe terenurile de fotbal ale lumii, ca formă de protest politic. Protestele politice din timpul evenimentelor sportive au drept scop atragerea amplă a atenției publice, obținerea unei mediatizări semnificative și transformarea terenurilor de fotbal în locuri de înaltă performanță în timpul meciurilor importante. Acționiștii dau dovadă de pace, spirit de carnaval și o anumită nesiguranță; în ciuda acestui fapt, ei se confruntă și constituie o preocupare considerabilă pentru elita*

conducătoare a statelor. Analiza acoperă protestele nonviolente de pe terenurile de fotbal din întreaga lume, din 1976 până în 2018. Articolul examinează activismul politic, în special acționismul politic de pe terenurile de fotbal ale lumii (în special streaking-ul), ca formă de protest politic. Investigația autorilor evidențiază două probleme: în primul rând, în ciuda faptului că sunt distractive, protestele la meciurile de fotbal reprezintă o modalitate de a exprima opinii și poziții „incomode” pentru autoritate; în al doilea rând, o pot submina și îi pot deteriora puterea. Streaking-ul poate genera mai multe proteste publice în sprijinul acționiștilor sau al convingerilor lor.

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, visual society¹ is dominated by semiotic and symbolic activity in the form of performances (or plays) which have acquired paramount importance to modern communities. Political events and activities have turned into performances (‘politainment’) and have acquired spectacular and theatrical forms. The crises in the traditional understanding of political activism and the ever-growing individualism have contributed to the development of dynamic, dramatic techniques in political processes. In democratic societies, activism is the driving force behind many policies and laws. “*The concerted efforts of individuals in pursuit of a cause is crucial to a working democracy*”.² Political activism takes various ‘classical’ forms (boycotts, pickets, strikes, ‘silent’ protests, etc.), but also the form of vivid performances. Naom Chomsky believes that political activism refers to “*joining together ... changing consciousness*”.³

Modern protests need a certain degree of artfulness to be successful and sports events may turn into a perfect ‘stage’. Sport has long been linked to intense feelings and regimented performances that follow rigorous rules and guidelines. It is no surprise that any rule infractions are discussed, recounted and remembered. In other words, the action gets a ‘second life’ and since it has a political connotation, it may influence the public perception of a phenomenon, a

¹ Bill Abbate, *The Dawn of the Visual Society. What is the visual society and how does it affect your life?*, October 21, 2022, <https://medium.com/illumination/the-dawn-of-the-visual-society-db454c6ca00f> (Accessed on 05.11.2022).

² *Political Activism*, Miller Center, 2022, in <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/teacher-resources/primary-resources/political-activism> (Accessed on 02.04.2022).

³ Naom Chomsky, *Activism, Anarchism, and Power*, in “Conversations with History: Institute of International Studies”, UC Berkeley, <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/conversations/people2/Chomsky/chomsky-con5.html> (Accessed on 02.04.2022).

process or a person. International football matches gather thousands of spectators in stands and millions more on television; therefore, politically active, politically conscious individuals and groups may view such matches as a platform to deliver a message or exhibit an attitude.

Sport has always been a target for many forms of political interest. Political leaders have seen the potential of exploiting sports for political purposes; sporting movements never have been afraid to include political actors in the sports family; sports organisations have always been preparing for a political 'invasion' of sport.⁴ Sports competitions in which participants represent states have a strong political element, just as political events have an impact on other areas of society. Therefore, the concept of "politics should be kept out of the sport" is only valid on the pages of the sports organizations' regulations.

Since sport is intricately linked to the larger socio-political context in which it operates, it does not exist in a vacuum. Whether football or basketball, cricket or gymnastics, social and political contexts shape both the sport and our response to it. Many sports were designed to enforce social needs, such as Japanese martial arts, celebrated as a means of spiritual development and social ordering, or cricket, which Victorians used to teach the ruling class to dominate and the plebs to obey. Leaders, autocrats, and powerful individuals have frequently used sports to assert their political dominance. Recently, more and more professional players are using their platforms to exercise their political views and support wider conversations about civil rights.⁵

Sport has a sustainable and significant political protest potential as it increasingly reflects the political problems of society, and becomes their platform, translator, and a kind of 'voice of society'. In this context stadiums turned into 'multifunctional' grounds, for instance, concentration camps (Chile during the period of the rule of A. Pinochet), and refugee camps (during military operations). Stadiums were used to host meetings, protests and marches with national symbols (a joint march under the slogan 'For United Ukraine', 2014),⁶ mass shows

⁴ Kutte Jönsson. *Sport and Politics. An Ethical Approach*, 2012, <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1400349/FULLTEXT01.pdf> (Accessed on 02.04.2022).

⁵ Kenan Malik, *We need to separate sports and politics. But also recognise that they're inseparable*, in "The Guardian", June 13, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jun/13/impossible-to-keep-politics-out-of-sport-just-as-it-should-be> (Accessed on 12.05.2022).

⁶ Denys Horielov, "*Rukh futbol'nykh fanativ v Ukrayini*". *Analychna zapyska* ["Movement of football fans in Ukraine". Analytical report]. National Institute of Strategic Studies,

(the Ariran festival in North Korea), to transmit politicians' speeches, and to hold election congresses (in the USA) and debates (the presidential elections in Ukraine in April 2019).

Individual, group and collective protest actions of athletes have been widely studied by scholars.⁷ At the same time, a sporting event provides an opportunity for fans to express themselves through political protest or personal stance. However, the academic community overlooks this issue, probably because such individual protests seem insignificant in terms of the effect on the state apparatus or as a powerful call for mass disobedience. However, such actions are undeniably a litmus test of societal issues (and the desire to eliminate them) precisely because of the manifestation of dissent in front of authorities and the public.

This article examines political activism, in particular individual political actionism, on football fields around the world as a form of political protest. Football, as a status sport, has a powerful media component, i.e., the championships of the world's leading football leagues are watched by billions of viewers, and the states and their leaders are in a long, highly competitive struggle to host the World and Continental Championships. That is why football matches are most often used for protest actions. The initiators of the actions consider stadiums as accessible platforms where it is convenient, efficient and effective to declare systemic political concerns, "raising awareness of social problems and injustice."⁸

Hence, taking into account the intersection of political protests and world's football matches, protests (specifically individual political actionism) during football matches may first be a way to voice views and positions 'uncomfortable' to the power, and second, a means to undermine the authority of the governing

2014, <https://niss.gov.ua/doslidzhennya/gromadyanske-suspilstvo/rukhn-futbolnikh-fanativ-v-ukraini-analitichna-zapiska> (Accessed on 08.03.2022).

⁷ M. Patrick Cottrell, Travis Nelson, *Not just the Games? Power, protest and politics at the Olympics*, in "European Journal of International Relations", Volume 17, 2011, Issue 4, pp. 729–753, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1354066110380965> (Accessed on 02.04.2022); Eric Dunning, Jay Coakley. *Handbook of Sports Studies*, Sage Publishing, 2000; Douglas Hartmann, *The politics of race and sport: Resistance and domination in the 1968 African American Olympic protest movement*, in "Ethnic and Racial Studies", Vol. 19, 1996, Issue 3, pp. 548-566, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.1996.9993924> (Accessed on 02.04.2022).

⁸ David Thibodeau, *Sport as a Form of Protest*, in "Sports for Social Impact", June 9, 2020, <https://www.sportsforsocialimpact.com/post/sport-as-a-form-of-protest> (Accessed on 02.04.2022).

elite and destroy the image of the power. Consequently, the reaction of the state authority will differ given the political regime. Legally unrecognised nonviolent forms of protest are analysed, that is, short-term ('video') striking radical actions, which, due to media coverage, reach the widest possible audience. Traditional forms of public protest appear mundane and outdated in contrast to such outrageous actions.

All individual protest actions between 1976 and 2021 have been investigated to confirm these theories. The following sports sites were analysed: championat.com (Russia), pressball.by (Belarus), football24.ua, football.ua, dynamomania.com (Ukraine), as well as articles in such information sites as espreso.tv (Ukraine), Belsat (Belarus), euroradio.fm (European radio for Belarus), and BBC News Russian Service.

The following methods constitute the methodological basis of the study: event analysis helped in investigating the specifics of football matches and tournaments of various levels. The content analysis allowed for the discovery of politically charged protests, while comparative analyses allowed for the correlation of protest action features and their evolution. Understanding protestors' intentions as well as the emotions of officials, players, commentators, and stadium spectators was made possible through psychological analysis. Establishing cause and effect relations allowed researchers to trace the socially important events in the host countries of football matches and tournaments that preceded the political protests of citizens on the football fields, as well as the consequences of these actions for activists, clubs and authorities.

The main article's body consists of four parts. The introduction outlines the aim and the applied methodology, while the next chapter provides the theoretical support for the study target. The third chapter consists of an examination of the specificity of known protest acts, and the next chapter offers evidence of the defined hypothesis. The article ends with the main conclusions drawn from the empirical analysis.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In Latin, *protestare* suggested the etymological connection to publicness and witness; to engage in a protest is to offer public witness. T. V. Reed claims protests are not always *against* something, the prefix *pro-* suggests that protests are *for* something – proposing, putting forth positive alternatives.⁹ James M. Jasper

⁹ T. V. Reed, *The Art of Protest. Culture and Activism from Civil Rights Movements to the*

emphasizes that individuals play key roles in protests – be they strategic decision-makers or individual protesters outside of organized groups; individuals often initiate small changes, many of which become widespread.¹⁰

It is worth mentioning that normative theorists were sharply divided between realists and idealists concerning the importance of protests and activism. The *'realist'* school suggests that limited public involvement was sufficient to ensure a stable and accountable government, so long as governments in representative democracies were legitimated by free and fair elections contested by rival parties and politicians at regular intervals.¹¹ 'Idealists' believe that increased public participation is essential for democracy; *"activism is thought to have multiple virtues, proponents argue, making better people, by strengthening citizen awareness, interest in public affairs, social tolerance, generalized reciprocity, and interpersonal trust, as well as fostering more responsive and effective government, by generating better decisions and more legitimate outcomes"*.¹² This study supports an optimistic perspective on the advantages and results of political protest activism.

Political activism is *"one of the forms of conscious purposeful behaviour of individuals and social communities in the field of politics; (...) it manifests itself primarily in the dissemination of certain ideas by a person or a group, the pursuit of political goals, support for the government or the opposition."*¹³

Citizens encounter major normative challenges in their daily lives, such as what is good and bad about what is happening, including how to treat others, how to act, and what to do for the best. Accordingly, Naisargi Dave understands activism as critique, invention and creative practice that challenges social norms.¹⁴ As a result, normative definitions governing political action are established (Naisargi

Present. Second Edition, Minneapolis – London, University of Minnesota Press, 2019, p. XIII – XIV.

¹⁰ James M. Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest. Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movements*, University of Chicago Press, 2008, p. XI-XII.

¹¹ Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 4th ed., London, George Allen & Unwin, 1952, p. 271.

¹² Pippa Norris, *Political Activism. New Challenges, New Opportunities*, in Carles Boix, Susan C. Stokes (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook for Comparative Politics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 630-631.

¹³ *Aktyvnyist' politychna* [Political Activity], in *Encyclopedia of Modern Ukraine*, 2001, https://esu.com.ua/search_articles.php?id=43540 (Accessed on 30.03.2022).

¹⁴ Naisargi N. Dave, *Queer Activism in India. A Story in the Anthropology of Ethics*, Durham, Duke University Press, 2012, p. 3.

Dave, 2012;¹⁵ Didier Fassin, 2015;¹⁶ Michael Lambek, 2010¹⁷). This study follows the values-based approaches and understands political activism as an assemblage of meanings and practices that express relationships of interest to the world.¹⁸ In our 'global village' full of contradictions and imbalance, sports have long been involved in politics. Consequently, such 'interests' may be presented in the context of sporting events, specifically football matches, to attract mass attention.

Political activism can take the form of political actionism, i.e. "*a type of political participation that is manifested in various spectacular forms of sociopolitical activism and has become increasingly prevalent in contemporary politics.*"¹⁹ Victoria Bavykina claims that actionism is, primarily, an action that violates customs and traditions, and political actionism is considered a social action conditioned by social processes and at the same time, it is a reflection of a social change, an attempt to artistically comprehend social life.²⁰ Natalia Khoma argues that "*political actionism is not all the diversity of bodily gestures; first and foremost, action is deed. Fulfilling any political tactics or realizing any artistic device, the action seeks its form and its meaning, focusing on the dynamics of direct links, rather than on institutional rules of the play. The action is a public act – or rather, it creates direct publicity through direct action. Actionist cannot always assume what will the action be, but s/he always knows what effect (outcome) s/he wants to achieve*".²¹

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Didier Fassin, *Troubled waters. At the confluence of ethics and politics*, in Michael Lambek, Veena Das, Didier Fassin, Webb Keane, *Four Lectures on Ethics. Anthropological Perspectives*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2015, pp. 175–210.

¹⁷ Michael Lambek, *Ordinary Ethics. Anthropology, Language and Action*, New York, Fordham University Press, 2010, pp. 39–63.

¹⁸ Sevasti-Melissa Nolas, Christos Varvantakis, Vinnarasan Aruldoss, *Political activism across the life course*, in "Contemporary Social Science", Vol. 12, 2017, Issue 1–2, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21582041.2017.1336566> (Accessed on 30.03.2022).

¹⁹ Natalia Khoma, Vasyly Kozma, *Spectacularization of political activism: Subject matter and social effect*, in "Epitheorese Koinonikon Ereunon", No. 158, January 2022, p. 3, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358243696_Spectacularization_of_political_activism_Subject_matter_and_social_effect (Accessed on 14.04.2022).

²⁰ Victoria Bavykina, *Politychnyy aktsionizm u konteksti teoriiy sotsial'noyi diyi* [Political actionism in the context of social action theory], PhD diss., V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, 2020, p. 32.

²¹ Natalia Khoma, *Political happening as a protest form of political participation*, in "Studium Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej", 2015, No. 3, p. 268.

Political actionism is based on “*symbolisation, with the investment of obvious and veiled subtexts in political actions. Political actionism is a sociocultural reflection, a form of rethinking sustainable political constructs*”.²² It is an artistic, entertaining and playful form of conveying the political. Given that protesters use inscriptions, colour on their bodies, clothing or lack thereof, i. e. it is a socio-political theatrical activity, it is appropriate to speak about the political performance, which is defined as a special, symbolic, usually ritual activity performed by an individual or a group of people to impress others, to draw attention to their activities.²³ The main goal of the political performance is to gain the audience’s attention rather than to make a mere communicative act; it is a complex communicative action, in which the roles of the actors and the audience are equal. The task of political performance is to introduce vivid, memorable information; it is a way of aestheticizing politics rather than a tool of genuine political struggle.²⁴ On the one hand, the actionists enrage society, and, on the other hand, they provoke the inevitable reaction of state authorities.²⁵

Football is the ‘No. 1 game’ in the world; it attracts the attention of thousands of spectators in the stands and a multimillion audience at various gadgets. Therefore, politically active citizens, groups and organisations increasingly arrange political rallies in football fields of countries around the world to protest, to draw the attention of the world community to address domestic and international issues.²⁶ Political protest, according to this research, is defined as a powerful citizen’s rejection of the state’s violations of their legitimate interests, universally recognised democratic norms and values, the existing political course, govern-

²² Oleksandra Gruieva, *Politychnyy aktsionizm: ponyattya, formy, dosvid vykorystannya u politychnomu protsesi* [Political actionism: concepts, forms, the experience of use in the political process], in “Politychne zhyttya” [Political Life], № 1, 2018, p. 21.

²³ Natalia Khoma, Vasyl Kozma, *Spectacularization of political activism..*, p. 11.

²⁴ N. M. Khoma (ed.), *Suchasna politychna leksyka: entsyklopedia, slovnyk-dovidnyk* [Modern political vocabulary: encyclopedia, dictionary-reference book], Lviv, Novyy Svit-2000, 2015, p. 208.

²⁵ Artem Kroytor, *Politychnyy aktsionizm yak forma mystets'koho vyrazhennya politychnoho protestu* [Political actionism as a form of artistic expression of political protest], in “Aktual'ni problemy filosofiyi ta sotsiologiyi” [Actual Problems of Philosophy and Sociology], № 24, 2019, p. 25.

²⁶ Serhii Kulyk, *Politychni aktsiyi protestu na futbol'nykh polyakh krayin svitu* [Political Protests on Football Fields Around the World], in *Nazad u maybutnye: shansy na hlobal'ne liderstvo u suchasnomu sviti* [Back to the Future: a Chance for Global Leadership in Today’s World], Lviv – Olsztyn, Vydavnytstvo LNU im. I. Franka, 2021, pp. 29–35.

ment decisions, and the prevailing relations between citizens and the state.²⁷ These actions are a manifestation and a component of much more complex political processes in specific countries; they acquire public resonance and discourse. The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) advise reporters not to describe the behaviour of supporters who go on onto the field. Thus, these moments are not included in the telecasts, except for the beginning of the action, when the cameras immediately switch to other objects such as the stands and the bench, or the editor starts replaying the dangerous moments. Therefore, depending on how rapidly the stewards operate, the spectator may not instantly comprehend or see what has occurred on the gadget screen. This is done to discourage other activists from chasing popularity.

The term 'streaker' is used in political actionism to refer to two types of people: first, someone who runs quickly through a public place wearing no clothes as a joke²⁸ or as a form of protest against the 'conventions of society,' and second, sports hooligans whose actions are not intended to disrupt the game.²⁹ This idea, however, does not properly capture the characteristics of those involved in football fields. Because they are carriers of a certain idea that influences the opinion of others and political processes, this study examines them in terms of political leadership. They are leaders of certain social groups (fans, political opposition) or a region (Catalonia), leaders-actors according to the style of leadership (Jimmy Jump, members of Femen, Pussy Riot); dysfunctional leaders, nonconformists to the existing political system (Alexander Vengerskiy); charismatic leaders (Jimmy Jump, Femen and Pussy Riot activists). These leaders represent political opposition (in terms of intent), national (in terms of the nature of activity) and international (in terms of extent) public organisations and movements.

Political protests on football fields of the world have yet to be extensively investigated. The research is hampered by the fact that commentators and sports journalists rarely report such actions. Many people are interested in this issue because of the resonant political protests of the famous streaker Jimmy Jump, which

²⁷ *Protest politychnyy* [Political protest], in N. Khoma, V. Denysenko, O. Sorba, L. Uhryn et al. (Eds.), *Politolohiya: navchal'nyy entsyklopedychnyy slovnyk-dovidnyk* [Political Science: Educational Encyclopaedic Dictionary], L'viv, Novyy Svit-200, 2014, p. 557.

²⁸ *Streaker*, in *Collins Dictionary*, 2022, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com> (Accessed on 09.02.2022).

²⁹ *A Brief History of Streaking in Sport*, in "The Guardian", July 18, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2013/jul/18/a-history-of-streaking-in-sport> (Accessed on 09.02.2022).

are connected to the recognition of Catalonia³⁰ as a part of Spain, granting it independence.³¹ Ruslan Siromskiy³² wrote about the information and protest actions of Canadian Ukrainians during the Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976. Anatoliy Romanov,³³ Olexandra Hruyeva,³⁴ Victoria Bavykina,³⁵ and others have reported on the peculiarities of group political protests, namely Femen and Pussy Riot and their demands.³⁶ The protest action of the Belarusian³⁷ Alexander

³⁰ Alex Mannanov, *Begushchiy chelovek* [The running man], October 30, 2014, <https://football.ua/hrusteam/253067-begushhijj-chelovek.html> (Accessed on 14.01.2022).

³¹ Zirky "Barselony" zihrayut' za zbirnu Kataloniyi proty Venesuely [The stars of "Barcelona" will play for the national team of Catalonia against Venezuela], March 19, 2019, https://espresso.tv/news/2019/03/19/zirky_quotbarselonyquot_zigrayut_za_zbirnu_kataloniyi_prot_y_venesuely (Accessed on 15.02.2022).

³² Ruslan Siromskiy, *Informatsiyno-protestni aktsiyi kanads'kykh ukrayintsiv pid chas Olimpiys'kykh ihor u Monreali 1976 roku* [Information and protest actions of Canadian Ukrainians during the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal], in *Mizhnarodni zv'yazky Ukrayiny: naukovi poshuky i znakhidky* [International Relations of Ukraine: Scientific Search and Findings], Vyp. 28, 2019, pp. 107–120.

³³ Anatoliy Romanov, "Pussy Riot" v finale. Kto i zachem vybezhal na pole. Futbol'noye pole kak mesto dlya aktsii protesta i shutki [Pussy Riot in the final. Who and why ran out onto the field], July 15, 2018, <https://www.championat.com/football/article-3490431-pochemu-uchastnicy-pussy-riot-vybezhal-na-pole-v-finale-championata-mira.html> (Accessed on 15.02.2022); Anatoliy Romanov, *Na Olimpiade-1976 fanat vybezhal na pole i stantseval gopak. Radi nezavisimosti Ukrainy* [At the 1976 Olympics, a fan ran onto the field and danced the hopak. For the sake of Ukraine's independence], March 23, 2020, <https://www.championat.com/football/article-4001605-kak-boleschik-na-olimpiade-1976-vybezhal-na-pole-s-ukrainskim-flagom-i-stanceval-gopak.html> (Accessed on 15.02.2022).

³⁴ Oleksandra Gruieva, *op. cit.*

³⁵ Victoria Bavykina, *op. cit.*

³⁶ *Obnazhennaya aktivistka "Femen" vybezhal na pole pered matchem Ukraina – Turtsiya* [A naked Femen activist ran onto the field before the Ukraine-Turkey match], in "Bukvy", September 2, 2017, <https://bykvu.com/ua/bukvy/74062-obnazhennaya-aktivistka-femen-vybezhal-na-pole-pered-matchem-ukraina-turtsiya/> (Accessed on 12.03.2022); *Paren' s belo-krasno-belym flagom vybezhal na pole vo vremya matcha "BATE" – "Arsenal"* [A guy with a white-red-white flag jumped onto the field during the game between BATE and Arsenal], in "UDF.BY", September 29, 2017, https://udf.name/news/main_news/162822-paren-s-belo-krasno-belym-flagom-vybezhal-na-pole-vo-vremya-matcha-bate-arsenal.html (Accessed on 04.02.2022).

³⁷ Yaroslav Steshik, *Bole'shchiki provodili yego aplodishmentami. Fanat poluchil 10 sutok za belo-krasno-belyy flag na matche "BATE" – "Arsenal"* ["The fans applauded him." A

Vengersky was widely covered in the Russian-language electronic media, attempting to paint a psychological portrait of him that was acceptable to the authorities.³⁸ The memoirs of Denys Myhal,³⁹ a direct participant in the political protests at the 1976 Summer Olympics, are of utmost importance, as are the articles describing the threats posed by this action to the image of the USSR, as well as adherents of *Russkiy mir*'s⁴⁰ modern 'hybrid' interpretation of Myhal's political protest. However, most of these publications are informative rather than analytical and do not address the issue of possible challenges/threats to the state's governing class, as well as popular perception and support, posed by such political protests.

SPECTACULAR POLITICAL ACTIONISM: CASE STUDY

The streakers' performances are unsystematic, and their actions have little impact on the course and outcome of matches, but there is a pattern: the more prestigious the sports competition, the more likely their occurrence. People from the host country are more likely to engage in such behaviour, whereas supporters of the guest club, citizens of other nations, or members of the diaspora are less likely. In general, political protests on football fields are low-budget events. Actions are taken directly during the game or during breaks, such as when a player requires medical attention. When an actionist appears, the referees stop the match; footballers, who are occasionally bothered by protesters, either do not respond or help

fan received 10 days for the white-red-white flag at the BATE-Arsenal match], in "Belsat. TV", September 29, 2017, <https://belsat.eu/ru/programs/boleshhiki-provodili-ego-aplodishmentami-fanat-poluchil-10-sutok-za-belo-krasno-belyj-flag-na-matche-bate-arsenal/> (Accessed 04/02/2022).

³⁸ *Provokator, vybezhavshiy na futbol'noye pole v matche s "Arsenalom" s BCHB flagom, davno iskal vozmozhnosti "otlichit'sya"* [The provocateur, who ran onto the football field in the match with Arsenal with a white-red-white flag, has long been looking for opportunities to "distinguish himself"], in "Teleskop Media", September 29, 2017, <https://teleskop.media/2017/09/29/provokator-vybezhavshij-na-futbolnoe-pole-v-matche-s-arsenalom-s-bchb-flagom-davno-iskal-vozmozhnosti-otlichitsya/> (Accessed on 12.02.2022).

³⁹ Liubomyr Kuz'myak, "*Syn Bandery vyzvolyav mene z politsiyi*". *Vin stantsyuvav na poli hopak iz praporom Ukrayiny v matchi zbirnoyi SRSR* ["Bandera's Son Released Me from the Police." He Danced Hopak with the Flag of Ukraine on the Field in the Match of the USSR National Team], in "Football 24", January 30, 2018, https://football24.ua/sin_banderi_vizvolyav_mene_z_politsiyi_ukrayinskiy_prapor_na_oi_1976_legendarna_istoriya_n433682/ (Accessed on 15.02.2022).

⁴⁰ Anatoliy Romanov, *Na Olimpiade-1976 fanat vybezhhal na pole...*

stewards in detaining actionists. Spectators in the stands may applaud the actionists. Stewards and stadium security officers detain the protesters and hand them over to the police. It is interesting for the spectators in the stands to watch the 'non-standard' episode of the game, to see how it will end, so they 'additionally' remember the match because of such protests. Indeed, commentators and spectators in the stands do not immediately understand the content of the action, because they cannot always quickly navigate the colours of flags and inscriptions, and they are either team fans or, as commentators say, fans of another club. They avoid showing situations when supporters come to the field during live TV broadcasts, therefore such incidents are covered by replaying game moments or directing cameras to other objects. Protest videos and images, as well as manifestos and calls from protest participants, are widely shared on social media. Therefore, the media environment expands the range of viewers and action interpreters and introduces them to the discursive field.⁴¹ As research has shown, not all acts of streaking have political connotations. Political protests, on the other hand, acquire prominence since they are directed against the government or the leader of a specific country, as reflected by the streakers' appearance, features, and exclamations.

The following instances of political activism on football fields throughout the world are worth exploring:

1. The semi-final match on July 27, 1976, at the XXI Summer Olympic Games, between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic national teams, at the Olympic Stadium, Montreal (Canada). In the 70th minute, Denys Myhal, a 20-year-old Canadian of Ukrainian origin, a member of the Ukrainian Youth Union, and a college student ran to the central circle of the field in an embroidered shirt. He was waving the blue and yellow flag of Ukraine, shouting "*Freedom to Ukraine!*" He performed several elements of *hopak* (Ukrainian folk dance) for 15 seconds. At that time, 150 Ukrainians held a "*Freedom to Ukraine!*" poster at the stadium. Myhal's action was not spontaneous because he had an anti-Soviet position and had participated in planned protests against the USSR during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich as a member of the Ukrainian Youth Union. When he appeared on the field, the commentator said, "*Oh, it's interesting; I guess he's a fan of the East German team. The colours of his flag seem to confirm this, but he performs a Soviet-style dance*".⁴²

Denys Myhal justified his actions by pointing out that the USSR national team consisted of nine players from the Dynamo Football Club (FC) (Kyiv), and

⁴¹ Victoria Bavykina, *op. cit.*

⁴² Ruslan Siromskiy, *op. cit.*

Ukrainians Valeriy Lobanovsky and Oleh Bazylevych coached it. *"It seemed to me that Ukrainian players in the national team of the Union will be pleased to see the Ukrainian flag directly on the field. I just wanted to draw attention and remind everyone that Ukraine is independent and has its own symbols"*.⁴³ He admitted that the act was spontaneous and he was guided only by the desire to be broadcast so that the Ukrainian flag could be seen by the whole world. The audience applauded. The referee stopped the match. The police caught Myhal as he was leaving the stadium, carefully hiding the flag close to his chest.

It should be mentioned that the incident was aired with both foreign and visiting supporters in the stands (at least fifty-hundred people). From a political point of view, public interest in protests, organizations and groups they represent, is growing, although not all citizens approve of such methods. During the Cold War, the Soviets suppressed such actions, demanding that the authorities of the states where sports events were held severely punish their participants. For example, the Montreal sports channel aired an event involving Myhal, but the match was shown on tape in the USSR, and thus the episode was censored. Myhal's reasons for his action were to have the Ukrainian flag seen by the entire world, to highlight the fate of the Ukrainian people and to support Ukrainian footballers.⁴⁴

2. June 25, 2008, European Championship, Germany – Turkey semi-final match, Stadium Park, St. Jacobi, Basel (Switzerland): at the 75th minute Jimmy Jump ran to the field, streaked 40 metres in a T-shirt with the inscription *"Tibet is not China"*. The action took place shortly before the Olympic Games in Beijing. The stewards stopped him.

His other spectacular action occurred on July 11, 2010, at the World Cup, Spain – Netherlands final match, Soccer City Stadium, Johannesburg (South Africa). Jimmy Jump wanted to put a beret on the World Cup, which stood on the stand; he was dressed in a T-shirt with the inscription 'Against Racism'. The guard stopped him a few meters away.

The Spaniard Jaume Marquet i Cot (born 1976) is considered the 'king' of streakers and sports hooligans. A fan of Barcelona FC, born and living in Catalonia, he ran on the field more than a hundred times during major international tournaments. Since his first appearance on the football field in 2002, he has called himself Jimmy Jump ('Double J') and his outings have become systemic. The purpose of his actions was to appear and stay in the broadcast of sports and social and cultural

⁴³ Liubomyr Kuz'myak, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ *Ukrayins'kyy prapor i hopak na olimpiys'komu stadioni* [Ukrainian flag and hopak at the Olympic Stadium], in "Svoboda", № 142, August 10, 1976, p. 2.

events for as long as possible. “*My goal is to involve people in problems of racial or social inequality. And, at the same time, to make the audience laugh*”.⁴⁵ It is an instance of personal motivation.

Jimmy Jump is a cult figure for Catalonia, as his mandatory attributes include a beret, a red Catalan hat that symbolizes Catalonia’s national identity and the struggle for independence from Madrid, and often the Catalan flag. He repeatedly tried to put the beret on the heads of different players (Samuel Eto’o (2004), Lionel Messi (2007), Cristiano Ronaldo (2010) and the World Cup (2010)). The stalker declared that in his actions with the beret “*there is no political message that I would like to convey. I want peace in Spain*”.⁴⁶ Jimmy Jump’s popularity is due to his website (<http://www.jimmyjump.com/>), where he published his speeches and autobiography and sold T-shirts with his name; he became the hero of the documentary and has more than 250,000 followers on Facebook. Thus, he partially commercialised his hobby to raise funds to pay fines imposed on him in different countries because of his protests. Not all of Jimmy Jump’s actions had a political connotation. Some of his actions were predictable and expected by the spectators. He kept good physical form to carry out his acts. Law enforcement officials banned him from accessing sporting venues and monitored his behaviour on the field, and he discontinued his actions in 2014 because of unpaid fines.

Although Jimmy Jump promoted the idea of Catalan independence by demonstrating symbols of the region⁴⁷ (but without making loud political statements), the government in democratic Spain treated him calmly even indifferently, i. e. his actions were interpreted as freedom of expression or hooliganism, for which he was regularly fined. Jimmy is more a symbol of entertainment than

⁴⁵ Alex Mannanov, *op. cit.*

⁴⁶ Nermin Yildirim, *Jimmy Jump şimdi de İstanbul'a mı ziplayacak?* [Will Jimmy Jump jump to Istanbul now?], in “Radikal”, September 4, 2010, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/hayat/jimmy-jump-simdi-de-istanbula-mi-ziplayacak-1017300/> (Accessed on 25.01.2022); Dmitriy Kustovskiy. *Izvestnyy sportivnyy khuligan khochet nadet' katalonskuyu shapochku na Gutora* [A well-known sports hooligan wants to put a Catalan cap on Gutor], in “Euroradio FM”, December 5, 2011, <https://euroradio.fm/ru/report/izvestnyi-sportivnyi-khuligan-khochet-nadet-katalonskuyu-shapochku-na-gutora-79306> (Accessed on 15.02.2022).

⁴⁷ Elmar Burchia. *Euro 2008, l'irruzione di “Jimmy Jump” in semifinale censurata dall' UEFA*, in “Corriere Della Sera”, 26 giugno, 2008, https://www.corriere.it/sport/08_giugno_26/immagini_tibet_uefa_censura_jimmy_643207fc-4389-11dd-bb33-00144f02aabc.shtml (Accessed on 18.01.2022).

the 'face' of separatism. However, the Catalan Independence Party paid part of the fine for Jimmy Jump.

3. On October 28, 2017, during the UEFA Europa League group stage match, BATE (Borisov) – Arsenal (London), Borisov-Arena Stadium, in Borisov (Belarus), Alexander Vengersky, a 26-year-old, entered the field in the 43rd minute. He was wearing a T-shirt with 'Pogonia' on his chest, the historical national emblem of Belarus, which is officially called an 'unregistered symbol', and the national white-red-white flag of Belarus (unlike the official red-green, which has been state-owned since Soviet times) with the 'Pogonia' coat of arms painted on it. He called his action a performance, as he wanted to promote national symbols. He ran across the whole field – from the Arsenal fan sector to the BATE fan sector. In the stands, the white-red-white flag of Belarus reminded of the flag of Arsenal because the London club has the same colours, so Belarusian commentators said that he was a fan of that club.⁴⁸ The management of football clubs takes an apolitical position on such actions, refuses to comment on incidents and offers to pass fines from FIFA and UEFA to violators or pay them themselves. The stewards caught Vengersky and handed him to the police. The Arsenal goalkeeper approached to shake the detainee's hand, while the fans greeted him with applause and cheers.⁴⁹ He was brought out of the stadium after being detained by stewards, forced on his knees, and struck on the kidneys. The court sentenced a 10-day administrative arrest for hooliganism and resistance to law enforcement, and a €5,000 fine for the BATE FC. While in custody, he went on a hunger strike in support of the prisoners.⁵⁰

The day before the match, Vengersky posted a photo on Instagram with a white-red-white flag, which he signed, "*Tomorrow will be hot*". On September 8, on the eve of the rally at the stadium, he took part in a street protest against the Belarusian-Russian military exercises 'West- 2017' with a poster "*Russian soldier go home. There is no vodka here*".⁵¹ He was arrested, tried and sentenced to pay a fine.

Vengersky's actionism is an example of a conscious political protest against the Belarusian authority, which, in the traditions of the USSR, replaced the history

⁴⁸ *Paren' s belo-krasno-belym flagom ...* .

⁴⁹ Yaroslav Steshik, *op. cit.*

⁵⁰ *Paren' s belo-krasno-belym flagom ...* .

⁵¹ *S flagom na match BATE "Arsenal" vybezhhal zhitel' Vileyki Aleksandr Vengerskiy* [Alexander Vengersky, a resident of Vileyka, ran out with a flag for the BATE Arsenal match], in "Euroradio. FM", September 28, 2018, <https://euroradio.fm/ru/bolelshchik-s-belo-krasno-belym-flagom-vybezhhal-na-pole-na-matche-bate-arsenal> (Accessed on 04.04.2022).

of Belarus with artificial symbols. It is also a protest against the militarization of Belarus in the interests of Russia's imperial ambitions. The treatment of Vengersky after his detention proves that such protests, even single ones, are seen by the authorities as a threat to the undemocratic regime and tarnish the image of the political elite.

4. July 15, 2018, Croatia – France World Cup final match, the Luzhniki Great Sports Arena, Moscow (Russia). Several heads of state were present in the stands, among them, Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation President and Emmanuel Macron, the President of the French Republic. Four members of the Russian art group Pussy Riot, dressed in police uniforms, ran onto the field in the 50th minute of the game. Three participants were stopped at once, and one of them continued to run around the stadium asking the players to 'high five' (a gesture of celebration or greeting in which two people slap each other's palms with their arms raised). The participants called the action "*A militiaman enters the game*", it took place one day before the poet Dmitriy Prygov's death memorial. He was the one who introduced the term "a militiaman, a bearer of heavenly statehood".⁵² The French national football team player Mbappé 'high-fived' one of the protesters. Dejan Lovren, the defender of the Croatian national team stopped one of the protesters and held him until the security guards arrived. Stewards took Pussy Riot participants off the field.

The Pussy Riot Manifesto demanded the release of all political prisoners in Russia, including Ukrainian director Oleh Sentsov, the termination of criminal cases related to social media reposts, the cessation of illegal arrests at rallies, the acceptance of political competition in the country, not fabricating criminal cases and not keeping people in jail for nothing and the transformation of an earthly militiaman into a 'heavenly' militiaman.⁵³

Protesters were sentenced to a 15-day administrative arrest and fines. According to the court decision, they were forbidden to attend official sports events in Russia for three years. On social networks, the reaction of Russians was negative: "*prevented the goal*", "*disgraced Russia*", "*it is a pity that now it is not 1937*", "*under drugs*", etc. Therefore, Pussy Riot activism had little political impact

⁵² Uchastniki "*Pussy Riot*" vybezhali na pole vo vremya finala CHM. Kak im eto udalos'? [Members of Pussy Riot ran onto the field during the World Cup final. How did they do it?], in "BBC News", July 28, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-44840997> (Accessed on 12.02.2022).

⁵³ Anatoliy Romanov, "*Pussy Riot*" v finale...

on Russians.⁵⁴

It should be recalled that Pussy Riot has conflicted with the Russian authorities since 2012 when three members of the group were sentenced to two years in prison for 'hooliganism'. The group organized protests against Putin at the Lobnoye Mesto on the Red Square and in the Church of Christ the Savior in Moscow. After being released from prison, the members established the 'Zone of Truth' human rights group and "Mediastone" journal.

5. September 2, 2018, the 2018 World Cup qualifying match, national teams of Ukraine and Turkey, Metalist Stadium, Kharkiv (Ukraine): before the start of the match, during the Turkish national anthem, a Ukrainian Femen activist Angelina Diash ran to the field. The bare chest of the black activist had the English message 'Erdogan killer,' and a traditional Ukrainian wreath covered her head. The movement's website called the action "Femen against Erdogan" and said that the activist decided to protest against the 'dictatorial regime' of the Turkish President who "*kills freedom and simply kills*". The Turkish national team served as a background for Femen's statements concerning its attitude toward Turkey's dictator.⁵⁵ She was caught quickly. Given the performance, as well as all Femen's actions, it drew more attention to the movement itself than to the political message.

Political themes are at the centre of the radical women's movement, which is set against a backdrop of ironic and witty performances. The idea of Femen's actions is that if a woman's body is so well adapted to promote commercial advertising, then why not use it to promote socio-political topics? However, in Ukrainian society, their actions are criticized or perceived sceptically, but in the West, the reaction is analytical and positive.⁵⁶

Therefore, these bright performances appeared to be aimed solely at impressing and entertaining the audience, making their initiators famous and recognizable; however, even in such a 'carnival' form, they are oriented towards a quite serious message: political protest against injustice and activation of the civic position of both initiators and fans as potential supporters of protest actions.

⁵⁴ In Russian culture, Prygov created the image of the Militiaman, the bearer of heavenly statehood: the heavenly militiaman is talking on his walkie-talkie with God himself and the earthly militiaman fabricates criminal cases.

⁵⁵ *Obnazhennaya aktivistka "Femen"...*

⁵⁶ Maria Mayerchyk, Olha Plakhotnik, *Femen: analiz diskursiv* [Femen: analysis of discourses], Heinrich-Boll Stiftung, 2011, <https://ua.boell.org/uk/2011/02/03/femen-analiz-diskursiv> (Accessed on 08.04.2022).

CITIZENS' POLITICAL PROTESTS ON FOOTBALL FIELDS OF THE WORLD AS A CHALLENGE TO THE STATE'S RULING ELITE

Although the publicity of the streakers' actions is focused more on the emotional effect and entertainment for the audience, the state authorities may see their actions differently when the streakers' messages have a political meaning.

This involves a threat to the state's territorial integrity and national sovereignty for nations with democratic political systems because of the growth of separatism in such regions. These are separatist movements in Catalonia. Although such actions have a clearly defined regional origin and are important to the inhabitants of these regions and cities, they create social tensions and cause economic instability in the country. Thus, Jimmy Jump is a generalised symbol of Barcelona and Anti-Madrid fans; he is regarded as an 'activist', 'anti-globalist', 'international demonstrator', and 'provocateur'. Under General Franco's regime, football was one of the means to demonstrate local support of independence, the confrontation between Madrid and its Real and the expression of a personal position. Therefore, the Barcelona slogan 'more than a club' acquired a political meaning, and the club itself became one of the main symbols of Catalonia. The striped yellow and red flags of Catalonia traditionally mark the team's matches, and the UEFA regularly fines the club for using symbols with political overtones. Due to the achievements of Barca, the club began to add the identification 'Catalans' rather than 'Spaniards'. The symbols of the region were on the official equipment of the club: the captain's armband of the Sanyera (the flag of Catalonia) colours; for several seasons the same colours have been the basis for guest sets of uniforms, and press conferences were held in Catalan.⁵⁷ The management of the Barcelona FC also made an official statement in support of the referendum held on October 1, 2017, in Catalonia, on the separation of this autonomous region from Spain, which was not recognized by official Madrid. Jimmy Jump was only routinely punished and forbidden to attend games in democratic Spain for his participation in the outward display of Catalan independence.

The authorities of countries with undemocratic or semi-democratic political regimes, such as the USSR, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Turkey, perceive political protests on the football fields as:

⁵⁷ *Kak Olimpiada i futbol doveli Kataloniyu do referendumu* [How the Olympics and football brought Catalonia to a referendum], in "Business-Gazeta", October 27, 2017, <https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/362064> (Accessed on 28.01.2022).

1) A threat to the state's territorial integrity by claiming alternative official histories of statehood, displaying national symbols and seeking their reinstatement. Therefore, the authorities in such countries consider protest participants to be extremists, provocateurs, and the commission of such actions is unacceptable. After all, actionists manage to display publicly their demands to thousands of viewers; their requests appear on their accounts and the websites of organisations. Protesters frequently wave flags that either are banned in their countries or are symbols of opposition. According to Myhal, he "*did not understand why Ukrainian athletes should perform under someone else's flag. Many of our compatriots won Olympic medals for the USSR. I considered this an injustice and wanted the Ukrainian flag to be raised in honour of the Ukrainians' victories. Especially since the Olympics are covered by many media. It seemed to me that my action would not remain in the shadows and the world would pay attention to the fact that Ukraine can be an independent state*".⁵⁸ Historically in Belarus, the white-red-white flag was the state flag, and 'Pagonia' was the national emblem. The Lukashenko regime has banned their use, for which one can go to prison (the case of Vengersky). Protests on football fields enrich national memory. For instance, in independent Ukraine, Myhal is considered the first stalker in USSR national team matches (at least on film); he is called "*our dancing boy*", and "*the first representative of the Ukrainian ultras*".

2) A threat to the spread of foreign influence on its territory. August 8, 2017, the UEFA Super Cup match, Real (Madrid) – Manchester United, the Philip II of Macedon stadium, in Skopje (Macedonia). Immediately after the final whistle, a fan with the heart and name 'Ronaldo' on his front and the seventh number (Cristiano Ronaldo's game number) and the name of the Russian Federation President 'Putin' on his back ran from the stands to the field. The fan ran half the field. He did not make any demands. Stewards caught him. The pro-Russian fan's run to the football field in Skopje (2017) may be interpreted as a manifestation of the state of bilateral relations between Macedonia and the Russian Federation. This was a sign of the destabilizing influence of Russia on the government in Macedonia, which began in 2008 when the attempt of this Balkan country to join NATO failed. That influence gradually spread to all sectors of society. In domestic politics – the ruling nationalist

⁵⁸ *Provokator, vybezhavshiy na futbol'noye pole v matche s "Arsenalom" s BCHB flagom, davno iskal vozmozhnosti 'otlichit'sya'* [The provocateur, who ran onto the football field in the match with Arsenal with a white-red-white flag, has long been looking for opportunities to "distinguish himself"], in "Telescop Media", September 29, 2017, https://football24.ua/sin_banderi_vizvolyav_mene_z_politsiyi_ukrayinskiy_prapor_na_oi_1976_legendarna_istoriya_n433682/ (Accessed on 30.01.2022).

conservative party “Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity” (VMRO-DPMNE) supports Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, whose actions led to three crises in 2015 and storming the Parliament in May 2017. In the energy sector – the implementation of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline project; culture – promotion of the Panslavism idea and the common origin of religion. Other influences include the financial assistance to erect Orthodox crosses and to construct churches, the establishment of the Russia – Macedonia Friendship Societies, the opening of the Russian Cultural Centre in Skopje and the awarding of the Patriarch Alexy II Prize to Gjorge Ivanov, the President of Macedonia, by the “International Public Fund for the Unity of Orthodox Peoples.”⁵⁹ Concerning geopolitics, mention should be made on the “*isolation from the Western influence*”, the non-accession of Macedonia to the NATO, and the EU, and the creation of a “*strip of military neutral countries in the Balkans*”. As regards the policy of world sanctions against Russia over the war in eastern Ukraine, Macedonia did not join Western sanctions in 2014.⁶⁰

3) A threat to the current political regime, to the functioning of public authorities and the constitutional order posed by the progress of political institutions of democracy, such as civil society, the rule of law and the media. The demands of the protesters are in line with the international organizations’ demands and statements regarding respect for human rights and freedoms, suppression of opposition (the action of the art group Pussy Riot in Moscow), and protests against the establishment of dictatorial regimes and their struggle against political opponents and media representatives (the action of the Femen activist Diash in Kharkov).

Such protests are part of a larger chain of protests against official authority policies and acts by opposing people and civil society representatives. Although the stadium protests are neither coordinated nor agreed with other opposition forces, they create a significant social effect and demonstrate the possibility to solve existing problems. Myhal’s action against the “*Soviet-Russian sports prison of the peoples and all those who support or silence its actions*” was just one in a series of other information and political protests of the Ukrainian diaspora during the

⁵⁹ *Vstrecha s Prezidentom Makedonii George Ivanovym* [Meeting with Macedonia’s President George Ivanov], 2010, <http://special.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/MK/events/54556> (Accessed on 26.04.2022).

⁶⁰ Aubrey Belford, Saska Cvetkovska, Biljana Sekulovska, Stevan Dojčinović, *Dokumenty utechki govoryat o popytkakh vmeshatel'stva Rossii i Serbii v dela Makedonii* [Leaked Documents Show Russian and Serbian Attempts to Intervene in Macedonian Affairs], 2017, <https://www.occrp.org/ru/spooksandspin/leaked-documents-show-russian-serbian-attempts-to-meddle-in-macedonia/> (Accessed on 26.04.2022).

1976 Summer Olympic Games in Montreal⁶¹. In the modern political history of Belarus, the protest of Vengersky, with the white-red-white flag and the 'Pogonia' emblem, echoes the protests of the opposition against the rule of Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenko, in 2020, as well as the Femen action against Erdogan, regarding the attempts of the President of Turkey to strengthen his power in the country by fighting political opponents and media. During the detention, the actionists did not physically resist, which further confirms the peaceful nature of the protests.

4) The threat of prolonged lawsuits, intensification of human rights activities and related publicity. Court hearings of '*field runners*' (as the local media call them) in countries with undemocratic political regimes (Russia, Belarus) are held the next day after detention. According to the court verdict, violators are brought to administrative and criminal responsibility under for hooliganism and resistance to police officers, or they are sentenced to probation. Moscow police generated reports on the protestors based on four provisions of the Administrative Code. All four participants of Pussy Riot received the maximum penalty provided by the provision on gross violation of the rules of spectators' conduct during official sports competitions if such actions do not show signs of criminal punishment for such actions.

5) The threat of the rise of new leaders of public opinion, informal leaders. For example, in 2008 Jimmy Jump was awarded the International Free Spirit Award for "*unbreakable spirit and infinite energy*", for "*loud advertising tricks*" for the sake of "*decent work*".⁶² The authorities of countries with undemocratic political regimes use mass media to create a profane, contemptuous and sarcastic image of the protesters. For example, in the publication "*How Ukrainian nationalists in pants and without helped our athletes*" modern Russian propagandists called Myhal a "*disco-hopak dancer*". They claimed that Myhal's father, Bohdan, had been a medic in the SS division Galicia, and his father's elder brother, Roman, had been a member of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), Deputy of Stepan Bandera in the OUN propaganda department, the commander of the combat intelligence department of the regional OUN. Finally, the Russian propagandists stressed, "the world media were quite indifferent to the actions of a Ukrainian patriot from Canada".⁶³ Russian media called the Belarusian Vengersky "*a provoca-*

⁶¹ Ruslan Siromskiy, *op. cit.*

⁶² *Free Spirit Award 2008: Martin Wyness and Jimmy Jump*, 2008, https://www.freespiritfestival.com/awards/2008-martin_wyness_and_jimmy_jump.html (Accessed 12.02.2022).

⁶³ *OI Monreal'-1976. SSSR – GDR 1:2. Sud'ba tantsora gopaka* [Olympic Games Montreal-

teur, a failed programmer, without higher education".⁶⁴

Various interpretations of the protesters' actions and features emerged in the media, ranging from positive to strongly unfavourable. Thus, "The Ukrainian Weekly" (Ukrainian Diaspora printed media), and "Svoboda" (USA) praised Myhal's actions to "*awaken national feelings in Ukrainian athletes*" as well as the conduct of police officers against him, while Soviet representatives put constant pressure on Canadian law enforcement to punish the guilty. Nowadays, representatives of the "Russkiy mir" resort to information manipulations around such actions: modern 'hybrid' Russian propaganda spreads fakes about Myhal's action at the Olympic Games, about 'our' (Soviet) sports and 'our' team claiming that Myhal planned to go to Donbas with the same flag to "*defend Ukraine as much as possible*."⁶⁵

6) Threat of public exposure of the institutions of state power's weakness and their low public authority. Political protests on the football fields of the world draw attention to the behaviour and actions of stadium security officers and law enforcement agencies, which are unable to control and prevent fan behaviour on the field. The protesters convince the audience that the protest is still possible under such conditions. The higher the level of sports competitions, the more structures and people responsible for security are involved, so it is difficult to successfully hold protests. However, CCTV footage shows that a stadium steward opened the gate to the Pussy Riot members and let them out on the field. Because it is unclear how members of Pussy Riot entered the stadium with fans' passports through several control lines, such actions must result in a revision of national and European civil and sports legislation, rules of spectator behaviour in stadiums and law enforcement agency actions, as well as the peculiarities of broadcasting sports competitions, and how the UEFA and FIFA impose sanctions on football clubs for fan behaviour.

CONCLUSIONS

The protesters' political demands are quite broad: granting state independence, restoration of the use of national symbols, the democratization of political regimes and addressing current social problems such as corruption and racism. The protests' limited duration was compensated for by their bright symbols, spec-

1976. USSR-GDR 1:2. The fate of the hopak dancer]", in "ZEN", May 11, 2020, <https://zen.yandex.ru/media/nef/oi-monreal1976-ssrgdr-12-sudba-tancora-gopaka-5eb92fa10b9b23028676ca74> (Accessed 28.01.2022).

⁶⁴ *Provokator, vybezhavshiy...*

⁶⁵ Anatolii Romanov, *Na Olimpiade-1976 fanat vybezhal na pole...*

tacular artistic solutions, and clear slogans. The peaceful behaviour of the actionists and their apparent vulnerability to the use of force by the authorities instil an understanding of the possibility and necessity of protest in the minds of citizens in an undemocratic society; it destroys the illusion of inviolability and power of the political regime. Protesters' representation of socio-political problems and slogans against heads of state destroy the positive image of the government and raise public doubts about the correctness of the chosen political course. The presence of a large number of fans in the stadiums who are thus accomplices in the action, the inability to stop the rapid spread of information about political activism, and criminal cases against protesters all undermine public confidence in the ruling elite and threaten the stability of its political institutions. Political protests involving individuals on the world's football fields are gradually combining into large anti-government protests and civil disobedience, which are already taking place or will take place soon in these countries. They develop a shared political awareness and eventually become national assets.

Public authorities limiting individuals' political protest, significant socio-political resonance and relative ease of protests on football fields around the world all contribute to a high probability that such protests will continue and develop in the future. Football fields remain a convenient platform for politically conscious citizens to interact with society on views and positions regarding current domestic and international issues, due to the widespread popularity of football and sports in general, as well as the availability of stadiums and match broadcasts.

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THE CAUSES OF THE RWANDA CRISIS AND THE 'POSTCOLONIAL SYNDROME'*

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Abstract: *The investigation focuses on the Rwanda crisis and begins with a brief introduction before looking into the historical circumstances preceding the 1994 genocide. It highlights the actual causes of the genocide and the Belgian colonisers' policies (and, to a lesser extent, the policies of the German colonisers before them), which amplified the differences between the Hutu and the Tutsi. The article outlines how Rwanda became a postcolonial state, where old rivalries turned violent and resulted in massacres. Important factors were also the poor financial state of the country and the fact that Rwanda was a densely populated country, which should be seen in connection with Europe's "divide and rule" policy. Rwanda suffered as a postcolonial state because of the various parties' conflicting views on power sharing, as well as the International Community's support for an agreement that mostly benefited the minority (the Tutsi). Even if the Arusha Accords were designed to "repair" the circumstances of an already failing post-colonial experiment, the pressure used by Western circles to accept them undermined the power of the majority (Hutu) by causing additional damages rather than eliminating the previously existing ones.*

Keywords: *Rwanda, Hutu, Tutsi, genocide, massacre, postcolonialism*

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Rezumat: Cauzele crizei din Rwanda și „sindromul post-colonial”. Studiul analizează situația ce a condus la criza din Rwanda. Mai întâi este trecut în revistă contextul istoric și motivele care au generat tragicele evenimente ce au debutat în anul 1994. Ulterior este explicat modul în care colonizatorii belgieni (și într-o măsură mai mică – înaintea lor – cei germani) au amplificat prin politicile lor diferențele dintre grupurile etnice hutu și tutsi. De asemenea, este analizată maniera în care Rwanda a devenit un stat post-colonial, unde vechile rivalități s-au acutizat și au condus la masacre. Sunt evidențiați factorii declanșatori importanți ai acestor evenimente, în care se includ starea financiară proastă a țării și densitatea mare a populației. Rwanda, ca stat post-colonial, a suferit din cauza modului diferit în care împărțirea puterii a fost văzută de diferitele partide de aici. Comunitatea internațională a promovat un acord care a favorizat în principal minoritatea (aici, tutsi). Presiunea aplicată de cercurile occidentale pentru acceptarea Acordurilor de la Arusha a subminat puterea majorității (hutu) provocând daune suplimentare, în locul eliminării celor deja existente, chiar dacă acordurile erau menite să „repare” situația unui experiment post-colonial deja eșuat.

INTRODUCTION

Rwanda is a landlocked country in the region of the African Great Lakes, in East Africa. It is one of the most densely populated countries in the continent, with a population of about thirteen million: 85% are Hutu, 14% are Tutsi and 1% are Twa.¹ In terms of religious beliefs, 65% are Roman Catholics, 9% Protestants, and 1% Muslims, while there is a percentage of 25% who believe in other local religions. Kinyarwanda is the spoken language almost by the whole population of the country, while English, French and Swahili are other spoken languages.² As such, there is no correspondence between language and religion.

The Hutu arrived in the region around 1000 AD, whereas the Tutsi arrived between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries from southern Ethiopia and were a pastoral group who owned cattle. Although the Tutsi were only a small part of the overall population, they managed to rule the region as they received military training. In essence, the ownership of cattle was an important denominator of superiority and wealth, which helped the Tutsi aristocracy to impose their rule.³

¹ Paul J. Magnarella, *Justice in Africa. Rwanda's Genocide, Its Courts, and the UN Criminal Tribunal*, New York, Routledge, 2000, p. 2.

² The members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and other refugees who came from neighbouring Uganda spoke English, as Uganda is an Anglophone country and Tutsi exiles grew up there (See Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, London, Arrow Books, 2004, p. 44).

³ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 3-7.

This hierarchical system of 'castes' prevailed in pre-colonial Rwanda and continued in the following years, augmenting the social distance between the two groups. Thus, the Tutsi were at the top, the Twa at the very bottom and the Hutu in the middle.⁴ However, it is also important to note that according to certain sources, the Tutsi-Hutu split was originally founded on geographical norms – 'centre versus periphery' and not rivalry, with the latter occurring relatively later.⁵ Although the distinction between the native populations pre-existed, the colonisers exploited this to their benefit. Rwanda's colonial history began in 1894 and became, together with Burundi and Tanzania, part of German East Africa. The Germans ruled the country until the end of the First World War when Belgian rule commenced under the League of Nations mandate system. The Belgians ruled Rwanda and Burundi until 1962, and later the two countries adopted their political systems.⁶

A summary of the events, relying on previous well-established literature, is necessary for the full understanding of the crisis and how it developed. The analysis of all the factors shows that Rwanda suffered from the "postcolonial syndrome," which is treated here as a political phenomenon. Decolonisation, as Kennedy declared, could be characterised as "the collapse of colonial empires and the creation of new nation-states across what came to be known as the Third World in the decades following World War II." As such, decolonisation is meant to describe "the political upheavals that brought an end to the European colonial empires" and resulted in the creation of several nation-states in Africa, Asia and the Pacific.⁷ However, the question that emerges is how successful these new states have been, and under what circumstances they developed. In essence, in some countries (including Rwanda) the local regimes that replaced colonial rule chose "selective amnesia," as regards the years of turmoil that preceded and ignored the interests of certain groups.⁸

THE EVENTS

The Europeans' views on Tutsi supremacy originated from Social Darwinism and other evolutionary theories, which flourished in Europe at the time. The

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 7-9.

⁵ Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide*, London, Hurst & Company, 2019, p. 21.

⁶ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁷ Dane Kennedy, *Decolonization. A Very Short Introduction*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 5, 8.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

Europeans assumed that the Tutsi, as descendants of the Ancient Egyptians, were superior to the rest of the Africans. Following the German model (which relied on the Tutsi aristocrats), the Belgians favoured the Tutsi also and relied on similar grounds.⁹ In addition, during Belgian rule, and in particular in the early years of the 1930s, the Catholic Church became an important factor in the structure of the Rwandese society, with many natives – including the Tutsi king – converting to Christianity and so being exposed to Christian values. It could be said that some of the Belgian reforms established the “modern Rwanda.”¹⁰ Nonetheless, in 1933 the Belgians proceeded also to a controversial decision, as they conducted a census and introduced a system of ethnic identity cards – indicating ‘ethnicity’ for everyone. Hence, ‘Tutsi,’ ‘Hutu’ or ‘Twa’ became ethnic labels, based on the status of cow ownership.¹¹

This system of ethnic identity cards lasted until the mid-1990s and was only abolished after the 1994 genocide. Essentially, it would not be an exaggeration to say that such an ethnic identity card system was a racist policy that inevitably caused further tension. As Magnarella claimed, this resulted in “a sub-national identity,” which divided the population, and was a case of a “negative history of dominance-subordination, superiority-inferiority, and exploitation-suffering.”¹² It was an anachronistic solution, which resulted in enmity and inevitably promoted further Tutsi supremacy.¹³

A change of attitude appeared in the 1950s when the Belgian colonisers switched their position and supported the Hutu. Several reasons contributed to this direction, but the Belgians’ turn towards democratic reforms was a basic factor.¹⁴ Of course, this change should be seen in connection with some important developments in the 19th century and the anti-colonial trend in Europe, which saw the possession of other countries with scepticism and did not leave Belgium unaffected.¹⁵ Consequently, the Hutu found fertile ground for the first time, and in

⁹ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁰ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 32-35.

¹¹ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 10-11. Keane refers to 1926, as the year when the Belgians introduced the system of ethnic identity cards (Fergal Keane, *Season of Blood. A Rwandan journey*, London, Viking, 1995, p. 193).

¹² Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 11-12.

¹³ Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 281. See also Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 229.

¹⁴ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 12-13.

¹⁵ H. L. Wesseling, *Divide and Rule. The Partition of Africa, 1880-1914*, translated by Arnold

1957, intellectual Hutu published the "Hutu Manifesto" to promote their cause for an independent Rwanda, with them (as the majority) in the lead. Two years later, the pro-Hutu party PARMEHUTU conducted a rebellion, which resulted in clashes between Hutu and Tutsi.¹⁶

In 1960, the Belgians started replacing the Tutsi with Hutu in the administration of the country, while in September 1961 legislative elections took place, with PARMEHUTU receiving 78% of the vote. Rwanda became an independent state in 1962, and Grégoire Kayibanda became the first president. Nevertheless, the new president adopted authoritarian methods, reminiscent of the traditional Tutsi aristocracy. To make matters worse, by 1963 extremist groups had killed Tutsi, whereas many more Tutsi had been forced to leave for other countries.¹⁷

Tutsi refugees who left for Burundi started to organise attacks against Rwanda and after an unsuccessful invasion in 1963, the Hutu government proceeded to a wave of slaughters against the Tutsi, while Tutsi politicians based in Rwanda were executed. Later, in 1972, political developments in Burundi had a significant impact on Rwanda, after the Tutsi-led military regime of Burundi defeated a rebellion of Burundian Hutu. The rebellion resulted in massive killings of Hutu, while many others left for Rwanda. In retaliation, Kayibanda proceeded to a new wave of attacks and many Tutsi were forced to leave the country.¹⁸ In substance, the Kayibanda regime paved the way for dangerous routes, as the president was responsible even for low-level positions in the administration. General Juvénal Habyarimana, who ousted Kayibanda in 1973 and adopted a racial societal structure with similar authoritarian policies, later adopted this method.¹⁹

As such, in 1973, a new regime and era commenced for Rwanda, and Juvenal Habyarimana became the second president. In Magnarella's words, "Habyarimana's Rwanda became a single-party dictatorship." Habyarimana focused on the separatist policies of the previous regime and kept the system of ethnic identity cards.²⁰ The pre-existing problem of population density was not resolved and by the 1980s, more refugees had been forced to leave for other countries. Despite the pleas, Habyarimana objected to any return of refugees and

J. Pomerans, Westport – London, Praeger, 1996, p. 77.

¹⁶ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 12-13.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, 13 and Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁸ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁹ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

²⁰ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 14-15. See also Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder. The Rwandan Genocide*, London – New York, Verso, 2004, p. 11.

invoked the problem of population density.²¹

In the meantime, political developments in Uganda also contributed to the turbulences: Tutsi refugees from Rwanda helped Yoweri Museveni to overpower Milton Obote and seize power in 1986. These Tutsi refugees, who had taken military training, formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987 and joined forces with some Hutu refugees.²² Although they were small in numbers, this diaspora group proved to be an effective and capable military force.²³ Aiming to return to Rwanda and get involved in politics, in the early 1990s the RPF attempted to invade the country. In response, the Habyarimana regime reacted with further repression measures against the Tutsi. Within this tense climate, Francois Mitterrand, the French president, applied pressure on Habyarimana to proceed with political reforms.²⁴ The latter made a compromise and announced the transition to a multi-party system in July 1990. In essence, Habyarimana and his party accepted this transition because they realised that the situation was at the edge of war, but, in reality, little changed, as the previous single-party system continued to enjoy all the power without any serious concessions.²⁵ In general, the RPF's attempts to invade Rwanda from Uganda and the extremist Hutu's efforts to maintain a power monopoly can be seen in the early 1990s.

Consequently, in the overall turmoil of the 1990s and with the financial state of the country deteriorating, the Arusha Accords—which Habyarimana signed rather unwillingly and despite the reactions of extremist Hutu circles – came as a final solution to satisfy these conflicting interests. The agreement provided for a ceasefire, a power-sharing arrangement, the return of Tutsi exiles, and restructuring of the armed forces and was finalised in August 1993.²⁶

In theory, the accords set the framework for a significant transition towards the democratisation of the country – allowing other parties to get involved in

²¹ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²² Their goal to return to Rwanda should be seen in connection with political developments in Uganda. After Museveni's accession to power, certain Tutsi of Rwandese origin, who helped him to overpower the previous regime, undertook key positions in the administration of Uganda. The climate was reversed though against those Tutsi refugees, and Museveni had been accused for allowing the overrepresentation of the Banyarwanda (André Guichaoua, *From War to Genocide. Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990-1994*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2015, p. 29).

²³ Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

²⁴ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁵ André Guichaoua, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-43, 45.

²⁶ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

politics.²⁷ However, in essence, with the signing of the Arusha Accords (and the power-sharing arrangement overall), the RPF enjoyed several gains, whereas the Habyarimana circles would need to make significant concessions.²⁸ As Sarkin and Fowler explained reasonably, while in the abstract the Accords were based on power sharing, extremist Hutu circles viewed them as a defeat and undermined them.²⁹

The overall structure of the agreements was basically unworkable, and goodwill was a critical precondition. For instance, a decision could be made only with the positive vote of pro-Hutu and pro-Tutsi political parties, and this could easily result in the paralysis of the political system. Some of the main provisions were as follows: Rwandese troops would be made up of 40% RPF and 60% FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaises – the armed forces of the Habyarimana and Interim governments), with a 50:50 officer corps ratio;³⁰ the return of Tutsi refugees; the establishment of a commission for national unity and reconciliation as well as a national summit on unity and reconciliation; the provision for a transitional government consisting of politicians from different political parties; and the deployment of United Nations forces.³¹

In fact, the agreements transferred political and military power to the hands of the RPF and the opposition parties. In Guichaoua's words, "the RPF and the domestic opposition accorded themselves full power, with their combined two-thirds majority in parliament offering them the possibility of modifying the rules of the game." Pro-Hutu circles organized their fight against the RPF after the accords were signed, which contributed to the division of the two groups.³²

In the meantime, in neighbouring Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye (a Hutu) was elected president in July 1993. Burundian Tutsi, who saw this as a victory of the Hutu and not as the outcome of a majority decision, assassinated the newly elected

²⁷ Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

²⁸ Susan Thomson, *Rwanda. From Genocide to Precarious Peace*, New Haven – London, Yale University Press, 2018, p. 18.

²⁹ Jeremy Sarkin, Carly Fowler, *The responsibility to protect and the duty to prevent genocide: lessons to be learned from the role of the international community and the media during the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia*, in "Suffolk Transnational Law Review", Vol. 33, 2010, No. 1, pp. 1-53.

³⁰ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

³¹ Susan Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 68. For the primary source see Article 2, 13, 14, 23E, 24A *Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front*.

³² André Guichaoua, *op. cit.*, pp. 66, 79.

president and his family in October of that year. In response, associates of Ndadaye who sought shelter in radio stations in Rwanda urged the Hutu to take revenge and kill the Tutsi – commencing racist propaganda against the Tutsi and the Accords. According to Magnarella, Habyarimana and his group were ‘alarmed’ by these changes and opposed the Arusha Accords’ implementation. At the same time, extremist Hutu started training the *Interahamwe* (a paramilitary organisation affiliated with the governmental forces) and intensified their initiation into anti-Tutsi indoctrination.³³ Because a large percentage of the Rwandan population was illiterate, radio became the main vehicle enabling extremists to spread their genocidal messages.³⁴ Of course, the extremists did not confine themselves to the radio only, as certain papers also delivered their messages and promoted this racist propaganda.³⁵ The Hutu extremists used divisive language and blamed the Tutsi, while the Habyarimana government similarly based its actions on racial politics and the view that the Tutsi were the enemy.³⁶

To understand the impact of the Burundian president’s death on the political scene of Rwanda, one needs to have in mind the past links between the two countries. In Prunier’s words, Ndadaye’s assassination had a “psychological impact” on the Hutu population of Rwanda, aside from the news of his death, which spread quickly. The Burundian Hutu refugees who arrived in Rwanda spread different stories about the aggressiveness of their compatriots.³⁷ Although it is probably excessive to assume that the violence in Rwanda was a “direct response” to the events in Burundi, the political developments in the two countries should be seen as closely related, and the fact is that the instability in Burundi contributed to the uncertain climate in Rwanda.³⁸

The implementation of the Arusha Accords was meant to take place at a time when both groups intensified their propaganda. Hutu extremist circles did not see positively the coexistence with their Tutsi compatriots and exploited the situation

³³ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³⁴ Alison Des Forges, *Call to Genocide*, in Allan Thompson (Ed.), *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 42.

³⁵ Marcel Kabanda, *Kangura: the Triumph of Propaganda Refined*, in Allan Thompson (Ed.), *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 62. See also Linda Melvern, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

³⁶ Susan Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

³⁷ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 198-200.

³⁸ Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: race, power, and war in Rwanda*, New York, Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 190-191.

to express overtly their anti-Tutsi feelings.³⁹ By signing the agreements, Habyarimana seemingly achieved a compromise with the RPF, but at the same time, he caused the vehement reaction of his circle – who felt threatened and undermined. Thus, Habyarimana had no other option, but to postpone repeatedly the implementation of the agreements. Nevertheless, this continuous postponement made the foreign interventions more persistent, and for Habyarimana, there was another problem: diplomatic pressure.⁴⁰

Control was lost, when Habyarimana's plane was shot down. The events of April 1994, and in particular the genocide that followed, with the massive killings of Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda, constitute one of the most tragic moments of world history. On 6 April, Habyarimana went to Tanzania for a meeting to discuss the situation in Burundi, but Rwanda was not out of the agenda, as well as Habyarimana's hesitations to implement the Arusha Accords. Habyarimana had been criticised by other African leaders, who insisted on the implementation of the accords. After the end of the meeting, Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira (President of Burundi) were on the same plane when it was hit by a missile and crashed into the garden of the Rwandan president's house.⁴¹ Following that, on 7 April 1994, the media in Rwanda exhorted the Hutu to attack the Tutsi, blaming them for the assassination of President Habyarimana. Extremist Hutu circles started spreading the view that eliminating the Tutsi was a form of retribution.⁴²

According to Prunier, Habyarimana's assassination remains an 'enigma.' A popular theory is that the plane was indeed shot down by members of the RPF, but another common opinion, and perhaps one that stands on firmer ground, is that members of his own circle, who would lose their power and privileges with the signing of the accords, killed Habyarimana.⁴³ Openly, Straus claims that "the hard-liners pursued genocide to keep power" and "the argument is right as far as it goes."⁴⁴

In any case, it is reasonable to say that those who planned and executed the genocide wanted to ensure their political survival.⁴⁵ Overall, the agreements favoured the rebels of the RPF to the detriment of the Habyarimana regime and

³⁹ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 208-212.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 211-212.

⁴² Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention. Genocide in Rwanda*, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2001, p. 15.

⁴³ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 213-220.

⁴⁴ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁴⁵ André Guichaoua, *op. cit.*, p. 237-238.

his circle.⁴⁶ Consequently, it was not a surprise that the RPF supported the accords unanimously.⁴⁷ In contrast, the Hutu hardliners had to compromise on a new situation and make significant concessions.⁴⁸ Thus, they cultivated a climate of polarisation between the two groups and promoted the view that it was a battle between the Hutu, represented by the hardliners, and the Tutsi, represented by the RPF.⁴⁹ In any case, the extremists found the perfect excuse to act and execute their genocidal plan.

Those who orchestrated the violence are most likely to be a small group of extremists, once affiliated with the political, military and economic elite of Rwanda. Driven by a racist ideology, they felt that they had to protect their power by opposing any reforms.⁵⁰ As such, the Hutu elites aligned with the hardliners and believed in the legitimacy of their actions. As Straus explained very effectively, “genocide was the new order of the day” and thus “became the new law of the land.” However, most importantly, the state changed the status of an ethnic conflict into a genocide and played the most critical role in the extermination of a whole group.⁵¹ Focusing on these political developments, one is inclined to accept that “ethnic manipulation was a standard strategy” and proved to be a critical means to gain political and economic control.⁵²

The genocide commenced in early April and ended only when the RPF took control of the situation. Advancing from the north, the RPF army defeated the extremist Hutu militias and declared a cease-fire. Later, they would form a new government together with moderate Hutu politicians.⁵³ Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, was president, and Paul Kagame (who played a key role in the founding of the RPF) was vice-president. After Bizimungu resigned in 2000, Kagame became president. By assuming the duties of vice-president initially, and later president, Kagame was able to oversee the political developments in the country, and thus the RPF became the dominant political power.

However, a new refugee problem emerged, as many Hutu left for other countries, mainly Zaire (later the Democratic Republic of the Congo). According to Prunier, those who planted the genocidal ideology and remained the ideological

⁴⁶ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁴⁷ Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁴⁸ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 48.

⁵⁰ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

⁵¹ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 66, 89, 201.

⁵² André Guichaoua, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

⁵³ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p.21-22 and Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

leaders of their circles had planned this 'exodus'.⁵⁴ In the same spirit, Straus explained that when the hardliners left the country, they took with them the 'remnants' of their 'genocide regime'.⁵⁵ This new wave of Rwandan exiles consisted largely of the Rwandan army and the *Interahamwe*, whose reorganisation in Zaire remains a threat to the current regime in Rwanda.⁵⁶

Today, it is widely accepted that Rwanda left behind the turbulences of the 1990s and is a peaceful country. The new regime managed the crisis and reconstructed the institutions and the governance. Despite the overall stability of the country, however, there are concerns, as Rwanda remains a one-party state. Since the RPF prevailed, it controls the country at a political, economic, and military level, without serious opposition or public criticism.⁵⁷ Some even argue that Rwanda never entered a democratic era, since even though the current regime has succeeded in eliminating ethnic connotations and discriminations from the past, its authoritarian style of governance is seen as a continuation of the previous regimes. In addition, the current regime relies heavily on the aftermath of the genocide, which became "a source of legitimacy astutely exploited to escape condemnation."⁵⁸ Simply put, what one sees in Rwanda today is the RPF's monopoly on power.⁵⁹

It is also imperative to note that there is a divergence of opinions in local society. While the RPF attempted to blame the Europeans for the unfortunate events in the country and presented Rwanda's pre-colonial history as "idyllic and free from divisive notions of ethnicity and race," certain Hutu groups perceive and present the pre-colonial history of the country as a period of oppression, where the majority was ruled by a minority, and this undoubtedly remains a

⁵⁴ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 300, 314. See also Idem, *Africa's World War. Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 1.

⁵⁵ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

⁵⁶ Idem, *Studying Perpetrators: a Reflection*, in "Journal of Perpetrator Research", Vol. 1, 2017, No. 1, pp. 28-38.

⁵⁷ Stef Vandeginste, *Political Representation of Minorities as Collateral Damage or Grain: the Batwa in Burundi and Rwanda*, in "Africa Spectrum", Vol. 49, 2014, No. 1, pp. 3-25; Alexis Arieff, *Rwanda: in Brief (Updated February, 2021)*, CRS Report, Version 12, pp. 1-12.

⁵⁸ Filip Reyntjens, *Rwanda, Ten Years on: from Genocide to Dictatorship*, in "African Affairs", Vol. 103, 2004, No. 411, pp. 177-210.

⁵⁹ Idem, *Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, in "African Affairs", Vol. 110, 2011, No. 438, pp. 1-34.

controversial issue.⁶⁰

THE REASONS AND THE 'POSTCOLONIAL SYNDROME'

According to Magnarella, "when analysing major events in complex political societies, such as states, the human materialist paradigm or research strategy recommends an initial focus on the material, demographic, and leadership sub-components of infrastructure as potential causal variables."⁶¹ Indeed, identifying the roots of postcolonial conflicts is always a challenging task, as the observer is obliged to focus on a combination of factors. As such, a thorough examination of the Rwanda crisis shows that the toxic atmosphere in the country was the result of extremism, which gradually grew bigger. In Dallaire's words, the "toxic ethnic extremism" had deep roots in Rwanda's history and was "built from colonial discrimination and exclusion, personal vendettas, refugee life, envy, racism, power plays, *coups d'etat* and the deep rifts of civil war."⁶²

It is an overstatement to say that the crisis in Rwanda should be seen solely in connection with the Europeans' policy of "divide and rule." As already explained, the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was a pre-existing status. Nevertheless, the colonisers exploited these inherent dividing lines and deepened the gap between the different groups, securing that way their presence and interests. The 'divide and rule' policy became the tool that underlined the disparities between the two groups. Simply put, colonisers contributed to pre-existing separatist trends, with their 'divide and rule' approach, and prevented the creation of a common national identity, even though they did not introduce separatism *ex nihilo*. In such circumstances, colonisers frequently discovered rich ground for reviving or strengthening old passions that resulted from the inherent 'disagreements' of the locals.

The policy of 'divide and rule' aimed at the separation of the local population, by turning the different communities or groups against each other. Naturally, this led to rifts and violence, and colonisers were able to impose their control by presenting themselves as mediators or peacemakers since local populations failed to see that coexistence was a basic pre-condition for the establishment of their states. In essence, the European colonisers of the 19th and 20th centuries (and even earlier) made different agreements with each group,

⁶⁰ Erin Jessee, *Negotiating Genocide in Rwanda*, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 238.

⁶¹ Paul J. Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁶² Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 513.

building on earlier versions of the Roman model of "divide and rule".⁶³

Although they discovered an existing hierarchical system in Rwanda, the Europeans gave the two groups new meanings by modifying it to serve their colonial interests. The Belgians employed indirect control by introducing ethnic identity cards, taking full advantage of the Tutsi aristocracy's presence to control the country. Consequently, 'race' became the most crucial factor in determining power. The terms 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' acquired a new meaning during the colonial era: race became almost synonymous with power and the hierarchical structure of Rwandese society.⁶⁴ In substance, based on racial criteria, local society had been divided between those with certain rights and privileges (the minority) and those who had been deprived of any rights (the majority). This resulted, rather naturally, in a 'bipolar identity.'⁶⁵

An important development was the emergence of certain anthropological theories about 'race,' which took place in the nineteenth century. These theories originated from pseudo-scientific terminology and attached specific physical characteristics to each group. The Europeans adhered to these theories and believed that because of their Ancient Egyptian origins, the Tutsi had a special status.⁶⁶ Essentially, the Europeans relied on groundless assumptions, manifested in the theories of John Hanning Speke and his *Journal of the Discovery of the source of the Nile*.⁶⁷ The author referred to superior and inferior groups and his analysis lacked concrete scientific evidence. As Prunier aptly explained, the Europeans mainly focused on Speke's theories and believed that certain groups could not have "a degree of political and religious sophistication." When such theories were implemented in Rwanda, a dichotomy emerged and became a basic societal element.⁶⁸ Jacques Maquet, a Belgian anthropologist, also promoted this dichotomy of the Rwandese population and described Rwanda as a feudal society, where the Tutsi were a higher caste and thus able to maintain political power.⁶⁹

According to Prunier, these views "became a kind of unquestioned 'scientific

⁶³ Timothy Howe, *Divide and Rule: The Legacy of Roman Imperialism*, in Thomas Benjamin (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism since 1450*, Volume 1, A-E, Thomson Gale, 2007, p. 306.

⁶⁴ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 21-22.

⁶⁵ Mahmood Mamdani, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁶⁶ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 6-7. See also Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁶⁷ John Hanning Speke, *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile*, Edinburgh & London, William Blackwood and Sons, originally published 1863.

⁶⁸ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 10-11. See also Linda Melvern, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁶⁹ Susan Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

canon” for the Europeans, and had a significant ‘impact’ on the local population. Nonetheless, without scientific validity and a humanistic approach, they were basically theories that envisaged a ‘superior race,’ the Tutsi, capable of dealing with the political administration. As Prunier also declared, “these European visions did not remain intellectual abstractions, but were translated into perfectly real administrative policies.” Hence, the colonisers with their decisions “systematised and rationalised” pre-existing policies, which resulted in the monopoly of all power by a minority.⁷⁰

The Europeans cultivated certain myths, which finally led to tension and rivalry. Most importantly, even if conflicts were likely to have taken place before the arrival of the colonisers, there is no evidence of a conflict with the magnitude of casualties that occurred in the 1990s. In other words, there is no evidence of a full-scale war in pre-colonial Rwanda.⁷¹ To say that the two groups hated each other from the outset and that the genocide constituted the result of an ancient rivalry is a misleading and simplified explanation of a very complex history, where colonialism played a critical role.⁷² As Peterson explained, “this genocide could not be attributed to ancient prophecy,” and before the arrival of the Europeans “systematic violence” was not the case. Under colonial rule, strict divisions were imposed and later promoted.⁷³ In the same spirit, Mamdani also asserted that the violence originated from the way colonisers organised society, viewing the Hutu as the indigenous people of the area, and the superior Tutsi race as foreigners.⁷⁴

The connection of the Rwanda crisis with the idea of ‘tribalism’ is misleading and without solid academic ground. The idea of an old tribal conflict is only a simplistic explanation that served European interests. According to Straus, “tribe offers understanding without history” and is mainly a “pre-political category.” Rwanda could be characterised as a country with a “specific history of ethnicity,” where one sees the effects of colonialism and there are no tribes.⁷⁵ In the same spirit, Kuperman explained that the two groups have different heritage and arrived in the region at different periods. However, since the Hutu and the Tutsi share the same language and religions, let alone the intermarriages, the term ‘tribe,’ similar to the

⁷⁰ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 39.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, p. 38-39.

⁷² Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁷³ Scott Peterson, *Me Against my Brother. At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda*, New York – London, Routledge, 2001, p. 257-258.

⁷⁴ Mahmood Mamdani, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

⁷⁵ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 40.

term 'ethnic group,' is inappropriate to distinguish the two Rwandan groups.⁷⁶

Before the arrival of the Europeans, the two groups interacted, intermarried, and shared and continue to share a common language and religion. Although the Tutsi were the privileged ones, the two groups lived closely for years. Their coexistence was disrupted when the Germans, initially, and later the Belgians, imposed firm divisions of ethnic nature. Hence, the European colonisers introduced a new reality where Hutu and Tutsi had been divided based on factitious identities.⁷⁷ The Belgian colonisers played a critical role in the events, as their authorities initially backed the Tutsi and later the Hutu, depending on their interests at the time. Thus, the end of colonial rule did not find Rwanda in an atmosphere of calmness and peace, as a new era of calamities commenced, where 'retaliation' was the easy excuse for violent action. When the Belgians left, a constant contest for political power began and ended up in polarisation and bloodshed.⁷⁸ After the Hutu took the lead in the administration, the widely spread view was that their government was not just legitimate, but also "ontologically democratic." Therefore, while initially, the Belgians favoured the "superior race," later they turned to "democratic majority rule."⁷⁹

Nonetheless, the Hutu were no longer marginalized, as they became the leaders of the revolution for an independent Rwanda. As Prunier put it: "the former victims had all been told that they were now free by decree."⁸⁰ However, the problem was not just that democracy became synonymous with the majority, but the fact that it had been accompanied by extremist views and the racist propaganda mentioned earlier.⁸¹ The majority attempted to spread this ideology by downgrading the minority to a second-class category. PARMEHUTU, the pro-Hutu ruling party, promoted the view that the Hutu were legitimate rulers who should maintain political and economic control.⁸²

Hence, when Rwanda became an independent state, and the Hutu gained important positions, they realised that they had power and opportunities they

⁷⁶ Alan J. Kuperman, *op. cit.*, p. 5. See also Paul Magnarella, *Explaining Rwanda's 1994 Genocide*, in "Human Rights & Human Welfare", Vol. 2, 2002, Issue 1, p. 25-34.

⁷⁷ Jeremy Sarkin, Carly Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-53. See also Gérard Prunier, *Africa's World War*, p. XXX.

⁷⁸ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 175-176, 182-183.

⁷⁹ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 80-81.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 347-349.

⁸¹ Jean-Pierre Chrétien, *RTLM Propaganda: the Democratic Alibi*, in Allan Thompson (Ed.), *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 55.

⁸² André Guichaoua, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

could not enjoy before. The Hutu power became the incarnation of democracy and their rule symbolised “demographic dominance,” strictly associated with the idea of the majority.⁸³ It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the rule of democracy accommodated the goals of the extremists, who interpreted democracy as the general concept of the ethnic majority. Building their extremist philosophy on the grounds of majoritarianism, the Hutu saw themselves as the natural rulers of the country and the Tutsi as outsiders without a say.⁸⁴

Rwanda was a small country with a high-density rate. This contributed further to the already tense atmosphere and cemented the “obsession” with the ruling class.⁸⁵ The growth of Rwanda’s population led to enmity and the country’s political elites exploited these circumstances to cultivate the belief that the Hutu population could have more land, had the Tutsi population been eliminated. As farming and government positions were the two main sources of employment in the country, Hutu and Tutsi became competitors. For instance, Habyarimana argued against the return of Tutsi refugees because Rwanda was a small and densely populated country with insufficient employment opportunities. Another significant aspect of the issue was the pro-Catholic attitude (most of the Rwandese are Catholic), which opposed the birth control measures.⁸⁶ As a result, the growth of the population in the twentieth century resulted in a “food-people-land imbalance,” which finally led to a “political indoctrination” that revolved around the elimination of the enemy.⁸⁷

In the chaos that followed the assassination of Habyarimana, normal civilians became genocidaires because they believed in racial propaganda or because they were afraid of being punished by the orchestrators (who were desperate to maintain power). Others feared the RPF and the advance of the Tutsi, while others wanted to gain power and control; finally, some proceeded to genocidal actions, because of “obedience.”⁸⁸ As Thompson explained, “killing Tutsi was a state-sanctioned event that came to bear the authority of key institutions – the military, church and media.”⁸⁹

⁸³ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, pp. 227, 247.

⁸⁴ Darryl Li, *Echoes of Violence: Considerations on Radio and Genocide in Rwanda*, in Thompson Allan (Ed.), *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, London, Pluto Press, 2007, p. 94.

⁸⁵ Gérard Prunier, *op.cit*, p. 3-4.

⁸⁶ Paul Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 25-26.

⁸⁷ Idem, *Explaining Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide*, p. 32.

⁸⁸ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 96, 137. See also Susan Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*.

Another factor that contributed to the bloodshed was the western insistence on the signing of the Arusha Accords, without the necessary psychological preparation. While Western circles applied pressure on the Habyarimana government for the acceptance and implementation of the accords, they failed to foresee that the transfer of significant power to another group would result in vehement reactions. The West underestimated the interests of the Hutu elites, who were threatened by the very nature of the new arrangement. From a diplomatic perspective, the West showed weakness in understanding the real danger: that the Hutu elites would be unwilling to hand over their power and privileges, at least not without them having the last word.⁹⁰ Although there was some scepticism about the accords, the widely spread view among western circles was that the agreements were the manifestation of diplomacy. As Melvern asserted, the UN failed to see that those whose positions were threatened, were those who controlled the army and oversaw other important institutions in the country.⁹¹

Turning to the critical question of whether the genocide could have been avoided, the observer can only make assumptions as in history there are no 'ifs.'⁹² Nonetheless, what one is obliged to acknowledge is that the West remained indifferent. Initially, Belgium, the former colonial power, kept a stance of inertia—especially after the death of the ten Belgian Blue Helmets (who protected Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana at her house) early in April. From their side, the US kept a similar position, mainly because of their fears and recent events in Somalia in the summer of the previous year. The UN Secretary-General, who referred to inter-communal killings, also kept a controversial stance.⁹³ In general, the UN, the Americans and the Europeans wanted to avoid any risks, and despite Romeo Dallaire's (the force commander of the UN mission to Rwanda) suggestions, the UN Security Council decided to withdraw a significant number of peacekeepers and treat the crisis as an internal problem.⁹⁴

When the French government requested approval from the Security Council for joint action with Senegal ("Operation Turquoise"), perhaps they wanted to

⁹⁰ Alan J. Kuperman, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

⁹¹ Linda Melvern, *op. cit.*, p. 60, 257.

⁹² For example, in his memoirs Dallaire explains how the international community could avoid the tragedy of 1994: "Could we have prevented the resumption of the civil war and the genocide? The short answer is yes. If UNAMIR had received the modest increase of troops and capabilities we requested in the first week, could we have stopped the killings? Yes, absolutely" (Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 514).

⁹³ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 275. See also Linda Melvern, *op. cit.*, p. 69-70.

⁹⁴ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 48. See also Linda Melvern, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

ensure the protection of their interests, as Rwanda was seen as a country within their sphere of influence.⁹⁵ As Prunier claimed, France interfered in the Rwanda conflict due to a mix of circumstances, including: “old memories, shared material interests, delusions of grandeur.”⁹⁶ In any case, though, France was the only country that showed some interest in Rwanda.⁹⁷ As regards the African states, they were divided about which Rwandese party to support, and this made things more complicated.⁹⁸ In Guichaoua’s words, “by action or by omission, having supported the campaign of one or the other belligerent over the previous four years, all major embassies endorsed or applauded the bellicose choices of their respective champion.”⁹⁹ In the same spirit, Straus asserted “Rwanda did not command enough economic or strategic interest to justify the risks of troop deployment.”¹⁰⁰

With the hesitant stance of the western powers, the extremists acted almost undisturbed. Roméo Dallaire described these western hesitations in his memoirs, as follows: “As far as I have been able to determine, on April 24 the NGO Oxfam became the first organisation to use the term ‘genocide’ to describe what was happening in Rwanda. Calling it ‘ethnic cleansing’ just did not seem to be hitting the mark. After numerous telephone conversations with Oxfam personnel in London, we queried New York if what we were seeing in Rwanda could be labelled genocide. As far as I am aware, we never received a response, but we started to use the term sometime after April 24 in all our communications. Little did I realise the storm controversy this term would invoke in New York and the capitals of the world. To me, it seemed an accurate label at last.”¹⁰¹

If the observer adheres to Dallaire’s memoirs, then it becomes easily understood that the Rwanda crisis “is the story of the failure of humanity to heed up a call for help from an endangered people.”¹⁰² The UN and the international community failed to see that the priority was the safety of a small African country and the protection of its people from the chaos of civil war and genocide. Furthermore, the international community refrained from using the appropriate phrasing: the US spokesperson, Christine Shelly, stated on June 10 that there are “acts of genocide” but “*all* murders cannot be put into that category”; also, Boutros

⁹⁵ Paul Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁹⁶ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

⁹⁷ See also, Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁹⁸ Paul Magnarella, *op. cit.*, p. 51, 111.

⁹⁹ André Guichaoua, *op. cit.*, p. 334-335.

¹⁰⁰ Scott Straus, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁰¹ Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

¹⁰² *Ibidem*, p. 516.

Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, remarked on 29 April 1994 that "Hutu were killing Tutsi and Tutsi were killing Hutu."¹⁰³ Similarly, the US and the UK permanent representatives to the UN, Madeleine Albright and Sir David Hannay respectively, objected to the use of the term 'genocide' for some time.¹⁰⁴

Commenting on the use of the term 'genocide,' Kuperman asserts that the first Western organisation that used this term was Human Rights Watch on 19 April, while the Pope also used the term on 27 April. The US Committee for refugees urged the Clinton government to make a declaration about the genocide on 2 May, and two days later, the UN Secretary-General declared the overall situation in Rwanda as a "real genocide."¹⁰⁵ Sarkin and Fowler assert that it was Oxfam that first referred to genocide on 28 April, but the term was used by the RPF to describe the situation on 13 April. As regards the Americans, their Defense Intelligence Agency used the term only on May 9, and the State Department characterised the whole situation as genocide in a resolution of July 13. In the same spirit, the Western media almost ignored Rwanda throughout the crisis.¹⁰⁶

In any case, the international community lacked the necessary alertness and was unable to see the crisis in its real dimensions. They insisted on the presentation of the Rwandan crisis as an ethnic conflict and turned a blind eye to the extinction of a whole group.¹⁰⁷ The consideration of the crisis as a civil war or an ethnic conflict¹⁰⁸, to an extent, served Western interests. As Dallaire asserted in his memoirs, "While most nations seemed to agree that something had to be done, every nation seemed to have a reason why some other nation should do it."¹⁰⁹

No case is the same as another case. However, in post-colonial states with a history of violence, a critical factor for destabilisation was and still is the share or apportionment of power. The existence of minorities frequently leads to turbulences, as political representation in the institutions of certain post-colonial states becomes a critical parameter.¹¹⁰ Although the Arusha Accords were meant to accommodate the needs of the whole population, their overall structure facilitated

¹⁰³ Gérard Prunier, *op. cit.*, p. 274-275.

¹⁰⁴ Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 374.

¹⁰⁵ Alan J. Kuperman, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹⁰⁶ Jeremy Sarkin, Carly Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23, 41.

¹⁰⁷ See also Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

¹⁰⁸ Dylan Lee Lehrke, *The Banality of the Interagency: U. S. Inaction in the Rwanda Genocide*, in Richard Weitz (ed.), *Project on National Security Reform. Case Studies Working Group Report*, Vol. II, March 2012, p. 467.

¹⁰⁹ Roméo Dallaire, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

¹¹⁰ Stef Vandeginste, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

the minority who would enjoy significant gains with the new power-sharing arrangement, as opposed to the majority who would have to make significant concessions. In other words, making concessions became predominantly an obligation of the majority, whereas the minority would have benefited from the concessions of the other party.

The Arusha Accords had been supported and promoted by Western diplomatic circles, who ignored the potential risks. The West failed to see that the establishment of an independent postcolonial state does not rely on the protection of minority rights and western interests (and of course, Rwanda is not a *sui generis* case, as there are other examples of postcolonial states where the majority and minority needed to coexist), nor on the representation of these rights in different institutional bodies. In such instances, psychological preparation is equally important, as to how to convince a majority, with valid and concrete reasons, about the rights of a smaller community. However, caution must be exercised while addressing the actions of extremist groups and how they can be restrained. In any case, the prospect to create and establish a common national identity in Rwanda, based on cultural, political, and other links was undermined by separatist driving forces. This is the “postcolonial syndrome,” and it should be seen as a historical-political phenomenon that occurs in certain parts of the world after the end of colonial rule.

‘Postcolonialism’ has been seen mainly as a literary phenomenon in the literature of Asia and Africa and emerged gradually in countries with a colonial past.¹¹¹ However, one should not neglect that it also denotes the historical period that followed the colonial rule. In other words, ‘postcolonialism’ and ‘decoloniality’ constitute political developments as well.¹¹² Nonetheless, if decolonisation shows the process, postcolonialism shows the outcome of that process. As has been noted, “to speak of colonialism today is really to speak of history”. Even if one argues that colonialism ended, its effects still have a significant impact on the politics, institutions, and governmental structures of certain states.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Raymond F. Betts, *Decolonization. A brief history of the world*, in Els Bogaerts, Remco Raben (Eds.), *Beyond Empire and Nation. The decolonization of African and Asian societies, 1930s-1960s*, Leiden, KITLV Press, 2012, pp. 23-37.

¹¹² Gurminder K. Bhambra, *Postcolonial and Decolonial Dialogues*, in “Postcolonial Studies”, Vol. 17, 2014, No. 2, pp. 115-121.

¹¹³ Mark Brown, *Colonial States, Colonial Rule, Colonial Governmentalities: implications for the study of historical state crime*, in “State Crime Journal”, Vol. 7, 2018, No. 2, pp. 173-198.

Perhaps the Rwandese, Hutu and Tutsi, had other intentions. Nonetheless, with their actions, they undermined the very existence of their state, as the Hutu-Tutsi conflict imposed an almost permanent status of rivalry and competition. Kagame's decision to abolish public talking about ethnicity could be seen as a positive development, but it is considered doubtful whether people have forgotten their Tutsi or Hutu status.¹¹⁴

In Kennedy's words, the states that emerged after the collapse of the empires, the nation-states, were "both the triumph and the tragedy of decolonization."¹¹⁵ Triumph, because decolonization signified an era of oppression, which ended with the independence of several new states; and tragedy, because certain postcolonial states, like Rwanda, had to face a new era of challenges and upheavals between the local groups.

As Licata asserted, colonialism became a "long traumatic relationship," which inevitably had a significant impact on the colonized, the colonizers, and their views about the world. Even after the end of colonialism, the shadow of this relationship lingers and affects people and their political culture. Even though the colonizers left, people's "minds are still colonized nowadays," and there is a situation where the ruled and the rulers remain in a permanent state of rivalry.¹¹⁶ The critical difference here is that the "postcolonial syndrome" suggests a rivalry between compatriots who failed to see themselves as such and adopted the role of their former colonizers.

CONCLUSIONS

Several reasons drove the *génocidaires* and the analysis of their genocidal action should be seen in the light of these circumstances. The analysis shows that although there was a pre-existing rivalry between the two groups, the genocide should be seen in connection with the deepening of this rivalry through the policy of 'divide and rule' – implemented by the Europeans.

¹¹⁴ The Economist, *Rwanda has banned talking about ethnicity*, March 30th, 2019, <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/03/28/rwanda-has-banned-talking-about-ethnicity> [Accessed on 06.02.22]. See also Mahmood Mamdani, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

¹¹⁵ Dane Kennedy, *op. cit.*, p. 69-70.

¹¹⁶ Laurent Licata, *Colonialism and Postcolonialism: psychological dimensions*, in Daniel J. Christie (Ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology*, Malden, Blackwell Publishing, 2012, p. 1-5.

The Germans and the Belgians wanted to secure their presence and interests as colonial powers. Adhering to pseudo-scientific theories, they cultivated and established an untenable political reality with higher and lower castes. Despite the pre-existence of this hierarchical system, in the hands of the Belgians, mainly, it gained a status of 'normality.' When the Belgians later decided that their interests are served better through a 'democratic' turn, then majority rule became the new political reality of the day. However, this was not the end, as oppression remained and what changed was only the roles. This transition was not a smooth transfer of power but took the form of a vehement and vengeful reaction. In cases like this, there are no 'winners' and 'losers,' since the 'loser' is humanity. The genocide of 1994 in Rwanda should be seen in conjunction with the colonial history of the country, but other facts such as the poor financial state of the country, the population density and some political developments in other countries should also be seen as accompanying factors that contributed to destabilisation. Yet, as we have also seen, the genocide took place without substantial involvement by the West and the international community, even though they supported the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The outcome of the crisis shows that the West could not see the potential risks of such an agreement, nor were ready to face the challenges. Securing the rights of a minority is certainly critical to any democratic state, but doing it by causing anxiety to the extremist circles of a majority becomes a dangerous task. Thorough consideration of all parameters and appropriate psychological preparation is a necessity before the implementation of any reforms.

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MIGRATION DIPLOMACY AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL IN TÜRKİYE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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Abstract: *A concept as old as human history, migration has almost always affected and changed social dynamics including but not limited to social, political and economic mechanisms. Indeed, Türkiye has been no exception. Serving as both the source and destination as well as the transit country for various groups of migrants, Türkiye has always been affected and experienced tremendous changes by the impact of migration waves. Indeed, Türkiye has been striving to use the phenomenon of migration as a foreign policy tool in the face of mass migrations in the international system. Accordingly, this study is designed to explore and discuss migration policies, the historical development of migration and the migration policy Türkiye has been implementing in recent times. In that, migration diplomacy is first discussed, followed by an in-depth analysis of Türkiye's migration diplomacy practices using the method of comparative analysis. The main research question is to inquire whether Türkiye has a solid migration diplomacy and, if so, the extent to which it is successful.*

Keywords: *Migration, Migration Diplomacy, Türkiye, Foreign Policy, Soft Power.*

Rezumat: *Diplomația migrației și politica externă a Turciei. Migrația, un concept la fel de vechi precum istoria umanității, a fost un element ce afectează și schimbă societatea în toate domeniile sale, în special social, politic și economic, în aproape fiecare perioadă de timp. În mod firesc, această situație a afectat și Turcia. Politica și practicile de migrație ale Turciei, care a fost o țară sursă, țară de destinație și țară de tranzit pentru imigranți în fiecare perioadă a istoriei, s-au schimbat de-a lungul timpului. Turcia a încercat să folosească migrația ca instrument de politică externă în fața migrațiilor în*

masă din țările componente ale sistemului internațional. În acest studiu sunt analizate ce este politica de imigrație, evoluția sa istorică și politica de imigrație a Turciei. Studiul, bazat preponderent pe metoda comparativă, prezintă și analizează diplomația imigrației și, totodată, pune în evidență practicile Turciei în acest domeniu. Principala interogație a studiului este dacă Turcia are o veritabilă diplomație a imigrației și, dacă răspunsul este pozitiv, cât de reușită este aceasta.

INTRODUCTION

Defined as the displacement of people from one place to another, migration is a concept as old as human history. Security concerns, political unrest, and economic factors stand out among the many causes of migration that have been present in practically every historical age. In this respect, migration affects the source and the destination country as well as the transit routes in many positive and negative ways.¹

Since migration leads to multidimensional impacts, it has been a multidisciplinary field of study and a major instrument used by states in their foreign policies, leading the way for the emergence of migration diplomacy practices in the international system over time.²

Actors in the international system use migration as a diplomatic tool in line with their foreign policy interests and strive to shape the international system, especially in periods when international migration is intense. Besides, states use migration diplomacy as a foreign policy tool to manage and canalize the movement of people across borders. Considered a sub-branch of public diplomacy, in this sense, migration diplomacy is a key issue for states with complex ties and relations with numerous actors in different fields.³

In this context, migration diplomacy aims to explore how global migration movements affect the international system. On the other hand, state interests, geo-political positions, and capacities also affect the migration diplomacy of target, source and transit countries. For example, the US is considered a target

¹ Emre Çıtak, *Migration and Securitization: An Assessment in the Context of Human Security*, in "Journal of Management and Economics Research", 2020, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 2.

² Iver B. Neumann, *Diplomatic Sites. A Critical Enquiry*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 28.

³ Froilan T. Malit, Gerasimos Tsourapas, *Migration diplomacy in the Gulf – non-state actors, cross-border mobility, and the United Arab Emirates*, in "Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies", Vol. 47, 2021, No. 11, p. 2560.

country for migration moves, and it has been applying migration diplomacy to prevent asylum seekers from reaching its southern borders. This was particularly the case during the term of former President Trump when several source countries such as India strove to conduct diplomacy to protect the welfare of their citizens abroad.⁴

In the context of Türkiye, this country is considered a transit country for migration waves. Türkiye has been implementing migration diplomacy based on a humanitarian understanding since the outbreak of the mass migration after the Syrian civil war starting in 2011. Thus, Türkiye has built close relations with the European Union (EU) on this issue, and the EU has promised Türkiye financial aid and visa exemption in the fight against illegal migration. However, the EU has not met these promises made to Türkiye and in turn, Türkiye has started to use migration diplomacy as an instrument to push the EU to fulfil its promises by threatening to open its borders to the outflow of migrant groups in its country to flee to Europe.⁵

Comprising three chapters, this study analyses Türkiye's migration diplomacy and its effects on Turkish Foreign Policy. The first chapter introduces the concept of migration diplomacy with an in-depth definition and its ramifications; the second chapter dwells upon the evolution of Türkiye's migration diplomacy in the context of legal regulations; and finally, the third chapter discusses Türkiye's migration diplomacy practices by a comparative method. The main element of the comparative method used in this research is the nature of politics that varies according to the Turkish diaspora in Europe and the immigrants in Türkiye. Different immigrant groups allow Türkiye to use its migration and public diplomacy in different ways, increasing its overall political manoeuvrability.

MIGRATION DIPLOMACY

Migration, a concept as old as human history, is an important element that significantly influences, changes, and shapes decisions in the international system ranging from education to health, from culture to security. Through multilateral strategies, including the promotion or deterrence of bilateral migration flows,

⁴ Ibrahim İrdem, Yavor Raychev, *Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?*, in "Insight Turkey", Vol. 23, 2021, No. 2, p. 240.

⁵ Ahmet İçduygu, Damla B. Aksel, *Turkish Migration Policies: A Critical Historical Retrospective*, in "Perceptions", Vol. 18, 2013, No. 3, p. 174.

migration has constituted an increasingly important area of states' relations with each other. Its deep impact on many areas has caused many actors to pay more attention to migration. So much so, states have used migration as an important tool in their foreign policies, leading to the emergence of migration diplomacy.⁶

Migration diplomacy includes some intergovernmental agreements that limit or promote migration movements to achieve various goals and develop certain strategies. For example, it can enable the extension of preferential treatment for certain foreign nationals or the use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage cross-border population mobility, such as establishing plans for the immigration of guest workers or other temporary workers.⁷ Besides, migration causes diplomatic interactions between states.⁸ In this sense, the migration diplomacy of states is affected in part by their interests and bargaining positions against other states depending on whether they receive immigrants, send them, or transit to other countries.⁹

Similarly, migration diplomacy is often shaped by the power and interest relationship between states, just like in classical diplomacy. Beyond the military and economic capacity, the geopolitical position of a state also determines the strategy for migration diplomacy. In this sense, migration diplomacy offers a way to understand how global migration flows affect international relations.¹⁰ As reflected in the practices of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), migration diplomacy manifests that states can gain interests or empower their bargaining position against others depending on whether they are a source, destination or transit country. In return, this situation has urged states to engage in diplomacy.¹¹

With the increasing number of migrants across the world, migration has become an important dimension in the diplomatic relations of states as well as

⁶ Carl J. Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate. The United States and Refugees during the Cold War*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 18.

⁷ Fiona B. Adamson, Gerasimos Tsourapas, *Migration Diplomacy in World Politics*, in "International Studies Perspectives", Vol. 20, 2019, p. 115.

⁸ John Torpey, *Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate Means of Movement*, in "Sociological Theory", Vol. 16, 1998, No. 3, p. 242.

⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 21.

¹⁰ Maria Koinova, Gerasimos Tsourapas, *How Do Countries of Origin Engage Migrants and Diasporas? Multiple Actors and Comparative Perspectives*, in "International Political Science Review", Vol. 39, 2018, No. 3, p. 315.

¹¹ Monica Duffy Toft, *The Myth of the Borderless World: Refugees and Repatriation Policy*, in "Conflict Management and Peace Science", Vol. 24, 2007, No. 2, p. 144.

one of the basic elements in foreign policy strategies. In other words, states use diplomatic tools and procedures to manage international migration through migration diplomacy. Regarded as a significant sub-element of a state's public diplomacy, migration diplomacy plays a crucial role in states' bargaining strategies in the international migration process. Through migration diplomacy, some states focus on absolute gains by developing a zero-sum and confrontational strategy against others. In this way, states choose either a relative gain or a positive-sum bargaining strategy.¹²

In the historical context, one can find the first examples of migration diplomacy in the 16th century. More specifically, after the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Empire in 1453, Europe started to seek new ways to control the Silk and Spice Routes as major trade routes coming along with the Geographical Discoveries. Thanks to the discovery of new places and new trade routes, Europe prospered economically with the transportation of precious metals from the newly-discovered lands to Europe, reaching the Renaissance and Reform movements in Europe. Indeed, during this process, European states forcibly displaced those they thought would disrupt the order, especially in political and religious terms.¹³

In this regard, the Industrial Revolution commencing in the 18th century brought about mass production while rapidly increasing migration from the countryside to cities. In that case, European states had to search for new raw materials, markets and labour force. Thus, colonial states enabled people to migrate to Europe to work as slaves from Africa for commercial reasons.¹⁴

With the French Revolution in 1789, nationalism emerged and laid the groundwork for the emergence of nation-states, ending up with the dissolution of multinational empires. After the French Revolution, the opponents fled to the states opposing the revolution and they played an important role in the coalition wars against France. In this period, the border controls of the states were more flexible and travel without passports made migration easier.¹⁵

Another major development that affected migration movements in the

¹² James F. Hollifield, *The Emerging Migration State*, in "International Migration Review", Vol. 38, 2006, No. 3, p. 892.

¹³ Natalie Zemon Davis, *Geneva, Refuge and Migrations (16th-17th Centuries)*. Foreword, in "Revue de l'histoire des religions", Vol. 1, 2015, p. 5-8.

¹⁴ Davut Ateş, *Industrial Revolution: Impetus Behind the Globalization Process*, in "Journal of Management and Economics", Vol. 15, 2008, No. 2, p. 37.

¹⁵ Kirsty Carpenter, *Refugees of the French Revolution: Emigres in London 1789-1802*, New York, Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 25.

world was, as one can easily assume, World War I. The increase in the number of migrants during and after the war turned migration into a security problem. Furthermore, the conflicts exacerbated this problem all around the world. Besides, the civil war in Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 accelerated migration to Europe, leading to a significant refugee crisis. Western states accepted people fleeing Russia into their own countries and used them as an important propaganda tool, especially during the Cold War.¹⁶

Indeed, during and after World War I, about 1.5 million people emigrated, and most remained stateless and without legal status. At the end of the war, the League of Nations (LN) was consulted to solve this problem. The LN considered those people as a group that faced persecution and was deprived of state protection.¹⁷ In addition, the world acknowledged refugees' lack of identifying documents thanks to the effort of Fridtjof Nansen, the first High Commissioner for Refugees of the LN. As a result, the Nansen Passport was presented to eliminate this deficiency. This document was the first legal document to ensure the protection of refugees in the international area.¹⁸ However, Adolf Hitler's coming to power in Germany in 1933 and his policies against Jews proved that the LN had failed in its policies. As a consequence, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was then established to deal more closely with refugees. However, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 led to the LN being questioned again.¹⁹ With the outbreak of World War II triggered by the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union and Germany in 1939, approximately 85 million people were forced to emigrate from their countries. As the number of immigrants increased, this issue was taken more seriously by states.²⁰

After World War II, the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was expanded. Besides, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administra-

¹⁶ Delia Rahmonova-Schwarz, *Migrations during the Soviet Period and in the Early Years of USSR's Dissolution: A Focus on Central Asia*, in "Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales", Vol. 26, 2010, No. 3, p. 15.

¹⁷ Christoph Rass, Ismee Tames, *Negotiating the Aftermath of Forced Migration: A View from the Intersection of War and Migration Studies in the Digital Age*, in "Historical Social Research", Vol. 45, 2020, No. 4, p. 10.

¹⁸ Otto Hieronymi, *The Nansen Passport: A Tool of Freedom of Movement and of Protection*, in "Refugee Survey Quarterly", Vol. 22, 2003, No. 1, p. 38.

¹⁹ G. Bruce Strang, *The Worst of all Worlds: Oil Sanctions and Italy's Invasion of Abyssinia 1935-1936*, in "Diplomacy and Statecraft", Vol. 19, 2008, No. 2, p. 217.

²⁰ Dudley Kirk, Earl Huyck, *Overseas Migration from Europe Since World War II*, in "American Sociological Review", Vol. 19, 1954, No. 4, p. 450.

tion operating within the body of the United Nations (UN) transferred its duties and authorities to this Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. Furthermore, the International Refugee Organization was established within the UN in 1947 after recognizing that organizations founded to solve migrant issues had continuously failed.²¹ Nevertheless, when the organization achieved no positive results about the refugee issue that had emerged after the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, many started to question the organization, causing it to lose credibility.²² In 1950, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was established and granted many diplomatic powers related to refugees. Thus, the organization managed to establish close diplomatic relations with numerous actors in the international system.²³

Looking at recent times, it can be observed that migration has become an important tool in interstate relations and foreign policies of states. The increasing number of migrants around the world has caused countries to generate nationalist policies, as state borders have increasingly become more important. Hence, migration diplomacy has found more use in states' foreign policies for economic and political reasons as well as for security, aiming to enhance soft power and establish and strengthen historical ties.²⁴

From this point of view, an important component used in the practice of migration diplomacy is the diaspora.²⁵ Diaspora enables diplomatic negotiations for a source state while also increasing communication with the target state. Migrants coming to the target country form lobbies and influence domestic and foreign policy in that target country. In addition, the source country uses migration diplomacy to get soft power through migrants travelling to the target country, and many source countries are often observed to use this element quite actively.²⁶ For instance, the Armenian Diaspora has significantly been influencing

²¹ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *United Nations, and Refugee Problem*, in "Pakistan Horizon", Vol. 38, 1985, No. 1, p. 50.

²² James L. Carlin, *Significant Refugee Crises Since World War II and the Response of the International Community*, in "Michigan Journal of International Law", Vol. 3, 1982, No. 1, p. 12.

²³ International Organization for Migration, *Glossary on Migration*, Geneva, International Organization for Migration, 2019, p. 57.

²⁴ Helene Yhiollet, *Migration as Diplomacy: Labor, Migrants, Refugees and Arab Regional Politics in the Oil-Rich Countries*, in "International Labor and Working Class History", Vol. 79, 2011, No. 1, p. 113.

²⁵ Charles King, Neil J. Melvin, *Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia*, in "International Security", Vol. 24, 2000, No. 3, p. 114.

²⁶ Lena Laube, *The Relational Dimension of Externalizing Border Control: Selective Visa*

the domestic and foreign policies of the states where they migrated after the 1915 incidents. They are particularly observed to have been affecting Turkish Foreign Policy, and the relations between Türkiye and Armenia. Target countries, on the other hand, also tend to use the diaspora in an attempt to increase their soft power. In other words, they endeavour to make any source country dependent on them in economic, social, political and cultural terms, while working to make sure that the source country adopts similar systems to theirs.²⁷

In this context, migration has turned into a major component in interstate relations as countries cooperate in many fields including war, peace, economy, trade, culture, environment, and human rights. On the other hand, the concepts of migration and migration diplomacy still have not received the attention they deserve in the discipline although it is believed that migration diplomacy will be better understood in the future.²⁸

TÜRKİYE'S MIGRATION POLICIES

As defined in previous chapters, migration is the movement of individuals or communities from one place to another to attain better living conditions than their current place of residence, where they live under poor living conditions due to several reasons such as civil war or armed conflicts. The interstate and inter-communal effects of migration are quite extensive and complex. Immigrant individuals or societies enter a new living environment with different political, economic and social dynamics, posing several challenges. Perhaps the most important element in resolving their issues is to address the living conditions of both migrant and host groups. The policies pursued by these states when dealing with migration are essential in this case.

Throughout history, migrations have taken place either voluntarily or compulsorily, and they have been characterized as temporary or permanent in terms of their duration. The forces driving voluntary and forced migration are not the same. It is more difficult for immigrant groups to adapt to economic and social life after they migrate naturally due to compulsory if they relocate for causes other than choice, such as war or natural disasters. In this context, it can

Policies in Migration and Border Diplomacy, in "Comparative Migration Studies", Vol. 7, 2019, No. 29, p. 7.

²⁷ Bahar Senem Çevik Ersaydı, *The Armenian Diaspora and the Need for the Other*, in "Gazi Academic View", Vol. 5, 2011, No. 9, p. 99.

²⁸ Jan Lidak, Radoslaw Stefancik, *Migration Diplomacy as a Foreign Policy Instrument*, in "Modern History", Vol. 25, 2022, No. 2, p. 140.

be assumed that the policies to be followed against forced migration should be more integrated than policies against voluntary migrations.

As such, due to the incrementing migration movements in the world, countries receiving immigrants have been facing the growing need to develop a flexible and sustainable migration policy.²⁹ Therefore, countries such as the US, Australia, and Canada that have traditionally been hosting many immigrants have adopted policies for regular immigration. Indeed, it can be stated that these countries owe their economic development to the manpower coming with this human mobility.³⁰ In the EU member states, however, the approach towards the acceptance of regular immigration, which lasted for half a century due to the demand for labour, changed after the 9/11 attacks. After this date, the policies that externalized migration towards the EU increased, and the EU desired to move outside the European borders through readmission agreements for the control of migrations.³¹

As in the rest of the world, discussions on international migration and migration diplomacy have increased in Türkiye, as well. For Türkiye, this increase is related to the political and economic instability of the states in the Middle East and the Islamic World in general, the mass migration movements starting with the civil war in Syria, and the effects of this situation on relations with third parties.³²

In this regard, the focus of this study is the voluntary migration of Turks in Europe and the irregular migrations that Türkiye is exposed to as a destination country. In addition, the research investigates how Türkiye evaluates its current migration diplomacy rather than whether the nature of migration is regular or irregular.

In this context, the geographical location of Türkiye can be seen as the main reason for being a destination country for migration movements. The most often used migration route to Europe is the Eastern route, where Türkiye is lo-

²⁹ Hasan Canpolat, Hakkı Onur Ariner, *Küresel Göç ve Avrupa Birliği ile Türkiye'nin Göç Politikalarının Gelişimi* [Global Migration and Development of Migration Policies of Turkey and European Union], in "ORSAM Report No: 123", Ankara, ORSAM Publishing, 2012, p. 9, https://www.orsam.org.tr//d_hbanaliz/Analiz_123_tr.pdf (Accessed on 22.09.2022)

³⁰ Ali Zafer Sarioğlu, *Türkiye'nin Merkezi Göç Yönetimi* [Turkey's Central Migration Management], in Adem Esen, Mehmet Duman (Eds.), *Türkiye'de Geçici Koruma Altındaki Suriyeliler: Tespitler ve Öneriler* [Syrians Under Temporary Protection in Turkey: Findings and Recommendations], İstanbul, Aryan Publishing, 2016, p. 45.

³¹ Hasan Canpolat, Hakkı Onur Ariner, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

³² Kaan Akman, *Local Governments and NGO Cooperation in Migration Management*, in "International Journal of Management Academy", Vol. 1, 2018, No. 3, pp. 452-466.

cated, compared to the other two, the Western and Central routes. Yet, the number of irregular arrivals using this route has been greatly reduced thanks to cooperation between Türkiye and the EU. The implementation of the EU-Türkiye statement of March 2016 played a key role in reducing irregular arrivals from Türkiye to Europe. However, this led the immigrants, who had weakened hopes of reaching Europe, to regard Türkiye as their destination country.³³ This is also supported by the fact that Türkiye offers similar religious, political, cultural and historical practices to the neighbouring countries. After 1980, on the other hand, Türkiye faced large waves of immigration due to the political and social crises in the Soviet Union, Iran, and Iraq in addition to the illegal and individual attempts of others from Africa and Asia to reach Europe via Türkiye.³⁴

Therefore, historical developments have led Türkiye to accelerate its migration policies to facilitate the process of managing irregular and regular migrations. Türkiye has made many legal and administrative arrangements to meet the needs over time. In this sense, a great many factors contribute to the shaping of Türkiye's international migration policies. First and foremost, is the need to implement regulations to allow migrants to adapt to host communities. Individuals' ideologies, cultural values, and economic circumstances are all taken into account while creating these policies. Another important issue is developing relations with third parties such as the European Union regarding immigration.³⁵

In this context, the first general regulation regarding migration policies in Türkiye was the Settlement Law in 1934, where the concept of immigrants was defined as "people of Turkish descent and culture" according to the needs of the newly established nation-state. Due to the increase in the number of individual and mass asylum seekers in the early 90s, especially those coming from Iraq to Türkiye, another regulation on asylum seekers was adopted in 1994.³⁶

³³ European Council, *Migration flows in the Eastern Mediterranean route*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/eastern-mediterranean-route> (Accessed on 03.10.2022).

³⁴ Yılmaz Demirhan, Seyfettin Aslan, *Türkiye'nin Sınır Ötesi Göç Politikaları ve Yönetimi* [Trans-Border Migration Policies and Administration of Turkey], in "Birey ve Toplum Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi", Vol. 5, 2015, No. 9, p. 34-35.

³⁵ Erhan Örselli, Veysel Babahanoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Göç Yönetimi ve Göç Politikalarının Gelişimi: Bir Kamu Politikası Analizi* [Turkey's Migration Management and Development of Migration Policies: A Public Policy Analysis], in "The Journal of International Social Research", Vol. 9, 2016, No.43, p. 2065.

³⁶ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, *Türkiye'ye İltica Eden veya Başka Bir Ülkeye İltica Etmek Üzere Türkiye'den İkamet İzni Talep Eden Münferit Yabancılar ile Topluca*

Although Türkiye has adopted a refugee law based on the 1951 Geneva Convention, the notions of refugees and asylum seekers are defined geographically. According to this law, Türkiye grants refugee status only to citizens of Council of Europe member states. In the Asylum and Asylum Regulation that came into force in 1994, the definition of a refugee was also determined with the said limitation. According to this regulation, asylum seekers from countries that are not members of the Council of Europe can only be granted “temporary protection” by allowing them to “stay in Türkiye for a reasonable period”.³⁷

In other words, immigrants coming from outside Europe cannot obtain refugee status, while migration mostly flows to Türkiye from non-European countries. The masses coming from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria cannot obtain refugee status due to the geographical limitation that Türkiye put into force in the 1951 Geneva Convention.³⁸ Unless Türkiye removes the geographical restriction, these persons under temporary protection cannot receive refugee status.

The logic of temporary protection is based on granting temporary residence permits to asylum seekers on the assumption that they will return to their country after a safe environment has been established.³⁹ However, it is observed that although some countries consider migration as a short-term phenomenon, asylum seekers in such countries are seen to have brought their families to these countries where they have been living for a long time. Moreover, they set up businesses by investing in the target country. Naturally, their second and third generations are born in that country of immigration. Thus, such countries have

Siğınma Amacıyla Sınırlarımıza Gelen Yabancılar ve Olabilecek Nüfus Hareketlerine Uygulanacak Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelik, 14th September 1994, at <https://www.multeci.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/1994-Yonetmeligi.pdf> (Accessed on 04.09.2022).

³⁷ Yücel Acer, İbrahim Kaya, Mahir Gümüő, *Türkiye İçin Yeni Bir İltica Stratejisi Üzerine Gözlemler* [Observations on a New Asylum Strategy for Turkey], in Özlen Çelebi, Saime Özçürümez, Şirin Türkay (Eds.), *İltica, Uluslararası Göç ve Vatansızlık: Kuram, Gözlem ve Politika* [Asylum, International Migration and Statelessness: Theory, Observation and Policy], Ankara, UNHCR Publication, 2011, p. 49.

³⁸ Münevver Kır, *A Reconsideration of Turkey's Geographical Limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention*, (Unpublished Master's Thesis), Hacettepe University, Ankara, 2017, <http://www.openaccess.hacettepe.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11655/3836/10153841.pdf> (Accessed on 28.09.2022).

³⁹ Khalid Koser, Martha Walsh, Richard Black, *Temporary Protection and the Assisted Return of Refugees from the EU*, in “International Journal of Refugee Law”, Vol. 10, 1998, No. 3, pp. 444-461.

had to enact laws aimed at the integration of immigrants into society, as they have become permanent in the target country.⁴⁰

Another issue that adds dynamism to Türkiye's migration policies is the change and development of policies within the framework of the European Union membership negotiations. In this context, circulars pertaining to the negotiations state that asylum seekers are under "temporary protection".⁴¹ Within the scope of this legal status, the people in question are allowed to enter and leave the borders; all their humanitarian needs are met, and their security is ensured. The legal basis of Temporary Protection is defined in Article 91 of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which was adopted on April 4, 2013, and entered into force in April 2014. For a more detailed regulation and convenience in implementation, a new regulation on temporary protection was published on October 22, 2014, by expanding the former regulation. Under article 91 of the aforementioned law, it was announced in July 2016 that Syrians would be allowed to become citizens of the Republic of Türkiye as a vital step in the integration process.⁴²

TÜRKİYE'S MIGRATION DIPLOMACY AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY APPROACH IN THE CONTEXT OF RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

Migration processes can become a part of diplomatic relations over time and turn into migration diplomacy — a process characterized by the use of migration flows as a strategic tool to achieve diplomatic purposes, regardless of the migration policy adopted by a given country. The framework of migration diplomacy is shaped by states' negotiation for solutions to common problems. States tend to cooperate in this process for mutually beneficial arrangements; they seek to manipulate unwanted migration flows or use their influence on the diaspora to gain political or economic benefits.⁴³

⁴⁰ Rinus Penninx, *Integration of Migrants: Economic, Social, Cultural and Political Dimensions*, in Miroslav Macura, Alphonse L. MacDonald, Werner Haug (Eds.), *The New Demographic Regime: Population Challenges and Policy Responses*, Geneva: United Nations Publication, 2005: pp. 137-152.

⁴¹ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, *Turkey: Temporary Protection Regulation*, 22nd October 2014, at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/56572fd74.html> (Accessed on 03.09.2022).

⁴² Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, *Law on Foreigners and International Protection No. 6458*, 4th April 2013, at <https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.5.6458.pdf> (Accessed on 04.09.2022).

⁴³ Kelly M. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration. Forced Displacement, Coercion and For-*

In light of these assumptions, two dominant mechanisms stand out in Türkiye-EU relations. The first is the asymmetric conditionality operating from the top down, based on Türkiye's fulfilment of the criteria imposed by the EU for long-term full membership. This mechanism has gradually lost its function over time. The second is the bargaining-based migration diplomacy to gain an advantage in a specific issue. This is the mechanism with high functionality in the current situation, and the EU is open to short-term concessions in the face of the migration diplomacy pursued by Türkiye.

Indeed, the current Türkiye-EU relations are a perfect example of the use of migration diplomacy in international relations. In this regard, Türkiye's relations with the EU have developed within the context of an internal and external identity dilemma. In this respect, Türkiye's EU harmonization efforts have evolved from the perspective of full membership to an international bargain involving migration diplomacy. In other words, Türkiye no longer bases its relations with the EU on the goal of full membership, but on gaining advantages through its migration diplomacy. The negotiation process of the readmission agreement between the EU and Türkiye is the most concrete example proving that Türkiye is striving to gain an advantage in bilateral relations through its migration diplomacy.⁴⁴

In this regard, the first migration diplomacy that Türkiye pursued against the EU was shaped in a form commonly referred to as visa diplomacy, which linked visa regulations to political or economic gains.⁴⁵ Similarly, Türkiye successfully used and continues to use its migration diplomacy to particularly gain concessions from the EU on visa liberalization and the revitalization of accession negotiations in general, using periodic and contextual changes to its advantage. The EU, on the other hand, has to strive to limit the issues with short-term consequences in its policies on migration governance to temporary concessions.

Therefore, Türkiye started to negotiate visa liberalization for Turkish citizens through migration diplomacy after 2010, instead of continuing to take steps for full EU membership, ending up signing the readmission agreement. During

eign Policy, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2010; Gerasimos Tsourapas, *Migration Diplomacy in the Global South: Cooperation, Coercion and Issue Linkage in Gaddafi's Libya*, in "Third World Quarterly", Vol. 38, 2017, No. 10, pp. 2367-2385.

⁴⁴ Ahmet İçduygu, Damla B. Aksel, *Two-to-Tango in Migration Diplomacy: Negotiating Readmission Agreement between the EU and Turkey*, in "European Journal of Migration and Law", Vol. 16, 2014, No. 3, pp. 337-363.

⁴⁵ Meral Açıkgöz, *Turkey's Visa Policy: A Migration-Mobility Nexus*, in "Turkish Policy Quarterly", Vol. 14, 2015, No. 2, pp. 97-107.

those years, Türkiye applied its migration diplomacy in a cooperative rather than coercive manner against the other party. In 2012, the migration mobility that emerged as a result of the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria strengthened Türkiye's position in migration diplomacy towards the EU and made it convenient to adopt compelling migration diplomacy. Hence, Türkiye reached an agreement in principle for visa liberalization for Turkish citizens to pass the EU borders in response to signing the readmission agreement after a long negotiation process.

Türkiye fulfilled the requirements of this readmission agreement, which reduced the number of migrants using the Balkan route. Schengen visa for Turkish citizens was expected to be lifted by the end of June 2016. However, the EU did not fulfil its obligations arising from the agreement and did not eliminate the Schengen visa for Turkish citizens. Nevertheless, the fact that Türkiye is still fulfilling the requirements of the agreement increases its prestige in international relations. For the EU, the possibility of Türkiye's unilateral withdrawal from the agreement is worrying and is a factor that weakens the EU's position in this context.

On the one hand, Türkiye shapes the regulations in migration policies according to its needs, on the other hand, the country complies with the decisions made in the negotiations using migration diplomacy in foreign policy, thus increasing its prestige in the international arena as an actor that fulfils its responsibilities. By continuing to maintain relations with the EU, which is the party that does not fulfil its responsibilities arising from the negotiations, Türkiye also reinforces the prestige it has gained in the normative sense. On the other hand, the EU did not fulfil the following commitments: to provide visa exemption to Turkish citizens on their travels to the Schengen area after 2016, to increase the aid for Syrians under temporary protection in Türkiye to 3 billion Euros, to open new chapters in the accession negotiations and to invite Türkiye to the EU Summits as in the past.⁴⁶

Nevertheless, the results of the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War forced the EU to cooperate with Türkiye, and naturally, migration diplomacy became the determining factor in the political relations between Türkiye and the EU. The parties succeeded in replacing the long-term goal of full membership with shorter-term goals, especially visa liberalization. In this sense, migration diplomacy towards the EU has signalled that it is a highly flexible diplomacy method to meet Türkiye's political needs and gain advantages.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy*, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/questions.en.mfa> (Accessed on 20.10.2022).

⁴⁷ Birce Demiryontar, *Accession Conditionality, and Migration Diplomacy: Turkey's Dual*

Notwithstanding that, the increasing securitization of the migration issue threatens the future of the Schengen Agreement and raises the possibility that EU member states will move away from democracy by strengthening populist right-wing parties in Europe. This situation consolidates the position of non-EU neighbours in diplomatic terms. Evaluating the relations with Türkiye in this context, it is possible to say that possible future negotiations concerning migration diplomacy on particular issues — not asymmetrically but based on the principle of conditionality – will gain force and become a norm in Türkiye-EU relations.⁴⁸

In this respect, the transition from migration policies to migration diplomacy and the process of Türkiye's becoming a target country for immigration are directly related to each other and these developments intersect in time. Türkiye's reputation as a target country for immigration, which became particularly evident after the migration movements arising from the Syrian Civil War, made it necessary to develop a general and valid policy on the issue of migration. For this reason, policymakers in Türkiye have used migration diplomacy as a tool of national interest and soft power, which they are convinced will benefit the country's economic and political interests beyond migration policy.⁴⁹

For Türkiye, another application area of migration diplomacy other than relations with the EU occurred with the beginning of using diasporas as a tool, as well. Indeed, as active participants in domestic politics, diasporas can affect the foreign policy of the country they are in, as well as the transnational representatives of the policies developed in their homeland.

After the great migration in the 1960s, the total population of Turks living abroad now exceeds 6.5 million, of which about 5.5 million live in Western Europe.⁵⁰ These migration movements have led to the establishment of a permanent Turkish diaspora in Europe, while the political activity of the Turkish diaspora in Europe has always been a sensitive issue. Relations between many European Union member states and Türkiye have deteriorated significantly in recent

Identity in Migration Policy Negotiations with the EU, in "European Politics and Society", Vol. 22, 2021, No. 1, pp. 88-103.

⁴⁸ Şebnem Köşer Akçapar, *International Migration, and Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century*, in "Perceptions", Vol. 22, 2017, No. 4, p. 1-34.

⁴⁹ Ahmet İçduygu, *Turkey's Migration Transition and Its Implications for the Euro-Turkish Transnational Space*, in Meltem Müftüler Baç, Senem Aydın Duzgit, Daniela Huber et al. (Eds.), *Global Turkey in Europe II: Energy, Migration, Civil Society and Citizenship Issues in Turkey-EU Relations*, Rome, Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2014, pp. 81-106.

⁵⁰ Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Turkish Citizens Living Abroad*, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-expatriate-turkish-citizens.en.mfa> (Accessed on 18.10.2022).

years. Türkiye's mobilization of Turks in Europe in recent years has significantly increased interest in the Turkish diaspora and its interactions with European society and politics. Large parts of the Eurocentric Turkish diaspora continue to define themselves primarily as Turks, not as full members of the societies they live in. This situation has caused the Turkish diaspora to be carefully followed in the countries where they reside since Türkiye has recently made these groups a tool of migration diplomacy.⁵¹

Migration diplomacy in the context of using the diaspora as a tool was tested by preventing the election campaign activities of politicians from the Turkish government in Europe before the referendum held in Türkiye in April 2017. The referendum in question coincided with the Dutch general elections. The Turkish authorities' attempts to hold a political meeting in the Netherlands were blocked, the landing of the Turkish Foreign Minister's plane was cancelled, and the Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policies was forcibly deported. In the face of this situation, the Turkish diaspora in the Netherlands took a stand in an attempt to affect the domestic politics in this country and set an example for the kind of migration diplomacy that Türkiye has created through the diasporas. Similar problems were experienced in Germany and Austria on the same issue, and the crisis experienced as a result of Türkiye's harsh reaction to the attitude of those countries brought the bilateral relations to the point of deterioration.⁵²

In this line, since the Turkish diaspora in Europe has inseparable ties with Türkiye and impacts the domestic politics of the country they reside in, their destination countries see them as a problem today, as it was in the past. Considering that Türkiye's relations with some groups such as Christian Democrats and far-right groups in some EU member states such as Germany and Austria have reached the lowest point in history due to its migration diplomacy practised through the diaspora, it can be argued that the use of diaspora as a migration diplomacy tool may potentially lead to tension or cooperation in the diplomatic relations.⁵³

⁵¹ Max Hoffman, Alan Makovsky, Michael Werz, *The Turkish Diaspora in Europe*, Center for American Progress, December 2020, <https://feps-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/turkishdiaspora-report-final.pdf> (Accessed on 18.10.2022).

⁵² BBC, *Turkey referendum: Erdogan rallies not welcome in Austria*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39105683>, 27th February 2017; BBC, *Turkey rallies row: Germany and the Netherlands harden stance*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39251216>, 12th March 2017; BBC, *Turkey 'detached from reality' - EU's Donald Tusk*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39278131>, 15th March 2017 (Accessed on 04.09.2022).

⁵³ Roger Putnam, *Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games*, in "In-

Defined as a functional tool for the solution of diplomatic problems and as government activities to inform and influence foreign peoples, the concept of public diplomacy is closely related to the concept of soft power, and Türkiye places history, culture, and humanitarian aid at the centre of its soft power. Türkiye's perception of soft power is shaped by religious sentiments in the Middle East and the Balkans, and by nationalist sentiments in European countries where the Turkish diaspora is densely populated. In this regard, along with the current developments in international relations, soft power should also be taken into account in terms of migration diplomacy. The phenomenon of migration is an issue that has the effect of transcending countries and societies. Improving immigrant relations is accepted as a global responsibility and a prerequisite of relations between countries and societies. In this context, it is possible to evaluate migration diplomacy from the perspective of public diplomacy.⁵⁴

On the other hand, public diplomacy, which can be defined as the communication of countries with foreign peoples, is also an integral part of international relations. Considering the issue of Syrians in Türkiye only as a national and international policy issue would mean ignoring the perspective of public diplomacy. Türkiye provides extensive humanitarian aid and hosts a vast number of immigrants, and this can be counted as a concrete example of the competent use of public diplomacy. The friendship established and the positive perceptions created with foreign peoples offer new opportunities as a facilitating factor for Türkiye to realize its foreign policy goals and to increase its international effectiveness.

In this sense, Türkiye's activities to help immigrants, build communication with these people and reflect this communication to the public constitute Türkiye's migration diplomacy. Indeed, immigrants, who are the most important actors in migration diplomacy, create new opportunities for public diplomacy policies with Türkiye's close circle, although they create some problems for Türkiye as in every country. Türkiye takes genuine attempts to establish good relations with these people and help them increase the country's prestige in the eyes of the international community, as well.

Generally accepted as one of the new aspects of classical diplomacy, public diplomacy and migration diplomacy require tackling different dimensions of

ternational Organization", Vol. 42, 1988, No. 3, pp. 427-460.

⁵⁴ Joseph Nye, *Yumuşak Güç* [Soft Power], İstanbul, Elips Kitap, 2005, p. 8.; Abdülkadir Varoğlu, *Kamu Diplomasisinde Kavramsal ve Kuramsal Süreç* [Conceptual and Theoretical Process in Public Diplomacy], in Ahmet Yalçınkaya Yeşim Özgen (Eds.), *Kamu Diplomasisi* [Public Diplomacy], İstanbul, Bahçeşehir University Publishing, 2013, p. 1.; Sait Yılmaz, *Akıllı Güç* [Smart Power], İstanbul, Kum Saati Publishing, 2012, p. 222.

international relations ranging from cultural, social, and economic fields. This also entails understanding the impact of public behaviours on the formation and execution of foreign policies.⁵⁵ Migration diplomacy, as a sub-branch of public diplomacy, is associated with the field of international relations outside of traditional diplomacy as it includes influencing the opinions of the public of other countries, and developing relations with similar private groups like diasporas and civil societies in foreign countries. Migration diplomacy also covers the inclusion of these groups in the foreign policy-making process, and cultural interactions between communities.⁵⁶

In the context of public diplomacy, immigrants and diasporas indicate the interpersonal and intercultural communication side of migration diplomacy. In addition, they constitute the cultural transfer between different nations.⁵⁷ Population movements lead to the formation of new communication and relationship channels between societies as well. In this sense, migrant masses have played an important representative role in international and intercultural communication throughout the history of humanity. As a result, states have found themselves obliged to develop various forms of relations with groups that have migrated to their countries or from their homeland to other countries.

Following the refugee crisis caused by the Syrian Civil War, Turkey has also attempted to control its political and cultural communication impulses. The masses coming from Syria are continuing to establish real-time interactions and developing relations with the Turkish people and representatives of public institutions and organizations on different platforms in many cities of Türkiye. These relations mediate the transfer of culture and value between the two societies, and the formation of perceptions.⁵⁸

While the necessity of forming policies against migration movements expresses a responsibility for countries in terms of international law, it is also a

⁵⁵ Vedat Demir, *Kamu Diplomasisi ve Yumuşak Güç* [Public Diplomacy and Soft Power], İstanbul, Beta Publishing, 2012, p. 6.

⁵⁶ Gyorgy Szondi, *Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences*, in "Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'", October 2008, p. 2.

⁵⁷ Nicholas J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase*, in Nancy Snow, Philip M. Taylor (Eds.), *Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, New York, Routledge, 2008, p. 19-24.

⁵⁸ Seong-Hun Yun, Elizabeth L. Toth, *Future Sociological Public Diplomacy and the Role of Public Relations: Evolution of Public Diplomacy*, in "American Behavioral Scientist", Vol. 53, 2009, No. 4, p. 500.

requirement of humanitarian and social sensitivity in the context of public diplomacy. Especially recently, Türkiye has been following a sincere and stable roadmap in fulfilling the requirements of this responsibility. By leading the preparation and coordination of public diplomacy strategies in general and migration diplomacy in particular, state institutions have enabled Türkiye to increase its prestige and negotiation power in the international community.

CONCLUSIONS

In recent years, states have been using migration diplomacy as a foreign policy-making process. While migration movements oblige countries to establish a permanent and flexible migration policy, these movements also encourage them to use migration diplomacy both to gain bargaining power in foreign policy processes and to include immigrant groups in these processes when evaluated from the perspective of public diplomacy.

Throughout history, Türkiye has succeeded in developing a migration diplomacy framework that transcends migration policies related to migration movements. It can be said that this development is closely related to Türkiye's becoming a destination country for migrant waves. Türkiye has internalized this new image and is currently using it to gain national interest and increase its soft power in foreign policy.

Relations with the EU, diasporas in EU member states, and immigrants from Syria are the three most important areas in which Türkiye employs migration diplomacy in foreign policy. In this context, it can be argued that Türkiye uses migration diplomacy effectively against both the West and its inner circle.

Migration diplomacy in Türkiye-EU relations works in favour of Türkiye, which seeks to gain national interest through negotiations over short-term problems. Therefore, Türkiye saved itself from the asymmetric relationship with the EU for full membership. In other words, Türkiye is no longer accepting the imposition to fulfil the requirements of full membership, while it has strengthened its position against the EU. In addition, while the EU does not fulfil its promises towards Türkiye, the fact that Türkiye fulfils its responsibilities arising from negotiations strengthens the international community's view on the issue in favour of Türkiye.

Türkiye's use of migration diplomacy against EU member states has become evident in countries where the Turkish diaspora is concentrated. The inclusion of diasporas in the domestic and foreign policy processes of both Türkiye and the countries they live in has shown that such migration diplomacy in interstate relations has great potential in terms of cooperation or conflict in bilateral

relations. In the case of Türkiye, it strengthens its ties with Turks living abroad by effectively using its public diplomacy skills. It is possible to indicate that examples of migration diplomacy in this sense will be encountered soon in European countries where the diaspora is dense.

Immigrants from Syria have contributed to transforming Türkiye's migration policies and achieving a consistent perception of migration diplomacy. It is possible for those coming from Syria to be the subject of migration diplomacy in two ways: the first is to benefit from them in bargains with the EU. The second is in the context of migration diplomacy, which is implemented from the perspective of public diplomacy or to develop Türkiye's relations with its neighbouring countries with whom it has historical ties. Türkiye manages both effectively.

In summary, all these developments reveal that Türkiye has succeeded in creating new opportunities in foreign policy by starting to use migration diplomacy as a tool. The bargaining power in the negotiations with the West has gained momentum in favour of Türkiye. Besides, Türkiye has intensified its relations with the diasporas and the neighbouring countries with historical ties, contributing to the increased soft power of Türkiye in international relations.

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BETWEEN DUTY AND PASSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF A CONTROVERSIAL KING'S POLICY IN A CONTROVERSIAL COUNTRY ¹

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Abstract: *Michael I, the last king of Romania (July 20, 1927 - June 8, 1930; September 6, 1940 - December 30, 1946), went into exile on December 30, 1947, and Romania came under a communist regime. Consequently, until 1989, Romanian historiography uncritically portrayed the Hohenzollern Sigmaringen monarchy, which had ruled Romania between 1866 and 1947, exaggerating its defects and failures and utterly disputing any kind of merits. Furthermore, state censorship prevented interwar publications about the lives of Romanian monarchs, their written memoirs or those of politicians of that time.*

Following 1989, the role of the Romanian monarchy was critically reassessed, gradually attempting to provide an unbiased appraisal of this institution. Censorship was lifted, allowing access to archives and the publication of memoirs by Kings Carol I, Carol II, Michael I, Queen Marie and Prince Nicholas, and numerous Romanian political leaders responsible for the country's fate in the first half of the twentieth century.

After the romantic era when these memoirs were regarded as "forbidden fruits" until 1989, apparently revealing only true events, a critical reconsideration of the monarchy's role in Romania, particularly of the controversial King Carol II, followed. The five volumes of the major work under consideration represent the "peak" of the recent critical reassessment of King Charles II's position and contribution to the history of Romanians and, to a limited extent, to the history of South Eastern Europe.

Keywords: *Charles II, monarchy, Romania, internal policy, foreign policy, private life*

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¹ Review on Narcis Dorin Ion, *Carol al II-lea al României. Un rege controversat* [Carol II of Romania. A Controversial King], vol. 1-5, Onești, Magic Print Publishing House, 2020 (vol. 1-4) and 2021 (vol. 5), 315 + 511 + 303 + 431 + 573 pages.

Rezumat: Între datorie și pasiune: implicațiile politicii unui rege controversat într-o țară controversată. La 30 decembrie 1947, ultimul rege al României, Mihai I (20 iulie 1927 – 8 iunie 1930; 6 septembrie 1940-30 decembrie 1946), pleca în exil iar în România se instaura regimul comunist. În consecință, până în 1989 istoriografia română a prezentat în mod necritic instituția monarhiei de Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, care condusesse România în perioada 1866-1947, hiperbolizându-i defectele și scăderile și contestându-i, aproape în întregime, orice fel de merit. În plus, scrierile din perioada interbelică care prezentau viețile monarhilor români, memoriile scrise ale acestora sau ale oamenilor politici au fost interzise publicului de către cenzură.

După 1989, rolul monarhiei în România a fost reevaluat critic, încercându-se treptat o analiză obiectivă a acestei instituții. Acest fapt a fost ajutat și de către desființarea cenzurii, fapt ce a permis deschiderea arhivelor și tipărirea memoriilor regilor Carol I, Carol II și Mihai I, ale reginei Maria și principelui Nicolae, ca și a numeroșilor oameni politici români, responsabili de destinele țării în prima jumătate a secolului XX.

După faza romantică, de considerare a acestor memorii drept un „fruct oprit” până în 1989, ce ar fi prezentat numai fapte adevărate, a urmat faza de reconsiderare critică a rolului monarhiei în România, în special a controversatului rege Carol al II-lea. Cele 5 volume ale amplei lucrări supuse recenziei reprezintă până în prezent „vârful” reconsiderării critice a locului și rolului regelui Carol al II-lea în istoria românilor și, parțial, în istoria sud-estului Europei.

Narcis Dorin Ion, general manager of the Peles National Museum, is a specialist in contemporary Romanian history, notably the era of Charles II. Since his student days in 1995, he has been involved in the scientific editing of Charles II's six-volume journal (Rom. „Daily Notes”). The most recent volume released in 2003 covers the years 1904-1951². His involvement in the editing process and authoring several thousand explanatory notes prepared him for the monographic research reviewed in the following pages.

The author's early life interest in the subject inspired him to write an extensively-documented work that uses many authentic sources from Romania's National Archives, Peles National Museum Archives and many letters and images from various public and private collections in Romania and abroad (Austria,

² Carol al II-lea, *Între datorie și pasiune. Însemnări zilnice* [Charles II, *Between Duty and Passion. Daily Notes*], vol. I (1904-1939), vol. II (1939-1940), vol. III (1941-1942), vol. IV (1943-1945), vol. V (1946-1948), vol. VI (1941-1951), edition supervised by Marcel Dumitru Ciucă and Narcis Dorin Ion, Bucharest, Curtea Veche Publishing House, Șansa SRL Publishing House and Press, Satya Sai Publishing House, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003.

France, Poland).

This work is currently the most thorough historical study devoted to Romania's most controversial king and, indirectly, to the country's interwar years.³

Since the material is abundant, it is necessary to provide the main facts about each volume before reaching conclusions about the work's overall strengths and weaknesses.

The first volume, with the subtitle *Carol II of Romania. Itineraries of a Life. The Fresco of an Era* examines the future Playboy King's (Paul D. Quinlan) childhood and adolescence (1893-1914), his time as the crown prince of Romania (1914-1930) and the first two years he took the role of „player king” (1930-1932), attempting to impose coalition governments led by several political personalities.

The volume focuses on the Romanian internal politics of the time (more information about foreign policy is given in volumes 3-5). It provides a complete fresco of the political world in Romania in the 1930s-1940s: corruption, intrigues, personal rivalries between politicians, distortion of political life to the point of caricature by the intrusion of the secret services and the royal *camarilla*, the power of certain Romanian businessmen having business and other types of connections in Western Europe and the USA. The following three facts are representative of the author's overall picture. Elena Lupescu, the king's mistress, established her own information service within the state, managed by Ion Pitulescu, chief of the postal and telegraph service. The industrialist Max Auschnitt (1888-1957), a member of the *camarilla* and one of Carol's unjustly imprisoned financiers, did business in the USA after leaving Romania and became friends with the future CIA director, Allen Dulles. Auschnitt's rival in business, Nicolae Malaxa (1884-1965), the most powerful Romanian industrialist, has also immigrated to the USA, did business and befriended the future president Richard Nixon.

The relevance of this volume lies in the detailed study based on numerous historical testimonies of the king's political goals: although a constitutional monarch, Charles II planned to abolish parties and institute a personal power system from his first year of rule, 1930. He would ultimately be able to achieve

³ He actually contributed to the controversy, both through his diary (see *above*) and his work, a combination of memoirs and political opinions, particularly on Romania's foreign policy after 1918. The work was completed in 1945 and published in 1994 (Carol II, *În zodia Satanei. Reflexiuni asupra politicii internaționale* [Under the sign of Satan. Reflections on international politics], edited by Jipa Rotaru, Tiberiu Velter and Horia Șerbănescu, s. l., Universitaria Publishing House, 1994).

such a “performance” in 1938.

The second volume is divided into two sections: *The Constitutional King* (1932-1938) and *The Egotistical King* (1930-1938). The first part is a sort of political history of Romania, accompanied by numerous references to memoirs of politicians of the time and archival documents, with three elements standing out. The first is the king’s particular role in promoting Romanian sports, the scout’s movement and Straja Tarii youth organization. The second is the king’s particularly complicated relationship with the former far-right Legionary Movement party, which evolved from benevolent neutrality to disinterest and reached repression. These pages are among the best written in Romanian historiography in this regard. The third reviews the country’s 1938 notable economic performances (Europe’s first producer of petroleum products and corn, fourth in wine production, fifth in wood and cereal, etc.), illustrating the country’s notable economic achievements despite the corruption of his regime.

The second part of the volume lists the king’s strained relationships with his family members, as shown by his unfair and abusive behaviour towards his mother, Queen Marie, his brother, Prince Nicholas and his sister, Archduchess Ileana. This part of the work highlights the king’s versatile psychology, excellently underlined in the work of American historian Paul D. Quinlan⁴, as well as the love and care for the education of his son, “Mihăiță”.

The third volume subtitled “the dictator king” (1938-1939) analyses four issues: the establishment of the king’s authority regime (February 10, 1938) and the government changes implemented until 1939, the king’s involvement in various foreign-policy actions, his armament concerns and the decimation of the Legionary Movement. The impartial observer may discover in these pages that the monarch was highly active in the country’s foreign affairs, bringing allies and benefits and conducting official visits to the British Empire, Belgium, France, Germany, and Turkey.

Attempts to arm the country were made too late, as felt in 1940 as a result of ultimatums when Romania would lose Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the USSR, north-western Transylvania to Hungary, and southern Dobrogea (the Quadrilateral) to Bulgaria, without fighting back. The king believed the troops’ morale was “splendid”, but their training and equipment were deficient. The cavalry received just half of the saddles required for mobilization. The remainder were to be received from England, with 17,000 ordered from India. The

⁴ Paul D. Quinlan, *The Playboy King: Carol II of Romania*, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1995, VIII + 264 p.

deficiencies in aviation and anti-aircraft artillery provision were astonishing. Unfortunately for the king and especially for Romania, he and the leading military looked at the military training of the troops superficially. For example, the king personally designed uniforms for his soldiers who marched in the May 10, 1931, parade but he never seriously considered their training and equipment for war.

The volume's conclusion, which spans several pages, is that Carol II had become a kind of puppet king in 1939 because the various ministers were imposed not by him, but by his mistress, Elena Lupescu, and the palace marshal, Ernest Urdărianu. Furthermore, these individuals undermined the little moral authority he still enjoyed among the masses.

The fourth volume consists of two parts: *The Dethroned King* (1940) and *The Wandering King* (1940-1953). The first part highlights the king's ten-year reign jubilee (June 8, 1940) when the country's representative writers presented the king with a handwritten tribute volume, so far unpublished, containing texts that, in form and substance, almost equalled the cult of personality established later by Nicolae Ceausescu!

Dense, well-written and well-documented pages are devoted to the aforementioned Romanian territorial losses in the summer of 1940, the reasons behind them, the king's abdication and General Ion Antonescu's power takeover on September 6, 1940.

The extensive conclusions of this first part of the volume scientifically validate what his son, King Michael I, had stated, influenced of course by his father's mistreatment of his mother, Queen Helen: Romania needed an enlightened monarch in the inter-war period (and Carol was one, both culturally and from an urban standpoint). However, Carol gradually turned into an operetta dictator under the influence of Elena Lupescu, Ernest Urdărianu and the camarilla.

The second part of the volume deals with the journey of the dethroned king through Portugal, Cuba, Mexico, Brazil and, again, Portugal, where he died, in his villa in Estoril, on April 4, 1953.

The fifth volume synthesizes the king's undisputable achievements in equipping the army (in 1938, the Ministry of National Defence had a third of the country's budget), his general devotion to the military institution, and his initiatives in the field of Romanian diplomacy, which he had a particular preference for.

The volume's final, most consistent section recounts his cultural endeavours, unmatched by any other Romanian king, for which he was rightfully called "the voivode of culture" by the people of culture and letters. Indeed, the monarch was a genuine Maecenas for writers and artists, patronizing the

construction of various cultural edifices and, in 1933, establishing the “King Carol II Foundation for Literature and Art” that published the most important literary and scientific works of interwar Romania.

The king's urban planning achievements are also noted since he is rightfully considered the second modern creator of Bucharest, endowed with Western European buildings during his reign. It is symbolic that King Carol I was the city's first modern founder.

Overall, this last volume of the book is an excellent orientation guide for foreign specialists interested in presenting the essence of Romania's cultural situation in the interwar period.

The scientific benefits of this work are evident: the introduction of a large number of archive documents, personal letters and original illustrations into the scientific circuit; the presentation and necessary amendment of the most authoritative opinions, for and against this king's reign, linked with views on this subject arising from the memoirs of politicians.

Less successful is sometimes the overuse of quotes from the memoirs of Charles II's contemporary Romanian politicians. Some works on Charles II by historians from the United States (for example, Paul D. Quinlan's *The Playboy King*) or Western, Central, and Eastern Europe are not cited. Therefore, it is advised that the author address the issues identified in a subsequent edition of his work or another book.

In attempting to analyse King Charles II's reign as a whole, one might conclude that he was undeniably a very gifted figure for the “job” of head of state. Descendant of an illustrious dynasty in European history, he was a polyglot (he spoke and wrote in Romanian, English, French and German), and had phenomenal intelligence, according to his contemporaries. His reign could have created such favourable results for the country because he was incredibly diligent (he woke up every day at 6 a.m.), possessed excellent work capacity and reigned over a major country in terms of economic and military power. This was not to be, for he prioritized his passion for his favourite, Elena (Magda) Lupescu, over the interests of the country, his family and his people. This fact, together with the acts of the camarilla led by the same Elena Lupescu, harmed both the country and him personally.

Unfortunately, this could not counterbalance what the world-class economist and politician Mihail Manoilescu truthfully stated:

“Carol was someone who loved Romania more than many of Romania's finest; he suffered when her prestige was harmed in any way; he held great

ambitions and dreamed of a European role for his country's people such as they had never known before"⁵.

The elites and the people paid little attention to the king's sincere love for the country and his great abilities since it had become public knowledge that all appointments in politics and all state orders in the economy were assigned from the royal mistress' residence in Vulpache Alley in Bucharest (demolished today).

Finally, as a last conclusion, one of the acknowledged experts on the issues of his reign stated, "Overall, it was a time of notable progress, particularly in the economy and especially in industry. Political life was very turbulent, there were great confrontations between democratic and extremist forces; political parties were eroding, making it easier for Charles II to formally dissolve them in March 1938, against the background of the Iron Guard's obvious ascent. [...] in terms of culture, remarkable progress has been made, both in improving the cultural level of the masses and establishing a real intellectual elite. Romania's foreign policy was marked by dynamism, by continental efforts to preserve peace; in the end, the position of the great powers was decisive, leading to the second world war, our country becoming the victim of the Soviet Union's, Germany's and Italy's forceful and dictating policy"⁶. *Quod erat demonstrandum*.

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