

ROMANIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORY OF MODERN UKRAINE DURING WORLD WAR II

Serhii SEHEDA , Dmytro VIEDIENIEIEV , Serhii LEVCHEUKO ,

National Defence University of Ukraine

E-mails: zhannasegeda@ukr.net; zastava67@i.ua; voyen_ist@ukr.net

Abstract: *The article deals with the organisation and operational activities of the Romanian military intelligence during World War II in the territory of modern Ukraine (1941–1944) based on Soviet counterintelligence documents from the funds of the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine and the USSR KGB documentary publications. Newly created in 1940, the Special Information Service (SSI), an authority fulfilling the functions of military intelligence and military counterintelligence, set up a special intelligence institution in the theatre of military operations: the Eastern Front Agency (Vulturul), with a network of centres (branches) and subordinate offices and residencies. SSI counterintelligence units managed to inflict significant blows on the Soviet underground and in some NKVD intelligence residencies in Odessa and Mykolaiv. The Romanian special service created training institutions for agents, radio operators, saboteurs, and couriers, as well as units of information and psychological confrontation, considering the study of public consciousness and mental characteristics of the enemy country's population.*

Keywords: *Romania, Special services, Ukraine, World War II, intelligence, counterintelligence, sabotage, propaganda.*

Rezumat: *Activitățile serviciilor speciale militare române pe teritoriul Ucrainei moderne în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial. Articolul analizează organizarea și activitățile operaționale ale Serviciului Special de Informații al României (Informații și Contrainformații militare) în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial, pe teritoriul Ucrainei modern, în perioada 1941-1944. Autorii introduc în circuitul științific o serie de documente*

ale organelor de contrainformații sovietice aflate în fondurile arhivelor Serviciului de Securitate al Ucrainei și în publicațiile fostului KGB. Serviciul Special de Informații (SSI) fusese reorganizat în 1940, îndeplinind concomitent funcții de informații și contrainformații militare (Birourile 1 și 2). SSI a înființat agenția de informații „Vulturul”, care acționa pe frontul de est, având o rețea de centre (filiale), birouri și rezidențe subordonate. SSI a reușit să dea lovituri semnificative serviciilor secrete sovietice, în zonele de operații NKVD din regiunile Odessa și Mykolaiv. De asemenea, a creat instituții de instruire pentru agenți, radio-operatori, sabotori și curieri și unități de informare și război psihologic, pe baza studierii caracteristicilor opiniei publice și a celor psihice ale populației țării inamice.

INTRODUCTION

In the period 1941–1944, the territory of modern Ukraine became one of the priority military theatres of World War II (1939–1945). As an ally of Hitler’s Germany, Romania had military intelligence and counterintelligence agencies actively participating in the ‘secret war’ in the territory of nowadays Ukraine. From late August 1944 de facto, and from September 12th on a contractual basis, Romania took part in the war on the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition, having lost, according to various data, 130,000–170,000 soldiers killed and wounded during the liberation of Europe from Nazism.

This paper introduces a set of documents of the Soviet special services into the scientific discourse to describe the Romanian intelligence activities through the lens of enemy documents (Soviet counterintelligence), which in turn can contribute to a comprehensive analysis of Romanian special services in the past.

In addition, the study will contribute to disclosing military-historical aspects of the Ukrainian past during World War II, the role of special services at the time, and the period of the confrontation between Soviet special services and rival intelligence. It opens up additional opportunities for studying other aspects of the military and political history of World War II, i. e. activities of the Romanian and Soviet special services during their confrontation in 1941–1944, the deployment of guerrilla and underground movement, the Ukrainian insurgent movement (with whom the Romanian intelligence established cooperation).

The scientific aim of the article is to study the evolution of the organisational structure of the central authority and peripheral operational bodies of Romanian military intelligence, forms and methods of their operational and service activities during the military campaigns in the territory of modern Ukraine in the period 1941–1944, based on little-known documents of the Soviet special services.

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE ISSUE

In the USSR, the issue of Romanian intelligence activities in the territory of modern Ukraine has been approached in scientific and historical papers on the activities of the Soviet underground and illegal residencies in the Romanian-occupied Southern Ukraine (primarily in Odessa and Mykolaiv). According to counterintelligence documents, a more detailed and professional study of the organisation, forms and methods of Romanian intelligence has been carried out in closed studies by scientific and pedagogical personnel of the USSR Committee for State Security (KGB). Romanian intelligence activities have been studied in the context of describing the structure and operational activities of the special services of Germany and its allies, the factors of the operational situation on the Eastern Front, the study of forms and methods of counterintelligence activities of SMERSH state security and military counterintelligence countering the reconnaissance and sabotage activities of the aggressors' special services.¹

In nowadays Ukraine, the topic of research has been described (including the works of Romanian scientists) in several publications on the history of development and activities of Romanian intelligence in the 20th century by Volodymyr Palyvoda and Artem Fylypenko, modern Ukrainian researchers of the past of the European countries' special services (National Institute for Strategic Studies).²

¹ P. Petrenko, *Bor'ba organov gosbezopasnosti s agenturnoj razvedkoj specsluzhb fashistskoj Germanii v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [The Struggle of State Security Agencies with the Intelligence Agency of Fascist Germany during the Great Patriotic War], in "Trudy Vysshej Krasnoznamennoj shkoly KGB SSSR," 1985, № 35, pp. 56-65.; A. Tsvetkov, P. Petrenko, *Bor'ba sovetskoj kontrrazvedki s diversionno-razvedyvatel'nymi formirovaniyami protivnika v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [The Struggle of Soviet Counterintelligence with Sabotage and Intelligence Units of the Enemy during the Great Patriotic War], in "Trudy Vysshej Krasnoznamennoj shkoly KGB SSSR," 1985, № 34, pp. 68-77; Vasilii Korovin, *Sovetskaya kontrrazvedka v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [Soviet Counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War], in "Trudy Vysshej Krasnoznamennoj shkoly KGB SSSR," 1985, № 35, pp. 43-56.; Ivan Ustinov, *Iz istorii bor'by sovetskoj voennoj kontrrazvedki s nemecko-fashistskoj razvedkoj vo vremena vojny* [From the History of the Struggle of Soviet Military Counterintelligence with Nazi Intelligence during the War], in "Trudy Vysshej shkoly KGB pri SM SSSR," 1971, № 2, pp. 50-62.; Nikolai Dushin, *Sovetskaya voennaya kontrrazvedka v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [Soviet Military Counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War], in "Sbornik KGB SSSR," 1985, № 106, pp. 7-16.

² Volodymyr Palyvoda, *Spetsialni sluzhby Rumunii: vid 'Sihurantsy' do rozviduvalnoho*

Among the primary scientific sources of Ukrainian authors have been the works of Romanian researchers on the history of the Romanian special services during 1918–1945, primarily the works by Pavel Moraru, Ion Constantin, Cristian Troncotă, Daniel Diaconescu, Cezar Măță, Alin Spanu, Florin Pintilie, etc.³ Furthermore, these researchers have not used Soviet counterintelligence documents, which further update their scientific research. The authors of this paper have also outlined the activities of the Romanian intelligence in the works on the history of the Soviet special services in the territory of modern Ukraine during World War II.⁴

spivtovarystva [Romanian Special Services: from Sigurantsa to Intelligence Community], in “Vyklyky i ryzyky”. Bezpekovi ohliad Tsentru doslidzhen' armiyi, konversiyi ta rozzbroyennya [“Challenges and Risks”. Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies Security Review], 2017, No. 18 (81), pp. 24-33; Artem Fylypenko, *Rumunski spetssluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate*, chastyna 1-3 [Romanian Special Services in the 20th Century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, parts 1-3], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate>; <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-2> and <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/rumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-3> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

³ Pavel Moraru, *Romania și bătălia informațiilor între Prut și Bug (1940-1944)* [Romania and the Information Battle between Prut and Bug (1940–1944)], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2011, 324 p.; Pavel Moraru, *Serviciile secrete și Basarabia (1918-1991). Dicționar* [Intelligence Services and Bessarabia (1918–1991). Dictionary], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2008, 319 p.; Ion Constantin, *Gherman Pântea: între mit și realitate* [Gherman Pântea: Between Myth and Reality], Bucharest, Bucharest’s Library Publishing House, 2010, 384 p.; Cristian Troncotă, *Mihail Moruzov și frontul secret* [Mihail Moruzov and the Secret Front], Bucharest, Elion Publishing House, 2004, 310 p.; Idem, *România și frontul secret 1859 – 1945* [Romania and the Secret Front], Bucharest, Elion Publishing House, 2007, 449 p.; Daniel Diaconescu, *Din istoria serviciului special de informații 1940-1945* [From the History of the Intelligence Service 1940–1945], Târgoviște, Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House, 2018, 280 p.; Cezar Măță, *Serviciile secrete ale României în războiul mondial (1939-1945)* [The Intelligence Services of Romania in the World War (1939–1945)], Iași, Demiurg Publishing House, 2010, 380 p.; Alin Spânu, *Istoria serviciilor de informații/contrainformații românești în perioada 1919-1945* [The History of the Romanian Intelligence/Counterintelligence Services from 1919 to 1945], Iași, Demiurg Publishing House, 2010, 791 p.; Florin Pintilie, *Serviciul special de informații din România: 1939-1947* [The Intelligence Service of Romania: 1939–1947], Vol. 2, Bucharest, National Academy of Intelligence Publishing House, 2003, 1248 p.

⁴ Dmytro Viedienieiev, Oleksandr Lysenko, *Protydiia radianskykh spetssluzhb nimetskii*

THE RESEARCH SOURCES

The authors have introduced little-known documents into scientific discourse, which concern the structure, forms, and methods of operational and service activities of Romanian military intelligence agencies and which are stored in the funds of the Sectoral State Archive (SSA) of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU). These are documents of the Soviet special services containing data and analysis, stored in several funds of the State Security Service of Ukraine: Fund 2 (counterintelligence structures of state security bodies); Fund 9 (administrative documents); Fund 13 (collection of printed publications); Fund 16 (information documents).

Valuable data about the network and activities of Romanian military intelligence in the territory of modern Ukraine can be found in the information materials of the Chief Counterintelligence Directorate (GUKR) of the People's Defence Commissariat (NKO) SMERSH (Soviet military counterintelligence) and the Counterintelligence Directorates SMERSH of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts. Some of them were published in collections of documents by the USSR Committee for State Security (KGB), which were unavailable to a wide range of researchers at the time. From similar documentary editions, the authors have used the 5-volume collection *Soviet State Security Bodies in the Great Patriotic War*,⁵ special documentary editions *Activities of State Security Agencies during the Great Patriotic War*⁶ and *Soviet Military Counterintelligence*.⁷

rozvidtsi y kontrrozvidtsi na terytorii Ukrainy v 1941–1944 rr. [Countering by the Soviet Special Services of the Activities of German Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the Territory of Ukraine in 1941–1944], in "Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal," 2015, No. 1, pp. 69–91.; Dmytro Viedienieiev, *Diialnist orhaniv ta viisk derzhavnoy bezpeky v Ukraini v period Druhoy svitovoy viiny (1939–1945 rr.)* [Activities of State Security Structures and Troops in Ukraine during World War II (1939–1945)], Kyiv, Natsionalna akademiia SBU, 2011, 98 p.

⁵ *Sovetskie organy gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti v Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojne: sbornik dokumentov i materialov* [Soviet State Security Bodies in the Great Patriotic War: Collection of Documents and Materials], Moskva, Vysshaya shkola KGB SSSR, 1990, vol. V, 1264 p.

⁶ *Deyatel'nost' organov gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* [Activities of State Security Agencies during the Great Patriotic War. Collection of Documents and Materials], Moskva, Vysshaya shkola KGB SSSR, 1964, 864 p.

⁷ *Sovetskaya voennaya kontrrazvedka. Sbornik dokumentov* [Soviet Military

PREPARING ROMANIAN SPECIAL SERVICES FOR THE WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION

In 1924, using the experience of Great Britain and France, Mihail Moruzov, the famous organizer and reformer of the Romanian special services, created the Secret Information Service (SSIAR), fulfilling the functions of foreign intelligence, military intelligence, and counterintelligence, subordinated first to the General Staff and later to the military. Romanian intelligence prioritised operational activities in Bulgaria, Hungary, Germany, and the Soviet Union. According to American spies (after the defeat of Romania in 1944), Romanian intelligence had collected the best information about the USSR, surpassed only by Germany.⁸

After the abdication of King Carol II (September 1940) and the establishment of the dictatorship of Ion Antonescu, on November 12th, 1940, the latter created SSI, Special Information Service (SSI or *Serviciul Special de Informații*), which was directly subordinated to him, and, in administrative terms, to the Ministry of National Defence. The service was headed by Eugen Cristescu (1895–1950), an experienced officer and one of the former heads of the political police (*Rom. Siguranța, Eng. Sigurantsa*). Preparing for the offensive against the USSR, in May 1941, the SSI Mobile Echelon was formed, headed by Colonel Ioan Lissievici, an intelligence officer. According to Eugen Cristescu, it “included groups of employees of the counterintelligence section, section G for communications with foreign services, a technical photography section, a telephone and telegraph section, an automobile section with cars and trucks, an administrative section with bureaucratic personnel, service personnel, officers’ canteen, security... a total of about 100 people, who comprised a reduced version of the service, whose task was to carry out intelligence and counterintelligence activities in contact with the General Staff.”⁹

Counterintelligence. Collection of Documents], Vol. 3, Moskva, Vysshaya shkola KGB SSSR, 1984, 444 p.

⁸ Artem Fylypenko, *Rumunski spetssluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate, chastyna 1* [Romanian Special Services in the 20th Century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, part 1], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

⁹ Idem, *Rumunski spetssluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate, chastyna 2* [Romanian Special Services in the 20th Century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, part 2],

In early 1941, the School of Intelligence Agents was established, which trained agents for work abroad and within the country. They studied individually for better covertness and qualification. The school curriculum included the following disciplines: terrorism and sabotage (20 hours), political and social movements (16), communism (20), separatism (16), ethnic groups and religious sects (16), law (40), intelligence and counterintelligence activities (34), encryption (6), radio communication (14), reconnaissance methods (30), field reconnaissance classes (90), shooting training.¹⁰

The intelligence work of Romanian military intelligence against the USSR intensified as World War II approached. In particular, the report for the first half of 1939 (August 10th, 1939) by Amayak Kobulov, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR illustrated that in the reported period out of 109 detained violators of the state border 12 were Romanian intelligence agents (618 refugees fled to the territory of modern Ukraine from the Romanian side until November 1st, 1939). In the area of Odessa alone, in the first decade of December 1939, border guards detained 6 agents of the Romanian special services, including those with significant experience in intelligence activities. Interrogations and analysis of various materials conducted by Soviet counterintelligence revealed certain systemic features of the Romanian military intelligence. Firstly, selecting and recruiting agents against the USSR was carried out, as a rule, by operative personnel of information bureaus (intelligence bodies) of the Third and Fourth Army Corps (Chişinău and Chernivtsi, respectively), as well as separate 'special intelligence centres' A (Chernivtsi) and B (Chişinău). Secondly, special training of agents for Soviet Ukraine was conducted in Chişinău and intelligence offices at border crossings. The curriculum included the study of Soviet uniforms, ways of crossing the Dniester River, possession of weapons, and most importantly, mastering the methods of collecting information about military units, the location of barracks, highways, military construction sites, etc. And finally, the primary tasks of the agency during the reconnaissance were to study the fortifications of the border zone, the military units there, the location of border outposts, military garrisons in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and other places, to recruit

in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-2> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

¹⁰ Idem, *Rumunski spetsluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate, chastyna 3* [Romanian special services in the 20th century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, part 3], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/rumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-3> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

informants, and to send them to Romania for training.¹¹

The intelligence bodies of the NKVD Border Troops noted joint activities of Romanian intelligence and representatives of German military intelligence in the border zone, particularly sending agents to the territory of present-day Ukraine.¹² At the same time, the Soviet special service acknowledged that the lack of proper filtering of refugees from Romania “definitely allows Romanian intelligence to send a significant amount of its agents into our territory, which remains out of our sight.”¹³

After the USSR annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940 and Romania entered the war against the USSR in 1941, SSI intelligence centres increased their activities: in Iași (headed by Lieutenant Colonel Trofin Macrinici) and in Suceava (Major Emil Tulbure). The centres were involved in sending agents across the state border to Bukovina and Bessarabia, directing them to collect data on the Soviet armed forces, state security agencies, public administration, the mood of the population in those regions, etc.¹⁴

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN SOVIET TERRITORY

During World War II, the chief intelligence body of Romania was the above-mentioned SSI, which fulfilled both intelligence and counterintelligence functions. At the time of Romania’s withdrawal from the war on the side of Germany, the SSI personnel numbered 917 people, including 89 senior and 24 junior officers, 502 officers, and 302 part-time officers; there were more than 140 cars, 35 radio stations, and a position-finder. The 1944–45 budget was set at 560 000 lei and additional funds were raised from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its diplomatic missions abroad, and other departments.¹⁵

According to the Tripartite Pact of November 17th, 1940, intelligence agencies were to cooperate among the allied states, i. e. Germany was not to carry

¹¹ Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy [Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine] (hereinafter **HDASBU**), fond 16, inv. 32 (1951), d. 69, f. 198-202.

¹² *Ibid.*, fond 16, inv. 34 (1951), d. 1, f. 245.

¹³ *Ibid.*, fond 16, inv. 32 (1951), d. 13, f. 375.

¹⁴ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1124.

¹⁵ *** *Din Memoriile lui Eugen Cristescu* [From the Memoirs of Eugen Cristescu], Bucharest, State Security Council, Education Directorate (Unpublished, for internal use only), 1968, p. 115.

out any activities or arrests in the territory of Romania and it was to report on the results of cooperation regularly.¹⁶

The primary units of the SSI headquarters were the intelligence agency department, the counterintelligence department, the military attaché department, and the special propaganda department. In turn, the intelligence agency department had the following sections:

Active, whose employees were engaged in selecting candidates for recruitment, recruiting agents, analysing intelligence data obtained; and

Passive, which carried out information and analytical processing of data obtained and developed new tasks for collecting data.

In January 1942, the SSI headquarters was reorganised, and it acquired the following structure:

1st section, reconnaissance (66 servicemen and 96 civilians), which in turn comprised three 'fronts' (areas of work): South, East, and West;

2nd section, counterintelligence, comprising nine specialized departments (secretariat, political, communists, economic, legionnaires (i.e., Romanian radical nationalists and fascists), national minorities, military personnel, air force, residency);

3rd section, relations with foreign intelligence services;

4th section, special counterintelligence tasks;

5th section, counter-sabotage;

A number of support sections: 6th (external surveillance and censorship of correspondence); 7th (personnel); 8th (legal); 9th (operational and technical); 10th (radio communication); 11th (automobile); 12th (administrative).¹⁷

The army had its own organisational and functional structure of intelligence agencies. It included the 2nd section (intelligence department) of the General Staff; 2nd bureaus (sections) at the level of military units (division, corps, army); regimental intelligence service, as well as special information services of aviation, navy, and artillery. Maritime and aviation intelligence, ground surveillance service, special eavesdropping service, decryption service, and secret service (intelligence agency) served as means of military intelligence.¹⁸

Specifically for intelligence and counterintelligence work on Soviet

¹⁶ Artem Fylypenko, *Rumunski spetssluzhby...*, chastyna 2 [part 2], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-2> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

territory, the intelligence agency of the Eastern Front, i.e., *Agency of the East*, was established (other names are *The Eastern Front Agency (Vulturul or 'Eagle')*), to which three centres (*Centru-1, 2, 3*) with intelligence and counterintelligence functions were subordinate. They were located, respectively, in Chernivtsi (headed by Colonel Mihai Goanță), Chișinău (Major Balotescu), and Odessa (Colonel Perju; he was sentenced to 25 years in prison on March 11th, 1949, by a military tribunal of the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Odessa region as a war criminal but, on December 1st, 1955, he was returned to the Romanian government). *Vulturul* was headed by Colonel Vasile Palius, a former White Guardsman better known by the pseudonym 'Vasile Ionescu.'

Vulturul's headquarters comprised the following functional units:

Bureau-1 (or 'methodical department', headed by Lieutenant Colonel Trofin Macrinici 'Ioanovic') consisted of 5 operatives, technical staff, and a group of captured senior officers of the Red Army. The unit studied and summarized materials from various sources and drafted analytical documents;

Bureau-2 (intelligence department, captain Ion Curăraru) comprised 12 operatives, which recruited the agents from the population evacuated from the Soviet territory, instructed the agents, and studied the information obtained. Within the unit, there was a 'special group C,' which recruited and trained the agents for withdrawal from the front line;

Bureau-3: the secretariat;

Bureau-4: transport department (of up to 30 people);

Radio group of up to 10 people, including prisoners of war.¹⁹

Vulturul's activities included recruiting, equipping, and training agents for performing various missions on the enemy front, interrogating prisoners of war, gathering documents that the enemy had left on the battlefield, identifying industrial infrastructure and warehouses of all kinds.²⁰

The Eastern Front Agency was created at the beginning of the war with the USSR, and, in the first stage of its activities, in fact, it did not conduct intelligence work along the front line. Instead, this institution initially focused on the "in-depth study" of the USSR army, industry, and the socio-political situation. Its sources were the interrogation of prisoners of war, defectors, the exposed agency of the Soviet special services, the interrogation of Soviet citizens in the occupied territories, the study of trophy documents, etc. In the area of deployment of the Romanian army, this agency organised counterintelligence work. According to the

¹⁹ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1128.

²⁰ Cristian Troncotă, *România și frontul secret ...*, p. 342-343.

Soviet military counterintelligence SMERSH, such information and analytical work allowed the SSI to obtain “relatively complete data” on the situation in the USSR, the capabilities of the military-industrial complex, and the state of the Red Army reserves. The SSI also clearly understood the current activities of the Red Army on the southern part of the Eastern Front.²¹

Each of the above-mentioned SSI ‘mobile’ centres had subordinate ‘subcentres’: branches and groups (sections, subsections) in different settlements, and within the Romanian army units. Thus, the Odessa SSI centre established branches in Ochakiv, Balta, and Tiraspol, and separate groups of captains Botezat, Frumos, and Porumbescu operated in Odessa. In turn, e.g., the sub-centre *Tiraspol* established residencies *Tiraspol*, *Dubosary*, *Berezivka*, *Ananiev*, *Rybnitsa*, and *Balta*.²²

Subsections (branches) directly established residencies and separate operational groups which operated in certain areas of responsibility. The *Centru* tasks included collecting intelligence data on the Soviet armed forces, the state of the Black Sea military and navy, counterintelligence of its own troops and bases in the Black Sea, combating guerrilla and underground movements, and studying the mood of the population in the occupied territories. These intelligence units were properly equipped and had their own radio stations and encryption facilities, laboratories, etc. As a rule, SSI centres were disguised as military construction units.²³

FEATURES OF THE AGENT-OPERATIVE WORK OF THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE

SSI bodies conducted military, political, and economic intelligence behind the lines of the Red Army and in the territory of European countries. Counterintelligence functions were much broader, as noted in Soviet documents. These included identifying enemy intelligence centres and their agents, exposing the Soviet underground and guerrilla units, preparing their intelligence and sabotage agents and withdrawing them from the front line (leaving to settle in

²¹ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1124-1125.

²² HDASBU, fond 13, d. 465, tom 4, f. 54; Artem Fylypenko, *Rumunski spetssluzhby...*, chastyna 2 [part 2], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-ukhkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-2> (Accessed on 05.12.2022).

²³ Vasili Hristoforov, *Organy gosbezopasnosti SSSR v 1941–1945 gg.* [State Security Bodies of the USSR in 1941–1945], Moskva, Glavnoe arhivnoe upravlenie goroda Moskvy, 2011, p. 197-198.

retreat), and setting up illegal sabotage groups. The Soviet side, in particular, acknowledged that Romanian intelligence had managed to study the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence bodies on its front line in depth. In the document *Special Soviet bodies identified on the Romanian–Soviet front* drafted by the SSI, “the activities of the intelligence agencies of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts were sufficiently covered.”²⁴

Such information collected by the SSI territorial centres came to Bucharest, where there was an analytical unit called ‘1st echelon of the Eastern Front Agency’ (headed by Captain Valeriu Bartu, pseudonym ‘Vlădescu’). He summarised the information received, analysed it, and submitted it to the SSI headquarters.

Depending on the front line and military situation, the *Vulturul* bodies underwent reorganisation and redeployment. At the beginning of 1943, the special body had three centres on the Eastern Front: Northern (nowadays Ukraine), Stalingrad, and the Caucasus. Later, such units were reorganized into the Crimean Centre (Simferopol, headed by Captain ‘Orovianu’), the Centre of Captain ‘Cucu’ (Crimea) and the Centre of Lieutenant ‘Zarafu.’

In addition to the mass-recruited agency, highly qualified undercover assistants also worked for the SSI. SMERSH documents have cited the example of 25-year-old recruiting agent Maria Lisnetska (‘Gavrilescu’). She had worked for the Polish intelligence in the past and she spoke several European languages, as well as Ukrainian. From 1940, she cooperated with SSI for a monthly salary of 50,000 lei. She repeatedly crossed the border with the USSR and she was in direct contact with the head of the SSI counterintelligence section; she was given the task of ‘substituting’ for the recruitment of the Soviet special service and joining its intelligence body, as well as establishing contacts with the Polish emigration intelligence, and collecting information about the British intelligence.²⁵

The defeat of German–Romanian troops near Stalingrad in November 1942–February 1943 led to a change in the priorities and tactics of the *Agency of the East*.

From that point on (starting in October 1943, when a top-secret SSI directive #8300 was issued), *Vulturul’s* emphasis was on recruiting the agents, leaving them for illegal work during the Romanian army’s retreat from the Bug and the Dniester rivers. This directive ordered the deployment of reconnaissance work along the front line in two priority areas: establishing residencies in the territory of Transnistria and the Crimea left by Romanian troops; and training

²⁴ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1125.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

qualified agents ('search agents'), residents, radio operators, and radio transmitting officers and sending them across the frontline.

Soviet documents stated that *Vulturul's* main body in Mykolaiv and its branches focused on recruiting agents and their special training for reconnaissance and sabotage missions in the Mykolaiv-Odessa-Tiraspol districts. In total, it was planned to leave 250 agents, and 19 radio stations in Transnistria, 220 agents, and 16 radios in Bessarabia, 150 agents, and 9 radios in Bukovina.

The agents were selected from traitors who tarnished themselves by extraditing communists, underground members and guerrillas, members of anti-Soviet organisations – the *Monarchical Union*, the *National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS)*, *Officers' Society*, former *White Guard* –, members of Ukrainian nationalist organisations, as well as doctors, agronomists, artists, speculators, shopkeepers, etc. For one or two months, special training took place in secret apartments and courier communication with the agency, passwords, and ciphers were developed. Soviet counterintelligence officers noted that the abandoned Romanian agents were provided with radio communications (there were training courses for radio agents in Odessa) and received 5 000 to 30 000 rubles for operational needs. In June–July 1944 alone, three radio stations left behind in retreat contacted the SSI. For their direction-finding, the deployment in Simferopol of a stationary radio counterintelligence point of the 5th Department of the People's Commissariat of the USSR State Security was sped up.²⁶

A fairly large contingent of SSI confidants was settled. In January–June 1944, the SMERSH military counterintelligence bodies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front found 991 spies, 121 of whom were trained and left in retreat by German and Romanian intelligence agents. As reported by the SMERSH Chief Directorate of Counterintelligence of the People's Commissariat of Defence of the USSR on May 10th, 1944, in the liberated territory of the Crimea at that time, 46 German and Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence officers were found and detained, 172 agents of such services were left for illegal work in the rear of Soviet troops, 388 active collaborators, and police officers.²⁷ In the Odessa region alone, more than 40 Romanian SSI officers and agents were arrested.²⁸

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1133.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

²⁸ HDASBU, fond 13, d. 693; d.375, f. 9-17; *Sovetskiye organy ...*, pp. 215-223; *Podryvnaya deyatel'nost' voenno-morskoj razvedki fashistskoj Germanii protiv Sovetskogo Soyuza nakanune i v period Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny 1941–1945 gg.* [The Subversive

Totally, during the warfare in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR in the period 1941–1944, 6 951 German, 791 Romanian, and 20 Hungarian intelligence agents were identified and detained. Of these, 2 574 agents were left before the retreat, and 508 were abandoned in the Soviet rear, 175 were recruited in the pre-war period. In retreating, the aggressors left more than 200 residencies in the territory of modern Ukraine with reconnaissance and sabotage missions (up to 2 500 trained agents). In total, during the period of Ukraine's liberation, counterintelligence agents exposed 4 822 agents of German, Romanian, and Hungarian special services.²⁹

The arrests by Soviet counterintelligence officers were significant in exposing the abandoned SSI agency. Thus, in Chişinău, the SMERSH operation group of the 3rd Ukrainian Front captured Major Balotescu, the head of the SSI 2nd centre, and many centre agents. In one of the prisoner-of-war camps, Lieutenant Păun (Ovidiu Şerbănescu), an operative and recruiter of the SSI agents, and radio operator Maric, who disclosed the radio station and codes, were found. Şerbănescu testified against 23 agents settled, including three residents. Seven of them were detained after receiving data about other agents known to them.

In addition, Major F. Botezatu, the head of *Centre H* of the 2nd section (intelligence) of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, was detained in Chişinău (he tried to shoot himself, was rescued, sentenced to 25 years in prison, and released in 1955). Many employees of this centre gave extensive evidence of the structure and intelligence work of the 2nd section of the General Staff, its Moldovan branch, and disclosed the place of document storage (they unsuccessfully tried to burn them in the old well). This made it possible to seize the personal files of 84 agents of the centre, correspondence with the General Staff, lists and addresses of radio stations left in the Odessa and Mykolaiv regions of the USSR, materials left behind in retreat, etc. In total, SMERSH detained 25 employees of 'Centre H,' 5 residents, and 6 agents.³⁰

After the Red Army entered Bucharest (August 31st, 1944), the Soviet agent 'Trajan' passed data from the agency's logbook to the operative group of the SMERSH Chief Directorate of Counterintelligence. After Romania entered the war

Activities of Naval Intelligence of Fascist Germany Against the Soviet Union on the Eve and During the Great Patriotic War], Moskva, RIO VKSh KGB SSSR, 1977, p. 172–173.

²⁹ HDASBU, fond 13, d. 375, f. 40; *Deyatel'nost' organov...*, p. 65; Vitalii Nikitchenko, *Chekisty Ukrainy v period Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [Security Officers of Ukraine During the Great Patriotic War], in "Sbornik KGB pri SM SSSR," 1971, No. 2, pp. 66–82.

³⁰ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 383–384.

in the Anti-Hitler Coalition and the arrest of the SSI head, it was renamed (on September 15th, 1944) as the *Information Service* of the Ministry of War. Soviet counterintelligence received data on 108 settled agents, lists of German and Hungarian agents, as well as many other valuable materials about the SSI activities, anti-Soviet emigration, foreign intelligence services, etc.

There were other military intelligence bodies, primarily through the aforementioned 2nd section of the General Staff at the relevant army headquarters or in the occupied settlements, particularly, the 2nd department of the Romanian Armed Forces Staff in Transnistria in Odessa, which also had a separate branch, 'Dr. Dinescu's apartment' (26 agents of this special body were found).³¹

It has been known that, in 1942 when the Romanian army was located in Rostov-on-Don, Colonel Ion Lissievici's 'SSI operational echelon' operated under it for some time. The structure of this body resembled the *Eastern Front Agency*, but without territorial branches. Practically, it was an information-analytical body, where all the materials obtained on the Eastern Front were sent for processing and generalizing (with the retreat of the Romanian army, the 'echelon' moved to Romania and ceased to exist).

Notable features of the SSI were the active use (establishment) of amateur anti-communist organisations and the introduction of intelligence positions there for reconnaissance and subversive work after the retreat of their troops. The OUN (i.e., The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) underground, White Guard, and Russian national-monarchist organisations offended by Stalinist policies were involved in the occupied territories. Romanian intelligence paid increased operational attention to the intellectuals, religious environment, and youth.

Therefore, the directive of the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKVD) of the Ukrainian SSR No. 12 *On strengthening intelligence and operational work to develop an anti-Soviet element among youth and hostile organisations and groups identified in 1943-1944* of January 25th, 1945, is significant. Among them is the illegal group of the National Labour Union of the New Generation, where youth was recruited by Romanian intelligence resident Yu. Penkovskiy and many of its members were recruited by the Romanian General Staff Intelligence Unit and German Naval Intelligence Service. A number of recruits were trained at a Romanian intelligence school in Odessa.³²

During the war in the territory of modern Ukraine, Romania created a network of special and security agencies of various departments, almost all of

³¹HDASBU, fond 13, d. 465, tom 4, f. 53.

³² *Ibid.*, fond 9, d. 5, f. 236-239.

which established their intelligence and operational positions. Chernivtsi is an example where in the period 1941–1944, the SSI Intelligence Centre, the Security Inspectorate (*Sigurantsa*, the Political Police of the Ministry of the Interior), the Police Department, the Gendarmerie Department (from the Chief Gendarmerie Department of the Ministry of the Interior), and the Counterintelligence Department of the 8th Infantry Division operated. Soviet counterintelligence in the Chernivtsi region managed to identify (arrest, register, and search) up to 700 agents, informants, and provocateurs of the Romanian special services. As of September 1st, 1950, 609 agents of the above-mentioned Romanian special services were arrested in Odessa.³³

After the end of World War II, the primary goal of Soviet security agencies was to identify the structure and personnel of Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies and to clear the territory of the southern regions of nowadays Ukraine of Romanian agents (Odessa, Mykolaiv, Ismail, Vinnytsia, Kherson regions, and Bukovina).³⁴

Furthermore, Romanian intelligence actively involved prominent representatives of the anti-Soviet political emigration of the peoples of the USSR. Following Romania's withdrawal from the alliance with Germany, and its entry in the war on the side of the Anti-Hitler Coalition, SMERSH detained 47 Romanian and German intelligence officers, 546 Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence agents, and arrested 99 functionaries of political emigration organisations. Notably, they detained the following and proved their contacts with the intelligence services of the Antonescu regime: I. Porokhovskiy, Secretary General of the Chief Military Council of Ukrainian Emigration to Europe (he was sentenced to 25 years in prison by a military tribunal), S. Delvig, Tsarist Army General and Colonel General of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), the Head of the Former Soldiers Society of the UPR Army and the Ukrainian Community in Romania. According to Soviet documents, on November 14th, 1944, he was sentenced by the military tribunal of the 2nd Ukrainian Front to the maximum penalty, although in encyclopaedic publications the date of death is 1949.³⁵

³³ *Ibid.*, fond 13, d. 465, tom 4, ff. 21-26.

³⁴ V. I. Ilnytskyi, M. D. Haliv, A. S. Boichuk, *Funktsionuvannia rumunskykh rozvidualnykh i kontrrozvidualnykh orhaniv u Transnistrii (1941-1944) (za materialamy HAD SBU)* [Functioning of Romanian Intelligence and Counterintelligence Structures in Transnistria (1941–1944) (based on Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine)], in "Zaporizhzhia Historical Review", 2020, Vol. 3 (55), p. 143.

³⁵ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1027-1028.

It is necessary to mention the mechanism of the SSI interaction with the intelligence services of Hitler's Germany. Professional contacts of the Romanian intelligence with the German military intelligence (Abwehr) began in 1937. For this purpose, a special department G was created within the SSI headquarters, which coordinated intelligence work on the front and in the territory of Romania. The above-mentioned Colonel V. Palius was personally connected with the leadership of the German military intelligence, and "provided them with services greater than those laid down in the framework of official cooperation," for which he received the Iron Cross Order.

Department G systematically provided German intelligence with information obtained, trophy documents on the state of the Red Army at the front and its rear, and the situation in the occupied territories. In turn, the Germans informed the SSI, although not as extensively (among the documents handed over to the Romanian side there is the well-known *Organisation of the SMERSH bodies of the Red Army*). To control its allies, German intelligence introduced its agency within the SSI, particularly the well-known head of one of the SSI centres, Major Balotescu, who left with the Germans after Romania's withdrawal from the war. Perhaps German partners often took away the most well-trained and promising agents of Romanian intelligence.

ORGANISING SABOTAGE WORK OF ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE RED ARMY

Another important area of activity of Romanian military intelligence was establishing sabotage groups, including those who acted under the guise of Soviet guerrillas of Romanian nationality. Work on the formation of guerrilla special forces intensified as Romanian troops retreated in 1944, with Romanian intelligence trying to use the carefully studied experience of the Soviet security forces in organizing the struggle along the front line.

In May 1944, the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR obtained information about the organisation of a *Romanian guerrilla unit* of up to 500 persons in the Crasna Putnei district, which was to spread the sabotage underground ("develop the guerrilla movement") in Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Moldova (weapons of the detachment were supplied by German military units). The establishment of a pseudo-guerrilla unit was led by Captain Cucu (in Crasna Putnei) and Major Balotescu (Vatra Dornei).³⁶

³⁶ HDASBU, fond 2, opus 87, d. 78, f. 321.

The guerilla unit, known and established in June 1944 in Bukovina (40 fighters, a radio station), was led by the German Istrati, a very experienced, specially trained recruiting agent. Recruited in 1940, he repeatedly crossed the border with the USSR and the front line. From July 1944, the unit's base was located near the villages of Davideny (*Rom.* Davideni) and Panca in the Storozhynets district of the Chernivtsi region. The unit, which consisted mainly of local Ukrainians, collected intelligence data, sent agents to the front line, conducted propaganda work among the population, and carried out numerous sabotage and terrorist acts against the Red Army.³⁷

According to the documents of the Soviet counterintelligence, the Romanian special service successfully created a pseudo-underground, especially in Odessa. Several similar facts came to light after the war as a result of inspections by state security bodies, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (CP(B)U), and the Odessa Regional Committee of the CP(B)U. Particularly, it turned out that Romanian counterintelligence defeated a significant part of the Communist underground due to the traitors (including Petrovskiy, the Secretary of the Underground Regional Committee of the CP(B)U, left in the occupied territories, and some members of the underground district committees of the CP(B)U in Odessa).

The Romanians set up a controlled *Municipal Underground Committee of the CP(B)U* led by the traitor Fajn, and other provocation units. Stepan Tymoshkov's 'underground group' was among them (he was captured, recruited, and sent to Odessa by the Romanian special services in December 1941), who tried to legalize traitors after the war, and submitted lists of 12 groups (353 members) of the non-existent 'underground.' According to the operative development of 'Pendulum,' the Soviet counterintelligence exposed S. Plotnytskyi's pseudo 'NKGB underground' (28 persons). During the exposure of the Romanian pseudo underground in Odessa, 5 agents of the German and Romanian special services, 22 SSI agents, 56 traitors, 22 active collaborators, etc., were arrested.³⁸

Accordingly, the directive of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR of December 21st, 1944, #2534/c provided counterintelligence agents with the operational development of members of the Communist Party and Komsomol, among whom Hitler's intelligence agencies *Abwehrstelle Ukraine, SD, Sonderstab R, Romanian counterintelligence* and *Sigurantsa* established pseudo-underground, pseudo-

³⁷ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 1129-1130.

³⁸ HDASBU, fond 9, d. 75, f. 260-261.

guerrilla units, and carried out provocative work.³⁹

COOPERATION OF ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE WITH THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

In the interests of intensifying reconnaissance and sabotage work in the rear of the advancing Red Army, Romanian military intelligence tried to establish cooperation with the command of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In November 1943, *Vulturul* put forward proposals for cooperation with Ukrainian nationalists in obtaining military, economic and political information (in exchange for assistance). With the participation of a white emigrant, Colonel Oleksii Pavlov, the SSI headquarters of the 'Eastern Front Agency' prepared a report outlining the capabilities of the Ukrainian insurgent underground movement and its use against Soviet troops (subject to arms assistance). After the project was approved personally by the 'Leader' Ion Antonescu (*Rom. 'Conducător,'* 1940–1944), through the Captain C. Chirilovici SSI centre (Bacău), several trained and recruited SSI agents from OUN members in Bucharest were sent to the front line to establish contact and interaction with OUN and UPA forces.

Furthermore, during the war, the underground intelligence of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) carefully studied the main policy areas of the Romanian occupation administration, the armed forces, special and police forces located in Northern Bukovina, Odessa and Transnistria, in typical intelligence and information reports of OUN centres, such as "News from the Romanian occupation," and "Overview of the life of Zabuzhzhia (Transnistria)." At the same time, special attention was paid to the features of military units, gendarmerie, police, network of the secret political police (*Sigurantsa*), counterintelligence regime features, and the attitude of the population towards the Romanian administration.⁴⁰

As the Soviet army was advancing in the territory of modern Ukraine, Ukrainian insurgents operating under the political leadership of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists established contacts with the SSI headquarters and peripheral bodies. In particular, in October 1943 in Odessa, Pavlyshyn, a representative of the OUN Chief Commander (Provid) and the head of the OUN network in the territory of Transnistria, and his deputy Semchyshyn contacted the

³⁹ *Ibid.*, fond 60, d. 83554, f. 181-193.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, fond 13, d. 376, tom 32, f. 135–136; tom 21, f. 81–85.

leaders of the SSI Centre #3, Colonel Perju, and Captain Arghir, who announced the government's agreement to negotiate with the OUN.

An agreement was reached on the mutual refusal of warfare. In April 1944, in Galați, OUN emissaries met with Colonel Alexandru Ionescu, a new head of the above-mentioned intelligence centre. The latter announced a decree of the Romanian government on the release of Ukrainian nationalists and readiness to provide the UPA with military-technical assistance. 14 OUN members were sent to Romanian intelligence. Later, OUN and UPA members studied at an intelligence school led by Pavlyshyn 15–20 km away from Bucharest and were sent to the Soviet rear on condition that the Romanian side is provided with intelligence information. In turn, radio operators were trained for the UPA in Galați.⁴¹

The Soviet special services attempted to deploy guerrilla and sabotage activities in the territory of Romania. In June 1944, NKGB Lieutenant General T. Stokach, Chief of the Ukrainian Staff of the Guerrilla Movement (USGM), approved a plan of organisational and operational measures of the USGM to intensify combat operations of Ukrainian guerrillas and assist the guerrilla movement in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland in disrupting the export of industrial equipment and strategic raw materials from these countries to Germany, as well as communication routes that transported reserves to the front line.

It was also planned to create organisational and sabotage units of 25 people each, staffed by experienced guerrillas, and representatives of the peoples of Eastern Europe (up to 40–50%) from among the cadets of the USGM School of Special Purposes (SSP) (including 17 units in Romania).

The training of foreign organizers of guerrilla groups in the above-mentioned USGM SSP initiated in May 1944 was significant for the rise of reconnaissance, sabotage, and combat activities of foreign anti-fascists (a total of 930 foreigners came to school by November 1944: Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, residents of Yugoslavia, and Ukrainians of Transcarpathia), 764 people graduated by November 1st. The basis of 'miner-saboteur' training was a 240-hour 4-week program. Much attention was paid to bilateral training close to combat conditions, mine actions, fire and topographic training, the

⁴¹ Dmytro Viedienieiev, Gennadii Bystrukhin, *Mech i tryzub. Rozvidka i kontrozvidka rukhu ukrainskykh natsionalistiv ta UPA (1920–1945). Monohrafiia* [Sword and Trident. Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Movement of Ukrainian Nationalists and the UPA (1920–1945). Monograph], Kyiv, Geneza, 2006, p. 277-278.

basics of propaganda, and tactical training based on the real experience of the guerrillas.⁴²

In addition to the SSI as a separate military intelligence service, the 2nd (Intelligence) Department of the General Staff of the Romanian Army moved directly to the territory of modern Ukraine (to the rear of the 2nd Ukrainian Front advancing towards Romania), for which it created a number of peripheral bodies, i.e. 2nd Bureau A at the headquarters of the 4th Infantry Corps in Iasi (headed by Major Constantin Păunescu). The bureau's activities included agency work and sending agents (under the guise of local residents) to a depth of 100 km beyond the front line. Recruitment candidates were selected in military units from among officers and soldiers who had relatives in territories adjacent to the USSR and were trained in special schools of intelligence.⁴³

Romanian special services considered information and psychological operations to be effective activities. 'Military propaganda' bodies are known to have existed within the branches of the 2nd (Intelligence) Section of the General Staff in the occupied lands. Romanian specialists had to admit that the basis of the stability and resistance of the Soviet population was the psychological type of the new Soviet person, which they did not understand. It is interesting to note the SSI's conclusion that the Soviet government "had formed the necessary human material, imbued with communist ideology, ready to always and everywhere follow the USSR administration directives [...], the entire Soviet territory inhabited by people with completely changed domination of communist ideology."⁴⁴ In May 1942 in occupied Odessa, the Institute for Anti-Communist Studies and Propaganda was established to develop special propaganda content (a group of anti-Soviet local scientific and pedagogical intellectuals also worked in the institution).⁴⁵

CONCLUSIONS

During World War II, a separate central subordination service was established in Romania with the functions of military intelligence and military counterintelligence: the Special Information Service. Its headquarters was built on

⁴² Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy [Central State Archive of Public Associations of Ukraine], fond 62, inv. 1, d. 133, ff. 115-120.

⁴³ *Sovetskie organy...*, p. 762-763.

⁴⁴ Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi..., fond 57, inv. 4, d. 103, f. 18, 20.

⁴⁵ HDASBU, fond 60, d. 83503, f. 325.

a functional-territorial basis. SSI deployed a separate structure in the theatre of operations and in the rear of the Romanian army: the Intelligence Directorate of the Eastern Front Agency (*Vulturul*). The latter created a network of centres (branches) with subordinate offices and residencies.

At the same time, the intelligence service of the General Staff (2nd Department of the General Staff and its subdivisions within the army staffs of the respective levels), the navy, and aviation intelligence services operated. The main SSI and military intelligence activities were carried out in Southern Ukraine, Northern Bukovina, and Crimea (especially, since the USSR border regions served as an arena of intense confrontation between Romanian and Soviet special services in the 1920s and 1930s).

According to Soviet documents, they praised Romanian intelligence's operational capabilities and qualifications in gathering information and deploying sabotage and subversive activities. In fact, in the territory of modern Ukraine, the SSI became the second most critical opponent of Soviet counterintelligence and SMERSH bodies, and the disclosure of the SSI agents and active collaborators serving in Romania lasted in the Ukrainian SSR for at least several years after the war.

The leading activities of the SSI and other military intelligence institutions (excluding field intelligence) were as follows: studying open sources; using intelligence and information capabilities of military diplomacy and other international relations; creating numerous intelligence headquarters in the occupied territory by withdrawing the agents from the front line or leaving the residences to settle in the retreat; preparing and withdrawing sabotage groups from the front line; interrogating prisoners of war, defectors, and the population of the occupied territories; establishing cooperation in the exchange of information with the intelligence services of Romania's allies; creating pseudo-underground and guerrilla units operating under the guise of Soviet guerrillas; and using the anti-Soviet opposition, political emigration of the peoples of the USSR and the nationalist movement, anti-Soviet insurgents.

SSI counterintelligence units, together with the political police *Sigurantsa*, managed to inflict significant blows on the Soviet underground and in some NKVD intelligence residencies in Odessa and Mykolaiv (using both traitors and collaborators), e.g. the effective reconnaissance and sabotage residency 'Kira' by an intelligence officer V. Molodtsov (Badaiev). At the same time, other successful reconnaissance and sabotage residencies, i. e. Major M. Geft ('Zolotnikov'), remained undisclosed.

The Romanian special services also demonstrated an understanding of the long-term importance of information-psychological (information-humanitarian) confrontation based on the results of the study of public consciousness, and mental features of the enemy country's population.

REFERENCES:

1. Constantin Ion, *Gherman Pântea: între mit și realitate* [Gherman Pântea: Between Myth and Reality], Bucharest, Bucharest's Library Publishing House, 2010, 384 p.

2. *Deyatel'nost' organov gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* [Activities of State Security Agencies During the Great Patriotic War. Collection of Documents and Materials], Moskva, Vysshaya shkola KGBSSSR, 1964, 864 p.

3. Diaconescu Daniel, *Din istoria serviciului special de informatii 1940-1945* [From the History of the Intelligence Service 1940–1945], Târgoviște, Cetatea de Scaun Publishing House, 2018, 280 p.

4. *Din memoriile lui Eugen Cristescu* [From the Memoirs of Eugen Cristescu], Bucharest, State Security Council, Education Directorate (Unpublished, for internal use only), 1968, 144 p.

5. Dushin Nikolai, *Sovetskaya voennaya kontrrazvedka v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [Soviet Military Counterintelligence During the Great Patriotic War], in "Sbornik KGB SSSR," 1985, No. 106, pp. 7-16.

6. Fylypenko Artem, *Rumunski spetssluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate*, chastyna 1 [Romanian Special Services in the 20th Century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, part 1], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate>.

7. Fylypenko Artem, *Rumunski spetssluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate*, chastyna 2 [Romanian Special Services in the 20th Century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, part 2], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/pumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-2>.

8. Fylypenko Artem, *Rumunski spetssluzhby u XX stolitti: vid Sihurantsy do Sekuritate*, chastyna 3 [Romanian Special Services in the 20th Century: from Sigurantsa to Securitate, part 3], in <https://niss.gov.ua/news/statti/rumunski-specsluzhbi-u-khkh-stolitti-vid-siguranci-do-sekuritate-chastina-3>.

9. Haluzevyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy (HDASBU) [Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine], Funds 2, 9, 13, 16, 60.

10. Hristoforov Vasilii, *Organy gosbezopasnosti SSSR v 1941–1945 gg.* [State Security Structures of the USSR in 1941–1945], Moskva, Glavnoe arhivnoe upravlenie goroda Moskvy, 2011, 432 p.

11. Ilnytskyi V. I., Haliv M. D., Boichuk A. S., *Funktsionuvannia rumunskykh rozviduvalnykh i kontrrozviduvalnykh orhaniv u Transnistrii (1941-1944) (za materialamy HAD SBU)* [Functioning of Romanian Intelligence and Counterintelligence Structures in Transnistria (1941–1944) (based on Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine)], in “Zaporizhzhia Historical Review”, 2020, Vol. 3 (55), pp. 131-145.

12. Korovin Vasilii, *Sovetskaya kontrrazvedka v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [Soviet Counterintelligence During the Great Patriotic War], in “Trudy Vysshej Krasnoznamennoj shkoly KGB SSSR,” 1985, No. 35, pp. 43-56.

13. Măță Cezar, *Serviciile secrete ale României în războiul mondial (1939-1945)* [Romania’s Intelligence Services in the World War (1939–1945)], Iași, Demiurg Publishing House, 2010, 380 p.

14. Moraru Pavel, *România și bătălia informațiilor între Prut și Bug (1940-1944)* [Romania and the Information Battle between Prut and Bug (1940–1944)], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2011, 324 p.

15. Moraru Pavel, *Serviciile secrete si Basarabia (1918-1991). Dicționar* [The Intelligence Services and Bessarabia (1918–1991). Dictionary], Bucharest, Military Publishing House, 2008, 319 p.

16. Nikitchenko Vitalii, *Chekisty Ukrainy v period Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [Security Officers of Ukraine During the Great Patriotic War], in “Sbornik KGB pri SM SSSR,” 1971, № 2, pp. 66-82.

17. Palyvoda Volodymyr, *Spetsialni sluzhby Rumunii: vid ‘Sihurantsy’ do rozviduvalnoho spivtovarystva* [Romanian Special Services: from Sigurantsa to Intelligence Community], in “Vyklyky i ryzyky”. Bezpekovi ohliad Tsentru doslidzhen' armiyi, konversiyi ta rozzbroyennya [“Challenges and Risks”. Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies Security Review], 2017, No. 18 (81), pp. 24-33.

18. Petrenko P., *Bor’ba organov gosbezopasnosti s agenturnoj razvedkoj specsluzhb fashistskoj Germanii v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [The Struggle of State Security Agencies with the Intelligence Agency of Fascist Germany During the Great Patriotic War], in “Trudy Vysshej Krasnoznamennoj shkoly KGB SSSR,” 1985, № 35, p. 56-65.

19. Pintilie Florin, *Serviciul special de informatii din Romania: 1939-1947* [The Intelligence Service of Romania: 1939–1947], Bucharest, National Intelligence Publishing House, 2003, Vol. 2, 1248 p.

20. *Podryvnaya deyatel'nost' voenno-morskoj razvedki fashistskoj Germanii protiv Sovetskogo Soyuza nakanune i v period Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny 1941–1945 gg.* [The Subversive Activities of Naval Intelligence of Fascist Germany against the Soviet Union on the Eve and During the Great Patriotic War], Moskva, RIO VKSh KGB SSSR, 1977, 228 p.

21. *Sovetskaya voennaya kontrrazvedka. Sbornik dokumentov* [Soviet Military Counterintelligence. Collection of Documents], Vol. 3, Moskva, Vysshaya shkola KGB SSSR, 1984, 444 p.

22. *Sovetskie organy gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti v Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojne: sbornik dokumentov i materialov* [Soviet State Security Structures in the Great Patriotic War: Collection of Documents and Materials], vol. V, Moskva, Vysshaya shkola KGBSSSR, 1990, 1264 p.

23. Spânu Alin, *Istoria serviciilor de informații/contrinformații românești în perioada 1919-1945* [History of the Romanian Intelligence/Counterintelligence Services from 1919 to 1945], Iași, Demiurg Publishing House, 2010, 791 p.

24. Troncotă Cristian, *Mihail Moruzov și frontul secret* [Mihail Moruzov and the Secret Front], Bucharest, Elion Publishing House, 2004, 310 p.

25. Troncotă Cristian, *România și frontul secret 1859 – 1945* [Romania and the Secret Front], Bucharest, Elion Publishing House, 2007, 449 p.

26. Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy [Central state archive of public associations of Ukraine], Funds 57, 62.

27. Tsvetkov A., Petrenko P., *Bor'ba sovetskoj kontrrazvedki s diversionno-razvedyvatel'nymi formirovaniyami protivnika v gody Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny* [The Struggle of Soviet Counterintelligence with Sabotage and Intelligence Units of the Enemy During the Great Patriotic War], in "Trudy Vyshej Krasnoznamennoj shkoly KGB SSSR," 1985, No. 34, pp. 68-77.

28. Ustinov Ivan, *Iz istorii bor'by sovetskoj voennoj kontrrazvedki s nemecko-fashistskoj razvedkoj vo vremya vojny* [From the History of the Struggle of Soviet Military Counterintelligence with Nazi Intelligence During the War] in "Trudy Vyshej shkoly KGB pri SM SSSR," 1971, No. 2, pp. 50-62.

29. Viedenieiev Dmytro, Bystrukhin Gennadii, *Mech i tryzub. Rozvidka i kontrrozvidka rukhu ukrainskykh natsionalistiv ta UPA (1920–1945). Monohrafiia* [Sword and Trident. Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Movement of Ukrainian Nationalists and the UPA (1920–1945). Monograph], Kyiv, Geneza, 2006, 408 p.

30. Viedienieiev Dmytro, *Dialnist orhaniv ta viisk derzhavnoy bezpeky v Ukraini v period Druhoy svitovoy viiny (1939–1945 rr.)* [Activities of State Security Structures and Troops in Ukraine during World War II (1939–1945)], Kyiv, Natsionalna akademiia SBU, 2011, 98 p.

31. Viedienieiev Dmytro, Lysenko Oleksandr, *Protydiia radianskykh spetssluzhb nimetskii rozvidtsi y kontrozvidtsi na terytorii Ukrainy v 1941–1944 rr.* [Countering by the Soviet Special Services of the Activities of German Intelligence and Counterintelligence in the Territory of Ukraine in 1941–1944], in “Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal,” 2015, No. 1, pp. 69-91.