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Dossier: Romanian-Ottoman-Turkish Relations at the Centenary of the Republic of Türkiye

- Assessing the Romanian Army: A Review of the Ottoman Military Attaché's Report in Bucharest (1891)
- The Regime of General Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the Analysis of the Office for Documentation and Administrative Studies of Romania (1941)
- What Actually NATO Means for Them? Turkish and Romanian Historical Perceptions on NATO





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DOSSIER:
ROMANIAN-OTTOMAN-TURKISH
RELATIONS AT THE CENTENARY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKIYE

THE OTTOMAN CAMPAIGNS IN WALACHIA, 1394-1395

ALEXANDRU MADGEARU *

Abstract

The expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula started after the battle of Kosovopolje (15 June 1389) led to the occupation of Bulgaria in 1393 and to the first raid of the Turks in western Walachia. The voevode Mircea launched an attack against the base of those marauders (Karinovasi), in the context of a larger offensive organized by Sigismund of Luxemburg. As punishment, the Ottoman army led by Sultan Bayezid I entered in Walachia in the autumn of 1394. The date of the campaign was subjected to a long controversy, but there is no strong reason to deny the date of 10 October 1394 mentioned by the Serbian annals for the battle usually called "Rovine". The name "Rovine" was not a real placename, but a Serbian noun meaning "cliff" or "ditch", used to describe the features of the battlefield. The location of the battle is too disputed, but it was somewhere on the route from Turnu Măgurele to Curtea de Argeș. The battle was won by Mircea, but a part of his boyars preferred to support the alliance with the Turks. Their chief, Vlad, was perhaps the son of voevode Dan I. Mircea took refuge in his Transylvanian feud, and signed a treaty of alliance with Sigismund of Luxemburg at Brașov (7 March 1395). A Hungarian army entered in Walachia in April 1395 and contributed to the liberation of the fortress Turnu (also known as Little Nicopolis), which was conquered by the Ottomans in the previous campaign. This victory of the armies of Sigismund and Mircea determined a counteroffensive of Bayezid I in May 1395. Sigismund went back to Walachia at the beginning of July to revenge the defeat. The cooperation between Mircea and Sigismund was achieved too late to obtain the defeat of the Ottoman invaders. In the autumn of 1394, Mircea was able to stop the conquest of the entire Walachia, preserving a part of it, despite the treason of Vlad. This partial preservation of power allowed the agreement of 7 March 1395, whose outcome was the expedition of the Hungarian army in April 1395. However, the Ottoman forces remained strong enough to cancel the results of this campaign, in the counteroffensive from May 1395 commanded by Bayezid I against the joined forces of Mircea and Sigismund.

Keywords: *Bayezid I, Mircea, Sigismund of Luxemburg, Ottoman Empire, Walachia, Bulgaria, Dobrudja, battle of Rovine*

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Preliminaries

At the end of the 14th century, the Ottoman state reached the Danube, the natural frontier of the Roman Empire which has substituted. During a period of two decades, two of the successor states of the Constantinopolitan imperial power were conquered, entirely (Bulgaria), or partially (Serbia). The Tsar from Tarnovo Ivan Shishman accepted to be the vassal of Murad I in 1376, but this did not impede the following Turkish raids. Sofia was occupied in 1385, and Niš (which belonged to Serbia) in 1386. The Serbian knez Lazar Hrebeljanović from Kruševac was too compelled to become a vassal of Murad I, in 1385. His state was extended from Novo Brdo to Belgrade. The expansion of the Ottoman Turks in the northern part of the Balkan Peninsula was not stopped by the victory obtained in 1387 at Pločnik (south-west of Niš) by the armies of Lazar Hrebeljanović, of the Bosnian king Tvrtko and of the Albanian ruler Gjon Kastrioti, against the beilerbey of Rumelia Lala Şahin Pasha¹. Encouraged by this defeat, Ivan Shishman attempted the liberation from the vassalage (he refused to take part in that campaign against Serbia). After the battle of Pločnik, he refused to give Silistra, as he promised before. This treason was punished in 1388 by an offensive commanded by the Great Visir Çandarlızade Ali Pasha. The Tatar Emir Kutlubuga from eastern Moldavia refused to cooperate in the war against Ivan Shishman. The cities Preslav, Shumen and Silistra were occupied, and Ivan Shishman had no other chance than to become again the subject of Murad I. Even if the tsarate of Tarnovo continued to exist, its most part was already under Turkish occupation².

In the north-eastern part of Bulgaria existed the state created by the despote Dobrotić (from the Terter family). This state included the harbors Emona, Varna, Kavarna and Kalikakra³. After the death of Dobrotić in 1385 or 1386, came to the rule his son Ivanko Terter, who was until then the master of a territory centred in Dristra (Silistra). Nothing certain is known on the fate of Ivanko Terter after 1388. The land of Dobrotić, as well as Silistra, were acquired by the Romanian Voievode Mircea before 20 January 1390, the date of the first

document (the alliance with the Polish King Vladislav Jagiello) which mentioned his title *terrarum Dobrodictii despotus et Tristri dominus*⁴. It results that the land of Dobrotić and Silistra were conquered after the campaign of Çandarlızade Ali Pasha, when Silistra was occupied by the Turks⁵, therefore sometimes in 1389, when the Ottoman forces were concentrated elsewhere: in a new campaign against Serbia.

Eight or nine months after the subjection of Ivan Shishman, Murad I organized a new attack against Lazar Hrebeljanović. The Serbian ruler was from the beginning of 1389 the vassal of the Hungarian King Sigismund of Luxemburg. In the battle of Kosovopolje (near Priština) from 15 June 1389, the Ottoman army of around 40.000 men fought against the coalition commanded by the Knez Lazar Hrebeljanović. In the Ottoman army were included the troops of the Serbian vassals Marko Kraljević (the king of the southern Serbia) and Konstantin Dejanović from Velbujd. On the side of Lazar were the forces of the ruler from Priština Vuk Branković, other troops from Bosnia commanded by King Tvrtko and Vlatko Vuković, as well as other sent by Georgios Kastriotis from Albania. It is possible that also the tsar of Vidin Ivan Sratsimir contributed with some troops⁶. The participation of some Romanians sent by Mircea was mentioned in a late copy of the proclamation of the victory (*fetih-nâme*), and in several late Ottoman chronicles. The earlier Ottoman chroniclers (Orudj bin Adil and Aşıkpaşazade) did not mention the Romanians among the participants. They are absent in one of most reliable sources, the "Life of Stephen Lazarević" by Constantine of Kostenets, as well as in the oldest Serbian annals. The Byzantine sources (Laonikos Chalkokondyles, Dukas, Makarios Melissenos) ignore too this Romanian presence in the battle of 15 June 1389. By this reason, the assertions from the youngest Ottoman chronicles were considered to be doubtful⁷. Both supreme commanders died in this clash which prepared the reconfiguration of the geopolitical situation in the Balkan Peninsula. Stephen and Vuk Lazarević, the sons of Lazar, became the vassals of Bayezid I, being obliged to pay the *harach* and to fight on his side. The southern Serbia was left to another vassal, Vuk Branković⁸.

By turning northern Serbia into a vassal state, the Ottomans reached a part of the Danubian borderland. Very soon, in November 1389, Sigismund of Luxemburg began his attacks against the territory mastered by his former vassal Lazar Hrebeljanović⁹. On his turn, Mircea found the opportunity to expand his state beyond the Danube, like he did in the *terra* of Dobrotić. The so-called *Podunavia* was not located in Dobrudja or Bulgaria, as it was considered for a long time. Marian Coman has demonstrated that *Podunavia* was the region around Braničevo, annexed by Mircea in 1389 after the battle of Kosovopolje. This region was adjacent to the Banat of Severin, possessed by Mircea since the beginning of his reign. The name *Podunavia* was attested in the documents issued by Mircea for the first time at 4th September 1389 and until 10 June 1415. Before that, *Podunavlje* was under the domination of Lazar Hrebeljanović, since 1379. The name *Podunavlje* continued to be mentioned in the titles of the Serbian rulers until 1413. It was therefore a disputed territory, or a divided one¹⁰. This expansion put Mircea in rivalry with Sigismund, and by this reason he established the alliance with Vladislav Jagiello (the document was signed in Lublin on 20 January 1390). The treaty specified that Vladislav will act *...contra Sigismundo regem Ungariae, et ipsius subditos, pro toto ipsius posse atque potentia, nos debet et tenetibus adiuuvare, contra alios veros nostros emulos* ("has the duty to help him with all his powers against Sigismund, the King of Hungary and against his subjects, and against other our enemies")¹¹. Therefore, the Voievode Mircea was involved in the partition of the Bulgarian and Serbian territories. He became thus a rival also for Bayezid I.

The agreement with Vladislav Jagiello was concluded before the first Turkish invasion in Walachia. Sometimes in 1390, the city of Vidin was attacked by an army commanded by Firuz Bey, following the orders of Bayezid I. The tsar of Vidin Ivan Sratsimir remained in position under Ottoman domination (until 1396), and his land became the base for the first Ottoman raid (*akin*) in Walachia. The Ottoman chronicles recorded that Firuz Bey received

afterwards the order to cross the Danube. The *akingi* (irregular troops specialized in plunder) entered in "Iflak", taking a large booty in stuff and captives. The danger of future attacks determined Mircea to change the attitude toward Sigismund, because they had now a common enemy. On 20 March 1390, at Suceava, the envoys of Mircea signed a new agreement with Vladislav Jagiello, specifying that Mircea had the possibility to close peace with Sigismund¹².

It was sustained that Mircea accepted to pay the *harach* after the invasion of 1390, on the basis of the brief accounts from the chronicles of Mehmed Pasha and Idris Bitlisi¹³, but Mihai Maxim demonstrated that there is no proof in the Ottoman sources for the establishment of the vassalage before 1394¹⁴.

The attack of the army of Mircea against the base of the *akingi* from Karınovası (Karnobat) was a revenge for the raid of Firuz Bey, and came when a powerful enemy of Bayezid I, the bey of Kastamonu Süleyman Candaroğlu II (1385-1391), entered in contact with him, to join the plot against Bayezid I. The campaign against Karınovası was mentioned in several Ottoman chronicles, but the date is uncertain. Aurel Decei, who was the first historian who examined in detail this event, argued for the year 1393, but further studies proposed the year 1391, soon after the attack of Firuz Bey¹⁵. Because the Ottomans and their Serbian vassals continued the attacks on the Danubian borderland of Hungary in 1391-1393, Sigismund was preparing a powerful counteroffensive in Serbia and Bulgaria. There were some successful actions in northern Serbia and Bulgaria in the summer of 1392, and even Ivan Shishman was convinced by secret negotiations to rebel against Bayezid I¹⁶. Tasin Gemil considered that the attack against Karınovası was organized in the context of this large offensive¹⁷. This interpretation seems to be the best explanation for the reason why Mircea undertook such a long distance campaign inside the Turkish territory.

Bayezid I found out about the possible new treason of Ivan Shishman. The offensive actions of Sigismund of Luxemburg and Mircea fulfilled in Bulgaria in 1392 showed that the control on this territory was by no way certain. A new campaign was directed to the remaining

part of the Bulgarian tsarate in the summer of 1393. Tarnovo was conquered on 17 July 1393 after a siege of three months. In Nicopolis, where he took shelter, Ivan Shishman hoped that Mircea will help him, but this did not happen. He surrendered to Çandarlızade Ali Pasha. The tsarate of Tarnovo was existing no more, being incorporated in the Ottoman Empire. The Danube became the strong frontier of this emerging state¹⁸. Now, it was possible to punish Mircea for his offensive actions. Silistra was too conquered by the Turks in the summer of 1393, but Mircea kept the other possessions in Dobrudja until the end of his reign. The documents including in the title the expression “up to the Great Sea” are dated up to 10 June 1415. It was proven that only in 1420 Dobrudja (in the present meaning of the name) was included in the Ottoman Empire¹⁹.

The campaign of Bayezid I in Walachia in the autumn of 1394

After the conquest of the tsarate of Tarnovo, Bayezid I was finally able to tackle an urgent issue: the threat of new attacks performed by Sigismund of Luxemburg or by Mircea. Of course, it was supposed that it was easier to strike the smaller power, Walachia. Its ruler, Mircea, needed a severe punishment for what he did with the *akingi*. But, as he will find, he was underestimating this enemy. About one year after the surrender of Ivan Shishman, Nicopolis became the starting place for the campaign against Mircea. The target was the residence of the voievode, Argeş (*Arkiş* in the Ottoman sources). Meanwhile, Sigismund was too preparing a new campaign against the Turks, but for a later moment. On 6 September 1394, his envoy asked for naval support from Venice, announcing that the king will attack in the following May²⁰. Actually, this really happened, as it will be presented in the next section of this study.

The oldest testimony about the campaign of Bayezid I in Walachia is that of Philippe de Mézières. In *Une epistre lamentable et consolatoire sur le fait de la desconfiture lacrimable du noble et vaillant roy de Honguerie par les Turcs devant la ville de Nicholopoli en l'empire de Boulguerie*, addressed in 1397 to the Duke

of Burgundy Philippe le Hardi, he wrote that: *Baxeth, environ trois ans a passés, ot une autre bataille contre les Walaquiens en laquelle il fu desconfis a plain et perdi environ XXX m Turcs qui furent mors en la bataille, et grant plante de crestiens aussi furent mors*²¹. From this short but clear passage results that the battle occurred sometimes in 1394, and that it was a victory obtained by the Romanians in open field. Philippe de Mézières found these facts from some of the participants at the battle of Nicopole (25 September 1396). It is impossible to ascertain the manpower involved in the battle. If the number given by Philippe de Mézières was true, then it could be supposed that the Ottoman army had at least 50.000 men. The casualties were great on both sides.

The anonymous chronicle of the years 1296-1413 discovered by Ioan Bogdan is the next source in the chronological order. According to the examination of Dumitru Nastase, the original chronicle was written in Greek, possibly by the notary of the Patriarchate Ioannis Hortasmenos (1370-1431), and then translated in Medio-Bulgarian. After the relation about the battle of Kosovopolje it is mentioned the campaign against voievode *Mircho*. In the battle were killed many important Turks and the Christian vassals Marko Kraljević and Konstantin Dejanović. The arrows of the Romanians made so many casualties that Bayezid was forced to retreat. Yet, he was able to put one of the boyars to rule the country in the place of Mircho, who took refuge in the country of the Hungarians²².

The “Life of Stephen Lazarević” written in Serbia by the Bulgarian Constantine of Kostenets in 1431 mentioned the participation of the despot in the battle against Mircea in the year 6903, where Marko and Konstantin died²³. Complementary data about the campaign of Bayezid I in Walachia was provided by 39 Serbian annals from the 15th century (edited by Ljubomir Stojanović in 1890). In the campaign were involved the forces of the Serbian vassals Stephen Lazarević, Marko Kraljević and Konstantin Dejanović (the last two died during the fights). All these old annals are dating the battle in the year 6903 (1 September 1394 – 31 August 1395). Ten variants of the annals dated after 1460 are specifying that the battle when

died Marko Kraljević took place on 10 October 1394. For the death of Konstantin Dragaš, an additional note made on a manuscript from the Athonite Chilandar monastery (*Romanov tipik*) mentioned the date 17 May, but without the year and the place where he died. This notice opened the long debate about the date of the battle between Bayezid and Mircea. Some historians inferred that 17 May 1395 was the real date of the battle, because they were sure that Konstantin Dejanović, identified with what Konstantin Dragaš mentioned in the notice, died on that occasion. Actually, the notice concerned the brother of Konstantin, Ioan Dragaš, who died on 17 May 1380²⁴. This source should be excluded from those concerning the campaigns in Walachia of Bayezid I. Yet, it is possible that Konstantin Dejanović died in the next war, which, as we will demonstrate below, occurred in May 1395. This results from the donation document of his daughter Helen for the monastery Petra in Constantinople made in October 1395. From the text preserved only in a later copy, it could be inferred that more than three and less than six months passed since the death, but the place, the exact date and the circumstances of the death remained unknown to the author of the text²⁵. Therefore, there is no strong reason to deny the date of 10 October 1394 mentioned by the Serbian annals.

A larger account of the campaign was transmitted by the Byzantine historian Laonikos Chalkokondyles, who wrote after circa 70 years after the events. He wrongly placed it after the battle of Nicopolis, but the relation itself is valuable for the details about the hostilities. We quote here the English translation of Anthony Kaldellis: "Later he sent armies to ravage the land of Hungary and Hungarian Walachia. After some time, he campaigned against the Walachians and against Mircea the ruler of Walachia, accusing him of being at war and marching against him with the Hungarians. It was against this Mircea that Bayezid, the son of Murad, marched, accusing him of having sided with Sigismund, the emperor of the Romans, during the previous war against the barbarians. He crossed the Danube and pressed forward, reducing the land to slavery. Mircea assembled an army from his territory but decided not to march against him and offer battle; rather, he

first safeguarded the women and children, settling them on Mount Brasso. Then he followed the army of Bayezid through the forests of that land, which are extensive and enclose it on all sides, making it inaccessible for invaders and not easy to occupy. Following him, then, Mircea performed remarkable deeds, giving battle if any contingent of the enemy broke away to seek supplies in the surrounding countryside or to plunder pack animals. Thus he followed the army with great daring and he fought conspicuously well in shadowing Bayezid. It is said that as the Turkish army was moving through this area, Mircea gave it a very hard time, as he isolated it and would not let up in killing its men. At that point Evrenos, the minister, expressed the opinion that the army should encamp there and seek relief. (...) So at that time Bayezid encamped there for the rest of that day, and on the next day he ferried his army across the Danube in the safest way he could. And that is what the army did that held against Walachia"²⁶.

The Ottoman chronicles transmitted details not present in the Christian sources, but with the usual chronological confusions of these sources. According to the oldest chronicles of Enveri, Orudj bin Adil, and Şemseddin Ahmed Kemalpaşazâde, the Ottoman army commanded by Bayezid I crossed the Danube by Nicopolis and advanced toward Argeş. Somewhere near the town, and on the shore of the river with the same name, the Turks were encountered by the army of Mircea, which was marching from his residence. In the first day of the battle, the casualties were great for the both parts. During the following night, the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha ordered the drowning in the river of the bodies of the Turks and the retreat on another position. Next day, the Romanians saw only their dead, and, by this stratagem, they were convinced that their casualties were higher. The chroniclers sustain that Mircea decided to make peace and to pay the *harach*. After that, Bayezid returned by Nicopolis to Adrianople. In the chronicle of Sa'adeddin Mehmed Efendi it was mentioned the reason of the campaign (the previous attacks of Mircea), but the account of the battle is different: the Romanians waited the battle near a mountain and most of them were taken

prisoners. The author also stated that Mircea begged the sultan to be pardoned for his rebellion, promising the increasing of the harach which was paid until then²⁷.

A short Greek chronicle written in Macedonia sometimes in the 16th century mentioned the campaign of Bayezid I beyond the Danube in the year 6903. The voevode of the Vlachs Mircea defeated him and followed him up to the Danube. Marko and Konstantin died in the battle, and Bayezid I escaped with only few people²⁸.

The anonymous chronicle of the years 1296-1413 was the source of the Romanian universal chronicle of Mihail Moxa (1620), where the chapter about the battle was copied with some differences (the refuge to the Hungarians is missing)²⁹. The later Walachian sources ("Letopisețul Cantacuzinesc", its Arabic version, the "History" of Radu Popescu, and the work of Mihail Cantacuzino about the genealogy of his family) added a new element in the tradition about the battle: it was fought somewhere near the Ialomița River. Many Turks died and the rest run away beyond the Danube, not by a ford³⁰. The mention of the Ialomița River could be explained by a confusion with the battle fought by Iancu de Hunedoara on 2 September 1442. The army commanded by the beilerbey of Rumelia Şehabeddin Paşa crossed the Daube by Nicopolis and suffered a disastrous defeat on the lower valley of Ialomița. The Romanians captured a large booty³¹.

The "History" of Radu Popescu transmitted a more elaborated narration, based on several sources, but with some mistakes. He quoted "the historian Ghiorghe Franți" for the two battles between Mircea and Bayezid: one near Nicopolis and another on the Ialomița, but these names are not present in the work of Georgios Sphrantzes. He mentioned "Marco Cralevici, Costandin and Drăgaș", but as allies of Mircea. Now it is known that the manuscript of Georgios Sphrantzes used by Radu Popescu was a changed version composed by Makarios Melissenos at Naples in 1573-1576. In this version, it is mentioned that Bayezid I started the war against Mircea, who came to fight in an unfavourable place, that the sultan retreated, and that Mircea decided to pay tribute for preserving the peace³². This text (also

known as Pseudo-Sphrantzes), derived from that of Laonikos Chalkokondyles, has no intrinsic value. The genuine text of Sphrantzes did not include the passage about this battle. The name *Rovine* was taken by Radu Popescu from the chronicle of Gheorghe Brancovici, who includes a short notice: "6903. Mircea, the voevode of Walachia, defeated the emperor Baiat at Rovine. Then perished Marco Cralevici, Costandin and Drăgaș"³³.

It is strange that Dimitrie Cantemir, so well informed about the Ottoman history, wrote nothing about the war between Bayezid I and Mircea in his famous book. He presented only the battles of Kosovopolje and Nicopolis, and ascribed to the reign of Bayezid I the battle of Războieni won by Stephen the Great against Mehmed II (25-26 July 1476)³⁴.

The name *Rovine* which designates the battle between Bayezid I and Mircea was not a placename, but a Serbian noun whose meaning was "ravine", "cliff" or "ditch". It was mentioned in the Serbian annals, but only in the newest group. The expression *на ровинахъ* described the topographical situation of the battlefield: "at the cliffs"³⁵. Sergiu Iosipescu (who considered that the battle took place just at Curtea de Argeș) advanced an ingenious idea: that the Serbian word which means "ditch" was a misunderstanding of the Greek word *fosaton* mentioned in the short Greek chronicle presented above. In Greek, the word *fosaton* has several meanings, among whom "army", but also "trench" or "ditch". The Serbian who read this chronicle made a mistaken translation, using the other meaning of the word³⁶. The hypothesis is possible at a first glance, but it is contradicted by the date of the short chronicle established by Peter Schreiner: in the 16th century (the clue is the surname of the murder of Murad, Kobilić, used only since that period). The same Byzantinist also proved that this short chronicle was based on the Serbian sources. Since the Serbian annals which mentioned the expression *на ровинахъ* are dated in the 15th century, the idea proposed by S. Iosipescu (who quoted in a footnote the work of Schreiner!) could not be accepted³⁷. The name *Rovine* from the Romanian late medieval writings (Gheorghe Brancovici and Radu Popescu) do not reflect an internal tradition about the

battle, because Gheorghe Brancovici took it from the Serbian sources.

The existence of some toponyms *Rovina* or *Rovine* in Walachia could not be taken in itself as an indication for the location of the battle, because also in the Romanian language exists the noun *rovină* (of Slavic origin). Such toponyms were formed as many others on the basis of the topographical features. It would be more accurately to call the battle “at the Argeș River”, but the name *Rovine* remained established in the historiographical tradition. This does not mean that it should be excluded that one or another *Rovine* was the real place of the battle. For instance, the wood *Rovine* on the hills near the Dâmbovnic River, around the villages Tuțulești, Suseni and Costești. This place is located at circa 65 km south from Curtea de Argeș, on a possible way from Turnu, and the landscape is suitable for the location of the battle. Ion Nania mentioned even a placename *Puțul lui Baiazid* (“the well of Bayezid”) in the village of Negrași, and a local legend about the battle and the church erected after that, dedicated to Saint Paraskeve (the feast day 14 October is four days after the day of the battle)³⁸. Another identification in a place more close to Curtea de Argeș (20 km south), at Merișani (at the confluence of Vâlsan with Argeș), was proposed by Nicolae Constantinescu³⁹.

Gheorghe I. Ionescu proposed the location between the lower basin of Argeș and the Neajlov Rivers, in a region largely wooded, at a distance of around 70 km from the Danube (he considered that the noun *rovină* meant in fact a place eroded by water)⁴⁰. Other attempts of identification were based on the wrong idea that the army of Bayezid I entered in Walachia from Banat (as it was described in a late compilation whose lack of value was demonstrated by Aurel Decei). Because near Craiova exists some placenames *Rovine*, it was supposed that they indicate the location of the battle⁴¹.

Teodor Nicolau, an infantry general, explained very clearly why the single possible crossing place was by Turnu and why a detour by Craiova was a strategic absurdity. But, because he believed that the word *rovine* could also mean “meadow” (which was not true for the medieval placenames), he proposed a location at 30 km north of Turnu, at Putineiu, in the area of Călmățui⁴².

Regardless the location, it is clear that the result of the fight was determined by the tactical advantage of the wooded field, which compensated the higher number of the enemies. The skirmishes organized by the Romanians along the way to the battlefield situated somewhere near the river Argeș, on the way to the residence of Mircea, contributed too to the weakening of the enemy, who started well the campaign, with the conquest of Turnu. This fortification (also known as the Little Nicopolis) was built few years before, when Mircea became aware about the increasing danger of the Ottoman attacks. The central tower with the diameter of 17,4 m was encircled by a precinct ruined by the Hungarians in April 1395 (see the next section), and repaired by the Turks in 1397-1398⁴³.

The fight of 14 October 1394 was only a moment of the Turkish-Romanian war which continued in the spring of the next year. The oldest sources (Philippe de Mézières and the anonymous chronicle of the years 1296-1413) support the opinion that the battle was won by Mircea, because Bayezid I had great losses and it was forced to go back beyond the Danube. Yet, Mircea lost his position at Argeș, because those boyars who were inclined to a policy of alliance with the Turks against the Hungarians supported a rival: Vlad. These boyars thought that the resistance was illusory, knowing what happened in Bulgaria. This Vlad was most probable the son of voevode Dan I, and by this reason he was too entitled to the rule of the state. It is even possible that, before the attack, he went to Bayezid to claim his support for taking the power⁴⁴.

Vlad ruled at Argeș with the obligation of paying the tribute, but also Mircea continued to be voevode, ruling the eastern part of the country, including the former land of Dobrotić, as it could be inferred from the treaty closed with Sigismund on 7 March 1395 at Brașov (see the next section). It was supposed that he moved to the secondary residence of Târgoviște⁴⁵, but this seems to be difficult to accept, because the town was in a region which could be controlled by the Turks. It would be more probable that he took refuge in one of the Transylvanian feuds, Amlaș or Făgăraș, which offered a real shelter and opportunities

for completing the loses with local men. The anonymous chronicle of the years 1296-1413 mentioned that he went to the Hungarians when the boyars gave the power to another unnamed ruler⁴⁶. We remember that, according to Laonikos Chalkokondyles, Mircea took care of the women and children, sending to “mount Prasovon”. Of course, they were not settled in the mountains, but in the area beneath them, which corresponds with the land of Făgăraș.

The alliance between Sigismund and Mircea and its results

In the battle of 10 October 1394 and in the following five months, Mircea was left alone by his potential ally, Sigismund of Luxemburg. The Hungarian king was present in Transylvania since December 1394, but he had other concerns which seemed more important for him, like the campaign in Moldavia in January – early February 1395, where he suffered a surprising defeat in the ambush at Hindău (or Ghindăoani). The Moldavian voevode Stephen I was the vassal of his enemy Vladislav Jagiello, while the former voevode Roman was the vassal of Sigismund⁴⁷. In this humiliated situation which followed after the defeat in Moldavia, Sigismund became more eager to cooperate with Mircea against the Turks. Even left with only a part of his country, Mircea remained still able to continue the fight. The alliance was the obvious solution for both rulers, especially because Sigismund did not receive the expected help from Venice in an anti-Ottoman war. The alliance was stated in the treaty signed at Brașov on 7 March 1395. It is true that, formally, the document expressed vassalage relationships, but this is normal, because Mircea was the vassal of the Hungarian king since he possessed the Transylvanian feuds. Yet, the treaty could be defined as a military convention closed between equal partners, signed by Mircea because, as he stated, Sigismund already helped him against the Turks. Mircea swore to fight together with Sigismund against the Turks and their allies (*adherentes*). He signed with the small seal, because, as he stated, the big one was not available. It was supposed that the big seal was lost in the battle⁴⁸. In 4 April 1395 Mircea was still recognized

by the abbot Gavril of Cozia as *gospodin* in the inscription on a bell⁴⁹, when Vlad was ruling at Argeș, this means that the authority of the usurper was not too much extended. The eastern parts of his state, formerly in *terra Dobrotici*, were mentioned as a possible war region in the treaty.

Only one month after the treaty, Sigismund became truly involved in the hostilities from Walachia. On 6 April 1395, he decided to send against the Turks from Walachia (*ad partes Transalpinas*) an army commanded by Stephen of Losoncz⁵⁰. The fights of the Hungarian army in Walachia against the Turks and their Romanian allies (the adherents of Vlad) were narrated in the chronicle of Ioannes de Thurocz. The campaign which had as a final result the reconquest of Little Nicopolis could be dated in late April or early May 1395⁵¹. The fight at Little Nicopolis (Turnu) was also mentioned in two documents from 8 December 1397, and one from 4 April 1404⁵². Some historians considered that the army entered from Severin and that the main fight took place somewhere in Oltenia, perhaps near Craiova⁵³, but the expression *alpibus transitis illius terre ad plana descenderunt* is more suitable with a march from one of the passes of the Southern Carpathians through the lowlands. Besides that, the final point of the offensive was Turnu, easier to reach by that direction than by crossing several major rivers like Jiu and Olt.

A passage from the document of 8 December 1397 confirms the information from the chronicle of Ioannes Thurocz, that the conquest of the fortress occurred before the death of Queen Mary⁵⁴. Therefore, the day of the death of Sigismund's wife is an important chronological indication for the succession of the events in the spring of 1395. Sergiu Iosipescu thought that the date of the battle of “Rovine”, which for him is 17 May 1395, could be confirmed by Jan Długosz, who wrote in the chapter of the year 1395 of his *History of Poland: Die Lunae decima septima mensis Maii, Maria Hungariae Regina, Sigismundi consors et germana soror Hedvigis Poloniae Reginae, Budae moritur*. In his opinion, it is possible that in Poland two pieces of news arrived from Hungary, one about the death of the Queen Mary of Anjou and another one about the

battle of 17 May 1395, and that they were recorded viceversa, even if the battle itself is not mentioned in the text⁵⁵. This hypothesis was an attempt to provide a confirmation for the date of the death of Konstantin Dejanović, and it was later endorsed by other Romanian historians⁵⁶. But a Polish scholar proved that there are independent and earlier testimonies certifying that Queen Mary of Anjou died indeed on 17 May 1395, and that Jan Długosz did not substitute the date of her death with that of a battle he ignored⁵⁷. The question is closed. The conquest of Little Nicopolis could be dated at the end of April, or at most in the first days of May, taking into consideration the time needed by Sigismund to travel from there to Buda.

The victory of the armies of Sigismund and Mircea and especially the conquest of Little Nicopolis determined the counteroffensive of Bayezid I, soon after the departure of the Hungarian king. This attack was described in an anonymous chronicle from Firenze. The reliability of this source (put in evidence by Șerban Papacostea)⁵⁸ is founded on the knowledge that the Florentine merchants were able to gather from Hungary, where they were very active during the reign of Sigismund⁵⁹. Therefore, it is true that a Turkish-Romanian-Hungarian battle occurred sometimes in May 1395, but not necessary on the 17. If the battle of “Rovine” would have happened on 17 May 1395, why this source is speaking about Sigismund, and not about Mircea? The other sources (Philippe de Mézières, the anonymous chronicle of the years 1296-1413, the Serbian annals, the Ottoman chronicles), when they described the campaign of Bayezid I in Walachia, are mentioning only Mircea. Sigismund became involved in the war only after this campaign of the autumn 1394, when Mircea had no ally to resist in front of the Ottoman army.

The fights of April-May 1395 were also recorded in the chronicle of the monk of Saint-Denys (the author was identified as Michel Pintoin). In this source, the descriptions of the battles fought by Murad and Bayezid I mixed and distorted events from different moments between the battles of Kosovopolje and Nicopolis. For instance, Sigismund was victorious in the battle where Murad died (he did not fought at Kosovopolje!), but in the

first part of the same chapter, it is written that *Lamorat (...) cette année il avait amené avec lui, à travers la Valachie et la Bulgarie, qui étaient devenues des provinces de son empire, une multitude si prodigieuse de Turcs, (...). A la nouvelle de son arrivée, l'illustre roi de Hongrie rassembla en toute hâte une armée composée des nobles, des bourgeois, des gens d'église, et de tous les chrétiens de son royaume. (...) Le roi forma son avant-garde de quatre cents hommes d'élite, qu'il envoya à la rencontre des Turcs, afin de connaître leurs mouvements et de savoir comment il pourrait les attaquer. Mais à peine ce corps eut-il passé une rivière voisine, qu'il rencontra tout à coup les Barbares, sévit enveloppé de tous côtés et assailli vigoureusement. Malgré l'effroi que cause souvent une attaque imprévue aux coeurs les plus intrépides, les chrétiens opposèrent une courageuse résistance. (...) Les chrétiens obéirent avec empressement; retrouvant toute leur énergie, ils se jetèrent sur l'avantgarde des Turcs, dont ce premier engagement avait un peu épuisé les forces, et combattirent avec acharnement. Ils frappaient à coups redoublés avec une vigueur infatigable; leurs coups étaient presque tous mortels; car la plupart des ennemis étaient mal armés*⁶⁰. This fragment might concern the campaign of April 1395, and it was thus understood by several historians⁶¹.

After the burial of Queen Mary at Varadinum (Oradea), Sigismund went back to Transylvania to prepare a new campaign in Walachia, to avenge the defeat suffered in May. On 5 June 1395, he was at Pyspuky (today, Episcopia Bihorului), and on 21 June 1395, he was again at Brașov. After few days, he crossed again the mountains by the Bran-Rucăr Pass. It is known that on 6 July 1395 he was camped at Câmpulung, answering to some property litigations⁶². The wrong date at the end of June or early July of Mary's death supported by various historians determined a wrong understanding of the succession of events, placing the death of the queen in the days before this moment when the king was present at Câmpulung. By consequence, it was considered that Sigismund returned to Buda sometimes after the conquest of Little Nicopolis, dated in this time framework at an uncertain moment after 6th July, perhaps in the first part of August 1395⁶³.

On the basis of the document issued at Câmpulung, it could be instead supposed that the king was preparing a new campaign in Walachia, but the hostilities were not yet started. What happened then, it is not clear, but there is a document which records the presence of Sigismund in the army camp at Severin on 25 August 1395⁶⁴. From Severin, he returned again in Transylvania (is mentioned at Sibiu on 13 and 17 September, and at Mediaș on 26 September)⁶⁵.

The following confrontations between Sigismund and the partisans of Vlad and the fate of this usurper, until the battle of Nicopolis, are out of the subject of this study, whose conclusion is that the cooperation between Mircea and Sigismund was achieved too late to obtain the defeat of the Ottoman invaders. In the autumn of 1394, Mircea was able to stop the conquest of the entire Walachia, preserving a part of it, despite the treason of Vlad. This partial preservation of power allowed the agreement of 7 March 1395, whose outcome was the expedition of the Hungarian army in April 1395. However, the Ottoman forces remained strong enough to cancel the results of this campaign, in the counteroffensive from May 1395 commanded by Bayezid I against the joined forces of Mircea and Sigismund.

NOTES

¹ C. Jireček, *Geschichte der Bulgaren*, Praga, 1876, p. 339-340; I. Dujčev, *La conquête turque de la Péninsule des Balkans de 1371 à 1389*, „Études Historiques”, Sofia, 7, 1975, p. 98; A. Decei, *Istoria Imperiului Otoman până la 1656*, București, 1978, p. 53; S. W. Reinert, *From Niš to Kosovo Polje: Reflections on Murad I's Final Years*, in *The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389). Halcyon Days in Crete I: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon (11-13 January 1991)*. Edited by E. Zachariadou, Rethymnon, 1993, p. 171; J. V. A. Fine Jr., *The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest*, Ann Arbor, 1994, p. 407-408; T. Gemil, *Romanians and Ottomans in the XIVth-XVIIth Centuries*, Bucharest, 2009, p. 89-92; R. Estangüi Gómez, *Byzance face aux Ottomans. Exercice du pouvoir et contrôle du territoire sous les derniers Paléologues (milieu XIVe-milieu XVe siècle)*, Paris, 2014, p. 282.

² M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet, *Cronici turcești privind Țările Române, Extrase, vol. I, Sec. XV – mijlocul sec. XVII* (Izvoare orientale privind istoria României, 1), București, 1966, p. 110-111 (Mehmed Neşri), 300-301 (Sa'adeddin Mehmed); Mehmed Neşri, *Огледало на света. История на османския двор. Съставителство, предговор и превод от османотурски език Мария Калицин*, Sofia, 1984, p. 93; C. Jireček, *Geschichte...*, p. 341-342; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea cel Bătrân*. Ediția a II-a. Ediție îngrijită, note, comentarii și indice de G. Lazăr, București, 2000, p. 255-257; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 53; T. Gemil, *Raporturile româno-otomane în vremea lui Mircea cel Mare*, in *Marele Mircea Voievod*, coordonator I. Pătroiu, București, 1987, p. 333-334; V. Veliman, *Domnia lui Mircea cel Mare în viziunea istoriografiei otomane (sec. XV-XVII)*, ibidem, p. 401-402; S. W. Reinert, *From Niš...*, p. 172-173, 184; T. Gemil, *Romanians and Ottomans...*, p. 92-94; G. Atanasov, *Le maître (authentès – dominus) de Drăstâr Terter et le beg tatar Kutlu-Buga pendant les années 70-80 du XIV siècle*, in *The Steppe Lands and the World beyond them. Studies in honor of Victor Spinei on his 70th birthday*, editors F. Curta, B.-P. Maleon, Iași, 2013, p. 393-394.

³ I. Barnea, Șt. Ștefănescu, *Din istoria Dobrogei, vol. III. Bizantini, români și bulgari la Dunărea de Jos*, București, 1971, p. 348-361; M. M. Alexandrescu-Dersca Bulgaru, *La seigneurie de Dobrotiçi, fief de Byzance*, in *Actes du XIVe Congrès International des Études Byzantines*, 2, București, 1975, p. 13-20; S. Iosipescu, *Balica, Dobrotița, Ioancu*, București, 1985, p. 140-171.

⁴ *Documenta Romaniae Historica. D. Relații între Țările Române, volumul I (1222-1456)*. Volum întocmit de Ș. Pascu, C. Cihodaru, K. G. Gündisch, D. Mioc, V. Pervain, București, 1977, p. 122 (nr. 75). The other documents: p. 125 (nr. 78 – from 6 July 1391) and p. 139 (nr. 87 - from 7 March 1395); D. Onciul, *Mircea cel Bătrîn. Cuvântare comemorativă la cinci sute de ani de la moartea lui*, ibidem, p. 246; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 252-254; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 53-54; D. Barbu, *Faits historiques et fictions historiographiques: la despotie de Mircea le Grand et le “despotat” de Siliștra*, “Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes”, 24, 1986, 4, p. 320-321; A. Pippidi, *Sur une inscription grecque de Siliștra*, ibidem, p. 326-327; N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 89-90, 263, 278; J. V. A. Fine Jr., *The Late...*, p. 423; G. Atanasov, *Добруджанското деспотство (Към политическата, църковната, стопанската и културната история на Добруджа през XIV в.) (The Despotie Domain of Dobroudja. About the Political, Clerical, Economical and Cultural History of Dobroudja in the 14th Century)*, Veliko Tărnovo, 2010, p. 133-147, 190-197, 215-216.

⁵ M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet, *Cronici...*, p. 110-111 (Mehmed Neşri), 301 (Sa'adeddin Mehmed); V. Veliman, *Domnia...*, p. 402; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 257-258; B. Câmpina, *Lupta Țării Românești împotriva expansiunii otomane (1335-1415)*, in Idem, *Scrieri istorice*, vol. I. Îngrijit de D. Mioc, E. Stănescu, București, 1973, p. 235-243; N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare (1386-1418). 600 de ani de la urcarea pe tronul Țării Românești*, București, 1987, p. 89, 90, 263, 278; T. Gemil, *Raporturile...*, p. 333-335; T. Gemil, *Romanians and Ottomans...*, p. 93.

⁶ C. Jireček, *Geschichte...*, p. 342; J. V. A. Fine Jr., *The Late...*, p. 409-410; S. W. Reinert, *From Niš...*, p. 205-206; S. M. Ćirković, *The Serbs*, Oxford, 2004, p. 84; M. Uyar, E. J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans from Osman to Atatürk*, Santa Barbara, Denver, Oxford, 2009, p. 24-26; I. Tjujundžev, P. Pavlov, *Българската държава и османската експанзия, 1369-1422*, Veliko Tărnovo, 1992, p. 20.

⁷ M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet, *Cronici...*, p. 31 (Şükrüllah bin Şehabeddin Ahmed), 38 (Enveri), 111-112 (Mehmed Neşri), 155 (Idris Bitlisi), 301-302 (Sa'adeddin Mehmed), 441 (Kodja Husein); D. Onciul, *Titlul lui Mircea cel Bătrân și posesiunile lui*, in *Scrieri istorice...*, II, p. 125; D. Onciul, *Mircea...*, p. 248; N. Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains et de la romanité orientale, Vol. III: Les fondateurs d'état*, Bucarest, 1937, p. 345; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 265-272; A. Iancu, *Știri despre români în izvoare istoriografice sârbești (secolele XV-XVII)*, in *Studii istorice sud-est europene, culegere îngrijită de E. Stănescu*, vol. I, București, 1974, p. 16-17; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 54-55; N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 275; V. Panaite, *Ottoman...*, p. 112. The presence of the Romanians was accepted by V. Veliman, *Domnia...*, p. 399; T. Gemil, *Raporturile...*, p. 335-336; T. Gemil, *Romanians and Ottomans...*, p. 96; C. Rezachevici, *Rolul românilor în apărarea Europei de expansiunea otomană în secolele XIV-XVI. Evoluția unui concept în contextul vremii*, București, 2001, p. 160-161.

⁸ G. I. Constantin, *Le 'traité' entre le Sultan Bazajet Ier et la Valachie*, "Der Islam. Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients", 59, 1982, p. 258; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 56.

⁹ P. Engel, *Ungarn und die Türkengefahr zur Zeit Sigismunds (1387-1437)*, in *Das Zeitalter König Sigismunds in Ungarn und im Deutschen Reich*, ed. T. Schmidt, P. Gunst, Debrecen, 2000, p. 57-58; M. Ivanović, N. Isailović, *The Danube in Serbian-Hungarian Relations in the 14th and 15th Centuries*, "Tibiscum. Acta Musei Caransebesiensis, serie nouă, Istorie și arheologie", 5, 2015, p. 380.

¹⁰ *Documenta Romaniae Historica. B. Țara Românească, vol. I (1247-1500). Volum întocmit de*

P. P. Panaitescu și D. Mioc, București, 1966, p. 29 (nr. 10), 51 (nr. 21), 64 (nr. 28), 70 (nr. 32), 74 (nr. 34), 76 (nr. 35), 81 (nr. 38); M. Coman, *Putere și teritoriu. Țara Românească medievală (secolele XIV-XVI)*, Iași, 2013, p. 253-258; M. Ivanović, N. Isailović, *The Danube...*, p. 379. For the older opinions, see A. Ghiață, *Condițiile instaurării dominației otomane în Dobrogea*, in *Studii istorice...*, p. 45-46; S. Iosipescu, *Două chestiuni de geografie istorică: I. în Podunavia sub Marele Mircea Voievod al Țării Românești; II. locul bătăliei de la „Rovine”*, in *Marele Mircea...*, p. 434-441; N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 90.

¹¹ *Documenta Romaniae Historica. D...*, p. 122 (nr. 75); P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 282-283; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile Țării Românești cu Ungaria la sfârșitul veacului al XIV-lea*, "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie", Cluj-Napoca, 18, 1975, p. 91.

¹² *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor, Volumul 1, Partea 2: 1346-1450, culese de E. de Hurmuzaki; culese și însoțite de note și variante de N. Densușianu*, București, 1890, p. 322-324 (doc. CCLXII, CCLXIII); M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet, *Cronici...*, p. 48 (Orudj bin Adil), 83 (Așik Paşa Zade), 156 (Idris Bitlisi), 180 (Tevarih-i al-i Osman), 290 (Tarih-i Nişandji Mehmed-Paşa), 303 (Sa'adeddin Mehmed efendi), 441 (Kodja Husein); D. Onciul, *Titlul...*, p. 123-124; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 283, 293; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 56, 62; A. Decei, *Expediția lui Mircea cel Bătrân împotriva acingșilor de la Karınovası (1393)*, in *Relații româno-orientale. Culegere de studii*, redactor M. D. Popa, București, 1978, p. 153 (translation of *L'expédition de Mircea I contre les akıncı de Karınovası (1393)*, "Revue des Études Roumaines", Paris, 1, 1953, 130-151); V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 91; V. Veliman, *Domnia...*, p. 404-405; N. Constantinescu, *Mircea cel Bătrân*, București, 1981, p. 93; N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 279-280; V. Panaite, *Ottoman...*, p. 112; C. Rezachevici, *Rolul...*, p. 156, 163; T. Gemil, *Romanians and Ottomans...*, p. 34, 99-101.

¹³ M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet, *Cronici...*, p. 113 (Mehmed Neşri), 156 (Idris Bitlisi); V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 90-91; G. I. Constantin, *Le 'traité'...*, p. 259-262; V. Panaite, *Ottoman Expansion to the North of Danube: Walachia and Moldavia (14th-16th century)*, in *The Turks*. Edited by C. G. Hasan, C. C. Oğuz, O. Karatay, vol. 3. *Ottomans*, Ankara, 2002, p. 112-113; T. Gemil, *Romanians and Ottomans...*, p. 34-35; M. Rhoads, *Bayezid I's Foreign Policy Plans and Priorities: Power Relations, Statecraft, Military Conditions and Diplomatic Practice in Anatolia and the Balkans*, in *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204-1453. Crusade, Religion and Trade between Latins, Greeks*

and Turks, ed. N. G. Chrissis, M. Carr (Crusades Subsidia, 5), Farnham, 2014, p. 188.

¹⁴ M. Maxim, *Cu privire la înțelegerile de pace româno-otomane din timpul domniei lui Mircea cel Mare*, in *Marele Mircea...*, p. 374-377. See also P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 294; C. Rezachevici, *Rolul...*, p. 163.

¹⁵ M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet, *Cronici...*, p. 39 (Enveri), 156-157 (Idris Bitlisi); V. Veliman, *Domnia...*, p. 405; A. Decei, *Expediția...*, p. 140-155; N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 282-283; N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 281; N. Pienaru, *Relațiile lui Mircea cel Bătrân cu emiratul pontic Candar-oğullari*, "Revista Istorică", serie nouă, 7, 1996, 7-8, p. 483-510; D. I. Mureșan, *Avant Nicopolis: la campagne de 1395 pour le contrôle du Bas-Danube*, "Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire", 83, Vincennes, 2003, p. 117-118; C. Rezachevici, *Rolul...*, p. 165; Ș. Andreescu, *Despre titlul lui Mircea cel Bătrân, domn al Țării Românești*, "Studii și materiale de istorie medie", 35, 2017, p. 13.

¹⁶ C. Jireček, *Geschichte...*, p. 345; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 294; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 92; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 61; T. Gemil, *Raporturile...*, p. 342; N. Constantinescu, *Mircea...*, p. 93-95; G. I. Constantin, *Le 'traité'...*, p. 263; M. Diaconescu, *The Relations of Vassalage between Sigismund of Luxemburg, King of Hungary, and Mircea the Old, Voivode of Walachia*, "Mediaevalia Transilvanica", Satu Mare, 2, 1998, 2, p. 254-255, 273; S. M. Ćirković, *The Serbs...*, p. 86; M. Ivanović, N. Isailović, *The Danube...*, p. 380; T. Pálosfalvi, *From Nicopolis to Mohács. A History of Ottoman-Hungarian Warfare, 1389-1526* (The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, 63), Leiden, Boston, 2018, p. 53-54.

¹⁷ T. Gemil, *Raporturile...*, p. 342; T. Gemil, *Romanians and Ottomans...*, p. 103-107.

¹⁸ N. Iorga, *Histoire...*, p. 350-351; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 294-296; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 62; I. Tjutjundžev, P. Pavlov, *Българската...*, p. 20-22.

¹⁹ *Documenta Romaniae Historica. B...*, p. 64 (nr. 28), 70 (nr. 32), 74 (nr. 34), 76 (nr. 35), 81 (nr. 38) D. Onciul, *Mircea...*, p. 246-247; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 295-297; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 62; G. I. Constantin, *Le 'traité'...*, p. 264; A. Ghiață, *Condițiile...*, p. 71-94; R. Șt. Vergatti, *Dobrogea lui Mircea cel Mare*, in *Mircea cel Mare, scutul Europei*, ed. D. Zamfirescu, București, 2009, p. 629-651.

²⁰ S. Ljubić, *Listine o odnošajih između južnoga slavenstva i Mletačke Republike. Knjiga IV. Od godine 1358 do 1403* (Monumenta Spectantia Historiam Slavorum Meridionalium, IV), Zagreb, 1874, p. 335-336 (doc. 476); *quod propter invasiones Turchorum in regno suo ipse deliberavit cum principibus,*

baronibus, fratribus et amicis suis partium suarum de mense mai proximo venturo movere se cum potenti exercitu suo et ire contra dictos Turchos ad damnum et destructionem suam, et quod propterea nobis placeat dare sibi super hoc consilium, auxilium et favorem et cet; L. Pilat, O. Cristea, *The Ottoman Threat and Crusading on the Eastern Border of Christendom during the 15th Century* (East Central and Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages, 450-1450, 48), Leiden, Boston, 2018, p. 54.

²¹ The work was published in *Oeuvres de Frossairt, publiées avec les variantes des divers manuscrits par M. Le Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove*, tome 16, Bruxelles, 1872, p. 511. I was not able to see the new edition by Ph. Contamine and J. Paviot (Paris, 2008); N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 297; C. Rezachevici, *Bătălia de la Rovine - un moment de vârf al rezistenței românești antiotomane*, "Revista Arhivelor", 71, 1994, 4, p. 320.

²² I. Bogdan, *Ein Beitrag zur bulgarischen und serbischen Geschichtschreibung*, "Archiv für slavische Philologie", Leipzig, 13, 1891, 4, p. 530, 538-539; I. Tjutjundžev, *Българската анонимна хроника от XV век*, Veliko Târnovo, 1992, p. 90; D. Nastase, *Cronica expansiunii otomane, 1296-1417*, in *In honorem Ioan Caproșu. Studii de istorie. Volum îngrijit de L. Leuștean, M. Magdalena Székely, M. R. Ungureanu, P. Zahariuc*, Iași, 2002, p. 255.

²³ G. Jovanović, *Константин Философ, Живот Стефана Лазаревића деспота српског*, Belgrad, 2009, p. 40-41 (c. 33); A. Iancu, *Știri...*, p. 17.

²⁴ D. Onciul, *Titlul...*, p. 125; D. S. Radojičić, *La chronologie de la bataille de Rovine*, "Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen", 5, 1928, 4-6, p. 136; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 298-299; A. Iancu, *Știri...*, p. 17; S. Iosipescu, *Doi chestiuni...*, p. 445; N. Constantinescu, *Puncte de vedere asupra datării Bătăliei de la Rovine („17. V.1395“)*, "Revista Istorică", serie nouă, 1, 1990, 7-8, p. 784, 788-792; C. Rezachevici, *Bătălia...*, p. 320. The volume edited by Dan Zamfirescu, *Mircea cel Mare, scutul Europei*, București, 2009 is the largest contribution supporting the date of 17 May 1395 as the single battle between Mircea and Bayezid I.

²⁵ F. Miklosich, I. Muller, *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani MCCCXV-MCCCCII e codicibus manu scriptis Bibliothecae Palatinae Vindobonensis*, vol. II, Wien, 1862, p. 260-262; C. Litzica, *Studii și schițe greco-române*, București, 1912, p. 28-30; D. S. Radojičić, *La chronologie...*, p. 137-139; N. Iorga, *Cu privire la luptele lui Mircea cu turcii*, "Convorbiri Literare", 35, 1901, p. 473-476 (Idem, *Studii asupra evului mediu românesc. Ediție îngrijită de Ș. Papacostea*, București, 1984, p. 141-144); S. Iosipescu, *De la bătălia de la „Rovine” la Istoria Polonă a lui Jan Dlugosz*, "Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și

Arheologie „A. D. Xenopol”, Iași, 23, 1986, 2, p. 707; N. Constantinescu, *Puncte...*, p. 784, 793-795; C. Rezachevici, *Bătălia...*, p. 320; M. Diaconescu, *The Relations...*, p. 255.

²⁶ Laonic Chalcocondil, *Expuneri istorice*, în românește de V. Grecu (Scriptores byzantini, II), București, 1958, p. 64; Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *The Histories*. Translated by A. Kaldellis, Cambridge (Massachusetts), London, 2014, p. 126/127-128/129; C. Litzica, *Studii...*, p. 14-17; N. Iorga, *Histoire...*, p. 357; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 298; R. R. Rosetti, *Istoria...*, p. 97; N. Constantinescu, *Mircea...*, p. 100.

²⁷ M. Guboglu, M. Mehmet, *Cronici...*, p. 39 (Enveri), 48-49 (Orudj bin Adil), 304 (Sa'adeddin Mehmed Efendi); V. Veliman, *Domnia...*, p. 407-414 (Hasan Beyzâde, Şemseddin Ahmed bin Süleyman Kemal Paşa-zâde); R. R. Rosetti, *Istoria artei militare a românilor până la mijlocul veacului al XVII-lea*. Ediție de P. Otu, București, 2003, p. 95-97; C. Rezachevici, *Bătălia...*, p. 321.

²⁸ A. D. Karpozilos, G. M. Parassoglou, *Διήγησις Βασιλέων τῶν Ἰσραηλιτῶν. A Short Chronicle*, “Byzantion. Revue internationale de études byzantines”, Bruxelles, 42, 1972, 1, p. 76, 81; P. Schreiner, *Die byzantinischen Kleinchroniken*, Wien, 1975, 1977, 1979, vol. I, p. 558-560, 562 (Chronik 72a); II, p. 50, 357; III, p. 115, 164; *Fontes Historiae Daco-Romanae (Izvoarele istoriei României)*, vol. IV. Scriitori și acte bizantine, secolele IV-XV, publicate de H. Mihăescu, R. Lăzărescu, N. Ș. Tanașoca, T. Teoteoi, București, 1982, p. 560/561.

²⁹ Mihail Moxa, *Cronica universală. Ediție critică, însoțită de izvoare, studiu introductiv, note și indici de G. Mihăilă*, București, 1989, p. 211; G. Mihăilă, *Cronica evenimentelor din Peninsula Balcanică (1296-1417) în comparație cu traducerea românească a lui Mihail Moxa*, “Academia Română, Memoriile Secției de Științe Filologice, Literatură și Arte”, seria IV, tom 11, 1989, p. 13-27.

³⁰ *Cronicari munteni. Ediție îngrijită de M. Gregorian*, vol. I, București, 1961, p. 84-85 (“Le-topisețul Cantacuzinesc”), 239-240 (Radu Popescu); I. Feodorov, *La chronique de Valachie (1292-1664). Texte arabe du Patriarce Macaire Za'im. Introduction, édition du texte arabe et traduction française*, “Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph”, Beyrouth, 52, 1991-1992, p. 41: *Après celui-ci vint Mircea-voivode l'Ancien. C'est lui qui fit bâtir le monastère de Cozia. Celui-ci livra une grande bataille à Bayazid, le chef des Agaréens, à Ialomița, et remporta la victoire sur lui. Il en tua, dans la lutte, des foules innombrables. Et Bayazid se sauva en passant le Danube et revint chez lui.*; N. Iorga, *Genealogia Cantacuzinilor de banul Mihai Cantacuzino*, București, 1902, p. 496.

³¹ As considered too S. Iosipescu, *Două chestiuni...*, p. 444-445. For the battle, see E. C. Antoche, G. Işksel, *Les batailles de Sibiu (22 mars 1442) et de la rivière de Ialomița (2 septembre 1442). Essai de reconstitution d'après les sources de l'époque*, in *Extincta est lucerna orbis: John Hunyadi and His Time. In Memoriam Zsigmond Jakó*, ed. A. Dumitran, L. Málly, A. Simon, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, p. 416-425.

³² Gergios Sphrantzes, *Memorii, 1401-1477 În anexă: Pseudo-Phrantzes: Macarie Melissenos, Cronica 1258-1481. Ediție critică de V. Grecu*, București, 1966, p. 222/2223; Pseudo-Sphrantzes (Macarios Melissenos, I, 22), in *Fontes...*, p. 442/443.

³³ Gheorghe Brancovici, *Cronica românească. Ediție critică de D. Mioc, M. Adam-Chiper* (Cronicile medievale ale României, XI), București, 1987, p. 61.

³⁴ D. Cantemir, *Istoria Creșterilor și a Descreșterilor Curții Othoman[n]ice sau Aliothman[n]ice, de la primul început al neamului adusă până în vremurile noastre*. Traducere de D. Slușanschi, vol. I, București, 2012, p. 67-69.

³⁵ P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 299; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 63; N. Şerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 293; C. Rezachevici, *Bătălia...*, p. 319-320; F. Petcu, C. Topoe, *Povestea unei ficțiuni: legenda bisericii lui Mircea cel Bătrân de la Mănăstirea Jitianu*, “Argesis. Studii și comunicări. Seria istorie”, Pitești, 29, 2020, p. 73-76.

³⁶ S. Iosipescu, *De la bătălia...*, p. 710-711; S. Iosipescu, *Două chestiuni...*, p. 443, 446.

³⁷ See also A. V. Diță, *Din nou despre bătălia de la Rovine*, in *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 65-66.

³⁸ G. T. Ionescu, *Unde sunt Rovinele bătăliei din 1394*, in Idem, *Contribuții la istoria românilor (Studii și materiale). Îngrijirea ediției, studiu introductiv și note de I. Căndea*, I, Brăila, 2004, p. 206-207; A. A. Bolşacov-Ghimpu, *Localizarea bătăliei de la Rovine*, “Studii și materiale de istorie medie”, 4, 1960, p. 391-394; I. Nania, *Contribuții la problema localizării luptei de la Rovine*, „Studii și articole de istorie”, 5, 1963, p. 431-435; Idem, *Localizarea și datarea luptelor de la Rovine și de „la locul numit Argeș”*, „Argesis. Studii și comunicări. Seria istorie”, Pitești, 11, 2002, p. 159-168; I. Bratu, *Și totuși, unde sunt Rovinele?*, „Revista de Istorie Militară”, 8, 1997, 5-6 (45-46), p. 83-87.

³⁹ N. Constantinescu, *Mircea...*, p. 103.

⁴⁰ G. T. Ionescu, *Unde sunt...*, p. 212-227.

⁴¹ B. P. Hasdeu, *Originile Craiovei, 1230-1400*, București, 1878, p. 57-60; N. Iorga, *Histoire...*, p. 355; Z. Gărău, *Noi argumente privind localizarea bătăliei de la Rovine, lângă Craiova. O ipoteză de lucru*, „Oltenia. Studii și comunicări”, Craiova, 3, 1981, p. 72-77; C. C. Giurescu, *Historica-geographica. Localizări de orașe, cetăți, sate și locuri*

de bătălie, in Idem, *Probleme controversate în istoriografia română*, București, 1977, p. 162-165. For the criticism of the document and of the alledged itinerary by Banat: A. Decei, *Deux documents turcs concernant les expéditions des sultans Bayazid Ier et Murad II dans les Pays Roumains*, "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", 13, 1974, 3, p. 395-413; I. Nania, *Localizarea...*, p. 156-157; D. I. Mureșan, *Avant Nicopolis...*, p. 120-123; M. Neagoe, *Mistificări grosolane ale istoriei României. De la Mihail Roller la Neagu Djuvara și Lucian Boia*, Târgoviște, 2014, p. 75-76, 174-180; G. T. Ionescu, *Unde sunt...*, p. 208-210.

⁴² T. Nicolau, *Două erori istorice*, București, 1934, p. 3-16. His conclusions were adopted by R. R. Rosetti, *Istoria...*, p. 96-97.

⁴³ H. Chircă, C. Bălan, *O inscripție din 1397-1398 privitoare la stăpânirea turcească de la Turnu*, „Studii și materiale de istorie medie”, 3, 1959, p. 359-364; G. I. Cantacuzino, *Cetăți medievale din Țara Românească în secolele XIII-XVI*, București, 2001, p. 184-198.

⁴⁴ D. Onciul, *Titlul...*, p. 127; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 303-304; B. Cămpina, *Lupta...*, p. 264-266; A. Decei, *Istoria...*, p. 63-64; N. Constantinescu, *Mircea...*, p. 106-107; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 95; G. I. Constantin, *Le 'traité'...*, p. 267-268, 278-279; O. Iliescu, *Vlad Ier, voivode de Valachie: le règne, le sceau et les monnaies*, "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", 27, 1988, 1-2, p. 73-105; G. T. Ionescu, *Contribuții la cronologia domniei lui Mircea cel Bătrîn și a lui Vlad Voievod în Țara Românească*, in Idem, *Contribuții...*, p. 133-136; C. Rezachevici, *Cronologia critică a domnilor din Țara Românească și Moldova, a. 1324-1881, vol. I. Secolele XIV-XVI*, București, 2001, p. 82; M. Rhoads, *Bayezid I's...*, p. 188-189.

⁴⁵ G. T. Ionescu, *Contribuții...*, p. 139-144; D. Căprăroiu, *Orașul medieval în spațiul românesc extracarpatic (secolele X-XIV). O încercare de tipologizare a procesului genezei urbane*, Târgoviște, 2014, p. 206-207.

⁴⁶ N. Iorga, *Histoire...*, p. 357-358 and M. Rhoads, *Bayezid I's...*, p. 189 considered that Mircea took refuge at Brașov. M. Diaconescu, *The Relations...*, p. 257 is certain that the land of Făgăraș was the real place of the refuge.

⁴⁷ P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 305-308; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 96.

⁴⁸ *Documenta Romaniae Historica. D...*, p. 138-142 (nr. 87); N. Iorga, *Histoire...*, p. 358-359; R. R. Rosetti, *Istoria...*, p. 99; B. Cămpina, *Lupta...*, p. 262-263; G. T. Ionescu, *Contribuții...*, p. 142-144; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 93, 96-98; T. Gemil, *Raporturile...*, p. 345-346; M. Diaconescu, *The Relations...*, p. 257-258, 273-276, 281; N. Constantinescu, *Puncte...*, p. 798; O. Iliescu, *Vlad Ier, voivode de Val-*

achie: le règne, le sceau et les monnaies, "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", 27, 1988, 1-2, p. 76-77; C. Rezachevici, *Bătălia...*, p. 321-322.

⁴⁹ C. Bălan, *Inscripțiile medievale și din epoca modernă a României. Volumul 2. Județul istoric Argeș (sec. XIV-1848)*, București, 1994, p. 238-239 (nr. I 257).

⁵⁰ *Documenta Romaniae Historica. D...*, p. 149-150 (nr. 93); G. T. Ionescu, *Contribuții...*, p. 145-146; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 100-101; N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 306; N. Constantinescu, *Puncte...*, p. 799-800.

⁵¹ Johannes de Thurocz, *Chronica Hungarorum, I. Textus (ediderunt E. Galántai, J. Kristó)*, Budapest, 1985, p. 210-211 (c. 201); János Thuróczy, *Chronicle of the Hungarians. Translation by F. Mantello, Foreword and Commentary by P. Engel*, Bloomington, 1991, p. 47-48: Sigismund made war on the transalpine peoples, who had hired a powerful band of Turks to defend them because they did not think they could rely on their own strength alone. When the royal troops had crossed the Alps and descended to the level ground of that region, and when the two enemies had arranged themselves in formation and engaged in a pitched battle, each eager to put their own strength to the test, both the Turks and the Walachians at once sought protection in flight, terrified by the flashing of the brightly shining armor that shielded the troops of the royal expedition. The king's army pursued them as long as it could. The Turks and the Walachians were falling left and right, and many more would have been added to the fallen had the horses of the king's knights, weighed down by the enormous load of armor on their backs, been able to catch up with those in flight, and had the arrival of nightfall not provided the enemy with a safe crossing of the Danube. After the dispersal of the opposing forces, King Sigismund encircled the fortress of Little Nicopolis in a ferocious siege. Both Turks and Walachians were at that time guarding this fortress, and during their frequent sorties from the walls they caused much disorder in the royal army. After, however, the king had recourse to siege-machines, he reduced a great part of the fortress to ruin, captured it, and, having executed some of its defenders and taken others captive, he handed it over for safekeeping to a Hungarian garrison. At length the successful king returned to Hungary in triumph, having imposed the yoke of obedience upon the people of these regions. Yet before Sigismund had arrived home, Queen Mary succumbed to a grave illness, which ended both her reign and her life.

⁵² *Documenta Romaniae Historica. D...*, p. 159-160 (nr. 100), 162, 167 (nr. 101), 177-178 (nr. 108); D. Onciul, *Titlul...*, p. 128; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 108.

⁵³ V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 101; N. Constantinescu, *Puncte...*, p. 800; D. I. Mureșan, *Avant Nicopolis...*, p. 124.

⁵⁴ *Documente...*, p. 384 (doc. CCCXXIII): *enique medio tempore et interim, dum haec fierent et agerentur, Inclyta Princeps et Domina Maria, felicitis reminiscenciae, quondam conthoralis nostra perchara, Domino Coeli imperante, rebus exempta est humanis...* The passage was not reproduced in *Documenta Romaniae Historica. D...*, p. 159-160 (nr. 100).

⁵⁵ Joannis Długossii seu Longini Canonici Cracoviensis *Historiae Polonicae...*, cura et impensis Alexandri Przeździecki, tomus III, Cracovia, 1876, p. 514; S. Iosipescu, *De la bătălia...*, p. 711; S. Iosipescu, *Carpații sud-estici în evul mediu târziu (1166-1526). O istorie europeană prin pasurile montane*, Brăila, 2013, p. 227.

⁵⁶ N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 309.

⁵⁷ M. Salamon, *On the credibility of an item in Jan Długosz's Chronicle May 17, 1395 - the date of the battle of Rovine or of the death of Queen Mary?*, in *Mélanges offerts à Oktawiusz Jurewicz a l'occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire* (Byzantina Lodziensia, 3), Red. W. Ceran, Łódź, 1998, p. 164-170. D. I. Mureșan, *Avant Nicopolis...*, p. 123 is the only Romanian historian who took into consideration this study. See also A. V. Diță, *Din nou...*, p. 63-65; Idem, *Despre o ficțiune istoriografică*, in *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 88-107.

⁵⁸ E. Bellondi, *Cronica volgare di Anonimo Fiorentino dall'anno 1385 al 1409 già attribuita a Piero di Giovanni Minerbetti*, in *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores. Raccolta degli storici italiani dal cinquecento al millecinquecento ordinata da L.A. Muratori*. Nuova edizione riveduta ampliata e corretta, vol. XXVII, 2, Città di Castello, 1915, p. 197: *Come tra il Re d'Ungheria e' l Baisetto furono grandi battaglie, e' l Baisetto vinse per allora. In questo tempo del mese di maggio 1395, avendo il Re d'Ungheria raunata molta gente d'arme per riparare che il Baisetto, figliuolo del Moratto Bai turco, il quale con più di cento cinquanta migliaia d'uomini armati veniva addosso per torli il reame d'Ungheria, ed essendo li loro campi vicino l'uno all'altro, e ordinato ciascuno di loro la sua gente a battaglia, ciascuno confortati li suoi a bene operare e valentemente l'una parte e l'altra combatterono, e con buon animo corsero alla battaglia, nella quale molta gente fu morta; ma molti più de Turchi che di Cristiani vi morirono, ma niuna delle parti di di fu vinta. Poi l'altro di, ricominciata tra loro battaglia aspra e crudele e presso che*

tutto il di combattutisi insieme con grande mortalità dell'una parte e dell'altra, pure alla fine il campo rimase al Baisetto e a' Turchi, comeché molti più furono morti de' Turchi che de' Cristiani. E per questa vittoria con loro avuta dal Baisetto, tutta Balacchia s'arrendè al Baisetto, e lui ubbidirono. Ma pure il Baisetto, per la grande perdita che avea fatto della sua gente, si tornò indietro con quella gente che rimasa gli era, che molta più n'avea perduta; e' l re Gismundo d' Ungheria si tornò a Buda con grande perdita fatta della sua gente, con isperanza di ristorare l'anno vegniente a tutto il suo onore perduto. Ș. Papacostea, *Mircea cel Bătrân și Baiazid. O între-gire la cunoașterea confruntărilor lor armate*, „Studii și materiale de istorie medie”, 16, 1998, p. 19-21; D. I. Mureșan, *Avant Nicopolis...*, p. 120, 126.

⁵⁹ K. Prajda, *The Florentine Scolari Family at the Court of Sigismund of Luxemburg in Buda*, „Journal of Early Modern History”, 14, 2010, p. 513-533.

⁶⁰ *Chronique du religieux de Saint Denys, contenant le règne de Charles VI, de 1380 à 1422, publiée en latin pour la première fois et traduite par M. L. Bellagiet*, Paris, 1839, vol. II, p. 388-389 (book XVI, chapter XVII).

⁶¹ M. Dinić, *Хроника сен-дениског калуђера као извор за бојеве на Косову и на Ровинама*, “Прилози за књижевност, језик, историју и фолклор”, 17, 1937, 1, p. 51-66; P. P. Panaitescu, *Mircea...*, p. 310; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 101; M. Diaconescu, *The Relations...*, p. 256; D. I. Mureșan, *Avant Nicopolis...*, p. 120.

⁶² *Documenta Romaniae Historica. D...*, p. 150-151 (nr. 94); D. Onciul, *Titlul...*, p. 128; N. Iorga, *Histoire...*, p. 360; B. Cămpina, *Lupta...*, p. 267; G. T. Ionescu, *Contribuții...*, p. 146; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 104; M. Diaconescu, *The Relations...*, p. 258.

⁶³ B. Cămpina, *Lupta...*, p. 267-268; G. T. Ionescu, *Contribuții...*, p. 146; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 109; N. Șerbănescu, N. Stoicescu, *Mircea cel Mare...*, p. 308-311; O. Iliescu, *Vlad Ier...*, p. 78; I. C. Dumitrescu, *Noi interpretări privind datarea bătăliei de la Rovine*, Argeșis. “Studii și comunicări. Seria istorie”, Pitești, 18, 2009, p. 116; S. Iosipescu, *Carpații...*, p. 227.

⁶⁴ *Documenta Romaniae Historica. D...*, p. 151-152 (nr. 95); V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 105, 116.

⁶⁵ F. Zimmermann, C. Werner, G. Müller, *Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen. Dritter Band: 1391 bis 1415. Nummer 1260 bis 1785*, Hermannstadt, 1902, p. 156-158 (nr. 1368-1370); G. T. Ionescu, *Contribuții...*, p. 147; V. Pervain, *Din relațiile...*, p. 112.

SOME NEW FINDINGS ON THE OTTOMAN ARMY AT THE BATTLE OF IAȘI (1578)*

SERKAN OSMANLIOĞLU **

Abstract

In 1578, the Battle of Iași took place between the Ottoman forces and the Cossacks as a result of the invasion of Iași, the major city of Bogdan (Moldavia), by Alexandru and the Cossacks that he gathered. The composition of Ottoman military forces during this engagement indicates the absence of direct involvement by the imperial army; instead, the regional sancaks and volunteer warriors from the vicinity areas actively participated in the campaign. In this regard, the Battle of Iași has significance in exemplifying the organizational capacity of the Ottoman Empire to mobilize additional forces when needed. This research is grounded on the yoldaşlık defteri (comradeship register) which was prepared by Davud Bey, the Sancakbey of Silistre and the commander of the Ottoman army. The study aims to reveal the issues regarding the sancak soldiers and volunteer warriors in the Ottoman army. In this respect, their identities, military roles in the battles and the dirliks that was granted to them as a recognition for their services will be analysed. In addition, the original information about the battle in the commandership register will be subjected to a comparative analysis alongside other relevant archival documents and literature, with the aim of presenting these findings to the attention of scholars.

Keywords: *Cossacks, Ottoman Army, Alexandru Potcoavă, Bogdan, Iași, Moldavia, Wallachia*

Introduction

By the 17th century, the Cossacks, settled along the northern frontier of the Ottoman Empire, had conducted raids against various Ottoman cities, with particular emphasis on Istanbul. These raids, especially directed at the

Ottoman capital Istanbul, put the Ottoman government in a highly challenging situation. Such circumstances sometimes effected the course of international relations. There are many studies about the effects of the Cossacks on relations between the Ottoman Empire and

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the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as well as the struggles during the following centuries¹. On the other hand, there is no comprehensive research focusing the uprisings and conflicts in the region during the 16th century, a period marked by the emergence of the Cossacks as an evolving power². The rebellion of Alexandru Potcoavă (1577-1578), which took place during this period and resulted with a short-term invasion of Iași, the main city of Bogdan, remains a relatively unexplored subject. This study aims to examine this historical process within the context of military history under the light of new documents. Our primary sources for this research are derived from Ottoman archival documents. The main source in this regard is *yoldaşlık defteri* (comradeship register) which was prepared by Davud Bey, who was the *sancakbey* (governor of a *sancak*) of Silistre and the commander of the Ottoman army during the Battle of Iași³. This register holds considerable importance because it provides information about the composition of the army during a campaign in which the main forces were not directly involved. It offers valuable information regarding the participants of the battle, their *sancaks* (sub-province, subdivision of an *eyalet*) of origin, their roles in the conflict, and the rewards they received for their contributions. Furthermore, we will delve deeper into the details of the battle, while shedding light on the soldiers' effectiveness.

Alexandru's rebellion

During the latter half of the 16th century, a series of significant events occurred, disrupting the political atmosphere within the Principality of Moldavia. The main actors in these events were the Ottoman-appointed voivodes, the deposed ones and magnates supported by the Poland-Lithuania Commonwealth. These kinds of developments sometimes led to throne changes in Moldavia. The Ottomans had already suppressed a similar rebellion in Bogdan before the rebellion of Alexandru. In this sense, it became evident that the rebellion led by Ion Potcoavă, also known as Yovan Voivode in Ottoman sources, increased the unrest and turmoil in the region⁴. In addition,

the suppression of this rebellion and the death of Yovan Voivode caused unrest among the Cossacks, and they united around Alexandru, who emerged as the avenging brother⁵.

According to the *nâme-i hümayûn* (sultan's letter to foreign rulers) dated 7 November 1577, which was sent to the Polish king, a few rebellious villages in Poland played an encouraging role in the Alexandru's rebellion⁶. The inhabitants of these villages supported Alexandru without the approval of their own king. Thus, the Cossacks asserted that their attacks on the region were in response to and at the invitation of the Bogdanians⁷. The aforementioned *nâme* provides valuable information about Alexandru's first activities. It reveals that the insurgents forged collaborative relationships with nearby fortresses that had resisted Ottoman authority, and they were involved in acts of plunder and livestock theft in the villages surrounding Bander. Moreover, in order to gain supporters, the rebellious Cossacks promised tax exemption to the local inhabitants in exchange for their support. In the subsequent sections of the *nâme*, the Ottoman government questioned the legitimacy of Alexandru's rebellion. The Ottomans emphasized that Yovan was a famous nobleman, whereas Alexandru was an unknown pretender who had no true fraternal connection to Yovan. In this way, it is understood that the Ottomans endeavour to discredit Alexandru's claims in order to diminish his public support. It also explains the use of the term "bandit" in reference to Alexandru's followers. The Ottoman administration also employed veiled threats towards Poland, implying that they might not complain in case of Tatar raids if they did not exercise caution in this matter.

The Ottomans did not have the opportunity for a direct intervention in Bogdan. This restraint was primarily because of the circumstances of that period, notably the ongoing and protracted Ottoman-Safavid Wars, which necessitated substantial military commitments to the East⁸. Therefore, the Ottoman tried to suppress the rebellion by the forces of the *sancakbeys*, auxiliary forces, and collaboration with tributary states, similar to their approach during the Yovan rebellion⁹.

The armies of both Sides

Ottoman archival documents contain substantial information about Alexandru and his supporters. Within these records, details regarding the composition of the forces through phrases such as “*hayli tüfenkli gelüp...gelen keferenin ekseri tüfenkli imiş...*”¹⁰ signifies that they arrived with a significant number of rifles...the majority of the enemy were armed with muskets. Similarly, expressions such as “*bir müfsid dahi zuhûr idiüp hayli tüfenklü ile gelüp...*”¹¹ imply “a deceiver appeared and arrived with a lot of muskets...”, while “*hayli tüfenkli ile vilâyet-i mezbûreye müstevli olup...*”¹² suggests that “[he] invaded the province with many musketeers”¹³. Davud Bey’s register does not offer a specific quantification of the Cossacks, instead, he only recorded that they came with “*mübâlağa tüfekçi*” (a significant number of musketeers) to emphasize the substantial musketeer presence among the rebels¹⁴. Some documents contain information regarding the size and composition of Alexandru’s army. For example, a *nâme-i hümayûn* addressed to the Polish king, stated that Alexandru’s army consisted of over 2000 Polish infantry and Cossacks as cavalry. However, there is no information about the number of the Cossack cavalry¹⁵. These descriptive expressions offer invaluable insights into the organization and the armament of the opposing forces.

Table 1: Sipahis and zaims who came from the Sancak of Silistre

District	Number
Silistre	119
Hırsova	52
Tekfur Gölü	61
Pravadi	19
Varna	68
Yanbolu	10
Karinabad	5
Rusi Kasrı	12
Aydos	2
Ahyolu	1
Total	349

In a *hükm* (order), dispatched to the *Sancakbey* of Silistre, the total strength of Alexandru’s force was estimated as 2000, but it is noteworthy that Alexandru’s followers were characterized as bandits in the same document¹⁶. According to the Ottoman documents, the force under Alexandru’s command exceeded 2000 soldiers. Considering that they repelled the Ottoman and Bogdanian forces, it can be inferred that they had the capability to defeat a regular army and used firearms effectively¹⁷. As previously mentioned, Alexandru was supported by certain rebel villages and fortresses within Poland. Most probably, these rebels also provided soldier to Alexandru. The above-mentioned statement “*Lehliüden iki binden ziyâde tüfenk-endâz piyâde*” (“more than two thousand musketeers from Poland”) also indicates the support to Alexandru.

The Ottoman military force assembled against the Cossacks under Alexandru was not the regular Ottoman army. Instead, it comprised troops from the *sancaks* close to the region. In the *ferman* sent to the *Sancakbey* of Silistre, the initial requested was to intervene with the forces from Nikopol, Bender and Vidin *sancaks*, alongside *akunjis* (Ottoman irregular light cavalry) and volunteer warriors¹⁸. However, the armament of the enemy troops and their fortified position in Iași increased the need for diversified categories of troops under the command of Davud Bey. Therefore, the Ottomans tried to enlist artillerymen and musketeers to join Davud Bey and also requested artillery support from the *sancakbeys* of Silistre, Nikopol, Vulçitrın, and the voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia¹⁹. In the *ferman* dispatched to the voivode of Transylvania, the presence of the musketeers was particularly emphasized; “... *Amma gönderdiğin leşker ekseri tüfenkli ola. Husus-ı mezbûr mühimdir. İhmâlden ihzâr eylesin...*”²⁰ (“... But the soldiers you send should be mostly musketeers. This point is crucial. May you prepare them without negligence...”). As mentioned earlier, some volunteers were to be recruited supplement the musketeer need. Davud Bey’s register holds significant importance as it provides detailed information about the composition of the Ottoman army mobilized against the Cossacks. However, it is important to note

that the register includes individuals, who were deemed worthy of *dirlik* (revenue granted as a living) and *terakki* (increase in revenue), were recorded in the register. The Ottoman force was under the command of Davud Bey, the *Sancakbey* of Silistre. As a natural consequence of this situation, the core of the army composed of the *zeamet* and *timar* holders from the *Sancak* of Silistre. These soldiers were from various districts within Silistre such as Hirsova, Lake Tekfur, Pravadi, Varna, Yambolu, Karinabad, Rusi Kasrı, Aydos and Ahyolu, rather than being exclusively from a single centre²¹.

The number of soldiers from Silistre and its surrounding districts varied from each other. The highest number of *zeamet* holders and *sipahi* originated from Silistre, Varna, Tekfur Gölü, and Hirsova (Table 1). Apart from Silistre and its sub-districts, the army also comprised soldiers from Paşa, Köstendil, Niğbolu (Nikopol), Çirmen, Bosnia, Selanik (Thessaloniki), Yanya (Ioannina), Avlonya, Prizren, Vize, and Tırhala (Table 2).

Table 2. Zeamet holders and sipahis from other provinces

Sanack/Village	Sayı
Paşa	6
Köstendil	2
Nikopol	9
Çirmen	2
Bosna	1
Selanik	2
Yanya	1
Avlonya	2
Prizren	1
Vize	1
Tırhala	1
Total	28

The Ottoman army included not only *zeamet* holders and *sipahi* from Silistre and other *sancaks* but also another group consisting of the offspring of military officers,

including *sipahi*, *zeamet* holders and *çavuş* (a term used for palace servants and a military rank) from the *sancaks* close to the battlefield. Ottoman practices included regulations regarding the granting of *dirliks* to the sons of these groups, even if they did not actively participate in battle²². However, their motivation for participation in the campaign was primarily driven by the aspiration to expedite acquisition of a *dirlik* through companionship. According to the register submitted by Davud Bey, 66 offspring of soldiers joined the war²³. Within this contingent, 61 were from the *Sancak* of Silistre, 3 from the *Sancak* of Nikopol and 1 from the *Sancak* of Paşa. One of these *sanjacks* was not specifically mentioned in the register. Among these offspring, 7 had fathers who were *zaims*, 2 were *dergâh-ı âli çavuş* (palace heralds or messengers) and the remainder were *sipahi*. One of the *zaims* was identified as the *alaybeyi* (the highest *timar* holder of a district) of Silistre. The register also provided detailed information about the roles held by the *sipahis*. For example, Yağmur, who possessed a *timar* valued 7,098 *akçe* (small silver Ottoman coin, asper), was listed as a *çeribaşı* (military recruiter)²⁴.

Another group against Alexandru was *eli emirliler*²⁵, a group whose numerical strength was less than the offspring of *sipahi* or *zeamet* holders. However, Davud Bey's register also offers information about the usefulness of this group. 16 *eli emirli* were mentioned in the register²⁶. While there is no direct information regarding the prior usefulness of three among them, one imperial *sekbân*, one imperial *çaşniğir* and one castle *azeb*. It is understood that these soldiers had royal orders due to their *terakkis* in their positions. For the other three, there is limited information except a phrase "*emr-i şerifi vardır*" (he has an imperial order). The remaining 10 soldiers were identified as individuals who had participated in the battle against Yovan Voivode and were granted *dirlik* orders in acknowledgment of their services²⁷.

Another group of volunteer warriors who actively participated in combat against the Cossacks under the command of Davud Bey was the *garip yigits*. Before the emergence of special military units such as *sekbân* and *levant*, the term *garip yigit*, referred to the people from the *reaya* (non-military population) who

voluntarily joined the pashas, beys and various state officials to acquire a *dirlık*. This method of recruitment gained widespread popularity during the 16th century Ottoman wars. There are many examples that these units were equipped with firearms and assigned various roles during campaigns²⁸. As a matter of fact, the number of *garip yigits* enlisted for their companions, which corresponds to 446 men, constituted more than half of the total number of soldiers submitted by Davud Bey²⁹.

The register presented by Davud Bey contained detailed information about the roles and contributions of the *garip yigits* during the battle against Alexandru. Their responsibilities can be categorized under several headings such as “*ağaç sürmekde ve metrisler ihdâsında ve karavullarda...*”³⁰ (carrying firewood, digging trenches, and participating in guard duty...). This suggests that they were actively involved in various activities like battlefield preparations and the execution of siege-related operations.

The active involvement of the *garip yigits* in the trenches shows that their role extended beyond preparations for the siege; they also played a crucial part in protecting the Ottoman forces against potential enemy offensives. The phrase “*nicesinin akrabasının şehid olup baş kesüp ve diri getirüp*”³¹ (“many of their kins were martyred, they brought prisoners and beheaded enemies”) implies the kinship ties among the *garip yigits*. This shows that the decision to engage in the fight for survival was not solely an individual choice, but also a decision made at the familial level.

The practice of presenting enemy heads and captives as evidence of their camaraderie is notable. On the other hand, the phrase “many of their relatives were martyred...” shows that it is not possible to express the number of *garip yigits*, but they participated the campaign in numerous ways beyond those directly mentioned within the register.

It is possible to mention some facts about 435 soldiers whose names are recorded in the register³³. For example, there is an indication under the names of 13 *garip yigits* that they are Hungarians. Their names were as follows: Hasan b. Abdullah, Pervane, Bali b. Abdullah, Hüdaverdi b. Abdullah, Mustafa b. Abdullah, Keyvan b. Abdullah, Memi b. Abdullah, Süleyman b. Abdullah, Ali b. Abdullah, Haydar b. Abdullah, Yusuf, İlyas and Behram³⁴. The reference to Abdullah as their father’s name shows that these 13 individuals were *mühtedi* (converts to Islam). Also, some of them, Murad b. Hüsvrev, Divane Ali and Piyale b. Abdullah had the term Arnavud (Albanian) under their names³⁵. Furthermore, the titles, *bayrakdâr* (ensign) beneath the names of Memi and Ali imply their potential role as flagbearers among the volunteer warriors they were associated with³⁶.

There are indications about the *sancak* origins of certain warriors. For example, Bosnia was indicated beneath the name of Kurd, while Silistre was attributed to Mustafa b. Abdullah and Mahmud b. Abdullah³⁷. It is also possible to acquire some information from the records about their fathers. For example, while Mehmed Çavuş was recorded as Mustafa’s father, Mehmed’s father İskender was noted as “*merdüim-i Sultan Mustafa*” (Sultan Mustafa’s man)³⁸. Other recorded father names include Hacı Osman, Mehmed Kethüda, Katib Süleyman. Evidently, it is evident from these names that individuals with regular incomes or wealth were also inclined to enlist as *garip yigit* in pursuit of acquiring *dirlık*.

There was also a group of *garip yigit* presented by Mustafa who served as Davud Bey’s *kethüda* (assistant responsible for helping some government officials). Since they were also under the command of Mustafa Kethüda, it is likely that they played an active role in both in battlefield preparations and the siege together with Davud Bey. However, these 100

Table 3: Soldiers worthy of *cirlık* and *terakki* in the defence of Bogdan³²

Garip yigits	Offsprings of zaim and timar holders	Zeamet holders	Sipahi	Fâris/Azeb	Eli emirli
616	65	23	392	2	15

warriors were recommended to be awarded a *timar* valued 3,000 *akçe* in recognition of their role in capturing Cossack prisoners³⁹. In addition to these 100 men, Mustafa Kethüda submitted another register that included additional 61 volunteer warriors. Some of the names in this register had accompanying notes that describes their usefulness. For example, 20 of the soldiers were remarked as “head” and one was as “sword”. These notes were evidence of how these warriors proved their usefulness. As a matter of fact, it is known that the Ottoman soldiers, especially *garip yigits* who joined the campaigns to acquire a *dirlik*, proved their comradeship and received *dirliks* by presenting items confiscated from the enemy⁴⁰.

Another military group within the Ottoman army, mentioned in the register, consisted of soldiers assigned to guardian duties. According to the register dated 25 May 1578, submitted by a man named Murad, 32 *sipahi* were allocated as a precautionary measure in case of a potential enemy attack⁴¹. The soldiers were not only stationed to provide security but also to address concerns related to public order. As a matter of fact, during the Alexandru invasion, there was public disorder around Silistre and Çirmen. The government had even sent orders to the *begs* of these two *sancaks*, tasking them with the responsibilities of maintaining security and capturing the bandits in the region⁴².

Battle of Iași (1578)


The archival documents offer large amount of information about the battle in Iași. For ex-

ample, a *nâme-i hümayun* dispatched to the Polish king on 9 November 1577 is important as it reflects the Ottoman perspective about the invaders and is the earliest document we have about the invasion⁴³. Despite the warnings conveyed to Poland about the invaders, it is understood that the Cossacks swiftly crossed into Bogdan territory. In the *ferman* dated 3 December 1577, sent to the *Sancakbey* of Silistre, stated that Alexandru crossed the border of Bogdan on 22 November 1577, approximately two weeks after the Ottoman ultimatum to the Polish king about the invaders⁴⁴.

The first military unit that fought against Alexandru and the Cossacks were the soldiers who were left by the voivode of Bogdan for defence. This unit encountered the Cossacks shortly after they crossed the border. The skirmish unfolded in the vicinity of the Pruth River, near Iași⁴⁵, and continued until nightfall.⁴⁶ In a *ferman* dispatched to the voivode of Bogdan, it was emphasized that the *beys* of Silistre and Nikopol had fought against Alexandru but were unable to secure victory due to shortage of musketeers⁴⁷. The following day, the battle resumed but neither side gained upper hand at the beginning. Subsequently, the invaders entered Iași. According to Romanian sources, Alexandru and the Cossacks entered the city on 4 February⁴⁸. Afterward, Alexandru assumed the leadership, established his headquarters in the church and palace, and fortified these positions⁴⁹.

Davud Bey recognized the necessity of artillery support to effectively fight with the entrenched Cossacks. An order was dispatched

Graph 1: Percentage of Military Troops Offered by Davud Bey, Sancakbey of Silistre



to the *bey* of Vulçitrin, instructing him to supply artillery and *akınjis* to the *bey* of Silistre⁵⁰. Furthermore, a similar directive was issued in a ferman dispatched to the voivode of Wallachia, ordering the transportation of artillery along with “*tüfenk-endâz*” (musketeer) soldiers⁵¹.

The church and palace, which had been fortified by Alexandru and his forces, were besieged by the Ottomans. A line of wood and barrels was used to encircle the invaders⁵². Davud Bey described the comradeship of various military units, highlighting their services included standing guard, digging trenches, and carrying logs⁵³. Therefore, it appears that after the Ottoman forces surrounded Alexandru, their focus shifted towards battlefield preparations. This included assignments such as the appointment of *karavul* (guard duty) and digging trenches safeguard against enemy incursions and maintain general security. Since the logs were used both for a blockade and a platform needed by the artillery, it is not possible to say anything definite. Davud Bey also recorded the involvement of *zaimzâdes* and *sipahizâdes* in “*kulle ihdâs*” (tower construction) in addition to the above-mentioned services⁵⁴. In this context, the towers likely refer to the platforms that the Ottomans constructed for their artillery, facilitating easier targeting of enemy soldiers positioned on the walls and bastions⁵⁵.

While Alexandru and the Cossacks managed to cross the border into Bogdan and reach Iași, they were not strong enough to resist Davud Bey and his reinforced army. Therefore, they attempted to flee after more than a month of siege. In some of the Ottoman documents, there are references to Alexandru’s intention to flee from Iași and return to Poland via the Bogdan border, albeit without specifying an exact timeframe. For instance, a *nâme-i hümmâyün* addressed to the voivode of Erdel (Transylvania) alludes to Alexandru’s plan to flee from the border between Wallachia and Bogdan, emphasizing the necessity for vigilance⁵⁶. In Davud Bey’s comradeship register and in his *arzuahals* (petitions), it is emphasized that Alexandru fled during night although specific details about his escape point are lacking⁵⁷. Due to the relentless Ottoman assaults, the in-

vaders were compelled to flee from both the castle and the church through a small gate at 00:45 on the night of 12 March 12⁵⁸.

Under the cover of darkness, the Cossacks’ attempt to escape was interrupted by the Ottomans. Alexandru and his followers were stopped by Davud Bey and his troops, and another skirmish took place. The Romanian sources emphasized the name “Ciorbeștilor” as the place of this final battle⁵⁹. Ottoman sources do not provide any information regarding this matter. Within Davud Bey’s official record, there is solely a reference to the skirmish during Alexandru’s escape⁶⁰. According to this register, Alexandru attempted to escape on the night of 3 Muharram 986 (12 March 1578) but was captured by the Ottoman soldiers⁶¹. In his letter to the king of Poland, Davud Bey stated that he had decapitated thousands of enemies including Baltsat, one of the Cossack leaders, and punished many others⁶².

The Ottoman forces won the battle and took many prisoners. Although Davud Bey’s records indicate the capture of Alexandru and twenty of his associates, there is no specific information regarding the total number of prisoners⁶³. Mustafa Kethüda requested *dirlıks* for the *garip yigits* who had brought Cossack captives, but there is no precise details about the number of prisoners⁶⁴. However, these individuals constituted just a portion of the overall captives. Some captives could not be presented by the soldiers. Directives were dispatched from the Ottoman central authority to address this matter. In an official order dated 23 March 1578 to the voivode of Bogdan, it was requested that all captives taken in the conflict with Alexandru, regardless of their possession by *sipahi*, Hungarians, Wallachians or Moldavians, should be chained and sent to Istanbul as soon as possible⁶⁵. It was also emphasized that the captives held by the Bogdanians would not be eligible for ransom, and payments would only be made for captives held by the *sipahis*. Similar orders were issued to other Ottoman administrators. For instance, in a letter addressed to the voivode of Wallachia, it was stated that captured Cossacks should not be executed; instead, they should be transferred to Istanbul for sentencing to serve in *kürek* (hard labour)⁶⁶. These kinds of instructions were dispatched to

the *begs* of Silistre, Niğbolu, Köstendil, Vidin, Alacahisâr, and Çirmen⁶⁷.

It is understood that the captives requested by the Ottoman administration arrived in Istanbul before 29 April 1578. In the order sent to Petru, the Voivode of Bogdan, reported the arrival of the Cossacks and urged him to promptly send the required tribute. Considering that the first order sent regarding the prisoners was dated 23 March 1578, it is understood that the prisoners reached Istanbul in 35-36 days. However, the insurgent leader Alexandru, who had been wounded in the battle, died on the way⁶⁸.

In addition to the compensation received in exchange for their captives, Ottoman soldiers were rewarded for their comradeship in battles. The register provided by Davud Bey encompasses detailed records about *dirliks* and *terakkis* awarded to various military groups based on their ranks and positions. For example, while *zeamet* holders received 2000 akçe *terakki*, this was 1500 akçe for *sipahis* and *eli emirlis*. There were also differences for those who received *dirliks* for the first time. While the offsprings of the *dergâh-ı âli çavuş* received 6000 akçe valued *timar*, the sons of *sipahizâde*, *zaimzâde* and *garip yigits* earned 3000 akçe valued *timar*. In addition, only 100 of the *garip yigits* were rewarded with *dirlik*. Apart from these groups, some officials were granted *terakki*. For example, the *faris* offered by Peter Voivode and the sons of the *dergâh-ı âli müteferrikas* (members of an elite guard unit of palace cavalry) presented by *Sancakbey* of Silistre were in this respect⁶⁹.

Conclusion

The rebellion led by Alexandru and the subsequent invasion of Bogdan in the latter half of the 16th century played a crucial role in emerging the Cossacks as a distinct group. This uprising demonstrated the Cossacks' capability to influence the political dynamics in Bogdan, even if only temporarily, by affecting changes in leadership. This event is significant because it showed the Cossacks' effective use of firearms and their ability to manoeuvre swiftly against both Ottoman and Bogdanese forces albeit for a temporarily advantage.

With the outbreak of the Safavid conflicts in the east, which required the deployment of

the main Ottoman army, the Ottomans sought to suppress the rebellion by mobilizing local *sancaks* and districts. This type of military mobilization provides valuable insights into the composition of the Ottoman army during campaigns. In our study, we have focused on an important register that we discovered and extensively analysed. This register prepared by the *Bey* of Silistre, who commanded the Ottoman forces, detailed the allocation of soldiers to specific *sancaks* and districts designated for the campaign. It not only recorded regular Ottoman troops but also identified volunteer groups that joined the campaign in order to acquire *dirlik*. Through this research, our objective is to highlight the significance of comradeship registers in Ottoman military history studies.

NOTES

¹ For detailed information, see. Dariusz Kolo-dziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th-18th Century): An Annotated Edition of Ahn-ames and Other Documents*, Leiden 2000; same author, "Polonya ve Osmanlı Devleti Arasında Tarih Boyunca Siyasi ve Diplomatik İlişkiler", *Savaş ve Barış: 15-19. Osmanlı-Polonya İlişkileri*, Ankara 1999, p. 21-35; Yücel Öztürk, "Osmanlı-Lehistan İlişkilerinde Savaş, Diplomasi ve Ticaret", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, XVI/55 (2017), p. 225-252. For the overview of Ottoman-Lehistan relations in the XVII-XVIIIth centuries, see. Mustafa Nuri Türkmen, "XVII. Asrın İkinci Yarısında Osmanlı Devleti ile Lehistan İlişkilerinin Bozulma Sebepleri Üzerine Bazı Değerlendirmeler", *Uluslararası Türkiye-Ukrayna İlişkileri Sempozyumu: Kazak Dönemi (1500-1800) Bildiriler*, p. 153-168; Uğur Demir, "Barış Asrı: Karlofça'dan Belgrad'a Osmanlı-Lehistan Diplomatik Münasebetleri (1699-1739)", *Türkiye-Polonya İlişkilerininin 600. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyum Bildirileri (27-28 Eylül 2014)*, İstanbul 2018, p. 49-67; same author, "Osmanlı-Rusya Münasebetlerinde Bir Dönüm Noktası: Kazak Hatmanlığı'nın İşgali (1764) ve Bir Kazak Beyzâdesinin Rusya'ya Dair Raporu", *Uluslararası Türkiye-Ukrayna İlişkileri Sempozyumu: Kazak Dönemi (1500-1800) Bildiriler*, İstanbul 2015, p. 777-804.

² For some evaluations on the Cossacks and the Ottomans in the 16th century, see. Ahmet Önal, "XVI. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Osmanlı-Leh İlişkileri", *Türkiye-Polonya İlişkilerininin 600. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyum Bildirileri (27-28 Eylül 2014)*, İstanbul 2018, p. 20-31; Yücel Öztürk, *Özüden Tuna'ya Kazaklar-1*, İstanbul 2004; same

author, "Relations Between the Turkish Empire, Zaporozhian Cossacks and Crimean Khanate in the First Half of the 17th Century", *Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv*, 2018, p. 26-34. For a recent study on the relations between Wallachia-Moldavia and the Ottomans in the perspective of the sources of both sides, see. Yusuf Heper, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Eflak-Boğdan İlişkileri (1574-1634)*, Phd Thesis, Uşak Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Uşak 2020.

³ Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (Presidency Ottoman Archives) (=BOA), Bab-ı Asafi, Nişan Tahvil Kalemi Defterleri (A.NŞT.d), nr. 1085.

⁴ For Ion Potcoava's voivodeship and rebellion, see. Yusuf Heper, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Eflak-Boğdan İlişkileri (1574-1634)*, p. 88-114, 124-128.

⁵ The claim that Alexandru was Yovan's brother is considered a fabrication by Nicolae Jorga (*Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*, C. III, çev. Nilüfer Epçeli, İstanbul 2017⁵, p. 244); In some studies, he is referred to as Yovan's brother (Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus, The Cossack Age to 1625 (Volume 7)*, tr. Bohdan Struminski, Toronto 1999, p. 116); Yücel Öztürk, *Özü'den Tuna'ya Kazaklar-1*, İstanbul 2004, p. 305; N. A. Mohov, *Oçerki İstorii Moldavsko-Russko-Ukranskih Svyazey (S Drevneysih Vremen Do Naçala XIX Veka)*, İzdatelstvo: Ştinita, Kişinev 1961, p. 62.

⁶ BOA, Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 104 (27 Şaban 985/9 November 1577). Pages 1-190 of the register were prepared as a master's thesis (Özge Teniş, *33 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri'nin Transkripsiyonu ve Değerlendirilmesi (p.1-190)*, Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, Master's Thesis, Erzurum 2019). However, there are many reading mistakes in this thesis. Therefore, we used the original register.

⁷ Dinu C. Giurescu, *Ion Vodă Cel Viteaz*, p. 197. As cited in Yusuf Heper, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Eflak-Boğdan İlişkileri (1574-1634)*, p. 134.

⁸ For detailed information on this subject, see. Bekir Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlı-İran Siyâsî Münâsebetleri (1578-1612)*, İstanbul 1993; Turgay Koçak, *Osmanlı-Safevi Mücadelesinde Askerî Harekât Alanı ve Muharebeler (1578-1590)*, 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Master's Thesis, İstanbul 2016.

⁹ At the time of the invasion, military activity was ongoing in the region. While the *Sancakbey* of Silistre was dealing with the Cossacks who invaded Bogdan, the *Sancakbey* of Akkirman was busy with the repair of the Bender Castle. Even the voivode of Bogdan was requested to help in this work within the possibilities. In this context, it was requested to help the *Sancakbey* of Akkirman in various matters ranging from

the supply of stone and lime needed for the castle to the construction of the unfinished parts (Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 54 (18 Şaban 985/31 October 1577)). For the *ferman* written to the *Sancakbey* of Silistre and the voivode of Bogdan, see. same register, hk. 55 (18 Şaban 985/31 October 1577).

¹⁰ Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 672 (20 Zilhicce 985/28 February 1578).

¹¹ Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 673 (20 Zilhicce 985/28 February 1578).

¹² Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 677 (19 Zilhicce 985/27 February 1578).

¹³ It is known that the Cossacks learned to use the firearms they captured from Ottoman fortresses in the 16th century and improved themselves in this field. In fact, they were far ahead of the Tatars, who preferred to use bows. On the military capabilities of the Cossacks and the skills they improved, see. Linda Gordon, *Cossacks Rebellions Social Turmoil in Sixteenth Century Ukraine*, Albany 1983, p. 79-88.

¹⁴ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 6.

¹⁵ "...hâlâ Silistre Sancağibeyi Davud, Boğdan voyvodasıyla mektûblar gönderüp müfsid-i mezburun karındaşı nâmına bir bedbaht zuhûr idüp Lehlüden iki binden ziyâde tüfenk-endâz piyâde ve atlu Kazaklar ile vilâyet-i Boğdan'a duhûl idüp muhkem cenk olup bi'l-fi'il Yaş Pazarı'nda oturup etrafi muhâsara olunduğu i'lâm eylemişler idi..." (Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 716 (Selh-i Zilhicce 985/9 March 1578)); Russian studies also refer to 2000 infantry and Cossack cavalry with reference to the above mentioned *nâme* (N. A. Mohov, *Oçerki İstorii Moldavsko-Russko-Ukranskih Svyazey (S Drevneysih Vremen Do Naçala XIX Veka)*, p. 62). In the same study, it is stated that there was a rumour that those who revolted against the Turks in Bogdan were from Russian origin and were supported by Russia, and that this idea was spread by the Polish boyars (p. 64, fn. 121).

¹⁶ "...Kazaklarının karındaşdır deyü Alexandru nâm bir mel'un dahi voyvoda nâmına kaldırup iki bin mikdârı eşkıyayla Boğdan'a duhûl itdükde..." (Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 747); Davud Bey also emphasized this point in his letter to the Polish king after the battle and stated that Alexandru's army was composed of many bandits, former shepherds, former slaves, Polish and Czechs (A. Mohov, *Oçerki İstorii Moldavsko-Russko-Ukranskih Svyazey (S Drevneysih Vremen Do Naçala XIX Veka)*, p. 63). Davud Bey's expressions should be evaluated as a discourse that underestimation of the other army in order to exaggerate his victory. The aforementioned bandits managed to defeat both the Ottoman and Bogdanian forces and caused the request for reinforcements. For the information given by the

Venetian ambassador on this issue, see. A. Mohov, *Oçerki İstorii Moldavsko-Russko-Ukranskih Svyazey (S Drevneysih Vremen Do Naçala XIX Veka)*, p. 62.

¹⁷ Alexandru's early successes were said to have increased his popularity among the Cossacks and raised their support (A. Mohov, *Oçerki İstorii Moldavsko-Russko-Ukranskih Svyazey (S Drevneysih Vremen Do Naçala XIX Veka)*, p. 63).

¹⁸ "*sen serdar nasb olunup müretteb ve mükemmel sancağın askeri ile Niğbolu ve Bender ve Vidin sancakları beğleri..... sancağına müteâllik alaybeği ve zuamâ ve erbâb-ı timarı ve livâ-yı mezbûrda olan akıncıları toçarıyla topçular ile müretteb ve mükemmel düşmen yarağıyla ve gâzâdan sefalu gönüllüleri ihrâc idüp*" (Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 230 (22 Ramazan 985/3 December 1577)).

¹⁹ Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 230, 233, 621, 622.

²⁰ Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 672 (20 Zilhicce 985/28 February 1578).

²¹ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 10-20.

²² For example, son of a *sipahi* could acquire a *dirlik*. (Halil İnalıcı, "Timar", *DİA*, XLI, 170).

²³ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 46-48.

²⁴ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 46.

²⁵ *Eli emirliler*, a nomenclature generally applied to those who had an order in their hands to get *dirlik*, appears in many comradeship registers from the second half of the 16th century onwards. These individuals, who were in comradeship but could not receive their *dirliks* yet, indicates the intensity in the system. For detailed information on the *eli emirliler*, see. Serkan Osmanlioğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Gönüllü Askerlerden Garip Yiğitler (XVI. Yüzyıl)*, p. 187-194; For the aforementioned decline and its role in the Ottoman military transformation, see. Coşkun Ünsal, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Askerî Değişim ve Kapıkulu Süvarileri (16-17. Yüzyıl)", *Harp Tarihi Dergisi*, sayı 7 (June 2023), p. 7-28.

²⁶ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 23.

²⁷ Apart from one soldier, there is no information about the amount of *dirlik* granted to these warriors due to their usefulness. The *timar* order of this soldier was valued 3000 akçe.

²⁸ For detailed information on the recruitment of these volunteer fighters in the battles especially for supply and logistics, see. Serkan Osmanlioğlu, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Gönüllü Askerlerden Garip Yiğitler (XVI. Yüzyıl)*, p. 91-131.

²⁹ The number of *garip yigits* submitted by Davud Bey in his own name was 435. However, 11 additional *garip yigits* were added at the end of the register and submitted with separate *arzuahals*. They were also counted in this number.

³⁰ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 34, 40; As the invasion coincided with the winter season, it must have af-

fected the Ottoman soldiers who went to battle outside the campaign season. Davud Bey records for the volunteer warriors that "*şiddet-i şitâyı bu kulları ile çeküp...*" (those who experience the harshness of winter with this servant of yours...) (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 40).

³¹ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 34, 40.

³² The data in the table is based on page 63 of A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, which refers to the summary of the register. Since the summary here includes the *dirliks* and *terakkis* granted to the soldiers, it is important in terms of indicating the final decision of the state regarding the number of soldiers.

³³ There is also information in the *ruus* records for the *garip yigits* who participated in the battles in Bogdan. For some of the soldiers submitted by the *Sancakbey* of Silistre, Davud Bey, to the voivode of Bogdan and the *Sancakbey* of Nikepolis, see. BOA, Kamil Kepeci Tasnifi (KK), nr. 233, p. 16 (26 Rebiulevvel 986/2 June 1578), 85 (14 Cemaziyelahir 986/14 August 1578), 155 (8 Ramazan 986/8 November 1578), 171 (11 Ramazan 986/11 November 1578), 177 (17 Ramazan 986/14 November 1578), 200 (18 Zilhicce 986/15 February 1579).

³⁴ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 34-36.

³⁵ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 35.

³⁶ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 35.

³⁷ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 35.

³⁸ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 36.

³⁹ "*Silistre beyinin kethüdâsı defteridir.Boğdan'nda yoldaşlık idüp Kazaklarla gelen yüz neferi ... idüp ibtidâdan üçer bin timara buyuruldu*" (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 41).

⁴⁰ For example, during the Cyprus Campaign (1570), a *garip yigit* who brought an enemy *tulga* (helmet) was assigned a *timar* of 2000 akçe (BOA, KK, nr. 221, p. 19 (6 Rebiulevvel 978/8 August 1570)).

⁴¹ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 56.

⁴² Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 199, 221, 240.

⁴³ For *nâme-i hümayûn*, see. Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 104 (27 Şaban 985/9 November 1577).

⁴⁴ "*...voyvoda nâmun olan haramzâde mâh- ı ramazanun on birinci günü Boğdan sınırında Turla suyun geçüp vilâyete girdüğüün...*" (Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 230 (22 Ramazan 985/3 December 1577)).

⁴⁵ "*Boğdan sınırında Turla suyun geçüp vilâyete girdüğüün muhafâzâda olan âdemleri karşı varup cenk idüp...*" (Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 230 (22 Ramazan 985/3 December 1577)).

⁴⁶ "*ziyâde cenk olup ahşam olunmağın ferâgat olunup...*" (Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 237 (22 Ramazan 985/3 December 1577)).

⁴⁷ Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 677 (19 Zilhicce 985/27 February 1578).

⁴⁸ Grigorie Ureche, *Letopiseșul Tarii Moldovei Pana La Aron Voda (1359-1595)*, (Constantin Giurescu edit), București 1916, p. 245-246.

⁴⁹ “zafer müyesser olmayup akibet bir kargır kilisayı tahassun itmekle muhasara olunup” (Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 747 (29 Zilhicce 985/9 March 1578). Heper unintentionally read the word “tahassun” (To take protection in a castle or fortress, to take refuge in a rocky place) as “taht” (throne) (Yusuf Heper, *Osmanlı Devleti Ve Eflak-Boğdan İlişkileri (1574-1634)*, Phd Thesis, Uşak Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Uşak 2020, p. 132). Tahassun, which means making a fortified shelter for protection, is also important in explaining why the Ottomans wanted artillery. Likewise, the register shows that not only the church but also a palace in the region was fortified “...Yaş Pazarı'nda olan saraya ve kilisaya tahassun iden Alexandru...” (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 45-48).

⁵⁰ Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 233 (22 Ramazan 985/3 December 1577), 622 (14 Zilhicce 985/22 February 1578).

⁵¹ Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 640 (15 Zilhicce 985/23 February 1578).

⁵² N. A. Mohov, *Oçerki İstории Moldavsko-Russko-Ukranskiĥ Svyazey (S Drevneyših Vremen Do Naçala XIX Veka)*, p. 63.

⁵³ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 6, 34.

⁵⁴ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 48.

⁵⁵ Veysel Göğer, *16. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Kale Kuşatmaları (Strateji, Taktik, Kuşatma Aşamaları ve Teknolojisi)*, Phd Thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, İstanbul 2014, p. 129-132.

⁵⁶ “Eflak sınırıyla Boğdan sınırunun ortasında firâr etmek üzere olduğun ilâm eylediği ecilden...” (Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 33, hk. 237 (22 Ramazan 985/3 December 1577).

⁵⁷ “ve melâin gice ile kaçup münhezim ve makhûr olup...” (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 6); “gice karaluğunda kaçup” (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 45); “Gice ile firâr idüp...” (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 66-3a); “lain-i mezbûr gice ile firâr eyledükde...” (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 66-7a).

⁵⁸ V. Motogna, “Ceva Nou Despre Alexandru-Voda, Fratele lui Ion Potcoava (1578)”, *RI, An. XII, N-le 1-3*, București, Ianuar-Mart 1926, p. 3. As cite in Yusuf Heper, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Eflak-Boğdan İlişkileri (1574-1634)*, p. 134.

⁵⁹ Yusuf Heper, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Eflak-Boğdan İlişkileri (1574-1634)*, p. 134.

⁶⁰ “Gice ile firâr idüp münhezim ve makhûr olduğı muhârebede baş kesüp diri dutup...” (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085 p. 66-3a); “lain-i mezbûr gice ile firâr ey-

ledükde ardından erişdüğü mahalde gereği gibi hidmed ve yoldaşlık idüp...” (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085 p. 66-7a).

⁶¹ “Sene sitte ve semânin ve tisa mi'e Muharreminin üçüncü gicesi gice karaluğunda kaçup sabaha değın cenk idüp makhûr ve münhezim dutuldukları muhârebede...” (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085 p. 45-48).

⁶² N. A. Mohov, *Oçerki İstории Moldavsko-Russko-Ukranskiĥ Svyazey (S Drevneyših Vremen Do Naçala XIX Veka)*, p. 63.

⁶³ There are references for this situation in the register submitted by Davud Bey. For example, in Petro Voivode's letter of request, a faris of Bandar (a cavalry unit in some Ottoman fortresses) is reported to have captured enemies and beheaded some of them (A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, 2/1-a); The same situation was the case for a soldier from the faris of Bender, who was presented by a man named Mehmed. (same register, p. 2/2-a). There are also records of *garip yigits* who captured prisoners: “baş kesüp ve diri getirüp hidmet ve yoldaşlıkda bulunup” (same register, p. 34, 66-3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, 7a, 8a, 9a); Some studies emphasized that those prisoner taken with Alexandru were important figures of the Cossacks (Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus, The Cossack Age to 1625 (Volume 7)*, p. 116).

⁶⁴ A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 41-42.

⁶⁵ Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 34, hk. 43 (14 Muharrem 986/23 March 1578).

⁶⁶ Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 34, hk. 44 (14 Muharrem 986/23 March 1578). Also see. Yusuf Heper, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Eflak-Boğdan İlişkileri (1574-1634)*, p. 134.

⁶⁷ Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 34, hk. 50, 51 (14 Muharrem 986/23 March 1578); It appears that there were captives in the possession of different persons in addition to the administrators and *sipahis* of the region. However, it is not clear whether the captives were from the Battle of Iași or not. For example, Hacı Hasan, one of men of the Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray, can be shown as such kind of example. In the *ferman* sent to Petro Voivode the Voivode of Bogdan, it is mentioned that Hacı Hasan had to sent his prisoner. However, it was requested to send the prisoner back upon understanding that the prisoner was not Bogdanian, but rather a Polish (Mühimme Defterleri, nr. 34, hk. 266 (13 Safer 986/21 April 1578)).

⁶⁸ Yusuf Heper, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Eflak-Boğdan İlişkileri (1574-1634)*, p. 134. In some studies, it is emphasized that Alexandru was impaled (A. Mohov, *Oçerki İstории Moldavsko-Russko-Ukranskiĥ Svyazey (S Drevneyših Vremen Do Naçala XIX Veka)*, p. 63, subnote 120).

⁶⁹ For detailed information on the *dirliks* and *terakkis*, see. A.NŞT.d, nr. 1085, p. 63.

ACCORDING TO THE OTTOMAN-ROMANIAN SOURCES: APPOINTMENT OF FERHAD PASHA TO THE WALLACHIA CAMPAIGN AND THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS (1595)*

YUSUF HEPER **

Abstract

Starting Long Wars which could occupy the state for a long time on the western front and the emergence of the Romanian nationalist Michael the Brave on the same dates changed political balances in Wallachia turned against Ottoman. Taking advantage of the wars with the Habsburgs, Michael rebelled against Ottomans in Bucharest on 13 November 1594, he turned his direction to the towns and villages along the Danube and he inflicted great damages to the Muslim people living this region. After the danger of security along the Danube, Ottoman authorities decided to produce more permanent solutions in Wallachia. In this context, the Wallachian voivodeship was directly transformed into an Ottoman province and Satırcı Mehmed Pasha was appointed as a governor. Also, ulufe soldiers were appointed to the castles which about to be built in Bucharest and Târgoviste. The task of implementing decision taken by the Porte was given to Ferhad Pasha. As a matter of fact, Ferhad Pasha came to Ruse after providing the ammunition and soldiers etc. necessary for Wallachian campaign. For a while, he supervised the bridge works that would facilitate Ottoman army's crossing to Wallachia and later he was dismissed from his duty due to the pressure of his rivals in Istanbul.

Keywords: Wallachia, Michael the Brave, Ferhad Pasha, Sinan Pasha, Transylvania

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Introduction

The last quarter of the 16th century led the Ottoman Empire to reconsider its domestic and foreign policies. After the Ferhad Pasha peace (1590), which was concluded after a long Thirteen-Year War with the Safavids in the east, a new field of struggle was opened in the west. Starting in 1591 with mutual conflicts on the Bosnian frontier, the struggles turned into an official general war two years later with the approval of Sinan Pasha¹. This process, known as the “Long Wars” or the “Fifteen Years War”, which was a turning point in Ottoman history, emerged in 1591 as a result of the mutual conflicts between Telli Hasan Pasha, the governor of Bosnia, and the Habsburg commanders trying to strengthen the Habsburg borders². In addition to these border conflicts, the Habsburg King Rudolf II’s failure to pay the tribute tax twice constituted the last phase of this tension. The Ottoman Divan, which convened upon these events, decided to declare war against the Habsburgs as a result of Sinan Pasha’s insistence³. During this period, the heavy taxes imposed on the people by Alexandru cel Rău (Alexandru III the Bad), the Voivode of Wallachia, led to a boyar conspiracy against him. Although the boyars complained to Constantinople about Alexandru cel Rău, nothing changed. Some of the boyars who complained to him were even captured, while others were killed by the voivode. Michael, who was thought to be among the conspirators, found the solution of taking refuge in Transylvania after the decision to arrest him. *Ban* Michael, who emerged in such a complicated period, was able to use the dissatisfaction in Wallachia in his favour⁴.

In his endeavours before Constantinople, Alexandru cel Rău demanded the capture of *Ban* Michael, claiming that he had taken several loads of coins (100-200.000 coins) with him. On the other hand, many boyars such as Stroe Buzescu and Radu Florescu, who were supposed to capture Michael, switched to the side of Alexandru cel Rău after the commitments made⁵. In this way, *Ban* Michael, who hid in Transylvania for two weeks under the supervision of the Transylvanian politician Baltazar Báthory, and with the Transylvanian prince Sigismund, went to Istanbul to

take the voivodeship when the conditions in Wallachia became favourable. Meanwhile, Sigismund Báthory, who was on good terms with the Ottoman centre, pleaded with Sinan Pasha and Edward Barton, the British ambassador in Istanbul, to elect Michael as voivode⁶. Although E. Barton did not play an active role in Michael’s election as voivode, he played a major role in ensuring that he was well received at the Ottoman Palace⁷. When Michael arrived in Constantinople for the voivodeship in May 1593, he met a group of boyars who simultaneously supported him. In their petition submitted to Imperial Council (Divân-ı Hümâyûn) on 30 May / 9 June 1593, the boyars stressed that they could not endure the cruelty of Alexandru cel Rău and that the oppression was unbearable and requested the removal of the cruel voivode⁸. As Kara Çelebizâde states, the Ottoman statesmen were convinced that it was necessary to appoint a new voivode in Wallachia, since they saw that Alexandru was no longer wanted⁹.

Michael, on the other hand, prepared the official present (*pîşkeş*), which had become a custom in order to obtain the office of voivodeship. He tried to guarantee his position by giving 100.000 gold coins as a gift to Sinan Pasha and other state officials¹⁰. Some of the money Michael spent until his accession to the voivodeship was paid by his cousin Andronic Cantacuzino. However, he had to borrow money from Greek, Jewish and Turkish merchants in Istanbul in order to cover the 7.000 loads of coins (700.000.000) he spent during his stay in Istanbul. Later on, he gave them a guarantee that he would pay this amount¹¹.

Finally, the Ottoman state authorities decided to dismiss Alexandru in August 1593 on the grounds that he had disturbed the peace in Wallachia and killed some of the janissaries in Bucharest¹². On 2 September 1593, the voivodeship of Transylvania was even informed and requested to capture the former voivode in case he fled to the Habsburg or Hungarian provinces and send him to Constantinople by loyalty¹³. Upon the dismissal of Alexandru cel Rău, Michael, who was nominated as a candidate for the throne of Wallachia with the support of the Oltenian boyars who had influence in Wallachia and the rich Greek

merchants in Istanbul, was appointed as voivode of Wallachia by the sultan in a short time¹⁴. While in Istanbul, he was dressed in a robe, a sign of the voivodeship, and was sent off to Wallachia with a splendid ceremony¹⁵. When Michael assumed the office of voivodeship, he was obliged to send food and ammunition to the Turkish armies in Hungarian lands (Veszprém), which was the battlefield of the Ottoman Empire against the Habsburgs¹⁶. After a while, he wanted to join the "Holy League" (Rom. Liga Sfântă), which was formed in Europe with the encouragement of Pope Clement VIII, with the intention of getting rid of the economic and political clamp of the Ottoman Empire, of which he was a tributary¹⁷. For this purpose, he sent a message to the Habsburg Emperor Rudolf II, stating that he did not provide military support to the enemy in order to prevent them from becoming stronger against Christendom, and expressed his intention to join the Holy League¹⁸. Radu Buzescu, who arrived as a secret envoy of Michael, who had not yet been able to make an alliance with the boyars regarding the rebellion against the Ottoman Empire, met the Habsburg Envoy (Rom. Emisarul Imperial) Marini here. He showed him the purpose of his visit and the letters sent by Rudolf II to Michael. Marini then said that he would personally come to Wallachia to visit the voivode in order to make sure of his loyalty. Meanwhile, Radu Buzescu made an agreement with Prince Sigismund Báthory of Transylvania. According to this agreement, Michael, the voivode of Wallachia, together with the voivodes of Moldavia and Transylvania, would raise their swords against the Ottoman Empire, the sworn enemy of the Habsburgs¹⁹. The replacement of Aaron the Tyrant and Sigismund Báthory caused the political balance in Transylvania and Moldavia's to shift in favour of the Ottomans. The changing political balance in Transylvania and Moldavia encouraged voivode Michael²⁰.

There is no doubt that the disobedience of the voivods of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania, who attempted to rebel during such a complex and difficult period of the Ottoman Empire, would have caused consternation in Istanbul. Within the framework of this idea, the subject chosen as a study sample includes

the preparations for the military expedition against Michael the Brave, the voivode of Wallachia, in 1595. This study will be analysed in a multifaceted manner within the framework of the documents in the Mühimme Record (A. {DVNS. MHM. d.}, Kamil Kepeci (KK.d.) 1872²¹ and Revenue Office continuing Records (MAD.d.) in the Presidential Ottoman Archives, as well as the information reflected in contemporary chronicles and the works of western authors.

Analysis of the Wallachian Revolt (13 November 1594)

At the beginning of 1594, Transylvanian Prince Sigismund Báthory, after long efforts, concluded an alliance agreement with the Habsburg Emperor Rudolf II. Later, he included the voivodeship of Moldavia in this treaty. Thus, the principality of Transylvania accepted to be an ally of the Habsburgs and to be ready to cooperate with them militarily when necessary. The preparations made in the neighbouring principalities against the Ottoman Empire were enough to attract Michael, who wished to join the Holy Alliance. Even before waiting for proposals from Wallachia, he sent envoys to the voivodes of Transylvania and Moldavia, proposing to them to act together in attacks against their common enemy, the Ottoman Empire, and finally full agreement was reached between the three Romanian principalities. This unity, which was approved by Emperor Rudolf II, was further strengthened by the promise of the Transylvanian principality to send troops under its command to Bucharest²². At this point, Sigismund Báthory sent some 4,000 of Transylvania's elite Szeklers troops, distinguished for their martial qualities, with 45 cannons to Wallachia under the leadership of Michael Horváth and Thury Ferenc²³.

At this time, Michael was subjected to pressure from the people and institutions from whom he had borrowed money while he was in Istanbul. In fact, many complaints were received by the Sultan in this regard. In one of these complaints, Pîrî, one of the contractors of the Dervish Convent of Muallâ, complained that he could not receive his receivables even though he had sent men to Michael many times²⁴. In the other, it was mentioned

that the boyars were guarantors for the sums borrowed from the foundations of Hâce-i Sultanî Saadettin Efendi, but they were not paid on time²⁵. Although the Ottoman administration repeatedly warned Wallachia to pay the debts, Michael kept postponing them because he could not afford to pay them. Indeed, the reais of Wallachia, crushed by economic obligations, were not in a position to bear the extra financial burden²⁶. Instead, Michael wanted to solve this problem once and for all by inviting all those who owed him money to his mansion in Bucharest. At Michael's invitation, when all the creditors had gathered at the Bucharest mansion, he first started to calculate the debts. Then the cannons there were turned on the crowd and the mansion was set on fire. At the end of this bloody showdown, Michael voivode started the rebellion movement simultaneously with the neighbouring voivodes on 13 November 1594²⁷. In connection with the events unfolding in Wallachia, Aaron the Tyrant, the voivode of Moldavia, sent troops from Hungary to the Danube fortresses of Bender, Izmail, Chilia and Akkerman and tried to take these places back²⁸. In Banat, Gheorghe Palatici incited the Serbian, Romanian and Bulgarian minorities under Ottoman protection and caused a lot of mobilisation on the Transylvania-Temesvár border. Increasing in number, the rebel groups started this rebellion by causing great damage to the convoys providing aid to the Ottoman fortresses on the Transylvanian border²⁹. In parallel with these rebellions in the north of the Danube, Michael, the voivode of Wallachia, led the Wallachian army to Giurgiu Castle on 16 November 1594.

In the Ottoman chronicles, the cause of the riots in Bucharest is attributed to the raid on Michael's mansion by creditors pressurising him and the counter-attacks by the forces of Wallachia. According to the narratives of the Ottoman authors, the revolts, which are dealt with on this basis in the chronicles, present different perspectives. Among them, Peçevi writes about the events leading up to Michael's rebellion based on the narrative of Alican Efendi, the regent of Giurgiu. According to Peçevi's account, a group of creditors, including janissaries, pressured Michael every day for the payment of debts. These creditors,

even to the point of outrage, stoned Michael's mansion and set it on fire, as well as ill-treating his men and taking whatever clothes etc. they found in the mansion. Michael, who could not endure these incidents any longer, used this as an excuse to slaughter the creditors on the spot, including the janissaries, and turned his direction to the Danube mansions³⁰. Nâima and Kâtip Çelebi, who seem to have been inspired by Peçevi to write about this event, give similar details³¹. Gelibolulu Âli, although confusing the place of this event with Moldavia, accepts the fact that the rebellion was based on the debt incident³². Likewise, in the histories of Karaçelebizâde and Hasanbeyzâde, the revolt in Wallachia is attributed to the same reasons³³. Selanikî, on the other hand, who offers a different perspective from these authors, does not go into these details, but only states that Michael received large debts from people such as janissaries and solachs, and the struggle against those who came to demand their creditors and the transformation of this struggle into a rebellion³⁴.

Western authors, who deal with this event independently of Ottoman sources, do not go into any of these details, but emphasise that Michael and his men carried out a great massacre in Bucharest with the help of the Transylvania principality³⁵. The British envoy T. Wilcox, interpreting the events in Bucharest on the basis of the news he heard in Moldavia, states that the voivodeships of Wallachia and Moldavia revolted against the Ottoman Empire, to which they were tributary, and that Turks and Jews in the voivodeship centres were killed³⁶. Finally, in his message to Valentin Prépöstvári, Prince S. Báthory, Prince of Transylvania, about the massacres in Bucharest, described them with the following words: "Mihai Horváth, Captain of Făgăraş, and the armies I allowed to go to Wallachia have so far slaughtered all the Turks they could get their hands on in Bucharest and other parts of Wallachia. They are now advancing every day along the Danube"³⁷.

After Bucharest, Michael, voivode of Wallachia, lost no time and led the Wallachian army to Giurgiu Castle on 16 November 1594. Giurgiu Castle, which was under siege by the Wallachian forces for some time, could not be captured³⁸, but the castle was severely dam-

aged³⁹. Unable to make sense of these unexpected rebellions in the north of the Danube, the Ottoman rulers urgently needed to be informed about the events taking place in the Danube islands. As a matter of fact, orders sent to the kādīs and sanjaks in Silistra, Ruse, Vidin and the Danube ports requested detailed information about the situation on the Danube and how the enemy was gathering⁴⁰. Michael the Brave and Aaron the Tyrant were dismissed upon the certainty of the revolts in Wallachia and Moldavia. The task of bringing Bogdan Sasul, who was elected instead of Michael, the voivode of Wallachia, was given to Mustafa Pasha⁴¹. After these preparations⁴², Mustafa Pasha headed straight to Danube in the winter of 1594-95 and waited for the forces of Wallachia in Ruse. Michael, who mentions the battles with Mustafa Pasha in his memoirs, states that he ambushed him in Ruse, killed many people in this battle, including Mustafa Pasha, and set Ruse on fire by taking the remaining cannons and other ammunition⁴³. Following this event, the armies of Wallachia, taking advantage of the vacuum of authority on the Danube, sacked Floci (10 December 1594), Hârşova (1 January 1595) and Silistra (8 January 1595) respectively. On the other hand, Nicopolis, Boğazköy (Rom. Cernavodă) and Tutrakan were also affected by these plunders. The Ottoman trade and port city of Ibrail (Rom. Brăila) on the Danube was captured by the forces of Wallachia in March 1595. Thus, voivode Michael was able to control the flow of trade and ammunition from the Danube to the Black Sea through Ibrail, the new control centre of Wallachia on the Danube⁴⁴. In particular, Michael's control of Ibrail made it difficult for the Ottoman navy to cross the Danube to Silistra and Ruse.

Appointment of Ferhad Pasha as Serdar of Wallachia

Since the sudden attacks of the armies of Wallachia-Moldavia against the Ottoman Empire in the winter of 1594-95 caused great confusion in and around the palace, more organised military expeditions against the rebels were necessary⁴⁵. According to Peçevi, Michael's crossing over frozen Danube River in winter, sacking Ruse and its neighbourhood

and massacring the inhabitants was enough to infuriate Mehmed III⁴⁶. As a matter of fact, on 2 Rajab 1003 (13 March 1595), the despatches from the Danube mansions mentioned that Michael had retreated to Wallachia after the looting and massacres he had committed there. For the time being, the Sultan asked for vigilance against possible attacks from Wallachia⁴⁷. At this point, the increase in attacks from Wallachia-Moldavia and the endangerment of security in the Danube mansions pushed the Ottoman statesmen to take a decision. Selaniki, who relates the discussions about the direction of the expedition to the West in the spring, states that Ferhad Pasha held a meeting to determine the direction of this expedition. In this meeting, the state officials, including Ibrahim and Mehmed Pasha, argued that the enemy in Budin should be attacked, while Halil Pasha expressed his opinion that an expedition should be organised against the cults of Wallachia and Moldavia. Upon this last idea, which was also accepted by Ferhad Pasha, it was decided to organise an expedition to Wallachia and Moldavia in the spring⁴⁸. Sultan Mehmed III approved the decision taken at this meeting:



Serdar Ferhad Pasha

"... The voivods of Wallachia-Moldavia, who are my tributary, being on a course of treason, rebellion and rebellion in accordance with their treachery mentioned in their clans, not only caused damage and damage to some parts of my homeland, but also took some castles and especially since they are on the path of sedition and mischief, in order to overcome the this enemy, my firmân has been issued with my hatt-ı humâyım in the name of expedition against Wallachia and Moldavia by my sirdâr Ferhad Pasha".

The Sultan decided to organise an expedition to the region. Mehmed III appointed Ferhad Pasha as serdar of the Ottoman army on 12 Ramadan 1003 (21 May 1595) for the campaign against Michael⁴⁹. On the other hand, as a result of long discussions in Imperial Council, it was ruled that the Wallachia and Moldavia voivodships would be transformed into beylerbeyliks. After these decisions taken in Istanbul, it was time for Ferhad Pasha's preparations for the campaign against Wallachia⁵⁰.

Military Preparations for the Wallachia Expedition

While Western sources mostly focus on Michael's diplomatic traffic in Wallachia,



Sultan Mehmed III

Ottoman authors of the period give important details about these preparations. Hasan Beyzâde refers to the preparations in Istanbul and states that Ferhad Pasha and his entourage were busy procuring the ammunition and equipment required for the expedition and that orders were written to the governors to join the expedition⁵¹. Kâtip Çelebi and Naimâ, on the other hand, mention the ten thousand janissaries placed under the command of Ferhad Pasha, who arrived in Davutpaşa with a large procession, and the navy loaded with cannons and ammunition sent to Ruse via the Danube⁵². There is an extensive list in the Revenue Office continuing records (MAD.d.) regarding the war materials purchased by Ferhad Pasha before the campaign. This list includes the number and value of the tools to be used in rifle production such as barrels, gunpowder nests, rods, rifle and gunpowder chests, etc. On the other hand, a wide variety of materials such as water containers, water bags, water bowls, powder pouches, shovel handles, cart bases and rings are listed for use in army supply⁵³.

Further elaborating on this information, Topçular Kâtibi Abdülkâdir Efendi (the Artillery Clerk) writes that these munitions and ammunition were loaded on camels and transported to the Danube by land, while four bacalushkas and eight kolonburnas produced at the Tophâne-i Âmire were transferred to the Danube by ships from the Black Sea. In addition to mentioning that the crew of neccâr, blacksmiths, architects, etc. required for the bridge to be built over the Danube was to be assembled in Ruse⁵⁴, Topçular Kâtibi also reported his observations on the readiness of the shayka and gunboat ships in Nicopolis and Vidin. The task of protecting the bridge between Ruse and Giurgiu against possible attacks was also assigned to Sokulluzâde Hasan Pasha⁵⁵.

The Beylerbeyi of Rumelia was assigned to provide troops for Sokulluzade Hasan Pasha who was to go to Wallachia. The sergeants in charge of this task made announcements to the people in the towns and villages within the province of Rumelia and asked them to be ready in time for the preparations for the expedition without using the summer and winter months as an excuse⁵⁶. According to the Mühimme provisions and the other sources of

this time, another duty of Sokulluzâde Hasan Pasha was to organise raids on enemy territories and to obtain information about the enemy's intentions and preparations by capturing prisoners. As a matter of fact, Sokulluzade Hasan Pasha and Osman, the Sanjak Beyi of Solnuk, who served under him, were victorious in his battles with a group of rebels in Wallachia and were praised by the sultan⁵⁷.

These preparations, which are mentioned by contemporary sources of the period, are further elaborated with the judgements of the mühime. In particular, it is understood that the pine wood used in the construction of the cannons mentioned by the Topçular Kâtibi came from the vicinity of Gallipoli, Lâpseki and Bergos. In the decree sent to the kadis in question, the necessity of preparing labourers and tractor trucks to bring the pine wood to Istanbul was emphasised⁵⁸. Again, in addition to the sergeants, company people and janissaries on guard in the sanjak of Caffa (Keefe) to join Ferhad Pasha, the sergeants of the dergâh-ı muallâ, the company people and the janissaries on guard were ordered to set off to join the expedition⁵⁹.

In addition to the supply of troops, it is noteworthy that a number of measures were taken to meet the ammunition of the expeditionary troops. As it is known, most of the supplies such as meat, grain, timber, oil and honey for the Ottomans' expeditions to the West were made from Wallachia-Moldavia. However, the rebellion of these voivods made the situation even more complicated. W. Baltasar even states that these rebellions had a negative impact on the Ottoman campaigns in the West and draws attention to the shortage of ammunition in the Ottoman army⁶⁰. In fact, the existence of the records of the mühimme, which indicate that such shortages were observed in Istanbul, confirms this⁶¹. In this context, the ammunition required for the Wallachia expedition was met from the sanjaks in Rumelia. Every five households in the sanjaks of Peloponnese, Avlonya, Karlı-ili, İnebahtı, İlbasan, Delvine and Ioannina (Yanya) were required to give one sheep⁶². In the decree sent to the kadis in the sanjaks of Silistra, Vidin and Chirmen, it was requested that the provisions found in Belgrade as nüzul cereal be brought and pre-

pared before the expeditionary Ferhad Pasha arrived in that neighbourhood⁶³. In addition, the kadi of Kirkkilise (Kırklareli) was tasked with the preparation of 7,698 kg of barley to be used as food for riding animals, which were of great importance in the supply of the army⁶⁴.

After the procurement of ammunition, ammunition, soldiers, etc. required for the Wallachia campaign, 28 campaign routes were determined for Ferhad Pasha from Istanbul to Ruse⁶⁵. Topçular Kâtibi describes the route of the Ottoman army in detail about the mansions and ranges that Ferhad Pasha visited until his arrival in Ruse. Accordingly, Ferhad Pasha and his entourage, after his destination at Davud Pasha, moved to Halkalı, Benefşe Çayırı⁶⁶, Çatalca Valley and arrived in Edirne on 23 May 1595⁶⁷. The English envoy Barton points out that Ferhad Pasha stayed here for five days in order to recruit men for the army and to rest his exhausted war horses⁶⁸. In fact, it is seen that the subasi of Tekfurdağı, Vize, Kocacık and NaldökenYoruks were warned from the centre to make sure that the soldiers in this vicinity catch up with the serd before Ferhad Pasha crossed the Balkans and arrived at the Danube mansions (12-13 June 1595)⁶⁹.

Following the small-scale measures taken, Ferhad Pasha and his entourage set out from Edirne on 27 May 1595, passed through Yambol and arrived at Karınâbâd field after a while. In the meantime, he received the news that Michael, one of the prisoners brought by Hasan Pasha, was requesting help from the voivodeship of Transylvania and the cannons were positioned close to Silistra in order to prevent sudden raids⁷⁰. In addition, Bervan Bey was assigned with volunteer soldiers to protect Silistra and its surroundings from enemy raids⁷¹. The Ottoman army travelled through the mountains and passes named Çalı-kavak and stayed at Matara-Burnu for three days. Ferhad Pasha took delivery of the galleys full of ammunition brought by the Black Sea and headed towards Razgrad (Hazergrad)⁷². Since the Ottomans used the Danube River only from Ruse and Belgrade to Budin and Esztergom in their campaigns beyond the Danube, the cannons, supplies and ammunition loaded from Istanbul were brought to Varna via the Black Sea and then brought to Ruse or Belgrade by

various means⁷³. In this context, the cannons brought to the Varna pier via the Black Sea should have sailed to the Danube and directly to Ruse, but the Ottoman fleet could not reach Ruse and Silistra via the Danube because of the 300-400 soldiers Michael had put in Ibrail Castle. At this point, the order given to Hıdır and Hasan, the chiefs of artillery companies, was to lighten the cargoes of the ships waiting in Varna and to fill them with soldiers in order to survey both sides of the Danube. If there was no possibility of the enemy harming the ships on the Danube coast, it was necessary to take the caramurels⁷⁴ in tow and go straight to Silistra and from there to Ruse. If it was observed that the Danube was blockaded by enemy troops, it was recommended to dig trenches on the banks of the Danube and place cannons there, and after ensuring the safe passage of caramurels and galleys, the cannons should be sent to Ruse by land⁷⁵.

While the Ottoman army was travelling to the Danube coast, preparations for the bridge between Giurgiu and Ruse were underway in Nicopolis. According to Mühimme judgements, the ships needed for the bridge were being built in the Nicopolis shipyard⁷⁶. In the judgement written to Müslihiddin, the kadi of Hazergrad, who was in charge of this matter, the following information about the preparations was requested:

- 1 – How many of the ships being built in Nicopolis have been completed so far?
- 2 – How many ships are left to be released into the Danube River?
- 3 – Is the timber for these ships ready? If it is ready, in how many days will it be completed?
- 4 – What are the aims of the Wallachian army?

The main concern of the Ottoman authorities was that Michael would make a sudden raid and destroy this fleet. In his memoirs, voivode Michael states that when he learnt about the preparations of the Ottoman army on the Danube, he sent his men to Ibrail, Cervena, Tutrakan and Nicopolis for sudden raids⁷⁷. After a while, it is even seen that Nicopolis was set on fire by Michael. The news that Michael's soldiers had damaged the navy had reached the

ears of the serdar. Taking these circumstances into consideration, the Ottoman authorities instructed Müslihiddin, the kadi of Hazergrad, to keep the ships under guard day and night with the beys of Vidin and Nicopolis and the sekbanbashi, and to request soldiers who could use firearms if necessary⁷⁸. On the other hand, in the firman sent to Sekbanbaşı Hüseyin, he was asked to arrive in Nicopolis immediately with his janissaries to protect the ships⁷⁹. The gunpowder needs of the janissaries under Sekbanbashi were also met from Nicopolis Castle⁸⁰. In addition to these preparations made in Nicopolis, he was asked to bring eight wide-mouthed, short-barrelled mortars, called kazgan, tied to camels⁸¹. Probably, the kazgans were requested due to their ease of transport and use.

Almost every military expedition was full of problems such as rains, building bridges for crossing rivers and swamps, and waiting for the soldiers of the provinces who were delayed on the way⁸². In this respect, the fact that the soldiers of the provinces, who were supposed to join the expeditionary army at the beginning of May, did not join the main army caused some problems. As a matter of fact, Ferhad Pasha had already complained to the centre while he was still in Razgrad when he saw that the soldiers expected to join him had not yet arrived. Gelibolulu Mustafa Âli, who includes his complaints, writes that they created a reluctance in Ferhad Pasha during the Wallachia Expedition⁸³. Moreover, when Ferhad Pasha arrived in the region, only 4.000-5.000 of the 40.000-50.000 soldiers who had been called for service were ready for duty. The reason for this situation was related to the anger towards Ferhad Pasha during the events in Ganja⁸⁴. In particular, the historian Hasan Beyzâde includes Ferhas Pasha's reproach to the centre that not even one tenth of the army was ready for the campaign even though he was very close to Ruse and therefore he should not be held responsible for the defeat in Wallachia⁸⁵. Ferhad Pasha even felt the need to enlist recruits under the name of "kul karındaşı" in order to recruit soldiers. Enlisting recruits in the campaign was a new formula that the state devised in order to meet the intense need for soldiers.

The fact that Ferhad Pasha, who embarked on the Wallachia Expedition, preferred this formula was very important in terms of showing the troubles experienced in the army⁸⁶.

As a matter of fact, the orders sent from the centre to the sanjaks located in the right and left branches of Rumelia were important in terms of showing the problems encountered regarding the supply of soldiers at the time of the campaign, as well as confirming the views of Ottoman authors regarding the problems in the army. Therefore, although Ferhad Pasha was eight or nine days away from Ruse, the fact that there were still soldiers from these regions who did not come to Ruse angered the central administration. In the order sent to the kadis of the sanjaks responsible for this matter, the sipahs with fiefs, müteferrika and sergeants were asked to put on their weapons and come to Ruse immediately. There were even threats that those who were not present during the roll call in Ruse would be deprived of their dirliks⁸⁷. At this time, Michael was aware that Ferhad Pasha was busy in Razgrad with the army procurement. However, since he could do nothing but fight the enemy day and night along the Danube River, he requested help from Poland through Jan Potocki, the Polish Hetman⁸⁸.

Ferhad Pasha and his entourage finally arrived in Ruse from Razgrad in July 1595. With the arrival of the Pasha, the timbers brought by ships from Nicopolis were landed here and the bridge construction started. Since the Danube River receded in the summer months, bridges were connected to the island between Ruse and Giurgiu and architects and neccars were invited here. When Ferhad Pasha set up his camp in Ruse, information about the enemy was obtained thanks to the information provided by the soldiers captured and brought from Wallachia⁸⁹. Based on this information, Ottoman authors record that the number of Wallachian forces exceeded 70.000 soldiers⁹⁰. However, according to the information provided by the Wallachia envoy to Transylvania, Michael had 30,000 Romanians, more than 10,000 Hungarians and some Cossack soldiers⁹¹.

While the Ottoman army was building bridges across the Danube River, the kadis in the south of the Danube were assigned duties in order to prevent ammunition shortages. In

the orders sent to the kadis of Shumnu, Eski Cuma, Ruse, Razgrad, Izladi, Ivluca, Tarnovi, Lofça and Pleven, the inhabitants of these towns were asked to collect one sheep for every ten sheep and deliver them to Ruse through their owners or proxies⁹². On the other hand, after Ferhad Pasha's arrival in Ruse, it is observed that concrete steps began to be taken for the transformation of the voivodeship of Wallachia into a beylerbeydom. According to the plan prepared by the Imperial Council in this regard, the fortresses to be built in Wallachia-Moldavia were to be staffed with soldiers with ulufes, aghas were to be appointed, and 2000 or 3000 fully equipped soldiers were to be deployed to defend these regions upon the arrival of the serdar⁹³. In particular, it was decided to appoint ulufe soldiers from Silistra and Dobrudja to these fortresses⁹⁴.

Dismissal of Ferhad Pasha

Despite all these preparations, Ferhad Pasha could not resist the attrition activities initiated by his rivals in Istanbul. Sinan Pasha was at the centre of the opposition front against Ferhad Pasha in Istanbul⁹⁵. In addition to Sinan Pasha, Ibrahim Pasha was also one of the leading figures of this opposition front. Ibrahim Pasha had a serious influence in the centre as he was the second vizier with the position of regent of sadaret. Almost all Ottoman authors of the period agree that when Ferhad Pasha was still on his way to Ruse, the requests for troops from the centre were used against him by Ibrahim Pasha⁹⁶. Ibrahim Pasha, who was waiting to become Grand Vizier, not only slowed down the logistics of the army in order to eliminate him, but he also reduced his reputation by spreading the rumour to the sultan that the military hated Ferhad Pasha⁹⁷. Thus, as a result of the successful propaganda of Sinan Pasha, who was at the centre of the opposition front against Ferhad Pasha, and Ibrahim Pasha, who was the implementer of these decisions, Ferhad Pasha suffered a serious loss of reputation. In the last critical phase of the preparations for the Wallachia Expedition, these two created a "leadership vacuum" in the expedition and reduced his power both at the front and at the centre⁹⁸.

Sinan and Ibrahim Pashas were of course

not alone in this coalition formed against Ferhad Pasha at the centre. One of the names in this coalition was Cigalazâde Sinan Pasha. He was in a rivalry with Ferhad Pasha to the point of enmity. On the other hand, Siyavuş Pasha of Kanijeli was positioned against Ferhad Pasha. The rivalry between these two was based on a rumour that Siyavuş Pasha wanted to be made grand vizier again. Cerrah Mehmed and Hadim Hasan Pashas, who were also members of Imperial Council, were among this team working against Ferhad Pasha. Finally, the ulema wing of the opposition front was headed by Shaykh al-Islam Bostanzâde Efendi⁹⁹. According to Hasan Beyzâde, the reason for the Shaykh al-Islam's participation in this team against Ferhad Pasha was the events that took place in the Hagia Sophia Mosque during the funeral prayer of Sultan Murad III. Although the duty of leading the funeral prayer of the Sultan was assigned to Hâce-i Sultanî Hoca Saadettin Efendi, Shaykh al-Islam Bostanzâde Efendi had performed this duty. For this reason, Shaykh al-Islam Bostanzâde Efendi had leaned towards the opposition front where Sinan Pasha was located¹⁰⁰. This opposition team agreed on the dismissal of Ferhad Pasha and carried out propaganda against him. With the advantage of Farhad Pasha's distance from the centre, Sinan Pasha gained the sultan's trust in Istanbul. Not even five months after his dismissal from Sadaret, he regained this position¹⁰¹.

In the end, Ferhad Pasha was dismissed from his post and exiled to Istanbul as a result of the influence of his arch-rival Sinan Pasha. The sources of this time about the reason for Ferhad Pasha's dismissal generally have a narrative style that the rivalry between the two was reflected differently to the sultan and Ferhad Pasha was left alone in the centre¹⁰². However, regarding Ferhad Pasha's dismissal, the historian Selanikî interprets this event differently from other authors. According to him, the reason for Ferhad Pasha's dismissal was that he did not have enough troops at the front and that he turned his face away from the cries for help during the massacres in Wallachia-Moldavia in the Danubian Mansions¹⁰³. However, a document in the Topkapı Palace provides a different information about

Ferhad Pasha's dismissal from these narratives. According to this, during the death of Sultan Murad III, some money went missing from the treasury and Ferhad Pasha was held responsible for this incident. Ferhad Pasha, on the other hand, completely denied the accusation of theft and even demanded an investigation into the incident. Although it is not yet clear whether this demand was realised or not, it is a question mark whether this allegation was made to defame Ferhad Pasha against the sultan or whether it was a real incident¹⁰⁴.

While Ferhad Pasha was busy with the bridge construction in Ruse, unaware of all these events, Ahmed, the Chief Doorkeeper (Kapıcılar Kethüdası) was ordered to go to Ruse with eighty men and capture him. However, Ahmed Agha, was only able to send the seal of the sultanate from Ruse in order to avoid any disturbances among the soldiers while the army was so busy with the bridge construction¹⁰⁵. Ferhad Pasha, who had been informed of these events a few days before, managed to escape from Ruse, leaving the responsibility to Satırcı Mehmed Pasha¹⁰⁶. Hasan Beyzâde and Topçular Kâtibi giving interesting information about his experiences on his return to Istanbul. Among them, Topçular Kâtibi mentions that in order to capture Ferhad Pasha, the Chief Doorkeeper and his entourage searched for him with horsemen in the Balkans. He then states that Ferhad Pasha fled the region disguised as an ordinary peasant by entering the gorges to cover his tracks¹⁰⁷. Hasan Beyzâde, on the other hand, evaluates the event from a different perspective by emphasising that Farhad Pasha had scattered his personal treasure to distract attention and fled in this turmoil¹⁰⁸. As a matter of fact, Ferhad Pasha would soon pay for his loss of political power with his life. Ferhad Pasha, who escaped from the team that wanted to capture him, reached his farm in Litroz and started to hide here. In the meantime, he was pardoned through the mediation of Safiye Sultan, but Ibrahim Pasha found a way to obtain a decree from the sultan for his murder. Bostancıbaşı Ferhad, who was assigned to capture him, took the former grand vizier from his farm and imprisoned him in the Yedikule dungeons. The next day, Suleyman Ağa, who was assigned to carry out Ferhad Pasha's exe-

cution, strangled him with the executioners¹⁰⁹. It would be appropriate to mention two events that caused Ferhad Pasha's death. The first of these was the appointment of Damat Ibrahim Pasha as the grand vizier in his place when he went on an expedition to Wallachia. Because Ibrahim Pasha was the most important implementer of the broad coalition Sinan Pasha had formed around him to eliminate Ferhad Pasha. The second is the fact that Ferhad Pasha did not have the eyes of his rival Sinan Pasha put out after the rebellion and gave up on this job¹¹⁰.

Conclusion

In the last quarter of the 16th century, the rebellion of the voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia against the Ottoman Empire, to which they were tributary, necessitated urgent measures against these voivodeships. Following the appointment of Ferhad Pasha as serdar, it was decided to change the status of these regions and to directly annex them to the Ottoman Empire. It can be argued that the Ottoman rulers adopted such a radical solution in order to maintain the flow of ammunition and supplies and to facilitate the passage of the Tatar army during the campaigns to the West. On the other hand, Ottoman sources agree that the purpose of the campaign against Wallachia was to eliminate Michael the Brave, the voivode of Wallachia. Unlike the other sources, Topçular Kâtibi explains the objectives of the expedition by stating that the expedition was aimed at revenge against Michael and that after the rebellion was suppressed, the provinces of Transylvania and Habsburg (Nemçe) could be easily raided¹¹¹. Therefore, the preparations for the expedition to be realised within the framework of this objective lasted approximately three months, and during this time Ferhad Pasha arrived in Ruse, having largely completed the preparations for the supply of food, supplies, ammunition, and soldiers for the Ottoman army. However, he was exposed to the intrigues in Istanbul during the construction of the bridge that would allow the Ottoman army to cross to Wallachia. The key figures at the centre of these intrigues were Sinan Pasha and Ibrahim Pasha. Especially Ibrahim Pasha's propaganda to discredit Ferhad Pasha in the eyes of the sultan showed its effect after a

while. With Sinan Pasha taking over the office of sadaret, the influence of Ferhad Pasha and his supporters at the centre diminished. Ferhad Pasha, who was dismissed from the office of sadaret due to the intrigues carried out at the centre, could not avoid being assassinated by his rivals. This event, which left a deep impact on Ottoman history, was frequently discussed by the authors of the period. From this point of view, I think that the rivalry between two prominent Ottoman statesmen must have benefited by Michael, the Voivode of Wallachia, the most.

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Table I: List and Prices of the Material's Mustafa Pasha Bought Before the Wallachian Expedition

Material Type	Piece/Weightiness/ Length	Unit Price	Total Value (Term of Kurus)
Saka Box	1 Pair	-	800
Wood	-	-	-
Carpet	4 part	30 Kurus	120
Trowel	1 Piece	-	360
Oak Lumber	224 Kg ¹¹²	-	700
Different kind of Trunks	6 Piece	8 Kurus	48
Strap	27 Piece	-	2900
Red Leather	7 Piece	80 Kurus	560
Arrow made by Oak	4 Piece	-	61
Kubur Yarn	4 Top	10 Kurus	40
Camel Sack	6 Pair	80 Kurus	1080
Beeswax	2.5 Kg	-	25
Saw	15 Piece	12 Kurus	180

White Felt	1 Piece	-	45
Red FELT	2 Piece	75 Kuruş	150
Carpet	50 Piece	5 Kuruş	250
Latch	4 Piece	8 Kuruş	32
Scales (For Gun Carriage)	50 Piece	150 Kuruş	6000
Axe for Cars	4 Piece	4 Kuruş	16
Small Link	10 Piece	15 Kuruş	150
Trunks	4 Piece/5 Kg	-	16

(BOA, MAD.d 00383, s. 87)

Table II: Rental Fees of the Servants During Mustafa Pasha's Wallachia Expedition

Service Group	Hire Costs (Term of Kuruş)
Cost of Hammal for Transported Gunpowder	50
Cost of Hammal for some Ammunition	70
Hire Costs for the Pulling Horses	23.200
Paddler Costs	160

(BOA, MAD.d 00383, s. 87)

Table III: Material List of Bought by Ferhad Pasha Before Wallachia Expedition

Material Type	Piece/Weightiness/ Length	Unit Price	Total Value (Term of Kuruş)
The Grip of Gun Barrel	580 Piece	73 Kuruş	42.340
Rifle Teller	1000 Piece	15 Kuruş	15.000
Gun Stock	577 Piece	13 Kuruş	7501
Ramrod	1920 Piece	-	960
Rifle Scratcher	192 Piece	-	4000
Arm Trunk	98 Piece	100 Kuruş	9800
Chamber Trunk	20 Pair	125 Kuruş	2500
Rifle Ball Trunk	101 Piece	50 Kuruş	5050
Rifle Trunk	10 Piece	1200 Kuruş	12.000
Bombardier Trunk	70 Pair	65 Kuruş	4550
Gunpowder Trunk	56 Pair	85 Kuruş	4760

Paper of Istanbul (for Tughra)	80	400 Kuruş	3200
Zamerra of Tirhala ¹¹³	196 Piece	19 Kuruş	3724
Camel Sack	62 Pair	180 Kuruş	11.160
Wick Yarn	50 Sac	20 Kuruş	100
Prick Sac	20 Piece	-	70
Waterskin for Water Bearer	723	13 Kuruş	9399
Water Pan (for Water Bearer)	2 Barrel	-	2000
Tap (for Water Bearer)	2 Piece	2400 Kuruş	4800
Bucket Pit	2 Piece	40 Kuruş	80
Hand Bucket	4 Piece	20 Kuruş	80
Black Felt	979 Piece	12 Kuruş	11.748
Pickaxe and Axe Grasp	9950 Piece	10 Kuruş	19.900
Trowel	1613 Piece	4 Kuruş	6452
Money Sac	360 Piece	10 Kuruş	3600
Gunpowder Sac	3240 Piece	10 Kuruş	32.400
White Tarp	129 Piece	150 Kuruş	19.350
Basket	-	4 Kuruş	215
Arrow Head and Circle	10 Piece	-	360
White Dye	223 Piece	72 Kuruş	16.056
Dye for Flag	3 Piece	450 Kuruş	1350
Pickaxe	6380 Piece	-	2120
Grasp of Iron Shovel	1513 Piece	-	2763
Belt for Flag bearer	312 Piece	120 Kuruş	37.440
Oil	2 Piece/360 kg	50 Kuruş	600
Kibble	2 Piece	100 Kuruş	200
Pore for Tuğ	10 Piece	10 Kuruş	100
Wicking	1000 Metre	-	800
Cotton	175 Sac	-	29.179
Galloper and its Circle	580 Sac Piece		10.940
Water pump	300 Piece/54 kg		5400
Bronze Bombard	500	3.5 Kuruş	1750
Hakbe of Water Bearer	70	5 Kuruş	350
Leather	29 Piece/300 kg	-	2900
Saw	950 Piece	12 Kuruş	11.400

(BOA, MAD.d 00383, s. 84-85)

Table IV: The List of Materials Required Artillery Ammunition

Material Type	Piece/Weightiness/ Length	Unit Price	Total Value (Term of Kurus)
Floorboard	989	-	1835
Lunette	149		
Iron wire	7.6 kg	5 Kurus	30
Chain for Artillery cannons	67	130 Kurus	11.310
Wood Scales	140	130 Kurus	18.200
Chains	71	130 Kurus	9230
Hobs	228.486	4 Kurus	913.944
Spike for floor	2326	150 Kurus	348.900
Wand	-	15 Kurus	255
Argil	-	-	540
Tin	38 Kg	50 Kurus	1050
Tinderbox	7.6 Kg	50 Kurus	300
Tall oil	1203 Kg	62 Kurus	2860

(BOA, MAD.d 00383, s. 86)

**Table V: Rental Fees of Service Groups who Involved
in the Wallachia Expedition**

Service Group	Hire Costs (Term of Kurus)
Blacksmiths	616.231
Neccâr of gun carriage	30.232
Daily Labours	60.907
Sawyers	1952
Sawyers	1949
Group of Nafakacı	2043
Irgats	570
Renting Price of Horses, Camels, Mule etc.	1609
Fee Paid for Loading Fees of Materials for Axe, Cutters, Rug, Strav etc.	6000

(BOA, MAD.d 00383, s. 86)

NOTES

¹ Feridun Emecen “Uzun Savaşların Başlaması (1592-1606) ve Zitvatorok Anlaşması: Dönemin Çağdaş Osmanlı Kaynaklarının Değerlendirilmesi”, *Osmanlı Klasik Çağında Savaş*, Timaş Yay., İstanbul, 2011, pp. 279.

² Maria Ivanics-Ress, “Osmanlı-Habsburg Savaşlarında Kırım Tatarlarının Rolü (1593-1606)”, *Osmanlı*, C. I, Ankara, 1999, pp. 456.

³ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, C. III, kısım I, 4. Baskı, TTK Yay., Ankara 1988, pp. 69-70.

⁴ Constantin Giurescu, *Istoria Românilor (Dela Mircea Cel Bătrân și Alexandru Cel Bun Până La Mihai Viteazul)*, Vol. II-Partea Întâi, Fundație Pentru Literatură și Artă Regele Carol II, București, 1943, pp. 260.

⁵ Constantin Rezachevici, *Cronologia Critică A Domnilor Din Țara Românească și Moldova (1334-1881)*, Vol. I (Secolele XIV-XVI), Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2001, pp. 322.

⁶ Ioachim Crăciun, *Cronicarul Szamosközy și Însemnările lui Privitoare la Români 1566-1608*, Cluj, 1928, pp. 99-100.

⁷ Ludovic Demeny ve Paul Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile Politice Ale Anglie cu Moldova, Țara Românească și Transilvania în secolele XVI-XVIII*, București, 1974, pp. 30.

⁸ Rezachevici, *ibidem*, pp. 323.

⁹ Karaçelebizâde Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l Ebrâr*, Bulak Matbaası, Kahire, 1832, pp. 475.

¹⁰ Crăciun, *Cronicarul Szamosközy*, pp. 99.

¹¹ Rezachevici, *ibidem*, pp. 323.

¹² Yusuf Heper, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Wallachia-Boğdan İlişkileri (1574-1634)*, Uşak Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Uşak 2020, pp. 179.

¹³ BOA, A. {DVN. MHM. d, nr. 71, pp. 381, order number 711.

¹⁴ Mihai Maxim, “Michael Brave’s Appointment and Investiture-September 2nd/2th, 1593 in Two Unpublished Official Turkish Documents”, *L’Empire Ottoman Au Nord Du Danube*, pp. 165; *Istoria Medie a României, Partea Întii (sec. Al X-lea sfîrșitul se. Al XVI-lea)*, (Autorii: Ștefan Pascu, Ion Ioanașcu vd.), Editura și Didactică și Pedagogică, București, 1966, pp. 339.

¹⁵ Crăciun, *Cronicarul Szamosközy*, pp. 100; Dan Simonescu, “Cronica Lui Baltasar Walther Despre Mihai Viteazul în Raport cu Cronicile Interne Contemporane, în *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie*, Vol III, (1959), pp. 62.

¹⁶ In the judgement sent to Voivode of Wallachia on this matter, the following statements were made: Hâliya-i vezir-i Âzam’ım olan düstr-u ekrem’ül ilâ âhirihi serdar Sinan Paşa *edâma’llâhü te’âlâ iclâlê-*

hû tarafından eğer harac ve eğer bârgir ve eğer sâir mühimmatı sefere müteallik her ne makule ahkâm-ı şerife vârid olursa asla bir an te’hîr ve terâhî itmeyüb mazmûnuyla amel ve sa’atiyle icrasında ihtimâm itmeği emr idüb buyurdum ki (...) Bk. BOA, A. {DVN. MHM. d, nr. 72, pp. 362, order number 703.

¹⁷ Giurescu, *ibidem*, pp. 261-262; Șt. Ștefănescu, “Războiul Cel Lung (1593-1606) și Resurecția Românească”, *Istoria Românilor*, Vol. IV, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2001, pp. 596.

¹⁸ *Mihai Viteazul în Conștiința Europeană: Documente Externe*, Vol. I, Editura Academiei R.P.S., București, 1982, pp. 616.

¹⁹ Nicolae Iorga, *Osmanlı Lui Mihai Viteazul*, Editura Militară, București, 1968, pp. 128-129.

²⁰ Ovidiu Cristea, “A Second Front: Wallachia and The Long War Against The Turks”, *Europe and The Ottoman World Exchanges and Conflicts (Sixteenth to Seventeenth Centuries)*, Edited by Gábor Kárman and Radu G. Păun, pp. 13-14.

²¹ The dates 5 Zilkade 1001 to 27 Rebiyülevvel 1002 (3 August 1593-21 December 1593) are given on the cover of the book in question, followed by the phrase “*suret-i ruzname-i humâyun*” written when Ferhad Pasha went on the Wallachia Expedition during his premiership and Grand viziership. Considering that Ferhad Pasha was appointed by the sultan the Wallachia Expedition on 12 Ramadan 1003 (21 May 1595) the dates 1001 and 1002 (1593) are suggestive. For this reason, we did’nt not included this book (defter) in the study.

²² Giurescu, *ibidem*, pp. 262-263.

²³ Ludovic Demeny, “Secui și Campania de Eliberare a Țării Românești din 1595”, *Revista de Istorie*, Nr. 4, Tom. 28, (1975), pp. 498-499.

²⁴ BOA, A. {DVN. MHM. d, nr. 72, pp. 50, order number 89.

²⁵ BOA, A. {DVN. MHM. d, nr. 72, pp. 175, order number 332.

²⁶ Irina Cristina, “The Ottoman Expedition from 1595 and its Effects on Wallachia’s Inhabitants”, *Annales d’Universite Valahia Targoviște, Section d’Archeologie et d’Histoire*, Tome IV-V, (2002-2003), pp. 147.

²⁷ Giurescu, *ibidem*, pp. 263; Cristina Feneșan, *Banatul Ottoman: Studii Istoricе*, Editura Ariergarda, Timișoara, 2017, pp. 179. Also one document mentioned about it that two official cavus send by the Porte to collect Wallachian tribute when they asked to tribute to Michael, he said “*come with me till mansion and I will give you my debt*” But after a while he changed his opinion and he threatened two cavus to turn back Istanbul. Thus they came to Istanbul with empty hands. Look. TSMA-E, nr. 810/31; Heper, *ibidem*, s. 185.

²⁸ Gheorghe Cantacuzino, Mihai Maxim vd., *Istoria Militară A Poporului Român, Epoca De Glorie A Oastei Celei Mari. A Doua Jumătate A Secolului Al XIV-lea-Prima Jumătate A Secolului Al XVI-lea*, Editura Militară, București 1987, Vol: III, pp. 143

²⁹ Yusuf Heper, "Uzun Savaşlar Döneminden Bir Kesit: Erdel'in Temeşvar'ı Geri Alma Teşebbüsleri (1596-97)", *Karadeniz İncelemeleri Dergisi*, Sa: 30, (2021), pp. 435.

³⁰ İbrahim Peçevi *Tarih*, Matbaa-i Amire, İstanbul, 1866, Vol: II, pp. 159-161.

³¹ Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke (1000-1065/1591-1655)*, Vol. I, (Haz. Zeynep Aycibin), Çamlıca, İstanbul 2016, pp. 60-61; Naimâ Mustafa Efendi, *Târih-i Na'imâ*, (Haz. Mehmed İpşirli), Vol. II, Ankara 2007, pp. 76-77.

³² *Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali ve Kühhül-Ahbar'ında II. Selim, III. Murat ve III. Mehmet Devirleri*, (Yay. Haz: Faris Çerçi), Vol: III, Erciyes Üniversitesi Yay., Kayseri, 2000, pp. 617-618.

³³ Karaçelebizâde, *Ravzatü'l Ebrâr*, pp. 476; Hasan Bey-zâde Ahmet Paşa, *Hasan Bey-zâde Târîhi*, Metin ve İndeks (1003-1045/1595-1635), (Haz. Şevki Nezihi Aykut), Vol. III, TTK, Ankara, 2004, pp. 439.

³⁴ Selânîkî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânîkî (971-1003/1563-1595)*, (Haz: Mehmet İpşirli), C. I, 2. Baskı, TTK, Ankara, 1999, pp. 409.

³⁵ Richard Knolles, *The Generall Historie of The Turkes*, London, 1603, pp. 1052; *Letopisețul Cantacuzinesc: Istoria Țării Românești (1290-1690)*, (Ediție Critică Întocmită de C. Grecescu și D. Simonescu), Editura Academiei R.P.R., București, 1960, pp. 55; Simonescu, "*Cronica Lui Baltasar Walther*", pp. 65; *Literatura Română Veche (1402-1647)* Introducere, ediție îngrijită și note de G. Mihăilă și Dan Zamfirescu, Vol II, Cronica Domniei lui Mihai Viteazul, (Cronica Buzeștilor), pp. 87.

³⁶ *Documentes Concerning Rumanian History (1427-1601)*, (Collected From British Archives by E. D. Tappe), London-Paris, 1964, pp. 84.

³⁷ Demeny, *ibidem*, pp. 499.

³⁸ Șt. Ștefănescu, "*Războiul Cel Lung (1593-1606)*", pp. 600.

³⁹ In a letter sent to centre by dizdars of Giurgiu Castle, they draw attention to the damages caused by Michael the Brave to the castle. Michael and his men set fire to Giurgiu Castle which was under siege and complained that the castle was falling into ruins, the inner castle and the Stone water gate walls had collapsed and the rooms where the warriors would stay were in need of repair. However, the fact that the peasants in the castle suburbs were not willing to construct the stone walls caused the Daube dizdars to undertake the repair work. Look BOA, KK.d., nr. 71, order number 404.

⁴⁰ BOA, A.{DVN. MHM. d, nr. 934.1, pp. 17, order number 45-46.

⁴¹ *Istoria Medie a României*, pp. 341; Giurescu, *ibidem*, pp. 263.

⁴² While there is no information in contemporary sources about Mustafa Pasha's preparations for the Wallachia Expedition, a document in the Revenue Continuing Record provides details of the materials purchased and states that total of 13.650 kurus was spent for this expedition. A fee of 19.580 kurus was paid for the hired service groups. Look BOA, MAD.d, Nr. 383, pp. 87. Also look Table I and II.

⁴³ *Documente Străine Despre Români*, (Culegere de Documente întocmită de Manole Neagoe, Ioana Burlacu vd.), Direcția Generală a Arhivelor Statului din R.S.R., București, 1979, pp. 92.

⁴⁴ Sergiu Columbeanu, "Acțiunile Navale Ale Lui Mihai Viteazul Pentru Stăpînirea Dunării", *Revista de Istorie*, Tom. 28, Nr: 4, (1975), pp. 486.

⁴⁵ Cirstina, *ibidem*, pp. 147

⁴⁶ Peçevi, *Tarih*, II, pp. 164-165

⁴⁷ BOA, A.{DVN. MHM. d, nr. 934.1, pp. 20, order number 49.

⁴⁸ Selânîkî, *Târîh*, II, pp. 467.

⁴⁹ BOA, A.{DVN. MHM. d, nr. 934.1, pp. 86, order number 182; Also Mehmed b. Mehmed writes "*it was given to responsibility of Islam army to the Ferhad Pasha*" about his appointment to the Wallachia Expedition after all the massacres and looting that Michael had carried out in the Danubian Mansions. Look Mehmed b. Mehmed er- Rûmî, *Nühbetü't-Tevârih ve'l Ahbâr*, (Haz. Abdurrahman Sağırılı), İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis), İstanbul, 2000, pp. 445.

⁵⁰ Concerning the transformation of Wallachia and Moldavia into the Beylerbeyliks also look Mihai Maxim, "Voyvodalık Ou Beğlerbeğilik? La Politique Ottomane Envers Les Ptincipatutes Roumanies (Novembre 1594 Fevrier 1596)", *Romano-Ottomanica, (Essays-Documents From The Turkish Archives)*, Isis Press, İstanbul, 2001, pp. 163-172

⁵¹ Hasan Bey-zâde, *Târîh*, pp. 442-443.

⁵² Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, pp. 70; Naimâ, *Târîh*, pp. 90.

⁵³ BOA, MAD.d, 383, s. 84-85. Detailing or pricing of this list also look table III ve IV.

⁵⁴ A decree dated 26 Ramadan 1003 (4 June 1595) written to the Danube mansions diversifies his information "*for the bridge to be built on the Danube River, 30 person neccâr, 60 person axemen from the Karinâbâd district, 20 person neccâr, 40 person axemen from the Silven district, 40 person neccâr, 80 person axemen from the Yambol (Yanbolu) district, 10 person neccâr, 20 nefer axemen from the village of Yambol district...*" Furthermore in the

continuation of this decree, 60 neccârs from Pomorie (Ahyolu), 20 neccârs and 40 axemens from Misivri, 20 neccâr and 40 axemen from Aydos, 60 neccârs and 120 axemen from Shumnu, 20 neccârs and 40 axemen from Cuma Pazarı, 40 neccârs and 80 axemen from Razgrad and 30 neccârs and 80 axemen from Ruse, look BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 92, order number 192. In addition, Ferhad Pasha paid a total of 140.037 kurus as rental fees for service groups such as daily labourers, irgads, sawyers and nafakacı. Especially when compared to the rental payments made during Mustafa Pasha. Ferhad Pasha paid approximately seven times more than him. BOA, *MAD.d.*, 383, s. 86. For comparison Table V.

⁵⁵ *Topçular Kâtibi Abdülkadir (Kadri) Efendi Târîhi (Metin ve Tahlil)*, (Haz: Ziya Yilmazer), TTK, Ankara, 2003, Vol: I, pp. 56-57.

⁵⁶ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 47, order number 105.

⁵⁷ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 80, order number 171; Topçular Kâtibi, *Târîh, I*, pp. 60.

⁵⁸ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 32, order number 73.

⁵⁹ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 40, order number 90.

⁶⁰ Simonescu, “*Cronica Lui Baltasar Walther*”, pp. 62.

⁶¹ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 40, order number 90. In order to eliminate the wheat, barley and oil shortage in Istanbul the kadi of Caffa were charged. It was expected that the ammunition loaded on the farmer ships Caffa sides would be sent to Istanbul in full. *Ibidem*.

⁶² BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 81, order number 174.

⁶³ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 21, order number 50.

⁶⁴ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 81, order number 173.

⁶⁵ Selânikî, *Târîh*, II, pp. 475.

⁶⁶ According to Hammer's account, while Ferhad Pasha was in Davud Pasha, some soldiers removed one of the bricks in front of the tent at night and broket he golden ball at the end of it, which was interpreted as a bad luck by everyone. Joseph Von Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi IV*, Vol: 7, Üçdal Neşriyat, İstanbul 1990, pp. 230.

⁶⁷ Topçular Kâtibi, *Târîh, I*, pp. 59.

⁶⁸ Tappe, *Documents*, pp. 82.

⁶⁹ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 85, order number 181.

⁷⁰ Topçular Kâtibi, *Târîh, I*, pp. 62-63.

⁷¹ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 82, order number 175.

⁷² Topçular Kâtibi, *Târîh, I*, pp. 63.

⁷³ Gabor Agoston, “Çevre ve Sınır Tarihi Çalışmalarının Buluştuğu Yer: Macaristan’daki Osmanlı-Habsburg Sınırı Boyunca Nehirler, Ormanlar, Bataklıklar ve Kaleler”, *Osmanlı’da Strateji ve Askeri Güç*, Timaş Yayınları, 3. Baskı, İstanbul 2019, pp. 101.

⁷⁴ The caramursels used in Ottoman navy were utilised in long-term campaigns and sieges. These small ships were especially useful in transporting timber, ammunition, war materials, ropes, galley oars and sails for the supply of the navy. Yasemin Nemlioğlu Koca, “*Karamürsel Gemisi: Özellikleri ve Kullanımına Yönelik Bazı Tespitler*”, *Uluslararası Kara Mürsel Alp ve Kocaeli Tarihi Sempozyumu II*, (Editörler: Haluk Selvi, M. Bilal Çelik ve Ali Yeşildal), Kocaeli Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Kültür ve Sosyal İşler Dairesi Başkanlığı Yayınları No: 35, Kocaeli 2016, pp. 290.

⁷⁵ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 94, order number 194.

⁷⁶ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 89, order number 186.

⁷⁷ *Documente Străine Despre Români*, pp. 92. This information is also confirmed by the Wallachian chronics. Look: Radu Popescu Vornicul, *Istoriile Domnilor Țării Românești*, (Introducere și Ediție Critică Întocmite de Const. Grecescu), Editura Academiei R.P.R, București, 1963, pp. 73.

⁷⁸ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 90, order number 188; P. Panaiteescu, *Documente Privitoare la Istoria Lui Mihai Viteazul*, Fundația Regală Universitară Carol I, București, 1936, pp.14.

⁷⁹ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 88, order number 185.

⁸⁰ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 91, order number 189.

⁸¹ BOA, *A.İDVN. MHM. d.*, nr. 934.1, pp. 90, order number 187; Salim Ayduz, *Osmanlı Silahları, Silah Üretim Merkezleri ve Literatürü Tarihi*, Tarih Okulu, Sa: X, (Mayıs-Ağustos 2011), pp. 14.

⁸² Kahraman Şakul, *Kamanıçe Kuşatması 1672*, Timaş Yayınları, 1. Baskı, İstanbul, 2021, pp. 31.

⁸³ *Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali*, vol. III, pp. 663.

⁸⁴ Rhoads Murphey, *Osmanlı’da Ordu ve Savaş*, (Çev. Tanju Akad), Homer Kitabevi, 1. Basım, İstanbul 2007, pp. 164.

⁸⁵ Hasan Bey-zâde, *Târîh*, s. 457. Also Ottoman official Historian Selanikî writes that the sultan appointed two people to investigate these complaints on the spot after the problems regarding the supply of soldiers were conveyed to the centre. These inspectors (Şebrenk Ağa and Mataracı Koca Kapıcı) together with Ferhad Pasha saw that only one tenth of the army was available in Razgrad and reported this to the Sultan. Selânikî, *Târîh*, II, pp. 480.

⁸⁶ Doğukan Bozkurt, *Serdar Ferhad Paşa'nın Hayatı; Askeri ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1566-1595)*, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü Unpublished Master Thesis, İstanbul 2022, pp. 134.

⁸⁷ BOA, A.İDVN. MHM. d, nr. 934.1, pp. 93, order number 193.

⁸⁸ Panaiteescu, *Documente Privitoare la Istoria Lui Mihai Viteazul*, pp. 15.

⁸⁹ Topçular Kâtibi, *Târih*, I, pp. 64.

⁹⁰ Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, pp. 72; Naîmâ, *Târih*, pp. 91.

⁹¹ Iorga, *ibidem*, pp. 178-179.

⁹² BOA, A.İDVN. MHM. d, nr. 934.1, pp. 95, order number 197.

⁹³ BOA, A.İDVN. MHM. d, nr. 934.1, pp. 77, order number 163.

⁹⁴ BOA, A.İDVN. MHM. d, nr. 934.1, pp. 89, order number 186.

⁹⁵ Naîmâ, *Târih*, I, pp. 92.

⁹⁶ Naîmâ, *Târih*, I, pp. 90; Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, I, pp. 70; Hasan Bey-zâde, *Târih*, pp. 457; Peçevi, *Tarih*, II, pp. 168.

⁹⁷ Mustafa Alkan, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Akıncı Ocağı'nın Sonu", *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, vol: 7, Sa: 13, (winter 2013), pp. 113.

⁹⁸ Murphey, *ibidem*, pp. 164.

⁹⁹ Bozkurt, *ibidem*, pp. 135-136.

¹⁰⁰ Hasan Bey-zâde, *Târih*, pp. 431-433.

¹⁰¹ Peçevi, *Tarih*, II, pp. 168-169.

¹⁰² İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, Vol. III (M. 1574-1703-H. 987-1115), Doğu Kütüphanesi, İstanbul, 2011, pp. 201; Naîmâ, *Târih*, I, pp. 92; Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, I, pp. 72.

¹⁰³ Selânikî, *Târih*, II, s. 491. Ottoman historian Naîmâ even includes Sinan Pasha's slander that Ferhad Pasha even allied with Michael the Voivod of Wallachia. Naîmâ, *Târih*, I, pp. 92.

¹⁰⁴ TSMA. E, Nr: 0815, 37/1; Bozkurt, *ibidem* pp. 139-140; Muhammed Hüseyin Öztürk, *Sadrızam Ferhad Paşa'nın Hayatı (Ö.1595)*, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsü Unpublished Master Thesis, Ankara, 2021, pp. 99.

¹⁰⁵ Selânikî, *Târih*, II, pp. 491, 498.

¹⁰⁶ Danişmend, *ibidem*, pp. 203.

¹⁰⁷ Topçular Kâtibi, *Târih*, I, pp. 70-71.

¹⁰⁸ Hasan Bey-zâde, *Târih*, pp. 462-463.

¹⁰⁹ Öztürk, *ibidem*, pp. 99-100.

¹¹⁰ Bozkurt, *ibidem*, pp. 133.

¹¹¹ Topçular Kâtibi, *Târih*, I, pp. 56.

¹¹² The unit of weight shown in the document as 4 scales is approximately equal to 56 kg. Look Hunz, Walther Hunz, *İslâm'da Ölçü Sistemleri*, (Çev. Acar Sevim), Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, İstanbul 1990, pp. 33.

¹¹³ A whoolen cloak worn by shepherds and peasants.

ASSESSING THE ROMANIAN ARMY: A REVIEW OF THE OTTOMAN MILITARY ATTACHÉ'S REPORT IN BUCHAREST (1891)

AHMET TAŞDEMİR *

Abstract

The 19th century witnessed a rapid surge in technological advancements, particularly in the fields of communication and transportation. These innovations revolutionized the temporal and spatial dimensions of military operations by enabling the swift acquisition and dissemination of previously restricted technical and tactical information. As a response to this change, one of the predominant methods for gathering intelligence on the armed forces of foreign nations was the appointment of military attachés. This study aims to examine an important military attaché report, specifically focused on the Romanian army in 1891. The report was prepared by Hafız Şevket Bey, the Ottoman attaché in Bucharest. This comprehensive report offers detailed information on the organization of the Romanian army, with particular emphasis on the reforms implemented in 1891. This article aims to reveal the administrative and military organization of the Kingdom of Romania by focusing on the recruitment procedures, armament, and the composition and roles of various army units, including infantry, cavalry, artillery, combat service support, and the navy within the contextual framework provided by Hafız Şevket Bey.

Keywords: *attaché, military intelligence, military organization, Ottoman Empire, Romanian Army, Şevket Turgut Pasha*

Introduction

The nature of warfare has experienced ongoing transformation throughout centuries, primarily propelled by advancements in firearms and military technology. While this evo-

lution progressed at a relatively slow pace until the 19th century, a notable acceleration became evident, particularly after the Napoleonic Wars. Consequently, the organization and administration of warfare assumed heightened

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complexity in response to these technological advancements. Armies expanded into massive formations, encompassing hundreds of thousands of soldiers, necessitated centralized control and intricate strategic planning. These conditions paved the way for the establishment of a general staff organization.

The advent of emerging technologies like railroads and telegraphy during the 19th century had a profound impact on the time and space perception in military operations. It brought a notable shift in the speed and scale of mobilization and deployment, thereby strategic and tactical thinking totally reshaped. With the Crimean War, the focal points of concern for general staffs extended beyond considerations of weaponry and army sizes; they began to be encompassed by the intricate realms of logistics and strategy. Various inquiries, including the enemy mobility, potential targets, offensive intentions, and defensive capabilities, emerged as the foremost issues requiring resolution.¹

The significant rise in the mobility of people, goods, and ideas has led to global homogenization, leading to an increasing uniformity among individuals. This homogenization has a notable influence on military doctrines, as John Lynn aptly described, causing a shift towards the strategy of “imitation of success” rather than the pursuit of differentiation. Consequently, the 19th century witnessed the emergence and establishment of “interstate” or “international” law and diplomatic relations. In addition, technological advancements accelerated communication and transportation, enabling the rapid acquisition and dissemination of previously classified technical and tactical information. These developments directly impacted military intelligence. Throughout the preceding centuries, military intelligence predominantly revolved around the efforts of political and military leaders, who sought to discern the political intentions, military capabilities, and wartime strategies of their adversaries through personal espionage networks. However, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, a transformative shift took place with the advent of specialized officials, particularly military attachés, who assumed diplomatic roles in foreign states. These attachés gained access to similar information via their diplo-

matic positions and this method became the main method for “imitation of success” in the realm of military affairs.²

The practice of gathering military intelligence about the armed forces of foreign states through the appointment of military attachés can be traced back to the Napoleonic Wars. In the early 19th century, Napoleon pioneered the deployment of military representatives to the French embassies for strategic planning of campaigns. These military envoys were tasked to report the developments within host countries. Following the Napoleonic Wars, this practice was adopted by several European states, including Prussia, France, etc. During this period, the institution of military attachés and their core responsibilities underwent a systematic and organized transformation. These appointments began to entail a clear delineation of their roles, with a primary focus on reporting significant developments within their designated areas of responsibility. Their observations encompassed a comprehensive range of subjects, including but not limited to: gaining a detailed understanding of the foreign state’s military forces, which involved not only assessing numerical strength but also tracking periodic changes, discerning key indicators, and measures indicative of a potential conflict; obtaining precise and timely information on military mobilizations; presenting a comprehensive military-focused portrait of the host country, considering all relevant military, scientific, law enforcement, and educational institutions, to identify noteworthy elements for emulation and other valuable innovations.³

In parallel with the unfolding developments in Europe, the Ottoman Empire initiated the practice of appointing officers to the attaché position within its embassies. However, it is noteworthy that, until the late 1850s, the majority of these appointments were oriented towards non-military roles. Following the conclusion of the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire adopted a policy of appointing attachés with military ranks and accompanying responsibilities.⁴

The formal establishment of the military attaché system within the Ottoman Empire took place during the 1860s. The Ottoman Empire began appointing military attachés to

Ottoman embassies in prominent European cities, including Paris, St. Petersburg, London, and Berlin. Conversely, the appointment of a military attaché in Romania, which is the central focus of this study, commenced in 1889. These military attachés operated under the jurisdiction of the second section of the Ottoman General Staff. Staff officers were selected for these roles based on their perceived competence to effectively fulfil the established expectations. The duties and responsibilities of attachés, particularly those related to the collection and dissemination of information, were also comprehensively outlined in official directives.⁵

In the aftermath of the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire underwent significant changes in its diplomatic practices, a transformation that included the establishment and development of the military attaché institution. In the subsequent years, the Ottoman government initiated the deployment of military attachés to various European capitals. One of among such attachés was Staff Major Yusuf Kenan Bey, who was assigned to the Ottoman Embassy in Bucharest in 1889.⁶ However, Yusuf Kenan Bey's tenure failed to meet the expected standards, leading to his dismissal on 8 October 1890, due to perceived deficiencies in his performance. To fill this vacant position, Staff Senior Captain Hafız Şevket, who had previously served as the attaché in Madrid since 1887, was appointed. He was also promoted to the rank of major upon assuming this new role.⁷ Hafız Şevket Bey arrived in Bucharest on 29 December 1890, officially commencing his duties in his new position.⁸

The reports prepared by military attachés offer valuable sources of information for the 19th and 20th century military history studies. This article will provide such kind of a report concerning the Romanian army, which was meticulously prepared by Hafız Şevket Bey in 1891, titled "*Romanya Devleti'nin Kuvve-i Askeriyesi*" ("The Military Power of Romania").⁹ This comprehensive report provides intricate information on the organization of the Romanian army. Hafız Şevket emerged as a prominent figure within the late Ottoman military hierarchy and later achieved the rank of major general. He played pivotal roles in significant

historical events, including the 31 March Incident, the Balkan War, and World War I. Moreover, he held strategic positions such as Ottoman Minister of War and Minister of Public Works in the last years of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰

During his tenure in Romania, Hafız Şevket Bey diligently followed the military developments and endeavoured to fulfil the primary objectives of his mission. His sense of duty and commitment are discernible through the Ottoman archival sources. Hafız Şevket Bey and other officials from the Ottoman Embassy closely observed the annual military manoeuvres conducted in various Romanian cities.¹¹ Furthermore, he actively participated in official ceremonies and special events attended by King Carol.¹² This active involvement in monitoring the military activities and participating in public events highlights his effective utilization of open-source intelligence opportunities. His dedication to gathering information is well exemplified in a report dated 21 March 1897, which he submitted to the Ottoman Ministry of War. This report meticulously detailed the preparations and expenditures made by the Romanians in anticipation of potential conflicts in the Balkans.¹³

Hafız Şevket Bey's tenure as the military Attaché in Bucharest was remarkably lengthy, spanning 19 years, his dedication and significant contributions consistently garnering commendation.¹⁴ Over the course of his service, he received recognition from the Romanian monarchy, being honoured with the 3rd degree of the Etoile Cordon de Roumanie in 1903 and subsequently the 2nd degree in 1909.¹⁵ In addition to this, Ottoman officials acknowledged his devoted service, presenting him the 3rd degree Order of the Medjidie in 1895, followed by the 2nd degree in 1905.¹⁶

Throughout his dedicated service, Hafız Şevket Bey achieved notable promotions, advancing from the rank of major to colonel. He was elevated to the position of lieutenant colonel on 15 October 1894, and subsequently attained the rank of colonel on 24 July 1903.¹⁷ In 1908, he was assigned as the commander of the 46th brigade of the Ottoman army upon expressing his desire to transition into active army duty. With this appointment he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general.¹⁸

The report of Şevket Bey on the Romanian army constitutes the focal point of our study. Şevket Bey meticulously compiled this report on 5 December 1891, approximately one year after assuming his position in Bucharest. Upon examining the report's contents, it becomes evident that one of the primary motivations for its preparation was the implementation of regulations by General Iacob Lahovary, the Minister of War, in 1891. These regulations precipitated substantial modifications to the organization of the Romanian army. Consequently, through this report, Şevket Bey aimed to apprise Ottoman policymakers of the aforementioned changes and the ensuing organizational reforms.

The report, archived in the collection of the Harbiye Military Museum Library under the record number 11509, is in a hardbound format, with no known duplicate copies. This meticulous document spans an extensive 85 pages and was handwritten in Ottoman calligraphy. It is meticulously organized into 13 primary headings, each comprising numerous subheadings. These headings comprise a wide spectrum of topics, including the Romanian army's involvement in the 1877-1878 war and subsequent post-war regulatory changes, the administrative and military organization of the Romanian army, detailed explanations of the recruitment process and principles, as well as the central and provincial organizational framework of the Romanian army. Moreover, the report provides an in-depth examination of the structural composition of various military classes during both peacetime and wartime, along with an analysis of the armament utilized by the Romanian forces. In light of this outlined context, this article aims to offer a comprehensive exploration of the Romanian army. Within this regard, the article will commence by delving into the recruitment procedures within the Romanian army, followed by a comprehensive exploration of the military organization of the Romanian Kingdom, including headquarters, infantry, cavalry, artillery, combat service support, and navy. By doing so, the article aspires to make a scholarly contribution to the field of military history, particularly in the context of Romanian army studies.

1. Conscription in the Romanian Army

The Romanian military underwent significant organizational reforms through new legislation enacted in February 1889. This restructuring effort resulted with the establishment of four army corps, each comprising eight brigades and thirty-three regiments. These legislative changes played a pivotal role in reshaping the organizational capacity of the army corps, which were centralized as follows: the 1st in Craiova, the 2nd in Bucharest, the 3rd in Galaţi, and the 4th in Iaşi. Prior to 1880, each of these army corps was composed of eight provinces. However, this arrangement proved challenges, as it did not consider the distribution of population among these provinces. Consequently, the allocation of less populated provinces to certain army corps created organizational difficulties. In response, a regulatory framework was introduced in 1880, ushering in a new system that aimed to balance populations among the army corps more equitably.¹⁹

The population of Romania was around 5 million during the 1880s and 1890s. Of this population, approximately 1.115.547 resided in the jurisdiction of the 1st Army Corps in Craiova, 1.231.161 in the 2nd Army Corps area in Bucharest, 1.184.391 in the 3rd Army Corps in Galaţi, and finally, 1.313.914 in the 4th Army Corps in Iaşi. The recruitment processes were conducted independently by the recruiting offices of each army corps.²⁰

The institution of conscription in Romania during that period was formalized by the Conscription Law of 1873, which underwent subsequent amendments in both 1882 and 1891. The final set of regulations was led by Minister of War Iacob Lahovary in 1891. With this law, the Romanian military was organized into three: the regular army, the reserve army, and the militia (home guards). The regular army was further divided into three subcategories: the regular, active reserve, and reserve. The conscription system in the country encompassed all physically eligible men, although certain exemptions and special considerations applied. Military service in Romania entailed a commitment spanning twenty-five years, commencing at the age of 21 and concluding at the age of 46. This extended service duration was divided into distinct phases. The first nine

years of military service were dedicated to the regular army, comprising the first three years of regular active service, followed by six years of active reserve service. The subsequent six years were allocated to the reserve army. The final part of military service spanned 10 years in the militia, which functioned as a form of home guard service. Upon completion of active regular duty, soldiers were returned to their hometowns but remained subject to recall for major manoeuvres and wartime mobilization.²¹ This conscription system effectively endowed the Romanian army with a substantial reservoir of trained reserves that could be activated and mobilized as required.

Reserve soldiers, the second category of conscripts within the Romanian army, were organized into groups based on their marital and parenthood status. In case of mobilization, these classes would be called sequentially, beginning with the youngest members. In 1891, the total numerical strength of the reserve army in Romania was estimated to be approximately 120.000. The third category of the Romanian army was known as the militia, comprised of individuals aged between thirty-six and forty-six. Recruitment within this group occurred during campaigns, primarily to maintain the internal security and defend borders and fortified positions. The total number of this group amounted to around 180.000. When combined with the regular army, counted between 150.000 and 200.000, the potential expeditionary capability of the Romanian army could have reached approximately 500.000.²²

Regular army soldiers underwent an extensive three-year basic military training program. For those who were not serving in the regular army, military training was conducted through various methods. For instance, biannual drills were scheduled for Sundays during the autumn and spring seasons. These drills occurred in company centres during April and May, and in battalion centres in August and September. The duration of these trainings was six hours in the spring and four hours in the winter. Soldiers selected through the lottery system but awaiting their conscription turn were called upon to undergo 60 days of training individually. During major manoeuvres, all soldiers were summoned to participate in the

exercises and received additional training and education, thereby ensuring their continuous readiness for regular duty.²³

Exemptions and deductions constituted significant aspects of conscription within the Romanian army, with specific regulations meticulously outlined in the 1891 legislation. According to this law, individuals convicted of homicide and those sentenced to two years or longer imprisonment were ineligible for military service. Additionally, some individuals were granted exemptions from regular service. These exemptions included individuals who were physically weak or disabled, sons of widows or elderly parents, and sons of individuals who had become disabled while serving in the army. These groups were exempted from compulsory military service during peacetime but were conscripted during wartime campaigns. Members of the Muslim or Christian faiths who had received religious education and successfully passed the required examinations enjoyed complete exemption from compulsory military service. Furthermore, the residents of Dobrudja region were exclusively assigned to the reserve army and were exempted from service in the regular army.²⁴

Deductions from the military service duration and deferments were integral components of Romania's conscription policies. While graduates of religious education programs received exemptions, the situation varied for those with formal education, who were subject to a system of reduced military service duration. Under this framework, graduates of institutions of higher education, foreign colleges, and mining schools were obligated to serve only six months in the regular army. Conversely, graduates from educational institutions other than those of higher education were subjected to one year of military service. However, the privilege of reducing the duration of military service was applicable if they completed their education by the age of twenty-six. Privileged conscripts who served six months or one year were subsequently transferred to the active reserve for one year, followed by two years in the reserve duty category. Those who were obligated to undergo military service but had health-related issues could obtain a two-year deferment. The decision regarding deferment

was made by a committee consisting of three military doctors. Furthermore, individuals who were exempted from military service or granted deferment were obliged to pay a certain amount of money.²⁵

The annual quota of young individuals subject to compulsory military service amounted to approximately 50.000 in 1891. Within this demographic, 29.000 individuals were conscripted annually. Among these, 13.500 were assigned to the regular army, while the remaining 15.500 of the annual conscripts were allocated to the reserve force, with 13.300 in the infantry reserve, and 2.200 in the cavalry reserve.²⁶

Another important change introduced by the legislative reforms of 1891 was in the recruitment policy of the Romanian kingdom, involving a transformation in the recruitment centres. The lottery process was carried out in each army corps centre and some provinces. However, conducting the conscription process in multiple centres hindered the efficient recruitment of battalions. Consequently, the method was revised, and each regimental departments started to conduct the recruitment process. It is important to note that the conscription process in Romania was executed through a lottery system, with the commencement and conclusion of service terms for each cohort taking place in February.²⁷

21 in November and December, continuing until the end of January. The conscription lottery process was executed by a commission composed of an officer appointed by the Ministry of War, an officer from the Ministry of Interior, a doctor, the director of the recruiting office of the affiliated regiment, and the local administrator of the province where the lottery took place. This commission was responsible for evaluating prospective conscripts, reviewing requests for exemptions and deferments, and adjudicating appeals and objections related to the previously announced population lists. The decisions of the commission were final, and only individuals whose exemption appeals were rejected were granted a twenty-day period to substantiate their rights and claims.²⁸

After the commission's assessments, individuals subject to military service were categorized into five groups. The first group com-

prised conscripts evaluated as suitable for military service. The second consisted of those who had submitted requests for exemption or deferment. The third group included individuals whose military service duration had been reduced to either one year or six months. The fourth contained conscripts and military school students currently in active service. The fifth and final category consisted of those who were exempt from military service. The last step of the recruitment process was drawing lot. Only the first part of these five groups was included in the conscription lottery.²⁹ After determining the required number of conscripts for the regular army, the remaining individuals were allocated to the reserve infantry, known as the *Dorobanți*. The *Călărași* regiments, constituting the reserve cavalry, were not part of the lottery system. Recruitment for the *Călărași* cavalymen was voluntary, as these individuals had to possess horses and meet the needs of their horses. Also, recruitment to the naval force was conducted through volunteer enlistment. Prior to the lottery, individuals who wished to enlist voluntarily were allowed the opportunity to express their preference for either the land or naval forces, and those who preferred naval service were directly enrolled. If the number of volunteers was insufficient, lots were drawn from residents around the Danube River and Black Sea coasts. The results of the lottery were final, irrevocable, and could not be subject to repetition under any circumstances. Following the drawing process, the results were compiled and publicly announced in each province.³⁰

2. Military organization of the Kingdom of Romania

The Romanian military organization was structured into three distinct components: the regular army, the reserve army, and the militia (home guards). The Romanian regular forces predominantly comprised the active units, such as infantry, cavalry, artillery, and the navy. Additionally, there were combat service support forces responsible for technical aspects, including military engineering, logistics, and military health service. These forces were organized under four army corps.

The organizational structure of each army corps was consistent, featuring two infantry divisions, each comprising two brigades, with each brigade including two regiments. Additionally, there was an advance guard battalion, a cavalry brigade consisting of three Călărași regiments, two artillery regiments each with seven to eight batteries and each battery equipped with six guns, an engineer battalion, a railway company, a bridging company, a transportation company, and a medical company. Each army corps also had a headquarters which consisted of a command echelon, staff officers, artillery and engineering commissions, a military health service commission, and a court-martial. It is important to note that the three cavalry regiments Roșiori, an infantry regiment with three battalions, one regular and two reserve units in Dobruđa, were not counted in the army corps organization.³¹

There was no permanent peacetime organization for the reserve and the militia forces.

Their recruitment primarily served as a contingency measure to replace potential casualties within the regular army. Facilities for storing various clothing, equipment, and essential ammunition needed for mobilization were established within the army corps headquarters located in Craiova, Bucharest, Galați, and Iași. It was estimated that in the event of a war, the army could achieve full mobilization within twenty-four days.³² The Romanian military organization during both peacetime and wartime was as follows. Additional details regarding this organizational framework will be provided in subsequent sections dedicated to relevant subtopics.

The presented data provides an overview of the peacetime military establishment of Romania, including 2,398 officers, 38,481 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men. This structure encompassed 109 battalions, 332 companies, 73 cavalry squadrons, 58 artillery batteries, 8,942 pack animals, and 348 guns.

Peacetime establishment of the Romanian Army³³

		Battalion	Company	Cavalry squadron	Battery	Officer	Rank and File	Pack Animal	Gun
	General Staff	20	4:3	5:3					
Infantry	Advance Guard	4	16			80	1.864		
	Regular Dorobanți	33	132			594	13.200		
	Reserve Dorobanți	66	264			761	5.096		
	Total Infantry	103	412			1.435	20.160		
Cavalry	Roșiori			12		93	1.704	1.443	
	Regular Călărași			24		298	3.424	2.788	
	Reserve Călărași			30					
	Remount			(1)		7	100		
	Army Stable					5	111		
	Total Cavalry			66		403	5.339	4.231	

Artillery	Field Artillery				58	262	5.226	3.438	348
	Siege Artillery	(1)	(6)			30	561	31	
	21 Fire Platoons					23	910	450	
	4 Labour Sections					10	734		
	Total Artillery				58	325	7.431	3.919	348
Combat Service Support	Engineering	(6)	(24)			104	2.742		
	Transportation			(4)		9	434	452	
	4 Administration (quartermaster) sections					84	985		
	Health Service			(4)		10	694		
	Gendarmerie			3		28	687	340	
Total Peacetime Establishment		109	442	73	58	2.398	3.8472	8.942	348

Remarkably, the naval component, which was not included in the table, comprised a fleet of 18 warships and a personnel count of 1.954. The Romanian navy consisted of 178 naval and civilian officers, 1.426 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, 50 cadets, and 300 enlisted reserves.³⁴

The manpower of the Romanian army during wartime comprised 3.638 officers, and 136.500 enlisted personnel, organized into 110 battalions, 436 companies, 80 cavalry squadrons, and 64 artillery batteries. This force was supported by 24.868 pack animals, and an artillery contingent with 348 guns. While there

Wartime establishment of the Romanian Army³⁵

		Battalion	Company	Cavalry Squadron	Battery	Officer	Rank and File	Pack Animal	Gun
	General Staff	20	4	5	5				
Infantry	Advance Guard	4	16			80	4.200	120	
	Dorobanti	99	396			2.475	99.000	3.000	
	Total Infantry	103	412			2.555	103.200	3.120	
Cavalry	Roşiori			12		93	2.250	1.800	
	Calaraşi			60		360	7.800	7.248	
	Total Cavalry			72		453	10.050	9.048	

Artillery	Field Artillery				64	408	12.800	10.000	348
	Siege Artillery	(1)	(6)			30	1000	200	
	Total Artillery	(1)	(6)		64	438	13.800	10.200	348
Combat Service Support	Engineering	(6)	(24)			160	6.000	1.000	
	Transportation			(4)		16	2.000	1.000	
	Health Service			(4)		16	1.000	500	
Total Wartime Establishment		110	436	80	64	3.638	13.6500	24.838	348

was no increase observed in the number of officers and equipment during this period, it is noteworthy that the overall size of the army could be increased through the mobilization and incorporation of the reserve units, potentially resulting in a fourfold increase.³⁶

As directly indicated by Hafız Şevket Bey, the Romanian soldiers were characterized by their exceptional valour and aptitude for military service. Their inclination towards hunting rendered them highly proficient in infantry and artillery forces, while those residing in the plains, due to their early exposure to horsemanship, proved to be excellent candidates for cavalry. With adequate training and meticulous organization, they had the potential to form a formidable military force.³⁷

2.1 Central organ of the army: headquarters

King Carol I held the position of commander-in-chief of the Romanian army. The administration of the army was under the direct control of the Ministry of War. However, as the commander-in-chief, the king was supported in military affairs by aides-de-camp and a contingent of staff officers. This advisory assembly, presided over by a brigadier general, included two colonels, two lieutenant colonels, and a major. Their primary responsibilities encompassed providing counsel to the king, serving as agent between the monarchy and the armed forces, and organizing meetings with foreign military attachés.³⁸

The other executive component within the core of the Romanian central military organization resided in the Ministry of War, under the

command of Brigadier General Iacob Lahovary. In 1891, the Ministry of War comprised 116 military and civil officers. Their hierarchical classifications were delineated as follows: one brigadier general, a civil inspector, three colonels, four lieutenant colonels (one of doctor), five majors (one of a pharmacist), 11 captains, four civil officers, six chief clerks, one surgeon, seven first lieutenants, five second clerks, four architects, seven registrars, five calligraphers, thirty-one copy clerks, and six quartermaster non-commissioned officers.³⁹

The Ministry of War comprised two distinct departments, each subdivided into five branches. Each department was responsible for the administrative affairs of its class. The first department was specifically devoted to managing the primary combatant elements of the armed forces, consisting of the following sections: 1. Staff officers and infantry, 2. Cavalry and Remount, 3. Artillery, 4. Engineering, and 5. Navy. In contrast, the second department was primarily responsible for administrative affairs, and its sections included; 6. Administration and logistic-supply, 7. Accounting, 8. Inspection, 9. Military health service, and 10. Pensions and grants.⁴⁰

Undoubtedly, one of the most significant sections within the central organization was the department of staff officers. Throughout the 19th century, when command and administration of armies became more complex, the Romanian department of staff officers had a developed organization under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. This department assumed numerous responsibilities such as military regulations, reforms, mobilization

procedures, inspections, and the coordination of transportation activities. It also played a pivotal role in the regulation of military education and training programs. The department of staff officers was systematically divided into three distinct branches, each led by a colonel. The first department assumed a wide range of vital functions, including the developments of military regulations, supply, mobilization and conscription, organization of the autumn manoeuvres, and the assessment of Romania's military readiness for a potential campaign. The second branch held the responsibility of coordinating crucial elements, encompassed army logistics and communication systems, entailed the management of railways, postal services, and telegraphy. Furthermore, this branch conducted assessments of foreign military forces and engaged in scholarly research into the histories of significant campaigns and battles. As for the third branch, it was subdivided into three specialized groups: the first dedicated to geodetic activities, the second to topographical surveying, and the third to cartographic plotting. The personnel within the Department of Staff Officers were under the command of a brigadier general, and their organization was structured as follows: three colonels (branch directors), one lieutenant colonel (director of the geodesy section), one major (director of the topography section), 10 captains, eight first lieutenants (topography section officers), one captain (administrator), one officer (librarian), one translator, six clerks, two engravers, two printers, one lithographer, one photographer, and two laborers.⁴¹

2.2. Infantry in the Romanian Army

The Romanian infantry was organized into two parts. The first one, recognized as the regular force, included four advance guard battalions, each with four companies, and alongside eight line regiments, two battalions with four companies each. The second part of the infantry, constituted the reserve force, was the Dorobanți. This force was comprised of 33 Dorobanți regiments with two battalions, each of with four companies. Rotational military service was the norm in Dorobanți regiments. Until 1891, only two companies and the officer cadre of the Dorobanți regiment were on active

duty during peacetime. Consequently, the wartime organization of the Romanian infantry in each army corps before 1891 encompassed 20-21 infantry battalions, comprising one advance guard battalion, eight Dorobanți regiments with two battalions each, and two line regiments. However, in comparison to their contemporaries, the number of infantry troops in the Romanian army was considered insufficient. During this period, for example, an Ottoman army corps comprised 34 infantry battalions, Russia had 32, and Austria had 25. Additionally, the Romanian infantry faced organizational challenges due to its dispersion into small, scattered companies across various regions. These matters led to protracted periods for mobilization, increased expenditures, and hindered the effective execution of training.⁴²

In 1891, Minister of War Iacob Lahovary presented a comprehensive report to the parliament, outlining the imperative need for substantial modifications in the Romanian military organization. Consequently, a new set of regulations was enacted, indicating significant changes in the Romanian military organization. Among the pivotal aspects affected by these reforms was the infantry division, which underwent profound transformations. Efforts were directed towards addressing the challenges faced by the Romanian infantry in comparison to their contemporaries. As part of these reforms, the regular line regiments and the Dorobanți force were combined into a unified Dorobanți force. Additionally, the number of battalions within the regiments was reduced from four to three, with each regiment now consisting of one regular battalion and two reserve battalions.⁴³

During peacetime, the regular battalions within the Dorobanți regiments were primarily responsible for defending strategic locations in Dobrudja and major urban centres, including Bucharest, Craiova, Galați, and Iași. On the other hand, the remaining battalions held reserve status and were assigned to attend in periodic training exercises on a rotational basis. They were also tasked with guard duties, participation in major manoeuvres, and serving as a resource to fulfil the manpower needs of the regular army.⁴⁴

With the combination of the Dorobanți and line regiments, the total strength of the Romanian infantry increased to 103 battalions, of which 99 battalions were constituted within the Dorobanți, comprising 33 regular force battalions and 66 reserve force battalions. The remaining four battalions constituted the advance guard. Consequently, the infantry of an army corps now comprised 25-26 battalions, bringing it into closer alignment with the numerical strength of infantry formations observed in contemporary armies.⁴⁵

The total strength of the Romanian infantry during peacetime encompassed 19,646 personnel, which included 1,355 officers, 4,346 non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men. The hierarchical distribution of ranks within this contingent was as follows: 24 colonels, 25 lieutenant colonels, 83 majors, 429 captains, 437 first lieutenants, 307 lieutenants, 41 doctors (holding the rank of captain), 9 musicians, 33 third lieutenants, 424 staff sergeants, 1,687 sergeants, and 2,202 corporals. Additionally, there were 1,944 individuals in the advance guard battalions, comprising 1,864 enlisted men and 80 officers. On the other hand, the wartime composition of the Romanian infantry consisted of 2,475 officers, 99,000 enlisted personnel, and 3,000 pack animals. When considering all infantry forces, the peacetime organization comprised of 103 battalions, 412 companies, 1,435 officers, and 20,160 enlisted men. This expanded during wartime, reaching a total of 103 battalions, 412 companies, 2,555 officers, and 103,200 enlisted personnel with the mobilization of the reserves.⁴⁶

Before 1891, Romanian infantry regiments were primarily identified using numerical designations. However, the implementation of new regulations brought about a transformation in which each regiment was assigned a unique and distinctive name. These names were inspired by various sources, including the military units with which the regiments were historically associated, notable geographical locations within the regiments' areas of operation, or the names of significant figures from Romanian history. For instance, the third regiment adopted the name "Olt", the twelfth regiment "Cantemir", the twenty-first regiment

was "Ilfov IV", the thirty-second regiment "Mircea" and the thirty-third regiment "Dobruja".⁴⁷

In 1891, the Romanian infantry was armed with Martini-Henry rifles model 1870, characterized by an 11,43-millimeter calibre, a weight of 3,970 kilograms, and a length of 1,26 meters. These rifles had an effective range of up to 1,380 meters and were accompanied by a 0.52-meter, 800-gram bayonet. Despite their serviceability throughout the 1880s, it became evident that these rifles needed replacement. Consequently, in 1887, the Romanian government allocated ten million francs for the acquisition of 100,000 new rifles. To make an informed decision on the choice of these rifles, a committee composed of officers from various ranks was convened. This committee conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the prominent rifles available during that period, subjecting them to rigorous trials. Following a thorough assessment, the commission concluded that both the Mannlicher and Mauser rifles outperformed their counterparts. Subsequently, in November 1891, the committee placed an order for 100,000 Mannlicher rifles.⁴⁸

2.3. Romanian cavalry

The Romanian cavalry was divided into two categories: the Roșiori, which constituted the regular cavalry force, and the Călărași, the reserve cavalry of the Romanian army. The Roșiori were fully equipped and supplied by the state, while the Călărași recruits were responsible for procuring their own equipment, supplies, and livestock. The Roșiori cavalry was organized into three independent regiments, with each regiment consisting of four cavalry squadrons along with a separate platoon. A colonel led each regiment, supported by 11 regimental senior officers. Additionally, there were two third lieutenants and one staff sergeant within each regiment. In the separate platoon, there were also five officers and 130 non-commissioned officers from various ranks who specialized in service support roles, including riflemen, tailors, tanners, shoemakers, saddlers, and fencing instructors. During peacetime, the Roșiori cavalry, consisting of 12 squadrons, had 93 officers, 1,704 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and 1,443

pack animals. In wartime, these numbers expanded to 93 officers, 2.250 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and 1.800 pack animals.⁴⁹

Between 1889 and 1891, significant changes were introduced to the organization of the reserve cavalry, the Călărași. Previously, the reserve cavalry consisted of 50 squadrons, encompassing 12 regiments, each with four squadrons, in addition to two Dobrudja squadrons. 16 squadrons of this force were on active duty while the remaining 34 were designated as reserve units. However, in 1891, a restructuring was initiated. Eight of the 12 Călărași regiments (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th, 10th, 12th) were re-configured, each now composed of one active and three reserve squadrons. Meanwhile, the remaining four regiments (3rd, 7th, 8th, 11th) were reorganized with five squadrons each: four as active force and one as reserve. Consequently, the peacetime cavalry organization of the Călărași comprised 24 active and 30 reserve squadrons, consisting of 298 officers, 3.423 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and 2.788 pack animals. In times of war, the numbers expanded to 60 squadrons, featuring 360 officers, 7.800 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and 7.248 pack animals.⁵⁰

Horses offered by Călărași recruits underwent rigorous evaluations, conducted by a squadron commander and a veterinarian, before being accepted. The final decision, however, rested with regiment commanders. If a horse failed to meet the established criteria, a remount horse could be provided to the recruit for a fee of 300 francs. During peacetime, Călărași recruits were responsible for maintaining the expenses of their horses, but under active service, all associated costs were covered by the army. Călărași squadrons were further organized into sections, with a rotational system in place for guard duty. Each enlisted man served one week in every eight weeks, resulting in approximately 20 weeks, equivalent to 140 days, of active service over their four years in the cavalry reserve. Considering training periods over these four years, each reserve Călărași recruit was expected to serve for a total of 440 days. During their active service, their primary duties encompassed internal security operations and judicial responsibilities.⁵¹

In addition to the Roșiori and Călărași units, the Romanian cavalry organization included the remount depot and military stables. As of 1891, these units comprised 12 officers and 222 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, responsible for procuring and maintaining the army's equine requirements. When combining the number of soldiers and horses within the Roșiori and Călărași classes with these units, the total peacetime strength of the Romanian cavalry amounted to 403 officers, 5.339 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and 4.231 pack animals. Conversely, during mobilization, the strength of the cavalry reached 453 officers, 1.050 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, along with 9.048 pack animals.⁵²

In 1891, the Romanian cavalry was armed with the Martini-Henry carbines, compact rifles measuring 0,94 meters in length and weighing 3,47 kilograms. Additionally, the first line of the Roșiori regiments was equipped with lances, which were 3,05 meters in length and weighed 2,50 kilograms. Cavalry non-commissioned officers had revolvers instead of carbines, while recruits in the cavalry batteries were armed with either a cavalry sword or a bayonet.⁵³

2.4. Romanian artillery force

The Romanian artillery was organized into three main divisions: field artillery, siege artillery, and labour companies, along with a fourth category comprising fire departments stationed in major cities. The field artillery was composed of eight regiments, with 50 infantry and eight cavalry batteries. Each battery was under the command of a captain and included three officers. Infantry batteries were organized with 81 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, along with 50 pack animals, while cavalry batteries comprised 92 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, along with 82 pack animals. During peacetime, the eight field artillery regiments collectively featured 262 officers, 5.226 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, 3.438 pack animals, 58 batteries, and 348 guns. In case of mobilization, these numbers increased to 408 officers, 12.800 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, 10.000 pack animals, 64 batteries, and 348 guns.⁵⁴

The siege artillery, primarily appointed in fortified positions, defensive lines, and fortresses, was organized as a battalion consisting of six companies and a separate platoon. These six companies comprised of 24 officers and 534 non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel. Including the personnel at the battalion headquarters and the separate platoon, the siege artillery's total peacetime strength amounted to 30 officers, 561 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, accompanied by 31 pack animals. The wartime establishment, on the other hand, expanded to 30 officers, 1.000 non-commissioned officers and enlisted, with 200 pack animals.⁵⁵

Another unit within the Romanian artillery was the artillery labour companies, organized into two companies and two platoons, as follows: 1. The labour company stationed at the Bucharest artillery factory, led by one captain, two first lieutenants, and 400 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men; 2. The warehouse platoon, a part of the Bucharest artillery factory, under the command of a captain, a first lieutenant, a lieutenant, and 70 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men; 3. The firearms industry company, consisting of a captain, a first lieutenant, a doctor, and 224 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men; 4. The gunpowder factory platoon, comprised a captain and 40 non-commissioned officers. In total, the artillery labourer unit encompassed 10 officers and 734 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men.⁵⁶

The artillery class included twenty-one fire platoons responsible for fire service, stationed in various cities across Romania. This collective unit comprised 23 officers, 910 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and 450 pack animals. When considering the combined strength of the field artillery, siege artillery, artillery labour units, and fire platoons, the total number of personnel within the Romanian artillery in 1891 amounted to 325 officers, 7.431 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, 3.919 pack animals, 58 batteries, and 348 guns during peacetime. In wartime, these numbers increased to 438 officers, 13.800 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, along with 10.200 pack animals, 64 batteries, and 348 guns.⁵⁷

The Romanian artillery was equipped with steel Krupp guns, primarily in 87-millimeter and 85-millimeter calibres. In addition to their primary weaponry, field artillery personnel were equipped with revolvers, cavalry battery personnel with swords, while infantry and industrial artillery personnel were equipped with bayonets.⁵⁸

2.5. Combat service support units in Romania

Apart from the primary land army components, which included infantry, artillery, and cavalry, the Romanian military had combat service support units responsible for various essential functions such as engineering, gendarmerie, supply, transportation, and medical health service. The engineering class played a vital role in scientific and engineering operations and was organized into two regiments. Each regiment comprised three battalions, each of which consisted of four companies and a separate platoon. The engineering regiments were diverse, with individual battalions specializing in various functions such as digger and sapper operations, telegraph services, railway construction, and bridge engineering. As of 1891, the Romanian army included 12 digger and sapper companies, four telegraph companies, five railway companies, and four bridge companies. Notably, the railway battalion was responsible for both operating the railway line connecting the fortifications around Bucharest and constructing railroads. This railway line in Bucharest was also constructed by the railway battalion. Each engineering company was meticulously organized and equipped with a comprehensive array of wagons and tools tailored to its specific functions. For example, within each digger and sapper company, there were two wagons containing tools related to topography, carpentry, and ironworking, along with an assortment of materials that included gunpowder and dynamite. Considering all components of the engineering class, the total number of personnel during peacetime amounted to 104 officers and 2.742 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and this number increased to 160 officers and 6.000 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men.⁵⁹

The engineering class demanded specialized technical expertise, and to provide comprehensive training and education for its personnel, two engineering schools were established in Romania. One of these schools served the first and second army corps in Bucharest, while the other catered to the needs of the third and fourth army corps in Focșani. These schools were under the command of a major and staffed with a captain and a first lieutenant.⁶⁰

During this period, a primary focus of the engineering class was the execution of fortification projects aimed at enhancing Romania's defensive capabilities in the event of potential conflicts. These projects were conducted under the guidance of Belgian General Henri Alexis Brialmont and resulted in the construction of numerous redoubts and fortifications in the regions surrounding Galați, Bucharest, Focșani, and Iași.⁶¹

The second component of the combat service support units within the Romanian army was the Gendarmerie. This specialized force held the responsibility of maintaining security in Bucharest and Iași. Gendarmes were enlisted through the lottery system and were preferably selected from conscripts who met specific qualifications, including height, literacy, and knowledge of proper etiquette. The Gendarmerie service was executed through the deployment of two infantry companies and three cavalry squadrons. Specifically, one infantry and two cavalry squadrons were stationed in Bucharest, while one cavalry squadron and one infantry company were based in Iași. The overall strength of the Gendarmerie force comprised 28 officers, 687 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, along with 340 pack animals.⁶²

The third category within the combat service support units was responsible for fulfilling the transportation needs of the army. This category consisted of four companies, each under the command of a captain and assigned to one of the four army corps. The collective strength of this category included nine officers, 434 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, and 452 pack animals. The subsequent unit was the quartermaster division, which comprised four platoons responsible for

overseeing various aspects of logistics within the army. Each platoon had specific responsibilities: the 1st Platoon managed equipment requirements, the 2nd Platoon oversaw industrial supplies, the 3rd Platoon handled provisions, and the 4th Platoon addressed tannery-related needs. In total, the quartermaster division encompassed 81 officers, three civilian officials, and 985 non-commissioned personnel within the Romanian army. The final unit was dedicated to managing the military health service. This unit included four medical companies, with each company serving one of the army corps. These four companies comprised 10 officers and 694 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men. During mobilization, each army corps was equipped with four mobile hospital vehicles, one equipment vehicle, one medical vehicle, and one supply vehicle. Additionally, a medical-surgical vehicle was allocated to each army corps or brigade.⁶³

2.6. Romanian naval force

In 1891, Romania did not have a separate ministry for the navy, and the naval operations were conducted under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. The navy underwent significant reforms with the regulation in 1886. This regulation outlined the responsibilities of the navy, which firstly included collaboration with the army during military campaigns, coastal patrols, and offering support for military transportation, secondly, inspecting and ensuring the safety of merchant ships bearing the Romanian flag both on rivers and at sea.⁶⁴


Recruits for the navy were selected from volunteers within Romania. Those interested in serving in the navy were recruited from residents along the Black Sea and Danube coasts for a period of eight years, consisting of five years of regular service and three years of reserve service. Naval recruits who successfully completed their regular service were exempted from general military duties, distinguishing them from infantry and cavalry personnel. Residents of Dobruđa, also, had certain privileges within this system. They served as a reserve force for the Romanian Navy totalling three hundred men. They were occasionally summoned for one month a service period, primarily employed for activities like port and

coastal inspections, as well as receiving training aboard naval vessels.⁶⁵

Unlike the infantry, cavalry, and artillery branches, the Romanian navy did not possess a dedicated naval officer school. The need for naval officers was met by individuals who pursued education at naval institutions in France and Italy. Similarly, the requirement for technical personnel, such as machinists and engineers, was fulfilled by recruiting individuals who had received their education abroad. Moreover, the shortage of naval officers was partially addressed by considering non-commissioned officers with three years of ship service, graduates of land forces schools seeking to transition to the navy, and some land forces lieutenants. To prepare non-commissioned officers for roles in the navy, a naval training school was established in Galați. The educational program at this school spanned three years, with the curriculum encompassing theoretical instruction during the first semester, followed by practical exercises aboard ships in the subsequent semester. Upon successful completion of this comprehensive training, graduates were enlisted in the navy with the rank of corporal.⁶⁶

The Romanian naval force was organized into four distinct entities: the Flotilla Command, Flotilla Corps Depot, Inspectorate of Harbours and Warships, and the Naval Shipyard. The Flotilla Command functioned as the central command and control hub for the Romanian naval forces and comprised 15 officers and non-commissioned officers. The Flotilla Corps Depot, led by a colonel, was responsible for the coordination of the Romanian naval force, and encompassed 33 officers, along with 500 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men. Additionally, the Corps Depot was responsible for overseeing the organization of the naval school, which included 21 officers, 446 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, 50 military students, and 300 reserves. The third component, the Inspectorate of Harbours and Warships, was tasked with managing and supervising river and sea activities. This unit was composed of 83 military and public officers, 340 regular non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, as well as 300 irregular non-commissioned officers and enlisted

men. Finally, the Romanian naval organization's last segment, the Naval Shipyard, was primarily engaged in the refurbishment of warships and the construction of smaller vessels. It comprised 25 military and public officers, 140 non-commissioned officers and enlisted men. In total, the comprehensive personnel strength of the Romanian navy in 1891 amounted to: 64 naval officers, six military engineers, one mechanical engineer, seven machinists, seven artillery officers, one engineering officer, 17 public officers, six doctors, five administrative officers, 34 engine officers, 30 guards, 288 non-commissioned officers, 1.138 enlisted men, 50 cadets, and 300 reserve enlisted men, amounting to total of 1.957 individuals.⁶⁷



May 4, 1889, Bucharest. Request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Romanian Legation in Constantinople to take steps to obtain the consent of the Ottoman authorities for carrying out repair and maintenance works for the gunboat Grivița

Military Capability of the Romanian Navy in 1891

Name of the Ship	Material of Construction	Date of Construction	Length (meter)	Breadth (meter)	Draught (meter)	Displacement	Indicated Horsepower	Speed (miles)	Armament
Elisabeta	Steel	1889	80	10,50	-	1320	4500	18	17 cm 4 Krupp guns, 8 small-scale guns, 4 torpedoes
România	Iron	1832	45	4,75	1,10	130	240	9	8-cm 4 Krupp guns
Ștefan Cel Mare	Iron	1866	57	8,52	2,01	350	570	13	8 cm 4 Krupp guns
Oltul	Iron	1889	30,50	4,20	1,80	100	160	11	... system 3 guns
Siretul	Iron	1889	30,50	4,20	1,80	100	160	11	... system 3 guns
Bistrița	Iron	1889	30,50	4,20	1,80	100	160	11	... system 3 guns
Grivița	Iron	1880	30	5,15	1,80	110	160	9	8 cm 4 Krupp guns and 1 machine gun
Fulgerul	Iron	1873	25	4,80	1,30	85	85	7	8 cm 4 Krupp guns and 1 machine gun
Mircea	Sheet Metal	1882	36	7,60	3,65	350	160	8	8 cm 4 Krupp guns
Rahova	Iron	1882	17	3,50	1,60	45	100	8,5	2 machine guns
Smârdan	Iron	1882	17	3,50	1,60	45	100	8,5	2 machine guns
Opanezul	Iron	1882	17	3,50	1,60	45	100	8,5	2 machine guns
Cel Bun	Iron	1882	22,8	4,6	1,7	100	150	8	2 machine guns
Năluca	Steel	1888	36,80	3,45	0,90	86	-	21	37 cm 1 Hotchkiss gun and 2 torpedoes
Sborul	Steel	1888	36,80	3,45	0,90	86	-	21	37 cm 1 Hotchkiss gun and 2 torpedoes
Smeul	Steel	1888	36,80	3,45	0,90	86	-	21	37 cm 1 Hotchkiss gun and 2 torpedoes
Șoimul	Steel	1882	19,20	2,4	0,7	15	150	16,50	1 Mitrailleuse
Vulturul	Steel	1882	19,20	2,4	0,7	15	150	16,50	1 Mitrailleuse

In 1891, the Romanian army possessed a significant naval contingent, which included a diverse range of vessels with various classes and displacement. The Romanian naval fleet was comprised of 18 warships, consisting of the following: a protected cruiser Elisabeta, 12 gunboats – two side-wheeled and one bottom-wheeled – (România, Stefan cel Mare, Oltul, Siretul, Bistrița, Grivița, Fulgerul, Mircea, Rahova, Smârdan, Opanezul and Alexandru cel Bun), and 5 torpedo boats (Năluca, Sborul, Smeul, Șoimul and Vulturul). Detailed information about these vessels is as follows:⁶⁸

Conclusion

The Romanian army underwent significant military reforms in 1891. These reforms were undertaken with the primary objective of enhancing the capabilities of the Romanian military establishment, which recently attained independence and lacked long-term organizational practices and experiences. A significant part of these reforms especially centred on the endeavour to increase the potential of the reserve force, in line with contemporary practices observed in modern armies. Consequently, as a part of this strategic realignment, important reform initiatives were implemented within the Dorobanți and Călărași, which constituted the fundamental components of the Romanian army. The Romanian infantry's total strength increased by uniting the line regiments and the Dorobanți regiments. This modification increased the wartime capability of Romanian infantry within each army corps to 25-26 regiments, representing a notable increase from the previous 20-21 regiments before 1891. Likewise, a restructuring initiative was implemented within the cavalry, leading to the expansion of the Călărași squadrons from 50 to 54. Additionally, the active force of the Călărași squadrons increased from 16 to 24.

When examining the restructured Romanian military organization, it becomes evident that a sufficient number of officers had been assigned to the various battalions. Particularly the meticulous organization of the artillery units, marked by an ample contingent of of-

ficers and a well-provisioned arsenal, distinguished the Romanian land forces from their counterparts in the Balkans. The regular execution of military manoeuvres and the comprehensive involvement of all reserve forces in these exercises represented an achievement that remained beyond the reach of most armies during this period. The arrangement of both combat forces and combat support services demonstrated a structure in line with contemporary armies, effectively prepared for both peacetime and wartime operations. Furthermore, the overall direction and administration of the military were organized under the General Staff, supplemented by the establishment of departments tailored to specific classes or functions.

Romania's strategic geographic location, encompassing both the Danube River and the Black Sea coasts, necessitated the establishment of a diverse array of naval assets characterized by varying types and displacement capabilities. These circumstances contributed to the emergence of a substantial naval capability within the Romanian Kingdom. Notably, the presence of various types of torpedo boats within the Romanian naval flotilla reflects the Romanian military's ability of adoption new technologies and doctrines such as the prevalent asymmetric warfare doctrine of the era, which primarily centred around torpedo boats. After the 1877-1878 War, the major powers of the time began to emphasize the significance of highly manoeuvrable torpedo boats over larger, high-displacement warships. The construction timelines of the torpedo boats integrated into the Romanian fleet align with this period of transition. However, despite Romania's significant maritime capacity in the regional context, featuring a variety of naval platforms, there was a shortage of naval officers available to effectively command and control these platforms. The absence of a naval academy within the Romanian navy, even as late as 1891, represented a significant and noticeable deficiency in the Romanian military, especially considering the paramount significance of technical training within the naval forces above all others.

NOTES

¹ Tim Hadley, *Military Diplomacy in the Dual Alliance German Military Attaché Reporting from Vienna*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016, p. 1; Peter Jackson, "Historical Reflections on the Uses and Limits of Intelligence", *Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society intelligence and statecraft*, ed. Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel, London: Praeger, 2005, p. 24.

² Gültekin Yıldız, "Osmanlı Dış Askerî İstihbaratında Formelleşme: Elçiliklerde Ataşemiliterliğin İhdası ve Osmanlı Askerî Ataşe Raporları", *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, No. 17 (Fall 2012), p. 240-241.

³ Alfred Vagts, *The Military Attache*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015, p. 11-15.

⁴ Özhan Kapıcı, "Tanzimât Döneminde Osmanlı Hariciyesinde Ataşelik Memuriyetinin Teşekkülü", *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2022), p. 360-369.

⁵ Gültekin Yıldız, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Askerî İstihbarat*, İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2019, p. 51-61; Gültekin Yıldız, "Osmanlı Dış Askerî İstihbaratında Formelleşme: Elçiliklerde Ataşemiliterliğin İhdası ve Osmanlı Askerî Ataşe Raporları", p. 253-254.

⁶ Gültekin Yıldız, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Askerî İstihbarat*, p. 48-50; Gültekin Yıldız, "Osmanlı Dış Askerî İstihbaratında Formelleşme: Elçiliklerde Ataşemiliterliğin İhdası ve Osmanlı Askerî Ataşe Raporları", p. 249-252.

⁷ Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (Presidency Ottoman Archives) (BOA), *İrade-Dahiliye (İ.DH)*, nr. 1195/93537, 6 October 1890; BOA, *Hariciye-Tahrirat (HR.TH)*, nr. 103/23, 12 October 1890; nr. 73/41, 8 June 1887.

⁸ BOA, *HR.TH.*, nr. 106/20, 21 November 1890.

⁹ Turguzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Kuve-i Askeriyesi*, 05 December 1891, Harbiye Military Museum, record no: 11509. Efforts are currently underway for the comprehensive publication of this report. I wish to express my special thanks to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Korkmaz, member of Turkish National Defence University, for not only bringing this report to our attention but also for his significant and valuable contributions.

¹⁰ *Balkan Savaşı'na Katılan Alay ve Daha Üst Birlik Komutanları*, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2004, p. 19-20.

¹¹ BOA, *HR.TH.*, nr. 147/78, 10 September 1894; nr. 148/93, 1 November 1894; nr. 164/30, 23 October 1895; nr. 157/48, 10 June 1895; nr. 163/63, 7 October 1895; nr. 260/13, 8 October 1901; nr. 273/110, 21 September 1902; nr. 293/39, 28 October 1903; nr. 339/100, 11 October 1906; nr. 332/45, 8 April 1906; BOA, *Yıldız-Komisyollar Maruzatı (KOM)*, nr. 13/32, 17 July 1904.

¹² BOA, *Y. Yaveran ve Maiyyet-i Seniyye Erkân-ı Harbiyesi (Y.PRK.MYD)*, nr. 25/50, 3 June 1903; BOA, *Bab-ı Âli Evrak Odası (BEO)*, nr. 2584/193781, 23 May 1905.

¹³ According to the aforementioned report, the Romanian government, considering the political and military developments in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Russia, recognized the necessity of thorough preparedness. In this context, the Ministry of War was allocated a substantial budget of 3,300,000 francs for the procurement of ammunition, and an additional 8,670,000 francs were earmarked for various preparatory measures. A detailed breakdown of the 8,670,000 francs expenditure is provided within the report. For instance, 3,600,000 francs were allocated for the construction of fortified positions, while 670,000 francs were designated for the maintenance and construction of transportation routes around the Galați and Focșani defense lines. Furthermore, the report includes information regarding the procurement of essential materials for the cavalry, naval forces, and the medical health service. BOA, *Y. Mütenevvi Maruzat (MTV)*, nr. 153/71, 21 March 1897.

¹⁴ BOA, *BEO.*, nr. 3382/253622, 25 August 1908.

¹⁵ BOA, *BEO.*, nr. 2183/163694, 30 September 1903; nr. 3529/264639, 3 April 1909.

¹⁶ BOA, *Y.MTV.*, nr. 107/18, 17 December 1894; BOA, *HR.TH.*, nr. 153/61, 27 February 1895; BOA, *İ. Taltifat (TAL)*, nr. 362/25, 2 May 1905.

¹⁷ BOA, *HR.TH.*, nr. 148/80, 28 October 1894; BOA, *İ.TAL.*, nr. 306/64, 24 July 1903.

¹⁸ BOA, *Y.MTV.*, nr. 310/7-1, 23 May 1909. Hafız Şevket Bey's appointment request to active duty occurred during a significant political juncture in the Ottoman Empire. His subsequent promotion to influential roles and active participation in the 31 March Incident strongly indicates his close affiliation with the Committee of Union and Progress.

¹⁹ Turguzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Kuve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 11-12.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13-18.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19-20.

²² Turguzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Kuve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 67-70, 81-82.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20-23.

²⁵ Turguzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Kuve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 23-24.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 69-70.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 20-21.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 25-27.

²⁹ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 27-28.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 28-29.

³¹ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 68-69.

³² Ibid., p. 72-73.

³³ Ibid., p. 81.

³⁴ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 79- 81.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 82.

³⁶ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 82.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 85.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 32.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 33-34.

⁴⁰ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 32-33.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 34-36.

⁴² Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 36-37.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 37-38.

⁴⁴ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 39.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 81-82.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 43-45, 81-82.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 40-42.

⁴⁸ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 73-74.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 45-47, 81, 82.

⁵⁰ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 49-51, 81,82.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 47-49.

⁵² Ibid., p. 52-53, 81,82.

⁵³ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 74.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 53-55, 81, 82.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 56, 81, 82.

⁵⁶ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 57.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 57-58, 81, 82.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 74-75.

⁵⁹ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 59-61, 81, 82.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 59-60.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 85.

⁶² Ibid., p. 63-64, 81.

⁶³ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 65-66.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 75.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 75-76, 28.

⁶⁶ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 76-77.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 77-78.

⁶⁸ Turgudzade Şevket, *Romanya Devletinin Ku-vve-i Askeriyesi*, p. 80, Also see *Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1860-1905*, Conway Maritime Press, 1979, p. 419.

ROMANIAN MILITARY ATTACHÉS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE UNTIL THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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Abstract

*Between 1878 and 1918, around fifty military attachés were accredited by the Romanian state in various European capitals, and their reports*** remained unpublished for the most part. The history of this position began in Constantinople, where a military attaché was appointed for the first time in 1878, a mission that he kept only for a year. Gradually, attachés were established in other European capitals, too. The activity of Romanian military attachés in various European capitals in the late 19th century and the beginning of the subsequent century can represent the topic of more comprehensive analyses in Romanian historiography, and the names of those who served are worth retrieving. Among them are the Romanian military attachés in the Ottoman Empire, for whom short biographies are outlined in the following lines. The main focus is on the last of them, Lucian Trantomir, a Romanian military attaché in Constantinople between 1913-16. The sources for such research are diverse, ranging from documents kept in the Romanian Military Archives to the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or various county archives in Romania. The investigation of such detailed reports written abroad by seasoned military personnel can provide new perspectives, as in the case of other Romanian military attachés, for reconstructing the involvement in the conflicts marking the beginning of the 20th century.*

Keywords: *Romania, Ottoman Empire, military attaché, diplomacy, co-Balkan regional policy, biography*

Introduction

In the last decade, Romanian historiography¹ has manifested more interest in mili-

tary attachés appointed by the Romanian state until 1918, from nominal lists published in the early 1980s² to the presentation of the activ-

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*** Several reports of the Romanian military attachés in Paris and Sofia were published in România in "Marele Război": Anul 1915. Documente, impresii, mărturii, ed. Mihail E. Ionescu, București, Editura Militară, 2015.

ity carried out by military attachés in Paris and Berlin³ in 1878-1940. In the same context, case studies were written, such as the activity of General Dabija – military attaché in Sofia in 1910-13 – analysed more thoroughly⁴, given that his memoirs were published as early as the mid-30s⁵. However, all these publications are far from exhausting the subject, considering that between 1878 and 1918, around fifty military attachés were accredited in various European capitals, and their reports⁶ remained unpublished for the most part. Among them are the Romanian military attachés in the Ottoman Empire, for whom short biographies are outlined in the following lines. The main focus is on the last of them, i.e., Lucian Trantomir, a Romanian military attaché in Constantinople between 1913-16. A first attempt of his biography was published a couple of years ago⁷. The sources for such research are diverse, ranging from documents kept in the Romanian Military Archives to the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or various county archives in Romania.

The situation of military attachés in the late 19th – early 20th century: general aspects

The history of this position began in Constantinople, where a military attaché was appointed for the first time in 1878, i.e., Romulus Magheru, but he kept his mission only for a year. Gradually, attachés were established in other European capitals, too. Several instructions and circular letters of the Ministry of War in late 19th century (mainly circular letters of the Ministry of War in the late 19th century, mostly from 1892 and 1896) and early 20th century regulated the mission of Romanian military attachés. It involved studying the organisation of the state where they were accredited, facilitating weapon orders and monitoring students and young officers who studied or benefited from internships abroad. On the other hand, several aspects were considered while appointing them in various European capitals: full military service, solid financial capital to cover the cost of living specific to European cities, and fluency in several foreign languages. The last two conditions were required from all Romanian representatives abroad⁸.

In order to understand their place in the history of the Romanian diplomacy, it is necessary to outline several details concerning the role and position of military attachés in a diplomatic mission. Article 45 of the Regulation for Romanian Legations Abroad, adopted in June 1880, clarified the status of military attachés. “They depend on the head of the legation for all matters regarding their report with local authorities, but they receive instructions from their Ministry and correspond directly with it for all matters related to the technical aspects of military art, conveying their reports to the head of Legation, too. Military attachés are appointed by ministerial letter and acquire no right in their diplomatic career for this service. The Ministry of War pays their wages and other compensations. They attend public ceremonies in their uniforms, along with the legation’s personnel”⁹. Four decades later, the *Instructions regarding the attributions and rights of military attachés*, comprising 16 articles, were structured into seven chapters: *The situation of military attachés attached to Legations, The duties of military attachés, The appointment and recalling of military attachés, The correspondence, The library, Detailed matters, Wages, subventions, and compensations*. Hence, the military attachés were part of the General Staff; at the same time, they were military agents and advisers attached to the Romanian diplomatic missions. In 1913, there were military attachés in France and Belgium, residing in Paris, and in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria, and Serbia, residing in Sofia, in the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire and Greece, residing in Constantinople. They were subordinated to the General Staff and belonged to the Intelligence Office. Concerning their activity, they were officially named, among others, “mediators” between the Romanian and foreign authorities in organising various military missions. In addition, they were not entitled to give interviews to the Romanian or foreign press, and their activity could not be the subject of publications during their missions. The military attachés were appointed following a proposal from the Ministry of War at the recommendation of the General Staff. Once he arrived in one of the countries mentioned above, the attaché went to the

head of the diplomatic mission, who introduced him to the local community following international customs. He also handed over to the head of mission all the military records, classified information, and available political and military reports, which he subsequently sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, in turn, submitted them to the General Staff. On the contrary, the correspondence concerning current, job-related matters was conveyed directly to the last. The military attaché benefited from 400 francs annually to subscribe to various publications in the country where he was accredited. If he wished to make study travels in the country where he was accredited, he did not require any special permission, but he had to inform the head of mission of the itinerary, purpose, and duration of his travel. Being assimilated to a legation advisor, he was entitled to transport, relocation, and rent compensations according to the Wages Law. In addition, he received Lei 1,000 for emergencies¹⁰.

The military attachés were recruited by the Chief of the General Staff, who then presented the list of possible candidates to the Minister of War. The last handed the list over to King Charles I, the Supreme commander-in-chief. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was not con-


sulted in the decision-making. The selection criteria concerned several conditions: the military attaché had to be able and capable of joining the highest circles of the society to carry out his duties¹¹, to have solid military knowledge, to have notions of science and culture, and to be well-off financially to cope with the demands of the mission¹². There were exceptions, though. For instance, General Dabija, attached in Sofia between 1910 and 1913, recalled having been proposed for this position by General Mavrocordat, the Head of the Military House of King Charles I and a former attaché in Vienna in the 1890s. Subsequently, he had discussed with the Minister of War, too. In early April 1910, King Charles I granted an audience to Dabija and requested more information about the foreign languages he spoke. Because he was fluent in French and German and had some notions of Russian, Dabija was told he had time to learn Bulgarian, too. A month later, when the sovereign granted him an official audience, he received further instructions, among which: to know as soon as possible the language of the state where he was sent and to send him the reports drafted for the General Staff. He would expect a political report about the neighbour south of the Danube in six months. He was warned, however, not to get inspiration from the reports written by the minister plenipotentiary in Sofia¹³.

The military attachés sent to the Ottoman Empire

From 1878 to 1916, three military attachés were sent to Constantinople. It is worth mentioning that, following the departure of the first military attaché – in 1879, Romulus Magheru, – from 1879 to 1910, Romania accredited no more military attachés in the capital of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, from 1911, the military attaché in Constantinople was also accredited in Athens; he spent a couple of months a year in the two capitals.

Romulus Magheru (1878-79)

Romulus Magheru was born on June, 6 1847. He was the son of general Magheru, who played an important role in 1848 Revolution in Wallachia. In 1864, he entered the military school, after two years he became a second



Colonel Romulus Magheru, source:
Universul, 1897

lieutenant and two years later a lieutenant. In 1872 he was promoted to captain, and five years later, when the Russo-Ottoman war began, he became a major. Few notes about Magheru can be found from the Norwegian officer Flood, who was in Romania between December 1876 – January 1877: “After the recommendation of a mutual friend, I was well received by Captain Romulus Magheru, who served as my guide in Bucharest (...) Magheru is 30 years old, officer since 1866, captain for 5 years, artillery and major staff officer. When you have been a captain for 5 years and have actually served for 3 years, you can pass an exam, almost exclusively on regulations. After the exam is over, those who pass are registered, in order of classification, on the promotion board to the rank of major. Magheru does not want to participate in January [i.e. 1877], although by doing so he will be overtaken by younger officers”¹⁴ After 1879, he was appointed military attaché of Romania in Berlin. Romulus Magheru was promoted lieutenant colonel in 1885 and colonel in 1891.

Aristide Razu (1910 - 1913)

Aristide Razu is the most famous of the three military attachés in Constantinople due to his successful military career. Born on March 7, 1868, in Cahul, he studied abroad, graduating in October 1895 from Polytechnics – University of Liege (Belgium), with a degree in electrical engineering¹⁵. Upon his return to Romania, Aristide Razu attended the Higher War School. After graduation, he became an assistant professor of fortifications at the Special School of Artillery and Engineering until 1903, when he moved to the 2nd Army Corps¹⁶. In June 1902, he married Margareta Laura Zoe Mandrea, the niece of Costache Aman, the step-brother of the painter Theodor Aman, founder of the Romanian Academy of Fine Arts¹⁷. On February 15, 1910, Aristide Razu was appointed military attaché in Constantinople¹⁸ and, from August 1, 1911, his mission was extended to Athens as well¹⁹. Meanwhile, he was promoted lieutenant colonel. Aristide Razu was in Constantinople during critical moments in the history of the Ottoman Empire: the Italian-Ottoman War and the Balkan Wars. In the context of the outbreak of the



Young captain Aristide Razu.

Source: Viorel Frincu, Personalități militare buzoiene în Campania din Bulgaria (1913), în Străjer în calea furtunilor. Magazin al Fundației „Mareșal Alexandru Averescu”

first Balkan war, in a report dated September 21, 1912, he notified that the empire was in the most difficult period in its history²⁰; but, his activity (in special, his reports about the Ottoman army) was not appreciated by his superior.²¹ After leaving the Ottoman capital, Aristide Razu returned to Romania. He played an important role in the First World War, becoming a divisional general²².

Lucian Trantomir (1913 - 1916)

Born on September 9/21, 1873, in Iași, Lucian was the son of Lazăr and Pulcheria (Pro-fira) Trantomir. At that point, his father was 44, and his mother 26. His parents lived on Str. Kogălniceanu, nr. 699²³. Lucian was baptised on November 22, 1873, in the Annunciation Church of the city. Two years later, in November 1875, his sister Beatrice was born²⁴.

He left home in 1889 to pursue his military career, but Lucian Trantomir was homesick despite seeing his father quite often. The young man had a hard time facing the army rigours. “I find it very hard to leave home, especially when I come to school here! As I think

about it, I enjoyed so much freedom at home! (...) Here, the reveille is at 5½ in the morning; you must wake up, dress quickly, and go out for the morning roll call. It is hard out here when you think of all the facilities at home”²⁵. Two years later, in June 1891, he still suffered from an illness that harrowed his last months of school. Considering he had to spend one more week at the school infirmary, he asked his father for some francs to cope with the situation. “Please, get me 4 francs to give him something for better care (all nurses are like that) and buy what I need without bothering you with it”²⁶. He also asked his father to send him three books but hide the French novel in his pocket, not the German books, which were “instructive and allowed”; “you can bring them wrapped, without disguise”²⁷.

After graduating from the Officer School, Trantomir evolved in his military career gradually: from an ensign in the 7th *Călărași* Regiment on July 10, 1894²⁸, to a lieutenant²⁹ on April 8, 1898³⁰, a captain from March 14, 1905, in the 3rd *Roșiori* Regiment³¹ and a major in March 1912³². Throughout his career, he received several decorations: “Tresor Sane” as an officer from the emperor of Japan, the fourth-class “Mecidiye” Order from Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the third-class “Prussian Crown” Order from Emperor Wilhelm II and the “Romanian Crown” Order as a knight, the “National Keeness” Medal for his participation in the second Balkan war³³.

On February 13, 1903³⁴, a Thursday, Lucian Trantomir married Aurelia, the daughter of Constantin Dănăricu, born on March 18/31, 1881³⁵. The two had a daughter together, i.e., Aurelia-Lucienne-Nicole, born in Bucharest on April 27, 1905³⁶. However, the marriage did not last due to the untimely death of his wife at 26, in September 1907, in the Swiss sanatorium of Leysen, suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. In addition, from the beginning of the year, Aurelia Trantomir had to visit the Davos or Leysin sanatorium to treat her illness (“double bacillus infiltrate”)³⁷.

In 1906, Trantomir was attached to the Austro-Hungarian army for ten months. He was assigned to the 6th “Albrecht Prinz von Preusen” Dragons Regiment for seven months. For the subsequent three months, he was at-

tached to the cavalry division in Vienna. Upon returning to the country, the captain published in March 1907 the work *An Austro-Hungarian Cavalry Division in 1907* comprising three chapters (*The Organisation of the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry; The concentration of the Cavalry Division from Vienna to Ratschkovitz, for Mass Instruction, August 10-22; Psychology of Annual Manoeuvres*), where he presented, among others, the distribution of the cavalry, instruction, and horse procuring³⁸.

Lucian Trantomir replaced Al. Razu in Constantinople³⁹. Though appointed in May 1913, Trantomir did not reach the Bosphorus shores immediately. The outbreak of the Second Balkan War postponed his departure. When he arrived in Constantinople, the Romanian Legation comprised Constantin G. Manu (minister plenipotentiary), Constantin Langa-Râșcanu, Emanuel Rosetti-Roznovanu (secretaries), Alphonse Lahaille (first dragoman), and Epaminonda Papacosta (second dragoman). One of the first decisions taken by Trantomir in his new position was to subscribe or perhaps even continue paying subscriptions to the leading journals: “Messenger d’Athènes” (one-year subscription between July 1, 1913 and July 1, 1914 cost him Lei 40) and “Lloyd Ottoman” (for half a year, between November 1, 1913, and April 30, 1914, it cost him Lei 11.35)⁴⁰. The practice continued in the subsequent years. In early February 1916, he asked the Ministry of War to reimburse Lei 190 for subscriptions to the “Lloyd Ottoman” and “Tanin” publications⁴¹.

Trantomir had no experience in the Ottoman Empire; we suppose that the mission was his first trip to Constantinople. The only previous relationship identified thus far is the decoration he had received from Sultan Abdul Hamid on November 30, 1907 (the fourth-class “Medjidie” Order)⁴². The awarding diploma states that he received it for “the high qualities distinguishing him and his heartwarming feelings for Our Empire making him worthy of Our Imperial favour”. However, one should not suppose that Trantomir took particular actions or initiatives to support the Ottomans. According to historians, during the reign of Abdul Hamid II, there was an “inflation” of decorations. The sultan was exceedingly gen-

erous in granting them. Trantomir's decoration in November 1907, when he was the head of the Budget Office within the Ministry of War, can be understood in the context of the negotiations to sign a military convention between the Ottoman Empire and Romania. The former suzerain coveted this convention, but it was never concluded. The lack of sources only allows us to suggest this connection; there are no supporting documents at this point.

Returning to his military and diplomatic missions, one can notice that, once arrived on the Bosphorus shores, Trantomir was still interested in Bulgaria (probably following instructions from Bucharest). In late December, he sent a calculation based on the original Bulgarian map on a 1:126.000 scale, comprising the fortification system in place to defend Sofia and the directions towards Serbia. The Serbian military attaché in Athens had given him the original Bulgarian map and promised to provide him with a detailed description of the Bulgarian defence system. The Romanian officer learned that the Serbians had acquired ten copies of the map mentioned above on the eve of the Serbian-Bulgarian conflict by paying Lei 10,000 to a Bulgarian officer⁴³. Several days



Lieutenant colonel Trantomir, source:
ANI, Colecția Documente, Pachet 30

later, Trantomir wrote a report about the military situation in the Ottoman Empire. It comprised information about the army on land grouped into three categories – forces available for operations, forces unavailable for the moment, and disappeared, about the marine; in the end, he detailed the financial situation⁴⁴. Furthermore, in early 1914, the instructions sent by the Head of Section II within the General Staff, Colonel Petala, to the Romanian military attachés in Sofia, Constantinople, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Paris, and Petersburg went along the lines: “I have the honour of asking you to please send the Regulations of the stages and any instructions, orders, etc. urgently in force concerning the service of stages in that army”⁴⁵.

The domestic context in the Ottoman Empire during Trantomir's mission in Constantinople is dominated by an increase in the power of the leaders of Young Turks and a decrease in the role and visibility of the reigning sultan, Mehmed V. These three years of the Ottoman history are intensely debated even after a century, primarily due to the repressive ethnical policy promoted by the so-called Young Turk triumvirate Enver-Talaat-Djemal, “the three pashas”: Enver Pasha, the Minister of War; Talaat Pasha, the Minister of the Interior, and Djemal Pasha, the Minister of the Navy. Lucian Trantomir arrived in an empire where the national Turkish ethnic discourse had become dominant, and excesses were commonplace, especially considering the 1915 moment⁴⁶. Furthermore, upon analysing the context of the Ottoman Empire joining the First World War, the historian Mustafa Aksakal characterizes the Ottoman society in 1914 as “a perforated society, with perforations running along ethnic and religious lines”⁴⁷.

In the autumn of 1913, the Empire bounced back after the Balkan Wars; the Treaty of Constantinople, ending the second military conflict for the empire, was signed on September²⁹. The Empire lost 80% of its European possessions and became more of an Asian empire, welcoming around 400,000 Muslim refugees from the area. Hence, “the Balkan Wars intensified Ottoman and Muslim feelings of vulnerability, sense of violation, and revenge”⁴⁸. The Ottoman army, concerning

which the Romanian military attaché in Constantinople gathered intelligence, had suffered enormous losses presented by the propaganda service as accidents of history to preserve the image of the Ottoman army as eternally glorious. The consequences of these losses included a new reform of the Ottoman army on May 12, 1914. The addition of August 1914 was seen as a way to rejuvenate the military and make the recruiting process more effective⁴⁹.

The Ottoman Empire joined the First World War in October 1914, somewhat forced by the traditional ally – Germany and entirely unprepared to face the war years. However, the decision to join the war stirred enthusiasm; the propaganda was successful if we analyse the photos taken those days in front of the imposing door of the Ottoman Ministry of War (the present-day Istanbul University). As Ottoman Empire joined the war, one of Romania's greatest fears – featured in various correspondence – was the impact of Ottoman military involvement in the war on Romania's commerce. More precisely, a closing of the straits would have devastated the Romanian economy; hence, monitoring the evolution of the conflict became a priority, as proven by the frequent reports of the military attaché Trantomir⁵⁰. Therefore, Lucian Trantomir, in two out of the three years spent on his mission in Constantinople, lived in a city in war. Though it was not located in the conflict area per se because the closest front was situated in the Dardanelles, Trantomir visualised the war under different forms to complete his intelligence for reports. Army enrolling and troop transfers became frequent phenomena in the city's streets. Permanently getting news from the front or concerning the shell production at the Tophane factory (near the legation), hospitals hosting wounded soldiers on the front – all were part of the daily landscape. He had no movement restrictions within the city, which made it easier for the Romanian military attaché to gather intelligence as requested by Bucharest. His office was in Romania's Legation in Constantinople (Taksim), in the city's diplomatic area. At the same time, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were in the old area of the city (the classic Istanbul). It was also closer to the Sultan's palace, but Mehmed V, who reigned from 1909 to 1918, was the least

involved in the decision-making among all modern sultans of the Empire.

Trantomir also carried out his activity in Athens. Before his departure, he held several conversations with the Minister of War. Through a verbal order, the latter asked him to investigate whether the Greek army had been inoculated with anticholera serum during the 1912-1913 campaign. Following a field trip, the military attaché reported that, in the first part of the campaign against the Ottoman armies in Thessaly and Epirus, the Greek troops had not suffered from cholera or been inoculated with anticholera serum. During the winter, though, they had been through gangrene caused by limb frosting, which led to many human losses (around 1,000 soldiers died). Things were different during the second campaign against Bulgaria. As cholera wreaked havoc, the Greek troops were inoculated with that substance. In June-July 1913, 10,000 became sick with cholera and 1,300-1,500 died⁵¹.

Before the First World War outbreak, the military attaché's activity was characteristic of his mission; for instance, in the spring of 1914, he sent to Bucharest the campaign equipment of the Ottoman infantry, which he had obtained through mutual exchange. Hence, he had asked the Bucharest authorities for the equipment of the Romanian infantry⁵². Following the outbreak of the conflagration, his activity became more intense, and additional tasks were added⁵³. For instance, in November 1914, the military attaché reported recruiting Moise Aron D. Mihailovici, born in Tulcea in 1893. The young man had come to Romania's General Consulate in Constantinople to obtain a permit to return to his country because he was threatened with recruitment in the Ottoman army.

He was recruited and assigned to the 33rd Tulcea Regiment. The consular representation was invited "to note in his free passage permit that he would be delivered by the relevant customs and police authorities to be sent to his assigned Regiment"⁵⁴. It is just an example within a wide array of such cases, where careful analysis and collaboration were required between the military attaché, Romania's consulate, local police, and City Hall to identify the correct status of each subject. In 1914, numerous

frauds attempt to avoid Ottoman military service were recorded. Similarly, when Romania joined the war in 1916, some Constantinople residents tried to escape forced repatriation to Romania or later to labour camps⁵⁵. The effects of the war's outbreak were noticed in other directions, too. In early 1915, Trantomir was warned that all future correspondence would be conveyed in a sealed envelope via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, only addressed to the Chief of General Staff, not various military heads⁵⁶. Some of his notes help us to reconstruct the expenses made by the military attaché in Constantinople in 1916⁵⁷.

While serving on his mission in the Ottoman Empire, Trantomir was promoted from major to lieutenant colonel. The head of the Legation, Constantin G. Manu, gave him the news on March 29, 1916⁵⁸. On April 1, 1916, Trantomir sent to the General Staff his request for approval of a short leave in April to visit his sick daughter and solve several family matters. Furthermore, in his favour, the military attaché argued that he had not taken a day off in around a year. "The momentary lull in Türkiye"⁵⁹ was another reason to request a return to Romania⁶⁰. A month later, he received the order to return to the country "to bring the papers requested"⁶¹. By analysing the passport issued in Bucharest for this visit to Romania on May 11/24, 1916, we note that Lucian Trantomir travelled with his orderly, Halil Feta Selami (a Muslim who most probably spoke Turkish). This choice made his stay in Constantinople easier. The same passport shows he had obtained the passage permits in Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire on June 30, 1916, which means that the attaché returned to the Ottoman capital less than two months before Romania entered the war.

Around the same period, in April 1916, the military attaché in Sofia, Tencesu, drafted a report requesting the burning of the old archive (from the founding of this position to 1914). He provided further explanations: the General Staff had drafted and possessed the Bulgarian army's classified leaflet until late 1914; from that moment on, all the reports penned by Tencesu were in Bucharest. Subsequently, he mentioned the work written by General Dabija⁶², a former military attaché in the Bulgari-

an capital, comprising valuable information about the military organisation of the neighbour south of the Danube. As a last argument, he stated there was no more space in the iron house, which was relatively small. On April 25, the request was approved, and two days later, he was ordered to draft an official report of the burnt papers⁶³.

The return to the country

Romania's entry into the war in August 1916 determined breaking off the diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. Lieutenant Colonel Lucian Trantomir returned to his country and was assigned to the General Headquarters on September 23, 1916⁶⁴. Within the General Headquarters, Trantomir worked in the 4th Grade of the General Staff Service; his superior was Colonel Vasile Niculcea⁶⁵. Subsequently, he was assigned as head of the 3rd Grade for a few months. At the end of his mission, Brigadier Rusescu highlighted his qualities: "A sharp, ordered, and skilful spirit, endowed with excellent common sense and a great insight into society norms"⁶⁶. Subsequently, Trantomir became the deputy head of the General Staff within the second army commanded by General Alexandru Averescu⁶⁷. The moment and causes of his death are not known so far. However, the documents that we consulted indicate that, in May 1919, he was no longer alive, which means that he must have died in 1918.

Conclusion

The activity of Romanian military attachés in various European capitals in the late 19th century and the beginning of the subsequent century can represent the topic of more comprehensive analyses in Romanian historiography, and the names of those who served are worth retrieving. The investigation of such detailed reports written abroad by seasoned military personnel can provide new perspectives, as in the case of other Romanian military attachés, for reconstructing the involvement in the conflicts marking the beginning of the 20th century. It is also helpful for a comparative analysis of Romania's situation in an international context. In the specific case of

Romanian-Ottoman relations, the activity of military attachés helps us understand the new context of the diplomatic relations between the two states after 1878 and Romania's strategic positioning in regional policy.

NOTES

¹ The topic is extensively analysed in Western European historiography: Maurice Vaisse, *L'évolution de l'attaché militaire en France au XXe siècle*, in *Relations Internationales*, n° 32, 1982, p. 507-524; Arthur Beneteau, *Servir les intérêts français en plein chaos révolutionnaire. Étude des attachés militaires en Russie, 1916-1920*, in *Bulletin de l'Institut Pierre Renouvin* – n° 47, 1/2018, p. 61-72; Wada Haruki, *Russian Military and Naval Attachés in Japan*, in vol. II, ed. by David Wolff, Steven G. Marks, Bruce W. Menning, David Schimmelpenninck Van Der Oye, John W. Steinberg, Yokote Shinji Brill, Leiden, 2007, p. 13-43; Tim Hadley, *Military Diplomacy in the Dual Alliance German Military Attaché Reporting from Vienna, 1879-1914*, LEXINGTON BOOKS, Lanham - Boulder - New York - London, 2016.

² Dumitru Preda, Mihai Retegan, *Lista atașărilor militare români (1877-1944)* in *Revista Arhivelor*, nr. 4/1981, p. 505-513.

³ Petre Otu, Maria Georgescu, *Radiografia unei trădări. Cazul colonelului Alexandru D. Sturdza*, București, Editura Militară, 2011, p. 65-85; Petre Otu, *Mareșalul Alexandru Averescu militarul, omul politic, legenda*, Editura Militară, București, 2005, p. 22-25; Maria Georgescu, Christophe Midan, *Un exemple de coopération bilatérale. Les attachés militaires français en Roumanie et roumains en France (1860-1940)*, București, Editura Militară, 2003 (see the chapters signed by Maria Georgescu, *Le statut des attachés militaires roumains 1878-1940*, p. 61-72; *Dictionnaire. Les attachés militaires 1860-1940 et chefs de missions roumains en France pendant la Première Guerre mondiale*, p. 113-208).

⁴ Delia Bălăican, *Activitatea de scriitor militar a generalului G.A. Dabija*, in *Patrimoniul*, Decembar 2015, p. 374-376; eadem, *Generalul G. A. Dabija – un reprezentant de marcă al generației sale*, in *Analele Științifice ale Universității Alexandru Ioan Cuza din Iași. Serie nouă. Istorie*, tom LXI, 2015, p. 395-413; Daniel Cain, *A Military Attaché in Bulgaria: Major Gh. A. Dabija in Institutul de studii sud-est europene. Identitate, cultura și politica în Sud-Estul Europei/Două colocvii româno-bulgare*, ed. Cătălina Vătășescu and Constantin Iordan, Brăila, Istros, 2014, p. 237-248.

⁵ G. A. Dabija, *Amintirile unui atașat militar român în Bulgaria 1910-1913*, București, 1935.

⁶ Several reports of the Romanian military attachés in Paris and Sofia were published in *România în "Marele Război". Anul 1915. Documente, impresii, mărturii*, ed. Mihail E. Ionescu, București, Editura Militară, 2015.

⁷ Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu, Silvana Rachieru, *Reconstituirea unei biografii: pe urmele atașatului militar al României la Constantinopol – Lucian Trantomir (1913-1916)* in *Analele Științifice ale Universității Alexandru Ioan Cuza din Iași. Serie nouă. Istorie*, tom LXV, 2019, p. 535-551

⁸ Dumitru Preda, Mihai Retegan, *op. cit.*, p. 505.

⁹ *Organizarea instituțională a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe. Acte și documente*, vol. I, Ion Mamina, Gheorghe Neacșu, George Potra (eds.), București, Fundația Europeană Titulescu, 2004, p. 440.

¹⁰ Arhivele Naționale Iași [National Archives Iași] (hereinafter ANI), Colecția Documente [Documents Collections], Pachet [Pack] 1051, dosar [file] 16, p. 1-10.

¹¹ This is what General Dabija recalls about the activity carried out by an attaché: "A military attaché is, first, a representative of his army; secondly, he is an eager official observer of the army to which he is accredited (...) He must use only the means allowed, be perfectly fluent in the country's language, know its geography and history; on top of them, all the military laws and regulations. He must thoroughly study the general State and military budgets and have detailed knowledge of army organisation, annual and incorporated contingents, mobilised contingencies, their numbers, the military personnel, their instruction, and the capacity of general commanders and General Staff officers. He must know the military annuary of active and reserve officers, to know the charts of the active and mobilised armies" (G. A. Dabija, *op. cit.*, p. 6).

¹² Maria Georgescu, *Le statut des attachés militaires roumains 1878-1940*, in Maria Georgescu, Christophe Midan, *Un exemple de coopération bilatérale...*, p. 69-70.

¹³ G. A. Dabija, *op. cit.*, p. 11-13.

¹⁴ G-ral R. Rosetti, *Notele unui ofițer norvegian înaintea și în timpul războiului de neatarnare 1876-1878*, in *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice*, seria III, tom VIII, 1927-1928, p. 197-205.

¹⁵ Viorel Frincu, *Personalități militare buzoiene în Campania din Bulgaria (1913)*, in *Străjer în calea furtunilor. Magazin al Fundației „Mareșal Alexandru Averescu”*, anul V, nr. 9, iunie 2011, p. 58.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ „Adevărul”, anul XXIII, 18 februarie 1910, p. 3.

¹⁹ „Adevărul”, anul XXIV, 30 iulie 1911, p. 2.

²⁰ Dumitru Preda, *România și războaiele balcanice (prima parte)*, in *Magazin Istoric*, nr. 7/1993, p. 14.

²¹ Oroian Teofil, *Generalul Aristide Razu*, in *Revista de istorie militară*, nr. 6/1999, p. 18-21.

²² Viorel Frincu, *op. cit.*, p. 58

²³ ANI, Fond Stare Civilă/Iași/Născuți [Public Records Collection/Iași/Born], dosar [file] 13/1873, vol. 3. Nr. [issue] 400-591, p. 43 v.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, Fond Stare Civilă/Iași/Născuți [Public Records Collection/Iași/Born], dosar [file] 7/1875, vol. IV, Nr. [issue] 593-792, p. 81 v.

²⁵ *Idem*, Colecția Documente, Pachet [Documents Collections, Pack] 1051, dosar [file] 1, unpaget.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, dosar [file] 2, unpaget.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, dosar [file] 3, not numbered. In August 1896, Trantomir graduated from the Special Cavalry School, which he had attended in 1895-1896, with a general point average of 15.36, ranking the 8th of 34 students (*idem*, dosar [file] 4, unpaget)

²⁹ In the context of the peasant uprisings of 1900, 25 *călărași* in the 11th Regiment of Brăila were subordinated to Lieutenant Trantomir in Buda (Rânicu Sărat County) to stop the spread of the riots to other localities (Gh. Matei, D. Mioc, *Documente noi privind răscoalele țărănești din anul 1900 in Analele Institutului de Istorie a Partidului de pe lângă C.C. al P.C.R.*, nr. 4/1965, p. 165).

³⁰ ANI, Colecția Documente, Pachet [Documents Collections, Pack] 1051, dosar [file] 5, not numbered. In November 1903, Trantomir graduated from the Superior School of War with a general point average of 15.54, ranking the second of the 19 graduates (*idem*, dosar [file] 6, unpaget).

³¹ *Ibidem*, dosar [file] 7, unpaget.

³² *Ibidem*, dosar [file] 17, not numbered.

³³ *Ibidem*, dosar [file] 12, not numbered; *ibidem*, dosar [file] 21, not numbered; *ibidem*, dosar [file] 15, not numbered; *ibidem*, dosar [file] 13, not unpaget; *ibidem*, dosar [file] 11, unpaget.

³⁴ The central press presented, in turn, details on the marriage of “gentle” Miss Aurelia to the “pleasant” lieutenant and the ball organised in Târgu-Jiu to honour the young couple (“Adevărul”, anul [year] XVI, nr. [issue] 4871, Thursday, 20 February 1903, p. 4).

³⁵ ANI, Colecția Documente, Pachet [Documents Collections, Pack] 1051, dosar [file] 8, p. 5.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, dosar [file] 10, p. 3-8.

³⁸ Lucian Trantomir, *O divizie de cavalerie austro-ungară în 1907 (cu o hartă în culori)*, București, 1907, 113 p.

³⁹ In June 1913, Al. Razu was still in the capital of the Ottoman Empire, and he sent a report to Bucharest recounting the departure of the “Elisabeta” cruiser from Constantinople. Its presence “in the middle of the mighty vessels of the international fleet increased our national prestige and provided our officers with a very favourable occasion to get instructed by interacting with the officers of foreign marines and visiting the significant naval units stationed here” (Arhivele Militare Române [Romanian Military Archives] – hereinafter AMR, Fond Marele Stat Major [General Staff Collection] Secția 2 Informații [Section 2 Intelligence], dosar [file] 214, p. 21).

⁴⁰ ANI, Colecția Documente, Pachet [Documents Collections, Pack] 1051, dosar [file] 20, *ibidem*, unpaget.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, dosar [file] 27, p. 1.

⁴² *Ibidem*, dosar [file] 12, unpaget.

⁴³ AMR, Fond Biroul Atașati Militari [Military Attachés Office Collection], dosar [file] 35/1913, p. 42 (a report of 17/30 December 1913).

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 45 (a report of 23 December 1913).

⁴⁵ AMR, Fond Marele Stat Major [General Staff Collection] Secția 2 Informații [Section 2 Intelligence], dosar [file] 207, p. 6 (the address of 21 January 1914).

⁴⁶ See the chapter *La “Jeune Turquie”*, in Hamit Bozarslan, *Histoire de la Turquie. De l'Empire ottoman à nos jours*, Paris, 2015, p. 247-286, where the author makes a detailed analysis of the transition of Young Turks from opposition to power, concluding that “the period 1908-1913 represents for the Committee of Union and Progress the testing years, where they learned and then monopolised power” (p. 277).

⁴⁷ Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 2.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

⁴⁹ Odile Moreau, *Pre-War Military Planning (Ottoman Empire)*, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pre-war_military_planning_ottoman_empire [accessed on 20.09.2019].

⁵⁰ Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], Fond Constantinopol [Constantinople Collection], vol. 164 bis, 165, 166.

⁵¹ AMR, Fond Biroul Atașati Militari [Military Attachés Office Collection], dosar [file] 35/1913, p. 22 (a report of October 1913).

⁵² AMR, Fond Marele Stat Major [General Staff Collection] Secția 2 Informații [Section 2 Intelligence], dosar [file] 290, p. 214 (a report of 19 May 1914).

⁵³ A more detailed analysis of his activity, as shown by the reports preserved in the diplomatic and military archives, will make the object of another study dedicated to the military attaché Lucian Trantomir.

⁵⁴ AMR, Fond Marele Stat Major [General Staff Collection] Secția 2 Informații [Section 2 Intelligence], dosar [file] 290, p. (a report of 12/25 November 1914).

⁵⁵ See Silvana Rachieru, *The "1916" Moment from the Perspective of the Ottoman-Romanian Relations – an Overview*, in Alexander Rubel, Claudiu-Lucian Topor (eds.), *The Untold War: Romania – Between Allies and Enemies. 100 Years After the Entry into the War*, Konstanz, Hartung Gore Verlag, 2016, p. 83-92.

⁵⁶ AMR, Fond Marele Stat Major [General Staff Collection] Secția 2 Informații [Section 2 Intelligence], dosar [file] 290, p. 222 (a telegram of 27 February 1915).

⁵⁷ In April 1916, he received Lei 450 and 4 *bani* from Bucharest, 25% of the wages for that month, then Lei 808 as military attaché compensation for the same month, Lei 200 food compensation; in May: 590 and 1 *ban*, accounting for 45% of the wages, Lei 808 as military attaché compensation, and Lei 200 food compensation for meals; in June: Lei 570 and 1 *ban* accounting for 43% of the wages for that month, the same amount of Lei 808 as military attaché compensation and Lei 200 food compensation; on 29 July, according to the fiscal year 1916/1917, he received Lei 600 as chancellery and library compensations (ANI, Colecția Documente, Pachet [Documents Collections, Pack] 1051, dosar [file] 43, p. 1-10).

⁵⁸ "Dear Colonel, I am happy to convey to you the following telegram I have just received: « *A la demande du Grand-État-major veuillez transmettre attaché militaire Comandant Trantomir qu'il a été*

promu à la date de 1^{er} Avril au grade de Lieutenant-Colonel par décret royal N° 1021, à la vacance lui y a, au même service. S [igné] Général Christesco, N° 16806, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Nano». I congratulate you from all my heart, dear Colonel. Yours respectfully, C. G. Mano. P.S. I add here a second telegram received for you as I was closing this envelope" (ibidem, dosar [file] 28, unpagé).

⁵⁹ The seeming lull was more apparent on the western front. For the Ottoman Empire, the intense conflict moved to the East, where Russia had advanced enormously in late 1915, capturing significant cities like Van, Erzurum, and the Black Sea ports of Rize and Trabzon.

⁶⁰ The report of 1 April 1916 comprises a pencil note of 19 April through which Prime Minister Ion I. C. Brătianu approved his return to the country (AMR, Fond Marele Stat Major [General Staff Collection] Secția 2 Informații [Section 2 Intelligence], dosar [file] 429/1916, p. 24).

⁶¹ ANI, Colecția Documente, Pachet [Documents Collections, Pack] 1051, dosar [file] 29, unpagé.

⁶² He must have referenced General G. A. Dabița's work called *Războiul bulgaro-turc din anul 1912-1913: cu 12 crochiuri și 13 oleate*, București, 1914.

⁶³ AMR, Fond Marele Stat Major [General Staff Collection] Secția 2 Informații [Section 2 Intelligence], dosar [file] 429/1916, p. 42-50.

⁶⁴ ANI, Colecția Documente, Pachet [Documents Collections, Pack] 1051, dosar [file] 36, unpagé.

⁶⁵ *Războiul de întregire (1916-1919). Comandanți militari români*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2016, p. 229.

⁶⁶ Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu, Silvana Rachieru, *op. cit.*, p. 550.

⁶⁷ *Războiul de întregire (1916-1919)*..., p. 262.

CAUSES AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMIGRATION OF THE MUSLIM POPULATION FROM ROMANIA TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE / REPUBLIC OF TÜRKIYE (1878-1939)

METIN OMER *

Abstract

This paper aims to analyse to what extent the emigration of Turks and Tatars from Romania to the Ottoman Empire / Republic of Türkiye had military causes. The chronological limits of the study are the year 1878, when Dobrogea entered the borders of the Romanian state, and the year 1939, when the Second World War started.

The analysis is divided into two parts. The first part explains to what extent military service in a Christian army was a cause of emigration and discusses whether the authorities in Bucharest succeeded in integrating Muslims into the Romanian army. In the second part, the interwar period is examined. The study shows that performing military service in a Christian army was no longer the main cause of emigration, but there were local abuses by some representatives of military institutions. These were investigated and action from the central authorities was called for, but the phenomenon, which had complex causes, could not be stopped. This part also explains the attraction that the transformations in the Republic of Türkiye and the military and political skills of its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, had on the Turks and Tatars of Dobruja. A final aspect analysed is the involvement of the Ministry of National Defence in the regulation of the emigration process.

The main sources used in the study are unpublished archival documents from Romania and Türkiye, newspapers and magazines of the Turkish-Tatar community, and the national press.

Keywords: *Turks, Tatars, Dobruja, Romania, Türkiye, emigration*

Introduction

With the incorporation of Northern Dobruja within Romanian borders following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, the authorities in Bucharest had to find solutions to

integrate a region with a complicated demography, different legal customs, and a distinct administrative system. In the region that had been part of the Ottoman Empire for four centuries, the majority of the population consist-

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ed of Turks and Tatars. During the period of 1877-1878, there was a significant migration of this population to the Ottoman Empire. According to a French consular report, in 1878, Dobruja had 71,146 (31.5%) Tatars, 48,783 (21.6%) Turks, 46,504 (21%) Romanians out of 225,692¹ inhabitants. By the year 1900, only 12,459 Turks and 28,450² Tatars remained. The process continued into the interwar period when, as a result of Southern Dobruja being annexed to Romanian borders in 1913, the Muslim population increased significantly. In 1928, in the Quadrilateral alone, there were 137,439 "Turko-Tatars", representing 40.56% of the total population of 338,897³. According to some estimates, approximately 115,000 Turks and Tatars emigrated during the interwar period⁴.

The causes of this phenomenon were complex. Some of them, such as property issues or the functioning of schools and community institutions, remained constant from 1878 to 1940, while others, such as the ideological aspect, the relationship with the Ottoman Empire or the Republic of Türkiye, acquired different connotations. The community itself did not have a unified attitude. There were two main schools of thought regarding emigration. The first group supported staying in Dobruja and accepting the benefits offered by the Romanian state. The second group consisted of those who preferred emigrating to the Ottoman Empire / Republic of Türkiye, considering it a space where they could preserve their identity. During the interwar period, a new trend appeared among the Tatar population, supporting the idea that the direction of emigration should be Crimea, the territory from which their ancestors came⁵.

This study aims to analyse the causes and military implications of the emigration of Turks and Tatars from Romania to the Ottoman Empire / Republic of Türkiye. Three main aspects are examined: the issue of Muslims serving in the Romanian army, their relationship with military institutions, and the involvement of the Ministry of National Defence in regulating the emigration process. The study is chronologically divided into two parts: the period before World War I and the interwar period. This division was considered nec-

essary considering how the Turks and Tatars in Romania perceived the Ottoman Empire and later the Republic of Türkiye.

The period before World War I. Can Muslims live in a Christian country?

Before World War I, in the debates regarding emigration from a military perspective, the most important aspect was the issue of serving in the Romanian army. This problem sparked extensive controversy within the community. In fact, the major theme of these discussions was finding an answer to the question of whether a Muslim could live in a Christian country. The discussions divided the community, with different positions taken among the Turkish and Tatar elites. Those in favour of emigration argued primarily that it was impossible for a Muslim to adhere to religious customs in a Christian country. On the other hand, leaders who attempted to persuade members of the Muslim community to stay in Romania included significant figures such as Ibrahim Temo⁶ and Mehmet Niyazi⁷, personalities who contributed to the modernization of the Turko-Tatar society.


To understand the perspective of those who supported emigration, one must consider an aspect related to military service. The majority of the Tatar population in Dobruja migrated to this region following the Crimean War of 1853-1856. According to some estimations, due to policies restricting the rights of Crimean Tatars in the peninsula and its surroundings, at least 300,000 Tatars emigrated to Ottoman territories. Some of them settled in Dobruja, which was then part of the Ottoman Empire⁸. One of the main reasons for emigration, as stated in reports prepared by officials from Crimean police, was the introduction of mandatory military service and, especially, the impossibility of adhering to Islamic precepts in the Tsarist army and the prospect of fighting against fellow Muslims⁹.

However, due to the close traditional, cultural, and religious ties with the Ottoman Empire, a special policy was adopted towards the immigrants. Because Dobruja was the territory where Russian and Ottoman armies clashed throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the region held particular strategic importance.

Thus, Crimean Tatar immigrants who arrived in the region before the Crimean War were integrated into special military units of the Ottoman army. In 1826, the Ottomans established the first *sipahi* unit composed of those who had emigrated from Crimea. It was based in Silistra and included Tatars, Turks, and Cossacks. Eventually, each community had its own sipahi unit led by its own leader¹⁰. One such unit made up of the Kabail Tatars from the Babadag area fought on Ottoman fronts located 4,000 km away¹¹. In exchange for their military service, the Kabail Tatars were exempt from certain taxes and were given the opportunity to advance in military positions. Their leader, Han Mârza, held the rank of *miralay* (colonel)¹². The large number of Tatars settled between the Danube and the Black Sea led the region to be called "Little Tartary"¹³.

For immigrants after 1856, the Ottoman state adopted a different strategy. This time, considering the very large number and difficult conditions in which they arrived, various facilities were provided to the immigrants. They were given a house, food, two oxen for ploughing according to the possibilities and were exempt from paying taxes (*oşur*) for 10 years, and from military service for 20 years¹⁴. Under these conditions, with military facilities that included special status units or exemption from military service, the prospect of joining a Christian army could not be an attractive one.

The issue was discussed at the diplomatic level between Bucharest and Istanbul. The defining moment in resolving this problem was the promulgation, on March 9/21, 1880, of the *Law for the Organization of Dobruja*, which, given its scope, was also known as the *Constitution of Dobruja*. The law regulated aspects concerning the territory of Dobruja, administration, judiciary, finances, and the military power. In the process of adopting the law, Romanian officials collaborated with the Ottoman counterparts. The main concerns raised by the Sultan's diplomats were related to the Muslim community. A preliminary version of the law was sent to the Grand Vizier, Said Pasha, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sava Pasha, on February 1/13, 1880, by Dimitrie C. Brătianu, the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania



Ibrahim Temo

in Constantinople¹⁵. Suleiman Bey, the minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary of the Ottoman Empire in Bucharest, made some remarks on the draft, which he sent to Sava Pasha on February 13/25, 1880. After the latter's approval, the minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary of the Ottoman Empire in Bucharest presented the these remarks to Boerescu¹⁶.

Suleiman Bey addressed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, asking him to exempt Muslims from mandatory military service. In his report, he also mentioned having discussions on this matter with some deputies, who received his remarks favourably¹⁷. In the final version of the "Constitution of Dobruja", Article 67 stated that, for ten years, there would be no conscription from Dobruja for the "regular army", although a territorial army (cavalry and infantry) would still be formed. Article 68 stipulated that Muslim residents

would form separate companies within the territorial army, while their uniforms, paid for by the state, would retain the fez and turban¹⁸.

Another important legislative moment with regards to the Muslim community and military service was related to the incorporation of Southern Dobruja within Romanian borders in the wake of the Second Balkan War. The territory, also known as the Quadrilateral or New Dobruja, had a demographic composition where Turks and Tatars were the majority, followed by Bulgarians and then Romanians¹⁹. Moreover, it had a unique legal and economic situation. Similar to Northern Dobruja, officials in Bucharest chose to integrate it gradually, based on a set of special measures.

As a result, on April 1/14, 1914, the *Law for the Organization of New Dobruja* came into effect²⁰. The law consisted of 160 articles, regulating all aspects related to the functioning of institutions in Southern Dobrogea. Regarding military service, Article 106 specified that all inhabitants of the new territory would be subject to military service obligations. An exception was made for Muslims, who were exempted until the year 1920. Additionally, a provision was introduced stating that Muslims who were to perform military service should be grouped “as much as possible” into separate units²¹.

Unsurprisingly, all these legislative efforts were not enough to stop the emigration process. Turks and Tatars continued to migrate to the Ottoman Empire due to military service considerations, but especially for financial and cultural reasons. However, there were community leaders who opposed the departure of Muslims from Romania.

Among them, a special place is held by Ismail Sabri Bey, second lieutenant in the Royal Regiment in Bucharest and graduate of the Romanian military school. He was born on April 22/4 May 1883 in the Dobruja town of Isaccea. On July 1, 1907, he was appointed second lieutenant in the 4th Roșiori Regiment, and on July 1, 1910, he was promoted to the rank of officer. Although he was promoted to the rank of captain on April 1/14, 1916, a few months later, on August 1/14, 1916, he resigned from the army. He was, however, recalled to the army because Romania entered the war on August 27, 1916,

and Sabri participated in the operations in Transylvania. During the battles, at the beginning of 1917, he disappeared from the front and was sentenced by the Romanian Martial Court for desertion. Eventually, he reached Istanbul, fleeing to Ankara in 1920 together with Anișoara, his Romanian wife, to support Mustafa Kemal. After the establishment of the Republic, he settled in Istanbul, where he remained until his death in 1957²².

In the context of articles published in the Istanbul press accusing the Romanian state of causing Muslims within its territory to emigrate due to its policies, Sabri Bey sent a “lengthy” letter in the last month of 1908, which was not published in its entirety but only as an extended summary in the Ottoman daily *İkdam*. In his statement, three main ideas stand out: criticizing the decision to emigrate, listing the facilities offered by the Romanian state, and encouraging Muslims in Romania to join the Romanian army²³. He argued that Muslims were emigrating solely due to “ignorance and fanaticism”, which he deemed a “misconception”. Consequently, Muslims, who were the most numerous and owned the most properties, had fallen “to the bottom of the ladder”, according to him. In Sabri Bey’s opinion, Muslims should take advantage of the facilities provided by the Romanian state. Addressing the question “What do Muslims lack in Dobrogea?”, he stated: “Even though we are becoming a minority day by day, we lack nothing...”. In addition, he listed the facilities offered by the Romanian state: institutional (the functioning of the Muftiate and Mohammedan tribunals), financial (payment of imams’ and teachers’ salaries, maintenance of mosques), and educational (establishment of schools)²⁴.

In Sabri Bey’s letter to the newspaper *İkdam*, an important aspect was his attempt to persuade the Turks and Tatars in Romania to join the Romanian army. Firstly, he pointed out that Muslim customs were respected during military service, citing the example of the opportunity to wear the fez, which he said had sparked envy “among many sons of the Romanian aristocracy” who wished they could wear it. He also criticized the reluctance of Muslims to attend Romanian military higher education institutions, mentioning that, despite

its efforts, the Romanian government could barely find three people to become officers. He provided a specific example, mentioning the Ministry of War's attempt to create a "special company" consisting of Muslims "in the most important regiment of Călărași in Bucharest". The initiative failed even though orders were given for them to be "treated with utmost care. Their barracks, their kitchen..." Out of the forty young Muslims, three deserted within the first twenty days, and the rest were taken away "by their parents through petitions accompanied by tears"²⁵.

Surely, the opinion of this officer from the Romanian army must be viewed critically. It is more of an image that the authorities in Bucharest were trying to promote. Indeed, Romanian officials took into account certain sensitivities of the Turks and Tatars, being careful to preserve certain institutions, such as Muslim tribunals. However, they did not always succeed in finding satisfactory solutions for various issues, such as, for instance, the salaries of imams and of the Turkish language teachers or the distribution of lands. Moreover, in the newspaper *Ikdam*, in the issue dated January 12, 1909, another letter from Constanța was published, this one anonymous, which seems to be a kind of response to Sabri Bei's statements. Its tone is critical towards the officials in Bucharest, who are seen as the main culprits for the emigration²⁶. In fact, emigration had complex causes, and it cannot be solely attributed to the mentality of the Muslim community or the policies adopted in Bucharest²⁷.

The perception of the military service and the Romanian army in general by the Turks and Tatars in Dobrogea gained greater importance in the lead-up to the First World War. That's why, during this period, voices opposing emigration, especially for military reasons, multiplied. The presence of a numerous Muslim community in both Romanian and Bulgarian Dobruja led the governments in Bucharest and Sofia to seek their support. Therefore, officials from both countries tried to address many of the community's demands. In Romania, these efforts translated into regulations governing the functioning of institutions such as the Muslim tribunals (qadis)²⁸. Additionally, the opinions of the community

members mattered in this context. An example in this regard is Ahmed Menesi, a student at the normal school in Iași, a Muslim who was well integrated into Romanian society. He published an article in May 1914 in response to rumours, most likely spread by Bulgarian authorities, suggesting that the Romanian state was about to introduce military laws and begin conscriptions²⁹. This news sparked a wave of emigration, a situation that did not sit well with Romanian authorities because, in the eyes of the Muslim population and international opinion, the Romanian administration could be suspected of not respecting minority rights³⁰. Menesi countered these claims, stating that the Bulgarians' words were "deceptive" and the Romanians' were "sincere", aiming to convince his compatriots to perform military service in the Romanian army. He portrayed it as a "blessing to serve in the Romanian army" because it was superior to the Bulgarian army. Furthermore, Menesi asserted that Romanian military representatives planned to "build barracks with mosques and baths where worthy and cultured religious leaders will be sent"³¹. Although there were some facilities provided for Muslims, such as the presence of an imam in the army and attention to providing food in line with Islamic precepts, there were never mosques in Romanian barracks.

The process of emigration could not be stopped during this period, military service and especially the prospect of war representing significant factors that led Turks and Tatars to emigrate. Nevertheless, many members of the community fought during the First World War, in the Romanian army, some even being decorated³². Among them, Kiazim Abdulachim stood out, who fell in the battle of Mărășești in the summer of 1917. He was decorated, and the Dobrujan press dedicated a series of articles praising his sacrifice. His brother, the politician Selim Abdulachim, founded the *Cultural and Sports Association Second Lieutenant Kiazim Abdulachim* in his honour, aiming to support young Muslims in Dobruja³³.

The Republican Era. Emigration: a "necessity for the defence of the nation"

In the interwar period, the emigration process was influenced by two major events.

Firstly, with the incorporation of Southern Dobruja within Romania's borders in 1913 in the wake of the Second Balkan War, recognized by treaties signed after the Great War, the Turkish and Tatar population of Romania increased significantly. Considering that the emigration process continued after 1918, in 1930 Romania had 154,772 Turks and 22,141 Tatars, according to the census. Most of them resided in the counties of Durostor and Caliacra³⁴. The issue was not the difficulty of integrating Muslims. The experience officials in Bucharest had with Northern Dobruja and the presence of a well-integrated community in this region, with experience in dealing with Romanian institutions, facilitated this process³⁵. The problem was primarily demographic, this time related to the Bulgarian population. Unlike Bulgarians, Turks, and Tatars did not have territorial claims, thus becoming a sort of "allies" to the Romanian state in the region. In this sense, the phrase "the guardians of Romania at the southern border"³⁶, encountered in the Turkish press in the region, is illustrative.

Secondly, the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye in 1923 was met with great enthusiasm by the Turkish-Tatar community in Romania, who embraced the reforms initiated in Ankara without significant resistance. Under the leadership of Atatürk, Türkiye was perceived as the identity space and a source of pride for the community in Dobruja.

In this context, the emigration of Turks and Tatars from Romania posed a problem for the country. Their mass emigration could be exploited by Bulgarian revisionism, accusing Romania of persecuting minorities in Dobrogea, and it jeopardized the demographic balance in the region, which was unfavourable to Romania. Therefore, there was a debate among the elites regarding their stance on emigration. Although there were voices opposing emigration, ultimately, the opinion prevailed that, instead of Muslim emigrants, Aromanians from the Balkans should be colonized³⁷. Nevertheless, efforts were made to identify the causes of emigration and resolve them. Some of these causes were related to Romanian military institutions such as the gendarmerie, border units, or the army.

An important factor that prompted Romanian authorities to address the issue of emigration was the criticism coming from the Turkish political elite and society. Following articles in the Turkish press that attributed Turkish emigration to policies directed against minorities, officials in Bucharest requested reports to understand the extent of the phenomenon and the challenges faced by the Muslim community. For example, a report from the Romanian minister in Constantinople, Gheorghe Filality, dated January 3, 1926, which was prepared in response to an article in the *Halk* newspaper published on December 31, 1925, that stated that "Turks in Romania wish to emigrate because minorities can no longer live in Romania"³⁸, confirmed the trend of emigration, among the causes, "as stated by the Prefect of Durostor County", being "the way they are treated by soldiers, gendarmes, and military units, which impose various chores on the Turkish population, hindering them from their agricultural work and taking their food at meagre prices"³⁹. The same report also called for measures to improve the situation of the Turkish population⁴⁰.

In the first half of the interwar period, one of the causes driving the emigration of Turks and Tatars was the issue of land distribution for war veterans. Dissatisfaction regarding the process of allocating land to those who had fought in the Great War was expressed in the Turkish-Tatar press in Dobruja. Articles addressing this problem emphasized the sacrifice Muslims had made by fighting in the Romanian army: "We shed our blood, mixing it with that of our Romanian brothers-in-arms", the tergiversations in being given land being described as "unjustifiable"⁴¹. Romanian institutions also noticed this issue and called for the regulation of the situation. They even established that families of ploughmen, orphans, invalids, widows, demobilized individuals, and those who had completed military service in the Romanian army should be granted at least 5 hectares of cultivable land⁴².

In the second half of the 1930s, the authorities' concern for the emigration process increased. This interest was due to the intensification of the phenomenon and the initiation of negotiations regarding the signing of a

convention between Romania and Türkiye to regulate emigration. The General Inspectorate of Gendarmerie played a key role in identifying the causes of emigration. The reports prepared by this institution were significant because they highlighted abuses by officials within the organization as one of the causes of emigration. In a comprehensive report from 1935, reference was made to the “obligations and chores” that the population had to perform at the request of civilian and military authorities, which could turn into abuses. The report compiled by the General Inspectorate of Gendarmerie mentioned five categories of mandatory labour that led to dissatisfaction among the Turkish population. Firstly, there was the requirement to supply drinking water to border guard posts. Water had to be transported over long distances, ranging from two to ten kilometres, whenever needed. Secondly, the Muslim population was demanded to supply food to border guards and gendarmes. Normally, payment for the products should have been made on the spot, but it was sometimes delayed for years. The third, fourth, and fifth categories involved the compulsory transportation of items needed by border guard posts, by gendarmes tracking Bulgarian komitadji, and of materials for building gendarme posts, schools, and churches⁴³.

These were also added isolated cases, many of them local misunderstandings. For example, at the beginning of 1934, a case was investigated in which a lieutenant from the Romanian army was accused of forcibly occupying one of the rooms of the mosque in the village of Ahmadlar, near Turtucaia, turning it into a flour storage and taking all the windows and straw mats that were in the building⁴⁴. In response to these accusations coming from the Turkish diplomatic representation in Bucharest, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence stated that, in fact, the room was not occupied by force, but with the approval of the hatip, of the general committee and of the village hall, and that the room was empty⁴⁵.

In addition to addressing these specific issues to prevent emigration, Romanian officials adopted a series of measures to facilitate the integration of Turks and Tatars, such as funding the Muslim Seminary in Medgidia and

introducing an amendment to the Romanian Constitution of 1923, stating that the religious representative of the Muslim community is a senator by right⁴⁶. Military measures were also implemented, among which two can be mentioned. The first one is the admission without exams of Muslim students from Dobruja to military high schools across the country⁴⁷. The second measure involved the appointment of military chaplains in barracks where Muslims resided⁴⁸. Their status was regulated by two laws, the first enacted in 1921, and the second in 1937⁴⁹.

However, these measures failed to stop the wave of emigration. The image of Atatürk as a strong military leader and the sense of duty towards strengthening the Turkish army were among the factors that influenced the decision to emigrate. Atatürk was admired not only for his political abilities but also for his military prowess, being considered the “Great Turk who saved the Turks and Turkishness from a great tragedy”⁵⁰. Part of the Turkish elite in Romania viewed emigration as a “necessity” for the “defence of the [Turkish] nation”, believing that it would contribute to the growth of the Turkish army⁵¹. They also contributed to the equipment of the Turkish army. Emigrants were allowed to transport their animals. Therefore, they were encouraged to take with them horses of 4 to 8 years of age, taller than 1.45 meters, and with a chest width of more than 15 cm, sought-after by the Turkish army⁵².

This admiration of the Turkish-Tatar community in Romania for the Republic of Türkiye and its achievements is also evident from the visits made by community leaders or even larger groups to Ankara. For example, in 1933, Senator Ahmet Taşci Rifat and Mufti Hafız Rifat from Durostor visited Ankara to celebrate ten years since the proclamation of the Republic and watched the military parade⁵³.

Given that the emigration trend could not be halted and both states agreed to allow Turks and Tatars to leave Romania for Türkiye, officials’ efforts were focused on organizing this process under the best possible conditions. Ankara’s goal was for the emigrants to arrive in the best possible material conditions in order to adapt quickly and contribute to the country’s economic development. Bucharest,

on the other hand, aimed to strictly enforce bureaucratic procedures, so as to avoid unforeseen situations that would have created problems for the Romanian authorities. An important aspect of these procedures was the military one. To be included on the emigration lists, an individual or a family needed an application accompanied by a municipal visa certifying the emigrant's address, a collector's office visa indicating whether or not they had debts, and a military representative's visa confirming that the applicant had completed military service. Then, the application had to be submitted to the Prefecture and the Turkish Consulate⁵⁴.

The issue of fulfilling military service was a problem because there were cases where families wanted to emigrate but couldn't because a family member had not yet fulfilled this requirement. To bypass all these bureaucratic procedures, many families chose not to apply for an emigration visa but for a visitation visa to see their relatives. Once they arrived in Türkiye, they settled there and did not return. However, in this way, even if they managed to establish themselves on Turkish territory, they did not benefit from several advantages offered by the laws there⁵⁵. To avoid this situation, Turkish officials attempted to inform the population about the procedures that needed to be followed. In such a meeting organized at the village café in Caibular, Cainargeaua Mare commune, Turkish diplomatic representatives conveyed to the locals that "Those who have sons in the army should have no worries because, after they complete their military service, the Turkish state will bring them back"⁵⁶.

Eventually, the emigration process was regulated through the *Convention regarding the emigration of the Turkish population from Dobruja*, concluded on September 4, 1936. In fact, the need to regulate the emigration process through an agreement between Ankara and Bucharest had been recognized by the Romanian Ministry of National Defence as early as 1933. In a report on emigration and its consequences submitted by the Ministry of National Defence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after requesting the cessation of emigration and the identification of its causes, a set of measures was proposed in the event of an agreement with Türkiye. Thus, emigration

was supposed to take place over a period of 10-15 years because, otherwise, it "would have certain repercussions on the total strength of the army, necessitating significant changes in the organization of the army". The emigration was to be organized in stages and by regions and, concerning those serving in the army, it was proposed that they be discharged as soon as their families could emigrate⁵⁷.

The final form of the Convention stipulated that the emigration process would take place over a period of five years, with specific areas designated for emigration each year. In addition, it established the conditions and bureaucratic procedures and it applied exclusively for the Turks from Dobruja. Regarding military service, Article 18 specified that "Young Mohammedan Turks from Dobruja, enrolled for evacuation from their region, will be released from military service if they prove that their family has fulfilled all the formalities prescribed for emigration and if they declare their intention to emigrate themselves. Similarly, young Mohammedan Turks residing in a region whose population is destined to emigrate in the current year will not be enrolled, under the same conditions"⁵⁸. Thus, the requirements of the Ministry of National Defence were partially met.

Conclusions

From the analysis of the emigration trend of the Muslim population from a military perspective, we can draw the following conclusions. One of the main causes of emigration was the requirement to serve in a Christian army. This issue was especially prominent before World War I due to the significance of religious factors in defining the identity of Turks and Tatars and the privileged status they had in the region during the Ottoman period.

As a result of the Romanian state's efforts to encourage Turks and Tatars to join the Romanian army, the initial negative perception changed. Consequently, due to the benefits provided by the authorities in Bucharest, such as retaining special uniforms or appointing imams as military chaplains, an increasing number of Muslims chose to enrol in Romanian military schools. Some of them even became opponents of the emigration trend, expressing their views in the Ottoman press.

However, with the reshaping of Romanian borders following the Second Balkan War and World War I, and the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye, the military aspects of emigration underwent changes. While military service was no longer a major issue, certain local abuses by representatives of military institutions led some community members to emigrate. These problems were reported in the gendarmerie or Ministry of National Defence reports, and measures were proposed to address them. These initiatives were not sufficient to halt the emigration trend, especially considering that, after 1923, a significant portion of the community admired the changes in the Republic of Türkiye and the achievements of its leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Under these circumstances, faced with a strong emigration trend, Ankara and Bucharest attempted to find solutions to allow the smooth conduct of this process. An important aspect was the possibility of emigration for Turks and Tatars who were in military service. This situation, as well as the manner in which the emigration should take place, were regulated through the convention concluded in 1936.

NOTES

¹ Kemal H. Karpat, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Etnik Yapılanma ve Göçler*, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, 2010, p. 413-414.

² Grégoire Danesco, *“La Dobroudja,” Étude de Géographie Physique et Ethnographique*, Imprimerie de L'indépendance Roumaine, Bucharest, 1903, p. 141.

³ Constantin Brătescu, “Populația Cadrilaterului între anii 1878-1938”, in *Analele Dobrogei*, XIX, vol. II, 1938, p. 198.

⁴ Metin Omer, *Emigrarea turcilor și tătarilor din România în Turcia între cele Două Războaie Mondiale*, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2020, p. 104.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 277-295.

⁶ Ibrahim Temo (1865-1945) was one of the founders of the Committee of Union and Progress. Due to his activities against the Ottoman Sultan, he sought refuge in Romania in 1895. Here, he became involved in Romanian politics and the modernization of the Turkish-Tatar community.

⁷ Mehmet Niyazi (1878-1931), the national poet of the Tatars born in Romania. He was a professor at the Muslim Seminary in Medgidia.

⁸ Hakan Kırımlı, *Türkiye'deki Kurum Tatar ve Nogay Köy Yerleşimleri*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 2012, p. 12.

⁹ Eldar Seydametov, “Crimean Tatar Emigration in the End of the 19th – Beginning of the 20th Centuries: Causes, Character and Scope”, in Tasin Gemil, Nagy Pienaru (ed.), *Moștenirea istorică a tătarilor*, vol. II, Editura Academiei Române, Bucharest, 2012, p. 244; Hakan Kırımlı, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁰ Kemal H. Karpat, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 204.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 204-205.

¹³ Metin Omer, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹⁴ Kemal H. Karpat, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

¹⁵ T. C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), fond Hariciye Siyasî, dosar 1060/3, lef. 001.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, lef. 006-007.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, lef. 2.

¹⁸ *Lege pentru organizarea Dobrogei*, Imprimeria Statului, Bucharest, 1880; Metin Omer, *op. cit.*, p. 65-70. Regarding the wearing of the fez in the Romanian army, see Nicolae Adrian Alexe, “Integrarea etnicilor musulmani din România – fesul turcesc în Armata României 1884-1930”, in CIBINUM, no. 16, 2016, p. 189-197.

¹⁹ See Constantin Brătescu, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

²⁰ See *Monitorul Oficial al României*, no. 1 bis, 1/14 April 1914, p. 49-63.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 58-59.

²² See Florin Țurcanu, Enis Tulça, *Dragoste și revoluție. Amintirile unei românce în Turcia lui Kemal Atatürk*, Editura Corint, București, 2016; Metin Omer, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

²³ Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (hereafter AMAE), fond Constantinopol, vol. 110, f.f.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁷ Vezi Metin Omer, *op. cit.*

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 135-138.

²⁹ Ahmed Meneși, “Emigrările Musulmanilor. Un pas Greșit”, in *Dobrogea Jună*, X, no. 17, 15 May 1914, p. 1-2.

³⁰ Metin Omer, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

³¹ Ahmed Meneși, *op. cit.*, p. 1-2.

³² Costin Scurtu, “Turco-tătarii din Dobrogea în armata română (sfârșitul secolului al XIX-lea începutul secolului XX-lea)”, in Venera Achim, Viorel Achim (coord.), *Minoritățile etnice în România în*

secolul al XIX-lea, Editura Academiei Române, Bucharest, 2010, p. 142-143.

³³ Müstecip Ülküsal, *Dobruca ve Türkler*, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara, 1987, p. 182.

³⁴ Sabin Manuilă, *Recensământul general al populației României din 29 decembrie 1930*, vol. VII: *Profesiuni. Populația pe clase și grupe de profesioni după sexe, vârstă, instrucție și neam; situația în profesie a activilor*, Editura Institutului Central de Statistică, Bucharest, p. X-XVII.

³⁵ Metin Omer, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

³⁶ "Turcii dobrogeni și revizionismul", in *Tuna*, no. 20, 29 June 1937, p. 1.

³⁷ Metin Omer, *op. cit.*, p. 218-219.

³⁸ AMAE, fond 71/Turcia, vol. 58, f. 100.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, f. 102-103.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 100.

⁴¹ Murat, "Un glas necăjit. Nedreptatea demobilizațiilor", in *Revista Musulmanilor Dobrogeni*, no. 3, 23 November 1928, Constanța, p. 3.

⁴² Arhivele Naționale ale României (hereafter ANR), fond Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, file 1/1935, p. 569.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, f. 566.

⁴⁴ AMAE, fond 71/Turcia, vol. 65, f. 33.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 38.

⁴⁶ This provision was not implemented because Muslims failed to choose a religious representative. See Metin Omer, *op. cit.*, p. 27, 128-129.

⁴⁷ BATIR, "Elementul musulman din Dobrogea", in *Halk (Poporul)*, no. 1, 20 February 1936, p. 1.

⁴⁸ *Monitorul Oficial*, Partea I, no. 173, 28 July 1936, p. 6502.

⁴⁹ *Monitorul Oficial*, Partea I, no. 67, 22 March 1937, p. 2795-2795.

⁵⁰ *Türk Birliği*, no. 1, 12 February 1930, p. 3.

⁵¹ "Münakasa ediyoruz. Göç politikası memlekete neler kazandıracaktır?", in *Tuna*, no. 12, 17 October 1936, p. 1.

⁵² ANR, fond Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, vol. 18/1933, f. 197; T. C. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA), 030.10.00. (Başbakanlık Muamelât Genel Müdürlüğü Evrakı Kataloğu) /116.810.13., p. 11.

⁵³ AMAE, fond 71/Turcia, vol. 59, f. 71.

⁵⁴ "Göç Haberleri", in *Türk Birliği*, 6 July 1934, p. 2.

⁵⁵ Metin Omer, *op. cit.*, p. 306-310.

⁵⁶ ANR, fond Inspectoratul General al Jandarmeriei, vol. 18/1933, f. 145.

⁵⁷ AMAE, fond 71/Turcia, vol. 65, f. 45-47.

⁵⁸ The Convention was promulgated in Romania through Royal Decree no. 2,560 on November 11, 1936, and published in French in the Official Gazette, Part I, no. 264, November 12, 1936, pp. 9453-9456, and in Romanian in the Official Gazette, Part I, no. 10, January 14, 1937, pp. 295-297; the Turkish Parliament adopted the Convention on January 25, 1937, and it came into effect after being published in the *Resmî Gazete*, no. 3523, February 2, 1937, pp. 7615-7618.

AN EVALUATION ON THE ROLE OF TURKISH TROOPS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALKANS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR*

VOLKAN MARTTIN **

Abstract

The First World War assumed a new dimension with the Ottoman Empire's involvement. The war fronts expanded to include the Caucasus, the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf and the Turkish Straits; however, conflicts continued in Europe until November 1914 when the Ottoman Empire joined the war. Previous experiences of the Tripoli and Balkan wars revealed that Ottoman Empire's isolation brought about significant losses. After the "July Crisis", amid the war ravaging in Europe, Ottoman administrators held negotiations between the blocs resulting in an alliance agreement with Germany. This agreement positioned the Ottoman Empire as one of the Central Powers. During the initial years of the war, the Ottoman Empire battled to repel attacks against itself and relieve the burden on its allies in Europe. Turkish troops, who demonstrated their capabilities through victories at Çanakkale and Kutü'l-Amare, were dispatched to Galicia, Romania, and Macedonia in accordance with Enver Pasha's belief that the outcome of the First World War would be determined in Europe. These units fought in battles, received recognition from their fellow soldiers, and experienced casualties. This study presents the activities of Turkish troops using available information and documents and evaluates the situations encountered during this process from a range of positive and negative perspectives.

Keywords: *First World War, Galician Front, Romanian Front, Macedonia Front, Joint Operations*

Introduction

It is noteworthy that the Ottoman Empire was diplomatically isolated during the Tripoli and Balkan Wars at the beginning of the 20th century. Even those political groups that re-

mained neutral in the conflicts took a stance against the Ottoman Empire and disregarded its territorial losses. In a backdrop of double standards, by other major powers (particularly Britain), employed against the Ottoman Em-

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pire, seeking diplomatic and military cooperation and alliances is a necessary step taken by the Union and Progress administration.¹

In the course of events that unfolded after the Balkan Wars, the “July Crisis” was instigated by the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Franz Ferdinand Archduke of Austria-Este, and his wife Sophie, Archduchess of Austria in Sarajevo, on 28 June 1914, which marked the perceived catalyst for the global conflict that ensued. Although the murder of Crown Prince Ferdinand – who was disliked by many within the dynasty – was a contributing factor, the new process was primarily shaped by nationalist and idealistic concepts, creating an atmosphere in which parties gave each other harsh ultimatums. In the aftermath of the assassination, the voices of mediators and peacekeepers were notably subdued, overshadowed by the longstanding rivalry between blocs and the intense competition to establish dominance. As a result, the warmongers gained the upper hand, culminating in Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war against Serbia on 28th July, 1914. Subsequently, the blocs declared war on each other, one after another.² Based on previous experiences, the Ottoman Empire deemed it preferable to align themselves with one side rather than remain isolated among the competing blocks. The key figures of the Union and Progress, who held influence over the administration of the Ottoman Empire, initiated the pursuit of European alliances.³ Negotiations regarding this matter were conducted with Britain, France, Germany and Russia. However, the initial attempts yielded no results. Since the blocks took into consideration the Ottoman Empire’s performance in the Tripoli and Balkan wars, the alliance’s demands were not met positively. Conversely, it appears that German Emperor Wilhelm II had a favourable view of the Ottoman Empire in order to achieve Germany’s Middle East objectives. It could be argued that this mindset facilitated the covert treaty arrangement between the Ottoman Empire and Germany on August 2, 1914.⁴

This alliance agreement paved the way for the Ottoman Empire to declare war on the Allied Powers approximately three months later. According to the secret alliance agree-

ment, the Ottoman Empire would maintain its neutrality, armed with the name of “müsallah bitaraf”. However, due to the effect of the war in Europe, it was Germany’s wish for the Ottoman Empire to enter the war as soon as possible. On the other hand, the fact that the battleships Sultan Osman and Reşadiye, which were ordered to Britain after the Balkan War, were not delivered due to the war situation, can be counted among the factors that accelerated the entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war. The fact that these battleships were not delivered caused outrage among the people. Britain’s attitude towards the Ottoman Empire since the Balkan War brought the Ottoman administrators and public opinion closer to Germany. Just in this process, the German battlecruiser Goeben and the lightly armoured Breslau took refuge in the Dardanelles, which strengthened the Turkish-German alliance. As it is known, these ships joined the Ottoman navy under the names Yavuz and Midilli, and German ship personnel were dressed in Ottoman uniforms.⁵

As the German Ambassador to Istanbul, Baron Hans von Wangenheim made it clear that the Ottoman Empire was anticipated to enter the war.⁶ The conflict in Europe transformed into trench warfare, and Germany’s failure to see the desired results from Austria-Hungary against Russia, after the Tannenberg triumph in Eastern Europe, led to the entanglement of the war in the European continent. As Germany faces challenges in both Western and Eastern Europe, it is hoping for support from Britain and Russia beyond the European continent to alleviate its burdens.⁷

In this setting, on October 27th, 1914, the Ottoman navy, led by German Admiral Wilhelm Souchon and commanded by Enver Pasha, sailed into the Black Sea and attacked essential Russian ports including Odesa and Novorosiisk. The “Black Sea Incident” was a clear indication of Ottoman Empire’s involvement in the war. Britain and France declared war on 5 November in response to the event, while Russia declared war and attacked the eastern border of the Ottoman Empire on 1 November.⁸

The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war was actually associated with the goal of ending the Russian dominance in the Black

Sea. But later it was seen that this could not be achieved at the desired level. On the other hand, with the gains from the war, there was no obstacle for the Ottoman Empire to reach its strong days again, especially the “Avrupa-i Osmani [Ottoman Empire in Europe] lost with the Balkan War and the “Elviye-i Selâse (Kars, Ardahan, Batum/Batumi)” lost in the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War became possible.

The actions of the Allied Powers shaped the fronts in which the Ottoman Empire participated during the first year of the war. Moreover, until the early months of 1915, the Ottoman Empire was preoccupied with the Dardanelles, Suez, and Canal operations, including the operation on the Suez Canal. When Germany was making no progress, the Canal and Sarıkamış operations diverted the Entente States’ attention away from Europe.⁹ And, as is well known, the Gallipoli Campaign of the Allied Powers began on 19th February 1915 with the aim of aiding Russia and ending the war through the defeat of Germany via the elimination of the Ottoman Empire. Troops landed on 24th April 1915, and the campaign concluded on 9th January 1916, with the departure of the last Entente soldier from Gallipoli.

Considering the events that took place simultaneously from the entry of the Ottoman Empire to the war until the beginning of 1916; on the Caucasian front, Köprüköy on 5-14 November, First Azap on 16-23 November 1914, Operation Sarıkamış on 22 December 1914 – 4 January 1915, First Tortum on 5 May-5 June 1915, Second Tortum on 6-13 June and 10- It is seen that he fought the Second Azap battles on 16 January 1916.¹⁰ In the same period, the British advanced from Basra to Amare on the Iraqi front and the Battle of Selman-ı Pak was fought on 22-25 November 1915.¹¹ At the same time, the First Canal Expedition was carried out on the Canal-Sinai front. During the Turkish victory in Kutül-Amâre in April 1916 on the Iraqi front, there were days that preceded the Second Canal Expedition on the Canal-Sinai front, and the Canal-Sinai front was transferred to the Palestine-Syria front in the following days.¹²

The total number of Ottoman soldiers who fought in such a vast region was around 2

million 850 thousand, including the Ottoman soldiers born in 1891-1893 who were under arms at the time of the war and the Ottoman soldiers who were in reserve during the war.¹³ The reflection of this number on the fronts was as follows: According to the mobilization order dated August 2, 1914, the number of Russian troops opposite the 3rd Turkish Army on the Caucasian front was approximately 350,000.¹⁴ On the other hand, as of November 1914, the Turkish force on the Iraqi front exceeded 23,000, of which 377 were officers, while the British force against them exceeded 20,000 with Indian soldiers. In the first days of January 1915, there was a British force of more than 30.000 in the Suez Canal area.¹⁵ In Gallipoli, it is seen that there was a force of about 489,000 people, considering that there were 410,000 British, Anzac and 79,000 French personnel, together with the navy, on a rounded basis, against the Ottoman Empire, which resisted with a total force of 260,000 people until the end of September 1915.¹⁶ When all these figures are put together, it would be unfair to say that the Ottoman Empire, which fought against the Allied forces of 265,000 Russians, 539,000 British and colonial forces and 80,000 French on the Caucasus, Iraq, Canal and Gallipoli fronts, did not ease the burden of Germany on the European fronts.¹⁷

Strengthened by its victories in Gallipoli and Iraq, the Turkish army faced two challenges in the summer of 1916 – the Second Canal Campaign and Russia’s offensive in the East. Both were met with a well-prepared response, and the Russian attacks were successfully repulsed.¹⁸

This brief introduction explains the historical process that led to the deployment of Turkish troops to the European battlefields, a subject that remains controversial.

Events Leading to the Deployment of Turkish Troops to Europe

As this article focuses on the actions of the Turkish troops in Galicia, Romania and Macedonia during the First World War on the European fronts, it is necessary to look at what happened in Europe from the time the First World War began until the summer of 1916.

The general course of the war was determined by the European fronts, which influenced the thoughts and objectives of every participating state. In this regard, the objectives and goals of Great Britain and Germany have been extensively discussed throughout the literature.¹⁹

It is evident that, with the aid of Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire opposed Russia in the Eastern European front, while German forces were engaged in fighting against French and British troops in the West. Specifically, the attitudes of Austria-Hungary and Russia were instrumental in shaping the course of the war and exerted significant influence on the activities in the Eastern European Front throughout the First World War. However, the significance of the German strategy (Schlieffen Plan) is evident in the conflicts of the Central Powers in Europe. As per this strategy, operations in Eastern Europe were delayed after those in Western Europe, giving priority to the Western Front. The Schlieffen plan appears rather straightforward in two stages: The initial step entails bypassing the French fortifications in the western region by entering France via Belgium, followed by promptly advancing towards Russia in the east in the second stage to benefit from Russia's delays during preparation. Collaborating with Austria-Hungary for military purposes constituted the fourth phase of the plan formulated by Moltke the Younger for execution. However, it has become necessary to dispatch reinforcements to the Austro-Hungarian troops, who have failed to halt the Russian advance as anticipated. General Ludendorff's assessment reveals that Austria-Hungary's military strength has gradually declined over the past three years. The parties acknowledge that the risk of disintegration among Austria-Hungary's troops, comprised of diverse ethnic communities, could further erode its military capability. It can be stated that the Eastern European battlefields stretch in an arc from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Adriatic below. During the initial months of the conflict, the northern region of this hypothetical arc saw activity with the Tannenberg and Mazuria Lakes struggles, while the focus of fighting towards 1916 shifted to the Carpathians. Galicia and Romania (Dobruja

/ Dobrogea) are regions that border the Carpathians and lack significant topographical features. These territories have been the subject of continuous power struggles due to their geographic location and were the site of major conflicts in Eastern Europe during the First World War.

Advancing on the Eastern front during August 1914, the Russians entered East Prussia and invaded the rest of Galicia. They defeated the Austro-Hungarian troops near Lemberg (Lwów-Lviv).²⁰ Following this Russian advance, on 11 September the Austro-Hungarian troops were forced to retreat behind the San River.²¹ Although on 13 September the German forces advanced towards the Russian zone southeast of the Eastern European Front, the town of Przemyśl, a crucial fortification on the Eastern front, was besieged by the Russians on 22 September following the retreat of the Austro-Hungarian troops. When examining the overall progress of the war, it becomes apparent that the Russians considered two potential options for their operation: one heading West-Northwest, and another heading South-Southwest. The successes of the Entente Powers on the Western Front, particularly at the Marne, prompted Russia to swiftly choose the West-Northwest direction, specifically Silesia. In response, Germany formed a new army called the "Ninth Army" in Silesia to assist the Austro-Hungarian forces. The German 9th Army crossed the Vistula River in early October and advanced towards the vicinity of Warsaw, exploiting the weak Russian front line. By the end of October, they had arrived. During the process, the Austro-Hungarian troops gained the upper hand in the Russian area, reclaiming the San River line and Przemyśl by 9 October. In late 1914, Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the German General Staff, assigned Hindenburg, along with Ludendorff, to the Eastern European Front. Anton Ludwig August von Mackensen was appointed to the 9th Army in these changes.²²

It is apparent that the Russians confronted the 9th Army with two armies in violation of regulations. At the end of 1914, 143 Russian divisions encountered 53 Austrian and 39 German divisions.²³ Following the start of 1915, the Eastern European war entered a period

of stagnation due to the winter season, while battles continued on the Western front. On the Eastern Front, two-pronged assault on the Russians was planned by German General von Ludendorff and the Chief of the Austrian General Staff General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. The Tenth German Army was formed in eastern Prussia to execute this plan, which aimed to push Russia out of Poland.²⁴ Russian troops in eastern Poland and Galicia were divided by the northwest-southwest boundary of the area. The troops of both nations were split into two separate sections, with new units formed specifically for this operation.²⁵

The Germans launched an operation in Masuria from the north and south during the formation of the 12th Russian Army in early February 1915.²⁶ The Russians were trapped in the region and their morale weakened due to the lack of supplies, which ultimately led to the German victory.²⁷ Compared to the positive developments in German territory, the Austro-Hungarian troops' delayed completion of their supplies determined the fate of the operation that would start from the Carpathian direction. This process saw only minor advances accompanied by great losses in Eastern Europe on behalf of the Central Powers.²⁸

Meanwhile, Italy's decision to support the Allied Powers in the first half of 1915 had an impact on the general course of events. In the autumn of the same year, German and Austro-Hungarian forces marched into Serbia and captured Belgrade. Advancing Central forces eradicated half of the Serbian army, removed Serbia and Montenegro from the maps, and declared control over the northern areas of Albania. In response, the British and French supported Greece and deployed troops to Thessaloniki, leading to the closure of the Serbian Front and the establishment of the Macedonian Front.²⁹ The Gallipoli Campaign proved impactful in determining the stance of the Balkan states. In the third quarter of the year, Greece announced mobilisation; Bulgaria joined the war in support of the Central Powers.³⁰ The potential threat of attack from the Allied Powers via Macedonia became a concern for the Ottoman Empire towards the end of 1915.³¹ In the "Donanma (Navy)" magazine published on those dates, it is reported that Russia invaded

Bessarabia but subsequently retreated without achieving any results.³² Similarly, von Bronsart highlighted this situation in his confidential report.³³

Sending Turkish Soldiers to Europe and the Balkans in 1916

The debate regarding the deployment of Turkish soldiers to Europe has been covered extensively. In this regard, evaluations were made about whether it was a request of the German General Staff or a proposal by Enver Pasha.³⁴ According to sources, General Falkenhayn's claim that he rejected Enver Pasha's offer is thought to be true for the initial phase of the war.³⁵ Because, considering the course of the war in Eastern Europe, the fact that the Austro-Hungarian troops could not cope with the Russian attacks meant that a victory such as Gallipoli would be jeopardized for the Ottoman Empire.³⁶ Although the connection between Galicia and Istanbul seems distant in terms of geographical location, the Russian policy expressed as "*The road to Constantinople passes through Warsaw*" clearly reveals this situation.³⁷

The Russian attacks that started in the summer of 1916 in Eastern Europe inflicted great losses on the Austro-Hungarian troops.³⁸ The failure to stop the Russian attacks was evaluated as the collapse of the Eastern European Front and a herald of general defeat. Due to the critical situation on the Western front, it is not considered possible to support Austria-Hungary, which Germany had strengthened financially and morally with the armies it established since the beginning of the war, in the same way in the middle of 1916. It can be said that the decision of the German Chief of General Staff Falkenhayn to evaluate the Turkish troops in fighting on the Eastern European Front was shaped in this environment.³⁹

During the period when Turkish troops were sent to Europe, the size of the Ottoman Army increased.⁴⁰ It can be assessed that, with the increase in personnel and the establishment of a new organization, the Ottoman Empire was in a relatively stable position on the fronts where it fought.⁴¹ The 15th Corps, followed by the 6th Corps – both significantly better equipped than the Ottoman forces on

the front line – were dispatched to Eastern Europe as prestigious units. In a similar vein, the 20th Corps was deployed in Macedonia.⁴²

Activities of the 15th Turkish Corps on the Galician Front

The 15th Corps, which had achieved great success in the Gallipoli campaign, was reorganised to be sent to Galicia.⁴³ According to the plan prepared for the transfer order, the corps, consisting of 625 officers, 31,560 soldiers and 5,293 animals, was transferred via Hungary – via Belgrade, Budapest, Krakow, Przemyśl, Lemberg, Podwysokie – to the river Zlotalipa, under the command of Lieutenant General Felix Graf von Bothmer, who had been deployed in the south of the Eastern Front since mid-August.⁴⁴ The units in which the 15th Turkish Corps participated were the German Southern Army within the Karl Army Group and consisted of the 3rd and 7th Army Groups. The Southern Army consisted of the 9th Corps, the Hoffmann Corps, the 15th Turkish Corps, the 6th Corps, the 12th Corps, the 48th Reserve Division and the Range Inspectorate under the command of Felix Graf von Bothmer. The 15th Turkish Army Corps initially joined the Linsingen Army Group further north, around Kovel, but was placed under the command of Graf von Bothmer after its deployment to Galicia.⁴⁵ They took up place on the west coast of the Zlotalipa.⁴⁶ In this region, the Russian 47th Division, consisting of the 185th and 187th Regiments, the 41st Division, consisting of the 161, 162, 163 and 164th Regiments, the 26th Division, consisting of the 101st, 102nd, 103rd and 104th Regiments, and the 3rd Turkestan Division, consisting of the 10th, 12th and 23rd Regiments, took part in the war.⁴⁷ In the battles of Zlotalipa, the Turkish troops suffered a total of 100 wounded and 30 martyrs (between 14 and 22 August).⁴⁸ While part of the corps took over the positions of the Hungarian troops and took part in the battles, the corps continued its transport operations.⁴⁹

The Corps, led by Colonel Yakup Şevki Bey, is deployed with the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division on the right, the Hoffmann Corps on the left, and the Corps Headquarters in Podwysokie. Additionally, the headquarters of the

20th Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Yasin Hilmi is located in Szumłany, and the headquarters of the 19th Division under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Şefik is located in Mieczyszców.⁵⁰ The endeavour to assault the 77th Turkish Regiment led by Captain Saip against the watchful Alliance soldiers was hindered by artillery fire on the 2nd of September. On the following day, conflicts occurred in the Potutory area where the 310th Hungarian Honat Regiment, employed in the attack, had to retreat, and the Hoffmann Corps was fatigued.⁵¹ In the attempt planned for the 5th of September, the 15th Turkish Corps was assigned to assist the Hoffmann Corps. During the withdrawal and securing on 6th September, the rear-guard of the 20th Division was at risk of encirclement owing to the untimely movement of the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division. Heavy losses were incurred by the 20th Division during the withdrawal, with the 1st Battalion of the 61st Regiment bearing the brunt of it. The entire 5th Division was also captured, besides the regimental units' losses. In the area of the 19th Division, two companies from the 2nd Battalion of the 77th Regiment were surrounded and captured, another event similar to others.⁵²

On 7th September, after the allocation of responsibilities, the Corps headquarters were left unchanged, but the 20th Division's headquarters was relocated to Lipicagorna, and that of the 19th Division was moved to Hutysko. During the latest resettlement, clashes resulted in around 1,500 casualties, including deaths, injuries, and missing persons. Nevertheless, no activity was detected on the night of 8th September, nor on 9th September.⁵³

In the meantime, objective assessments were made that security precautions in the Corps vicinity were inadequate and that the Russians could approach very closely. Furthermore, solely relying on scouts for security was deemed incorrect. On September 15th, in the 61st Regiment region and under Captain Bahattin's command, a raid was conducted on the Russian trenches across from the 419-altitude hill. At the same time, the Russian troops' attack on the 2nd Battalion of the 62nd Regiment was repelled, and the assault on the 397m hill in the 57th Regiment area

was unsuccessful towards the evening. On September 15, the Russian offensive aimed at breaking the battle line formed by the Turkish and German troops, targeting the 61st Turkish Infantry Regiment. This attack resulted in significant losses to Turkish soldiers. Due to the absence of tactical reserves, no reinforcements were provided to prevent the breaking of the battle line.⁵⁴ The 20th Turkish Infantry Division, which suffered significant losses during the Russian attacks, eventually secured a 5 km front, while the relatively resilient 19th Turkish Infantry Division defended a 10 km front. It was observed that the Russians had made a move in the battles that had taken place thus far, and responded accordingly. According to the predetermined order of attack, the conflict that commenced at dawn on 16th September persisted on the 307-altitude hill in the 19th Division zone, located within the areas of the 62nd and 63rd Regiments of the 20th Division, directed by Major Ahmet Muhtar, and was successfully repulsed within twelve hours. It was documented that poison gas was administered by Russian forces in the territory of the 62nd Regiment, led by Major Nazmi, during this conflict.⁵⁵

The Russian troops, who advanced to the second line on the Hill 397, under the responsibility of the 57th Regiment, commanded by Major Hayri, acted together with the 57th Regiment of the 72nd Regiment and were pushed back with the fire support of the 55th German Division, thus clearing the area of the 19th Corps of Russian troops. In the September 16 fighting, in which the 15th Corps fought for about 12 hours, defended its positions and achieved significant successes, the opposing Russian troops were 185 and 187 of the 47th Division; 161, 162, 163 and 164 of the 41st Division; 101, 102, 103 and 104 of the 26th Division; and 10, 12, 21 and 23 regiments of the 3rd Division. Although four divisions achieved success against the Russian troops, it was observed that the Turkish Corps became exhausted, sustained considerable casualties, and even experienced a shortage of officers in some of its divisions. In this instance, there was a modification made to the boundary between the 15th Turkish Army Corps and the

Gerok Group, resulting in Lipicadolna line being handed over to the Gerok Group, except for Hill 417.⁵⁶

While there was a general stalemate on the front during the morning of 17 September, the attack launched towards the 61st and 63rd Regiments by the 20th Division at approximately 11 o'clock was countered by the 216th German Reserve Division and the 20th Division, resulting in defeat for the attackers in Lipicadolna. During these battles, in which Russian troops attacked the positions of the Turkish Corps until evening, casualties were sustained, and officers, including regimental commanders, fought alongside privates. Since deploying in Galicia, the Turkish Corps has lost 95 officers and 7,000 soldiers, leaving six battalions and 22 companies without a commander within a month. Overall, there was a setback at the front between 18th and 24th September.

The 41st Russian Division, comprising the 162nd, 163rd, and 164th Regiments, launched a direct attack on the southern section of the 77th Turkish Regiment's territory as well as the 62nd Regiment. They successfully took over the first-line trenches located on the eastern side of Hill 421. However, a counter-attack carried out by the Russian forces on September 24 at 17:00, saw them being pushed back. Despite incurring significant casualties, a noteworthy number of prisoners were taken. Between the 25th and 29th of September, reconnaissance missions were conducted and artillery and heavy infantry weapons were fired, but no other action occurred on the front. The Turkish Corps replaced the 62nd Regiment with the 61st Regiment as a precaution on the 27th of September. Intelligence reports indicated that the Russian troops, who were anticipated to attack in October, began to approach the Turkish positions and subsequently attacked the Hoffmann Corps on the 30th of September. At approximately 13.30, the 77th Regiment launched an attack on the 61st, 72nd, and 57th Regiments, successfully reaching the positions of the 61st and 57th Regiments. A bayonet battle ensued, involving the 72nd Regiment under the leadership of Major Rifat. In the report sent to the Turkish Deputy Commander-in-Chief, it was stated that this battle was the fourth in

which the Corps participated. Approximately 500 prisoners were taken, with the majority of losses suffered by the 61st, 62nd, and 57th Regiments, totalling 45 officers and 5,000 privates. Roughly 12,000 soldiers were armed with rifles. The deficiencies at the command level were addressed by the non-commissioned officers who were in charge of directing the battalions and companies.⁵⁷

At approximately 11 o'clock on the 1st of October, an assault on the 20th Division zone was thwarted with gunfire, while no movement was detected in the 19th Division region.⁵⁸ Artillery fire persisted on the 2nd and 3rd of October, with occasional intervals and sporadic gunshots. Although Russian troops temporarily advanced in these attacks, they were subsequently driven back with a counter-offensive. The Russian attempt to seize Hill 421 (Cevattepe) on the 6th of October was repelled. The Turkish Commander-in-Chief received a report stating that 15 officers and 3,000 privates were lost by the Turkish forces in the mentioned two days. Meanwhile, the losses on the opposite side were four or five times higher.⁵⁹ The 20th Division was incapacitated by tremors and the fatigue of the Corps reserves necessitated adjustments to the front line. As per army orders, the 20th Division was removed for recovery, while the 36th German Reserve Division and 18th Reserve Infantry Regiment were dispatched in its place and remained under army control.⁶⁰

Between 8th and 15th October, there was little activity on the front. Prior to the renewed assault commencing on 15th October, the Corps units worked to enhance their position and fortify their positions. The attack was launched directly against Turkish positions which suffered heavy losses and were eventually eliminated. By the evening of 16th October, the 61st Regiment had taken up position in Hutysko as a corps reserve. Lieutenant-Colonel Sedat, who had the necessary skills to form and develop Turkish units similar to the German storm troopers (Stoßtrupp) in Galicia, was appointed to replace the commander of the 19th Division, who left Galicia on the same day.⁶¹

The Headquarters of the 20th Division has reached Hutysko. Apart from sporadic clash-

es, there were no noteworthy offensives on the front. Towards the end of the month, the 15th Turkish Corps took advantage of the situation and attacked the Russians on the Cevat and Rıza hills east of Hill 421, which is in front of the front. As a result, the 63rd Turkish Regiment captured a considerable number of prisoners and ammunition.⁶²

By the end of 1916, battles in early November had established divisional lines and disbanded the German Lebedor Detachment. The 57th Regiment from the 19th Division and the 62nd Regiment from the 20th Division, with one battalion missing each, were placed in corps reserve. Reinforcement works were carried out due to the continued stagnation on the front. In the meantime, it was observed that the Russian divisions underwent alterations, and it was ascertained that the 21st, 23rd, and 52nd Russian divisions were positioned opposite the Turkish Corps.⁶³

In 1917, arrangements were ongoing in the Galician Front. On 14 January, the 36th German Division on the right of the Corps was placed under the operational control of the 15th Turkish Corps, resulting in a change in the Corps' line.

The assault of Russian forces on the 19th Division commenced at daybreak on 28th January 1917. As a consequence of the attack on the 77th Regiment towards the 397-altitude (Çikilani) hill, some of the trenches were recaptured in a counter-attack. According to the testimonies of the detained captives, the units responsible for the attack were the 81st, 82nd, and 23rd Regiments. The assault on the right flank of the 57th Regiment failed to proceed due to the defensive firing and artillery of the German division located to the north.⁶⁴

In February 1917, the 72nd and 77th Regiments of the 19th Division exchanged their areas of responsibility. Despite several attempts by Russian troops to attack on different days throughout the month, they were unsuccessful. On 12 March, the 20th Division took the positions to the left of the 36th German Reserve Division, while the 119th German Division took control of Çikilani and its surrounding areas, previously held by the 19th Division. Furthermore, on 15th March, the 36th German Division, under the supervision of the

15th Turkish Corps, began operating under the command of the 27th German Corps. Based on the available intelligence, it was determined that the 21st Russian Division, which previously faced the 19th Division, was substituted by the 108th Division and the 3rd Transamur Division. Furthermore, two regiments of the 3rd Transamur Division were located in the Çikilani.⁶⁵

Meanwhile, the political events in Russia had an impact on the front. Two Russian soldiers approached the trenches in the 15th Corps region and stated that they did not want war, which can be interpreted as reflecting Lenin's stance on permanent peace.⁶⁶ Although there was mutual artillery fire, the front remained stagnant until mid-May. Nevertheless, Russian aircraft activity and movements behind the front suggested a forthcoming attack, prompting the preparation for a counterattack. The Turkish troops' strategic placement prevented significant casualties from the Russian attacks that began in the spring of 1917. It is evident that the Russians sustained significant casualties during the conflicts that persisted at various intervals and intensities until the end of May. The new series of Russian attacks that started in June 1917 continued relentlessly until the end of the month.⁶⁷

Departure of the 15th Corps from the Front and the Activities of the Remaining 20th Turkish Division

On 10th April, Turkish military officials announced that their troops stationed in Galicia would be transferred to another front. In compliance with this, the 15th Corps made arrangements to return home in May-June. In accordance with the orders of the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, the 15th Corps will depart successively, with the 19th Division leaving after handing over its positions to a German division, while the 20th Division will continue to serve at the front for some time. The 19th Division successfully adhered to the transfer schedule from 11th June to the evening of 7th July. They were replaced by the German 15th Reserve Division. Although Kerensky was the Head of Government during the transfer of the corps headquarters, it had no effect on the front. However, it was ob-

served that the Russian troops expedited their preparations for the offensive. As a result, the 7th Siberian Corps and 22nd Russian Corps were stationed against the 15th Corps. Heavy artillery fire began at 5 o'clock on June 29, focusing on the 20th Division area followed by the attack on Rohatyn and then expanding to the entire front the next day. Specifically, before noon on the first day, the 20th Turkish Division area was attacked first against the 61st Regiment, then in the afternoon against the 62nd and 63rd Regiments, and continued through the night. During this attack, poison gas shells were fired, trenches were destroyed by artillery fire, and communication lines were cut. However, they were able to repel their opponents. The attack was focused on the centre of the front, resulting in heavy casualties for the 20th Division and neighbouring German divisions. After the fire subsided at night, artillery fire increased again at around 5 o'clock on July 1st. Since artillery fire was directed at the 15th German Reserve Division and the 20th Turkish Division but not at the 75th German Reserve Division, the latter responded by joining the battle against the Turkish Division. The Russian troops attacked the Cevat and Rıza hills with the aim of capturing the 421-altitude hill. The Turkish troops prioritized the defence of the 421-altitude hill and recognized its key strategic importance. Although Cevat and Rıza hills changed hands during the Russian attack, they could not progress much under the artillery fire of the 20th Division in the afternoon. The Russian troops, which consisted of the 1st, 3rd and 5th Finnish Divisions and two Transamur divisions, were eventually repelled and the hills were retaken with a counter-attack at 4pm. During these battles, the Russians used 305-millimeter heavy railway guns, as well as their 150-millimeter howitzers, which they had not used before. The absence of a new attack on 3rd July indicates that the Russian forces lacked offensive power.⁶⁸

On the days when the Russian troops moved south, the 15th Turkish Corps departed on July 15 to return home. The 20th Turkish Division, remaining at the front, came under the command of the Rohatyn Area Command at 6 pm on July 12, 1917. Although the division requested to reduce its area of responsibility

to higher authorities in the region, no positive response was received. Meanwhile, Russian troops moved southwards and attacked the Austro-Hungarians, resulting in the splitting of the front. The Russian Central Government openly called for the attacks to continue and for the removal of opponents from the trenches to be prevented. However, despite the demands, anti-war sentiments and intimidation on the Russian side weakened the impact of the attacks. For this reason, the Russian Command, which ceased the offensive on 10 July and resorted to defensive strategies, opted to reinforce the rear lines and relocate the unit headquarters to that area. Consequently, the Böhmer-Ermolli Army Group initiated preparations for a counter-attack, led by the Southern Army on the following day, after a successful attack on 19 July.⁶⁹ Upon the aerial reconnaissance taken on 21st July, it was observed that after the Russian forces withdrew by burning the settlements, a warm contact was made, and the advance continued. The following day, it was evident that the Russian front had disappeared. In the first phase, the forward operation began with the intention of taking advantage of the rout against the Russian troops situated between Seret and Dniester. Depending on the situation at the frontline, the Turkish 20th Division moved towards the southeast on July 25th and 26th. By the end of July, they had taken control of Nyvra village. However, before advancing beyond Zbruch River, they were instructed to return home.⁷⁰ In accordance with the orders, the artillery units assembled in Hutysko on August 8th, and the infantry arrived on August 19th. The artillery and 22nd infantry then departed by train on August 16th. The Turkish 20th Division's headquarters arrived in Istanbul on the 11th of September 1917, and the remaining soldiers returned to Istanbul on the 26th.⁷¹

Activities of the 6th Turkish Corps on the Romanian (Dobruja) Front

Romania's effective neutrality during the First World War came to an end on 27 August 1916, when it joined the Allies. Bulgaria's participation in the war and Russia's successes in summer 1916 were major factors that led to Romania's decision to enter the conflict.⁷²

Considering the potential to win regions like Transylvania in light of Russian troop advances under Brusilov's command, the Romanian administrators enlisted unprepared troops to join the war. Unfortunately, Romanian infantry did not possess automatic rifles, gas equipment, or trench mortars, and their artillery was lacklustre. Romania's geographical location is also considered a weakness, being situated between Transylvania and Bulgaria, the Romanian capital is not far from the Bulgarian border. Moreover, there are landforms that facilitate the entry of the Central Powers into Dobruja (Dobrogea).⁷³

However, differing opinions exist between the British and Russian General Staff regarding Romania's actions in the war. The British perspective was influenced by their aim to unify with the Entente soldiers in Thessaloniki, as well as the elimination of the Bulgarian barrier through Romania's operation towards Bulgaria which resulted in the defeat of the Bulgarians. In the Russian perspective, the appeal of moving towards the West holds greater weight, given the assistance of the Romanians, whose political requests will be fulfilled in the operation aimed towards Bukovina and the Carpathians.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, certain obstacles arose during the implementation of their chosen course of action. It has become apparent that the Romanians, who pursued the latter viewpoint, made the right choices in these matters. In the Russian perspective, the appeal of moving towards the West holds greater weight, given the assistance of the Romanians, whose political requests will be fulfilled in the operation aimed towards Bukovina and the Carpathians. Due to the general landscape shaped by the disruptions, the perception that Romania had made an incorrect decision during the war grew prevalent. The German and Austrian troops, commanded by Mackensen, who were in charge of the occupation of Dobruja, determined the course of the war in the face of Romania's operation on 27/28 August. Thus, the success of Romania was directly related to the speed of its army. The Romanian army, advancing to Transylvania in the west, suffered a defeat by Mackensen at Tutrakan on 5th September.⁷⁵

Simultaneously, the Ottoman General Staff issued an order on 20th July 1916 to place a

two-division corps in reserve within the 5th Army area.⁷⁶ In accordance with the order, the 15th Division from the 17th Corps and the 25th Division from the 14th Corps were taken into reserve along with the headquarters of the 6th Corps under the command of Mirliva (Brigadier General) Mustafa Hilmi Pasha.⁷⁷ The 25th Division was directed to assemble in Edirne and the 15th Division in the regions of Manisa and Soma to be subsequently transported to Uzunköprü Train Station for the transit of troops to Romania.⁷⁸ It is significant to mention that the initial transfer occurred concurrently with the period when Romania entered the war. The Office of the Commander-in-Chief has reported that the 6th Corps will finalize its deficiencies while gathering in Edirne during the ongoing shipment to Galicia.⁷⁹ The host detachment will minimize issues in dispatch and transfer. The 25th Division, which has access to various hotels and barracks in Edirne, has an advantage over the 15th Division coming from Manisa-Soma towards Bakırköy. While they were seated in their respective locations, the telegram dated 20th August, received by the 6th Corps Commander Mustafa Hilmi Pasha from the Mackensen Headquarters, outlined the need for prompt action. Since the completion of their deficiencies by the 6th Corps' divisions was delayed, the 25th Division, commanded by Colonel Şükrü Ali Bey and composed of the 59th, 74th, and 75th Regiments, was appointed on 7th September. Additionally, the 15th Division commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hamdi Bey, comprised of the 38th, 45th, and 56th Regiments, was appointed on 26th September.⁸⁰ Transfer delays also occurred due to the inadequate Bulgarian railways and slow supply.⁸¹ The deployment of Turkish troops to the front lasted from 19 to 23 days. The 15th Division was deployed to Varna, whereas the Corps Headquarters and the 25th Division were demobilised to Pravadi following orders from the Mackensen headquarters.⁸²

At the same time, the German General Mackensen and the Bulgarian General Toshev disagree about the operation in Romania. Mackensen believes that attacking from the Romanian left flank will bring a decisive result due to the morale it will raise, but Toshev

points out the danger of a counter-attack when advancing on the left flank. As instructed by Mackensen, the 3rd Army launched an attack across a broad front, with no clear focal point or reserve forces in place. Despite the initial success of the Army's plan to push the opponent towards the coast, the attempt ultimately failed due to insufficient cavalry and reserves, resulting in the missed opportunity to secure a critical position like Gobadin (Cobadin).⁸³ On 16th September, the Central forces made progress in a continued operation, with the pioneers of the 3rd Army reaching the fortified positions at Tuzla-Gobadin-Rasova. The Romanian positions were attacked on 17th September, and in response to the advancing troops becoming exhausted, the command advised them to hurry up and the importance of preventing Russian aid reaching the Romanians was emphasised. The soldiers, who had been marching for days, were fatigued. The opposition, stationed in fortified positions, took advantage of this and displayed more resilience. Consequently, the planned objectives were not met. The targeted outcomes were not achieved in the attacks carried out without a focal point. It was observed that the Alliance forces returned to their previous positions to prepare in this regard. On 20th September, the 25th Division arrived at Bayramdede, which is currently known as Independența, and established their campsite. The 2nd Battalion of the 56th Regiment from the Turkish 15th Division arrived at Karaömer via train, and Colonel Şükrü Ali, the 25th Division Commander, transferred this battalion to Bayramdede. The 1st Battalion of the Turkish 56th Regiment was placed under the command of the Army Commander in Hacıoğlu Pazarcık, while the Regimental Headquarters and the 3rd Battalion remained in Varna.⁸⁴

The Allied forces advanced against the Dobruja troops on September 21st with the 1st Cavalry Division. Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa İzzet Bey commanded the reconnaissance of the 74th Regiment, which occupied the southern ridges of the Engez (now known as General Scărișoreanu) and Kaşıkçı (Casicea) line to the right of the Dobruja troops. His reports indicate that an opposing marching column was advancing towards Engez and Kaşıkçı

via Edilköy, which is now known as Mirișteea. At 11 o'clock, it was observed that the aforementioned marching column had reached in front of the positions of the 74th Regiment. Despite facing artillery fire, the opponent continued to advance by reducing their lines. The troops that were moving towards Kaşıkçı were scattered by the artillery fire, but they still managed to reach Kaşıkçı. It was apparent that the opponent possessed the strength of 3-4 battalions in contrast to the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 74th Regiment who were in position. Two companies from the regimental reserve and a heavy machine gun team were summoned to reinforce the battalions. Following the positional resistance that persisted until 5pm, a counter-attack was conducted on the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa İzzet Bey, the Regiment Commander. During the battle, the Turkish regiment received support from two heavy batteries, a German howitzer, as well as two Turkish and three Bulgarian batteries, which provided firepower. The opponent on the Kaşıkçı side was observed to have withdrawn, leaving several dead and captives. However, due to limited availability and darkness, a follow-up operation was not possible. As a result of the Battle of Engez-Kaşıkçılar, the 74th Turkish Regiment suffered 22 fatalities, and 130 privates and two officers were injured.⁸⁵

On the 25th, the 25th Division marched from Bayramdede to Güvemli, also known as Chirnogeni today. At 11.30, while situated 20 km west of Güvemli, the division redirected its course towards there upon receiving news that the Allied forces were approaching Hamzaça (Amuzaca/Amzacea) from Topraisar. Due to poor visibility caused by the darkness and the absence of reconnaissance, communication issues and difficulties arose. Meanwhile, the 75th Regiment was heavily fired upon. In this battle, the Turkish forces suffered a total of 25 casualties, including three martyrs, one of whom was the battalion commander, 20 wounded and 2 missing.⁸⁶

During the last two days, the troops have been engaged in discussions and fortification. On the night of 23 September, the 25th Division received orders to launch an attack on Amzacea. It was also decided that the al-

lies would support the Turkish troops with a cavalry division in the attack planned for the following morning. The Division Commander, Colonel Şükrü Ali, ordered an attack at 7 o'clock in the morning. The operation involved two companies from the 59th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 56th Regiment, along with the Divisional Engineering Company and the 77th Machine Gun Company serving as the division reserve. Additionally, the artillery regiment received orders to attack from a position behind a hill, which was at an altitude of 125. The operation was executed at Azaplar (Tătaru) in the 75th Regiment and at Erebil in the 59th Regiment. The cavalry division and Bulgarian cavalry division will advance to Amzacea at approximately 5pm to gather information. Meanwhile, the gunners will identify the most appropriate position and inform Mustafaasi.

Division Commander Colonel Şükrü Ali Bey ordered the attack at 8.30 based on the information obtained. The attack will be launched from two arms with heavy artillery support of the allied troops. In the afternoon south of the 104-altitude hill, the 59th Regiment encountered an opponent infantry battalion supported by two batteries and a heavy machine gun company on the left arm. The 59th Regiment, in command of the 2nd Battalion of the 56th Regiment from the right, swiftly advanced forward. Simultaneously, the 75th Regiment was approaching Karaköy, now known as Pelinu, and successfully occupied it, making contact with the 59th Regiment on its left. These events became known as the Battle of Karaköy. Following the success of the 75th Regiment, the opposing forces were observed retreating to Amzacea. The conflict persisted until 3 pm, when the 59th Regiment captured Hill 104, allowing the 75th Regiment to enter Amzacea and advance northwards. In the Amzacea Offensive, which took place on 24th September, nine officers and 103 soldiers were martyrs, and a total of 997 casualties were incurred, with 598 soldiers being injured.⁸⁷

During that same period, the 74th Regiment began operating with the allied troops, following General Topalov's command to advance. Lieutenant Colonel M. İzzet Bey, the Regiment Commander, assembled the battal-

ion commanders to explain the order given on the map. While the regiment fulfilled the order at 7 o'clock and held the Engez-Kaşıkçı, the 3rd Battalion exceeded their remit by executing the order incorrectly. In response, the 2nd Battalion followed suit. Despite the Regiment Commander noticing the situation and instructing the advancing battalions to return to their designated positions and continue with the reinforcement work, it was too late. Both battalions found themselves in hostile contact with the opponent. Meanwhile, following the death of the 3rd Battalion Commander, the Regiment Commander rallied the troops and launched a counter-attack in an effort to halt the advance of the opponent, comprised of two Russian regiments and some Romanian forces, using the trenches as cover. General Topalov issued orders to resume the attack at 5pm. During the execution of Topalov's order to attack, in the battles known as the Second Battle of Engez-Kaşıkçı, the Turkish Regiment suffered the loss of one officer and 58 privates, with 6 officers and 328 privates wounded, and 230 personnel missing. Conversely, one officer and 112 privates were taken captive.⁸⁸ Following this action, there was a pause on the front until 30 September and a counterattack was expected due to the preparations made by the Romanians.

The Romanians had relied on the Russians for victory in the north, but lengthy Russian movements denied them the advantage they had hoped for. While Romanian troops were assumed to be outnumbered by assaults from the south and southwest, the boost in morale imparted by Mackensen's skilful leadership changed the course in favour of the allied forces. The losses and withdrawals suffered in the early days of Dobruja led the Romanian military administration to concentrate on the southern operation. Subsequently, on 1 October the Romanian Dobruja Army initiated a counter-attack. During the offensive, the Turkish 25th Division was attacked and Amzacea was bombarded with artillery.⁸⁹

At the same time, rival infantry regiments were observed advancing towards the front of the Turkish 59th Regiment. At 8.45, it was observed that the remaining opponent forces were progressing towards the right flank of

the Turkish 75th Regiment. In this situation, Lieutenant Colonel Hamdi Bey, commander of the 15th Division, issued an order for the 38th Turkish Regiment, which was short one battalion, to advance towards Hill 104. At 10:20, an advancement of cavalry and infantry units were observed approaching the frontline of the 56th Turkish Regiment, but it was halted by artillery fire. The battle commenced at 11am in the area of the 75th Turkish Regiment. The right flank of the 75th Regiment's cavalry division experienced difficulty while dealing with a superior force, consequently requesting aid. The Commander of the 25th Division, Colonel Şükrü Ali Bey, assigned the 2nd Battalion of the 38th Regiment to assist the struggling division. Similarly, the 75th Regiment requested support from the division to protect its right flank. Consequently, the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Regiment and the 77th Heavy Machine Gun Company were deployed. At 1pm, the cavalry division clashed with the opponent north of Taşlyük and the situation on the division's front became dangerous. Despite being halted by Turkish artillery fire on the 59th Regiment's front, the opponent advanced towards the 56th and 74th Regiments. The 74th Regiment, under allied command, took part in a battle on the right flank, with 1st Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Georgiev, due to the regiment's broad responsibility in the region. Although the Cavalry Division and 25th Division successfully repelled the opponent until sunset, they were unable to initiate a pursuit operation. From the statements of the prisoner, it was disclosed that the opposing units partaking in the assault were the 243rd and 244th Brigades. A fruitless nocturnal offensive occurred in the district of the 25th Division, whereas the remaining troops were preoccupied with strengthening their positions during the obscurity of the night.⁹⁰ There were both improvements and setbacks in the battles that occurred during the evening of 3rd October. During the battles that persisted nearly without interruption until 6th October, the Corps suffered 6,372 casualties, including 21 officers, 1,202 men martyred, and 55 officers and 3,499 men wounded, 2/3 of them from the 25th Division.⁹¹

Çernovoda (Cernavodă) and Mecidiye (Medgidia) were the primary targets of the Oc-

tober offensive, which aimed to sever the Romanian main supply line and seize the strongly fortified Gobadin.⁹² The attack was influenced by modifications to the front line structure made by German authorities. The opportunity for adjustments arose from the front's stagnation, which persisted until October 18th, 1916. In the forthcoming attack on the 19th of the month, the group order informed the troops that General Kantarciyev would command the eastern part of the territory, spanning from the Black Sea to the Gobadin railway, while General Toshev would lead the western part extending from the railway to the Danube. The troops in both groups would be under the direction of Field Marshal Mackensen.⁹³

On the morning of 19th October, artillery from the newly established positions of German and Bulgarian forces commenced firing. Upon raiding their opponents, who were unable to retaliate, the 15th Division launched their attack at 9:30am followed by the 25th Division at 11am. The 15th Division made significant progress in their advance without facing formidable opposition. However, further progress was hindered by the opponent's resistance in the subsequent hours. With the attack, the security elements of the opponent were pushed back on the entire front, and their principal positions were reached on that day.⁹⁴

As of 21st October, Mackensen ordered the continuation of the ongoing offensive, following two days of successful battles, which has the potential to be decisive by putting pressure on the opponent. Upon receiving the order, the Commander of the 6th Corps set the target as the Kaçamak (Viișoara) – İdriskuyu (Veteranu) line and requested an attack by establishing close contact with the neighbouring units. Although the Turkish divisions had completed their preparations by 7 o'clock, Mustafa Hilmi Pasha ordered them to attack without waiting for the neighbouring 4th and 1st Bulgarian divisions, which could not be contacted. He also requested the army to urge the neighbouring units to take action. Despite the late attack from the neighbouring unit, the 25th Division achieved success, compelling its opponent to retreat towards Gobadin whilst endeavouring to reinforce the gained positions. Simultaneously, the Bulgarian division on the right failed

to advance, creating a gap of approximately 3 km with the 25th Division which was bridged with the division's precautionary measures. The front of the 15th Division encountered a similar situation where the 25th Regiment of the 1st Division, with whom it was in action, could not advance, resulting in a dangerous gap. The opposing artillery fire caused significant damage to the exposed 45th Regiment. However, the ordered line was reached four and a half hours after the attack began.⁹⁵

Romanian and Russian troops, defeated in Gobadin, attempted to evacuate Dobruja. To this end, they aimed to hold Çernovoda, a key position, in the hope that the evacuation could be carried out without any casualties. At the same time, Mackensen, wishing to further his success with an attack, declared that he would command the attack that was to take place on 22 October and that he would command both groups.⁹⁶ In the attack the 6th Corps assigned the 25th Division the right part of İdriskuyu and the area 3 km west of the Mecidiye line. On the left of the same line, the 15th Division was given control. In the north of Kocayük, the 74th Regiment was allocated as the corps reserve. The attack began at 9am on 22nd October, under challenging circumstances where communication between troops was inhibited and orders inadequately delivered due to rain-fall causing the telephone lines to be disconnected overnight. Nevertheless, the 25th Division successfully reached its target by midday, while the 15th Division moved closer to the Mahmutkuyu (Izvoru Mare)-İdriskuyu line. Although the 1st Bulgarian Division's weighty manoeuvres resulted in occasional gaps in the front, the 15th Division overcame these hazards with the aid of reserves. On October 25th, Mackensen was informed of Çernovoda's evacuation, prompting him to consider capturing it. Turkish troops bolstered the offensive, encountering similar obstacles in the process.⁹⁷ Since General Toshev did not want the troops to assemble in Çernovoda, he ordered them to circumvent the city and gather in the Tortoman vicinity after splitting the force to ensure this location's safety.⁹⁸ According to reports, Romanian troops withdrew towards the north-northwest direction after Mecidiye and Çernovoda changed hands on 25 October.⁹⁹ On

26 October, Colonel Şükrü Ali Bey, commander of the 25th Division, began assembling his troops in the region now called Mircea Vodă, following the instructions received from Colonel Kishelov, commander of the 4th Division. Despite being assigned to reconnaissance, the 6th Corps successfully repelled the opponent units in the southern Dobruja region.¹⁰⁰

After assuming control over Southern Dobruja, the German General Staff planned the operation in Romania and made necessary preparations. As per the plan, the 217th German Division, the 1st Bulgarian Division, and the 6th Corps were relocated to the Danube front. General Toshev disbanded the Eastern and Western Army Groups and repositioned the units under his command as before. On October 27th, the 6th Corps Commander Mustafa Hilmi Pasha issued a defence order and instructed the corps to establish a position between Derinköy (Dropia) and Mecidiye for fortification works. As of November 1st, reports were received that Russian and Romanian troops had mostly withdrawn to the west of the Danube. The 15th Division Commander held a meeting with General Kantarcıyev to discuss the objective of repelling the opposing postal unit located on Hill 280. At 8 am on 2 November, the division departed from Pazarlı (Târguşor) with a column and security equipment, and advanced without encountering notable resistance. At 3 pm, as per the order from General Kantarcıyev, the security equipment was withdrawn, and the division's headquarters were set up in Kaçamak, where the division stayed for the night. During the same period, the 25th Division Corps remained at its designated position and focused on fortification.¹⁰¹

The process of reinforcing the troops' positions, which commenced on the 4th of November, was ongoing until the 8th of November. On the 14th of November, the 3rd Army assessed the opponent's situation, who had launched attacks in recent days, and tasked the 6th Corps with defending the section extending from the railway to the northbound highway from Tortoman. Although the defence line of the corps reached 15 km, the presence of the corps was still minimal. As of 23rd November,

when the Danube army advanced from Ziştovi towards Wallachia, the opponent was left with limited options.¹⁰²

The military operation, initially launched by Russian and Romanian forces targeting the right flank of the 3rd Bulgarian Army, focusing on German troops located in Romania, and also impeding Mackensen's forces crossing the Danube, was halted by increasing artillery fire from the Combined Division and the 6th Corps, causing it to reach a standstill. It was estimated that there were four to six battalions opposing the Competent Division and the same amount facing the 6th Corps. However, following the opponent's heavy losses during the two-day offensive, the front and Çernovoda experienced a period of stagnation until 29 November, while Mackensen's Danube Army successfully completed its crossing of the Danube from Ziştovi. The progress made by the 9th German Army in western Romania caused the opposition to evacuate Dobruja. As a result, the 3rd Army assigned the 74th Regiment to the 6th Corps, which continued to strengthen its position in response to the updated circumstances.¹⁰³ Apart from previous attacks on the 4th Division, the Corps front experienced no significant movements between 2-7 December. Stubborn Russian forces carried out an attack, beginning with a night raid on the 4th Division area, which intensified periodically. The Russians suffered heavy casualties and were repelled.¹⁰⁴

Mackensen enquired of Toshev whether the 3rd Army intended to attack. Additionally, it was announced that the northern march would persist to aid the Central forces advancing in Romania. Preparations and arrangements have been made pertaining to this matter. Following orders from the army, the 6th Corps provided the required notifications to the divisions to carry out the offensive task from the Pazarlı (Târguşor) – Satsköy (Crucea) – Kartal (Vultura) line. The military personnel proceeded on the morning of 15th December and the divisions on both sides progressed in sync. It was observed that the army corps lending support to the 3rd Army's northern advancement was efficient, resulting in the rival forces attempting to sustain some

altitudes being displaced by the offensive. At the same time, it appears that the 6th Corps engaged in the Başköy-Çineli Battles along the Babadağ north line. The 6th Corps advanced until December 25th and was subsequently placed under the command of the Danube Army. The opposing forces, having lost their ability to attack Dobruja, retreated to Maçin (Măcin).¹⁰⁵

After the 6th Corps had relocated to Romania, the Turkish authorities, considering the situation on Turkish fronts, recognized the necessity to strengthen their forces there. Therefore, they chose to send solely the 26th Turkish Division under Mackensen's command. Since the Bulgarian authorities prioritized the transport of their own units, the 26th Turkish Division, which waited for an additional 10 days in Edirne, was able to travel to Tirnova within 15 days. During the three-day transfer to Patras, only the headquarters travelled by train while the other troops marched on foot. The Commander of the 26th Division is Lieutenant Colonel Hamit Fahri. The 73rd Regiment, involved in the establishment of the division, is led by Major H. Tahsin, the 76th Regiment by M. Nuri, the 78th Regiment by Ömer Lütfü, and the 26th Artillery Regiment by Lieutenant Colonel Ali Haydar.¹⁰⁶

The Romanian authorities had intended to bolster morale by organising resistance along the road to Bucharest following their recent defeat. The Romanian army, alongside Russian troops, aimed to launch an attack against the Danube Army as a whole. After assessing the situation, Mackensen deemed it appropriate for the right wing of the army to continue with the offensive whilst the left wing took a defensive stance to counter the concentration of Romanian forces. After the 78th Regiment successfully extricated the 217th German Division troops from a challenging position during the Battle of Mărzânești on 27th November, the 26th Turkish Division was ordered to launch an attack. The division suffered 13 casualties, including 3 injured soldiers. Although there was initial belief that on December 1st the 26th Division had engaged with the opponent south of Tirnova, by 12.30 pm, the 73rd Regiment faced a challenging predicament leading to the with-

drawal of several companies. Thanks to Major H. Tahsin's efforts, a chance to counter-attack emerged, and the opponent withdrew towards the north with considerable losses. In the Battle of Draganești (Drăgănești-Vlașca), reports indicate that one officer and 85 soldiers from the 26th Turkish Division lost their lives, while 7 officers and 518 soldiers sustained injuries and 357 soldiers were declared missing.¹⁰⁷

Since the opposition's attack power was neutralised by the general counter-attack, the 26th Division, along with the Central forces, were tasked with providing cover until the 3rd of December. At 6:30 am, the Kaufmann Cavalry Brigade in Balarya (Bălăria/Valea Plopilor) engaged in battle, and after yielding the front-line to the 78th Regiment sent from the 26th Division, withdrew, leaving reinforcements to maintain the defence. It was determined that the units of the 9th Romanian Army, supported by artillery, were the opposing force. During the battle, the 78th Regiment faced critical moments.¹⁰⁸ To strengthen the weak right flank, the commander of the 78th Regiment, Ömer Lütfü, assumed control of the passing-through 73rd Regiment in the village of Balarya. Although the Romanian forces, who attacked the newly arrived 73rd Regiment at 12:30, were initially successful, they were not able to maintain their position during the subsequent counterattack. It was recorded that the Turkish division, which had inflicted heavy casualties on its opponents, suffered 500 killed and 160 wounded.¹⁰⁹

Meanwhile, after the defeat of the Romanian army, which had been reinforced by Russian troops, Mackensen's forces marched towards Bucharest. The destruction of the bridges during the withdrawal strengthened the belief that the opponent could not return. When they reached the advance guard, it became apparent that there were no military forces located in Bucharest. This prompted Mackensen to send his staff officer to capture the city. The staff officer sent to Bucharest reported that the city had been declared an open city.¹¹⁰ After Mackensen's arrival, he ordered the troops to turn their route eastwards. The inauguration ceremony in Bucharest was conducted only by the 26th Division of Turkish troops, who

held a parade suitable for the occasion.¹¹¹ The procession included the Division Band, Division Headquarters, Cavalry Company, and one team from every detachment, along with the 78th Infantry Regiment and Engineering Company. The Turkish troops stayed stationed in the southern parts of Bucharest and did not enter the city, except for the ceremonial guard. Lieutenant Colonel Hamit Fahri Bey, who was the Commander of the 26th Division headquartered at the Imperial Hotel in Bucharest.¹¹²

After the capture of Bucharest by Allied forces, a follow-up operation ensued. During the pursuit, the 26th Turkish Division engaged in combat in Vizirol (Viziru). Ordered by the Danube Army to attack, the 26th Division took action at 8am on 26th December and were able to approach the opponent easily due to the foggy weather. Following the lifting of the fog at 10 o'clock, the opposing sides fiercely battled. Although the 78th Regiment approached the opponent's trenches at a distance of less than one kilometre, it had to halt due to heavy artillery fire, while the 76th Regiment was unable to advance against its robust opponent because of the weakness of its left flank. It was subsequently realised that the resilient opposition was the troops of the 124th Russian Division. The same assault was instructed to be replicated the following day, thus aiding the efforts of the 9th German Army. The offensive continued on 28th December, but the flank of the 26th Division remained on the defensive. It was determined during reconnaissance on 29th December that the opponent had left their positions overnight. The 26th Division, which took action in conjunction with the Danube Army at 5 am, captured Vizirol and proceeded with its pursuit. On 30th December, the division reached Osmanol (Unirea) and continued to advance in line with the adjacent units. The 26th Division suffered 258 martyrs and 1,428 wounded during the five-day pursuit.¹¹³

On 4 January 1917, 6th Corps Commander Mustafa Hilmi Pasha arrived in Vizirol and took command of the 26th Division. Meanwhile, the 15th Division crossed the Danube from Hârşova and reached Osmanol. Thus the 15th and 26th Divisions of the 6th Corps came under the command of the Danube Army. In

the Danube Army's first attack of the new year, the 26th Division was given the task of finding the opponent. On 5 January, the division defeated the enemy's weak rear and managed to advance north in two columns. To block the foe's retreat, the 78th Regiment marched towards Nazăru (Siliştea) with the 78th on the right and the rest of the division on the left. From January 10 onwards, there were several days of low-intensity activity, including reconnaissance operations, artillery fire, and positional fights. This continued until the end of March. On March 26, 1917, the 26th Division was informed of its transfer.¹¹⁴ Following the notification, the division was relocated to Istanbul in April 1917. Subsequently, the 15th Division and the 145th Brigade assumed responsibility for the division's previous area of operation.¹¹⁵

Especially in recent times, it has been observed that Russian soldiers have emerged from their trenches expressing anti-war sentiments. The front remained unchanged until July 1917, when reconnaissance activities revealed that the Romanians were using French war equipment and being trained by French officers. In spite of German control in and around İbrail (Brăila) in August, the bombing and reconnaissance activities of French planes did not lessen. While Romanian harassment fires persisted in September, an overall sense of retreat was noted. On September 3rd, a raid was ordered with attacking troops, the 15th Division attacked Mihailea, and successfully repelled the Romanians who had left destroyed trenches with excessive material inside. After the incident, the frontline remained stagnant. On September 30th, it was announced that the 15th Division would be relocated to Istanbul. Despite no developments on the front in October and November, it was initially planned for the 46th Division to be replaced by the 15th Division in Istanbul. However, this plan was later dropped, and the "advance units" of the 46th Division, including the 25th Division, began to return home. In December 1917, the Goltz Cavalry Division took over the 25th Division's area, and the division returned to Istanbul within 21 days. In the new year, a section of the 75th Regiment was transported by

rail, but there was no significant progress on the front. Although it was announced that the 15th Division and 6th Corps Headquarters, which remained at the front until March 1918, would relocate to Trabzon and further east through Köstence (Constanța), the transportation in April and May involved freight from İbrail to Çernovoda, then by train to Köstence, and finally to Batumi using the Akdeniz, Reşitpaşa, and Olga vessels. The headquarters arrived in Batumi on May 9th. The 15th Division was transferred to Batumi in five stages with the divisional headquarters arriving on June 29th, 1918.¹¹⁶

Activities of Turkish Troops on the Macedonian Front

Allied troops aiding the Serbian army in Macedonia pulled back to the Greek border due to the attacks. During this time, the Central Powers paid close attention to the Greek borders, which were still neutral, as they aimed to win over the Balkan states. In October 1915, French General Sarrail (Saraj) assumed command of the Allied forces in Salonika, which were later reinforced by the arrival of the 57th and 122nd French Divisions. Venizelos' overthrow of King Constantine in Greece allowed the Greeks to join forces with the Allies. The situation in Greece raised concerns and prompted mobilisation among Bulgarians. Subsequently, in August 1916, the Bulgarians captured the region up to the Struma River with the progressive movements of the 7th and 10th divisions. Thereupon, on 12th September 1916, the Allied Powers launched an assault on Ostrovo-Monastir (Bitola).¹¹⁷

During Enver Pasha's meeting with Hindenburg and Ludendorff in September 1916, the situation on the Macedonian front was discussed. The strategic importance of Macedonia was discussed in terms of preventing Allied forces in the Balkans from meeting Russia, ensuring road links between the Central Powers and transporting supplies from Germany.¹¹⁸ At the end of the negotiations, German officials requested that Turkish soldiers be sent to Macedonia on 12 September. Enver Pasha ordered the 50th Division, which was to

join the 2nd Army, to go immediately to İstanbul and assemble at Bakırköy (Makri-keuy).¹¹⁹ Meanwhile, the infantry units also changed their rifles.¹²⁰

The 50th Turkish Division, consisting of the 157th, 158th and 169th regiments under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Şükrü Naili Bey, was transported by rail every day until 25 October. It is worth noting that the divisional commander was not told which front he was going to, nor were the Bulgarian officials in the region. The divisional adjutant, who went with the first convoy, arrived in Drama on 23 September and received the first order from the commander of the 10th Bulgarian Division to assemble the division in Angista (Agistas). When the combat units of the 50th Division reached Drama with the divisional headquarters, they received their first operational order from the 10th Bulgarian Division. This Bulgarian division was responsible for taking precautions in the region against the danger of Allied landings between the mouth of the Meriç (Maritsa) and the mouth of the Struma, and for stopping their advance in the region between the mouth of the Struma and the west of Serres (Sérrai). In the initial order of operations, it was observed that the 10th Bulgarian Division's field of responsibility was divided into four subdivisions. With the exception of the area east of the Mesta River, the 50th Division was assigned to the remaining three subdivisions. Following reconnaissance and observations of the unit's area of responsibility and the adversary, Şükrü Naili Bey issued his initial comprehensive directive on October 18th. In the order; "Doksambaz-Angista" line, where the 27th British Division is located between Lake Takyanos and the sea, the 10th British Division is to the west of this division, the 1st Bulgarian Brigade is located to the west of the 50th Division and the 2nd Bulgarian Brigade is located to the east, under the command of the 10th Bulgarian Division of the 50th Turkish Division. It was announced that he was assigned to defend the "Leftera Bay-Pravişte" line.¹²¹

While Şükrü Naili Bey requested that the 10th Bulgarian Division address deficiencies

in area inspections, communication, fortification, and logistical support, defensive measures were also taken. The Division Commander's requests were answered positively, to some extent, between 22 and 25 October. Despite the reinforcement works being a priority for several days, no progress was made due to the rocky structure of the region and the lack of materials. The disparity in comprehension between the Turks and Bulgarians is evident from the Bulgarian troops' satisfaction with subpar fortifications that disregarded concealment and obstruction, despite being in the same area.¹²²

While fortification and positioning efforts continued with intricate arrangements, reports received by the division between 28-30 October drew attention to the attack order adopted by the opponent, stating that Italian, Russian and Greek soldiers were seen at the front as well as British and French. The anticipated attack commenced at 8am on 31st October with heavy naval and artillery fire. It was noted that the gunfire was aimed particularly at the zone of the 169th Regiment and Tevfikbey Farm, which was guarded by the 1st Bulgarian Brigade.¹²³

The 169th Regiment has established its position in the first place with three battalions in the north of Dedebalı (Galipsos), and placed one battalion as a reserve in the north of Lakovikia. The 158th Regiment has assigned two battalions to the first line and is monitoring the Aegean Sea. It has deployed one battalion in Moustheni as the regiment's reserve and the other battalion as the division's reserve in the north of Arşaklı. It has been observed that the British Division troops have been given attack orders. In a fierce naval and artillery environment, the 80th British Brigade advanced towards Neohori-Dedebalı at 3.30 pm. Effectively slowing down the pace of their march were the shots fired by the 50th Division artillery. In the evening, the British troops made four efforts to seize the forward positions with reinforcements, only to be repelled by the intense artillery and infantry fire of the 50th Division. They were forced to retreat to their old positions. In this battle, known as the Battle of Karabayır, British artillery fire caused damage.

The 50th Division suffered 115 casualties, including 19 martyrs.¹²⁴

Although the British attempted new attacks from the Serres region between 1st November and 6th December, they were unsuccessful due to artillery fire from the 50th Division area. Furthermore, no movement was observed on the front during this period. The construction of connection roads and shelters with the assistance of local people was carried out in those days. Engineer companies were formed from non-combatant soldiers. Additionally, the artillery units were reorganized based on the battle experience gained.¹²⁵

Despite the general stagnation in the Struma and Vardar areas of the Macedonian front in the autumn of 1916, the Allied attacks on the Bitola side intensified day by day. The arrangements in the Struma section resulted in the replacement of the 11th German Army by the 1st Bulgarian Army and the focus on reinforcing the Struma due to the shifted forces.¹²⁶ The Supreme Command of the Central Powers decided to convert the Turkish forces situated in the Struma sector of the Macedonian Front into a two-division corps and augment it with a strengthened Turkish regiment under the command of the 11th German Army.¹²⁷ The decision taken on November 9 was implemented by the Turkish Commander-in-Chief, who sent the 46th Infantry Division to the front and established the 20th Corps comprising the 50th Division and the 16th Depot Regiment in Istanbul. The Corps Commander, Abdülkerim Pasha, was appointed.¹²⁸

The Ottoman Rumelia Detachment, consisting of three infantry battalions, a heavy machine gun company, a cavalry platoon, an artillery battery, a fortification team and a combat team led by Staff Major Mehmet Nazım Bey, was assigned to the 11th Army in the Monastir region of the Macedonian Front. With a total strength of 3,598 personnel, the reinforced 177th Infantry Regiment was part of this detachment.¹²⁹ Thus, besides the 20th Corps, which housed the 50th Division, the Macedonian Front also involved the 177th Infantry Regiment. However, upon the Corps' arrival in Drama on December 6, the frontline remained

stagnant. In his orders subsequent to meetings and investigations, Corps Commander Abdülkerim Pasha instructed the corps to reinforce its designated territories by exploiting the terrain, defending against rival attacks and repulsing incoming attacks.¹³⁰

In the new year, the 20th Turkish Corps area on the Macedonian Front, comprising of 42,410 soldiers, did not engage in any significant operations; instead, its units focused on training and reinforcement.¹³¹ The usage of poison gas by the Allied Powers put the possibility of a poison gas attack on the front on the agenda and special training was given for this postulate. Consequently, officers who spoke foreign languages were sent to Sofia to receive training on assault troops. In February, the first line units were replaced with reserves in order to maintain the same structure within the corps. Efforts were made to address communication problems at the same time. Meanwhile, after the establishment of the Corps, cases of indiscipline and desertion were reported among the militia units of the 50th Division, and in order to deter such behaviour, morale-boosting measures and some degree of punishment were introduced. When other Turkish fronts faced a critical situation in March 1917, the Turkish Commander-in-Chief attempted to withdraw some troops from the European fronts to reinforce these fronts. All the units except the 50th Division and the 177th Regiment were able to return home. After the transfer was completed on 11 April 1917, the 20th Corps returned home and was subsequently transferred to Palestine. Furthermore, the 46th Division, which was included in the Corps programme, was also deployed to Iraq.¹³²

There were no significant alterations to the status quo of the remaining 50th Division. April was characterised by reciprocal artillery fire and specifically targeted artillery fire on the 169th Regiment's positions, supported from the sea by the British. In May, the first-line regimental zones of responsibility were revised. The division's return to the homeland was scheduled for June, with the 50th Division relocating on 30 June and gathering in Istanbul

on 25 July 1917. Depending on the situation in other Turkish fronts, the 50th Division was dispatched to Aleppo. Following the departure of the 50th Division, the only remaining Turkish troops on the Macedonian Front were the Ottoman Rumelia Detachment (177th Regiment) in the Monastir (Bitola) sector.¹³³

Activities of the Ottoman Rumelia Detachment in North Macedonia

The Ottoman Rumelia Detachment, a reinforced infantry regiment consisting of the 177th Turkish battalion, was assembled in Köprülü on December 29, 1916. Initially, the detachment set up camp in tents near the station, later moving into buildings with the arrival of 2,500 supply units, increasing its total strength to 4,336. On February 18, 1917, the detachment was relocated to the vicinity of Prilep. Due to its location on the front line, the Detachment remained uninvolved in any major conflicts. Later, it fell under the control of the 62nd Corps and the Reorganized Division in the region between the Prespa and Ohrid lakes. When the threat of losing the strategically significant Giyavat Pass between the Macedonian and Albanian fronts arose due to the intense attacks of the Allied Powers, the 11th German Army took measures in this regard.¹³⁴

The French offensive, commencing on 12 March with the objective of seizing control of the Giyavat Pass, focused its efforts on the central German battalion. Subsequent to the deployment of a well-equipped Turkish battalion, the attack shifted towards the Bulgarian battalion's positions. Upon the commencement of French artillery fire in the morning of March 20th, the Bulgarian battalion relocated the area where their commander was stationed to the Turkish troops. Seeking to withdraw, the Turkish battalion moved and took up their positions under the increasing intensity of the artillery fire. As they settled, the 12th Company found themselves in an indefensible position, thereby creating a one-kilometre gap between the 9th and 11th Companies. The French seized an opportunity and attempted to launch an assault, resulting in the martyr-

dom of 80 soldiers from the 12th Company. The 3rd Battalion Commander responded to the situation with a dominant counter-attack, leading to victory. The next day, all four companies of the 3rd Battalion were positioned on the first line. Subsequently, there was no further engagement other than artillery fire and reconnaissance activities until the end of the month.¹³⁵

The second battalion of the detachment departed from Prilep on 18th March and assumed responsibility for the area previously occupied by the Austrian battalion upon arrival two days later. The area was later passed on to the German battalion, and the second battalion moved to the rear of the third. It was agreed that the Turkish detachment would initiate the attack scheduled for April. The plan entailed moving the 2nd Battalion behind the 3rd Battalion. However, it failed to consider that the strength of the detachment was significantly diminished with 415 casualties in March alone. On April 1st, following artillery fire, the 62nd Corps launched the attack at 5:50 pm. The main attack was ordered by Staff Major Mehmet Nazım Bey to be launched from the positions of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, alongside the 9th, 10th, and 12th Companies of the 3rd Battalion. Additionally, he ordered the 1st Battalion to execute the secondary attack. Due to French artillery and machine fire, the operation progressed slowly. Nevertheless, the Turkish troops managed to infiltrate the French positions. Due to the casualties, the operation ceased at the current line. During the French counter-attack on the 2nd of April, the Platoon Commander was hesitant to relinquish the acquired positions, taking the casualties into consideration. Nevertheless, despite the Detachment's diminishing fighting ability, the French intensification of the attack caused Detachment Commander Mehmet Nazım Bey to face a challenging decision to revert to his former positions. Following the French troops' reclaiming of their former positions, the front came to a standstill, allowing for only sporadic artillery fire engagement between both sides. The detachment incurred 712 casualties, including 20 officers, over the two-day conflict.

Owing to the unsuitability of combat from the local supply soldiers and the inflicted losses, the Detachment Commander endeavoured to relocate the troops to a rest area located behind the front. The Turkish Commander-in-Chief was asked by him to provide combat officers and privates. As a consequence, 13 officers from Istanbul and a small number of privates from the 16th Depot Regiment in Drama were dispatched. However, the proposal to rest the troops was rejected with evasive responses. While the prolonged correspondence went on, the French offensive, which began at 7 a.m. on May 7th, focused on the 3rd Battalion's area. The bayonet attacks of 7-8 May that followed were successfully repelled. In the last French assault, the detachment suffered 139 casualties, mostly from the 10th Company.¹³⁶

In late June 1917, Detachment Commander M. Nazım Bey requested his dismissal after his unit rest proposals were rejected. Consequently, he left the detachment on July 10th. Lieutenant Colonel Ali Bey took over as the commander, assuming the role on July 28th. During this period, the region was in a state of stagnation, with troops concentrating on reinforcing fortifications.¹³⁷

After Greece joined the Allied Powers, a series of attacks were launched by the Allies in the Ohrid-Prespa area, with a particular focus on the Turkish zone during August. The Turkish troops were lauded for their defensive efforts during the assaults. Lt-Col. Ali Bey, like his predecessor, requested that the platoon be given a rest, but he too was delayed by the 62nd Corps and the Crew Division. Furthermore, a decision was made for the platoon to enter into combat and to participate with 80 soldiers in a limited-targeted assault on the positions of the Allied Powers, which were being held by the Russians. During this attack that occurred on the night of September 6, 1917, the front lines of the Russian positions were reached. 41 casualties were suffered by the Turks, whilst the Germans had two. The French replaced the Russian troops on the following day, after which the assault began. The shelling, which commenced in the morning, persisted until the evening of September 7, causing signifi-

cant casualties among the Turkish forces. Nevertheless, the assaulting French troops were repelled and retreated to their former positions. During this short struggle, the detachment suffered 129 casualties. After analysing the seeming deadlock on the battlefield, the Detachment's break was discussed. Finally, after persistent efforts, a long-awaited order was received from Ludendorff. On 3rd December 1917, the Detachment was deployed in Bučín and the vicinity, carrying out supply, maintenance and training activities. During this time, Lt. Col. Ali Bey left the Detachment and was replaced by Cavalry Lt. Col. Sadık Bey, and 3rd Battalion Commander Major Sabir Bey was in charge of the Detachment until the arrival of the new commander. The detachment arrived in the Ohrid – Prespa region from the rest area on February 11, 1918, and conducted reinforcement and reconnaissance activities. However, due to the stagnation at the front, they were forced to return home. By May 1918, the Ottoman Rumelia Detachment was instructed to depart from the Ohrid-Prespa region and join the 15th Turkish Division in Romania before moving to Batumi.¹³⁸ After spending some time in Constanta with the 15th Division, the detachment returned home on June 28, 1918.¹³⁹

Evaluation

Turkish forces deployed in Eastern Europe and the Balkans achieved several victories over the course of more than a year. Memoirs and archives have documented some issues. The Galicia front reports by Yakup Şevki Pasha, Mustafa Hilmi Pasha's Dobruja front reports, and Nazım Bey's writings in Macedonia contain statements about the allied officers' general attitude. The Turkish troops were entrusted with critical responsibilities in both territory and mission during the war. Furthermore, despite disparaging reports provided to the Germans by Bulgarians who fought with Turkish troops on the shared front, the statement of Mustafa Hilmi Pasha regarding the situation remains significant. Commanders of the military found it unacceptable to underestimate the challenges encountered by Turkish soldiers

or the successes attained despite substantial losses. It can be stated that Yakup Şevki Pasha, Mustafa Hilmi Pasha, Şükrü Naili Bey, Nazım Bey, and Ali Bey exhibited a patriotic mindset in facing the challenges they encountered. Furthermore, Cevat Pasha's appointment to the Galicia Front over Yakup Şevki Pasha indicated a more measured approach. Additionally, the German Command personnel expressed contentment with the new regulation.

When reporting on the Turkish troops' activities on the frontlines, there was a neglect of the soldiers' fatigue conditions during battles.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, casualties were observed as a result of communication issues with allied troops.¹⁴¹ Several measures were implemented to prevent confusion in the historiography of correspondence, including the order from Mustafa Hilmi Pasha for troops to adopt the Gregorian calendar instead of outdated versions, starting on 27th September 1916.¹⁴² It is documented that Allied force commanders, particularly those on the Romanian Front, along with the 3rd Bulgarian Army Commander, General Toshev, employed persuasive and condemnatory language towards the Turkish troops, specifically the 25th Division.¹⁴³ However, he acknowledges the significant reduction in the number of Turkish troops and the broad extent of his responsibility.¹⁴⁴ The Turkish troops faced superior opponent units due to inaccurate estimations of the number of opposing forces on the Dobruja front.¹⁴⁵

Furthermore, the main issues can be attributed to delays during transport, lack of provisions, transportation line irregularities, and prioritizing allied soldiers' dispatch in transport vehicles.¹⁴⁶ In the conducted operations, there were issues caused by informing the low-level command staff and soldiers only moments before the attack.¹⁴⁷

The archival documents indicate that the language barrier was a significant impediment in executing the German command team's combat directives. This problem arose because the instructions were only available in German, while the Turkish troops also had to communicate in German.¹⁴⁸ It is worth noting,

however, that memories of the deployed region convey no issues existed between the troops and the local population. Archival records and memoirs reveal the cooperation between the local population and the Turkish troops. It is evident that the Central Powers were apprehensive about the deployment of Turkish soldiers to the areas with Turkish communities in Western Thrace and Macedonia. The documents expose the Bulgarian command's apprehension about the close proximity of Turkish soldiers to the local Turkish population.

At the same time, the level of training and military knowledge of Turkish officers is very high, and they have good communications with their counterparts in the allies. The fatality of large numbers of officers during the conflicts has been a major concern for the command. Turkish unit commanders serving in Eastern Europe and the Balkans have regularly expressed their worries about the gap left by officer losses in their correspondence.¹⁴⁹

In this context, the losses of Turkish troops serving in Eastern Europe and the Balkans can also be counted. The total casualties of Turkish troops in Galicia, in terms of martyrs, wounded and missing, as in other European fronts, cannot be calculated with today's possibilities. However, it is possible to draw up a table which, as a result of archival and library

research, can provide information on this subject (See also. Table 1). According to the war diary of the Turkish troops who fought in Galicia between 14 and 22 August 1916, there were a total of 100 wounded and 30 martyrs.¹⁵⁰ In the battle of 16 September 1916, the 20th Division lost 243 martyrs, including 28 officers, and 670 wounded and missing. The 19th Division suffered 125 martyrs, including 12 officers, 416 wounded and 245 missing.¹⁵¹ According to the report by the Chief Physician of the Corps, during the clashes that transpired on 16th and 17th September 1916, the Corps lost 45 officers and 639 privates who were martyred, while 22 officers and 2477 privates were injured.¹⁵² Between 29 June and 2 July 1917, the 15th Turkish Corps suffered 248 martyrs, including 6 officers. 1,027 were injured, including 15 officers. 1,275 personnel were missing in action.¹⁵³

The following information pertains to casualties, specifically martyrs, wounded individuals, and missing persons, on the Romanian Front. During the period of September 14th to 17th in 1916, one officer and thirty privates from the 75th Regiment were martyred. The total number of casualties was 349 men, of whom 269 were wounded and 49 were missing. According to sources, due to transportation limitations, the seriously injured were left

Table 1: Casualties of Turkish troops on the Romanian front

Date/Period (1916)	Unity	Martyr		Wounded		Missing	
		Officer	Private	Officer	Private	Officer	Private
14-17 September	75th Regt	1	30	269			49
21 September	74th Regt	2	22	130			
21 September	75th Regt	1	2	20		2	
21 September	59th Regt		3		9		70 ¹⁵⁴
24 September	74th Regt	1	58	6	328	1	229

24 September	75th Regt		13		109		27
	59th Regt		84	5	429		241
	56th Regt, 2nd Battalion		4	2	40		17
	77th Regt, Machine Gun Coy		1	1	13		
	Engineer Company				1		
	Artillery Regiment			1	4		
	Cavalry Company		1		2		2
<i>Subtotal</i>	25th Division		103	9	598		287
1-6 October	6th Corps	18	795	39	2,854	8	950 ¹⁵⁵
25-26 October	6th Corps	40	1,824	98	7,622	13	2,007 ¹⁵⁶
1 December	26th Division	1	86	7	517		357
26-30 December	26th Division		258		1,449		

in the village of Edil, where the regiment was deployed.¹⁵⁷ On September 21st, during the Battle of Engez-Kaşıkcılar, the 74th Regiment suffered a total of 154 casualties including 22 martyrs, two officers and 130 wounded privates.¹⁵⁸ Similarly, the 75th Regiment suffered 25 personnel losses, including 3 martyrs, one of whom was the battalion commander, 20 wounded and two officers missing in action on the same day. During the fighting around Amzacea on 24 September, the 25th Division suffered 997 casualties, including 103 martyred privates, nine officers, 598 wounded privates and 287 missing.¹⁵⁹

When Lt. Col. Mustafa, commander of the 56th Regiment, was martyred on 3 October 1916, Lt. Col. Kazım, commander of the 38th Regiment, took over the command of his regiment.¹⁶⁰ During the Battle of Drăgănești in December 1916, the 26th Division suffered the loss of an officer and 86 privates. Additionally, seven officers and five hundred and seventeen

privates were wounded, and three hundred and fifty-seven privates were missing in action.¹⁶¹ Following a 5-day operation commencing on December 26, the 26th Division suffered 258 martyrs and 1,449 wounded.¹⁶²

During the Battle of Karabayır on the Macedonian Front, the 50th Turkish Division suffered 113 casualties, including 19 martyrs.¹⁶³ Additionally, the Ottoman Rumelia Detachment in North Macedonia incurred 415 casualties in March 1917, and suffered 712 casualties, including 20 officers, during the two-day battle that commenced with the French counter-attack on April 2, 1917. Similarly, despite the repulsion of the opponent with a bayonet attack on 7-8 May, 139 individuals, mostly from the 10th Company, sustained casualties.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, during the confrontations that persisted until the evening of September 7, 1917, the Detachment encountered substantial losses and subsequently forced the French

to retreat back to their former positions. The Detachment's casualties in this particular engagement amounted to 129 individuals. It is evident that Turkish forces endured considerable casualties.

Turkish troops have received recognition from authorities in Germany, Austria, and Türkiye for their services.¹⁶⁵ An archive document dated October 25, 1916, announces awards for soldiers who participated in the "pursuit with very small units in the flat and waterless plains of Dobrudja" operation.¹⁶⁶ Thanks to their success in the Battle of Balarya on 3rd December 1916, the 26th Division received appreciation. Later, Major Ömer Lütü's 78th Regiment flag received a medal as a commendation. During the end of 1916, the 26th Division participated in the Battle of Vizirul, where clashes with regiments from the 124th Russian Division facilitated the advance towards İbrail (Brăila).¹⁶⁷ The bravery and valour of the Turkish soldiers in these battles enhanced the Turkish army's magnificence, as per the allied commanders' statement.¹⁶⁸ The naming of the 50th Turkish Division serving in Macedonia as "Zafer (Triumph)" can also be seen in this context.

Turkish military personnel have been observed actively conducting training on various fronts where they operate. Training exercises were carried out behind the front lines, in accordance with the conflicts allowed in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.¹⁶⁹ Soldiers were provided with a range of training programmes, including "Air Defence" and "Fire Practice" for artillery units, "Assault Units (Shock troop/Stoßtrupp)" and "Bomb and Machine Gun" for infantry, and "Defence Construction Practices" and "Concrete Construction" for engineering units. Moreover, soldiers were trained in sowing and planting, which also involved the use of agricultural machinery.¹⁷⁰ The German military authorities have stated that these training courses have enabled the Turkish army to fully demonstrate its capabilities. This has been demonstrated by the historical record. The returning troops have been effective both on the Syrian-Palestinian and the Caucasian fronts. In the end, they played a key role in the success of the Turkish War of Independence.

Conclusion

When evaluating the activities of the Turkish troops, it is evident that the Galicia, Romania, and Macedonia fronts gained prestige for the Ottoman Empire. Galicia is a historically significant region that has seen numerous struggles for dominance, including a Russian-German-Austrian contest during the First World War, particularly on the Eastern Front. The Turkish troops performed their duties commendably during these conflicts.

Turkish troops who fought alongside various Central Powers units on the fronts in Galicia, Romania, and Macedonia ultimately fell under the authority of the German General Staff. In August 1916, due to Germany's growing significance in coordinating central command for the Central Powers, strategic planning across all fronts, and mobilising their armies, Cevat Pasha was selected to replace Yakup Şevki Pasha. The decision was made because Yakup Şevki Pasha was unable to establish a productive relationship with the Germans, particularly along the Galician front. This was considered a German coup. It is apparent from archive documents regarding Enver Pasha's extensive cooperation with the German General Staff that he successfully averted any issues with Germany and strove to improve the position of the Ottoman Empire during the war. Enver Pasha's commendable efforts in enhancing the prestige of the Ottoman Empire must be acknowledged. Turkish soldiers who were considered to have no issues adjusting to foreign troops were chosen for deployment in Europe and the Balkans. Turkish troops received a warm welcome from their fellow soldiers where they were stationed. The 15th Corps, which fought in Galicia, was particularly renowned as the "Heroes of Gallipoli" and received accolades for their valour.

The great challenge that the Turkish Corps stationed in Galicia, Romania, and Macedonia encounter is the tremendous length of their area of responsibility. According to archival documents, Turkish troops launched an attack before their deployment to the front had been completed and their commanders had taken control of the units. Another issue highlighted in the documents is that the fatigue of soldiers during wartime is not considered. Archival re-

cords reveal that the frequent violent fighting resulted in the loss of a significant number of Turkish soldiers, thus hampering the troops' ability to carry out their missions.¹⁷¹ This caused several predictable challenges during the war.

Turkish unit commanders are making efforts to tackle issues that emerge from misinterpreting orders. It could be argued that the Turkish soldiers who fought alongside soldiers from the Central Forces encountered significant challenges. The management of the Galician and Romanian fronts by German or Austrian commanders, the presence of Bulgarian officers in Macedonia, the use of foreign languages in correspondence, calendar differences in official communication, and a shortage of translators are just some of the challenges faced.

Nevertheless, Turkish forces fighting in Europe acquired significant knowledge and experience that translated into subsequent victories on the fronts. Alongside their proficiency and expertise in infantry, cavalry, combat, bombs, and poisonous gas, progress has also been achieved in logistics and administrative activities.

Turkish soldiers, who bravely fulfilled their responsibilities while serving abroad and defended their trenches at heavy cost, undoubtedly demonstrated heroism that has an exceptional status in history.

NOTES

¹ F. Feyler, "Makedonya Harbi ve 46. Fırkanın Makedonya Cephesindeki Harekatı [The Macedonian War and the Operation of the 46th Division on the Macedonian Front]", *72 Numaralı Askeri Mecmua'nın Tarih Kısmı*, nr.13, vol. 1 (1916-1917), Askerî Matbaa, İstanbul, 1928, p. 10.

² BOA [Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of State Archives, Ottoman Archives], HR.SYS (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political), 2108/2, 5 October 1914.

³ Cemal Akbay, *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Siyasi ve Askerî Hazırlıkları ve Harbe Girişi [Turkish War in the First World War, Political and Military Preparations of the Ottoman Empire and the Entry to the First World War]*, vol. 1, Gnkur. Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları [General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Department Publications], Ankara, 1991, p. 33-43.

⁴ M. Lâşer, "Büyük Harb Esnasında Alman ve Türk Kumandanlıkları [German and Turkish Commands during the Great War]", *Mecmua- Askeriye*, trans. Capt. İbrahim Efendi, nr.59, Kanun-ı evvel 1341/December 1925, pp. 49-50; F. Feyler, *op.cit.*, p. 12; Cemal Akbay, *op.cit.*, p. 47-48.

⁵ Cemal Akbay, *op.cit.*, pp. 193-199; Liman von Sanders, *Türkiye'de Beş Yıl [Five Years in Türkiye]*, trans. M. Şevki Yazman, Burçak Yayın Ltd. Şti., İstanbul, 1968, p. 41-49.

⁶ Liman von Sanders, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

⁷ General Ludendorff, *My War Memories 1914-1918*, vol. 1, The Naval & Military Press Ltd., East Sussex, 2005, p. 2; Mülman, "Büyük Harb'te Türkiye'nin Almanya'ya Muaveneti [Türkiye's Assistance to Germany in the Great War]", *Mecmua-ı Askeriye*, nr. 68, 1928, p. 90.

⁸ Cemal Akbay, *op.cit.*, p. 213-216; Liman von Sanders, *op.cit.*, p. 49-51; The bombardment of Seddülbahir by the Entente Powers on 3 November 1914 without officially declaring war on the Ottoman Empire is nothing but a violation of the laws of war, cf. Cemal Akbay, *op.cit.*, pp. 221-237; The Turkish squadron operating in the Black Sea sunk the Russian minelayer Prut, which had 700 mines on board, "Black Sea Incident", *The Examiner*, Nov. 14, 1914, p. 7.

⁹ Mülman, *loc.cit.*, p. 92.

¹⁰ *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Kafkas Cephesi, 3 ncü Ordu Harekâtı [Caucasian Front in the First World War, 3rd Army Operation]*, vol. II, Book One, Genelkurmay Basımevi [General Staff Press], Ankara, 1993, pp. 97-676; Fahri Belen, *Birinci Cihan Harbinde Türk Harbi [Turkish War in the First World War]*, vol. II, Genelkurmay Basımevi [General Staff Press], Ankara, 1964, pp. 98-127.

¹¹ Fahri Belen, *op.cit.*, pp. 13-44.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 49-86.

¹³ Necmi Koral, Remzi Önal, Rauf Atakan, Nusret Baycan and Selahattin Kızılırmak, *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Tarihi, Osmanlı Devri, (Birinci Dünya Harbi, İdari Faaliyetler ve Lojistik) [Turkish Armed Forces History, Ottoman Era, (World War I, Administrative Activities and Logistics)]*, vol. X, Genelkurmay Harp Tarihi Yayınları [General Staff War History Publications], Ankara 1985, p. 163 ff; Edward J. Erickson, *Size Size Ölmeyi Emrediyorum! Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Osmanlı Ordusu [Ordered to Die, A History of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War]*, trans. Tanju Akad, 2nd Edition, Kitabevi Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2003, p. 278.

¹⁴ Sean McMeekin, *I. Dünya Savaşı'nda Rusya'nın Rolü [Russia's Role in World War I]*, trans. Nurettin Hüseyini, Yapı Kredi Yayınları [Yapı Kredi Publications], İstanbul, 2013, p. 163.

¹⁵ Necmi Koral et al., *op.cit.*, p. 159.

¹⁶ *Birinci Dünya Savaşı, Çanakkale Cephesi Harekâtı (Haziran 1914-Ocak 1916)[World War I, Çanakkale Front Operation (June 1914-January 1916)]*, Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt (ATASE) Daire Başkanlığı Yayınları [General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies (ATASE) Department Publications], Ankara, 2014, s. 238.

¹⁷ Ludendorff claims that the battles on the Caucasian Front did not ease their burden as he had hoped, see. General Ludendorff, *op.cit.*, p. 177. In the following lines he states that the Turks and Bulgarians eased the burden on Germany, cf. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁸ Robert B. Asprey, *The German High Command at War*, Warner Books, London, 1996, p. 256.

¹⁹ Marian Kent (ed.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu ve Büyük Güçler [The End of the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers]*, Alfa Yayınları, İstanbul, 2013; David Stevenson, *The First World War and International Politics*, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2001; Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, W.W. Norton&Company Inc., New York, 1967.

²⁰ Sean McMeekin, *op.cit.*, p. 118, 162; Ahmet Suat, "Büyük Harpte Galiçya Cephesinde 15. Türk Kolordusu [15th Turkish Corps on the Galicia Front in the Great War]", *76 numaralı Askerî Mecmua'nın Tarih Kısmı*, nr.17 (Ayrı Basım), 1 April 1930, p. 1; Gülhan Barlas, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Harbi Avrupa Cepheleleri [Turkish War European Fronts in the First World War]*, Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1996, p. 3.

²¹ BOA, HR.SYS, 2108/2, leaf: 11, 5 October 1914; General Ludendorff, *op.cit.*, p. 88-89.

²² Norman Stone, *op.cit.*, p. 96-128.

²³ The Russians have eight armies, compared to a total of six armies, two of the Germans and four of the Austrians. Mahmut Boğuşlu, *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Savaşları [Turkish Wars in the First World War]*, Kastaş Yay. [Kastaş Publications], İstanbul, 1990, p. 75.

²⁴ Peter Hart, *op.cit.*, p. 157; Norman Stone, *op.cit.*, p. 111.

²⁵ Peter Hart, *op.cit.*, p. 158.

²⁶ General Ludendorff, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

²⁸ Peter Hart, *op.cit.*, p. 159.

²⁹ General Ludendorff, *op.cit.*, p. 172-173; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 5-6; Peter Hart, *op.cit.*, p. 187.

³⁰ Ahmet Suat, *loc.cit.*, p. 3.

³¹ Archive of the Turkish General Staff, Military History and Strategic Studies Department (ATASE), First World War (BDH), Folder: 125, Old File No: 92, New File No: 589, Index: 12, 13 July 1915 (Hereinafter, ATASE, BDH, 125.92.589.12, 13 July 1915).

³² *Donanma [Navy]*, nr. 73-122 (17 Kanûnuevvel 1331/22 Safer 1334/30 December 1915), p. 1186.

³³ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Strasında Türkiye'de Bulunan Alman Generallerinin Raporları [Reports of German Generals in Türkiye During the First World War]*, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları [Turkish Culture Research Institute Publications], Ankara, 1966, p. 33.

³⁴ Robert B. Asprey, *op.cit.*, p. 272; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Ortaasya'ya Enver Paşa [Enver Pasha from Macedonia to Central Asia]*, vol. III, 7th Edition, Remzi Kitabevi [Remzi Bookstore], İstanbul, 2005, p. 322; There is also an opinion that Bulgaria's applications to Germany were effective in the transfer of Turkish troops to the European fronts, upon the promise that the Ottoman Empire would help Bulgaria unofficially in the face of the deterioration of the situation of the Austrian troops. Ahmet Suat, *loc.cit.*, p. 6.

³⁵ Cemal Akbay, *op.cit.*, p. 141; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *op.cit.*, p. 322.

³⁶ BOA, HR.SYS, 2424/16, leaf: 3, 27 July 1916; Piotr Nykiel, "The 15th Corps of the Imperial Ottoman Army on the Eastern Galician Front (1916-1917)", *Bellekten*, vol. 79, nr.284, 2015, p. 338; General von Seeckt seems to have mentioned the danger of Istanbul falling into the hands of the Russians, cf. Akdes Nimet Kurat, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

³⁷ Sean McMeekin, *op.cit.*, p. 122.

³⁸ According to official records, Austria-Hungary lost a total of 475,138 military personnel, of which 10,756 were officers, in these attacks. Ahmet Suat, *loc.cit.*, p. 5; Edward J. Erickson, *op.cit.*, p. 195.

³⁹ Liman von Sanders, *op.cit.*, p. 146-148; Edward J. Erickson, *op.cit.*, p. 195-196.

⁴⁰ The National Archives (Kew, London, England), War Office (WO), 301/643; WO, 301/645.

⁴¹ Fahri Belen, *Birinci Cihan Harbinde Türk Harbi*, vol. III, Genelkurmay Basımevi [General Staff Press], Ankara, 1965, p. 93.

⁴² Piotr Nykiel, *loc.cit.*, p. 339; Fikri Güleç, *Birinci Dünya Harbi, Avrupa Cepheleleri (Romania Cephesi) [World War I, European Fronts (Romanian Front)]*, vol. VII, part 2, Genelkurmay Başkanlığı, Ankara, 1967, p. 162.

⁴³ Ahmet Suat, *loc.cit.*, p. 8; Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *Birinci Dünya Harbi, Avrupa Cepheleleri (Galiçya Cephesi) [World War I, European Fronts (Galicia Front)]*, vol. VII, Part 1, Gnkur. Basımevi [General Staff Press], Ankara, 1967, p. 24.

⁴⁴ Piotr Nykiel, *loc.cit.*, p. 340; ATASE, BDH, 237A.727.985.044-01; ATASE, BDH, 237A.727.985.014, 14 August 1916.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁴⁶ Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 44; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 31; For the 113th Russian Division, see Edward J. Erickson, *op.cit.*, p. 197-198; Ahmet Suat, *loc.cit.*, p. 11, 16, 28.

⁴⁷ WO, 106/1055, report sent from Warsaw on 14 July 1915.

⁴⁸ Ahmet Suat, *loc.cit.*, p. 20-28.

⁴⁹ Edward J. Erickson, *op.cit.*, p. 198; Ahmet Suat, *loc.cit.*, p. 22; ATASE, BDH, 237A.727.985.024, 4 September 1916.

⁵⁰ Volkan Marttin, "Galiçya Cephesi'nde 15. Türk Kolordusunun Etkinliği Üzerine [On the Efficiency of the 15th Turkish Corps on the Galician Front.]; II. Uluslararası Tarih Sempozyumu (100. Yılında Birinci Dünya Savaşı) [2nd International History Symposium (First World War Centenary)], İzmir, 2014, p. 637.

⁵¹ Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 36-37.

⁵³ Ahmet Suat, *loc.cit.*, p. 55; Volkan Marttin, "Galiçya Cephesi'nde...", p. 640.

⁵⁴ "Since the arrival in Galicia, the casualties of the Turkish corps have increased to 95 officers and 7,000 men, and six battalions and 22 companies have already been left without a commander..." See. Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 45; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 32.

⁵⁵ Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 43.

⁵⁶ Ahmet Suat, *loc.cit.*, p. 69-70.

⁵⁷ Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, pp. 47-49.

⁵⁸ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

⁵⁹ Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 51; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

⁶⁰ Volkan Marttin, "Galiçya Cephesi'nde...", p. 641.

⁶¹ It should be emphasized here that the Turkish Assault Troops, which were first raised in Galicia with German doctrines and practices, showed great benefits first in the Palestine Front and then in the Turkish War of Independence.

⁶² Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

⁶³ ATASE, BDH, 229.272.948A.036, 1 December 1916; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 5-6.

⁶⁴ Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

⁶⁵ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 47.

⁶⁶ Norman Stone, *op.cit.*, p. 283-284, 301; Volkan Marttin, "Bolşevik Söylemlerinin Birinci Dünya Savaşına Etkisi [The Impact of Bolshevik Discourses on the First World War]", *TESAM Academy Journal*, 6(2), 2019, p. 195.

⁶⁷ Volkan Marttin, "Galiçya Cephesi'nde...", p. 642.

⁶⁸ Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, pp. 72-74.

⁶⁹ Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 75; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 56-57.

⁷⁰ ATASE, BDH, 227.574.941.016, 1 August 1916; This is the most extreme point the Turks have reached on the front. Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 79; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 58.

⁷¹ Cihat Akçakayalıoğlu, *op.cit.*, p. 83; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 59-60; Volkan Marttin, "Galiçya Cephesi'nde...", p. 643.

⁷² Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 84.

⁷³ Basil Lindell Hart, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı Tarihi [History of the First World War]*, trans. Kerim Bağrıaçık, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2014, p. 341.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 343.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

⁷⁶ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 31.

⁷⁷ *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'na Katılan Alay ve Daha Üst Kademedeki Komutanların Biyografileri [Biographies of the Commanders of the Regiments and Higher Ranks Participating in the First World War]*, vol. I, prepared by Hülya Tokur-Nurcan Aslan, Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları [General Staff Military History and Strategic Studies Directorate Publications], Ankara, 2009, p. 21-22.

⁷⁸ M. Neş'et, "Büyük Harpte Romanya Cephesinde 6. Türk Kolordusu [6th Turkish Corps on the Romanian Front in the Great War]", *Askerî Mecmua*, nr. 78, Issue: 19 (1 November 1930), p. 31-32.

⁷⁹ ATASE, BDH, 5007.H-12. 1-27, 28.; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 32-33; Fikri Güleç, *Birinci Dünya Harbi, Avrupa Cepheleeri (Romania Cephesi) [World War I, European Fronts (Romanian Front)]*, vol. VII, part 2, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1967, p. 37; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 90-91.

⁸⁰ The transport requirements for a division were: 210 riding horses, 12 draft horses, 119 pack animals, 279 pairs of harnesses, and 73 carts. M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 38, 40.

⁸¹ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

⁸² Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 96.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁸⁴ M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 40-44.

⁸⁵ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 49-52; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 71-74.

⁸⁶ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 110.

⁸⁷ ATASE, BDH, 229.272.948A.002, 26 September 1916; Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 54-58; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 76-78; Beyhan Rasim and Necip Fehmi, with whom I spoke in Amzacea, reported the existence of a German monument in the village, and noted the absence of references in Romanian historical records to Turkish forces fighting in their villages.

⁸⁸ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 57-58; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 78-79.

⁸⁹ For this reason, these battles were called the Second Battle of Amuzaca/Amzacea, cf. M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 81.

⁹⁰ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 64; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 87.

⁹¹ M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 98.

⁹² Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 74.

⁹³ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 135.

⁹⁴ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 81.

⁹⁵ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 82-86; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 111-114.

⁹⁶ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 88-89; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 115.

⁹⁷ ATASE, BDH, 229.272.948A.019-01, 25 October 1916.

⁹⁸ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 94; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 119.

⁹⁹ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 93-94; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 147, 149.

¹⁰⁰ ATASE, BDH, 237A.727.985.036-13; ATASE, BDH, 237A.727.985.036-14, 30 October 1916; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 150; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 119-120.

¹⁰¹ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 95-96; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 121-122.

¹⁰² Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 102.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁰⁴ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p.163.

¹⁰⁵ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 110-117; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 129-133.

¹⁰⁶ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 122.

¹⁰⁷ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 123-130; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 146-147.

¹⁰⁸ The 78th Turkish Regiment, which showed great bravery in the battle, is commemorated along with the Battle of Balaria.

¹⁰⁹ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 129; For the 1,600 wounded, cf. M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 153.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

¹¹¹ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 130-131; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 154.

¹¹² Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 131; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 184; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 155;

¹¹³ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 131-135; M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 158-161.

¹¹⁴ Regarding the start of shipping as of 31 March, see. ATASE, BDH, 229.272.948A.081-02, 28 March 1917; ATASE, BDH, 229.272.948A.081-08, 2 April 1917.

¹¹⁵ ATASE, BDH, 229.272.948A.081-10, 2 April 1917; In the following document dated 23 May 1917, it is stated that the 56th Regiment, 3rd Battalion and the telegraph team set off from Ibrail with the equipment and animals belonging to the party's supplies, see. ATASE, BDH, 227.76.944.043-19, 23 May 1917.

¹¹⁶ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 154-161.

¹¹⁷ Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *Birinci Dünya Harbi, Avrupa Cepheleeri (Makedonya Cephesi) [World*

War I, European Fronts (Macedonian Front)], vol. VII, part 3, Gnkur. Basımevi, Ankara, 1967, p. 13; M. Tevfik, "Harb-i Umumi'de Osmanlı Makedonya Cephesi [Ottoman Macedonian Front in the Great War]", *Mecmua-i Askeriye*, vol. 2, nr.14, 1 May 1920, p. 570; Zekeriya Türkmen, "Büyük Harpte Makedonya Cephesi'nde Osmanlı Ordusu [Ottoman Army on the Macedonian Front in the Great War]", *Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları*, vol. 14, Issue: 27-28 (2015), p. 214.

¹¹⁸ General Ludendorff, *op.cit.*, p. 256; "Enver Paşa Hazretlerinin Seyahati [The Travel of His Excellency Enver Pasha]", *Servet-i Fünun*, vol. 51, nr.1318, 21 September 1916, p. 212.

¹¹⁹ M. Tevfik, *loc.cit.*, p. 573; The new secret agreement, consisting of nine articles and dated September 28, 1916, was discussed and accepted in the Parliament, see. Zekeriya Türkmen, *loc.cit.*, p. 216; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 219.

¹²⁰ M. Tevfik, *loc.cit.*, p. 574.

¹²¹ Feyler, *op.cit.*, p. 23; M. Tevfik, *loc.cit.*, p. 575; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 30-31.

¹²² Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 224-225; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 33-35.

¹²³ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 225; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

¹²⁴ Feyler, *op.cit.*, p. 27; M. Tevfik, *loc.cit.*, p. 578; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 226; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

¹²⁵ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 226-227; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

¹²⁶ General Ludendorff, *op.cit.*, p. 251.

¹²⁷ General Ludendorff, *op.cit.*, p. 256; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 228; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

¹²⁸ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 228; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 38-39.

¹²⁹ M. Tevfik, *loc.cit.*, p. 570.

¹³⁰ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 232; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 42; Zekeriya Türkmen, *loc.cit.*, p. 223-224.

¹³¹ Necmi Koral et al., *op.cit.*, p. 411.

¹³² Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 52.

¹³³ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 236; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 53.

¹³⁴ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 236-237; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 53-54.

¹³⁵ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 237-240; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 56-57.

¹³⁶ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 240-242; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 58-60.

¹³⁷ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 242-243; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 60-62.

¹³⁸ ATASE, BDH, 227.76.944.026-30, 8 May 1918.

¹³⁹ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 245-246; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 65-66.

¹⁴⁰ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 101.

¹⁴¹ M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 78; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 115.

¹⁴² Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 90.

¹⁴³ In the reply of 6th Corps Commander Mustafa Hilmi Pasha to Toshev, it was stated that the war was carried on with sacrifices, half of the troops and one-third of the command staff were lost, and because of this casualty, there were irregularities in the operation, and this could be seen in every army in the world. It was requested "*that the division be protected from false accusations*"; see. Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 128.

¹⁴⁴ M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 940; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

¹⁴⁵ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 117.

¹⁴⁶ M. Tevfik, *loc.cit.*, p. 580-581.

¹⁴⁷ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 132-135.

¹⁴⁸ ATASE, BDH, 237A.727.985.021, 23 August 1916; ATASE, BDH, 237A.727.985.021-02, 11 September 1916.

¹⁴⁹ ATASE, BDH, 237A.727.985.041-01, 2 November 1916.

¹⁵⁰ Ahmet Suat, *loc.cit.*, p. 22.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁵³ Edward J. Erickson, *op.cit.*, p. 201.

¹⁵⁴ M. Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 74.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁵⁶ Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 95.

¹⁵⁷ M. Tevfik, *loc.cit.*, p. 70; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 106.

¹⁵⁸ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 108.

¹⁵⁹ Neş'et, *loc.cit.*, p. 78; Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 115.

¹⁶⁰ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 125.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 188.

¹⁶³ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 226; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

¹⁶⁴ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 240-242; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 58-60.

¹⁶⁵ BOA, HR.SYS, 2437/105, 26 July 1917; On the extraordinary usefulness of Turkish troops in battles, cf. BOA, HR.SYS, 2437/104, 26 July 1917.

¹⁶⁶ ATASE, BDH, 229.272.948A.019-02, 25 October 1916.

¹⁶⁷ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 186-187; Fikri Güleç, *op.cit.*, p. 133-135.

¹⁶⁸ Among the phrases employed is "They extolled the Turkish army's magnificence," Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 228; Fazıl Karlıdağ-Kâni Ciner, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

¹⁶⁹ Gülhan Barlas, *op.cit.*, p. 206.

¹⁷⁰ M. Tevfik, *loc.cit.*, p. 167.

¹⁷¹ ATASE, BDH, 239.272.948A.006-01, 6 October 1916.

THE REGIME OF GENERAL MUSTAFA KEMAL ATATÜRK IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE OFFICE FOR DOCUMENTATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES OF ROMANIA (1941)

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Abstract

At the beginning of 1941, the Office of Documentation and Administrative Studies in the Ministry of the Interior in Bucharest developed an analysis of Türkiye under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The political evolution, doctrine, and institutions involved in implementing the reforms and the results obtained were analysed. The analysis is pertinent, it does not omit the delicate events in the evolution of Türkiye, but, as a whole, it is favourable to the regime of Kemal, which laid the foundations for Türkiye's development into an important regional actor.

It is possible that this analysis was requested by the Romanian Prime Minister, General Ion Antonescu, who wanted to know how a military man could successfully reform a state that was on the edge of the precipice. Maybe General Antonescu was thinking of following his example and initiating some necessary reforms for Romania at that time. The objective of the analysis was to identify the means that allowed the evolution of Türkiye to the level of an important regional political actor.

The analytical material is appreciative of a man who changed a country through will, dedication, and effort. All the reforms initiated in the 1920s were the basis of Türkiye's development, especially after the Second World War, when it became an extremely important actor in the Black Sea area, the Middle East, NATO, and South-Eastern Europe.

Keywords: *Türkiye, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, regime, analysis, Romania*

The Ottoman Empire was a major expansionist power starting from the 14th century, which dominated and influenced Southern, Eastern, and Central Europe for several cen-

turies. Twice (in 1529 and 1683), the Ottoman army reached Vienna, but each time Christian forces managed to repel the attackers. Starting from the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire went

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through a slow and steady decline, due to both internal crises and the conflicts (most of which were lost) with Austria and Russia. The loss of territories in Europe and the Caucasus, as well as the absence of reformist sultans or grand viziers, deepened the crisis, so much so that in the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was referred to as the “sick man of Europe”. However, the major Western powers (especially England and France) preferred to keep this “sick man” alive because they realized the immense market represented by Ottoman territories, and the loans granted were guaranteed with extremely favourable economic concessions.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Christian states in the Balkans (Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece) formed an alliance and launched the final major offensive to drive the Ottomans out of Europe (1912-1913), which they successfully achieved. The fact that, after the cessation of hostilities, Bulgaria attacked its former allies (Serbia and Greece, June 1913) led Romania and the Ottoman Empire to intervene, each gaining a territory. Thus, the Ottomans recaptured some of the territories lost in Europe during the First Balkan War.

In the First World War (1914-1918), the Ottoman Empire’s alliance with the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) proved fatal. They lost the war, many colonies (some declared independence, while others came under Anglo-French control), and were forced to accept provisions that infringed upon their independence, sovereignty, and national dignity. General Mustafa Kemal emerged against the backdrop of increasingly vocal discontent and of the preservation of feudal structures both in administration and politics. As a military commander that scored resounding successes in the First World War, with a profound understanding of the Ottoman state and a visionary with regards to the future of his country, Kemal took on the role of reforming Türkiye. He first launched a counteroffensive to drive out enemy forces occupying various parts of the national territory, then removed the Sultan and all feudal institutions (political, economic, religious, etc.). His structural reforms in all areas secularized the state, developed it, and radically transformed it in a short period.

Through his handling of internal and external affairs, Mustafa Kemal, also known as Atatürk (the father of the Turks), became a role model for other political leaders. His longevity helped him choose and educate disciples to continue his work and vision.

In this context, at the beginning of 1941, the Office for Documentation and Administrative Studies within the Ministry of Interior in Bucharest prepared an analysis of Türkiye under the leadership of Atatürk. The analysis examined political developments, doctrines, institutions involved in implementing reforms, and more. The analysis is pertinent, not omitting sensitive aspects of Türkiye’s history (such as the massacres of Greeks and Armenians), but, overall, it is favourable towards the Kemalist regime, which laid the foundations for Türkiye’s development and transformation into a major economic power.

It is possible that this analysis was requested by the Romanian Prime Minister, General Ion Antonescu, who wanted to understand how a military leader could successfully reform a state on the brink of collapse. Perhaps General Antonescu was considering following Atatürk’s example and initiating some necessary reforms for Romania at that time.

The history of General Mustafa Kemal’s rise to power

As a defeated state on the battlefield, the Ottoman Empire requested an armistice, which was signed at Mudros (September 30, 1918), and then was compelled to sign the Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920), which reserved for it the fate of a “small Anatolian state, devoid of independence and completely economically subservient”¹. In essence, the empire was dismantled (from nearly 1.6 million square kilometres in 1914, it was reduced to just over 450,000 square kilometres), its finances were controlled by Anglo-French representatives, its army reduced to 50,000 men, a few ships, and without the right to possess a military aviation. This extremely oppressive treaty was signed by the Sultan but was never ratified by the Parliament of Istanbul or any other legislative assembly.

However, the Turkish national idea followed a slow but steady ascent, gaining trac-

tion among the “young intelligentsia” at the beginning of the 20th century and expanding in scope and depth with the Young Turks’ revolution (1908). The spread of progressive ideas among the masses took place against the backdrop of World War I and the ensuing loss of territories, some inhabited by foreign minorities, who were awakened by the upsurge in nationalism spreading across Europe. Nevertheless, the idea did not have a leader until General Mustafa Kemal, later dubbed Atatürk (the father of the Turks)². When the government in Istanbul understood the danger posed by General Kemal, they sent him to Anatolia as an inspector of the Third Army. However, it was here that the general realized the gravity of the situation in his country, as well as the fact that the Turkish nation vehemently rejected the partition that the authorities in Istanbul had assumed through the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres. It was then that he understood the need to begin organizing the struggle for the independence of his nation.

The first sign of revival was the message sent from Amasya on June 22, 1919, signed by General Kemal and other senior officers, which marked the beginning of the war of independence for the new Turkish nation. Kemal proposed the creation of a national government in Anatolia that would represent the people and the national will. On July 23, 1919, he organized the first National Congress in Erzurum, where he was elected president. The congress drafted programmatic documents and issued a proclamation outlining the principles on which the struggle for complete independence and territorial defence should be based. Until the assumption of political power, the Congress decided to elect a “Committee of Representation” to act as an executive body.

At the Sivas Congress (September 4-11, 1919), which brought together representatives from all provinces of Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal was also elected president. In addition, the statutes of the previous Congress were adopted and declared valid for all of Türkiye. A motion was also passed to reject any diminishment of sovereignty on national territory and to request the recognition of Türkiye’s complete independence.

However, the unity of all moral and physical forces was not yet complete. The next step

was the convening of a National Assembly with extraordinary powers to represent national sovereignty. For this purpose, Mustafa Kemal ordered general elections and on April 23, 1920, the National Assembly was convened, forming the government of the new Turkish state, known as the “Government of the Grand National Assembly”. The next stage was the commencement of the war for liberation from enemy occupation: the Greeks to the west, the French to the south, and the Armenians to the east. The French were defeated in the Battle of Marash (January 21 – February 13, 1920); through the Battles of Oltu (June 18-25, 1920, and September 3-5, 1920), the Armenians were expelled, and the Greeks were driven out of the occupied areas by September 1922. The victory was confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923), which recognized the complete independence of Türkiye, “acquired after an immense effort by the entire nation”³. The Treaty of Lausanne established a free state born from the will and strength of the Turkish people, which accepted two conditions: the demilitarization of the straits and the handover of the Mosul Vilayet. Thus, the independence lost by the Treaty of Sèvres was restored through the military exploits of Mustafa Kemal in just four years after the defeat in the First World War.

The first reform by the new government was the abolition of the monarchy on November 1, 1922, while the Caliphate was still retained. The government’s seat was established in Ankara and, on October 29, 1923, the Republic was proclaimed. Mustafa Kemal was elected president and, after four months, the Caliphate was also abolished, as it was incompatible with the idea of total national sovereignty. Members of the House of Osman were invited to leave the Republic. One by one, the people liberated themselves from all the previous frameworks, taking sole responsibility for the future. All these reforms are collectively known as the “Turkish Revolution”, which, constitutionally, began with the illegal elections for the Grand National Assembly in 1920.

This “sui generis” Revolution – “which we could say was legally conducted, in a spirit of authority and discipline”⁴ – acted illegally only in the 1920 elections, held without the

authority of the Sultan, but justified by a severe internal crisis and direct interference of the enemy in the affairs of the state. The Grand National Assembly itself, the result of these elections, established its power gradually, thus giving legal legitimacy to its actions. What characterizes this Revolution is the fact that it represents the natural outcome of events of the First World War, "having no need for any ideological preparation"⁵. Placed in a revolutionary situation, the Turkish people and General Mustafa Kemal were compelled to improvise historically in order to achieve their goal: freedom of the nation.

The fundamental political principle of the pragmatic democracy in the Turkish Republic was that reality should take precedence over doctrine. Therefore, Kemalism cannot be characterized as a left or right-wing doctrine. It represents a continuous adaptation in accordance with the realities of Turkish life and "not a servile intersection of other systems"⁶. Kemalism favoured end results over programs. The centre of gravity of all its programs was represented by the energy and insight of its spiritual leaders. It does not fit into slogans and formulas passed down from one generation to the next. Therefore, the regime of the new Türkiye is not defined by formulas, but by the name of its creator – Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The most important reforms implemented after the proclamation of the Republic were:

1. The establishment of the Republican People's Party (CHP), whose statutes were adopted on September 9, 1923;

2. The complete secularization of the country;

3. The adoption of a new Constitution on April 20, 1924;

4. The abolition of the tithe system and its replacement with a general tax through the Law of March 1, 1925;

5. The abolition of the fez and its replacement with the hat, based on a decree by the Council of Ministers in September 1925;

6. The closure of dervish monasteries and the dissolution of religious sects through the decree of September 2, 1925;

7. The introduction of the 24-hour day through the law of December 26, 1925;

8. The adoption of the Gregorian calendar in place of the Hegira calendar through the law of December 26, 1925;

9. The major judicial reform through the introduction of the Civil Code, based on the Swiss model, and the Commercial Code, inspired by German and Italian models, in 1926.

10. Alphabet and language reform through the law of November 3, 1928.

11. Establishment of mandatory weekly rest, on Sundays, through the law of May 29, 1935.

12. Separation of state and religion, enshrined by the Grand National Assembly on April 5, 1928.

13. Political and social rights for women, equal to men, through the laws of 1930 and 1935.

Through political, social, and economic reforms, Türkiye underwent a total transformation, both morally and materially, "with unforeseen repercussions for the future of this nation in all fields"⁷, as stated by the experts at the Office for Documentation and Administrative Studies in Bucharest.

Kemalist doctrine and ideology

The political doctrine of Mustafa Kemal can only be defined in the light of specific facts and realities, without getting lost in classical formulas. Thus, Article 1 [nu cumva Articolul 3?] of the Constitution of April 20, 1924, states that: "Sovereignty belongs absolutely to the nation. The governing principle is based on the right of the people to decide for themselves and effectively determine their own destiny. The form of government is the Republic". Article 2 was amended by the Law of February 5, 1937, and it has the following content: "The Turkish state is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular, and revolutionary. The official language is Turkish, and its capital is the city of Ankara". Also in 1937, Article 44 was amended, which outlines the appointment of the prime minister and ministers: "The Prime Minister is appointed by the President of the Republic from among the members of the Assembly. The other ministers are chosen by the Prime Minister from among the members of the National Assembly, and all ministers are presented to the Assembly after the approv-

al of the President of the Republic. (...) If the Assembly is not in session, this formality is postponed until the Assembly convenes. The government will inform the Assembly of its political standpoint within a maximum period of one week. The Prime Minister selects the Undersecretaries of State from among the members of the Assembly and presents those selected for approval to the President of the Republic”.

The freedoms of Turkish citizens are highlighted in Article 68: “All citizens of Türkiye are endowed at birth with liberty and full right to the enjoyment thereof. Liberty consists in the right to live and enjoy life without offense or injury to others. The only limitations on liberty – which is one of the natural rights of all – are those imposed in the interest of the rights and liberties of others. Such limitations on personal liberty shall be defined only in strict accordance with the law”; Essentially, this Constitution is characterized by a deeply national spirit, being inspired and crafted from the needs and tendencies of the people. It has a realistic nature, as the people who fought to secure their sovereign and independent existence remain masters of their own destinies.

Its unified spirit and tendency are also remarkable. Starting from the unconditional sovereignty of the nation, it effectively leads to the principle of a single power within the state, represented by a single body: the Grand National Assembly. From the realism and unitary system of this Constitution, its original character emerges: authoritarianism, since democracy, whose supreme ideal is the complete independence of the country, tends towards the concentration of the moral and material forces of the nation into a single body.

From the spirit of this concentration system, with any deviation with a national scope being excluded, the body where the national will is represented actually gains broad authority and exercises guardianship over the collective life of the country. As for how the Turkish Republic is organized, it is based on the principle of representative democracy. The nation’s will, expressed through universal suffrage, constitutes the sole source of power in the state, with sovereignty being exercised on its behalf by an elected body. The coun-

try’s fundamental law acknowledges that the National Assembly, which is the emanation of the people, is the sole source of power. It elects the President of the Republic, who in turn appoints the cabinet members from among the members of the Assembly.

The National Assembly also selects the members of the Council of State and the Court of Accounts from among individuals who have held high administrative positions. In turn, the National Assembly is elected through universal, indirect, majority, equal, individual, optional, and secret vote. Citizens of both sexes who have reached the age of 22 have the right to participate in these elections, and only those who have reached the age of 30 can be elected, with some minor restrictions based on moral considerations or intellectual incapacity. Suffrage is indirect because voters are not called upon to directly choose their deputies. They first elect members of the electoral colleges, and these elected representatives then choose the national representatives in the second stage. However, the program of the Republican People’s Party in the late 1930s proposed replacing this system with direct suffrage.

The National Assembly is the sole body through which national sovereignty is expressed. It has extensive competence, exercises general control over the officials of public institutions and government bodies. It performs acts of high politics and high administration, approves the budget, can dissolve itself, and it is the final recourse for citizens against injustices or administrative irregularities committed against them. The Assembly elects with an absolute majority a president from among its members, who can be re-elected indefinitely for four-year terms.

However, the democracy established by General Kemal should not be understood in its usual sense. It unequivocally rejects the classical liberal regime, both in the political and economic domains, and recommends itself as a democracy based on discipline and authority exercised solely for the benefit of the community. It grants the greatest power to the National Assembly, which embodies the nation’s will. Precisely for this reason, it cannot be dissolved by any authority other than itself. Local organization is managed by Administrative Councils

directly elected by the people.

Regarding the relationship between the Assembly and the executive power, the Constitution establishes the president's right to promulgate laws within ten days from the date of their passage, but also to return to the Assembly those laws the president has objections with. If the Assembly votes for the same law a second time, the president is obligated to promulgate it.

The supreme command of the army is vested in the Grand National Assembly, which is represented by the President of the Republic (Article 40).

Statism

Statism (as provided for in Article 2 of the Constitution) represents a complete reorganization on an economic and social level that was necessary and without which independence and freedom risked remaining mere aspirations. This is because private initiatives and capabilities were insufficient to meet the numerous demands, especially economic ones, in the new state, which found itself obliged to take on these large responsibilities on its own.

The system imposed that the state-created industry be managed anonymous companies, subjected to the rules of private economy and of the commercial, control and supervision code, exercised by the state in its capacity as a shareholder. In 1933, the first five-year industrialization plan began, which sought to replace private initiative in the fields where, despite all efforts, it was still insufficient. This plan had two important characteristics:

1. It was not inspired by the principle of "a outrance" autarky (excessive);
2. It aimed exploit the country's natural resources with its own means, primarily of those sought-after domestically.

The essential lines of the second plan concern mining industry and electrification of the country, food industry, chemical industry, maritime trade, and small-scale industry⁸. The institutions implementing the plan enjoy freedom of action and all the advantages attributed to private enterprise, overseen by the state. The plan has the following managing institutions: Sümerbank, Etibank (with the purpose of exploiting mines), and İş Bankası.

This industrialization is one of the important concerns of the governments and has been placed under state's control in order to achieve its goal uniformly and with sufficient capital. Political leaders, despite the controversies that arose regarding the incongruity of this regime with the democracy established by the Constitution, have always stated that the regime advocates for moderate statism and opposes any excess that would discourage private initiative. Therefore, a protectionist policy has been adopted, whose autarkic character is merely complementary.

In the program of the Republican People's Party, it is considered that the foundation of economic life is individual work and that the effective intervention of the state in certain matters is necessary not because of a lack of trust in it, but because it is indispensable for the country's rapid economic uplift, to prevent it from falling prey to capitalism like other democratic countries. In the Party's 1935 program, it is mentioned that "To the same extent that the state is interested in playing its constructive and creative role in economic matters, it seeks to encourage private initiatives and regulate and control those that are already established". Thus, the Party's program gives official recognition to activities unfolding outside of a centrally planned economy, with the aim of protecting it from overproduction.

At the same time, the state takes on the role of price control and prevents conflicts of interest between producers and consumers. With the same spirit of balance, peace, and conciliation, disputes between employers and workers are also prevented. This state intervention was applied not only in industry but also in agriculture, on as large a scale as possible. For this purpose, an Agricultural Institute was established, which contributes, through its branches, to the development of agriculture.

The conclusion of Romanian analysts was that "The Party is an enemy of capitalism and pauperism alike"⁹.

Nationalism and revolutionism

Turkish nationalism expressed "faith in the vitality and future of its race"¹⁰, translating the aspirations of the people towards unity and independence. From this perspective, Kemalism

can be defined as a vigorous reaction against the Ottoman feudal social structure, which divided the people into different castes and categories, whether it was the theocratic aristocracy (representatives of cults and religion) or the economic and social elite (large landowners, major merchants, tithe collectors). In practice, the secular regime was a rejection of Ottoman cosmopolitanism and a reaction against the universalist policies promoted by the sultans for centuries.

In the program of the party founded by Kemal, the nation was defined as “a social and political entity, comprising fellow citizens bound to each other by a common language, culture, and ideal”. For the new Türkiye, religious and racial community did not equate to national community. To belong to the same nation, it was not required to belong to the same race and religion, but it was necessary to speak the same language, have the same culture, and even share the same ideals. Therefore, according to Article 9 of the Statute adopted at the 4th Congress of the Republican People’s Party, in 1935, “any citizen who habitually uses the Turkish language, who has assimilated Turkish culture, and who has embraced the principles of the Republican People’s Party, may be admitted to the Party. He should not have taken a stance against the national struggle, have not participated in movements or organizations directed against it, and should exhibit a mentality that is not politically negative in character”.

On this occasion, it is worth mentioning the extreme measure that allowed the creation of a unified Turkish national state, with social and economic consequences, such as the evacuation of Armenians and Greeks from Anatolia. These acts were not peaceful and damaged Türkiye’s image internationally. The official viewpoint was that national necessity took precedence, leading to deportations, population exchanges, or even massacres of minorities “when they were found to be in collusion with the country’s enemies”¹¹. According to an erudite historian, Norbert de Bishoff¹², “Depuis l’expulsion des Grecs et des Arméniens, l’Anatolie et avec elle, la Turquie, ont vraiment un caractère national unifié”¹³. On the other hand, regarding the only remaining element, the Kurds, who represent a significant

numerical force, Türkiye “works with brutality, employing all means of political pressure to suppress them with their distinct ethnic identity in the national republic. Their existence is in annoying contradiction with the fundamental principles of the state, which aims to be a national state, along with the fear of creating diplomatic and military complications for the Turkish nation in difficult times”¹⁴. The disappearance of the first groups (Greeks and Armenians) required Turkish nation to fill the void, especially in the economic sphere, a process that amounted to a genuine revolution.

The idea of revolution in Kemalist ideology should be understood as creation and radical transformation through a continuous march towards progress, with the aim of achieving the greatest leaps possible. Certainly, in its early stages, revolutionism was used in the sense of radicalism that did not tolerate half-way measures in its reformist zeal but aimed to “work as swiftly as possible, bypassing stages and making leaps through time”¹⁵. The method employed in this process of reorganization was experimental and consisted of not starting a new operation until the old one had been verified. In this way, reforms had to demonstrate a logical sequence and a distinct sequence, so that the final result could not be a failure.

Republican People’s Party

The unification of the Turkish people had its earliest beginnings in the “Association for the Defence of National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia”. This association, which constituted the first nucleus of national resistance, was the one from which the Republican People’s Party would later emerge. At that time, in the beginning, the Association had a single ideal: to drive the enemy out of the national territory and achieve true independence, both politically and economically. Its field of action was the entire country, with all citizens as members without distinction, and it had two bodies, decisional and executive: periodic congresses on one hand and a permanent representative council on the other.

At the first Congress in Sivas, elections were decided for the Grand National Assembly, which convened on April 23, 1921. In the same year, a Constitution was voted on, which,

intentionally, omitted two important institutions: the Sultanate and the Caliphate. The Constitution drew inspiration from a concept that holds a pivotal place in Türkiye's constitutional history: that of the sovereignty of the nation, without any restrictions or conditions of any kind. It established a republic without a president and a system with a single power, represented and exercised by the Grand National Assembly. This responded to the urgent need to concentrate national forces and entrust them to a unified command. As the Association achieved its goals after the War of Independence, it was to transform into a new organization with a different ideal. From these considerations, the Republican People's Party was born, encompassing the entire nation with which it identified and which would carry out the great social revolution in its name.

Before founding this organization, Mustafa Kemal, through a proclamation dated November 7, 1922, invited all the intellectuals of the country to make their ideas known. Then, through a tour of the country's major cities, he invited the population to public conferences and answered questions on the subjects discussed. On this occasion, he emphasized that it was about an organization open to the entire nation and not a party defending the interests of a specific class, against which another party would rise to defend the interests of other classes or categories. "By the People's Party, we do not mean to designate only a part, but the entirety of the nation. It defends the interests of the entire nation and all categories equally, aiming to bring them into harmony for their common well-being. The interests of different categories of citizens are perfectly reconcilable and not a means to separate them into classes. All citizens fall into the category we call the people. Therefore, the People's Party will be a school of civic education for our people"¹⁶, Kemal affirmed on several occasions, gaining the sympathy of the population.

This secular movement served as a school for the nation's political leadership and for the civic education of the people. The party had no opposition because the supreme leader was also the party's president. The President of the Republic presides over this party, which was unique precisely to ensure unity and avoid po-

litical party discord. Dissidents who emerged and established a new party, the Liberal Party, were disavowed by President Kemal and had to dissolve it and return to the old ranks, even though they claimed that their program faithfully reflected the ideas and principles of the Republic's leader. Remarkably, the principle of a single party emerged naturally and not through a dictatorial law or measure, perhaps because it was led by the very person who enjoyed the absolute trust of the nation.

The party, even from its earliest beginnings, avoided overly theoretical discussions. Statesmen asserted that the party's development was linked to the demands of the moment and circumstances, not to programs, and the principles of freedom, equality, and property were subordinate to the higher interests of society. In the new state, national sovereignty had to be exercised by the leader with the cooperation of the cadres moulded in his image, who were to represent only the collective interests. For their education, the elites of these political cadres of Turkish democracy were continuously in direct contact with the leader, being alternately summoned to discuss political, social, and economic issues related to the nation's interests. The ideas and realities of the revolution were studied and analysed in free discussions in a special atmosphere, under the watchful eye of Atatürk. Everyone involved in the President's politics absorbed its spirit, which had its source in Ankara and then spread throughout the country. The ideas that the chosen individuals expressed within the Grand National Assembly were later "baked"¹⁷ in these free conversations under Atatürk's presidency.

The program of the Republican People's Party

The fundamental program of the administration was that of the Republican People's Party, a realistic and dynamic one, well represented in the Grand National Assembly¹⁸. This program directly originates from everyday life, and the path it follows is the one charted by the Turkish nation as a whole. Its spirit does not allow the Party to be concerned only with a part of the nation or a specific region but with the entire collective living within the country's

borders. By merging the government administration with that of the party, the goal was solely to demonstrate that no distinction was made between citizens, since “power is singular, and it belongs to the nation”¹⁹.

Looking beyond these general lines, it can be seen that in this program, the life and health of the Turkish citizen constitute a national matter that the government must always consider. Alongside national security, individual security is emphasized, which must be guaranteed by the laws of the Republic and by judges. For this reason, the judicial organization and legislation must adapt without deviation to the dynamics of secular life. In turn, economic life is considered as a whole, encompassing activities in agriculture, trade, industry, and public works in general, domains that cannot be viewed separately.

“In the mechanism of political life, Atatürk stated, which constitutes the expression of a nation’s independence and worth, the state, culture, and economy that form its main mechanisms are interconnected”²⁰. To maintain all the results of the revolution, the executive authority considered its own authority essential, aimed at ensuring the security of citizens and national order. As for local authorities, they have the mission of organizing five-year work plans under a central technical bureau and focus on improving public aesthetics and hygiene. Special attention is given to cities, which, due to their geographic location and natural beauty, are intended to attract tourists and generate income for the country.

Agriculture was considered the foundation of the national economy, so the government made the following commitments:

1. Not to leave any farmer without land, which, to the extent it provides for a family’s subsistence, takes on an indivisible character protected from any encroachment. The extent of land exploited by large cultivators or farm owners is limited according to population density and the fertility of the region where they are located.

2. To increase, improve, and protect working tools.

3. To take special measures by regions and to create agricultural centres, which, for example, ought to teach peasants the most suitable agricultural and industrial procedures. Measures were also taken to standardize products

to make them economical and easier to export.

4. To ensure abundant and inexpensive production.

5. To provide each family with at least a pair of animals, preferably horses.

The agricultural industry is also granted special importance, thus strengthening the fight against plant epidemics and agricultural pests. Research has been done with the aim of identifying the most suitable technical methods for activity and production in order to improve yield and quality. In this way, wheat and animal breeds improved, and visits by farmers have been organized to see how work is done in other regions, demonstrating the attention they are granted.

The improvement of the situation of peasantry represented a primary objective, and, to achieve these results, the Party has organized People’s Houses everywhere with a rural section, whose members are tasked with providing villagers with all the benefits that culture, on the one hand, and hygiene, on the other hand, impart to people. Their main task is to work on the education and development of the peasantry from a social, sanitary, and intellectual perspective. These Houses organize rural celebrations to which townspeople, in particular, are invited, as they have an interest in creating closer ties between the rural and urban environments. They cooperate with the sections of popular courses for the free education of peasants and with the sections of social assistance for medical aid. At the same time, they are equally responsible for providing personal services to villagers, such as handling correspondence for illiterate peasants or dealing with business matters they may have in the city, etc. They have been designated with the mission of offering advice to villagers, providing them with technical information, and instilling hygiene rules. Peasants are invited to visit the People’s Houses in their district, where they will receive a warm welcome, get information and advice on all subjects of interest to them, and attend conferences, presentations, and film screenings organized especially for them.

The state also organized a corps of “rural educators”, who form the core of the educated peasant masses, so crucial for the future. These

educators are recruited from among soldiers performing military service and receive special training to prepare them for the role of educators. Once they enter the villages, they have the mission of teaching the peasants hygiene rules, the art of modern construction, the secrets of agricultural techniques, and serving as schoolteachers, among other responsibilities. The Republican People's Party expressed its will to provide land to all peasants. This idea was put into practice between 1930 and 1937, and large rural properties that were not well utilized were distributed to landless peasants. It should be added that in Türkiye, before the period leading up to the Second World War, there were over 600 credit cooperatives. "This system unique to Türkiye yielded unexpected results"²¹, noted Romanian analysts.

In foreign trade, the fundamental principle was to preserve the active nature of the balance of trade. For domestic trade, the following priorities were emphasized: organization, standardization, nationalization of trade, and the establishment of cooperatives.

Industrialization was one of the challenges of the Kemalist regime, representing one of the greatest national causes. It was a necessity for harnessing the country's resources and achieving the ideal of an advanced and prosperous nation while also being a matter of national defence. To achieve this, loans were provided, coal and iron mines were exploited, and vessels of various tonnages were built. Secondly, plans were drawn up for infrastructure construction (bridges, roads, railways, etc.), and special attention was given to financial matters, which are key elements to the vitality, strength, and functioning of the state mechanism through currency stabilization, credit consolidation, coordination of monopolies, etc. The corporatist system was not allowed as it contradicted the general principles of Kemalism, which only permitted the representation of the collective interests of the community in front of the state and not the representation of interest groups. Trusts, monopolies, and cartels were prohibited, as were unions that could create discord between employers and workers. "Success in this endeavour can only be achieved through a rational

and systematic approach"²², declared Atatürk. As for the workers, they were organized and guided through the organs of the Party.

The institutions that implemented Kemalist reforms

The leaders in Ankara made efforts to rebuild and reform everything that was old in the attempt to endow the country with entirely new institutions and organizations. For this reason, they placed great importance on the activities carried out by popular organizations and private associations, alongside the activities of official authorities. First and foremost, emphasis was placed on the activities of the People's Houses and the Societies of Turkish Linguistic and Historical Studies, which began to produce works in line with the principles of the Revolution to create a revolutionary culture and propagate it throughout the country. The most recent works include the "Statutes of the Republican People's Party" adopted at the 5th Grand Congress of the Party (June 1, 1939) and the "Program" adopted at the Fifth Grand Congress of the Republican People's Party (May 1939). Apart from these, which were the most visible, there are still others:

1. The federation of sports associations, initially comprising 14 sports clubs, was led by the Council President himself. It was admitted as a public interest institution, subsidized by the state and national organizations, and eventually grew to encompass over 180 clubs. It constructed sports facilities in cities, thanks to local administration, and spread the passion for sports everywhere.

2. The Association for Child Protection distributed various types of aid to children and organized a "Children's Week" with conferences, performances, and more. In 1932, 800 conferences were held, and the number of speeches and meetings focused on children during this period exceeded 1500.

3. The Turkish Red Crescent also plays a very important social role. Between 1923-1933, it spent nearly 1.5 million Turkish pounds on disaster relief, constructed buildings with almost 1,000 sections and branches. Its income is exclusively derived from contributions and donations from citizens.

4. The Association for Public Education was founded with the aim of educating poor chil-

dren, especially those of laborers, and providing assistance to needy students who wished to pursue higher education. Dormitories and schools with special programs were established, where many hours were dedicated to the teaching of foreign languages, convincing Turkish students not to attend schools run by foreigners.

5. The National Association for Economics, established in 1929, expanded to have over 200 branches and conducted extensive propaganda among the people through exhibitions of national products. Deposits in 1928 amounted to 23 million pounds, and in 1932, they reached 40 million pounds, indicating a nearly 100% increase.

6. The Aeronautics League received strong support from the People's Republican Party and achieved the following:

- Obtained three million pounds by 1933.
- Inaugurated nearly 500 branches across the country.
- Established aviation schools and organized aeronautical competitions.
- Brought engineers from France and Germany and actively promoted civil aviation to the masses.
- Constructed hangars and aerodromes.
- Published magazines, organized aviation-themed conferences, and celebrated famous pilots.
- Organized an Aviation Lottery, which served as a significant source of income.

People's Houses

General Mustafa Kemal gave his party a mission with which political organizations are not usually entrusted: that of educating the people, not only politically but especially culturally, guiding them in all branches of national activity, advising, assisting, and facilitating their work and activities. This unique cultural organization in the world is that of the People's Houses. Established in 1932, they had grown to over 200 by 1940, spread across numerous cities and villages, with more than 100,000 members of both sexes, each playing "the most blessed role in the social education work undertaken by the Party"²³. The cultural policy pursued by the Party in the country through them aims to promote sciences, tech-

nology, fine arts, and to disseminate the most accurate information about the country's politics and economy. These Houses are open to all citizens, whether or not they are members of the Party. They are divided into nine sections, which are as follows: language, history, and literature; fine arts; dramatic art; sports; social assistance; popular courses; libraries and publications; village; museums and exhibitions. The work in each of these sections is not entrusted to paid staff, but to the members of the Houses, who volunteer to serve the community.

The language, history and literature sections are tasked with assisting the Society for the Study of the Turkish Language in its linguistic reform work, publishing literary and scientific periodicals (reaching approximately 30 in number), organizing conferences on various topics of public interest, engaging in historical studies, local history, etc., in short, demonstrating a consistent activity in the areas under their jurisdiction.

The fine arts sections aim to promote the appreciation of fine arts among the people, organize concerts even in villages, and provide effective protection to all artists, painters, etc.

The dramatic arts sections establish amateur theatre groups in each House, organize performances, and distribute educational films, etc.

The Sports sections, which the Party considers to be of utmost importance, oversee and subsidize all sports events in the country. They are responsible for organizing athletes and ensure that sports are a healthy exercise and not an exhausting effort.

The responsibilities of the social assistance sections are particularly significant. They offer valuable support to state institutions. All Houses have medical cabinets where member doctors care for local patients. They open dispensaries for children, assist mothers, provide aid, etc. For example, the House in the city of Trabzon has a medical staff of 28 practitioners. Several Houses periodically organize medical tours with medical personnel who go to villages in their jurisdiction, tend to the sick, and distribute medication.

As for the popular courses sections, they work to teach reading and writing to illiter-

ate individuals of all ages, organize at people's request conferences, technical courses for all craft trades, history courses, civic and social knowledge courses, accounting courses, typing courses, sewing courses, and equally emphasize foreign language education.

The libraries and publications sections are tasked with maintaining and enriching the libraries of the People's Houses, publishing works on industry or commerce, and organizing reading rooms.

Finally, the museums and exhibitions sections are responsible for organizing educational trips, ensuring the protection of art and historical monuments, etc. These sections also organize exhibitions in which all manufacturers and producers of the country participate.

In 1937 alone, 3,000 conferences were held, along with 1,164 concerts, 135 art exhibitions, 1,164 performances, and 1,549 cinema sessions. The libraries of the People's Houses were visited by 1,598,191 individuals, compared to 149,949 in 1933.

The Society for the Study of the Turkish Language also plays a paramount role in the cultural development of the country. It has accelerated the progress achieved through the adoption of new Turkish alphabet and has enriched the language with the necessary number of authentic words that have replaced foreign ones. The results of these efforts are published by the society for the benefit of educational institutions.

On the other hand, the Society has achieved something extraordinary in the field of linguistics by developing dictionaries and publishing a Great Turkish Encyclopaedia.

Conclusions

The analysis of the regime of General Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Türkiye is an objective and in-depth approach of the transformation of a nearly paralyzed feudal state into a functional one, firmly anchored in the international system. The goal of the analysis was to identify the means that allowed Türkiye to evolve into a significant regional political actor. In the preparation of this work, the analysts at the Office of Documentation and Administrative Studies used various sources from Romania, Türkiye, and other states,

which led to an objective picture. Although leader Atatürk had passed away several years before the work was written, the situation in Türkiye had not suffered any erosion. No one was criticizing the former president or his regime, and no one was claiming to be a saviour of the nation. On the contrary, the goals set by Kemalist doctrine were faithfully implemented in practice, and no one deviated from their implementation.

On the other hand, the situation in Romania was a difficult one, especially in light of the events of the previous year: the territorial losses in the summer of 1940, the abdication of King Carol II, the proclamation of a national-legionary state, the cohabitation between General Ion Antonescu and the Legionary Movement, and the Legionnaires' rebellion (January 21-23, 1941). In what foreign policy was concerned, Romania had joined the Tripartite Pact to secure from Germany guarantees for its remaining borders. However, two neighbouring countries, the USSR and Hungary, were still targeting Romanian territories and were acting subversively to achieve their goals.

Even if General Antonescu had wanted to implement the Kemalist model, the highly volatile situation both inside and outside Romania only allowed for partial implementation of the reforms. In any case, on June 22, 1941, Romania joined Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Finland in the campaign against the USSR. Romania's objective was the liberation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, as well as removing the communist threat from national borders. In the long term, the aim was to regain north-eastern Transylvania.

The analytical material remained only an objective, at times appreciative, perception of a man who changed a country through willpower, dedication, and effort. All the reforms initiated in the 1920s laid the foundation for Türkiye's development, especially after World War II, when it became a highly important player in the Black Sea region, the Middle East, NATO, and Southeast Europe.

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NOTES

¹ The National Central Historical Archives (hereinafter: ANIC), fond Ministry of Internal Affairs – Office for Documentation and Administrative Studies (hereinafter: MI-ODSA), file 28/1941, page 1.

² Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (born March 12, 1881, Thessaloniki – died November 10, 1938, Istanbul) was a Turkish military officer and politician. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1904 and joined the Committee of Union and Progress in 1907, which aimed to modernize the Ottoman Empire. He served as an officer in Libya against Italy and, during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), he was appointed as the commander of the defence in Gallipoli, after which he became the military attaché in Sofia in 1914. During World War I, he commanded the 19th Division, the 16th Army Corps, and the 7th Army. He distinguished himself by repelling the Anglo-French landings at Gallipoli in 1915, fighting against Russian forces in the Caucasus (1917-1918), and in the Palestine-Sinai region. In 1919, he founded the Turkish nationalist movement in Ankara and initiated the struggle to drive out the Anglo-French-Italian-Greek forces from Türkiye. He led the troops that defeated the Greek armies at the battles of Sakarya (August 1921) and Dumlupınar (August 1922). On October 29, 1923, he proclaimed the Republic of Türkiye, became its first president, and initiated a series of modernization reforms in society. For more information about his life and activities, refer to the following sources: Mehmed Ali Ekrem, *Atatürk, făuritorul Turciei moderne*, Editura Politică, Bucharest, 1969; Mustafa Ke-

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³ ANIC, fond MI-ODSA, file 28/1941, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 5.

⁸ More in: Dr. N. Mănescu, *Turcia de astăzi*, Bucharest, 1939, which includes statistics, maps, and comprehensive data regarding agriculture, forestry, livestock farming, mineral resources, industry, transportation, foreign trade, public finances, currency, credit, etc.; Marcel Clerget-Coll, *La Turquie-pasé et présent*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1938.

⁹ ANIC, fond MI-ODSA, file 28/1941, p. 13.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 13.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 14. The figures show that, despite the bloody losses suffered by the Armenians, at the beginning of 1914, there were still two million of them in the territory of Türkiye, but after the Turkish-Armenian war in 1920, only 50,000 souls remained (cfm. Norbert de Bischoff, *La Turquie dans le monde, L'empire ottoman, la République turque*, Payot, Paris, 1936, p. 171-172). The Greeks numbered over two million, but after the exodus to the motherland, around 90,000 remained in Türkiye.

¹² Norbert de Bischoff (b. 1894, Vienna – d. 1960, Vienna), Austrian diplomat since 1920, with missions in Ankara (1930-1933) and Paris (1933-1938). Retired in 1938 and forced to leave for Paris. From 1947, political representative and, from 1953, ambassador in Moscow until 1960. He published: *Ankara: Eine Deutung des Neuen Werdens in der Türkei*, Holzhausen, Vienna/Leipzig, 1935; *La Turquie dans le monde, L'empire ottoman, la République turque*, Payot, Paris, 1936.

¹³ Norbert de Bischoff, *La Turquie dans le monde...*, p. 173.

¹⁴ ANIC, fond MI-ODSA, file 28/1941, p. 15.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

¹⁸ More in: „Discours prononcé par Atatürk le 1er Novembre 1937” and in C. Beyar, Président du Conseil prononcé devant la Grande Assemblée Nationale le 8 Novembre 1937, „Discours Programme”.

¹⁹ ANIC, fond MI-ODSA, file 28/1941, p. 19.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

A STAGE IN ROMANIAN-TURKISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS: THE ROMANIAN EMBASSY IN ANKARA (1938-1940) *

ADRIAN VIȚALARU **

Abstract

Romanian-Turkish relations went through several stages between the two world wars, both in terms of political-military relations and in terms of diplomatic representation. Raising the level of diplomatic representation from legation to embassy in 1939 was an initiative of King Charles II, who wanted to consolidate his regime by achieving diplomatic successes. The death of president Atatürk and the appointment of a new head of state in Ankara delayed the creation of the Turkish embassy in Bucharest. Türkiye was therefore the last member of the Balkan Pact to implement the agreement reached by the four Allied states in the last months of 1938. Romania and Türkiye also adopted different formulas for the appointment of ambassadors. Although the leaders in Ankara opted for the appointment as ambassador of the diplomat who had been in charge of the diplomatic mission in Bucharest since 1931, the leadership in Bucharest appointed, in the period 1939-1940, two ambassadors (V. Stoica and R. Crutzescu). Even if there were changes at the symbolic level and regarding the rules of diplomatic precedence, this new stage did not produce important changes in the relations between the two allied states.

Keywords: *embassy, diplomatic relations, Romania, Türkiye, V. Stoica, R. Crutzescu*

Introduction

Romanian-Ottoman/Turkish diplomatic relations have a long history, marked by multiple connections between the two countries. From a diplomatic agency (1859-1878) to a legation (1878-1916), Romania's diplomatic

mission in Istanbul ceased its activity on August 17, 1916, when war broke out between Romania and the Ottoman Empire¹. At the end of the war, a Romanian (High) Commissariat was created in Istanbul, which mediated relations between the two states during a pe-

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riod marked by negotiations for the signing of the peace treaty and internal political turmoil in the Ottoman Empire². However, it was not until July 20, 1922, that relations between the Kingdom of Romania and the Ottoman state were re-established at legation level³, without Bucharest sending a head of diplomatic mission to Istanbul⁴. On April 24, 1924, Gheorghe Filality, a diplomat with experience in the Balkan area, who had served as Romania's commissioner in Türkiye since 1919, handed his letters of accreditation as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the President of Türkiye⁵. Basically, the last country defeated in the war with which Romania resumed diplomatic relations and established a legation was Türkiye.

Another moment of political and symbolic significance in Romanian-Turkish relations occurred on August 1, 1929, when, after a period of delays, the decision was taken to move the Romanian legation from Constantinople to Ankara⁶, which became the capital of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Thus, after a more tense phase in the first decade of the interwar period, Romanian-Turkish relations went through a "period of cooperation" in the 1930s⁷. An important moment was the creation, in 1934, of the Balkan Pact, which put relations between Bucharest and Ankara on new terms. On the basis of this alliance between Romania, Türkiye, Greece and Yugoslavia, relations between the four countries intensified, and in 1938 there was talk of raising the rank of diplomatic representations from legation to embassy.

Negotiations between the Balkan Pact countries on the transformation of legations into embassies took place at a time when Romania had opened its first embassy in Warsaw in May 1938, but was also negotiating with other European states on the change of status of diplomatic representations. Despite the insistence of Romanian diplomacy, against the backdrop of an increasingly tense international political context as a result of the Czechoslovak crisis, only France and the Vatican accepted the transformation of legations into embassies in December 1938⁸.

For both King Charles II and the government in Bucharest, it was important that the states of the Balkan Pact also accepted the

proposal made by Romanian diplomacy, as it would have given a signal of cohesion at a time when the Little Entente, the other regional alliance to which Romania belonged, had become inoperative.

Therefore, the present study aims to present, first of all, the negotiations between the states of the Balkan Pact on the issue of raising the level of diplomatic representation and to find an answer to the question: why did Romania's allies in the Balkan Pact take this step slightly later than the Vatican or France? Why was Türkiye the last of the Balkan allied states to appoint an ambassador to Romania? Then, we will present some aspects concerning the functioning of the Romanian Embassy in Ankara, focusing on the composition of the diplomatic staff and, especially, on the professional profile of the two Romanian ambassadors (Vasile Stoica and Radu Crutzescu). At the same time, we will analyse the context in which the Bucharest authorities decided, in September 1940, to change the diplomatic representation from embassy to legation.

A political initiative turned into reality: Romanian embassies in Balkan Pact countries

After negotiations with Poland and contacts with representatives of major powers on the issue of transforming legations into embassies, another direction assumed by Romanian diplomacy aimed at obtaining the agreement of the Allied States, within the Balkan Pact and the Little Entente, to transform legations into embassies⁹. According to some Italian sources, this issue seemed to have been discussed between representatives of Romania and Türkiye since February 1938 at the meeting of the Balkan Pact held in Ankara¹⁰. However, it is certain that King Charles II discussed, during his visit to Türkiye in June 1938, with President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the possibility of raising the level of diplomatic representation as an expression of friendly ties between the two states¹¹. This topic of interest for Romania was also addressed in July 1938, on the occasion of the visit to Romania of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, on the occasion of Queen Marie's funeral¹². However, the first public confirmation of Romania's

actions to its allies came in the second half of August 1938. Following negotiations held in Bled, Yugoslavia, between representatives of the Little Entente states, it was decided on 22 August that “the legations in Bucharest and Belgrade should be raised as soon as possible to the rank of embassies”¹³. Czechoslovakia, in full crisis, following the claims of the German minority on its territory, maintained its point of view not to proceed to the lifting of its legations to the rank of embassy.

However, the most important moment occurred in Geneva in the autumn of the same year. Representatives of the Balkan Pact states agreed, within the framework of the proceedings of the Permanent Council held on September 16, to proceed to lift the legations to the rank of embassy¹⁴. The move was intended to reconfirm the ties between the four allies, as the other alliance of Romania and Yugoslavia, along with Czechoslovakia, was put to great test. The decision was not a simple one. British diplomatic documents show that the Greeks did not want the legations of the Balkan Pact states to be raised to the rank of embassy. Therefore, they tried to persuade the British

to intervene in order to appease Romania’s initiative. But the British refused to get involved in the Balkan states’ issue. As Türkiye, through the voices of Atatürk and Aras, although “embarrassed”, responded positively to the initiative launched by King Carol II, the Greeks also agreed¹⁵. These decisions must also be linked to international developments in the Balkans, marked by the signing, on July 31, 1938, of the Thessaloniki Agreement between the Balkan Pact, through the Greek leader I. Metaxas, and Bulgaria¹⁶. This agreement paved the way for a better relationship with Bulgaria, which led Tevfik Rüştü Aras to declare, in September 1938, that he supported the embassy elevation of the legations “of the five Balkan states”¹⁷.

By the end of November, no action was taken to materialize the Geneva agreement of 16 September. This is closely related to the tense situation in Europe, the focus of Romania’s foreign policy on the consequences of the Munich Conference and the preparation of the tour carried out by King Carol II in Europe, as well as the death, on November 10, 1938, of the President of Türkiye, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

However, at the end of November, Romanian diplomacy tried to speed up the process of raising the legations of the Balkan Pact states to the rank of embassy. On November 29, Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen called on the Romanian ministers plenipotentiary in Ankara, Athens and Belgrade to inform the governments of the three allied states that Romania “has made all the necessary preparations to raise its legations to the rank of embassy” in the states of the Balkan Pact¹⁸. The Romanian dignitary proposed that the entire operation be carried out in December, and the transformation of legations into embassies to enter into force starting January 1, 1939¹⁹. Romanians received an encouraging response only from Greece. This prompted the Romanian Foreign Minister to send, on December 4, to the legations of Greece, Yugoslavia and Türkiye, a message in a harsher tone, stating “for extremely serious reasons we are obliged to urgently promulgate the law whereby the ties of Paris, the Vatican, Belgrade, Athens and Ankara are elevated to the rank of embassies”. Petrescu-Comnen reiterated part of the message of November 29, suggesting to the Balkan Pact states that the measure should



Tevfik Rüştü Aras

be put into practice in the following steps: “We (Romanians, author’s note) promulgate the law later this week. Reform to enter into force on January 1, next year. Applications for agreement to be made during the month of December. The new ambassadors should present the accreditation letters only during January, at a date that would be agreed upon”²⁰. The Romanian Foreign Minister called for an immediate response, motivating that a big change would take place in Romania’s diplomatic corps. Actually, the reality was different. On the one hand, a government reshuffle was being prepared in Romania, and one of the ministers concerned was Petrescu-Comnen himself²¹. On the other hand, King Carol II was preparing for the creation of the National Renaissance Front, which was founded in mid-December 1938. In this political framework, it was important that the process of asserting Romania’s legations in France, the Vatican, Yugoslavia, Türkiye and Greece to be completed as soon as possible. This act was beneficial both for the king, who sought to consolidate his regime, challenged from within, and for the foreign minister, who, in the event of losing his position in the government, would be satisfied to be appointed as the head of an embassy.


However, Türkiye’s new Foreign Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu did not share the Romanians’ view. He reasoned that it was impossible to implement this measure from January 1: “financially speaking, the creation of a Turkish Embassy to Bucharest on the 1st of January 1939, both from the point of view of voting law for the creation of three new embassies, as well as their placing in the state budget”²². The Turkish dignitary was advancing as a possible date for the transformation of the Bucharest legation into an embassy in the middle of 1939. The reasons were legal, financial, but they were also related to the fact that Türkiye’s new leadership, headed by President İsmet İnönü, wanted to restructure the diplomatic corps. Therefore, the Turkish proposal was for Romanians to implement the timetable, and Türkiye would also proceed to the appointment of ambassadors to the three Balkan Pact states “at a later date and as soon as possible”²³. The Yugoslavs also tried to calm down the haste with which the government in Bucharest wanted to com-



Şükrü Saracoğlu

plete the process of transforming legations into embassies. The Yugoslavs argued that parliamentary elections would be held in December 1938²⁴. After the suffrage, the government was to be reshuffled. Therefore, the measure would be implemented with a “slight setback” compared to the timetable proposed by the Romanian Government²⁵. On the other hand, the Greeks initially agreed with the proposals from Bucharest²⁶. Then, having learned about Türkiye’s decision, they revised their point of view. Motivating that in Geneva in September 1938, the foreign ministers of the Balkan Pact states agreed to proceed simultaneously to the lifting of legations to embassy rank, the leadership of the Athens Foreign Ministry informed Romania on December 5 that Greece would do the same as the other allied states²⁷. However, the Greek Foreign Minister was told his Romanian counterpart that Greece was going to press Türkiye to speed up the adoption of measures to transform legations into embassies²⁸.

Despite these obstacles, the leaders in Bucharest sought to complete their plan. As a re-



İsmet İnönü

sult, on December 12, the Romanian Foreign Minister announced the governments of the Balkan Pact states that Romania will proceed to the lifting of the legations to the rank of embassy, and the Allied states will do the same as soon as possible²⁹. In this context, on December 12, 1938, the act proposing the lifting of the legations to the rank of embassy was signed, and at the meeting of the Government of Romania on December 17 the decision was taken to hand King Carol II the decree whereby the three legations of Romania were transformed into embassies on January 1, 1939³⁰. As of January 1, 1939, Romania was represented in Ankara, Athens and Belgrade at embassy level. The ambassadors were not immediately appointed, as stated in the proposal of the Romanian Foreign Minister in December 1938.

The ministers plenipotentiary of Romania from Greece and Türkiye were recalled from January 1, 1939³¹. They were replaced with Vasile Stoica in Ankara (February 1) and Radu Tr. Djuvara in Athens (February 24)³². In Belgrade, the new ambassador, starting February 1, 1939, was Victor Cădere. Professor, politician, and diplomat, he led Romania's legation in Yugoslavia between November 1936 and August 1938³³.

In the end, Yugoslavia, Greece and Türkiye acted individually, and not simultaneously, when they, in turn, lifted the Bucharest legations to the rank of embassy and appointed ambassadors. The Greeks were most receptive, who began legal proceedings as early as December 1938³⁴. However, it was only at the beginning of March 1939 that the Greek Ambassador to Bucharest, Constantin Collas, submitted his credentials. Greece chose to appoint as ambassador the minister plenipotentiary who had previously been active in the Romanian capital³⁵. Also, on February 1, 1939, Yugoslavia appointed the Bucharest minister plenipotentiary Jovan Dučić as ambassador to the Romanian capital³⁶. Dučić's appointments in Bucharest and Cădere in Belgrade were made public as Romanian Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu was on a visit to Yugoslavia on February 1, 1939³⁷.

The last ambassador of the Balkan Pact states appointed to Bucharest was Türkiye's. In mid-June, on the occasion of the visit of Romanian Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu to Türkiye³⁸, the Turkish government announced that it would implement the decision to transform the Bucharest legation into an embassy, while also asking for approval for the future ambassador³⁹. Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver⁴⁰, who was active in Romania since 1931 as an envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, was appointed ambassador to Bucharest on July 8, 1939⁴¹. Thus, all three Allied states chose to accredit their ministers plenipotentiary in Bucharest as ambassadors to Romania.

Romanian ambassadors in Ankara: Vasile Stoica and Radu Crutzescu

Romania's first ambassador to the Republic of Türkiye was Vasile Stoica. Born in Avrig (Transylvania, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) on January 1, 1889, V. Stoica has been involved unofficially in diplomacy since the First World War, when he was part of a Romanian 'propaganda mission' to the United States of America, but he joined the Romanian diplomatic service in July 1921 as second class secretary of legation. Although his early career was marked by various tensions, which took him out of the diplomatic corps in two stages (1923-1926; 1928-1929), from 1930 his

work in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs moved to a higher level. Vasile Stoica was promoted to Minister Plenipotentiary 2nd class and appointed at the head of the Romanian legation in Albania. After two years in Tirana, he was appointed head of the legation in Sofia (1932-1936) and then became the chief of the diplomatic mission in Latvia (1936-1939)⁴². Vasile Stoica thus had diplomatic experience in diplomatic missions in the Balkans and the Baltic States, and his work was appreciated by King Charles II. In addition, Stoica was involved, from his observation post in Riga, in the complicated relations between Romania and the USSR, which was another of his advantages, given Türkiye's role in the security of the Black Sea area, where Soviet-Turkish relations were of particular importance.

Vasile Stoica was one of Romania's senior diplomats who had a good relationship with the political decision-makers in Bucharest. That is why his appointment as ambassador to Ankara was supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Grigore Gafencu, with whom he had the same old political affinities, as both diplomats were members of the National Peasants' Party. In this context, on January 18, 1939, Gafencu informed Stoica that he had requested the approval of the Turkish officials for his appointment to the rank of ambassador, and that he would retain the rank of minister plenipotentiary 1st class (obtained in 1938) in the internal hierarchy of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁴³.

Ambassador Stoica arrived in Ankara in the first decade of March. The first important protocol meeting was with the Turkish Foreign Minister on March 11, 1939. The Romanian diplomat reported to Bucharest that: "I was received with a real burst of joy"⁴⁴. A few days later, on March 15, he presented his letters of accreditation to the Turkish President, İsmet İnönü⁴⁵. Stoica's mission began in a tense international context, marked by the disappearance of the Czechoslovak state and the problems generated by Romania's minister plenipotentiary in London, V. V. Tilea, who informed the British authorities about an alleged "ultimatum" submitted by Germany to the Romanian state⁴⁶.

An experienced diplomat with a strong personality, Vasile Stoica was a keen observer



Vasile Stoica

of Turkish politics and an assiduous promoter of Romania's political and economic objectives in its relations with the Republic of Türkiye. He sought to integrate as quickly as possible into the diplomatic and political environment of the Turkish capital and to understand as well as possible the political psychology of the Turkish leaders. As Türkiye was becoming an increasingly important ally of Romania and Turkish sensitivities had to be contained, Stoica called the attention of the leaders in Bucharest to avoid mentioning the defeat of the Turks in 1877/1878 by the Romanian army in published articles and speeches on the occasion of the celebration of May 10. The fact that the Romanian ambassador's suggestions were sent to the king and the head of the Romanian government shows, on the one hand, the credibility that Stoica had in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on the other, the attention that the authorities in Bucharest were showing towards relations with Ankara⁴⁷.

We do not insist here on his activity in Ankara, a subject addressed in various specialized

studies⁴⁸, but we mention the fact that Stoica was an important piece in the gears of Romanian diplomacy. However, his involvement, together with the other Romanian representatives in the capitals of the Balkan Pact states, in the project to set up the “bloc of neutrals” in the last months of 1939 stands out⁴⁹. This is why Stoica’s work in Ankara was appreciated by the King. For example, on October 27, 1939, Charles II noted in his Diary: “Afternoon conference with Argetoianu, Gafencu, Cădere and Stoica on our Balkan policy. The ambassadors made their report, particularly the one in Ankara. It was agreed that the action of forming a Bloc of neutrals in South-Eastern Europe should continue, with the Balkan Pact as its foundation and leaving Yugoslavia to begin its negotiations... A fine plan, but I don’t see much hope of success now, as the spirits are agitated”⁵⁰. Even though the project to form a bloc of neutrals failed, Stoica’s work was not affected. In the first part of 1940, the Romanian ambassador was involved in obtaining information, via the Turkish channel, about the Soviet Union’s policy towards Romania and the Balkans. Stoica had a series of meetings with decision-makers in Ankara, sending to Bucharest telegrams and reports full of substance on the subject⁵¹.

Although Vasile Stoica was appointed, on March 4, 1940, Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of National Propaganda⁵², he continued his work in Ankara. It was not until June 22, 1940, that Stoica left Türkiye, ending his mission as Romanian Ambassador to Ankara⁵³.

Vasile Stoica’s replacement at the head of the embassy in the Turkish capital was Radu G. Crutzescu. A diplomat by profession, Crutzescu was born in Bucharest on September 5, 1892, and was admitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs following an exam as a legation attaché in 1918. His career was different from that of Stoica, who had joined the diplomatic corps as a 2nd class secretary. Crutzescu therefore rose step by step through the diplomatic ranks, becoming legation counsellor in 1930⁵⁴. Working for a period in the Ministry’s Central Administration in the Directorate of Political Affairs, he became deputy director in 1932, a position which gave him a good position in the administrative machinery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, it was only after

Titulescu’s replacement at the head of the Sturza Palace that Radu Crutzescu was promoted to the rank of minister plenipotentiary 2nd class and was appointed, in November 1936, to head the legation in Sofia⁵⁵. So Crutzescu’s first mission as head of legation was to Bulgaria, where he replaced Vasile Stoica. After his move to Moscow, prepared in the first months of 1938, did not materialise, Crutzescu was appointed, on 1 May 1938, at the head of the legation in Prague, where he worked until mid-January 1939, when he returned to the Central Administration of the Ministry and was appointed Director of Political Affairs. He served only briefly in this important position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since he was appointed, on March 1, 1939, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Romania to Germany⁵⁶. Thus, Radu Crutzescu was, at the end of the 1930s, one of the members of Romania’s diplomatic elite, since he held important positions in the Ministry and was entrusted with leading difficult and highly rated diplomatic missions in the Romanian diplomatic service, such as the one in Berlin.

In a context where V. Stoica had been appointed undersecretary of state in the Romanian government, and Romanian-German relations seemed to be viewed in different terms by the leaders in Bucharest, Radu Crutzescu was replaced in Berlin by Alexandru Romalo and appointed, on June 1, 1940, to head the embassy in Türkiye⁵⁷. Radu Tr. Djuvara had followed the same path the year before, when he was transferred from the Romanian legation in Germany to the embassy in Athens. Even though Crutzescu no longer worked at the diplomatic mission in Türkiye, as Djuvara had been in Greece, he had expertise in the Balkan area and was well acquainted with significant foreign policy issues as a result of combining important positions in the Ministry’s Central Administration (in the Directorate of Political Affairs) with work at the head of diplomatic missions.

Considering the international political circumstances, Radu Crutzescu took over the embassy rather quickly. On June 24, he arrived in Istanbul⁵⁸, a day later in Ankara, and on June 28, 1940, he presented his letters of accreditation to the President of the Republic of

Türkiye⁵⁹. The beginning of his mandate was marked by the ultimatums received by Romania and the ceding of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. In this context, there were problems in the transmission of telegrams between Ankara and Bucharest, caused, according to Crutzescu, by the measures taken by the Bulgarian authorities⁶⁰.

So, Radu Crutzescu, with the help of his collaborators, had to integrate quickly into the political and diplomatic environment in Ankara, being, from the beginning of his mandate, assailed by important requests from Bucharest. First of all, the Romanian government wanted to know whether, in the context of the events at the end of June, Türkiye would respect its obligations under the Balkan Pact if Bulgaria attacked Romania⁶¹. Then, in the first days of July 1940, Crutzescu was asked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain to the Turkish authorities the “change of course in the orientation” of the Romanian state’s foreign policy, stressing that the “foundations of the Balkan Pact” and the close ties between the two states would not be affected⁶². Crutzescu complied with these requests and, when the situation calmed down, sent a first relevant political report to Bucharest by courier on July 5, 1940. He did not shy away from stating that the ceding of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union had been received in Türkiye with “deep satisfaction”, even if disguised under “expressions of sympathy” for Romania⁶³. In addition, Crutzescu made a coherent analysis of the geopolitical situation in Europe, stating that a military clash between the Germans and the Soviets was “almost inevitable”⁶⁴.

Crutzescu was a keen observer of the international scene, as well as an analyst of Turkish-Romanian relations with many critical touches. In telegrams and reports sent to Bucharest he drew attention to political actions or information published in certain Turkish newspapers that affected the interests and international image of the Romanian state. Crutzescu also intervened on several occasions with the Ankara authorities to ask them to tone down the attitude of some Turkish newspapers towards Romania⁶⁵.

Radu Crutzescu’s stay at the head of the diplomatic mission in Ankara was short-lived.

The political changes in Romania in the first half of September 1940 generated a chain reaction in Romania’s diplomatic service. General Ion Antonescu, Prime Minister and “leader” of the national-legionary state, ordered the replacement of several heads of diplomatic missions, including Radu Crutzescu. Moreover, on September 11, 1940, Antonescu decided that Romania’s embassies should be transformed into legations and that the rank of ambassador should be abolished⁶⁶.

In this context, on September 12, Crutzescu informed the Turkish Foreign Minister of the decision taken by the new leadership in Bucharest. Mehmet Şükrü Saracoğlu was “unpleasantly surprised” by the sudden and unilateral decision of the Bucharest authorities, given that Romania had insisted in 1938 on converting the legations into embassies⁶⁷. However, according to diplomatic practice based on the principle of reciprocity, the other member states of the Balkan Pact had to accept Bucharest’s decision and proceed to convert the embassies in Bucharest into legations⁶⁸. Of Romania’s three allies, Türkiye and Yugoslavia had the most objections. On the one hand, the Turkish state had been the last to transform the legation in Bucharest into an embassy, and on the other it had raised the head of the diplomatic mission in Bucharest to the rank of ambassador. The Ankara authorities did not want to change Tanrıöver, so the compromise was that he should be accredited as minister plenipotentiary, but retain the right of precedence “he had when he first presented his letters (of accreditation, n.n. A.V.) as minister” and after the transformation of the Turkish embassy in Bucharest into a legation⁶⁹. In this context, on September 23, 1940, the measure to transform the Ankara legation into an embassy was officially implemented⁷⁰, although Yugoslavia postponed taking a decision, as the Bucharest authorities would have wished⁷¹.

This is the diplomatic framework in which Radu Crutzescu ended his mission in Ankara in mid-October 1940⁷². In practice, he was initially accredited as head of the Romanian Embassy in Türkiye, but ended his mission as minister plenipotentiary at the head of the Romanian state legation in Ankara.

Vasile Stoica and Radu Crutzescu collaborated with a number of diplomats who worked

in the embassy, as well as with the staff of the consulate in Istanbul, which operated under the coordination of the diplomatic mission in Ankara. Although the symbolic prestige of the diplomatic representation increased with the transformation into an embassy, no major changes were made to the diplomatic and consular staff structure. Stoica and Crutzescu collaborated with the 2nd class secretary Mihail Popescu, appointed in Ankara on July 1, 1939⁷³, with the counsellor Gheorghe Căpităneanu⁷⁴, who had replaced Constantin Marinescu Eliad, who had worked in Ankara from 1931 to 1939⁷⁵. Radu Crutzescu also had as his first collaborator the counsellor Emanoil Krupenski⁷⁶, who was transferred to Ankara in July 1940, replacing Căpităneanu, while Gheorghe Zerva⁷⁷ and Vaghelie Hrisicu⁷⁸ worked at the consulate in Istanbul. The Ankara embassy therefore did not have a large diplomatic staff, like that of some diplomatic missions in the capitals of the great powers (England, Germany, France) or in countries with which Romania had a tense relationship, such as Hungary.

Conclusions

The transformation of Romania's legations in Türkiye and the other states of the Balkan Pact into embassies was obviously an achievement with symbolic connotations for Romanian diplomacy. In the context when the international situation in Europe was marked by major tensions, and at internal level there were important political transformations that increased the number of the king's challengers, achieving "victories" in foreign policy was meant to strengthen the regime of Carol II. This explains the insistence with which the Romanian diplomacy initiated negotiations on this issue, as well as the tenacity with which it sought to implement the agreements on the transformation of legations into embassies. At the same time, we should note that, by raising the legations to the rank of embassy, it was also aimed at boosting relations with the allied states, in the present case with Türkiye. However, achieving this goal is difficult to prove if we analyse the evolution of relations between Romania and Türkiye between 1939 and 1940.

The Romanian Embassy in Türkiye was headed by two experienced diplomats (Vasile

Stoica and Radu Crutzescu), who had worked in their careers in Romania's diplomatic missions in the Balkans. They headed the diplomatic mission with the rank of ambassador, while in the internal hierarchy of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Stoica was minister plenipotentiary 1st class and Crutzescu minister plenipotentiary 2nd class. While for Stoica the mission to Türkiye was a springboard to an important political-administrative position, that of undersecretary of state at the Ministry of National Propaganda, for Crutzescu the quick end of his mission in Ankara meant a return to a director's post in the central administration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead, the Turkish leaders preferred the option of continuity in the diplomatic post, accrediting as ambassador the diplomat who had headed the diplomatic mission in Bucharest since 1931.

The raising of the diplomatic representation between Romania and Türkiye to the level of embassy between 1939 and 1940 was an important and symbolic stage in the history of relations between the two countries. Even if there were no notable political changes after the creation of the embassies, and the decision to return to diplomatic representation at legation level by the Bucharest leadership displeased the Turkish leaders, the Ankara legation was a very important diplomatic mission during wartime. At the end of the conflict, the new leadership in Bucharest, in agreement with Ankara's leaders, decided to return to the 1939-1940 level of diplomatic representation starting in March 1946, transforming the legations into embassies.

NOTES

¹ Ion Mamina, Gheorghe Neacșu, George Potra, Nicolae Nicolescu (eds.), *Organizarea instituțională a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe. Acte și documente*, volumul II, 1920-1947, București, Fundația Europeană Titulescu, 2006, 560-561; Silvana Rachieru, *Diplomați și supuși otomani în Vechiul Regat: relații otomano-române între anii 1878 și 1908*, Iași, Editura Universității Alexandru Ioan Cuza, 2018, p. 109-114; Silvana Rachieru, *A social perspective on the history of modern Romanian diplomacy: the case of the royal legation of Romania to Istanbul*, in Gh. Cliveti, Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu, Adrian Vițalaru, Ionuț Nistor (eds.), *Romania and*

European Diplomacy. From Cabinet Diplomacy to the 21st Century Challenges, Trieste/Iași, Beit Casa Editrice/Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2012, p. 125-139.

² Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (hereinafter AMAE), București, Fond Problema 82, folder 96 (Turcia), f. 11-12.

³ Ion Mamina, Gheorghe Neacșu, George Potra, Nicolae Nicolescu (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 561.

⁴ Although Nicolae Simionescu was appointed Romania's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Istanbul, he did not take up his post (*Ibidem*, p. 561; Mehmet Ali Ekrem, *Relațiile româno-turce între cele două războaie mondiale (1919-1944)*, București, Editura Științifică, 1993, p. 27).

⁵ AMAE, Fond Problema 77, folder F 12 – Gheorghe Filality, vol. 2, unpagued. For Information on the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and Türkiye, see also at Metin Omer, *Emigrarea turcilor și tătarilor din România în Turcia între cele două războaie mondiale*, Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2020, p. 202-203.

⁶ Florin Anghel, *Romania between Istanbul and Ankara: The Beginning of the Alliance in the first decade of the Kemalist Republic*, in “Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi”, 54, 1 (2014), p. 440-447; Metin Omer, *op. cit.*, p. 205-210; Liliana Boșcan, *Diplomatic and economic relations between the Kingdom of Romania and the Republic of Türkiye during the Atatürk period (1923-1938)*, Ankara, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2019, p. 59-67, 81-83.

⁷ Vezi detalii la Mehmet Ali Ekrem, *op. cit.*, p. 38-49; Liliana Boșcan, *op. cit.*, p. 91-197.

⁸ Adrian Vițalariu, *Political interests and symbolic stakes. The first Romanian Embassies (1938-1939)*, in *Romanian Diplomacy in the 20th Century. Biographies, Institutional Pathways, International Challenges*, editors Adrian Vițalariu, Ionuț Nistor, Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu, Berlin, Peter Lang, 2021, p. 177-202.

⁹ On the negotiations on raising the level of diplomatic representation between the Balkan Pact countries see also *Ibidem*, p. 195-201.

¹⁰ King Carol II noted in his daily notes, after meeting Atatürk: “I also note the ambassadors issue, receiving assurances, with the reservation made to me yesterday by Aras” (Carol II, Rege al României, *Însemnări zilnice 1927-1951*, volumul 1, 11 martie 1937 – 4 septembrie 1938, București, Editura Scripta, 1995, p. 178); Archivio Storico Diplomatico (hereinafter ASD), Rome, Fond Romania, folder 12 (Bucharest, 10.03.1938/XVI, Ugo Sola to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Bucharest, 29.07.1938, Ugo Sola to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), unpagued.

¹¹ Dumitru Preda (ed.), *România-Turcia. Relații diplomatice*, vol. I, 1923-1938, București, Editura Cavallioti, 2011, p. 350. Türkiye already had embassies in several states.

¹² AMAE, Fond Dosare Speciale 1935-1944, folder 378/2, f. 77; ASD, Fond Romania, folder 12 (Bucharest, 29.07.1938, Ugo Sola to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), unpagued.

¹³ AMAE, Fond Dosare Speciale 1935-1944, folder 378/2, f. 56.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 58, 63.

¹⁵ The National Archives, London, FO 371 /22446, f. 167.

¹⁶ Maria Costea, *Relațiile politico-diplomatice româno-bulgare (1938-1940)*, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Napoca Star, 2010, p. 140-145.

¹⁷ Bulgaria showed interest in this subject, but apparently the Balkan Pact states did not take official steps to materialize the foreign minister's “offer” (AMAE, Fond Dosare Speciale 1935-1944, folder 378/2, f. 57-58, 90, 105, 106).

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 63.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ AMAE, Fond 71/România, folder 104, f. 474.

²¹ Adrian Vițalariu, *Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen – diplomat*, Iași, Editura Universității “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași, 2014, p. 412-413.

²² AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 60, f. 358-360.

²³ AMAE, Fond 71/România, folder 104, f. 475-477, 494-496, 571; Liliana Boșcan, *op. cit.*, p. 177-178.

²⁴ The elections were held on 11 December 1938.

²⁵ AMAE, Fond 71/România, folder 104, f. 497.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 485.

²⁷ AMAE, Fond Dosare Speciale 1935-1944, folder 378/2, f. 86; AMAE, Fond 71/România, folder 104, f. 511-512; AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 60, f. 361-363.

²⁸ AMAE, Fond Dosare Speciale 1935-1944, folder 378/2, f. 88-89.

²⁹ AMAE, Fond 71/România, folder 104, f. 472-573, 579-580; AMAE, Fond Dosare Speciale 1935-1944, folder 378/2, f. 85-87.

³⁰ Arhivele Naționale ale României, București, Fund Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri. *Jurnale*, folder 483, f. 122-123, 127. See also AMAE, Fond Problema 82, folder 96 (Turcia), f. 23-29.

³¹ The two heads of diplomatic missions recalled were: Alexander Telemaque, from Türkiye, and Eugen Filotti, from Athens.

³² Ion Mamina, Gheorghe Neacșu, George Potra, Nicolae Nicolescu (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 547, 561. Djuvara had been active in the diplomatic mission in Athens at the beginning of his career. Before reaching Athens, he led the legations of Belgium

and Germany. Radu Trandafir Djuvara presented credentials to the King of Greece on 4 May 1939 (AMAE, Fond Problema 77, folder G 49 – Radu Tr. Djuvara, vol. III, unpagged).

³³ Ioana Ecaterina Asăvoaie, *Diplomatul Victor Cădere (1919-1944)*, Bragadiru, Editura Miidecărți, 2019, p. 251.

³⁴ AMAE, Fond 71/România, folder 104, f. 635. After being recalled from Belgrade in August 1938, Cădere was appointed royal resident of the Lower Danube Land.

³⁵ AMAE, Fond 71/Grecia, folder 86, f. 16-18.

³⁶ „Universul”, February 3, 1939, p. 1; “Primul ambasador iugoslav la București”, in “Universul”, February 4, 1939, p. 9. For the opinions of the Yugoslav diplomat about the situation in Romania during 1937-1939, see Jovan Dučić, *Rapoarte diplomatice din București (1937-1939)*, București, Editura Universal Dalsi, 1998.

³⁷ „D. Ministru Gafencu a sosit la Belgrad”, in „Universul”, 3 February 1939, p. 1.

³⁸ AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 61, f. 118-173. Gafencu visited Türkiye from 11 to 14 June 1939.

³⁹ AMAE, Fond Dosare Speciale 1935-1944, folder 378/2, f. 115, 117. In fact, Türkiye simultaneously elevated its legations in Athens, Belgrade and Bucharest to the rank of embassy.

⁴⁰ Pentru detalii despre cariera diplomatului turc, vezi Metin Omer, *op. cit.*, p. 244-251.

⁴¹ Dumitru Preda (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 354. His mission to Romania ended in December 1944. Mehmet Ali Ekrem claims that the King of Romania gave his approval for the appointment of the Turkish ambassador on 16 June 1939, but erroneously states that Vasile Stoica was also appointed ambassador to Ankara at that time (Mehmet Ali Ekrem, *op. cit.*, p. 95; AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 61, f. 174).

⁴² During this period, V. Stoica had multiple accreditations, as the head of the diplomatic mission in Latvia also represented Romania's interests in relations with Lithuania. AMAE, Fond Problema 77, folder S 75 - Vasile Stoica, vol. 3, f. 158.

⁴³ AMAE, Fond Problema 77, folder S 75 - Vasile Stoica, vol. 3, f. 41.

⁴⁴ AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 61, f. 12.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 15.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 15-19, 30-33. On this topic see also Bogdan-Alexandru Schipor, *Politica Marii Britanii la frontiera de vest a Uniunii Sovietice, 1938-1941*, Iași, Editura Junimea, 2007, p. 108-119.

⁴⁷ AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 61, f. 98-99.

⁴⁸ See, for example: Ioan Opriș, *Vasile Stoica în serviciul României*, București, Editura Oscar Print, 2008, p. 254-282; Mioara Anton, *The Quest for a Compromise. The Balkan Front and Vasile Stoica's Mission in Ankara (March 1939 – June 1940)*,

in Adrian Vițalaru, Ionuț Nistor, Adrian-Bogdan Ceobanu (eds.), *Romanian Diplomatic Corps (1918-1947). Recruitments, Professional Ways, Intellectual Profiles*, Konstanz, Hartung-Gorre Verlag, 2020, p. 179-198.

⁴⁹ Mehmet Ali Ekrem, *op. cit.*, p. 104-111. Bogdan-Alexandru Schipor, *op. cit.*, p. 283-296.

⁵⁰ Carol al II-lea, Rege al României, *Însemnări zilnice*, volumul II, 13 martie – 15 decembrie 1939 (caielele 8-10), București, Editura Scripta, 2003, p. 259.

⁵¹ AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 61, f. 272-294.

⁵² AMAE, Fond Problema 77, folder S 75 - Vasile Stoica, vol. 3, f. 61. Stelian Neagoe, *Istoria guvernelor României de la Începuturi – 1959, până în zilele noastre – 1999*, ediția a II-a, București, Editura Machiavelli, 1999, p. 132.

⁵³ AMAE, Fond Problema 77, folder S 75 - Vasile Stoica, vol. 3, f. 74.

⁵⁴ AMAE, Fond Problema 77, folder C 86 - Radu G. Crutzescu, f. 54.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 63.

⁵⁶ *Anuar diplomatic și consular 1942*, București, 1942, p. 121.

⁵⁷ AMAE, Fond Problema 77, folder C 86 - Radu G. Crutzescu, f. 160.

⁵⁸ AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 61, f. 336.

⁵⁹ AMAE, Fond Problema 77, folder C 86 - Radu G. Crutzescu, f. 161.

⁶⁰ AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 61, f. 340.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, f. 341.

⁶² *Ibidem*, f. 343.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, f. 345-346.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 346.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 362-364, 373-374.

⁶⁶ Ion Mamina, Gheorghe Neacșu, George Potra, Nicolae Nicolescu (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 233-234.

⁶⁷ AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 61, f. 379.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 382.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, f. 384, 388.

⁷⁰ Ion Mamina, Gheorghe Neacșu, George Potra, Nicolae Nicolescu (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 561.

⁷¹ AMAE, Fond 71/Iugoslavia, folder 13, f. 159, 185,

⁷² He had his farewell audience with the President of Türkiye on 10 October 1940 (AMAE, Fond 71/Turcia, folder 61, f. 395).

⁷³ Adrian Vițalaru (ed.), *Anuar diplomatic și consular al Regatului României, 1946. Din istoria Ministerului Afacerilor Străine*, Iași, Editura Universității “Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2016, p. 239.

⁷⁴ *Anuar diplomatic și consular 1942*, p. 116.

⁷⁵ Adrian Vițalaru (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 225.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 222.

⁷⁷ *Anuar diplomatic și consular 1942*, p. 159.

⁷⁸ Adrian Vițalaru (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 218.

WHAT ACTUALLY NATO MEANS FOR THEM? TURKISH AND ROMANIAN HISTORICAL PERCEPTIONS ON NATO

YIĞIT ANIL GÜZELİPEK *

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, remarkable changes have occurred in international systemic dynamics. Although these changes are mostly imagined on the axis of polarity in terms of international relations, the changes in the missions and visions of international organizations are also noteworthy. In this context, NATO, a Cold War organization, is among the first examples that come to mind. To put it more clearly, NATO has gone beyond being a mere security organization and has gained different missions from nation building to humanitarian aid. On the other hand, the organization, which increased the number of allies, accepted a significant part of its 'old enemies' as its 'new friends'. In this context, it is considered extremely important to compare the perceptions of an old 'friend' of the organization like Türkiye and a relatively new 'friend' of the organization like Romania towards NATO. This comparison provides an insight into NATO's perceptions of its allies; on the other hand, it provides a test of the perceptions of two nation-states in two different blocs towards NATO during the Cold War period. This study aims to investigate both Türkiye's and Romanian's perceptions on NATO by considering the modernization and westernization concepts in the sense of security.

Keywords: *Türkiye, Romania, NATO, Security, Modernization, Perception*

Introduction

It is not a surprising fact that many of the studies focusing on the concept of security in the International Relations literature still rely on military security. Although the traditional understanding of security has been greatly eroded and diversified due to the intense im-

pact of globalization, military security is still the first type understood from the notion of security. Because, for an actor that cannot ensure its military security, the lower layers of traditional security such as cyber security, climate and environmental security, and energy security will not mean much. On the other hand, the dominant influence of the realist paradigm

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in International Relations played a remarkable role in the establishment of this understanding. While realism defines the reason for existence of states in the international system as survival, it also emphasizes that it is essential for states to achieve this mission on their own within the framework of the self-help principle. However, one of the most important criticisms of the realist paradigm in modern international relations is the fact that even the dominant power has a limited capacity to be self-sufficient in the modern international system. In other words, the modern international system has created a mechanism, shaped by the principle of interdependence rather than self-sufficiency. In this context, even in an area that is extremely fundamental to international relations, such as security, states consider cooperation as an obligation rather than a choice.

In this context, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the two most prominent international organizations of the Cold War period, were established as an outcome of the collective security approach. Under the influence of nuclear armament and nuclear war hysteria, one of the keywords of the Cold War period, NATO and the Warsaw Pact adopted military security as their priority mission. In addition, securing discipline within the pole they lead, by using various pressure tools has come to the fore as another reason for the existence of both organizations. In both organizations, where there was a vertical structure within a hierarchical understanding, the decision-making process was largely monopolized by the USA and the USSR. In other words, the relationships of organizational members with the organization are largely shaped by complying with the decisions taken rather than participating in the decision-making process.

Accordingly, depending on the conditions of the Cold War, what perception and thoughts the polar leader has about his own members, rather than the perceptions and thoughts of the members of the organization about the organization they are affiliated with, emerge as a much more fundamental issue. Because the relations of both organizations with their members have actually emerged as a perfect reflection of the relations of the polar leaders with their allies.

On the other hand, the Cold War officially ended with the collapse of the USSR. As a result, although the Warsaw Pact abolished itself, NATO still continues to exist today. This situation actually points to an extremely ironic fact. While the disappearance of one of the two organizations, which we can consider ontologically as the reason for each other's existence, should automatically mean the completion of the mission of the other actor, today the importance and role of NATO in terms of the international system continues to increase. Moreover, former Eastern Bloc countries such as Romania, which were members of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, have adopted becoming a member of NATO as a priority foreign policy goal since the 2000s.

In this context, the end of the Cold War is not just about revealing the sharp change in the foreign policy preferences of the former Eastern Bloc members. In addition, it is possible to claim that the evaluations made about NATO have shifted from an ideological and subjective level to a more critical and rational basis since the 1990s. Therefore, today it is observed that the relationship between NATO and its members is evolving from monologue to dialogue, unlike the Cold War period. This situation brings with it the reality that member countries' perceptions of NATO are extremely important for the future of the organization.

In the study consisting of two parts, the main chronological division is determined as the Cold War. Therefore, in the first part of the study, Türkiye's perceptions regarding NATO are mostly included. The second part of the study consists of the perceptions of Türkiye and Romania, both NATO members, regarding NATO in the new world order that emerged after the Cold War. In this section, the perceptions of both countries regarding the organization are presented as comparisons on the basis of similarities and differences. The conclusion of the study is a prediction of Türkiye's and Romania's future perceptions of NATO, considering the increasing importance of NATO in the international system after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

1. Separation before Alliance: Türkiye's and Romania's Perceptions of NATO during the Cold War

The 20th century appears as the period in which the disciplinary roots of international relations were formed. On the other hand, the same century also hosted the two great world wars that humanity has ever seen. Although the period in question is worth examining in many aspects, one of the most important issues that stand out from a military perspective in the first half of the 20th century is the intense polarization in the international system and the military alliances established depending on these polarizations. Because, these alliances established in the pre-war conjuncture gave very clear signals about who and how the blocs would be formed during the war period. In this context, although Türkiye and Romania were rival actors within two hostile military organizations during the Cold War, cooperation emerged as a much more dominant choice than competition for Türkiye and Romania at the very beginning of the century.

Due to the re-establishment of the balance of power in the international system immediately after the First World War, Türkiye and Romania determined their foreign policy preferences as anti-revisionism. This situation undoubtedly represents a balancing policy that Türkiye, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece need against the Italian threat, which is felt very intensely in the Balkans.¹

In this context, the Balkan Entente, established on February 9, 1934, represents the first significant collective security initiative that Türkiye and Romania took part in in the first half of the 20th century. On the other hand, the Balkan Entente, built during the interwar period, failed to become an insurance against the extraordinarily aggressive and expansionist policies of Italy and Germany, which were increasingly rising in the international system. As a result of the occupation of all member countries of the pact by Germany during the Second World War, except Türkiye, expectations increased that the new alliance relations to be formed after 1945 would be different from the pre-war ones. An important point that should be noted at this point is the fact

that the foreign policy preferences of the USSR will be the main dynamic in the conjuncture that will occur after the war.

According to Dimitrov, the main reason for the separation between the USA, Britain and the USSR, which fought together against the Nazis during the Second World War, was that they could not reach a consensus on the future of the Eastern European countries and local institutions after the war.² On the other hand, it would be an incomplete analysis to see the emergence of the Cold War, which left its mark on the 20th century, as solely the Eastern European issue and local institutions. While, in retrospect, the effects of the American Revolution and the French Revolution produced extremely 'legitimate' and 'modern' results that continue to this day, it is a controversial issue even today to what extent the 1917 Revolution was able to realize its essence.³ In this context, the Tsarist regime's rejection of the American and French Revolutions and the introduction of another revolution with completely different dynamics from these two revolutions at the beginning of the 20th century actually made the long-existing east-west dichotomy meaningful, this time through the Soviets. This situation actually represents an extremely interesting situation. Because, while the east-west dichotomy, which has lasted for a long time historically, was previously manifested between Europe and the Ottoman Empire; after the Second World War, the USA and the USSR, neither of which were Europeans, became the 'pole' leaders of the east-west dichotomy. In the final analysis, the alliance relationship that existed out of necessity between the USA and the USSR during the Second World War ended, as expected, after the war. After this date, Soviet expansionism began to show itself very clearly in different points of the international system, especially in Eastern Europe. In many Eastern European countries such as Romania, the Soviets managed to consolidate socialist regimes in a top-down manner; border neighbours such as Türkiye came under intense threat from the USSR. In this context, with the official start of the Cold War, the harsh competition between the USA and the USSR, which spread to almost every field, brought with it the paranoia of nuclear war.

This situation necessitated the establishment of military organizations with broad participation for the security of the polar leaders and their allies.

Although experiencing the Soviet threat intensely during this period was a common concern of Türkiye and Romania, being able to eliminate the Soviet threat stands out as the main dynamic that separates the two countries. During this process, Türkiye has endeavoured to build a foreign policy around the axis of westernization and modernization policies, which are a natural extension of the Atatürk period. According to Landau's dialectical analysis, although the principles of westernization and nationalism are seen as opposites of each other⁴ it has been interpreted as a manifestation of politics. Even when the Second World War ended, the distinction between domestic and foreign policy in Türkiye remained extremely blurred. On the other hand, domestic policy and foreign policy were considered complementary to each other.⁵ In this context, as of 1946, Türkiye transitioned to multi-party political life with the establishment of the Democratic Party. Although it is still a highly controversial issue whether Türkiye's political choice was influenced by internal or external dynamics, it is certain that the effort to be 'similar' with its western allies, especially the USA, against the Soviet threat played a huge role in this choice. Becoming a member of NATO, which was founded in 1949 and is the defence organization of the West, became the primary goal of Turkish foreign policy in this period. It is possible to claim that this primary goal is fed by two different motivations. The first reason that we can consider as *realpolitik* is to eliminate the increasing Soviet pressure on Türkiye by joining with western allies and organizations. The second motivation is related to Türkiye's foreign policy mind rather than *realpolitik*. Although the United Nations, which was established almost simultaneously with NATO, symbolizes Türkiye's presence in the international arena, it has become an ideologically heterogeneous organization. In addition, NATO was envisioned as a purely western organization in which the westernization and modernization efforts that have existed since the Atatürk period could be realized. On the

other hand, it had been an extremely difficult process for Türkiye to achieve this foreign policy goal.

As a result of the general elections held on May 14, 1950, a new era began in Türkiye when the Republican People's Party handed over power to the Democratic Party. It is possible to claim that this new era is shaped by a relative consensus in foreign policy, as opposed to very intense domestic policy debates in Türkiye. Because, in the new period, Turkish foreign policy continued in a line aimed at protecting from the Soviet threat, as in the previous period.⁶ One of the developments that support this argument, which we can conceptualize as 'two parties, one foreign policy', has been experienced specifically in the context of NATO membership. As of 1949, when the single-party period was experienced in the country, Türkiye has made intense attempts on the axis of the USA and the UK to become a member of NATO since the establishment of the organization. On the other hand, these initiatives of Türkiye were rejected as nothing more than verbal commitments that the USA and Britain would support Türkiye in case of an attack on Türkiye.⁷

On the other hand, the Korean War, which broke out in June 1950, was not only the first serious foreign policy test of the Democratic Party; it was perceived by the foreign policy makers of the period as a great opportunity for Türkiye's NATO membership. In this context, Türkiye, which sent 4500 soldiers to the Korean War, eventually became an official member of NATO in 1952. At this point, Türkiye's persistent membership applications to NATO should be stated chronologically; in addition, it is thought that analysing the reasons why Türkiye's applications were rejected would be useful for the arguments of the study.

As stated before, Türkiye has made intense diplomatic contacts in order to become a member of NATO since its establishment. In this context, the first official application was made on May 11, 1950, and was rejected. Continuing the same policy of the Republican People's Party towards NATO, the Democratic Party made a second application on August 1, 1950, and this application was also rejected. According to Sancaktar, the main reasons for the rejection

of Türkiye's applications to NATO are the US's establishment of independent military organizations in the Middle East and the Mediterranean and the involvement of Türkiye in western defence within these organizations. On the other hand, another important reason is that NATO is not only a military organization, but also a homogeneous organization in terms of political, cultural and other common values. Because the intense discussions between the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Party are related to procedure, there have been no discussions on the basis of NATO membership. In this context, the Republican People's Party also welcomed the Democratic Party's decision to send troops to Korea; he emphasized 'UN ideals' and 'US friendship'.⁸ Türkiye's NATO membership was perceived by both the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Party as a satisfactory outcome of Türkiye's support for the 'free world' and its existence built on western values. In the final analysis, in the mentioned period, Türkiye's relations with the USA and NATO were not just about national interests; in addition, it is possible to claim that it also has a spiritual and emotional dimension.

NATO membership, which was seen as one of the most successful moves of Turkish foreign policy throughout the 1950s, and perceptions towards the organization changed for the first time in the 1960s. The *détente* period that started in the international system in the 1960s was not a period in which the tension between the polar leaders decreased relatively; it was also a period when security perceptions in international relations changed. In this context, due to the decrease in the risk of possible war between the USA and the USSR, the agenda of international relations began to move beyond purely military issues.⁹ Due to this situation, Türkiye's importance in the eyes of the USA and NATO began to decrease relatively compared to the previous period, and a period of 'national disappointments' towards the USA and NATO began for Türkiye. In 1964, these disappointments turned into a foreign policy trauma for the USA and NATO.

As it is known, one of the most important issues that has occupied Turkish foreign policy since the 1950s has been the Cyprus issue.

The military operation that Türkiye planned to carry out to protect the Turkish population living in the region was blocked by the USA in 1964, as a result of the incident that went down in political history as the Johnson Letter. Although this obstruction was perceived as a great disappointment by the Turkish side in terms of Türkiye-US relations, the statements regarding NATO in the letter expressed a much greater disappointment for Türkiye. Accordingly, it was stated in the letter that NATO would not be able to defend Türkiye if a possible military operation by Türkiye against Cyprus brought Türkiye and the USSR face to face.¹⁰ Although this situation did not cause a radical change in Türkiye's perceptions of NATO, it led to the USA and NATO being seriously questioned for the first time in terms of Turkish foreign policy since 1949. In this process, in the context of multidirectional foreign policy, it is possible to claim that the socialist left movements that rose greatly in the 1960s in Türkiye had an important role in questioning the USA and NATO. According to Doster, the centre-right and centre-left in Türkiye have never made a statement against NATO. On the contrary, Türkiye's engagement in NATO was seen as a rational choice for different ideological segments in the country. On the other hand, the socialist left, which started to gain popularity in Türkiye in the 1960s, saw the USA and NATO as co-actors and, as a result, expressed these actors as implementers of imperialism, which significantly shaped the Turkish society's perception of NATO.¹¹

It can be claimed that there are four main reasons why Turkish foreign policy's unilateral dependence on the USA and NATO was transformed by a multidirectional foreign policy discourse in the mentioned period. First of all, Türkiye's failure to find the support it expected from the USA and NATO on the Cyprus issue gave very strong signals to Turkish foreign policy makers that Türkiye's international interests and the USA's international interests may differ. In fact, in Türkiye's 'emotional' engagement with the USA and NATO in the 1950s, it can be seen that there was a belief that the interests of the two countries and NATO were perfectly compatible. Secondly, the rejection of the USSR's invasion threat against Türkiye

through official channels provided a relative relief in Turkish foreign policy. Thirdly, the unique dynamics of the *détente* period in the international system expanded the movement area of Turkish foreign policy. In other words, the assumption that a strong engagement with the USA and NATO is a rational and national foreign policy since the end of the Second World War has given way to a more realistic and versatile foreign policy discourse since the 1960s. This discourse was envisioned as an extension of the independent foreign policy doctrine. Finally, in 1966, France criticized the Anglo-Saxon hegemony in NATO and decided to withdraw from the military wing of the organization,¹² which was also a warning criticism for Türkiye. It can be seen that until the 1980s, Türkiye's perception of NATO was based on a 'sceptical loyalty' towards the organization. On the other hand, it is possible to claim that as a result of a *déjà vu* experienced in Turkish foreign policy in the 1980s, Türkiye's perception of the USA and NATO returned to that of the 1950s. This return is undoubtedly closely related to the very important developments that took place in the international system in the 1980s.

The junta administration that seized power as a result of the September 12, 1980, Military Coup in Türkiye showed an extremely strong will to return to strong engagement with the USA and NATO. This choice is undoubtedly closely related to the neo-liberal trend that is on the rise in the international system. With the neo-liberal trend, which is expressed as the reflection of political liberalism in the economic field, in the 1980s, the view that the state designs the economy evolved into the view that the economy designs the state.¹³ This new trend has found a perfect response in Türkiye as well; the discourse of the West and Western organizations representing the modern and free world has begun to find a response among Turkish foreign policy makers again.

On the other hand, it would be an incomplete analysis to see the increasing importance of the USA and NATO in Turkish foreign policy since the 1980s as merely an ideological trend in the global system. Because two very important developments that took place in the international system in 1979 increased the need of the western allies for the USA and NATO.

With the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the period of *détente* in the international system that had been going on for a while officially ended. More clearly, the belief and expectations among the international public opinion that the Cold War is about to end have turned into a pessimistic reality that the Cold War is still continuing. Secondly, as a result of the Islamic Revolution that took place in Iran in the same year, one of the USA's closest allies in the region suddenly turned into its biggest enemy, resulting in a major change in the Middle East policies of the USA and NATO, especially towards Türkiye. Although this change may at first glance be expressed as the renewed importance of the USA and NATO in Türkiye, this situation has also brought about the necessity for the USA and NATO to defend the southeastern wing of the international system. In this context, unlike the 1950s, it can be seen that the relations of the USA and NATO with Türkiye have evolved from a hierarchical and vertical basis to a relatively more horizontal and negotiable basis. Romania's perceptions of NATO, another country used in the study during the Cold War, are extremely different from Türkiye's perceptions. Rather than being a direct conflict between Türkiye and Romania, this situation is a reflection of the conflict and competition between the military organizations to which both countries are affiliated.

Founded in 1955, the Warsaw Pact is a military organization with similar functions to NATO. The organization, which can be described as the other of NATO, aimed to protect the socialist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, against any threats that may come from the West. Similar to the NATO example, the Warsaw Pact does not only have the mission of preventing threats that may come from the NATO side; it also undertook the task of disciplining the USSR's own bloc. According to Deletant, although Romania is one of the founding signatories of the Warsaw Pact, it has always strived to gain an autonomous position within the Warsaw Pact. In fact, this reflex of Romania sometimes went as far as testing the power of the USSR. In addition, it seems that Romania was extremely reluctant to enter into a military conflict with NATO members during the Cold War.¹⁴

On the other hand, when two Balkan states, Türkiye and Greece, became NATO members in 1952, Romania's threat perception towards NATO increased significantly. Because, this situation was perceived by Romanian foreign policy makers as an invasion threat to Romania through NATO.¹⁵ On the other hand, it is difficult to claim that this threat went beyond the classic Cold War paranoia, since NATO and the Warsaw Pact refrained from entering into a hot conflict with each other in Europe during the Cold War.

In the final analysis, the fact that Romania tried to pursue an autonomous and independent policy within the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War period proves that Romania's engagement with the Warsaw Pact was not an emotional one, like Türkiye's engagement with NATO, but was a mandatory relationship. In particular, the USSR's use of hard force to suppress the democratic movements in Czechoslovakia, which went down in political history as the Prague Spring, gradually weakened Romania's ties with the Warsaw Pact. With the official end of the Cold War as a result of the collapse of the USSR, a new era began for Romania, like many Eastern Bloc countries. This new era represents a process shaped around the discourse of modernization and a strong engagement with western organizations such as NATO. In the next part of the study, Türkiye's and Romania's perceptions of NATO after the Cold War and the relations between Türkiye and Romania within NATO will be analysed.

2. Unification After Separation: Türkiye's and Romania's Perceptions of NATO After the Cold War

Although the end of the Cold War was welcomed with great satisfaction by the international public, this situation brought with it some unsettling dynamics for states and international organizations. This state of uneasiness raises different concerns for states; it also expressed different concerns for international organizations such as NATO. Although the Cold War period represents almost half a century of nuclear war paranoia for states, the bipolar world system actually allowed almost

all states in the international system to develop their own foreign policy habits. In other words, that long lasting Cold War conditions had deeply rooted what states should do in foreign policy in terms of opportunities and threats. Therefore, with the evolution of the system from bipolar to unipolar, many states in the international system had to redesign their foreign policies both doctrinally and in practice.

On the other hand, the situation has been slightly different for international organizations that face similar dynamics in terms of polarity. Because many of the international organizations that are active actors in the international system today were established under the conditions of the Cold War. Within simple logic, it can be claimed that the existence of most of these organizations depends on the existence of the Cold War. As mentioned before, the main motivation that makes NATO meaningful was the Warsaw Pact itself. Therefore, with the end of the Cold War, it became necessary for these international organizations to continue their existence by experiencing radical transformations in their missions and visions. It should be noted right away that this mission and vision transformation does not mean that the relevant organization gives up its basic mission and vision; but it refers to the addition of new visions and missions to the current ones. In addition to successfully undertaking this new vision and mission, new trends emerging in the international system also played a major role in NATO's continued existence as a strong international actor in the international system after 1990.

In this context, the End of History thesis put forward by Francis Fukuyama just before the end of the Cold War had a great impact on international relations. Accordingly, as a result of the developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe, Marxist and socialist ideologies suffered an absolute defeat against liberalism and capitalism. In other words, Fukuyama claimed that liberalism, led by the USA, had declared its final victory and that this was the end of history in the context of ideologies.¹⁶ This thesis of Fukuyama has created a strong perception that the United States, in particular the unipolar world system, and all international organi-

zations operating under the leadership of the United States, such as NATO, have no alternative in the new world order. When this argument is examined specifically for Türkiye and Romania, it has created a perception of NATO that differs within its own dynamics for both countries, but is also similar at one point.

Former members of the organization, such as Türkiye, have attempted to gain an important place for themselves in the foreign policy agenda of the dominant power because they perceive the USA and NATO as partners, despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat. More clearly, this situation can be analysed as the perception that the USA is the sole 'boss' of the international system with its superpower identity, just like in the early years of the Cold War, and the articulation of the USA and NATO in accordance with this perception. For Romania, the perception of NATO is related to the natural attraction of modernization and westernization due to the lack of alternatives that emerged with the end of the Cold War. Therefore, in the international conjuncture that emerged after 1990, westernization and modernization were not a choice for the former Eastern Bloc states; but had to be considered a necessity.

The two most suitable geographies to analyse this argument specifically for Türkiye are the Middle East and the Balkans. The Gulf War, which broke out in 1990, was a turning point for the elimination of concerns that Türkiye had lost its importance in the eyes of the USA and NATO. In this context, Türkiye, which has complied with the UN and NATO decisions from the very beginning, played an active role in the Gulf War when NATO sent its air forces to the southeast of Türkiye.¹⁷ This situation undoubtedly strengthened Türkiye's position within NATO, distinguishing between former NATO members that emerged with the end of the Cold War and countries that later tried to integrate into the western system. Similarly, Türkiye, which played an active role in the Yugoslav crisis, one of the most important international problems of the 1990s, in both the Bosnian War and NATO's intervention in Kosovo, strengthened its position within NATO in late 1990s and early 2000s; at the same time, it continued to imagine NATO

membership as an important part of the discourse on a modern Türkiye. Finally, it can be claimed that Türkiye, whose motivation for European Union membership was at the highest level in the 1990s and 2000s, perceived NATO as an intermediary institution to facilitate its membership in the European Union during this period.

It seems that Romania, which was on the verge of a major transformation in the early 2000s, had a similar foreign policy motivation as Türkiye in the same period. In this context, it seems that the main motivation for Romania's NATO membership in 2004 was the international public recognition of its success in national development, democratic progress and transition to a free market economy through NATO.¹⁸ Considering the 1990s as the transition period from the old system to the new world order, Romania successfully completed its membership in the European Union in 2007 and completed the institutional phase of its modernization process. Just as seen in the example of Türkiye, it is seen that Romania perceives NATO membership as a complementary and essential process in order to strengthen the European Union membership process. On the other hand, unlike Türkiye, it seems that the Russian factor still plays an extremely important role in Romania's perception of modern NATO. As is known, the process that started with the Soviet occupation of Romania's Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina regions with the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was completed with the consolidation of top-down Soviet socialism in the country with the end of the Second World War.¹⁹ The place this situation has acquired in Romania's socio-political memory causes Romania's security perception to be strongly coupled to NATO today. Undoubtedly, the expansionist foreign policy approach that Russia is currently pursuing in (South)Eastern Europe and the Balkans makes Romania's security concerns extremely meaningful. According to Naumescu, the occupation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 also increases the importance of this region, which was once perceived as a periphery, for NATO.²⁰

In this context, it can be seen that Türkiye gave extremely strong support to Romania's

NATO membership process from the very beginning. It is seen that Türkiye attaches great importance to Romania's NATO membership in order to ensure stability in the Balkans, and provides this support in order to accelerate the democratization process and limit the distance of the army from civilian politics in both countries.²¹ In the final analysis, both countries consider NATO membership not only in terms of military and territorial security; it is also seen that it is evaluated in the context of democratization, civilization and modernization. Because, this argument supports that NATO is not perceived only as a military organization by its allies today. This thesis is very parallel to the changing mission and vision of NATO after the Cold War.

Conclusion

In the International Relations literature, there are many academic studies regarding Türkiye's and Romania's relations with NATO. On the other hand, very few of these studies tested Türkiye and Romania comparatively within the same study. Similarly, a large portion of the studies in the literature have discussed the relations of both countries with NATO solely in terms of geopolitical paradigms and military security. In this study, the hypothesis that NATO is not just a military organization is supported by the secondary hypothesis that the majority of international actors envision the notion of modernization as a very important axis of their national and international security. The geopolitical reasons for the study are also explained by the threat posed by the USSR and Russia to both countries.

In this context, the USSR's demands on Türkiye immediately after the Second World War became the main motivation for Türkiye's strong engagement with the USA and NATO. In addition, it is certain that the westernization and modernization principles of the Atatürk period made NATO an extremely important actor for Türkiye in this period. On the other hand, it seems that Türkiye perceived NATO and the USA as close partners in the 1950s. It seems that this perception is envisioned as an emotional bond rather than a rational engagement for Türkiye. The biggest foreign pol-

icy success of the USA in this process is that it has perfectly created the perception among its allies such as Türkiye that the interests of the USA and NATO are equal to the interests of its allies. With the *détente* period, it seems that Türkiye's emotional engagement with the USA and NATO has settled on a more rational basis. Just as Romania tested the power of the USSR within the Warsaw Pact from the 1960s onwards, Türkiye tried to eliminate its unilateral dependence on the USA in the context of its multidirectional foreign policy discourse from the second half of the 1960s to the 1980s. During this process, Türkiye began to perceive the USA and NATO as two separate actors and tried to fulfil its obligations towards NATO despite the tensions with the USA. The foreign policy preferences of Türkiye, which wanted to test its level of importance in the unipolar world system in the eyes of the USA and NATO, with the end of the Cold War, under the influence of the neo-liberal trend that dominated the international system since the 1980s, the examples of the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis should be considered in this context. In the final analysis, it can be seen that Türkiye's perception of NATO in the historical process is also directly proportional to its perception of the European Union.

For Romania, which gave great impetus to the modernization and westernization process in the 2000s, NATO was perceived as a tool of modernization. In addition, it appears that Romania has extremely tightened its engagement with NATO, especially after Russia invades Ukraine in 2022. This situation reinforces the fact that NATO is still an extremely important organization for the western bloc. Türkiye's strong support for Romania's NATO membership from the very beginning reveals the parallelism in the forward-looking domestic and foreign policy goals of both countries.

NOTES

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ROMANIA AND TÜRKIYE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR. SECURITY PROJECTS IN THE BALKANS AND OFFICIAL MEETINGS, 1953-1989

ANDREEA-IULIANA BĂDILĂ *

Abstract

The framework of bilateral relations between Romania and Türkiye during the Cold War was analysed taking into account the evolution of the international system and the ideological bipolarity of the two political-military alliances, to which the two states belonged. After Stalin's death, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania, and Khrushchev's relative policy of détente, the establishment in Bucharest gradually began to build its own agenda abroad. It aimed at resuming relations with the West, especially in the economic area, and to assert itself internationally, by launching initiatives including in the field of security and cooperation in the Balkans.

The objectives of the Romanian officials have also found their counterpart in relations with Türkiye, which is also interested in reconsidering the relations with the US and its allies after the missile crisis and in prioritizing its own foreign interests. Particularly, after Nicolae Ceaușescu came to power, we witness a notable evolution of Romanian-Turkish relations maintained by a dynamic exchange of mutual visits starting from the level of heads of government (Maurer – Demirel), Foreign Ministers or those who held portfolios in the economic, technical, industrial, cultural and scientific area and up to head of state (Ceaușescu-Sunay), maintained until the second half of the 1980s. The constant development of the bilateral dialogue has been reflected in countless long-term agreements concluded between Romania and Türkiye at industrial, technical-scientific, cultural, commercial level, the establishment of joint economic commissions, but also in the progress made in the area of military cooperation, in the field of military industry and in the mutual support of security projects aimed at transforming the Balkans into an area of peace and good neighbourly relations.

Keywords: *Romania, Türkiye, mutual visits, cooperation, projects, regional security, Balkans, Corneliu Mănescu, Nicolae Ceaușescu, Süleyman Demirel, Cevdet Sunay*

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At the end of World War II, due to well-known political-ideological reasons, Romania's fate was sealed, becoming an integral part of the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. The same course was followed by the other states in Eastern Central Europe, constrained both internally and externally by the Soviet hegemon: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, and Hungary.

Referring to the foreign policy actions of the states that entered the process of Sovietization, these were limited and conditioned by Moscow's desires and interests on the international stage. This involved freezing bilateral relations with Western states and imperative security measures, along with narratives condemning Western policies. Moreover, any foreign intentions, including visits between socialist bloc states, were carefully controlled and monitored by the USSR, which received detailed reports about their content and nature.

The new post-war geopolitical realities were reflected in the behaviour of democratic states grouped around the North Atlantic Alliance, which Türkiye also became a member of on February 18, 1952.

The division of Europe into two antagonistic political-military camps substantially affected the dynamics of international relations and the dimension of bilateral cooperation between states. Hence, in the first decade of the Cold War, Romanian-Turkish relations were even more sporadic and less documented in archives or historiography.

Even though after Stalin's death in March 1953, officials in Bucharest became interested in shaping their own foreign policy agenda and resuming relations with Western states, their actions were very modest. They were aware of the major dangers that could arise from an act of defiance. An essential role in re-establishing relations with Western states was played by Romania's admission to the United Nations structures on December 14, 1955, an event that facilitated affirmation and involvement in security and cooperation issues in Europe through initiatives and projects.

As early as the summer of 1957, discussions took place within the Political Bureau

of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party (PMR) regarding the possibility of launching a security project in the Balkans at the United Nations General Assembly. However, this was to be analysed with Soviet officials before proceeding. Shortly after, between August 15-16, a delegation led by Ion Gheorghe Maurer visited Moscow, where V.V. Kuznetsov¹ provided a positive response to the Romanian leaders, appreciating that their initiative "ensured security not only in this part of the world, in the Balkans, and in Europe, but also in Asia"².

The Romanian project aiming for the security of the Balkans was part of a broader plan to create a denuclearized zone in the region, consistently advocated during UN sessions and materialized in General Assembly resolutions such as 1236 (XII) "Peaceful and neighbourly relations among States" in 1957, 1301 (XIII) "Measures aimed at the implementation and promotion of peaceful and neighbourly relations among States" in 1958, or 2129(XX) "Actions on regional level with a view of improving good neighbourly relations among European States having different social and political systems" in 1965.

Romanian security initiatives in the Balkans received ample support from the Soviet Union, especially from a military strategic perspective. Nikita Khrushchev's promotion of the principle of peaceful coexistence led to changes in the approach to security and disarmament in relations with the West. However, developments in the Middle East, specifically the situation in Syria, an "ally" of Moscow in the Arab world, created tensions in Turkish-Soviet relations³.

In this context, a proposal for "improvement and development of relations between Balkan states" coming from an intermediary state, such as Romania, a satellite state, might have been better received by Western states than if the invitation had come directly from the Soviet hegemon. Thus, on September 10, 1957, before the UN session, Romania, through the voice of the Prime Minister of the Romanian People's Republic, Chivu Stoica, addressed a message to its counterparts

in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Türkiye. The message extended an invitation to contribute to the “strengthening of friendship” and peace among the peoples of the Balkans⁴. Furthermore, Chivu Stoica’s call aimed at organizing a conference to develop a “collective understanding” to which states in the region, regardless of their political-ideological orientation, could adhere. This understanding would be based on principles of equality in rights, sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs, embodied through the conclusion of a treaty to transform the Balkans into a zone of peace. The response was favourable from the leaders of Yugoslavia (September 13), Bulgaria, and Albania (September 18). Greece gracefully declined the proposal (September 23)⁵, and Türkiye, as we will show, hesitated for years to take a stance on Romania’s initiatives in the Balkans. Indeed, given their ideological nature and NATO membership, the reactions of Türkiye and Greece did not surprise the political leadership in Bucharest.

On September 10, 1957, Romania’s representative, Chivu Stoica, sent a separate message to the Prime Minister of Türkiye, Adnan Menderes, expressing interest in the development and strengthening of Romanian-Turkish relations. This interest also extended to consolidating peace in the Balkans and peacefully resolving disputes⁶.

The documents from the National Archives and those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, particularly telegrams and reports from the embassy in Ankara, reveal that the Turkish government had no reaction to the message from “Comrade President Chivu Stoica” regarding Balkan collaboration⁷, nor to subsequent invitations. This situation persisted until 1966, when Romanian diplomatic notes still mentioned that “as known, the Turkish government has not provided any official response to our initiatives from September 10, 1957, and June 5, 1959, regarding Balkan collaboration and the transformation of this region into a denuclearized zone”⁸.

Moreover, until Nicolae Ceaușescu came to power, Romanian-Turkish relations were characterized by the typical Cold War bloc rheto-

ric: mutual distrust, hesitation, suspicion, and the promotion of major powers’ interests at the expense of national ones. While a gradual opening towards the West occurred in Romania following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1958, in Türkiye the economic crisis and measures adopted by the Adnan Menderes government heightened internal contradictions. The signing of a military agreement with the USA further inclined Türkiye to serve American interests, according to a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1959⁹.

The military coup in Türkiye in 1960, the return to a parliamentary regime, the rise of the İsmet İnönü government, the Cyprus crisis, and the missile crisis of 1962 were all events that led officials in Ankara to revise their foreign policy agenda. They were disillusioned and felt isolated from their alliance partners. Türkiye’s shift in its international arena also coincided with Romania’s interests, which aimed to build bilateral relationships with states outside the Warsaw Pact, particularly in the economic zone.

On February 11, 1961, Türkiye’s ambassador to Bucharest, İzzet Aksalur, in an audience with Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, confirmed that “economic and cultural relations are developing well” between the two countries after the change of regime in Ankara and that he aimed to further enhance them. The Turkish official acknowledged the “economic momentum in the Romanian People’s Republic (RPR)” and appreciated the “friendly” attitude of the press and especially that of the Romanian authorities, who “welcomed him warmly”. Turkish delegations that visited the RPR “returned to Türkiye with the best impressions”¹⁰.

Regarding Romanian-Turkish political relations, the Turkish ambassador did not hesitate to mention that “the two countries have different socio-political regimes”: “Romania is a member of the Warsaw Treaty, and Türkiye is a member of NATO, and in these conditions, the two countries have important obligations to fulfil. In this situation, political issues can only be resolved in a comprehensive manner, addressing them as a whole and not on a regional level”¹¹.

Leader Gheorghiu-Dej supported the Turkish ambassador's opinions regarding the "progress" between the two countries in developing economic, trade, and cultural relations. He noted that "the mutual visits of delegations and personalities has contributed to strengthening relations", and that "the possibilities for developing relations between the Romanian People's Republic and Türkiye are much beyond the current level of relations"¹².

During the meeting, Gheorghiu-Dej brought up the Romanian government's proposals for creating a zone of peace in the Balkans, a solution to disputes among neighbouring countries. He also mentioned the convening of a conference to discuss matters of general interest, potentially resulting in an agreement to maintain peace in the Balkans. The leader from Bucharest highlighted the support received from the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, which officially declared "its readiness, along with other major powers, to guarantee an agreement aimed at transforming the Balkans into a zone of peace". Furthermore, Gheorghiu-Dej informed the Turkish ambassador in Bucharest that during his visit to the United States, "some American circles view Romania's initiative positively", subtly indicating that "so far, no response has been received from Türkiye". However, the leadership of the Romanian People's Republic "is patient in this regard"¹³.

In conclusion, Ambassador Izzet Aksalur returned to the status of the two countries, stating that "they are part of two opposing military blocs" and that "the issue of maintaining peace in the world can only be resolved globally"¹⁴. This led to the assertion that "regional solutions cannot have an effect as long as major problems are not resolved on a global scale". Regarding Romania's expected response, the Turkish ambassador's justification implied that preparing a position for the government in Ankara stemmed from its "international commitments" (NATO membership). In the end, he stated that "it is good to wait for the results of the UN discussions"¹⁵. This referred to the 15th session of the General Assembly, where Romania's initiative was on the agenda,

indicating that Türkiye was not ready to have an individual stance and was waiting to adopt a bloc position.

In June 1962, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej pointed out that Greece and Türkiye had a "negative attitude" towards Romania's initiatives at the UN and also towards proposals supported by the Soviet government regarding security in the Balkans and the Mediterranean¹⁶. Although Turkish officials had not officially provided a response recorded in Romanian archives, the authorities in Bucharest were aware of Türkiye's position based on its political-ideological affiliation. Hence, they sought to find common elements for cooperation in the economic sphere.

The final years of the Gheorghiu-Dej regime outlined a framework of Romanian-Turkish bilateral relations geared towards collaboration in trade, cultural¹⁷, sports, and scientific exchanges, through agreements, conventions, and more, which would be further embraced and developed during Nicolae Ceaușescu's era. An example in this regard was the Romanian proposal from November 1964, addressed to İsmet İnönü's Turkish government, suggesting the conclusion of a long-term economic (specifically commercial) cooperation agreement. However, it was not accepted on the grounds that Türkiye "was not yet in a position to move towards such extensive bilateral economic cooperation". This invitation was successfully revisited only in the following years¹⁸.

The year 1966 represents a key moment in the development of Romanian-Turkish bilateral relations, initiating a series of reciprocal visits that opened up new perspectives and fundamental changes in the dimensions of cooperation, consolidation, and partnership between the two states. The initial moment was marked by the visit of the Prime Minister of the Romanian Socialist Republic, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, to Türkiye (July 25-31, 1966), upon the invitation of his Turkish counterpart, Süleyman Demirel (extended on April 11, 1966). Subsequently, a year later, Süleyman Demirel¹⁹ visited Romania (September 11-17, 1967). This was followed by the visit of the Romanian

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corneliu Mănescu, to Türkiye (November 24-26, 1968), against the backdrop of his popularity among the Ankara authorities, who supported his candidacy for the presidency of the UN General Assembly. Everything culminated with the visit of the President of the State Council of the Romanian Socialist Republic, Nicolae Ceaușescu, in 1969.

Returning to Gheorghe Maurer's visit to Türkiye from July 25 to 31, 1966, accompanied by Foreign Minister Corneliu Mănescu²⁰, which marked the upward trajectory of Romanian-Turkish bilateral relations, it is noteworthy that the visit was prepared to explore new possibilities of collaboration between the two states. Beyond economic subjects and the status of trade exchanges²¹, they discussed the political situation in Europe and the Balkan region, as well as disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Maurer explained the "necessity of peaceful coexistence" among states with different socio-political systems and the establishment of a European security system²². Turkish Prime Minister S. Demirel, accompanied by the Turkish Foreign Minister during the Romanian-Turkish meeting, expressed interest in the proposals from the Bucharest delegation, stating that the importance of peaceful coexistence "must go beyond a mere statement of intention". This was a topic to which the Turkish government attributed significant importance in its foreign policy agenda, "unlike in the past".

Regarding Romania's initiative in the Balkans, Prime Minister Demirel "manifested an inclination to move beyond the initial position and consider the issue of establishing a European security system", showing interest in the "practical approach" to implementing this matter. Despite the nuanced changes highlighted in the Turkish Prime Minister's discourse on the dimension of the bilateral relationship with Romania, Ankara's "commitment to NATO" was not forgotten, framed within a "collective defence system" due to the "threat materialized by the territorial claims of the Soviet Union over two eastern provinces of Türkiye"²³.

The Turkish Prime Minister's conclusion was that, despite a "certain mutually advantageous approach" with Moscow and an inten-

tion for collaboration, he could not help but reiterate an older position that "security in a specific region is not valuable as long as security is not achieved worldwide"²⁴.

The visit of the Romanian government delegation to Türkiye marked the first extensive bilateral contact between the two states, where the complex issues of European security were discussed. This led to the conclusion of new agreements in the fields of science, arts, tourism, as well as the initiation of negotiations on maritime navigation and other economic domains²⁵.

At the invitation of the Romanian side, on September 11-17, 1967, the Prime Minister of Türkiye, Süleyman Demirel, visited Romania, during which the security issues in the Balkans were revisited, which were the basis for Romanian initiatives supported at the UN sessions. The year 1967 was particularly significant for the establishment in Bucharest, as Romania's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corneliu Mănescu, successfully ran for the presidency of the UN General Assembly. He became the first Romanian to be elected to this position on October 19, 1967, by 112 out of a total of 120 states. Türkiye was among the states that voted in favour.

From the beginning of the year, on February 25, 1967, in a note proposing a visit to Romania by a delegation led by Süleyman Demirel, the Turkish side responded "positively and promptly" to the Romanian request to support Corneliu Mănescu's candidacy for the presidency of the twenty-second session of the UN General Assembly²⁶.

The support for Mănescu by Türkiye²⁷ marked the positive outcome of the course of Romanian-Turkish relations, amid the development of contacts at the level of government leaders and foreign ministers. Also in 1967, in the second half of May, I.S. Çağlayangil, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, visited Romania²⁸ to examine the progress of resolving the issues discussed with Prime Minister Maurer in Türkiye and the possibility of signing consular and legal assistance conventions²⁹, as well as new agreements in tourism, air, road, and maritime transportation, among others³⁰. However, the most significant aspect that

emerged during the visit of the Turkish diplomat Çağlayangil to Romania was his admission that “the membership of Balkan countries in different socio-political systems does not constitute an obstacle to the normal development of relations between them”. This statement carried significant weight in the development of Romanian-Turkish relations at the highest political level, highlighting Türkiye’s desire to open up new perspectives for cooperation in the Balkans³¹.

The evolution of Romanian-Turkish relations was noted during the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to Romania in the autumn of 1967, accompanied by the Foreign Minister, I.S. Çağlayangil, who was visiting Bucharest for the second time that year.

During the discussions, the Turkish Prime Minister officially explained why Türkiye did not respond to the proposals made by the President of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People’s Republic in 1957 and also remained silent on those from 1959. He stated that, until 1964, “Turkish statesmen did not refer in their statements to the issue of Balkan collaboration”. Modest progress appeared a year later at the United Nations General Assembly when Foreign Minister Çağlayangil declared that “establishing friendly relations between Türkiye and the other Balkan countries would contribute to consolidating peace and promoting cooperation in our Balkan region”³². This aspect was also noted in the documentary records of Romanian diplomats in 1967, reporting that Demirel’s government program was aimed at expanding foreign relations with socialist states and achieving “greater independence from the USA and NATO”. This suggests that Türkiye was beginning to adopt its own position on international issues³³.

Moreover, starting in the fall of 1967, we observe substantial changes in the discourse of Turkish officials. If, up to that point, the government justified its position through its membership in NATO, within the framework of a collective defence system, Süleyman Demirel changed the paradigm, stating that “countries will be entitled to seek security in a regional framework” as long as they cannot be

protected within the UN. However, in the end, he makes a veiled mention of NATO membership obligations stemming from Türkiye’s strategic and geographic position³⁴.

Interestingly to note in the dynamics of Romanian-Turkish relations was the appearance in the pro-government newspaper “Zafer” on August 24, 1967, of an editorial by former ambassador to Bucharest, C.T. Karasapan, which highlighted the Romanian proposals for collaboration among the Balkan states from the late 1950s, “which did not resonate in Ankara at that time”³⁵.

Later on, we can observe that Türkiye’s relations with socialist states entered a new phase, in which the government in Ankara aimed “to develop [them] harmoniously, in a spirit of neighbourliness”, through reciprocal visits, including with the Soviet Union, even if, in fact, economic collaboration was paramount³⁶.

During the exchange of talks that took place in the autumn of 1967 between the two Romanian and Turkish delegations, Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer reiterated that Romania attaches great importance to creating an atmosphere of understanding and good neighbourliness in the Balkans. He considered that the highly positive development of friendly relations between Romania and Türkiye, countries with different social-political systems, represents a significant contribution in this direction³⁷. In turn, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel emphasized during the visit that the Turkish government is making efforts to establish good neighbourly relations in the Balkans, highlighting the rapid development of relations between the two states, especially in the economic, social, and cultural domains³⁸.

From November 24-26, 1968, Foreign Minister Corneliu Mănescu made another visit to Türkiye, emphasizing the need for new opportunities to develop bilateral relations and new actions and exchanges of views regarding Balkan collaboration³⁹. The main proposal was to organize a meeting of the foreign ministers of the countries in the geographical region of the Balkans⁴⁰. The Romanian official was well received by the government in Ankara, especially given his popularity for his actions at the



**Nicolae Ceaușescu bidding farewell to the President of the Republic of Türkiye,
General Cevdet Sunay (March 29, 1969, Esenboga Airport)**

Source: "Fototeca online a comunismului românesc", reference number: 14/1969

UN. The results of the bilateral meeting were favourable for both parties, and the visit, as always, provided an opportunity to conclude new conventions and agreements in the economic domain. The visit of the Romanian Foreign Minister was also conducive to organizing and arranging the visit of the President of the State Council, Nicolae Ceaușescu, to Türkiye⁴¹.

Following this, from March 24-29, 1969, Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife Elena made another visit to Türkiye (Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir) at the invitation of counterpart Cevdet Sunay. The visit represented a landmark moment in the history of Romanian-Turkish relations after Romania's proclamation of independence in May 1877, particularly during Nicolae Ceaușescu's era. After the meeting

between the two heads of state, fruitful Romanian-Turkish collaboration ensued, supported by new reciprocal visits over two decades, an acceleration of the regulation of bilateral relations through a huge series of agreements in all fields, although the most important dimension remained consistently economic, followed by trade.

An important area in which "fruitful collaboration" was sought was the "improvement of the peace climate" in the Balkans, an obsessive theme on Nicolae Ceaușescu's foreign policy agenda. "I believe that no effort is too great to make the Balkans a zone of good neighbourliness and fruitful collaboration", stated the Romanian official in his first speech at Ankara on March 24, 1969, during the dinner

hosted by Sunay⁴². In his interventions during the visit, Ceaușescu highlighted the “positive evolution of relations between Romania and Türkiye”, demonstrating “convincingly that differences in societal organization are not an impediment”. He emphasized that ensuring peace and security “does not go through the division of the world into opposing military blocs but through collaboration” between states⁴³. Demirel, in turn, assured that Türkiye’s foreign policy is intended to contribute to the defence of peace and the improvement of the climate in the Balkans, emphasizing that “there are possibilities” for Romanian-Turkish relations “to develop even further, as well as to establish contacts in other areas”. Economic cooperation and agreements in trade, tourism, transportation, consular relations, and legal assistance were already appreciated⁴⁴. At the end of the visit, the joint Romanian-Turkish statement stated that the constructive contri-

bution of bilateral relations between the two states would positively influence the situation in the Balkans. The two leaders shared common beliefs regarding nuclear disarmament and the peaceful resolution of tensions⁴⁵.

Furthermore, in interviews with the newspaper “Scântea” during President Ceaușescu’s visit to Türkiye, Cevdet Sunay emphasized that there was “full agreement for the development and diversification of relations between Romania and Türkiye”, and “there is no problem to be settled”⁴⁶. This provided an open path towards bilateral collaboration in all areas. Supporting this initiative, S. Demirel added that Türkiye’s “open and fair” policy was directed towards peaceful coexistence and collaboration with both large and small states, aiming to serve mutual interests⁴⁷. Demirel concluded that Romanian-Turkish relations had seen significant development and represented “the most beautiful proof that belonging to different allian-



**Nicolae Ceaușescu welcoming the President of the Republic of Türkiye,
General Cevdet Sunay (April 13, 1970, Bucharest-Otopeni International Airport)**

Source: "Fototeca online a comunismului românesc", reference number: 15/1970

es and having different social systems do not constitute an obstacle to mutual development”.

On April 13-17, 1970, President Cevdet Sunay accepted the invitation from his counterpart Nicolae Ceaușescu to visit Romania, touring cities like Bucharest, Craiova, Constanța, the Black Sea coast, and the hydroelectric plant on the Argeș River. He acknowledged the nature of the Romanian-Turkish bilateral relations, which had reached their peak with the Romanian leader's visit to Türkiye a year prior. The significance of the visit was emphasized by the signing of an agreement between the Romanian and Turkish governments to establish a joint economic commission aimed at intensifying economic, industrial, and technical cooperation between the two states⁴⁸. The issue of security remained a constant in the messages of the two leaders, reiterating their mutual beliefs in supporting any realistic initiative for good neighbourly relations among Balkan states⁴⁹, based on principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and the avoidance of the use of force.

In the early 1970s, against the backdrop of international developments and a climate of détente in relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, Western states became increasingly interested in Romania's foreign policy. A particular aspect was the growing number of reciprocated visits⁵⁰. In American diplomats' notes, Nicolae Ceaușescu was appreciated as a “maverick” within the Eastern bloc, especially after publicly condemning the Warsaw Pact troops' invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moreover, Romania's openness to the West, its affirmation within CSCE meetings through security and disarmament initiatives like reducing nuclear weapons, and the aspiration to transform the Balkans into a zone of peace, were actions that gave the Romanian dictator a significant image capital in the West⁵¹.

On July 30, 1971, a telegram from the Romanian embassy in the USSR stated that the US State Department had received information suggesting a conference of the Warsaw Pact states was to be convened to discuss European security issues and aspects of relations among the Balkan countries. American diplo-

mats in Moscow hinted that during this meeting (about which their Romanian counterparts had not been informed), “issues related to the visit of the Romanian party and government delegation to China were to be raised, which had caused dissatisfaction among the other socialist countries of the Warsaw Pact”⁵².

The tension in relations between the Romanian leader and the socialist bloc was reflected in documents from Bulgarian archives after the meeting in Crimea on August 2, 1971: “indeed, a series of opinions were expressed regarding the existing differences with the Romanian communist leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu”⁵³. After returning from Yalta, Todor Zhivkov, the President of the State Council of Bulgaria, informed his colleagues about Moscow's concern that, “by aligning among themselves and with China”, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Albania could form a distinct group in the Balkans that could “openly or secretly” create a regional Balkan bloc “based on anti-Sovietism”. In Leonid Brezhnev's opinion, the leader of Moscow, “Ceaușescu has gone too far”, which is why serious discussions were scheduled with him to make “the Romanians realize that their actions are wrong and dangerous”⁵⁴.

Indeed, a key aspect in Romania's relations with members of the Warsaw Pact was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which represented one of the best opportunities for the leadership in Bucharest to assert itself on the international stage, expose its own foreign policy line, and free itself from Soviet pressure. Consistently, through the initiatives of the establishment in Bucharest to address security and other issues outside the patterns imposed within the socialist political-military bloc, Romania and Ceaușescu were in the spotlight of criticism from Leonid Brezhnev. However, the Soviet leader limited himself to such verbal observations, which weighed heavily in the analysis of international relations. Romania's behaviour was not sanctioned within the meetings of the Warsaw Pact because the Soviet Union had an interest in maintaining an atmosphere of fair play among socialist states while presenting a bloc posi-

tion, especially on security issues, to Western audiences.

Inaugurated in Helsinki on November 22, 1972, the preliminary conference on European security was a success for Moscow's diplomacy. In January 1973, in a summary of the discussions held by the USSR leader with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs regarding the progress of negotiations with Westerners, Leonid Brezhnev remarked, "we could turn the world upside down in just one year, we, the socialists"⁵⁵, emphasizing that the success was due to the joint action of the member states of the Warsaw Pact.

At the end of the reunion, Brezhnev did not fail to point out, once again, that "it was not helpful when the Romanians in Helsinki entered into discussions on unimportant matters"⁵⁶, classified as "trifles" that could lead to postponing the CSCE process. The Soviet leader's reactions oscillated between calling for bloc unity and constant reprimands of Ceaușescu, often invoked in discussions with other socialist counterparts: "I told Ceaușescu [...] the Westerners are just waiting for us to falter and give them pretexts to postpone everything. [...] We must work together. If cracks appear, then we will have difficulties"⁵⁷.

Romania continued to pursue its own course in relations with the Western world and Türkiye, aiming to develop economic relations, acquire technologies and licenses, without "escaping" from the socialist bloc. Romania was aware of the importance of maintaining a status quo in its relationship with Moscow and the Eastern states.

In the first half of the 1970s, Romanian-Turkish cooperation continued to be constructive for both states, through the signing of new economic and trade agreements, technical-scientific and cultural agreements. On March 26, 1971, a new government led by İsmail Nihat Erim was installed in Ankara. Between November 3-7, 1971, Corneliu Mănescu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, made another official visit to Türkiye, during which he reported that against a backdrop of détente, the Erim government continued "to contribute and support any constructive proposal" aimed

at serving peace in the Balkans. Mănescu reported that the Romanian delegation was received "with great attention and cordiality"⁵⁸.

On March 21, 1972, a note signed by Romania's ambassador to Ankara, George Marin, pointed out that there were new developments in Türkiye's attitude regarding collaboration in the Balkans: "new, positive qualitative nuances"⁵⁹. This change in the Ankara government was determined by the policy of the major powers, which, in the interest of solving global problems, "can neglect small countries, even when they are part of the same military alliances"⁶⁰. Furthermore, this political conviction was also shared by the leadership in Bucharest about the Eastern alliance to which Romania belonged, a common element that brought Romania and Türkiye even closer. The Ankara government noted the "reduction of the strategic interest of the USA in Türkiye" by choosing Greece to build a base for the Sixth Fleet, a signal that undermined the Turks' trust and collaboration with NATO. Meanwhile, Türkiye offered assurances that it makes "efforts to maintain friendly relations with neighbouring countries"; which was a reality, launching a series of invitations, including visits to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece⁶¹. The Bulgarian side proved to be the least cooperative, refusing the possibility of a bilateral meeting⁶², while the Greek authorities engaged in several bilateral contacts, albeit against the backdrop of NATO membership.

Starting in 1973, from the contacts between the Romanian ambassador and military attaché in Ankara and Turkish officials, we can discern the mutual desire to develop bilateral relations, including in the military domain. Initially, opportunities for development in military education emerged, with exchange visits between naval training ships, meetings between military sports teams⁶³, and later, in early 1974, the first tentative talks at the level of Defence Ministers. Ion Ioniță, the Romanian Minister of Defence, extended an invitation to his Turkish counterpart, Hasan Esatışik, to make an official visit to Romania⁶⁴.

After the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975, which, among other things, provided for order and security on the Europe-

an continent based on principles of sovereign equality of states, non-use of force or threat of force, and cooperation between states, a new series of reciprocal visits was recorded in Romanian-Turkish relations.

On August 27-29, 1975, President Süleyman Demirel made another visit to Romania at the invitation of his counterpart, Nicolae Ceaușescu. During the meetings, the two heads of state exchanged views on the conclusion of the CSCE conference in Helsinki, concluding on an optimistic note that it would have reverberations on establishing real peace in the Balkans⁶⁵. The leader of the Romanian Socialist Republic also argued that expanding cooperation among Balkan states in different areas would transform the region into one devoid of nuclear weapons, military troops, and foreign bases. The President of Türkiye approved the statements made by his counterpart, stating that the development of Romanian-Turkish relations was not only in the interest of both countries, but also for security in the Balkans. The good collaboration was seen from a “long-term perspective”⁶⁶.

Less than a year later, on June 22, 1976, Nicolae Ceaușescu visited Türkiye once again for four days at the invitation of the new Turkish president, Fahri Korutürk. The newspaper “Scântea” stated on the front page of June 23, 1976, that the visit of the Romanian dictator to Türkiye represented a “new impetus” and “a new and significant moment in Romanian-Turkish dialogue at the highest level”, emphasizing the common desire of the two countries “to contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, and cooperation in the Balkans”⁶⁷. The issue of security in the Balkans became more present and obsessive than ever in Ceaușescu’s discourse, with the official stating that Romania, like Türkiye and other countries in the Balkans and Europe, was “deeply interested in the Mediterranean, the Aegean, and the Black Sea to be dominated by understanding and security”, and the seas should become “those of peace and collaboration”⁶⁸. The issue of disarmament was not forgotten, and the desire was for the Balkans to be devoid of nuclear weapons, troops, and military bases⁶⁹.

On August 3, 1976, a meeting took place in Yalta, Crimea, between Nicolae Ceaușescu, the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, and Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, regarding the perspectives of collaboration among Balkan states. The Soviet leader explained to his Romanian counterpart that “raising the issue of a Balkan union or alliance has no solid basis”⁷⁰ because Türkiye and Greece were part of NATO. “Such a union has no justification”, said Brezhnev, other than Ceaușescu’s “desire” to have “something” in the Balkans⁷¹.

Nicolae Ceaușescu offered a detailed response, arguing that “the problem is not understood correctly”: “First of all, no one raises the issue of a Balkan union. This would be entirely unrealistic. Secondly, improving relations and developing collaboration between Balkan countries is not only in the interest of the Balkan countries but also of socialist countries, I could say even in the interest of the Soviet Union”⁷². Nicolae Ceaușescu also mentioned the transportation routes in the Balkans, “which could not be ensured through Bulgaria, Romania, Türkiye, Greece, or Yugoslavia”, adding that it was “in everyone’s interest to solve certain problems of this kind”. The Romanian official asked Brezhnev what the socialist countries had to lose. The Soviet counterpart manifested irritation with how Bucharest handled the situation, especially in its relationship with the West: “You raise the issue of expanding and deepening regional collaboration in the Balkans”⁷³.

During March 21-23, 1977, George Măcovescu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania (RSR), visited Türkiye to meet his Turkish counterpart, İ.S. Çağlayangil. The discussions covered various topics, including the positive outcome of Ceaușescu’s visit to Türkiye and the successful collaboration between Romanian and Turkish delegations in the CSCE, particularly concerning economic aspects⁷⁴. A key issue analysed in the context of Balkan security was Bulgaria’s negative stance towards collaboration with Türkiye. In this regard, the Turkish leadership expressed concerns about the USSR’s position

on Balkan cooperation, especially economic, which they were going to discuss during the Turkish foreign minister's upcoming visit to Moscow⁷⁵. At the end of George Macoveșcu's visit to Türkiye, following an agenda set by Nicolae Ceaușescu, especially focusing on regional security, the Romanian and Turkish delegations concluded that "there are ample opportunities for political cooperation in the Balkans"⁷⁶.

Nicolae Ceaușescu's persistence in reacting to the Balkan situation often perturbed Leonid Brezhnev. During the meeting on August 14, 1978, in Yalta, the Soviet leader confided to his trusted ally, Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, that the relationship with the Romanian dictator was "agitated". The essence of the Soviet attitude towards this situation can be summarized as follows: "I know, Todor, that you've had several opportunities to speak directly and frankly with Ceaușescu. It's clear that the necessity for such influence is now extremely important", Brezhnev stated⁷⁷. The policy promoted by Romanian officials regarding Balkan cooperation created "diplomatic complications for Bulgaria: «When they stir up the issue of establishing Balkan cooperation, they do it simply on a whim»". From Brezhnev's perspective, the issue of regional cooperation in the Balkans, as seen by Romanians, Yugoslavs, and Greeks, was a way to reduce the influence of the Warsaw Pact states in the region. This was the essence of their approach. Brezhnev recommended "countering decisively all projects aimed at creating an autonomous Balkan group to promote «their particular interests»"⁷⁸.

During this period, new details emerged regarding the prospects of Romanian-Turkish relations, particularly in the military domain. Hasan Işık, the Turkish Minister of National Defence, positively assessed the state of bilateral collaboration, proposing that the Romanian side "prepare to discuss possibilities for mutual supply of materials necessary for the army" and cooperate in "building industrial facilities in Türkiye to produce technical means necessary for the army and which could be exported to Romania and other countries".

In the conversation with Romanian ambassador George Marin, Hasan Işık explained that part of the army's necessary imports were to be "paid for by deliveries of military materials produced in Türkiye". These Turkish proposals were to be discussed with the Romanian side during meetings with Ion Hortopan, the Deputy Minister of National Defence and Chief of the General Staff, and possibly with Minister Ion Coman, who had received invitations to visit Ankara⁷⁹. During protocol actions with Romanian diplomats on August 1, 1978, General Kenan Evren, the Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Army, emphasized the interest in Romania's foreign policy in the Balkans and relations with neighbouring countries. Taking advantage of the occasion, Evren reminded of the invitations extended to the two Romanian military leaders mentioned above to visit Türkiye, from which he expected a response⁸⁰.

In contrast, on August 17, 1979, the Ceaușescu couple undertook a new visit to Türkiye⁸¹, this time for a day. The Romanian-Turkish conversations once again highlighted mutual interest in the "cause of understanding and cooperation in the Balkans and in Europe"⁸². Beyond the good Romanian-Turkish collaboration in all domains appreciated by both parties, on May 5, 1980, in a telegram sent from Ankara, Turkish Army General Kenan Evren reiterated the perspective of military cooperation, extending an invitation for the Deputy Minister of National Defence and Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army to visit Türkiye⁸³.

On April 5-8, 1982, General Kenan Evren, the president of Türkiye, visited Romania. During discussions with his Romanian counterpart, progress and prospects of Romanian-Turkish relations in all domains were emphasized, along with the importance of bilateral collaboration in the Balkans⁸⁴, culminating in a Joint Declaration⁸⁵. Besides the economic objectives visited by the Turkish general, the protocol of the meeting of the Political Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party mentioned that the heads of both states had established measures to deepen Romanian-Turkish relations, especially in the context

of the continuity of the European and regional security process post-Helsinki⁸⁶.

To further emphasize Romanian-Turkish friendship, on May 20-23, 1983, Nicolae Ceaușescu visited Türkiye at the invitation of Kenan Evren. Attention was also focused on the situation of nuclear disarmament in the Balkans and the need for normalizing relations between the West and the East⁸⁷. Concurrently, Turkish newspapers like “Turkish Daily News”, “Cumhuriyet”, “Hurriyet”, and “Türkiye” appreciated Ceaușescu’s visit, highlighting the continuation of the strong friendship relationship between Romania and Türkiye⁸⁸.

The way the newspaper “Scântea” portrayed the two reciprocal visits in the early 1980s did not capture concrete elements of progress in Romanian-Turkish relations or propose practical measures or initiatives the two states were expected to undertake in the direction of Balkan security. The information was lacking in substance, formulated in the propagandistic spirit of the era of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s personality cult, to showcase the efforts and extensive activity that the dictator carried out abroad.

In the same vein, during the visit from October 19-21, 1987, when dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu met with Turkish leader Kenan Evren in Ankara, discussions regarding the importance of Romanian-Turkish collaboration for security and stability in the Balkans were resumed, but without any practical proposals⁸⁹. Even in the content of the folder about the visit of the President of the Romanian People’s Republic (RPR) to Türkiye found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ archive, details about this topic were not identified. The documents were limited to the economic sector, potential joint actions in the commercial field, and presenting the progress made between the two countries⁹⁰. At the end of the official discussions, the “strengthening of good relations” between Romania and Türkiye was emphasized⁹¹.

Although Romania continued to maintain good cooperative relations with Türkiye in the 1980s, contemporary sources seem to indicate that bilateral relations did not unfold at the level of the previous decade. The plans and concrete measures that animated the repre-

sentatives of the two states in the 1970s were replaced by courtesy visits to economic and cultural objectives.

The Romanian-Turkish relations in the dynamics of the Cold War reflected the evolution of the post-war international climate analysed in the context of the division of the European continent into two opposing political-military groups: NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. After Stalin’s death, and implicitly the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in 1958, the establishment in Bucharest gradually evolved from conformism to defiance in relations with Moscow, becoming interested in resuming relations with the Western world, especially economically, and culturally and scientifically.

Without escaping from the structures of the socialist bloc, aware that it ensured its political survival, Romania tried to get closer to Türkiye, a NATO member country, itself distraught by US policies in managing the missile crisis of 1962 and that of Cyprus. Beyond the constraints imposed by the rhetoric of the bloc, the common denominator found by both states was the interest in shaping their own foreign policy line and asserting themselves internationally.

The development of Romanian-Turkish bilateral relations gained consistency after Nicolae Ceausescu came to power, and this fact can be seen through the dynamics of exchanges of mutual visits at the level of heads of state, prime ministers, foreign ministers and more. The talks between Romanian and Turkish officials were materialized essentially by signing countless long-term agreements of a scientific, technical, commercial, industrial nature, setting up joint economic commissions, but also exchanges of experience in enterprises to notice the progress made in the two states.

Despite the post-war realities imposed by Europe’s ideological affiliation and bipolar geo-political structure, during the meetings, Romania and Türkiye also tackled more delicate issues such as the military dimension, security and cooperation in the Balkans, their transformation into a zone of peace, aspects of disarmament, and which were material-

ized through mutual support within international forums, in particular UN and CSCE, but also through bilateral cooperation in the area of defence industry, weapons and military equipment. Beyond the status of the two states belonging to blocs with antagonistic political systems, Romania and Türkiye demonstrated until the end of the Cold War that the level of bilateral cooperation and dialogue remained at a high level, supported by common interests.

NOTES

¹ V.V.Kuznețov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

² The National Archive of Romania (hereinafter ANR), Fond CC of RWP, Foreign Relations, file no. 55/1957, p.3.

³ Laurențiu-Cristian Dumitru, Șerban Pavelescu, *Marea Neagră în timpul Războiului Rece. 1945-1990 (The Black Sea during the Cold War. 1945-1990)*, in the volume “Marea neagră de la «lacul bizantin» la provocările secolului XXI. Culegere de studii”, (“Black Sea from the «Byzantine Lake» to the challenges of the XXI century. Collection of studies”), coordinated by Mihail E. Ionescu, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p.332-334.

⁴ The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter AMAE), Fond 220/1957, R.S.R. (The Socialist Republic of Romania)-5, Directorate II, f.p-7.

⁵ Ion Calafeteanu (coord.), *Istoria politicii externe românești în date (History of Romanian Foreign Policy in Data)*, Enciclopedica Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, p.376.

⁶ AMAE, Fond 220/1957, R.S.R. - 5, Directorate II, p.27-32.

⁷ AMAE, Fond 220/1964, R.P.R. (People's Republic of Romania)-5, Directorate II, p.1.

⁸ AMAE, Fond 220/1966, Türkiye 1, Directorate II, Foreign Relations, p.26-36.

⁹ AMAE, Fond 220, R.P.R.-5, Directorate II, f. 2-3.

¹⁰ AMAE, Fond 220, Türkiye /1961, Türkiye, Directorate II, Foreign Relations, f.8.

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² *Ibidem*, f.9.

¹³ *Ibidem*, f.10.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ “Scântea”, Year XXXI, No. 5570, June 25, 1962, p.2.

¹⁷ Since 1963, cultural exchange protocols have been concluded annually between Romania and Türkiye. See AMAE, Fond 220/1966, Türkiye 1, Directorate II, Foreign Relations, p.1-3.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p.4-8.

¹⁹ Süleyman Demirel (1924-2015), Turkish politician. He was Prime Minister of Türkiye for seven terms from 1965 to 1993, and President from 1993 to 2000.

²⁰ Corneliu Mănescu was nominally invited by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to Türkiye and had an important role in discussions with the Turkish side on issues of economic cooperation (oil, iron ore, petrochemicals and transport). AMAE, Fond 220/1966, Türkiye 1, Directorate II, Foreign Relations, p.4-8.

²¹ AMAE, Fond 220/1966, Türkiye 1, Directorate II, Foreign Relations, Volume II, p.45-49.

²² AMAE, Fond 220/1966, Türkiye 1, Directorate II, Foreign Relations, p.159-168.

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ AMAE, Fond 220/1967, Special Files, Türkiye 2, p.1-2.

²⁷ AMAE, Fond 220/1968, R.S.R.-5, Directorate II, p.14.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ AMAE, Fond 220/1967, Special Files, Türkiye 2, p.1-2.

³⁰ AMAE, Fond 220/1968, R.S.R.-5, Directorate II-a, p.21-23.

³¹ AMAE, Fond 220/1967, Türkiye, Directorate II, Foreign Relations, p.159.

³² *Ibidem*, p.158.

³³ AMAE, Fond 220/1967, Special Files, Türkiye 2, f. 151-153.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, f.154-159.

³⁵ AMAE, Fond 220/1967, Türkiye, Directorate II, Foreign Relations, p.159.

³⁶ AMAE, Fond 220/1967, Special Files, Türkiye 2, p.151-153.

³⁷ “Scântea”, Year XXXVII, no. 7462, September 14, 1967, p.1.

³⁸ “Scântea”, Year I XXXVII, no. 7466, September 18, 1967, p.1-4.

³⁹ AMAE, Fond 220/1968, Türkiye 4, part I, Special Files, p.11-13.

⁴⁰ AMAE, Fond 220/1968, Türkiye 4, part II, Special Files, p.63-65.

⁴¹ AMAE, Special Files, Fond 220/1968, Türkiye 4, Volume II, f. 178-184

⁴² “Scântea”, Year XXXIII, no. 8015, March 25, 1969, p.3.

⁴³ "Scântea", Year XXXIII, no. 8016, March 26, 1969, p. 3.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵ "Scântea", Year XXXIII, no. 8020, March 30, 1969, p.1-3.

⁴⁶ "Scântea", Year XXXVIII, no. 8013, March 23, 1969, p.1.

⁴⁷ "Scântea", Year XXXVIII, no. 8014, March 24, 1969, p.1.

⁴⁸ "Scântea", Year XXXIX, no. 8399, April 17, 1970, p.1-3.

⁴⁹ "Scântea", Year XXXIX, no. 8400, April 18, 1970, p.5.

⁵⁰ Among these, from the first half of the 70s, we selectively mention Nicolae Ceausescu's visits to the West – France, Austria, Iceland, Canada, USA, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, West Germany –, but also the visits of Western heads of state and government to Bucharest from Austria, Finland, Holland, Israel, the visit of Margaret Thatcher, Henry Kissinger, Jacques Chirac, Gerard Ford etc.

⁵¹ Mioara Anton, *Când maverick a încetat să fie maverick. Nicolae Ceaușescu și Pactul de la Varșovia (1980-1990), When maverick stopped being maverick. Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Warsaw Pact (1980-1990)* in the volume "Revoluția din 1989. Învinși și învingători" ("The Revolution of 1989. Losers and Winners"), coordinated by Anneli Ute Gabanyi, Alexandru Muraru, Andrei Muraru, Daniel Sandru, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2020, p.90-100.

⁵² *July 30, 1971, Moscow. Telegram from the First Secretary of the Romanian Embassy in the USSR, Ilie Georgescu, to the First Directorate for Information Relations received by the U.S. Department of State regarding the convening of a special conference of Warsaw Treaty member countries* in the volume "Documente Diplomatice Române. Seria a III-a. România și Tratatul de la Varșovia. Conferințele miniștrilor Afacerilor Externe și ale adjuncților lor (1966-1991)" (Romanian Diplomatic Documents. Series III. Romania and the Warsaw Treaty. Conferences of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and their Deputies (1966-1991), Volume edited by Mioara Anton, Alpha MDN Publishing House, Bucharest, 2009, p.325-326 (hereinafter to be quoted under the logo *DDR, Romania and the Warsaw Treaty*).

⁵³ Central State Archive of Bulgaria, Sofia, Fond 1-B, File 2499, p.10.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁵ January 20, 1973, Bucharest. Summary of the talks held by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev, with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, regarding the stage of nego-

tiations of the USSR with France, West Germany and the USA, on European security issues in *DDR, Romania and the Warsaw Treaty*, p.375-376.

⁵⁶ It is about the fact that the Romanian diplomacy had an initiative regarding the rules of procedure of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that were not previously brought to the attention of the Soviets. Romanian Ambassador Valentin Lipatti mentions in his memories that the "irritation" of the Soviets was caused by the fact that "we had not consulted them beforehand on the procedural document, as we were supposed to do, according to the ritual existing under the Warsaw Treaty". See, Valentin Lipatti "În tranșeele Europei. Amintirile unui negociator" ("In the trenches of Europe. Memories of a negotiator"), Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1993, p.27.

⁵⁷ January 20, 1973, Bucharest. Summary of the talks held by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev, with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, regarding the stage of negotiations of the USSR with France, West Germany and the USA, on European security issues, in *DDR, Romania and the Warsaw Treaty*, p.375-376.

⁵⁸ AMAE, Fond 220/1971, Türkiye 5, Volume 2, Directorate I, Foreign Relations, p.21-22.

⁵⁹ AMAE, Fond 220/1972, R.S.R.-5, Directorate I, Foreign Relations, Volume I, p.58-60.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p.68 -72.

⁶³ AMAE, Fond 221/1974, f. 1-2.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p.13.

⁶⁵ "Scântea", Year XLV, no. 10270, August 28, 1975, p.1-3.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁷ "Scântea", Year XLV, no. 10525, June 23, 1976, p.1.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p.3.

⁶⁹ Beyond the Balkan security aspects, an important point of the talks between the two heads of state remained cooperation in the technical-scientific, economic, commercial and cultural fields, unanimously assessed as having made "significant progress" in technical-scientific, economic and cultural cooperation.

⁷⁰ The alliance was to consist of Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Türkiye, Greece and Albania.

⁷¹ August 3, 1976, Note of conversation on the occasion of the meeting of Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu with Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in *DDR, Romania and the Warsaw Treaty*, p.490.

⁷² *Ibidem*.

⁷³ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁴ AMAE, Fond 220/B, 1977, Türkiye – R.S.R., p.6.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, p.29.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*, p.30.

⁷⁷ Central State Archive of Bulgaria, Sofia, Fond 1-B, File 2499, f.21.

⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, f.21.

⁷⁹ AMAE, Fond 211/1978/Türkiye – R.S.R., p.1.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, p.1.

⁸¹ In this context, a synthesis was elaborated on the “continuous upward evolution” of Romanian-Turkish relations from the perspective of economic cooperation and trade. See AMAE, Fond 20/1980, Türkiye, p.1-8.

⁸² “Scânteia”, An XLIX, Nr. 11505, August 18, 1979, p.1.

⁸³ AMAE, Fond 220/1980, Türkiye, p.28.

⁸⁴ “Scânteia”, Year LI, Nr. 12323, April 6, 1982, p.1.

⁸⁵ “Scânteia”, Year LI, Nr. 12326, April 9, 1982, p.1.

⁸⁶ ANR, Fond CC of RCP, Chancellery Department, Volume 1, File 20/1982, p.9-10.


⁸⁷ “Scânteia”, Year LII, no. 12672, May 21, 1983, p.3.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, p.2.

⁸⁹ “Scânteia”, Year LVII, no. 14047, October 20, 1987, p.1-3.

⁹⁰ AMAE, Fond 220/1987, Türkiye, p.22-48; 75-79.

⁹¹ “Scânteia”, Year LVII, no. 14048, October 21, 1987, p.1.




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