

ROME AND TARENTUM IN APULIA, 326-320 B.C.*

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Abstract: *Apulia represented the second important front of strategy in the Second Samnite War. Livy records that in 326 B.C. Rome signed an alliance with the Apulians. In modern historiography, many authoritative voices disputed the historicity of this treaty, motivating that it had been invented in order to justify the Roman armies' disastrous defeat at Caudium, in 321 B.C. According to Livy, the armies trapped in the defile at Caudium were marching to Luceria, under siege by the Samnites. But the re-enactment proves only that the annalistic tradition used the Roman presence in Apulia to justify the Caudine defeat and not the lack of Rome's contacts in Apulia. The alliance signed in 326 B.C. with several Apulian communities had obviously in view the possibility of using the Samnite forces in southeastern Italy, by opening a second field of military actions. At the same time, we cannot ignore another side of the agreement: the Apulian alliances were supposed to keep Tarentum at distance from the Samnite conflict and the centers in Apulia represented a base for possible military actions to southern Italy.*

After the Caudine peace, the Roman-Samnite hostilities ended, but Rome continued to consolidate its presence in Apulia. The literary tradition records military actions in this region and the conclusion of several treaties with Arpi, Teanum and Canusium between 320-318 B.C.

In 320 B.C., when the Roman troops were ready to begin the battle with the Samnites at Luceria, Livy records the arrival of a mission from Tarentum, who tried to end the hostilities. There are not many doubts regarding the fact that the hostilities with the Samnites stopped until 315 B.C. due to the Caudine peace from 321 B.C. and the battle from Luceria is only an invention of the Roman historians. The situation is indeed unlikely, but behind it, it is possible to find Tarentum's diplomatic intervention, worried about the expansion of the Roman influence in Apulia.

Keywords / Cuvinte cheie: *Apulia, Caudium, Lucanian League, Luceria, Rome, Samnite League, Tarentum*

The Second Samnite War was meant to place the communities in the Italic Peninsula in a new polarization scheme. The events that took place at Naples in 327-326 B.C. set the grounds for a balance of forces featuring Rome and the Samnite League. However, in the secondary ground, as Naples entered the Roman influence¹, Tarentum took action by approaching the Samnite League.

Taking advantage of these conflicts, Rome spread its diplomatic spectrum to the southern and southeastern regions of Italy, so that Livy recorded the alliances concluded with Lucani and Apuli² in 326 B.C.

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¹ The Crisis of Naples: Livy 8.22.5-8.23.12, 8.25.2-8.26.7, Dionysius 15.5.1-15.6.5. See, for the involvement of Tarentum, Mommsen 1987, 213, Ciaceri 1927, 20-21, Pais 1928, 134, Hoffmann 1934, 22 *sqq.*, Wuilleumier 1939, 89-90, Afzelius 1943, 162, Frederiksen 1984, 208, Brauer 1986, 73-74, Lomas 1993, 46 *sqq.*, Oakley 1998, 680-682, Nedu 2008, 151-155.

² Livy 8.25.2-3: *et alia nova nihil tum animo tale agitantibus accesserunt auxilia. Lucani atque Apuli, quibus gentibus nihil ad eam diem cum Romano populo fuerat, in fidem venerunt, arma virosque ad bellum pollicentes; foedere ergo in amicitiam accepti.*

The fact that the two treaties were close in time and in Livy's text, made E. Salmon conclude that the historian from Patavium, believing in the existence of a Lucanian alliance, had associated to it a similar treaty concluded in Apulia. To this interpretation, E. Salmon added J. Beloch's old theory regarding the significance of data about the beginning of the relations between Rome and Apulia. According to J. Beloch, the entire tradition regarding Rome's contacts with Apulia before 318 B.C. is but a fake made up in order to justify the disaster at Caudium in 321 B.C.³ when, according to Livy, two Roman armies had been trapped in a defile, without any possibility of escape, because they were in a hurry to arrive in Apulia, so they passed through their enemies' territory⁴.

Although many modern researchers embraced it, J. Beloch's theory is not flawless. In fact, it starts from a weak reasoning that tried to clarify the way in which the annalistic tradition recorded the defeat at Caudium. It is true that the Caudine failure had to be justified and the lamentable impression of the defeat demanded a cover-up, but it is not honest to consider fake the entire series of political and military events involving Rome in Apulia, before 321 B.C. According to Livy, the two consuls were hurrying to Apulia in order to help Luceria⁵. Sending two consular armies across the mountains of Samnium to the battlefield in Apulia, does not seem a plausible action. First of all, crossing the Appennines through the enemies' territory involved too many risks, at the beginning of the Second Samnite War, as to be put in practice⁶. Second, the two consuls's departure to Apulia would have left the war zone in Campania and the Liris Valley prone to Samnite attacks. More likely, the action from 321 B.C. seems to be an ample attempt made to end the war by attacking Malventum, the capital of the Hirpini Samnites⁷. Considering these observations, Livy's narration has a strong annalistic character that faked the motivation of the Caudine expedition. The distortion is obvious in Livy's paragraphs on the 321 B.C. disaster. In order to keep the appearances, the annalistic tradition connected two components of the history of the Second Samnite War: the Roman presence in Apulia and the campaign at Caudium. Furthermore, we encounter the motive of the ally in danger, which is part of the typology of the good faith reactions specific to the Romans. From this point of view, we might consider the Livian version of the unfortunate expedition not as a proof of some fabricated Apulian contacts, but, on the contrary, as a testimony pleading for their authenticity.

The terms negotiated in 326 B.C. and the parts involved in the agreements are available only in theory. Livy records the Apulians as partners of negotiations but the term does not have a well defined political meaning⁸. Strictly, Apulia is the name of the territory between the area

³ Beloch 1926, 397 *sqq.*; Salmon 1967, 215; the alliances were also denied by Afzelius 1943, 163, inspired by J. Beloch re-enactment.

⁴ Livy 9.2.2-5.

⁵ Livy 9.2.1-8.

⁶ Salmon 1967, 224: Livy's statement, that the Roman forces were headed to Luceria, is a military nonsense.

⁷ Salmon 1967, 224; Oakley 2005, 26: the Roman armies attempted a decisive attack in the Caudium – Beneventum area.

⁸ Livy 8.25.2.

occupied by the Frentani and the Aufidus River⁹. The political unity in this area had been achieved within some microstates that were gravitating around more important communities¹⁰. The first Apulian centers that concluded treaties with Rome were nominated as late as 320-318 B.C., when Livy and Diodorus mention Arpi, Teanum and Canusium¹¹. As long as the sources keep the matter silent, it's impossible to find out which communities came in contact with Rome at the beginning of the Second Samnite War. However, according to the records we have about the alliances concluded in 320-318 B.C., we might hypothetically infer that Rome's first diplomatic relationships in Apulia were partnerships with certain centers situated in the area between the territory of the Frentani and approximately along the Aufidus River.

In this area there were favourable premises for Rome to build a useful network of alliances. In the past, the small Apulian communities had little chances to manifest themselves independently on the history scene. Under the rule of Archytas, the political and Tarentum's economical influence in the Apulian territory was considerable. The fate of the Apulian microstates evolved in connection with one of Tarentum's greatest era. It's difficult to specify the exact character of the relations between the Greek city and the Italic centers from the south-east of the peninsula; however, it seems that we can talk about the transformation of Apulia into an area of Tarentine influence¹². But the end of Archytas' rule, around 350 B.C., led to the dissolution of Tarentum's domination upon the Italic communities from the neighbouring regions. From a certain point of view, the Apulian centers probably appreciated the waning of the Greek control upon the territory, but, at the same time, the negative consequences were quick to appear. The power void created by the decline of the Tarentine influence became a temptation for the Samnites, who tried to expand to the east, beyond the Federation's mountains¹³. The echo of the Samnites' expeditions can be retraced in Livy's text. In 320 B.C., Consul L. Papirius Cursor marched with a Roman army up to Arpi, and was greeted everywhere with a friendly attitude. The historian of Patavium explains the reason: the inhabitants were afraid of the Samnites because they used to destroy their crops¹⁴. The devastating economic and psychological impact of the Samnite raids was probably a decisive factor that led many Apulian communities to embrace Rome's influence. Tarentum was no longer able to protect them, but Rome, who was at war with the Samnite League, had the necessary means to provide them protection. The Roman politicians understood that Apulia, due to the Samnites' pressure, was favourable to them. In this area they could open a second front that, due to the constant flow of troops, could wear out the Samnite forces. Also, the

⁹ However, in a broader sens, Apulia designated the region between the territories of the Calabri and the borders of the Frentani; see Strabon 6.3.1; Nissen 1902, 835 *sqq.*; Hülsen 1979, 288-290; Salmon 1967, 18 *sqq.*; Oakley 1998, 675.

¹⁰ It is possible that the political Apulian microunits would were temporarily united in leagues or federations, but it is not certain; see Salmon 1982, 20.

¹¹ Arpi (320 B.C.): Livy 9.13.6-10; Teanum and Canusium (318 B.C.): Livy 9.20.4-5, Diodorus 19.10.2 (only Canusium). The mention of Luceria as an ally of Rome in 321 B.C. seems to be a fake meant to justify the Caudine expedition as helping an ally in danger.

¹² Regarding the Tarentum's relations with Apulia during the rule of Archytas, see Ciaceri 1927, 439-440; Hoffmann 1934, 43-44; Wuilleumier 1939, 72-73; Heurgon 1973, 208.

¹³ It is very likely that Apulia was considered a solution for the Samnites' pastoral economy (De Sanctis 1907, 304; Salmon 1967, 48-49).

¹⁴ Livy 9.13.6-7.

Apulian alliances isolated the Samnite Federation from the Sabellian tribes in central Italy and surrounded, from the east, the Samnite territory¹⁵.

From the Samnite War perspective, these agreements can be completely understood and played a significant part during the hostilities. Still, it remains to be seen if they had any connection with the tensions between Rome and Tarentum, generated in the context of the crisis of Naples. For Livy, the war with the Samnites was going to decide the control over Italy and this is why the belligerents made all possible efforts to obtain the victory¹⁶, therefore, in his text, this crucial confrontation was given a major importance. The alliances concluded in 326 B.C. with the Lucanian League and several Apulian communities were probably considered part of the Roman anti-Samnite policy. According to the historian of Patavium, they don't appear to have any connection to the caution measures Rome had to take in order to prevent Tarentum's possible military involvement in the Samnite War. First he records the conclusion of the treaties in Apulia and then he describes the outbreak of the war with the Greeks from the eastern coast, showing that Tarentum wasn't comfortable with Rome's alliances with Lucania and a part of Apulia¹⁷. His phrasing and the succession of the events allow us to understand that, from Livy's point of view, the treaties of 326 B.C. were conceived in order to encircle the Samnite League. But the Livian text is far from offering a satisfactory image of the diplomatic contacts in Apulia at the beginning of the Second Samnite War. He only mentions the conclusion of the alliances and the promise of help, in men and weapons, which accompanied the negotiations, but does not provide details about their content.

In these circumstances, the terms of the alliances can only be hypothetically recomposed. As we showed above, the Samnite expansion towards the fields of Apulia led the nearby communities into the network of Roman alliances. They probably engaged to help the Roman troops that would have fought in Apulia with logistics, thus creating the basis of the warfare operations in southeastern Italy.

The relations of the communities in this region with Tarentum were oscillating, depending on the period, as the Dorian colony alternated diplomacy with military actions. During Archytas' rule, it is possible that the Tarentine influence on the people from the south-east of the peninsula was considerable. But we cannot assert that the Greek city's political "print" was always and everywhere positively welcomed. Probably, some communities accepted the situation as a momentary solution, in order to avoid a hostile reaction from Tarentum. The fact that its relations with the hinterland were not entirely friendly is demonstrated by the events occurred 20 years after Archytas exited the public life. Being at conflict with the Italics, Tarentum appealed to the services of Alexander of Epirus, who was in Italy in 334-331 B.C. His first actions were subordinated to the Tarentine interests, as he was called to Italy to defend them. According to Justin, he was at war with the Apuli, and then concluded an agreement with several communities from north of Tarentum¹⁸. The hostile relations during the short time of the king was present in the peninsula seem to demonstrate

¹⁵ The Apulian alliances in 326 B.C. were accepted by De Sanctis 1907, 304; Pais 1928, 136-137; Ciaceri 1932, 21 *sqq.*; Hoffmann 1934, 44; Scullard 1951, 109; Heurgon 1973, 206; Frederiksen 1984, 208; Brauer 1986, 73-74; Lomas 1993, 47; Oakley 1998, 650-651; Nedu 2007, 8-9.

¹⁶ Livy 8.23.9.

¹⁷ The Apulian alliances: Livy 8.25.2-3; the outbreak of the war with the Greeks from Tarentum: Livy 8.27.1-5.

¹⁸ Justin 12.2.5-6; Livy 8.24.4 only mentions that he occupied Sipontum in Apulia.

that the Apulian centers, divided and incapable to withstand by themselves, alternated obedience and open warfare trying to find a way to survive. Considering this, Tarentum was probably sometimes seen as a tolerable partner, in comparison to the Samnite League, but the foreign policy of the Apulian communities cannot be interpreted as an expression of loyalty to the Dorian colony.

In 326 B.C., the complicated external situation offered to these communities the chance to obtain protection against the Samnites, but it is possible that Rome also brought into discussion its new Apulian allies' position towards Tarentum. From the military point of view, the region held considerable advantages, and it could be the starting point of an expedition to the south in case the tensions with Tarentum exploded. Strategically speaking, we must mention that the negotiations with the Lucanian League, completed or in course of being completed during the negotiations in Apulia, could offer the solution for the stopping of a possible Tarentine military intervention in the conflict area in Central Italy. The Samnite-Tarentine junction in the Apulian regions was still possible, and the Romans could prevent this danger only by gaining allies in Apulia and establishing several operational bases. Undoubtedly, in 326 B.C., one of the major objectives of the diplomatic contacts in Apulia was to set up of the favorable conditions for the opening of a second Samnite front. However, we cannot leave out the anti-Tarentine aspect of the negotiations. As long as the tension in the relations with Tarentum could not be reduced in a fashion favorable to both sides, we consider it reasonable to assume that the alliances signed with the partners from the southern end of the peninsula were also conceived to keep this enemy at distance.

The direct and immediate consequences of the alliances in Apulia are being recorded by Livy in the text about 326 B.C., when the war between Tarentum and Rome broke out. Livy writes that the Tarentines disliked Naples entering the Roman control, and feared Rome's alliances in Apulia and Lucania; as they sensed the war approaching the city's gates they preferred the Romans as enemies rather than masters¹⁹. Tarentum is not pointed out as a direct participant in the hostilities during the Second Samnite War, but this absence could be explained precisely by the existence of the alliances in Lucania and Apulia²⁰. These treaties stopped all initiatives and explain why Tarentum hesitated to directly interfere in the actions in central and southeastern Italy.

Rome's interest for the regions in the southeast of the peninsula remained constant during the Second Samnite War. Until the Caudine disaster, Livy recorded two campaigns in Apulia, in 323 and 322 B.C.²¹. Another war that broke out in 325 B.C. against the Vestini can also be connected to the interests in Apulia²². By defeating the Vestini, Rome tried to consolidate its access to the operational field in Apulia. Other actions are described in *Ab urbe condita* after 321 B.C., but the conclusion of the Caudine peace raises important questions regarding the battles

¹⁹ Livy 8.27.1-3.

²⁰ Livy 8.27.1-3: *Aliud subinde bellum cum alterius orae Graecis exortum. Namque Tarentini, cum rem Palaepopolitanam vana spe auxilii aliquamdiu sustinuissent, postquam Romanos urbe potitos accepere, velut destituti ac non qui ipsi destituissent, increpare Palaepopolitanos, ira atque invidia in Romanos furere, eo etiam magis, quod Lucanos et Apulos – nam utraque eo anno societas coepta est – in fidem populi Romani venisse allatum est: quippe propemodum perventum ad se esse, iamque in eo rem fore, ut Romani aut hostes aut domini habendi sint.*

²¹ The expedition from 323 B.C.: Livy 8.36.3-6; the campaign from 322 B.C.: Livy 8.38.2-8.40.2.

²² Livy 8.29.1-14.

against the Samnites, on any front, between 320-315 B.C. It's more likely that the peace concluded between Rome and the Samnite League after the battle of Caudium led to the end of hostilities until 315 B.C., but the Roman annalistic tradition wiped off the shame of the defeat by inventing numerous compensatory victories²³. The peace from 321 B.C. imposed to the Romans the evacuation of the colonies at Cales and Fregellae, but it did not restrict the possibilities of action in Apulia or other regions that were not part of the Samnite territory. Both powers considered the Caudine treaty to be a peace of compromise to last until they recovered their strength. Under these circumstances, Rome continued to search for new allies and keep the old ones. The battles in Apulia against the Samnites, in 320-316 B.C., can be erased from the history of the Second Samnite War. But it's hard to dispute the reality of the fact that the Romans consolidated their presence in this region using diplomacy or military means²⁴. Livy recorded the first Apulian expedition after the Caudine disaster in 320 B.C., when the Arpians concluded a treaty with Rome²⁵. In 319 B.C., the Roman legions marched into the region of the Frentani, in order to secure the routes of communication with the Apulian territory. One year later, in 318 B.C., the communities of Teanum and Canusium were also convinced to ally with Rome²⁶.

At the same time with the recommencement of the battles against the Samnites, Apulia became the second field of battle, playing a very important in the Roman strategy. The actions against the Samnite troops began in this area in 315 B.C.²⁷. The following year brought an important success while attempting to encircle the eastern flank of the Samnite League: Luceria, an important locality at the foot of the Appennine Mountains was conquered and the Senate decided to settle there a Latin colony with 2,500 people²⁸. This was an essential step for entering the Samnite territory from the east or for Rome to develop the field of military operations more to the south of Italy, towards Tarentum. For 307 B.C., Livy's text recorded a campaign against the Sallentini²⁹ and in 306 B.C., according to Diodorus, the military operations focused around the locality of Silvium³⁰. Due to the importance that Rome granted to the central area of Italy and to its alliances from the southeastern area of the peninsula, in the same year they started to build *Via Valeria*, in order to facilitate the connections with these regions and the rapid movement of the legions to the eastern fields of military operations³¹.

²³ For the analysis of the Caudine peace, see Salmon 1929, 12 *sqq.*; Salmon 1967, 226 *sqq.*; Lipovsky 1981, 147 *sqq.*; Forsythe 2005, 298 *sqq.*; Oakley 2005, 3 *sqq.*

²⁴ Salmon 1967, 230 *sqq.* labeled the Apulian campaigns between 320-316 B.C. as fabricated. Probably the Caudine peace did not stop the search for new allies and the communities in Apulia did not always voluntarily join the Roman policy. In order to bring them into the Roman network of alliances, in some cases, military pressure was necessary. From this point of view, the presence of the Roman troops in Apulia, in 320-316 B.C., cannot be as suspicious as E. Salmon thought it was; Oakley 2005, 37-38, 263-264, considered these expeditions to be historical realities.

²⁵ Livy 9.13.6-10.

²⁶ Livy 9.20.4-5; see also Diodorus 19.10.2; the treaty with the Teates, Livy mentioned in 317 B.C. (9.20.9) doubles the alliance signed in 318 B.C. with Teanum; in fact, the Teates are the inhabitants of the community of Teanum; *cf.* Oakley 2005, 269.

²⁷ Livy 9.23.1-2.

²⁸ Livy 9.26.1-5; Diodorus 19.72.8; see Salmon 1970, 58.

²⁹ Livy 9.42.4-5; see Nedu 2007, 10 *sqq.*

³⁰ Diodorus 20.80.1-2; *cf.* Nedu 2007, 10 *sqq.*

³¹ Livy 9.43.26; see Salmon 1967, 246; Forsythe 2005, 309-310.

As early as the beginning of the Second Samnite War, Tarentum was undoubtedly worried about the Roman alliances that penetrated the region of Apulia, which it used to be its traditional sphere of influence. This situation called for urgent measures, but the alliance of Rome with Lucania placed an enemy in the Greek city's eastern flank. The Lucanian treaty signed in 326 B.C. was able to paralyse the Tarentine initiatives and the Dorian colony continued to hope that Samnite League would win the war.

Even if Tarent's military involvement against Rome wasn't favourable in the last years of the 4th century B.C., it still remained diplomatically active. After Rome's defeat at Caudium, Livy records a Tarentine diplomatic mission in Apulia, but its context and reasons for its often raised questions in modern historiography. According to the Livian text, in 320 B.C., the Roman army and the Samnite troops were about to start the battle outside Luceria's walls, when a Tarentine mission arrived and summoned the two armies to end the conflict. If one of the them opposed to the peace, then the Tarentines would engage in the war on behalf of those who accepted to end the hostilities³².

The interpretation of these actions occurred in the Roman foreign policy after 321 B.C. is not easy. The annalistic tradition tried to deny the peace concluded after the defeat at Caudium, considering it was a private agreement accepted only by those trapped in the defile, and never ratified by Rome³³. This way of distorting the reality is perfectly clear in Livy's account, strongly affected by the impressions of the Roman annalists³⁴. More serious is the fact that the tradition of the first Roman historians invented a whole series of great battles and victories, in order to prove that the war continued after 321 B.C. and to avenge the defeat at Caudium. In Livy's text, Tarentum's diplomatic intervention in Apulia is inserted among the details of an unlikely campaign, ended in 320 B.C. with the Romans taking Luceria. Starting from the dispute of the historical reality of this victorious expedition, some modern reconstructions also deny the contacts between Tarentum and Rome, which Livy places during the battles around Luceria³⁵. In our opinion, this is not the best way to interpret the Roman-Tarentine talks in 320 B.C. In this case, as well as in the case of the Caudium expedition, two episodes were connected and they must be analysed separately. In the episode of the Caudine defeat the annalistic tradition justified the campaign by the necessity to protect Luceria, which was under siege. In 320 B.C., in Livy's text we two other connected events: the invented battle at Luceria and the negotiations with the ambassadors of Tarentum. We have all the reasons to consider the first narrative nucleus to be fake, because the peace from 321 B.C. ended the Roman-Samnite hostilities. While the second narrative nucleus, although the way the historian mentions it raises suspicions, may hide behind the appearances the existence of some diplomatic contacts between Rome and Tarentum. Rome's delicate situation after the defeat at Caudium explains why the Dorian colony tried to find a way of communication in 320 B.C. The Caudine peace was useful to the Samnite, compelling Rome to evacuate the colonies established inside the league's territory, but Tarentum was still threatened by the alliance

³² Livy 9.14.1-2: *Per id tempus parantibus utrisque se ad proelium legati Tarentini interveniunt denuntiantes Samnitibus Romanisque ut bellum omitterent; per utros stetisset quo minus discederetur ab armis, adversus eos se pro alteris pugnatueros.*

³³ A good analysis of the situation: De Sanctis 1907, 307; Salmon 1929, 12 *sqq.*; Salmon 1967, 226 *sqq.*; Lipovsky 1981, 147 *sqq.*; Forsythe 2005, 299 *sqq.*; Oakley 2005, 31-34.

³⁴ Livy 9.4.4-9.7.10.

³⁵ See De Sanctis 1907, 315 *sqq.*

between Rome and the Lucanian Federation. This dangerous connection added to the alliances the Romans signed with several centers from Apulia, ignoring Tarentum's traditional interests in the region. The Samnite League negotiated after the Caudine defeat and obtained a favourable peace, so Tarentum probably believed that there were good premises for debating with Rome about the situation of the Apulian communities that hesitated between Tarentum and Rome. This might be a plausible interpretation for Tarentum's intervention in 320 B.C., if we analyse without discrimination the data on the incident recorded by Livy. Far from being a simple annalistic invention, the discussions Livy mentioned regarding 320 B.C. express Tarentum's concern for Rome's interference in its own sphere of interest in the southeast of the peninsula³⁶.

If we accept the interpretations presented above, another point of view may take shape regarding the first years of the Second Samnite War. Rome and the Samnite League fiercely fought in central Italy, but failed to bring the hostilities to a decisive point. We believe that Tarentum stayed in the shadow of the two main powers and tried to manipulate certain events as much as possible.

³⁶ The Tarentine intervention was accepted by Mommsen 1987, 217; Brauer 1986, 74-75; Ciaceri 1932, 24: Tarentum interfered in 320 B.C. at Luceria in order to prevent the expansion of the hostilities in its sphere of influence; Hoffmann 1934, 50: behind the Livian text there are some possible Roman-Tarentine discussions, because the mediation was the normal way of solving litigations in the Hellenistic world and Rome had just been defeated at Caudium and could be approached; the place of the debates, Luceria, in the north of Apulia, seems to be plausible; assumption of Lomas 1993, 49; Willeumier 1939, 92-93: the intervention of the Dorian colony is real and proves the concern for the perturbation of its interests in Apulia; Giannelli 1974, 356-357: Tarentum's political leaders became worried about the Roman advance in Apulia and interfered in 320 B.C. to stop the expansion of the war to the south of this region; Oakley 2005, 156-157 did not make a decisive statement about these contacts.

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The Roman involvement in Apulia in the first years of the Second Samnite War