



THE ENTIRE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE



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Issued under the aegis of the Romanian Commission of Military History as a supplement of magazine „Viața Militară” (Military Life)

Address: Romanian Commission of Military History, Bucharest, 5—7 Drumul Taberei str., tel 31.30.44

Readers from abroad may subscribe to this magazine through the agency of ROMPRESFILATELIA — press import-export department Bucharest Calea Griviței no. 64—66, sector 1, P.O. Box 12-201, telex 10376

THE OUTLOOK OF PRESIDENT NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU ABOUT THE PLACE AND ROLE OF THE 1848 ROMANIAN REVOLUTION IN NATIONAL HISTORY

Reader ION ARDELEANU, DHist.

The Romanian socio-political thinking places in the fore, on the highest summit, the outlook of President Nicolae Ceaușescu on the Romanian people's history due to his profound analysis in deciphering sources about the socioeconomic development. The entire theoretical work of President Nicolae Ceaușescu revolves round history, as fundamental component. In this context there is any stages, problems, socio-political movement not to have been studied and spotlighted their place and role in the Romanians' historical development. Such a moment is the 1848 Romanian Revolution from the carrying through of which there are celebrated 140 years.

Event of reference which, through its character, programme, development, implications influenced more than one century of the Romanians' national history, the 1848 revolution is stemming its vim from the entire evolution of the Romanian people theretofore. "The 1848 Romanian revolution — Nicolae Bălcescu asserted, one of the heads of the revolution — was not an irregular phenomenon, ephemeral, without past and future, without another cause than the fortuitous will of a certain minority or a European general movement. The general revolution was the occasion, but not the cause of the Romanian revolution. Its cause goes back to olden times. Its makers are eighteen centuries of endeavours, sufferings and work of the Romanian people upon itself. Unfolded within the framework of the revolutions that had been embracing Europe, the 1848 Romanian revolution had causes and objectives of its own, it was the outpost of the

bourgeois-democratic revolution in this part of the continent.

Joining in the process of national regeneration on the road of revolution ushered in by the historical moments of 1784 and 1821, the 1848 revolution developed and rendered a superior and unitary content to the ideals that animated the popular masses during those events. The requirements of the Romanian society's development by the mid-19th century imposed — more stringently than in previous decades — the implementation of some structural democratic reforms to ensure the free development of the economic, industrial, cultural etc. activities. "In 1848 — President Nicolae Ceaușescu pointed out — the bourgeois-democratic revolution was an objective necessity for unfettering the nation's creative energies, for its placing on the orbit of the modern civilization, for the attainment of the century-old dream—union within the frontiers of a sole country".

Imposed by the objective evolution of the Romanian society, the great national uprising of 1848 was prepared, in the same time, through the activity of numerous revolutionary secret associations and societies, political, or literary or artistic. The representatives of national culture, soldiers of national prosperity — as one of them Alecu Russo was to characterize the scholars and men of letters of that age — placed their talent and actions in the service of a patriotic work for preparing the renewing transformations, for substantiating and spreading the revolutionary ideas.

A great number of periodicals — "Cărierul românesc", and "Albina românească",



The People's Rally held in Bucharest on the 130th anniversary of the 1848 bourgeois-democratic revolution

founded by Ioan Heliade Rădulescu and Gheorghe Asachi, "Gazeta de Transilvania", and "Foae pentru minte, inimă și literatură", edited by George Barițiu, and the cultural magazines "Dacia literară" and "Arhiva românească", founded by Mihail Kogălniceanu, "Magazin istoric for Dacia" by Nicolae Bălcescu and August Treboniu Laurian — contributed to the crystallization of the 1848 ideology, to paving the way to the outburst and unfolding of the revolution.

The Romanian society, that in the first half of the 19th century was in early stage of modernization, witnessed a national ideology engendered by specific social and national realities enriched by the great trends of the European ideology that represented a main means for promoting the new against obsolete state of things, for demonstrating the anachronism of the foreign domination in full contradiction with the Romanian people's aspirations towards social and national progress. Militant and lawful through its content, the ideologic activity mobilized and made the people thoroughly grasp the major deziderata facing the entire nation, thus contributing to securing a broad popular participation in the revolution. The structural transformations requested for the development of the Romanian society aimed at both the abolition of feudal rules, the creation of conditions for material and cultural progress, for the organization of social life on the principles of modern society as well as the achievement of the independent national state through the removal of dependence on the great dominating or "protector" empires. So, the programme documents of the revolution reflected these fundamental commands passed through the light of the outlook and ideology of the whole pleiad of revolutionary thinkers. The 1848 revolution broke out and developed against a background full of contradictions, being preceded and prepared by important accumulations in national economy, revolutionary-democratic ideology, by essential forms of manifestation of national conscience. The revolutionary

events broke out in 1848 and lasted to August 1849.

Highly important in point of theoretical contributions is the appreciation made by President Nicolae Ceaușescu about the unitary character of the 1848 revolution unfolded in the three Romanian countries — Muntenia, Moldavia and Transylvania —, separated through temporary frontiers imposed by history's vicissitudes and due to the neighbouring empires' intervention. **"The bourgeois-democratic revolution in Moldavia, Transylvania and Muntenia — Romania's President pointed out — unfolded simultaneously and had a unitary character as it was the expression of the same objective requirements of the Romanian society's development, of the ideals animating the sons of this people".** Really, whatever the place and moment wherein one programme or another was formulated, the ideas and principles are identical belonging to the unique programme of social and national emancipation of the Romanian people on revolutionary way.

The Romanian people's aspirations for liberty and social justice were to be more or less clearly formulated in all programme documents, in manifestoes or articles published in patriotic newspapers issued during the revolution or immediately after that. So, there were claims for "equality of political rights", "general contribution" or "public responsibilities incumbent upon everybody depending on one's state and wealth and the eradication of privileges", "general assembly made up of representatives of all social classes", "a ruling prince for a five year term and elected by all social strata of the Romanian society", "ministerial and clerks' responsibilities", "the absolute freedom of press", or "the freedom of speak, write and publish without any censorship", "the people's arming", "the ensuring of personal liberty", "courts made up of jurymen of reputation", and other similar revendications with pronounced political character revealing the major goal of the 1848 revolutionaries to organize the Romanian

society on the basis of the bourgeois-democratic principles. Important for ushering in the way for capitalist development and the improvement of the popular masses' situation were the stipulations referring to the creation of conditions necessary for industrial, trade and commercial activity, inclusively the setting up of a national bank. For the masses of peasants, essential was that article 13 of the Islaz Proclamation which stipulated: "The emancipation of the socmen (bondsmen), who will turn into land-owners by compensations".

The unitary and lawful character of these revendications and the popular masses' presence represent the fundamental element that ensured the 105 day-govern by revolutionary forces in the Romanian Country of Muntenia and the endorsement of some laws in conformity with these programme documents. Thus the heroic resistance of the Transylvanian Romanians got both strength and power until the summer of 1849, militarily confronted with numerous and various enemy forces.

"Symbolical is also — President Nicolae Ceauşescu pointed to — that at Blaj, on the Liberty Field, beside Avram Iancu, Simion Bărnuţiu, George Bariţiu, Timotei Cipariu, Al. Papiu-Ilarian and the other Transylvanian revolutionary heads there were also revolutionary militants from the other Romanian provinces like Alexandru Ioan Cuza, Vasile Alecsandri, Alecu Russo, Costache Negri, Gheorghe Sion, Dimitrie Brătianu and others. This was an eloquent expression of all the Romanians' combat brotherhood in 1848 for the implementation of all revendications of the bourgeois-democratic revolution for the assertion of the aspiration and will for national unity, for the making up of the unitary Romanian national state".

Historical reality recorded, however, the armed action of the Ottoman and Tsarist empires against the Romanian revolution what made Nicolae Bălcescu conclude that the future revolution should be "a national revolution." Quite telling is that the Blaj "articles" related to the specific situation of the Romanians in Transylvania vis-à-vis the coinhabiting nationalities and especially vis-à-vis the nationalist policy promoted by the Hungarian revolutionary government that was taking the stand of rejecting anything concerning the Transylvanian Romanians' right to national liberty and independence. National unity and independence were clearly formulated in the programme of the Moldavian revolutionaries who, after the defeat of the 1848 revolution continued their activity in emigration; they were asking: Moldavia's union to Muntenia as a crown of all deeds, "the keystone without which the entire national edifice would fall down".

"The Romanian revolution of 1848 — President Nicolae Ceauşescu pointed to — placed in the fore, in all the Romanian principalities, as fundamental objectives, the removal of the old feudal rules, the shaking off of any foreign domination and oppression, the people's socioeconomic development on the road of progress, the setting up of a modern, united and free Romania". The social and national ideals written down on the fighting banner of the 1848 revolutionaries — ideals for which they rose and called the people to revolution —, the heroism and abnegation with which they faced the reaction, stubbornness and spirit of sacrifice proved by the popular masses in these fights revealed the Romanian people's combat will, fully aware of its vital interests, resolved to win by any sacrifices the social and national liberty, the right to live free and united in its own country. The 1848 Romanian revolution, though defeated by foreign armies, superior as military force, represented a plenary assertion of the Romanian people's potential and revolutionary capacity, of its national consciousness, of its determination to be on a par with the advanced ideas of the epoch, to go further, unabatedly, on the road of democracy and progress. The Romanian revolution showed the world, the European public opinion, the progressive forces of everywhere, the high spirit of sacrifice of the 1848 generation who waged one of the hardest, longest, and most dramatic military confrontations with the enemy and counter-revolutionary forces that Europe underwent during the tumultuous years of 1848—1849.

The 1848 Romanian revolution marked an important stage in the Romanian people's evolution, ushered in new perspectives for the ascension of the capitalist economy, individualized the social classes and categories resulted from this evolution which were to make and consolidate modern Romania. The 1848 ideals continued to yield fruit through the 1859 Union, the 1877 State Independence and the 1918 Great Union, through the organization of the Romanian economic and socio-political life on the coordinates of progress and democracy. **"The teachings of the 1848 events** — President Nicolae Ceauşescu underlined — **strongly attest that the formation of the nations, of the national states is a lawful and irreversible process, that no force exist in the world able to impede this process, able to stifle the peoples' will to live free and independent"**.

Today, the Romanian people, in celebrating the 140th anniversary of the 1848 Revolution energetically action for the building up of the new society on the motherland's beloved soil, for the glory of socialist Romania.

„EIGHTEEN CENTURIES OF ENDEAVOURS..“

Reader NICOLAE EDROIU, DHist.

The 1848 Revolution in the Romanian Countries was the aftermath of a long-standing evolution of the Romanian society, the outcome of a series of accumulations in the main fields of the social life and of revolutionary assertion of new social forces. The 1848 Revolution with the Romanians had historical roots going back to previous centuries of Romanian national history and its premisses strongly asserted in the decades before that half of century so much imbued with revolutionary tumult. The Romanians' uprising in 1848 mirrors the then stage in the historical evolution of the Romanian society, the necessities facing it at that time.

In the same time, the 1848 Romanian Revolution represented a Romanian case in a Europe-embraced social movement. In the history of Europe, the span of time between the end of the 18th century (marked by the 1789 revolution in France) and the mid 19th century (when the 1848 Revolution took place) represented the age of democratic revolutions, of the popular masses' revolutionary assertion and of the newly-created bourgeoisie, eager for winning political power. It was the age of the nations' moulding and assertion, so determined to build a state of their own, the nation-state, through their liberation from under foreign domination and political unification.

The Romanian society recorded all these historical phenomena and processes, its evolution having been synchronous to the European one in general. Like the revolutions unfolded in the other European states, the Romanian bourgeois-democratic revolution was the outcome of the whole previous evolution of the Romanian society as it was following the ever ripening conditions needed to its carrying out and the crystallization of capitalist elements and radicalization in the popular masses' movement¹.

The Romanian people's revolutionary traditions are going back in time. Following the aggravation of feudal exploitation exerted by boyars-nobles, the adscribed peasantry waged an uninterrupted struggle with a view of checking the ascending course of obligations it was subject to within the framework of feudal rent and for social liberation as well. 550 years ago, a great peasant uprising outburst in the north-western part of the Romanian habitat, known as the Bobilna uprising by

the name of the high plateau between Cluj and Dej where the mutinous peasants organized their camp. It was here that the first great victory of the peasants in the struggle against feudal class was scored as the latter were imposed the former's terms. Numberless were, both before and after the quelling of 1437 uprising, the peasants' upheavals and not only theirs, but of townspeople, of workers in the coal- and salt mines too, local unrests, resistance forms of the popular masses against the exploiters. A wide-range social movement outburst in spring 1514 that turned into a true peasant war; against the nobles within the voivodate of Transylvania the peasants-in-bondage or about to be in bondage and bind to the land² rose in arms. The feudal-taken drastic measures after the peasantry's defeat, the legislation of the land-bondage and increase of the number of compulsory working days, of the other obligations to the lords of feudal estates determined other social movements in the ensuing period. It comes to the peasant uprisings in 1562, 1595—1596 and those backing Michael the Brave in Transylvania in autumn of 1599³.

The spiraling aggravation of living conditions in the state of the adscribed peasantry in the Romanian countries in the 17th century, the instalment of the noble-boyars' regime, the serfs' binding to the land entailed the peasants' uprisings. In Moldavia and Muntenia the peasants' uprisings took place in the context of the fights for winning the throne, on which occasion the townspeople, petty-boyars and town-dwellers also were rising in arms, these movements turning into true large-scale popular movements. In 1665 a large-gamut uprising outburst in Muntenia on which occasion there was recorded the intervention of the troops of Muntenian, Transylvanian and Moldavian feudals aimed at restraining its spreading in the three Romanian countries⁴. The instalment of the Habsburg regime in Transylvania by the end of that century and of the Ottoman-Phanariot one in the other two Romanian countries in early 18th century broke out the people's revolt, their uprisings over 1703—1711, in 1744, in 1759—1760 as well as the ever increasing flights of the serfs from the feudal estates.

The 18th century, called the Enlightenment Century, entailed a speeding up in the process of moulding of the Romanian na-



Horea, the leader of the 1784 revolution

tion, of its assertion in the struggle for social liberation, from foreign domination as well. Transylvania's population was made up, in majority, of Romanians brought up in a state of grievous bondage by the Magyar nobility, they being also denied any political rights. Inochentie Micu and his followers drafted the politico-national programme of the Transylvanian Romanians and the Horea-led revolution in autumn 1784 demonstrated once again the revolutionary potency of the Romanian peasantry⁵.

The ultimatum that the peasants in rebellion addressed, on behalf of Horea, to the Magyar nobility — was in fact a true programme of the movement the target of which was the abolishment of nobility and the apportion of the landed property among those who were really turning it to account; it also set forth the revolutionary activity guiding lines for the ensuing period. So, as the great historian and revolutionary Nicolae Bălcescu said "Horea... wrote down the rights of the Romanian nation and the political and social programme of its future revolutions"⁶. Yet, even before the outbreak of the 1848 revolution, young Avram Iancu was to give a political sentence to the conservative

nobility: "It is not with philosophic arguments that one could convince those tyrants, but with Horea's lance!"⁷.

The *Supplex* movement in 1791 was to demonstrate the ripeness of the Romanians' politic national movement, it having been impelled by the Horea-led revolution. "The memorandum (*Supplex*) — as D. Prodan spotlighted — is not only an indicator for a local evolution, but it also takes the gauge of this evolution involvement in the large waves for renewing or remaking the European world"⁸.

The 1821 Revolution led by Tudor Vladimirescu mirrors the spiraling development of the Romanian society, its evolution towards the modernization and improvement of institutions. Also, it mirrors the intensification in the social (antifeudal) and national (antiPhanariot, antiOttoman) senses of the Romanian movement. Elements from all strata of the Romanian society participated in the revolution⁹. It had numerous supporters in Moldavia and the Romanian Transylvanians were reportedly to have backed up the Tudor Vladimirescu-led revolution¹⁰, a fact actually mirroring the then extension of revolutionary process on the scale of the entire Romanian nation.

The historical period spanning over the 1821 Revolution and the 1848 one shaped premises to the triggering off, in all three Romanian countries, of the social and national liberation revolution of the Romanian people. Capitalist elements penetrated the agriculture and the economy of the towns and boroughs, quantitative accumulations being recorded in all domains of social life. The population increase in the Romanian countries grew manifest, as

Cloșca and Horea (contemporary print)





Tudor Vladimirescu leading his soldiers towards Bucharest

well as the increase of the towns and boroughs, their ever increasing separation from the agrarian output. This fact would influence the development of the Romanian agriculture the agrarian problem having to enjoy priority within the politic, revolutionary programme. The industrial development of the Romanian economy, the progress recorded in point of technology employment, of building industrial establishments in Muntenia, Transylvania and Moldavia, the intensification of mine workings and the improvement of the mine extraction and working, the extension of the salaried workers conducing to the making of the national market; all this represented new elements of progress of the period prior to 1848. As for culture and ideology is concerned one should mention the shaping of the national framework, with the assertion of national culture and ideology out of which the programme acts of the 1848 Revolution came. The Romanian youth of that time perceived the changes occured in the Romanian society and the new progressive orientations and it itself was to think of the transformations necessary to be made in the Romanian habitat.

The structural transformations within the Romanian society in that quarter of century preceding the 1848 Revolution, the demographic evolution and changes in agriculture and trades (industry), in culture and ideology, represented premisses to the 1848 Romanian Revolution. The making and assertion of the Romanian nation is a historical process full of significances and consequences upon the whole Romanian society thus marking the period at the mid-last century¹¹. Hence, the 1848 Revolution in the Romanian Countries came of the longstanding evolution of the Romanian society and its requirements in that historical span, an evolution in full consens with the general ascension of the Romanian society. With good reason Ni-

colae Bălcescu appreciated in the years of reevaluations following the 1848 Revolution that "it was not an irregular phenomenon, ephemeral, without past and future, without other cause than the accidental will of a minority or the general European movement. The general Revolution was the occasion, but not the cause of the Romanian Revolution. Its cause goes back to remote times.

*Its makers are eighteen centuries of endeavours, sufferings and work of the Romanian people for itself. It was a stage, a normal historical evolution, absolutely necessary of that providential movement that drags the Romanian nation together with all mankind along the unbounded road of the progressive development"*¹².

1 Gh. Platon, *Geneza revoluției române de la 1848. Introducere în istoria modernă a României*, Editura Junimea, Iași, 1980, 303 p.

2 Ștefan Pascu, *Voievodatul Transilvaniei*, vol. III, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1986, pp. 295-348.

3 Idem, *Miscări țărănești prilejuite de intrarea lui Mihai Viteazul în Transilvania. în „Studii de istorie medie”, I, 1956, pp. 123-154.*

4 Lidia A. Demény, N. Stoicescu, *Răscoala seimenilor sau răscoala populară ? 1655*, Editura Științifică, București, 1968, 325 p.

5 D. Prodan, *Răscoala lui Horea*, vol. I-II, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1979, 602 + 766 p., II-nd edition, 1984.

6 Nicolae Bălcescu, *Miscarea românilor din Ardeal la 1848*, în *Opere*, ediția G. Zane, Editura Academiei, București, 1982, p. 114.

7 Iosif Sterca Sulufiu, *Biografia lui Avram Iancu*, Sibiu, 1897, pp. 5-6.

8 D. Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum. Din istoria formării națiunii române*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1984, p. 9-10.

9 A. Ofetea, *Tudor Vladimirescu și revoluția de la 1821*, Editura Științifică, București, 1971.

10 Idem, *Solidaritatea românilor din Transilvania cu mișcarea lui Tudor Vladimirescu*, Colecția Hurmuzaki, New Series III, Editura Academiei, București, 1967.

11 Gh. Paton, *Geneza revoluției române de la 1848*, pp. 114-284.

12 Nicolae Bălcescu, *Opere*, vol. II, p. 107.

THE 1848 ROMANIAN REVOLUTION — AN OUTPOST OF THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION

Reader VASILE CRISTIAN, DHist.

On the map of the 1848 revolutionary Europe the Romanian countries were the most advanced points in the East. Blaj, Bucharest, Jassy, Cernăuți were the easternmost points where, in that hot year, the flame of the revolution outburst, where combat plans were conceived and programmes were drafted with a view of building up the future modern society. This fact, with deep-going implications upon domestic and international situation too, was clearly pinpointed by contemporaries, by diplomats and publicists. On November 19, 1848, the well known French newspaper "La Reforme", in underlining the unity of the Romanian territory and nation considered it — a highly telling appreciation for the problem we are interested in — as "France of the Orient" and the most natural ally of the latter representing the "outpost of free and republican Europe" called to put the flag of independence between Rus and Turc, between Kremlin and the City of the Seven Towers". In the same time, spotlighting the importance of the Lower Danube where there was the "knot of the European war" and that the "salvation of Europe and civilization" was depending on, emphasis was put on the Principalities' economic and strategic position, the acuteness of the Romanian problem "one of the most important in point of the European equilibrium and especially of the big duel between democracy and absolutism in Europe"¹. Given the things, referring to the intervention of the Tsarist troops, the Pruth could be considered as a "Rubicon of contemporary history"². The quoted newspaper took over the viewpoint of a Romanian from Paris who drew the attention that the Danubian Principalities represent "the keystone of the European equilibrium in point of general policy" and that while defending themselves against

an arbitrary protectorate the Romanians are concomitantly defending several interests concerning Europe and especially the democratic work being performed in Europe³.

At the same time, beside numerous and constant information on the revolutionary developments, the foreign newspapers, French in particular, spotlight the Romanian nation's role as a defender of the Lower Danube basin, the great part a Romanian unitary state would play in barring Russia's advance to the Straits, the need for it to be aided, by Latin nations first of all⁴.

It was a duty coming not only from the Romanians' deeds in 1848, but from their role in the defence of European civilization in the past as well. Historian Jules Michelet was to clearly emphasize this assertion in a book specially dealing with this subject. "Peoples from the West — he said — always keep grateful memories of Oriental nations; situated on Europe's frontiers they protected and shielded you from the Tatars' onslaught, from the Ottoman armies", special mention having to be made for "unhappy Romania", "one of the defense shields of Europe"⁵. Through their action in 1848 — the same Michelet wrote — the Romanians placed their nation within the world's calendar". This assertion underlined an essential thing: "An outpost in older times, of the great Roman empire"⁶, the Romanians were subsequently obliged to fight a fiery and stubborn fight, sometimes to sacrifice themselves so as the West be able to build in peace; through their 1848 uprising they expressed their will for joining in the European modern edifice, even if they were bordering upon two empires built on conservative foundations which had generated a reactionary policy, so strikingly shown in 1848—1849, against the upheaval on their borders, the

armed intervention being a prolongation of the political attitude, mirrored in numerous documents, among which the well known circular letter of the Tsarist government dated July 19/31, 1848 full of distortions and mistakes, a contradictory letter, wherein Nesselrode "ascertained the existence of a Romanian question without recognizing it and erasing it from the European law"⁷.

The outpost role of the Romanian Revolution within the general framework of 1848, spotlighted by both the progressive forces and the reactionary ones, was not a mere outcome of occurrences, but it was deeply rooted in the process of moulding and asserting the Romanian nation, having been preceded by other two European-sized movements. The Horea-led revolution, placed in time between two of the top moments of the general revolutionary process — the American and the French ones — represents the widest range rising to fight against social and national oppression in Central and Eastern Europe in the last quarter of the 18th century, a "very important (event) for contemporary history, that roused numerous and revealing reactions, among which the well known stance of the future French revolutionary, J. P. Brissot who considered it in absolute lawfulness⁸. In its turn, the Tudor Vladimirescu-led revolution join in the wide-scope revolutionary process that embraced Europe by 1820. In the ensuing years the political situation did not permit such wide-scope uprisings, but the period was very dense as for the attempts at designing an architecture of the future Romanian modern state, sometimes at its putting into practice in conformity with the "century's breath", hence with the directions proposed by the loftiest aspirations of the time, starting, to be sure, from the historical groundwork of the own development with its peculiarities. Revolutionary tendencies would grow up in contact with the West's spiritual and political movement where many young people studied. On the other side the foreigners also focused their attention, to a greater degree, upon the realities at Lower Danube through contacts established with the Romanians, through written works about them, some of them quite ample like that, for instance, in three volumes, authored by J. A. Vailant significantly entitled *La Roumanie* (1844). One might assert that through many of their representatives, the Romanians joined in the European revolutionary movement, in its spiritual form, even before 1848 and the participation of some of them to the events unfolded in February 1848 in Paris was to put seal of their adhesion to the general tendencies of that epoch.

But naturally in this sense essential was the Romanian revolution itself stemmed

from the necessities of the own society and demonstrating the world that it represented a unique entity on the way of modernization, of national and social emancipation, being "closely linked to the dignity and independence of civilized Europe"⁹, that the international juridical status of the Romanian countries could not have but an artificial character since through their structure and aspirations they were joining in what the then publications named "the large family of the European peoples". It was, in fact, the spirit of the programme-documents. It is true that some of them, from tactical reasons, had to make some concessions in order to deal gently, without getting the expected results, with the susceptibilities of the great neighbour empires. But their spirit is the one, in fact general, of the revolution by mid-last century, even if inherently, specific necessities had to be taken into account.

The revolutionaries' action pleaded in the same sense. When it succeeded in imposing it was in military field, but prevailing was the diplomatic activity dictated by the epoch's conditions as contemporaries were to point to¹⁰. The Romanians took important diplomatic demarches in Austria, Germany, France, developed relations with the Polish revolutionaries and also tried to change the attitude of some states that the revolution had not yet embraced or were hostile to it. In their turn they enjoyed the wide support of international public opinion, a fact revealed in various manifestations, firstly in the wide-scope publi-

Horea's seal bearing the inscription
"Horea Rex Daciae"



cistic action unfolded in their favour; with good reason one could remark that in only two years. Europe spoke and wrote about the Principalities more than she did in a string of decades¹¹.

Equally revealing for the significance of the Romanian revolution as an outpost of the European revolution was the fact that for its defeat, impossible through the force of internal reaction only, was necessary the coalesced armed intervention of the three neighbour empires¹². The latter's sense is more than obvious. Trying to justify the intervention against the Hungarian revolution the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nesselrode, showed that "we acted in this way in order to defend our own house and choke the fire in the neighbours only". His assertion, whose metaphorical form cannot conceal its exact significance is so much the available for the Russian intervention in the Danubian Principalities. It is right that the Russian diplomacy tried to present it as having been determined by a special care for the integrity of the Ottoman empire — a care for the inheritance of an ill relative coveted by other pretenders too — and justified that the Principalities would not have been independent. But it really came to the fear for the creation of a Daco-Romanian kingdom anticipated by the revolution and capable to conduce to two consequences that actually history itself was to validate — the modification of international situation in the area through the building of a dam in the way of the Russian expansion towards southeast Europe and the emergence of a revolutionary hotbed to influence the liberation struggle of the neighbour peoples.

The Romanian revolution did not end, in the strict sense of the word, in 1848—1849. The return to a political organization approximately similar to the previous one did not allow any longer the development of a revolutionary activity but its spirit was preserved. It manifested itself both internally, even wrapped up in veiled forms, and externally through the wide-range action unfolded by the people driven into exile backed up by publicists, scholars, senior politicians. The latter's ideas are sembable in a great measure to those met in 1848¹³.

Starting from history stress is put on the present and importance of the Romanian nation so as conclusions to be drawn upon the importance of its future development. Yet, the argumentation is strengthened, this time, by the experience of the revolution, the discussions being more concrete, especially since the Oriental Question reopened again. As early as in March 1853 Marx and Engels pinpointed as a positive fact that the revolutionary spirit embraced the Danubian Principalities as

the year of 1848 had proved, it growing up in the ensuing year, and envisaged that the Romanian nation "might play an important part in the definitive settlement of these territories' problem"¹⁴, a prevision to be practically confirmed in the following period. Because we must not forget that 1848 was not only the starting point in the building up of modern Romania, but it prepared the next international situation first of all through making the Romanian question a European problem¹⁵, then through establishing the international programme of the Romanian society's development. This makes the 1848 Romanian revolution be thoroughly understood as an outpost of the European revolution, an outpost that must not be seen only in point of space, but of time also. In a conservative Europe the Romanians continued to resort to methods, particularly to revolutionary principles. Against some important external pressures they succeeded, through the "a fait accompli" policy to gradually achieve the 1848 programme, especially in the union age when former revolutionaries were ahead of the young state, as really former revolutionaries also played an essential part during the War of Independence. The accusations that conservative diplomacy and press brought against Romania as a revolutionary hotbed made but strengthen the idea that like in 1848 the Romanian area represented, for a long time, until the wholly implementation of the programme of that year when the continent was seized by flames, an outpost of the European revolution.

1 Apud Olimpiu Boroş, Raporturile românilor cu Ledru Rollin şi radicalii francezi în epoca revoluţiei de la 1848, Bucharest, 1940, pp. 110, 117, 192 and foll.

2 Anul 1848 în Principatele române, III, Bucharest, 1902, p. 180.

3 Olimpiu Boroş, op. cit., p. 210.

4 Ibidem, p. 108, 115.

5 Jules Michelet, Scrieri alese, II, Istoria Revoluţiei, Editura Minerva, Bucureşti, 1973, pp. 335—336.

6 Ibidem, p. 335.

7 Leonid Boicu, Geneza chestiunii române ca problemă internaţională, Editura Junimea, Iaşi, 1975, p. 110 and foll.

8 See at large Nicolae Edroiu, Răsunetul european al răscălelii lui Horea, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1976, David Prodan, Răscălea lui Horea, II, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1984, pp. 653—798.

9 Al. Cretzianu, Din arhiva lui Dumitru Brătianu, I, Bucureşti, 1933, p. 126—127.

10 H. Desprez, La révolution dans l'Europe orientale, Paris, 1948, p. 13.

11 România în relaţiile internaţionale 1699—1939, Editura Junimea Iaşi, 1890, p. 125.

12 Istoria militară a poporului român, IV, Editura Militară, Bucharest, 1987, p. 278.

13 Apostol Stan, Revoluţia română de la 1848, Editura Politică, Bucharest, 1987, p. 424, and foll.

14 Karl Marx, Fr. Engels, Opere, 9, Editura Politică, Bucharest, 1959, pp. 9—10.

15 Leonid Boicu, op. cit., and foll.

THE FLAME OF REVOLUTION IS COVERING THE ENTIRE ROMANIAN TERRITORY

JASSY, March 27/April 18, 1848
THE FIRST REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAMME

Prof. GHEORGHE PLATON, DHist.

The 1848 Revolution was a necessary outcome and, at the same time, an expression of the process of growing up and development of the Romanian society; specific means for the achievement of social and political progress¹, it represented an important stage in the nation's ascension. It was through it that the Romanian nation sanctioned its existence and defined the "profound forces" animating it thus having written down itself in the history of "nationalities' century". Preceded by a longstanding and complex revolutionary situation, the Romanian Revolution stored up, in launching it, strong energies.

Prior to the 1848 Revolution the development of the Romanian history had been accelerating. The pace of renewing transformations, of the revolutions (demographic, agrarian, industrial, ideologic) intensified, the society's modernization generalized, the social tension grew up in intensity following the disagreements entailed by the statutory rules, the political tension permanently fostered a state of effervescence and strain. Within this atmosphere national culture was developing that was to define the personality of the Romanian nation and the national consciousness was strengthening in the background of the common options of the three Romanian countries. Within this huge process having involved economy, social and spiritual life, that modified the people's mentality by enlarging their scope of knowledge, *the Romanian nation*, politically divided, closed its ranks, homogenized its composition and spiralled-up its integration in the European economy, policy and spirit of the time.

When the European revolution started, this transformation process of the Roma-

nian society was in full swing. The struggle between new and old, against abuses and privileges, for social justice, national dignity and liberty had been generalized thus giving rise to wide-scope and dynamic unrests. Necessary was a theoretic and practic programme capable to interest, rally together and put into motion all the living forces of the nation, to channel the huge revolutionary tension within the Romanian society. It was the task taken over by the leaders of the revolution, outstanding members of the generation ennobled with the emblem of this "*spring of the peoples*".



The political situation of the three Romanian countries, the problems engendered by the old-century separation, the lack of a preliminary preparation as well as the revolution in the Habsburg Empire, the latter's turning into a constitutional monarchy a.o., prevented the unity plans, extant during the revolution, from their materialization. In the circumstances of the European revolution development, the revolutionary committee from Paris decided that the actions to unfold simultaneously. The precipitance of events in Moldavia made, however, those plans become inoperative. Here, the Revolution started before the "căuzași" (ist. revolutionist — o.n.) who were abroad to have arrived in the country.

In the first months of 1848 political unrests and revolutionary fever strongly embraced the whole Romanian area. Added to this social tension and feverish political activity were the news about the European revolution. The town of Jassy vibrated the first on hearing the renewing developments. By early March 1848 the town was in full ebullition. Anonymous

appeals, posted up in the streets, were urging on fight against the ruling prince, were asking for assemblies to be convened that were to mirror general aspirations and desires. "(...) *Gather together, wisely consult each other without discussions and ask the election of a patriot prince. Take the enlightened nations for a model — read such an appeal — that are fighting for their liberation*". Other numerous manifestoes were demanding the Beizade Grigorie to be expelled from the country, the dismissal of the supreme court members and the press freedom². In spite of a severe censorship, French newspapers that were mailed in closed envelopes through the Austrian post were translated having been afterwards spread over. In this way, events and ideas of the French revolution, from other countries of Europe³ were brought to general knowledge.

Representatives of revolutionary circles from all counties, assembled, in great number, at Jassy, in order to consult together on measures to be taken. Numerous meetings were organized. "*All the society's classes awakened from a deep sleep — Vasile Alecsandri was to write. People able to save their homeland from*

During the 1848 revolution, at the Great National Assembly of Blaj, Vasile Alecsandri composed the first version of the Union Dance




Mihail Kogălniceanu. The union of the Romanian Countries of Moldavia and Muntenia is the cornerstone of the entire national edifice

oppression and especially the youth of Moldavia... felt themselves driven by a lofty and haughty hope. Then a great number of people were running to Jassy, from all counties, to unite with their brethren from the Capital and try to cure the illness that was racking the Romanians for ages"⁴. "*To waste time is a crime*", was warned G. Sion who, in his way to Jassy; met numerous revolutionaries from Vaslui and Birlad who were armed as they "*were going to fight*"⁵.

Under these circumstances, when the triggering off of the revolution was impending, on 10/28 March there was brought to knowledge the circular letter of Nesselrode, chancellor of Tsarist Russia, which warned that the Tsar would not permit any "anarchy" in the outskirts of his empire, nor would he permit the ties linking the Principalities with the two powers, suzerain and protector⁶, to loosen. The eventuality of an armed intervention — after the demobilization of a part of the revolutionaries — could not stop, however, the normal course of the events.

Aware of internal and external implications, the responsible factors insistently



Alecu Russo, a close friend of Nicolae Bălcescu

recommended an attitude of calm and wisdom not permitting any pleas for foreign immixtures. The consular agents of the big powers accredited in Moldavia's capital pronounced their opinion in favour of concessions. But the ruling prince, he himself caught between the national movement and an eventual Tsarist intervention equally jeopardizing his rule, decided to action energetically. As he could not rely on the army, won by the oppositionist national movement, M. Sturdza made up a pretorian guard with the purpose of putting it up against the malcontents and of mastering the situation. This step aroused strong reactions and made deeper the extant unrests.

Although forbidden, through prince's many orders the protest movement intensified in point of frequency and amplex. M. Drăghici (the last Moldavian chronicler) referring to the "rebellion breath" that had imbued the country, wrote that initially the meetings of the malcontents were unfolding in private houses with the attendance of some 15–20 people. Then, they were to take place in public houses where "good and evil were gathering together under the slogan of equality in order to indulge in petty politics aimed at their emancipation through a large constitution... without shrinking from the government". At Petersburg Hotel, just "in the flank of the princely Court", he narrated further, "three noisy meetings unfolded setting up for national meetings"⁷.

During these agitations the opposition

groups reached a unity of views grounded on general, national interests. Through the agency of the Minister of Interior, the Prince started negotiations with the opposition leaders. C. Rolla, V. Alecsandri, L. Rosetti, M. Epureanu, P. Cazimir a.o., representatives of intellectual youth opposition especially, were asked to inform the government about the "people's wishes". On the latter's answer that they could not speak on behalf of the people without its consulting, the arrangement was made for a great assembly to be convened, on which occasion the revendication programme was to be drafted to be later on forwarded to the Prince. It came, hence, to the Assembly of March 27/April 8 convened at the Petersburg Hotel too. It was attendend by "more than one thousand men" (other sources speak of 2,000 men), "of all social classes, of all convictions, of all nationalities, coming from all Moldavia's counties".

The assembly, where on the one side was the nation and the administration on the other side — watched with great interest by the entire population of Jassy — unfolded in an atmosphere of great enthusiasm having been appreciated as a true "revolutionary club". For the first time the oppression regime was directly and free blamed. The speakers of this national representation, relying on the legal grounds of autonomy, were deeply concerned with the "interests of motherland" exclusively. There were discussed the most important problems facing the Romanian society of the time; then a commission assigned to draft the revendication programme was elected. The main part was played by Vasile Alecsandri.

This programme, comprising 35 points, entitled "Petition Proclamation — of the Moldavian boyars and notability"⁸, moderate in content and form, while respecting the "regular legality", stipulated in the first article: "the strict observance of the Regulations in point of its content, without any distortion". This was an answer to the threats from outside. On its whole the *Petition* was a wide fan of principles and dispositions the application of which aimed at removing the abuse-bound Regulation and introducing a constitutional regime including: personal safety, ministerial and official responsibility, the school and education reform "on a large, national ground", the abolishment of censorship, the moral and social uplifting of the clergy. Stipulations were provided for the setting up of a national bank and of a trade Court, "the fast improvement of the peasants' conditions" as well as the amnesty of political convicts. It was also demanded the dissolution of the public Assembly, elected through abuses and violence and the setting up of a new Assembly that to be "a true representation

of the nation" as well as the setting up of a citizen guard.

While explaining the moderation of the claims submitted in March, Mihail Kogălniceanu wrote down later on: "*then Moldavia complaining of the illegalities only was eager for being reset in legality so as to be able, in legality, to make other greater improvements*"⁹. Many of the revendications, in spite of their moderation, as M. Drăghici appreciated "*in striking a blow at Turkey's authority were also touching Russia's preponderancy on protectorate*"¹⁰.

The very next day, March 28/April 9, there was a true pilgrimage to the houses of chancellor C. Sturdza where the programme drafting commission had convened. People "*of all conditions*" were signing the document and at several desks "*the national desires*" were copied out in order to be spread over and brought to general knowledge. Decision was taken that should the Prince reject to sanction the *Petition* and then the legalization of the movement, then a large popular movement was to be organized capable to impose the demands. Nor the use of more radical measures was excluded. But these goals could not be materialized. M. Sturdza, with energy and brutality, quelled the movement; a severe

terrorist regime was set up in Jassy and all Moldavia.

The national regeneration movement started in Moldavia would extend and embrace the entire Romanian territory turning into a national revolution. The Romanian nation, divided through arbitrarily imposed political frontiers, was solidary in thoughts and feelings; it tested the irresistible force of the feelings of unity, its firmness and capacity to achieve its national state. The trust in the destinies of Future Romania became unflinching.

1 Cf. Gheorghe Platon, The Revolution — A Means for the Carrying Out of Social and National Progress in the Romanian Society in the Modern Epoch, in "*The Entire People's Struggle*", nr. 4 (14), 1987, pp. 47—49.

2 Anul 1848 in Principatele Române. Acte și documente, vol. I, pp. 142—145, 171—172.

3 G. Sion, Suvenire contimpurane, București, p. 167.

4 Anul revoluționar 1848 in Moldova. Documente, București, 1950, p. 200.

5 G. Sion, op. cit., pp. 171—172, 176.

6 Anul 1848 in Principatele Române, vol. I, pp. 168—169.

7 Manolaki Drăghici, Istoria Moldovei pe timp de 500 ani până în zilele noastre, tom. II, Iași, 1857, p. 208.

8 Anul revoluționar..., vol. I, pp. 176—179.

9 Ibidem, vol. IV, p. 90.

10 M. Drăghici, op. cit., p. 210.

BLAJ, May 3/15, 1848

„WE WANT TO UNITE WITH THE COUNTRY”

Reader LIVIU MAIOR, DHist.

The 1848 Romanian revolution, carried out in full synchronism with the events in Europe, was the upshot of a long historical evolution, the expression of the process to develop the society at large, standing as a hallmark in the centuries-old struggle waged by the entire people to fulfill its social and national aspirations. It evidenced the maturity of Romanian nation since the development of national consciousness brought to the limelight the question of national unity, of the formation of the modern unitary state despite the domination by Ottoman and Hapsburg empires over the the Romanian territories. "**The revolution** — emphasizes President Nicolae Ceausescu — **expressed the unitary programme of the entire people, centered on**

the imperious target to unite all Romanians within the borders of the same national, democratic, modern and independent state."

Since the 1848 Transylvanian revolution broke out against the backdrop of worsened social and national contradictions, it was, consequently, directed in the first place against the feudal-absolutist establishment, aiming to remove it and to create the propitious conditions to restructure the society. The social and national targets of the 1848 Romanian revolution — the abolition of serfdom and the recognition of Romanian nation were closely interrelated, mutually interdependent.

Urged by forceful peasant movements, the Romanians' leaders started, since late

March and early April, to programmatically express their ideas on the revolutionary solution of the pendant questions. In the night of March 24 to 25, 1848, Simion Bărnuțiu drafted the manifesto significantly titled *Provocation*. The abolition of serfdom, the recognition of Romanian nation on an equal footing with the other "nations" in Transylvania, the convening of a Romanian national congress were foremost priority targets for this stage of the revolution. After a short while, a consensus was achieved between various revolutionary centers and consequently the Great National Assembly, meant to be the National Congress of the Romanians in Transylvania, was called up in Blaj on May 3/15, 1848, to draw up the final form of the programme.

The assembly was convoked, in the main, to adopt a solidary stand toward the tendencies manifest among Magyar revolutionaries, among liberal nobility, namely their plan to annex Transylvania to Hungary. Dreading the union of the ancient Romanian land of Transylvania to its sister countries, Moldavia and Wallachia, and also frightened that once the regime based on "Unio trium nationum" was removed they would lose their social and political supremacy, the nobility supported "the union" or more correctly, the annexation of the principality. The rejection of the "union" in the very first manifestos and proclamations by the Romanians brought to the fore the need to convene a Romanian national assembly. Besides the imperative to discuss within a larger framework the programme of the revolution, a body was also needed to focus all dispersed forces of the Romanians at a watershed moment of their existence, and the unanimously accepted formula was that of the Great National Assembly.

In spite of the measures taken by the authorities of the Principality, three days before the assigned date tens of thousand of peasants from all the corners of Transylvania wended their way to the city of Tîrnave. A day before, on May 2, the cathedral in Blaj hosted a restricted meeting also attended by revolutionary Romanians from Moldavia, forced to leave Moldavia after the revolution was defeated in March. Simion Bărnuțiu took the floor. He proclaimed using an ample documentation the Romanians' will to win their legitimate national rights, without prejudicing the other nationalities: "The Romanian nation enlightens the coinhabiting nationalities that willing to form and organize itself on a national principle it does not foster enemy intentions against other nations and acknowledges the same right for all." Bărnuțiu further developed as a fundamental idea the priority question to unite all Romanians into a self-dependent political nation and to acknowledge certain collec-

tive rights of the nations. He combated the idea of Transylvania's "union" with Hungary, on the grounds of the centuries-old antagonisms between the Magyar ruling class and the Romanian popular masses. In the trail of his forerunners, he set forth as his basic argument the Romanian majority character of the population in Transylvania. The establishment of the Hungarian unitary state within its mediaeval historical borders — he emphasized — would have reduced the Romanian nation to the minority statute and all future decisions on social and political structure, on cultural development would have been made without consulting the representatives of the Romanian nation.

This speech, an inspired eulogy of national language and culture, of democratic freedoms — the foundation of man's life and dignity — was a steppingstone in the elaboration of the future programme. It incorporated the 18th c. political programme and was influenced by the references to historical records and natural law formulated in the *Supplex* movement, enriching them with new concepts and rounding them off with a rigorous plan of political and social claims.

The following day, on May 3/15, 1848, in an atmosphere of lofty patriotism and revolutionary spirit, in the presence of over 40,000 people the Great National Assembly opened its proceedings, the first event of this kind in the troubled history of the Romanians, an upshot of the aspiration after social and national liberty which kindled the popular masses. The tens of thousands of peasants listened spellbound to the tribunes' words which answered their centuries-old aspirations. "That day, awaited by thousands of thirsty-for-freedom people as the redemption day and feared by many, came" — wrote the newspaper *Organul național*, and a Magyar participant Meszaros Károly gave a vivid description of the Assembly: "As far as the outer appearance of this grandiose popular assembly is concerned, it is unlikely that Europe has ever seen something of that sort."

The Great National Assembly adopted the programme of the revolution which included the main political, economic and social claims of the Romanians: national equality, the abolition of serfdom, the freedom of commerce, the abolition of censorship, the independence of Romanian Orthodox church etc., conferred a bourgeois-democratic dimension to Romanian revolution. The protest against the contemplated "union" with Hungary was deeply rooted in the Romanians' hearts. Going across the tens of thousands of peasants, Bishop Semenyi heard the peasants shouting "that 'union' is out of the question", while one of the Magyars' leaders, pondering over this aspect, wrote to a

was also an outstanding instance of Romanian revolutionary solidarity, a general solidarity with the idea of state unity. The Hapsburg and Magyar authorities, before and after the assembly, called attention to all those who disseminated the idea to re-establish the "Dacian empire", to the Romanians in the Principalities, who took active part in the events in Transylvania. Thus, about May 3/15, Constantin Roman together with young Kalinderu came back to Transylvania to attend the Great National Assembly. From Braşov, Michael Maurer informed the government about a meeting which was held in that town and where the young revolutionary, a close friend of Bălcescu, took the floor: "It was him who spoke in public about the restoration of Dacia to its former state." Also attending the Assembly in Blaj were the Romanian revolutionaries from Moldavia, forced to leave the country in late March. The events on the Cimpia Libertăţii engraved unforgettable memories in their consciousness. Alecu Russo, an eye-witness to this Assembly, wrote: "On a vast plain, forty thousand Romanians listen, under a flying three-colour flag, to the words of Transylvanian iintelligentsia. Moldavians and Wallachians, exiled from their countri-

es, breathlessly looked at the assembly trooped in groups after their native villages and regions, an entire people, wearing the same costume, speaking the same language like our people", and Gheorghe Sion stated: "The history of the Romanians with the sufferings of the past and of the present, the national rights, the love for their motherland, the pride to be a Romanian were the paramount ideas approached by the speakers at this assembly."

The Great National Assembly of Blaj was the most important event occurred until then, which outlined the consciousness of Romanian people's unity. The participation of the Romanian from Moldavia like Gh. Sion, Alecu Russo, Ioan Cusius, Teodor Moldovan, Dimitrie Brătianu and others, turn this event into the onset of the entire 1848 Romanian revolution. It was, through the adopted decisions, through its popular echo, a turning point in the history of the Romanian people. The Assembly of Blaj signified, likewise, the strong assertion of the Romanians as a self-dependent nation resolved to lay down their lives for the defense of their national being, of their sacred rights to unity and independence.

ISLAZ, June 9/21, 1848

THE HISTORIC PROCLAMATION, A GENUINE CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNTRY

Reader IULIAN CĂRȚANĂ, DHist.

The 1848 Romanian revolution is part, with its specific aspects, of the great European movement which cast away the old anachronistic structures in favour of an evolution aimed at material progress, social democratization and more just international relationships, and the assertion of national sovereignty. The Romanian revolutionary programme originated from the entire Romanian nation, over the artificial state borders extant in the middle of the 19th century, is epitomized in the proclamation made at Islaz on June 9/21, 1848, which, as President Nicolae Ceauşescu highlights, "was to become *de facto*, over the entire

period of the revolution, the country's constitution"¹, focused the aspirations nourished by a new generation as the representative of an entire nation. On June 13/25, 1848, Nicolae Bălcescu informed the consulates in Bucharest that by virtue of the right to independent internal administration a new constitution was proclaimed, profoundly attached to the country's internal interests. The Romanian revolutionist stated: "*I shall have the honour to let you know soon the bases of this constitution which will rule from now on in Wallachia.*"² After about a month, the same revolutionary democrat wrote to Ion Ghica,

then on a mission to Constantinople, the following: "Work in all eagerness there so that we win the recognition of the Constitution. Only thus could we save the revolution and defeat the entire reaction."³ It is evident the authority with which the Romanians invested the act of June 9/21, 1848, which was to be also acknowledged by the international public law.

The process to devise the act of June 9/21, 1848, as all wide-scope documents aimed to boost the entire country into a creative effervescence unbound in time limits, was difficult and characteristic for all revolutionary states in 1848. The bourgeois revolutionary ideology was a reality, even if diffuse and manifestly disparate apt to be confused with a mood foreshadowing the great changes. On the eve of the launching of revolution in Muntenia, there were two revolutionary nuclei likely to theoretically and practically prime the revolution, Paris and Bucharest. On March 8/20, 1848, in Paris, turned into the international heart of the revolution, but without the pretense to guide it,⁴ upon at Bălcescu's initiative a meeting was held of the Romanian revolutionaries who drafted the revolutionary programme and which included, following Bălcescu's insistences, the settlement of agrarian problem through a land reform with compensations. The meeting was attended by revolutionaries from the Romanian Countries of Muntenia and Moldavia, telling proof of the unitary character taken by the 1848 Romanian revolution.⁵ The programme adopted on March 8/20, its basic provisions foreshadowed the Islaz Proclamation.⁶ After this event, the Romanian revolutionaries in France's Capital City decided to return to the country with the view to organizing and launching the revolution.

In Bucharest, the situation could be deemed, in view of all the symptoms detectable in the social and political life, as revolutionary. The incontestable leader of the opposition to ruling order, as was seen at the time both by his contemporaries at home and abroad, was Ion Heliade Rădulescu.⁷

A question which raised partisan debates at the time and in the following years was who really masterminded the Islaz Proclamation. Ion Ghica stated that the programme was drafted by Bălcescu who inserted article 13 as a solution to the social problem, a concentrated expression of the 1848 revolution⁸. In 1864, Heliade wrote that "that constitution is my work." In fact, the twenty two points of the draft programme are the upshot of the collective debates held by the revolutionary committee, which implied mutual concessions with the view to ensuring the revolutionaries' unity. The introductory part, the final form of articles, the concluding

invocations were the work of Heliade who infused them with his ideas, in his unmistakable, pathetic style.⁹

On June 9/21, 1848, Heliade reads the proclamation at the popular assembly held at Islaz, which crowns the onset of the revolution in Muntenia. The document, presented as an emanation of the people's sovereignty, was the constitutional groundwork which directed the activity carried out by the revolutionary government in June-September 1848, even if due to external circumstances, those provisions could be achieved only partially. The character of *constitution* is conferred by the form in which it was adopted, that is by a popular assembly which gave its plebiscitary vote, while on June 11/23, 1848, the document was sanctioned by Gheorghe Bibescu.¹⁰

The document of June 9/21, 1848, is a unique act, which has to be approached accordingly, without minimizing in the least the commentaries and completions made by Heliade in favour of a recapitulation, while the lack of a systematic vantage is only apparent since the then political stake obliged to seemingly prolix and contradictory formulas. Seen against the historical backdrop of that time, the constitution asserted the national dignity and the need of political emancipation, basic bourgeois-democratic principles related to citizen rights, administrative-constitutional-type provisions likely to organize the state on bourgeois-democratic bases. Heliade's revisions can confound the reader by the reiterated reference to tradition and the country's glorious past. Therefore, this bespeaks of Heliade's outlook on revolution, which was seen as a restoration, as a slow continuous movement to which all social classes in society unanimously agreed.¹¹ Leaving aside this utopian motivation, it evidenced the bourgeois-democratic character of the document in its entirety, which set forth principles and norms related to the development of new capitalist relations and to the assertion of the bourgeois system of state organization, and, likewise, spotlighted the nation's will to do away with the feudal regime and the foreign domination.¹²

The fundamental aim pursued by the revolution in Muntenia was the abolition of the Russian protectorate, an aim which was the mainstream of several provisions and items included in the constitution of June 9/21, 1848.¹³ It proclaimed the country's right to full autonomy, to legislative independence, prerogatives which were seriously thwarted by the Organic Rules, dramatically detailed by the article added in 1838 which prohibited any internal initiative to change the constitution. The text of the preamble was clear: "The Romanian people gets rid of these Rules which run




The Islaz Proclamation (painting by Alexandru Tipoiă)

counter to its legislative rights and to the treaties which recognize its autonomy. This riddance, is to the very use of the High Porte, which will be the arbitrator together with France, Germany and Great Britain whom the Romanians entreat for judgment and help in any oppression they might be subjected to.”¹⁴ It set forth the idea of a collective guarantee granted by the great powers. The revolutionaries’ orientation toward the Ottoman empire was evident both in their declarations and in their diplomatic actions. The choice was vital the more so as the revolutionaries understood that the Porte benefited by the support extended by western powers, a fact which came true in a few years. Likewise, the following paragraph can be read along the same line: “*The Romanian people taking into consideration the discontinuations in its relations with the High Porte, chiefly from 1828 onwards, taking into consideration that its representative to Constantinople is a foreigner, claims to have its own relations directly with the High Porte and its representative to Constantinople to be a Romanian.*”¹⁵ The problem to secularize the consecrated monasteries (stipulated in article 12 and developed in the preamble) had financial real-cito-national reasons. The question had financial reasons, but perhaps to a greater extent politico-national reasons. The question was not new but the time had come for a trenchant solution. The Greek clergy in the Principalities was a pretext often used by the protective power to discretionarily intervene in Romanian internal affairs. The aspect was grasped as such and in 1823 the decision was taken to remove Greek heads of the monasteries, a measure which was revoked 4 years later. In 1843, Russia imposed through the Buyukdere memorandum the exemption of consecrated monasteries from the funds which they had to

give to the state¹⁶, so that, the act carried out by Alex. I. Cuza in 1863 expressed the free exercise of national sovereignty. The second part of the Islaz proclamation was an energetic appeal against the protective power’s intervention and forewarned: “*We in our appeal claim but our rights and we protest beforehand with the High Porte, France, Germany and Great Britain against any invasion on our land which will covet our happiness and thwart our independence within.*”¹⁷ The Romanian revolutionaries did not oversize foreign intervention in the interest of revolution and warned that if an aggression would be committed they were “a nation totalling more than 8 million inhabitants and at any foreign invasion threatening their liberty they will raise like one to defend their homes.”¹⁸ The frequent references to social solidarity, to lucid and deliberate elimination of social antagonisms are naturally influenced by certain concepts circulated in those days which rejected the class struggle in a period of regeneration, a false stand in fact, but, none the less, worth mentioning is the emphasis on national solidarity as a means against foreign intervention, which evens out the very social divergencies which undermine the revolution’s foundations.

The agrarian question ranked utmost in the revolutionaries’ debates and was briefly mirrored in the famous article 13 (“*the emancipation of bondsmen who are given land through compensation*”) but also in the preamble. The peasants called “the country’s real sons... demand a part of land which will suffice to feed his family and his cattle, a part paid off for centuries on end with their sweat. They ask it and the country grants their request.”¹⁹ The choice words, the definition of home-land as a supreme entity which benefits



**“In the name of the Romanian people”
— the Islaz proclamation printed by a contemporary publication**

by the results of collective and individual actions and which subsequently distributes them again to society, spotlight coherent and clear concerns to approach social questions. It implies that in spite of divergencies between revolutionaries on the agrarian question,²⁰ vital as it was for the pre-eminently agrarian Romanian society, this would have been rightly termed, because the idea of a right settlement of agrarian relations was already a definite gain for the understanding of society's members. Suchlike wording: *"The bond and also that infamous slavery is abolished, the work at the building or roads is abolished, the peasant without land will own land"*²¹ is unlikely to remain mere abstract promises.

The Islaz Constitution laid the foundations of a representative system. The state form was rigorously republican. In keeping with article 5 the ruler (a traditional title) was an executive, he was elected for a 5-year term from all the classes of society (although it is certain that the revolutionaries had in view the bourgeoisie and not the peasantry). Referring to the ruler's election it stated that *"the people having the sovereign right can invest anybody whom it deems worth with this title and for as long a term as it considers to befit its needs."*²² The reduction of the civil list had to guarantee that the ruler elected by the people could not have the means to corrupt the electorate. The profoundly democratic view of a ruler was clearly emphasized: *"The ruler is elected from one of the citizens, and after his ruling he will be again a citizen, a son of his country."* The appeal addressed to Gheorghe Bibescu, in fact an attempt to make legal the revolution and not to be seized, implied its transformation into a republican-type executive power. *"The time has come for you to show the entire world that you were and are a Romanian; the time has come for you to wash away the past and to bequeath to your children a glorious name."*²³ The legislative power was entrusted to a general assembly which had to deal with the current problems incumbent on it but this was supplemented with another provision which institutionalized an original practice, namely the election every 15 years of a constituent assembly which had to introduce into the constitution the reforms claimed by subsequent developments. This "betterment" of constitutional action is questionable.

The paramount field of human and civil rights is amply approached both in the recapitulation and in the preamble, which proclaimed a series of rules and measures on freedoms: freedom of the press, freedom of speech, of assembling, freedom of elections ("the large, free, right election"), freedom to learn associated with equality of sexes to public education. The idea of

freedom is explicitly worded: *"The people decreeing the civil and political rights which the citizen has always had, also declares that all Romanians are free."*²⁴ As a member of the national guard to be created, *"all the Romanians are a guarantor of public freedoms"*. Freedom is indissolubly correlated with the principle of equality also expressed in the syntagm *"the same civil and political rights for all Romanians."*²⁵ The abolition of slavery²⁶, the emancipation of Jews, political rights for those having other religious denominations, the suppression of nobiliary titles which had no offices (definitively achieved by the Paris Convention of 1859 — editor's note) are as many statements which sanctioned the abolition of socio-political privileges and discriminations. The same principle is included in the fiscal rules on which it reads: *"Justice does not admit that the poor alone should bear the country's tasks and the rich be exempt. Consequently it decrees the general contribution according to everybody's income."*²⁷ Hence, the equality to pay taxes is rounded off by the idea of a progressive tax, a democratic outlook which implied on a larger plane the attempt to achieve social justice, to put on human bases the relationships among the society's members. The abolition of the degrading punishment with thrashing and of the death penalty point out the above-mentioned statement (*"The criminal register with its procedure"* of 1851 maintained the death penalty but its use was greatly limited). The questions of public education are carefully and thoroughly approached in the constitution of June 9/21, 1848. On the one hand, as we have mentioned above, it underlined the principle of equality (*"education is equal, progressive, and integral for all"*) and on the other it adumbrated the importance of the educational system to ensure a national education, attached to the revolutionary ideals which could be fully achieved only by the citizens who devoted themselves of their will and who had the needed technical training. In fact, the sentence *"protesting against the bad judgment to degrade and destroy our nationality by replacing the tuition in mother tongue in schools"*²⁸ pointed to an immediate reality, the rule of 1847, both in Moldavia and Wallachia, which changed the tuition in Romanian for a tuition in French, in order to create an elite loyal to the authorities of the day. Without ruling out the revolutionaries' total agreement to this matter, worth to be mentioned is that it was the creed expressed by the president of the Romanian Academy in 1867, Heliade, ac-

(continued on page 75)

THE ROMANIAN ARMY IN DEFENCE OF THE REVOLUTION

Colonel GHEORGHE TUDOR, DHist.

The keystone in understanding the army's options and its behaviour in the 1848 revolution might be found in the appreciation of inestimable theoretico-methodological value made by President Nicolae Ceaușescu according to which: "As a red thread may be traced right through the whole history of motherland the close link of the army with the people out of which was born, its identification with the ideals of liberty, justice and independence of the broad popular masses, the unflinching will to defend the ancestors' land, the people's right to build its life as it wishes".

The army's role and mission were directly related to the 1848 revolution programme. Historical retrospect facilitated by scientific research strikingly reveal that the Romanian people, in its uninterrupted advance on the road of progress and modern civilization had to resolve three objectives decisively influencing its future: the abolition of feudal relations in order to speed up the forces of production; the union of all Romanian provinces within a strong centralized state; the winning of full independence as a *sine qua non* for the Romanian society's advance into the ripening Middle Age.

To be sure the three objectives should be considered into a correlative outlook and unity as they were conditioning each other because without internal liberty no outside liberty might exist and viceversa. In this sense Nicolae Bălcescu spotlighted that *"the liberty inside the country... could not be won without external liberty"*. In his turn Alecu Russo was to say about this correlation that: *"the liberation is twofold: internal and external... they are sisters and they cannot exist one without another"*. The Romanian revolution waves were strongly striking against two large fronts: the internal one, represented by forces interested in maintaining the socio-economic statu-quo and the external one mirroring the interests of the big limitroph empires. In fact, historical experience demonstrated that the Romanian people's ascension towards modernity the

prelude of which was the revolution led by Horea, Cloșca and Crișan and in a larger sense the 1600 Union achieved by Michael the Brave was systematically encumbered, but never stopped, through the intervention of these empires' armies.

That is why, from the perspective of our historiographic front, the contents and message of the 1848 Revolution programmes, either it comes to Blaj, Iași or Islaz, they are true "war declarations" made by the most advanced political forces of that historical moment for the abolition of the old feudal rules and the continuous modernization of Romanian society. In the same time, the 1848 Revolution had a profound character of national liberation. The highly rich content of the dialectic interconnexion between the revolution objectives determined, to the highest degree, the army's role in triggering off and successfully carrying through of the revolution.

Choosing again the way of revolution, after a span of almost three decades only, (from the 1821 one), in order to accelerate the process of national and social liberation, of faster advance on the road of modern civilization, the Romanian people thoroughly understood that under those complex historical conditions particularly determined by the neighbourhood of militarist and reactionary empires — Ottoman, Tsarist and Habsburg — ready at any time to quell any progressive movement, the armed struggle was the only way to come off victorious.

Numberless historical sources and resources have unveiled the ways, methods and forms wherethrough the army defended the 1848 revolution as a sovereign and lawful act of the Romanian people meant to open new perspectives on the road of ever stronger assertion in the concert of the world's nations.

In point of typology the armed defense of the 1848 revolution does not enter the already known canons and widely proliferated in the speciality literature. It was a natural following since the army in being called to back up a constructive and



General Christian Tell, minister of the army in the 1848 revolutionary government of Bucharest

upward national ideal, contributed to the defense of revolution through the firm struggle carried out, too, by outstanding representatives of the military establishment skilled in wielding the pen. They made from oral, written or printed word a food of mind and energetic goad in the struggle for the success of revolution. Cadres of the army took part in the wide-range process for working out the 1848 ideology the revolution programme of preparation and carrying through within which the armed struggle was reserved a well-defined place.


That the army was a guarantor of the revolution also comes of the state of mind prevailing the military, the officers included, thus confirming the truth according to which the Romanian army subordinated its entire existence and evolution to the strategic objective expressed in the defence of ethnical being, of the Romanian people's land, independence and liberty permanently jeopardized, in one form or another, by aggressive states and expansionist empires. Therefore, considering this historical experience the army was seen not only as a motive power of the revolution, but

its reliable defender also. We therefore fully grasp why the 1848 revolutionaries wrote down in their programme presented in front of the peasants, soldiers and officers gathered at Islaz, on June 9, 1848, both the organization of a national guard and the army's role in defence of revolution. The proclamation addressed the army a rousing call to struggle: "...Romanian brothers! Soldiers, you, our sons and brothers, secure the good order because this is your duty. Do not obey people bearing ill will against you and against us when ordering you to shoot your brothers and stain your hands with the blood of those rising up for your good and of your parents too". On addressing to the officers the proclamation read: "...Draw out your swords, make them shine before the sun of your motherland's justice and liberty. Here is the most glorious road in the history's annals opening in front of you... And if your commanders are giving orders against your brothers, you must obey the voice of suzerain people only: break to pieces your swords before any orders to shed blood".

On the eve of the revolution a true test was made on the army's state of mind. At Turnu Severin one could find that the "officers were speaking very enthusiastically

Captain Nicolae Pleşoianu, leading figure of the 1848 revolution





Captain Pavel Zăgănescu, commander of the valiant firemen brigade in the battle of Dealul Spirii

cally and free", as they were sure of the revolution victory, at Islaz captain Nicolae Pleșoianu declared that he was ready and joined the "soldiers' confidence". The officer intensified propaganda amidst the soldiers "speaking against the 'fleeckers' (boyars). Prince Gheorghe Bibescu was reported even the existence of a "soldierly revolution". The army's option for revolution made Colonel I. Odobescu give the order of June 8, 1848 that read: "one could realize that many of the officers, in lower hierarchy even, do not stay in their offices and are spending their time making walks in the streets although military people must always set a model for everybody in watching the good order. Severe order is given for in the future nobody to dare wandering from their offices and garrisons and to alway be ready in executing the governments' orders since otherwise the soldierly laws will be applied with utmost strictness".

Getting the hang of things, Prince Gheorghe Bibescu made great efforts from winning the support of military units. He went to the Bucharest garrisons and after had showed the soldiers his epaulette riddled by a bullet he conveyed the soldiers the appeal to suppress "some unrests aimed at disturbing the order and tranquility" when he required the aid of the military in the garrison located in Dealul Spirii (Spirii Hill) Major Polizu reported with firmness: "We are ready to renew the loyalty oath if Your High-

ness is asking it to combat the country's enemies. But against our brothers, we shall never fight". In his turn captain Fărcășanu, meeting the prince when was leaving the garrison, advised the prince to sign the constitution wished by the people. Telling is that both in the infantry garrison and in the cavalry one Bibescu was given the same answer, namely that the military "are ready to shed their blood while fighting against the motherland's foes, but never will they shed Romanian blood, patriotic blood", that "when foreigners, enemies for Your Highness and for our motherland will come from outside, then we swear on our loyalty to do our duty until the last drop of blood; but against the Romanians, against our brothers, no matter how would they come, if they are asking the motherland's improvement particularly, never shall we rise".

Determined to quell the revolution, Prince Bibescu convened the Bucharest military units commanders. Much was he surprised when Captain Gheorghe Mavrocordat, commander of cavalry squadron reported him that his squadron "would not shoot the rebels". In Capital, in spite of all measures taken by Bibescu that the army to suppress the revolutionary actions, the military answered they would not shoot the rebels what made the "Pruncu român" newspaper dated June 12 write that "our brave officers... the whole army, fraternized with the people... all declared in a single voice that are brothers with every Romanian and that... all are ready to shed the last drop of blood for their motherland". Lacked of the army's support and under the ever-increasing pressure of the popular masses, the fundamental force of the revolution, Prince Gheorghe Bibescu was compelled to sign the Constitution.

The subsequent developments spotlighted the army's determination to defend the revolution not against the internal forces, that had been already defeated, but again against the Ottoman and Tsarist empires' troops that penetrated in the Romanian Country of Muntenia on 13 and respectively 15 September 1848. At that hard time for the fate of the revolution Nicolae Bălcescu conceived an ingenious strategic plan against the foreign intervention.

The plan visualized, in main, the concentration of forces in Buzău area, the sending of a group made up of standing and volunteer troops to meet the Ottomans at Călugăreni, the Magheru-led troops in Oltenia being considered as a general reserve, they having been a component of the formations created by the 1848 revolution which represented a main moment in the revealing of the armed people's role in the struggle for social and national liberation.

But as the politico-strategic conditions were entirely unfavourable, the plan failed in becoming operational. Consequently, by the afternoon on September 13, the observer from the "scouting picket" announced that the Ottoman army was entering Bucharest. A part of the Ottoman troops advanced to the garrison in Dealul Spirii and asked Colonel Radu Golescu to surrender the weapons and the garrison, but the Romanian officer answered he had no order in this sense. Menaced by Kerim Pasha he answered with the dignity characteristic of the Romanian officer: *"the duty of a soldier is to die arm in hand and more satisfied is in this case than to see disarmed himself"*. Unpleasantly surprised by this answer the Ottomans tried to enter the garrison but at that moment the firemen company led by captain Pavel Zăgănescu arrived. The soldiers of this brave subunit, fire-supported by the garrison troops, wrote down a page of glory in the golden book of the struggle

traditions of the Romanian army.

The Bucharest garrison troops, of the 1st and 2nd infantry regiments and the fire company opposed a stubborn resistance to the Ottoman forces, superior in point of member. **"Unforgettable will remain in the people's memory — President Nicolae Ceaușescu underlined — the acts of bravery performed by the fire detachments led by captain Pavel Zăgănescu, by the soldiers of the 2nd regiment who sacrificed themselves in an uneven clash, overwhelmed by the invaders' superiority, for the salvation of the sacred cause of the revolution, for the defense of the motherland."**

Integrated within the large frontiers of the European revolution, strengthening its rays and stumping its shadows, the 1848 Romanian revolution revealed the army, its destiny and mission in being near the people and revolution closing its ranks, as Nicolae Iorga picturally wrote, "round the tricolour".

POPULAR MILITARY STRUCTURES DURING THE 1848 — 1849 ROMANIAN REVOLUTION

The survey of the events occurred in the middle of the 19th century in Europe evidences the active role played by the military factor and mainly the effort made by revolutionary leadership to create new own armed forces, which, devoted to its cause, should most efficiently support the programme to renew the society and to defend the nation's liberty and independence against the attack launched by home and foreign reaction, eager to maintain the advantages derived from older regimes.

This question — which was differently materialized in Europe, although the most significant form, of a bourgeois-democratic type, was that of "national guards" — was, naturally, approached by the Romanian movement of social renewal and national assertion. The Romanian patriots aimed, prior to the revolution, to create a real system able to ensure the popular masses's participation in the country's defense. These were what Nicolae Bălcescu called "the national reserves" — popular-type formations, recruited both from towns and from villages — so that, in case of emergency, besides the regular army units, practically the entire people able to carry arms fight back all those who would have

jeopardized the country's rights, its revolutionary gains. A. C. Golescu (Albu) was right to emphasize, on August 18, 1848, that *"in politics, besides justice, you must also have force."* *"The mission of a revolutionary government — Nicolae Bălcescu later highlighted in a letter addressed to his companion of ideas and combat, Al. G. Golescu (Arăpila) — is very simple: to disseminate and arm the revolution, this is its mission."*

We want to reiterate that in the preparation, organization and operation of Romanian popular military structures — from the projects to the creation of the proud revolutionary army of Transylvanian Romanians — the leaders of the national movement aimed to fuse the entire people's valuable fighting traditions with the new tendencies asserted in the military practice. In the "peoples' spring", at a time when *"the entire Europe is arming to win the dreamt-of liberty,"* the Romanians — as Avram Iancu declared, on May 28/June 9, 1848, before the future tribunes — had the duty *"to arm themselves, too, because the time has also come for them to be free"*.

The desideratum to create certain demo-



"In the Câmpeni camp" (painting by Brăduț Covaliu)

cratic popular-type military forces — in point both of social representation and also of immediate and long-term targets which they were set to achieve — was mentioned in almost all draft programmes and programmes mapped out by Romanian revolutionaries. Thus, in Moldavia, the poem-manifesto by Vasile Alecsandri, titled *To the Romanians* and circulated as early as February 1848, inspiritedly called "To arms, brave men, to arms! (...) Over the Molna, over the Milcov, over the Prut, over the Carpathians." The *Petition-Proclamation*, drafted in Iași and addressed to the ruler on March 28/April 9, 1848, "on behalf of all states" wrote at the point 35, "the urgent creation of a town guard in all boroughs", formed both by Romanians and foreign owners (a provision in the spirit of the time through which every citizen had the duty to participate in the work done to the benefit of the entire country); concomitantly, the ruler's bands of mercenaries had to be dissolved, since they proved to be tools in the service of personal interests, against civil rights and order.

Over the Carpathians, there where, as Simion Bărnuțiu showed "the Romanians' heart has always throbbed for liberty", the memorable general assembly of the nation held on Cimpia Libertății at Blaj, on May 3/15, 1848 — taking a solemn oath to defend the Romanian being and language, its fundamental right to life and progress — called through the *Points* voted in a vibrating patriotic mood, in the name of the selfsame liberty, for the "people's arming or the national guard to defend the country within and without" pointing out that "the Romanian militiamen should have their own officers."

Eftimie Murgu, the mouthpiece of the Romanians in Banat, declared that "if we want to be a free people, all like one

should take up arms, so that, if need be, we ourselves defend our rights. Therefore, the army, or the national guard ought to be seen as a warrant of these rights, of our civil freedoms." On June 9/21, 1848, at Islas, the Muntenian Romanians asserted the people's sovereign right to arm itself, establishing under the tricolour flag "the national guard, in which all Romanians are born to be its soldiers" and whose task was to ensure "the happiness and civil freedoms of the nation."

The idea to prepare certain popular armed forces as numerous as possible was evident in the summer of 1848 in the actions carried out by the Romanian revolutionaries in Moldavia as a corollary of the struggle waged for national unity and independence. In Baia, Dimitrie Cantacuzino wrote to Lascăr Rosetti, in Cernăuți, on July 16/28: "So that Russia did not maintain its influence here, even through the Turks, we have to achieve the union at any cost, and above all to organize an armed force manned by at least 25,000 people, so that we have a defense strength at our borders topping 90,000 men, which will achieve more than a national guard..." For the aim nourished by all Romanians, "for the happy future of the entire Romania", *The Wishes of the National Party*, drafted in August 1848 in Cernăuți by Mihail Kogălniceanu, emphasized, at the point 15 the "compulsory" need to create "a town and village guard", the country's "main force, to 'have a sound guarantee for material and moral wealth, and for the defense of the country and of public happiness.'"

The purpose of all these armed popular formations — as spotlighted by one of the *Appeals* launched in those tumultuous days — was "all to be armed, to fight back our enemies and to defeat them." The re-

volutionary newspaper — *Poporul Suveran*, issued in Bucharest, set forth the will to energetically repel any threats to enslave our people: "To invade our land with the aim to enslaving us, a foreign army, will have, first, to tread on the bodies of ten million Romanians, will have first to break down our hearts and crush the love for our homeland which dwells there."

If in Moldavia, home reaction backed by the Czarist army prevented the creation of national guards, the application of the revolutionary programme aimed to set up popular defense structures was achieved in the other Romanian Countries starting from the summer of 1848.

In Bucharest, the action was launched the following day after the grandiose assembly on the Cîmpia Filaretului. After two days, on June 14/26, the creation of national guards was decreed, Nicolae Goleescu, Minister of Home Affairs, being in charge of its organization. Colonel Scarlat Crețulescu, appointed as head of the national guard, presented, a week later, "a draft of the obligations and duties of the national guard," which was at once put into effect. It stipulated that every citizen between 21 and 50 of age was enlisted in the guard, its chiefs and officers (see the decree of August 18/30) being elected by the majority of voices" (votes) of its members. A staff was formed to direct the entire activity put under a military discipline, all the members of the guard wearing a distinctive badge. The guard was territorially organized, in legions, battalions, companies whose number varied function of the administrative subdivisions. The national guard — which took the oath of allegiance to the country and the revolution on June 15/28 — aggregated on several stages, the process being brought to a close in September both in towns like Buzău, Brăila, Rîmnicu Vilcea, Ploiești, Focșani, Călărași, Turnu Măgurele, Turnu Severin, Craiova, Caracal, Cernăuți, Pitești, Curtea de Argeș, Cîmpina, Cîmpulung Muscel a.o., and also in villages in Muscel, Ialomița, Prahova, Rîmnicu Sărat, Romanăți, Vlașca, Dimbovița, Vilcea, Gorj, Dolj, Mehedinți counties, the total effectives which could be mobilized amounting to about 20,000 people. In Bucharest, on September 3/15, 1848, there were already formed 5 "legions", 10 batalions and 40 companies manned by 10,375. Worth mentioning is that, in order to perform quick riposts against possible counterrevolutionary attempts, as early as August, a special sub-unit "the mobile guard" was created having mounted and foot soldiers.

The imminence of an intervention made by foreign forces, correlated with the ripost flared up by internal conservative forces, imposed the Romanian revolutionaries the need to make also

use of other forms of popular military organization besides the national guards. If, again, in Moldavia only attempts were made to call to arms the peasantry, in the other principality, over the Carpathians, where the revolution was triumphant, a strong contingent of volunteer foot soldiers and pandours was formed by the increase of territorial effectives and units and by the drafting of an ever greater number of volunteers, mainly from the pandours in Oltenia and the discharged soldiers. The decree issued by the provisional government of June 28/July 10, 1848, emphasized that two thirds of the best soldiers "drilled with their officers and mounted" be ready to be operatively concentrated and used, if need be; moreover, all "volunteers" "from any social class, nation or religion," organized in regiments, each manned by 2,000, could enlist in the army. The regiments set up in the entire country, with "as national as possible" names, were made up of two battalions which in their turn were formed of two platoons of six groups; a regiment and a battalion had also a small staff, manned if need be with active officers too (having the pay of their army ranks). The volunteer pandours had to be exempt from any "impost" and village obligations, a provision aimed to attract ever larger social categories. The revolutionary government had already appointed, on June 18/30, "for his military credit and virtues", Gheorghe Magheru as "general capitan of all non-standing troops of foot-soldiers and pandours in Romania and also as general inspector of all national guards", having also a general staff. In late July, in Tirgu Jiu the first 500 mounted soldiers were going to the military camp at Riurenî (Vîlcea county). The process to organize these popular formations — already toilsome because of the opposition put by the former local administrators and reactionary boyars — underwent several stages; thanks to the untiring activity carried out by the general captain and by revolutionary commissaries, who pre-eminently acted in Oltenia, by the middle of September, 1848, important effectives were concentrated at Riurenî: 1,500 well-equipped mounted soldiers, 8,000 volunteers, the total figure of mobilized forces at that moment under Gh. Magheru's command being estimated at over 140,000 men.


In Banat, the national assembly held in Lugoj on June 15/27, 1848, decided the creation of a great "captainship", formed by the three Banat counties — Caraș, Timiș and Torontal — manned by well-equipped forces under the supreme command of Eftimie Murgu, who practically in the summer and autumn of the same year established the Romanian administration in this province until April 1849.

The initiative to create a peasant army belonged to Avram Iancu, which was already applied at the time, first by a sustained activity to muster the inhabitants in the valleys of the Arieș, Mic and Mare rivers. As early as the meeting in Câmpeni, Avram Iancu established the principles to organize and muster the revolutionary army.

This was the decisive moment when the Romanian people effectively launched the armed struggle for the fulfilment of its lawful claims worded in the Blaj proclamation of May 3/15 1848. Its firm decision to renounce to a passive expectation, which could effect the Romanian people's definitive subjugation is tellingly proved by the measures taken to call the armed bands of the Romanians from the region

organization of national guards.

The organization of the revolutionary army on the principle of administrative military structure lent its structures both a larger autonomy and also an increased responsibility to fulfil its missions. According to the directions given by the Committee, the basic military unit was the legion, divided in subunits founded on the decimal system applied to the Romanian army and which had been also introduced in the Romanian popular armies led by Horea and also to the pandour bands. Thus, it included tribunates (battalions), centuries (companies) an decuries, being, in fact, formed by many camps, greater units, detachments led by tribunes and captains. Pride of place was given to the question of effectives so that they were manned by an adequate number of soldiers. The troops



Fire weapons in the 1848 revolution

of the Apuseni Mountains to Câmpeni (June 27), to Gura Riurilor (June 20—21) and again to Câmpeni (June 22). It was, as tribune Ciurileanu recalled, "a general assembly in the mountains" at the imperative "To arms!". At all these calls, the peasants answered at once, inspired by an unflinching enthusiasm, proving their revolutionary spirit and adhesion to the cause of social and national emancipation.

In the following months, establishing the general headquarters at Blăjeni and Bulzești, Iancu varried on the military organization of the villages in the Apuseni Mountains, so that at the third assembly held in Blaj in September 1848, he came at the head of a detachment manned by 6,000 armed *moți*. On September 22/October 2, A. T. Laurian inspiritedly wrote to Gheorghe Bariț: "The Romanian guard was created throughout the entire country. We have over 200,000 armed Romanians." The activity to form the popular armed forces was based on the *Instructions* of the National Committee of October 1848 on the had a two-pronged character: first the standing troops, not too numerous but well trained and equipped and the non-standing troops which were mobilized function of

local needs at a given time. In all, in the spring of 1849 they were estimated to 30,000 soldiers, or to other accounts, even to 70,000.

The revolutionary army had a popular character, the main element being the Romanian peasantry together with foresters and miners in the Apuseni region. This homogenous social composition conferred it the needed moral strength and revolutionary dynamism which highly impressed the contemporaries.

The revolutionary forces were structured so that they better match the requirements of a resistance warfaring.

The troops were mainly formed of infantry, equipped with spears, scythes, axes, hatchets and guns. It was sustained by a small artillery, permanently under the direct orders of Avram Iancu who distributed the pieces according to war developments. Of all legions, the most famous by its feats was the Auraria Gemina led by Avram Iancu, who turned, in 1848—1849, the Apuseni Mountains, according to the appreciation made by Karl Marx in "the center of the real people's war."

DUMITRU PREDA

THE CAMP AT CÂMPUL LUI TROIAN

Colonel CONSTANTIN UCRAIN, DHist.

Set up with a view to mustering up the forces that were to defend, arm in hand, the 1848 revolution in Muntenia, the Camp of Câmpul lui Troian was one of the great accomplishments of the revolution. Establishing the camp and appointing a brave commander, adopting immediate final measures for arming and drilling the troops, were as many top issues to be solved by the revolution leaders.

A few days after the outbreak of the revolution, on July 14, 1848, the administrative leadership of the counties in Oltenia were requested by the government to muster in soldiers, skilled at weapons, well equipped "most valiant riders, if possible."¹ On June 18, the interim government asked former army captain Gheorghe Magheru to prepare the armed forces of the revolution, and to muster in the troops meant to defend it. At the same time he was appointed by governmental decree

General Gheorghe Magheru, organizer of the military camp of Troian



no 39 "general captain of the irregular troops in Romania and general inspector of all national guards."² The same decree sanctioned the setting up of a pedestrian corps and of a pandour corps."³ Concomitantly the interim government settled the question of the instruction camp for the effectives. It is worth mentioning that most of the revolutionary leaders started from the premise that the camp had to be situated, geographically speaking, in a spot that enabled the most favourable conditions for political-military cooperation of Romanians on both sides of the Carpathian mountains. Nicolae Balcescu for example, stressed that the camp had to be emplaced "at a point that permits easy access to Transylvania which has promised to send its frontier regiments⁴ in help". Northern Oltenia appeared thus to be the most suitable place for the setting up of the camp both for military strategy and political reasons. Because domestic opposition stepped up its activity west of the Olt⁵, in particular, the Muntenian revolutionaries deemed that the camp had to be organized in northern Oltenia, as a means to do away with any domestic counter-revolutionary attempts. The selection of northern Oltenia as the site for the camp was also due to the existing revolutionary traditions in this Romanian province. The masses kept intact recollections of the deeds of arms perpetrated by Tudor Vladimirescu and his pandours in the struggle for social and national liberation, the pandours being this time too the basis of the 1849 revolutionary army. With a view to recruiting volunteers Gheorghe Magheru "entrusted written orders to his men" and asked the local authorities to acknowledge their "task" and help them. He asked the volunteers to give their oath to the homeland "to be faithful to the Romanian nation and defend it with all their might against any attack and oppression."⁶ According to Ioan Maiorescu, in early September the camp numbered more than 10,000 volunteers⁷, while by the end of the same month the number rose to over 12,000, plus the more than 1,100 pedestrians in the Oltenian counties.⁸

With a view to increasing the troops at Câmpul lui Troian, on the eve of the penetration of foreign troops in Bu-

charest, the Princely Deputies freshly elected in the place of the Interim Government decided to send to Câmpul lui Troian some military units. Thus, on September 1, 1848 general Christian Tell who still held the position of minister of war ordered company 5 of Zimnicea, company 6 of Bechet and company 8 of Islaz (all belonging to the 1st Infantry Regiment) to move to Craiova, at the orders of colonel Nicolae Pleșoianu who, in agreement with Gheorghe Magheru was to decide the sending of troops to Câmpul lui Troian. A few days later the Princely Deputies decreed, on September 10, 1848, the dispatch of a battery of artillery and of the 1st Cavalry Division from Bucharest."⁹ After September 13 besides these units a few subunits of the 2nd and 3rd infantry regiments, of the 2nd and 3rd cavalry divisions as well as numerous soldiers from the firemen company headed by Pavel Zăgănescu¹⁰ arrived at the camp. Thus, in September the Troian Camp numbered about 30,000 soldiers¹¹, under the command an army corps made up of 2 majors, 10 captains, 17 lieutenants, 9 second lieutenants and 12 cadets to drill the army, at the head with colonel Nicolae Pleșoianu, as well as a few foreign officers: Polish colonel Zablocki, sent to the Câmpul lui Troian following Nicolae Bălcescu's insistence, French Sabatier, Dessain and Guy François, sent by the French ambassador in Constantinople (General Suspick), upon the demand of Ion Ghica, in the Ottoman capital.

Great attention was paid by the commander of the Troian camp to the equipment of the troops and their preparation for battle. Following the dispositions given to the country authorities in Oltenia, and the numerous interventions by the central bodies, the weaponry improved considerably.¹²

General Magheru took care of various organizational aspects such as the medical service, the engineer corps of the camp, supply with foodstuffs, and fodder for the horses. To increase the camp's safety he requested colonel Nicolae Pleșoianu to step up surveillance of the Ottoman troops in the city of Vidin, and to appoint captain A. Christofi commander of the Calafat checkpoint, situated near Vidin. To the same end after the penetration of the Ottoman intervention troops into Bucharest he decided that the mo-

vable bridges across the river Olt be withdrawn on the right bank, while the defence of the fixed bridge at Slatina was entrusted to a powerful detachment.¹³ As to ammunition reserves he decided they be kept "in the monasteries near Troian's camp."¹⁴ To prevent epidemics, the general approached a sizeable number of specialists in the army¹⁵ while for the maintenance of the armament he asked the authorities in districts and counties to send over to Câmpul lui Troian skilled locksmiths.¹⁶ For building shelters he had wood brought over as well as tents of various sizes.

Serious supply difficulties — the camp numbered 30,000 people and 300 horses — were eventually overcome. In order to meet the outlays necessary for purchasing foodstuffs and fodder, on September 5, 1848 the Princely Deputies issued a decree which granted general G. Magheru 3,000 gold coins from the country's treasury.¹⁷ Thus, to procure the soldiers' food and the animals' fodder the camp commander entrusted a group of men with the purchase of victuals. In early September Zisu Dumitrescu, one of these men, informed the general that he had managed to collect over 120,000 lbs of maize¹⁸, while the head of the Vilcea county spoke of a substantive amount of hay, maize, cereals and fodder.¹⁹

Upon learning about the events occurred on September 13, in Bucharest, at Dealul Spirii, and about the measures adopted by the Ottoman Porte and Tsarist Russia with a view to quenching the revolution, the forces gathered at the Câmpul lui Troian camp, at the lead with their commander, were determined to fight, arm in hand, against any foreign invasion. The dispatches sent on September 16 to the Sultan and to Omar Pasha, in Bucharest by the commander of the Troian camp read that he would wait "in arms" for later events, thus showing his resolve to resort to armed resistance. Notwithstanding the fact that the about 30,000 people in the camp were ready to sacrifice their lives in the defence of the revolution, the situation took a different turn. On September 27, when preparations for battle were in full swing, an envoy of the British consul in Bucharest came to general G. Magheru with a message in which the general was counselled to "muster out

all men in arms" and to withdraw "beyond the Romanian frontiers" because, in the conditions created by the Ottoman and Tsarist occupation troops any attempt to let the arms speak "could but prove fatal for the entire Walachia".²⁰

This letter was followed by the convening of the general staff of the camp that carried on lengthy talks and expressed hesitation. The entreaty of the British consul was rounded off by the propositions to dismantle the camp made by I. H. Rădulescu and by general Christian Tell who, in a letter from Sibiu where they had taken refuge, urged G. Magheru not to put up resistance against the intervention troops in order not to "push the country into a fatal war"²¹ as well as by the opinions of some of their counsellors, Polish colonel Zablocki included, who did not see the slightest chance of success in case of a confrontation with the intervention troops.

After 24 hours of indecision, on September 28, 1848, general G. Magheru decided for the dismantlement of the Câmpul lui Troian Camp. This resolution was communicated to the troops and the population in two proclamations which showed that, compelled by the circumstances the general had been forced to take this decision. In conclusion he thanked all those who had answered enthusiastically the calls made, and had risen in arms for the defence of the revolution. "Keep down in your Romanian hearts" read the proclamation addressed to the soldiers — "the feelings of patriotism and nationalism

animating you and do not forget that you are in duty bound to come running, at any call of the homeland, to lay down your lives in order to acquire our sacred rights."²²

1 The Year 1848 in the Romanian Principalities, vol. I, Bucharest, 1902, p. 500.

2 Ibidem, p. 651.

3 Ibidem.

4 Nicolae Bălcescu, Works, vol. IV, Bucharest, 1964, p. 96.

5 Apostol Stan, Constantin Vlăduț, Gheorghe Magheru, Bucharest, 1969, p. 103.

6 Apostol Stan, Constantin Vlăduț, op. cit., p. 106.

7 The Year..., vol. IV, p. 493.

8 Ibidem, vol. III, p. 297.

9 C. Căzănișteanu, M. Cucu, E. Popescu, Military Aspects of the 1848 Revolution, Bucharest, 1938, p. 113.

10 Ibidem, p. 114.

11 Apostol Stan, Constantin Vlăduț, op. cit., pp. 122-123.

12 C. Căzănișteanu, M. Cucu, E. Popescu, op. cit., p. 111.

13 The Year 1848..., vol. IV, p. 423.

14 I. E. Rădulescu, On the History of the Romanian Regeneration or the 1848 Events, Bucharest, 1893, p. 212 (On the dismantlement of the camp, on September 29, general G. Magheru handed in to the administrator of Vilcea county, 5 kegs of gunpowder, 36,240 gunpowder tubes, 244 rifles with bayonet, 248 out-of-order rifles, 36,240 gunpowder tubes in boxes).

15 The Year 1848, vol. II, p. 238.

16 Ibidem, vol. IV, p. 214.

17 Ion Ghica, Memories from Exile after 1848, vol. I, p. 86.

18 The Year 1848, vol. IV, p. 293.

19 Ibidem, vol. V, p. 4.

20 Ibidem, vol. IV, p. 530.

21 I. E. Rădulescu, op. cit., p. 250.

22 Anul 1848..., vol. V, p. 659.

CHRONOLOGICAL LANDMARKS

(March 1848—August 1849)

The 1848 Romanian revolution represents an event of wide reverberations in the historical development of the Romanian people, a lofty assertion of national solidarity and consciousness. Engendered by causes belonging to the internal socio-political process of the Romanian countries the Revolution did not outburst spontaneously, but it stemmed from the profound contradictions of the Romanian society and also from its aspirations to national liberation and unity.

Guided by the Dacoromanian spirit the Romanian nation actioned at those moments as a unitary whole. "Moulded under similar conditions, taking place in the same period, proclaiming common goals, the 1848 Revolution had unitary

character in all three Romanian countries — as President Nicolae Ceaușescu asserted. The fact that similar supreme ideals were written on the revolutionary banner in all these provinces — the abolition of the feudal servitudes, the liberation of serfs, the winning of democratic liberties, the overthrow of foreign domination and the achievement of national unity and independence — eloquently show the community of interests and aspirations uniting the sons of the same people in spite of separating borders, artificial and temporary".

Although the coalesced actions of the Ottoman, Tsarist and Habsburg empires' armies quelled the revolution and reinstated for a moment their authority, the revolution-launched historical pro-

THE YEAR 1848 AND ITS DOCUMENTARY SEALS

Colonel GHEORGHE CRISTACHE, D Hist.
MARIA DOGARU, D Hist.

The 1848 revolutionaries paid special attention to heraldic devices. The study of testimonies preserved from the time of the great national uprising occurred in mid 19th century points to the fact that great ideals were graphically expressed, symbols being a means to mobilize the masses to revolutionary action. A telling proof in this sense is that a first decree of the Interim Government bore on the creation of the tricolour flag, in time this turning into a symbol of lofty desiderata, of the masses' resolve to implement the revolutionary programme. The fact that the leading body of the revolution in Muntenia, notwithstanding the vortex of events, had managed to find the time for issuing five seals — using heraldic devices to express the radicalization of the revolutionary struggle — is yet another testimony of the interest the 1848 revolutionaries showed for symbols.

The first seal of the Interim Government of Muntenia is round and has a 30 mm diameter. It features an eagle with a Roman axes (naturally, in point of meaning they were a heraldic bird holds in its claws the insignia of power, in the right the sword and in the left the sceptre. The following legend, in the Latin alphabet, was engraved, bordering the field: *GUVERNUL PROVISORIU 1848 IUN. 9.* (THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT 1848 JUNE 9). The moulds preserved are in black ink.¹ It is interesting to note that in order to underline the significance of the event the date of the outbreak of the revolution² (photo 1) was also inscribed in the field of the seal.

The second seal used by the Interim Government (35 mm) differs from the first in that it no longer features the two axes/Roman (naturally, in point of meaning they were a heraldic pleonasm). The heraldic bird, having the typical traits of a mountain bird (rich plumage, powerful claws, crooked beak) is



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cess could not be checked. Through its entire development, through the popular masses' enthusiasm, through the fundamental goals it proclaimed, the 1848 revolution dealt a heavy blow at the old economic and socio-political rules and opened a large road to the renewing programmes in the Romanian society's structure. The revolutionary ideas continued to live in the people's conscience, the 1848 programme becoming the struggle platform of the political forces militating for making modern Romania.

● **10/22 March 1848.** Popular Assembly at Cernăuți decided the formation of an action Committee; during this month there was drafted the revendication programme of the Romanians from Bukovina entitled *The Country's Petition*.

● **12/24 March** The *Provocation* manifesto, edited by Simion Bărnuțiu at Si-

biu and disseminated in several towns of Transylvania; it was claimed the Romanians' acknowledgement as a nation with fully equal rights as the other nations of the Principality, the convening of an own national assembly, the abolition of serfdom; it also objected against "any kind of union that someone would dare to make on behalf of the nation!" hence it was rejected the idea of a union to Hungary, as the union could be decided by the Romanian nation only whose political existence as an independent nation should be acknowledged.

● **27 March/8 April.** The great popular assembly at Jassy (Petersburg Hotel) attended by more than 1000 people "of all social classes, of all opinions". Speeches delivered by Lascăr Rosetti, Al. I. Cuza, Vasile Ghica denounced and incriminated the oppressive regime of

situated above a panoglia of unfolded banners, arms and musical instruments; in the lower half of the field there are two gun barrels, a drum and a group of gun balls disposed 3.2.1. The legend GVERNUL VREMELNIC AL ȚERII ROMÂNEȘTI (THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF MUNTENIA)³, is enscribed at the border of the seal. This image points to the Romanian state tradition (the eagle with a cross being the official symbol of Muntenia as early as the 14th century⁴) and recalls the fight for independence (the weapons and unfolded banners, photo 2).

The "interim government" was the name given by the Bucharest people to the government elected the day after Prince Gheorghe Bibescu's abdication.⁵ The government issued deeds in which it used both names. Eventually the title Interim supplanted the other. Due to his a new seal mould was made which features similar devices to the ones depicted above.

The difference consists in the fact that the crown was removed (an element which the revolutionaries considered an autocrat symbol) and the text engraved read: GVERNUL PROVISORIU AL ȚĂRII ROMÂNEȘTI (THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF MUNTENIA).⁶ (Photo 3).

1 State Archives, Buch., *Separate Sheets Collection* (Library III, 36).

2 Ibidem, *Seals Collection* (Seal Matrices), no. 3032.

3 Ibidem, *Holding Walachia's archive*, file no. 865, 1847, part. I, p. 605.

4 C. Moisil, *Romania's Coat-of-Arms, Its Historical and Heraldic development*. Excerpt from *Grains*, II, no. 2, Feb. 1931, pp. 65-85.

5 Maria Dogaru, *Contributions to the Knowledge of Seals Used by the Interim Government and the Princely Deputies*, June 9-13, Sept. 1848, in *Revista Arhivelor*, 11, no. 2.

6 Library of the Academy of the S. R. of Romania, *collection Separate Pages*, 129.

Prince Mihail Sturdza and expressed the Country's longing for liberty and progress.

● **28 March/9 April.** A meeting was convened that worked out *The Petition Proclamation of Moldavia's boyars and notability* signed by hundreds of people; it included 35 socio-political revendications, moderate enough in their essence. It claimed: individual security, release of political prisoners, ministers' responsibility, education reform on national grounds, abolition of export custom duties for cereals, national bank, "the rapid betterment of the peasants' conditions", abolition of censorship, the setting up of a national guard and the making up of a new assembly; the last three revendications went beyond the "legality" of the action and the moderation of the document.

● **29 March/10 April.** Prince Mihail Sturdza declined the petition-programme, arrested some of the leaders and installed an oppressive regime.

● **8/20-9/21 April.** Secret meetings of the revolutionary committee in Bucharest attended by young people who had come from France aimed to fix the time for starting the revolutionary action in Muntenia; debates about collaboration with the Transylvanian Romanians, with those from the border regiments that were to cross the mountains in support of the revolutionaries from Muntenia.

● **18/30 April.** The first assembly at Blaj of the Transylvanian Romanians attended by 4000 people, peasants in majority. Decision was taken for a huge assembly to be convened in the same place, i.e. at Blaj on 3/15 May to synthesize and finalize the revolutionary programme of the Romanians. Speeches de-

THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1848 ROMANIAN REVOLUTION

Colonel VASILE MOCANU, DHist.

The 1848 Romanian revolution, although defeated by the brutal intervention of the Ottoman, Czarist and Hapsburg empires effected through its entire development, through the revolutionary clan of the popular masses, through the fundamental targets it proclaimed, the shake-up of old feudal rules which hindered the progress of the Romanian society, "thus marking an incipient stage in the socioeconomic development of the Romanian Countries, in their struggle for social justice and liberty, for the achievement of national unity and the creation of the unitary Romanian national state, for the riddance of foreign domination and the winning of our country's sovereignty and independence."

The revolution bequeathed a rich political and military heritage. Practically, the entire modern history of Romania will be marked, from that

year onward, by the imprint of the targets set in the programme of the 1848 revolution. **"The Revolution — emphasizes President Nicolae Ceaușescu — made world knowledge the great thirst for liberty and independence of the Romanian people, its undaunted will to shake off the yoke of social oppression and foreign domination, to build its free and dignified life, to participate, besides the other nations, in the effort to develop the human civilization. The 1848 revolutionary struggles asserted the sacred right of the Romanian people to self-existence, and also its decision to keep with the advanced ideas of the time, to unflinchingly advance on the road of democracy and progress."**¹

Indeed, the 1848 revolution forcefully asserted the Romanian unitary national organism, strengthened the feeling of ethno-na-

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livered by I. Buteanu, Avram Iancu — who was accompanied by 2000 "Moți" (inhabitants of the Apuseni Mountains) —, Al. Papiu Ilarian, V. Nemeș, Simion Bărnuțiu. The latter declared: "the time has come for serfdom to be abolished and the Romanians to be reinstated in their rights, as it is right to be so, as a nation they are". The assembly represented, too, a triumph of national solidarity versus confessional separatism.

● **2/14 May.** Meeting of Transylvanian Romanians in the Blaj cathedral aimed at drafting the revolutionary progress. The famous speech delivered by Simion Bărnuțiu underlined the necessity for the Romanians to make up an independent political nation: "the Romanian nation inform the coinhabiting nationalities that in its will to make up itself and organize on national grounds has no enemy thought of other nations (...) the Romanian nation neither wants to

rule over other nations, nor will it permit the others' rule, but it wants equal rights for all of them".

● **3/15—5/17 May.** The Grand National Assembly at Blaj convened on the Liberty's Field by the Transylvanian Romanians attended by 40 000 Romanians, peasants in majority and representatives of the Romanians from Muntenia and Moldavia. There was debated and adopted the programme called *The National Petition* — drafted on the basis of principles heralded by S. Bărnuțiu in his speech which embodied the main desiderata of the Romanian nation: national independence in political sense, the right to have its own representatives in the Diet, administration and justice proportionally to its number, the autonomy of the two churches, the abolition of serfdom without any damages, freedom of industry and trade, the dissolution of

tional appurtenance and underlined the strong grounds and solidarity of national consciousness.

A vigorous epitome of social and national aspirations, an important moment in the assertion of the Romanian nation, the 1848 revolution quickened the process of making modern Romania. Synthetizing the fundamental, lasting conclusions which derived from the preparation, organization and development of the 1848 revolution, Nicolae Bălcescu clearly set forth the need to develop political targets which were not only imperious but also decisive for the winning of national independence. "*Once this revolution is achieved — writes Nicolae Bălcescu — we have still to accomplish other two revolutions: a revolution of national unity and, later on, a revolution of national independence, so that the nation should regain its full national rights.*"²

The rich ideological and cultural heritage of the 1848 generation, the strong democratic traditions and ideals of national liberty and union, nourished by the largest strata of society, amplified and raised onto new steps in the following decades by the progressive forces, marked the entire evolution of the Romanian people in the years to come.

The 1848 Romanian revolution — was — through its preparation, development and consequences — a mainstream of political and military conclusions and teachings, widely used by the doctrinaires and thinkers of the following period. The achievement of social and national targets set in the unitary programme of the revolution, which decisively influenced the subsequent development of society on the road of pro-

gress and civilization, called for the settlement of many military problems related to the ensurance of the victory of progressive forces, the defense of revolutionary gains and the struggle against foreign intervention. To cope with these situations, to successfully fight back the possible repressive forces — by far more numerous and better equipped — the Romanian revolutionaries rightfully considered as stringently necessary — as in the case of the 1784 uprising and 1821 revolution — to rally the popular masses in the defense effort. Worth mentioning is that, owing to its effective military and political preparation and to its two-pronged character, social and national — the Romanian revolution called to arms in the Principalities the social classes and categories which represented the overwhelming part of the population interested in the achievement of the deep-going changes in internal structure and international statute of the Romanian state in that age.

On the other hand, the large-scale programme of economic, social and political changes mapped out by the revolutionaries could not, naturally, elude the army. The successes scored by revolutionary propaganda within this establishment and the significance borne by the army all along the years, as an expression of national rebirth, determined the leaders of the 1848 revolution to rank the military organism as a decisive factor for the triumph of the revolution. The revolutionary developments fully justified these orientations — which gave vent to the propensity and openness of military, officers and soldiers for renewing currents — to win the army

gilds, freedom of speech and press, personal liberty and freedom of assembly, national guard, the development of the Romanian education, the problem of "union to Hungary" would not be discussed before the acknowledgement of the Romanian nation a.o. Voicing their national feelings tens of thousands of Romanians asked — as N. Bălcescu declared — to unite with the "Country".

● **8/20 May.** Popular meeting in Bukovina chairmanshiped by Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki attended by representatives of all social categories, of all nationalities; a programme was drafted to be turned subsequently into the *Country's Petition* of June.

● **12/24 May.** Strongly impressed by the Grand Assembly of Blaj the revolutionaries from Moldavia, among whom Vasile and Ion Alecsandri, C. Negri, Al. Russo, George Sion, Zaharia Moldoveanu a.o. drafted, at Braşov, the six

points of the secret revolutionary oath entitled *Our Principles for the Motherland's Improvement*. This programme embodied: the abolition of feudal obligations of the peasants and their allotment, without compensations, the abolition of privileges of any kind, the setting up of the "Country" institutions grounded on the principles of liberty, equality and brotherhood" and the "Union of Moldavia and Muntenia into a sole Romanian independent state".

● **18/30 May.** The article authored by George Bariţiu, issued in "Gazeta de Transilvania" that objected against Transylvania's incorporation to Hungary, a political act voted by the Cluj Diet on 17/29 May; it was underlined that the "Romanian nation's fate will be decided at Bucharest and Jassy but not at Cluj, neither at Blaj, nor at Buda".

● **29 May/10 June.** The official newspaper of monarchy "Wiener Zeitung"

over to the side of the revolution's cause, to use it as main tool in the struggle waged to conquer the political power, then to strengthen the revolutionary gains and to defeat the riposts of internal reaction and of counterrevolutionary foreign forces.

The action to win the army over to the side of the revolution successfully prepared the ground for the forthcoming revolution. The army, as a whole, coped with the volatile situation, both in the incipient stage of the revolution in the Romanian Country of Muntenia — which, started at Islaz (June 9, 1848), with the active participation of the military, incorporated from its onset, most of the soldiers — and also during the three months of revolutionary government, when the army fulfilled all its missions. The counterrevolutionary plots of June 19 and 29, 1848, mostly failed because of the prompt intervention, besides the popular masses, of the troops faithful to the Provisional Government. The goal and will of the army in the Romanian Country of Muntenia, like, in fact, those of the border guards regiments in the Romanian Country of Transylvania, were the strengthening and defense of the revolutionary power, which could not be established and maintained unless most of the Romanian army adhered and supported it. The army's attachment to the cause of the revolution came to the fore during the Dealul Spirii fights against the Ottoman counterrevolutionary troops. Likewise, over 30,000 combatants in the Rîureni camp — where, besides the armed masses and the members of the national guard, were also subunits of the standing and territorial army — were inspired by the

unflinching decision to repel the foreign aggression, to safeguard the revolutionary gains. With good reason, Dimitrie Bolintineanu stated retrospectively that “all our revolutions are carried out by the army or at least when part of the army espouses the revolutionary ideas and approves of the revolution.”³

The revolution materialized the doctrinary principle according to which only the generalized defense put by the entire popular masses could repel a foreign counterrevolutionary action, far superior in number and material means. Therefore, of paramount importance is the fact that popular-type military structures, organized on the principle of armed nation, including all social categories, like the national guards and the regiments of volunteer pandours⁴ in Muntenia, the army of soldiers-peasants led by Avram Iancu in Transylvania.⁵

Moreover, in point of strategy, also worth mentioning is the formation and operation of a superior military command, charged by the leadership of the revolution — the *Provisional Government* in Muntenia and the *Romanian National Committee* in Transylvania — with important functions such as to prepare the population and the territory for defense, to equip the standing and popular-type troops, to lead the overall military operations and actions, to devise the forms and methods to carry out the armed struggle, to perform certain large-scale manoeuvres of forces and means on interior directions in relation with the developing events, to promote the cadres for all echelons, like or identical with those in the standing armies etc. The supple and

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published the protest of the Romanian nation before the public opinion throughout the world versus Transylvania's incorporation into Hungary: “Transylvania's union, proclaimed against any right of man is not valid and the courts of the entire world must recognize the righteousness of the Romanian protest”.

● **9/21 June.** The Popular Assembly at Islaz that marked the starting point of the 1848 Revolution in Muntenia. The masses were shown both the proclamation of the revolutionary committee and its action programme. The Islaz Proclamation envisaged equality in rights, the marking up of a representative assembly of all society's classes, a ruling prince to rule for five years, ministerial responsibility, the freedom of press, secularization of monastery wealth, the abolition of serfdom and the peasants' allotment through granting compensations etc. The programme en-

visaged the firm defense of the country's autonomy by rejecting any outside interference in its internal affairs, without openly declaring in favour of unity and independence, from tactical reasons, not to offer any pretext for foreign interventions.

● **11/23 June.** The outburst of revolution at Bucharest. The prince Gheorghe Bibescu “on seeing the people's perseverance” was obliged to sanction the revolutionary programme and accept the making up of a new government. The Capital's military units refused to obey to the prince's call for quelling the revolutionary action.

● **13/25 June.** Prince Gh. Bibescu resigned the crown and left the country.

● **14/26 June.** The making up of the Bucharest provisional government appointed to lead the country until the election of a new ruling prince. The first decrees of the provisional government:

efficient organizational military structures were in keeping both with the Romanian tradition and also with the requirements of modern warfaring, with the basic musts of military art applied to the specific and concrete conditions occurred in the evolution of Romanian society in the middle of the 19th century.

The self-evident conclusion is that the 1848 Romanian revolution was one of the most prominent instances in the process of the Romanian people's historical becoming. Its historical significance is manifest in the effort made to solve the fundamental problems facing the Romanian society at a crucial moment in its existence. Romania's history in the 1848—1918 period is nothing but a record of the achievement, in successive stages, of the 1848 paramount desiderata. The grounds of the ensuing development of Romanian society were in fact laid down by the 1848 revolutionary programmes, the historical road of modern history being hallmarked by the fulfilment of the claims set forth in Iași, Blaj, Islaz, Lugoj, Brașov and Cernăuți. The 1848 revolution, as the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party emphasizes, "gave a fresh impetus to the capitalist development of our society, opened up the road for mutations and changes in the structure of society, for the achievement of the basic ideals of our people. It kindled the torch of the revolutionary spirit in the Romanian Countries, ever strongly developed the self-consciousness of the Romanian people, the conviction of the inhabitants in the three Romanian Countries on the need of national unity within the borders of the same state."⁶

On the military plane, the teachings of, the 1848 revolution will be taken over and even developed in the following decade, when the objective musts of Romanian society's development imposed the further strengthening of national military organism, its unitary development through the extension and strengthening of both standing army and territorial troops, gradually creating a propitious framework to equip and train ever greater military effectives, able to defend the country's borders. It is the great merit of the 1848 generation to have achieved a sound and rigorous synthesis between the experience of the centuries-old struggle waged for the defense of independence and the new principles to organize the army in the modern age, which will be the groundwork for the creation of the modern Romanian national military system.

1 Nicolae Ceaușescu, Romania on the Road of Building Up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society, Vol. 8, the Publishing House for Political Literature, Bucharest, 1973, p. 463.

2 Nicolae Bălcescu, Works, Vol. IV, Correspondence. Letters. Memoirs. Addresses. Documents. Notes and Materials, edited by G. Zane, Bucharest, 1964, pp. 277—278.

3 Dimitrie Bolintineanu, February 11 for the History of Three Years Preceded by the Regulations Rulers, Bucharest, 1879, p. 54.

4 The Military History of the Romanian People, Vol. IV, The Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1987, pp. 288—302.

5 Ibidem, pp. 309—318.

6 Nicolae Ceaușescu, Romania on the Way of Completing Socialist Construction, Vol. 3, Meridiane Publishing House, Bucharest, 1969, p. 294.

the creation of the national tricolour: blue, yellow and red with the motto: Justice-Brotherhood; the abolition of civil ranks and of censorship, the making up of national guard; the abolition of the death penalty and of beating.

● 15/27 June. The meeting in the Cimpia Filaretului (The Filaret Field) — since then the Liberty Field —, near Bucharest wherein the people took the oath on the revolutionary programme and hailed the provisional government.

The second popular meeting at Lugoj of 12 000 Romanians under the chairmanship of Eftimie Murgu. Here, at the Liberty Field a firm will was pronounced for the making up of a national administration; revendications for: the people's arming — Eftimie Murgu being appointed as a supreme Captain of the Banat —, the Romanian language in administration and army, the autonomy of the Romanian church. The people

took the oath for "preserving the Romanian brotherhood, motherland and nationality". The Hungarian government turned down these claims.

● 18/30 June. Decrees concerning the organization of a nonstanding army of volunteer dorobanți and pandours and the appointment of Gheorghe Magheru as a general captain of the nonstanding troops of volunteer "dorobanți" and pandours and general inspector of national guard.

● June 1848. The Romanians in Bukovina submitted to the Vienna authorities *The Country's Petition*. It was demanded that Bukovine "be treated as an independent province with a special Diet", (and) have its own province administration, the employment of the Romanian language in schools and institutions, multifarious social and commercial ties with Moldavia and Muntenia a.o.

„THE ROMANIAN NATION HAS THE RIGHT TO LIVE BY ITSELF, FOR ITSELF“

The social and national claims worded in the programmes of the 1848 Romanian revolution, the daring, heroism and spirit of sacrifice proved by the large popular masses in their clash with the reactionary forces aroused the interest of European public opinion, commanded the respect of progressive circles on the continent, eager to know this nation in full swing at this historic turning point. The foreign press issued detailed accounts of the events occurred in the Romanian Countries showing sympathy for the Romanian people's cause. The French newspapers *Le Siècle* and *Journal des débats* amply featured the content of the 35-article Petition-Proclamation of Iași which they considered to be a real charter of the country.¹ In Lemberg, Augsburg, Naples, Paris and Vienna, newspapers informed on the outbreak of the revolution in Bucharest, seen as a "popular movement" led by young boyars, merchants and officers who forced ruler Gheorghe Bibescu to sign a Constitution through which the republic was proclaimed.² The development of revolutionary events in the Romanian Countries of Mun-

tenia and Transylvania, the documents printed in the press of the time enlightened the European public opinion on important aspects of the Romanian people's past, which motivated the lawful struggle waged to achieve that ideal of national unity. The newspaper *La Reforme* clearly stated that "the Muntenians, the Moldavians and the Transylvanians call themselves Romanians and the territory which has for a long time witnessed their sorrow is Romania"³. The French newspaper defended the "noble and generous" Romanian nation, posing the question: "who would dare challenge its right to break free from that odious wardship (the Czarist protectorate — editor's note), to live by itself, for itself", while after the revolution broke out in Bucharest, the same newspaper further stated on the need that the Romanians from the other provinces join in the struggle against the reaction.⁴ On Jun 22, 1848, *Allgemeine Zeitung* wrote that "the Romanian people from all provinces wants to unite into a single country."⁵

● CHRONOLOGICAL LANDMARKS ●

● **19/31 July.** Under the pressure of Tsarist diplomacy, the Porte decided for a part of the Ottoman army stationed at Rusciuk to be shifted on the Romanian territory in order to restore the "legal" order. Sulejman pasha sent a letter to the "boyars and notabilities" from Bucharest to persuade them "to accept again submission".

Note of the Tsarist government condemning tendentiously the Romanians' actions and their goals being stressed the pan-Romanian orientation of the revolution in Muntenia and accusing that the Romanians wanted to make up a national and independent ethnical bloc to also embody within its frontiers the Romanian historical provinces subject to the domination of the Tsarist and Habsburg empires.

● **20 July/1 August.** Protest manifestation in the Liberty Field in Bucharest against the encroaching upon the country's territory by the Ottoman army, attended by more than 30 000 people, half of whom were peasants.

● **31 August/12 September.** Bloody chash between Romanians and Magyar authorities in the Luna village (Turda country) provoked by the peasants' opposition to recruitment, an expression of the masses' protest against the "union" with Hungary.

● **End of August.** At Cernăuți there was published *The Wishes of the National Party in Moldavia* drafted by the

(continued on page 74)

■ MARIA GEORGESCU

European newspaper printed minute reports on the latest developments of the revolution in the Romanian Country of Transylvania in close relation with the revolution in Hungary. Worth mentioning is that the foreign press emphasized the energetic protest raised by the Transylvanian Romanians against the arbitrary measure taken by the aristocratic Diet in Cluj on Transylvania's annexation to Hungary. In this respect, a Paris newspaper spotlighted the "great emotion" experienced by the Romanians in Transylvania who were thus prevented to carry out their revolutionary programme.⁶

Journalist Hippolyte Desprez had foreshadowed, as early as the beginning of 1848, the unity of Romanian national movement. "This maimed people forms a single body and the large territory which it covers in its unity is called Romania, if not in the language of treaties at least in that of patriotism." He was certain that among the Romanians, although separated in provinces under the domination of absolutist monarchies, there was a friendly communion aimed at emancipation and unity, and the Romanianism established among "all the Romanian Countries a tie of ideas and interests, not less stronger than the blood one."⁷

Telling are the testimonies made by French officers Sabatier and Dessaint working with the special service of French ambassador to Constantinople, who arrived in Bucharest on August 6/18, 1848, and got in touch with the leaders of Romanian revolutionaries. Surveying the requests made by the provisional government to the High Porte, Sabatier was impressed by the aspiration of the Romanian revolutionaries to achieve a very large autonomy, almost identical to the state of independence, an aspiration which he deemed to be just and lawful. "There are two points — he writes — which struck us, mostly in the ardent wish nourished by the Moldo-Wallachians to re-integrate the Romanian nationalities, that is to re-unite the two provinces into a single one and to elect the ruler called to rule them under the sovereignty of the Porte and the collective protection of the great European powers... We have admired this throbbing feeling of nationality, this pride of the Latin origin, which makes the patriots dream to re-establish the old Dacia."⁸

The unity of purposes contemplated by the 1848 Romanian revolution was also highlighted by the Hungarian liberal politician Miklos Wesselenyi: "Their plans and hopes (of the Romanian revolutionaries — editor's note) are the future union into a nation and a country of all Wallachian populations having a common origin and

language." The journalist showed that the aspirations nourished by the Romanians in Moldavia, Muntenia, Bukovina, Bessarabia, Transylvania are grounded on "their rights on the former ownership of the original land — never lost but only restricted through oppression and usurpation — and on many others of this kind."⁹ In fact, this unity of social, and mostly national aspirations was the main cause of the military intervention carried out by the neighbouring empires. In the attempt to justify the decision to send troops to stifle the Romanian revolution, the emperor's cabinet in Petersburg informed the government and "the European public opinion" on the Romanians' wish to slatter, through revolution, the yoke of foreign domination and to unite in a single national and independent state on the territory on which they formed as a people. "Their future plan is, in fact, evident. The programme mentions it and their proclamations do not secrete it. It is to restore their [...] antique nationality, that is to cease to be provinces and to achieve, under the name of the Daco-Roman Kingdom, a new separate and independent state, at whose formation it calls all their brethren in Moldavia, Bukovina, Transylvania and Bessarabia."¹⁰

Press correspondents largely presented the Romanian people's firmness to defend at any cost the revolution against interventionist troops. The European newspapers reported that in Bucharest the revolutionary government prepared an armed resistance in the mountainous regions. "The Romanian people being thus abandoned and betrayed by all parts decided to take an extreme measure, which alone could regroup its forces with the view to saving the freedoms of a nation. The mass mobilization was proclaimed and the volunteers shot up like mushrooms. 16,000 people have already formed an army and are concentrated in the towns at the foot of the mountains... besides a patriotic corps has been already set up of the most resolute volunteers. All soldiers who form this legion trained to fight to the last for the country's freedoms should neither survive a defeat not be taken prisoners..." Their readers were informed that in Bucharest the inhabitants have defended the town's gates to check the enemy's advance while volunteer corps and armed peasants pour from any nook and corner to defend the Constitution. It cannot be a more important painting to be painted now than the canvas of this momentous event happening in the outskirts of Bucharest. An entire population, resolute, enthused and ready to lay down its life for its nationality, keeps watch at the town ga-

tes.' "The fierce clash between the firemen at the Dealul Spirii barracks and the Ottoman troops was largely featured in the European newspapers.

In the fall of 1848, French, German and Italian newspapers reported on the debates held in the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament in Pest on the attitude toward the other nationalities in Transylvania and expressed their opinions on the ways to nationally pacify the revolutionary forces in Transylvania. Thus, the Naples press organ *Giornale del Regno delle Due Sicilie* wrote that "if Kossuth and his collaborators realize the bankruptcy of the policy carried on so far and act to grant equal rights to the other nationalities too, then the revolution can be saved."¹² Reporting on the content of the Romanian nation's Memorial of February 13/25, 1849, addressed to the emperor in Vienna which justified the achievement of the Romanian nation in a unitary, self-dependent state organism within the monarchy, the Vienna press foreshadowed that "the borders between this new Romania and the other Romanian countries will level down and thus a strong Daco-Romanian empire will rise."¹³

All these irrefutably evidence that during those tumultuous months the European public opinion was riveted on the Romanian people who struggled for social justice and national liberty, that the 1848 Romanian revolution was not only an instance of our national history but also an instance of European history. The Romanian revolutionary phenomenon was the upshot

of the historical evolution undergone by this society in the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic space and was part of the general European movement recorded in history by its outcome, meant to propel mankind on the road of civilization and progress.

Major GHEORGHE VARTIC

1 Cf. Constantin Șerban, The 1848 Romanian Revolution in the European Press of the Time, in The 1848 Revolution in the Romanian Countries, The Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Bucharest, 1974, p. 187.

2 Ibidem.

3 Cf. Dumătru Suciu, The Romanian political Situation in the French Press, (1848), in the Yearbook of the Institute of History in Cluj, XIII, 1970, the Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, p. 147.

4 Ibidem.

5 Constantin Șerban, op. cit., p. 188.

6 Ibidem, p. 196.

7 Hippolyte Desprez : La Moldo-Valachie et le mouvement roumain, in Revue des deux mondes, Janvier, 1848, p. 108.

8 Cf. C. Colescu-Vartic, in 1848. Revolutionary Days, Bucharest, 1982, pp. 783-784.

9 Cf. Cornelia Bodea, 1848 with the Romanians. A History in Data and Testimonies, Vol. I, the Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1982, p. 241-243.

10 Ibidem.

11 Cf. Constantin Șerban, op. cit., p. 194.

12 Ibidem, p. 198.

13 Cf. Ștefan Pascu, The Creation of the Romanian Unitary Nation State, Vol. I, the Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Bucharest, 1983, p. 123.

ECHOES FROM VIENNA

The first Viennese newspaper to announce the victory of the revolution in the Romanian Country of Muntenia was *Wiener Schnellpost* of July 5, 1848. The news was reprinted in *Der Volksfreund* and *Der Demokrat*. The amplest report on these events was given by the *Wiener Schnellpost* of July 11, under the title "The Bucharest Revolution — No Bloodbath"

Further on the newspaper wrote about the climate in the capital stressing that "Bucharest is infused with enthusiasm."

Shortly afterwards the Austrians were acquainted with the Romanian Constitution, actually the 22 items of the Islaz proclamation, printed in the *Wiener Zeitung* newspaper of July 15. Then came the tidings of the abdication and flight of

prince Bibescu together with most of the grand boyars, issued by *Der Volksfreund* of July 11, and *Der Demokrat* of the following day. The Viennese newspapers were quick to underline the importance of the events occurred in Muntenia. "Liberty and the sacred right of the peoples have scored yet another victory" noted *Wiener Schnellpost* of July 15.

The Vienna press related with satisfaction about the quelling of the counter-revolutionary attempts. The most comprehensive reports in this sense were given by *Die Presse* of June 19/July 1 which underscored: "The opposition was entirely overwhelmed by the unarmed national guard and by the people." The newspaper also informed its readers that there had

been shooting at the people and seven persons found their death. A graphic article depicted the funerals of the victims, attended by 20,000 people who gave vent to their revolutionary resolve.

The defeat of the second counter-revolutionary plot was recounted by *Die Presse* of July 30 and August 30, which published two dispatches from Bucharest following the events of June 29/July 11. Stress was laid on the great rally in Bucharest under the slogan "Down with the traitors of God and of the Homeland!" *Wiener Zeitung* of July 26 mentioned that "On July 12 the entire working class and the merchants demonstrated..." *Der Volksfreund* of August 2 announced that "Calm reigns again and the members of the (interim) government have resumed their daily activities."

The Viennese press was quick in grasping the manifest will to unite of the Romanian Countries. Thus, *Der Volksfreund* of August 9 observed: "A few more days of efforts and maybe a few more tears shed and the whole of Romania will be great, free and powerful."

The newspapers of Vienna printed several articles laying stress on the Romanians' unswerving resolve to remain free "They are decided to die, if need be, for the liberty which their sons have conquered after a threat of 18 centuries" pointed out *Der Freimütige* of August 11. *Die Oesterreichische Biene* of July 19 concluded that "the Romanians will become free like their parents and elders."

A number of reports praised the measures taken by the Interim Government such as the removal of censorship, of boyar titles and ranks, of corporal punishment etc. Nevertheless, the main point of the revolution was freeing the peasants and allotting land to them. *Die Presse* of August 23, 1848 noted that "The peasants will get the rights they have been denied so far" while *Wiener Zeitung* of July 23 highlighted the issues generated by the delayed application of article 13 of the Constitution.

The Viennese newspapers were aware of the danger stemming from the reactionary nature of the system characterizing the Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia. Nevertheless they trusted, erroneously of course, the Ottoman procrastinations and nurtured the hope the Porte would acknowledge

the Romanian "Constitution." Thus, *Der Demokrat* of September 2 believed the rumours according to which the Sultan would have sanctioned the Romanian claims, under British influence. *Der Volksfreund* of September 7 noted that "the opposition is completely crushed." The same opinions were shared by the newspapers *Der Radikale*, *Die Reform* etc. After a few days there followed a sad awakening. *Der Radikale* of September 30 mentioned, according to a dispatch from Bucharest in the wake of the rejection of the Romanian claims that "the Homeland's enemies have scored a particular victory in Constantinople."

The tragical events of September were given ample room in the Viennese newspapers. *Wiener Zeitung* of October 6 related the beginning of Faud efendi's move. Several reports informed of the rally of September 6/18 when the people showed its resolve to maintain "the constitution." This fact was also underlain by *Der Radikale* of September 30 which also mentioned the sad plight of the Romanian people. "Abandoned by all the European powers (the Romanians — ed.n.) are doomed to defend their very existence in the face of two enemy powers." *Die Presse* and *Gerad'aus*, in their issues of October 11 and 17, laid emphasis on the dedication of the masses that opposed the invaders and described the heroic battle between the Romanian firemen and the Ottoman troops. Note was also made of the Tsarist troops' entry in Muntenia.

The entire Viennese democratic press condemned the foreign intervention. *Der Radikale* of September 30 wrote that the Ottoman military action ran counter to "all the country's capitulations and treaties concluded between the Porte and Russia." *Der Freimütige* of October 8 concluded: "The people's right has been affected."

Several newspapers reported on the organization of resistance in Vilcea. *Gerad'aus* of October 17 informed its readers that resistance was put up "under the leadership of the brave head of the soldiers, Magheru." *Die Presse* of October 20 stressed that "the battle is extremely lopsided yet the Romanians want to inform Europe that they are indeed worthy to be free".

■ EUGEN GLÜCK, D Hist

55 Years from the Creation of the Antifascist National Committee within which the Young Revolutionary NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU Brilliantly asserted himself

ROMANIA IS FIRMLY AGAINST FASCISM AND REVISIONISM

Prof. NICOLAE PETREANU, DHist.

This year we celebrate the 55th anniversary since the creation of the Romanian Antifascist National Committee (RANC) — a mass organization set up and guided by the Romanian Communist Party — which militated in all firmness against the danger posed by Hitler fascism and revisionism, against expansionist tendencies of Nazi Germany, for the defense of the country's independence and sovereignty, for the people's progress and welfare. In the 18 months of its activity, from June 1933 to November 1934, the Antifascist National Committee, answering an imperious need of that time, asserted itself as a combative patriotic organization, a polarizing factor of antifascist movement carried out by the large popular masses in Romania.

The establishment of fascist regimes in Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria and in other countries, and then the victory of Nazism in Germany and Hitler's coming to power,

in early 1933, put in jeopardy the liberty, independence and sovereignty of many peoples.

The Romanian Communist Party was the first to give the alarm signal in our country and raised in all firmness to defend the country, acting against the danger posed by fascism and revisionism. The large-scale activity carried out by the communists to defend the Romanian people's major interests, the country's territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, found a propitious ground in the antifascist feelings nourished by the Romanian people, profoundly attached to the ideals of independence, democracy and peace, opposed, by its traditional humaneness, to terror and dictatorship, to the brutal interference in the peoples' life and quiet.

An expression of the priorities set by the Romanian Communist Party to the antifascist struggle was the creation in June 1933 of the Anti-

fascist National Committee, one of the first organizations of this kind in Europe.¹ Spotlighting the importance of the creation of the Antifascist National Committee and emphasizing its historical significance, *Scinteia*, wrote in August 1933: "*The Communist Party and the entire revolutionary movement hail this fighting action against fascism. The Communist Party calls all Party members, all the members of revolutionary organizations, the entire working class to untiringly support the action launched by this committee.*"² Telling thereon is, moreover, the very composition of the organization's leadership, which included noted personalities, Communist Party members, intellectuals animated by their love for the homeland, who were members of various political parties, workers with lofty civil and patriotic feelings. With the view to strengthening the Antifascist National Committee with revolutionary elements from the worker youth, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party appointed as representative of the youth

in the Capital, within the Committee, Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, who through his activity within the committee proved lofty virtues of revolutionary communist: courage, dynamism, perseverance, profound love for his homeland and people, bondless abnegation to the working class and the Romanian Communist Party. Together

aimed to defend the country's territorial integrity and independence against fascist and revisionist danger, the Romanian Communist Party gave pride of place to achieve the fighting unity of the working class, as the foundation of the single front of all antifascist and antirevisionist national forces. The agreement to form a

single front signed in Bucharest, in 1934, by the Antifascist National Committee, the Labour League and the Unitary Socialist Party, the successes won in ensuring the action unity in the country's main cities on the occasion of strikes, elections for labour chambers, antifascist and antirevisionist meetings and demonstrations confirmed, furthermore, the just conclusion that, under the given circumstances, there was a real possibility to form an ample fighting alliance, centered on the Worker Single Front, against fascism, for the defense of the country's independence and integrity. The upshot of this large-scale political activity carried out by the communists materialized in the creation of the Democratic Front, which included the Romanian Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Unitary Socialist Party, the Ploughmen's Front, the Union of Magyar Work-



Titles of underground publications printed by the Romanian Communist Party and circulated among the military

with comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu in the leadership of the Antifascist National Party were also: Iorgu Iordan, professor, chairman; Petre Constantinescu-Iași, professor, vice-chairman; Victor Gherasim, secretary; Ilie Cristea, high school teacher; I. Miromnescu, Constantin Moțaș and Radu Cernătescu, professors; Cicerone Theodorescu, poet, Barbu Lăzăreanu, journalist, Ion Iliescu and Gheorghe Popa, workers, Iacob Sternberg and Sandu Eliade, film directors a.o.³

In the strategy and tactics of the struggle

"The message of the Party to the army" (painting by Paul Atanasiu)



ers in Romania, certain local organizations of the Democratic-Social Party, of the Peasant National Party, of the Peasant Radical Party and other democratic groups.

The Antifascist National Committee carried out an ample activity aimed to attract into the antifascist movement certain larger categories of citizens, of different political persuasion, but united by the common will to bar the access of fascism in Romania. *"Gathering around the antifascist action all those performing a manual or intellectual work in towns and villages — emphasized the Appeal released in July 1933 — we can forestall in Romania the triumph of a current which carries the germ able to destroy all fountainheads of work and thinking."*⁴ Over 400,000 letters of adhesion were addressed to the Antifascist National Committee. Throughout the country, regional and county committees were created. In the summer of 1934, upon the Communist Party's initiative, the Antifascist National Committee of the Youth and later the Antifascist Committee of Women came into being.

The creation of local antifascist committees and the wave of adhesions cropped up in the summer of 1933, alarmed the authorities, informed that in Cluj, Iași, Timișoara and in other towns the organization of antifascist committees was initiated. Therefore, the authorities asked the regional police inspectorates to take measures to keep a close watch of the activity performed by this organization, because it was known that: *"the entire activity against fascism*

*is centered toward communism, and thus the propaganda is plainly aimed to attract the worker layers in the struggle against fascism."*⁵ In this interval, particularly combative was the Romanian antifascist press. The Antifascist National Committee, its regional and county committees supervised the release of several publications such as: *Buletinul mișcării antifasciste*, central organ of the Antifascist National Committee, *Clopotul* (Botoșani), turned into the central organ of the Antifascist National Committee after the suspension of the *Buletinul*, in February 1934, *Alte zări* (Cluj), *Ecoul* (Iași), *Cuvînt nou* (Brașov), *Echipa*, the organ of antifascist youth, *Umanitatea*, *Momentul*, *Veac nou* (Bucharest), *Îndrumarea* (Galați), *Banater Deutsche Zeitung* (Timișoara) and others.

"The Party — spotlights President Nicolae Ceaușescu — particularly emphasized the need to muster the intelligentsia, besides the working class, the popular masses, in the struggle waged to safeguard the basic interests of our nation (...) Doing honour and glory to our intellectuals, the most reputed Romanian scientists, writers and artists and also the cohabiting nationalities devotedly participated in the struggle for the defense of the country's independence and integrity, against the policy aimed to nazify the country, against the betrayal of national interests by the ruling classes, and many of them activated within the Party ranks, putting in the service of the people their entire creative power and even their

*life."*⁶ Iorgu Iordan, for example, unmasking the legionaries as traitors of their homeland, wrote that these served the interests of Italy and Hungary, which wished *"the revision of frontiers to the benefit of the latter."*⁷

An important aspect of the activity carried out by the Antifascist National Committee was its contribution to the struggle against fascism internationally, the solidarity, through the most diverse means, with antifascist forces abroad. *"To fight against fascism — wrote the Buletinul — means to strengthen the role of profound solidarity with the heroic antifascist fighters in Germany; to stir up the campaign of resolutions and subscriptions for the antifascist fighting front; to kindle and enlarge the protest movement within the working masses against the Leipzig process and to save the victims from the fascists' hands and, by unleashing a wave of strikes and protests against the German ships hoisting the swastika; to refuse to unload the German goods from wagons and ships, preventing their transportation. These are — concluded the central organ of the Antifascist National Committee — some of the efficient weapons to fight against Hitler fascism."*⁸ Representatives of the Romanian Antifascist National Committee attended the Antifascist World Congress held in Paris, in June 1933, and also their congresses and plenaries of Antifascist National Committees of Women and Youth, making a substantial contribution to map out the tactical line of the European movement against fas-

cism. The Antifascist Congress in Paris elected the Antifascist International Bureau, which, besides Romain Rolland, André Gide, Maxim Gorki, also included representatives of antifascist movement in Romania, like Petre Constantinescu-Iași.

The creation and activity of the Romanian Antifascist National Committee strongly influenced public opinion, mustered popular masses in the antifascist struggle, alerted the authorities which increased their deterring measures. Consequently, on November 25, 1934, in keeping with the restrictions imposed by the state of siege, 32

mass revolutionary organizations, among which the Romanian Antifascist National Committee too, were suspended, the headquarters of this organization and its press organs being closed.

Recalling the conditions in which the Antifascist National Committee came into being 55 years ago, we highlight with pride the heroism and devotion which animated the communists, the patriotism and solidarity of the large masses which followed and supported the Romanian Communist Party in its heroic struggle waged against fascist danger, for the defense of Romanian motherland.

1 The Romanian Antifascist National Committee, ANC, *The Publishing House for Political Literature, Bucharest*, 1985, p. 139.

2 *Scinteia*, No. 11, of August 1933.

3 ANC, op. cit., p. 141.

4 *The Archives of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party*, holding 25, file 4161, page 394; *Dimineața* of July 1, 1933.

5 *The Archives of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party*, holding 25, file 4162, pp. 133, 194, 205.

6 Nicolae Ceaușescu, Romania on the Road of Building Up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society, Vol. 13, *The Publishing House for Political Literature, Bucharest*, 1977, pp. 43-44.

7 Art. Fascism and Peace, in *Ecolul* of July 7, 1934.

8 ANC, op. cit., p. 197.

THE ANTIFASCIST STRUGGLE IN ROMANIA HAD A RELIABLE SUPPORT: THE ARMY

Colonel CONSTANTIN TODERAȘCU, DHist.

Emphasizing, as early as the rise to power of fascist regimes in certain European countries, mainly since January 1933 — when Hitler took over the power in Germany — the extremely serious danger posed by nazism to national sovereignty and independence, to the country's territorial integrity, the Romanian Communist Party mapped out a realistic scientific strategy aimed to unite all patriotic, democratic forces, including also the workers and peasants who were in the army, with the view to forestalling fascism, revisionism and jingoism, to

unmasking the terrorist organization "The Iron Guard" — an agency subsidized by the Third Reich.

The targets set for the antifascist struggle, clearly and accurately presented in the appeals and calls addressed by the Romanian Communist Party to the entire people struck a deep echo in the hearts of Romanian military. When, on August 30, 1940, in the wake of the fascist Diktat by Germany and Italy, Horthy Hungary occupied the northwestern part of Romania, our entire army were soul and body with

the people in the demonstrations and protests occurred. "In Brașov, — wrote the newspaper *Scinteia* — the soldiers fraternize with the revolutionary movement which demonstrates in the streets,"¹ while the street demonstrations in Cluj "were joined by the entire garrison of Cluj."² In Sibiu, a Romanian officer, who joined the endless columns of demonstrators, stated: "If we are not able to defend our sacred rights, we do no longer deserve to wear the military uniform."³

The antifascist, antirevisionist and antirevan-chist spirit animating the Romanian military soared after the regime led by legionaries and General Antonescu came to

power (September 6, 1940) and after the first units of the Wehrmacht entered our territory (October 12, 1940) and Romania joined the war on the side of Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941) and during the entire period of Antonescu's dictatorship, of the Nazi occupation and of the war waged in the east. Aware of the serious consequences triggered by these dramatic home and foreign developments on the Romanian national being, continuously guided by the decisive orientations and actions initiated by the Romanian Communist Party and by other progressive, patriotic political parties and organizations, the Romanian military raised in all firmness, together with the entire people, against fascist aggressors, against the propaganda, assassinations and attempts perpetrated by the "death squads", formed by the members of the "Iron Guard" which murdered noted personalities of political, cultural and scientific life, including generals, officers, non-commissioned officers.

The utter repulsion shown by the Romanian Army to fascism was mainly reflected in its firm attitude expressed after the legionaries were included in the government's composition in September 6, 1940. Thus, the measure taken by the "Iron Guard" to send its "commissaries" to military units was foiled by patriotic officers and commanders who arrested without delay and drove out of the barracks in no time the fascist agents. Likewise, in January 1941, when the legionaries launched their mutiny with the view to seizing the entire power, the army acted

promptly and firmly, annihilated the rebels' attempt and thus doing away with the legionaries' ruling; notwithstanding this, General Antonescu quickly replaced it with the regime of his own dictatorship. For the courage and heroism shown by the Romanian military in the fights against the legionaries, several officers, non-commissioned officers and privates were decorated with orders and medals by the king, at that time being "the head of the army."

The historical survey offers a host of data and instances which prove that, even in the interval when, against the Romanian people's will, in the international context when the aggressors pushed Romania into the war launched by Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union, the Romanian army continually preserved its organic antifascist, antirevisionist and antirevanchist spirit. This defining feature of the Romanian army, originated from the fundamental mission, of supreme responsibility incumbent on Romanian army for centuries on end — viz. the defense of the ancient land — was strongly substantiated by the vast political, ideological and organizational activity carried out by the Romanian communists among the military.

Thoroughly aware of the huge antifascist potential represented by the Romanian army, the Romanian Communist Party could not only be in permanent touch with all military categories up to the Supreme Command, but also to integrate the country's military organism into the overall forces able to

ensure the national consensus aimed to carry out a decisive struggle against fascism, to prepare and achieve the antifascist and antiimperialist revolution of social and national liberation.

Disseminating its strategy in the masses of soldiers and officers, the Romanian Communist Party highlighted in many documents the need to switch the arms against Hitler Germany and to liberate the country from fascist occupation. As early as July 8, 1941, the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party sent a circular showing that: *"The Romanian soldiers must (...) switch the arms against fascist invaders (...)"*⁴ This idea is also emphasized in the resolution of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party in January, 1942, which pointed to the need to attract the army *"in the patriotic, anti-Hitler front of the entire Romanian people."*⁵ Likewise, the newspaper *România liberă*, issued in Timișoara, wrote: *"The Romanian army must turn the arms against Hitler hordes. It must drive out of the country the Nazis, thus answering its real mission, defending the homeland, its aspirations, the people."*⁶

In keeping with the latest developments, the communists' appeals and calls addressed to the army spotlighted the patriotic obligation of generals, officers and soldiers to be ready for the decisive battle against fascist invaders. Thus, the manifesto issued by the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party on November 7, 1943, addressed to all military Romanians, read: *"Generals, officers,*

soldiers! (...) Be ready for the great liberation battle!"⁷ and the *Buletinul Capitalei* of July 1, 1944, launched the following call: "Soldiers! Your homeland asks that you fight against Hitler troops! (...) The entire Romanian people is with you! United with workers and peasants, valiantly fight for a free and independent Romania."⁸

Answering these calls and appeals laden with patriotic feelings, many soldiers, faithful to their antifascist convictions, actively participated in the organization and development of antifascist resistance. From the host of instances recorded in documents, we shall mention: the transportation to Bucharest by motor-cars supplied by the Constanța-based 9th Infantry Division, of certain truckloads of weapons and ammunition to equip the patriotic fighting formations; the acquisition of guns, pistols and grenades from certain military units in Craiova and in other localities. In the stage of political and military preparation for the antifascist and antiimperialist revolution of national and social liberation, the Romanian Communist Party was in permanent touch with military placed in key-posts in army hierarchy, such as: generals Constantin Sănătescu, Gheorghe Mihail, Constantin Niculescu, Constantin Vasiliu-Rășcanu, Constantin Anton, colonels Dumitru Dămăceanu, Radu Rusescu, Emilian Ionescu a.o. Guided by the communists, these high officers, in their turn, established contacts with other military staff like generals Iosif Teodorescu, at the Military Command of the Capital (MCC), Ilie Șteflea, chief of Staff,

Ilie Crețulescu, division commander, colonels Valeriu Șeșescu, Aurel Balaban, Gheorghe Zamfirescu and many others at the Staff, at the MCC or at the commands of great and operative units.

The anti-Hitler and anti-dictatorial feelings of the Romanian army were also evident in the discharge or removal of



"Underground Party Meeting" (painting by Gheorghe Labin)

cadres, personalities with strong ties in the country's political circles. Thus, between September 9, 1940 and late 1942, 81 generals, and many colonels were dismissed from the army.

Expressing, in specific forms, their opposition to fascism and to further waging the war in the east, decision-makers in the Staff focused their efforts in full agreement with the entire nation's aspirations to save and preserve the country's military potential for the struggle waged to liberate the northwestern part of the territory under Horthyist occupation. Through this action, the effectives which had to be sent to the front were lessened with about 220,000 military¹⁰ which accounted for the fact that the Romanian army

preserved intact forces totalling over a million of combatants in the service of the Romanian revolution and the anti-Hitler war.

Fully convinced of the just policy carried out by the Romanian Communist Party in close relation with the other forces eager to overthrow Antonescu's dictatorship and chase away the fascist invaders, on August 23, 1944, answering the country's call, the entire Romanian army achieved the supreme historic act to switch the arms against Hitler Germany. Thus all the country's soldiers, from private to general, jointly acting with the patriotic fighting formations, with armed popular detachments, created on the spot, with all forces in the nationwide military system, started to fight against fascist invaders, joining their efforts to anti-Hitler coalition.

The documents of those days record appreciations of high historical and political value on the lofty responsibility with which the Romanian army acted in the anti-Hitler struggle. Hence, the Manifesto to the Army issued by the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, read: "Your heroic struggle has broken down in a few days the domination of Nazis and their tools (...) The entire people embraces from the depth of its heart your struggle full of elan and sacrifice, because your struggle is the entire people's struggle for freedom, independence and a better life."

In its turn, the central press organ of the Democratic-Social Party wrote: "With elan, with a heroism surpassing any commendation, the Ro-

manian units raised a wall made of their powerful worker and peasant chests, commanded by their brave officers, and they slew the Hitler beast." ¹² Moreover, the article titled "Long Live the Romanian Army!" issued in the newspaper *România liberă*, stated: "The Romanian army has spoken. On behalf of the entire Romanian people (...) unflinching, in the service of the government, which has restored the country's democratic freedoms, it has inaugurated its work to cleanse the national territory of the Hitler hordes. (...) " ¹³ If until August 31, 1944, the Romanian army — wholly acting under the National Command — chased away Hitler troops from the country's territory, at that time under the Romanian government's control, afterwards, in the months of September and October it struggled in cooperation with Soviet troops to liberate the northwestern part of

Romania, an action successfully carried out on October 25, 1944.

Further heroically acting, along with the anti-Hitler coalition, against Nazi and Horthy troops on the territory of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Austria, until the final victory of May 1945, the Romanian army gloriously ended its fight against fascist aggressors and invaders. In this struggle, almost 170,000 men (dead, wounded and missing) valiantly fought for the noble cause of peoples' liberation from Nazi occupation. Synthesizing the Romanian army's struggles for liberation and independence, President Nicolae Ceaușescu emphasized: "It is the great merit of our army that it understood the responsibility incumbent on it in those days before the country and the people and, at the Party's call, it turned like one the arms against Hitler Germany, joining then the glorious Soviet armies to fully li-

berate our homeland until the final victory against Hitler Germany." ¹⁴

¹ *Scinteia de Septembrie* 17, 1940.

² The Worker, Socialist Democratic Movement. The Romanian Communists Party's activity and the Country's Defense at the Romanian Communist References, the Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1983, p. 500.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ *ISISP Archives*, mark A. XXV—10.

⁵ The Worker, Socialist, Democratic Movement, p. 519.

⁶ Ibidem, p. 520.

⁷ Ibidem, p. 540.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 555.

⁹ Lieutenant General Ilie Ceaușescu, D.Hist., The Command Staff of the Romanian Army against Nazi Germany, in *Magazin istoric*, No. June 6, 1984 and June 7, 1987.

¹⁰ Ibidem, No. July 7, 1984, p. 11.

¹¹ *România liberă*, No. 6 of September 4, 1944.

¹² *Libertatea*, No. 6 of September 1, 1944.

¹³ *România liberă*, No. 13 of August 27, 1944.

¹⁴ Nicolae Ceaușescu, Romania on the Road of Building Up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society, Vol. 10, the Publishing House for Political Literature, Bucharest, 1974, pp. 899—200.

MAXIMUS AND DICTUMS

The force and strength of any popular armies rest in its close tie with the people, in their joint struggle.

NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU

We may take pride in our past. On hard conditions our people preserved its national being. In this part of the world, it has been a factor of progress and civilization, it has made its contribution to the advance on the road of a better world.

NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU

When a nation is rich in economic resources, rich in military training, rich in spiritual assets and mainly rich in patriotism, that nation, whatever the historical circumstances, is certain to triumph since it is invincible.

DIMITRIE GUSTI

MAXIMUS AND DICTUMS

NEW ARGUMENTS RECONFIRM ROMANIA'S RANKING THE FOURTH WITHIN THE ANTI-HITLER COALITION

Glorious chapter in the bimillenary history of the Romanian people, Romania's participation in the anti-Hitler war, started with August 23, 1944 — once with the triggering off of the antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation, long-and minutely prepared by the Romanian Communist Party, in coalescence with the other democratic, patriotic and antifascist forces of the country —, was an event of paramount importance in the World War II that it shortened by at least 200 days. Triggered off when the defeat of Nazi Germany was not clearly outlined, Romania's military action alongside of the United Nations forces counted for a valuable strategic-military contribution to the victory won in May 1945, having been at once perceived by contemporaries' conscience as one of the decisive events for the general development of military operations, for the upshot itself of the world conflagration.

Objective appreciations — made by political personalities, military specialists, radio station commentators and publicists from many a country all over the world, shortly after the triggering off of the revolution and the starting of fights against Nazi Germany and Horthy's Hungary — underlined from the very beginning the particular consequences of the Romanian action, the remarkable strategic advantages it created to the United Nations, out of which one should mention: the collapse of German defensive on the southernwing of the Soviet-German front, the curbing down of the Wehrmacht-arranged disposition in the Balkan Peninsula; the opening of the "Focșani-Gate" and once with this the "gates" of Central Europe (on the Danube Valley) and of South-East Europe in the way of the Soviet armies' advance which prevented them from passing to "carry out subsequent actions" planned by the Soviet High Command in the

strategic Directive dated August 2, 1944; the carrying through of a huge front translation — on its southern wing in East Europe —, a matchless event in the history of the World War II; the important change, in favour of the United Nations, of the balance of forces of the two coalitions, the negative impact upon the Hitlerite war machine, through the sudden cessation of any Romanian supplies so vital for the going on of the war, of oil and cereals particularly; the entailing of a true earthquake in the Axis-controlled political system; the uninterrupted contribution (exclusively grounded on the Romanian people's work and own availabilities) highly efficient and at the country's highest parameters, with remarkable strategical implications upon the general evolution of the war in Europa etc.

Unlike other European countries whose liberation was, to a large degree, due to external factors, the Romanian people's rising to determined struggle against the invaders, in August 1944, was not the exclusive outcome of a favourable evolution in the external developments, but it was a revolutionary act deeply rooted in the Romanians' heroic past, a crowning of the Romanian people's struggle in defence of its independence, liberty and unity, of the anti-Hitler resistance movement launched in autumn 1940 once with the German troops' entrance in Romania, what practically meant the country's occupation by the Nazi Wehrmacht. An oeuvre of the Romanian people itself, the antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation triggered off on August 23, 1944, in a fervent revolutionary context that proved decisive in the course of developments, benefitted, on foreign level, by a series of favourable developments: the victories won over the Nazi Wehrmacht by the Soviet Union armies



After more than four years of Horthy occupation north-western Transylvania was liberated by the valiant Romanian army

— that bore the brunt of the anti-Hitler war —, of the United States, of Great Britain and of other states in the anti-Hitler coalition, as well as by the ever-increasing partisan and national liberation struggle from various countries.

From that historic moment Romania participated in the anti-Hitler war with her entire human, military and economic potential, with all her forces, her army — fully backed up by the entire nation, mobilized by the enthusiast patriotic call "Everything for the front, everything for victory" — heroically fighting in close combat collaboration with the Soviet army until the final defeat of Nazi Reich. **"The Romanian people** — President Nicolae Ceausescu underlined — **demonstrated through numberless deeds of bravery and lofty patriotism that its vital aspiration, its supreme goal was the liquidation of fascism — the greatest foe of the peoples' liberty and independence, of the human civilization, the securing of motherland's independence, the right to a free development"**.

On her entering the anti-Hitler coalition, due to previous preoccupations of the patriot generals and officers from the General Headquarters for preserving the national military forces with a view of liberating national territory from the fascist domination, Romania was in possession of a considerable combat strength that she put immediately and entirely at the disposal of the United Nations. Having, unlike other European states, a proper army with a centralized command and well-established structures (50 operational and training infantry divisions, 71 squadrons

with 1646 aircrafts — out of which 508 combat planes —, 71 more important ships etc), staffed with 1 200 000 fighters (about 8.5 per cent of the entire population of the country and 15 per cent of the male potential) Romania put at the disposal of the United Nations, on August 23, 1944 the whole Romanian military body that represented a considerable military force.

Though in the course of the anti-Hitler war the share of these forces decreased, it was due to the stipulations made in the Truce Convention of September 12, 1944, in the military Romanian-Soviet Protocol of October 25, 1944 and to other exigencies of the Allied Commission of Control. On no account did the Soviet allies intervene, in Romania, for the setting up of military units to be committed against the Hitlerite troops because absolutely permanently Romania's whole military availabilities were employed on the anti-Hitler front as in fact it was done with the country's economic potential. Accordingly the remarkable military economic and financial efforts made by Romania exclusively relied upon the own resources of the country, upon the unremitting work of the Romanian people who performed concomitantly and irreproachably the great tasks deriving from the stipulations of the Truce Convention.

Equally important were the strategic advantages following Romania's effective participation in the anti-Hitler war the Romanian army's actions having been conducted in close combat cooperation with the Soviet troops along one of the most important breakthrough direction


		Active cadres	Reserve force	Total
Officers		17,086	22,611	39,697
NCOs		36,100	14,813	50,913
Troop		317,553	742,026	1,059,579
Cadets in military schooling	Officers	1,890	9,258	11,148
	NCOs	5,840	10,791	16,631
Other personnel categories			Aprox.	25,000

The Romanian army strength on August 23, 1944.

to central Europe, i.e. the Danube Valley, not at all inferior to the northern one (Warsaw-Berlin) and within a wide-range European area of 1700 km in depth stretching from the coast of the Black Sea to the Bohemian Plateau. After had liberated until 31 August 1944, through its own efforts the entire national territory being on August 23 under the Romanian government's authority, the Romanian army checked and even denied by early September 1944 the advance of the Hitlerite and Horthyist troops trying to seize over the passes in Meridional and Western Carpathians; afterwards it mounted, together with the Soviet army, the liberating offensive in Romania's north-western part that ended on October 25, 1944. Continuous blows stricken at the enemy on the southeastern-north-western direction by the Romanian and Soviet armies north of the Meridional Carpathians and west of the Western ones made easier the Soviet forces' offensive launched through the Eastern Carpathians passes on the general direction Tirgu-Mures — Dej — Satu Mare. Equally important and efficient were the military operations carried out for the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where the First and Fourth Romanian Armies fought on wide-range and compact battlefronts up to 120 km in Hungary and 130 km in Czechoslovakia, in front sectors of certain strategic value (Debreczen), then on the access lines to and inside Budapest, on the Upper and Mid-Tisza, in the mountainous massifs Bükk, Hegyalja, Matra, on the Hernad Valley as well as in the mountainous zone in east Czechoslovakia (wherefrom the enemy was threatening both the flank of the Soviet strategic groups acting on Warsaw — Berlin alignment and of the

Soviet and Romanian forces in assault on the Hitlerite and Horthyist resistance points inside Budapest) and in the centre of this country west of the Hron to near Prague. Heroically fighting on the Oradea—Budapest—Prague—Vienna direction, the two Romanian armies liberated, by themselves, about 30 000 sq km in Hungary and 35 000 sq km in Czechoslovakia, i.e. 25—30 per cent of the totalled surface of the two countries, accounting for more than a quarter of the effort of the allied forces on this direction. Concomitantly, Romanian armour and railway units fought in Austria, in the highly important oil quarter north-east of Vienna. Quite telling for appreciating Romania's important place within the United Nations' common efforts stand the following indicators: 1700 km crossed through heavy fights against the enemy at an average pace of 6.5 km a day; the defeat of the Hitlerite and Horthyist troops in 20 mountainous massifs, the assault crossing of 12 water courses; the liberation of 8717 localities; an economic effort of more than 1 200 000 000 \$ (1938 currency); the direct commitment to fight of 538 536 military, out of whom the losses amounted to 170 000 (killed, wounded and missing) etc.

As I have mentioned above Romania's remarkable contribution to the defeat of Nazi Reich, the high share of the forces committed to fight were spotlighted even during the anti-Hitler war; so, B.C.C. took over and broadcast on January 7, 1945 the appreciation printed in British newspaper "Sunday Times" according to which: "*Of all nations fighting against Hitlerite Germany Romania ranks today the fourth in point of the strength committed to the battle for the defeat of Nazism*". Labour De-



Gunners of the 19th Infantry Division shooting at the enemy in Hungary

puty Ivor Thomas showed in the House of Commons that *"Since Romania ranks the fourth country actually fighting on the front against Germany it would be proper to suggest that she should be granted the co-belligerency status"*. The great importance of Romania's entering the anti-Hitler war and her remarkable share to the defeat of Nazi Germany and Horthyist Hungary was also pointed out by top-officials of anti-Hitler coalition-member states. We remind those who have lost their memory while making appreciations on the Romanian share to the defeat of fascism the decree on decorating the Romanian State's head with "Victory" Order, the highest Soviet war order that wrote down the truth, i.e. *"Romania's entrance the anti-Hitler coalition took place, at a time when Germany's defeat was not clearly outlined"*, the statement of the Cordell Hull, the US Secretary of State Department who underlined that through Romania's entering the war *"the Nazis must know that their domination in the Balkans is crushing down"*; the elogious remarks made by Winston Churchill, Britain's Prime Minister and Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, the former stating that *"Romania's siding with the Allies brought the Russians an extraordinary advantage; they will reach Belgrade, Budapest and probably Vienna before the western powers to have broken through the Siegfried line"* (as in fact it happened). Making similar appreciations, on January 13, 1946 Paris

radio station broadcast: *"France is deeming that Romania, through her contribution, shortened the war with at least six months"*. Some months later, the USSR representative at the Paris Peace Conference A. J. Vishinsky underlined that *"Romania rendered assistance to the United Nations and first of all, to the Soviet Union..."* which made the greatest efforts during the anti-Hitler war. In the same context Heliodor Pika, member in the Czechoslovak delegation pointed out that *"the Romanian army's contribution to victory was incomparably greater than that, for instance, of Italy which was acknowledged as cobelligerent state"*.

The particular significance of these appreciations represents for the Romanian people a reason for legitimate patriotic pride and a stimulus for the historians to show with scientific objectiveness the contribution made by the Romanian people, by all peoples of the world to the great victory over fascism. As for Romania, a keen and objective analysis of historical data and facts demonstrate that except the Soviet Union, United States of America and Great Britain, no other state within the United Nations coalition had a more unfavourable strategic influence upon the Nazi Reich in the war developments in Europa as Romania had.

■ Major ALESANDRU DUȚU

WE HAVE BEEN HERE FROM TIMES OF YORE. THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE'S AUTOCHTHONY AND STEADINESS IN THE CARPATHO-DANUBIANO-PONTIC AREA

Lieutenant-General ILIE CEAUȘESCU, DHist.

The Romanians' history is the history of a steady people, moulded in one and the same cradle, where it followed its own path of action and manifestation, of shaping a material and spiritual culture of its own. Numberless archaeological vestiges and written documents going back to antiquity clearly spotlight an unquestionable truth, namely the Romanian people, through its remotest forebears, has been living here, in the Carpatho-Danubiano-Pontic area, from times immemorial. We, the Romanians, are the oldest inhabitants of the ancestors' land and one of the oldest peoples of the entire continent. Highly telling is the assertion made by Nicolae Iorga who underlined that *the Romanian people has fourfold millenary roots: this is our pride and this is our might. Where the ancient Thracian shepherd lived, there the Romanian settled; where the Roman's fortress was built, there our prince would settle his; where the Thracian village was in olden times, now the Romanian village is living its life; in the places where our towns are erecting now there were in the old days centres of previous civilizations represented by people whose successors are we*¹.

As ancient writings recorded, our right forebears, the Geto-Dacians, were born and lived here having a permanent and uninterrupted continuity in the Carpatho-Danubiano-Pontic area. They never left the territory where were born, but kept on living in these places defending their being and right

to a free existence in spite of numberless vicissitudes of history. The indestructible ties of the Geto-Dacians with the land where they lived from times immemorial stand for an essential trait of the socioeconomic and political life of our forerunners. The inhabitants of these lands early practiced works such as the cattle breeding and especially the land tilling, occupations that played a great part in terms of people's steadiness and sedentary life. Over all ancient times, agriculture-embracing ever more developed forms and using ever more improved tools — was a steady occupation of the Romanian people's forefathers; it took its share, beside animal grazing, bee-keeping, pottery act, furrier's trade, metal-extraction and working and other trades, in moulding a rich material and spiritual life and also, in growing up the love for the native land.

Makers of one of the great civilizations of the ancient world, comparable at that time with those revolving round the Mediterranean basin, the Geto-Dacians permanently focused, after their first documentary mentioning by Herodotus, the attention of written sources. Highly telling for our forerunner's unflinching will to defend their habitat in front of aggressors is their daring will to face the Persian King Darius I more than 2500 years ago. Well-known are the Geto-Dacians' derring-do in the fights against the Persian armies and their bravery, doubled by wisdom, when, under the command of Dromi-



Group of Dacians returning home
(detail from Trajan's Column)

chaetes they put up opposition to Ly-simachus, the Macedonians' king.

In the 1st century BC, under the leadership of Burebista, appreciated by an ancient source as *"the first and greatest of all Thracia's kings"*, there was set up a strong centralized and independent Geto-Dacian state, which demonstrated, through its existence, more than 2050 years ago, the favourable conditions of our forerunners' political unification, a fact underlying the very idea-force of the Romanian people's unity. The Burebista-led state (the 1st century B.C.) was exerting its authority upon a vast territory that was stretching to the Wooden Carpathians in the north, to the Mid-Danube westwards, beyond Tyras in the east, to the Haemus Mountains in the south and to the western coast of the Black Sea in the south-east also embodying the Greek cities on the Pontic coast. As early as in that period, the main foe for the existence of the independent Dacia was the Roman Empire, a super-power of the ancient world in full territorial expansion. The Roman extension to the north met the heroic and longstanding opposition put up by Dacia's fighters led, at that time, by king-hero Decebalus. In the wake of the great wars in 101—102 and 105—106 AD, a part of the Dacian Kingdom was occupied by the Romans thus having been cut out her liberty and disorganized her political, military, economic and cultural life. However, in spite of those hard circumstances, the Geto-Dacian people kept on maintaining and developing its traditional socioeconomic and politico-military

structures and rapidly rebuilt its State existence in the other territorial quarters of former kingdom that remained out of the Roman occupation.

Literary sources and archaeological resources preclude the biased and lack-content assertion according to which the Dacian people would have been crushed once with the Roman conquest. This "theory" spread about, for the first time, in the second half of the last century by R. Roesler and taken again, since then by the foes of the Romanian people's continuity was given firm and thoroughly argued answers by Romanian and foreign historians. The numerous autochthonous settlements that kept on enduring after 106 AD on the whole territory of Dacia, the frequent archaeologic discoveries of the Dacian-type pottery, the wide-spread employment of the Geto-Dacian-type cremation practices, the perpetuation of Dacian names for persons, localities, rivers, the existence of the Dacian detachments in the Roman army a.o. stand for sure proofs of Dacian habitation denseness after part of Dacia was turned into a Roman province as well. In fact, that the Dacian people's disappearance is quite impossible does not require any demonstration as such an assertion is flagrantly vying with the historical truth. *"A people having the size of the Dacian one — Simion Mehedinți was writing —, spread on such a varied relief (...) could not be broken up. This catastrophic conception is running counter to everything we know from other peoples' history"*².

Pluridisciplinary research-historical, archaeologic, sociologic, linguistic, ethnographic etc. — offered conclusive answers referring to the Dacian people's ethnical and steady habitation during the direct contact with the Roman civilization in the 2nd—3rd centuries. The Dacian community — an original agrarian community with multifarious functions in point of economic, social and politico-military organization — proved

The reverse of a
denarius featuring
Trajan's Column
(A.D. c. 113)





"The Padeș Proclamation" (painting by D. Stoica)

an extraordinary vitality both in the subdued territory and in free Dacia. The endurance of the ancient community secured the preservation of the native ethnical stratum and the uninterrupted existence of the Romanian people all over the Carpatho-Danubiano-Pontic area. "Essential is — P. P. Panaitescu noted — *that the continuity of communities on our country's territory from the Geto-Dacians to the setting up of the feudal states means the Romanian people's continuity in Dacia as a settled people, linked to the territory, permanently stick to the land*"³.

Numerous historical sources irrefutably attest that once with the Romans' advance to the Danube, then with their passage north of the river, the two great civilizations-Dacian and Roman — blended together, reciprocally influenced one upon another, the Dacian people assimilating the Latin language and also taking over other elements of the Roman civilization and spirituality, the latter rendering it the traits with which the Romanian people has crossed almost two millenia of history. This process of synthesis, that covered several centuries, would reach its acme and finalize in the IInd—IIIrd centuries AD all over the Carpatho-Danubiano-Pontic area. Through the blending of the two civilizations-Dacian and Roman — the Romanian people moulded, steady for 2000 years in its ancient habitat.

In the centuries that followed the finalization process of its ethnogenesis, the Romanian people was compelled to face by itself, by its own forces, the migrators who were to cross, wave after

wave, its territory, some of them having to temporarily settle down in these places and to be assimilated by the autochthonous people.

The migratory populations, which had an inferior stage of civilization, could not budge the Romanian people from its ancient land where it had moulded and developed. Whether for the centuries following the Roman army's and administration's retreat from imperial Dacia written records attesting to the presence of the new people are scarce enough, they cannot represent an argument for the foes of the theory on our steadiness and continuity.

With good reason Romanian erudite Sextil Puscariu was writing: "*The chronicles recorded the events, but not the uniform course of time; they noted the new peoples' invasions, but not the endurance of the autochthonous ones; they wrote down the wars, but not the peaceful life and the old State organizations*". The epoch of migrations fully demonstrated both vigour, vitality and resistance force specific to the Romanian people, its links going to mere blending with the ancient land.

Demonstrating that the migratory populations were just in passing by and autochthonous population did never leave the spot, historian A. D. Xenopol pinpointed that the Romanians were reshuffling in front of the migrators "*in the neighbouring shelters of the mountains and forests so as to be always near their houses and tillage land (...)* Whenever the Tatars were coming what did the Romanians do? Were they leaving their country? Not at all, because on each new onslaught we find them

again settled down in their houses" 4. Generalizing a multimillenary historical experience, Neagoe Bassarab in his well-known *Învățăture* (Teachings) advised his descendents that, even under most dramatic circumstances, when the invaders would have succeeded to temporarily occupy a part of our hearth, they should not leave the ancestors' land, but to continue the resistance until victory: "do not exit from your country (...) but remain here within your frontiers (...) because your enemy, who came against you, will not remain for long (...) And you will curb down your enemies under your foot" 5.

The high level of material and spiritual civilization of the Romanian people, their numerical superiority, their living in the same habitat for thousands of years represented sources and resources of its capacity of resistance in front of historical vicissitudes; they also lent it the means for an extraordinary force of assimilating other population that settled down close to it. In underlining the uninterrupted continuity of material and spiritual life of the Romanian people in its ancestral hearth and giving a riposte to the attempts at distorting the historical truth, Romanian writer Liviu Rebreanu wrote: "what argument for continuity might be more credible than the existence of this people in the same place after two thousand years" 6.

Archaeological proofs completed by written documents have offered precious information about the organization of the Romanians' sociopolitical life in the period of transition to feudalism. "The popular Romanians" in the 4th—8th centuries continued then by the Romanian knezdoms and voivodates documentarily attested in the 9th—11th centuries led by "jude" (judex—who held social and juridical prerogatives alike), dukes or knezes or voivodes propelled the development of the production forces and relations, secured the defense against the invaders, kept ties with political formations of the same kin, as well as with some neighbour or farther located states thus asserting themselves ever more active in the political life in Central and South-East Europe 7.

The tradition of the State organization with the Romanians — those "lands of the Romanians" mentioned in writings, the voivodates led by Gelu, Glad and Menumorut extant in Transylvania, Banat and Crișana before the Hungarians' arrival in the Pannonic Plain — attest to the steadiness and continuity of life and political organization of the Romanians in their ancestors' motherland. Living and working, from times of yore, on the land of their fathers and great-

grandfathers, the Romanians have always felt, to the highest degree, their appurtenance to this habitat, their autochthony. All the Romanian chroniclers and scholars clearly showed this truth in their work, the Romanian voivodes defended with the price of their own life the right deriving from this reality, foreign historians and travellers showed clearly the whole world this fact. While mentioning the Anonymus' chronicle, German scholar I. Thunmann mentioned that "the Magyars' onslaught in 896 found them (the Romanians — o.n.) in Transylvania and in Hungary on this side of the Danube (...) The Vlachs (i.e. the Romanians — o.n.) have been living from ancient times both in Wallachia and Moldavia" 8. Magyar historian and ethnograph Paul Hunfalvy wrote that "the ancestors of today's Romanians did never break off, since Trajan to our days, their living in former Dacia, i.e. in Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia" 9 and Horváth Mihály unequivocally asserted that: "Transylvania was peopled with Romanians when the Hungarians were making their appearance in Pannonia" 10.

So, the Romanians and their forefathers had from ever a hearth of their own that they never abandoned as steadiness was one of the fundamental truths of their historical evolution. Brilliantly synthesizing this reality, President of socialist Romania underlined: "In most difficult times, our forebears never deserted the land where they had been born; fraternizing with the land, with the mountains and the plains, with

Michael the Brave, the prince of the first union of the Romanians (painting by Gh. Tattarescu)



the rivers and the deep forests, they stood their ground and they fought to preserve their identity and their right to live in freedom"¹¹.

Essential for the resistance of the entire Romanian people against all foreign onslaughts is its staying on in the same ancestral habitat, its non-dislocation from native places. The Romanian people's defining traits, language and civilization, remained unaltered and proved their vigour in course of time having continuously enriched themselves following an internal evolution and the contacts with other peoples' civilizations.

Benefitting by higher political organization forms, developed all over the ancestors' territory, the Romanian people organized itself in strong feudal states that strengthened its internal cohesion and created premises to external conjugated actions thus dynamizing the unitary development. Vicissitudes and sufferings that the Romanian people underwent would never curb it down, but on the contrary they steeled and strengthened its determination not to spare any sacrifice in defense of motherland. Attempts by some pseudohistorians at contesting the Romanians' steadiness on the territory of their motherland proved completely treacherous and erroneous. "The answer to this — the General Secretary of the Party underlined — was given by Mircea, by Stephen the Great, by Ioan of Hunedoara, by Michael the Brave. It was given by those who defeated Bayazid, who stood their ground against so many conquerors, who accomplished the first centralized state of the Romanians of Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania. They did not come from other parts, they did not fall from the skies; they lived and they were born here, in this land and they defended it with their own blood"¹².

The Romanian people, from ever stable in its habitat, was faced in the Middle Ages with numberless attempts by neighbour aggressive powers to take hold of the Romanian territories, to distabilize the internal situation, to broke off the Romanian unity and the evolution to the making up of a sole state. The Ottoman Empire, in conquering the whole Balkan Peninsula and turning the Bulgarian and Serbian states into pashaliks reached the southern frontier of the Romanian Country of Muntenia. The anti-Ottoman joint front, the firm and longstanding resistance against the Ottoman expansion and aggression, the understandings and treaties concluded with the Porte — the so-called *capitulations* or *ahidname* — allowed Muntenia, Moldavia and Transylvania to autonomously develop and

preserve their territorial integrity, to govern by their own laws and customs. The victory won at Mohács (1526) and the instalment of the Ottoman imperial domination over Hungary for a century and a half under the form of the Buda pashalik had strong implications for the Romanian Countries as well.

Transylvania became an autonomous voivodate and in this position it established relations with the Porte, semblable to those achieved by the other two Romanian countries and the steady ties among them would grow up. Pursuing to exit from the Ottoman suzerainty, Michael the Brave resumed the fight and would score, at Giurgiu and Călugăreni, at Nicopole and Vidin etc., victories that showed the lawful aspiration of the Romanian people to liberty; the bravery and skill proved by the illustrious voivode, called with good reason in the epoch documents *most brilliant, all-valiant, all-famous, derring do, our hero, the wall of Christendom and its revenger, the new Achilles, the wonderful, the praiseworthy in the world etc*¹³. From 1600 to our days history recorded him as he called himself: "Prince of Wallachia, of Transylvania and of the whole Moldavia"; it was due to him that the Romanian people's evolution recorded its first completion — *inevitabilis fatorum lex*, namely the accomplishment of a law of implacable destiny, as Gaspar Bojtinus — the official historian of Gabriel Bethlen — asserted with good reason.

The Romanian people's steadiness in its hearth of moulding, of work and right triumphed in the 1600 union having been its cause and effect and the centralized and independent unitary state turned out to be an objective historical achievement and in the perspective of history, quite viable. The outside armed intervention temporarily destroyed this politico-State achievement as afterwards "the Romanian nation again was divided; the Romanians again were subject to alien or different powers"¹⁴. The multifarious ties between their countries continued however: the common origin, economic situation, language, customs and traditions, never-interrupted historical traditions etc. all this demonstrate that the Romanian people's endurance in its habitat was an objective reality, unquestionably much stronger than foreign pressures, immixtures and domination. After the Ottoman Empire incurred the 1683–1687 defeats, a part of our territory — Transylvania — was subdued by the Habsburg Empire and in 1691 it became a principality, with its own institutions and laws, dependent on the Vienna court, unlike



**Horea at the head of his
revolutionary army**

Hungary which was actually incorporated into this empire. The Habsburg policy could not annul the multimillenary historical reality of Transylvania as an independent state which attested, in this habitat, that the Romanians was the sole people that never left its hearth, that uninterruptedly maintained relations with the brethren beyond the mountains. Neither Oltenia's annexation for 21 years (1718—1739) — another part of Romanian country —, nor the Banat's passing under Habsburg authority, nor the territorial rapture in 1775 when Moldavia's northern part, Bukovina, was occupied by the Habsburg Empire, nor the onerous haggle between the Sultan and the Tsar concerning Bessarabia's incorporation — Moldavia's region between Pruth and Dniester into the Tsarist Empire after the Russo-Ottoman war in 1806—1812, nor the bloody quelling of the 1821 Romanian revolution by the Ottoman troops and of the 1848 revolution by the interventionist Ottoman, Tsarist and Austrian troops, nor the dreadful terror and nor the disnationalization policy promoted in Transylvania by the Austro-Hungarian dualism — which for 51 years, from 1867 to 1918, exerted a double oppression — nobody and nothing could broken up the inexorable course of history in the Carpatho-Danubiano-Pontic area, a history attesting to the Romanian people as a unique and legitimate master.

The Romanians were and are aware they represent, here, both autochthony and steadiness. It is just this conscience that determined — as Professor Keith Hitchins from Illinois University, Urbana-Campaign (USA) stated — the intertwinning of the social and national goals in the programme of the 1848 Romanian Revolution in Transylvania: *"Together, Iancu and his peasant army fought to achieve a large programme of reforms which did not separate the social, national and liberal components:*

*the complete abolition of serfdom without granting any damages for the noblemen; the securing of all political liberty and civic equality in rights for the whole population of Transylvania, irrespective of the language they are speaking; the recognition of the right to self-determination"*¹⁵.

Really, it was for the promotion of these assets in their hearth of steady habitation that the Romanians were fighting as they are — as one of the most famous French historians, Alfred Ramboud declared — *"pre-eminently a sedentary people"* and *"nurture to the highest degree feelings of love for the land and the Roman cult of the Terminus god"* and which, in one of their proverbs, is compared to the rocks of a torrent which stay on while the water is flowing on"¹⁶.

Autochthonous and steady in their ancestors' hearth, the Romanians were always in overwhelming majority in point of demography. French historian Henri Gaidoz¹⁷ who studied the ethnic reality north and west of the Carpathians asserted: *"after the census made in 1890 by Hungarian administration, 15 counties making up Transylvania count 2 251 000 inhabitants out of whom 1 276 000 Romanians **, 697 000 Hungarians and 217 000 Germans"*¹⁸. Yet, the same historian would note with stupefaction: in 1845 a Romanian from Braşov who graduated the faculty of law asked to be appointed in his native town; his claim was declined because he was a Romanian"¹⁹ (!).

Hard times steeled the Romanian people who, in spite of all vicissitudes, did not leave its cradle, did not forget its origin, language and beliefs, did not stay passively in front of the invaders, but it put up on multifarious levels — military, political, cultural, linguistic and religious — an uninterrupted resistance; it was another proof of the solidarity of *"all branches of the Romanian nation"*²⁰, as Nicolae Bălcescu wrote, of their will for *this unity to also manifest at politico-State level so as this unity to make from Muntenians, Moldavians, Bessarabia-, Bukovina and Banat-inhabitants, from Transylvanians... to make a political body, a Romanian nation, a state of seven million of Romanians"*²¹.

Victories of the Romanian steadiness were, too, the 1859 Union, the 1877—1878

* The Roman god of the boundary marks.

** Subsequently, the censuses will testify the existence of some 3 000 000 Romanians.

War of Independence and the Dobrogea's coming back to the Mother-land, the liberation of ancient and permanent Romanian habitation territories through the carrying out of the war for national liberation and completion in 1916—1918 as well as the grand popular assemblies which decided through an impressive plebiscit *the union of the Romanians' and Romanian-inhabited territories — Transylvania, Banat, Bukovina and Bessarabia — to Romania, the latter hailing "with love and enthusiasm the liberation of the nations subdued theretofore by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, namely, the Czechoslovak, Austro-German, Yugoslav, Polish and Ruthenian nations"*²².

The course of developments would be crowned, as a corollary, by the 1918 Great Union, what categorically demonstrate that this moment — unique in the Romanian people's history through its amplexness and significance — was not the outcome of some occurrences, the fruit of favourable conjuncture or of agreements concluded at negotiations' table, but it was the natural outcome of the struggle waged by the broad popular masses, an act of profound historical justice able to allow the achievement of a lawful concordance between the objective reality and the inalienable rights of our nation, on the one hand, and the national framework insistently demanded by these realities, on the other hand. **"The Union — said the General Secretary of the party — was the victorious crowning of the centuries long struggle waged by the most advanced forces of the Romanian people in Moldavia, Muntenia and Transylvania, by the great scholars and great thinkers of the nation, of the activity carried out by the revolutionaries and socialist militants, of the aspirations and the will of the entire Romanian people"**²³.

The Carpatho-Danubiano-Pontic steadiness of our forefathers led by illustrious Burebista, Decebalus, Michael the Brave etc. — crowned with the needed act of historical justice of the Great Union — was acknowledged by representatives of the Magyars, Saxons, Swabians, Jews etc. and was juridically internationally sanctioned through the peace treaties²⁴.

The Great Union raised on a higher level the unity achieved along the centuries among all Romanian provinces, created the socioeconomic and cultural national, framework for the faster development of the forces of production, meant the embodiment, within the frontiers of the same state, of the entire

people's creative energies and capacities, created favourable conditions to the ascension of the revolutionary workers' movement, of all progressive forces of society.

In the inter-war years, when the territorial integrity and national independence of Romania were jeopardized by the fascist and revizionist forces in Europe, the Romanian Communist Party, which emerged on the stage of the Romanian socio-political life in May 1921, through the transformation of the Socialist Party, called the entire people **"to be on alarm. Hitler wants to steel our wheat, oil and territory"**²⁵. And in August 1940 when a part of Transylvania was snatched away from Romania's body and annexed to Horthyist Hungary, the Romanian people firmly remonstrated against this loathsome diktat which was **"in flagrant contradiction with reality and with its imprescriptible rights over the land of all Transylvania"**²⁶.

There followed, on August 23, 1944, the triggering off of the antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation. Its victory was the outcome of the heroic struggle carried out by the whole people who rewon its independence, Romania's engagement entailing crucial changes in the evolution of the world conflagration shortened with about 200 days.

In the decades that elapsed from the victory of the antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation of August 1944, Romania has undergone several historical stages. There was carried through the democratic revolution and starting with 1948 objectives of the socialist revolution commenced to be performed that abolished for good and all exploitation and

"Băneasa in August 1944" (painting by Ion Tolaş)



oppression, economic, social and national inequalities, thus ensuring the full liberty and equality of all citizens of our motherland. In a short historical while that lasted almost 20 years "there was achieved the socialist based organization of State-owned and cooperative property, of all economic and social sectors that secured the victory of the first stage of socialist revolution"²⁷.

As for the implementation of the revolutionary transformations in Romania a distinct place is held by the period ushered in by the Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, a political event of decisive importance in the life of our party and people which inaugurated a new stage in the contemporary history of our Mother-land. The Congress stringently stressed the necessity of the high pace development of industry and of the other branches of activity, of the strong rise in the agrarian production, of the consolidation of socialist economy in general.

The attainment of those objectives, the intense development of the forces of production throughout the country's territory allowed for a passage to a higher stage, that of building up the multilaterally developed socialist society.

In the 23 years that elapsed from the Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party the Romanian people has achieved a vast constructive work, of thorough transformation of the entire society having been ensured the development and modernization of socialist industry and agriculture, the flourishing of science, tuition, art and culture, the continuous rise of the material and spiritual living standard of all working people, the ever stronger assertion of liberty, national independence and sovereignty, Romania witnessing the most fertile period of its history called by the Romanian people with entitled patriotic pride, **the Nicolae Ceaușescu Epoch.**

The socialist age of its multimillenary evolution crowns the exemplary endurance of the Romanian people in one and always the same hearth, haloing the autochthony and steadiness in the area where it was born, worked and fought in order to mould its own destiny.

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GROUNDWORKS OF THE ROMANIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE

THE ARMED NATION AND THE POPULAR WAR IN THE OUTLOOK OF THE 1848 REVOLUTIONARIES

The struggle waged by the Romanian people for unity and independence, for ensuring the continuity of its state life generated since the remotest times an own way to carry out a warfare characterized by the mobilization to the military effort of all able to carry arms, irrespective of their social statute, and by the use of all possible tactics — from the deliberate retreat to the permanent harassing — aimed to weaken, exhaust and finally to chase away the invaders, which implied to create before the invading troops a demo-economic void, by the deliberate sacrifice of localities, harvests, means of communication, of all sources of food and vehicles etc. Nicolae Bălcescu, the military ideologist of the 1848 Romanian revolution, made a synthetic but thorough survey of this specific form of resistance used by our forerunners. He wrote: *Whenever a strong enemy invaded the country all the inhabitants in the plains laid waste the towns and villages and gathered with their herds and food in the mountains whose access was defended both by the natural configuration and by fortifications. Old people, women and children rested in the mountains while the youth took up arms, formed bands and harassed the enemy. The country's army hid away in the forests, avoiding the open clash with the enemy's crowds, confining themselves to wage a war of attrition, to sever the means of communication, to capture its provisions, hence to starve it and finally to force it to leave the country unsuccessfully or to attract it into difficult and unknown places where they paid with their life for the impudence to invade the ancient land. In this wise, the country managed to chase away the Hungarian and Ottoman hordes, which threatened to invade it.*¹ This way to fight back the aggression indispensably called for a particular moral force and a flawless discipline. *"Therefore, a single will and a perfect discipline should reign in the country, so that at the first call the entire people take up arms like one"*² emphasized Mihail Kogălniceanu. Hence, it was a popular

warfare in its full acceptation, which implied the direct or indirect participation of the country's entire able-body population in the action to chase away the aggressor and which accounted for the great victories won by the Romanian armies throughout the centuries.

Always faced with enemies superior in point of military equipment the Romanian people found in the forerunners' military organization adequate solutions to cope with home and exterior conditions obtaining in the middle of the 19th century. In fact, the Romanian army included from the very beginning in its organization, besides regular units, non-regular territorial formations (foot soldiers, border guards, town guards and gendarmes). The latter's recruitment and military service, which were done according to certain principles taken over from the old autochthonous military structure, contributed to the considerable growth of the effectives called to arms, so that, from the onset, — in spite of foreign interferences — the Romanian modern army preserved certain

Eftimie Murgu, foremost Banat representative of the 1848 revolution



VITEZA

LITRA A

OASTEI ROMANE

CU COTURAMA DE INCAUTARE OTOMANA

IN DELU SPIRII

Bucuresti anul 1848, seria 2a, bust 14 cm, dupa modelul

DE

Alina D. Popoviciu



BUCURESTI

TIPOGRAFIA NAȚIONALĂ A LUI ȘTEFAN KARSIȘESCU

Strada Georgeand, Hotelul Chiriacu, No. 2

1866

Work by Major D. Papazoglu concerning the heroic battle of the Romanian soldiers at Dealu Spirii

military categories "in keeping with the oldest, best and soundest traditions of this country."³ as Nicolae Iorga showed. In fact, the experience of the American revolution and mainly of the French one tellingly prove it — as Frederick Engels also emphasized — that "the aggressed state has to put up the revolutionary principle of 'the entire people's mobilization' against any invading armies."⁴

The 1848 Romanian revolution and its leaders had the merit to have defined the doctrinary principle of armed nation and to have conferred it the adequate organizational substance. The extension of national military forces and their "democratization" through the creation of an army or of certain categories of popular-type troops, in other words, the application of the doctrine of armed nation was one of the desiderata often worded in the programmes of claims drafted by the Romanian patriotic and progressive circles in the period before the large-scale revolutionary development of 1848. Ten years earlier, in 1838, the National Party of the Romanian Country of Muntenia led by Colonel Ion Cimpineanu asked that "besides the regular army a national guard be set up"⁵ while in article 2 of the Draft Constitution proposed by the same political group, and coauthored by its leader and cadet Nicolae Bălcescu, read that "All the Romanians able for the military service will be drafted."⁶ Hence the equipping and military training of ever greater effectives. The leaders of the 1848 Romanian revolution deemed that a priority task incumbent on "the revolutionary rule" after the power was taken over was "to form the re-

volutionary army", in large numbers, mostly recruited from the peasantry and the national guard to be established. In a work published in Braşov in 1846 and titled *Elements of Political Right according to Several Authors*, by a Philo-Romanian, Costache Negruzzi stated that a representative government should give pride of place to the "organization even popular of the army"⁷, an army with a large popular representation whose interests and mission have to match the aspirations and struggle for emancipation of the people. "The army should be the people — wrote Negruzzi — the army should be body and soul with the people and with the citizens who form it and who have to be enlisted only for a resolute and forasmuch as they will be incorporated in the nationwide mass they should be forestalled to develop other interests than the nation's and to become the tools of the power."⁸ Likewise, Nicolae Bălcescu declared since 1844 for the organization of the Romanian army on larger mass grounds. In his in-depth study *The Romanians' Armed Power and Military Art from the Creation of the Wallachia Principality until Now*, he favoured a "reform of our army's organization, a reform likely to establish better defense grounds"⁹, highlighting, in a fundamental thesis of the policy aimed to organize modern national army, the imperious need that all the Romanians between 20 and 60 of age have the duty to serve in the country's army.¹⁰ In this spirit, he proposed the establishment of a military system in which the standing army — much too "costly" for the country's budget, and which, moreover, took away "large manpower from agriculture and industry" — reduced its effectives, foremost ranking the "national reserves" (territorial troops, militiamen, the national guards, the levy etc.) The shifting of priority from regular troops was motivated by the instance that for the Romanians — Nicolae Bălcescu opined — "State power does not lie in active army but in national reserves."¹¹ This military organization proved to be the most adequate not only because it would have fully met Romanian political, economic, geographical, social and historical realities but also because it would have perfectly matched its main strategic target: namely to always pursue "only a defense aim"¹², as the thinker and animator of the 1848 Romanian revolution emphasized.

None the less, this extension of the effectives trained in time of peace to participate in the defense effort was only a side of the concept of armed nation. Whenever the country was invaded by enemy troops, "whenever at stake is the defense of national territory, the defense of the country against enemy invasion or to deliver it if it is occupied (...) then the army

corps, the soldiers do not suffice, then extra forces are needed, an entire armed population is needed.”¹³ Hence, it imposed the calling to arms of all the country's citizens and the use of all means to chase away the aggressor, to launch a real war waged by the entire people to safeguard its fundamental interests and prerogatives. Telling thereon are the statements made by C. A. Rosetti in the summer of 1848, at a time when the troops of the neighbouring reactionary empires were concentrated at the borders to liquidate the revolution which triumphed in Bucharest. In suchlike crucial situations, “all citizens from all social classes, from 18 to 50 of age (...) if need be, all, when the drums beat, should gather and be ready to defend their country, their liberty, ready to shed the last drop of blood for it.”¹⁴

These coordinates formed the axis of the military policy carried out by the leaders of the Romanian people's destinies during those tumultuous days when the Romanian nation claimed the fulfilment of its lawful rights to a dignified life, within a unitary and independent state. Indeed, the 1848 Romanian revolution, on one hand created a series of military structures from the category of “national reserves” — like the national guards and the regiments of volunteer pandours — and on the other, contributed to the crystallization in the national military thinking of the doctrine of armed nation and popular war, the upshot of the joint action of the revolutionary leaders in all Romanian territories, a dialectic synthesis between the specific claims

raised by a bourgeois-democratic revolution and the traditional elements originated from a long armed effort carried out by our people to defend the country's unity and independence.

■ Colonel CONSTANTIN CĂZANIȘTEANU

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MAXIMUS AND DICTUMS

Soldiers' valiance is more important than their number.

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

It is not a more useful army than the own army, and... the courage and skill can be the soldiers' assets by the way they are equipped, trained and given orders.

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

Be certain, you who are engaged in the profession of arms, that as you are, so the soldiers whom you command will be in a whole.

BLAISE DE MONTLUC

MAXIMUS AND DICTUMS

ANOTHER UNELUCIDATED DOSSIER: THE CEREUS NETWORK (I)

Major MIHAIL E. IONESCU, DHist.

The Istanbul branch of the American Office for Strategic Studies (OSS) — a vast organization for picking up intelligence with “residences” in various parts of the world started to alert in spring 1944. Officials from Washington arrived on the Bosphorus’ coasts in order to question not only the officers commissioned with the “control” of sources, with the assessment and processing of the collected intelligence, but even the “sources” and “sub-sources”, namely the informers. One of these officials, after four weeks of investigations, wrote a report entitled the “Dogwood Organization”. From its first pages the document was consuming, “This memorandum summarizes the findings of the undersigned after a series of meetings with Dogwood that extending over a period of about four weeks”, ended with a conclusion without any retort.” By way of a final observation it is my own belief that Dogwood himself was bound to the Germans... (line ripped out from American archives) and that the Dogwood Organization is not used by only one source (enemy — o.n.), but by several aimed at intoxicating the Allied intelligence agencies”.

The Dogwood network, for collecting information, was dissolved on July 31, 1944. This was the end of a chapter from the history of the secret war, as various specialists appreciated a true “fiasco” for the OSS. Ended but still unelucidated. This chapter also embodied the secret of “Știrbei mission”. As it is known, Barbu Știrbei arrived at Istanbul in March 1944 as a Romanian envoy to negotiate with the allied representatives the terms on Romania’s exit from the war against the Soviet Union and her joining the United Nations coalition. From Istanbul, Barbu Știrbei went to Cairo, where on 17 March 1944 he had a first meeting with the allied representatives (Sovietic, British and American).

Although the “Știrbei mission” was covered in top secret, both his travel and

goals were to focus the international press after the Romanian envoy had arrived at Istanbul. British Secret Service had heard, before the first newspapers to have introduced information in this sense, that the Abwehr knew about the motives underlying Știrbei’s presence in Turkey. How was it possible for a secret of such importance to have been known by the enemy? The answer — of course not entirely, as everything concerning the secret war — could be found while remaking partially the activity unfolded by Cereus Network.

ZEPPELIN PLAN AND CEREUS NETWORK

Within the Western allies’ preparations for opening the second front in West Europe of great importance were the actions unfolded on the secret front with the purpose of deceiving the enemy about the landing place in Europe. The American secret services elaborated, with that end in view, a wide-range plan for “intoxicating” the enemy with the purpose of convincing the latter that the landing — planned to be executed in France’s northwest and south — was to take place in the Balkans. The purpose was to compel the enemy to dissipate its forces so as during the landing operations the German Command should not concentrate a striking force able to nip in the bud the allied operation. “The plan, Zeppelin — one of the historians familiar with this problem, Anthony Cave Brown was to write —, was based on Allied knowledge of German misconception that Churchill favoured a Balkan invasion in World War II as he had in World War I.”

In order to start the Zeppelin plan-envisaged actions, in September 1943, the OSS Chief himself, General William J. Donovan arrived at Cairo.

The plan is not known thoroughly and many of its details are either ignored or

carefully concealed from in discreditable eyes. Even people directly participating in its carrying out could publish only short briefings — and unavoidably in fragments — in obscure country magazines merely after four decades from those events.

As for American archives all references to people involved in the carrying out of this plan are mercilessly wiped out and the respective documents, thus dressed, have been classified of late only.

It is known that an utmost important role was granted to the intelligence collecting organization, with the code name Cereus, created by the American secret service in Turkey.

Two intelligence officers, who arrived in Turkey in May 1943, were responsible for the making of this organization. They were Lanning Macfarland and Archibald F. Coleman who functioned in Turkey under the cover of press correspondent of Saturday Evening Post. One of the first agents recruited by the American agents was the Czech engineer Dogwood "who-as some historians assert — had ties practically with all the European intelligence services, British included". He was favoured by the existence of a large network of informing agents, working for him, both in Austria and Hungary.

Cereus had two main components: the "Rose" network and the Dogwood, respectively; the first was controlled by clerk officer Macfarland, and the second, by the "newspaperman" Coleman.

Dogwood had founded a company — Western Elektrik — the headquarter of which, as documents testify, was a genuine office of the network staffed with "paid interpreters, stenographers and functionaries". The latter and the informing agents were of German, Austrian, Czech or Hungarian ethnical origin. Everybody had flowers code names.

The dominant figure of the whole "Cereus" network was Dogwood, whose true name is not disclosed even at present the American archives having carefully wiped out the lines that would have identified him. The investigation closing report, out of which we have quoted above, presents him as follows: "The man is a consummate egotist who apparently believes himself omniscient and insuperably crafty and it is my conviction that through his vanity and desire for power he has directly or indirectly been made the tool of any member of German agents."

SUCCESSIVE AND SPECTACULAR FALLS

In February 1944 one of the Abwehr agents at Istanbul, Erich Vermehren and his wife yielded themselves to OSS. Almost at once other three German agents in

Turkey followed their example. The latter's preliminary interrogatories disclosed the American secret services an almost unbelievable fact. Namely, one of the best American secret agents in Turkey — his real or code name was not known by the German defectors-worked under the close control of Abwehr.

Washington immediately sent an officer to make an inquiry into this case. He established rapidly a common point in a series of failures of the Istanbul branch of OSS. And this common point was Dogwood. Consequently, he was put to a detailed interrogatory and the upshot was the dissolution of Cereus network and Dogwood's mysterious disappearance. Surprising for the investigators was the attitude of Dogwood who, defying the most elementary rules of this work, did not disclose the American officers the identity of the agents in the network he was controlling, but in the course of interrogatories only. Moreover, the protests, against this uncommon fact, of the officer responsible with the security of OSS "residence" in Istanbul were swiftly quelled.

The "productivity" of the Cereus organization — and within it, of Dogwood network was very high. Over June 1943 and February 1944 Cereus supplied for the American secret services some 730 intelligence reports coming from 53 agents. So, in December 1943, out of those 117 intelligence reports delivered by the entire OSS "residence" at Istanbul, Cereus was "claiming" for 51, out of which Dogwood a considerable number — 31. In the ensuing month, of 159 intelligence reports, Cereus was the first, with 83 reports, in the source top. This period reveals, in fact, that in the organization documentation Cereus was mingled with Dogwood and the "Rose" organization was recorded independently.

But, which were the failures recorded in the activity of the American intelligence service at Istanbul?

A first defeat that was to be cleared up by the people investigating Dogwood and his agents was the "Moltke case". Helmuth von Moltke was the third count of this name. The first had been Prussian Field Marshall from the war against France in 1870, the second, the chief of the German General Headquarters by early WW I. At the end of 1943 H. von Moltke arrived at Istanbul coming from Germany carrying with him a document entitled "Report on the existence of a strong German group ready to prepare and support the Allied military operations against Nazi Germany". In essence, Moltke's proposal that was to come *through Dogwood* to the Allied political and military responsible factors envisaged Germany's consent to her defeat and the western forces' occupation without the participation of the Soviet Union. After

considering the mission had been performed the envoy of the German anti-Hitler group came back to Germany. Yet, Moltke who was to come back to Istanbul in January 1944 for conducting further the talks, was arrested by Gestapo, charged with high treason and executed.

The second secret American action that the German secret service had been informed was the so-called "Morde case". Theodor Morde, correspondent of the American magazine "Reader's Digest" arrived in October 1943 at Istanbul where he got into direct touch with Coleman. He claimed to be with a special mission entrusted to him by the very President of USA and that he had to immediately contact Franz von Papen, the ambassador of Nazi Germany to Turkey. As he came to Istanbul under such uncommon conditions and with the direct support of OSS higher echelons, the American intelligence officers would grant him their assistance at once. The access of Th. Morde to von Papen was facilitated by the *Magnolia*, the code name of one of Dogwood's agents, identified with Alexander Rustow, professor of economic and political sciences at Istanbul University, who had left Germany due to his anti-Nazi beliefs.

The plan that Morde submitted to von Papen included the US acknowledgement of the German supremacy in Europe provided Hitler's removal from power. The whole plan was evidently anti-Soviet as it

visualized a division of the world spheres of influences among USA, Great Britain and Germany only, the latter having supremacy in continental Europe. Von Papen answered positively. He accepted the talks and even a secret cipher for telegraph communication was given to Morde (may some 2—3 cables sent by von Papen were intercepted by the OSS "station" in Cairo where they could not be decoded).

Even if argued doubts exist as for the involvement of the American President, it is true that a report drafted by Moltke about his meetings with von Papen was discovered in the presidential archives. And Morde was awarded a high decoration for the services he made during the war for the OSS. But it is very true too that the German agents at Istanbul commenced to spread over rumours about some talks between one representative of the American President and one representative of the Reich in Turkey with the purpose of concluding peace. But this German action evidently aimed at undermining the Teheran Conference between the chiefs of the USA, the Soviet Union and the Great Britain (December 1943) in revealing the American "duplicity". Equally obvious was that Abwehr had knowledge about the "Morde case". A connection was made between this intelligence leakage and Dogwood whose agent, *Magnolia*, had been present in the Morde-Papen talks.

MAXIMUS AND DICTUMS

He who wishes to master the art of warfare must incessantly learn. I am not of the opinion that it can ever be exhausted... The experience has taught me from battle to battle new lessons, but there are still a host of things on which I have never been able to gather any experience yet.

FREDERICK THE GREAT

Erroneous images on the enemy's force represent the strongest foe, the obstacle to all great actions.

JOHANN DAVID SCHARNHORST

The war is... an act of violence, to force the enemy to comply with our will. Violence arms itself with the inventions of arts and sciences to fight back violence.

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

MAXIMUS AND DICTUMS



"LET'S SAY A WORD OF HUMANITY"

Animated by the wish of liberty, the Romanians and the Hungarians were, at the onset of the 1848—1849 interval, on the same side of the barricade in their struggle against the common oppressor: the Habsburg empire. The Romanian revolutionaries did their utmost to gather into a single mainstream the revolutionary actions of the Romanians and of the Magyars and to direct them toward a unique aim likely to effect the liberation of the two peoples. Nonetheless, the Magyar revolutionaries, proclaiming Hungary's liberation, made the huge mistake not to recognize the liberty and right of the Romanian people and of the oppressed nationalities to choose by themselves their own destiny, deciding instead Transylvania's annexation to Hungary. A people well aware of its historical rights, proud and right, could not agree to change the Austrian yoke for the Hungarian one. Rejecting the forced annexation of Transylvania by Hungary as an arbitrary and counterrevolutionary act, the Romanians proclaimed themselves as a free and independent nation.

Hence the struggle broke out. A cruel, sometimes even desperate struggle which claimed from its combatants all their physical and intellectual resources. A dramatic struggle waged by the two sides with "own weapons."

Simion Bărnuțiu stated in his speech made on May 2/14 in the cathedral of Blaj: *"The Romanian nation enlightens the coinhabiting nations that, willing to form and organize itself on the national principle it does not foster enemy intentions against other nations and acknowledges the same right for all, and wishes to sincerely observe it, asking for the same observance in keeping with one's own justice; consequently, the Romanian*


*nation wishes neither to rule over, nor be ruled by other nations, but wishes an equal right for all."*¹

At the same time, Lajos Kossuth, the leader of the Magyar revolution, said: "Let's Hungarianize all the Romanians, otherwise, we will perish... Only those Romanians should be granted citizen rights that become Hungarian." And further on: "The country's leadership orders you, Romanians, that every one obeys. If not, terrible will be the punishment."²

The Romanians, convinced that he who sows wind will reap the whirlwind, gave a peaceful answer. The Peace-Making Committee addressed an appeal To the Hungarian and Szeckler Nation in Transylvania: *"As long as our senses are not intoxicated by the bloodshed of battles, as long as our judgement is not confused by the sweeping passions, let's say a word of humanity... If we are to fight one against the other, let's spare our feelings of humanity, let's spare our good reputation, let's open by our love of humanity the cogent path toward peace..."*

*In this spirit of humanity we do call our conationals and our coalied brethren Do the same: all the love of humanity, all the generosity you show will bear golden fruit."*³

The other side answered, once more, with threats. In an *Appeal to the Wallachian People*, Lajos Kossuth, after he promised the Romanians social rights provided they gave up their national claims, warned: "None of those who rebelled against the country (the Hungarian historical state with Transylvania arbitrarily annexed — editor's note) could expect mercy... Their land will be taken and will be divided among the country's faithful sons, and they will perish by the executioner's axe or by sword."⁴




Simion Bărnuțiu, leader of the 1848 revolution

Unlike the previous one, the appeal addressed to the Magyars in Aiud by Prefect Simion Prodan Probul read: "I am addressing to you now for the second time, as good neighbours whom from the bottom of my heart I wish to defend with all my might and possibilities, if not otherwise, friends, at least with a good advice. Therefore, I ask my fellow citizens first: Do you know what are you doing? Who do you fight against? Who do you want to battle with? I don't believe you do; but I further ask you, taking in consideration the good understanding between our nations: who and what are you fighting for? Do the citizens of our towns have real motives to be bloodthirsty? To direct their guns against their lives and beautiful homes, built by the sweat of their brows, like some children who goad on a waps' nest?"⁵

This appeal to humaneness was answered with a savage, ferocious hatred. For example, Magyar fighter Vasvári Pál addressed to the Romanians thus: "Let's shake a friendly hand with the lenient (those who accepted to be Magyarized — e.n.) but with the other hand let's brandish the merciless sword of revenge. Against those who do not convert, we pass the sentence: this people was exterminated!"⁶

The Chairman of the Great National Assembly held in Sibiu on December 16/28, 1848, stated that "the terrorism of the enemy we are fighting against has impaired the very measures as scarce as they were to wage this war in as humane as possible conditions," then urged the assembly "to find, by all means, peace-making measures and ways to prevent the crimes."⁷

Prefect Ioan Buteanu sacrificed his life for the cause of the Romanian nation






Prefect Ion Buteanu addressed Major Csutak Koloman the following words: "What a fine thing it would be if you contemplate, realize and endeavour to win the Romanians' heart because, upon my word, this is what you need and not to kill defenseless people, to shoot dead women and children, to set villages on fire, to impoverish the people and to turn the entire country into a cemetery. This runs counter to the rights of mankind, of nature and of peoples, and if you do not put an end to this tyranny, befitting only to barbarous and savage peoples, you will soon answer for it before the cultivated Europe, since only the savages' yoke yielded such a painful oppression.

Therefore, Magyar brethren neither God nor the people could endure it. We are ready either to live or to perish, but above all to maintain our humaneness and, if need be, to arm ourselves for our principle. The fate will decide.

Wake-up, there is still time and do not spoil your national character since you are haughty and often the stupid haughtiness is much detrimental to a nation, and a bad and foolish policy can carry a people to the ground."⁸

To the wave of plunders, violences and crimes, of injuries and threats — which even General Bem repudiated, telling the Magyars in Transylvania that they had behaved like tyrants and that he was sickened by their deeds — the Romanians always answered, even in the most painful moments, with decency, moderation and humaneness.

Avram Iancu, the hero of the Romanian revolution in Transylvania — tragically afflicted that even Lajos Kossuth, whom he admired and respected so much, did not find the fraternal warmth and understanding whom they badly needed in the struggle against tyranny — wrote, on June 15, 1849, to brigade commander Jozsef Simonffy: Believe me, brother, that it



Stephan Ludwig Roth. The language of this country "is not the German or the Magyar, but the Romanian language."

hurts me to tell you that we have rightly used so far our armies against our oppressors...

We want to awaken you and show you that the worm of destruction gnaws at your roots, and undermines the bright future you could have achieved for good.

In brief, we want to tell you further on and therefore we say: if you have a God in heaven and a country on earth, use either means to negotiate with us, be fully convinced that between ourselves and yourselves the weapons could never arbitrate, but don't be late!"⁹

All demarches, including those made by illustrious revolutionist Nicolae Bălcescu, were all in vain, and in spite of the attempts to reconcile the Romanian and Magyar revolutionary leaders, the fights broke out, as Avram Iancu had clearly foreshadowed and stated: "Not the philosophical and humanitarian arguments will

persuade these tyrants... but the spear, Horea's spear."¹⁰

In the struggle waged by the Romanians, pride of place was given to defense actions in reply to Magyars' provocations, actions which brought to the limelight the entire corollary of soldier-like and human virtues of the Romanian people. "The *Moșii* led by Iancu, by Axente Sever and by Popa Balint — stated Nerva Hodoș — are fearless if one hurts their feelings; they were not bad and neither did they make blunders."¹¹ "Nowhere have I found so much love for one's homeland and nation — emphasized Iosif Sterca-Șuluțiu — like with the Romanians in the Apuseni Mountains, an as brave in time of war as kind in time of peace people."¹²

Overlooking these Romanian virtues on behalf of which many reconciliatory appeals were addressed in the heat of the battles, those who could have been, to the benefit of their nations, on the same side of the barricade, triggered the destructive war of the Romanians in Transylvania, ignoring that it would backfire. The most drastic measures effected but the growing resistance put by the Romanians, the strengthening and spreading of the conviction that they were and are the real masters of these lands. In spite of all oppressions, the humaneness shown by our revolutionary fighters overcame the wave of vicissitudes and troubles, being a distinctive sign of their strength, an ineffaceable seal of a people who knew and knows that it is unbending and unconquerable provided it relies on what it owns from its forerunners who have never grounded their love for the ancient motherland on hatred and enmity. Even after many, painful and appalling injustices, the Romanian revolutionary fighters remained what they really were, as they asserted themselves on world arena, as they always were: dignified, heroic, kind. On August 3, 1849, when the Magyar revolution had to fight against the overwhelming troops of

imperial armies and when the Romanian revolutionists could have profited by joining the Habsburg forces, Avram Iancu wrote, from Cimpeni, to Kossuth: "...to prove our brotherly feelings we nourish for the Magyar nation, we have decided to be neutral to the Hungarian army throughout these battles, not attacking it and only defending us in case of an attack."¹³ A decision inspired by a spiritual nobleness and dignity, a decision with a profound revolutionary and humane character, which defines the very structure and essence of Romanian humanism: the consciousness of the fact that nobody, whatever the circumstances, can raise the sword for one's own liberty and justice, without doing wrong or oppressing the others. Even in the most difficult instances of our history — burdened, overwhelmed by injustices and enmities — we were, are and will be humane, humaneness being the main feature of the Romanian genius.

■ Major VIOREL DOMENICO

1 Simion Bărnuțiu, The Romanians and the Hungarians. A Speech at the Blaj Cathedral on May 2/14, 1848. With an Introduction and Commentary by C. Bogdan-Duică, Cluj, 1924, p. 9.

2 Cornelia Bodea, 1848 with the Romanians. A History in Data and Testimonies. The Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1982, Vol. I, p. 460, Vol. II, p. 921.

3 George Barițiu, Selected Parts of the History of Transylvania, Vol. II, pp. 767—768.

4 Kossuth Lajos, Complete Works, XIII (III), Budapest, 1952, pp. 153—154.

5 Cornelia Bodea, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 981.

6 Titus Popovici, Methods and Styles in the Service of the Deliberate Forgery of History, *România literară*, No. 13, 1987.

7 Ibidem.

8 Cornelia Bodea, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1031—1082.

9 Ibidem, p. 1091.

10 Iosif Sterca-Șuluțiu, The Biography of Avram Iancu, Sibiu, 1987, p. 96.

11 Nerva Hodoș, Simeon Balint, Avram Iancu's Life and Struggles in the Apuseni Mountains of Transylvania in 1848—1849, Bucharest, 1913, p. 18.

12 Iosif Sterca-Șuluțiu, op. cit., p. 1.

13 Cornelia Bodea, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1101—1102.



1877-1878

PAGES OF THE INDEPENDENCE EPOS

An analysis of the Romanian foreign policy in the eighth decade of the last century conduces to the conclusion that between 1871-1876 Romania was already acting as an independent state, free on its destiny. Thus there were concluded, with the neighbour countries, telegraphic, post or commercial conventions and diplomatic agencies were set up at Berlin, Rome and Petersburg. On June 16/28, 1876 the Romanian government sent a memorandum ("the seven revendications") to the Porte and guarantor powers that revendicated the acknowledgement of the "Romanian State's individuality and the name of Romania", what would have really lead to the recognition of Romania's independence under the big powers' guarantee. Istanbul answered that the Porte could not think of this memorandum but after the end of the war (in summer 1875 in Bosnia and Hertzegovina a strong anti-Ottoman uprising outburst followed in April 1876 by the Bulgarians' rise in rebellion; and on 18/30 June 1876 Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman empire). The big powers' diplomatic activity focused upon the Balkan hot developments was spiralling day by day as they could foresee a possible change in the continental balance of for-

ces. The Tsarist empire's negotiations with Austro-Hungary on the redivision of the zones of domination in south-east Europe — a zone subject to the jurisdiction of the Ottoman empire, called in diplomacy as the "ill man" — were successful for the two sides. First, there took place the meeting at Reichstadt (Zakupy) on July 8, 1876 between Alexander II, Russia's emperor and Francisc Joseph, the emperor of Austro-Hungary accompanied by their foreign ministers, Gorceakov and Andrassy. A provisional settlement of contradictions between the two empires in the Balkan quarter was reached. A verbal accord that was to change the political configuration of southeastern Europe stipulated that in case of the Porte's defeat Russia would get the three counties in south Bessarabia retroceded to Moldavia through the Paris Treaty (1856) — and Batumi; in return for her promised neutrality Austro-Hungary was to receive a part of Bosnia and Hertzegovina¹.

Although the Reichstadt understanding was secret, the Romanian politicians grasped the intentions of the neighbour empires. Trying to shun an unilateral decision by

Russia and Austro-Hungary, Mihail Kogălniceanu, Romania's ministry for foreign affairs sent, on 20 July/1 August, a new note to the Romanian diplomats to the guarantor powers wherein he showed that the Romanian army "is eager for taking part in the struggle"² for winning the motherland's independence. Prime-Minister I. C. Brătianu conducted diplomatic talks with Francisc Joseph at Sibiu (August 1876), then one month later at Livadia (Crimea) with Alexander II and chancellor Gorceakov with a view of preparing external conditions for proclaiming the independence. He asked the Russian responsible factors that in case of a war against the Porte the Tsarist troops could pass through Romania's territory on the basis of a convention to secure Romania's territorial integrity. The Romanian government adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality towards Serbia by consenting to the passage of volunteers, armament, ammunition, equipment and food, sent by the pan-Slav committee from Russia to the Serbian army across Romania's territory — and backed up the Bulgarian fighters acting for their country's independence.

On 16/28 November 1876 Count Nelidov and Russian colonel M. Cantacuzin, envoys of Rus-

sia's ambassador at Istanbul, Ignatiev, a firm advocate of panslavist ideas, arrived at Bucharest. A week later an agreement was reached with the Romanian side on the principles that should underlie the convention on the Russian troops' crossing Romania. In order to reassure the Romanians about Bessarabia's southern question, Nelidov declared that a formula was found: "Russia was to guarantee the Romanian state's security and indivisibility within its present borders (as it is now) in case they would be menaced following the Russian troops' passage" — hence versus the Ottomans only. Romania was further considered a vassal to the Porte.

On 11/23 December 1876 at Istanbul the conference of the European powers' representatives started its works destined to restore peace in the Balkans. In the same day, the Porte, considering that might deprive the big powers of any pretext for interventions in Rumelia, promulgated a constitution, liberal on the surface, whereby, among other things, it arrogated to itself the right to appoint the "chiefs of the privileged provinces" (Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Egypt). The Romanian government sent the Porte and the guarantor powers a note of energetic protest whereby it considered null and void the stipulations of the Ottoman Constitution referring to Romania. Expressing the state of spirit of the entire country Ion C. Brătianu, the chief of the Romanian government, declared: "Roma-

nia is faced with an encroachment upon her rights for which, along centuries, the Romanians shed their blood. Neither the long sword of Bajazid and Mohamed could break through Romania's mountains where today Midhat Pasha dares to enter with his Constitution"⁴. On the Romanian government's request for the Porte to solemnly state that Romania was not considered an Ottoman province, the ministry for foreign affairs Savfet Pasha refused to make the explanations required and declared that Romania is an "Ottoman territory"⁵.

The Porte's Divan turned down the proposals forwarded by the guarantor powers and thus the conference ended without any clearings up as for the Oriental Question. In fact, Russia had won a great diplomatic victory through the Porte's politico-diplomatic isolation and in Romania, whose claim for vouching for her neutrality had been turned down by the big powers, the trend in favour of a war for winning the independence was spiralling up.

On 3/15 January 1877, at Budapest, a secret treaty (initialed on 6/18 March) between Russia and Austro-Hungary regarding an eventual Russo-Ottoman military conflict in the Balkans. Austro-Hungary engaged herself to stay neutral in return for annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina⁶. Bessarabia's south and some Ottoman possessions in Asia⁷ were to be incorporated into the Tsarist empire. This secret treaty had a double significance:

Russia wanted to remove any risk for the event of 1854 would not repeat when she had to retreat the troops from the Romanian Principalities due to the threats of the Habsburg army; Francis Joseph and Alexander II considered that it "was their duty to wash away the blemish" of having ceded some territories over which they had not had but the right of force. So, the loss of Venice and Lombardia was to be compensated by Austro-Hungary with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the south of Bessarabia, reunited with Moldavia by dint of the Paris Peace Conference (1856) was to be reoccupied by Tsarist Russia.

Otto von Bismarck, chancellor of the German empire, who for a period of time was the "arbiter" of Europe, was for a Tsarist action in the Balkans and for the incorporation of Bessarabia's south into Russia. On the one hand, it would have led to the sharpening in the Russo-British contradictions (London was the supporter of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman empire). At the same time a decisive blow would have been dealt at the stipulations of the Paris Peace Congress, considered actually a great victory of France. In fact, Bismarck had declared, in December 1875, to the Russian ambassador to Berlin, Ubril, that Austro-Hungary could occupy Bosnia "if would be content of she

return for some advantages to Russia as for Bessarabia (...). As for us there will be no difficulty in subscribing to such an understanding⁸. In December 1876 Germany's chancellor had indirectly offered Egypt to Robert Cecil Salisbury — the minister for India's affairs who was occupying himself with the problems of Orient —, Russia following to receive the mouths of the Danube⁹. The same stand was taken by the too little "fair profiteer" of the European affairs (as Bismarck called himself) after the failure of the Istanbul conference, too, when he urged the Tsarist Russia that, in starting the war against the Porte "not to make too many scruples towards Romania"¹⁰.

At London, on 19/31 March 1877 the guarantor powers signed the protocol whereby they recommended the Porte the army's demobilization and the application of reforms, regarding Christian populations. The Ottoman government rejected the protocol; the reason was that "it injures the Ottoman empire's sovereignty, established through the Paris Treaty"¹¹, thus opening the road to war. Tsarist Russia, posing as a proxy of the guarantor powers, could hence unimpededly resort to the power of weapons, with a view of solving the "Oriental Crisis"¹² according to interests of her own. The intentions of the two big northern powers — Russia and Germany — roused reverberations in the European press. The "Ro-

mânul" newspaper of January 10, 1876, quoting "Le Monde" pointed to: rumour was spread in the diplomatic circles that Romania would have reached with the Porte an agreement concerning the redemption of independence with a sum of money. *Russia's consent could be got by ceding her Bessarabia's south and Germany's one by concessions "concerning railways"*.¹³ Romania was to receive on this occasion the Dobrudja, an ancient Romanian land.

By early 1876, on January 27, Bucharest had heard that Tsarist Russia was amassing troops on the Pruth and that General Ignatiev, Russia's ambassador to Istanbul, had threatened the Porte, while Ion Ghica was present, that "his government will take the Danubian provinces (our underlining) as a pawn as soon as the Ottomans occupy Serbia and Montenegro!"¹⁴. Prince Carol, voicing the will of liberty of the Romanian people declared: "We are determined to beat off any occupation, whatever part would it come from. Of course, we shall not be able to oppose, for a long time, to a big power, but we shall know to maintain our viewpoint in front of it"¹⁵. The stand of the Second Reich concerning the Russo—Romanian relationship was clearly stated by Bismarck, through the German general consul in Romania, von Alvensleben (17 December 1876) who declared that "it is better for Romania to let the Russian troops pass (across her ter-

ritory — o.n.) by dint of a treaty than give herself to Russia"¹⁶.

■ MIRCEA SOREANU

1 *Istoria diplomației*, ed. V. P. Potemkin, vol. III, Bucharest, 1948, p. 40; H. Hauser, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe (1871—1914)*, vol. I, Paris, 1929, p. 135; *Istoria României*, vol. IV, Bucharest, 1964, p. 592.

2 Documente privind istoria României. Războiul pentru independență (further quoted D.I.R. Războiul pentru independență), I, 2, Bucharest, 1952, p. 294.

3 N. Iorga, *Locul românilor în istoria universală*, ed. Radu Constantinescu, Bucharest, 1985, p. 419. For Russia's official stand see M. M. Zalișkin, *Vnesnjaja politika Rumynii i rumynsko-russkie otnosenija 1875—1878*, Moskva, 1974.

4 N. Iorga, *Istoria românilor*, vol. X, Bucharest, 1939, p. 172.

5 D.I.R. Războiul pentru independență, vol. II, p. 29.

6 E. Diaconescu, *Acordul de la Reichstadt (1876) and Tratatul de la Budapesta (1877)*, "A.A.R.M.S.I.", series III, t. XXV, Mem. 27, Bucharest, 1943, p. 70; *Istoria diplomației*, III, p. 49.

7 H. Hauser, op. cit., I, pp. 140—141; Serge Gorianow, *Le Bosphore et les Dardaneles*, Paris, 1910, p. 333.

8 S. Gorianow, op. cit., p. 314.

9 Cf. E. Bourgeois, *G. Panges, Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la grande Guerre*, Paris, 1922, p. 191; E. Diaconescu, op. cit., p. 11.

10 *Istoria diplomației*, III, p. 49.

11 Mustafa Ali Mehmed, *Istoria turcilor*, Bucharest, 1976, p. 347.

12 C. Căzănișteanu, M. E. Ionescu, *Războiul neafrînării României, 1877—1878*, Bucharest, 1987, p. 185.

13 C. Bacalbașa, *București de altă dată*, vol. I, ed. A. and T. Avramescu Bucharest, 1987, p. 185.

14 *Memoriile regelui Carol I al României* (by an eye-witness), vol. VIII, Bucharest, w.a., p. 35.

15 *Ibidem*, p. 36.

16 *Ibidem*, vol. IX, p. 16

NICOLAE BĂLCESCU

A BRILLIANT MILITARY HISTORIAN

Looking back in time, over a century separating us from the existence and struggle of the 1848 revolutionist Nicolae Bălcescu (1819—1852), he remains more as a military historian of the Middle Ages. His main work written during the very short interval he had been given for creation (of only eight years) deal mostly with the 14th—17th centuries: *Armed Forces and Military Art since the Creation of the Wallachian Principality to the Present Times* (1844), *Armed Forces and Military Art with the Moldavians during their Glorious Times* (1846) the posthumous work *The Romanians under Prince Michael the Brave*.

Bălcescu did not study the military past of his nation without a clear motivation for the future "I preferred to deal with the military institutions first, as they were our forefathers' greatest assets, bringing about our country's greatness and power for over four centuries, and I am convinced that if the Romanians' country ever takes its deserved place among the European peoples, it would happen greatly because of the regeneration of its old military institutions."¹

Things become clearer if placed against the general backdrop of the Europe of 1830ies and of the big debates for the reform of the military systems that took place in Prussia and France.

The Romanian echoes of the Landwehr debates met the interests of both the political decision-making factors and of the "national party" in the evolution of the army of the Romanian principalities,² equally restricted by regulations and by major hardships of finances, armament and equipment supplies.

Nicolae Bălcescu and his older friend Ion Ghica were in favour of arming the people — an outlook stemming both from the national historic tradition and from the prospect of an unequal conflict with some more numerous forces. In his letter to Alexandru G. Golesecu (Arăpila), dated Focșani, June 25 1848, Bălcescu devised energetic steps to be taken for enlisting in *mobile guard* and creating *pandour* troupes, getting arms from Breslau, Prussia. Like Ion Ghica, he was thinking of placing the resistance movement in the mountains and waging the partisan war from there in case of a foreign invasion.³

When in Constantinople, where he took part in negotiations with the Ottoman Porte, Bălcescu was writing to Christian Tell, in late August, 1848, to prepare military demonstrations both on the road to Buzău and to Călugăreni, giving Gheorghe Magheru full powers to consolidate the supreme future military resistance in Oltenia.⁴ It was going to be implemented as well

through the cooperation with the Romanian armed forces of Transylvania and Banat.

Though rather short, the historian's political experience in the government of Walachia combines the historic conception of organizing the whole people's defence struggle with the real situation and with the necessities of the time.

During the next stage, when Nicolae Bălcescu continued his struggle in exile, trying to mobilize the west European public opinion and diplomacy in favour of the Romanian national cause, he gathered his last forces to write his major historic work, *The Romanians under Prince Michael the Brave*. The prospective value of his research work are obvious in this case as well, Bălcescu's endeavour is permanently connected to the need of explaining historic processes, of ascertaining values, and establishing the place of the factors of national unity.

A smaller importance has been given to Nicolae Bălcescu's notes on the research on military history, as they were introduced only after book II in Alexandru Odobescu's edition. Living in exile, Bălcescu asked a friend in the country to help him get several maps of Walachia and Transylvania, which if compared, could help him reconstruct Michael the Brave's campaigns. His trips to the former

Vlașca County were to identify the sites of camps in the winter campaign of 1594/1595 and of the Stănești, Putineiu and Serpătești battles. Research on location had to collect any piece of information from the local inhabitants, any stories, legends and folk songs about these events happened in the past; Bălcescu made it clear that "we have to write them exactly as the peasants retell them."

As to the battles on the Danube in the summer and autumn of 1595, the great historian required the exact width of the river between Rusciuk and Giurgiu, the names of the old sites that allowed for the construction of the bridge, one of which being the site of the old Singiorgiu citadel "which is ruined now."⁵ To stage back the battle of Călugăreni, Nicolae Bălcescu considered that some more time should be given to "make a plan of that narrow passage and make a thorough description, containing the length and width of the passage, of the road and bridge existing in it, of the waters flowing there and of the names of the hills surrounding it. His land research contained also the exact placement of the enemy's camps situated on two heights separated by a forested valley that did not prevent their permanent and mutual watch."

He was equally interested in matters of urban topography. As to the Tîrgoviște battles, his correspondent had to find out the site of churches and monasteries, of the ruins of the princely court, related to them, checking some distances recorded in ancient sources in arrow lengths. The drawings of the various limits of the towns and the length of the river network were

corroborated with the belligerents' placement, noting at the same time local remembrances of these events.

In connection with the withdrawal to the mountains of Michael the Brave's army, Bălcescu did not neglect another historic event that had taken place in this place, i.e. the victory against the Hungarians won by the army corps of Dragomir, Prince Vladislav's chief magistrate (about 1364—1374) which "involved a thorough description of the place called Cetatea lui Negru Vodă (the citadel of the Negru Voivode), of the ruins to be found and of all traditions and legends on Negru Voivode and of the natives' memories, if any, of the above-mentioned battle that brought the fame of that place."

The historian imagined possible passages through those narrow passes, asking for a comparison between possibilities of crossing the mountains in the 16th century (as proved by documents) dan in his time.

Subsequent campaigns required similar documentations, but he was forced to stop there...⁶

With his remarkable intuition of the times and people, Bălcescu had imagined the real working method of military history, a two-sided discipline, requiring a permanent reference of the sources to the realities of the ground. The following editions of his masterpiece *The Romanians under Prince Michael the Brave* did not meet Nicolae Bălcescu's aims; it was only Alexandru Odobescu who piously restored the glory of the journey from Giurgiu to Neajlov and the importance of the memorable battle of Călugăreni.⁷

Besides the study of the military past, Băl-

cescu had a permanent interest in the military art, making a profitable use of the *Cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaire*, by Rocquancourt (4 vol., Paris, 1838), the corresponding volume of *Encyclopédie méthodique. Tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la guerre et leur rapports avec la politique des Etats*, by baron Henri de Jomini (Saint Petersburg, 1830), *Stratagèmes et ruses de guerre* (2 vol., Paris, 1826), which acquainted him to Napoleon's wars.

In a letter addressed to Alexandru Zane, from Paris, June 16, 1850 Bălcescu confessed: "I am preparing myself, resuming some studies of military art which I began some ten years ago, as theory must precede practice."⁸

Nicolae Bălcescu proved to be our contemporary through his exemplary study of military history, through his great awareness in the struggle for defending the past and historic truth.

■ SERGIU IOSIPESCU

1 N. Bălcescu, Works I. Historical, Political and Economic Writings, 1844—1847, edited by G. Zane and Elena G. Zane, Bucharest, 1974, p. 46.

2 Ibidem, Works IV, Correspondence, edited by G. Zane, Bucharest, 1962, p. 37, (a letter to Ion Ghica, dated October 23, 1843).

3 Ibidem, pp. 92—93.

4 Ibidem, p. 106.

5 Archeological research made after 1976 by the Centre for Studies and Researches on Military History and Theory within the Central Military Museum, made precious contribution to the knowledge of stages and characteristics of this fortification.

6 Nicolae Bălcescu, The History of the Romanians under Prince Michael the Brave, edited by Alexandru Odobescu, Bucharest, pp. 149—152.

7 Ibidem, p. 154.

8 Ibidem, Works IV, Correspondence, p. 307.

CHRONOLOGICAL LANDMARKS

(continued from 36 page)

Moldavian revolutionary committee strongly influenced by the programmes of Braşov, Islaz and Blaj. Having an unofficial character this programme could include the major revendication of the union of the two extra-Carpathian Romanian provinces, a political act appreciated as the "keystone without which the entire national edifice would fall down".

● **2/14 — 16/28 September.** The third National Assembly at Blaj attended by about 60 000 people. The resolution adopted on this occasion again remonstrated against Transylvania's union with Hungary, an act accomplished against the Romanian people's will. There was revindicated a Diet made up of Romanian, German and Magyar deputies, elected proportionally with the number of inhabitants represented, a provisional government, the setting up of the Romanian national guards, the cessation of the terrorist regime instaled by the Hungarian revolutionary government.

● **13/25 September.** The Ottoman troops entered Bucharest; the armed fight in Dealul Spirii (Spirii Hill) during which the military of Bucharest garrison offered an unexpected and well-deserved retort to the invading army; the old regime was reinstaled.

● **15/27 September.** The Tsarist troops under command of General A. N. Lüders entered Muntenia in support of the Sultan's army; the revolution participants were arrested and maltreated.

● **28 September/10 October.** The military camp at Riureni (Trojan's field) was dissolved in the wake of the overwhelming Ottoman-Tsarist invasion.

● **September-October.** The Romanian National Committee in Sibiu organized Transylvania into 15 prefectures, each of them having a legion commanded by one prefect and one sub-prefect. There was thus installed a Romanian administration and management. In Banat too, in the wake of some peasant revolts the local Magyar authorities were removed and a Romanian administration was installed in conformity with the principles written in the revolutionary programme.

● **13/25 December.** The army of the Hungarian government led by general Iosif Bem defeated the Austrian army and seized Cluj; until March 1849 it

managed to occupy the greatest part of Transylvania, excepting the town of Alba Iulia and the area of the Apuseni Mountains that remained under the Romanians' rule and were heroically defended until July 1849 by the popular army led by Avram Iancu.

● **27 February/11 March 1849.** The revolutionary Magyar army occupied Sibiu; the Romanian National Committee and a great number of Romanian intellectuals took refuge in Muntenia.

● **10/22 — 11/23 April.** Negotiations between the leaders of the Romanian popular army ahead with Avram Iancu and deputy Ioan Dragoş, the representative of the Hungarian government at Pesta led by Kossuth Lajos concerning the conciliation of the Romanian-Magyar revolutionary forces.

● **24 April/6 May.** The breaking off of the Romanian-Hungarian negotiations due to the attack launched by the Hungarian army commanded by Major Hatvani Emeric on the town of Abrud.

● **26/28 April — 8/10 May.** The Romanian revolutionary forces led by Avram Iancu defeated the army commanded by Hatvani and freed the town of Abrud.

● **29 May/10 June — 4/16 June.** The resistance of the Romanian popular army in front of the troops led by Colonel Kemény Farkas trying to breaking through the Romanian defense in the valley of Crişu Alb river towards Abrud.

● **20 June/2 July — 24 June/6 July.** The last attempt of the Hungarian army under command of Vasvári Pál to get into the Apuseni Mountains, on the Someş valley, ended again with a Romanian victory.

● **2/14 July.** Under the pressure of the counteroffensive launched by the Austrian army and the entrance of the Tsarist troops the government in Pesta accepted to sign the *Project for Pacification* and the treaty for making up a Romanian legion.

● **1/13 August.** The Hungarian revolutionary army commanded by general Görgey Arthur capitulated at Şiria, near Arad in front of the Tsarist army commanded by General I. F. Paskevici; the Romanians, on their turn, were compelled by the commander of the Austrian army to lay down their weapons.

● **August 1849.** The defeat of the revolution in the principality of Transylvania and Banat joined by the reinstalment of the absolutist regime of the Vienna Court.

(continued from page 19)

according to which the cultivation of the national tongue is the foundation of the Romanian nationality.

Starting to build a society of justice, equality and fraternity, a society which theoretically offered equal opportunities to all citizens, the bourgeois-democratic constitution of June 9/21, 1848, mirrors the assertion of a national option for progress and independence, for achieving a unitary, modern state.

1 Nicolae Ceaușescu, Romania on the Road of Building Up the Multilaterally Developed Socialist Society, Vol. 8, the Publishing House for Political Literature, Bucharest, 1973, p. 591.

2 Nicolae Bălcescu, Works, Vol. IV (the correspondence), critical edition by Gheorghe Zane, Bucharest, 1964, p. 88.

3 Felix Pontell, op. cit., p. 81, 82.

4 For the unitary approach to the 1848 Romanian revolution, see Dan Berindei, 1848 in the Romanian Lands, Bucharest, 1984, Gheorghe Piaton, The Modern History of Romania, Bucharest, 1985, pp. 114—142.

5 Valeriu Sotropa, The Draft Constitutions, the Programmes of Reforms and the Petitions of Rights in the Romanian Countries in the 18th century and early 19th century, Bucharest, 1978, p. 138.

6 Mircea Angheliescu, Ion Heliade Rădulescu, the Cultural Guide and the Writer, Bucharest, 1986, pp. 208—209.

9 Grigore Tugui, Ion Heliade Rădulescu, the Cultural Guide and the Writer, Bucharest, 1984, p. 42.

10 Ion Vintu, in The History of Romanian Law, Bucharest, 1984, Vol. II, part. I, pp. 136—138. On its juridical character as a constitutional act, declaration of rights and naturally constitution. Well versed with this document, Valeriu Sotropa considers it as a complex act which reunites three dimensions: a political programme, a declaration of rights and a draft constitution (Valeriu Sotropa, op. cit., p. 138).

11 Basic views to understand Heliade's complex personality in Gh. Zane, Bălcescu, The Work. The Man. The Epoch., Bucharest, 1975, p. 316—321.

12 Pop Teodor Leon, Romania's Constitutions, Bucharest, 1984, p. 17.

13 Anastasie Iordache, Apostol Stan, The Defense of Romanian Principalities' Autonomy, 1821—1859, Bucharest, 1987, pp. 113—114.

14 The Year 1848 in the Romanian Principalities, Bucharest, 1902, tome I, p. 491.

15 Ibidem, p. 495.

16 Mircea Păcurariu, The History of Romanian Orthodox Church, Bucharest, 1981, Vol. 3, pp. 116—117.

17 The Year 1848 in the Romanian Principalities, p. 500.

18 Ibidem.

19 Ibidem, p. 493.

20 On Heliade's views on this matter see Vasile Maciu, Ion Heliade Rădulescu in the 1843 Romanian revolution in Studii și articole de istorie XXXVII—XXXVIII(1978), pp. 45—67, Mircea Angheliescu, op. cit. In exile, C. A. Rosetti opined on the abolition of land ownership, a stand criticized by N. Bălcescu who had the most just view on the agrarian problem.

21 The Year 1848 in the Romanian Principalities, p. 493.

22 Ibidem.

23 Ibidem, p. 499.

24 Ibidem, p. 495.

25 Ibidem, p. 491.

26 This desideratum was fulfilled on February 8/20, 1856, when Barbu Știrbei promulgated the abolition of gypsy slaves, through the compensation of owners with ten gold coins for every gypsy liberated (Cornel I. Scafes, Vladimir Zodian, Barbu Știrbei, Bucharest, 1981, p. 94).

27 The Year 1848 in the Romanian Principalities, p. 491.

28 Ibidem, p. 494.

MAXIMUS AND DICTUMS

If there are other peoples and they have many and strong men, you should show courtesy and good will to them. And if you could have thus remained on peaceful terms with them then this is now quite well.

NEAGOE BASARAB

If they came to conquer you... be frightened neither by them nor by their numerous army... a valiant and courageous man is never scared by many.

NEAGOE BASARAB

Mankind's sacred rights have always been defended in this country, our parents knew them, valued them, laid down their lives for them and if they did not bequeath them in all their wholeness this is not their fault blameworthy are the difficult conditions in which they lived.

NICOLAE BĂLCESCU

We have several instances that the Romanian soldiers if they are well commanded by their leaders are the best soldiers.

General GEORGE ARION

GREAT COMMANDERS

AVRAM IANCU (b. 1824, Vidra de Sus — d. September 10, 1872, Baia de Criş). Remarkable political leader and revolutionist, during the Romanian revolution, 1848—1849. Graduated from the Zlatna Secondary School and Cluj Academic High School (begun in 1841), he attended the training courses of Transylvania's Court of Appeal (1847). Together with priest Balint of Roşia and lawyer Ion Buteanu of Abrud, he had an intense activity of preparing the revolution in the Apuseni Mountains (March—April 1848), the first meeting of the Romanians in Blaj, April 18/30, 1848 and of the Great Blaj Assembly of May 3/15—5/17, 1848, when he was elected as a member of the National Council, a body that had to implement the programme for "the Romanians' equal rights." After the Magyar Diet of Cluj proclaimed Transylvania's "union" to Hungary (May 29, 1848) and especially after the bloody repressals protracted by the reactionary forces in Aiud, he asked the National Council to let the Romanians fight with "Horea's spade" against the Hungarian counts' attempts at preserving the old order in the principality. Calling the crowds to fight, he showed that the whole of Europe "is getting armed to defend its freedom. The Romanians should be ready as well, as it is high time



Avram Iancu

to be granted their freedom." As early as June 17, groups of *moţi* (Romanian peasants of the Apuseni Mountains) armed with guns, spades and scythes, gathered in Cîmpeni, and Iancu decreed that all landed property would go into the former serfs' possession (June 17—18, 1848). Several thousands of peasants gathered in a camp at Gura Rîului (June 20, 1848), organized in groups headed by captains, just like during the 1784 great Romanian uprisings. Taking part in the third mass rally in Blaj (September 14/26—16/28, 1848) with 6,000 armed *moţi*, he made his contribution to the adoption of a programme of vital reforms for the Romanian nation, firmly rejecting the forced "union" of this principality with Hungary. The National Council created 15 legions throughout the whole of

Transylvania, made up of tribunates, and centuries, commanded by tribunes and centurions. Iancu was appointed Prefect of the Auraria Gemina Legion (from Cîmpeni, Bistriţa and Bucium) and defeated the counterrevolution plots in the Apuseni Mountains, facing the attacks of the nobles' armies and of the regiments fighting for the Pesta Government, along the Mureş line (October 1848), to Aiud Turda, Cluj (November 1848).

The arrival in Transylvania of a Hungarian army (headed by the Polish General Bem) with big effectives, in December 1848 — January 1849, brought about a change of the situation, in favour of the enemy. The *moţi* of the Apuseni Mountains, led by local prefects and headed by Iancu, proved capable of waging a "genuine national war", as Karl Marx said.

Avram Iancu divided the whole region of the Apuseni into four military sectors, supervised by a legion. Each big unit was made up of distinct subunits of lanciers and gunmen, footmen and horsemen; there was also a group of artillery, equipped with improvised or captured guns. Each legion was commanded by a prefect and some vice-prefects. He also demanded a rigorous discipline and wanted to strengthen their fighting capacity, equipping them as far as possible with guns (the beginning of

the revolution, the groups had about 16 gunmen). Iancu's army had to fight in very hard and complex circumstances, when they were surrounded, with fewer effectiveness and poorly armed. To overcome this shortcoming, "The Prince of the Mountains" adopted defensive as his major tactics, organizing it in a circular disposition, backed by strong natural forms of relief, blocking the main access roads to the mountains. He had always tried to have the initiative and make surprise attacks, through an active defensive, through attacks and counter attacks, skirmishes and ambushes.

The invading troops were defeated, though they were waging a genuine "extermination" war against the Romanians; thus major Emeric Hatvany was defeated in the pass between Abrud and Cimpeni (May 6/18 — 8/20, 1849; lieutenant-colonel Farkas Kemény was held back on the Brad—Abrud—Cimpeni access line (June 3/15, 1849); other enemy commanders were defeated in the same way in June—July, 1849. They admitted their serious failure of their plans of defeating the Romanian revolutionary forces. Thus, Farkas Kemény wrote "that the peasants can fight better than Puchner's soldiers (e.n. the Austrian soldiers). If we chased them from a hill, they were running to another one in turns. (...) It was impossible to defeat them in this way."


The fighting ceased in the summer of 1849, as a consequence of the truce signed by General Bem, after Kossuth had signed a pacification project (July 2/14 1949) which admitted rather late some reforms for the Romanians. Though Iancu was quite benevolent towards General Bem, his army could not face the offensive launched by Czarist and Hapsburg troops, his last resistance fights ending in July—September 1849. The imperial authorities ordered the dissolution of Romanian national guards and their disarmament in 1851—1852, dissolving the frontier guards too, being afraid that they might turn into centres of a Romanian armed movement for the liberation of Transylvania. Iancu continued to militate for "the Romanians' equal rights" sending petitions to Vienna and refusing as a protest to receive high Hapsburg distinctions.

Disappointed by the imperial commanders' disloyalty, Avram Iancu spent the last years of his life away from public life, passing away in Baia de Criș. He was buried in Țebea, under Horea's oaktree.

GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI (b. July 4, 1807, Nice, d. June 2, 1882, Caprera). General, fighter for the unity and independence of Italy. When 25, he enlisted in the navy of the Kingdom of Sardinia, joined the secret revolutionary society "Young Italy," organized by Giuseppe

Mazzini, militating for the country's unity and freedom. He took part in an unsuccessful attempt at insurrection in Genoa and had to take refuge in France (1834) and then to Latin America. There he fought in the armed forces of the Republic of Rio Grande do Sul against the Brazilian empire (1836—1841). He then sided with the Uruguayans in their conflict with dictator Juan Rosas of the Argentine (1841—1848), defending Montevideo (1843, 1847) and making an offensive action in northern Argentine (1846). During the Italian revolution (1848—1849) he led the volunteers of the provisional Committee in Milan in its struggle against the Austrian occupation troops (1848) and defended Rome (1849) against the French troops commanded by General V. Oudinot, that had come to support Pope Pius IX (1846—1878) to get back the Holy See. Exiled to the United States and Peru (1849—1856), he got involved also in the political unrest in the peninsula before the French—Austro—Sardinian war (1859) where he commanded a corps of 5,000 volunteers. He came out victorious at Varese (May 26) and San Fermo (May 27), which allowed him to free Brescia (June 13). Taking advantage of the discontents in Sicily and enjoying the unofficial support of Camillo Cavour — the Prime Minister of Piemonte — Garibaldi land-

ed unexpectedly on the island, starting his campaigns for the unification of the "Two Sicilies" with Piemonte. Heading 1,000 volunteers ("the red shirts") he won successively the battles with the Napoli troops at Calatafimi (May 15, 1860), Palermo (June 7, 1860), Milazzo (July 20—25, 1860), he crossed the Messina Strait (August 20, 1860) and entered Salerno (September 6, 1860); through his victory of Volturno (October 1—2, 1860) he completed the liberation of the south of the peninsula. He tried to enter the Papal State too, but he was wounded at Aspromonte (August 29, 1862) and taken prisoner by the Pope's troops. He commanded again a volunteers corps during the Italo-Austro-Prussian war (1866), advancing towards Trentino to



Giuseppe Garibaldi

Caffaro, Monte Squello, Bezzecca, etc. After a new attempt at liberating Rome, he was defeated at Mentana (November 3, 1867) and retired as a private citizen to Caprera. He offered his services to the Versailles Government upon the outbreak of the Franco—Prussian war (1870—1871) com-

manding the volunteers from the Vosges; he bravely defended Dijon (January 21—23, 1871). After the war, he dedicated himself to political life.

A front-ranking representative of the mid-19th-century European democratic revolutionary generation, a legendary hero of the epos of Italy's unification, Garibaldi was also a skilled military organizer and commander, animated by the supreme ideal of the struggle for liberation. An experienced fighter in avant-garde actions, in surprise attacks, in forced marches, he trained and commanded a good revolutionary army, whose poor equipment and training were superseded by his enthusiasm and flexible tactical thinking.

■ Captain VLADIMIR ZODIAN

GREAT BATTLES

THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION CARRIED OUT BY THE 4TH ROMANIAN ARMY IN THE SMALL FATRA MOUNTAINS

Colonel NICOLAE CIOBANU, DHist.

The Offense Operation performed by the 4th Romanian Army in the Small Fatra Mountains rank upmost among the large-scale actions carried out by the Romanian forces on the anti-Hitler front.

The onset of the operation found the main forces

of the Romanian Army, commanded by Army Corps General Nicolae Dăscălescu, engaged on the southeastern slopes of the Small Fatra Mountains, contiguous, on the right, with the forces of the Czechoslovakian Corps, and on the left, with the 40th Soviet Army, to-

gether with was made up of the 2nd Army Corps (led by General of Division Costin Ionașcu), with the 6th, 21st infantry divisions and 1st cavalry division whose great units were engaged west of Váh, on the eastern slopes of the White Carpathians, and the 6th Army Corps (commander, General of Division Gheorghe Stavrescu) with the 3rd, 11th and 18th infantry divisions, the Soviet 54th Fortification Sector and two flame-thrower battalions in action on the eastern slopes of the Small Fatra Mountains. Hence, in the Operation carried out in the Small Fatra Mountains, the 4th Army acted with six divisions (of which four of infantry and one of cavalry) and a Soviet sector of fortifications which had the combative worth of an in-

Facing the 4th Romanian Army were German and Hungarian troops from the 320th Volksgrenadiere Division and the 76th and 15th infantry divisions, of which we mention two infantry battalions, one of pioneers and the other of drilling respectively — all German, and also several Hungarian subunits, such as, for example, the 43rd Mountain Corps Battalion. The enemy, using the terrain advantages made great efforts to maintain as long as possible the bridgehead east of the Váh river.

The 4th Army's commander decided to take the offensive with the 2nd Army Corps on an about 12-km-long front strip, west of the Vah river, while the 6th Army Corps had to act on the remaining front.

[illegible]

about 100 km and followed the alignment: the height 1018, the heights east of Factory and Čičmany towns, Opatova, 10 km south of Trenčín.

conditions to develop the offensive deep in the enemy's disposition.

79.

April 27, the units of this division reached close to the east of Uhersky Brod, thus contributing to liberate that locality and to repel a strong German counterattack, an action in which the 4th Mounted Soldiers Regiment was conspicuous. Concomitantly, the 9th Infantry Division performed a forced 125-km-

Corps in the second stage contributed to intercept the communications in the Váh valley, in the district of Trenčín town, an instance which checked the retreat of Hitler groups east of the river. In spite of extremely difficult conditions, due to both the sometimes fanatical resistance put by the enemy but also the moun-

arms. Among those fallen in action stood out by his courage, tenacity and spirit of sacrifice captain Gheorghe Decuseară (battery commander in the 30th Artillery Regiment from the 21st Infantry Division) who laid down his life in order to check, together with the battery soldiers, a powerful enemy counterattack.

At the outset of the offensive operation, the 4th Romanian Army successfully fulfilled its mission, crossing together with the 6th Army Corps (the 18th Infantry Division, the 54th Soviet Fortification Sector, the 3rd and 11th infantry divisions) the main range of the Small Fatra Mountains, and together with the forces of the 2nd Army Corps (the 1st cavalry, the 21st and the 6th infantry divisions) it crossed the Váh river and the main range of the White Carpathians. The other Romanian divisions (the 8th cavalry and 9th infantry) which acted in the strip occupied by the 40th Soviet Army reached the valley of the Moravia river.

Through its characteristics (the width of the offensive strip totalling about 100 km, the depth of the operation of 25—30 km, the duration of fighting actions spanning over 16 days, offensive paces in keeping with terrain requirements, largescale translation manoeuvres, performed, mostly, in parallel with the front line), the operation carried out by the 4th Romanian Army in the Small Fatra Mountains and the White Carpathians stands among the prominent actions performed by the Romanian Army in the anti-Hitler war, making, together with the other Romanian liberating operations, a substantial contribution to the defeat of fascism and the winning of the victory in the WW II.



Romanian artillery subunits on the Czechoslovakian front

long march in a record time — 36 hours — and afterwards, in cooperation with the great Soviet troops of the 51st Soviet Army Corps, repelled enemy resistances in the Strani district, and until the end of the operation, it penetrated the Moravia valley achieving an important bridgehead in the region of Popoviče locality. The soldiers of the 34th Infantry Regiment were conspicuous in these fights, soldiers who on April 18, organized an anti-tank sector managing to repel a fierce counterattack carried out with armoured means by the German troops which were menaced to be encircled.

The offensive actions performed by the 2nd Army

tainous terrain without any communications, the Romanian troops broke down the German defense. The regiments of the 6th Infantry Division heroically forced the enemy to cross back the river Váh, then penetrated deep in the enemy disposition and conquered the main range of the White Carpathians, thus creating the propitious conditions for the successful development of the offense on the Moravia river. Concomitantly, the 1st cavalry and 21st infantry divisions drove, after fierce fights, a 10—15 km long salient into the enemy defense and crossed the main range of the White Carpathians. In these fights, the Romanian military performed valiant deeds of

THE CORRAL SEA

Early in May 1942, the Japanese invasion of south-east Asia had spread to the Malay Peninsula, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia), the Philippines and most of Burma. In April a Japanese air force loomed in the east of the Indian Ocean and chased away a British fleet, causing great damage. On May 6, Corregidor too capitulated, an important US resistance spot in the Philippines.

The speed of the advance somewhat confused the plans of the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo. A further sustained offensive towards Australia was opposed by the commander of the Combined Fleet (the Japanese fleet containing the main battle ships, armoured ships and aircraft carriers) admiral Yamamoto who opinioned for a fresh blow in the Pacific, the conquest of the Midway Islands in order to push the American fleet into decisive action.

The lack of sufficient troops, mostly stationed in Manchuria in the event of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, made Tokyo — in expectation of Midway (MI) Operation — to proceed south-east, to MO Operation, aimed at Port Moresby, for the occupation of the Tulagi port (south of Solomon Islands) and of Port Moresby (southern coast of New Guinea) in the north of the Coral Sea. This move

was just beginning the isolation of Australia from the Pacific area. Lae and Salamaua, on the north-western coast of New Guinea had already been occupied in March and the drilling of the occupation forces had started in April so that operation MO could begin on May 3.

The British and American fleet could hardly defend Australia. The allied fleet in the south-east Pacific — ABDA Fleet (American-British-Dutch-Australian Fleet) had been lost in the defence of the Dutch East Indies. Nevertheless, the Australians were resolved to put up resistance against the Japanese. Thus, the ex premier Hughues declared in the Canberra Parliament that if fate was against the UN fleet that tried to pierce the advance of the Japanese squads they had to climb on the breach in the wall and make ready for the big decisive battles.

Australia's north-western coast, the most suitable for landing, was defended by the Great Barrier Reef, 2,400 km long. An old law, the Immigration Act of 1901 which had expelled all coloured workers from the island — Japanese, Chinese, Malayan, Indians — exempted the pearl-fishers. Most of them were Japanese and they knew better than oceanographers the se-

cret canals and passageways between the reefs.

For the US naval command in the Pacific (CINCPAC) it was essential to locate "the Shock Force" — the group of six aircraft carriers that had made possible the air victories of the Japanese to that date. The information provided by the submarines, the services of radio communication decoding, by various observers were not sufficient. This meant that the Japanese were preparing to land on the south-western coasts of New Guinea. To counter these moves the allied navy set up three task forces along the Australian coast — to the west that of British rear-admiral I. C. Crace — three cruisers, two destroyers, to the east that of US rear-admiral F. J. Fletcher — Task Force 17 (TF) with aircraft carrier Yorktown (19,000 tons, 108 planes) three cruisers, four destroyers — which in February sailed south of the Pacific — and the task force of US rear-admiral Aubrey Fitch — TF. 11 — with plane carrier Lexington (33,000 tons, 135 planes), two cruisers, four destroyers coming from Pearl Harbour. Two tankers (Neosho and Tippecanoe) escorted by two destroyers were to secure sea refueling for the two T.F.

The Japanese convoys, leaving Rabaul (New Britain) where to land under cover provided by rear-admiral Goto — light aircraft carrier

Shoho (11,500 tons, 30 planes), four cruisers and a destroyer coming from north-east, from the Bougainville archipelago. At Tulagi, a single transport ship with part of the Special Landing Force was accompanied by a mine layer, 8 mine dredgers and 2 destroyers (rear-admiral Shima). Then, other 11 carrier ships, and the bulk of the Third Special Force, accompanied by a cruiser, six destroyers, a mine layer (rear-admiral Kajika) and a support force (two cruisers, three gunboats, an aircraft carrier — rear-admiral Marumo) headed towards Port Moresby, to pass through the Jomard straits in south-eastern New Guinea. As the Japanese knew about a US Carrier Force (the naval force also featured aircraft carriers) in southern Pacific, the entire operation was also supported by a Shock Force, made up of the Zuikahu and Shokahu aircraft carriers (25,500 tons, 90 planes each), with rear-admiral Hara — two cruisers and six destroyers — with vice-rear admiral Takagi, coming from the north, from Truk (Carolines). The high command of all forces was provided in Rabaul by vice rear-admiral Inoue, commander of the 4th Fleet.


On May 3 the Japanese took Tulagi. The following day, on May 4, the convoy for Port Moresby also left Raboul. Admiral Fletcher headed north on

Yorktown, since Lexington was refueling. In successive air raids 99 US planes sank the Kizutsuki destroyer at Tulagi, 3 mine dredgers and damaged a few landing ships. Fletcher returned south to refuel and then joined TF 11 on May 6. Informed by B 17 hydroplanes from Port Moresby about the Japanese air cover (the Shoho group) the US admiral sent Crace's cruisers south of New Guinea and headed, with TF 17 and TF 11, to Jomard Straits to intercept the Japanese, fruitlessly attacked by the hydroplanes.

The following day, on May 7, at about 04.00 hours, the Japanese convoy, on its way to Port Moresby, joined the Air Cover Force. The US aircraft carriers, at about 200 miles from Jomard Straits launched 93 planes in attack. At about 09.45 Shoho (commander Izawa) the main target of the attack, was hit by 13 bombs and 9 torpe-

does, and sank in 15 minutes; the carriers spread north, and Sazanami saved about 100 survivors of the carrier crew. The blow seemed decisive as Inoue gave up the operation, yet, the Americans, though expecting to face three enemy aircraft carriers had not been informed of the approaching Japanese Shock Force. This one, learning about the Tulagi air raids hurried south, refueled on May 6 somewhere in the north-east of Rennell island (south of Solomon islands). Entering the Corral Sea had found out following a reconnaissance flight that a US Carrier Force was present south. The identification had not been correct. The same morning of May 7 when the Americans sank Shoho, the 78 planes sent by the Shock Force had dropped 7 bombs not on an aircraft carrier but on the Neosho tanker which had fueled the US ships in the Task Force, and

The great air-and sea battles in the Corral Sea



sank with three bombs the destroyer Sims. The survivors on Neosho were rescued four days afterwards when the wreck was sunk.

In the afternoon of May 7 the weather turned hellish in the east of the Coral Sea. The Japanese had precise information about the position of the US aircraft carriers and at 16.15 hours rear-admiral Hara sent 27 skilled pilots to attack in overcast sky. Nine Japanese planes were intercepted by US Wildcat radar-guided planes, one was downed by the A.A. artillery while 11 perished when landing on deck. The Japanese could only see their enemies for a few moments in the mist though their ships were at about 100 miles distance. At this time the Americans already knew that the Japanese aircraft carriers were not far. In order to avoid a surprise attack at night both fleets drew near each other, Fletcher south-west and Takagi north. And both admirals deemed that the clash, so far postponed, was to take place in the morning.

On May 5, at dawn, the enemies reverted course and sent a reconnaissance force. Contact was re-established at about 08, at 235 miles. Two aircraft carriers operated from each side. The Japanese had 122 planes and boasted a vaster experience as well as easy-to-handle fighter planes and more efficient torpedoes but kept on flying in a low-vi-

bility area. The Americans had only 121 planes of which the bombers were superior to the Japanese.

Takagi and Hara were the first to begin the attack with 70 bombers and torpedo strike aircraft escorted by 20 fighter planes. Between 09.50 and 10.30 Yorktown avoided the torpedoes and got a single bomb, which although causing much fire did not reduce ship speed. Lexington (commanded by F. C. Sherman), attacked in pincers, was hit by two torpedoes in the port and two bombs in the bridge deck. Three boilers were flooded. By equilibrations (a manoeuvre of flowing liquids aboard from a tank to another) the ship maintained its position. Meanwhile (09-09.25 hour and a speed of 24 knots. Meanwhile (09-09.25 hours), 82 US planes started the attack and at about 10.30 the bombers spotted the enemy aircraft carriers. Soon Zuikahu disappeared in the rain clouds and only Shokahu was set afire by three bombs of the diving bombers launched from Lexington. As the Japanese pilots reported they had sunk both US aircraft carriers Takagi sent Shokahu to base whose planes could no longer land on deck, and only a few were recovered. Being left with only 9 planes and upon orders from Inoue Takagi withdrew north with the entire force.

Nevertheless, the guesswork of the Japanese pilots did not prove true. The gas sipping from the broken pipes on the bottom of Lexington caused another two powerful blasts, fire on board could not be contained and at 19.56 the ship sank after a destroyer from its own escort had planted five torpedoes into it.

The battle ended. Fletcher's forces headed towards the Tonga islands. Inoue, thinking his air cover forces were too few, gave up the Port Moresby operation and gathered all task forces at Rabaul. Only the aircraft carriers, upon Yamamoto's order, continued to look for the Americans until May 10 when they returned to Truk.

All in all the Japanese had lost a light aircraft carrier, a destroyer, 80 planes and a few small units; the Americans in their turn had lost a heavy aircraft carrier, 66 planes and a tanker. Tactically speaking the denouement of the Coral Sea battle — the first air-and-sea battle in mankind's history, — with two air forces hitting at each other without seeing much — seemed slightly favourable to the Japs. For the allies it was the first clash when the Japanese offensive in the south-east of Asia and in the Pacific was staved off and its forces made to give up a planned landing. Moreover, aircraft carrier Yorktown participated in the next battle (Midway, June 1942) which brought about a favourable turn in the Pacific war, while Shokahu, under repair, and Zuikahu, renewing its airplane fleet, missed the battle, which sensibly diminished the Japanese Shock Force.

■ NICOLAE KOSLINSKI

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THE ROMANIAN ARMY. A ROAD OF BATTLES AND GLORY IN CZECHOSLOVAK TERRITORY


Colonel (r) FLORIAN TUCA, DHist.

After successfully carrying through their combat missions in the territory of Hungary, the Romanian troops with a strength of over 240,000 continued their victorious liberating advance alongside the Soviet troops in the territory of Czechoslovakia. Fighting in this country for five months, until the final victory of the anti-Hitler coalition over the Nazi Reich, the Romanian forces participated actively, in close cooperation with the Soviet forces, in the performance of wide-scope operations, escalated ten important mountain massifs, forced four large water courses and freed 1,722 localities, 31 of which were towns. The chronicles of the anti-Hitler war recorded in golden letters the elan and courage shown by the Romanian soldiers in the battles for Rožnava, Lučenec, Zvolen, Banská Bystrica, Kremnica, Banovce, Kroměříž, Kojetín, Nove Mesto, Uherski Brod, Veselý and others, the bravery and tenacity with which they climbed, through snow and frost, up the Slovak Ore Mountains, Javorina, Tatra and Fatra, Nitra or the White Carpathians, the manliness and ingenuity with which they forced the furious waters of the Hron, Nitra, Váh or the Morava. While facing the enemy on the Czechoslovak front, the Romanian units and large units advanced over 400 km into the enemy disposition, reaching a point at some 80 km from the capital of the friendly country, Prague. Their road of battle was strewn with great human losses. According to the Romanian statistical data, the blood tribute paid by the Romanian people in the clashes for the liberation and rebirth of Czechoslovakia rose to over 66,000 military (dead, wounded or missing). For paying homage to the blood toll given by the sons of Romania in the battles on Czechoslovak territory, at Lučenec, Zvolen, Humpolec, Piešťany, Bohunice, Krupina, Velá, Čepčín, Stara Tura, Velká, Javorník, Havlíčkův Brod, Pustiměř, Brno and many other localities, mo-

numents and obelisks were erected or memorial plaques were laid. The inscriptions written on them bespeak the warm gratitude of Czechoslovakia's citizens for the sacrifices made by Romania's sons in the battles for the liberation of other countries and the defeat of fascism. We shall refer below to some of these remarkable memorials.

LUČENEC. Monument. It rises at the eastern entrance into the locality. As results from the inscription carved into it, it was erected in the memory of *"The Heroes of the Fourth Army Corps, of the second and third mountains corps divisions, fallen in the Lučenec area for the liberation of Czechoslovakia."* From the log of the units and large units which acted in that area over January 9—24, 1945, it results that over 1,900 sons of Romania gave their blood in the battles for the liberation of Lučenec. The memorial raised in their honour imposes by both its size and originality. It consists of a massive stone column of rectangular shape ending in the upper part with a volume resembling an aircraft with two planes. Exquisite Romanian floral motifs were carved with patience and talent on the façade of the monument.

The Lučenec memorial devoted to the heroes of the Romanian army was unveiled on July 6, 1945. On its inauguration, attended by numerous Czechoslovak citizens and representatives of the Romanian troops, the mayor of the town said: "We have gathered here to honour the heroes of the Romanian allied army who gave their lives, the most precious asset, on the altar of our liberation and the liberation of their homeland... By their sacrifice they contributed so that we, who are still alive, may live in happiness in the new, democratic Czechoslovak state... Our greatest respect and highest honour for the fallen Roma-



Czechoslovakian localities where monuments were erected in remembrance of the unforgettable deeds of arms of the brave Romanian soldiers


nian heroes. Our eternal remembrance. We incline our flags before our so dear monument. We assure you, our dear Romanian friends, that we shall take care of it as if it were ours and that for us and for the coming generations it will be a symbol of liberty and of Czechoslovak-Romanian friendship."

ZVOLEN. Monumental ensemble. It is an impressive complex suggesting the scope of the Romanian sacrifice it glorifies. It was erected on a hill of the large town to the liberation of which the Romanian troops made an outstanding contribution. The complex consists of two distinct elements: the monument proper made of a massive stone block of rectangular form resembling the sanctuaries of the Romanian voivodes, which is placed on a pedestal of impressive size: a series of small memorial signs to which bronze plaques were attached, each noted by a letter of the alphabet from A to Z. Each plaque resembles a page in a huge register which contains the names of thousands upon thousands of heroes. Here are some of them: soldier Antohi Mihai, fallen at Zvol. Slatina; sergeant Constantin Vasile, fallen at Nova Bosaca; sergeant Catană Mihai, fallen at Buzica; senior sergeant Chiriță Vasile, fallen at height 665; soldier Zoinea Ioan fallen at Lest; corporal Zoica Aurel, fallen at Detva. All of them were ordinary people, born in the land of Romania. They gave their lives in the battles fought far away

from their country, in Czechoslovakia, in the name of great and noble goals: the liberation of the peoples from foreign occupation and the defeat of fascism. They are names of both Romanian simple soldiers and officers which will remain for ever in the golden book of the heroes of the anti-Hitler war.

On the front side of the monument, under the coats of the Socialist Republic of Romania carved in stone, there is an inscription in both Romanian and Czech: "Eternal glory to the Romanian heroes fallen in the battles for the liberation of the Czechoslovak Republic from the fascist yoke. 1944—1945."

KREMENICA. Memorial plaque. It was attached to the wall of the People's Council of the town in the year of the 10th anniversary of the locality's liberation by the Romanian and Soviet troops. On the plaque, made of cast iron, it is written among other things that in the battles for crushing the enemy in the Kremnica area and for the liberation of the town "26 Soviet soldiers, 41 Romanian soldiers and 80 inhabitants of the locality lost their lives." Emphasizing the courage, dedication and sense of sacrifice with which the Romanian soldiers fought in the Kremnica area, the then minister of war, the army corps general C. Vasiliu Răscănu, showed in an order of the day that "on taking the town and the railway station of Kremnica... I had once more the opportunity to express my warmest thanks to the brave fighters..."



Monuments paying homage to heroism of the liberating Romanian soldiers in the Czechoslovakian localities of 1. Lučenec. 2. Zvolen 3. Havlic-
kuv Brod 4. Kroměříž

1

KROMĚŘÍŽ. Monument. It stands in a park in a zone of the town significantly called the Peace Square. It was erected shortly after the victorious end of the Second World War. The monument glorifies the sacrifices made by the Romanian army on the first days of May 1945 in the battles for the liberation of the town. The memorial has a quite particular shape: it represents a real anti-tank cannon which was turned into a monument due to a local initiative. Talking with several residents of Kromeriz, I learned that the respective anti-tank weapon, of Romanian origin, had been fully hit by a shell in the course of the battles of May 4—5, 1945 on the southern outskirts of the settlement. When the clashes in the area ended, the piece remained on the spot where it had been hit. Shortly after the victorious end of the anti-Hitler war, the Kroměříž officials took measures for the anti-tank cannon to be placed on a high concrete pedestal and thus be turned into a true memorial. On a marble plaque attached to the façade of the pedestal one can read: *"May 5—6, 1945. Monument of the Kroměříž battles. Eternal glory to those who sacrificed their lives for the liberation of our homeland!"*

As a recognition of the remarkable contribution made by the Romanian troops to the liberation of the town and of other settlements in that part of Czechoslovakia as well as of their sacrifices in the fierce


battles in those parts, other two monuments dedicated to the Romanian heroes were eventually raised in the town of Kroměříž.

HAVLICKUV BROD. Memorial sign. It marks, like a milestone, the height 488 in the proximity of the locality. On May 12, 1945, in that locality situated at about 80 km from Prague, the military of the 26th infantry regiment "Rovine" were quartered after a victorious road of battles. Until reaching the locality, they, much like the other military of the glorious Romanian army, had accumulated 260 days of battle on the anti-Hitler war and had marched along 1,700 km in terrible heat or rain, in snowstorms and bullet rains. An itinerary that took a heavy toll on them, many of them having fallen during it. In the battles in Czechoslovakia alone, four officers, six



3

4



2

non-commissioned officers and 101 soldiers had fallen. In their memory, their comrades erected at Havlickuv Brod a memorial resembling a roadside cross. On a pedestal made of stone, a massive marble plaque of dark colour was set on which the following words were carved: "A sign for eternity in memory of the Romanian soldiers of the 26th infantry regiment «Rovine» from Craiova, fallen in the battles for the liberation of Czechoslovakia."

In his address on the unveiling of the memorial, colonel Alexandru Manolache,

the former commander of the regiment, said among other things: "Whoever passes by this marble plaque will stop and learn that in these parts there once fought Romanian soldiers of the 26th infantry regiment, Oltenian people as Mircea the Great was, who had battled with so much heroism at Rovine, Moldavian people as Stephen the Great was, who had battled with so much heroism at Podul Inalt... Rest in peace, heroes of the 26th infantry regiment! You have done your duty as you swore to. Eternal will your memory be!"

ATTITUDES

HISTORY AND POLITICS, TRUTH AND FORGERY ABOUT SOME WORKS CONCERNING TRANSYLVANIA'S HISTORY

FLORIN CONSTANTINIU, DHist.

Whoever is perusing the book authored by Hungarian emigrant Arpad Balog *Histoire démythifiée de la Roumanie* (Paris, 1979) as well as the special supplement of the "Carpathian Observer" publication, *Transylvania and the Theory of Daco-Roman-Romanian Continuity* (ed. Louis L. Löte, Rochester, New York, USA) or *Erdély története* (under the editorship of Köpeczi Bela, Budapest, 1986) finds at once that behind the first's trivial violence, the second's "learned" character and the third's pretensions to "academic" objectiveness there are hidden the same theses: the contest of the Daco-Roman and Romanian continuity in the area of old Dacia in the 3rd—13th centuries, the alleged south-Danubian origin of the Romanian people and language, the late coming in Transylvania, by the end of the

12th century-beginning of the 13th one, of the Romanians presented as a nomadic pastoral population. How could be explained the resuming, by some dilettantes, like Arpad Balog or specialists like the authors of *Erdély története* printed by the Printing House of Science Academy of the People's Republic of Hungary, of some slandering and disparaging theses, assertions and interpretations about the Romanian people, in full contradiction with the historical reality and refuted for long time by researches made by both Romanian and numerous foreign historians? How could be explained the perseverance of Marxist historiography from Hungary and of Hungarian emigration in West Europe, USA and Canada in spreading abroad these theses and their

refuse to take cognizance of proofs offered by written and archaeological sources, by linguistic, ethnographic and logical arguments in favour of the Romanian continuity north of the Danube?

In order to find answer to these questions it is necessary to go back to the origin of the discussions about the Romanians' continuity. Before doing it we must remind that both *Gesta Hungarorum*, the Chronicle of anonymous notary of King Bela IV written about 1200 and *Gesta Hunnorum et Hungarorum*, the chronicle of Simon of Kéza, written between 1280—1285 — both of them written, hence, in the period when the foes of the Romanian continuity north of the Danube claim that the Romanian shepherds' penetration in Transylvania took place coming from the south of the Danube — hence, both chronicles do not make any references to this penetration of the Romanian population inside the Carpathian arch¹. On the contrary, Anonymous narrated the fights fought by the Hungarians against Gelu "quidam Blacus" (a certain Romanian), "Dux Blachorum" (the leader of the Romanians), and pointed to the Romanians' presence in the

Glad-led army. One should conclude relying on the analysis of the two chronicles that at the time of their writing nobody doubted the Romanians' continuity in Transylvania, their anteriority vis-à-vis the Magyars in Transylvania. Had the Romanians been a population recently settled down in Transylvania or had they been in course of crossing the Carpathians when the two were writing their chronicles, how could the above mentioned chroniclers have been deceived so seriously in writing as they did about the Romanians in Pannonia or Transylvania? Could Anonymus to fabricate a Romanian military and political leader in the fights against the Magyars when, should we believe the foes of the Romanian continuity, his contemporaries would have known and seen that the Romanians were some late immigrants? The truth is that as long as the question of the Romanian continuity north of the Danube and especially in Transylvania did not get a political connotation, nobody in the Hungarian society and in case of Anonymus even in the King's entourage hesitated in asserting that the Romanians preceded the Hungarians in Transylvania.

What made this attitude in conformity with reality be abandoned? The answer must be searched in the development of the national emancipation struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians. As it is well known Inochentie Micu grounded his claim for the Romanians to be granted equality in rights with the other "nations" in Transylvania on arguments attesting to the

Romanians as the oldest and most numerous population in Transylvania and that through the taxes paid to the State they were covering the greatest part of public expenditures². The argumentation employed by Inochentie Micu turned into the nucleus of the political programme of the Transylvanian Romanians' national movement from the moment of *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* (1791) to the Great Union of 1918.

In political confrontations generated by refusals for satisfying the right and legitimate revendications of the Transylvanian Romanians, the latter's enemies were to use the assertions made by Fr. J. Sulzer (1727—1791) in his "*Geschichte des transalpinischen Daciens*" about the south-Danubian origin of the Romanians and their alleged coming north of the Danube in the 12th—13th centuries. Pursuing to combat *Supplex*, Y.C. Eder and Martin Bolla appealed to the "arguments" of Sulzer³. Since then the question of the Romanians' continuity was politicized; since then to our days it has kept this close joining in political purposes. Unless this political connotation had existed then the question of the Romanians' continuity north of the Danube would not have existed or at least, would no longer exist (more exactly would not any longer have fostered the discussions about).

Since the theory of the Romanians' south-Danubian origin wrapped up the known form authored by R. Roesler (1871) the Romanian historiography accumulated a huge "dossier of proofs" on the continuity that

cannot be ignored by any honest and well-informed researcher.

In spite of these research the Hungarian historiography, either older and newer, keeps on standing its old ground. Telling is, from this point of view, that the above mentioned "Carpathian Observer" republished an article by László Réthy dating from 1886! For this author and for his editors of today, the Romanian language was born in... Dalmatia!

In refusing to take knowledge of conclusions offered by Romanian historiography, a true and fruitful dialogue is impossible. The Romanian school of history does not pretend to have the exclusive monopoly over the truth, but it is guided by the search of truth exclusively. The Romanian historians have always considered that the investigation of the past is a knowledge-bound effort, never ended; that once with the discovery of new sources or through new interpretations, our scope of knowledge is going deeper. Transylvania's history, as it was and is actually — as an integral part of the Romanian people's history — was and is in the focus of the Romanian researches. The rich bibliography devoted to it attests to the strong interest for this ancient Romanian land. A recent example spotlights the permanent effort for renewing the information and rethinking basis of Transylvania's history. Thanks to Arab sources, an excerpt from the story written by Guillaume de Rubrouck while narrating his journey to the

Mongol empire (1253—1255) who placed the Romanians near the Baszkirs, has found its clearing up: some Baszkirs accompanied the Hungarians in the Pannonic Plain, then came together with the latter in Transylvania; the contact of the autochthonous Romanians with the Baszkirs left the verb "a boscorodi" (i.e. to mutter or grumble) and the noun "bozgor"⁴ (pejorative for Hungarian).

As long as research is guided by the only aim of discovering the historical truth, it serves to the reciprocal cognizance of the peoples and contributes to their rapprochement. That the Hungarian historiography of today is perpetuating some these and viewpoints belonging to the past, to the Horthyist period inclusively, is not but a source for tension and controversies.

Whatever explanations one might give an assertion like that made in *Erdély Története* according to which Transylvania is a distinct ethnical and cultural entity in Central East Europe, hence being contested as an integrant part of Romania and of the Romanian people's history, such an allegation excludes any true exchange of opinions, useful for the progress of historical research. The main condition of a scientific dialogue is that the interlocutors to be well infor-

med and to act in good faith. But how shall we consider the authors of *Erdély története* who allege that the great pestilential epidemic of 1348—1349 swept off the Hungarians in Transylvania only, hence numerically diminishing them, but spared the Romanians who continued to grow up numerically?

The confrontation of opinions — the whole development of science has proved it — is beneficial to scientific investigation. For instance, one might call into question whether the name of locality of Gilău comes from the name of Gelu (as we also believe)⁵, or viceversa, (as Gy. Görffy considers in alleging that the notary "fabricated" Gelu as coming from the toponymic Gilău), but for the outcome of discussions to be both conclusively and useful, the a priori attitude of discrediting Anonymus, because he told of the Romanians as Transylvania's inhabitants before the Magyars' arrival, must be abandoned.

The controversy round the Romanians' continuity-born by the end of the 18th century, in the "heat" of political struggles launched by the Transylvanian Romanians' claiming for equality in rights — was used later, after the 1918 Great Union with the purpose of denying the legitimacy of Transylva-

nia's Union with Romania. Today the vehicling of the theory on the Romanians' south-Danubian origin aims at the same political target, however much its advocates would try to deny.

History delivered its verdict on December 1, 1918 when the autochthonous and in majority population of Transylvania — the Romanians — voted the union with their brethren beyond the mountains. Attempts at contesting, in any way, a historical reality born from an objective process — the making of the Romanian nation and of its national state — discredit the authors of such attempts and unmask them as enemies of understanding and cooperation among peoples.

1 Stelian Brezeanu, *La continuité daco-romaine*, Science et politique, București, 1984, p. 29.

2 D. Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum*, București, 1984, pp. 151—158.

3 Stelian Brezeanu, op. cit., p. 58—59.

4 Virgil Ciociltan, *Informațiile lui Guillaume de Rubrouck despre români și baszkiri în lumina izvoarelor orientale*, în *Românii în istoria universală*, vol. III, Iași, 1987, p. 19, and fool.

5 *Idem*, *Observații referitoare la românii din cronica Notarului anonim al regelui Bela*, în *Revista de istorie*, t. 40 (1987), nr. 5, p. 445, and foll.

THE CREATION OF THE ROMANIA-INDIA ASSOCIATION FOR HISTORICAL STUDIES



A festive meeting took place in the princely hall of the Central Army Club, marking the foundation of the Romania-India Association for Historic Studies, on January 20, 1988. This new scientific body is the outcome of an old and fruitful cooperation of Romanian historians with the Indian Sociallook International Publications and the Sociallook International magazine, headed by B. C. Gupta. It sets forth to take firm action for promoting mutual dissemination of the two people's millenary history.

Graced by the presence of Lieutenant-General Ilie Ceaușescu, DHist., Chairman of the Romanian Commission for Military History, and of the Indian editor, B. C. Gupta, the meeting gathered numerous researchers of and experts in history, representing relevant institutes from Bucharest. Lieutenant-General Ilie Ceaușescu highlighted in his opening address the rich activity of the Indian Publishing House and of the India-Romania Association of Historic Studies, founded on March 9, 1987, in New Delhi.

Reader Mircea Mușat, DHist., read the activity project of the Indian-Romanian association over the 1988—1989 interval. The document stipulates bilateral workshops, colloquiums, conferences on topics that will be settled later, articles published by the Indian and Romanian press on the history and culture of the two peoples; the mutual publication of some works on national history; the creation within the Library of the Centre for Study and Research on Military History and

Theory of a department on the history of the Indian people; the organization in Romania and India of some photo and book exhibitions on topics that will be settled later; a project of documentary and study trips for the mutual information and acquaintance of the members of the Association for historic studies. Special issues of the *Sociallook International* magazine will be dedicated to the 140th anniversary of the 1848 Romanian revolution and of the 70th anniversary of the creation of the Romanian unitary national state.

Colonel Dr. Gheorghe Tudor, Director of the Centre for Study and Research on Military History and Theory, secretary general of the Romanian Commission for Military History, Colonel Dr. Vasile Mocanu, professor at the Military Academy, dr. Cristian Popișteanu, editor-in-chief of *Magazin Istoric*, dr. Ana Budura, senior scientific researcher at the Institute for Historic and Social-Political Studies within the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Colonel Dr. Constantin Toderășcu, Captain Cornel Codiță and Mihail Zahariade, scientific researchers with the Centre for Study and Research on Military History and Theory expressed in their interventions the admiration for the Indian guest's rich activity deployed for the study of the history of the Romanian people, of the work of the Romanian President, making thus a substantial contribution to the strengthening of the friendship between the Romanian and Indian people.

Editor B. C. Gupta spoke about the books and articles published in New Delhi on

the anniversary of the birthday and over 55 years of revolutionary activity of Nicolae Ceaușescu, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania. He informed the audience that after the creation of the India-Romania Association for historical studies numerous requests have been registered for information on Romania, her President who dedicates himself to the peoples' happiness, to world peace and disarmament.

Concluding the meeting, Lieutenant-Ge-

neral Ilie Ceaușescu, DHist., emphasized the special scientific significance of the creation of the Romanian-Indian Association for historical studies and warmly thanked editor B. C. Gupta for his activity of rapprochement and understanding between the Romanian and Indian peoples, extending him the invitation of visiting Romania again.

■ EDITORIAL STAFF

ROMANIAN SCIENTISTS IN THE U.S.A.

Already traditional, the Romanian historians' participation in the annual congresses of the American Historians' Association (A.H.A.) was noteworthy in 1987 as well. Held in Washington D.C. from December 27 to 30, 1987, the 102nd A.H.A. Congress — attended by 4,005 participants from various countries, a large number of them from the host country, of course — was an opportunity for the Romanian historians to organize and provide material for two sections: "From the Medieval Political Nation to the Contemporary Nation in Eastern and Central Europe" and "The Foreign Policy of the East and Central European Countries at the End of the Second World War". The papers delivered by the reader Ion Pătroiu, DHist., from the University of Craiova, by researchers Gh. Buzatu, DHist., and Valeriu Dobrinescu, DHist. from the "A. D. Xenopol" Institute of History and Archaeology of Iași and by Major Mihail E. Ionescu, DHist., from the Centre for Study and Research on Military History and Theory cast light on aspects of the Romanian "case" within the more general themes mentioned above.

The continuity of the Romanian participation in this annual gathering of US historians was welcomed by A.H.A. Executive Director, Samuel Gammon, DHist., who stressed the usefulness of such a dialogue for deepening mutual knowledge and strengthening bilateral scientific ties.

Continuing their visit to the USA, the Romanian historians, supported by the I.R.E.X. organization and its director, A. Kassof, conducted researches in Ame-

rican archives and libraries, especially in Washington, and delivered papers on subjects of Romanian history at universities and colleges in American towns like Boston, Saragota, Portland, New York, a.o. On those occasions, they highlighted important episodes of the Romanian people's lengthy struggle for independence and unity, the great accomplishments made in Romania in the unprecedentedly flourishing two decades, this country's foreign policy of peace and collaboration.

At the end of January 1988, the Romanian historians donated to the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. a number of books of Romanian history and with the help of officials of that institution organized a Romanian book exhibition at the Department for Eastern Europe of the Library of Congress which displayed publishing novelties from the sociopolitical and technical-scientific domains.

The assistance granted to the Romanian historians by American scientists from various institutions — dr. Radu Florescu (Boston College), dr. George Ursul (Emerson College — Boston), St. Fischer-Galați (University of Boulder — Colorado), John Taylor (National Archives — Washington), dr. David Kraus (Congress Library), dr. Paul Heimstra (Fullbright Foundation), dr. K. Verdery (Baltimore), Walter Beach (Brookings Institution — Washington), a.o. — turned this visit into an event favouring the development of the scientific relations between the two countries.

■ GHEORGHE BUZATU, DHist.

Making the fundamental truths of the Romanian people's history known abroad

The better knowledge in other countries of the fundamental truths of the Romanian people's history is one of the permanent goals of the Romanian Commission for Military History especially given the fact that the increase of Romania's international prestige has brought about a growth in the number of those desirous to know its history, culture, creation.


The Romanian Commission for Military History periodically sends abroad books dealing with Romanian history printed under its aegis. Thus, last year, it sent freshly printed books to almost

200 foreign institutions and fora — over 30 national commissions for military history and military and civilian historical research, great university and public libraries, history professors and researchers, etc. in Europe, Asia, Africa, North America and Latin America, the Far East. Now, the respective works are accessible to students and the large public in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other socialist states, in the United States of America, Norway, England, France, Italy, Japan, Australia, as well as in Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, a.o. They also enriched the holdings of the large libraries at the United Nations Organization "Dag Hammarskjöld" in New York and the Palace of Nations in Geneva.

Among them are the monographs *From the Dacian State to Socialist Romania — 2000 Years of Statehood* (in English and German) by Ilie Ceaușescu, DHist., *Romania in the First World War* (English), Vasile Alexandrescu, DHist., *The Making of the Uni-*

tary Romanian Nation State — International Recognition (English) by Mircea Mușat, DHist., and Ion Ardeleanu, DHist., *Romania and the Great Victory* (Russian, English and French) by Ilie Ceaușescu, DHist., Florian Tucă, DHist., Mihail E. Ionescu, DHist., Alexandru Dutu, the collection of studies *Pages from the Millenary History of the Romanian People*, No. 16 dealing with Romania's participation in the anti-Hitler war, with abstracts in foreign languages, *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire*, No. 66 edited by the Romanian Commission for Military History on the anniversary of 2,500 years since the first battles of the Geta-Dacian people for liberty and independence, three special issues in English, French, Russian, Spanish and German of the review *The Entire People's Struggle* dedicated to special episodes of the Romanian people's history: the 1877 Independence War, the glorious battles of Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz of 1917; the Great Union of 1918.

The necessity and importance of the publish-



ing activities undertaken by the Romanian Commission for Military History are emphasized by the letters received by us. One of them is signed by prof. A. F. Kizchenko, the dean of the Faculty of History in Kiev, who expresses his profound gratitude for the works issued by the Romanian Commission for Military History he received, assessing that "they will contribute to the better study of Romania's history in the USSR as well as to a close collaboration between the two countries' historians, to the rapprochement between the Romanian and Soviet peoples". In his letter, prof. Qian Chengdan, Chairman of the Department of History of the University of Nanjing — China — underlines the great interest aroused by Romania's history and thanks for the possibility to "benefit to a great extent by the studies sent by the Romanian colleagues." Thanking for "the interesting books referring to the Romanian people's history", major P. E. Helba Pedersen, secretary of the Danish Commission for Military History, informs us that they "will be included in the library of the Copenhagen garrison and will be placed at the disposal of the public from all over Denmark." Dr. C. M. Schulten, the General Secretary of the International Commission for Military History, address-

sing he Chairman of the Romanian Commission for Military History, states: "Your initiative of making known the exploits and accomplishments of the Romanians is praise-worthy and leads to closer ties of friendship among peoples." The French professor Roland Andréany of the "Paul Valéry" University of Montpellier also thanks for the works sent to the university: "I am pleased to note that the Romanian Commission for Military History is permanently active and holds a high position within the International Commission for Military History."

The scientific standard of the approaches contained by the works edited and sent by the Commission is also assessed by professor Alexandre Chabert of the "Louis-Pasteur" University of Strasbourg: "These works demonstrate the thoroughness of the researches carried out by your Commission. They bring a new outlook on the less known aspects of the courageous Romanian people's history".

The British editor Andrew Mackenzie also considers quite necessary that the Romanian view of history should be brought to the attention of the wide world since after the publication of the three volumes of Transylvania's History, the Hungarians have started expressing their viewpoints

ignoring all contrary evidence. The American professor Arthur L. Funk, Chairman of the American Committee for the History of the Second World War, also expresses his delight at receiving the books on Romania's history and at the fact that they are published in English, which is quite helpful to those not conversant with the East-European languages. Professor H. Yasui, Chairman of the Nippon Commission for Military History, remarks that the Nippon Commission takes "special interest in the history of the Second World War, of the East-European countries, Romania among them; I believe that these books will give us broad possibilities to know the questions of interest to us." Professor dr. Amalendu Guha, Director of the Institute for Alternative Development Research in Oslo, voices his conviction that all "the books will be of great help to our researchers in the Eastern Europe", while professor dr. Manfred. Rauchensteiner, General Secretary of the Austrian Commission for Military History, informs us that the works sent by us "were included in the stock of the library of the Institute of Military Sciences to be studied and researched by Austrian historians."

■ Lieutenant-Colonel
ANGHEL FILIP

THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE'S MILITARY HISTORY, VOLUME V

The Romanian Commission of Military History, The Centre for Study and Research on Military History and Theory released the fifth volume of *The Romanian People's Military History**, a solid and valuable synthesis.

This remarkable work of national interest is an outcome of the effervescence ushered in all fields of material and cultural life by the historical Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party, of the theses and guidelines of an extremely valuable theoretical and practical value formulated by Nicolae Ceaușescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, on the thorough knowledge of the Romanian people's multimillennial history. This treatise is grounded on this scientific, solid and original outlook, tracing back the genesis and evolution of the national military doctrine, the advanced military tra-

ditions inherited from the Geto-Dacians, the Romanian people's struggle for the defence of territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, the place and role of the army in the country's socioeconomic,



politic and cultural life, etc.

Volume V of *The Romanian People's Military History*, compiled by numerous valuable contributors, experts in modern and contemporary history, deals with "The Evolution of the Romanian Military Body since the Winning of the State Independence to the Great Union of 1913. Romania during the First World War", as its subtitle suggests.

The book has 18 distinct chapters, covering

almost one thousand pages. The authors make use in a critical manner of a vast bibliography and synthesize a rich amount of statistic data and documentary information taken from national and foreign archives, making a convincing image of the social, economic, politic, military and cultural progress achieved by this country during late 19th century and early 20th century. Thus "the evolution of the national military structures during the interval between the Independence War and the eve of Romania's joining WW I illustrates the fact that the main guidelines of the military policies promoted by the Romanian state met the policies of the defence of the country's independence and sovereignty, defining the specific features of Romanian military doctrine." (p. XI). In keeping with this scientific outlook, which deals with the military phenomenon related to the specific national, social, economic, politic conditions, an important part of the book (chapters II—IV, pp. 41—200) deals with major topics like the legislative and organizational framework of the military defence system, the management bodies of the military system, mapping out call to arms and operational projects, systems of military recruiting, training and instruction of cadres and troops, equipment with modern weapons, the inner and territorial structure of the army. This valuable book evinces the idea that the army has been an essential factor of the

* Board of editors: Academician Ștefan Pascu, Lieutenant-General Ilie Ceaușescu, D.Hist., (senior editor), Professor Ștefan Ceaușescu, D.Hist., (senior Mircea Mușat, D.Hist., Reader Ion Ardeleanu, D.Hist., Colonel Gheorghe Tudor, D.Hist., Colonel Vasile Alexandrescu, D.Hist., Major Mihail E. Ionescu, D.Hist., Major Ioan Talpeș, D.Hist.

struggle for freedom, sovereignty and independence, during that interval of time, as well as throughout the whole Romanian people's history. All along history, the army has always been involved side by side with the people in the effort made for the country's material and cultural progress. As the Party General Secretary highlighted, "the soldiers were working in the economic field as well, they were training for the homeland's defence, they were always participating arm in hand to farming works, ready at any moment to leave the plough and defend their homeland."

The military's participation in the cultural and scientific life is dedicated a vast chapter in this book. Numerous command cadres and senior officers were members of the Romanian Academy, representing various fields of science and culture, such as: Generals Zaharia Petrescu, Gr. Crăiniceanu, C. N. Hirjeu, C. I. Barozzi, well-known researchers of history, cartography, geography and geodesy, medical sciences (pp. 248—251). Significant in this respect is the fact that two big works of national interest (*The Great Geographic Dictionary of Romania*, vol. I—V, Bucharest, 1892—1900 and *Encyclopaedia of Romania*, Sibiu, 1898—1904, edited by C. Diaconovici) were authored by a number of officers among others.

In political life (election campaigns, various events sponsored by cultural societies), the Romanian military advocated the extension of bour-

geois-democratic rights, the intensification of the struggle for national liberation and the completion of the Romanian people's state unity.

The First World War faced the Romanian nation with vital questions of its destiny and historic evolution. The book highlights the solidly documented idea that starting August 1916, Romania decided to participate in the war with all her economic, military and human potential, assuming all the risks created by such an important confrontation. Romania's joining a war which she had not started had become a necessity, as it was waged at the Romanian frontiers among great powers that occupied territories inhabited by Romanians and had annexationist tendencies. The book firmly stresses the fact that the participation of the Romanian nation in the war, between 1916—1918, was required by the necessity of completing the state unity and not by imperialist purposes, as some foreign historiographic works biasedly assert.

Two extensive chapters (XI, XII) deal with the campaigns of the autumn of 1916 and 1917, stressing upon the heroism and valour of the Romanian army during the war for the people's reunification. The autumn 1916 campaign had two major tactical and strategic targets: a) the operation for the liberation of Transylvania; b) the strategic operation for the defence of the Romanian territory between the Carpathians, Danube and the Black Sea; it took more than 135 days, and it became

a war of the whole people for defending the homeland's ancient land, her sovereignty and independence. Numerous pages vibrating with patriotism and evocative force are written about the great battles and military actions on the Dobrudja front, the battles of Sibiu, Braşov, Bran-Cimpulung area or the big clashes at Oituz, on the Olt and Jiu Valleys.

Romania mobilized and used in the autumn campaign of 1916 four armies totalling 20 infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, with about 834,000 people, i.e. 10.56 per cent of the country's army (pp. 499—500) to fulfil the politic-strategic objective of the war for national liberation. This human and military potential acquires a special significance if one takes into account the fact emphasized by the book, that the Romanian state had to face great hardships in equipping the army that Romania's allies did not supply the required equipment and did not fulfil their economic and military obligations incumbent on them from the military and political convention signed with the Romanian government. Though the Romanian army had suffered considerable losses (90,000 killed, 80,000 wounded and over 110,000 prisoners) and over two thirds of the national territory had been surrendered to the German and Austro-Hungarian invaders, Romania had not been defeated. German General Ludendorff admitted that "We defeated the Romanian army, but we could not destroy it", pointing out that Roma-

nia was defeated because her allies had not observed the commitment of backing the front between the Carpathians and the Danube.

Romania's military campaign of 1917 is dedicated a big number of pages. Studying numerous documents, statistics, information and data from military archives, the authors highlight the initiatives and measures adopted by the Romanian state and government for the re-organization of the national economic and military system, for restoring the country's defensive capacity. The reorganisation of the Romanian army, helped also by the French military mission headed by General Berthelot, determined the creation of a substantial, powerful force, considered by the foreign political and military observer as "one of the best fighting systems in Europe" (p. 531). As a consequence, Romanian military effectives were, in July 1917, of about 700,000 people, out of which over 512,000 belonged to the operational army, 207 infantry battalions, 110 cavalry squadrons and 243 batteries. At the same time, the Central Powers had concentrated on the Romanian front considerable armed forces of about 80 infantry divisions, with almost 800,000 military, plus

roughly one million of reserve military (pp. 547—552).

A chapter of over one hundred pages depicts preparation, development and consequences of the great victories of Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz, under the command of highly skilled militaries like Eremia Grigorescu, Alexandru Averescu a.o.

The last part of the book deals with the national and international political context of the creation of the national unitary state, with the significance and consequences of the 1918 Great Union for the evolution of the Romanian nation. The fundamental feature of the struggle for the 1918 Great Union was its widely popular character, the fact that it involved numerous aspects of the peasants, intellectuals, the working class, the socialist movement, the main social classes and categories. Despite all their political and social limits, the bourgeoisie and a great part of the landowners' class joined the struggle for unity, acting in keeping with the objective laws of historic development, in the spirit of national necessities and aspirations. Making a thoroughly scientific and objective analysis of the Romanian social, economic, politic and national

realities, this book illustrates the thesis formulated by President Nicolae Ceaușescu, stating that the creation of the Romanian unitary national state was the oeuvre of the whole nation, "an expression of the objective laws of social and national progress, ensuring the full and permanent unity of our nation, opening the road for her ever stronger assertion in the world's economic and political life."

Rich and representative illustrations, numerous statistic tables, maps and charts, plans for military operations, as well as an extensive Romanian and foreign bibliography and a useful, necessary general index enhance the value of the treatise. It contains also detailed English, French, German, Russian summaries.

The five volumes printed so far and the following three volumes of *The Romanian People's Military History* are an outstanding historiographic achievement and a solid ground, preceding the publication of the treatise of national history.

■ Reader

ION PĂTROIU,
DHist.

Front Cover : Group of Romanian revolutionaries demonstrating in Bucharest on June 11/23, 1848 (Water colour by C. Petrescu)

Back Cover : The 1st Infantry Regiment of the Romanian Country of Muntenia (1847)
Infantry men and staff officers in the Romanian Country of Moldavia (1847)


● 140 d'années depuis la révolution roumaine de 1848. La conception du président Nicolae Ceaușescu concernant la place occupée et le rôle joué par la révolution roumaine de 1848 dans l'histoire nationale. „Dix-huit siècles d'efforts...” La révolution roumaine de 1848, avant-poste de la révolution européenne ● La flamme de la révolution enveloppe l'espace roumain tout entier. Iași, 27 mars/8 avril 1848: Le premier programme révolutionnaire. Blaj, 3/15 mai 1848: „Nous voulons nous unir au Pays”. Islaz, 9/21 juin 1848: L'historique proclamation, une vraie constitution du pays ● Aphorismes et réflexions ● L'armée défend la révolution ● Structures militaires populaires à l'époque de la révolution roumaine de 1848—1849 ● Le campement sur le „Champ de Trojan” ● Repères chronologiques (mai 1848—août 1849) ● L'année 1848 à la lumière des sources sigillaires ● L'importance politique et militaire de la révolution roumaine de 1848 ● Temoignages étrangers. „La nation roumaine a le droit de vivre par elle-même, pour elle-même.” Echos de Vienne ● 55 d'années depuis la constitution du Comité National Antifasciste ou s'était affirmé brillamment le jeune révolutionnaire NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU. La Roumanie se prononce résolue contre le fascisme et le révisionnisme. La lutte antifasciste de Roumanie dispose d'un appui de confiance: l'armée ● La Roumanie dans la guerre antihitlérienne. Arguments nouveaux reconfirmant la 4^e place occupée par la Roumanie dans le cadre de la coalition antihitlérienne ● Verités fondamentales de l'histoire nationale. Nous sommes ici depuis toujours. L'autochtonie et la stabilité du peuple roumain dans l'espace carpatodanubien-pontique ● Fondements de la doctrine militaire roumaine. La nation armée et la guerre populaire dans la conception des révolutionnaires de 1848 ● Un dossier pas encore élucidé: le réseau Cereus (I) ● La mémoire des documents. „Disons encore un mot sur l'humanité”. Pages de l'épopée de l'indépendance. Nicolae Bălcescu, un brillant historien militaire ● Grands commandants ● Grandes batailles. ● Les monuments du combat ● Attitudes. Histoire et politique, vérité et faux sur quelques travaux concernant l'histoire de la Transylvanie ● De l'activité de la Commission Roumaine d'Histoire Militaire ● Le livre d'histoire

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

● 140-летие румынской революции 1848 года. Замысел президента Николае Чаушеску о месте и роли румынской революции 1848 года в национальной истории. «Восемнадцать веков труда...» Румынская революция 1848 года, форпост европейской революции ● Пламя революции охватывает все румынское пространство. Яссы 27 марта / 8 апреля 1848 года: Первая революционная программа. Блаж 3/15 мая 1848 года: «Мы желаем объединиться со Страной». Ислаз 9/21 июня 1848 года. Историческая прокламация, подлинная конституция родины ● Итерчения и размышления ● Национальная армия защищает революцию ● Военные народные структуры во время румынской революции 1848—1849 года ● Лагерь Кымпуллуй Троян ● Хронологические данные (март 1848 г. — август 1849). 1848-й год в свете запечатанных источников ● Военно-политическое значение румынской революции 1848 года ● Иностранные источники и доказательства: «Румынская нация имеет право жить сама, своими силами, за себя». Венские отклики ● 55-летие создания Национального антифашистского комитета в котором блестящим образом проявил себя молодой революционер НИКОЛАЕ ЧАУШЕСКУ. Румыния решительно выступает против фашизма и ревизионизма. Антифашистская борьба в Румынии имеет надежную опору: армию ● Румыния во время антигитлеровской войны. Новые доказательства вновь подтверждают положение нашей страны на IV место в рамках антигитлеровской коалиции ● Фундаментальные истины национальной истории. Мы здесь навсегда. Местный коренной характер и непоколебимость румынского народа в карпатско-дунайско-понтийском пространстве ● Фундаменты румынской военной доктрины. Вооруженная армия и народная борьба в концепции революционеров 1848 года ● Нерешенное еще досе: Сеть связи Черкус (I) ● Память документов: «Еще одно слово о гуманности». Страницы эпопеи независимости. Николае Балческу, блестящий военный историк ● Великие военачальники ● Крупные битвы ● Памятники борьбы ● Точки зрения. История и политика, правда и фальшь в связи с книгами об истории Трансильвании ● Из деятельности румынской комиссии по военной истории ● Книга об истории.

INHALT

● 140 Jahre seit der rumänischen Revolution vom Jahre 1848. Die Auffassung des Präsidenten Nicolae Ceaușescu bezüglich der Stelle und der Rolle der rumänischen Revolution von 1848 in der Nationalgeschichte. „Achtzehn Jahrhunderte von Bemühungen...” Die rumänische Revolution von 1848. Vorposten der europäischen Revolution ● Die Flamme der Revolution fasst den ganzen rumänischen Raum um. Iași, den 27. März/8. April 1848: das erste revolutionäre Programm. Blaj den 3./15. Mai 1848: „Wir wollen uns mit dem Land vereinen”. Islaz, den 9./21. Juni 1848: Die historische, Proklamation, eine authentische Verfassung des Landes ● Maximen und Überlegungen ● Die nationale Armee verteidigt die Revolution ● Volkstümliche Militärstrukturen in der Zeit der rumänischen Revolution, 1848—1849 ● Das Lager am Feld Trojans ● Chronologische Anhaltspunkte (März 1848 — August 1849) ● Das Jahr 1848 im Lichte der Siegelquelle ● Die politisch-militärische Bedeutung der rumänischen Revolution vom Jahre 1848 ● Fremde Beweise „Die rumänische Nation hat das Recht durch sie selbst und für sich selbst leben”. Wienerische Echos ● 55 Jahre seit der Schaffung des Nationalen Antifaschistischen Komitees wo sich der Junge Revolutionär NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU glänzend behauptete. Rumänien drückt sich entschieden gegen den Faschismus und Revisionismus aus. Der antifaschistische Kampf aus Rumänien besitzt eine standhafte Stütze: die Armee ● Rumänen im Antihitlerkrieg. Neue Beweise bestätigen den 4. Platz unseres Landes im Rahmen der antihitleristischen Koalition ● Grundlegende Wahrheiten der Nationalgeschichte. Wir sind hier seit jeher. Die Autochtonie und die Standhaftigkeit des rumänischen Volkes im karpatodanubien-pontischen Raum ● Grundlagen der rumänischen Militärdoctrin. Die bewaffnete Nation und der Volkskrieg in der Auffassung der Revolutionären vom Jahre 1848 ● Ein noch nicht aufgeklärtes Dossier: das Netz Cereus (I) ● Die Erinnerung der Dokumenten. „Sollen wir noch ein Wort über Humanität sagen. Seite aus dem Epos der Unabhängigkeit. Nicolae Bălcescu, ausgezeichnete Militärgeschichtler ● Grosse Heerführer ● Grosse Schlachten. ● Denkmäler des Kampfes ● Stellungnahmen. Geschichte und Politik, Wahrheit und Fälschung über zwei Arbeiten bezüglich der Geschichte Transilvaniens ● Aus der Tätigkeit der Rumänischen Kommission für Militärgeschichte. ● Das Geschichtsbuch.



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