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The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention

Beyond and below what was once
Czechoslovakia lie the deep Balkans.
They are, it has been said,
a sort of hell paved with the bad intentions
of the powers[1].

By the beginning of the twentieth century Europe had added to its repertoire of *Schimpfwörter*, or disparagements, a new one which turned out to be more persistent than others with centuries old traditions. „Balkanization" not only had come to denote the parcelization of large and viable political units but also had become a synonym for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian. In its latest hypostasis, particularly in American academe, it has been completely decontextualized and paradigmatically related to a variety of problems.[2] If European identity, as Agnes Heller has maintained, is characterized by „the recognition of the accomplishment of others," then „the myth of Occident and Orient is not a juxtaposition of civilization with barbarism but rather of one civilization with another," and „European (Western) cultural identity has been conceived as both ethnocentric and anti-ethnocentric."[3] If Europe has produced not only racism but also anti-racism, not only misogyny but also feminism, not only anti-Semitism but also its repudiation, then what can be termed „Balkanism" has not yet been coupled with its complementing and ennobling antithesis.

„Orientalism" was advanced by Edward Said to denote „the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient–dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short Orientalism [can be discussed and analyzed] as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient."[4] Particularly inspired by Foucault, from whom he not only borrowed the term „discourse" but his focus on the relationship of knowledge to power,[5] Said exposed the dangers of essentializing the „orient" as „other". Less attention in this respect has been paid to the essentialization (or, rather, self-essentialization) of the „west", as the hegemonic pair in the dichotomy. Predictably, the response to Said's book was quite polarized: modernization theorists and classical liberals were severely critical;[6] however, there was also serious and subtle epistemological critique, an attempt to avoid the extremes and go beyond Said, and beyond orientalism.[7] Studies of power and representation have also progressed beyond Foucault.[8]

Yet, despite distinguished and undistinguished objections, the place of „orientalism" in academic dictionaries is secured. Its continuing resonance is perhaps best explained by the growing awareness of students of society and history „of the role of their academic disciplines in the reproduction of patterns of domination."[9] What has been recognized „is that the critiques of colonialism have not really led to a reflection on the evolution of knowledge that brings us into the post-colonial (or neocolonial) present."[10] Nor have critiques of domination and dependence outside the colonial context, as in the case of the Balkans.

But „Balkanism" is not merely a sub-species of orientalism,[11] an „orientalist variation on a Balkan theme."[12] The absence of a colonial legacy (despite the often exploited analogies) is not the only, not even the main difference. „Balkanism" evolved independently from „Orientalism" and, in certain aspects, against or despite it, partially because southeastern Europe (or the Balkans)[13] has been considered geopolitically distinct from the near or the middle east. Its Christianity opposed it to Islam and fed the crusading potential of western Christendom. Despite many depictions of its (Orthodox) Christianity as „oriental despotism," inherently non-European or non-western, still the boundary between Islam and Christianity continued to be perceived as the principal one. Moreover, Balkan self-identities constructed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were invariably opposed to „oriental others": geographical neighbors, e.g. the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, as well as regions within the area itself and portions of one's own historical past (usually the Ottoman period and the Ottoman legacy).[14] Here, I will focus exclusively on the first of these two sides of Balkanism: its construction from the outside.

Geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as „the other", the Balkans became, in time, the object of a number of externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations and have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the „European" and „the west" has been constructed. Balkanism conveniently exempted „the west" from charges of racism, colonialism, Eurocentrism and Christian intolerance: the Balkans, after all, are in Europe, they are white and they are predominantly Christian.

The „civilized world" (as Europe outside the Balkans and North America have proclaimed themselves)[15] was first distressed not simply by events in the area but by area itself during the Balkan wars (1912-1913). News of the barbarities committed on this distant European peninsula came flooding in and challenged the peace movements which were gaining strength and becoming institutionalized. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace established a commission (eight well known politicians, professors and journalists from France, the United States, Great Britain, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary) „to inquire into the causes and conduct of the Balkan wars."[16] Their report, published in 1914,[17] considers in detail the historical roots of the Balkan conflict, presents the points of view and aspirations of the different belligerents, as well as the economic, social and moral con-

sequences of the wars, and their relation to international law. It includes an introduction by Baron d'Estournelle de Constant reiterating the main principles of the peace movement: „Let us repeat, for the benefit of those who accuse us of 'bleating for peace at any price,' what we have always maintained: War rather than slavery; Arbitration rather than war; Conciliation rather than arbitration."[18] De Constant also differentiated between the first and the second Balkan wars; the first was defensive and a war of independence, „the supreme protest against violence, and generally the protest of the weak against the strong... and for this reason it was glorious and popular throughout the civilized world."[19] The second, however, was a predatory war in which „both victor and vanquished lose morally and materially." But both „finally sacrificed treasures of riches, lives, and heroism. We cannot authenticate these sacrifices without protesting, without denouncing their cost and their danger for the future."[20] While not optimistic about the immediate political future of the region, the commission concluded:

> What then is the duty of the civilized world in the Balkans?... It is clear in the first place that they should cease to exploit these nations for gain. They should encourage them to make arbitration treaties and insist upon their keeping them. They should set a good example by seeking a judicial settlement of all international disputes.[21]

De Constant himself reiterated:

> The real culprits in this long list of executions, assassinations, drownings, burnings, massacres and atrocities furnished by our report, are not, we repeat, the Balkan peoples. Here pity must conquer indignation. Do not let us condemn the victims... The real culprits are those who by interest or inclination, declaring that war is inevitable, end by making it so, asserting that they are powerless to prevent it.[22]

In 1993, instead of launching a fact-finding mission, the Carnegie Endowment satisfied itself with reprinting the „Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars," preceding that title with a gratuitous caption, „The Other Balkan Wars."[23] Also added is an introduction by George Kennan, ambassador to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and to Yugoslavia in the 1960s, best known as the *padre padrone* of the US policy of containment vis-à-vis the USSR. Entitled „The Balkan Crises: 1913 and 1993,"[24] this introduction is in turn preceded by a two-page preface by the president of the Carnegie Endowment, Morton Abramowitz, which recounts his almost serendipitous idea to reopen the 80-year-old report. It convinced him „that others should also have the opportunity to read it. It is a document with many stories to tell us in this twilight decade of the twentieth century, when yet again a conflict in the Balkans torments Europe and the conscience of the international community."[25] Abramowitz considers Kennan the person to best bridge the two events and instruct the conscience of the international community (which seems to have been tormented primarily by the Balkans throughout the twentieth century). We „all now benefit from his insight, his sure sense of history, and his felicitous style."[26]

Kennan's introduction/article begins with praise of peace movements in the Unites States, England and northern Europe which sought to create new legal codes of international behavior. Although the initiative for an international conference on disarmament came from the Russian Tsar Nicholas II, it was „immature dilettantism, ... elaborated by the characteristic confusions of the Russian governmental establishment of the time, ... not a serious one."[27] And although it was not serious, it was „seized upon with enthusiasm" by the proponents of peace who convoked the two Hague Peace Conferences and other international initiatives. Having separated the serious men from the dilletant boys, thus retrospectively essentializing cold war dichotomies, the introduction describes the historical context of the turn of the century, the outbreak of the Balkan wars and report of the Carnegie commission which follows.

> The importance of this report for the world of 1993 lies primarily in the light it casts on the excruciating situation prevailing today in the same Balkan world with which it dealt. The greatest value of the report is to reveal to people of this age how much of today's problem has deep roots and how much does not.[28]

Confirming thus his belief in the maxim *„Historia est magistra vitae,"* the second part of Kennan's introduction analyzes analogies with the past and the lessons of these analogies, its approach indicated by the slip „the same Balkan world."[29] The newly created Balkan states are summed up as monarchies whose leaders were „as a rule, somewhat more moderate and thoughtful than their subjects. Their powers were usually disputed by inexperienced and unruly parliamentary bodies"[30] – leaving one to wonder which was the rule and who were the exceptions. The Bulgarian Tsar Ferdinand, „Foxy Ferdinand," plunged his country into the second Balkan war, despite better advice, to achieve his wild ambitions (not Balkan, but central European, more particularly, Saxe-Coburg-Gothan) to enter Constantinople as victor; he accomplished the loss of his crown and the unruly parliamentary body ruled that he was never to set foot in Bulgaria again. The „moderate" Milan Obrenovich involved and humiliated Serbia in a war with Bulgaria in 1885;[31] and Kennan could have used the bloody assassination of the last pathetic Obrenovich, Alexander, in 1903, to illustrate typical Balkan violence, had he not been of royal birth.[32] Finally, the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen dynasty of Romania was moderation incarnate, especially the soap-opera Carol II, whose mother was the beautiful Queen Marie, a „regular, regular, regular, regular royal queen" according to a caption in a 1924 *Time,*[33] the favorite grand-daughter of Victoria and an intimate friend of the Waldorf Astors.[34]

On the other hand, the explanation for the Balkan irredenta, for dreams of glory and territorial expansion, is summarized in one sentence: „It was hard for people who had recently achieved so much, to know where to stop."[35] No mention that recent Balkan upstarts, under the „moderate" guidance of mostly German princelings, were emulating the „frugal" imperial behavior of their western European models. Critical of the original report in that „there was no attempt to analyze the political motivations of the various governments participating in the

wars,"[36] Kennan's introduction nonetheless sums up his view of the reasons for the Balkan wars:

> The strongest motivating factor involved in the Balkan wars was not religion but aggressive nationalism. But that nationalism, as it manifested itself on the field of battle, drew on deeper traits of character inherited, presumably, from a distant tribal past... And so it remains today... What we are up against is the sad fact that developments of those earlier ages, not only those of the Turkish domination but of earlier ones as well, had the effect of thrusting into the southeastern reaches of the European continent a salient of non-European civilization which has continued to the present day to preserve many of its non-European characteristics.[37]

Had Kennan's essay introduced the original report, written a whole year before the outbreak of World War I, one could empathize with its moral outrage even while overlooking its conceptual inaccuracies: at the time, it seemed that with little effort the *belle époque* would endure forever. Kennan, on the other hand, had full knowledge of the butcheries of two world wars. And although at least technically it is indisputable that the spark for the power-keg came from the Balkans, very few serious historians would claim that they were the cause of World War I.[38] Perhaps because the Balkans were comparatively late and reluctantly involved in World War II, Kennan does not even mention it: „Well, here we are in 1993. Eighty years of tremendous change in the remainder of Europe and of further internecine strife in the Balkans themselves have done little to alter the problem this geographic region presents for Europe."[39]

Indeed, there is something distinctly non-European in the dimensions of Balkan slaughters. After World War II, it is ethnocentric at least to state that „these states of mind [animosities] are not peculiar to the Balkan people, ... they can be encountered among other European peoples as well... But all these distinctions are relative ones. It is the undue predominance among the Balkan peoples of these particular qualities, and others that might have been mentioned."[40] One is tempted to ask whether the Holocaust resulted from a „due" or „undue" predominance of barbarity. Certainly the Holocaust occurred fifty years ago, but the two Balkan wars were even earlier; besides, Kennan wrote his essay only a year after the „neat and clean" Gulf war operation during which there were twice as many casualties as incurred by all sides during the two Balkan wars.[41] Whether the Balkans are non-European or not may be a matter of academic and political debate, but the area certainly has no monopoly on barbarity.

It is not my intention merely to express moral outrage at somebody else's moral outrage. My question is: how does one explain the persistence of such a frozen image of the Balkans? While historians are well aware that dramatic changes have occurred on the peninsula, their discourse on the Balkans as a geographic/cultural entity is overwhelmed by a discourse utilizing the construct as a powerful symbol conveniently located outside historical time. And this usage itself is the product of nearly two centuries of evolution. How could a geographical appel-

lation be transformed into one of the most powerful pejorative designations in history, international relations, political science and, nowadays, general intellectual discourse? There seem to be three reasons which I will discuss in turn: first, innocent inaccuracies have resulted from imperfect geographical knowledge, transmitted by tradition. Second, this purely geographical appellation was later saturated with political, social, cultural and ideological overtones so that by the turn of the century „Balkan" had pejorative implications. Third, the complete dissociation of the designation from its object occurred and a further evolution of pejorative usage resulted. Commensurately there occurred the reverse and retroactive ascription of the pejorative designation to the geographical area (particularly after 1989).

Only during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did west Europeans become aware that the European possessions of the Ottoman Empire had a distinct physiognomy of their own and merited attention other than as mere Ottoman provinces or as archeological sites. On the one hand, commerce between western Europe, primarily Great Britain and France, was increasing; there was continuing interest in the monuments of classical antiquity; and the napoleonic wars had deterred travelers from visiting western Europe and the western Mediterranean (especially in the case of the Grand Tour) and induced them to visit „the east". On the other hand, the intensifying activities of the Balkan populations for political sovereignty during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries attracted attention to populations which had been hitherto subsumed under the undifferentiated title of Ottoman or Turkish Christians. Views of the area were colored by romanticism and/or *Realpolitik,* resulting in polarized advocacy or demonization of these populations. Philhellenism swept Europe in the 1820s, followed by disillusionment with realities; Turkophilia and Slavophobia were in vogue, together with the mirror-image phenomena of Turkophobia (or rather Islamophobia) and Slavophilism as direct functions of great power politics, and specifically nineteenth century attitudes towards Russia.

While travel literature was a fashionable genre throughout eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Europe, there is no doubt that travelers' accounts were the preferred reading after novels in Britain. They represented an important portion of English literature and, „although the literature of travel is not the highest kind, and indeed cannot be called a distinct branch of literature, yet a history of English literature rightly assigns a space apart to such books, because this kind of writing, perhaps more than any other, both expresses and influences national predilections and national character."[42] Obviously, geographical discovery was going hand in hand with a simultaneous invention of the region and the two processes are, in fact, inseparable.

In 1794 the „wrecks of ancient grandeur" led John Morritt, then freshly out of Cambridge, across Europe to Constantinople, and from there to Troy, Mount Athos and Athens. After going through the Shipka Pass, he described his feelings in a letter to his sister: „we were approaching classic ground. We slept at the foot of a mountain, which we crossed the next day, which separates Bulgaria from Romania

(the ancient Thrace), and which, though now debased by the name of Bal.Kan, is no less a personage than the ancient Haemus."[43] Certainly this „Levant lunatic" and future prominent member of the Society of Dilettanti must have been irritated by any reminder of the present on „classic ground"; yet the later accretions were duly recorded. This was one of the very first times that the mountain chain dividing Bulgaria from east to west and running parallel to the Danube was called „Balkan", Turkish for „wooded mountain."

Practically all previous travelers, including Edward Brown, who published his popular and influential „Brief Account of Some Travels in Diverse Parts of Europe" in 1669, had used only the ancient term „Haemus."[44] Brown maintained, following ancient authors, that the mountain chain continued to the west, separating Serbia from Macedonia, and that, under different names, the Haemus stretched between Pontus Euxinus (the Black Sea) and the Adriatic.[45] From the early nineteenth century on, „Haemus" and „Balkan" were used interchangeably;[46] after the 1820s „Balkan" became the preferred although not yet exclusive term.[47] In 1827 Robert Walsh repeated the earlier error that the Haemus stretched for over 500 miles, beginning at the Bay of Venice and reaching the Black Sea; now, he added, this chain was called „Balkan," which meant „difficult mountain."[48] Not until 1827 was „Balkan" used to refer to the whole peninsula, when Walsh mentioned that the bishops in this region were always Greeks who used Greek as the liturgical language exclusively in the southern parts and predominantly in the northern parts of the Balkans.[49] Still, the region was commonly called the „Hellenic peninsula," „Greek peninsula," „Illyrian peninsula," „Roman peninsula," „Byzantine peninsula," „Thrace," etc., evoking its ancient or medieval past. Until the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the increasingly frequent designations were „European Turkey," „Turkey-in-Europe," „Ottoman Empire in Europe," „(European) Levant" and, after the turn of the century, „South-Slavic peninsula", „Southeasteuropean peninsula," (part of) „Mediterranean Europe," (part of) „Danubian Europe," (part of) „Eastern Europe," „Southeastern Europe". For the Ottoman rulers the region was „Rum-eli," – Rumelia – literally „the land of the Romans," i.e., of the Greeks.[50] Although Morritt's classically conditioned ears had been offended by the sound of „Balkan," the descriptions of the area dating from the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and most of the nineteenth century are non-judgmental and matter of fact.

The reason why „Balkan" became one of the most often used designations (alongside southeastern Europe) has little to do with precise geography.[51] The German geographer August Zeune was the first to use the term „Balkan peninsula" *(Balkanhalbeiland)* in 1809: „In the north this Balkan peninsula is divided from the rest of Europe by the long mountain chain of the Balkans, or the former Albanus, Scardus, Haemus, which, to the northwest, joins the Alps in the small Istrian peninsula, and to the east fades away into the Black Sea in two branches."[52] In the 1830s, as a result of his expeditions, the French geologist and geographer Ami Boué authoritatively and definitively corrected this perception.[53] However, by the turn of the century „Balkan peninsula" or simply „Balkans" was increasingly used and had

established itself with a political rather than a geographical connotation.[54] In 1922 the Serbian geographer Jovan Cvijic, much as he was aware of the incorrect employment of the term, used it himself in his important work on the peninsula.[55]

By the close of the nineteenth century there were in place two patterns of perception of the Balkans which, for lack of a better definition, can be termed loosely the aristocratic and the bourgeois.[105] They were transmitted throughout the following periods and perpetuated, sometimes literally, sometimes in a modified form, often intertwined, by consecutive generations. While the Macedonian question had contributed to the reputation of the peninsula as a turbulent region, it was during the Balkan wars and World War I that „balkanization" was coined, conclusively sealing a negative image for the area. A new feature, however, was added to this image: violence. Western Europeans had always proclaimed horror at apparently „eastern" barbarities, especially impaling. This punishment was reported by practically all travelers;[106] and its exoticism fired morose western imagination – as a result of which Vlad Țepeș[107] was transformed into the immortal figure of Dracula. Yet, early descriptions did not reflect a self-perceived moral superiority and never attributed atrocities in the region to inherent genetic defects. Violence as the *Leitmotiv* of the Balkans is a, strictly speaking post-Balkan wars phenomenon. According to Rebecca West:

> Violence was, indeed, all I knew of the Balkans: all I knew of the South Slavs. I derived the knowledge from memories of my earliest interest in Liberalism, of leaves fallen from this jungle of pamphlets, tied up with string in the dustiest corners of junk-shops, and later from the prejudices of the French, who use the word „Balkan" as a term of abuse, meaning a rastaquouère type of barbarian.[108]

Another facet which had seasoned in nineteenth century thinking was added to „Balkan" during the interwar period: the racial. An apprentice of Gobineau and Chamberlain, to mention but a few of the founding fathers of racism, Hermann, Graf von Keyserling, was an influential figure in the philosophy of self-knowledge and cultural psychology, around whom a school was formed *(Schule der Weisheit)* in Darmstadt in the 1920s aimed at bringing people through creative knowledge to self-attainment. In 1928 he published „Das Spektrum Europa," which was published in translation as „Europe" in the United States;[109] of his twelve chapters, one is devoted to the Balkans:

> What is the significance of the Balkans to us who live in other lands? ... Why is it that the word „Balkanization" is almost always rightly understood and rightly applied? ... As far as I can see, its symbolic sense may best be apprehended from two starting-points; the first is the generally accepted statement that the Balkans are the powdermagazine of Europe. The second is the fact of a peculiarly elemental and irreconcilable racial enmity.[110]

Having provided lengthy descriptions of the Greeks, the Romanians and the Turks (the Serbs, Bulgarians and Albanians were „primitive warrior and robber races" not worthy of attention), Keyserling summarized the Balkans:

> The Balkans of today are nothing but a caricature of the Balkans of ancient times. The spirit of the Balkans as such is the spirit of eternal strife. Inhabited as they are by primitive races, they present the primal picture of the primal stuggle between the one and the all. In the case of the highly gifted and highly educated nations and individuals, this picture emerges as the spirit of the agon. But the earth-spirit of the Balkans as such is the primal formative power.[111]

The same year, 1928, saw the American translation of a Swedish book which had appeared in Stockholm in 1927.[112] The author, Marcus Ehrenpreis, who traversed the Balkans, Egypt and the Holy Land in quest of „the soul of the East," was critical of his co-passengers who had „learnt nothing" and had brought back only

> their precious possessions, photographs and big hotel bills... This is not the way to visit the Orient! If you would win something of the soul of the East do not approach it as you would a strange country but as if you were returning home – to yourself ... Do not go condescending as a bringer of civilization, but as a disciple, humbly and receptively.[113]

This spirit was conspicuously absent from his first chapter, „Across the New Balkans":

> The Orient is already in evidence at the Masaryk railway station in Prague. Not the real Orient of the Azhar at Cairo or the one of Haifa's street cafes, but that variant of the East known as Levantinism; a something, elusive of definition – the body of the East but without its spirit. It is a crumbling Orient, a traitorous deserter from itself, without fez, without veil, without Koran: it is an artificial, trumpery New Orient which has deliberately broken with its past and renounced its ancient heritage.[114]

The description of the inhabitants of this Levant (as contrasted to the „true East") bears witness to their racial degeneration:

> There is something eccentric in their conduct, they are overloud, too sudden, too eager... Odder, incredible individuals appear on all sides – low foreheads, sodden eyes, protruding ears, thick underlips... The Levantine type in the areas between the Balkans and the Mediterranean is, psychologically and socially, truly a „wavering form," a composite of Easterner and Westerner, multilingual, cunning, superficial, unreliable, materialistic and, above all, without tradition. This absence of tradition seems to account for the low intellectual and, to a certain extent moral, quality of the Levantines... In a spiritual sense these creatures are homeless; they are no longer Orientals nor yet Europeans. They have not freed themselves from the vices of the East nor acquired any of the virtues of the West.[115]

In both Keyserling's and Ehrenpreis's works the former dichotomy between gentlemanly overlords and cringing subjects has found a theoretical rationalization: the inhabitants of the Balkans as „crossbreeds" are racially and culturally inferior, not only to western Europeans but also to the oriental other.

Of course, the shots of Gavrilo Princip, which signaled the outbreak of World War I, have left an indelible mark on practically all assessments of the region. John Gunther's immensely popular „Inside Europe" thus summarized American feelings:

> It is an intolerable affront to human and political nature that these wretched and unhappy little countries in the Balkan peninsula can, and do, have quarrels that cause world wars. Some hundred and fifty thousand young Americans died because of an event in 1914 in a mud-caked primitive village, Sarajevo. Loathsome and almost obscene snarls in Balkan politics, hardly intelligible to a Western reader, are still vital to the peace of Europe, and perhaps the world.[116]

This section of the book was reprinted even after the outbreak of World War II. Is it possible that Hitler's snarls in German politics were more intelligible to readers because they were western? Admittedly, it would be a difficult step to take to assert that even World War II can be blamed on the Balkans. But, after fifty years, someone finally took that step: Robert Kaplan, who openly aspires to become the Dame Rebecca West of the 1990s, maintained in „Balkan Ghosts" that „Nazism, for instance, can claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses of Vienna, a breeding ground of ethnic resentments close to the southern Slavic world, Hitler learned how to hate so infectiously."[117]

During the interwar period there was significant academic research on the Balkans, primarily in Germany, and several Balkan institutes were founded in the region.[118] After 1918, however, usage of the designation „Balkan peninsula" became less common because of its geographic inadequacy and because it was value laden. According to Mathias Bernath, „Southeastern Europe" was to become the „neutral, non-political and non-ideological concept which, moreover, abolished the standing historical-political dichotomy between the Danubian monarchy and the Ottoman Balkans that had become irrelevant."[119] During the 1930s and 1940s, however, „Südosteuropa" was adopted by the nazis to become *Wirtschaftsraum Grossdeutschland Südost* in their new order.[120]

And finally, a new facet of the image of the Balkans was added after World War II when a new demon, a new other, communism, was grafted onto it, one which exempted two of the most important representatives of the Balkan *Kulturraum,* Greece and Turkey. Since the 1970s discussions on the identity of (east) central Europe have increased and have become increasingly vociferous.[121] Ideologists seeking to rationalize and legitimize emancipatory breaks from the tutelage of the Soviet Union have viewed the region in terms of opposites, e.g. between Catholic and Orthodox, Byzantium and the west. East central Europe has been relegated to the nebulous realm of „Western values" while the Balkans with Russia are, if not strictly Asian, then semi-Asian, „Halb-Asien," „Savage Europe," „The Other Europe"[122] or the newly coined and ostensibly neutral „Eurasia". In his present incarnation as a politician, Vaclav Havel argued for a non-inclusive policy on the part of NATO using the terminology of civilizational fault lines:

> If ... NATO is to remain functional, it cannot suddenly open its doors to anyone at all... The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – and Austria

> and Slovenia as well – clearly belong to the western sphere of European civilization. They espouse its values and draw on the same traditions. Moreover, the contiguous and stable Central European belt borders both on the traditionally agitated Balkans and the great Eurasian area, where democracy and market economies are only slowly and painfully breaking away toward their fulfillment.[123]

Former Secretary of State Laurence Eagleburger, who does not have a previous incarnation as an intellectual, made the same point: addressing the responsibilities and credibility of NATO in connection with the Bosnian crisis, he stated that the organization should be very much alive and should include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (apparently not Slovakia) „so that there is a clear message who should be in and who out."[124] Current discourse on the Balkans, when the overexpansion of European institutions endangers the exclusiveness of the privileged club, is thus perfectly clear.

To come full circle and link the Kennan prelude with a Kennan coda, his piece becomes intelligible only in the light of this „clear message." What one can hear in it are motifs of a distinct and well known melody of an earlier period with some fresh improvisations. It is an American patrician version of the old aristocratic European paradigm garnished with nineteenth century Victorian righteousness. It manifests an evolutionary belief in the superiority of orderly civilization over barbarity, archaic predispositions, backwardness, petty squabbles, unconforming and unpredictable behavior, i.e., „tribalism." Kennan's use of „tribal" relegates the Balkans to a lower civilizational category, one to which Africans are usually relegated. Africa and Asia have been classified by Elie Kedourie, according to their alleged political tradition, as the legacy of tribal rule and the legacy of Oriental despotism.[125] Tribal society's central feature is its primitiveness, lack of complexity and, implicitly, weakness. When confronted „with the demand of modernization for a sophisticated system of law and political representation, it merely collapses into tyranny";[126] moreover, this is an „oriental" tyranny which entails intrinsic passivity, incompatible with initiative and enterprise. Such classification of peoples according to notions of (social and technological) complexity and activity is a fundamental principle of an imperial discourse which has been inherited primarily by the press.[127] It also precludes any responsibility or simply empathy which the „civilized world" might otherwise bestow on more „reasonable" people. Thus, responding to the question „What is to be done?" Kennan's introduction concludes that „no one – no particular country and no group of countries – wants, or should be expected to occupy the entire distracted Balkan region, to subdue its excited peoples, and to hold them in order until they calm down and begin to look at their problems in a more orderly way."[128]

Current discourse on the Balkans also reflects a shift in western policy toward Turkey. Before the twentieth century there was an ambiguous attitude toward the Turks: while there was a perhaps unconscious empathy with the ruler, there was also sympathy for fellow Christians, although this was not necessarily reflected in

official policies, at least in Britain. Britain in particular was anti-Russian and considered itself compelled to uphold the Ottoman Empire as an ally and as a barrier against further southern and eastern Russian expansion. This geopolitical configuration was in many ways inherited by the United States, and Turkey became an important element in the cold war anti-Soviet alliance. But there was no longer any ambiguity: the Balkans were no longer Christian but communist. Additionally, since World War II it has become illegitimate to criticize any society, including Turkey, for being non-white, non-Christian or non-European. Kennan's introduction accordingly downplays the role of the Ottoman Empire and the Turks in the Balkans: current problems stem from their „distant tribal past," and have roots that „reach back, clearly, not only into the centuries of Turkish domination" but are „developments of those earlier ages, not only those of the Turkish domination but of earlier ones as well." Finally, „one must not be too hard on the Turks"; after all, „in a sense, there was more peace when [the Balkans] were still under Turkish rule than there was after they gained their independence. (That it not to say that the Turkish rule was in all other respects superior to what came after.)"[129]

It is valid to re-assess empires, including the last multi-national empire, the Soviet.[130] Epithets such as „anomalous" for empires will probably fall into disuse in academic writing.[131] And it is certainly not valid for Balkan politicians and intellectuals to use the Ottoman Empire and Turkey as scapegoats for all their misfortunes and misconduct, to attempt to define themselves against a demonized other, in this case very literally to resort to orientalism.[132] But Kennan has essentialized the Balkans: he has transformed Herder's Balkan „Volksgeist" into Kaplan's „Balkan ghosts." Roland Barthes remarked that collective representations and mentalities can be frozen, kept stagnant by power, the press and reigning values.[133] David Spurr has shown, in the case of the third world, that while the press continues to cling to normative views of civilization formed during the colonial era, anthropology and cultural criticism have questioned the consequences of such views.[134] Such questioning has not been directed at the Balkans, possibly because their non-colonial status has left them out of the sphere of interest of postcolonial critique and cultural criticism, and because Balkan, and in general European, anthropology has been somewhat marginal to the field.[135]

If Kennan is contextualized in what I have described as an imperial geopolitical continuity, he will not be seen (or, at least, not seen only) as a hostage of a tradition of stereotypes. Certainly, he is in the same relationship with „Balkanist" texts that all readers, according to Wolfgang Iser, are with all written texts. A text, in his formulation, is bracketed off from the world it represents and „what is within the brackets is separated from the reality in which it is normally embedded." There is a continual oscillation between both worlds that produces a two-fold doubling – one affecting the recipient, the other the world of the text itself.[136] While this duality serves to aestheticize fictionality in literature because it is an essentially staged discourse, fiction in philosophical (or other) discourse remains veiled and, therefore, can be subject to rules of practical application, can be designed for a specif-

ic purpose, in a word, can be falsified.[137] Indeed, „the challenge of orientalism is precisely the challenge of a discursive formation that has complicated extratextual and nondiscursive implications and consequences."[138] One might also add sources. From this perspective Kennan is an important architect as well as *porte-parole* of power-politics. Authority and authorities may consciously and deliberately shape representation or appropriate existing types of representation for political expediency. In Iser's terms, this is an „intention-led mobilization" on the part of the activator.[139] Kennan is thus an example of one at an intersection, or in the midst of a complex and dialectical chain reaction, between knowledge as power, of „discourse as a violence we do to things or, at all events, as a practice that we impose on them."[140] This is also a configuration where (political) power yields knowledge, for the two are „rigorously indivisible."[141] In the field of social psychology, John French and Bertram Raven have differentiated six bases of social power: coercive, reward, legitimate, reference, expert and informational power.[142] Expert power is based on the perception, on the part of the target, i.e., audience and readership, that the agent possesses superior power and ability; informational power depends entirely on the quality of the message, its persuasiveness and the logic of its argumentation. The expert power and informational power that a person such as Kennan exerts is enhanced by, and at the same time bears a double responsibility because of, the dual target of his agency: policy-makers and the public. Faced with stark political realities, and working within the confines and with the modest means of academe, one can hope only to subvert the informative power of expert authority.

The Balkans have been ill served by discovery and invention. Balkanism and its subject are imprisoned in a field of discourse in which „Balkans" is paired in opposition to „West" and „Europe", while „Balkanism" is the dark other of „western civilization." When the Balkans were part of the scatter pattern of invective aimed at the east and „Orientalism" was the other necessary for the self-essentializing „West" and „Europe", there existed the prospect of their rediscovery in a positive fashion. With the rediscovery of the east and orientalism as independent semantic values, the Balkans are left in Europe's thrall, anti-civilization, *alter ego,* the dark side within.

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1. John Gunther, *Inside Europe* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), 437.
2. Thus we read that „at the University of California at Berkeley Chancellor Chang-Lin Tien broods over the Balkanization taking place throughout society" (Ellis Cose review of *Divided We Fall: Gambling with History in the Nineties* by Haynes Johnson, in *The New York Times Book Review,* [27 March 1994]: 11). Likewise, in a lively academic debate over multiculturalism at Rice University, Eva Thompson, a professor of German and Slavic studies, saw the multiculturalism-curriculum not as

a means of creating a shared identity but as the Balkanization of the American people (*Sallyport* [December 1991]: 33).

3. Agnes Heller, „Europe: An Epilogue?" *The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity,* eds. Brian Nelson, David Roberts and Walter Veit (New York: Berg, 1992), 14.
4. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 3.
5. Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essay and Interviews* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
6. See, for example, David Kopf, „Hermeneutics Versus History," *Journal of Asian Studies* 39, no. 3 (1980). The heated exchange with Bernard Lewis has been summarized recently in a collection of essays by Bernard Lewis, „The Question of Orientalism," *Islam and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 99-118. For a survey of the reception of Said's theory, see Robert A. Kapp, „Introduction: Review Symposium: Edward Said's Orientalism," *Journal of Asian Studies* 39, no. 3 (1980).
7. See, in particular, Jayant Lele, „Orientalism and the Social Sciences," *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia,* eds. Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 45-75. Also see the critique by Ernest Gellner of Said's latest book, *Culture and Imperialism* in *The Times Literary Supplement,* 19 February 1993 as well as Said's response in *The Times Literary Supplement,* 4 June 1993.
8. Stephen A. Marglin and Frederique Appfel Marglin, eds., *Dominating Knowledge: Development, Culture and Resistance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990): James Clifford, „On Orientalism," *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature and Art* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 255-76; S. P. Mohanty, „Us and Them: On the Philosophical Bases of Political Criticism," *Yale Journal of Criticism* 2, no. 2 (1989): 10-31.
9. Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, „Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament," 1.
10. *Ibid.*, 2. This recognition has been made on the basis usually of studies on India and other colonial cases: Raymond Schwab, *The Oriental Renaissance: Europe's Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680-1880* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), a translation of *La Renaissance Orientale* (Paris, 1950); Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988); Sara Suleri, *The Rhetoric of English India* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989); Roland Inden, *Imagining India* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
11. There is one different use and definition of „Balkanism" which I am aware of. In 1932 Konrad Berkovici published *The Incredible Balkans* (New York: Loring and Mussey, 1932), a popular historical pamphlet in which he treated Balkanism as the particular system of government fostered by the Austrians in their eastern domains (217 ff.).
12. This is, of course, a paraphrase of the title of the excellent article by Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden, „Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans': Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics." *Slavic Review* 51, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 1-15

13. In this text „southeastern Europe" and „Balkans" are used as synonyms, although it is possible to look for nuanced differences in their usage.
14. On internal orientalism, see Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden, „Orientalist Variations on the Theme 'Balkans.'" About the historical dimension, see Maria Todorova, „The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans," *The Ottoman Legacy*, ed. L. Carl Brown (forthcoming).
15. It is symptomatic that politically correct expressions are not applied to the dichotomy „civilized-uncivilized" in geographic terms, especially in regard to Africa or to the Balkans, where it is either the response of the „civilized West" or of the „civilized world" which is evoked. (For the first, see Secretary of State Laurence Eagleburger on the *MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour*, Friday, 29 April 1994 commenting on Rwanda; for the second there are numerous examples, among them the recent *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 March, 1944 on the implementation of the no-fly resolution in Bosnia.
16. The membres of the commision were for France: Baron d'Estournelle de Constant, a senator, and Justin Godart, a lawyer and member of the Chamber of Deputies; for the United States: Samuel Hutton, a professor at Columbia University; for Great Britain: Francis Hirst, the editor of *The Economist* and the journalist H. N. Brailsford; for Russia: Pavel Miliukov, a professor of history and member of the Duma; for Germany: Walther Schücking, a professor of law; and for Austria-Hungary: Joseph Redlich, a professor of public law.
17. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Intercourse and Education, *Report of the International Commission To Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars*. (No. 4, 1914).
18. *Ibid.*, 1.
19. *Ibid.*, 4.
20. *Ibid.*, 4-5.
21. *Ibid.*, 273.
22. *Ibid.*, 19.
23. *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict by George F. Kennan* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993).
24. The introduction was also published separately as an article in *The New York Review of Books* which in many ways aspires to record, if not to set, intellectual fashions in the US (*New York Review of Books* XL, no. 13 [15 July 1993].
25. *The Other Balkan Wars*, 1.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, 3.
28. *Ibid.*, 9.
29. Historians with a less „sure sense of history" will be somewhat skeptical of such a frozen historical image; others, with a pedantic attention to historical detail, will be annoyed by seemingly insignificant inaccuracies. Thus, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania are all said to have sprung up as new states at the beginning of the twentieth century. But Serbia began its road to autonomy in 1804, was granted full autonomy in 1830 and full independence in 1878, together with Montenegro; Romania was united in 1859 and shortly afterward received international recognition. Bulgaria was created in 1878 and declared its de facto independence

in 1908, thus being the only country to which Kennan's assertion technically applies. Since Greece is not even mentioned among the four states (Kennan obviously knows that it was created in 1830), the statement cannot be interpreted as a generalization that by the beginning of the twentieth century there were a number of independent Balkan states (4).

Further, Greece is again omitted from the description of the outbreak of the Balkan wars, although it is well known that it played a crucial role in the Balkan alliance system. Instead, we read the assertion that „the hostilities had been inaugurated in the first war by the Balkan Slavs" (6).

To speak of a Byzantine penetration of the Balkans is an absurdity both historically and conceptually. Southeastern Europe was the realm of the Byzantine Empire and it is the Byzantine state which was penetrated by different tribes, most prominently by the Slavs, who at one point or other created their independent medieval states. To speak of the „Balkans" as a pre-Ottoman construction displays an anachronistic attitude which is pardonable for a journalist but usually is considered ignorance in a historian (13).

30. *The Other Balkan Wars*, 4.
31. This event was used by George Bernard Shaw to produce his own „peacenik" variation on a Balkan theme.
32. Z. A. B. Zeman („The Balkans and the Coming War," *The Coming of the First World War*, eds. R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988] has not missed the point. Zeman flatly asserts that it was not the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 but the brutal military coup in Belgrade in 1903, five years earlier, which was the turning point in the relations between Austria and Serbia, impressing the idea that it was the particular distastefulness of the deed to which civilized Austrians objected, and not some esoteric economic frictions, nationalism and raison d'état.
33. *Time*, 4 August 1924.
34. As befits a soap-opera performance, Simon and Schuster recently published a soap-opera biography of Queen Marie: Hannah Pakula, *The Last Romantic: A Biography of Queen Marie of Romania* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).
35. *The Other Balkan Wars*, 4.
36. *Ibid.*, 6.
37. *Ibid.*, 11, 13.
38. One of the last attempts in this direction was Joachim Remak, „1914 – The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered," *Journal of Modern History* 43 (1971): 364-65. Recently it has been taken up again by Z. A. B. Zeman, „The Balkans and the Coming War."
39. *The Other Balkan Wars*, 12-13.
40. *Ibid.*
41. For war losses of the Balkan belligerents, see the same Carnegie report, 395, 243. This does not take into account the losses from disease, misplacement of civilian population, etc. The same criterion, however, is applied to the Gulf war casualties, which do not include the losses of the Kurdish population, the effects on the infrastructure of Iraq, the hunger, child war trauma, etc. Of course, an official number for the Gulf war was never released and it is curious that American mass media have forgotten this story. The only attempt to calculate the Iraqi losses was quick-

ly squelched. For a review of the Gulf war and some of the relevant literature, see Theodore Draper, „The Gulf War Reconsidered," *The New York Review of Books*, 16 January 1992; and „The True History of the Gulf War," *ibid.* 30 January 1992.

42. *The Cambridge History of English Literature* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1922), XIV, 255.

43. John B. S. Morritt of Rokeby, *A Grand Tour. Letters and Journeys 1794-96*, ed. G. E. Marindin (London: Century Publishing, 1985), 65.

44. John Burbury Gent, *A Relation of a Journey of the Right Honourable My Lord Henry Howard, From London to Vienna, and thence to Constantinople; In the Company of his Excellency Count Lesley, Knight of the Order of the Golden Fleece, Councellor of State to his Imperial Majesty, etc. And Extraordinary Ambassadour from Leopoldus Emperour of Germany to the Grand Signior, Sultan Mahomet Han the Forthe* (London. T. Collins, I. Ford and S. Hickman, 1671); *Early Voyages and Travels in the Levant. II. Extracts from the Diaries of Dr. John Covel, 1670-1679* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1893); *Travels in Turkey and back to England By the late Reverend learned Edmund Chishull* (London: W. Boyer, 1747); Adam Neale, M.D., „An Itinerary from London to Constantinople in Sixty Days; Taken in the Suite of His Excellency, the British Ambassador to the Ottoman Porte in the Year 1794," *A Collection of Modern and Contemporary Voyages and Travels: Containing, I. Translations from foreign languages, of voyages and travels never before translated. II. Original voyages and travels never before published. III. Analyses of new voyages and travels published in England* (London: R. Phillips, 1805-1809); *Travels through some parts of Germany, Poland, Moldavia and Turkey* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1818); W. M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece* (London: J. Rodwell, 1835).

45. Edward Browne, M. D., *A Brief Account of Some Travels in divers Parts of Europe, Viz. Hungaria, Servia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Thessaly, Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and Friuli. Through a great part of Germany, and The Low Countries. Through Marca Trevisana, and Lombardy on both sides of the Po. With some observations on the Gold, Silver, Copper, Quick-Silver Mines, and the Baths and Mineral Waters in Those Parts. As also, the Description of many Antiquities, Habits, Fortifications and Remarkable Places. The Second Edition with many Additions* (London. Benj. Tooke, 1685).

46. John Galt, *Voyages and Travels, in the Years 1809, 1810, and 1811; containing Statistical, Commercial, and Miscellaneous Observations on Gibraltar, Sardinia, Sicily, Malta, Serigo, and Turkey* (London: X. T. Cadell & W. Davies, 1812); Willian Macmichael, *Jorney from Moscow to Constantinople: In the Years 1817, 1818* (London: J. Murray, 1819); Capt. Charles Colville Frankland, Royal Navy *Travels to and from Constantinople, in the years 1827 and 1828: or Personal Narrative of a Journey from Vienna, through Hungary, Transylvania, Wallachia, Bulgaria, and Roumelia, to Constantinople; and from that city to the capital of Austria, by the Dardanelles, Tenedos, the Plains of Troy, Smyrna, Napoli di Romania, Athens, Egina, Poros, Cyprus, Syria, Alexandria, Malta, Sicily, Italy, Istria, Carniola, and Styria* (London: H. Colburn, 1829).

47. Robert Walsh, *Narrative of a Journey from Constantinople to England* (London: F. Westley and A. H. Davis, 1828); James Edward Alexander, Esq. *Travels from India to England; comprehending a visit to the Burman Empire, and a journey*

through Persia, Asia Minor, European Turkey & o. In the years 1825-26. Containing a chronological epitome of the late military operations in Ava; an account of the proceedings of the present mission of the Supreme Government of India to the Court of Tehran, and a summary of the causes and events of the existing war between Russia and Persia; with sketches of natural history, manners and customs, and illustrated with maps and plates (London: Purbury, Allen and Co., 1827); Captain James Edward Alexander, *Travels to the Seat of War in the East, through Russia and the Crimea, in 1829. With Sketches of the Imperial Fleet and Army, Personal Adventures, and Characteristic Anecdotes* (London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1830); Major, the Honorable George Keppel, *Narrative of a Journey across the Balkans, by the Two Passes of Selimno and Pravadi; also of a Visit to Azani, and other Newly Discovered Ruins in Asia Minor, in the Years 1829-1830* (London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1831).

48. Robert Walsh, *Narrative of a Journey*, 104-5.
49. *Ibid.*, 112-14.
50. Karl Kaser, *Südosteuropäische Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1990), 91-92.
51. For a uself survey of the evolution of geographical ideas about the Balkan mountain, see *ibid.*, 94-95.
52. August Zeune, *Goea: Versuch einer wissenschftlichen Erdbeschreibung* (Berlin: Wittich, 1808). The quote is from the second edition (Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmler, 1811). 11.
53. Ami Boué, *La Turquie d'Europe ou observations sur la géographie, la géologie, l'histoire naturelle, la statistique, les moeurs, les coutumes, l'archéeologie, l'agriculture, l'industrie, le commerce, les gouvernements divers, le clergé, l'histoire et l'état politique de cet empire* (Paris: Arthus Bartrand, 1840).
54. Karl Kaser, *Südosteuropäische Geschichte*, 96.
55. The original was published in French: Jovan Cvijic, *La péninsule balkanique: géographie humaine* (Paris: A. Colin, 1918); the Serbian translation followed in 1922: *Balkansko poluostrvo i juznoslovenske zemlje* (Belgrade, 1922).

105. It is an irony, of course, to subsume socialists under this heading, but bourgeois here is understood in its broadest meaning of urban, rational, industrialized, etc.
106. Impalings are described by Thomas Glover, Fynes Moryson, Peter Mundy, Henry Blount, etc.
107. See Radu Florescu, *Dracula, Prince of Many Faces: His Life and His Times* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989), and *Dracula, a Biography of Vlad the Impaler, 1431-1476* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1973); see also Kurt W. Treptow, ed., *Dracula: Essays on the Life and Times of Vlad Tepeş* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
108. Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, 21.
109. Count Hermann Keyserling, *Europe*, trans. Maurice Samuel (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1928).
110. *Ibid.*, 319.
111. *Ibid.*, 321-22.
112. Marcus Ehrenpreis, *The Soul of the East: Experience and Reflections*, trans. Alfhild

Huebsch (New York: Viking Press, 1928). The original was published in Stockholm: Hugo Gebers, Förlag. 1927.

113. *Ibid.*, 208-9.

114. *Ibid.*, 11.

115. *Ibid.*, 12-13.

116. John Gunther, *Inside Europe*, 437.

117. Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), XXIII. Kaplan's unfortunate and pretentious book has received a devastating (and excellently written) review by Henry R. Cooper, Jr. in *Slavic Review* 52, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 592-93. See also the serious objections by Noel Malcom, „Seeing Ghosts," *The National Interest*, no. 32 (Summer 1993); and the heated exchange between Kaplan and Malcom in *The National Interest*, no. 33 (Fall 1993).

118. See *Petnadeset godini institut za balkanistiska, 1964-1978: Istoricheska spravka i bibliografiya* (Sofia: CIBAL, 1979); Nikolay Todorov, *Razvitie, postizheniya i zadachi na balkanistikata v Bilgariya* (Sofia: CIBAL, 1977).

119. Mathias Bernath, „Südosteuropäische Geschichte als gesonderte Disziplin," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1973), 142.

120. Karl Kaser, *Südosteuropäische Geschichte*, 106. With the exception of this brief but very valuable overview by Kaser, there has not appeared anything comparable to the extremely important Michael Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastward: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Most likely its use by the nazis rendered the designation „Southeastern Europe" undesirable despite appeals for its re-introduction, e.g. the Yugoslav geographer Josip Roglic's call to use „Southeast European Peninsula" (quoted in George W. Hoffman, *The Balkans in Transition* [Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1963], 11-12). On the other hand, when, at the annual convention of the AAASS in Phoenix in 1992 a panel was entitled „Can the Balkans Become Southeastern Europe? A Current Assessment," this provoked the question whether this was not an already *déjà vu* scenario from the interwar period.

121. For a theory of central European identity, see Jenö Szücs, „Three Historical Regions of Europe", in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives* (New York: Verso, 1988); Timothy Garton Ash, „Does Central Europe Exist?" *The New York Review of Books*, 9 October 1986: Ferenc Feher, „On Making Central Europe," *Eastern European Politics and Societies* 3, no. 3 (Fall 1989); and especially the collection of essays edited by George Schöpflin and Nancy Wood, *In Search of Central Europe* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989) which has references to all pertinent titles published until then.

122. See, for example, Karl-Emil Franzos, *Aus Halb-Asien* (Leipzig: Verlag von Knopf und Härtel, 1878); Harry de Vindt, F.R.G.S., *Through Savage Europe, Being a Narrative of a Journey undertaken as Special Correspondent of the „Westminster Gazette," Throughout the Balkan States and European Rusiia* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1907); E. Garrison Walters, *The Other Europe* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1988).

123. Vaclav Havel, „New Democracies for Old Europe," *The New York Times* (17 October 1994): E. 17.

124. *MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour*, 7 February 1994.

125. Elie Kedourie in the *New Republic,* 17 December 1984. Cited in David Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing, and Imperial Administration* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 71.
126. David Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire,* 72.
127. *Ibid.,* 61-68, 73.
128. *The Other Balkan Wars,* 14.
129. *Ibid.,* 14-15.
130. See, for example, William Pfaff, „The Absence of Empire (Eastern and Balkan Europe)", *The New Yorker* 68, no. 25 (10 August 1992).
131. „Anomaly" was used rather indiscriminately, for example, by Laurence Lafore in *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1971) to explain the Austrian paradigm as the central cause for the war, next to Serbian nationalism: the second chapter of the book even was entitled „The Austrian Anomaly."
132. This merits a separate study and has been the subject of some of my own work. See Maria Todorova, „Die Osmanenzeit in der Bulgarischen Geschichtsschreibung seit der Unabhängigkeit," *Die Staaten Südosteuropas und die Osmanen,* ed. Hans Georg Majer (Munich, 1989), 127-61; „The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans," *The Continuing Ottoman Legacy,* ed. L. Carl Brown (forthcoming).
133. Roland Barthes, „Bichon chez les nègres", *Mythologies* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1957), 72-73.
134. David Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire,* 73.
135. Academic research on the Balkans, although certainly not immune from the affliction of Balkanism, has by and large still resisted its symptoms.
136. Wolfgang Iser, *Prospecting: From Reader Response to Literary Anthropology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 238-39.
137. *Ibid.,* 240-41.
138. Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, „Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament," *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament,* 5.
139. Wolfgang Iser, *The Fictive and the Imaginary: Chartering Literary Anthropology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), XVII.
140. Michel Foucault, *L'Ordre du Discours* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 55; Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language,* trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 229.
141. Michel Foucault, „Space, Power and Knowledge," *The Cultural Studies Reader,* ed. Simon During (New York: Routledge, 1993), 169.
142. It is the latter two, and particularly the distinction between them, which are most unself for this analysis. See J. Richard Eiser, *Social Psychology: Attitudes, Cognition and Social Behavior* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 39; Alice H. Eagly and Shelly Chaiken, *The Psychology of Attitudes* (Orlando: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1993), 635-36.

(„*Slavic Review*", 53, 1994, 2, p. 453-464, 474-482)