

ACADEMIA DE ȘTIINȚE SOCIALE ȘI POLITICE
A REPUBLICII SOCIALISTE ROMANIA

ANUARUL
INSTITUTULUI DE ISTORIE ȘI ARHEOLOGIE
„A. D. XENOPOL“
(SUPPLEMENT IV)

ANGLO-ROMANIAN RELATIONS
AFTER 1821

EDITURA ACADEMIEI REPUBLICII SOCIALISTE ROMANIA
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ANGLO-ROMANIAN RELATIONS

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—STUDIES FROM THE THIRD ROMANIAN-ENGLISH COLLOQUY OF HISTORIANS—

(JASSY, JULY, 1981)

VOLUME
PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION
BY
GH. BUZATU
WITH THE COLLABORATION OF
AL. PASCU

FOREWORD

BY

MIRCEA PETRESCU-DIMBOVIȚA

Allow me to open the proceedings of the third Anglo-Romanian colloquy on history by expressing the satisfaction that they are held in Jassy at the "A. D. Xenopol" Institute which recently celebrated forty years of existence. We are convinced that this scholarly event, organized by the History and Archaeology Section of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences with our Institute and the National British Committee of the International Association of South-East European Studies, will mark, just as the previous ones have done, a new step forward in deepening the study of the history of Romanian—British relations and in strengthening the scholarly connections between the historians of the two countries.

We are so much the happier for hosting this colloquy in Jassy as the problems of Romanian-British relations have been among the research objectives of our Institute. Thus for the modern and contemporary period investigations have been undertaken in Romanian and recently also in British archives, sometimes with quite fruitful results. Some of the contributions have been published; they refer to the place of oil in bilateral relations (1880—1929), the political and economic ties in the inter-war period (1919—1939), the policy of Great Britain towards Romania at the 1919 Peace Conference and during the Second World War. Similarly, in a recent monograph on Romania in international relations the stress has been laid on the crucial moments of Anglo-Romanian relations between 1699 and 1939. The research on Dimitrie Brătianu's mission in London and on the policy of the European powers, including England, in the epoch of the Union (1856—1859) can be included within the same framework.

As a matter of fact, even before the creation of our Institute, there had existed in Jassy preoccupations in this respect, a point of reference undoubtedly being the appearance in 1917 of Nicolae Iorga's well-known work on the history of Romanian-British relations, then published in French and translated into English in 1931. Actually, in the later interwar period some Jassy historians such as Gh. Brătianu, Ilie Minea, A. Oțetea, N. Corivan, Em. Diaconescu and others, without achieving special works in this domain, dealt with some aspects of Romanian-British relations in the medieval and modern epochs.

In their turn, the British archaeologists and historians have visited our Institute, exchanging views with the Jassy specialists. In this regard, we are pleased to recall meetings with outstanding British scholars, such as the archaeologists V. G. Childe, I. A. Richmond, Stuart Piggott, J. D. Evans,

T. Sulimirszki, T. G. E. Powell, Nancy Sandars, or the historians Steve Runciman, Dimitrie Obolensky, Hugh Trevor Roper and Alan Mihlward.

This colloquy in Jassy affords us a new opportunity of knowing each other and of debating as colleagues some important questions in the evolution of Anglo-Romanian relations between 1821 and 1918. We are glad that the present scholarly event is attended by well-known historians with profound preoccupations concerning not only the history of England but that of South-East Europe as well, especially of Romania. In this regard we are extremely happy to extend our welcome to Professor Richard Clogg of King's College, London, Secretary of the British Committee of the International Association for the Study of South-East Europe, distinguished specialist in the history of Greece on which he has published and edited numerous volumes. In fact the paper he will submit here proves the constancy of his pursuits, this time connected with the presence of the Wallachians in Macedonia.

We also welcome the participation of Dr. Trevor J. Hope, a British specialist well-known to us, who has concentrated his efforts on a thorough study of Anglo-Romanian relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, being the author of numerous studies, some of which have appeared in our specialized publications and having a Ph.D. degree in History from "Nicolae Iorga" Institute of History in Bucharest.

We are also happy to meet again in Jassy Professor Eric Tappe, with whom I am connected by wonderful personal memories, his understanding and support for the archaeological researches at Glină—Bucharest remaining unforgettable. Benefiting from a multilateral training of a classical nature, having also learned Romanian which he then taught at London University, besides his interest in the Romanian language and literature and his being an inspired translator of I. L. Caragiale and Mircea Eliade, he has approached the domain of Romanian civilization practically, publishing Romanian medieval documents, researching the Romanian presences in Great Britain since the Middle Ages up to our days, and at this colloquy he is going to submit his considerations on Anglo-Romanian literary contacts between 1848—1878.

With the same pleasure we greet the presence at the colloquy of Dr. Maurice Pearton, well-known to the Romanian specialists by his preoccupations in the field of the history of Romanian oil, which was the object of his Ph. D. thesis at Oxford, published in 1971. It is an ample monograph devoted to the years 1895—1948, indispensable to anyone researching the question of Romanian oil. This time we have the pleasant occasion of listening to his opinions on an important matter of political and diplomatic history in which Romania has offered her own models — the neutralities of 1914—1916 and 1939—1940, his report referring to the former.

Similarly we are happy to have with us Dr. David Turnock who, to the studies regarding the history of South-East Europe, adds his announced report on Sir Charles Hartley's especial role in the problem of the functioning of the European commission for the Danube.

At the same time we welcome the participation of Prof. Harry Hanak, chairman of the Departement of History, excellent expert on international relations between Great Britain and Russia and very familiar with the problems of Central Europe, who undertakes to examine in his intervention the review New-Europe 1916—1920.

We are likewise glad that Dr. Denis Deletant, disciple and successor of Professor Tappe at London University, is attending this colloquy. Being sentimentally attached to Romania by family connections, he is well-known to us by his scholar and teaching activity.

In the same context we warmly welcome the Romanian specialists to the proceedings of the colloquy, first of all Professor Ștefan Pascu, full member of the Romanian Academy, the President of the History Section of this Academy and of the National Committee of the Historians in Romania, who will submit the report on the echo in Great Britain of the struggle for political rights of the Romanians in Transylvania.

We are also happy to have with us at this colloquy our guests from Bucharest, Professor Dinu C. Giurescu and the researchers Cornelia Bodea, Paul Cernavodeanu, Al. Dușu, and Gh. Dobre, Professor V. Vesa from Cluj-Napoca, as well as the specialists from Jassy, Professors Gh. Platon and V. Cristian, and researchers Al. Zub, Gh. Buzatu, Val. Dobrinescu and Șt. Lemny. In their announced reports and discussions, they will examine the problems of Romanian-British relations under the political-diplomatic, economic and cultural aspects. I should like to bring to your attention, now, that we kindly invite all of you who are present, to join in during the discussions occasioned by the papers submitted, in the hope that the dialogue between the specialists will be extremely fruitful, serving as it does a single objective, the finding out of historical truth. At the same time, we hope that this dialogue will strengthen the scholarly cooperation between the Romanian and the British historians and that the results of their efforts will be made known by the publication of the colloquy proceedings.

By way of conclusion, we would like to express our warmest thanks to Professors Mihnea Gheorghiu, President of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences, Viorel Barbu, Rector of the University "Al. I. Cuza" of Jassy, and Ștefan Ștefănescu, President of the History and Archaeology Section of this Academy, for the very precious assistance they have rendered to the successful organization of this scholarly event, as well as to Constantin Paraschiv, Secretary for Academic Affairs of this Section, who has not spared any effort to make possible our meeting in Jassy. At the same time, we thank most warmly Mr. Bruce Nightingale, Cultural Attaché of Great Britain in Bucharest, who has attended in Bucharest and in Jassy to the matters relating to the preparation of this colloquy and has made all the efforts for it to be held in accordance with the agreement between the two Academies.

Thank you !

THE ENGLISH PUBLIC OPINION AND THE STRUGGLE OF THE TRANSYLVANIAN ROMANIANS FOR THEIR RIGHTS

BY

ȘTEFAN PASCU

To deal with such a problem one must first of all define public opinion in the way contemporary politicians understand it. In their view public opinion is a psychosocial phenomenon occurring at the level of smaller or larger groups confronted with social, political and economic events or phenomena. It expresses the choice and it is the collective judgement of the respective groups, according to their social and political conscience, with regard to these events, and phenomena. On the other hand, public opinion has objective determinations and subjective conditionings, such as : the conscience of the individuals composing the group, or of the group as a whole, and the influence of the acknowledged representatives, of the leaders, their prestige and authority, as well as the mentality of the group. In order to have social pertinence public opinion implies homogeneity of views of significant social groups.

A second preliminary explanation necessary to a most objective analysis of the problem to be discussed is connected to the events and phenomena determining the creation of a public opinion. There are two correlative conditions that have to be satisfied by any event or phenomenon in order to bring about a public opinion.

First, the events dealt with should be exceptionally important in the history of a nation : they should belong to the category of just undertakings meant to secure the progress not just of one people, but of the whole humanity. In the second place, the efforts and strife of a nation should be supported by the international public opinion, both governments and, most of all, the masses. This is the case of the Romanian people's struggle for freedom and justice, independence and unity, as it is the case of the international echo and the way in which public opinion supported the just cause of the Romanians.

Given the vicissitudes of history, the Romanian people's efforts and pains, perseverance and struggle for justice and freedom, independence and unity, have been uninterrupted, and so were the international response and the support they called forth. There were variations of intensity only, in accordance with the intensity of the Romanian people's struggle itself and the importance of the aims, as well as the international situation.

In this paper we confine ourselves to what is generally called modern period. Its beginning was marked by an event of both cultural and political significance, i.e. the work of the learned Prince of Moldavia, Dimitrie Cantemir, *Historia incrementorum atque decrementa Aulae Othomanicae*. This book

was at the same time a pleading for the right of the Romanian people to independence. Its first translation was made into English, by N. Tindal, between 1734—1735 (*The History of the Growth and Decay of the Ottoman Empire*). It was not only the first but also the best of the translations of this book in widely used languages. It was well received by the English public opinion, the political circles and the intelligentsia, so that a second edition came out shortly after the first one.

The efforts and striving for freedom and unity of the Romanians in the 17-th and 18-th centuries were encouraged by the European public opinion. The European press, and many booklets and prints, and open-letters written by famous men of politics and culture, and university lectures made known the great Transylvanian peasant revolt of 1784, under the leadership of Horea. Among the above means of information mention must be made of the London paper "Courier de l'Europe, Gazette Anglo-Française" that apprized public opinion of the fact that the insurgents were Transylvanian Romanians, descendants of the Roman colonies of Dacia, representing a population of 670,000 people, oppressed by the most unbearable feudal yoke. The English public opinion, or at least an important part of it reflected in this paper, sympathized with: the revolt and the insurgents, and justified their action by the social and national injustice endured by the Transylvanian Romanians. Other English paper expressed the same attitude, and through them the public opinion in the young American state became acquainted with the situation as well.

The 1848 revolution, larger in scope and importance, brought about a correspondingly widespread impact upon the European public opinion. Its social goals — the abolition of serfdom, the granting of property to the serfs, with or without any compensation to be paid by them — the call for independence and national unity, stirred the interest of the revolutionary circles in many European countries, among them: France, Sardinia, Germany and Austria.

But the revolutionary platform was carried on and became the programme of the 1848 generation. They struggled hard for its implementation at home and abroad. The Romanian emigration delivered an intense activity in the main European capitals: Constantinople, Paris, London, etc. In the spring of 1849, Eliade Rădulescu had meetings in London with some persons of consequence in the British public life, and he succeeded in convincing them of the cause of the union of Transylvania with Moldavia and Wallachia. Meetings of solidarity with the right of the Romanians were organized in Manchester, Birmingham and Brighton. Among the political personalities that were present, it is worth mentioning the names of: Lords Brougham, Gladstone, Roebuck and Lord Otway. Those that attended the Brighton manifestation voted a memorandum (in favour of the Romanian cause) addressed to Queen Victoria. The 1859 Union of the Principalities, the first step toward the Union of all the Romanian territories, was a major issue in the period between 1848 and 1918. Aware of the fact that this objective and legitimate process was in full accordance with the unshaken wish and will of the entire Romanian population, the European public opinion supported the efforts and struggle for Union.

The English public opinion was well acquainted with the situation and sympathized with it through the papers of wide circulation and influence such as: "The Times", "The Morning Post", "The Daily News", "The Daily Telegraph", "The Standard", "The Graphic" a.s.o.

After the achievement of modern Romania through the Union of Moldavia and Wallachia, the independence was not only necessary but also possible. The Romanian people felt itself capable of winning the country's independence. And if the Union implied an impressive solidarity of all the Romanians, beyond the artificial boundaries of the time, the independence was equally the work of the entire Romanian population. Boundaries meant to separate brothers were wiped off in 1877, just like they were in 1859, by the unanimous wish of the Romanians, both from Romania and the foreign-dominated Romanian territories.

Volunteers from Transylvania and Bukovina joined the Romanian army; material and moral aid from all the Romanian provinces was sent to supply the Romanian army in the battlefield. In the face of such an impressive and solidary will and heroism of the Romanians, the public opinion, distrustful in the beginning, changed its attitude in their favour. The French, English, Italian, American, Belgian, Swedish and Norwegian press competed in fervently praising the Romanian army's heroism, supporting the independence and the cause of the Romanians in general, which equally included their prospect of the formation of a single Romanian state. Cultural societies and personalities, politicians and political organizations supported the idea. Parliamentary debates and official voices actively worked for it, during and after the war, when the European diplomats met in conferences and congresses to decide the fate of the peoples, when Romania's rights were so much overlooked by the Great Powers.

The European governments had heard of but didn't listen to the voice of the Romanian people during the Berlin Congress. But not even those governments could ignore the Romanian question. For one thing, it was too important, for another, the public opinion overruled the mean and selfish play of the diplomacy. Protest against it continued to be manifested in support of the Romanian "cause" until it became more than ever before a European issue.

The English public opinion was deeply involved in the European matters so that the Romanian cause was also subject of debate in the English Parliament. This happened especially between 1875—1878, in connection with the outbreak of the anti-Ottoman war. The points of views there expressed were contradictory. Some Members of Parliament, as for example Lord Stratheden and even Lords Campbell, Derby and Bourke were ready to support the Romanians provided that the independent Romania would not fall a prey of the stronger neighbours. Gladstone proved to be persuaded of the idea of the free and united Romania as a barrier against expansionism. After the conclusion of the Peace treaty in Berlin, the deputies Druff, Gladstone, May and Campbell spoke of the flagrant injustice suffered by Romania.

The English press was more and more concerned with the Romanian issues being, for its largest part, the expression of the English public opinion in favour of the struggle of the Romanian people for its rights, for liberty

and unity. "The Times", "The Daily News", "The Daily Telegraph", "The Standars", "The Morning Post", "The Graphic", "Manchester Guardian", a.s.o., were some of these papers. The first of them had their own correspondents on the front who witnessed the Romanians' heroism and their spirit of sacrifice for a right cause.

The Memorandum movement of the Transylvanian Romanians, turned into a general Romanian movement, was openly embraced and encouraged by the progressive European public opinion, and was considered a case of international law. For a decade and a half, between 1882—1896, the world public opinion followed with interest and sympathy the Romanians' struggle for their rights and justice, freedom and unity. The parliaments of certain European countries (Italy, England, France, Belgium, etc.) debated upon the situation of the subject peoples in the Habsburg Empire in general, and of the Transylvanian Romanians in particular. Considerable attention was also devoted to the policy of oppression of these peoples by the two "dominant nations", the Austrians and Hungarians, especially in the Eastern part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, i.e. Transleithania (as this part of the Empire was officially known). Public opinion had been constantly prepared by the press of the respective countries, the student organizations and various scientific and cultural societies and associations. The Transylvanian Romanians' Memorandum of 1882 and the Bucharest Student Memorandum of 1891—both of them printed in some of the widely used foreign languages—were favourably received. The goals included in these memoranda persuaded public opinion to strongly defend the Romanian cause. Furthermore, the international echo of the Manifests of the Romanian students at foreign universities printed in French, English, Italian and German, was even more powerful. The oppressive policy of the Hungarian rulers was denounced with new arguments. Students, professors, members of European Parliaments, the French, Italian, English, Belgian and, partly— even the German and Austrian press discussed the problem of the Transylvanian Romanians, and secured a wide audience and reale political support.

The contents of the 1892 Memorandum exposed the economic, social, political and cultural situation in Transylvania, with all the inequities and the oppressive measures of the ruling Hungarian landowners and bourgeoisie. The brutal measures of the denationalization policy through school, church, administration and the unjust laws brought about serious international protests. The refusal of the Imperial Court in Vienna to receive the delegation of the three hundred Romanians that had taken the way to Vienna to present the Emperor the Memorandum, constituted one more reason for the public opinion to react in favour of the Romanians. The persecution, ill-treatment and law court action taken against the supporters of the Memorandum by the authorities and the police provided a strong reason for the public opinion to condemn oppression and defend its victims. Thereafter, the question of the Transylvanian Romanians, and partly of those in Bukovina, beacame a European concern to a greater extent than in 1859 and 1877.

In the service of this idea "The League for the Cultural Unity of All Romanians", then founded, with the deliberate view of supporting the strife for cultural unity, in Romania and abroad, was actually ment to pave the way for the political unity of all the Romanians. The chapters of the

"League" in Belgium and France, and the extension of their activity to England and Italy, played an important role in letting the world know more about the Romanian cause.

In many countries, the echo of the Romanian cause and the support it was given were impressive. The Hungarian authorities had to face such a fierce international reaction that the policy of oppression turned against those who had unleashed it. Its beginning was in the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire itself. A big meeting, supporting the Memorandists, in fact the Transylvanian Romanians, was held in Vienna, after the refusal of the Imperial Chancellery to receive the Memorandum. The Austrian Social Christian Party, progressive publications, public opinion in general, openly attacked the Hungarian rulers' policy and the oppression set forth by the authorities.

The European public opinion presently joined the actions of protest against the oppression of the Austro-Hungarian rulers, making common cause with the struggle of the entire Romanian people.

Similar views were shared by Belgian, French, Italian, and English students, who were quick in expressing their protests against the aggressive measure and their sympathy towards the oppressed. Prominent cultural and scientific personalities took part in the student manifestations, or organized other such actions of support themselves. The press was prompt in joining the general chors. Politicians, deputies, senators, ministers, professors, scientists and men of culture contributed to internationally known papers and argued in favour of the Romanians. Mention must be made of : George Clemenceau and E. Flourens, Frédéric Mistral and Leconte de Lisle, Émile Zola and Alfred Rambaud, Renato Imbriani and Giosuè Carducci, Angelo De Gubernatis and Menotti Garibaldi etc. etc. ; "La République Française" and "La Justice", "Journal des Débats", and "L'Europe", "Le Figaro" and "Le Siècle"; "Il Diritto" and "Corriere della Sera", "Il Parlamento" and "Gazzetta di Torino"; "L'Indépendance Belge" and "La Réforme", "Le Précurseur" and "L'Étoile Belge", "Moskovskii Vedemosti" etc. The influence exercised by the press, the activity of the sections of the "Cultural League" and of the student societies, the public conferences and the university lectures, etc., created a favourable and supportive public opinion in the European countries.

Interparliamentary meetings declared their solidarity with the Romanian cause, European Parliaments reacted against the state of affairs in the Empire and the oppression of the nationalities, adopting official measures to weaken the aggressive policy of the Hungarian landowners and bourgeoisie and to support the Romanians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in their struggle for rights and justice. Letters were sent by outstanding representatives of the public opinion — politicians, scientists, men of culture and publicists — to the president of the "Cultural League", professor V. A. Urechia, and it is only part of them that were gathered in a volume with the significant title *Voci latine, De la frați la frați* (Latin Voices, from Brothers to Brothers).

In the period that followed the Memorandum movement until World War I, the world public opinion rightfully understood the Romanian question and could back up the struggle for justice and freedom of the Transylvanian

Romanians. Dominant tendencies turned into open struggle for political and national unification of all the foreign-dominated Romanian territories with Romania. The ethnic situation and the self-determination principle made up the ground for the arguments called upon to justify this attitude.

Together with the European public opinion that in most of the cases strongly supported the cause of the Transylvanian Romanians, the English public opinion, more than ever before joined the European chorus. It set up as a psycho-social phenomenon embracing larger social and political groups, demonstrating clearer social and political conscience. The explanation is easily perceived by anyone knowing the social, political and economic situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and especially in that region, where the oppression of the non-Magyar peoples brought about important political movements.

The English press took up an attitude, first in "The Times", then in "Pall Mall Gazette", on the occasion of the Memorandum of the Romanian Students in 1891. It was concerned with the national liberation movement, considered to be fully justified since there were millions "of Romanians living in Transylvania under a policy of Magyarization, cruelly oppressing them". The English statesman, several times Prime Minister, William E. Gladstone sent the Romanian students a letter expressing, without ambiguity, its position in favour of the national aspirations of the Romanians.

There was another statesman joining the cause, Lord Edmond Fitz Maurice, British Foreign Secretary in several governments, who, in a series of articles in "Pall Mall Gazette" deals with the precarious situation of the Transylvanian Romanians, accusing the oppressive policy of the Magyar rulers of being the source of a hard struggle between the nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and, consequently, a danger threatening Europe. This was a point of view Lord Fitz repeated on the occasion of the legal proceedings instituted to the authors of the Memorandum by the Magyar government in May 1894, in Cluj. The English politician manifested his regret at the intolerant spirit of the Magyar authorities towards the non-Magyar nationalities.

James Bryce, who besides being a politician was also a historian, thus better understanding the historical and political issues, also expressed his view about the Romanian cause. Since he wanted to know the truth from first hand information, he persuaded Lord Kimberley, Foreign Secretary at that time to charge E. Fitz-Gerald, the well-known journalist from "The Daily News", with the mission of making investigations in Transylvania and Romania. The conclusions of this undertaking offered new arguments in favour of the Romanians, and hence they contributed to the growing interest of the English public opinion in the Romanian cause.

The more so as in the same period with Fitz Gerald's investigations, the English General Consul in Budapest, Arthur Nicholson, sent a report to the Foreign Office, report of the greatest importance from the point of view of the English public opinion dealing with: the exclusivism of the ruling Magyar classes as well as that of the Magyar parliamentary regime; the chauvinist policy raised to the level of a doctrine of state; the organized character of the national and political struggle of the Transylvanian Romanians; the solidarity between the masses and their leaders; the support given

to Romania ; the joint fight of the Romanians, and Saxons of Transylvania against the dualism and the uncompromising struggle between the Romanian nation and the dualist political system. The English diplomat considered that the result of this situation could be the outbreak of a revolutionary war for the liberation of Transylvania from the Austro-Hungarian rule. So much the more as Nicholson viewed the Romanian people as having a high intelligence, tenacity and thirst for culture and knowledge, an enterprising and active spirit at the same time. The conclusions of the English politician were the following : all the attempts and efforts to denationalize the Romanians were futile and the future of Transylvania couldn't be decided without the majority of its population which was Romanian.

A convincing and significant expression of the solidarity of the English public opinion with the cause of the Transylvanian Romanians was the impressive manifestation of May 5th, 1894, organized by Oxford University, and chaired by Prof. Morphil, the well known Romanist. Besides the large number of students there were professors participating as well like : W. Spörner, A. N. Carlyle, S. Ball, J. W. Bridges, etc. Since Prof. Morphil knew the Romanian language and history, he evoked the sufferings of the Transylvanian Romanians, and their aspirations of social and national liberation. To what he had found out from books and publications he added his own impressions and conclusions about the unjust life of the Romanians, drawn on the occasion of his visit to Romania and Transylvania, where and when he met "a people of noble birth speaking a language of Latin origin, a people that in spite of the persecutions undergone, developed so vigorously". Condemning the policy of Magyarization of the Romanians and the legal proceedings taken against the authors of the Memorandum, prof. Morphil appealed to the sympathy of his fellow countrymen "for the cause of a nation full of vitality, hard-working, and industrious, having no other wish than that of being an element of culture within the great European family". The speech delivered by the Professor of French origin Jeanne Del'Homme had also a strong impact upon the audience. She pleaded for the "right cause" of the Transylvanian Romanians and claimed that it should acquire world sympathy. The great student manifestation at Oxford University, ended with the motion proposed by Prof. W. Bridges, backed by Prof. Spooner, and received with enthusiasm by the audience. It expressed the hope that the Transylvanian Romanians would fulfil their aspirations for national freedom and unity. It was one of the most impressive actions of solidarity with the Romanian people by the number and values of the intellectuals that participated in it, by the place where it was organized, by the enthusiasm and the decisions taken by those who were present, by the continuation of the actions of influencing public opinion and the English Members of Parliament.

Participants in scientific congresses (Rome) and interparliamentary meetings (The Hague, Bruxelles) expressed their solidarity with the cause of the Transylvanian Romanians. After the condemnation of the authors of the Memorandum, the President of the Interparliamentary Union, Frederic Passy, disapproved of the policy of national oppression against the Roma-

nians, of the imprisonment of the "representatives of all the people for having fought for the good of their nation". Another such act of solidarity of the European public opinion with the struggle for rights and justice of the Romanian people was the refusal of the Interparliamentary Union to organize its proceedings in the capital of Hungary, the following year.

Works having a historical character in support of the Romanian cause came out in England, like that of W. Miller. *The Balkans ; Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro*. It was joined by a great number of others, signed by the prominent historian G. M. Treve and by the historian and publicist of real talent and erudition Seton-Watson (Scotus Viator) : *Racial Problems in Hungary, Corruption and Reform in Hungary, The War and Democracy, Romania and the Great War, Political Persecution in Hungary*, a.s.o. One must also mention the work of the outstanding publicist H. Wickham Steed, *The Habsburg Monarchy*. Articles signed by B. Bury, R. Seton-Watson and H. Wickham Steed, were published in : "English Historical Review", "Slavonian Review", "History", "Review of Reviews", etc. These sustained and honest writers apprized British public opinion of the unjust situation of the non-Magyar and non-German nations in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, explaining, at the same time, the objective character of their movements for national and social freedom.

The final act of the great Romanian struggle, the aspiration and fight for political and statal unity—aroused great interest and public support in almost all the European countries (even in those belonging to the coalition of the Central Powers) and in the United States. Conferences, the press and official reports, parliamentary debates, widely attended public manifestations, were registered in France, England, Italy, Belgium, Serbia, Russia, the United States. Such manifestations even took place in Germany, Austria—Hungary—unofficially an tot the extent it was possible under war circumstances in such countries opposed to Romania. Presidents of states, such as Raymond Poincaré and Aristide Briand and later on Woodrow Wilson ; Prime Ministers like Georges Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando ; Foreign Secretaires as Arthur-James Balfour, Stephen Pichon, Sidney Sonnino and Robert Lansing ; other high politicians such as Allan Leeper, R. B. Sheridan, Franklin-Bouillon, Franklin Lane, Saint-Aulaire, Wopocke, Cesare Borghese ; men of politics and culture, publiciste like V. I. Lenin, Lord Fitz Maurice, Mortcliff, Cecil and Dunedin ; then Austin Chamberlain, Seton-Watson, Wickham Steed, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishops of Oxford and London, Lacour-Gayet, Raphael Georges Lévy, M. Dubost, Andrea Torre, Maria Rugier Gen. Ferigo, Theodore Roosevelt, W. Bullit, E. Gay, the socialists Albert Thomas, Pierre Renaudel, Arthur Henderson, Sidney Web, Emile Vandervelde, Louis de Brockère, Camile Huysmans and many, many othres, pressed for the accomplishment of the just cause of the entire Romanian people, the unification in a single and independent state. Well-known newspapers such as "Times", "Washington Post", "New York Times", "Le Journal", "Le Matin", "Corriere della Sera", etc. felt they were bound in honour to echo voice of the public opinion and to direct it.

The material and human efforts and sacrifices of the Romanian people in the war for the unification found a favourable response in the English

public opinion. The press, prominent politicians and men of culture, such as Lord Edward Fitz Maurice, pointed out the responsibilities of the Allies towards the difficult situation in which Romania was in 1917. After the victories of Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz, in the summer of 1917, the English statesman Asquith declared, in the House of Commons, that "Romania proved to be invincible". The English sympathy didn't quit Romania, not even in the most difficult moments when, abandoned by the Allies, she was forced to concede the humiliating peace of Buftea-Bucharest. One must remember in this respect Lord Balfour's attitude in the House of Commons.

The Romanian emigration on the allied countries was also stimulating the interest of the public opinion for the achievement of the century-old ideal: the unification of all Romanian territories that were under Austro-Hungarian and czarist rule. As a result of this activity, Allan Leeper the Secretary of the Prime Minister Lloyd George, asks the Romanian emigration to chaw up a memorandum "on Romania's efforts in the war and the situation of the minorities after the achievement of the national unity of the Romanian people". The Memorandum was written by George Moroianu and it "was very well done and very useful" to the British diplomacy at the conference to negotiate peace. The activity of G. G. Mironescu, N. Lupu, O. Goga, G. Moroianu, as well as the visit of Take Ionescu and Nicolae Titulescu in England, at the beginning of August 1918, contributed to the growing interest of the English public opinion in Romania's matters. Lloyd George, R. Sheridan, Allan Leeper, Lord Northcliffe, and other politicians were the interpreters of the Romanian cause and influenced the English public opinion. Consequently England was among the first countries to have recognized the National Council for the Unification of Romania (Paris) as officially representing all Romanians. They secured it their cordial cooperation and support: "in order to keep alive and develop the warm and friendly relationship between Great Britain and Romania".

A unity was created between the unshaken will of the Romanian people and the international public opinion, with regard to the political and state unity of all the Romanians. The common ground for this unity was to be found in three principles: the right of the peoples to self-determination, their will to build up their unitary national states, and the ethno-demographic realities. Thus, the legitimate and objective process, i.e. the union of the peoples separated because of the vicissitudes of history into one body-politic could be accomplished. The national union of the Romanians could be achieved as a result of the full observance of the fundamental principles mentioned above, in April-December 1918, through the successive and unconditioned union of Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transylvania with Romania. It was sanctioned by the Peace Conference in Paris, and this was not without the decisive support of the British delegation (Lloyd George, Balfour, Seton-Watson, Wickham Steed) that represented the English public opinion.

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In the beginning there was the idea, the idea turned into tendencies, the tendencies into efforts, and the efforts into the open struggle for liberty and

justice, for rights and unity, of entire people, in an impressive solidarity. Each achievement ment a new step in the progress of history. The unshaken will of the Romanian people to accomplish its legitimate aspirations was decisive in this objective process. The support of the international public opinion — the English one having played an important role — successfully contributed to the efforts of the Romanian people. In this way, at the end of an impressive epopee, through the parallel action of the national and international factors, the historical justice came to light.

THE VLACHS OF MACEDONIA : SOME BRITISH PERSPECTIVES

BY

RICHARD CLOGG

The "Eastern Question", the study of the perennial crises that afflicted the Ottoman Empire in its protracted decline and their impact on the relations of the Great Powers, has long attracted the attention of British historians. This is not surprising in view of the preponderant role played by Britain in the diplomacy of the Eastern Question. One might have thought, indeed, that this particular seam of historical research had been virtually exhausted in writings too numerous and too well known to be repeated here. That this is not the case, however, has been convincingly demonstrated by Richard Millman in his recent *Britain and the Eastern Question 1875—1878* (Oxford, 1979).

One fruitful avenue of research, however, that has not in my view so far received the scholarly attention it deserves is the study of the interaction of public opinion and public policy in Britain's dealings with South East Europe and, in particular, the extent to which, if at all, the writings of the various publicists who openly championed the cause of the various peoples of the Balkan peninsula influenced, to use the modern jargon, 'opinion-makers' and those responsible for the formulation and execution of British foreign policy, be they politicians or diplomats. For, as the American political scientist Kenneth Bouldings has pointed out, "those responsible for determining the policies and actions of states do not respond to the 'objective' facts of a given situation but rather to the 'images' which they have of the situation. It is what we think other states are like, rather than what they are really like, that determines our behavior. It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines how we deal with it"¹.

Studies of this kind can broadly be divided into two categories. The first consists of the analysis of popular attitudes and prejudices and the way these influence policy. The widespread anti-Russian feeling that existed in 19-th century Britain is, of course, well known and indeed it was a popular music hall song during the period of the great Balkan crisis of 1875—8 that gave rise to the expression "jingoism" in English :

"We don't want to fight ; [the Russians]
But, by Jingo, if we do,
We've got the men, we've got the ships,
We've got the money too".

¹ Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (1959) 120—31, cited in Harry J Psomiades, 'American Images of

The actual impact of public opinion and of popular prejudice on the formulation of official policy is, of course, difficult to quantify, while the extent to which the popular press actually shapes, or merely reflects, popular prejudices is another matter altogether. It does appear, however, that in the preliminaries to perhaps the most pointless war of the 19-th century, the Crimean War, the weak and vacillating administration of the Earl of Aberdeen was undoubtedly influenced to take an uncompromisingly anti-Russian line by popular agitation².

Aside from the liberation struggles of the Balkan peoples themselves, Russia represented the most persistent threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire in the 19-th century. As a consequence Russophobia frequently had as its corollary support for the Ottoman Turks, a tendency stimulated by admiration for the courage and resolution shown by Turkish soldiers, e.g. at the siege of Plevna or when Britain and Turkey ended up on opposite sides during the First World War. Admiration for "Johnny Turk" as a first class fighting man is an attitude that dies hard in Britain³. Yet there was of course another powerful strand in British public opinion as it impinged on the Eastern Question. This was the sympathy felt by British Christians, particularly those outside the Church of England, for the persecuted Christians, be they Orthodox or Armenian, of the Ottoman Empire. It was this 'non-Conformist conscience' to which Gladstone appealed in his famous pamphlet, *The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East* (1876), tens of thousands of copies of which were circulated. In this piece of inspired polemic, prompted by the massacres perpetrated by the Turks in the Bulgarian lands in May and June 1876, Gladstone called on the Turks, "their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbachis" to depart, "bag and baggage", from "the province they have desolated and profaned"⁴.

The second kind of study focusses not so much on popular attitudes and prejudices, and on the way in which politicians pay attention to, or ignore these, but rather on the efforts to influence educated opinion and, in particular, to sway politicians and policy makers, and concerns not so much campaigns waged in the columns of the popular press as in more sober organs such as the *Manchester Guardian* or in books and tracts which of necessity enjoyed a limited circulation. During the critical period between the Crimean War and the end of the First World War, a period which saw the emergence and consolidation of most of the Balkan states and the drawing

Greece and Turkey since 1945' in Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides, eds., *Greek-American Relations: A Critical Review* (New York, 1980) 191.

² On the question of British public opinion during this period, see Olive Anderson, *A Liberal State at War. English Politics and Economics During the Crimean War* (London, 1967).

³ Significantly, similar attitudes were widespread among Australians who bore the brunt of the disastrous fiasco of Gallipoli in 1915. Donald Horne in his excellent autobiography, *The Education of Young Donald* (Harmondsworth, 1975) 71 records that "our intolerance was directed in effect almost exclusively towards the English, the 'Poms'. We looked down on Poms almost as much as we looked down on Catholics. Their officers, of course, were effeminate, incompetent and dictatorial. The Poms did not make such good soldiers as Johnny Turk. Of all the peoples of the world living outside Australia, those we held in the highest regard were the Turks".

⁴ The Bulgarian agitation and its political consequences in Britain is the subject of R. V. Shannon, *Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876*, (London, 1963).

of boundaries which, with some notable exceptions, have created the modern map of South East Europe, there were numerous publicists active in Britain championing the cause of one or the other, or sometimes of more than one, of the Balkan peoples. I use the word publicist not in any derogatory sense, for frequently these were individuals of very considerable intellectual attainment, yet few of them approached the question with what one might call true academic detachment. Moreover, in their enthusiasm for this or that ethnic group they frequently imbibed the prejudices of those they championed. It was not enough, for instance, for Edith Durham that "Albanomane connue", as the Greek ambassador to London once despairingly described her, almost singlehandedly to bring the struggle of the Albanian people for national liberation to the notice of the British people. She also had to disparage the Turks, Greeks and Serbs, whom she felt to be parties to a conspiracy to deny a separate Albanian identity⁵. Numerous other such publicists spring to mind. Some of them were redoubtable women in the mould of Edith Durham such as the Misses Muir Mackenzie and Irby, the authors of the highly influential *Travels in the Slavonic Provinces of Turkey in Europe* (London, 1866). There was H. N. Brailsford, whose brilliantly written and impassioned *Macedonia, its races and peoples* (London, 1906) was prompted by his experiences as a relief worker in a Macedonia devastated in the wake of the ill-fated Ilinden uprising of 1903. There was William Miller, the outstanding and highly prolific scholar/journalist, whose writings contributed so much to an informed and sympathetic understanding in Britain not only of the aspirations, achievements and problems of the Greeks but of the other Balkan peoples as well. There were, too, some notable publicists on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, such as the MP and former diplomat Aubrey Herbert⁶ and Sir Mark Sykes⁷. There were those, too, like R. W. Seton-Watson, who moved from journalism to academe, and whose sympathies were passionately engaged by those struggling for self-determination not only within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire but within those of the Habsburg Monarchy as well. I have no need to rehearse Seton-Watson's manifold writings on Eastern Europe to this audience and I look forward, as I am sure we all do, to Cornelia Bodea and Hugh Seton-Watson's edition of R. W. Seton-Watson's correspondence relating to Romania. In addition to these individuals who sought to alert the British public, and in particular the educated British public, to developments that were profoundly to influence the map of Eastern Europe, there were also bodies such as the Balkan Committee, consisting of Members of Parliament with interests in the Balkans and others, which similarly sought to educate the public as to the political realities that underlay the seemingly interminable crises that shook the region.

⁵ Edith Durham, after whom a street in Tirana is still named, was the author of a number of books pleading the Albanian cause, e.g. *The Burden of the Balkans* (London, 1905), *High Albania* (London, 1909), *The Struggle for Scutari* (London, 1914), *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle* (London, 1920).

⁶ See his Ben Kendim. *A Record of Eastern Travel* (London, n.d. (1924)).

⁷ The author of *Dar-ul Islam: A Record of a Journey through Ten of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey* (London, 1904) and the *Caliph's Last Heritage. A Short History of the Turkish Empire* (London, 1915). See also Leland Buxton's, *The Black Sheep of the Balkans* (London, 1920).

With a few notable exceptions there have been few systematic studies of the interplay of propaganda, public opinion and policy during this critical period in the history of South East Europe. Only in the case of R. W. Seton-Watson have serious studies of this kind been carried out. I have in mind here, of course, the recent study by his sons Hugh and Christopher, *The Making of a New Europe: R. W. Seton-Watson and the last years of Austria Hungary* (London, 1981) and the recent publication of his correspondence on the Yugoslav question, *R. W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs: Correspondence 1906–41* (London and Zagreb, 1976), soon to be joined by his correspondence on Rumania⁸. This is a question of particular interest to me as a member of King's College of the University of London for it was of course King's College, under the aegis of its ardently philhellenic and strongly pro-Venizelist principal Rona'd Burrows, that during the First World War became a power house of academic propaganda in favour of the new nations of Eastern Europe⁹.

What I want to do in this brief intervention is to examine the kind of information that was available to opinion-makers in Britain about the Aromâni or Vlachs of Macedonia and the Pindus during the early years of this century when the Vlach question was to assume a considerable political significance within the overall context of the Macedonian problem, particularly after the Imperial Ottoman *irade* of 1905 which conceded to the Vlachs the status of a *millet* within the Ottoman Empire¹⁰. I shall not be discussing the Vlach question itself, which has been excellently treated by Max Demeter Peyfuss in his thoroughly documented *Die Aromunische Frage*¹¹. Nor shall I be treating of the official British attitudes to the political aspirations of the Vlachs of the Ottoman Empire, which was by no means unsympathetic¹². Rather I shall be looking at the kind of information that was publicly available about the Vlachs, at a time when the Vlach question emerged as a significant element in the Macedonian imbroglio.

Before the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries it cannot be said that the Vlachs of the Ottoman Empire had impinged to any great extent on the

⁸ I should also like to draw attention to the excellent work by Dimitri Kitsikis, *Propagande et pressions en politique internationale. La Grèce et ses revendications à la Conférence de la Paix* (Paris, 1963), a revealing and well documented study of the Greek propaganda effort in the immediate aftermath of World War I.

⁹ It was during Burrows' principalship that the Korae Professorship of Modern Greek and Byzantine History, Language and Literature was inaugurated in 1919. The first holder of the chair was Arnold Toynbee, whose *Western Question in Greece and Turkey* (London, 1922), did not at all endear him to the wealthy members of the Anglo-Greek community who had endowed the chair. The ensuing row, which resulted in Toynbee's resignation, is a classic instance of the dangers inherent in sponsored scholarship.

¹⁰ The text of this short *irade* is given in George Young, *Corps de droit Ottoman* (Oxford, 1905), II, 69.

¹¹ *Die Aromunische Frage. Ihre Entwicklung von den Ursprüngen bis zum Frieden von Bukarest (1913) und die Haltung Österreich-Ungarns* (Vienna, 1974).

¹² A certain number of British official papers relating to the Vlach question were published in the British Parliamentary Papers known as Blue Books, e.g. Turkey nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, (1903); Turkey nos. 1, 2, 4, (1904); Turkey nos. 2, 3, (1905); Turkey nos. 1, 2, (1906); Turkey nos. 1, 3, (1907); Turkey nos. 1, 2, 3, (1908) etc. One of the first tasks assigned to Aubrey Herbert on his appointment as an honorary attaché to the British Embassy in Constantinople in 1904 was to write a memorandum "on the character, aspirations and political importance of the Kutzo-Vlachs, Roumanians of Macedonia", *Ben Kerdin*, op. cit., 30–1.

consciousness of educated British opinion. An early reference to the Vlachs is the lament of the great historian of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon, that the agriculture of the barren land that was Greece had been abandoned to the 'vagrant Wallachians'¹³. From the late 17th century onwards there are sporadic references to the Vlachs in the numerous writings of British travellers in European Turkey¹⁴. But it was not until the end of the 19-th century that serious efforts were made to unravel the ethnographic puzzle posed by the Vlachs. One of the most interesting of these accounts is that of that incomparable analyst of the Ottoman Empire in the period of its final decline, Sir Charles Norton Edgcombe Eliot, whose *Turkey in Europe* was published in London under the pseudonym "Odysseus" in 1900.

Eliot put his finger on one of the reasons why the Vlachs had hitherto attracted so little attention from travellers who could not begin to match his own profound understanding of the Ottoman Empire. "One may live and travel in the Balkan lands", he wrote, "without seeing or hearing anything of the Vlachs, until one's eyes are opened. Then one runs the risk of going to the opposite extreme, and thinking, like Roumanian patriots, that most of the inhabitants of Macedonia are Vlachs in disguise". He attributed this inconspicuousness to a number of factors; to the generalised bilingualism of Vlachs, to their preference for living in remote and inaccessible places ("the favourite position (naturally somewhat rare) being a hole on top of a hill"); to their nomadic existence as shepherds or *kiracis* (muleteers); to their lack of political organisation or of a church of their own. He located the "head-quarters" of the Vlachs in the Pindos mountains, with Metsovo being "in some sense a national capital". In Eliot's view the Vlachs did not "form a political, nor as far as I can judge, a physical unit". But they did, he believed, constitute a linguistic unit, a view he backed up by an analysis of the language spoken by the Aromâni.

In a brief survey of the history of the Vlachs, Eliot wrote that "when Macedonia became the battlefield of nationalist Propagandas, when Greeks were proved to be really Bulgarians, Bulgarians really Servians, and everybody something different from the name he bore, it was only natural that the Vlach element should be brought into prominence, and a theory started that most people in Macedonia were, with or without knowing it, really Vlachs, and this theory naturally found favour in Roumania". He pointed to the difficulties faced by the Vlachs in seeking to establish themselves as a distinct ethnic group in the Ottoman Balkans and in particular to the refusal of either the Ecumenical Patriarch or the Bulgarian Exarch to create a Vlach episcopate. He also emphasised the extent to which the Ottoman Porte found it convenient to encourage Vlach aspirations, safe in the knowledge that Romania could never hope to annex the Pindos region. The Vlachs and Turks, he maintained, got on together admirably: "when the tax-collector called, the inhabitants of the villages were never at home, and this simple arrangement was accepted by both parties". Eliot concluded his account by pointing out that "the Vlachs have a genius for well-built stone houses

¹³ *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury (London, 1907) VI, 486.

¹⁴ e.g. W. M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece* (London, 1835) 4 vols.

provided with comfortable, quasi-European furniture ; and I have even known one with whom I stayed go so far as to replace a broken window pane, not with brown paper, but with a new piece of glass — a proceeding, I believe, unique in the Levant”¹⁵.

The next serious attempt to discuss the Vlach question is to be found in H. N. Brailsford's *Macedonia. Its Races and their Future*, published in 1906. Brailsford's book arose out of his experiences as a relief worker in Macedonia in the aftermath of the Ilinden uprising. Less detached and more polemical than Eliot's *Turkey-in-Europe* it nonetheless constitutes a most valuable analysis of the Macedonian problem at one of its most critical stages. Like Eliot, Brailsford was struck by the material culture of the Vlachs. He recounts how, in the miserable *han* of the Vlach village of Pisoderi he encountered 'a stage of civilisation which we hardly expected to encounter in a herdsman's village on a mountain top'. For he came across, "rarest of all sights in Macedonia", a young man reading a book, Trikoupis' *History of the Greek War of Independence*, while another played "something European on a genuine violin". Both turned out to be schoolmasters.

Brailsford was subsequently installed in the village headman's house where "the surroundings breathed of distant civilisations. The floors were boarded, the walls were papered, and on them hung a map of Europe as though to remind the children who played around it that Macedonia belongs by right to the Western world of enlightenment and freedom. We dined at a table and sat on chairs — and presently we were to meet the priest of the place, who actually boasted the possession of a little library". He was struck, too, by the "large and ambitious" school building that was in the course of construction. With five teachers for the boys and three for the girls" it seems a startling provision for this minute community". The villagers were anxious to explain that the new school was to be a "modern and commercial school". For the Vlachs were a practical people. Whereas in the classical gymnasia of the Greeks the boys "may learn by heart a play or two, a speech of Demosthenes and half the Odyssey", the Vlachs study Greek because "there is no Eastern language so useful in the trade of the Levant". "There is a little Pisoderi in Macedonia, where the aged repose and the children grow, but the greater Pisoderi is in Roumania and in Egypt, where fortunes are to be made in freedom. It matters little that there are no fields to till amid these barren rocks. The people of Pisoderi reap their harvests in the Delta".

"There is", Brailsford believed, "no race in all the Balkans so mysterious and so individual as the Vlachs". While they might shelter themselves in the Greek Church, adopt Greek culture as a disguise, serve the Hellenic idea, and among the men, at least, speak Greek more or less fluently nonetheless "at home the national Latin idiom persists, and their callings, their habits, their ways of thinking make them a nationality apart". While not very numerous "without their aid the Greeks would cut a poor figure among the statistics of the Macedonian races. The so-called 'Greeks' of Monastir are Vlachs to a man".

¹⁵ *Turkey in Europe* (London, 1900) 410 ff.

He recorded that they lived apart, "rarely intermarrying with Slavs, upheld by some tradition of an ancient superiority which teaches them to despise the newer races". Brailsford was himself in no doubt that they formed a part of the Romanian people, the most widely distributed of the Balkan peoples. "The Vlach language is as genuinely Latin as any of the Romance tongues of the West", although he looked on the Vlach speech of Macedonia as little more than a *patois* for the home, its vocabulary having lost "all traces of culture".

The failure of the Greeks to absorb the Macedo-Vlachs, despite their preponderant influence in the Church, in commerce and in education, Brailsford attributed to "the position of the Oriental woman". It was they who kept the language alive and who had no need, as did their menfolk, to acquire fluency in Greek. Indeed he argued that "had the Greeks spent the same pains on educating the women of Macedonia that they took to Hellenise the men, the whole Balkan Peninsula might have been Greek to-day". Although the Greeks were making some effort in the direction of the education of girls it was with little effect. "I have seen the excellent Greek school for girls at Monastir where Vlach maidens are painfully taught to construe their Xenophon. The ludicrous mistakes of grammar which one heard in the lower forms were enough to show that the teachers were drilling these children in a foreign tongue. It is easy to taboo every word of Vlach within the schoolroom walls. But outside on the steps when Urania quarrels with Aspasia over her broken doll, she expresses her feelings in fluent and natural Vlach".

A propos the political aspects of the Vlach question, Brailsford wrote that :

"Twenty years ago there was nothing in Balkan politics so inevitable, so nearly axiomatic, as the connection of the Vlachs with the Greek cause. They had no national consciousness and no national ambitions. Scattered as they are, it was obviously impossible for them to dream of a Vlach nation... With some of them Hellenism was a passion and an enthusiasm. They believe themselves to be Greek. They baptized their children 'Themistocles' and 'Penelope'. They studied in Athens, and they left their fortunes to found Greek schools and Greek hospitals".

This loyalty to Greece, Brailsford believed, for the majority of the Vlachs, to be "a more calculating and interested attachment". For "this sparse and furtive race is of necessity opportunist". Hitherto there had been a number of good reasons why the Vlachs should have attached themselves to the Greek cause. But the war of 1897 had revealed the inadequacy of the Greek army. Since then there had been a tendency to look towards the Bulgarians but "it would be a mistake to suppose that any great number of them joined the Bulgarians openly". He expressed surprise that the Romanian government had not played the Vlach card more aggressively. "The Vlachs are, in a sense, the pivot of the Macedonian question. They are not numerous in comparison with the Bulgarians, or even with the Albanians. But without them the Greeks would cut a sorry figure... It is only the Vlachs who give Hellenism a foothold. Withdraw them from their Greek alliance, and Greece must disappear from Macedonia. Group them with the Bulgarians, and the Slav supremacy will be unquestioned and unchallenged". Brailsford concluded his analysis by giving a brief resume of the latest developments in the

Vlach question, including the concession by the Ottoman Porte to the Vlachs of the status of a *millet*¹⁶.

Another book bearing on the Vlach question was published in London in the same year as Brailsford's *Macedonia*, that is to say 1906. True, its author, Tereza Stratilescu, was Romanian and not British but I mention the book in this context as it appeared just as the Vlach question began seriously to impinge on British public opinion with the proclamation of the Imperial Ottoman *irade* of 1905. Tereza Stratilescu's book bore the significant title of *From Carpathian to Pindus. Pictures of Roumanian Country Life* (London, 1906). The book aimed essentially to describe "the genuine and most interesting part" of the Romanian nation, namely the peasants. It was largely focussed on the peasants of the Kingdom but there is some interesting material on the Macedo-Vlachs. She held the majority of the 'Pindic Vlachs' to be nomads "roaming about like foam on the billows of foreign nations". She lamented the fact that the Aromâni shepherd "these much-tried offsprings of old Rome", "sees with despair the frontiers growing under his feet, and the taxes multiplying in front of his herds". She had little time for the well-to-do among the Vlachs for these were almost entirely "Grecised", "wrapping themselves in the pride of borrowed ancestors, and forgetting all the time that they too have ancestors of whom they may be proud". "If Roumanism in the Crapathian", she continued, "has been saved in the darkest hours of hardship, it has been saved by the poor, by the humble; will the poor and humble of the Pindus be able to do as much for Roumanism in their much harder conditions?"¹⁷.

Pride of place in any analysis of writings in English on the Vlachs must, of course, go to A. J. B. Wace and M. S. Thompson's *The Nomads of the Balkans: An Account of Life and Customs among the Vlachs of Northern Pindus* (London, 1914). Peyfuss singles out the Wace and Thompson volume and Gustav Weigand's *Die Aromunen: Ethnographisch-philologisch-historische Untersuchungen über das Volk der sogenannten Makedo-Romanen oder Zinzaren* (Leipzig, 1894/5: two volumes) as two works of particular importance for an understanding of the Vlach question. But whereas Weigand was in receipt of a subsidy from the Romanian government and was at times during his travels taken for a Romanian agent¹⁸, Wace and Thompson had no particular axe to grind.

Peyfuss describes Wace and Thompson as ethnographers, whereas in fact they were archaeologists, with only an amateur, but nonetheless highly informed, interest in the Vlachs. Their acquaintance with the Vlachs occurred entirely by chance during the winter of 1909–10 while they were looking for inscriptions in Southern Thessaly between Mount Othrys and Almiros. They chanced to employ a Farsherot or Albanian Vlach as a muleteer and happened also to spend the night at the village of Vlachoyianni, a winter village of the Vlachs of the Pindos. They subsequently employed a Vlach muleteer from Samarina, whose account of life in his native village high in

¹⁶ Brailsford, *op. cit.*, 173 ff.

¹⁷ Stratilescu, *op. cit.*, 40 ff.

¹⁸ This did not prevent Weigand's book being strongly criticised by Romanian scholars. As a result Weigand transformed his Institute for Romanian Language at the University of Leipzig into an Institute for Balkan Studies, Peyfuss, *op. cit.*, 19–20.

the mountains proved very attractive to the two archaeologists who had spent the previous July excavating amid the heat, mosquitoes and dust of the Thessalian plain. In 1910 they first visited Samarina and other villages of Pindos, and the following year they journeyed to the Vlach villages around Verria and also to Neveska and Klisura. In 1912 they visited Monastir (Bitola) and the Vlach communities in the region of Resna, Ohrid, Voskopojë and Korçë.

Their purpose was not to give a complete account of all the Vlach settlements but rather "to give a detailed description of Samarina and the adjacent villages on Pindus together with some account of the Balkan Vlachs as a whole". Wace and Thompson were not much interested in the way in which "the recent history of the Vlachs has been complicated by political troubles". Indeed they are unusual in that, unlike other contemporary observers, they did not see the Vlachs in the context of the Macedonian problem. But they did give a summary account of recent developments in the Vlach question. They considered that "nearly all modern Greek books and pamphlets on the Vlachs which might otherwise be of extreme interest and value, are owing to their political theories almost entirely worthless". They did not consider Romanian books on the Vlachs to be impartial witnesses either but believed that "from the nature of the case they are less liable to fantastic theories". They were inclined to believe Weigand's estimate of 375,000 Vlachs in the Balkan Peninsula as a whole to be too low, believing them to number not less than half a million. In their book Wace and Thompson included chapters on "The Costumes of Samarina"; "Government and Trade, Churches and Houses"; "Birth, Baptism, Betrothal, Marriage and Burial Customs"; "Festivals and Folklore"; "The Distribution of the Vlachs"; "The Vlach Language"; and "The History and Origin of the Balkan Vlachs". An appendix contains select texts to illustrate the Vlach language. In all the book is a mine of information on the Vlachs of the Pindos region on the eve of the First World War, abounding with acute observation and scholarly insight.

None of the authors that I have so far mentioned, despite their various degrees of sympathy for the Vlachs and their political aspirations can be described as propagandists on behalf of the Vlachs, nor did they seek to exert pressure on the Foreign Office to espouse the Vlach cause. Nonetheless there were British publicists willing to take up the Vlach political cause and needless to say R. W. Seton-Watson was one of them. In an article written at the time of the first Balkan war, for instance, he called for "a special charter of liberties for the Coutzo-Vlachs, in whatever new territory fate might place them", arguing that Romania's strict neutrality in the war jus-

⁹ *Passim*. The authors of the books that I have mentioned so far are all to a greater or lesser degree sympathetic to the Vlachs and accepted their Romanian origins as proven but there were also accounts whose authors were distinctly less sympathetic. See, e.g., G. F. Abbott, *The Tale of a Tour in Macedonia* (London, 1903) 77 ff: "With the exception of their patois, everything else about the Wallachs — specially the civilised Wallachs of the towns — is Hellenic: their manners and customs; their legends and ritual songs; their commercial and intellectual life, and their religion are all thoroughly Greek, and on all questions touching nationality they are more Greek than the Greeks themselves. It is over twenty years since the Romanian propaganda began to tamper with the Wallachs; but, as has been stated already, without any perceptible success. Few of the Wallachs have allowed themselves to be persuaded that they are Romanians and those it is generally asserted, have yielded to other than purely historical arguments".

tified such a move. He went so far as to argue that "the really just solution would be an invitation to Roumania to enter a 'League of Five Kings' and to make Constantinople her capital"²⁰. Moreover the views of observers such as Brailsford and Wace and Thompson found their way into such encapsulations of official British attitudes as the "Peace Handbooks" prepared by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office for the Versailles Peace Conference. In conclusion, then, it can be said that while the Vlachs of Macedonia gained no real champion in Britain during the critical early years of this century, nonetheless accurate and broadly sympathetic information on their past history and present aspirations was readily available to the educated British public from a number of sources. The Vlachs of Macedonia were, as a result of the efforts of writers such as Eliot, Brailsford, Wace and Thompson, no longer a completely unknown quantity. They could not now simply be dismissed, as Gibbon had done over a century earlier, as "vagrant Wallachians".

²⁰ "Austria-Hungary as a Balkan Power", *The Contemporary Review*, cii (1912), 801—6.

DUMITRU BRATIANU AND BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING THE UNIFICATION OF THE ROMANIAN PRINCIPALITIES (1848—1859)

BY

TREVOR J. HOPE

Readers of *The Times* opened their newspaper on the morning of the 5th September, 1850, to find the story of an unfortunate East European visitor to London, who, the day before, had barely escaped a lynching at the hands of a working class mob. It provoked an Anglo-Austrian diplomatic incident and more column inches were expended on the story in *The Times* and elsewhere, than on any other item that month.¹ The hapless victim of this outburst of British ill-humour was an elderly field-marshal of the Imperial Austrian army, the former commander of the Imperial forces in Hungary, the Baron Julius Jakob Von Haynau (1786—1853). His flogging of Italian women at Brescia in 1849 had earned him the nickname "Hyena of Brescia", while his cruel outrages in Hungary not only brought about his dismissal from the army in July 1850, but assured notoriety for him in Britain as the very embodiment of tyrannical despotism, whose rule had brought misery and suffering to millions of Italians and Hungarians. The draymen of Barclay and Perkin's brewery, who had chased Haynau through the streets of London, were giving vent in unusually dramatic form to a deeply felt British antipathy towards the autocratic, Continental powers and their representatives, the corollary of which was widespread sympathy and support for the subject nationalities of the oppressor states.

Italians, Hungarians and above all, the Poles, could always count on a large body of public opinion in Britain ready to aid their campaign for national unity and independence². All three nationalities in various ways enjoyed similar backing to that mounted on behalf of the Greeks during their national struggle of the 1820s. But in the same way as the revolutionary events of 1848 in Paris, Berlin and Vienna tended to overshadow similar developments in other European cities, so the voice of the Polish, Italian and Hungarian propagandists in Britain has overshadowed the appeal directed at British public opinion on behalf of the peoples of Moldavia and Wallachia in their bid for national unification. The years which spanned the collapse of the 1848 revolutions in the Principalities and their eventual unification in 1859 were a time of mounting nationalist agitation

¹ *The Times* 5, 6, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 27 September 1850 and *The Illustrated London News* vol. XVII, 1850, 221.

² Norbert J. Gossman, "British Aid to Polish, Italian and Hungarian Exiles 1830—70" *The South Atlantic Quarterly* (1969) vol. LXVIII, 231—245; and Peter Brock, "Polish Democrats and English Radicals 1832—1862" *The Journal of Modern History* (1953) vol. XXV, 139—156.

both inside and outside those countries, punctuated by the Russo-Turkish conflict (1853—56), better known as the Crimean War. For the first time the Principalities became a major issue in European diplomacy. The high drama surrounding that war and the deep impact it made upon Britain has obscured the fact that its origins lay in the refusal of Russia to end its habitual interference in the Principalities, and that the major issue of the peace conference at Paris which terminated the military conflict, was the political reorganization of the Principalities and the arrangement for European supervision of the commerce and navigation of the Lower Danube³. The band of Romanian nationalists who forced into exile after the collapse of the 1848 revolutions could not have foreseen that their political aims would have been so speedily elevated to the realm of international diplomacy. As a consequence, Britain's formerly passive role in Romanian affairs was transformed into an active influence over the political future of the Principalities.

Someone who did recognize the pivotal position of Great Britain was the person chosen by the Provisional Government of Wallachia, shortly before its overthrow, to carry a message to Lord Palmerston requesting British support for the revolutionary government. This was Dumitru Brătianu (1818—1892), a man who was to orchestrate, almost singlehandedly, the campaign in Britain in favour of the Romanians' national aims⁴. He was one of that talented group of Romanian liberal democrats of the generation of forty-eight, who carried the dream of a free and independent Romania into reality. Brătianu alternately charmed and cajoled the British into paying attention to what the Romanian exiles had to say. For ten years he passed back and forth acting as chief representative in London of the Paris-based national movement. His campaign passed through a number of stages — his early appeal to British ministers and the cultivation of Members of Parliament; a period of semi-clandestine activity as the Romanian representative to Mazzini's London-based European Democratic Central Committee; an attempt to inspire a popular movement among the British public through press articles and public meetings; and finally a return to his earlier conviction that British policy towards the Romanians was best encouraged by direct appeals to those politicians willing to debate the issue in the British parliament, thus directly influencing government policy⁵.

³ Radu R. N. Florescu, "The Rumanian Principalities and the Origins of the Crimean War" *The Slavonic and East European Review* (1964) vol. 43, 46—67; and W. G., East, *The Union of Moldavia and Wallachia, 1859; An Episode in Diplomatic History* (Cambridge, 1927) 26—52.

⁴ There is no full-scale biography of Dumitru Brătianu but for a recent biographical sketch see: Dumitru Vitcu, *Diplomații Unirii* (Bucharest, 1979) 154—186.

⁵ There was a further, ancillary activity in which Brătianu was engaged whilst in Britain. He wanted to encourage people with professional skills to go out to the Principalities and lend their knowledge and experience to the construction of the infrastructure of the nascent state. Dr. and Mrs. John Baker Mawr, with whom Brătianu lodged in St. John's Wood, London, between 1855 and 1858, were a case in point. They not only befriended Brătianu but also agreed with him that they should emigrate to Bucharest and help establish modern medical facilities in the Principalities. Mawr gave up his job as district surgeon accoucheur at St. Mary's Hospital, Paddington, and took up residence in Bucharest where he remained from 1858 until his death there in 1892. Like the Frenchman, Dr. Carol Davila, the Mawrs' performed outstanding service to the Roumanians, especially during the struggle for independence in the 1877—78 war.

No-one can doubt that Brătianu faced a daunting task when he arrived on Britain's shores with Alexandru Golescu (Negru) in November 1848. Neither Parliament, the press nor the public had hitherto taken any interest in the Romanians' quest for unity. The general ignorance and lack of interest concerning this matter afforded any Foreign Minister considerable scope for manoeuvre. For Lord Palmerston, the chief arbiter of Britain's foreign policy throughout this period, even when not in charge of the Foreign Office, that freedom of manoeuvre helped him maintain the unchallenged primacy of British interests. Roughly translated into the context of Romanian affairs, this meant the maintenance of Ottoman sovereignty. Palmerston stressed the point repeatedly in his dealings with Brătianu; but, at the same time, there were factors working in the Romanians' favour. Since the war of 1828 Russian influence had predominated in the Principalities. In Britain, periodic clashes of interest produced widespread Russophobia which became particularly intense over matters pertaining to the Eastern Question⁶. Brătianu's strong card was that the revolutionary movement of 1848 was principally designed to throw off the Russian yoke, and that by uniting the Principalities under a foreign prince, backed by international guarantees, a barrier to Russian expansion would be created. The idea of creating a bulwark against Russia in Eastern Europe had been Britain's argument for the restoration of an independent Poland, so it was not surprising that the Poles' most ardent British champion, Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart (1803–1854), should have been Brătianu's earliest collaborator. As President of the Literary Association of the Friends of Poland, Stuart was able to introduce Brătianu to his middle class associates. One of these, William Lloyd Birkbeck (1807–1888)⁷, the honorary secretary of the Association, drew up the anonymous pamphlet: "The Russians in Moldavia and Wallachia", which was printed in London on the eve of the parliamentary debate on the Principalities in March 1849. The meagre results of that debate demonstrated the extent to which organizational groundwork was a necessary prerequisite for winning the British government to their view.

Although the initial phase of Brătianu's activity in Britain between 1848 and 1849 had emphasised the need to acquaint the leading politicians with the Romanian case, he quickly appreciated the value of cultivating a favourable press. Britain had a large newspaper-reading public even among

See: Trevor J. Hope, "Contribuția doctorului J. B. Mawr și a soției sale la viața medicală românească (1858–1892)" in Gheorghe Brătescu, ed., *Din tradițiile medicinei și ale educației sanitare: Studii și note* (Bucharest, 1978) 313–324.

⁶ See: J. H. Gleason, *The Genesis of Russophobia in Britain* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950).

⁷ Birkbeck, like his father before him (the educationalist Dr. George Birkbeck), was closely associated with the Polish cause and a close friend of Lord Dudley Stuart. He accompanied Stuart on the visit to Sweden in November 1854 to enlist the help of the King of Sweden in Poland's regeneration (It was during the course of this visit that Stuart died in Stockholm). A graduate of Trinity College, Cambridge, Birkbeck was called to the bar in 1833, and in 1860 became Downing Professor of Law at Cambridge and later Master of Downing College. His sister, Anna Margaret, married Colonel Mednyanszky, the aide-de-camp to the Hungarian nationalist General György Klapka See: John G. Godard, *George Birkbeck, the Pioneer of Popular Education: A Memoir and a Review* (London, 1884) 194–196.

the working class⁸, and politicians were already sensitive to press campaigns. To exert an influence over public opinion, and through public opinion, an influence upon the government, became one of the prime objectives of Brătianu's campaign. Lord Palmerston, despite his personal liking for Brătianu, was able to offer little beyond his declared aim to see the Russians terminate their occupation of the Principalities. A process of educating the British public through the press and keeping the Romanian situation in the minds of the politicians until some new opportunity arose, was Brătianu's plan. Had he been able to proceed unhindered, his talents as a propagandist for the Romanians would have probably borne fruit much earlier. As it was, he had to return to Paris and devote his energies to combatting critics of his anti-Turkish sentiments, which were blamed for the lack of more positive results⁹.

Political differences among the Romanian exiles and an increasing tide of Continental reaction, drove the group into more conspiratorial activities, in so doing it re-opened the long-standing dispute with the Hungarians. The vexed question of Transylvania came to the fore with the publication of an appeal to the Romanians by the leaders of The European Democratic Central Committee. Under the leadership of Giuseppe Mazzini this committee was attempting to forge a united group out of the several national committees of the European radical exiles gathered in London¹⁰. Nicolae Bălcescu had initiated moves to include the Romanians during discussions at the time of his visit to London in January 1850¹¹. The initial committee comprised Ledru Rollin (France), Arnold Ruge (Germany), Giuseppe Mazzini (Italy) and Albert Darasz (Poland)¹², with Dumitru Brătianu and Lajos Kossuth joining later to represent the Romanians and Hungarians. In June, 1851, the organ of the European Democratic Central Committee, *La Voie du Proscrit*, launched its appeal to the Romanian people, briefly alluding to the troubled relations with "the races which surround you"¹³. The call was taken up by the radical press in Britain, most notably by Julian Harney *The Friend of*

⁸ Robert K. Webb, "Working Class Readers in Early Victorian England" *English Historical Review* (1950) vol. 65, 349. See also: E. E. Kellett, "The Press" in G. M. Young, ed., *Early Victorian England* (London, 1934) vol. II, 3—97; A. R. D. Elliot, "Reviews and Magazines in the Early Years of the Nineteenth Century" in Sir A. W. Ward and A. R. Waller, eds., *The Cambridge History of English Literature* (Cambridge, 1907—27) vol. XII (1915), 140—163; and R. K. Webb, *The British Working Class Reader, 1790—1848: Literacy and Social Tension* (London, 1955).

⁹ Christian Tell, *Ion Eliade and Nicolae Golescu to D. Brătianu, Paris, 12/24 March 1849* in Alexandru Cretzianu, *Din Arhiva lui Dumitru Brătianu* (Bucharest, 1933) vol. I, 201—203.

¹⁰ A. Müller Lehning, "The International Association (1855—1859): A Contribution to the preliminary history of the First International" *International Review for Social History* (Leiden, 1938) vol. III, 201—202; and Alvin R. Calman, *Ledru-Rollin après 1848 et les Proscrits Français en Angleterre* (Paris, 1921) 95.

¹¹ Cornelia C. Bodea, "Nicolae Bălcescu: A Revolutionary Militant and Diplomat" *Revue Roumaine d'Etudes Internationales* (1969) vol. 5, 97—115.

¹² Albert Darasz died in September 1852 and his funeral at Highgate cemetery on the twenty-second was the occasion for a great demonstration in which Brătianu and other leaders of the European Democratic Central Committee participated. See: William J. Linton, *European Republicans: Recollections of Mazzini and his Friends* (London, 1892) 319; and Alvin R. Calman, *op. cit.*, 164.

¹³ Alexandru Marcu, *Conspiratori și Conspirații în Epoca Renașterii Politice a României 1848—1877* (Bucharest, 1930) 44—50.

the People, which, on 10 July 1851, published the manifesto English under the heading "The Danubian Democracy". It was not the reactio of the British press on this occasion which proved the decisive factor resulting from this appeal. Instead, it was the polemical debate which it stirred between Brătianu and Daniel Irányi (former secretary of the Budapest Committee of Public Safety), in the columns of the Parisian newspaper, *La Presse*, during June and July, 1851. This exposed the problem between the Hungarian and Romanian points of view and the difficulties of arriving at any acceptable solution to the Transylvanian issue. It was to cripple further collaboration between the Hungarians and Romanians on the committee, thereby reducing its value to all concerned. Dumitru Brătianu revealed his disillusionment and frustration with the lack of progress in his correspondence with Maria Rosetti in October 1852¹⁴. It was in fact the low point of his years in exile. In 1851 Russian troops had been withdrawn from the Principalities, but the revolutionaries of '48 were still barred from returning home. Their national revolt had ended in failure and gradually the programme of a national Romanian state embracing the Transylvanian Romanians as well as the Romanians of Moldavia and Wallachia plus a genuinely radical social policy, gave way to less ambitious proposals.

As the pendulum swung against radicalism, so Brătianu once again turned to diplomatic activity. When Russian troops returned en masse to the Moldavian border he wrote another letter to Lord Dudley Stuart in March 1853, outlining the danger in the current situation and appealing to Stuart once more to raise the question of the Principalities in the House of Commons. He recalled that, "England has, on every occasion, proclaimed the neutrality of the territories of Moldavia and Wallachia, has always protested against the presence of the Russians in the Principalities, and always urged them to quit that country at the earliest possible moment"¹⁵. Brătianu avowed that the Romanians still had faith in the efficacy of British diplomacy, and regarded Britain as the one European power capable of "understanding the cry of liberty and right amongst other peoples". He paid tribute to Stuart's friendship towards the Romanian four years earlier, and for his "eloquent pleading in favour of the Danubian Principalities"¹⁶. Stuart's reply laid heavy emphasis upon the Romanians' relations with the Turks:

"I have been led to make these observations on the importance of a good understanding between the Principalities and the Porte by the consideration that a contrary state of things would materially aid the machinations of Russia against your country, which it is the object of your letter by exposing to counteract. Public opinion is, after all, not wholly without weight in the world; and if it cannot always check the ambition and schemes of princes and cabinets, it yet often stimulates governments to the discharge of their duties in opposing and preventing them. How much less would (British) public opinion be outraged by any attempt on the part of Russia to occupy or get possession of the Principalities, if it were the prevailing idea that

¹⁴ D. Brătianu to Maria Rosetti, London, 18 October 1852 (Biblioteca Centrală de Stat, Bucharest, Fond Bălcescu, MS. AB 146/11).

¹⁵ D. Brătianu to Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart, London, 20 March 1853 in "The Correspondence of D. Brătianu with Lord Dudley C. Stuart, M. P. on the Danubian Principalities in 1853", Pamphlet *Moldavia and Wallachia* No. 388, Forster Collection, Victoria and Albert Museum, London. Cf. Armand Lévy, *La Russie sur le Danube* (Paris, 1854) for a French translation of these letters.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

the inhabitants were dissatisfied with the Turkish government, and therefore not averse to such a change.

I consider it, therefore, of great consequence to make known to the world that the Principalities have no desire to sever their connexion with Turkey, and that they look on the idea of passing under the rule of Russia with abhorrence. Your letter, which brings out the latter point, at least, so strongly as calculated to produce an excellent effect"¹⁷.

Stuart's response underlined the basic ambiguity of the British philo-romanians' position. If they were to obtain popular support for the Romanian cause, they had to be able to show that this would neither materially endanger the Turks nor lead to any increase in Russian power. Brătianu was able to give his own personal guarantee to Stuart that such was not the intention of the Romanian nationalists, but it remained the constant doubt in British minds, which was never quite laid to rest¹⁸. Lord Dudley Stuart made plans for a personal visit in 1853, but his death in Stockholm in September the following year, before he could make the trip, removed from the scene one of the Romanians' most dedicated British friends.

The outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey in October 1853, and the involvement of Britain, France and Sardinia on the side of the Turks in the spring of 1854, thrust the affairs of south-eastern Europe into international prominence. Its effect was to present the very occasion Brătianu had been waiting for in order to provide a receptive public with material about the Romanians. Initially, the publishers and editors of the daily press, periodicals, learned journals and books eagerly sought material about the Balkans. A wide variety of works were published, among them the first elementary English grammar of the Romanian language¹⁹. Press, public and parliament were all, for the first time, eager to glean whatever information could be offered about the lands of the Lower Danube. At the focus of military activity shifted away from the Principalities and towards the Crimea, so popular interest was transferred, and when the news of political and military incompetence began to be relayed back to Britain, the enthusiasm for the conflict turned to bitterness. The government of Lord Aberdeen became the scapegoat and the success of John Roebuck's critical motion of 1855 to set up an enquiry into the conduct of the war brought about the defeat of the ministry²⁰. The war gave encouragement to the Romanians, who placed their hopes in the eventual peace settlement, and redoubled their diplomatic efforts. In Britain a larger body of parliamentarians now expressed interest in the Romanian Principalities. They were led by Austin Henry Layard, the renowned archaeologist, who had met Brătianu in June 1853, and who subsequently questioned the attitude adopted by the government towards the Principalities. Much to the disappointment of the Romanians, military considerations encouraged the allies to permit an Austrian occupation of the Principalities, thereby forcing Russia to evacuate under threat of direct Austrian military intervention. Brătianu's euphoria at the opening of the

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart to D. Brătianu, Petersham, 26 March 1853.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, "D. Brătianu to Lord Dudley Coutts Stuart (London) 27 May 1853".

¹⁹ Friedrich MaxMüller, *Suggestions for the Assistance of Officers in Learning the Languages of the Seat of War in the East* (London, 1854).

²⁰ See: J. B. Conacher, *The Aberdeen Coalition 1852—1855* (Cambridge, 1968).

conflict gradually evaporated as one foreign occupation was replaced by another. Brătianu had been eager to stir popular opinion on the question of the Principalities and over the summer of 1853, as the war clouds were gathering, there had been talk of arranging a public meeting at Manchester at which Layard and others would speak²¹. There was some misunderstanding as to whether it was better to call a public meeting, or announce a series of public lectures, but in the end the whole idea was postponed²². Layard in particular, was afraid of provoking public opposition, and, in common with most of Brătianu's political acquaintances, preferred to keep the matter within parliamentary and diplomatic circles. Brătianu himself was undecided, his radical allies urged him to take the debate to the British people, and the great demonstrations which had been organized for Kossuth in 1851, and on other occasions for the Italians and Poles, were cited as examples to emulate. The distinct reserve felt by his parliamentary friends, decided him against the idea for the duration of the war. Instead, Brătianu continued to encourage the publication of articles in the newspapers and periodical press, and was even willing to arrange for journalists to be paid out of the funds of the Paris exiles. One recipient was Eyre Evans Crowe (1799–1868), whose son, Joseph Archer Crowe (1825–1896), had been in the Principalities from July to September 1854, covering events on the Lower Danube for *The Illustrated London News*²³. Together, father and son were responsible for a large proportion of the material inserted in British newspapers about the Principalities between 1855 and 1858. Eyre Crowe had been the editor of the liberal newspaper *The Daily News* when Nicolae Bălcescu's letter, written during his stay in London, was published in January 1850²⁴, and since time, Crowe became a passionate advocate of the reform and unification of the Romanian Principalities. With so many friends and acquaintances in Fleet Street, Crowe proved very useful to Brătianu. Later, when it had been decided that Sir Henry Bulwer should be sent to Bucharest with other European commissioners to assess the situation in the Principalities and report back to the diplomats assembled at the Paris Conference, Crowe went out to cover the mission with Romanian funds and an impressive list of Romanian contacts²⁵.

²¹ A. H. Layard to D. Brătianu, London, 14 July 1853, in Al. Cretzianu, *Din Arhiva lui Dimitrie Brătianu* (Bucharest, 1933), vol. I, 351.

²² Anastasie Iordache, *Goleştii: Locul şi rolul lor în istoria României* (Bucharest, 1979) 234–5.

²³ J. A. Crowe, *Reminiscences of Thirty-Five Years of My Life* (London, 1895) 142. E. D. Tappe, "E. E. and J. A. Crowe and Romanian Union: some unpublished letters of 1857" *The Slavonic and East European Review* (1962) vol. XVI, 135–143.

²⁴ E. D. Tappe, "Nicolae Bălcescu's Propaganda in England: his meetings with Cobden and Palmerston" *The American Slavic and East European Review* (1954) vol. XIII, 67–71.

²⁵ He became particularly friendly with Ion Filipescu, whom he introduced to Sir Henry Bulwer in 1857: E. E. Crowe to Sir Henry Bulwer, London, 20 April 1857, *Arhivele Statului*, Bucharest, Misc. MSS. no. 61.

For the Romanians, it was a time of intense activity, and Brătianu hurried to Paris to lobby the assembled representatives. Until 1856, Brătianu had been able to put across a coherent anti-Russian thesis, which, although it could never hope to satisfy the British philo-Turks, did impress a significant segment of liberal opinion. Indeed, it has been claimed that the propaganda activity of the Romanian exiles in Britain had encouraged and inflamed the wave of Russophobia which had swept the country into the Crimean War.

The termination of the Crimean conflict in 1856 left the final decisions about the terms of a peace settlement to the diplomats meeting at Paris²⁶. By the Peace Treaty Russia was forced to give up her protectorate over the Principalities, southern Bessarabia was retroceded to Moldavia and the Black Sea neutralised. Russia now set out to work for undoing the losses sustained by this peace, and to do so, priority was given to breaking the diplomatic alliance which had brought about this reversal of fortune. In particular, the period between 1856 and 1859 saw a rapprochement between Russia and France with Russia acquiescing in French encouragement of the Romanian liberals' programme²⁷. This diplomatic volte-face rebounded to the distinct disadvantage of the Romanian campaign in Britain.

The only country to rival the unpopularity of Russia in British opinion was Austria. Her opportunistic policy during the war and her unwillingness to immediately evacuate the Principalities after the military conflict played straight into Brătianu's hands²⁸. During 1855–56, questions in Parliament about the refusal of the Austrians to allow the return of the Romanian refugees of '48, and the abuses suffered by the Principalities under Austrian rule, received a sympathetic hearing²⁹. Not only Layard, but Arthur Otway and John Roebuck, urged the government to speed the Austrian evacuation of the Principalities and permit the return of the refugees, while in the House of Lords, Lords Clanricarde and Lyndhurst did the same. Layard, Clanricarde and Lyndhurst were kept in close touch with events at the Paris conference through Eugène Poujade, former French consul in the Principalities, who had married a Romanian and become a convinced advocate of the union³⁰. Layard especially had become an important link in Brătianu's chain of contacts, for he not only was able to introduce Brătianu to his circle of political allies in the Liberal Party, but he was able to maintain links with the Turks through his friendship with Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador in London³¹. Unfortunately the change in Russian foreign policy was to break Brătianu's collaboration with Layard, who found himself quite unable to support a course of action which received Russia's blessing, and when Layard lost his Aylesbury seat at the 1857 general election his support for Brătianu effectively ceased.

By that time, however, Brătianu's campaign no longer depended on one or two politicians. His involvement in the European Democratic Central

²⁶ Radu R. N. Florescu, "The Rumanian Principalities and the Origins of the Crimean War", *op. cit.*, 61–62.

²⁷ Barbara Jelavich, *Russia and the Rumanian National Cause, 1858–1859* (Hamden, Conn., 1974) 12–13. Leonid Boicu, *Diplomația europeană și triumful cauzei române (1856–1859)* (Iași, 1978) 57 ff.

²⁸ See: Leonid Boicu, *Austria și Principatele Române în vremea războiului Crimeii 1853–1856* (Bucharest, 1972).

²⁹ C. A. Rosetti and Nicolae Gulescu lent additional help to Brătianu at this juncture, George Fotino, *Din vremea Renașterii Naționale: Boerii Golești* (Bucharest, 1939), vol. IV, 30–32.

³⁰ E. Poujade to A. H. Layard, Paris, 11 March 1856 The Layard Papers, British Museum, MS. 38, 984, fol. 289.

³¹ Replying to Layard, who had just sent him a portrait of himself in oriental dress, Musurus called him, "un ardent ami de la Turquie ...dès votre jeunesse." Musurus to Layard, [London?], 19 February 1869 The Layard Papers, British Museum, Add. MS. 38, 996, fol. 92.

Committee had opened up channels of communication with British radicals, as well as other foreign nationalists. Nicolae Crețulescu, among others, had criticised Brătianu for the length of time he spent with the other exile groups³², but in 1856 this collaboration yielded important results. Already John Roebuck, the radical Independent M. P. for Sheffield, had taken up the Romanians' cause and in the summer of 1856 he introduced Brătianu to Lord Brougham and William Gladstone³³. At the same time Dr. Arnold Ruge (1802—1880)³⁴, the German representative on the European Democratic Central Committee, came forward to offer his help in organizing a public demonstration. This was the Brighton meeting of 6 October 1856.

Brătianu and Ruge planned the meeting to take place in Brighton principally, one suspects, because Ruge had made his home in the town. There were, however, two other important advantages. Brighton's politics had a strong radical tradition and the townsfolk could be expected to give their backing to the meeting. It was also relatively close to London and attracted large numbers of influential people from the capital during the season (September to December)³⁵. The organizers themselves could expect to receive considerable publicity. Ruge and his wife set up the local committee over the summer of 1856, while Brătianu contacted his parliamentary allies to urge their co-operation.

Two local politicians were invited to provide the keynote speeches — Montagu David Scott (1818—1900) and John George Dodson (1825—1897). Dodson was a lawyer and Sussex landowner, the son of a former M. P., Sir John Dodson, and was parliamentary Liberal candidate for East Sussex, a seat he won in the following year. He developed a highly successful political career, holding a variety of Treasury posts in Gladstone's Liberal governments. He was elevated to the peerage as Lord Monk-Bretton when he retired from the House of Commons in 1884³⁶. Scott was also a prominent lawyer, who defended cases brought before the Brighton magistrate's bench, and so was constantly in the public eye. He became a Liberal Member of Parliament in 1874³⁷. Scott's close association with Brighton's chief magistrate and mayor, Alderman William Hallett J. P. (1794—1862), was

³² N. Crețulescu to A. G. Golescu, Bucharest, 23 October/4 November 1856 in Cornelia C. Bodea, ed., *Documente privind Unirea Principatelor* (Bucharest, 1963), vol. III, 148.

³³ J. A. Roebuck to Lord Brougham, London, 6 July 1856 The Brougham Papers, University College London, MS. 11, 929. In this letter Roebuck revealed Brătianu's latest scheme: "There is here a Wallachian whom I have known some time, who is labouring on behalf of his country and is anxious to make the people of this country know how their material interests are connected with those of the principalities. To this end he purposes to send at his own expense an English agent to the principalities in order that he may acquire by actual instruction a knowledge of the people and country and then that he should communicate this knowledge to our people here by giving lectures at the various towns in the provinces —" And also: J. A. Roebuck to William Gladstone, London, 28 July 1856 (The Gladstone Papers, British Museum, Add. MS. 44, 386, fols. 76—77).

³⁴ *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (Leipzig, 1889) vol. 29, 594—598.

³⁵ Brighton at this time was described as "a town which has risen from obscurity, and has become within the last century the resort not only of persons moving in the middle ranks of life, but also of many of the nobility; and which now contains from about 75,000 to 80,000 inhabitants." Anon., [Amelia Balcombe] *Glances of Brighton Past and Present* (London, 1856) 2.

³⁶ *Who Was Who 1897—1915* (London, 1920) 501.

³⁷ Frederic Boase, ed., *Modern English Biography* (London, 1965) supplement to vol. III, vol. VI, 536.

probably instrumental in securing Hallett's services to chair the October meeting. The mayor was already wellknown as the town's most prominent radical reformer, and his predilection for foreign causes had often been the subject of criticism³⁸. Another prominent local figure, William Coningham (1815—1884) was also a member of the organizing committee. He had contested a Brighton seat in 1847, and was eventually returned as member for the town at the general election of 1857³⁹. At the local level, therefore, it is clear that a liberal-radical alliance formed the core supporters of Romanian unification. (Had it been possible to forge such alliances in the larger urban centres of the Midlands and industrial North of England, Brătianu's campaign would have triumphed. Instead, he was to meet a decisive check from this quarter).

The meeting which took place on Monday 6 October had never been intended as a purely local event, but few of the organizers could have predicted the impact it would have. Ruge himself had arranged coverage by the local press, and had even published two articles in *The Brighton Herald* just as the meeting date was announced. He reviewed Romanian history and outlined current developments. He criticised the role of all the great powers, and censured the attitude of Austria and Turkey towards the Romanian, and concluded :

"Therefore, to keep the English Government in the right line, the English people must advocate now the union of Moldavia and Wallachia, and not go to sleep upon the laurels of the last war, whilst the fruit of it is lost by shuffling, intrigues and deceit.

The Union of the Roumanish nation is the most important of all the conditions of peace ; it is at the same time the best guarantee of its lasting.

Never has Russia attacked the Turks by sea, always by the way of the Principalities. Unite them, and you stop up that road against the northern disturber of the peace of Europe"⁴⁰.

In the next article, which appeared on the weekend before the scheduled meeting, Ruge argued against the major thesis advanced by British sceptics of Romanian unification. He prefaced his views with a quote from the adversaries of union : "We must strengthen the hand of Turkey, and take good care not to do what Russia wishes"⁴¹. Anti-Russian feeling was at its height, and the argument that Britain should on no account support Russian moves to unify the Principalities was a point of view gaining increasing favour. Against this Ruge argued that although Russian diplomats at the Paris conference were advocating the union, it was not what they really wanted, for it could not be in the best interests of Russia to have a free and independent state on their south-western borders. Ruge went even further, and argued that it was in the interests of Turkey to have the united Principalities as a barrier to future Russian expansion in the Balkans. To show that neither the union of the Principalities nor an hereditary prince to govern them, was against the rights of the Turkish Sultan, Ruge produced the text of the old treaties between Turkey and the Principalities, side by side with the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris (1856). These had been copied from

³⁸ See the obituary to Alderman Hallett : *The Brighton Gazette* 10 April 1862.

³⁹ Frederic Boase, ed., *Modern English Biography* (London, 1965, reprint) vol. I, 692.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, *The Brighton Herald* 27 September 1856.

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, *The Brighton Herald* 4 October 1856.

the pamphlet which Vasile Boerescu had produced a few months earlier and were later used by Brătianu in his letters to the press. Ruge again concluded that, "the only way to protect Turkey is, therefore, to stand honestly by the Treaties, and to go honestly with the legitimate wishes of the people of the Principalities. Then the Turks and the Romanians will always combine against their common enemies, the Austrians and the Russians"⁴². It was an argument that Brătianu was to use time and again in the coming months as the debate intensified.

Apart from setting the scene through such articles in the local press, as well as paid advertisements announcing the meeting, Brătianu and Ruge left nothing to chance, planning everything down to the last detail. Brătianu's letter of 30 September showed the Romanian leader's familiarity with the local arrangements⁴³. He enquired whether Ruge had been able to ensure that one of Brighton's M.P.'s "Pitchel" (sic) would attend the demonstration⁴⁴, and whether Colonel "Fauvert" (sic) would lend his name to the proceedings⁴⁵. Ruge's wife, Agnes, was also involved in the organization, and had proposed that the front of Brighton's town hall⁴⁶, the venue for the meeting, should be draped with the Romanian colours. Brătianu pronounced this an excellent idea, sending Mrs. Ruge the Romanian tricolour and adding (diplomatically), that the Union Jack had also better be hoisted as well. Giant posters advertising the meeting were to be put up in Brighton and Brătianu emphasised that the Crimean War and the Anglo-French alliance should be alluded to in these posters in order to attract British attention, "because the English public will not be excited if the question is reduced to that of the Principalities alone". He also told Ruge to obtain a commitment from "the excellent Mr. Scott to say a few words at the meeting; for he is one of the most influential men in Brighton and a word from him will produce a great effect"⁴⁷. Brătianu stressed the fact that the success of the meeting was essential, for being the first of its kind it would greatly influence the course of future meetings⁴⁸.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ D. Brătianu to Dr. A. Ruge, London, 30 September 1856 in Paul Herrlich, ed., *Arnold Ruge's Briefwechsel und Tagebuchblätter aus den Jahren 1825—1880* (Berlin, 1886) vol. II, 170—171.

⁴⁴ He was referring to Admiral, Sir George Richard Brooke Pechell (1789—1860) who represented Brighton in the Whig interest from 1835 to 1860. Pechell took a particularly active part in questions relating to naval affairs, the mercantile marine and fisheries and was a popular figure in Brighton politics. (No mention was made of the second member for Brighton, Lord Alfred Hervey (1816—1875) who represented the constituency in Parliament between 1842 and 1857). There is no positive indication that either politician attended the meeting or took any part in the Roumanian campaign.

⁴⁵ This most probably referred to Colonel John Fawcett, a conspicuous figure in Brighton politics.

⁴⁶ Amelia Balcombe described the Town Hall in 1856 as "a noble-looking building, which was commenced in 1828 ... and opened in 1830; and which is constantly rendered a busy scene of action by the inhabitants of the town. The largest room, which is used both for balls and concerts is 140 feet long. The local authorities, and various Office Collectors and Surveyors, have offices in this building; where also the Magistrates' Court is held." *Glances of Brighton Past and Present*, op. cit., 59—60.

⁴⁷ Paul Herrlich, op. cit.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem.*

Brătianu need have had no fear that Ruge would have left any stone unturned in the organizational work involved in planning this demonstration. It had even been arranged that the meeting would coincide with the visit of the ex-ruler of Moldavia, Prince Grigore Alexandru Ghica, who had been the Hospodar of Moldavia between May 1849 and October 1853, and again between October 1854 and June 1856, and who arrived in Brighton with his retinue towards the end of September⁴⁹. The meeting was ensured wide coverage not only in the local press, but in the London papers too. Brătianu would have been sure to publicise this demonstration among his press friends, including Joseph Archer Crowe, who attended the event. By the evening of 6 October 1856 all was prepared for the first public demonstration of British support for the unification of the Principalities.

Six weekly newspapers were published in Brighton in the 1850's and all carried detailed reports of the speeches made in the Town Hall. *The Brighton Herald* prefaced its report by saying that "considering how little interest is usually felt among the public in questions of this kind, (it) was remarkably well attended"⁵⁰. Other papers, less sympathetic to Romanian union, reported the meeting as "only thinly attended"⁵¹, although all acknowledged that it was both "an important and influential meeting"⁵².

Apart from the main participants already mentioned, the radical M. P. for Birmingham, William Scholefield, travelled down to Brighton to address the meeting and Ruge himself spoke on behalf of Brătianu. Another speaker was the writer and journalist Horace St. John (1832—1888), leader-writer on political topics for *The Daily Telegraph*, and one-time correspondent for *The Standard* and *The Times*. Other distinguished supporters sent apologies for their absence to the local secretary, A. H. Cox, including Lord Brougham, Arthur Otway, John Forster, William Gladstone, William Harrison Ainsworth and John Roebuck. The latter expressed his wish for the meeting's success, adding :

"It is my earnest wish that the influence of England may be used in support of freedom and good government in the Principalities, and I am delighted to find that the public are beginning to take an interest in the destinies of these hitherto unfortunate countries. They might be made a means of checking the despotism which is supported by Russia, Austria and Turkey. An independent and free people placed between these Empires, would, if supported by England, greatly aid the advance of civilization in the East, and go far to check the ambition of Russia and Austria. The only hope of justice to the Principalities is in England, every other nation that has any influence upon their well-being is our enemy of freedom and liberal institutions"⁵³.

The resolution to which the Brighton speakers addressed themselves advocated the union of the two Principalities, "in order to make a free and

⁴⁹ His arrival was announced under the column "Fashionable News" in *The Brighton Herald*, Saturday 27 September, 1856. The following week Sir John Dodson (1780—1858) the former M. P. for Rye and judge of the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, arrived with his son (a principal speaker at the meeting) and daughter-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. John George Dodson, at 7½ Marine Parade, Brighton, according to the same society column in *The Brighton Herald*, Saturday 4 October, 1856.

⁵⁰ *The Brighton Herald* 11 October 1856.

⁵¹ *The Brighton Guardian* 8 October 1856.

⁵² *The West Sussex Gazette and Country Advertiser* 9 October 1856.

⁵³ J. A. Roebuck, to Dr. A. Ruge, Leeds, 3 October, 1856 published in *The Brighton Gazette* 9 October 1856.

powerful nation of the Roumans", and urged the British government, "to satisfy the just expectations of the Rouman people as to their internal government"⁵⁴. Montagu Scott moved the resolution in a speech which concentrated on the diplomatic aspects of the question. He was cheered when he said that Britain had not fought the Crimean War to see one tyranny in the Principalities replaced by another. He reminded the audience that Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, had agreed to the union, and he looked forward to the day when the five million Romanians of the Principalities, "would be created into a nation, owning neither the despotism of Austria nor of Russia, but a free people"⁵⁵.

Dodson, in seconding the motion, was able to draw on his own personal experience of the Principalities, for he briefly visited Wallachia in September 1855 on his way to the Crimea. He had met Prince Ghica at Cologne on his way to Vienna, who had invited him to visit the family estates. Dodson's description of his travelling companions was brief:

"Moldavian Gents... The Oriental peeping out in fur dressing gown. Prince Ghica's passport in French and Sclavonian. One a great landowner. Both decided anti-Russian, wished the allies had campaigned in Bessarabia"⁵⁶.

As a result of the chance meeting with Prince Ghica, Dodson was able to observe something of agricultural practices in the Principality, a subject on which he was very knowledgeable. Although he was unimpressed with general agricultural standards and techniques on the Ghica estates, he was quick to recognise their tremendous potential. Political developments too, had been carefully noted. When he returned to Britain he lectured on his travels, always concluding his talks with the recommendation that, "smaller states be formed out of the provinces of European Turkey according to the nationalities that inhabit them — (thus the Neo-Latin Principalities)"⁵⁷.

Prince Grigore Alexandru Ghica now sat on the Brighton Town Hall platform listening to Dodson plead the cause of unity and independence for the Principalities. Nor did he stop at demanding unity for Moldavia and Wallachia alone. The Romanians, he claimed:

"had a nationality of 6½ million people, totally distinct as a race, who seemed to be interposed by the providence of God as a barrier, to stop the progress of Russia to the south. There were 5 millions in the two Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, Bessarabia contained nearly a million more, and half a million were subjects of Austria. In addition to these were Transylvania and Bucovina"⁵⁸.

Dodson dwelt at length on the historical background of the Romanians and discussed the form of government (hereditary monarchy) which he considered most suited to their current condition. He lamented the lack of a large middle class and discussed the problems of Romanian agriculture, declaring that the remedy must be both radical and complete, the last vestiges

⁵⁴ *The Brighton Gazette* 9 October 1856.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁶ The diary of John George Dodson, Monk Bretton Papers, the Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS dep Monk Bretton vol. 36, "Diaries and Notebooks 1848—96". I am indebted to Lord Monk Bretton for permission to examine these papers.

⁵⁷ Draft Notes of "Lectures — Turkey: Lewes, Hurst & Hastings 1855" *Ibid.*, MS dep Monk Bretton vol. 38, "Early Papers: Tours of America and Turkey".

⁵⁸ *The Brighton Gazette* 9 October 1856.

of serfdom had to be effaced and a democratic regime instituted⁵⁹. Dodson's speech was the most instructive of the evening and earned him much applause. He had gone much further than any public speaker had ever dared to do in advocating not just the minimum programme being sought by Brătianu, but a policy for the greater Romania that only emerged after World War I.

He was followed by William Scholefield, who, perhaps anticipating the storm of protest from pro-Turkish quarters, again stressed than an independent state free from Austrian or Russian control would strengthen rather than weaken the Ottoman Empire. These sentiments were echoed by Ruge, who read to the meeting Brătianu's speech. He did not neglect to correct the population figures given by John Dodson, which, he claimed, were an under-estimation, and he stated that if Moldavia and Wallachia were united they could muster an army of 100,000 men, and, moreover, would be surrounded by a sympathetic kindred population, thus making them well able to defend themselves⁶⁰. He stressed the point that the matter under discussion was still open, unlike the affairs of Hungary or Poland, and the meeting was designed to pressure the government into adopting their motion. A further speech from Horace St. John followed similar lines and brought the official part of the meeting to a close, but not before an unscheduled speaker came from the audience — a Mr. Matthews, a mechanic and chartist. He expressed his pride in the fact that so many working men had attended the gathering and was pleased that Brighton had the honour of being the first town to express itself on this subject, which robbed the government of the excuse that there was no popular movement to support the Romanians⁶¹. With that the meeting unanimously adopted the motion and gave three hearty cheers for the union of Moldavia and Wallachia.

Brătianu was delighted with the success achieved by the Brighton meeting, and C. A. Rosetti wrote excitedly about the affair. As a result, further meetings were planned for Liverpool, Manchester and London and a committee of philo-Romanians was created in Great Britain⁶². By the end of the second week of October 1856, every national newspaper in Britain had carried reports of the Brighton gathering, usually copying verbatim from the account in *The Brighton Gazette*⁶³. *The Morning Chronicle* ran an editorial along with a full account of the meeting, in which it admitted that, "there is no doubt that public opinion has pronounced very positively in favour of a union between the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia"⁶⁴. The press in the provinces outside Sussex took up the story from the national papers, and the event was even reported on the Continent. The reaction

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*.

⁶² C. A. Rosetti to Ion Filipescu, (Paris?), 10 October 1856 Biblioteca Centrală de Stat, Bucharest, Fond Bălcescu, MS. AB/146/34.

⁶³ Influential local newspapers also reported the Brighton proceedings: See *The Liverpool Mercury*, 10 October 1856; *The Manchester Examiner and Times*, 10 October 1856; and *The Birmingham Daily Press*, 9 October 1856, the latter giving prominence to the speech of its M. P., William Scholefield.

⁶⁴ *The Morning Chronicle* 8 October 1856.

was not long in coming. Turkey's ambassador wrote to Layard in anger and despair :

"Who would have thought that after Turkey had declared war solely for the defence of these Provinces, after she had poured her blood over the Danube and had fallen into debt and been almost ruined by that war, that one would find the English today publicly pleading the consummation of a pre-eminently Russian scheme, whose practical and inevitable consequences would be the definitive loss of Provinces to Turkey and the beginning of the dismemberment of the Empire?"⁶⁵.

One of the consequences of the profound disquiet aroused in Britain by the Government's Near Eastern policy, and the deterioration of Russo-Turkish relations to the point of war in 1853, had been the establishment of local, public foreign affairs committees, whose object was to examine and pass judgement on issues of foreign policy. These committees had their origin in the frustrated political ambitions of the disenfranchised lower-middle and working classes, and drew their strength from the industrial regions of the north of England. They also attracted some support from traders and manufacturers, who felt keenly their inability to influence foreign policy under their existing parliamentary representation, which was so heavily weighted against them. The undisputed of the foreign affairs committees movement was David Urquhart, who, on quitting Parliament in 1852, had devoted much of his time to attacking Lord Palmerston's foreign policy⁶⁶. He had acquired considerable knowledge of Eastern affairs through having served on several missions on behalf of the British Government in Turkey, and through having served at the British embassy in Constantinople⁶⁷. With financial backing from George Crawshay, a Gateshead ironmaster, and James Grant, editor of the London *Morning Advertiser*, Urquhart, in 1855, launched a new twopenny weekly newspaper, *The Free Press* dedicated to his views, with C. D. Collet as its editor⁶⁸. *The Free Press* thereafter became the mouth-piece of the foreign affairs committees, and under Urquhart's influence fiercely attacked any attempts which might have indicated British collusion in Russian designs to weaken the Ottoman Empire.

No sooner had the Brighton meeting been held, then the Newcastle Committee for Investigating the Action of Diplomacy gathered to condemn it. George Crawshay (1821—1896), its chairman, (a friend of Urquhart who likewise had lived for a time in the Near East pursuing his commercial interests)⁶⁹, wrote to the participants accusing them publicly of misleading

⁶⁵ *Musurus Pasha to A. H. Layard, London, 8 October 1856*. The Layard Papers, British Museum, Add. MS. 38, 935 fols. 7—8.

⁶⁶ Richard Shannon, "David Urquhart and the Foreign Affairs Committees" in Patricia Hollis, ed., *Pressure from Without in Early Victorian England* (London, 1974) 239—261. See also: M. H. Jenks, "The Activities and Influence of David Urquhart 1833—1856" unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of London, 1964.

⁶⁷ See: Gertrude Robinson, *David Urquhart. Some Chapters in the Life of a Victorian Knight-Errent of Justice and Liberty* (London, 1920).

⁶⁸ C. D. Collet, *History of the Taxes on Knowledge* (London, 1899) vol. II, 57—61.

⁶⁹ George Crawshay's obituary in *The Times*, 23 March 1896, described him as being three times mayor of Gateshead and head of the engineering firm of Hawks, Crawshay & Co., "he was a staunch free-trader who threw himself into the Anti-Corn Law agita-

the people by neglecting to point out in their speeches that the proposal to unify the Principalities was backed by Russia⁷⁰. Horace St. John was disapprovingly referred to as a man "well known as connected with projects for a "Christian Kingdom on the Bosphorus" and John Roebuck as, "Lord Palmerston's convenient friend", while they accused what they termed, "the genteel democrats of Brighton (of) ... doing their best to hand the trade of the Danube over to Russia"⁷¹. The virulence of the attack took the Brighton participants by surprise. St. John wrote back to say that this point had in fact been mentioned at the meeting even if the press had failed to report it, and William Scholefield replied from the Reform Club :

"When men attack my arguments, I defend myself as well as I can. When they charge me with 'dishonesty', I leave the issue to others. This is the only answer I have to make to the resolution bearing your name — of which I have received a copy this morning"⁷².

The issues raised, however, could not be dismissed so easily. The Newcastle Committee stated that they were "satisfied that the fact that Russia is in favour of the union of the Danubian Principalities was *not* entirely suppressed at the Brighton Meeting". However, the Committee declared that it was "not satisfied that matter was honestly dealt with"⁷³. Nor was that all, the Newcastle Committee prepared its own report and circularised it together with a translated copy of the Porte's protest against the union of the Principalities, which had been issued the previous July.

The effect of this counter-attack was to make those who had hesitated on the question of the union even more hesitant, if not actually hostile to the idea advocated at Brighton. This was reflected in the editorial comment of *The Brighton Gazette*, which revealed that having had time to reflect upon the events set in motion by the public demonstration, it concluded that :

"The so-called 'National' movement is the mere interested design of certain ambitious Boyards, most of whom are tools of either Austria or Russia. The agitation is entirely artificial, and we think that we shall not wrong the people of these provinces when we say, that it is far better that we should at once set our faces against an agitation so merely personal, with so little prospect of a popular result, and which we cannot support without violating the faith which we have solemnly pledged to Turkey."⁷⁴

The reaction was by no means confined to the local press. *The Standard* published the attack of the Newcastle Committee in full⁷⁵, and so did *The Morning Herald*⁷⁶. Brătianu was provoked into a reply, repudiating any suggestion that union of the Principalities was a Russian proposal, pointing

tion. In 1848 he took up the cause of the Chartists, and at various times he supported the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Danes in their national struggles... He... was a sympathizer with Midhat Pasha and the Turkish reformers. He was Turkish consul at Newcastle...".

⁷⁰ *The Free Press or Journal of the Working Men's Committee* 18 October 1856.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*.

⁷² William Scholefield to G. Crawshaw, London, 13 October 1856 published in *The Free Press* 1 November 1856.

⁷³ *Ibidem* (*The Free Press* 1 November 1856).

⁷⁴ *The Brighton Gazette* 16 October 1856.

⁷⁵ *The Standard* 11 October 1856.

⁷⁶ *The Morning Herald* 11 October 1856.

out that the measure had been first favourably received by the Western allies and adding that: "Anyone acquainted with the wiles of Russian policy is bound to believe that Russia only supported the scheme of union to cast suspicion upon it and cause its ultimate rejection"⁷⁷. *The Morning Herald* pursued the argument a stage further when it published the full report of the Newcastle Committee on the union of the Principalities⁷⁸. This traced the proposal for union back to 1829 when the administrative fusion of Moldavia and Wallachia was discussed in one of the articles of the Organic Statutes. The report invoked Urquhart's opposition to Russian expansion at the expense of Turkey and, under the slogan — "What is 'against Turkey is for Russia and from Russia'" — added darkly:

"Russia knows perfectly well that the Moldo-Wallachian monarchy to be borne at the conference at Paris must of necessity be her satellite, as is the Freek monarchy which was borne at the conference of London. England, France, and 'public opinion' did her (Russia's) work before, and are doing it again"⁷⁹.

The vehemence with which the Newcastle Committee expressed its condemnation of the unionists as Russian agents, and the public controversy which ensued, prompted Urquhart to write to George Crawshaw to point out that it was not the uniting of the two Principalities to each other that caused him alarm. It was true that, as the report had stated, Urquhart had condemned the move as a Russian project, but he reminded Crawshaw that on another occasion he had actually proposed such a union:

"My proposal, which you will find in the "Constitution of the Principalities", was designed to take this means of agitation out of her (Russia's) hands, and to mitigate the wrongs out of which the facilities of agitation spring. But it was a Union of the Princes, not of the Administrations; and it was to be effected by the Porte in conjunction with the Principalities. At the same time, there was to be created an army of Wallachians and Moldavians, for the common defence, under their own officers, and the whole was to be accompanied by a constitution granted by the Porte, to be worked by themselves"⁸⁰.

By the time Urquhart's letter had been published the public argument over the Principalities had raged in all the national newspapers for over three months, and his own attempts to square his earlier attitude with that now adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committees seemed rather a lame excuse.

Arnold Ruge entered the fray with a vigorous attack on the Newcastle Committee, chiding them for their apparent notion, "that we must do everything the Turks wish, and avoid everything the Russians support or advocate, in reference to the Principalities"⁸¹. The following day Brătianu's de-

⁷⁷ D. Brătianu to the Editor of the *Morning Herald*, Londra, 15 October 1856 published in *The Morning Herald* 17 October 1856.

⁷⁸ *The Morning Herald* 24 October 1856.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ David Urquhart to G. Crawshaw, St. Anne's, Blarney (near Cork, Ireland) 4 November 1856 published in *Supplement to The Free Press* 21 January 1857. Cf. Cornelia C. Bodea "David Urquhart and the Romanian 'National Movement'" Paper read at the first Anglo-Roumanian Colloquium at Căciulași, July 1975.

⁸¹ *The Morning Advertiser* 17 October 1856.

tailed response to the opposition of Romanian unification was published⁸². He accused "the Greeks of the Phanar" of inciting distrust at Constantinople over the proposed union and trying to create a breach between the Moldavians and Wallachians. This had been the traditional means whereby the phanariot princes by their intrigues had secured one or other of the hospodariates. He tried to calm fears that the union was anti-Ottoman by pleading that what the Romanians were asking was little more than what was guaranteed them under the capitulations, and he produced extracts of the treaty of 1460 between Vlad V of Wallachia and Sultan Mahomet II. He cited the moments in history when the Principalities had sought unification — 1389 under Mircea I; 1499 under Stephen the Great and 1600 under Michael the Brave. Finally, he closed less with an appeal to reason, than with a passionate rallying cry:

"We desire the union because we are one people, homogeneous, identical as no other people in the world are or can be; because we have the same origin, root, language, and religion, the same traditions and history; [the same institutions, customs, laws, and administrative regulations, the same tendencies and aspirations, hopes and fears, interests and wants to satisfy; the same frontiers and purposes to defend... There is no natural barrier and no visible sign of their separation. Everything tends to unite, nothing to separate them, unless it be the ill-will of those whose wish it is to see them divided and weak, in order that they may make the country a stepping stone for the conquest of the Ottoman Empire... We especially desire the union because it already exists in our hearts, because we have the conscience of our common destinies and of our identical mission; because we have but one mind, which will be tortured, if possible to all eternity, but which cannot be divided. In other words, we want it because we require tranquility to augment under the shade of peace, and for the mutual interest of ourselves and of humanity, the moral and material resources of our country, and live in good friendship with the Turks"⁸³.

The same letter, which Brătianu wrote on 16 October, was also published by *The Times* on the 25th of that month. Nor were these only contributions to what was rapidly developing into a national debate over the Romanian question. Since 3 October 1856 when a report from a Romanian correspondent in Iași dated 21 September was published, *The Morning Advertiser* had been conducting a lengthy correspondence between two anonymous readers: "Justitia" and "Anti-Russian". The source of the argument stemmed from the suppression of two liberal newspapers in the Principalities — *l'Étoile du Danube* and *Zimbrul*⁸⁴. This prompted "Anti-Russian" to argue that freedom of the press had never existed in the Principalities⁸⁵, which in turn was contested by "Justitia"⁸⁶. "Anti-Russian" returned to the attack with fresh assertions⁸⁷ which were again refuted by "Justitia"⁸⁸. By this time the debate had been widened to more general considerations of the unification issue and a further anonymous contribution appeared from "A Friend of Romania"

⁸² *The Daily News* 18 October 1856.

⁸³ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁴ *The Morning Advertiser* 3 October 1856.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 4 October 1856.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 6 October 1856.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 9 October 1856.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 11 October 1856.

on the same day as yet another letter from "Anti-Russian"⁸⁹. "Justitia" had the last word on 17 October, claiming further debate would only be repetitive, and, "the tone adopted by all the journals of the day on the subject of Principalities, is in the spirit of my views, and in support of the rights and wishes of the Romanians"⁹⁰. The 27 October saw *The Morning Advertiser* again publish a contribution from "A Friend of Roumania", by which time the editor too must have considered the subject exhausted and closed his correspondence columns to further contributions on that subject⁹¹.

The identity of these two antagonists was never revealed, although the arguments used were clearly those put forward by Brătianu in his articles, on the one hand, and by the members of the Foreign Affairs Committees on the other. Doubtless some of the other contributions were deliberately placed in the press and paid for by the Romanian National Committee. Writing to Rosetti in September 1856 Brătianu boasted that he could buy "the whole British press with 800 (pounds?)" as well as change minister, consuls and organise meetings⁹². Eyre Crowe's mission to Constantinople and the Principalities in the autumn of 1856 cost 1,000 French francs a month, in addition to the costs of the journey. It has been stated elsewhere that Crowe was receiving £40 per month for inserting Brătianu's material in *The Post*, and that the entire press campaign was probably accounting for about £60 per month⁹³. It was an enormous sum by the standards of emigré financial resources at that time, and even then, Brătianu's letters were constantly begging for further sums.

The results of the publicity campaign which followed in the wake of the Brighton meeting were probably not what Brătianu had expected. He could not have foreseen the blast of criticism which the Romanians would receive from the one journal scathingly referred to by *The Examiner* as "the Foreign Office of Newcastle". The foreign affairs committees, especially Crawshaw's Newcastle Committee, forced the Romanians on to the defensive, and the press debate which they inaugurated would have done good rather than harm, but for one fact. They neutralised any hope of support the Romanians could have expected to get from the northern trading and manufacturing classes, who were liberal in sentiment, but too well aware of their own interests to support a cause that might harm British commercial interests in Ottoman Turkey. Back in March 1856 Layard had urged Brătianu to emphasise the commercial benefits Britain might have expected from the united Principalities, and Brătianu told him he would make in the focal point of his renewed campaign⁹⁴. It proved impossible, however, to convince

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 14 October 1856. "A Friend of Roumania" was how Mrs. Emma Bennet Mawr signed her appeals to the British press during the war of 1877–78, when she was appealing for funds to support the hospital which she and her husband established in Bucharest. There is, however, nothing further to identify the anonymous author of 1856.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 17 October 1856.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 27 October 1856.

⁹² D. Brătianu to C. A. Rosetti, London, 24 September 1856 in Al. Cretzianu, *Din Arhiva lui Dumitru Brătianu op. cit.*, vol. II, 168–169.

⁹³ Radu R. N. Florescu, *The Struggle Against Russia in the Roumanian Principalities 1821–1854* (Monachii, 1962) 245.

⁹⁴ D. Brătianu to A. H. Layard, 26 March 1856 The Layard Papers, British Museum, Add. MS. 38, 984, fols. 317–320. See also: Beatrice Marinescu, "Economic Relations

the supporters of the Manchester School that they had more to gain than to lose by backing the Principalities against Turkey. Indeed, Layard himself grew progressively cooler towards the Romanian unionists as his own business affairs in connection with the Ottoman Bank project and railway schemes at Constantinople began to show signs of success⁹⁵.

The decision of the Paris Congress to adjourn whilst their team of commissioners toured the Principalities and observed the elections for the Divans Ad Hoc, which were supposed to be a test of the strength of public opinion, removed the issues for a while from Paris to the Principalities. The fraudulent outcome of the elections in Moldavia in which the anti-unionists scored a victory in 1857 provoked a renewed diplomatic crisis between Britain and France, the latter threatening to break off diplomatic relations with the Porte unless the elections were re-run without massive Turkish interference. The complex internal affairs of the Principalities continued to be well documented by the British press, and articles in both the *Edinburgh Review* and the *Westminster Review* early in 1857, together with the consistently pro-Romanian *Examiner*, proved that the issue was by no means resolved one way or the other⁹⁶.

The British general election of 1857 removed from Parliament Layard, Forster, Otway, Milner-Gibson and a number of other M.P.'s who had shown an interest in the Romanian cause. With the re-opening of diplomatic manoeuvres it became more than ever necessary to ensure that the Romanians could rely upon a well-informed spokesman in the House of Commons. The earlier approaches which John Roebuck had made to William Gladstone on behalf of Brătianu now payed dividends⁹⁷, for Gladstone shed his previous inhibitions and took up the challenge by publicly advocating the union⁹⁸. The move was as significant for the future course of British policy towards the Eastern Question as it was significant to the union of Moldavia and Wallachia. Gladstone's conversion to the Romanian cause was an element in his reappraisal of Britain's entire eastern policy. To his established ideas that Britain should strive to preserve the European concert, refuse to meddle in the strictly domestic affairs of the Ottoman empire, and decline to make the safety of India pretext for opposing all new ideas for the general benefit, he now added a fourth consideration :

between the Romanian Principalities and Great Britain (1848—1859) in *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, (1969) vol. VIII, 271—281.

⁹⁵ William N. Bruce, ed., *Sir A. Henry Layard G.C.B., D.C.L., Autobiography and Letters...* (London, 1903) 210—212. Sir Arthur Otway called Layard "the first Liberal Imperialists", *Ibid.*, 267.

⁹⁶ *The Examiner* 25 April 1857

⁹⁷ J. A. Roebuck to W. E. Gladstone, London, 28 July 1856 The Gladstone Papers, British Museum, Add. MS. 44, 386, fols. 76—77. According to Gladstone's diary, he first met Brătianu two days after Roebuck had written his letter introducing them (Wednesday, 30 July, 1856). H.C.G. Mathew, ed., *The Gladstone Diaries* (Oxford, 1978) vol. 5, 152. Gladstone's diary records that he saw Brătianu on five occasions over the next two years and wrote him seven letters.

⁹⁸ Although Gladstone had expressed his good wishes for the success of the Brighton meeting he had intimated a few months earlier that he wished to be better acquainted with all aspects of the Romanian case before he made any public pronouncements upon it: W. E. Gladstone to D. Brătianu (London?), 5 August 1856 in Al. Cretzianu, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 128.

"Where England has an influence to exercise on the affairs of the East, she should not repose her entire, or even her principal, confidence on armed intervention to prevent the aggressions of Russia on Turkey, but should endeavour to raise up such living barriers as might effectually interpose between Constantinople and the Russian Empire"⁹⁹.

Gladstone was here preparing to turn his back on the plan in which he had reluctantly acquiesced four years previously.

At the time of Britain's entry into the Crimean War, Gladstone had a conversation with the prime minister, Lord Aberdeen, during which he justified his own belief that war should be declared: "We stand upon the ground that the Emperor (of Russia) has invaded countries not his own, inflicted wrong on Turkey, and what I feel much more, most cruel wrong on the wretched inhabitants of the Principalities"¹⁰⁰. Gladstone also warned the prime minister, "that I, for one, could not shoulder the musket against the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and must there take my stand"¹⁰¹. He always maintained that Britain had joined the war in March 1854 to fight a just cause. The essential objects as he saw them had been the abolition of Russian rights over the Principalities, and the destruction of Russian claims upon Greek Christians under Ottoman sway. As the war progressed, however, he began to see more clearly and identify more closely with the aspirations of the Balkan peoples for peace and freedom to develop their own institutions. As his friend and biographer, Lord Morley, expressed it:

"As time went on... (he) realised that Mahometan institutions in the Ottoman empire were decrepit; that the youthful and vigorous elements in European Turkey were crushed under antiquated and worn-out forms and forces unfit for rule. He awoke to the disquieting reflection how the occupation of the Principalities had been discussed, day after day and month after month, entirely as a question of the payment of forty thousand pounds a year to Turkey, or as a violation of her rights as suzerain, but never in reference to the well-being, happiness, freedom, or peace of the inhabitants"¹⁰².

Gladstone expressed dismay over the delay which had occurred in the settlement of the Romanian question when he spoke in the Commons in August 1857. The political freedom which the Danubian Principalities had vindicated by their stand over the elections, "amid surrounding slavery" was still imperfect. But it was there, if anywhere, that "we might hope to see Christian institutions and Christian liberty setting an example" to neighbouring but even less favoured regions¹⁰³. Although Gladstone had expressed interest in Greek affairs, his intervention in favour of the Romanians was his earliest venture on behalf of the subject peoples of the Balkans, which, in the late 1870 s became the hallmark of his approach to the Eastern Question.

⁹⁹ F. W. Hirst, "Mr. Gladstone as a Peelite, 1846—1859" in Sir Wemyss Reid, ed. *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone* (London, 1899) 394.

¹⁰⁰ John Morley *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone* (London, 1908).

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰² *Ibidem*, p. 405.

¹⁰³ *Hansard: Parliamentary Debates* 14 August 1857, quoted in F.W. Hirst, *op. cit.*. Despite attempts by Otway in March 1857, no success was achieved on the question of obtaining permission for the Romanian exiles to return to the Principalities, although Palmerston again expressed his sympathy with this intention. See: D. A. Sturdza, ed., *Acte și Documente relative la Istoria Renașterii Românei* (Bucharest, 1889) vol. IV, 69—70.

Events over the summer of 1857 kept the issue of union constantly in the news¹⁰⁴. The disputed elections in the Principalities resulted in a serious crisis when France, Sardinia, Prussia and Russia, all broke relations with the Porte. To salvage something of the Anglo-French entente, Napoleon III and foreign minister Walewski visited Queen Victoria at Osborne House on the Isle of Wight in August, and discussed a compromise by which France refrained from demanding the union in return for British support for fresh elections¹⁰⁵. The Turks gave way, and new elections were held in September which resulted in a resounding victory for the unionist candidate. When the Divans met the following month they took the earliest opportunity to vote for union and a foreign prince¹⁰⁶. Such calculated defiance resulted in the dissolution of the Divans in January 1858 and the summoning of another conference at Paris for May.

The return of the Romanian question to the assembled diplomats in Paris meant the redoubling of Brătianu's efforts to keep up pressure on the British government. The issue throughout 1857 had degenerated into a sterile debate in the British press between advocates of the view that the United Principalities would become another troublesome country like Greece, and those who saw them developing along the lines of Belgium. Gladstone snapped country and Parliament out of their lethargy with what even his opponents conceded was a most eloquent speech in the debate on the Principalities of 4 May 1858. For more than an hour Gladstone persuasively argued the case for accepting the wishes of the people of the Principalities and permitting their union:

"I say the union of the Principalities is the ardent desire of the people of those territories. I am anxious to make good that proposition, because, although it is not conclusive upon the question, yet I speak in the British House of Commons — I speak in that assembly to which I will not say alone, but to which almost alone, every lover of liberty in the world has now to look for the vindication of his rights — and I implore the House of Commons to do full justice to the wishes to the rights and interests of these peoples, if those interests be compatible with justice and the welfare of Europe"¹⁰⁷.

Gladstone addressed himself to the question of Russian policy, advancing the view that since Britain would not always be able to guarantee resistance to Russian aggression, it would be in her best interest to aid the establishment of a viable state with the will to defend itself. "There is no barrier", he argued, "like the breast of free men"¹⁰⁸. Gladstone referred to the "sagacity" of the Russian plenipotentiary at the Paris conference, and said: "It was dangerous for Russia to support the union, if the union was going to be carried; but if there was going to be a set opposition to it, it was

¹⁰⁴ Trevor J. Hope, "Sir Henry Bulwer and the Wallachian Elections of 1857" *Balkan Studies* (1973) vol. 14, 324–330.

¹⁰⁵ Andrei Oșetea, "L'accord d'Osborne (9 août 1857)" *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire* (1964) vol. III, no. 4, 677–696; and W. G. East, "The Osborne Conference and the Memorandum of August, 1857" *English Historical Review* (1928) vol. XLIII, 409–412.

¹⁰⁶ D. A. Sturdza, "Însemnătatea Divanurilor ad-hoc de la Iași și București în istoria renașterii României" *Analele Academiei Române: Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice* Series II, vol. XXXIII (Bucharest 1910–1911) and vol. XXXIV (Bucharest, 1911–1912).

¹⁰⁷ Hansard: *Parliamentary Debates* vol. CL, 4 May 1858.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

desirable for her to support it, for she would thereby gain the credit with the people of the Principalities of being their friend, and of pursuing the policy they had at heart"¹⁰⁹. His argument that Britain was honour-bound to support the union of the Principalities rested on the fact that when the issue had been first raised in Paris, the French foreign minister, Count Walewski, had stated that as such a union satisfied the true interests of the peoples of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Congress should support it. The Earl of Clarendon, Britain's foreign minister, had expressed his support of that opinion, adding only that the wishes of the Romanians themselves should be taken into account¹¹⁰. The Austrian occupation and the disputed elections for the Divans Ad Hoc had delayed the process of consultation, but now that public opinion had been consulted and given an unequivocal reply, it was the duty of Britain to honour her pledge and support the desire of the people of the Principalities for union.

Seymour FitzGerald, the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, replied to the debate. He made the point that the debate Gladstone had initiated was almost without precedent. The Paris Conference was about to meet to consider the evidence submitted to them by the commissioners sent to the Principalities, and now the House was being asked to declare itself in a way which could only be interpreted as an instruction to the assembled representatives of independent Europe. But the main thrust of his speech was that it was not so much a question of union that was being demanded, but one of independence, for the Divans of Moldavia and Wallachia had insisted upon a foreign prince being placed on the throne, which called into question their whole relationship within the Ottoman Empire. FitzGerald maintained that the Principalities were incapable of maintaining their independence, and that for the House to aid them in securing it would not be in their own best interests. He was heavily criticised by Serjeant Deasy (M. P. for Cork), Lord Cecil (M. P. for Stamford), M. G. Duff (M. P. for Elgin), John Roebuck and Lord John Russell, who all made appeals in support of the union. It was left to Benjamin Disraeli (Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Lord Palmerston to lead the real opposition to the motion. They did so on the premise that union would inevitably lead to independence, and independence would not only weaken Turkey, but would leave the Principalities themselves prey to their stronger neighbours. Union under a foreign prince could only play into the hands of Russia, or lead to a division of the Principalities between Austria and Russia, as had happened in the case of Poland. Inevitably, they dwelt at length upon the relationship of the Principalities with the Ottoman Porte, and bluntly stated their opinion that the same benefits would be bestowed upon Moldavia and Wallachia as separate political entities, just as well as if they were united, but without the great political risks involved. The House was urged to do nothing which might jeopardize the negotiations under way in Paris. As usual, Palmerston was listened to with great respect, and while Gladstone clearly won the admiration of the House for his speech, the votes,

¹⁰⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

nevertheless, went against the motion in a ratio of three to one¹¹¹. Gladstone's diary entry recorded his bitter disappointment: "Made my motion on the Principalities. Lost by 292: 114 and with it goes another broken promise to a people"¹¹².

The debate was anything but a catastrophe for the Romanian cause. It was the first occasion that the issue had been so frankly debated, and in the final analysis the votes of the members of the House of Commons had been placed on the side of caution rather than on the side of experiment. They preferred to keep their options open and await events. That so well informed a debate could have taken place at all was a tribute to Brătianu's work, for it was he who had assiduously provided Gladstone with all the relevant materials. (In the light of the subsequent policies adopted by Gladstone and Disraeli towards the Eastern Question, it is interesting to note that it was Brătianu who had researched Disraeli's earlier comments on the Romanian question and rushed them to Gladstone on the eve of the famous debate)¹¹³.

No hint of disappointment tinged the letters of gratitude sent to Gladstone after the debate. Together, Brătianu and Nicolae Golescu wrote of their "sincere thanks for their eloquent plea in the House of Commons which you devoted to the defence of our rights and interests"¹¹⁴. The Romanian exiles in Paris sent Gladstone an album of Romanian scenes as a token of their gratitude, expressing the view that they never doubted the Romanians would one day be free when they had men like Gladstone to defend their rights¹¹⁵. Gladstone's acknowledgement of the Romanians' gift revealed a hint of his future Eastern policy when he declared that he had striven to pursue a course of action not only favourable to the Romanian people, "but as truly counselled by a just estimate of the interests of Turkey and Europe... I am well convinced that the cause which we pleaded was a just one and I trust it may yet please Providence to prosper it"¹¹⁶.

The conference at Paris came to a compromise agreement on 19 August 1858, providing the Principalities with a novel if complex political organization. Although the two Provinces were to retain their separate hospodars, administrations and assemblies, a Central Commission with a single court of appeal was to be established and legislative power was to be divided between

¹¹¹ *Ibidem*. At least Palmerston's speech pleased George Crawshaw, who wrote expressing the Newcastle Committee's views on the debate to the Turkish foreign minister on 21 May 1858. *The Free Press* 30 June 1858.

¹¹² H.C.G. Matthew ed., *The Gladstone Diaries op cit.*, vol. 5, 295. In 1867 the Romanian parliament voted to accord Gladstone and Roebuck honorary citizenship in recognition of their services to the national cause.

¹¹³ D. Brătianu to W. E. Gladstone, London, 4 May 1858 The Gladstone Papers, British Museum, Add. MS. 44, 389, fols. 188–190. See also: R. W. Seton-Watson, *Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics* (London, 1930).

¹¹⁴ N. Golescu and D. Brătianu to W. E. Gladstone, London, 4 May 1856 The Gladstone Papers, British Museum, Add. MS. 44, 389, fols. 186–187.

¹¹⁵ The Romanian exiles in Paris to W. E. Gladstone 20 June 1858 in Al. Cretzianu, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 221–222.

¹¹⁶ W. E. Gladstone to Brătianu, London, 14 July 1858 in Al. Cretzianu, *op. cit.*, vol. II, 222–223.

the assemblies and Central Commission¹¹⁷. Such an arrangement required fresh elections, which were held in January 1859. The Romanians showed what they thought of the arrangements reached in Paris by electing the same man, Alexandru Ion Cuza, as hospodar for both Principalities. The Great Powers were left little choice but to accept the fait accompli which broke the spirit, if not the letter, of the August convention. With war between France and Austria looming over Italy, Britain urged the Porte to give way and on 31 May 1859, the Turks recognised Cuza's double election as Hospodar of the United Principalities¹¹⁸. *The Times*, in common with several other British newspapers, accepted the matter philosophically, though still maintaining its suspicions of Russian intentions:

"It is Europe to watch the progress of events, not vainly endeavouring to thwart inevitable tendencies, but resolute to prevent the names of liberty and nationality being used to screen the advances of a defeated but still threatening power"¹¹⁹.

The Daily News, which had first supported, and then backed down over the union of the Principalities, gave its blessing to the new regime, at the same time censuring the diplomats of the Paris Conference for disregarding the wishes of the people:

"...The Roumans have, with all the freshness of infancy, examined the constitutional timepiece so ingeniously manufactured for them in Paris, and, finding it a little slow, have provided it with a new mainspring of their own making"¹²⁰.

Vasile Alecsandri, who visited London in March 1859 to explain the official Romanian position to British ministers, wrote of the sympathy and good wishes expressed for the Romanians by Lord Russell and Lord Clarendon. He went on to tell Prince Cuza that, "the name of the Brătianu's in the eyes of these gentlemen was equivalent to an incendiary torch being put to powder"¹²¹. It was a harsh comment on the efforts made by the Brătianu brothers, particularly Dumitru Brătianu, to propagandise the Romanians' national cause in Britain. Yet, in another sense, it was a tribute. Dumitru Brătianu had not made life easy for the British ministers, just the reverse. His efforts had embarrassed them on more than one occasion. Without his labours the Romanians' case would have been little understood. Even if the support he managed to generate fell short of what was hoped for, his achievements were still impressive.

Historians both in Britain and Romania have under-rated British responses to the campaign for the unification of the Principalities and overlooked the successes which Brătianu secured. The emphasis upon the diplomatic aspects of the period has obscured the limitations which democratic society,

¹¹⁷ D. A. Sturdza, *Acte și Documente relative la Istoria Renașterii României* (Bucharest 1889) vol. VII, 306 ff. For a full discussion of the background to these events see: T. W. Riker, *The Making of Roumania: A Study of an International Problem 1856—1866* (London, 1931). Also: Dan Berindei, *Epoca Unirii* (Bucharest, 1979), and Idem., *L'Union des Principautés Roumaines* (Bucharest, 1967).

¹¹⁸ Beatrice Marinescu, "Poziția Marii Britanii față de Dubla Alegere a Domnitorului Cuza și față de Unirea Politico-administrativă a Principatelor Române (1859—1861)" in *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Modernă* (Bucharest, 1975) vol. V, 69—98.

¹¹⁹ *The Times* 11 February 1859.

¹²⁰ *The Daily News* 19 February 1859.

¹²¹ V. Alecsandri to Prince A. I. Cuza, 14 March 1859 in Cornelia C. Bodea, ed., *Documente Privind Unirea Principatelor* vol. III, op. cit., 543.

even in mid-nineteenth century Britain, placed upon events. Party politics, were in a state of flux at this time. The modern Liberal and Conservative parties were only in the making. Their distinct approaches to the Eastern Question and the future of the Balkan nationalities had still to be clearly defined. With many groups and factions represented in Parliament, much work had to be done to lobby political opinion. Too much emphasis has been placed upon Britain's pro-Turkish sympathies; it was not so much the Turcophile tendencies but rather Russophobia which motivated British attitudes towards foreign affairs in the years immediately following the Crimean war. The experience of the war had been a bitter one and suspicion of Russian intentions characterised every British reaction. It was the one factor no government could ignore and it bedevilled all discussion of the Romania's case. Hence, even in the radical strongholds of the industrial north, where support for the Hungarian, Polish and Italian national movements was greatest, the Romanians had to battle against the pro-Russian accusations of the foreign affairs committees.

A belief in the superior virtues of democracy was the outstanding characteristic of the political class — an extension of the suffrage was one of the great domestic issues of the 1850s — and set Britain aside from developments on the Continent. Hatred of the dictatorial actions of the autocratic empires was clearly demonstrated in the worker's treatment of General Haynau. Sympathy for the oppressed nationalities was exhibited in the fact that they had always been granted refuge and protection by successive British governments¹²². Thus the Romanians too could be assured a fair hearing.

Historians have long repeated the judgements of an earlier generation of scholars, whose general thesis lamented the lack of interest shown by the British in the Romanian problem. It used to be commonly asserted that only two politicians ever raised the Romanian question in the House of Commons — Stuart and Gladstone; that no real publicity was obtained for the Romanian cause in the British press; and that public opinion in Britain remained basically ignorant about the Principalities¹²³. The truth may not be the reverse of this position, but a modest reassessment can be made in the light reverse, of more recent research. When this is done, a more fulsome tribute may be paid to the exertions of Dumitru Brătianu and his British supporters.

¹²² See Bernard Porter, *The Refugee Question in Mid-Victorian Politics* (Cambridge, 1979).

¹²³ R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Romanians, from Roman Times, to the Completion of Unity* (Cambridge, 1934) 256—257; W. G. East, *op. cit.*, 28—30; and Nicolae Iorga, *A History of Anglo-Romanian Relations* (Bucharest, 1931) 93—94.

ROMANIAN PRINCIPALITIES AND ENGLAND IN THE PERIOD PREVIOUS THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

BY

GH. PLATON

In 1848, when the military interventions put an end to the Romanian revolution, the European opinion expressed ever more incessantly the conviction that the Principalities represented "the key for European equilibrium" that the Pruth was a real "Rubicon of the contemporary history", that the Danube was "a knot of the European War", and the Romanian nation was "the avant-guard of free and republican Europe"¹. A while before but mainly beginning with 1838, when in his daring political step I. Cîmpineanu expressed the national aspirations, the *idea* of organizing the 8 million Romanians in a "powerful and independent" state able to represent "a pondering body between Turkey and Russia to maintain the political balance", playing thus an important role in the so-called "Oriental Problem"² has been frequently formulated.

In 1853, and especially, after the Crimean War, the great powers — England mainly — were compelled to agree that at least for that moment "the gravity centre of the world" is on the Danube³ a river which represented "the strategical basis of the political balance in Orient"⁴. "Toute la question d'Orient — is noted in this respect — se résume aujourd'hui dans les Principautés", the Gordian knot of the problem⁵. Such appreciations are so current in the then press and in the diplomatic correspondence of the time that they cannot be considered but expressions of a clear political reality⁶.

¹ The mentions are comprised in the content of some articles published by the newspaper „La Réforme” on 24 March, 16 July, 8 August and 24 November 1848; in Olimpiu Boitoş, *Romanian's Relations with Ledru Rollin and French Radicals in the Epoch of Revolution of 1848* (Bucureşti, 1940) 97—98, 117, 192—193, 200, and *Year 1848 in the Roumanian Principalities*, vol. III, 180 (in Roumanian).

² See, in this respect, the important appreciations in the columns of the newspaper „Le National”, and in the content of numerous booklets and contemporary materials; cf. Vasile V. Haneş, *Formation of French Opinion on the Romanians in the 19-th Century*, vol I (Craiova, 1929) 104, 113 and *passim*.

³ This phrase belongs to Talleyrand and it is to be found in the booklet *L'Empereur Napoléon et les Principautés Romaines*, published in Paris, 1858, cf. *Acts and Documents regarding the History of Romania's Renaissance*, vol. VIII, 251 (in Romanian).

⁴ H. Geffcken, *La Question du Danube* (Berlin, 1883) 8.

⁵ *Acts and Documents...*, vol. VIII, 251.

⁶ It is true, the *geographic space*, or better say the placement of Romanian territory in the European geographic context influenced — in a manner which was not sufficiently underlined until now — the destiny of Romania's History; It imprinted a specific content to the relationship between inner and outer, created in certain historical moments at least an important weight to the foreign factor increasing the value of the impulses and the inter-dependencies with the outer world. It is not less true that this factor influenced in

Certainly we are not supposed to discuss here the conditions and the stages reached by this clarification. The facts belong to one of the most unrestful stages of European History, about which I am sure, there will be much written. At the same time I consider it is of no use to come back upon the data concerning the relations of the Romanians with England that preceded the *Oriental Crisis* marked by the Crimean War as they are already well known⁷. I myself reconsidered them in a recent study⁸. Radu N. Florescu's paper offers information — new and important ones in this respect⁹ — drawn out from English archives. My intention is far modest: referring to the general lines of Great Britain's policy I shall attempt — on the basis of an outward analysis — to establish or merely to suggest the extent in which the Romanians managed by means of their collective efforts within a difficult international context in a complex and reciprocal series of impulses, in a relatively short time to define and give contour to a *Romanian problem* within a larger frame of the Eastern Question.

1. The defining of the *Romanian problem*, the raising of the Principalities from their condition of an *object* of the litigations between Russia and Turkey (with the frequent interference of Austria¹⁰ to the rank of the *subject* of international relations was not only a consequence of the evolution of history by the blind game of events or by the willingness of the great powers whose interests were engaged in this area. The phenomenon occurred naturally as a consequence of the process of growth and development of European society within which the Romanian Principalities entered with their discrepancies and limits. In this evolution in which the modern European Society has

a corresponding manner the international relations too in whose context the Romanians developed. These facts which, we admit, are worth a larger debate are clearly drawn from the evolution of the history of Romania.

⁷ Cf. Basile Lungu, *Les Grandes puissances et les Principautés Roumaines de 1821 à 1826* (Paris, 1935); N. Iorga, *Histoire des relations Anglo-Roumaines* (Jassy, 1917); I. C. Filitti, *The Correspondence of English Consuls in Principalities (1828—1836)*, extract from the "Annals of Romanian Academy", "The Memoires of Historical Section" 2-nd series, vol. XXXVII, Bucuresti, 1916; Paul Simionescu and Radu Valentin, *Documents inédits concernant la création du consulat britannique à Bucarest (1803)*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", No. 2, 1960; Paul Cernovodeanu, *English Economic Interests in the Low Danube and the Black Sea between 1803—1829*, in "Review of History", vol. 28, No. 11, 1975.

⁸ *Romania within the International Relations: 1699—1939*, edited by L. Boicu, V. Cristian, Gh. Platon (Iasi, 1980), chapter III (1815—1853) 68—135 (in Romanian).

⁹ Radu R. N. Florescu, *The Struggle against Russia in the Romanian Principalities 1821—1854* (Monachii, 1962).

¹⁰ Referring to the place of the Romanian Principalities in these frequent conflicts, the Belgian diplomat Jacques Poumay makes the following appreciation: "[...] Terre fertile et inépuisable, la Valachie et la Moldavie sont depuis Catherine II le quartier général de toutes les invasions Russes contre la Turquie, le sens et le but de toutes les agressions. Les principautés représentent un grenier d'abondance des troupes Impériales trop hereuses de trouver a vil prix dans cette terre promise des Czar, la paille, le sel pour les hommes et le fourrage pour la nombreuse cavalerie Russe [...]" (Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et du Commerce Extérieur de Belgique, Correspondance politique, Légations, Roumanie, 1-er vol. (1852—1856), doc. 172, dépêche du 27 août 1855). The French diplomat Bois le Comte had made the same reflexions in 1835 on the opportunity of a visit in Moldavia and Wallachia: "Avant et après 1828, wrote the diplomat, la Russie a considéré les Principautés en temps de paix comme un moyen d'intervention et d'extension de son influence sur les territoires étant sous la domination de la porte et en temps de guerre comme un grenier pour ses armées" (Cf. *Hurmuzaki*, vol. XVII, 384).

formed the idea of Europe was settled up, the integration of Romanians into European economy, ideology but especially into European consciousness and politics was achieved. It is a complex process of a continental coverage, of the development and consolidation of capitalism within which the Romanian nation also constitutes itself with a chrystalized *national ideology*¹¹. Romanians reach the consciousness of themselves, they settle down o political strategy and tactic in a world in which as a point of the new modern order the inter-dependencies become ever closer and ever more complex. The political struggle in the Principalities — to which I shall limit my observations — uses now, at the end of the 18th century and the first two decades of the 19th century, the modest way of the *memoires* in which the coming back to the old capitulation, the union and a larger international audience are requested in a period in which in the Eastern Question the great powers England included begin sometimes to be interested and to act accordingly though contradictorily¹².

In their actions, the Romanians had to sail between Scylla and Carybda, between the tendencies of the Christian powers and those of the Muslims, both of them being dangerous for their national existence.

Though unspectacular the advances brought about by this first steps are worth appreciating. The capitulations (old treaties signed by Romanian kings with the Porte), inscribed in international acts are included in this way in the European public laws.

The Romanians made use of the political context and oriented their actions according to it managing to influence it in a manner in which the historical analysis of the 18th century and the first decades of the following century can prove. By means of the huge echo enjoyed by the unrest led by Horea in 1784 on the Continent¹³ the *Romanian problem* was launched even stronger in the European consciousness; the organic link between Transylvania and the Principalities has been underlined though the national political struggle carried out in distinct circumstances generated certain peculiarities for the two parts of the Romanian territory¹⁴. The *nation* affirmed itself as unitary on both slopes of the Carpathians.

2. The revolution of 1821 opened a new stage for the internationalization of the *Romanian problem* stressing in this way its European character. To this it contributed not only the independent political consequences of the event. To draw the attention of the European powers upon the situation of the Principalities represented a part of the political strategy established by the leading factors of the national struggle. To raise the peoples in the

¹¹ In this respect see largely in Gh. Platon, *The Genesis of 1848 Romanian Revolution. Introduction in the Modern History of Romania*, Iași, 1980 (in Romanian).

¹² Gh. Platon, *Le "problème oriental" et le "problème roumain" dans la première moitié du XIX-e siècle. Interférences et implications*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", v. XVIII, 1979, n. 2.

¹³ See D. Prodan, *Horea's Revolt*, vols. I—II (București, 1979) and Nicolae Edroiu, *The European Echo of Horea's Revolt (1784—1785)* (Cluj-Napoca, 1976).

¹⁴ Gh. Platon, *Quelques particularités du mouvement national roumain à la fin du XVIII-e siècle et la première moitié du XIX-e*, in "Nouvelles Études d'Histoire", vol. VI₂, Bucarest, 1980, 15—24.

¹⁵ It is rather difficult to suppose, taking into account the whole previous historical evolution, that it was only now that the European powers came to appreciate the European interest of the *problem of Principalities* (cf. Radu N. Florescu, *op. cit.*, 111).

south-east Europe and to early support on an eventual conflict between Russia and Turkey could not remain limited to the sphere of interests of the regional powers. It is sure that in elaborating their plans the Romanian political leaders counted on the intervention of the powers and the internationalization of the conflict; in this way the *Romanian problem* could have been taken from the exclusive sphere of the relations between Russia and Turkey. When — as a consequence of the development of events — the initial plans failed Tudor Vladimirescu wanted to achieve the same political objective by means of a prolonged military resistance. In its consequences the Romanians' revolution gave partially an expression to their plans and ideals. It was not accidentally of course that further international answers coincided with the national political objectives of the Romanians.

Supporting energetically though without much competence the interests of English policy Strangford — England's ambassador in Constantinople — brought real services to the Romanian cause in these grave circumstances, in which many national interests have been engaged. He himself was in the Romanian Country (Wallachia) and Transylvania and actively contributed to the nomination and confirmation of the Romanian prince to whom he offered an important diplomatic support¹⁶. In the context of our discussion is less important whether the *dissociation* of the *Greek problem* from the problem of the Principalities and the control and the moderation of Russia's aggressivity by *associating* England to its policy is or not Strangford's work or he was a mere accomplice, a perfect one, of the policy of the English Cabinet. For our history more important are the consequences of this policy a fruit of the rivalry between the two great powers — a rivalry which will dominate and influence the European Policy. Practically it has been reached a *division of the spheres of influence*. The above mentioned dissociation left the Romanian Principalities under the exclusive influence of czarist Russia. The situation has maintained until the Crimean War¹⁷. The convention of Akkerman and then the Adrianople treaty and the Organic Statute enforced this influence. Referring to this aspect, N. Iorga appreciated it as a "charter of the preconsular protectorate"¹⁸.

The Adrianople Treaty, though it was a bi-lateral act, contributed to a stronger connection of the Principalities to the European context. The war which had solved the previous crisis was practically carried out by Russia under European commission, with the engagement that it would have as a consequence territorial annexations. It is difficult to appreciate at what extent this measure was or was not convenient to the czarist policy. It is certain the fact that irrespective of Kiseleff's insistences who, after the long military occupation of the Principalities, considered that the moment was proper that

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 117 and the fol.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, 113 and the fol.

¹⁸ After rejecting in June, 25, 1848, the mediation request of the revolutionary Wallachian government, motivating that Wallachia is under the sovereignty of the Porte and that the British Government is not yet entitled to undertake such an action, in August, 1848, answering to an interpellation of Lord Dudley Stuart, Palmerston underlined: "As a protecting power, Russia has in Principalities well defined relations which are authorized by treaties. What she has done must not be considered as an illegal intervention of a country in the affairs of another one [...]" (cf. *Year 1848 in Romanian Principalities*, vol II, 91).

¹⁹ N. Iorga, *Histoire des relations Russo-Roumaines*, 279.

Russia should extend to the Danube, the *natural border* of the empire²⁰, but the czar did not agree with it. In adopting this decision which ensured the maintainance of the Ottoman Empire with its whole territory but also with its weaknesses, the *collective position* of the powers, and above all, the opposition of England played an important rôle. As a consequence of this fact during the next period under the new and complicated international circumstances, and though the Russian protectorate upon the Principalities had become extremely severe, the two Romanian countries have been practically placed under a *sui generis regime of collective guarantee*. In the conditions of the increase of the activity of the consuls of the western powers it became possible the organization and even the diversification of international contacts. At the same time, irrespective of its restrictive limits, the Organic Statute allowed a *legal political activity*. It happened that as a consequence of czarist Russia's benevolence but under the impulse of the unrest generated by the revolution of 1821, an expression of the need to renewal, social and national progress of the Romanian society.

3. The periode previous to the revolution of 1848 under the sign of the Organic Statute is characterized — as it is known — by a powerful affirmation of the national spirit and consciousness. New modern structures develop, the school in Romanian language is created, the National theatre is founded, and our national history is situated on scientific foundations. The affirmation of the Romanian nation is against the background of a profound and many-sided process of economic and social development, of modernization of the structures of the state. The *political activity*, both open or hidden becomes an inseparable component of life under the conditions in which any gain of the economic and cultural order represented a step towards independence, to the affirmation of the general-national values. Policy is but a part of the activity of the society, is the *sum of the whole activity*. Millitantism puts its print on all the manifestations of the spiritual life.

In this huge process of renovation a more active *integration and engagement* into European economy and policy is achieved. The inter-dependences become more complex, and the interferences more numerous. The Principalities become an important field of diplomatic struggles between *conservatory* and *liberal* powers. England's and France's consuls played an important part in this period supporting and organizing the national struggle of the Romanians in thwarting the policies of czarist Russia and Austria. Though there was not a certain agreement — such an agreement was not reached even in the two steps of the ephemeral *Cordial Entente*, the representatives of the two powers favouring the organization of the inner political efforts and especially facilitating the external steps and the integration of the *Romanian problem* into the circuit of the Continental diplomacy. The eyes of all those

²⁰ Hurmuzaki, suppl. I, vol. IV, 378—381, 387—389, 418—419, and I. C. Filitti, *op. cit.* In a letter sent to the Great Duke Constantin Chancellor Nesselrod gave an expression to this policy in the following terms: "Cette Monarchie (Turcia), réduite à n'exister que sous la protection de la Russie et à n'exécuter désormais que ses desirs, convenait mieux à nos intérêts politiques et commerciaux que toute combinaison nouvelle qui nous aurait forcés à trop étendre nos domaines, par des conquêtes, soit à substituer à l'Empire ottoman des États que n'auraient pas tardé rivaliser avec nous de puissance, de civilisation, d'industrie et de richesse [...]" (apud Emil Girardin, *Situation de la Question d'Orient*, 3-ème édition, Paris, 1854, 13—14).

who were militating for the national cause, wrote N. Iorga in this respect "étaient tournés vers les consuls, qu'à l'encontre de la Russie envahissante représentaient le principe de liberté aussi en ce qui concerne la vie des peuples celui de France et celui d'Angleterre"²¹.

The indirect support received by the Romanians was given as a condition inseparably connected to the *integrity* of the Ottoman Empire to the assurance of *capitulations* in Principalities and of the treaties signed by the powers with the Porte a fact that offered the consular jurisdiction a discretionary authority. And it is clear that such conditions gravely affected the autonomy and national Romanian interests. They limited, even annulled the political support and the assurance for a hypothetical annexation to Russia or Austria was conditioned by the enforcement of the connections with the Porte, "the only link that united them with Europe"²² (according to the opinion expressed by the appreciation of the juridic situation of the Principalities). As it is known, the Romanians could accept the risk of breaking off their relations with the Porte and rejecting the capitulations and consular jurisdiction only in 1877; they did so in an international context as full of dangers as the previous one, giving up the collective guarantee and assuming the responsibility of their own existence in spite of the warnings which did not differ in their matter from those included in the political reasons of the period we consider. But now, in the statutory epoch the national political struggle was only at its beginnings in the period of accumulation and organization.

In more favourable inner circumstances the national political forces making use of the possibilities offered by the evolution of the international political situation, acting in various ways, gradually elaborated a national programme, the tactics and the strategy of political struggle.

This period is — in my opinion — one of the most interesting of our history. The *integration* of the Principalities and the *Romanian problem* in the circuit of the economic, political and spiritual life of Europe in the consciousness of European opinion, offers to the historian a fascinating spectacle, an opportunity of deep meditation of interesting and generous observations. Regretting that I cannot enter details here, I wish I only emphasize the extent in which England took part and supported this effort which determined the development of one of Europe's nations: the Romanian nation.

²¹ N. Iorga, *Histoire des relations Anglo-Roumaines*, 10.

²² On 27, March 1938, Chateaugiron, recording the tendency of the authorities in the principalities to damage the *privileges* of the powers, writes that together with the consuls of England and Austria they decided to defend these privileges (*Hurmuzaki*, XVII, 695, Chateaugiron to Molé). Referring to the support requested by the members of Assembly of Wallachia concerning the attitude they were to adopt in the problem of the *additional article*, the diplomat writes that, together with Colquhoun he recommended moderation. "[...] Nous n'avons que leur présenter l'espoir d'un avenir plus heureux et les exhorter pour le moment à la patience, triste consolation pour des malheureux mais la seule qu'il nous doit permis de leur offrir [...]. Depuis longtemps je leur ai dit, ce que l'orgueil national les empêchait de voir, que le lien qui les attachait encore à la Porte, était leur SEULE ancre de miséricorde, et que si les capitulations n'étaient plus reconnues dans les Principautés, aucun lien politique ne les rattachait à l'Europe" (*ibidem*, 703—704, Chateaugiron to Molé, 11 mai, 1838). The same recommendation in almost identical terms was made by De Nion, the French consul in Bucharest, to Gh. Bibescu (cf. Gh. Bibescu, *Romania from Adrianople to Balta-Liman* (1829—1849). *Bibescu's Rule. Correspondence and documents*, 1843—1856, vol. I, București, 1893, 289—294).

It is only natural that in the British foreign policy, "mobile" and "oscillating", the *English interests* — according to Palmerston's slogan — had to prevail "over all other problems"²³. As far as Romanians are concerned one could not speak of a direct, open support but of the use of British disponibilities in the general content of Continental policy, especially within the Eastern Question. At the same time due to England's position regarding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire the opinion towards the juridic statute of the two Principalities was that it was impossible to establish any kind of relation able to enframe in normal diplomatic conveniences. Irrespective the ways in which they can be defined, the relations existed. The presence of the British representative in Principalities gave them a larger political opening and entertained the hopes in a better knowledge of the inner situation and, as a consequence, the hopes in a more consistent and effective political support.

The appointment of E. L. Blutte as Consul in Principalities in April 1826 brought into relief the interest of English diplomacy to get accurate information on Romanian realities under the conditions in which the Romanian provinces directly entered the acting sphere of English policy. Strangford's experience who was forced to travel to the north of Danube, was a stimulus in this respect.

Considering that, by means of the Organic Statute, Russia wanted to annul the capitulations — a fact that could mean the annulment of English influence on the Principalities and the menacing of European commerce on the Danube river — Blutte was a zealous defender of the capitulations. Being the only consul who remained in the country during Russian occupation Blutte was consulted by the Moldavian boyars concerning the plans regarding the union of the two Principalities to form a kingdom with a juridic statute similar with that of Greece under the collective guarantee of the Powers²⁴. He also mediated M. Sturdza's step carried out on behalf of Moldavian boyars by means of the English ambassador in Petersburg, Heytesbury, at the beginning of 1931. The future prince expressed his wish that European powers which manifested such a vivid interest in Greece would agree to guarantee the security and independence of the Principalities.

This step was not encouraged either by the ambassador in Petersburg nor by the Foreign Office and Blutte was reprimanded that he made himself an accomplice to attempts which are against British policy directed to the maintenance of the integrity of Ottoman Empire²⁵. Nevertheless the fact that must be underlined, the step undertaken by M. Sturdza in the English diplomatic circles represents the *first attempt* aimed obtaining an Anglo-French guarantee in favour of Principalities, a guarantee which could have been incorporated in the contents of the Organic Statute²⁶.

English diplomacy did not directly support the Romanians' attempts to internationalize the *problem of Principalities*. But it is certain the accurate information provided by Blutte concerning the state of spirit and to the

²³ Cf. Beatrice Marinescu, *Romanian—English Relations between 1848—1877*, The summary of doctorate thesis, Institute of History „N. Iorga” (București, 1976) 56.

²⁴ Radu R. N. Florescu, *op. cit.*, 150—152. Hurmuzaki, XVII, 532.

²⁵ Radu R. N. Florescu, *op. cit.*, 172 and I. C. Filitti, *op. cit.*, 32.

²⁶ Radu R. N. Florescu, *op. cit.*, 172—173.

intentions of the protecting powers, the energy he manifested in defending the "rights" of the subjects of his own country, proved that the fate of the two Principalities could not make England unaffected. Blutte was convinced, a conviction shared probably by his superiors, that Moldavia and Wallachia consolidated through the recognition of national privileges would ensure the peace and rest for Europe. To the end of his career he expressed his trust that soon the western powers would raise the Principalities to a more important position than the one they were when he wrote his notes²⁷.

The appointment of Colquhoun, in 1834, directly by Foreign Office proves a new orientation of English diplomacy as regarding the Romanian Principalities. Although he situated *exclusively* on the ground of consular attributions²⁸, in contrast with the representatives of France like, for example A Billecocq or Huber, who having been given larger attributions made use partially by their political prerogatives, Colquhoun played an important role in the long while he remained in Romanian Principalities. Convinced by the fact that Romanians, neglected by Europe, expected more support from the English government, he made as much as he could to defend their interests — but only as subjects of the Porte and not as members of a distinct nationality. He took an active part to the enforcement of inner opposition to thwart the influence of czarist Russia (he brought an important contribution in organizing the resistance against *the additional article*), established connections between Romanian representatives and the leaders of English diplomacy and actively contributed to the formation of English opinion concerning the importance of the problem of principalities; he never deviated from the „standard“ policy he represented himself. Defending the cause of Romanians he had in view first of all the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the re-establishment of its "sovereignty" in Principalities²⁹. Huber, the consul of France in Iași, wrote the following references on England's policy in Principalities and on Colquhoun's activity :

“L'Angleterre, on ne saurait le dissimuler, cherche à diminuer ou au moins à neutraliser l'influence Russe dans les Principautés, et provoque par tous les moyens qu'elle peut avoir un ordre de choses qu'elle se plaît à recommander aux puissances, ses alliés spécialement la France, qu'elle désire s'associer, dans un but de sage politique qui leur est commune. M. Colquhoun s'aquite, je le sais, avec zèle de cette tâche, dans l'intérêt des deux Principautés”³⁰.

According to its political objectives the English government did not give course to the advances formulated by Alexandru Ghica. The conflict between Colquhoun and the ruler which took unjustified proportions as related to its causes was detrimental to our relations with England³¹. The incertitude generated by the attitude of the English ruling circles often created the

²⁷ N. Iorga, *Histoire des relations Anglo-Roumaines*, 108—109.

²⁸ *Hurmuzaki*, XVII, 780—782 (Billecocq to Thiers, 7 aug. 1840).

²⁹ Radu R. N. Florescu, *op. cit.*, 163 and the fol. In 1853 Colquhoun speaks of the *wish of the whole people* to see the two Principalities united under the rule of only one King. See R. W. Seton-Watson, *Histoire des Roumains de l'époque romaine à l'achèvement de l'unité* (Paris, 1937) 237.

³⁰ *Hurmuzaki*, XVII, 739 (Huber to Molé, 28 February 1839). See also p. 730, dispatch of 25 January 1839.

³¹ *Ibidem*, 788—789, 792, 812—813, 835.

impression of complicity with Russia³² and hindered Romanian political forces to manifest openly³³.

Together with A. Billecocq, on another level and from another outlook, R. Colquhoun, a friend of I. Cîmpineanu played a first-order part in the spectacular political step of the Romanian patriot³⁴. At the same time he was acquainted with M. Sturdza's plan, elaborated together with I. Cîmpineanu, to achieve a Romanian kingdom with an international statute similar with that of Belgium meant to form a barrier between the three limit empires³⁵.

Romanians' political step made by means of I. Cîmpineanu, an expression of an organized political action in the spirit and for the defence of national interests, though a failure is of a distinct importance. This was the first open attempt to determin the internationalization of the Romanian problem; through the echo it provoked it represented an important step to the fulfilment to this objective.

The political circumstances were unfavourable and the Romanians did not obtain the support they had expected, a support able to allow them to undertake in common a demonstration in favour of independence they had planned and of which the representatives of the consular body had been informed³⁶. But striking the balance of the period that preceded the revolution of 1848 we must admit that the Romanian problem witnessed important steps forward. Using the complex international circumstances within the contradictory policy firmly oriented to thwart the czarist influence on the Principalities the Romanians carried out various actions with a precised aim.

In parallel with the inner diplomatic efforts which provoked outer reactions and created an interaction which underlined the contours of the Romanian problem, the same perseverent efforts for getting the European opinion held an important place in inscribing this problem in European consciousness and then on the agenda of diplomacy. The revolution in 1848 pointed to the way covered by the Romanians in its historical and national development and at the same time it marked the distinct importance of the Principalities for the international relations of the time. This was the result of an evolution which was achieved and perfected by the successive accumulations during the previous twenty years.

³² *Ibidem*, 1039 (Duclos to Guizot, December, 6, 1844).

³³ *Ibidem*, 718—719 (Huber to Molé, November, 14, 1838). Some Moldavians declared to Huber: "Que la France, l'Angleterre et l'Autriche nous montrent leur bon vouloir, et alors nous monterons à l'Europe ce que nous sommes, ce que nous pouvons. Nous serons hardis, du jour où, secourus par l'occupation autrichienne, l'Angleterre et la France nous promettaient leur appui".

³⁴ See Cornelia Bodea, *Romanians' Struggle for National Union 1834—1848* (București, 1967) and Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, Vlad Lahovary, *Aspects of I. Cîmpineanu's Activity on European Level* in "Romanian Review of International Studies", nr. 3, 1977.

³⁵ *Hurmuzaki*, XVII, 732—734 (Huber to Molé, February, 1, 1839).

³⁶ *Ibidem*, 782 (Billecocq to Thiers, September, 10, 1840).

ROMANIAN-ENGLISH RELATIONS DURING THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN

BY

VASILE CRISTIAN

Due to the interest shown to them, the Romanian-English relations on the eve of and during the Congress of Berlin have repeatedly drawn the attention of the research workers. After Nicolae Iorga's synthesis¹ who resumed only to the acknowledgement of Romania's independence by the British government — some other papers presented important aspects concerning both the diplomatic action and the attitude of the public opinion. Such papers as those of G. Moroianu², Radu Rosetti³, R. W. Seton-Watson⁴, W. N. Medlicott⁵, are primarily based on edited information — documents published during Oriental crisis in periodicals, parliamentary debates, memoirs. However, in some of these papers inedited information has been also used. The discovery of such information became systematical after the World War II providing thus a more solid basis for the scientific research, a fact proved among others by the papers of D. P. Ionescu⁶, M. S. Anderson⁷, V. Teodorescu⁸, Beatrice Marinescu⁹ which have been of an actual help in making up the present communication. This paper will be necessarily limited to certain aspects which we considered to be more important. Interesting considerations we encountered also in studies regarding the year 1878 (with its premises and consequences) both in general terms and from various angles. In fact we

¹ Nicolae Iorga, *Histoire des relations Anglo-Roumaines* (Jassy, 1917). English version and a preface of R. W. Seton-Watson: *A History of Anglo-Romanian Relations* (Bucharest, 1931).

² George Moroianu, *Legăturile noastre cu Anglia* (Cluj, 1923).

³ Radu Rosetti, *Relații anglo-române în perioada războiului din 1877* (Vălenii de Munte, 1928); idem, *Some Excerpts from the British Press 1877—1878* (București, 1927); *Romania's Share in the War of 1877*, „Slavonic and East European Review”, March, 1930. (Here I used the French edition).

⁴ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Histoire des Roumains de l'époque romaine à l'achèvement de l'Unité* (Paris, 1937).

⁵ W. N. Medlicott, *The Recognition of Romanian Independence*, „Slavonic and East European Review”, XI (1933), No. 32, 345—372, No. 33, 572—589.

⁶ D. P. Ionescu, *Atitudinea Angliei față de independența României*, „Studii și materiale de istorie modernă”, III, (1963), 83—110.

⁷ M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1877—1923. A Study in International Relations* (London, 1966).

⁸ Venera Teodorescu, *Inițierea reprezentanțelor diplomatice la Londra, în Reprezentanțele diplomatice ale României*, I (București, 1967) 301—324.

⁹ Beatrice Marinescu, *Great Britain and the Recognition of Romania's State Independence (1880)*, „Revue Roumaine d'Histoire”, XV (1976), No. 1, 71—79; idem, *Anglia și neatrănarea politică a României*, „Revista Arhivelor”, XXXIX (1977), No. 1, 62—75.

had already the opportunity to refer to this moment¹⁰. The research of this year's events has been highly facilitated by the microfilms exchange (the collection belonging to the State Archives in Bucharest is — under the view of our interest — of an inestimable value¹¹ as well as by the publication of a large number of documents concerning the English-Romanian relations during 1877—1878¹².

They can be studied almost in every detail which allows numerous nuances to earlier conclusions although they remain valuable in their general characteristics.

It is easy to understand that the Romanian-English relations during the Congress of Berlin can not be considered but in the general context of such a complex year, 1878 which we dare say marked in the evolution of international relations a much more important step than the Peace of Frankfurt¹³ and it had deep political, national and social implications for the European south-east.

A peace settlement has always raised complicated problems. They were to be most difficult at the end of a war whose objective had been the essential change of the state of a region where important and numerous interests continued to be at conflict. For Romania this fact had to have an important limitation of its possibilities. Due to the fact that the State Independence modified its international statute it was consecrated only after it had been acknowledged by the other European countries and first of all by the great powers. In this scope successive battles were necessary among which the campaign on the south of the Danube was but a first stage. It was followed by ardent diplomatic battles — at least as difficult as the military ones — due to the situation in which the government in Bucharest could act¹⁴.

The great powers could not conceive international relations except as relations between them starting from the well-known affirmation of some "general interests". Thus, in our case, the western powers were ready to accept certain changes as a consequences of the War of 1877—1878, but they could not agree that they should entail a substantial change of the international situation as a consequence of the decay of the Ottoman Empire. From here it resulted a reserved attitude towards the new independent or autonomous states in the south-east of Europe, their acknowledgement being conditioned by accepting certain clauses concerning not only territorial questions — which were in close connection with the change of the power rating in a more general plan — but also problems of inner organization. In our case, the

¹⁰ Vasile Cristian, *La Roumanie et les traités de San Stefano et de Berlin*, „Revue Roumaine d'Histoire”, XVII (1978), No. 1, 51—76; idem, în *România în relațiile internaționale (1699—1939)* (Jassy, 1980), 274—301.

¹¹ We make use of this opportunity to renew our warm gratefulness for the State Archives of Bucharest, as well as to the State Archives of Iași who offered good conditions for reading some microfilms from the archives of the Foreign Office.

¹² I mention the volume appeared under the care of prof. univ. George Macoveescu, Aurelian Gr. Paraipan, Alexandru N. Popescu, Constantin I. Turcu, *Independența României. Documente*, IV, *Documente diplomatice 1873—1881* (București, 1978).

¹³ I treated this question more detailed in *Considerații privind locul României în relațiile internaționale după cucerirea independenței*, „Analele Științifice ale Universității „Al. I. Cuza” Iași”, s. III, History, XXII (1977), 31 and following.

¹⁴ Vasile Cristian, *La Roumanie et les traités de paix de San Stefano et de Berlin*, 51 and following.

explanation must be also sought in the past. Romania had proved a peculiar energy opposing several times "a surprising resistance force against Europe's will"¹⁵. The policy of the "fait accompli" had often imposed, under the conditions of collective guarantee, solutions disagreed by the great powers; some of these solutions were steps to full state independence. The same policy had been applied on the occasion of the declaration of independence in May, 9, 1877. One could therefore suppose that after its obtaining Romania's actions would be more energetic — a fact that could have had important consequences due to its important geographic position. This fact seemed undesirable for the great powers not only diplomatically but also because in a Europe conservatory in its largest part Romania through the manner by which had solved its fundamental problems was a center of revolutionary unrest which under the then conditions could have stirred the surrounding regions. The English diplomacy have often drawn the attention on this fact; when, at the beginning of 1876, the Romanian government announced the intention to get the country military prepared, Lord Derby by means of the British Consul in Bucharest expressed the anxiety of the English Cabinet concerning the possibility of Romania's independence and underlined that it "insisted on the danger of such a revolution"¹⁶.

In fact the interests of Britain were opposed to the Romanian aspiration to break off with the Ottoman Empire whose integrity found at the time in England its unic defender due to the English Mediterranean interests that had to dictate the attitude of the Foreign Office. We could not enter here the details of the negotiations engaged by the Romanian government with the English diplomats before the Congress in Berlin, negotiations held mostly in Paris, Constantinople and Bucharest, due to the fact that Romania (the name of Romania, claimed in 1866 had been officially accepted by the British Government in 1876) was not represented in London where it had sent some diplomatic missions. It is worth mentioning only the fact that the attitude of the Foreign Office towards Romania was dictated mainly by the evolution of the Romania-Russian relations. Romania's neuter attitude during the early phases of the Oriental Crisis was appreciated by the English Cabinet. The action of the Romanian diplomacy to obtain a statute of neutrality like the ones of Belgium and Switzerland met in turns a refuse in London. On the occasion of a conference held in Constantinople with Ion Ghica, in December 1876, Lord Salisbury declared among other things that "la question de la neutralité de la Roumanie présente sans doute des côtés avantageux. Mais la soulever maintenant, à l'heure même où l'Europe tente un suprême effort pour maintenir la paix sur la base des traités existents, ce serait introduire le germe des complications nouvelles, provoquer d'irritants débats, aggraver une situation déjà grosse de difficultés, et conduire à un avortement presque certain l'oeuvre de la Conférence. Solliciter l'érection de la Roumanie en État neutre, sous une garantie européenne spéciale, c'est demander la modification du pacte

¹⁵ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Histoire des Roumains*, 386.

¹⁶ Quotation after Beatrice Marinescu, *op. cit.*, 64. Here also is to be found a more detailed demonstration of the Romanian-English relations before the war. It is interesting that even after the conquest of independence some governments insisted on the possibility that Romania should constitute a centre of revolutionary unrest, as it was underlined by the diplomats in Petersburg, Vienna and Berlin.

international de 1856, en tant qu'il règle la condition politique des Principautés Danubiennes. Or, il est peu probable que les Puissances consent à accueillir et à patronner une demande de cette nature. Si le traité de Paris a déjà subi de cruelles atteintes dans bien de ses parties, du moins subsiste-t-il intact dans celles de ses stipulations qui ont organisé en Orient un nouveau droit public européen, au respect duquel les Puissances semblent attacher le plus haut prix"¹⁷. To these considerations whose he conferred theoretic character, but which are extremely revealing, Salisbury added others connected mainly with geographic reasons. The advantage of Belgium and Switzerland lies in the proximity of guaranting powers, which was not the case for Romania. Moreover, "la malheur de la Roumanie veut qu'elle soit la voie la plus directe qui débouche en Turquie. Les combinaisons diplomatiques les plus habiles qui tendraient à fermer cette voie demeureraient vaines, dès qu'une Puissance serait intéressée à les oublier, ou décider à les enfreindre. Le droit tomberait devant la force, qui deviendrait, alors plus que jamais, l'argument suprême"¹⁸.

It is easily understandable that under such conditions the proclamation of Independence was not approved in London and least of all the alliance of Romania with Russia and their co-operation in the war against Turkey. They also explain at a large extent the attitude of the English diplomacy towards Romania during the first half of 1878. It is true that the conflict appeared between this and its ally in the eve determined a more nuanced attitude of the Cabinet in London who followed with a particular interest the political and military events on the Low Danube. The English diplomacy remained however reserved as to the participation of Romania at the projected Peace Conference, a conference to which initiation the British contribution had been substantial. On the very day in which the signing of the treaty in San Stefano took place the British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Lyons sent a message to Callimaki-Catargi, as an answer to the note of 3/15 February 1878 of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs that the English government "prend en sérieuses considération les questions qui lui ont été soumises"; however, "il lui est impossible de se prononcer dès maintenant et il se réserve d'agir en notre faveur dès que les circonstances le permettront"¹⁹.

This attitude, in fact common to other Powers, has been maintained until the opening of the Congress in Berlin prepared through severe talks. The bilateral agreements achieved until then had anticipated the treatise which could not be closed without long talks.

Among the essential preliminary negotiations the most interesting for our subject-matter are the English-Russian ones. For the intensive diplomatic activity which prepared the Congress, "the touchstone" — as a French diplomat

¹⁷ *Independența României. Documente*, IV, 164.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 165. It is interesting that later on, in a letter addressed to Kogălniceanu, Jomini had resembling ideas showing that Belgium's neutrality is based on the neighbouring with England and concerning the power of these treaties he stated a formula which, being used later on by a German diplomat, was to become famous: they are not but simple "chiffons de papiers" (Vasile M. Kogălniceanu, *Acte și documente din corespondența diplomatică a lui Mihail Kogălniceanu relative la războiul independenței României 1877—1878*, București, 1893, 10).

¹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Official Documents of the Diplomatic Correspondence* (București, 1880) 67.

noticed — was the settlement of Bulgaria²⁰. Its extension up to the Aegean Sea under the conditions in which its organization might have been achieved with Russian support and during the occupation by the Russian armies it would have ensured Russia the possibility of its access to the Mediterranean Sea and it would have been a direct menace for Constantinople. Such a situation could not be accepted mainly by England. In the period immediately following the Treaty of San Stefano on the first plan of the diplomatic activity will be situated the England-Russia relations.

The British government led by Lord Beaconsfield tried to exercise pressures upon Russia, leaving to understand even the possibility of an armed conflict. That is why Lord Derby resigned. On 1-st of April his successor, Salisbury sent to the diplomatic agents of Great Britain to be remitted to the foreign ministers a long note in which, by making a history of the problem, showed the implications of the Treaty of San Stefano and insisted upon the problems of special importance for England, such as the creation of the Large Bulgaria and the increase of the role of Russia at the Black Sea as a consequence of the territorial transformations²¹. In their turn the Russian government tried to reject the British arguments in a circular note of Gorceakov²². Both notes have been published a fact that accentuated the impression of the profoundness of the conflict. At last an English-Russian agreement was reached and signed on 30 May, 1878. According to it Bulgaria's boundaries were displaced much to the north along the Balkans. Russia accepted to limit its annexations in Transcaucasus in order to lessen the danger of a menace upon the British areas of influence in Asia. But, even if it expressed its regret for such a possibility, England gave in fact its agreement for the boundaries of Russia to come back at the Danube since "elle ne se trouvait pas immédiatement intéressée [...] pour qu'elle fût autorisée à encourir seule la responsabilité de s'opposer au changement proposé"²³, the last underlining being connected to the fact that the other powers had already expressed their agreement concerning the movement of this boundary. This fact was to determine their attitude towards Romania both on the eve and during the Congress.

The Romanian government learned too late about the decisions reached at San Stefano. In the conditions in which it was known that these would be discussed at an European Congress it tried to obtain the support of certain great powers to modify the clauses regarding Romania. The main hope was directed for a while to England on her behalf to be the most definite adversary of the San Stefano Treaty. Salisbury assured Callimachi-Catargi — who left especially for London, that the British government and public opinion was one of goodwill for Romania, "mais qu'en toute franchise il devait ajouter aussi qu'il y a des questions qui intéressent plus directement l'Angleterre et que, si l'intervenait un arrangement sur ces points essentiels, elle n'irait pas jusqu'à prendre les armes uniquement pour nous"²⁴.

²⁰ *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, 1-ère série, t. II, 263.

²¹ *Documents diplomatiques. Affaires d'Orient. Congrès de Berlin* (Paris, 1878) 38.

²² *Ibidem*, 43 and following.

²³ G. Noradoughian, *Requiel d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, vol. III, 522—523.

²⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Official Documents*, 134.

The general diplomatic context was reflected by the condition in which the delegates sent by the Romanian government to Berlin, the premier I. C. Brătianu and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Kogălniceanu had to carry out their activity. Their efforts to obtain the right to participate directly at the debated of the problems that regarded their country proved to be sterile and they met everywhere only "des protestations purement académiques", of "une bienveillance platonique"²⁵. The leader of the British delegation, Lord Beaconsfield received them only on 18-th/1-st of July and he only listened to them "très attentivement" and said that "en politique l'ingratitude est souvent le prix des meilleurs services"²⁶. It is important to underline that on the previous day when he raised a problem which together with Count Corti had already raised, Lord Salisbury requested that the Romanian representatives should be interrogated by the Congress since — as the protocol reads — "aux yeux de son Excellence, la Haute Assemblée, après avoir écouté les délégués d'une nation qui réclame des provinces étrangères (Greece — o.n.), agirait équitablement en écoutant les représentants d'un pays qui demande à garder des contrées lui appartenant"²⁷. This request (which had been announced in a letter Salisbury addressed to Callimaki-Catargi before the Congress) was wholly supported by Corti. But it stirred discussions. Bismarck attempted to contraccarate it because, according to his opinion the hearing of the Romanian delegation at the Congress would not have been of the nature to facilitate the proceedings of the Congress and the good understanding between the plenipotentiaries. In his turn, Count Șuvalov tried to establish a distinction between the admission of the Greek delegates and Romanian delegates, the former belonging to an already acknowledged state in Europe. Finally, Salisbury-Corti proposition has been accepted by all the participants.

The decision of the Congress concerning Romania have been however only the result of the talks between the representatives of the great powers. The attitude of the British diplomats must be considered in this context. In fact, the English Cabinet had warned Romania that their decisions would be made only in accordance with the attitude of the other countries, especially concerning Bessarabia. Although between the Russian and English plenipotentiaries appeared sometimes lively discussions, the result was the one foreseen in the bilateral agreement between the two governments. In fact all the other great powers agreed that no one could refuse Russia the frontier before 1856, an essential aim of its participating in the war²⁸; England which obtained in the meanwhile territorial compensations, accepted in its turn this solution because "elle ne se trouvait pas directement intéressée" in this matter²⁹. At the same time it joined the proposition concerning the statute of the Israelis in Romania, an attitude prepared by a campaign of a part of the English press — with inherent exaggerations³⁰ — and naturally supported by Disraeli, who had become in the meantime Lord Beaconsfield. The discussions around this problem postponed in fact the acknowledgement of Romania's Independen-

²⁵ *Ibidem*, 164—165.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, 171.

²⁷ *Documents diplomatiques. Affaires d'Orient*, 155.

²⁸ See, especially, S. Goriainov, *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles* (Paris, 1910) 147 and following.

²⁹ Noradoughian, *op. cit.*, III, 522.

³⁰ *Independența României. Documente*, IV, 204.

dence by England, as well as by Germany and France, until February 1880. One must underline that England had in general a supple³¹ attitude and contributed to the achievement of a compromise so that the acknowledgement of the independence by the great powers should come to life without the Romanian parliament's acceptance *ad-litteram* the stipulations of the article 44 of the treaty of Berlin³².

In the history of the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Romania, the year 1878 represents one of most interesting moments. Each of the two parts had proposed itself a particular aim, neither of them could reach entirely, succeeding at the same time to ensure what was essential according to their own standpoints: Romania obtained its independence, though conditioned, England could not save its *statu-quo* in the South-East of Europe, but managed to prevent the Russian expansion to the Mediterranean Sea. The changes brought about by the Congress of Berlin created thus new bases for the diplomatic relations between England and Romania and had their influence upon the economic and cultural relations between the two countries.

³¹ Connected with this problem, see Beatrice Marinescu, *Great Britain and the Recognition of the Romanian Independence (1880)* 71—79.

³² An ample and solid analysis which proves that the essential role in the postponement of the recognition of the independence starting especially from economic relations was of Germany in D. Berlescu, *O pagină din istoria contemporană a României: Recunoaşterea independenţei*, „Studii şi cercetări ştiinţifice”, IV (1953) 513—543.

THE ANGLO-ROMANIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN 1821—1856

BY

PAUL CERNOVODEANU

Created in 1803 as an observation and information centre of the British diplomacy in the Balkans, the Consulate of Bucharest, granted by the Levant Company, constitutes, at the same time, an outpost of English commercial penetration at the Lower Danube and the Black Sea in its preliminary exploratory phase.

The Levant Company had traded in the Eastern Mediterranean more than two centuries on the basis of its charters of *privi'eges*, which record its closed monopolistic character. But the way in which it carried out its operations was now proving to be very out of date even obsolete, in the light of the demands for the liberalisation of trade, which the new English society was now making. The abolition of the Levant Company began to be considered as a necessity. On 18 May 1825, its property was devolved entirely to the Crown, and all its consular representatives in the Levant came under the direct control of the Foreign Office.

An important consequence of this new British political initiative in South-Eastern Europe was the measure taken by Ambassador Stratford Canning — with the permission of the British authorities — to re-establish the British Consulate (closed in 1816) in the Danubian Principalities with both a political and economic competence, as a point from which to observe the Russian's activities and also to promote more active trade in the Black Sea and on the lower Danube.

After the abolition of the monopoly exercised by the Levant Company, free enterprise on the part of all the merchants was to be encouraged and chiefly the Ionians, who were eager to establish flourishing business in that area.

A new consul, E. L. Blutte, was designated on 11 October 1825 and took office on 5 May 1826, when he arrived in Bucharest.

It was only after the Russian-Turkish peace treaty of Adrianop'le (1829) that the British economic penetration was to develop under new, more favourable conditions. The treaty of Adrianople obviously opened another phase in the problem of navigation and international trade in the Black Sea and on the Danube, due to Russian's right to control the Delta area. Nevertheless some advances were then made in both the economic and the political development of the Romanian Principalities. The three Turkish strongholds on the banks of the Danube (Turnu, Giurgiu and Brăila) together with their hinterland, were returned to Wallachia. The Turkish monopoly in both Principalities was abolished when the supply of corn, butter, tallow, timber etc. to the Porte was no longer compulsory. The treaty made trade open to all kind of merchandise, established the right of navigation on the Danube for

Romanian ships, and granted her complete administrative autonomy. All these stipulations encouraged agricultural production in the Romanian countries, ensured the rapid integration of their foreign trade into international commerce, and also accelerated the process of their integration into the modern European community.

It was only after 1829 that British trade with the Romanian Principalities received a formal structure. As one would expect, the most active trading centres were to be the Danube ports of Brăila and Galați, where British vice-consulates were soon established. The clearly defined intention of British Governments after 1829 was to counterbalance the distinct advantages held by Russia in this area, owing to the possession of the mouths of the Danube, as well as to the control which Russia exercised over international navigation on this river; even more since she also had great prospects of advancing towards the straits, thus endangering the precarious balance of power attained in the Eastern Question. So, the British reply on economic grounds to Russian hegemony, consisted — among other things — in initiating an active trade with the Romanian Principalities.

For their part, the Principalities found some advantages in the extension and diversification of their trade relations, in spite of the inequitable position in which they were placed vis-à-vis the great powers, not only as a consequence of their weak economic structure, but also owing to their political dependence on the Ottoman Porte. Nevertheless, Moldavia and Wallachia undertook to ensure an active trade, chiefly along the Danube, their main artery. Through the ports of Galați and Brăila — which successively obtained a statute of *free port* (1-st of June 1837) and the right of *emporium* (2-nd of March 1837), — were exported the natural resources of the Romanian lands, namely their food products and their cattle, in exchange for high quality manufactures, which their own industry, then at its very beginning, could not provide.

The first British commercial Company in the Principalities, headed by George Bell and Andrew Lockhart Anderson failed to bankruptcy in 1836, due to some Russian obstructive measures against the foreign vessels in the Delta and also to some unhappy financial speculations. Many Romanian merchants were ruined also in this failure.

Despite this unpleasant but temporary incident in the course of Anglo-Romanian economic relations, the British trade flourished in the two upper-mentioned Danubian ports. Charles Cunningham in Galați and St. Vincent Lloyd in Brăila were two very honest and able British agents who began to activate trade in these ports, in their capacity as diplomatic representatives with the rank of vice-consuls.

Through the conscientiousness and professional skill of these two vice-consuls — and Cunningham's particularly high qualities — from as early as 1837 yearly statistical accounts were compiled, which contained very valuable data concerning the movements of ships in the Danubian ports, as well as the quantities of goods bought and sold, their prices, the general conditions of trade, price lists, tariffs, monetary equivalents etc. Some other data are to be found also in Romanian sources (customs tariffs, movement of ships in Galați and Brăila, the 1849 printed statistical work of the economist Nicolae Suțu, etc.).

Particular attention was given in their reports by the two British vice-consuls to cereal farming in both the Romanian Principalities. This accounts for the fact that the first commodities to be imported from them were cereals, chiefly wheat and maize, in great quantities, as well as rye and barley, though to a lesser extent. After cereals, the goods obtained from the Romanian Principalities which seem to have had a certain demand on the British market, or which were intended to be reexported to British colonies, consisted chiefly of animal products: cattle, calcinated bones, ox hides, hare skins, tallow, wood, preserved beef and also ox tongues. Nevertheless, the quantities of such products purchased in Brăila and Galați were trifling, and the statistics for them were less accurately kept.

The raw material for the British textile mills, such as linseed, rapeseed, hempseed, and also silk, were also purchased by British merchants in the Danubian Principalities in very small quantities. The same lack of interests is showed in British trade in Galați and Brăila in such commodities as burel-staves, candles, stucco-plaster, yellow berries etc.

British exports to Wallachia and Moldavia through the Danubian ports consisted chiefly of manufactures, cotton twist, refined and crushed sugar, iron and coals.

In their hopes to obtain more advantages in the Levant, Black Sea and Lower Danube trade, the British commercial circles pushed Lord Ponsonby, ambassador to the High Porte to conclude with the Ottomans a new commercial treaty (16 August 1838), very profitable for the British merchants. But its stipulations were not extended to the Danubian Principalities, due to their net official opposition. The British consuls at Bucharest and Jassy explained to Foreign Office that the Principalities have a separate and distinct character from other provinces of the Ottoman Empire and consequently placed out of the direct sphere of the commercial Anglo-Turkish Convention.

In the 1840' many other British tradesmen tried to improve their business in the Principalities, supporting for instance the creation of a Stock Company in Galați and Brăila, headed by Cunningham for the maintenance of the navigation in proper conditions in the Danube's Delta by the deepening of the Sulina branch (1839) a.o. Also a factory for preserving beef to be sold in Britain was established in Galați in 1844 by the English entrepreneur Stephen Goldner, succeeded in 1851 by Ritchie & Powell C^o. A similar factory functioned at Calafat in Little Wallachia in 1852 under the direction of Koopman & Bridgman Corporation.

The growth of British trade with the Romanian Principalities became really important after the repeal of the famous Corn Laws by the House of Commons in 1846. These Corn Laws had effectively prohibited the import of grain from foreign markets into Great Britain; by their repeal English merchants were allowed to supply the British market with cereals from the Principalities. The terrible famine of 1846 in Ireland following the loss of the potato harvest in all the Irish countries obliged the British Government to purchase a much larger quantity of cereals from abroad. In the Danubian ports maize was the cereal in greater demand in 1847 as well as in the following year. The statistical tables show a substantial growth in the quantities of maize purchased by English merchants, as well as the increase in its price.

The strain induced by the revolutionary events of 1848—1849, as well as the deepening of the Eastern Crisis, owing to the deterioration in Russo-Turkish relations, also contributed for the progressive worsening of relations between Great Britain and Russia (the first being supporter of Ottoman integrity). This also resulted in grave problems for the trade of the Lower Danube in 1853.

The sharpening of antagonism between the great powers led to the outbreak of the Crimean War, which ended, as it is known, with the defeat of Czarist Russia. Among the objectives pursued by the victors — mainly by Great Britain — at the Congress of Peace in Paris in March 1856, one of the most important was that of expelling Russia from the mouths of the Danube, thus eliminating her commercial competition and her control over the maritime affairs of the river. This was obtained by the cession of the port of Russia of the three districts located in southern Bessarabia, namely Cahul, Bolgard and Ismail, the cession being agreed in the framework of articles XX and XXI of the treaty of peace concluded the 30-th of March 1856; by the neutralization of the Black Sea, the access to which was prohibited to the battle fleets of every country located in the Pontic area (articles X—XIV) and, eventually, by the establishment of a new international statute for the Danube (articles XV to XIX).

The main provision concerning the regime of the Danube consisted in setting-up a European Commission — first conceived as being only provisional — and which was composed of the representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey. Its chief aim was to guarantee the liberty of navigation along this important artery, as well as to assure conditions for normal traffic, through engineering works designed to clear the mouths of the river sediment which was continually accumulating there, as well as other works for making the river more easily navigable.

The European Commission of the Danube settled in Galați on the 4-th of November 1856, originally having only a temporary character, soon obtained a permanent basis to the fact that, in spite of the absence of the representatives of the smaller riverine states, it could effectively contribute to the maintenance of a certain political and economic equilibrium in the Danubian area.

In conclusion, the Anglo-Romanian economic relations between 1821—1856 have been — generally speaking — prosperous but they suffered also due to the political statute of the Principalities and the lack of a specific commercial agreement with Great Britain.

SIR CHARLES HARTLEY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROMANIA'S LOWER DANUBE-BLACK SEA COMMERCE IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY¹

BY

DAVID TURNOCK

„De Dunăre, ca și de Carpați, se leagă întreaga viață a poporului nostru; ea este partea care ne ține în contact cu popoarele din apusul și centrul Europei și tot ea ne deschide calea largă a oceanului pentru schimbul produselor țării și al muncii poporului cu produsele țărilor celor mai îndepărtate“².

It is well known that during the late nineteenth century Romania overseas trade expanded very rapidly. The total (registered) tonnage of shipping leaving the Danube rose from 0.54 million in 1860 and 0.66 in 1880 to 1.22 in 1900 and 2.27 in 1910. Political conditions were favourable, thanks to an ending of the Ottoman trading monopoly (1829) and the recognition of Romania's independence (1878) while her ability to supply large quantities of cereals, oil and timber in return for advanced technology created a powerful economic basis for close commercial links with the powers of Central and Western Europe. The growth of overseas trade led to radical changes in Romania's economic geography because a much greater value was now placed on access to the Lower Danube and the agricultural potential of the steppes was greatly increased by the rising demand for cereals³. Probably no other part of Romania has been so transformed over the last century or more than Dobrogea, a territory extending from the Danube delta southwards to the Bulgarian frontier and clearly demarcated to the east and west by the Black Sea and Danube respectively (Figure 1 a)⁴. There has been a growth of rural population through more intensive use of the natural resources but the urban component has been boosted by the growth of the port cities as well as the local demands for service centres.

¹ With just a few exceptions the spelling of place names has been based on the Romanian versions, even when the names appears in quotations. Problems arise over the names for certain sections of the Sulina river where Romanian names are not known and the French names used by the E.C.D. are therefore retained.

² Gr. Antipa, *Dunărea și problemele ei științifice, economice și politice* (București, 1921), 2.

³ I. Cârțână and I. Seftiuc, *Dunărea în istoria poporului român* (București, 1972); P. Gogeanu, *Dunărea în relațiile internaționale* (București, 1970); I. Seftiuc and I. Cârțână, *România și problema strimtorilor* (București, 1974).

⁴ C. Brătescu, *Regele Carol I și colonizările Dobrogei*, *Analele Dobrogei*, 19, 85—101; D. Bugă and C. Rusenescu, 1964, *Distribution and Growth of Population Between the Carpathians and the Danube in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, *Revue Roumaine: Géologie, Géophysique et Géographie* (abbreviated henceforth, *Revue Roumaine: Géographie*), 8, 22—6; V. Mihăilescu, *Progresele economice și culturale realizate în Dobrogea sub stăpânirea românească*, (București, 1940).

Although the mouths of the Danube were important commercial highways in medieval times, providing economic underpinnings for the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, with their rival ports of Galați and Brăila respectively, overland trade seems to have been fostered during the centuries of Turkish suzerainty⁵. Dobrogea as a whole was only very sparsely settled in 1878 when pastoral farming (much of it integrated with the Carpathians through transhumance) was still predominant⁶. The Danube delta included little flood-free land among its marshes and lagoons (the well-wooded sandbanks of Caraorman and Letea being most significant here) and development was further discouraged by its frontier position, between Russia and Turkey, in the early nineteenth century, a situation emphasised by treaty obligations to keep stipulated areas devoid of settlement⁷.

Throughout the modern period there has been an emphasis on two principal routes for international shipping, one using the river Danube right through the delta into the Black Sea and a second involving overland movement across Dobrogea from Cernavodă on the Danube to Constanța on the Black Sea coast. The relative importance of these routes has fluctuated a great deal but both were improved considerably in the late nineteenth century through the engineering skills of Sir Charles Hartley (Figure 2). This paper tries to examine his contribution to some of the largest public works to be carried out on Romania's territory which remain fundamental elements in Romania's transport geography. It has not been possible to make any extensive search through archival sources but a considerable amount of published material is available and the work has been greatly advanced through discussions with Mr. C. W. S. Hartley who is researching into the career of his great uncle⁸.

Charles Hartley was born near Newcastle, the son of an iron merchant. He trained as an engineer and at the age of twenty travelled to Scotland to take up an appointment as a district railway engineer. Three years later, in 1848, he took up employment with the Sutton Harbour Company in Plymouth, but he also interested himself in local road and railway development projects and attempted to take the post of borough engineer in the town. Failure to win this job brought about his adventures abroad because Hartley obtained a commission as Captain of Engineers and subsequently left for the Crimea. He served with a portion of the Turkish Contingent, commanded by Major (later Lt. Gen. Sir John) Stokes. It was on the recommendation of Sir John Stokes, among others, that Charles Hartley was elected Engineer

⁵ See however V. Ciobanu, 1980, *Aspects du trafic commercial fluvial dans la zone de la mer Noire dans la deuxième moitié du XVIII^e siècle*, *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, 19, 733–9.

⁶ N. Dragomir, Oierii mărgineni și transhumanta lor în Dobrogea, *Analele Dobrogei*, 19, 121–37; C. Filipescu, *Agricultura în Dobrogea nouă*, *Analele Dobrogei*, 19, 1–42; I. Ștefănescu, *Changes in the Agriculture of Dobrogea during the Last Hundred Years*, *Revue Roumaine : Géographie*, 21, 1977, 87–101.

⁷ A. C. Banu and L. Rudescu, *Delta Dunării* (București, 1965); P. V. Coteș and I. Popovici, *Județul Tulcea*, (București, 1972); I. Popovici, *Delta Dunării* (București, 1974).

⁸ Mr. Hartley kindly allowed me to examine his great uncle's scrap books and diaries as well as the atlases which were published by the E.C.D. He also showed me an unpublished typescript outlining the technical and political considerations affecting the choice of the Sulina channel and offered various opinions which have been incorporated in the final draft of the paper.

in Chief to the European Commission of the Danube established by the Treaty of Paris at the end of the Crimean War. Reports on his work for the E.C.D. were made to the Institution of Civil Engineers and extensive use has been made of these records, covering his addresses and related discussion, in this paper⁹. He described the delta in the early 1850 as being "entirely destitute of culture" apart from a few patches by the Chilia and Sf. Gheorghe branches. Total population was reckoned to be only about six thousand for "reeds of large growth cover the greater portion of its surface and vast swamps and freshwater lakes are met with in every direction"¹⁰. Hartley spent seventeen years (1856—1871) at Sulina and his success in improving the navigation channel over the notorious Sulina bar, and straightening the winding channel upstream through the delta towards Galați, brought him a knighthood and high international esteem as one of the world's leading harbour engineers. Although he returned to London in 1872 he remained attached to the E.C.D. as Consulting Engineer and made annual visits to the delta to supervise further works.

Romania's independence, acknowledged in 1878 along with jurisdiction over Dobrogea, created a new situation in which Sir Charles' plans for a new harbour on the Romanian coast could be implemented but in 1882 it was decided that growth should be based on the old Turkish harbour of Kustendje, now Constanța. His connections with Roumania and the E.C.D. continued until his retirement in 1906.

THE PROBLEM OF THE LOWER DANUBE

By the middle of the nineteenth century a very critical situation had arisen on the Lower Danube. There was a growing interest in trade with the Romanian Principalities but the access through the delta was compromised through natural hazards and political difficulties. The Danube distributaries (Chilia, Sulina and Sf. Gheorghe) were tortuously winding and complicated by shoaling but even greater hazards were encountered at their mouths on account of shallow water over the bar and sudden exposure to strong easterly winds. For navigation within the delta the Chilia and Sf. Gheorghe channels were relatively trouble-free but unfortunately the greatest depth of water over the bar was found at Sulina and during the early nineteenth century this was the branch that was normally in use for international commerce. Even so maximum depth at the bar was reported to be only four meters in a report by J. de Hagemeister to the Russian government compared with 5.5 m. available in the channel upstream. Vessels had to reduce their draught to cross the bar and for this reason an important lightering trade developed at Sulina. This business seems to have been in the hands of Greek sailors who accounted for the majority of Sulina's thousand inhabitants in the early 1850 s. There is doubt that the lightermen were hardly better

⁹ C. A. Hartley, 1862, *Description of the Delta of the Danube and Works Recently Executed at the Sulina Mouth*, *Minutes of Proceedings, Institution of Civil Engineers*, 21, 277—308; C. A. Hartley, 1873, *On the Changes that Have Taken Place along the Sea Coast of the Delta of the Danube and the Consolidation of the Provisional Works at the Sulina Mouth*, *Ibid.*, 36, 201—53.

¹⁰ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 280.

than pirates and through false bottoms on their vessels and other devious methods sought to deprive ships of part of their cargo. Cioriceanu refers to the lightermen as follows: "leur industrie consistait à dépouiller en grand et par association les malheureux capitaines obligés par suite des obstacles qu'ils rencontraient dans les parages d'avoir recours à leurs services"¹¹. But the system would have been hazardous even with the utmost efficiency and honesty. Transfer of cargo beyond the bar could be quite chaotic in strong winds which might blow the ships away from the delta and prevent their return. The popular writer D. Urquhart explains that if there were strong winds "the vessel must get up her anchor, or slip it, or stand out to sea if she can; and if she cannot do that she must go on shore as has occurred more than once. The lighters in the meantime must find the best of their way into the river again and in doing so they are sometimes lost with all the grain they contain. When saved the wheat rarely escapes being damaged and is generally disposed of at a losing price to speculators"¹². Hartley mentions one December night in 1855 when "during a terrific gale twenty four sailing ships and sixty lighters went ashore off the mouth and upwards of three hundred persons perished"¹³. He describes the Sulina entrance as "a wild open seaboard strewn with wrecks, the hulls and masts of which, sticking out of the submerged sandbanks, gave the mariners the only guide where the deepest channel was to be found"¹⁴.

The situation was complicated by political issues. For centuries the Lower Danube lay deep in Turkish territory and the river remained closed to foreign shipping until 1784 when Austria gained the right to navigate downstream below the Iron Gates. The Russians meanwhile gained navigation rights on the Black Sea and the Straits in 1744 (Treaty of Kuciuk-Kainargi). But these limited agreements were overtaken by the concept of free navigation. The Treaty of Vienna (1815) declared that all the navigable rivers of Europe should be considered the highways of nations and although the Danube was not internationalised at the time any artificial restrictions tended to become important areas of conflict. The Lower Danube became a bone of contention between Austria and Russia as the Turkish Empire continued its long process of contraction and the international concept was regarded with a marked ambivalence by whichever power considered itself to be in the ascendancy. In the early nineteenth century this was Russia. Freedom of navigation for all was agreed between Russia and Turkey under the Convention of Ceta-tea Albă in 1825 but the Dardanelles were closed to all warships other than Russian under the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. On the Danube the Russian frontier advanced southwards from the Chilia branch, reached in 1812 (Treaty of București), to the Sulina in 1817 (under a protocol between the Porte

¹¹ C. D. Cioriceanu, *La Roumanie économique et ses rapports avec l'étranger de 1860 à 1914*, (Paris, 1928) 130. See also P. Cernovodeanu, *British Economic Interests in the Lower Danube and the Balkan shore of the Black Sea Between 1803 and 1829*, *Journal of European Economic History*, 5, 105–19; P. Cernovodeanu, 1977, *The International Trade Through Galați and Brăila, 1837–1848*, *Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, 16, 517–31.

¹² D. Urquhart, *The Mystery of the Danube* (London, 1851) 388–9. Further reference is given by E. D. Tappe, E. C. Grenville, *Murray and Rumania*, *Revue de Littérature Comparée*, 39, 439–48.

¹³ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 291.

¹⁴ C. A. Hartley, 1873, 239.

and the Russian ambassador, confirmed by the Treaty of Cetatea Albă and finally to the Sf. Gheorghe in 1829 (Treaty of Adrianople). This latter treaty allowed the Russians to operate a quarantine station at the Sulina mouth. It was widely believed that the quarantine system was operated unfairly to divert shipping away from Galați and Brăila towards Russia's own port of Odessa. An extreme view argued that quarantine procedures were "employed as a barrier intruded between the principalities and the remainder of Turkey and as political police to keep the former under the control of Russia"¹⁵. It was also widely believed that Russia was deliberately inattentive to maintenance work at the Sulina mouth with the result that the depth of water at the bar fell to as little as 2.4 m. Austria had an important interest in the Lower Danube when the introduction of a steamship in 1829 opened up possibilities of through sailings from Vienna to such ports as Constanța, Smyrna, Trebizond and Varna. The state backed the company (Erste Donau Damfschiffartgesellschaft) and negotiated a ten year agreement with Russia for free navigation. Under this arrangement of 1840 Russia would improve the Sulina mouth and Austria would pay taxes to help finance the work. But no significant improvement was effected. It is known that a British dredger was sent out in 1851 and worked intermittently but brought no long term benefit¹⁶.

It remains very much a matter for speculation how far Russia deliberately impeded commerce on the Lower Danube. But Sulina became a hotly-debated issue in Britain and political writers argued that the difficulties there were part of a long-term plan to restrict navigation to the Chilia arm to strengthen Russian control and improve the position of Ismail over Galați and Brăila. The British government saw restrictions on the freedom of commerce as a violation of the spirit of the Treaty of Vienna and, pressed by public opinion, were unwilling to allow that there were technical and administrative problems that the Russians were unable to solve. The problem was seen as soluble through construction of a canal across Dobrogea from Cernavodă to Constanța¹⁷. Austria contemplated such a scheme in 1844 and Urquhart visualised Constanța becoming a trans-shipment port for Europe¹⁸. This seems to be the first time that the alternative route to the Danube delta was seriously advocated. But no serious feasibility studies were carried out and the idea was abandoned in 1856 when the European Commission of the Danube was established. During the Crimean War a road across Dobrogea was suggested as a solution that could be quickly implemented but even this simpler alternative was not proceeded with. Instead interest shifted back to the delta for the Crimean War, which developed in no small measure out of frustration over Russia's control over the Danube, led to the Russian frontier being pushed well back from the delta. And to prevent any one power from gaining the upper hand over the eastern reaches of the

¹⁵ D. Urquhart, 1851, 364. Urquhart's role as a publicist is discussed by G. H. Bolsover, *David Urquhart and the Eastern Question*, *Journal of Modern History*, 8, 444—67.

¹⁶ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 297. See also J. H. Skene, *The Danubian Principalities: the Frontier lands of Christian and Turk*, (London, 1854) 384.

¹⁷ P. Cernovodeanu, *România și primele proiecte de construire a canalului Dunăre—Marea Neagră, 1838—1856*, *Revista de istorie*, 29, 189—209.

¹⁸ D. Urquhart, 1851, 112.

Danube the delta was internationalised under the Treaty of Paris¹⁹. This step has been hailed as 'one of the most enlightened and constructive measures ever embodied in a general treaty' and it certainly proved to be one of the most permanent and successful results of the Treaty of Paris (1856)²⁰. An international commission was to preside for two years over the improvement of the navigable channel through the delta and then control would pass to an authority consisting only of the riparian powers²¹. But the problems involved in development required a much longer gestation period while the success of the commission in reducing conflict meant that the majority of the powers found they had a vested interest in retaining the organisation (Figure 3)²². The first extension in 1859 followed from the need for a longer period to improve the river but the subsequent extensions of 1871 (twelve years) and 1883 (indefinite) were more obviously politically-motivated. The E.C.D. therefore survived the Congress of Berlin (1878), and even the settlements following the First World War²³.

THE SELECTION OF SULINA

The E.C.D. was required 'to designate and to cause to be effected the works necessary below Isaccea to clear the mouths of the Danube and the neighbouring parts of the sea from the sands and other impediments which obstructed them, so as to put that part of the river and the said parts of the sea in the best possible state for navigation'. It was very quickly realised that merely raking the river bed (the traditional Turkish practice allegedly abandoned by the Russians) had no positive effect and that dredging conferred no significant benefit either. More elaborate works were needed and a prolonged discussion started as to what measures were needed and which delta branch should be selected. For whereas the Sulina arm carried the bulk of the commercial traffic and was therefore selected for dredging it might well have been more feasible to concentrate heavier investments on either the Chilia or Sf. Gheorghe channels. Various surveys were made,

¹⁹ W. E. Mosse, *The Rise and Fall of the Crimean System 1855–71* (London, 1963).

²⁰ F. Schevill, *The History of the Balkan Peninsula*, (New York, 1933) 361–2.

²¹ The members of the Commission were Austria (later Austria–Hungary), France, Prussia (later Germany), Russia, Sardinia (later Italy), Turkey and United Kingdom. Romania was also represented after the Congress of Berlin recognised her independence in 1878. The Commission did not have extensive territorial sovereignty but it did have an area of jurisdiction, a flag and a budget. It enacted navigation and police laws and carried-out works. It controlled the Danube upstream to Isaccea (Galați, 1878; Brăila, 1883) and exerted authority in Sulina (radius 3.7 km.) and on Insula Șerpilor (where a lighthouse was maintained) in addition to the boats and lands under its ownership.

²² L. A. Maher, *Great Britain and the International Control of the Danube 1856–83: A study of British Policy in S. E. Europe with Particular Reference to the European Commission of the Danube* (Oxford, University Ph. D. thesis, 1968). Other literature includes J. P. Chamberlain, *The regime of international rivers: Danube and Rhine* (New York, 1923); H. Hajnal, 1929, *Le droit du Danube internationale* (The Hague, 1929); G. S. E. C. Kaeckenbeeck, *International rivers* (London, 1918); E. Krehbiel, 1918, *The E.C.D.: An Experiment in International Administration*, *Political Science Quarterly*, 33, 38–55; A. Prigrada, 1953, *International agreements concerning the Danube* (New York: Mid-European Studies Center); C. V. Suppan, *Die Donau und ihre Schifffahrt* (Wien, 1917).

²³ W. N. Medlicott, *The Congress of Berlin and After* (London, 1938).

some by Hartley himself, some by naval personnel serving on warships maintained in the delta area by certain powers represented on the E.C.D. and still more by other engineers.

The Chilia channel did not emerge as a strong possibility. Although the conditions for navigation were good as far as Vilkov they deteriorated further downstream where the river entered swampy ground and divided into 'at least twelve distinct mouths not one of which is navigable except for fishing vessels'²⁴. Furthermore although the sea bottom rapidly shelved into deep water beyond the bars "the distance... of the bars from the shore, the rapid advance of the shelf seawards and the large volume of water delivered to the sea, by so many mouths branching out in all directions, all tend to place the mouths of the Chilia in the worst possible condition for successful treatment"²⁵. The bulk of the Danube water was discharged through this branch (63.0 percent, compared with thirty for the Sf. Gheorghe and only seven for Sulina) and deposition of the massive amounts of sediment carried by the river (calculated at 42.6 million tons per annum during the 1860s but now 67.5) was found to be proportional to total discharge. The Chilia delta was therefore expanding at a relatively rapid rate and any enclosed seaway built over the bar would have to be progressively lengthened. Hartley's own surveys, when compared with earlier work for the Russian and British governments showed a "startling extension" of the delta and the therefore rejected the Chilia branch in favour of the more southerly distributaires "where the sea depths are greater and the advance of the sand banks much less remarkable"²⁶.

The choice between the Sulina and Sf. Gheorghe branches was then resolved in the latter's favour. Although the depth over the bar was relatively shallow there were good prospects that piers built out across the bar would give better long term results than at Sulina. The entrance channel would be longer at Sf. Gheorghe than Sulina but because the former "occupied an advanced geographical position with respect to the coast on either side and as its frontage was swept and kept comparatively steep by littoral current ... it was clear that ... the prolongation of works necessary to keep pace with the new deposits would be less considerable than at any other mouth"²⁷. Two footnotes might be added to this: first as Hartley himself explains "the greater sea depths opposite the Sf. Gheorghe would insure for a much longer period a constant navigable depth at the sea entrance" and the total amount of sediment would be reduced on account of the division of the Sf. Gheorghe branch into the Kedrilles and Olinka channels²⁸. The piers would be built along the former channel leaving the latter to remain in its natural state taking one third of the discharge and sediment load. Then again the navigable channel of the Sf. Gheorghe through the delta region was considered to be much better than Sulina. The 1857 surveys revealed that in "nearly every respect the Sf. Gheorghe offered decided advantages over the Sulina", for the former "offers no real obstacles while

²⁴ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 279.

²⁵ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 283.

²⁶ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 283.

²⁷ C. A. Hartley, 1873, 244.

²⁸ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 284.

at every turn of the upper reaches of the Sulina disaster of every kind is imminent"²⁹. The Sf. Gheorghe branch followed a long meandering course but 'from the ample and uniform width and depth of the river however these windings are not such obstacles to navigation as might be expected'³⁰. Besides the meanders could easily be avoided by short canals: a 520 m. cut would save 4.8 km. while ten kilometers of cuts would shorten the distance by more than 27 km. The Sulina channel was difficult to enter at Tulcea because of the acute-angled bend away from the Sf. Gheorghe channel. There were also sandbanks: "these obstacles combined with many intricate windings, and the numerous shallows which occur in the upper portion of this branch, render the navigation of the Sulina at all times hazardous and difficult"³¹.

Unfortunately the more southerly situation of Sf. Gheorghe, which made for shorter voyages to Constantinople (more than thirty kilometers), also made for longer voyages to Russian ports: hence in this respect Sulina was a compromise³². Furthermore it was evident that short-term improvements could be made with relatively little expense at Sulina. Piers of relatively short length would suffice to reach the bar at Sulina and the Commission agreed to these provisional work "with a view of giving the speediest relief to the navigation in the cheapest manner"³³. Hartley also recalls how "it was distinctly guaranteed that this provisional expedient should not prejudice the choice of the mouth to be eventually selected for permanent treatment"³⁴. But the British member of the E.C.D. Col John Stokes clearly felt that any significant effort at Sulina would result in *de facto* abandonment of Sf. Gheorghe because in a climate of financial stringency it would appear more attractive to consolidate the investments already made. This in fact proved to be the case and hence the anomaly of the acceptance of the Sf. Gheorghe by a Technical Commission in Paris in 1858 being followed by attention to the Sulina arm only³⁵. This is an interesting decision which has had a permanent effect on Romanian transport networks. It has to be pointed out that technical opinion was not unanimously behind the Sf. Gheorghe. While Hartley was supported by the opinion of other engineers (the Austrians Wex and Le Chevalier de Passetti) a German engineer Nobiling preferred Sulina and the British Captain Spratt finished up arguing for the Oceacov mouth of the Chilia. The decision was clouded further by certain proposals made for artificial canals to be built to avoid the natural outfalls. Particularly interesting here is the plan for Sf. Gheorghe by Captain Fowke to build a canal from the Kedrilles channel (just downstream of the junction with the Olinka) across to the Black Sea coast and so avoid the Kedrilles bar. These proposals were rejected by the Commission in favour of the

²⁹ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 279.

³⁰ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 279.

³¹ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 280.

³² Voyages to Russia would not have been very important commercially at the time but the Russians may well have seen some strategic advantage in developing a channel nearer to their territory.

³³ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 285.

³⁴ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 285.

³⁵ The Paris International Technical Commission was convened to consider the problem of opening the Danube when it became clear that the E.C.D. was deadlocked.

principal of improvement of "guiding the river waters across the bar by means of piers projected from the most advanced dry angles of the mouth; or in other words of concentrating the strength of the river current on the bottom of the proposed improved seaward channel by an artificial prolongation of the river banks into deep water"³⁶. But nevertheless the serious suggestion of on a alternative strategy may have weakened the resolve of those commissioners who supported Sf. Gheorghe plan (Britain, Sardinia and Turkey). Furthermore the Turks had allowed a concession to a British company to build a railway across Dobrogea to forge the link between Cernavodă and Constanța of which a canal and military road had previously been proposed. The threat of the railway to the delta's grain trade was taken very seriously by the E.C.D. and Hartley was sent to make a report. This advised that an improved navigation channel through the delta would be cheaper to use than the railway, but given the threat of competition and the uncertain finances of the Commission (with the Turks being expected to provide most of the finance, for the works would be carried out on what was then Ottoman territory) it is possible to see how the Sulina option came to be preferred. This is all the more understandable in view of the particularly strong opposition to Sf. Gheorghe by Russia, still ambivalent over any scheme to improve the navigability of the Lower Danube and especially one that would be inconvenient to her own shipping.

Work on the Sulina branch (Figure 1 b)

Temporary works were undertaken at Sulina to obtain a minimum depth over the bar of 4.88 m. An improvement of 0.6 m. was needed to achieve this and the initial aim was to secure this benefit for eight years during which period the Sf. Gheorghe scheme might be brought to fruition. As Sir John Stokes the British Commissioner explained the idea was "that in order to maintain an improved depth at Sulina two piers should be run out, parallel to each other near their extremities, in the best direction for the continued prolongations which would thereafter be necessary to perpetuate the improvement"³⁷. Since the prevailing wind was N.N.E. the northern pier was made to overlap the southern by 185 m. This overlap meant that "as soon as a vessel entering came under the shelter of the north pier and the moment she began to feel the greatest strength of the current the pier protected her from the waves and prevented her from losing her way in the broken water of the bar"³⁸. The work was carried out between April 1858 and July 1861, with three months lost each winter through the Danube freeze and another week lost on average for each of the thirty remaining months because the weather was too stormy³⁹. The more rapid flow of water in the channel was immediately effective in giving the desired depth at the bar. Indeed the depth increased to 6.1 m., which "the most sanguine never ventured to predict when the works were begun" and Sulina became

³⁶ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 284.

³⁷ C. A. Hartley, 1873, 250.

³⁸ C. A. Hartley, 1873, 247.

³⁹ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 289.

one of the best commercial harbours of the Black Sea⁴⁰. The thinking behind the scheme, which argued that piers would increase the scouring effect of the river water, especially at times of high discharge, was amply vindicated by 'the furious descent of the extraordinarily high floods of winter 1860—1 which swept away the remains of the bar between the training walls' and increased the depth from some 2.8 to 5.0 m.⁴¹

Subsequently however the depth of water was shown to fluctuate quite considerably, with a reduction to 3.8 m. at the end of 1862 and further deterioration after an improvement back to 4.8 m. in June 1863. The trouble was correctly diagnosed as "a slack river current unduly surcharged with earthy particles meeting at its issue from the river with southerly and easterly winds"⁴². Flood water would make for a deeper channel but it was also important that wind should blow in the prevailing direction to remove accumulations of sediment from the channel. Hartley recommended that the overlap of the northern pier should be reduced to 45.7 m. so that greater containment on the south would take sediment still further out to sea and reduce the danger of encroachment by the southern sandbank when winds veered to the east or southeast. The work was carried out and gave highly satisfactory results with the depth increasing in the flood water of Spring 1870 to 6.7 m. and stabilising at 6.1 m.

Significant changes also took place in the evolution of the delta. Hartley produced figures to show movements in subterranean contours in the years before E.C.D. was set up (comparing his own 1857 observations with those made in 1829) and again between 1857 and 1861 when the preliminary works were complete. Contour lines advancing towards the shore would indicate increased depth and these are shown as positive (Table 1). Contour lines advancing seawards would suggest deterioration through growth of the delta. The figures show a general deepening to the north, to the 5.48 m. contour and accelerated shallowing to the south at the same depth. Shallowing was taking place at greater depths (up to 9.14 m.) but at slower rates to both north and south. Indeed if the latter depths are taken as indicators of delta expansion then the rate of advance was evidently cut by half because as Hartley explained the 'great bulk of silt bearing water... is as a rule carried far to the south-east by the littoral current instead of flowing into the sea as formerly with a feeble and constantly decreasing current by numerous shallow channels which were always changing in direction and extent'.⁴³ The figures also point to the local growth of sand banks to the south since shelter behind the south pier encouraged deposition. However the predominant process along the coast is erosive and this meant that an extension of the north pier was needed in 1867 to keep it linked with the mainland⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ C. A. Hartley, 1873, 208.

⁴¹ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 291.

⁴² C. A. Hartley, 1873, 211.

⁴³ C. A. Hartley, 1873, 215. Recent information on the evolution of the delta is provided by P. Găstescu, *Modificările țărmului Mării Negre în dreptul Deltei Dunării, Studii și cercetări de Geologie, Geofizică, Geografie: Geografie*, 24, 235—40; P. Găstescu, *Evoluția țărmului Mării Negre între brațul Sf. Gheorghe și grindul Perișor*, *Ibid*, 26, 37—42; P. Găstescu and A. Brier, 1980, *Present Changes in the Danube Delta Morpho-hydrography*, *Revue Roumaine de Géographie*, 24, 41—6.

⁴⁴ Landward extensions to the northern pier were required on four occasions in the late nineteenth century: in 1871 (211.5m.), 1873 (45.7 m.), 1876 (61.0 m.) and 1883

Table 1
Changes in the sea bed at the Sulina mouth 1829-61

Submarine contours (meters)	Movement (meters per annum) (1)			
	North of the mouth		South of the mouth	
	1829-57	1857-61	1829-57	1857-61
Up to 3.66 (12 ft.)	- 1.22	+ 32.00	- 7.01	- 28.96
4.57-5.48 (15-18 ft.)	- 11.02	+ 22.10		
7.32-9.14 (24-30 ft.)	- 31.70	- 18.29	- 26.36	- 12.95

1. The figures are based on surveys made over distances up to 1.52 km. (5000 ft.) north and south of the outfall.

Source: C. A. Hartley 1873.

Thus the provisional works gave a depth of at least 1.2 m. more than had been anticipated and their undoubted success was crucial in the Commission's decision to adopt the Sulina arm as the sole navigable channel. The decision was reinforced by the difficulty in raising sufficient funds for the Sf. Gheorghe works. The only problem was the risk that over the years Sulina might be absorbed by the relatively rapid extension of the delta associated with the Chilia arm, but it was recognised that the danger could be avoided if necessary by closing the southernmost (Stambul) entrance to the Chilia arm⁴⁵. What was called for now was a strengthening of the Sulina piers to make the installations permanent. In 1866 the Commission accepted Hartley's proposal to convert the piers into solid structures, but work did not start for two years until a loan was arranged and then three years were required to complete it. It was very convenient that the initial work was of a type that was suitable as base for consolidation and Hartley expressed the view that a more satisfactory arrangement could not have been contrived had the Commission decided on Sulina alone from the start. The impro-

(17.1 m.), a total extension of 335.3 m. The original north pier was 1413.7 m. as built between 1858 and 1861 (consolidated 1866-70). The south pier was 914.4 m. long when built between 1858 and 1861, but only 516.9 m. was consolidated (between 1866 and 1871) because 397.5 m. became incorporated into the south bank through the deposition of sediment. There was however a prolongation of the south pier in 1869 by 139.3 m. (reducing the overlap between the two piers from 185.0 m. to 45.7 m.) and further extensions in 1876-7 (consolidated 1885-6) eliminated this overlap altogether. See C. H. L. Kuhl, *The Sulina Mouth of the Danube, Minutes of Proceedings, Institution of Civil Engineers*, 91, 1888, 329-33.

⁴⁵ Between 1856 and 1894 the annual advance of the Chilia delta was shown to be 120 m. for the Oceacov channel, 76 m. for the New Stambul and 27 m. for the Old Stambul, compared with 18 m. for Sulina and 21 m. for Sf. Gheorghe. The more rapid growth of the Chilia delta (especially the Oceacov sector) was related to sediment load combined with particularly gentle slopes on the sea bed. It was forecast that the Sulina outfall would be incorporated into the Chilia delta after 175 years. See L. F. Vernon-Harcourt, *The Survey of the Danube Delta in 1894, Minutes of Proceedings, Institution of Civil Engineers*, 122, 1895, 336-42.

Table 2

Shipping at

	1855-64 ⁽¹⁾				1865-74				1875-81		
	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C
Austria—											
Hungary	192	0.22	42.6	11.3	173	0.35	60.6	11.9	99	0.46	45.8
France	34	0.17	5.8	1.5	26	0.51	13.3	2.6	48	0.84	40.4
Germany	59	0.20	12.0	3.2	23	0.39	8.9	1.8	6	0.82	4.9
Great Britain	247	0.25	62.9	16.6	339	0.44	148.9	29.3	448	0.92	110.1
Greece	1 175	0.12	146.1	38.6	780	0.15	119.9	23.6	483	0.20	97.9
Italy	226	0.19	42.4	11.2	249	0.35	86.6	17.1	40	0.33	13.1
Romania	120	0.09	10.4	2.8	45	0.13	5.9	1.2	15	0.16	2.4
Russia	50	0.01	0.7	0.2	90	0.16	14.1	2.8	63	0.19	12.2
Turkey	445	0.09	41.2	10.9	509	0.08	43.2	8.5	381	0.09	33.7
Others	107	0.13	14.4	3.8	29	0.21	6.1	1.2	16	0.53	8.5
Total ⁽²⁾	2 655	0.11	378.5	100.0	2 263	0.22	507.5	100.0	1 599	0.42	669.0
Sailing ships	2 676	0.15	392.9	89.7	1 999	0.18	361.4	68.5	928	0.15	141.2
Steam ships	166	0.27	45.1	10.3	355	0.47	166.5	31.5	675	0.80	542.3
Total ⁽²⁾	2 842	0.15	438.0	100.0	2 354	0.22	527.9	100.0	1 603	0.43	683.6

A. Average annual number of ships passing

B. Average tonnage (registered)

C. Total tonnage (registered)

D. Percentage of total tonnage

vised plan turned out to be perfect with "the construction in the first instance with great rapidity of simple training works of timber and stone, such as the nearest forests and quarries produced, and then with consolidation later on with concrete when the stone work had been beaten down to its ultimate level by the action of the waves"⁴⁶.

The works proved to be extremely successful and ensured a gradual increase in minimum depth past the turn of the century, reaching an estimated 7.0 m. in 1911⁴⁷.

However of the 46.7 million francs spent by the E.C.D. between 1856 and 1907 only 12.3 million were spent on the outfall. Very important works were carried out along the entire length of the Sulina arm to straighten the channel and increase its depth⁴⁸. And where the river spread out too much there were training works to restrict its width to 122 m. (400 ft.) in the upper part and 183 m. (600 ft.) in the lower. It was the cost of such im-

⁴⁶ C. A. Hartley, 1873, 208.

⁴⁷ Figures of 3.43 for 1861-70, 4.03 for 1871-80, 4.65 for 1881-90 and 5.29 for 1891-1900 are given by C. I. Băicoianu, *Le Danube: aperçu historique, économique et politique* (Paris, 1917) 117.

⁴⁸ Information is given in the Commission's atlases: *C.E.D.: plans comparatifs de l'embouchure et des sections fluviales du bras de Soulina* published in Leipzig by F. A. Brockhaus in 1867 (by C. A. Hartley), 1874, (C. A. Hartley and C. H. L. Kuhl) and 1887 (ditto). See also V. Bey, *Notice sur les travaux d'amélioration de l'embouchure du Danube et du bras de Soulina 1857-91*, (Paris, 1893); C. Rosetti and F. Rey, eds., *La Commission Européenne du Danube et son oeuvre de 1856 à 1931* (Paris, 1931); D. A. Sturdza, *Les travaux de la commission européenne de la boucle du Danube 1859-1911*, (Vienna, 1913).

Sulina 1855–1914

D	1855–91				1895–1901				1905–14			
	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
6.8	96	0.78	74.4	5.5	114	1.47	167.5	10.4	141	2.07	292.1	15.3
6.0	46	1.17	54.0	4.0	25	1.31	32.7	2.0	23	1.76	40.5	2.1
0.7	19	1.02	19.5	1.4	30	1.06	31.9	2.0	25	2.04	51.0	2.7
61.3	732	1.25	911.6	66.9	150	1.70	763.1	47.3	346	2.25	780.1	40.8
14.6	255	0.61	151.6	11.4	238	1.27	303.0	18.8	256	1.65	423.1	22.1
2.0	45	0.89	40.0	2.9	81	1.40	113.4	7.0	72	1.59	114.4	6.0
0.4	3	0.16	0.5	*	38	1.03	39.2	2.4	35	1.55	54.3	2.8
1.8	86	0.35	29.8	2.2	126	0.48	60.0	3.7	47	0.82	38.4	2.0
5.0	361	0.19	68.7	5.0	226	0.26	58.2	3.6	111	0.35	39.0	2.0
1.3	9	1.01	9.1	0.7	36	1.23	44.3	2.7	55	1.43	78.9	4.1
100.0	1 652	0.82	1 362.0	100.0	1 361	1.18	1 613.3	100.0	1 111	1.72	1 911.8	100.0
20.7	517	0.17	90.1	6.5	273	0.22	58.9	3.6	98	0.23	22.9	1.2
79.3	1 156	1.12	1 294.7	93.5	1 091	1.43	1 560.0	96.3	1 017	1.86	1 896.3	98.8
100.0	1 673	0.83	1 384.8	100.0	1 361	1.19	1 619.0	100.0	1 115	1.72	1 919.2	100.0

1. 1856–61 for nationality table

2. There are unexplained discrepancies between the two totals in Baicoianu's figures.

Source: C. I. Baicoianu 1917, 262–5.

provements that had led Hartley to advocate the Sf. Gheorghe channel as being the more rewarding option in the long run and it is very likely therefore that a short-term advantage in favour of Sulina was very quickly lost in the Sulina shoals which, Hartley recognised, could only be removed with “great expense, uncertainty and loss of time”.⁴⁹ Shoals were a constant headache to the Commission because banks of up to one meter could develop unpredictably during a single day while any ships that were grounded immediately attracted deposits. The shoals at Batmiche-Kavac were removed by groynes during 1861–2 while the difficult Argagnis section was improved by dredging and training works between 1858 and 1863. But the work continued long after Hartley had ceased to be chief engineer. Training works were undertaken at sixteen different places during the 1870s and 1880s and in many cases the investment was largely wasted through subsequent decisions to build entirely new canals to straighten and shorten the river course (Figure 1 c).

The first such canal was built in 1868–9 on a particularly tortuous section of the famous “Great M” which justified the claim that “three quarters of the compass was passed through in proceeding down to Sulina”⁵⁰. A cut of just 580 m. (widened in 1874–5) achieved a shortening of 1.77 km. But the upper part of the Sulina channel was still very tortuous and the new chief engineer C.H.L. Kuhl remarked in 1881 that “there is ample

⁴⁹ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 303.

⁵⁰ C. A. Hartley, 1973, 229.

room for improving it by cuts for shortening and straightening the course by suppressing sharp bends which, as steamers navigating the river increase in size and number, become more and more objectionable"⁵¹. During the 1880s however the entry into the Sulina Channel at the junction with the Sf. Gheorghe was improved and an artificial cut of 945 m. brought a shortening of the total length of 885 m. (1880—2), followed by attention to the sections at Papadia (1883—4), Argagnis (1885—6) and Masourale (1888—9). A further improvement was made at Argagnis (1897—8), but the final developments were crowned by "second generation" canals at Papadia (1894—7) and Great M (1890—1902) which cut off earlier cut-offs as well as winding sections of the natural channel⁵². Significantly the loop at Tulcea was not modified because this would have undermined the commercial life of the town but even so there was, altogether, a shortening of the Sulina channel from 83.8 to 62.6 km. The straightening of the channel and the recession of the banks due to the wave action created by shipping has meant that the share of Danube discharge using the Sulina has increased from 7.0 percent in 1856 to 17.0 in 1970⁵³. Considerable festivities were a fitting climax to the work in 1902 when Prince Ferdinand and Princess Marie sailed down the new canal to Sulina accompanied by six men of war representing the naval presence maintained by commission members. But in wining and dining their royal guests at a Sulina banquet the commissioners may well have reflected that the series of *ad hoc* works carried out to provide a straight six meter channel (involving a total volume of 25 million cubic meters of material) were far more costly than measures on the Sf. Gheorghe channel to reach a similar standard.

Any such thought could however be assuaged by the reality of the E.C.D.'s success in accommodating increasing volumes of shipping⁵⁴. The first, provisional works were followed by an increase in the number and capacity of vessels entering the river. In 1869, 2881 vessels were recorded at Sulina with a combined registered tonnage of 677,000. This meant a sixteen percent increase in numbers over 1853 and a doubling of average tonnage. The payment of tolls was more than compensated for by the elimination of the lightering system and falling insurance costs as the number of wrecks was reduced: the incidence of wrecks declined sharply from 3.9 per thousand ships in 1855—60 to only 0.8 in 1861—9 and 0.2 in the early 1870s⁵⁵. The number of ships using the Danube declined during the

⁵¹ C.H.L. Kuhl, *Dredging on the Lower Danube, Minutes of Proceedings Institution of Civil Engineers*, 65, 1881, 266—70.

⁵² For details of further canal building in the delta see Gr. Antipa, *Les recherches hydrobiologiques et leurs applications pratiques en Roumanie, Connaissance de la terre et de la pensée roumaine*, 6, 197—242. A summary appears in D. Turnock, *Water Management Problems, in Romania, Geojournal*, 3, 1979, 609—22.

⁵³ 7.2 in 1893, 9.0 in 1905, 12.0 in 1921, and 15.6 in 1943. The figure of 17.0 for 1970, compares with 20.0 for Sf. Gheorghe and 63.0 for Chilia. I. Ujvari, *Geografia apelor României* (București, 1972), 193. See also H. Grumăzescu et al., *Harta fizico-geografică a Deltei Dunării, Studii și cercetări*: Geografie, 11, 1964, 35—52; I. Ujvári, *The Hydrologic Regime of the Danube, Revue Roumaine: Géographie*, 8, 1964, 65—9.

⁵⁴ V. Jinga, *Principii și orientări ale comerțului exterior al României 1859—1916*, (Cluj-Napoca, 1975); B. Marinescu, *Aspects of Economic Relations Between Roumania and Great Britain, 1862—1866, Revue Roumaine d'Histoire*, 18, 1979, 773—83.

⁵⁵ Freight rates per ton of cereals from the Danube to the U.K. and northern Europe fell from L.2.2¹ in 1856—60 to 50 p. in 1897—1905 (and at times as low as 32 p.): L. A. Maher, 1968, 184.

1890s but total tonnage continued to rise, averaging 1.9 million during the decade 1905—14. This in turn meant an average tonnage of 1720 for each of the 1115 annual shipping movements recorded (Table 2). British shipping was still prominent, with an average share of 40.8 percent of the tonnage in 1905—14 (though it had been 66.9 percent between 1885 and 1894), followed by Greece (22.1 percent) and Austria-Hungary (15.3). The Romanian share was small at 2.8 percent but the total tonnage of 54.3 thousand tons represents very important progress over the 1880s and reflects the establishment of national merchant shipping companies such as Service Maritime Roumain. The figures do not of course take account of Romania's river shipping upstream to Regensburg (by Navigația Fluvială Română) which developed after the 1895 accord with Suddesdamschiffahrtsgesellschaft. Romanian investments in port facilities (especially dock enlargements at Galați and Brăila, along with a naval dockyard at the former) complemented the E.C.D. docks and shipyard at Sulina (to say nothing of the other contributions to local infrastructure including telegraph communications, medical services, electric lighting, churches and local roads)⁵⁶.

PROGRESS AT CONSTANȚA

This expansion of commerce on the Danube was not the only expression of Romania's developing maritime commerce however. Constanța emerged yet again as a rival to the delta. The Austrians made some use of the Cernavodă—Constanța route in the years before the Crimean War in order to avoid the difficulties arising from Russian control of the delta. But D. Urquhart reported that the option was eventually rejected because of the poor facilities at Constanța and the difficulty of handling passengers and cargo in rough weather. Urquhart observed that "were the port improved... the steam trade might emancipate itself from the thralldom of Russia by perfecting this line, but it would never be suitable for general commerce"⁵⁷. He would certainly be amazed to see Constanța today, heading for a capacity of 60 million tons. The Cernavodă—Constanța railway project which had a bearing on the selection of the Sulina branch for improvement in 1859 was in fact opened in 1860⁵⁸. The concession was granted to the British Danube-Black Sea Railway Company in 1857 and construction began a year later. Hartley was requested by the E.C.D. to make a survey of the likely impact of the railway and he concluded, correctly, that in terms of both capacity and cost the river route would be competitive. The railway would not be capable of carrying all the present cereal export let alone the future grain traffic (which he reckoned could be as much as four to five times the current level). The railway technology was certainly adequate for the task but capital investment was inadequate to build a really efficient line and the access to Constanța harbour was particularly unsatisfactory as the

⁵⁶ D. Bugă, *Romania's Port Towns on the Danube in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, *Revue Roumaine : Géographie*, 12, 1968, 143—7.

⁵⁷ D. Urquhart, 1851, 385.

⁵⁸ J. H. Jensen and G. Rosegger, *British Railway Builders along the Lower Danube, 1856—1869*, *Slavonic and East European Review*, 46, 1968, 105—28.

line zig-zagged down the face of the bluffs — a technique adequate for a mineral railway but hardly for a main line carrying heavy freight.

The railway was also an economic failure and when the Romanian government purchased the line in 1882 it had to take over a debt of some £ 113,000 owing to the Ottoman authorities. The Romanian takeover was part of a project by the newly independent state to establish a port independent of the E.C.D. In 1882 Sir Charles Hartley was asked to draw up plans and although his suggestions were modified extensively his association with the project is quite clear. It seems that changes were made in the light of experience at other European ports and work began in 1896 by the French company Adrien Hallier in association with the Romanian Ministry of Public Works under I. B. Cantacuzino. The Hallier connection was quickly terminated however and the Romanians assumed full control. Further modifications were made by Gh. Duca and A. Saligny in 1898—9 and the port opened in 1909⁵⁹. Meanwhile the railway was being realigned with transformation at either end: at Cernavodă the Carol I bridge designed by Anghel Saligny and built between 1890 and 1895 gave contact with a railway built from Bucureşti to Feteşti, while at Constanţa the railway was taken down through a tunnel from the plateau surface down to sea level thereby eliminating the zig-zags which had so complicated operations on the original railway. The entire railway was complete in 1912. It is evident that Sir Charles Hartley advised on the tunnel in the light of his knowledge of tunnelling work on other parts of the European railway system. Thus, although he was acting only in a consultative capacity Hartley does have a role in the development of a second major avenue of overseas commerce.

The railway and harbour project for Constanţa is remarkable bearing in mind the limited resources of the Romanian state at the time. It is not surprising that the period of construction was long drawn out. What is surprising, considering the distinctly hesitant approach to railway building in the inter-war period, is the determination to persevere with the plan even though Romanian commerce did not really need it at the time⁶⁰. Cereal exports through Constanţa did not seriously threaten Brăila's importance and was essentially as an oil port (connected by pipeline as well as railway with Ploieşti) that Constanţa developed its trade rapidly during the 1930s after a slow recovery during the 1920s to the pre-war capacity. It has been demonstrated that 'considerations of economic feasibility were clearly overridden by technological and political ambition' for Constanţa was a symbol of Romania's independence and the technical vanity of project leaders may have led them to advocate a large scale approach⁶¹. Unfortunately resources could not sustain a rapid rate of progress and the vested interests of the trading community and the E.C.D. made it difficult to divert existing traffic from the Danube route. Yet the maintenance of a high level of primary ex-

⁵⁹ J. H. Jensen and G. Rosegger, *Transferring Technology to a Peripheral Economy: The Case of the Lower Danube Transport Development 1856—1928, Technology and Culture*, 19, 1978, 675—702.

⁶⁰ D. Turnock, *The Romanian Railway Debate: A Theme in Political Geography, Journal of Transport History*, 5, 1979, 105—21.

⁶¹ J. H. Jensen and G. Rosegger, 1978, 701.

porting in the years leading up to the First World War and the lack of any realistic alternative to Constanța to challenge the delta route (not to mention the beginning of a high-class tourist industry on the Black Sea coast) all served to maintain interest in what has over the long term proved to be a tremendous asset to Romania. It stands in sharp contrast to the Danube route in building optimistically for the future rather than short term cost-benefit considerations, and in reflecting a vibrant national interest in distinction to a more sedate international consensus. Modern technology served two quite different political expressions and Sir Charles Hartley brought his engineering skills to both of them.

CONCLUSION

Sir Charles Hartley has won widespread recognition in both Britain and Romania for contribution to the development of the Danube⁶². It would be wrong to argue that he could be regarded as a major force in the critical decisions that were taken to open up certain new lines of communication during the second half of the nineteenth century. But it is arguable that he made a significant contribution to the success of these projects by offering realistic advice and showing personal qualities which allowed his recommendations to be taken seriously. Hartley may not have been an important innovator but he did take the trouble to acquaint himself with essential evidence, travelling widely to study the impact of many major engineering works. In the case of the Danube he carried out his own surveys and satisfied himself that improvements to the Sf. Gheorghe branch would be most desirable. He merely reached the same conclusion of Captain Spratt whose work just before the Crimean War had pointed to this branch as the one where investment would be most rewarding. But a very substantial case was made and this impressed the International Technical Commission. And although required by short-term financial considerations to examine the Sulina outfall he produced a feasible plan (backed up by experience of river estuaries in other parts of Europe which he had visited) which turned out to be so successful that the Sf. Gheorghe option was never revived. It was claimed by one of the discussion following his paper of 1862 to the Institution for Civil Engineers that the provisional works were considered extremely successful by all classes in Moldavia and that these beneficial results were due principally to "the constant devotion and to the talent and ability displayed by Mr. Hartley during their construction"⁶³. His skill as an engineer was evidently complemented very fully by a gift for diplomacy which enabled him to develop solid working relationships with people who were initially prejudiced against him. Although the Technical Commission of the E.C.D. accepted a British engineer in 1857 on the recommendation of Sir John Stokes, the British commissioner, Hartley's position was initially an uncomfortable one in view of the numerous plans and recommendations which conflicted with his own views and threatened to undermine his cre-

⁶² Gh. Niculescu et al., *Geografia Văii Dunării românești* (București, 1969) 15.

⁶³ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 294.

dibility in the eyes of some members of the Commission. But he overcame the pressure on him to make a premature report and within two years won over the delegates by his ability and modesty. Stokes claimed that "during his long sojourn on the Danube he (Sir Charles Hartley) had by his high integrity, strict justice and delicate sense of humour gained the esteem and affection of everyone with whom he had been brought in contact"⁶⁴. And this winning combination was no less effective over the Romanian monarchy and government so that Sir Charles was involved in a consultative capacity over the various ramifications of the Constanța project. The draft of these remarks would suggest that a less methodical and sensitive engineer might have been less successful at Sulina in the crucial years of the late 1850s and led to the whole Danube question being reopened. In this case it is interesting to speculate what would have been effect of a demoralising failure. Would Sulina have been abandoned in favour of Sf. Gheorghe or would the will of the powers to unlock the Danube have cracked and diverted more attention to the Cernavodă—Constanța railway project?

However perhaps such scenarios are less important than the gaps that remain in our knowledge of what actually happened. Examination of the literature suggests that there are some outstanding questions relating to both the delta and Constanța. In the case of the former it might first be asked whether the powers ever appreciated the scope for the improvement of the Cernavodă—Constanța route in preference to the delta in 1856? Presumably the myth that the problems at Sulina were all the fault of the Russians (through the operation of quarantine regulations and neglect of Turkish methods to maintain adequate depth over the bar) made it appear obvious that an international commission would have immediate success in the delta. Hence the E.C.D. never considered the Constanța—Cernavodă route and instead entertained the hopelessly unrealistic notion of work at Sulina being completed within two years. The lengthy discussions which led to Sulina being preferred to Sf. Gheorghe in 1858 have been quite fully examined but much less has been said about the decision to carry out the consolidation works at Sulina in 1866. Nevertheless there is conflicting evidence on the extent to which the decision over preliminary works was expected to be permanent. L. A. Maher writes of the "sincer belief that the Sulina project would prove successful sooner and at lower cost"⁶⁵. Yet Sir Charles makes it quite clear in his report that the first work at Sulina did not prejudice the decision over further investment. He hoped that means would be found "to complete works of a definitive character at the Sf. Gheorghe entrance"⁶⁶. Was there any real attempt to reopen the argument in favour of Sf. Gheorghe, or was the undoubted success of the provisional works at Sulina so outstanding that no other decision could be contemplated — especially with the strong Russian opposition to Sf. Gheorghe and the immediate financial implications of the latter which were particularly worrying to Turkey. It appears that Stokes continued to champion the Sf. Gheorghe route on the grounds that the clearly viable strategy adopted at Sulina would bring even greater benefits when applied to the other river. Presumably there was some strong argu-

⁶⁴ C. A. Hartley, 1873, 253.

⁶⁵ L. A. Maher, 1968, 55.

⁶⁶ C. A. Hartley, 1862, 303.

ment on the subject until the initiative foundered over Russian and Turkish objections in 1865. However the consolidation works at Sulina did commit the E.C.D. irrevocably to the Sulina channel and involved heavy investment during the rest of the century in straightening the river and improving access for steam-powered vessels.

The Constanța angle of the story also has its intriguing aspects. It is clear that the first railway project suffered from inadequate economic and political backing. The Romanians (Moldo-Wallachians) could not act at this time with all the freedom of an independent state and were in any case constrained by the fact that Dobrogea was not then part of their territory. They had access to the Black Sea in South Bessarabia and it is interesting to note that Sir Charles Hartley was approached by Prince Cuza on the subject of a port to be built in this area independent of the E.C.D. Hartley reported that the Oceacov mouth of the Chilia arm was the best place for development, for the bay to the north (Jibreni) was shallow and also unprotected to the north and northeast. But the political argument was evidently strong enough for this advice to be overruled in favour of a site away from the delta, although there would have been E.C.D. control of the approach (along the Chilia arm, with a canal from Vilkov). The project disappeared with the coup which removed Prince Cuza from power but it is an interesting introduction to the Constanța plan which is really the equivalent to Jibreni under the new territorial situation after the Congress of Berlin when the Romanians, much to their initial chagrin, received Dobrogea in compensation for South Bessarabia which was incorporated to Russian administration. There is much that remains unclear about the Constanța scheme. A fascinating point must be the involvement of Sir Charles Hartley in two competing developments. The Romanians were no doubt glad of his expertise, but what must the E.C.D. have thought about their former chief engineer assisting in a project that threatened their revenue? It is clear that the E.C.D. did allow Sir Charles to take on various commissions even while he was working as chief engineer, but since the first railway to Constanța apparently caused so much alarm to the Commission (and exerted some influence on the decision to reject the Sf. Gheorghe option) their perception of the Romanians' intentions for Constanța is potentially interesting.

So is there any link between the progress in developing Constanța and the progressive improvements made to the Sulina channel during the 1880s and 1890s? It is arguable that since some of the earlier work on deepening the shoals was not entirely successful, and because steamships of increasing tonnage were seeking access to Brăila, that the bypassing of the "Great M" would have been achieved anyway, especially with the income from tolls providing the necessary finance. But the Commission could not be sure that the Romanian government would not use its influence to have the state railways introduce concessionary rates to benefit Constanța against Brăila and the possibility of a sense of competition as a spur to improvement surely cannot be rejected. Related to all this is the question of Romanian attitudes to the E.C.D. and the strength of feeling against an international authority having jurisdiction on Romanian territory. The situation must have been seen as an affront to national pride, especially in view of the exclusion of a Romanian representative from full membership of the London Conference of 1883, the decisions of which Romania naturally refused to recognise. Yet the country

did benefit from the enhanced commercial prospects and also from the stabilisation of Danube frontiers against further Russian encroachment. L. A. Maher therefore claims that there was genuine appreciation of the Commission's work⁶⁷. Public opinion naturally wanted Romanian control of the delta, but it would seem that compromises were reached on the most sensitive issues and that the E.C.D. took a pragmatic view towards Romania's sensibilities as indeed they did towards Russian claims for sovereignty over the Chilia channel⁶⁸. Just how powerful therefore was the political pressure behind the Constanța project, seen as a means of developing a port independent of the Commission? Obviously the whole decision-making environment for this long-term investment must have been extremely complex but any new insights would be helpful.

The final point must be an acknowledgement that the First World War did not bring and end to the development of the Constanța and Sulina routes. Constanța had not built up to the planned capacity (quite apart from problems of war damage) while Vintilă Brătianu, writing a foreword to C. I. Băicoianu's book on the Danube, envisaged improvements to the tributaries of the Danube, and better facilities for railway-river interchange, especially with regard to the problem of winter freeze (at that time not even Tulcea, let alone Sulina, had a railway link)⁶⁹. He also mentioned the need for a Danube-Black Sea Canal. There was a sharp fall in cereal exports after the First World War but the promise of greater oil shipments and the potential role of Romanian ports for commerce between Eastern Europe and the Middle East helped to maintain momentum⁷⁰. Plans for great improvements to inland waterways, including a Danube-Black Sea Canal, were not implemented before the war and immediate post-war efforts were not brought to a successful conclusion⁷¹. But the extremely rapid growth of trade over the last twenty years, coupled with heavy investments in industrial projects on the Lower Danube has created a powerful stimulus for the further extension of Constanța and the construction of the canal⁷². Meanwhile the Sulina channel has been maintained as a prominent element in Romanian shipping⁷³. At the

⁶⁷ L. A. Maher, 1968, 170–84.

⁶⁸ For example, N. Iorga, *Cestiunea Dunării* (Vălenii de Munte, 1908); M. Kogălniceanu, *Cestiunea Dunării* (București, 1882); Similar concern was expressed after 1918: E. P. Botez, *Canalul Dunărești* (București, 1911); V. Brătianu, *Cestiunea Dunării* (București, 1920); N. Dascăl, *Dunărea noastră* (București, 1927); Gh. Popescu, *L'internationalisation des fleuves navigables: le Danube et la Roumanie* (Paris, 1920).

⁶⁹ C. I. Băicoianu, 1917, XI–XII.

⁷⁰ S. Mehedinți, *La situation Géographique de la Roumanie, L'économiste roumain*, 3, 1927, 33.

⁷¹ G. Kish, T. V. A. on the Danube, *Géographical Review*, 37, 1947, 274–302; N. Pompiliu, *Canalul Cernavodă—Constanța și o nouă mare pentru România*, *Buletinul societății de geografie*, 57, 1938, 151–63; K. A. Sinnhuber, *Inland Waterway Projects in East Central Europe*, *Géography*, 40, 1955, 269–71; N. Spulber, *The Danube—Black Sea Canal and Russian Control over the Danube*, *Economic Géography*, 30, 1954, 236–45.

⁷² E. Dăgănescu, *Porturile maritime și fluvial-maritime românești*, *Terra*, 5 (6), 1973, 3–16; B. Zotta, *Contribuții privitoare la portul Constanța*, *Comunicări de geografie*, 8, 1969, 129–38; B. Zotta, *Lucrările de modernizare și extindere a portului Constanța*, *Terra*, 3 (4), 1971, 47–52.

⁷³ Gh. Niculescu et al. 1969, 242–54; C. Stan and A. Ghenovici, *River and Sea Transport in the Brăila—Sulina Section of the Danube*, *Revue Roumaine: Géographie*, 8, 1964, 45–50. See also *Atlasul României*, plate XII–5.

same time complex development of the delta which has transformed the landscape and settlement pattern of the last century⁷⁴. There is little doubt that over the years Constanța has become the main focus of Romanian merchant shipping and the completion of the canal and the enlarged port of Constanța Sud-Agigea will tilt the balance still further away from the delta but this is merely the latest stage in the continuing relationship between the two routes and the plans for a free port at Sulina might suggest that the delta will have a role to play as the Danube's linkage with the Main and Rhine opens a new chapter in navigation on the river⁷⁵. However some experts believe that the Sulina river is approaching a crisis. Not only has a progressive lengthening of the jetties become necessary but the problems of silting offshore, on account of the encroachment of the Chilia delta, may eventually lead to the closure of the entrance altogether⁷⁶. A new shipping lane will therefore have to be opened up because the capacity of the Danube-Black Sea Canal will not be great enough to handle all the traffic. It is interesting to note that the problem was anticipated by Sir Charles Hartley and that the solution of improving the Sf. Gheorghe channel may eventually be adopted — more than a century after it was first seriously proposed.

⁷⁴ I. Băcănaru, *Etablissements ruraux du Delta du Danube*, *Revue Roumaine: Géographie*, 8, 1964, 27—31; I. Băcănaru, *La systématisation des localités du Delta danubien*, *Ibid.*, 11, 1967, 79—90; I. Velcea and G. Iacob, *Types of Land Use in the Danube Delta*, *Ibid.*, 8, 1964, 239—44; E. E. Vespreamanu, *Evaluation of the Present State of the Danube Delta Land Region*, *Ibid.*, 24, 1980, 47—52.

⁷⁵ G. Korompai, *The Effects of the Europa Canal Rhine-Main-Danube*, *GeoJournal*, 1 (2), 1977, 33—44; G. G. Weigend, *The Danube River: An Emerging Regional Bond*, *Geoforum*, 6, 1975, 151—61.

⁷⁶ P. Coteș, *Geomorfologia României* (București, 1973) 153.






Figure 1 Shipping routes from Dobrogea A. General location map B. The piers built at Sulina C. Improvements to the Sulina river. Notes: 1. Regarding Map B it should be noted that there were further landward extensions of the northern pier in 1873, 1876 and 1883 involving a total length of 123.8 m. There was also a seaward extension of the south pier in 1876-7 (consolidated 1885-6) which eliminated the north pier overlap. 2. Regarding Map C the names of sections where river bank consolidation works took place were: 1. 43-44 Millaire (consolidated 1878-86); 2. Argagnis (1872-6); 3. Petits Argagnis (1882-5); 4. Masourale (1879-86); 5. Veniko (1873-86); 6. Tchobangirla (1872-85); 7. Monodendri (1875-9); 8. Kaloayros (1883-5); 9. Gorgova (1880-5); 10. Austria Superieur (1876-86); 11. Austria Inferieur (1873-8); 12. 'M' (1874-6); 13. Batmiche Kavac Superieur (1886-7); 14. Batmiche Kavac Inferieur (1884-6); 15. Tchamourli (1885-6).




Figure 2 Sir Charles Augustus Hartley K.C.M.G. 1825—1915. The picture, was taken in 1906 when Sir Charles was aged 81, was kindly made available by Mr. C.W.S. Hartley.



Figure 3 The European Commission of the Danube in 1871. From left to right: Senor Berio (Italy); Sir Charles Hartley (Engineer in Chief), Herr de Radowitz (Germany), Baron Zulauf Pottenburg (Austria—Hungary), Ismail Bey (Turkey), Lt. Col. Stokes (United Kingdom), Herr Mobler (Secretary General), Baron d'Offenburg (Russia). The picture was kindly made available by Mr. C.W.S. Hartley.

STRUCTURAL AND QUALITATIVE CHANGES CONCERNING THE BRITISH-ROMANIAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS DURING THE MODERN AND CONTEMPORANEOUS AGES

BY

GHEORGHE DOBRE

We intend to treat so pretentious an item as that mentioned in the title for some peculiar reasons.

The first one would be that, through the study of the trading structures, we wish to point out the strength and the richness of the content of these traditions, into one among the most interesting realms pertaining to the history of the British-Romanian relations, namely, the commercial realm.

A second one was that, by such a study, we could be able to put into stronger light the fact that the *traditions* under scrutiny have more and more *enriched themselves*, as time passed ; and that they get new *dimensions* and *significations*, in conformity with both the historical evolution and the present and actual development, in the prospect of the economic grounds of both our countries.

Unquestionably, in the limited space allowed to us, we are only able to emphasize some aspects and moments which seem to have been of a peculiar importance.

If inquiring, even in a quite compendious way, about the structural and qualitative changes which occurred into the framework of the British-Romanian trading relations, in the period, say, beginning with the obtaining of Romania's political independence (1877), up to nowadays, we are able to distinguish at least three main under-periods, each of them corresponding to three important changes :

1. During the first under-period — comprised, roughly, between the obtaining of Romania's independence and the eve of the First World War, Romanian economy found itself under the influence of a twofold innovating process : on the one hand, under the influence of the striving — of a national amplitude — aiming at consolidating the political independence conquered in 1877, through obtaining, too, an economic independence ; on the other hand, under the influence of the evolution towards now economic structures, by the beginning of the creation and the development of an autochthonous industry, a national one, consisting of Romanian factories. Unquestionably, such a process was not lacking a lot of previous experiments before 1877 ; and it was not to close itself after the end of the First World War. But its influence upon the growth of Romanian economy began to be strongly felt, precisely during this underperiod. Of course, the inequalities attested by the development and the structure of such a process have been very important.

A telling evidence of such an occurrence was, for instance, the fact that Romania's national income grew, between 1862 and 1911, at an average

rate of 1,6% *per annum*; nevertheless, if we take the period from 1862 to 1899/1901, the rhythm had been of 1,2% *per annum*, while from 1899/1911 up to 1911 it had been of 3,1%, which was 2,5 times higher¹.

The foreign trade contributed heavily to such a growth. We may take into account, for instance, the fact that, between 1862 and 1911, the yearly growth of Romanian external trade was 2,2%. But this rhythm, from 1862 to 1899/1902, was of a value of only 0,8% *per annum*, while from 1899/1901 to 1911 it was to register an average value of 7,7% *per annum*.

England occupied a first-rank place in the framework of Roumanian trading relations during this period. During the under-period mentioned above, England vied with Austria-Hungary, France and Germany for the front-rank in Romanian foreign trade².

The following table offers some useful available evidence concerning England's changing place in Roumania's foreign trade :

Table 1

England's position in the Foreign Trade of Roumania, from 1875 to 1914
(periods of five years)³

The years (average data every fifth year)	Import	Export	On the whole
1874 to 1879	II	II	II
1880 to 1884	II	I	II
1885 to 1889	I	I	I
1890 to 1894	II	I	I
1895 to 1899	III	I	II
1900 to 1904	III	II	III
1905 to 1909	III	II	III
1910 to 1914	III	III	III

We may thus notice that, for the importing trade of Roumania, Britain held the first rank from 1885 to 1889; and that during the following years, between 1875 and 1894, she situated herself on the second rank and, then, up to 1914, on the third one. In exchange, as concerns Roumania's exportations, England obtained only during one period, namely from 1910 to 1914, the third rank; she ranged herself on the second rank, three times (from 1875

¹ *Indicatorii ai evoluției economiei românești, 1860—1938* by Gh. Dobre, in „Studii și cercetări economice, Sinteze”, 2nd vol., Nr. 69 (Bucharest, 1980), 381 and fol.

² C. I. Băicoianu, *Istoria politicii comerciale și vamale a României*, 2 volumes, (Bucharest, 1904); N. Xenopol, *La Richesse de la Roumanie* (Bucharest, 1916); Georges D. Cioriceanu, *La Roumanie économique et ses rapports avec l'étranger, de 1860 à 1913* (Paris, 1928).

³ Presenting the rough annual data contained in the yearly official publication of the Romanian Ministry of Finances: *Comerțul exterior al României pe anul...* (*Romania's Foreign Trade for the Year...*) The synoptical tables published by G. D. Cioriceanu in his work quoted above (note Nr. 2) contain some disappointing inaccuracies. An English reader can usefully consult the yearly absolute primary figures concerning the Romanian external trade with various states in the collection of B. R. Mitchel, *European Historical Statistics* (London, 1975) 491, 496, 552—554; this work was also prepared on the basis of Romanian sources and accounts.

to 1879, from 1900 to 1904 and from 1905 to 1909), and on the first rank four times (from 1880 up to 1899).

A still telling image concerning the evolution of Romanian trading relations with Britain is offered by the data contained in the following table, nr. 2⁴.

Table 2

The evolution of Britain's weight in Roumanian foreign trade, from 1875 to 1914

Index number : 1885-1889 = 100

<i>The years (average values every fifth year)</i>	Import	Export	on the whole
1875-1879	71,0	29,9	40,6
1880-1884	79,8	73,1	67,5
1885-1889	100,0	100,0	100,0
1890-1894	93,3	82,1	77,2
1895-1899	79,8	44,0	53,8
1900-1904	66,7	17,1	31,0
1905-1909	61,9	21,0	32,2
1910-1914	50,0	14,3	24,1

It ensues, thus, that, up to the period comprised between 1885 and 1889, the Romanian trade with England registered important increases; but that, after this period, it began to shrink, up to the period comprised between 1910 and 1914, when it represented, compared with the reference period, only 50% for the import, and only 14,3% for the export, the sum total representing only 24,1%, if compared with the period in which the English trade in Romania had reached its climax.

We must also observe the fact that the inequality reigned not only for the ebbs and flows of import and export, but also concerning the registered variations during the years under scrutiny, concerning the same ebbs and flows.

Under such an aspect, the rate of variability for the whole range of time mentioned above is peculiarly telling, for it represents a value of 20% for the imported wares, while, for the exported ones, the same rate raises up to 65%, the average rate for both export and import reaching the figure of 46%.

Beyond those conjunctural oscillations and fluctuations — which, for its turn, the international trade uses to experience, too, feeling their effects — we find again, in these figures, some deeper influences of a structural nature.

First of all, he have to take into account the very structure of the importations and exportations pertaining to the Romanian trade with Britain. Concerning such a question, some useful elements are furnished to us by the following table⁵.

The variations registered by these figures, as well for the import as for the export, reflect, undoubtedly, some important changes undergone by the trading policy under the geographic aspect. For instance, in the Romanian

⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁵ Among the "textiles" we have also included wool, hair, etc., as well made-up clothes; in the item "metals" are also included engines and machines of every size.

Table 3

The structure of the Romanian trade with England, in the years 1885/1889 and 1910/1914, in % :

Import			Export		
Wares	1885—1889	1910—1914	Wares	1885—1889	1910—1914
Textiles	70	51	Cereals and secondary products	96	68
Metals	12	7	Oil and secondary products	—	27
Fuel (coal)	4	32	Wood, lumber, etc.	—	1
Other products	14	10	Other products	4	4
The sum total	100	100	The sum total	100	100

import of textiles and metals, towards the end of the period under scrutiny, some other countries, such as Germany and France, also began to occupy a main level. On the other hand, Romania's cereals were no longer able to remain in competition with the American ones, and that accounts for the shrinking of Romania's exportations towards Britain⁶. During the second part of the under-period, the exportations of Romanian oil and that of its under-products began to acquire a more and more important weight.

All these variations attested, at the same time, the fact that for all trading relations one has to search for the prominent economic structures in both the countries trading between them, as well as for the trends which were permeating those structures, under the impact of the internal social and economic forces.

A plain image of the trend permeating these structures is available to us from the estimative account which follows :

Thus, in Britain, a pre-eminently industrial country, the weight reached by its industry in her GNP was of 40% and growing, while in Romania, a

Table 4

The weight occupied by industry and agriculture in the Gross National Product and in the National Income of Britain and Romania in some more representative years, in %

Country and years	Industry	Agriculture
Britain (GNP) ⁷ / 1881	40	11
1901	43	7
Romania ⁸ / (National Income)		
1862	4,5	67,7
1899/1901	8,1	61,6
1911	11,6	53,5

⁶ See also I. N. Angelescu, *L'évolution du commerce extérieur de la Roumanie* (Bucharest, 1914).

⁷ B.R. Mitchel, *op. cit.*, 804.

⁸ Our own estimations are published in the *Indicatori...*

country which was just traversing the initial stage of edifying an indigenous industry of a factory pattern, the weight occupied by the industry was very low, as concerning the national income, though it inscribed itself on an ascending line. In exchange, agriculture still occupied a very great weight in Romania's economic life, while in Britain this weight was, on the contrary, very low.

2. A second under-period comprizes what we currently use to term the period between the two World Wars. During this period, Romania's economy evolved under the impulsion of the same innovating trends mentioned above. The great Romanian victory obtained in 1918, through the union of Transylvania with her mother-country Romania, was to more and more accelerate this process, being a cardinal contribution to the improvement of Romania's position.

The world economic system of the 30's threw also down Romania's economy. Nevertheless, this economy possessed great resources, which allowed her to promptly recover from the crisis which had affected it, and thus, on the eve of the outburst of the second World War, Romanian economy reached the highest level of development from the whole economic history of Romania, up to that date.

Some estimative reckonings⁹ show us that, in 1938, Romania's national income was higher by 370% than that registered in 1926, the average yearly rate of its growth having thus been of 2,70%. In contrast with the situation of the years before the outburst of the first World War, Romania's external trade had substantially shrunk its importance concerning Romania's economic growth during this later period. Between the years mentioned above, the volume of Romania's external trade grew, for the export, by only 250%, the rhythm thus registered being of only 1,80% *per annum*, while Romania's export represented only 61,90%, compared with the level reached in 1926; the yearly rhythm of Romania's importations was thus a negative one: — 40%¹⁰.

Table 5

The place occupied by England in Romania's foreign trade, from 1919 to 1938¹¹

The years (average values every fifth year)	Import	Export	on the whole
1919 to 1923	I	III	I
1924 to 1928	IV	III	III
1929 to 1933	II	II	II
1933 to 1938	III	II	II

⁹ We have utilized here the appreciations made by D. Georgescu in the chapter *Venitul Național (National Income)* of the IV-th volume of *Enciclopedia României*. His accounts have been, nevertheless, emended by us, by removing from his reckonings the jobs belonging to unproductive services, including also the so-called income of domestic women. For obtaining the figures of the volume, in order to reckon the respective dynamics, we have made use of a unique deflector: the gross prices, which have been included in the same volume by D. Georgescu himself.

¹⁰ Reckoned on the basis of the indices set up and published by N. Georgescu-Roegen in his study *Un quantum-index pentru comerțul exterior al României* (Bucharest, 1938).

¹¹ Besides the sources mentioned on note 3, we also add: "Buletin trimestrial", Nr. 1—2/1933 of the I.R.C.; *Anuarul statistic al României pe 1939/1940* (Romania's Sta-

Table 6

The evolution of England's weight in Romanian external trade Index number : 1924 - 1928 = 100

The years (average values every fifth years)	Import	Export	on the whole
1919 to 1923	145,0	79,6	139,7
1921 to 1928	100,0	100,0	100,0
1929 to 1933	108,8	184,1	138,5
1931 to 1938	112,1	168,8	139,7

Though Britain herself had been heavily affected by the world crisis of 1929—1933, she, nevertheless, continued to occupy a front-rank in Romania's external trade in the years comprised between the two World Wars. The figures contained in the following table confirm this statement (table 5).

Thus, during the five years following the first World War, England occupied in Romania's importations first place; then, her weight shrinks to the fourth place, for raising anew, during the years of the crisis and after it, the second and then to the third place. As for the exportations, the solution was more steady: during the ten first years following the end of the war, England maintained herself on the third place and, for the following ten years, her position raised to the second one. To begin with the period comprised between 1924 and 1928, England's weight began to maintain itself on an ascendent line, as the following data confirm¹² (table 6).

The variations thus registered must be inscribed in the framework of the same trends also observed during the years on the eve of the first World War, when the rate represented by England's weight in the Romanian importations raised to only 14,6%, while for Romania's exportations England's weight was already 33,3%.

Table 7

The structure of the external trade of Romania to England, from 1931 to 1938 (in %)

Import		Export	
Wares	%	Wares	%
Textiles including wool, hair, etc.)	17,1%	Cereals and their under-products	30,6%
Iron and iron products	9,4%	Mineral fuel	31,0%
Other metals	7,4%	Other wares	38,4%
Engines and machines	11,8%		
Other products	21,6%		
Total	100,0		100,0

tistical Annuary for 1939/1940) and *Comerțul exterior al României pe 1927—1937* (Romania's Foreign Trade for 1927—1937), published under the care of the Romanian National Bank.

¹² Reckoned on the basis of the rough date contained is the works mentioned on note 11.

Under a structural report, Romania's importations from England and exportations to England marked some important shifts when compared with the previous years. The following table (No. 7) contains a noticeable evidence for such a situation ¹³.

As concerning Romania's exportations to England, two groups of products hold some close weights, namely, the cereals and their under-products, and oil with its under-products. Both are now representing weights contrasting with those previously ascribed to them: the first under-group has now a considerably diminished weight in Romania's exportations; the second one moved into a contrary sense, and was considerably higher than previously.

All these trends reflected, undoubtedly, the new shiftings in the structure of Romania's economic life. As concerning these new trends, the following data offer to us some more informations:

Table 8

The weight reached by industry and by agriculture in the total social product and in the national income of Roumania in 1938¹⁴ Reckoned in current prices %

The Index	Industry	Agriculture
Social Product	39,0	30,1
National Income	30,8	38,1

England, for her part, maintained her economic structure reached during the previous century also during the years comprised between the two World Wars. The available accounts reflect the fact that, even during these years, high disparities manifested themselves between the existant possibilities and their inadequate employment. For instance, in the Romanian import of engines and machines, England only participated, from 1934 to 1938, with little more than 7% yearly. English markets also absorbed, during the same years, only 7,4% from the sum total representing Romania's exportations of cereals. As concerning the products of Romania's processing industry, they either could not be purchased in England or, if purchased, they represented only insignificant weights on British markets ¹⁵. Then, the outburst of the second World War will abruptly interrupt British-Romanian relation, up to Romania's liberation in 1944.

3. During the third under-period, which comprises the present years, Romanian economy underwent a deep transformation. The new political structures built by the Romanian Communist Party after the liberation aimed at promoting the chief interests of the Romanian people, and they thus created some propitious conditions for consolidating the independence and the sovereignty of the Romanian state, as well for ensuring an actual economic

¹³ Reckoned according to the works signaled on note 11.

¹⁴ *Anuarul statistic al R. S. România 1980 (The Statistical Year-Book of the Socialist Republic of Romania for 1980)* 92.

¹⁵ Reckoned after the *Anuarul statistic al României pe 1939/1940*.

independence, through the re-shaping of Romanian economy in order to modernize it.

Thus, Romania's national income raised from 1950 to 1979 fourteen times, its average rate of growth being of 9,6% yearly. Only from 1965 to 1979, the increase of Romanian national income was of 340 : 100, the yearly average rhythm of its growth being thus 9,2%.

Simultaneously, Romania's foreign trade amplified itself more and quicker than her national income. Thus, between 1950 and 1979 its total volume was multiplied by 34 (for the importations by 33 and for the exportations by 34), the average yearly rhythm thus registered being of 13% ; between 1965 and 1979, its volume was multiplied by 7, its average yearly rate being of 15%¹⁶.

During this important process of growth, the trading relations between Romania and other countries could diversify themselves, as their geographical area amplified itself. The ground for their settlement have been the very principles to which President Nicolae Ceaușescu has conferred the statute of a corner-stone concerning Romanian foreign policy. These principles spring from the inalienable right of each people to remain the sole master of his own country ; and they necessarily imply that, in the relations among all the world states, the principle of the full equality of rights, that of the strict respect of independence and sovereignty, that of non-interference in the inner affairs of other states, and that of the renunciation to force and to the use of force, should govern. It is well-known that Romania maintains trading relations with a lot of countries of the world : socialist countries, developing countries, as well as industrialized and developed ones. Among the latter, the place occupied by England is highly important. Thus, in the period comprised from 1965 to 1979, England inscribed herself, among the European countries with which Romania kept trading relations, on the third place, after the Federal Republic of Germany and France. As compared with the previous situation, a new element is furnished by the different qualitative structure of Romanian importations and exportations with England. The data contained in the following table convincingly attested thus¹⁷.

Table 9

The Structure of Romanian Foreign Trade with England (average data every fifth year from 1975 to 1979 (%))

Groups of wares	Import	Export
Food and living animals	0,9	9,5
Raw materials	6,6	5,5
Mineral fuel	0,7	6,1
Fats, greases, edible oils	0,1	—
Chemical products	12,2	2,2
Manufactured wares	19,7	22,1
Equipment and machines	53,2	19,1
Various manufactured products	5,7	35,4
Other wares	0,9	—
T o t a l	100,0	100,0

¹⁶ The rates of growth have been reckoned according to the data furnished by the *Anuarul statistic al R. S. România pe 1980*.

¹⁷ We have resorted here, for our reckonings, to an official source : *U. N. Commodity Trade*, for the years under inquiry, the data being obtained from British sources. The inte-

As concerning the wares imported by Romania from England, the focal point is the fact that the chief weights are represented by the imported means of production needed for the equipment and reequipment of the Romanian economy, with advanced technical devices. We may also observe that, besides such products, relatively high weight is also occupied by raw materials, fuel, as well as by the group of half-finished products belonging to the group of chemical wares and of the manufactured ones. The group consisting of alimentary substances is of an insignificant weight.

As concerning Romanian exportations, they present a situation which could never have been imagined during the past. The sum total of two positions, only, from the table above, namely, number 6 and number 8, mark a weight of more than 57,5%. We may also notice that Romanian exportations of equipments and of industrial engines has a weight higher than 19%. Our attention is also struck by the fact that the raw materials and the mineral fuel has, both, a weight of 11,5%, while that very group of products holding previously the first-rank, that of food and of animals, has now only a weight of 9,6%.

These figures reflected, thus, the great changes and shifts which have occurred in the deep structures of the Romanian economy; they took place in the whole range of it, during the years of Socialist construction.

Table 10

The Specific Weight of the Industry and of the Agriculture in Romania's Social Product and in her National Income, from 1950 to 1970¹⁸ (a)

Indexes and Years	Industry	Agriculture
<i>Social Product</i>		
1950	46,6	25,7
1965	57,3	21,5
1975	61,6	13,3
1979	63,2	13,7
<i>National Income</i>		
1950	44,0	27,9
1965	48,9	28,9
1975	56,2	16,0
1979	58,5	14,8

As one may easily observe, the growth of the weight of industry and, respectively, the diminution of the weight of agriculture — representing an historical general trend — drew Romania's economy towards the contemporaneous economic structure existing in the world. Such a fact creates a wider and more substantial basis for the extension and diversifying of the Romanian

rested readers are warned that the figures for the foreign trade of at least two countries do not coincide with each other, for the way of registering the prices of the products exported or imported being a different one.

¹⁸ *Anuarul statistic al României* 1980, 92.

commercial changes with other countries, chiefly with England, with whose trading opportunities Romania did not in the least exhaust, the range of the existing possibilities for intensification and rise.

Romanian industry, with its present and prospective structure offers, for such a view-point, a broad range of initiatives and exchanges of material values, which are reciprocally advantageous for both countries.

Table 11

The Structure of Romanian Industry from 1975 to 1979¹⁹ (in %)

Industrial Sectors	Level of Prices on the 1. 1. 1977				Prices on the 1.1. 1979
	1975	1976	1977	1978	
<i>Industry in general</i>	100	100	100	100	100
Group A	71,3	71,4	72,4	73,8	73,7
Group B	28,7	28,6	27,6	26,2	26,3
Ferrous Metallurgy	7,3	7,1	7,6	7,7	7,6
Mechanical engineering and processing metals	30,5	30,7	31,5	33,0	34,0
Electrical engineering	4,8	4,7	4,8	5,1	5,3
Chemistry	8,6	9,0	9,0	9,2	8,7
The processing of wood	4,1	3,9	3,9	3,8	3,7
Textiles	8,1	8,3	8,3	8,2	8,3
Ready-made clothes	3,7	3,7	3,6	3,5	3,5
Food industry	15,2	15,0	14,8	13,7	13,6

In the same direction plead, convincingly, the dynamical trend of the Romanian economy, as it results from the following table :

Table 12

The Dynamics of Romania's economic evolution, as illustrated by some representative indicators, from 1975 to 1979²⁰ 1975 = 100

Data	1976	1977	1978	1979	Average rate of growth, 1975- 1979
Population	100,9	101,9	102,9	103,8	0,9
Working population	100,8	101,1	101,1	101,7	0,4
Fixed Funds	110	121	131	143	9,3
Volume of investments	109	121	141	146	10,0
Social product	110	119	129	136	7,9
National Income	111	121	130	138	8,4
Gross industrial production	111	125	137	148	10,3
— Group A	111	127	140	152	11,0
— Group B	112	122	129	138	8,3
Gross agricultural production	119	118	122	128	6,4
The volume of the foreign trade	115	131	146	174	14,8

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, 156—157.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, 90.

In the light of such realities, the statements of President Nicolae Ceaușescu, uttered with the opportunity of his visit in Great Britain, in 1978, get ever more actual significations. Referring to the aims pursued during the negotiations, he actually said: "I believe that, owing to the achievements of these aims, both the Romanian and the English people will have to win something; these achievements will allow us to extend the relations of collaboration between our states, which have different social regimes; and thus they will demonstrate that, when such states are driven by the very principles of equality and of reciprocal respect, very good things can thus be obtained"²¹.

²¹ Also published by the *Revista Economică*, Nr. 25 of the 23d of June, 1978, 2.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF NEUTRALITY IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR — THE ROMANIAN CONTRIBUTION, 1914—1916

BY

MAURICE PEARTON

Much of the historiography of the First World War interprets the whole conflict in terms of its results. In view of the drastic changes the War promoted — not least for Romania — such an approach is entirely legitimate but, in my submission, results alone do not satisfactorily account for what happened from 1914 onwards. They necessarily omit those options which were considered but not adopted and they tend to induce us to judge policies and events only in regard to the extent to which they fostered or hindered the known outcome. Alternately, if we are examining the inner history of the War, an approach in terms of results strongly suggests that everything from 1914 led steadily and ineluctably to 1918. This also can mislead by obscuring many details of contemporary relevance particularly, I wish to maintain, through minimising or ignoring the change in character which came over the War after Verdun and the Somme. The object of the attack on Verdun, it will be recalled, was not to capture a partly-dismantled fortress but to drain French manpower and demonstrate to “the French people that they had nothing more to hope for”. Tactically, it signified final acquiescence in positional warfare. The year of Verdun was also the last in which the embattled governments could rely on the cohesion and loyalty of the home fronts.

The change in character has been discussed as regards the technology of war — the introduction of the tank, for example — but the history of technology implicitly stresses continuity of development — a process leading from research to production — rather than the processes of adaptation through which the major powers learned to fight the kind of war they had chosen to fight, as distinct from the one they had planned to fight. Similar processes of learning are to be found in the sphere of the economy (with which this paper is primarily concerned). In that sphere, far from ineluctable progress, there was a succession of experiments, false starts and of incomplete “rapprochments” between what was thought natural and inevitable in 1914 and responses to needs as they were disclosed by the conduct of the war. Just how hesitant the process was may be suggested by the time the adaptations took to accomplish — about two years. Measured against the expectations and practices of the previous century the time is remarkably short, but measured against the War itself, two years, I would remind you, is appro-

* The basic documentary materials relating to Romania for this paper are to be found in the archives stored at the Public Record Office, London, under references FO 341, FO 368, FO 369, FO 371, FO 382, and FO 902, for the years 1914 to 1916 inclusive.

ximately half the conflict. "Kriegswirtschaft" is a phenomenon of the end of the War, and a prescription for the next ; in 1914, it was not even envisaged as a concept, let alone a systematic practice.

It is notorious that the younger Moltke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff dismissed the idea of systematic planning for supply, with "Wir haben einen Krieg zu führen". It is, perhaps, less well known that in August 1914 the columns of *The Times* bore advertisements from British army officers for such elementary items of kit as revolvers, field glasses, map cases and other essentials ; they also had to get on with a war, which, it was universally agreed, would be over by Christmas. The Kaiser, possibly with the Schlieffen timetable in mind, expressed himself more optimistically ; he told his departing troops that they would be home by the time the leaves fell. The reasoning on both sides was *a priori* ; the forces engaged were so vast that "le grand choc" would inevitably produce complete victory or complete defeat.

The reasoning was falsified by experience. After their retreat to the Aise on 13th September the German forces dug themselves a fortress which the Allies then besieged for most of the next four years. The completion of entrenchments from the North Sea to Switzerland in October altered the character of the war — though, as I have suggested, it was not until 1916 that it assumed the forms in regard to which it is frequently analysed. Till then both sides improvised, experimented and adapted — eventually concentrating their major strategic efforts on the western front. In a war of attrition, rather than of annihilation, the army ceased to be an autonomous instrument of policy wielded by government and became the sharp end of a nation at war. For the same reason, received ideas as to the economic effort that war implied also had to be discarded or modified out of recognition. How that was achieved over supplies of munitions has been well documented ; but the production of shells was not only branch needing vigorous reorganisation ; other, less glamorous, deficiencies had also to be remedied. Two instances must suffice.

Germany, notwithstanding the *Wehrbeitrag* of 1913, made no provision for war taxes. It was confidently believed that a Schlieffen-style victory would cause international finance to rally to the mark and that extraordinary war expenses would be recovered from the defeated enemy, as in 1870. Special war taxes were not necessary. So the ratio of taxes to state expenditure declined rapidly ; from 82% in 1913 to 28% in 1914, to 7% in 1915. A deficit on this account in the following year prompted a comprehensive programme of financial legislation, including for the first time a tax on company profits. But all that only happened in 1916.

They ordered things no better in France, where the operative principle had also been that a short war required no special financial planning ; the expenses incurred could be covered by short-term loans and advances from the Bank of France ; all of which would be recovered through the indemnity which would feature prominently in the peace terms rightly imposed on the defeated enemy. Attrition on the Western Front made it evident that some time would elapse before the indemnity was collected. The government's response was not to reorganise public finances, however belatedly, but to step up the floating debt and the issue of banknotes. Unlike the Germans, however, the French Government shrank from imposing direct taxes, even

on incomes derived from the profits on the wartime loans which were its main domestic source of funds. (Perhaps this was wise, in view of the country's history of tax collection). The same delicacy prompted a series of moratoria on outstanding debts and claims; the moratoria increased in range and scope as the War progressed.

Delayed reactions in France and Germany alike responded to the official optimism of the military that the decisive break-through was imminent — a view which provided unimpeachable authority for putting off unpleasant decisions. But the reactions also demonstrated the fumbling attempts to deal with a situation for which any precedents, if they existed at all, were either unhelpful or misleading. From a psychological standpoint, the time-lag indicates the hold on men's minds of the verities of the economic liberalism in which their careers had been spent.

If the internal economy of the main belligerents was not suitable for the war they had come to wage, neither were their international economic relations. It is often forgotten how genuinely international the economy of Europe was before 1914. The lesson was swiftly brought home to the policy-makers in embattled states. Most of the aluminium used in Germany for the manufacture of Zeppelins was imported from Switzerland where it was produced from bauxite from France, (at that time responsible for about half world output). French officials made the inconvenient discovery that the manufacture of explosives in the plants owned and operated by the French state depended on imports of phenol from Germany. Britain, then still regarded as the paradigmatic industrial state, in 1914 possessed only one factory for making magnetoes, and one for ball bearings; all other requirements were met by imports from Austria and Germany. Even such elementary items as pressure-gauges were imported. The fact of the matter was that till July 1914 political frontiers did not coincide with the boundaries of the economy or of manufacture. No one expected that they should. From July 1914 it became necessary to bring them into line, by substituting materials or sources of supply. It also became necessary to wage what came to be called "economic warfare", not just at arm's length through blockade but through attempts to cut or restrict the enemy's supplies at source. In this the British held the advantage at sea, the Germans on land. Their struggle raised a range of new questions about the concept and practice of neutrality.

I have no wish to enter the labyrinth of the international law of neutrality in the nineteenth century. Suffice it to say that, by July 1914, the trend of debate and of the agreements arrived at had been to strengthen the rights of neutrals and clarify the distinction between neutral and unneutral conduct. Moreover the rights and duties of neutrals had been codified for the first time. Except for states held to be neutral by international agreement (like Belgium), to declare neutrality was to exercise an option. The right to do so was recognised as an absolute, but thereafter translating that right into action was conditional; neutrals were required to abstain from war and to treat belligerents impartially. On these conditions, belligerents were required to recognise the neutrality of states electing to stay out of hostilities. The obligations were reciprocal; "unneutral" behaviour invalidated them and justified the belligerents in reprisals or demands for satisfaction. The constraint on

the belligerents in so doing was to avoid driving the neutral state to side with the enemy.

But what in this context constituted "unneutral" behaviour was far from certain. How, for example, could the neutral's duty to refrain from participation be squared with the right of asylum for disabled ships of belligerents? This particular problem was argued in advance, though inconclusively; there were other areas of uncertainty which it was foreseen could only be clarified by practice. But what no-one had foreseen was that in wartime conditions, policy makers could not reach *answers* based on *evidence*, they had to make *choices* based on *assumptions*. The assumptions might be supported in logic but they could not be empirically tested since the result might well be to drive the neutral towards the enemy. That outcome could not be risked. This proved to be the Achilles' heel of the Great Powers in their economic warfare.

So when on 3rd August 1914 the Romanian Government declared its neutrality in the conflict which was breaking out, the precise implications of the action were not crystal clear. Thereafter until August 1916 Romania's history as a neutral reveals the skilful exploitation of ambiguity. For Romania was not neutral in the same sense as, for example, Sweden was neutral¹.

Despite internal pressures, the Swedish government was determined to stay out of the conflict. The Romanian Government, on the contrary, was determined to enter the conflict. The choice of the respective governments, therefore, suggested widely differing outcomes in policy. The problem for the Swedish Government was to strike a balance between its fear of Russian attack, the predisposition of its leading groups for Germany, and its dependence on imports either from Britain or via British controlled waters. The problem for the Romanian Government was to pick the winner².

¹ There were similarities which, apart from Sweden's position as one of Europe's "professional" neutrals, make it sensible to adopt comparisons. From the British point of view, Sweden and Romania were both states bordering on the Central Powers and already well integrated with the German economy. Both states had influential ruling groups which from tradition or education leaned towards Germany. Access for British shipping to both countries depended on passage through straits controlled by other states which for their own individual reasons favoured Germany. The entry of Turkey into the war and the mining of the Baltic off Cape Falsterbo by the Swedish navy insulated both Romania and Sweden against British power in home waters for any purpose, supportive or otherwise. By the outbreak of war in 1914, both countries had only recently undergone severe internal crises; in Romania the jacquerie of 1907 and its aftermath; in Sweden, successively, the battle over the franchise between 1905 and 1908; industrial unrest, marked by strikes, lockouts and bomb outrages in 1908–1909; the crisis over defence policy in 1912–1914. Both states had unsettled frontier problems; Romania, with Bulgaria over Romania's acquisitions in the Balkan War, Sweden with Norway, over the secession of the latter from the Swedish crown in 1905. In July 1914, neither in Bucharest nor Stockholm was the respective frontier considered stable enough to dispel any idea of a threat to security. Governments and ruling groups in both states were intensely suspicious of Russia's aims and ambitions; Romania, over Bessarabia and the Straits; Sweden, over the Åland islands and Russian policy in Finland in general. These suspicions to a great extent dictated Romanian and Swedish policies towards other states. Hence, for both, Germany offered in many ways the best conceivable security against Russia.

² Brătianu's policy hinged on one simple proposition: to acquire Transylvania. The problem for him resolved itself into one of means. The Allies were the more likely to be

In pursuing their respective policies, however, both states possessed certain strategic assets, which substantially increased their bargaining power. Sweden controlled the only land route between Britain and Russia; Romania, that between Russia and Serbia. Sweden, moreover, was a primary supplier of machinery and equipment to Russia, and could retaliate against any excessive British pressure by threatening to disrupt supplies to Britain's ally. This weapon became the stronger, the more difficulties Russia's industrial effort experienced. Romania's economic leverage was less direct: it was more a matter of defining the terms on which Allied deprivation operations should take place. The value of these strategic assets varied with the course of the campaigns. Sweden's advantage faded when Russia was knocked out of the war; Romania's, when Serbia was overrun or when the Allied forces failed to force a passage to Constantinople. But they *were* assets and, as such, they were consciously used in pursuit of the national interest.

What enabled the leaderships to capitalise on the assets was the change in character of the War. A short war, even though on a vast scale (as universally expected before 1914) would have confined the role of the neutrals to the theory elaborated at that time: their trade would be disorganised but no more than was unavoidable through the necessity of military operations. Attrition wrecked this reasoning. It caused greater disorganisation but at the same time it increased the importance of the neutrals, giving their governments greater leverage over the policies of states which by all other yardsticks were vastly superior. The war showed that what mattered in this contest was not overall strength or resources but power at the point of application. A lever has two ends, and in the shifting circumstances of conflict, the fulcrum could be made to shift also.

I would now like to turn more specifically to the case of Romania, as evidenced by its relations with Britain as they appear in the British archives.

By 1914 the British interest in Romania was predominantly commercial. Galați was as important as Bucharest, and consular activity formed the bulk of the diplomatic traffic with London. The Consul at Galați was also

able to compel Hungary to yield the province as the penalty of defeat. This line of argument suggested participation in the conflict on the side of the Allies. The disadvantage, from Brătianu's point of view, was that the Allies included Russia, relations with which were and remained his most acute preoccupation by reason of Bessarabia and the equally sensitive question of the passage of Russian troops through Romanian territory. In his view, the worst outcome would be for Romania to be a junior partner in the liberation of the territory as the Russian Government would then expect to have a determining voice in the drawing of the new frontiers, a process in which Brătianu feared even the prior treaty stipulations agreed in Petrograd on 1st October 1914 might fail to secure Romanian interests. (He was mindful that Russian support in 1877 had cost Romania the three southern districts of Bessarabia). This outcome of itself suggested that Germany be not totally alienated, regardless of any economic arguments for keeping relations going. There was also the outside chance that, in a victory for the Central Powers, Germany might be prevailed upon to press Austria to make concessions. Irrespective of how it was to be achieved Transylvania remained *the* priority, to which all other policy options had to give way. Brătianu was determined that Romanian forces should not be diverted into minor campaigns in the Balkans, and for that reason sought to purchase security on Romania's southern frontier by making concessions to Bulgaria. After Bulgaria joined the Central Powers, Brătianu was prepared to consider committing Romanian forces in that quarter but only if France and Britain showed a prior willingness to commit theirs effectively and on a scale he thought adequate. (See 5, below).

the British Representative on the Danube Commission. Investments were few, notably in the *Bank of Romania Ltd.* and the *Romanian Consolidated Oil-fields*, a consortium of small companies put together in 1912. But Romanian oil was not regarded as a strategic raw material. For Britain, strategically, Romania was an aspect of overall command of the Mediterranean. Otherwise, British policy considered Romania to be primarily the concern of France or of Germany. In the crisis of 1914, His Majesty's Government was content to monitor French and Russian reactions to Romanian policy, and to concern itself with the potential advantages which geographical proximity and an existing predominance in the market conferred on Germany. Official thinking about neutrality centered on the two states declared neutral by international agreement, Belgium and Switzerland, — not on Romania. But after 4th August 1914, British officials had to devise a policy towards states electing to stay out of the conflict, especially those bordering on the Central Powers. They concluded that Sweden would never move against Germany but that Romania *might* be persuaded to join the Entente. In principle therefore Britain had an interest in maintaining the status quo in the Baltic which it did not have in regard to Romania. This maxim governed Britain's relationships with the two states; it was reaffirmed by the outcome of the one strategic decision which affected them both after Turkey entered the war in November 1914, viz to establish direct contact with Russia via the Dardanelles in preference to the Baltic.

For Britain and Romania, then, "neutrality" translated into active but differing policies. For Britain, it implied an opportunity to turn Romanian neutrality into Romanian belligerence, subject only to the price Britain was asked, and was prepared, to pay; for Romania it implied an opportunity to pursue prewar national aims as a regional power in a wartime context, and to seek to promote the national element in the Romanian economy. That a government led by Ion Brătianu would be no easily compliant instrument was accepted. Robert Seton-Watson advised the *Foreign Office* :

"There is no question at all that he is keen on Roumanian Unity and indeed is something of a chauvinist; this is even more true of his masterful wife. But I believe the real key to him is... a very strong feeling of his own subtleness and ability and a certain mepris of the statesmen and diplomats... with whom he has to deal. He knows himself to be more than a match for most of them and thinks that this applies to all"³.

British officials recognised that Brătianu as "Realpolitiker" was only conditionally pro-Entente, but did regard him as the Entente's best bet; the alternative, after all, was Marghiloman — a point which Romanian ministers and their associates like Elie Blank did not fail to make at frequent intervals. Its relevance was driven home by Brătianu himself when he informed Sir George Barclay, the British Ambassador, that agreements made with him would not be binding on any successor as Romania's Prime Minister. British policy, accordingly, was constrained not to undermine, indeed actively to support Brătianu's position. This, in practice, was a source of weakness: the British Government was obliged to rely on the good offices of one who saw the necessities of strategy in his terms and not theirs. If Anglo-Romanian relationships were going to be made to work, then these differing interpre-

³ Letter to Foreign Office 30.9.1915 (FO 371; 2217).

tations of the possibilities of 'neutrality' had to be brought into line and given some coherence, even if they could not be completely harmonised.

I now wish to turn to specific areas of Romanian policy to examine how the Government manoeuvred within the rules in pursuance of its objectives. In this connection, however, it is important first to note the correlation between military events and fluctuations in Romanian policy⁴. "Romanian forces" it was proclaimed in the Bucharest Press "should only be engaged to deliver the coup de grace", but the willingness to commit forces varied with Brătianu's estimates of the chances of success, and the state of the forces themselves. He was determined however, that they should be used to unify Transylvania and therefore not be involved in campaigns for lesser objectives in the Balkans⁵. Such judgements about strategy affected Romanian policy in economic matters, and enable us, conveniently, to break down the period of neutrality into three distinct phases. The first is from August 1914 to the death of Carol I (which allowed Brătianu a free rein in policy-making) and to the formal entry into the hostilities of Turkey on 5th November (which shut off access to Allied shipping): the second is from the end of 1914 to the end of 1915, when the entry of Bulgaria into the war, the Austro-German offensive against Serbia and the Allied failure at Gallipoli and Salonika completely altered Romania's regional position. The year 1915 also, it will be recalled, saw the Central Powers in the east established on a front from Riga to Cernăuți. The third phase was from January to August 1916 — a period marked by the evident failure of the German attack on Verdun (which appeared to show that the Allies had regained the initiative) and Brusilov's startling offensive in Galicia (which appeared to erase the Austro-German gains of the previous year). It will be evident that 1915 was the year of greatest ambiguity, and therefore, it is on that year I wish to concentrate our attention. But some unforeseen problems presented themselves straight away.

As long as Bulgaria and Turkey remained out of the war, Romania's neutrality could conform to the broadly accepted definitions and rules; the British interest, accordingly, lay in gaining Romanian cooperation in stopping the transit of contraband goods, and in preventing British nationals from trading with the enemy. That in itself immediately revealed a problem. On 17th August 1914, the *Bank of Romania* in London instructed its office in

⁴ The correlations are discussed briefly by S. D. Spector in *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1962) Chapter I.

⁵ Letter to Mișu 6.9.1915 (FO 371; 2271). In October, Brătianu, in response to the renewed drive against Serbia, expressed willingness to commit Romanian forces to aid his Balkan neighbour provided, inter alia, 200,000 Allied troops took part in the campaign by the end of the year, and of those 150,000 were ready for action in the Balkan theatre by the end of November. The British offered two objections (i) since they had no trained drafts ready, the forces, or a significant part of them, would have had to be withdrawn from the Western front where British and French forces had just been severely mauled in Champagne and Artois, and (ii) even so, it was logistically out of the question for them to be transported and prepared for battle in a matter of eight weeks. Thereafter British official opinion concluded that either (a) Brătianu knew what he was demanding and was therefore deliberately asking the impossible for reasons of political tactics, or that (b) he did not realise what his demands implied and therefore was being incompetently advised. The episode did Brătianu's standing permanent damage in Whitehall, and offset to a degree the representations of the British Ambassador in Bucharest on Romania's behalf. (see FO 371; 2273/1915).

Bucharest to refrain from meeting any drafts drawn on Germany or Austria and from initiating any business with those countries, in consequence of the royal proclamation forbidding trading with the enemy. The Bucharest office replied, pointing out that it was subject to Romanian law — which allowed no such restriction⁶. At the time, British legislation affected only enemy nationals in enemy countries and permitted transactions with enemy nationals in neutral countries (such as Romania)⁷. Nevertheless the exchange of messages points to a problem which became increasingly intractable as the expected short war turned into the unexpected long one and the rules governing trading with the enemy were made more rigorous. What was the “nationality” of a company? Under conditions of international free trade, the question is of interest only in cases of litigation; at most it indicates the nationality of those drawing dividends or of governments to whom taxes are payable. Under wartime conditions, the question became acute. The *Bank of Romania* in London could well find itself with a branch which was ordered by the Romanian Government, under whose jurisdiction it was, to trade with banks having their legal seat in enemy territory. Pre-war international discussions had sorted out the vexed question of the nationality of a ship, for purposes of the rules of blockade; no one had bothered about the nationality of corporate enterprise: in consequence there were no accepted rules. The inherent tension was eased by practice, case by case, with the British Government trying to persuade the Romanian Government not to force British concerns to act in ways contrary to British Law, and the Romanian insisting that its requirements must be met, when they could not be modified to take account of the British point of view. This attitude extended to all transactions the Romanian Government thought necessary; early in 1915, the *Bank of Romania* in Bucharest reported that the *Romanian National Bank*⁸ had threatened to boycott any bank offering to buy sterling at any rate other than 26½ and that, though it disagreed with that rate on commercial grounds, it had fallen into line. We have no time to explore this issue in detail, but the conclusion from the evidence in the Foreign Office archives must be that the Romanian government successfully insisted upon its requirements, irrespective of the nationality of foreign legal owners of branches or of the beneficial owners of Romanian registered companies.

The initiation of contraband control ran into similar conflicts of jurisdiction. The Embassy discovered that a man named Hildebrand, an agent of the German Government in buying grain, had bought a Greek vessel in Constanța but had preserved its Greek identity by arranging that one-third of the shares were held by the former master of the ship, who was Greek. The ship, in consequence, could trade under the Greek flag, although beneficially it was German owned and operated for German account. Protests to the Romanian authorities elicited that the transaction was perfectly legal — as was the brokerage in the matter of the Port Captain of Constanța. Non-Romanians domiciled in Romania could freely be registered as

⁶ Exchange of correspondence 17.8.1914/19.8.1915 (FO 168; 1066).

⁷ On British Trading with the Enemy regulations, see AC Bell, *The Blockade of the Central Empires* (London, 1961).

⁸ The Romanian National Bank was a private institution owned by prominent members of the Liberal Party.

owners of vessels registered in Romanian ports. The British authorities were constrained to accept that the Romanian Government had no incentive to change the law ; — in fact would be exposing itself to German pressure if it did so⁹. The further question then arose : was this kind of gap in the British control system worth trying to press the Romanian Government into closing, if by so doing, the Romanians had to make larger concessions to Britain's enemies by way of "compensation" ? The question admitted of no rigorous answer ; only of purely subjective assessments of the balance of advantage. This outcome neatly illustrates the role in policy-making of the ambiguity I mentioned earlier.

The other main source of difficulty in this connection was that the Romanian Government did not agree with British definitions of contraband goods, and, in particular, by negotiating a transit agreement with Bulgaria, kept open a leak in the system which was damaging to British interests especially after Turkey entered the war. That event cut sea communications with the United Kingdom at the same time as it provided a reason for an increase in contraband traffic. The Central Powers adopted a number of ingenious expedients to evade Romanian control such as fitting false bottoms to beer barrels, and declaring as "agricultural machinery" what inspection proved to be mines and shells. These materials apart, however, any goods consigned from Germany in transit to Bulgaria, went through and from Bulgaria into Turkey. The leak could not be stopped.

The closing of the Straits increased the leverage the Central Powers could bring to bear, since they became the sole source of supply of a range of goods Romania required to keep its own economy moving. Deliveries from Britain could only take place either via Serbia — where communications were abysmal, and which was under attack anyway, or via Archangel (*not* the nearest port of entry) or through the Baltic route (which, as explained, increased the leverage of the Swedish Government). The then Bulgarian port of Dedeagath on the Aegean was connected by rail to the Bulgarian and hence Romanian system but the track inland inconveniently meandered in and out of Turkish territory. It had been laid out to meet the needs of peacetime commerce, not wartime trading. Britain's ability to meet Romania's legitimate commercial needs was drastically reduced.

For these reasons in 1915—1916 Britain found itself with greater problems and far less to offer. Policy-makers soon realised that they were dealing not with Romania alone but with a complex situation in the Balkans as a whole, in which Romanian fears that Bulgaria might take the opportunity to upset the Treaty of Bucharest of August 1913 were an important element in Romanian motivations. Commercially, the policy-makers found that Romanian behaviour could only be influenced by considering Romania not — as had been *en vogue* — as a largely German market, but as an element in a network of Balkan and Near Eastern economic relations.

Here, British policy had to come to terms with local practice. The control system relied on the scrutiny and registration of documents ; it was being applied in an area where transactions were concluded personally between

⁹ On the Hildebrand case, see FO 368 ; 1388/1915.

individuals vis à vis, and where no one wrote anything down if he could possibly avoid it. Apart from this divergence in expectations, local practice did not comprehend techniques which Britain took for granted; the Board of Trade discovered that goods were normally consigned to a principal or agent in the port of discharge; "through" bills of lading to the ultimate purchaser were unknown. In the case of Romania, the British authorities turned to the Government to issue official end-user certificates. It also got round the access problem by concentrating all deliveries to Romania through the Agence du "Service Maritime Roumain" in Salonika. Unfortunately, these arrangements only came into force about six months before Bulgaria itself entered the war and Serbia was overrun. The point for us, however, is that new techniques and arrangements could not be introduced unilaterally; the Romanians had to be persuaded of their utility, not from the British but from their own point of view. For them every change was a concession and commanded its own "price". What was happening in the diplomacy of Romania's participation in the fighting (which has been well documented) finds its parallel in the day-to-day problems of commerce and finance.

The weakness of Romania's position was that, as a state which was beginning to build its own industrial infrastructure, it depended on specific technological imports, such as locomotives, to pay for which it had to sell, principally, oil and grains. The production of neither can be conveniently "switched off", without causing dislocation and fundamental economic damage. Additionally, if the Romanian armed forces were to be qualitatively improved to take on an army with the fire-power and combat experience of the German, then a large capital sum was required; the extra costs could not be defrayed out of the ordinary revenue. The ability to alleviate, if not solve, both problems gave Britain an opportunity to press its own views and policies; the negotiations for a loan to improve the army specified that the conditions would be guaranteed by any Romanian government, whether headed by Brătianu or not. British officials also tried to get Romania to clamp down on the transit of contraband goods, according to their definitions. Such bargaining was only realistic as long as the campaign at the Dardanelles gave some hope that sea communications would be restored. The evacuation of Allied forces in December 1915 — January 1916 and the absence of any lightning advance from Salonika undercut the British bargaining position, and, indeed left officials in Whitehall wondering whether the resources to bolster British policies in Romania might not be better employed elsewhere. Brătianu's own behaviour did nothing to discourage them in this belief.

During 1915, however, it was reasonable to try to bring the two sets of policy requirements into line. The trouble, from the British standpoint, was that the Germans could equally well supply Romania's needs, and were better placed to threaten sanctions against "unneutral" or overtly pro-British behaviour. The Germans could not object to, and the Romanians could benefit from, pre-emptive buying of those staple exports on which Romanian revenues depended — oil and grains. Even if they could not be got out of Romania, they could be stored and therefore removed from the market.

As soon as Turkey's entry into the war was imminent, the British Government urged on their allies a policy of buying oil products on joint account and shipping them to Novorossisk for storage. The French agreed

but the Russians demurred, saying that they had enough oil of their own but that they would participate in a joint storage scheme. Whether the scheme was ever put into operation or not is unclear — it disappears from the files — but the withdrawal of supplies from the local free market was recognised as a feasible method. It became the more important as the continued operation of the oil industry threw up large surpluses which threatened to swamp the country's storage capacity, shut down the refineries and thus cause a stoppage of crude oil production. Domestic demand in fact declined, since the falling off in general exports reduced the circulation of trains on the CFR, which was the main customer for fuel oil. The industry itself suffered from restrictions on imports, especially metal goods, drilling pipe and sulphuric acid, which Britain could not supply and which the German Government held out as a *quid pro quo* for oil products.

The British Government initiated large-scale purchase and storage operations in Romania itself, contracting for a total of 96,000 tons of gasoline, which was largely stored at Constanța. From the Romanian point of view, these purchases alleviated but did not solve the problem and by August 1916, the level of stocks in the area subsequently occupied by the Central Powers was three times that of August 1914. The damage to the industry threatened by stagnant exports prompted the Government in April 1915 to take powers to seize all installations and products¹⁰. This act of state had other implications, which we shall discuss later.

Meanwhile, the Government regulated oil exports as it thought fit. It adopted a British suggestion that the specification of export kerosine be sealed down from 12—15 per cent light fractions on distillation to a maximum 2.5 per cent, so that German refiners would be unable to extract gasoline by re-running the material. On the other hand, British officials were continually puzzled as to the precise meaning of Romanian export regulations; they found that in practice, "prohibited" did not mean, as they expected, "forbidden" but only that the exporter had to apply for an export licence; similarly, "suspended" might simply imply that trains were experiencing difficulty with gradients around Predeal. Alternately, the Ministry of Finance, which could generally be relied upon, said one thing but the actual movements of goods suggested the opposite. Comparisons between official reassurances and what actually happened could only be made, of course, *post facto*. Officials in London suspected "a deliberate lack of system", which raised doubts as to Romanian good faith. In conjunction with Brătianu's constant raising of the political price for military intervention, the unclarity of Romanian economic policies towards the Allies, as practised, gave arguments to those in Whitehall who considered that Britain was being led by the nose. From our present point of view they testify to the success with which the Romanian Government manoeuvred according to its own conceptions of the national advantage.

We have considered so far the Romanian Government reacting to initiatives deriving from British policy, and by implication, the policies of the Central Powers. I would now like to concentrate on Romania's use of neutrality

¹⁰ On Romania's internal oil market and Government policy towards it, see Maurice Pearton, *Oil and the Romanian State* (Oxford, 1971) Chapter IV.

to further its own positive (not reactive) policies. In April 1914, Brătianu had assured Sazonov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Romania had no engagement which, in the event of a European war, would preclude her from taking such a course as her interests dictated. He was implying that Romania's automatic adhesion to the Triple Alliance need not be taken for granted, but, in a more general sense, Brătianu's words held good for Romanian policy as a whole; what Romania's interests were, of course, was defined by the National Liberals — and they tended to define them as being for the National Liberals. For them, the domestic counterpart to the development of Romania into what would now call a regional power was the reduction or elimination of foreign economic influence inside the country, and the assertion of the role of the state in the ownership, control and operation of major economic assets. I would like in the time available to discuss two instances.

The first is the Danube Commission, set up to control internationally access to the mouths of the Danube by the Treaty of Paris in 1856, to which Romania had been admitted after the Congress of Berlin. The original purpose of the Commission was two-fold, politically to prevent Russia from controlling the delta, and technically, to ensure that the river mouths were improved and kept in order (in 1856, the draft had been only 3 metres). By 1914, the Liberals had already put the replacement of international authority by Romanian authority on their agenda. They argued that Romanian technicians were perfectly competent to police the river and maintain it in good order and that the dues would be a useful course of revenue. Angelescu, the Minister of Finance, made a speech in the Chamber of Deputies in these terms in June 1914, so the other members of the Commission were much aware of what the Government had in mind. The outbreak of war diminished the number of ships going in and out of the Danube — partly by reason of their owners' refusal to pay high war risk insurance rates — and thus diminished the Commission's revenue. That in turn implied that, failing other sources of finance, dredging and maintenance operations would cease in a predictable time, and access to shipping would be further restricted. The technical hazards to navigation would restrict traffic even more.

It is diverting to observe in the British archives, how the representatives of states which had just inflicted or suffered, respectively, a disastrous defeat among the Masurian lakes sat down with the representatives of states whose armies were then busily trying to outflank each other in Picardy and Artois, and joined their Italian and Turkish confrères (soon to take opposite sides in the conflict) to explore just how the operations of the Commission could be maintained without giving the Romanian Government a chance to take it over. By December 1914, they were constrained to accept a Romanian loan, which Whitehall conceded with reluctance, fearing further political demands. The reservations were quickly proved to have been well-founded. The Liberal programme was reiterated in March 1915 by Băicoianu, former Secretary of the Ministry of Domains, who in a speech to a Liberal study group called for a more equitable form of administration and in particular a régime at the mouths of the Danube which would allow riverain states more effective participation, reserving to the concert of Europe as a whole only a right of surveillance.

Romania had given proof, he argued, of its capacity to discharge administrative and technical functions and could safely be entrusted with the work, — which at the same time would safeguard the state's own authority. In terms of personnel, Băicoianu's demand translated into the right to nominate the chief engineering, financial and administrative officers of the Commission. The other partners did not doubt the Romanians' capacity to carry out these functions: what worried them was the likelihood that the Romanian Government would make control of the Danube part of its domestic political spoils system, with charges put high enough to allow not only a return to the Romanian treasury but also a percentage to be creamed off for the Liberal banks.

As the leaves fell, and there was no sign of the troops returning home, and as the closing of the Straits excluded British shipping, the problems of the Commission thereafter appear only sporadically in British archives during Romanian neutrality.¹¹ They appear again, in detail, at the time of the Treaty of Bucharest and the Versailles settlements, which are beyond the scope of this paper.

The second example of Romania's using neutrality to further prewar policies derives from the oil industry. In July 1914, it was no secret that the governing Liberal party and its nominees in the bureaucracy had plans to limit the activity of foreigners in the development of Romania's oil resources, to reserve state lands as the *apuri* for a national, that is Liberal — owned, oil company for exploration, and to limit the operations of foreign capital in refining and marketing. At the time these ideas were elaborated, they were generally ignored on the grounds that foreign capital and the access to the international market it represented were more important to Romania, than Romania was to foreign capital as a source of supply. The War, however, robbed this proposition of any truth it might have had. The Allies faced the paradox that those who wanted to discriminate against foreigners in oil were also those who were likely to intervene on the Allied side; moreover, prolonged neutrality gave them the opportunity effectively to bring oil operations under state control, which was unlikely to be lifted without substantial concessions to the nationalist point of view. The key move was the declaration of a state of siege in March 1915, under which the Government took the powers to seize and operate the oil industry, to which I have referred. This was the first time the state asserted the right to control the industry through control of its assets rather than by means of the ordinary functions of taxation and transport, and of the market. In public speeches, Vintilă Brătianu, brother of the Prime Minister, advocated converting the apparatus of wartime control into a permanent petroleum monopoly, without which — he argued — the economic emancipation of Romania was impossible. A bill was introduced into Parliament in May 1916 but had not been passed by the end of the session. When Parliament reconvened, Romania was no longer neutral. However the displacement or expropriation of foreign interests was clearly on the political agenda.¹²

¹¹ On the Danube Commission, see FO 168 ; 1066.

¹² See Pearton, *op. cit.*, Chapter IV.

What conclusions may we draw from this initial investigation?

Romanian neutrality from August 1914 to August 1916 coincided with what I identified at the beginning of this paper as the experimental, indeterminate period of the war. Certainly until the end of 1915, both the Central Powers and the Allies were improvising and experimenting, strategically, tactically and in relation to their economic and industrial requirements. Romania was in a position to meet some at least of these requirements, and the longer the war went on, the more important became Romania's ability to supply. But Romania also had the power to withhold supply which gave it considerable bargaining strength. Prewar theorising about neutrality had not envisaged that small neutral states would have that degree of initiative and flexibility vis à vis stronger foreign governments.

It had also assumed that the limits of the neutrals' foreign policy would be set by the Great Conflict, that their governments would have to react passively to the policies of the belligerents. Romanian experience showed this assumption to be false. Neutral states did not cease automatically to act like states: they did not abandon summarily their own aims in foreign policy, but found, in fact, that conditions of general war in some respects improved their chances of attaining their objectives. To this end, they relied not only on their intrinsic bargaining power — which in the circumstances was considerable — but also on the ambiguity of the rules governing neutrality. Small states may have fewer options than large ones but they can concentrate their resources on those options they do have.

In this respect, the Romanian Government showed that neutral governments of small states have one other particular advantage, namely that they control the information on which belligerents have to make their policy judgements. In wartime Romania, rumours appeared as facts and facts as rumours; states of siege, censorship and control of telegrams all conferred advantages on the neutral government which prewar theory left entirely out of account¹³. The opaque quality of much of the information available entered into the assumptions on which the belligerents made their choices. The opacity, however, was deliberately contrived by the neutrals, to protect their interests as they saw them.

The belligerents' choices were not absolute but relative, couched in terms of the balance of advantage. British estimates of what to do had to take account not just of Romania, as a trade partner, but of possible, or likely, or feasible German reactions. The Germans on their side suffered a similar constraint. The Romanian Government used this to impose reciprocal limits on the belligerents' action, and with great effect. Neutrality, in fact, rests on something like a balance of power, *at the point of its application*. Romania showed how the balance could be maintained, to the advantage of the neutral.

Postwar analysis of neutrality focussed exclusively on the status of the "professional" neutrals and on the violation of their rights and interests as construed in prewar theory. On this score, the neutrals pictured themselves as the injured innocents of the international system. Injured they no doubt

¹³ The Swedish Government achieved the same result simply by ceasing to publish trade statistics.

were, innocent they certainly were not. In fact Swedish policy was more akin to Romanian policy than it was to the prewar prescriptions. Both states were part of a European-wide circuit of goods and services which could not but be damaged by large-scale war — but both states maximised the freedom of manoeuvre the prolongation of the war conferred on them not only to minimise the immediate danger but moreover successfully to pursue long term domestic and foreign objectives in a wartime setting. 'Neutrality' served admirably for this purpose¹⁴. More attention to Romania's achievements in this respect would have prevented subsequent commentators from assuming that small size and limited resources (compared with the Great Powers) connoted weakness or passivity.

¹⁴ On neutrals as "industrial co-belligerents", see Maurice Pearton *The Knowledgeable State; Science Warfare and Diplomacy from 1830* (London, 1982) Part IV.

THE ROMANIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS BETWEEN 1914—1916

BY

VASILE VESA

The Romanian-British relations during the First World War have been investigated by the Romanian historiography in connection only with Romania's relations with the Entente. In the first two years of neutrality these relations were marked by the acknowledgement of Romania's legitimate aspirations to achieve national and state unity. In consequence these relations developed from the political engagement of Romania, concluded in August 1915, to the military engagement concluded in the 1916 political and military agreements.

It is a well-known fact that before the breaking out of World War I the powers of the Entente took the necessary steps to determine Romania's neutrality, which was finally adopted by the Crown Council on August 3rd, 1914. After that the diplomats of the Entente made efforts to induce the Romanian Government to join the Entente in the war¹. Their constant endeavour met with success since the Romanian government wanted to use the international political situation in order to achieve its national unity, a desideratum established since the second half of the 19th century. Romania's negotiations with the Entente took a very long time for two reasons. First, the Romanian Government wanted to have the approval of the Entente in including within the boundaries of the Romanian state all the territories inhabited by the Romanians. Secondly, they asked that Romania's military intervention in the war should be secured in favourable military conditions.

The Romanian-British relations can be investigated only in connection with Romania's attitude towards the Entente. Generally speaking, the Entente adopted a favourable attitude towards Romania, but the position of the three powers (Russia, France, Britain) was slightly different. Romania's negotiations with the Entente were carried on with Russia, which had been given the consent of her two partners. During the negotiations, the incidents caused by the differences of opinion could be cleared up by the conciliative intervention of the British and French governments. While the French Government adopted a favourable attitude towards the Romanian Government, the British Government took a cautious position. Its attitude was justified by England's position towards the South-East European states and by her concern to deal tactfully with the susceptibility of the Russian diplomacy. With all this cautious policy England played an important role in the negotiations meant to make Romania join the Entente in the

¹ Eliza Campus, *Din politica externă a României 1913—1947* (București, 1980) 13—124.

war. The dissensions between the Romanian Government and the governments of the Entente could be evaded by the interventions of the British Government in Paris, Petrograd and Bucharest.

England also played an important role in solving some of Romania's economic problems (the sale of her cereals on the English market) as well as in supplying the Romanian army with modern weapons. Consequently, between 1914—1916, when Romania was neutral, the relations between the two countries were extremely intense. In the following lines we will insist upon some important aspects of this intercourse in order to throw light upon the hard and fruitful activity carried on by the Romanian and British diplomats in London and Bucharest.

Ever since the beginning of August 1914, the governments of the Entente acknowledged the Romanians' demands for their national rights. Under these circumstances and on Russia's initiative the draft of a Russo-Romanian treaty was drawn up on August 7th. The treaty acknowledged Romania's national aspirations and guaranteed her territorial integrity during and after the war. Sir Edward Grey gave his adhesion with the stipulation that after the war His Majesty's Government would consider the guarantee to be only a diplomatic aid³. The reserved attitude of the British government could be explained by the attitude of the English political circles which inclined towards Bulgaria. They considered that the major interest of the Entente was to win Bulgaria over to its side. Thus the activity of the diplomacy of the Entente was opened in the Balkan Peninsula. It failed due to the way in which it was carried on, and to the territorial disagreements between the south-east European states. So the British-Romanian relations in the autumn of 1914 can be mentioned among the failures of the Entente to conclude an agreement between Bulgaria, Greece and Romania in order to help Serbia. At the beginning of 1915 the British diplomacy had an initiative meant to make Romania join the Entente in the war. In his interview with the Romanian Minister Nicolae Mișu, Sir Edward Grey mentioned: "I have not urged Romania to appear on the scene so far. I have two reasons to advise your Government not to delay its decision. First I have to tell you confidentially that Hungarian personalities submitted to us some proposals that may have no consequences, but their proposals can be renewed and if Hungary offers a separate peace her proposals could be favourably accepted. I also wish that Romania's intervention took place before the Austro-Germans have attacked Serbia"⁴. Sir Edward Grey's argument interested I. I. C. Brătianu, the Romanian Prime Minister who was not favourably looked upon in London. He knew that the Great Powers would treat every nation separately, in accordance with the service the respective nation would allow to them. The above-mentioned discussion, associated with Russia's comminatory measures

² Les Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, fonds Guerre 1914—1918. Paris. Dossier Balkans-Roumanie. Négociations avec l'Entente, vol. I, file 15. Copy of the draft of the Russo-Romanian Treaty of August 8-th, 1914. (In what follows A.M.A.E.Fr., fond Guerre, N.A.E.).

³ *Ibidem*, 17.

⁴ A.M.A.E.Fr., fonds Guerre, Dossier Générale, vol. II, f. 54, (Paul Cambon telegram of January 31-st, 1915).

caused anxiety in Bucharest⁵. Under such circumstances I.I.C. Brătianu declared to Prince Iusupov, the Russian minister in Brussels, that: "Romania will join Russia but I (Brătianu) demand that she should have the opportunity to choose the right moment"⁶. The above-mentioned declaration synthesizes the Romanian Government's view upon Romania's participation in the war. From a political point of view Romania decided to join the Entente ever since the breaking out of the war, but she did it, officially, in the summer of 1915. The Romanian government had delayed the declaration of war in its desire to start the action in favourable military circumstances. Brătianu's well-known "delay policy" did not affect Romania's political opinion. Brătianu wished that Romania's participation in the war avoided a national catastrophe and were useful to the Entente. The allusion of the British Government to possible negotiations with Hungary was only a means to exert pressure upon the Romanian Government. As a matter of fact at the beginning of 1915 the English opinion was more and more favourable to Romania. Boierescu related from London: "Nobody here thinks to exclude the interests of the Romanians from Transylvania; on the contrary their interests will be supported to put an end to the nationalities' problem in Europe once and for all"⁷. The British minister in Bucharest was authorized to declare on January 28th 1915 that the British Government refused to take into consideration any suggestions concerning Hungary's independence which might hinder Romania's national aspirations concerning Transylvania.

An important chapter in Romania's relations with the Entente was marked by the decisions taken by England and France to force the crossing over of the Dardanells. Besides the military advantages of the action the Entente had in view the diplomatic effects which could influence the attitude of Bulgaria, Greece and Romania. The development of the military operations in the straits caused anxiety in the south-east European countries rather than determined them to join the Entente in the war.

In the spring and summer of 1915 the two countries were confronted with new conditions. We refer to the negotiations between the Entente and Italy as well as to Romania's negotiations with the Entente, opened in Petrograd on May 3rd 1915. It is known that England represented the Entente in the negotiations with Italy. I. I. C. Brătianu, who had concluded a secret agreement with Italy on September 23rd, 1914, felt out the situation to see the reaction of the British Government to his suggestion of an Italian-Romanian cooperation in the war. The suggestion was favourably accepted by Sir Edward Grey, the head of the Foreign Office and by H. Asquith, the Prime Minister. But the simultaneous intervention could not be carried out because the Italian government did not accept the Romanian Government in its negotiations with the Entente. The refusal was motivated by Italy's hopes that her demands would meet less difficulties.

At the same time Brătianu hoped that a Romanian-Italian action would make the Entente accept Romania's national demands. Under these circumstances Romania opened the negotiations with the Entente which lasted

⁵ Arhiva Centrală de Stat, Bucharest, Microfilme Belgia, R/11, The report of February 11th, 1915.

⁶ *Ibidem*, The report of February 13th, 1915.

⁷ Eliza Campus, *op. cit.*, 74.

for three months (May-August 1915). In spite of the British Government's wish that the Entente should be more categorical in its relations with Romania, Britain supported the Romanian point of view. This was done under the influence of the French government. The English government had restraints towards the Romanian-Serbian frontier line in the Banat; they supported the Serbian point of view. However Brătianu was victorious after Th. Delcassé met H. Asquith at Calais in July 1915. Serbia was promised Croatia although Italy did not agree. Alfred Pingaud had an interesting opinion when he stated that from the point of view of the European diplomacy Romania's claims to the southern part of the Banat led to the Yugoslav unity⁸.

The powers of the Entente acknowledged Romania's legitimate territorial demands but they did not sign a written agreement. The Romanian Government had good reasons to believe that signing a political convention without military obligations was extremely dangerous in the relations of Romania with the Triple Alliance. As a matter of fact the military agreement was impossible in the summer of 1915 if we think of Russia's military defeats. Finally, Romania accepted to hinder the transit of the war ammunitions on her territory⁹.

England's support was expressed in the promise to buy cereals from Romania in order to prevent them from being sold to Germany, but also in order to save Romania from economic suffocation. At the same time, Romania made great progress in concluding a loan of 7,000,000 (pound sterling). In addition the English public opinion sympathized with the Romanian people. Among the journalists who influenced this attitude we mention R. W. Seton-Watson who visited Romania in 1915.

The autumn of 1915 brought new aspects to the English-Romanian relations. Bulgaria had already joined the Triple Alliance and had attacked Serbia. The governments of the Entente understood that Serbia's defeat could have disastrous effects upon their position and military operations in the Balkans. Under these circumstances England made efforts to determine Romania join Serbia in the war. Therefore in October 1915 she asked Romania to make her declaration of war. She promised in exchange to send 200,000 soldiers in the Balkans, to challenge Greece to discharge her duties towards Serbia, and to send guns for 500,000 soldiers in Russia¹⁰. Brătianu considered that the soldiers sent to Salonic were not enough to represent a real danger for the enemies. With all the pressures Brătianu refused to join the Entente. His attitude was justified by the slowness with which the troops were disembarked at Salonic, not to mention the poor equipping in comparison with the Austro-German massive concentration of troops sent to defeat Serbia. Lloyd George underlined the discrepancy between the mission of the troops sent to Salonic and their equipping, too bad to face an offensive action". Beginning with that action till 1916, there was an interconditioning

⁸ Alfred Pingaud, *Histoire diplomatique de la France pendant la Grande Guerre*, vol. I (Paris, S.a.).

⁹ Arhiva Bibliotecii Centrale de Stat, Bucharest, CCCXCVI/8, Queen Maria's telegram to England's King of August 29-th 1915.

¹⁰ A.M.A.E.Fr., fond Guerre, Roumanie, N.a.E., vol. III, Copy of the Ed. Grey to Delcassé on October 13-th 1915.

¹¹ Lloyd, George, *Mémoires de Guerre*, vol. II (Paris, 1935) 10—11.

between the Salonic front and Romania's declaration of war. Romania wanted an offensive action of the army at Salonic, while the French and British staffs conditioned the action of the troops upon Romania's declaration of war.

In 1915 (autumn) the Romanian Government managed to evade the pressures exerted by the diplomacy of the Entente. But they knew that it was time to take a decision. As Lord Fitzmaurice stated in his article "Le silence roumain" published in "Le Figaro": "the hesitation is no longer possible. Romania looks forward to her victory, her glory, and her national unity. She will not let the opportunity slip. She cannot let it"¹². But at the beginning of 1916, Romania had to avoid the danger that came from the Triple Alliance that wanted the Romanian Government define its position more accurately. This resolute attitude was due to the 1916 trade agreement of the Romanian and British governments. According to that agreement England bought 80,000 waggon load of cereals from Romania. The trade agreement had a political significance. After the straits had been blockaded England had to deposit the cereals in her gangboards along the Danube until the end of the war. It became evident that the agreement was meant to diminish the opportunities of the Triple Alliance to buy cereals from Romania. Moreover the English could buy the cereals not only through the Romanian Sale Committee but also directly from the producers, from the peasants and merchants, i.e. from those social strata which had been affected by the restrictions of the Romanian Government. The direct contact with a great number of people brought about a positive attitude towards England.

In 1916 England played an important role in solving the conditions of the Romanian Government: the rhythmic provisioning of the Romanian army with modern war materials and the offensive action of the army at Salonic which had to precede Romania's declaration of war. As for the provisioning, the Romanian Government had to face serious difficulties. At the beginning of the war the diplomacy of the Entente received with reserves the possibility to provide with weapons a country which they considered an ally of the Triple Alliance, although a committee led by colonel Rudeanu had been carrying on negotiations with the western governments ever since 1914. In 1915 many agreements were concluded, but Serbia's defeat and occupation made impossible the transport of weapons across the south-east countries. So the weapons could be transported only through Arhanghelsk crossing Russia. On the 22nd of June 1916 the first ship loaded with ammunition (Mellsonme) sailed for Arhanghelsk.

The second condition, the offensive, of the troops from Salonic was of special interest for the Romanian Government. This offensive co-ordinated with the Russo-Romanian action in the Dobroudgea could offer a safe protection against a Bulgarian attack. The attitude of the British government was contrary to the plans of the Romanian Government, but in the end it proved to be in accordance with them. The British government did not want

¹² "Le Figaro", 3-e série, nr. 278/3 oct. 1915.

to commit itself towards the Romanian Government because it didn't believe in the offensive action of the troops in Salonic. However, the English played an important part in the concluding of the agreements with Romania on August 17th 1916. These agreements represented the first diplomatic success of the Entente in the south-east Europe. It was the first political and military agreement between Romania and Britain with important consequences. It opened a new era in the collaboration during the war. The Romanian Government had confidence in England's support and in the international sanction of the stipulations of the political convention.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ROMANIAN-ENGLISH RELATIONS (1916—1920)

BY

VALERIU FLORIN DOBRINESCU

In the period of "being in abeyance and ready to defend the frontiers"¹, which was the very synthesis of I. I. C. Brătianu's policy in achieving the national-statal unity, Great Britain, as well as its allies, made considerable efforts and pressures with a view to attracting Romania on the side of the Antanta. If France generally agreed that Russia should accept the conditions required by the Romanian Prime Minister, the English diplomacy opposed our demands which they considered to be "exaggerated"².

The sincere wish of the Romanian people to build up a unitary national state by not participating in the war, which was expressed by several political men including I. I. C. Brătianu was not attainable. In the context of the general situation, the only possibility to *integrally achieve the national ideal* was the manipulation of the international political situation. The creation of the unitary national state was not, to be sure, the work of one man or one generation. The aspiration of the Romanian people was translated into life by virtue of historical righteousness and by what ages on end had gathered up as force of will of all the generations. *But it was mostly I. I. C. Brătianu who launched some decisions and actions which preceded the century-old ideal as well as the decisions over Romania's policy during World War I*³.

During its neutrality, Romania found moral and material assistance in the English nation. Several statements were sent to London as early as 1915 and they gave voice to our legitimate claiming and insisted on the necessity of an integral national unity of Romania. These statements, which the leading circles in our country knew, detailed the reasons why we were late in entering the conflagration and also the difficulties we met with⁴. Although neutral, our country found understanding at the British authorities as far as the supply of military material or of any other material⁵ was concerned.

¹ The Central State Library, Bucharest, Fund Alex. St. Georges, Arch. Victor Antonescu, P.C./4—2, unpagged; The Library of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Arch. Titu Maiorescu, III Msse, ff. 3—6.

² C. Xeni, *Take Ionescu, 1858—1922* (Bucharest, "Universul", 1932) 327.

³ A. P. Samson, *Memoriile unui gazetar* (Bucharest, 1979) 14.

⁴ G. Moroianu, *Legăturile noastre cu Anglia. Scurtă privire asupra legăturilor anglo-române și asupra propagandei noastre în Anglterra din trecutul îndepărtat până astăzi* (Cluj 1923), 86—87.

⁵ The Archives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (we shall further quote Arch. M.F.A.), Fund 71, E2, London, 1914—1929, vol. 29, f. 104, telegram 1900 3rd/16 October 1915; from London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed by Nicolae Mișu.

The difficult transport and transit across the Scandinavian countries was of a nature to affect the rhythmical provisioning of Romania. In Sweden, a special law forbade any transit of war material. In spite of all this, Sweden's minister in London promised Nicolae Mișu that his country would facilitate the transit "on conditions that we guarantee the material would not be obtained by Russia"⁶.

As soon as Romania entered the conflagration the English government, in the commitments it had promised to make in August 1916, assisted our country with war material, ammunitions, armament⁷, etc. All the same, these were serious impediments as far as the transportation of such materials was concerned. Many of them never came into our country⁸, being retained on the territory of Russia⁹. As a matter of fact, the way Romania acted militarily, from August 1916, was determined by its distrust in Russia's final sincerity. The difficulties in supplying Romania with military material continued. Later on, David Lloyd George himself admitted that if Russia and Romania had been sufficiently equipped by England and France, they would not have been defeated¹⁰.

At the start of 1917 England offered Romania a 40 million pounds credit, by common consent of the Allies¹¹.

In the meantime, a strong echo had in England the propaganda launched by some political personalities and men of culture, particularly, those enrolled in *The Association of Romanian University Professors*¹². None of the Romanians' national requirements was disconsidered, such demands being warmly defended by indisputable scientific evidence. There were published books, leaflets and maps which were sent to political personalities in England; there were also delivered many conferences. As a result of these efforts, there was founded in London, in August 1917, *The English-Romanian Society*¹³ which played an important part in promoting bilateral relations, in the better knowing, by the English nation, of *the Romanians' aspirations towards unity*. To the society belonged such illustrious personalities in the religious, political, literary and economic life as: the archbishop of Canterbury, the earl of Bryce, Lord Hugh Cecil, Lord Dunedin, exminister, the bishops of London, Oxford and Winchester, the councillors of the Universities of London and Oxford, Lord Gladstone, Lord Baisboroug, W. Steed, R. W. Seton-Watson, Leeper (first secretary of the society), dr. Madge, professor

⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 108, telegram 1931, 8th/21st October 1915, N. Mișu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁷ Archives Ministry of National Defence (we shall further quote Arch. M.N.D.), Fund 3831, dossier no number, Position 92, f. 145, telegram 961, from London, signed Arion.

⁸ The Library of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Arch. Gen. Rudeanu, I Mss 1, vol. III, pp. 641—642, 666, 668.

⁹ Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Foreign Office* 371, 4705, ff. 17—19.

¹⁰ David Lloyd George, *Souvenirs de guerre. La victoire* (Paris, 1926) 276; the English historian W. N. Medlicott writes that the victory of the Entente much depends on Romania and Russia (*Contemporary England 1914—1964*, London, Longmans, 1967, 45).

¹¹ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, 1914—1924, London, vol. 29, telegram 173, 15th January 1917, from London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, f. 370, signed N. Mișu.

¹² The Central State Library, Fund Alex. St. Georges, Arch. Take Ionescu, XCVIII/8/4, Report to the Minister of Finance, ff. 104—105.

¹³ Arch. M.N.D. Fund 5418, dossier 161/64, 1918, Position 549, f. 45.

Murray and others. The society made our claiming known by means of press and organized many meetings, defending the Romanians' legitimate right to complete national unity.

Dr. N. Lupu, who lived for a longer period of time in Great Britain, worked intensely in order that the English public opinion might understand and agree to Romania's claiming. Likewise, Take Ionescu's first wife, Bessie Richards published, on July 12th 1917, *The Choise of Romania* which defended the Romanians' right to national unity.

As far as the legitimate national aspirations of the Romanian people were concerned, several English personalities held favourable views as early as the wartime. *The Balfour statement* entitled *The Settlement of Peace in Europe* referred to the foundation of a Great Romania in the South-East of Europe¹⁴. During their visit in the U.S.A. the Balfour mission informed the American diplomacy as to England's intentions about the future of Romania which, in the opinion of the *Foreign Office*, had "to get the possessions of a minimal part of the Russian territories and also of the Hungarian zone frontier which is inhabited by Romanians on either side"¹⁵.

The Prime Minister David Lloyd George considered that Romania had to get back all its territory. In January 1917 he told Nicolae Mișu that his country thought of Romania as "an important ally whom England would do its best to assist efficiently, mainly by the way to get ammunition". The leader of the British government said that "the Romanians would become again masters of their own country and they would achieve their *national ideal*", England being "the sincere protector of the small countries"¹⁶. Similar declarations were made by Lord Cecil in the House of Commons¹⁷ and Asquith during a meeting which took place in Leeds¹⁸.

The British Minister of Foreign Affairs had also been informed about Romania's situation and its claiming by a statement made by Professor George Moroianu on September 24th 1918. These were mentioned in this document the war efforts our country had made, as well as the will of all Romanians that they should join, after the conflagration, their original country¹⁹. The English government was informed as well, about the way the coinhabiting nationalities were to be treated after the Union. The correspondence that followed after this document was issued brought its significance into stronger relief and illustrated the interest the English political circles took in the national problems of the Transylvanian Romanians, and also in the evaluation of our people's real contribution to the war against the Central Powers during World War I. A.W.A. Leeper, secretary of the Prime Minister and B.B.C. Sheridan high clerk in the Intelligence Service appreciated the statement as "extremely well done" and "exceptionally useful"²⁰, insisting on Ro-

¹⁴ David Lloyd George, *Mémoires de guerre*, tome II (Paris, 1935) 329.

¹⁵ Col. House, *Papiers intimes*, t. III, Publiés par Ch. Seymour, (Paris, 1930), 58.

¹⁶ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, 1914-1924, vol. 29, London, f. 374, telegram 74, 21st January 1917, from London, N. Mișu to Take Ionescu.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, telegram 1486, 15th May 1917, N. Mișu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, f. 433.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 488, telegram 3287, 14th September 1917, N. Mișu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁹ G. Moroianu, *Les luttes des Roumains Transylvains pour la liberté et l'opinion européenne* (Paris, 1933) 242-259.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, 202-203.

mania's righteous wish to see its ideal of national unity fully achieved. Our representative was closely connected at that time with W. Steed and R. W. Seton-Watson, supporters of the Romanians' national cause, and published in the "Times" various notes and articles. His visit was only the beginning of a series of other visits by exponents of the Romanians' national struggle: Oct. Goga, Sever Bocu, Avram Imbroane, Ioan Sîrbu.

The victories the Romanian army obtained in the summer of 1917 were highly appreciated by the English newspapers and by many political men in this country. Lord Roberts and Lord Cecil mentioned in their declarations, "the splendid service of the Romanian Government and Army". The "Daily Graphic", the "L'Enock Telegraph", the "Liverpool Daily", the "Teachers' World", the "Morning Post" commented on the services the Romanian army brought to the Allies and also referred to the necessity that Romania should be assisted materially and militarily²¹. In his turn, David Lloyd George in a speech he delivered in Paris on November 12th 1917 did not fail to observe that there was no coordination and unity in the conceptions and strategic actions of the Allies, thus intuiting the military future of Romania²².

As to the conclusion of the armistice on the Oriental front the English government was at the beginning a little puzzled. However, on December 21st 1917, the four allied ministers: Sir George Barklay, Charles Vopicka, the Marquis of St. Aulaire, and the baron of Fasciotti admitted of the "extremely difficult situation of Romania"²³. There was, to be sure, some difference between armistice and separate peace but under the circumstances of the Russian revolution and having no possibility at all to receive any assistance, the latter was the fatal consequence of the former²⁴. A document issued at that time specified that "a similar situation to Romania's would be difficult to find in history. It cannot be judged by ordinary criteria. Our territory being under occupation and our military forces being counter balanced by the Russians, our only chance to survive is *the victory of the Allies* we are forced to adopt this line of thoughts when seeing what happened when we took the decision of signing the armistice, and having the experience of so many cases in which our Allies' generous intentions failed to have useful effects in due time"²⁵.

The Romanian nation, the correspondent of the "Times", Brown, wrote "wishes to continue the war. Especially the army at the front does not believe that a non-victorious peace with the enemy is possible after the terrible sacrifice at Mărăști and Oituz". He thought that, after the conclusion of the armistice by the Russians, there was nothing left for the Romanians but doing the same thing. He also considered that the Romanian political men appreciated the start of the talks with the Central Powers" as a purely military measure, dictated by circumstances and having no political importance

²¹ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, f. 10, vol. 90, 1914, telegram 240/61, 3rd November 1917, Major Arion to I. I. C. Brătianu.

²² *Ibidem*, f. 5, telegram 234/11, 2nd November 1917, from London, Major Arion to I. I. C. Brătianu.

²³ Gh. Brătianu, *Acțiunea politică și militară a României în 1919 în lumina corespondenței diplomatice a lui I. I. C. Brătianu*, Second Edition (Bucharest, 1940) 27.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, 29.

²⁵ State Archives Bucharest, The Royal House Fund, Ferdinand, dossier 44, 1919, ff. 1-2.

whatsoever. Romania intends and is determined to be loyal to the Allies" ²⁵. From London, the minister Nicolae Mișu transmitted that the English political circles were convinced that *Romania had not been able to resist* ²⁷.

The peace treaty with Germany and its Allies was not only the result of Romania's insufficient preparation ²⁸ but it mainly originated in the overturn of front which took place in the South East of Europe beginning with the end of 1917 ²⁹. Concerning the new circumstances, the English ambassador in Paris, Lord Derby, told our minister in the capital of France that England was "the power which opposed to the recognition of Romania's quality of an allied country" ³⁰. Such a decision contradicted the declarations Balfour made in the spring of 1918. On March 11th, after his return to London, the leader of the English diplomacy sent our minister in Great Britain a note which read: "I wish to assure you that His Royal Majesty's Government has the greatest sympathy towards the Romanian Government in the present situation; it watches carefully and worries about the course of events in Bucharest" ³¹. On the occasion of the party the Lord Mayor gave Balfour mentioned that Romania had been forced to make peace with the Central Powers ³². In the House of Commons, on April 10th, he declared that "Romania was still an Ally" ³³.

After the conclusion of peace in Bucharest, there is a coldness in England relations with Romania as well as a certain slowness in Britain's fulfilment of the financial obligations it had taken upon itself ³⁴. The Romanian chargé d'affaires in London, Mihai Boerescu, was positive that the English government "would not agree to observing some commitments towards Romania as an ally" ³⁵.

During the war it was Take Ionescu who had the most intense political contacts with the representatives of the *Foreign Office* and the British press ³⁶. In his visits to London, in August and October 1918, the Romanian diplomat was accompanied by N. Titulescu, the former being granted an audience by David Lloyd George and Arthur James Balfour ³⁷.

In November 1918, answering Take Ionescu's letter, the leader of the English diplomacy promised again that, at the Peace Congress, England "would give all its sympathy and assistance to the general principle of Ro-

²⁶ Arch. M.N.D., Fund 3831, dossier 357, 1916—1918, Position 228, 11th December 1917, f. 43.

²⁷ C. Xeni, *op. cit.*, 32.

²⁸ State Archives Bucharest, The Royal House Fund, Ferdinand, dossier 77, 1918, f. 1.

²⁹ *Idem*, dossier 91, 1918, ff. 6—11.

³⁰ Gh. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, 32.

³¹ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, 1914—1924, vol. 29, f. 509, London, Radiogram 639, 3rd/16th, March 1918, Mihail Boerescu to General Averescu.

³² *Ibidem*, f. 518, telegram 802, 8th April 1918, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed Boerescu.

³³ *Ibidem*, f. 519, telegram 826 11th, April 1918, from London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed Boerescu.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 512, telegram 788, 23rd March 1918, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed Boerescu.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 510, telegram 747, 22nd March/4th April 1918, from London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, signed Boerescu.

³⁶ The Central State Library Bucharest, Arch. M. Boerescu, PXLVII, dossier 1, no page.

³⁷ C. Xeni, *op. cit.*, 417

manian unity (o.u.)³⁸. England recognized the National Council of the Romanian Unity on November 11th 1918 by the letter A. J. Balfour sent to T. Ionescu. In the same letter it was specified that the British government received favourably the development of its relations with our country, whose efforts "*are so profoundly appreciated in England (o.u.)*"³⁹.

A problem on which the success of our claiming at the Peace Conference depended highly was the composition of the Romanian delegation. Besides the prime minister who was to be the chief of the delegation, as established by the former French-British talks, we had to include diplomats with political experience, well-known and appreciated in Paris and London. This necessity was sensed by Mihai Boerescu who, in a radiogram on November 15th/28th 1918 showed the importance, for our national interest, to designate the principal delegates to the Conference. "In London and Paris, he transmitted, the names of the ministers Nicolae Mișu and Take Ionescu are unanimously considered to be trustful, by any government"⁴⁰. The conclusion of the Romanian diplomat was also based on the fact that he had been told at the *Foreign Office* that "you do not know you have the best representative in minister Mișu whose authority is unanimously recognized and who deserves all our trust"⁴¹. He had been told the same things at the embassy of France in the capital of England.

Considering this detail as well, and wanting Romania's national interests to be defended by capable men who enjoyed great prestige in the capitals of the principal powers of the Antanta, King Ferdinand I, acting on the council of his close collaborators included in the Romanian delegation to the Peace Conference such personalities as I. I. C. Brătianu, Take Ionescu and Nicolae Mișu who had won quite a fame in the defence of our rights. On December 3rd, through a telegram he sent to the Romanian minister in Paris, I. I. C. Brătianu asked Take Ionescu to come back home "*in order to set down exact instructions concerning the attitude at the Congress [...] leaving aside the party attitude which should not compromise the unity of political action, more necessary than ever at the time (o.u.)*"⁴². Take Ionescu would not return to the country because there were, between himself and the Romanian prime minister, great differences of opinions concerning the military relations with the Allies and the content of the treaties we had concluded with the Antanta. To Take Ionescu's mind, policy was "the art of possibilities" and that is why he did not think that a careful examination of Romania's situation was necessary. The conceptions of the two political men were irreconcilable.

The Romanian-English relations strengthened after Romania's entrance in the first world conflagration. The British diplomacy watched carefully the efforts Romania made during the war and drew up, on a political and

³⁸ G. Moroianu, *Les luttes...*, 224.

³⁹ The Central State Library, Bucharest, Fund Alex. St. Georges, Arch. V. Antonescu, PCLXXXIV/7—25, telegram, from Paris, 18th November, to the President of the Council of Ministers, signed Cretzeanu, unpaged.

⁴⁰ Idem, Arch. M. Boerescu, PXLVII, unpaged.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*.

⁴² Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, E2, dossier 222, f. 1, telegram, 3rd/16th December 1918, I. I. C. Brătianu to Cretzeanu.

diplomatic plan, projects concerning the postwar reorganisation of Europe⁴³. Great Romania held an important place in such projects. The events at the end of 1917 and the conclusions of peace in Bucharest had, as far as the bilateral Romanian-English relations are concerned, unfavourable consequences on Romania's national interests. The British diplomacy launched the idea that our country was not an ally, which had significant consequential effects on Romania's relations with the Great Powers, mainly during the works of the Peace Conference in the capital of France. In Paris, England's strong economic and financial interests influenced the attitude of its diplomacy towards Romania's claiming.

At the end of the first world conflagration, the representatives of our country went to Paris to present, for confirmation and international recognition, before the Great Powers and the peace forum in the capital of France, the *Plebiscitary Decisions of Union* on March 27th/April 9th, November 15th/28th and December 1st 1918. The recognition, for several times, by diplomats of the Antanta, of the principle of the self-determination of peoples and *Romania's legitimate righteousness to its national unity*⁴⁴, the affirmation of new norms of international relations which were to lie at the basis of the post-war inter-statal relations, were of a nature to increase the trust of Romania, and of other small and middle countries, in the work the Peace Conference was on the point of achieving.

Romania came to Paris conscious that it had fulfilled the international obligations it had taken upon itself during the war and had made enormous human and material sacrifices. So, our country, from a number of 7.5 million inhabitants, lost in the years 1916-1918 about 10% of all its population⁴⁵. In order to be able to take part in the war Romania had contracted borrowings of over 2.5 billion gold lei and the public debt, both internal and external, coming out of this rose to 72,643,191,077⁴⁶. Also the Romanian military contribution to the victory of the Allies in 1918 was quite considerable⁴⁷.

The Great Powers admitted at the beginning of 1919 that our country was an ally "on the same footing as Serbia, Belgium and Greece". The Romanian minister in Paris, Victor Antonescu, observed that the difference, in favour of Belgium and Serbia and at the expense of Romania, was of an "English origin"⁴⁸ and hoped that France would not accept such a position. Indeed, the idea of arbitrarily dividing the states came from the English prime minister David Lloyd George. According to this decision, subsequently adopted by the other Great Powers, each country meant before the Peace

⁴³ C. Xeni, *op. cit.*, 385.

⁴⁴ State Archives Bucharest, the Collection of Microfilms, U.S.A., Records of the Department of State relating to World War I and its termination (1914-1929), Microcopy 367, r. 62, vol. 59; *Ibidem*, rola 633, c. 747. The Library of Congress Presidential Papers, Microfilm Woodrow Wilson Papers, 1915, 1921, rola 345, f. 3183; *idem*, Great Britain, rola 390, c. 757.

⁴⁵ Mircea M. Popa, *Primul război mondial (1914-1918)* (București, 1979) 470.

⁴⁶ Gh. M. Dobrovici, *Istoricul dezvoltării economice și financiare a României. Împrumuturile contractate 1823-1933* (București, 1933) 477.

⁴⁷ Public Record Office Foreign Office 371/4705, 1920, telegram, 2nd September 1920, F. J. Duncan to F. Rattigan, ff. 15-16.

⁴⁸ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 223, f. 5, Radiogram 47/6, 19th January 1919, from Paris, V. Antonescu to I. I. C. Brătianu.

Conference exactly how much its military power meant—it was thus created a discriminatory category of “states with limited interests” a theory against which it was not only the leader of the Romanian delegation that rose and indicted. Such a situation made the military attaché in Romania, C. B. Thomson, observe that “the neutrality that the so-called democratic governments possessed, maybe unconsciously, was not very far from the neutrality of the autocratic empires in whose opinions the small countries and the poor peoples were negligible factors”⁴⁹.

The Romanian delegation was unfavourably received in Paris, they were repeatedly hurt and being done wrong⁵⁰, which made a contemporary exclaim that we passed through a “nightmare of peace”. Among others, Romania was accused of having signed the peace treaty with the Central Powers—consequently, it had no right whatsoever to the claiming it had made before the conference. In this context, the Take Ionescu — I. I. C. Brătianu dispute was used by the Allies against our country's national demands.

Speaking up on our behalf, I. I. C. Brătianu showed with emphasis that he was talking “in the name of Romania's right to national unity”⁵¹. The Romanian political man explained what was necessary about the peace in Bucharest and demanded the frontiers which were to assure the liberty of our administrative, political and economic existence and also the development “in the sense of a national conscience”⁵². After proving that the new historical provinces which were being united to the country, in their integrity, cannot be discussed upon without injuring “the essential conditions of our development”⁵³ I. I. C. Brătianu insisted that the Great Powers were making compromises “at the expense of the small countries”⁵⁴, which was endangering their future of national security.

A first moment bringing about a tension in Romania's relations with the Great Powers was the signing of the Versailles Treaty with Germany, a document which was handed to our delegation five minutes before they had to enter the Conference hall⁵⁵. The problem of the reparations was unsatisfactorily solved up, Romania's interests, mainly, being disconsidered⁵⁶. Although our country was paid but little attention in this treaty, I. I. C. Brătianu signed it nevertheless, “not to break down the harmony”, the more so as our country “was not very interested in the problem of Germany”⁵⁷. But the leader of the Romanian delegation was determined that, after the conclusion of the other treaties, especially with Austria and Hungary, he should no longer tolerate any compromises. I. I. C. Brătianu also expressed his

⁴⁹ Boris Ranghet, *Relațiile româno-americane în anii primului război mondial, 1916—1918* (Cluj-Napoca, 1975) 168.

⁵⁰ V. F. Dobrinescu, *Anglia și România în timpul Conferinței de Pace de la Paris (1919—1920)*, “Anuarul Muzeului Județean Vaslui”, II, 1980, 353—374.

⁵¹ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 222, ff. 82—83.

⁵² *Ibidem*.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, f. 89.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, ff. 138—146; *D.B.F.P.*, First Series, vol. I, 1919 (London, 1947) 7—11.

⁵⁵ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 222, f. 152.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 153, telegram, from Paris, 14th May 1919, I. I. C. Brătianu to Mihai Pherekyde.

⁵⁷ E. Bold, *Unele probleme privind participarea delegației române la Conferința Păcii de la Paris (1919—1920)* „Analele științifice ale Universității „Al. I. Cuza”, Iași, Istorie, tom XIV, 1968, 27, 45.

dissatisfaction in the presence of France's minister of foreign affairs, Stephen Pichon, and Italy's representative, the latter promising that his government would help us⁵⁸. French political men like A. Thomas, L. Bourgeois, A. Briand, Ribot, Painlevé admitted that the arguments invoked by the Romanian prime minister were quite right, which did not prevent the Great Powers from taking decisions in the important problems of the small states on a "completely empirical and understandable" basis⁵⁹.

The content of the treaty with Austria, mainly the articles affecting the independence and sovereignty of the Romanian state provoked a straining in our country's relations with the Great Powers. The position of the Romanian delegation was brought into stronger relief during the plenary meeting on May 31st 1919. Taking the floor, I. I. C. Brătianu, after showing that our representatives considered that the conclusion of peace with Austria left no doubt about Bucovina joining Romania, made concrete proposals concerning the modifications of some articles⁶⁰. Showing that our government vouchsafed all the minorities living within the new frontiers the same rights as to the other Romanian citizens, I. I. C. Brătianu rejected the tutorship of the Great Powers over the small states. His observations on the financial clauses of the St. Germain Treaty referred to the fact that it was not, fair and in the spirit of the international rights that the states ceding territories, of the old monarchies or created after they dissolved themselves, should for the goods and the properties of the ex-Austrian-Hungarian government⁶¹. The Romanian political man was convinced that such conditions would not be accepted because we inherited an independent country and didn't need to sacrifice our independence. The position of the Romanian Government was appreciated by the leaders of the delegations of the other small countries, and also by many personalities in France, Italy and U.S.A.

The following day, our representatives communicated the Conference, through a statement, that the problem of the minorities had been solved up by the Romanian Government "in the most complete manner and in the most fair spirit". It was also specified that the interference of the great powers was "useless and dangerous", because of being "imposed from the outside"⁶². Mention must be made that it was England that had the initiative in the problem of the minorities. David Lloyd George wrote that "at the end of April 1919 a statement was made by the Economic Section of the British delegation at the Peace Conference which required that *a certain way of guarantees should be imposed on the new states, concerning the interests of the populations entering their jurisdiction. The immediate case was Poland*"⁶³. In Paris, the English initiative enjoyed much assistance, mainly from the Americans.

I. I. C. Brătianu understood, at the time, that the English policy, towards our country was still "reserved" and "but little understanding"⁶⁴. What

⁵⁸ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 222, f. 153, telegram, from Paris, 14th 1919, I. I. C. Brătianu to M. Pherekyde.

⁵⁹ H. Nicolson, *Quand on faisait la Paix* (Paris, 1936) 46.

⁶⁰ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, vol. 57, f. 67.

⁶¹ Idem, dossier 222, f. 176.

⁶² *Ibidem*, f. 185.

⁶³ Gh. Brătianu, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁶⁴ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 121, f. 28.

characterised it, the Prime Minister affirmed, in a report he sent by courier to Mihai Pherekyde, was "the ignorance of the continental affairs caused by the fact that the great results of the war had already been obtained by England through annexing the colonies and destroying the German fleet"⁶⁵. On such grounds he considered a discussion of ours with David Lloyd George as "very embarrassing". He thought, however, that we could count on Churchill, Curzon and Bonar Law, our talks with them not being "without any effect"⁶⁶.

England and United States manifested towards our demands a generally identical⁶⁷ attitude which did not exclude in the least great differences of opinion in some other matters. The attitude of the British diplomacy towards Romania was dictated to some extent, by the implications of the Soviet problem which so much haunted David Lloyd George⁶⁸. A certain disinterest of the English Prime Minister in the international policy was but apparent⁶⁹.

After a short visit in London, I. I. C. Brătianu observed that dissatisfaction with the Americans was so visible in the capital of England that "Paris really has the feeling the delays of peace in general engender great discomforts in what concerns us (o.u.)"⁷⁰.

Romania's Prime Minister insisted again in the *Comission for studying the territorial problems of Romania* that our demands from an ethnographical, political and economic point of view should be satisfied"⁷¹. During the meeting on June 5th 1919, I. I. C. Brătianu showed that the concept of "limited interest" is misused with reference to the small countries. The small countries, the Romanian Prime Minister considered "have no limited interests, it is their influence that is limited. *The military power of a country should be conceived in relation with its frontiers and neighbourhood (o.u.)*"⁷². Our representative demanded that the evaluation of a state's military forces should be made after *knowing the frontiers*. The demonstration was taken over by Italy's prime minister, Orlando.

Although the Romanian officials considered the minority clause contrary to the "sovereign rights"⁷³ of our country, it was very difficult to change anything because all the treaties that the Great Powers had to sign together with the small states, including Romania, had already been made⁷⁴. At our new protests, the Conference admitted of a small change of article 68, which meant very little if compared to the objections⁷⁵. Such delegates as the minister of foreign affairs Balfour suggested that Romania should be announced it would not receive the territory under discussion unless it had

⁶⁵ Idem, vol. 222, f. 118, Radiogram, 25th March 1919, from Paris, I. I. C. Brătianu to M. Pherekyde.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁷ H. Nicolson *op. cit.*, 46.

⁶⁸ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 222, f. 118.

⁶⁹ Idem, dossier 181 f. 124, telegram 233, from Paris 21st March 1919, signed I. I. C. Brătianu.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*, f. 94.

⁷² Paul Mantoux, *Les Délibérations du Conseil des Quatres (24 mars—28 juin 1919)* (Paris, 1955), vol. II, 315, 190, 321.

⁷³ *D.B.F.P.*, First Series, vol. IV, 20—21.

⁷⁴ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 58, f. 115, telegram, from Paris, 20th July 1919, V. Antonescu to I. I. C. Brătianu.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, ff. 118—121.

accepted the minority clause and signed the Treaty⁷⁶. The representatives of the states shared this view⁷⁷. The leader of the French diplomacy, St. Pichou, like the Romanian minister in Paris, Victor Antonescu, knew that *Willson and Lloyd insist that this treaty (with Austria) should not be changed and France was not the only one, unfortunately, to determine the policy of the Conference as to Romania (o.u.)*⁷⁸.

As for the attitude of the Conference in the problem of the Treaty with Austria, I. I. C. Brătianu decided to leave Paris, considering that our country was "a sovereign state whose independence had not been questioned about by anybody". Romania's position in the problem of the St. Germain Treaty was highly appreciated by the French press and by some English newspapers ("The Times", "Morning Post", "Globe", "Liverpool Courier", "Daily Chronicle"). The U.S.A. and England were considered to be "authors of the aggressive policy of the Conference towards Romania"⁷⁹. The Great Powers stuck to their negative attitude towards Romania, and on September 10th 1919 the Treaty with Austria was signed without the signatures of the Romanian and Serbian delegates 12th 1919, maintained the same intransigent line towards the decisions of the Conference. The decisions of the Supreme Council on October 12th November 3rd and 7th, as well as George Clark's mission in Bucharest meant to determine a change in Romania's attitude towards the peace forum in Paris. A new note of the nature of an ultimatum was sent to our country on November 15th 1919. In its answer, the Romanian Government declared to be bitterly impressed by its content and also by the fact that "*the equality in rights of all nations, large and small*" was utterly disconsidered. Romania showed that "*its rights were disconsidered and its enormous sacrifices were not mentioned at all*"⁸⁰ and announced that it was ready to sign the Treaty with Austria if the Supreme Council would accept to take into account, in its answer, the fact that our country "*did not understand to adhere to the stipulations which affect the sovereignty of the state and its independence (o.u.)*"⁸¹.

After further pressure from the Allies⁸², Romania decided to sign the St. Germain Treaty, the financial settlements and the Treaty with Bulgaria⁸³, after which, on December 22nd 1919, the Supreme Council authorized the renewal of the economic relations with our country⁸⁴.

After the setting up of the Hungarian Republic of Councils, the new authorities, in spite of the provisions of the Belgrade armistice strengthened the army, called its citizens to arms and attacked Romania twice⁸⁵. The first attack against our armies which were east of the Tisa was launched on July

⁷⁶ D.B.F.P., First Series, vol. I, 279.

⁷⁷ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 58, f. 264.

⁷⁸ Idem, dossier 224, Radiogram, 21st August 1919, ff. 216–217.

⁷⁹ The Central State Library, Fund Al. St. Georges, Arch. V. Antonescu, PCXXIV, dossier 5, telegram 147; Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 224, f. 243.

⁸⁰ The Library of the Academy, Arch. Gh. Kirileanu, Palace, XXXII, Varia 2, ff. 15–20.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*.

⁸² D.B.F.P., First Series, vol. II, 480–481.

⁸³ *Ibidem*, p. 562; *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* vol. 1, 1919 (Washington, 1934) 28.

⁸⁴ D.B.F.P., First Series, vol. II, 589.

⁸⁵ Arch. M.N.D., Fund 3831, dossier unnumbered, 1919, Position 2587, f. 16.

20th 1919. In this context, the Romanian troops entered Hungary, at the consent of and on the suggestion of the Allies, an event which made the international situation in this region very complicated.

The discussions on July 11th 1919 meant to settle down the Romanian-Hungarian frontier⁸⁶. The Council of the ministers of foreign affairs, taking into account I. I. C. Brătianu's suggestion, announced the frontier line between Romania and Hungary; our political man had found that there were "very great differences, mainly in the extremities", which made him unable to take a conclusive decision all by himself. At the same time he regretfully observed that "*the settlement of the frontier was made without our participation*"⁸⁷. On the same occasion, Balfour said that "the established frontiers were good for peace time but not as good from a strategic point of view". The English political man did not think that the Romanians could be asked to retreat themselves "before the Hungarians evacuated the Czechoslovakian territory"⁸⁸. Wilson showed his reserve towards this opinion and considered that "we could tell the Romanians. If you do not observe our decision we shall cease to support your demands and you will stay outside the Peace Treaty"⁸⁹. The answer of the leader of the British diplomacy did not fail to come soon: "you will be able to act this way but, in fact, *you will place again Romanian populations under Hungarian domination*". He was afraid that, if postponed (the establishment of the frontiers) "great inconveniences" might take place. "*I do not think it is fair to change what has been decided. The President will take a decision (o.u.)*"⁹⁰.

Neither did the Allies have a common line towards Romania. On August 14th 1919, Balfour, after considering the report of the Romanian Government to be "satisfactory", showed that Romania "*had had many arguments which had to be discussed upon and, eventually, had to be given an answer (o.u.)*"⁹¹. On the same occasion, Italy's representative, Tittoni, said that "the attack of the Hungarian army was a sheer violation of the armistice"⁹².

Meanwhile, four commissions of experts-English, French, Italian and American⁹³, drew our frontiers with Hungary, *the closest to the provisions of the 1916 Treaty being the one established by the British team*. The four lines were finally examined and, after some compromise, the frontier was mapped — the Romanian Government was informed about it as late as October 12th 1919. The Hungarian delegate, Appony, gave the English prime minister a map drawn by Pal Teleky, in order to obtain a change of the frontier lines established by the commission of experts. But David Lloyd George did not approve of any modification⁹⁴.

⁸⁶ Arch. M.F.A., Fund the Peace Conference, dossier 222, f. 207.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁸ *Les Délibérations...*, vol. 2, 415—416.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁹¹ *D.B.F.P.*, First Series, vol. 1, 409.

⁹² *Ibidem*, 410.

⁹³ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 58, f. 235, telegram 2nd September 1919.

⁹⁴ „Familia”, Seria a III-a, anul VII, 3—4, Mart-April 1940, pp. 15—16.

Another moment which brought into relief the Romanian-English relations was Al. Vaida-Voievod's visit to London, "an observation post of the first order"⁹⁵ in the understanding of the international relations. Before the start of the discussions, the English press concerned itself with our problems. As shown by the report of the Press Bureau in London, on February 20th 1920, whilst newspapers of a limited distribution were "against us" the great quotidiens showed "interest and understanding to the cause of the Romanians"⁹⁶. The conservatory "The Times" on February 14th 1920, for example lashed out its satire, in an article, against "the perfidious Hungarian propaganda" and underlined the fact that in the capital of Great Britain "the presence of some notorious Magyar agents had been tolerated under insignificant pretexts". The Tory newspaper showed simultaneously that "Balfour condemned the Hungarian propaganda"⁹⁷, which was not limited, in England, to parliamentary circles and press. Several Hungarian messengers went on a tour of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and Birmingham⁹⁸. "The Times" and "The Daily Telegraph" published many articles about the Romanian-Hungarian relations; the former protested against the Magyar propaganda in England against "*the right cause of Romania, Serbia and Czechoslovakia* Great Britain's allies, who greatly contributed to the happy denouement of the Great War"⁹⁹; the latter in an article entitled *Romania's Politics. The Confessional minorities. The Jewish Question*¹⁰⁰, described the fair way our country treated the minorities in Transylvania. They enjoyed perfect liberty, just like the Jews in fact.

Concerning the Romanian problems, England's prime minister, being questioned by two members on the Parliament, considered their "accusations" of Romania's policy as "groundless". A member of the House of Commons, Maclean, who asked for a change of the frontiers in favour of Hungary, was answered by Balfour: "the frontiers are the best possible and they were drawn an eye to economic, ethnical and military reasons"—they were "mapped out by the Commission of the experts after a detailed research"¹⁰¹.

Al. Vaida-Voievod who was well received in London took part in the Conference of the Allied Powers. The leader of the Romanian Government found in London a rather tense international atmosphere¹⁰². In this context, the Romanian political man expected that the national demands of our country would be ultimately accepted by the Allies. He recommended that the Romanian diplomacy should "fight against any tendency to create a Confederacy of the Danube" and added that the efforts of Hungary, "which works with all its force, can be successfully paralysed". Our country, Al. Vaida-Voievod said, "*belongs to no coalition. Only in such a manner can we defend its interests and existence (o.u.)*"¹⁰³.

⁹⁵ The Central State Library, Fund Al. St. Georges, Arch. Take Ionescu, CXXV/14, letter on 10th January 1920, Titulescu to Take Ionescu, ff. 6—7.

⁹⁶ *D.B.F.P.* First Series, vol. 2, 932—934.

⁹⁷ Arch. M.D.N., Fund 3831, dossier 128, 1919, Position 2894, f. 12.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 16.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, f. 12.

¹⁰⁰ *Idem*, Fund 876, dossier 20, 1920, Position 661, f. 1.

¹⁰¹ *Idem*, Fund 3831, dossier 128, 1919, Position 2894, ff. 9—10, 55.

¹⁰² Arch. M.F.A. Fund 71, England, Relations with Romania, vol. 39, 1920—1937, f. 49, telegram 293/203/24th, February 1920, Al. Vaida-Voievod to Ștefan Cicio Pop.

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*.

In London, Al. Vaida-Voievod participated, on February 26th and March 3rd 1920, in the Conference of the Allied Powers. In the first meeting the leader of the government showed the difficulties which were facing Romania because some 1918 Union acts had not been sanctioned by the Allied Powers¹⁰⁴. During the meeting on March 3rd 1920 Al. Vaida-Voievod agreed to signing the peace with the Soviets, if the Conference recognized the completeness of Romania's national unity¹⁰⁵. The Romanian political man had further talks with Balfour and also with the leaders of the French and Italian governments.

The talks in London concerning the conclusion of the treaty with Hungary were extremely interesting, especially after a telegram sent by Nitti, which referred to the re-examination of the frontiers in favour of this country¹⁰⁶. Taken over by the Council, the problem raised lively discussions. Lord Curzon presented a memorandum whose conclusions were drawn with the assent of the French government, which had considered the problem *completely solved up and thought that it was highly unlikely that slight local modifications should be admitted at the moment of the delimiting operations*¹⁰⁷. At the Foreign Office, Mihai Boerescu was given fresh assurance that we could as much consider this question as "closed and decided upon in our favour" and in what concerns the economic clauses" it would only suffer slight modifications"¹⁰⁸.

The conference of the ministers of foreign affairs and the ambassadors, presided by Lord Curzon decided on March 8th 1920 that the project of the Treaty with Hungary should stay as such in what concerns the territorial, military, financial and transit clauses. The problems still under the debate of the commissions of experts, after this date, were not of a nature to bring any prejudice to Romania's essential interests¹⁰⁹. The demand of the Hungarian delegation that (plebiscitary) "popular consultations" should occur was rejected as groundless. The authors of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary accepted in fact the unquestionable value of the plebiscitary Decisions in October, November and December 1918. The Peace Treaty with Hungary was concluded on June 4th 1920—on part of our country it was signed by dr. I. Cantacuzino and N. Titulescu. It was ratified by the Romanian legislative forums on the 17th and respectively the 26th of August, the same year¹¹⁰.

The ratification of the Trianon Treaty by the law-giving forums in Great Britain was another opportunity for the reactionary circles in this country to undermine the Decisions of the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, in the House of Commons there were expressed lucid opinions, according to the historical realities. So, presenting the project of law for the ratification

¹⁰⁴ D.B.F.P., First Series, vol. 7, 1920, 263—265.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibidem*, 379.

¹⁰⁶ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, England, Relations with Romania, vol. 39, 1920—1937, f. 43, telegram 409, 2nd March 1920, Al. Vaida-Voievod to Ștefan Cicio Pop and Nicolae Iorga.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, telegram 609, 22nd March 1920, from London, signed M. Boerescu.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰⁹ V. Moîșuc, *Tratatul de la Trianon — consacrare internațională a legitimității Unirii Transilvaniei cu România*, "Anale de istorie", 3, 1976, 55.

¹¹⁰ "Monitorul Oficial" (The "Official Monitor"), partea I, nr. 136, 21st September 1920, 4710.

of the Trianon Treaty, the secretary of state Harmsworth rightly emphasized that the "reign of Hungary had largely dissolved itself before the start of the works of the Peace Conference" because this country, he went on "was nothing but an artificial conglomerate of unsimilar and sometimes hostile races"¹¹¹. Sir Samuel Hoare and Lord Curzon spoke in almost identical terms.

After I. I. C. Brătianu's resignation, the government leaders who succeeded him, particularly Al. Vaida-Voievod, tried to create a favourable basis for the relations between the two states. The efforts of Al. Vaida-Voievod and Take Ionescu, supported by the British officials, were happily awarded by the signing of the Trianon Treaty on June 4th 1920 and, on October 28th, of the Paris Proceedings.

At the Peace Conference the problem of the Romanian oil was of highest importance for the winning side¹¹². The term of *oil diplomacy*¹¹³ came now into prominence and its effects were sensibly felt especially during the side-negotiations. Manysided and stringent factors required, as early as 1919–1920, that our state should initiate a *national program* of oil policy. It was the true expression of the interest of the autochthonous bourgeoisie and responded to some of Romania's major commandments.

As early as the end of 1918, England showed its interest in the fate of the Romanian oil¹¹⁴. In a letter addressed to I. I. C. Brătianu, on December 22nd 1918, Sir G. Barklay protested in the name of the British Legacy in Bucharest against our country's levying a distraint upon the *Astra Română* company, reminding us that "two or three English companies are much implied in its fate" and "in fact the *Schell Company* possessed a great deal of its stock"¹¹⁵.

In Paris, England was concerned about the Romanian oil, its position towards our problems at the Peace Conference being governed by the need to secure the English interests in this industry¹¹⁶. The Romanian Prime Minister, who went to London in March 1919 became wise to the British intentions. He let Mihai Pherekyde know that "*oil is as important there as in Paris (o.u.)*"¹¹⁷.

During his talks with some French officials I. I. C. Brătianu was greatly surprized, when discussing upon the effects of the financial borrowing our country had solicited, to be asked about a "*declaration refering to oil*"¹¹⁸. The Romanian prime minister rejected it indignantly and told Clotz and Sargent that the problem of oil implies a cooperation of the French and the Romanians but "it does not permit us to promise anything in this con-

¹¹¹ V. Moisuc, *op. cit.*, 56.

¹¹² Gh. Buzatu, *România și trusturile petroliere internaționale pînă la 1929* (Iași, 1981), 111–126.

¹¹³ Idem, *Problema petrolului românesc la Conferința Păcii de la Paris din 1919*, "Anuarul Institutului de istorie și arheologie A. D. Xenopol", XV/1978, 228.

¹¹⁴ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier, 58, f. 13, Radiogram, from Paris, 5th December 1918, signed Boerescu, Cretzeanu.

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 67, telegram 22, December 1918, from England's Legacy, signed G. Barklay.

¹¹⁶ S. D. Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I. C. Brătianu* (New York, 1962) 163.

¹¹⁷ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 181, f. 123.

¹¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

text¹¹⁹. He concluded by saying that it was common interest to put off this problem because Romania is in a political situation "that hinders its free decisions" and "it has to consider the interests of England and the U.S.A."¹²⁰. Great Britain, as a matter of fact, had urged us that it understood to be kept wise to "our interests"¹²¹ in this matter. I. I. C. Brătianu realized in the course of the talks that the English Government agreed with the French one and both of them" were tempted to see the reasons why Romania postponed it (the oil problem) as "*pretexts causing the not so very understanding attitude at the Conference (o.u.)*"¹²².

On April 4th 1919 Great Britain and France in a letter sent by their chargés d'affaires in Bucharest, Henry Cambon and F. Rattigan, declared themselves to be ready to cooperate in the development of the oil industry in Romania. Their proposals met with the assent of I. I. C. Brătianu who, on the part of our government, put the "*ne varietur*" resolution¹²³.

The talks Romania had with England and France on the problem of oil did not fail to raise the discontent of the American Senator Baruch, one of Wilson's most important collaborators, who told I. I. C. Brătianu that his country "does not admit that by understandings hostile to their interests, we should grant other states the exclusive participation in oil"¹²⁴. Sadler, the representative of the *Standard Oil*, gave the Romanian prime minister to understand that the English had already had discussions with the Americans who wanted to reduce our country's percentage in the oil industry, which the former considered not be acceptable from the Romanian point of view¹²⁵. By a memorandum on April 23rd 1919, quite unfriendly and signed by Hoover, the Americans let I. I. C. Brătianu know that Romania's provisioning by the States would immediately stop if their conditions were not satisfied. The leader of the Romanian Government considered this interference to be inevitable, "the attitude of the American political men towards Romania being governed by the *Standard Oil*"¹²⁶. The delegates of the United States went on telling, during their discussions with the English and the French, that their country could not be pushed out of the exploitation of the Romanian oil¹²⁷. They considered this problem to be of an international character and mainly relied on its financial aspects which were to be decisive in the decision of the Romanian Government.

In its turn, the British diplomacy became ever more interested in concluding an understanding in the problem of the Romanian oil. Curzon, the chief of the *Foreign Office*, asked Rattigan to present Romania with the data of the problem in order that it might specify whether it is willing to discuss it. The *Oil Company* sent a representative to Bucharest on this very purpose¹²⁸. It was thought that, once I. I. C. Brătianu had left the Confe-

¹¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹²¹ *Ibidem*.

¹²² *Ibidem*, f. 175.

¹²³ *Ibidem*, letter on 23rd April 1919, I. I. C. Brătianu to M. Pherekyde.

¹²⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 188, letter on 27th April 1919, I. I. C. Brătianu to M. Pherekyde.

¹²⁷ D.B.F.P., First Series, vol. IV, 1919, pp. 1095, 1096, 1099.

¹²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 1102.

rence, it was no longer possible to deal with "detailed proposals but the problem had to be closely watched at all costs". The representative of the *Company*, Long asked for direct negotiations and said that "England's interests would be seriously damaged if measures were not taken in due time with a view to solving such problems up, the French government being ready to adopt a similar policy"¹²⁹. The English-French-Romanian agreement in the oil problem was signed as late as July 29th 1919, despite the opposition of the Americans. It offered the west-European capitalists guarantees of participation in the liquidation of the ex-competing oil societies¹³⁰.

Although the representatives of England and France tried to start talks on August 5th 1919¹³¹ Romania communicated on the 8th of August that 'the agreement was broken down because of the American interference which made it impossible for the Romanian Government to take such commitments until the American advance money received during the war had not been repaid'¹³².

England's diplomatic representatives in Bucharest received instructions to continue the talks with Romania they had started in Bucharest concerning the development of the oil industry in our country¹³³. The intentions of the Great Powers were not only to get the shares of the formerly rival societies but also to settle down on some oil terrains belonging to the Romanian State. Such an intention is clearly seen both in Weakley's memorandum which developed a letter Béranger had sent to Clemenceau, and in the Hamar Greenwood, Bart, M. P. Béranger understanding¹³⁴.

As late as April 24th—25th 1920 did England and France obtain the consent of the new Al. Averescu Government to the clauses concerning Romania in the San Remo oil conventions¹³⁵.

Therefore, it was I. I. C. Brătianu's view point of the oil problem that prevailed at the Peace Conference. The Romanian Prime Minister had been obliged to initiate side-negotiations mainly with the representatives of England and France who were interested in two questions: the former was the liquidation of the formerly competing oil societies which was an opportunity to consolidate their positions in the Romanian oil industry; the latter referred to the start of the exploitation of the large and rich oil terrains. As for the former the liberal Government was not hostile to a friendly way but as far as the latter clause was concerned the Government was hard to convince¹³⁶.

The evolution of the Romanian-British relations from 1919 to 1920 implies, be sure, a problem which was considered at that time and was to be considered in the same terms later on, as being decisive in keeping the

¹²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 1104.

¹³⁰ Gh. Buzatu, *Problema petrolului...*, 240.

¹³¹ Arch. M.F.A., the Peace Conference, Fund 71, dossier 58, f. 143.

¹³² *Idem*, dossier 224, f. 29; *D.B.F.P.*, First Series, vol. IV, 1110.

¹³³ *D.B.F.P.*, First Series, vol. IV, 1108.

¹³⁴ *Ibidem*, 1104, 1111.

¹³⁵ H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference*, vol. 6 (London, 1924) 603.

¹³⁶ Gh. Buzatu, *The Place of Oil Problem Within the Evolution of the Romanian-English Relations (1880-1929)*, in "Anuarul Institutului de istorie și arheologie "A. D. Xenopol", XV, 1978, 68-70.

detente in the Eastern Europe : the relations between the Soviet Russia and Romania.

Our country did not participate, either diplomatically or militarily, in the development of the Russian revolution which was remarked by V. I. Lenin who said : "there are such states as Romania that did not try to fight against Russia"¹³⁷. Both sides intended to start bilateral talks for giving their relations a normal juridical background. The discussions themselves, in a period in which the Great Western Powers did not even think of recognizing the Soviet state and were engaged in talks with the representatives of the Russian emigration and the phantom "government" of the counter-revolutionaries to which they promised the satisfying of their territorial demands,¹³⁸ illustrated the clear-sightedness of the Romanian leading circles. They justly considered it to be necessary, for the vital interests of the country, to maintain good relations with all neighbours irrespective of their internal political regime. Romania specified that "she was no at war with Russia and she would make no aggression against it but she would defend her frontiers with all her forces"¹³⁹.

The problem of the Romanian-Soviet relations came again into prominence during the meetings of the Supreme Council on the 1st and 11th of July 1919, when the configuration of Romania's frontiers was discussed upon¹⁴⁰. The representative of France, Tardieu, read the report of the *Committee for territorial problems* which, according to the principle of the peoples' national self-determination, admitted of Romania's statal completion¹⁴¹ and the guarantees it gave of the rights of minorities in accordance with the provisions of the League of Nations. The prime minister, I. I. C. Brătianu emphasized in his speech that the year 1918 expressed "the will of the Romanian people" and the counsels acted similarly in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries as well¹⁴². The English delegate A. W. Leeper came into evidence, in the territorial Committee, through his constant activity of defending the national rights of the Romanian people.

The Romanian diplomacy did not agree to England's repeated demands, transmitted by its representatives in Bucharest, of not adopting a hostile position towards General Denikin. "I asked Mr. Brătianu-Rattigan, the English chargé d'affaires in Bucharest, wrote Curzon — *in the most serious manner*, to consider our recommendation of changing his policy and advised him to assist Denikin to his own welfare (o.u.)"¹⁴³. The *War Office*, among other obligations, charged the British Military Mission in Romania, led by General Greenley, with the mission of urging us "not to disturb Denikin"¹⁴⁴.

¹³⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Opere*, vol. 52 (Bucharest, 1956) 99—102.

¹³⁸ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, U.S.S.R., 1940, vol. 90, extracted from the report Nicolae Titulescu sent to Carol the Second in 1940, f. 126.

¹³⁹ V. V. Tilea, *Acțiunea diplomatică a României (noiembrie 1919—martie 1920)*, (Sibiu, 1925), 38—123.

¹⁴⁰ *D.B.F.P.*, First Series, vol. 3, 1919, 4—11 ; Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 58, f. 84.

¹⁴¹ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, the Peace Conference, dossier 227, f. 223 ; *D.B.F.P.*, First Series, vol. 3, 1919, pp. 6—7.

¹⁴² *D.B.F.P.*, First Series, vol. 3, 1919, 10.

¹⁴³ *Ibidem*, letter of Rattigan to Curzon, 8th October 1919, 585—586.

¹⁴⁴ Arch. M.D.N., Fond 3831, dossier 128, 1919, Position 2894, f. 20.

In a telegram General Greenley sent on September 19th I. I. C. Brătianu was advised to keep in view" the final line of our policy (England's)", the prime concern of the War Office being "Denikin's interests"¹⁴⁵. W. Churchill spoke to the military attaché in London in the same terms and so did he speak with two members of our Parliament, on November 10th 1919. The British political man informed them that his government wished us "to come to terms with Denikin (o.u.)"¹⁴⁶.

Neither Rattigan nor Makinder and General Keyes¹⁴⁷ who arrived in Bucharest on December 21st 1919, succeeded in obtaining a change in the attitude of the Romanian Government towards Denikin and his entourage. I. I. C. Brătianu, like General Văitoianu and Vaida-Voievod who succeeded him at the head of our government maintained a clear position towards the insistant urges of the British diplomacy. Greenley reported to the War Office in London, on October 6th 1919, that "the situation was not very satisfying in the relations between Denikin and Romania". He mentioned that the tone of our press was "markedly hostile", all the efforts here being made "by ourselves and the plenipotentiary minister (o.u.)"¹⁴⁸.

The Supreme Council took over, in its meeting on January 20th 1920, the discussion of the Romanian problems, on which opportunity the English prime minister David Lloyd George appreciated the righteousness of our territorial claiming¹⁴⁹. Although acquainted with the affirmative decision of the Comission for Romanian affairs, the Council finally decided to postpone for an unknown date this question on account of the international situation.

The San-Remo Conference on April 24th—25 1920 took over the discussion of some of Romania's territorial problems. England's representative, Lord Curzon, declared that during the reunion in London in March 1920 there was concluded by experts a treaty which was to be handed to the sides under discussion and communicated to the Conference of the Ambassadors¹⁵⁰. In the light of the decisions taken at San-Remo on British initiative, the Allies decided to start talks with the Soviet delegation headed by Krasin¹⁵¹.

From London, in September 1920 Mihai Boerescu informed the control of the Foreign Office that he had had talks with the British officials on the relations with Russia. Bonar Law told him that his country agreed to the Romanian-Soviet talks "if the Russian offers were acceptable" and said that we "should not turn them down"¹⁵². In his turn, the prime minister David Lloyd George sympathized with the Romanian-Soviet contacts and thought that in this manner "we were sure to obtain from the present Russian regime better conditions than from another imperialist government, Vranghel or

¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴⁶ State Archives Bucharest, Fund Fund Royal House, Ferdinand, dossier 55, 1919, f. 1, 3.

¹⁴⁷ D.B.F.P., First Series, vol. 3, 1919, Rattigan to Curzon, 24th December 1919, 740.

¹⁴⁸ Arch. M.D.N., Fund 3831, dossier 128, 1919, Position 2894, f. 34.

¹⁴⁹ D.B.F.P., First Series, vol. 2, 1920, 936.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, vol. 8, 89.

¹⁵¹ P. Apostol, A. Michelson, *Questions d'ordre international. La dette publique de la Russie* (Paris, 1922) 65.

¹⁵² The Central State Library, Fund Al. St. Georges, Arch. Take Ionescu, LXXIX, 6, telegram from Paris, 13th September 1920, to Take Ionescu.

some others". The idea of a conference with the Russians and all the allies in London being put off he advised us to talk "directly with the Soviets". The English prime minister seemed to be much in favour of Romania's peace with the Soviets and our alliance with the neighbours"¹⁵³.

England, although it had no intention at all to recognize the Soviet Russia, proved to be more flexible in its relations with this country in the second half of the year 1920. The liberal part of the Labour Party opted for an immediate peace with Russia and David Lloyd George, and the members of his cabinet shared this view unofficially¹⁵⁴. Both the English prime minister and the diplomats in this country thought mainly of taking over the economic relations with Russia.

After the Great Powers had signed the Peace Protocol in October 1920, the Soviet Russia lodged official protests¹⁵⁵.

The Romanian diplomacy was equally careful about the relations with Russia which considered itself to be at war with our country and thought that "it had not gone beyond the rights and the obligations of a neutral state"¹⁵⁶. Our country repeatedly¹⁵⁷ stated that its intentions were peaceful, considering that "the changes that had taken place in Russia had no repercussions on keeping an attitude of perfect and absolute nonintervention"¹⁵⁸.

The English diplomacy watched carefully the Romanian-Russian relations, a first phase when the British circles believed that the Whites would win there were made pressures on Romania to support the counter-revolutionary forces in Russia, particularly Denikin's army. But Romania did not give any credit to the solicitations of the *War Office*. Furthermore, our country started talks with the Soviet Union for placing the relations between the two states against normal juridical backgrounds.

After the Polish-Soviet war the English diplomacy wanted to start Romanian-Soviet bilateral negotiations. England, although not intending to immediately accept of the Soviet regime declared at last in favour of economic relations with Russia.

The Romanian diplomacy, proposing that we should have normal political-diplomatic relations with the Soviet Russia stipulated the *sine qua non* condition that the 1918 Union should be recognized. The other problems (*the treasure, the placement of the embassy, the minorities*) were given a secondary place. At the moment the Great Powers thought of interfering as deeply and efficiently as possible in the development of the Russian revolution Romania was an exception by its decision to start and maintain relations with this country within the principles of international rights. To a certain extent the Romanian diplomacy had to take into account the position of England and France but this gesture did not affect the observance of the

¹⁵³ *Ibidem*, NCH, dossier 1, f. 70, telegram 948, Averescu, Derussi to Take Ionescu.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 51.

¹⁵⁵ Arch. M.D.N. Fund 5418, dossier unnumbered, Position 633, f. 125.

¹⁵⁶ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 71, England, Relations with Romania, vol. 39, 1920—1934, telegram 2812, from London, 17th November 1920, signed M. Boerescu.

¹⁵⁷ A.I.S.I.S.P., (*The Archives of the Institute of Historie and Social-Political Studies with the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party*) Fund 28, dossier 655.

¹⁵⁸ Arch. M.F.A., Fund 5418, dossier unnumbered, 1920, Position 633, f. 17

international norms : non-interference in the internal business, the recognition of the territorial integrity.

In the general evaluation of the results obtained through the efforts of the Romanian diplomacy and especially in the appreciation of the significance of England's and the other Great Powers' recognition of Romania's historical rights and their treatment in the system of the Peace Treaties in Paris one has to observe that to the limited extent the Great Powers consented to support Romania's legitimate rights, they did nothing but participated in the juridical sanctioning of a *de facto* situation, instituted as an evident reality of the Romanian people's fight for the achievement of the ideal of its national unity.

The Romanian-English relations from 1916 to 1920 offers sufficient evidence that between the diplomacies of the two states there were moments of active collaboration and also many disagreements caused, in general, by the different viewpoints of the external orientations of England and Romania. But, despite all such inconveniences Romania tried to give stability too its relations with England, understanding that only in this way can it contribute actively to the maintenance of peace on the European continent and to the creation of a background favourable to the free and independent development of all peoples.

Material and political support given by England in the years 1916—1920, and as well as, encouragement, in general lines, of the national claims of Romania had a favourable effect on the development of the relations between the two states in the inter-war period.

Translated by Professor Luiza Pârnu

APPENDIX

ROMANIA

Annual Report, 1919

(203822)

Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon — (Received June 15)

(No. 134)

Bucharest, May 25, 1920

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the annual report on Romanian for 1919. As no report has been written since 1913, I have included a brief history of the past six years.

I am indebted to Mr. Cradock Hartopp for the sections dealing with the Danube and the relations with Serbia, Russia and Bulgaria, and to Mr. Adams for those dealing with the financial and economic situation. The brief report on communications has been furnished by Colonel Walton, chief of the Railway Mission.

I have, §
F. RATTIGAN

1. No annual report on Romania has been published since 1913. I have therefore thought it advisable to compile a short historical survey of events since the outbreak of the war in August 1914.

(A.) — POLITICAL

Political Situation at the outbreak of the European War

2. At that date Roumania was still technically bound by her treaty with Austria-Hungary, though it was no secret that the majority of the people was imbued with strong sympathy for France, and was entirely opposed to King Carol's earnest desire for an alliance with the Central Powers.

3. As soon as it became obvious that war was inevitable, a crown council was summoned by the King to decide on the course to be pursued by Roumania. His Majesty, after a careful *exposé* of his views on the situation and the prospects of the rival Powers, invited the Council to declare for an offensive and defensive alliance with the Central Powers. The Prime Minister, M. Bratiano, made a characteristic speech, which might have meant anything. It was, in fact, a model of the art of sitting on the fence. In the light of after events and of my own experience of M. Bratiano's character, I presume that he was from the first an apostle of neutrality, to be tinged with friendship for whatever side appeared in the ascendant.

4. Speeches were then made by MM. Filipescu and Take Jonesco, the leaders of the Opposition and strong advocates of an understanding with the *Entente*. Both these statesmen were from the first convinced of the ultimate triumph of the Western Powers. M. Take Jonesco is the only Roumanian I know who has studied Mahan and has any real idea of what sea-power means. The majority of Roumanian statesmen were in considerable awe of the might of Germany, of which the evidence was continually before their eyes. But even they were against any form of alliance with the Central Powers, as they recognised that the Roumanian people could never be brought into a war against the Latin countries. M. Marghiloman, who subsequently became, through the force of circumstances, the leader of the pro-German Party, spoke in favour of neutrality, and the King was obliged to abandon his longcherished plan of active intervention on the side of the Central Powers.

Negotiations with the Entente Powers.

5. In the spring of 1915 M. Bratiano gradually came to the conclusion that the *Entente* Powers would be the stronger, even if they did not actually win the war. From that moment negotiations were secretly taken up between himself and the Allied representatives with a view to the entry of Roumania into the war on our side.

6. Meanwhile the Conservative Party had split into two factions, the first, under Filipescu and Take Jonesco, in favour of immediate action on the side of the *Entente*; the second, under Marghiloman, in favour of neutrality, with a tendency towards Germany. The former section, with the support of the French Minister, M. Blondel, started a series of street de-

monstrations in favour of joining the Allies. This movement was discouraged by Sir George Barclay, who rightly held that nothing could be gained by such agitation. Neither the King nor the mass of the people were in the least likely to be influenced by such means. They could only be brought to take action on our side if and when they were convinced of our triumph. It was essential that the decision to attack the Central Powers should be made by a man as notoriously cautious as Brătianu if the country were to enter into the war whole-heartedly.

7. Sir George Barclay's lack of support for this agitation aroused the resentment of M. Take Jonesco, but there can be no doubt that his action in discountenancing it was entirely justified by the course of events. He wisely concentrated on an endeavour to win over M. Brătianu, the one man who could bring Roumania into the war on our side. It was to strengthen the latter's position in withstanding an artificial agitation fostered by the Germans amongst the land proprietors that Sir George Barclay advised that His Majesty's Government should make a large purchase of wheat. This question has been gone into so thoroughly that it is unnecessary to examine it in detail here. It has been clearly proved that, judged as a political measure, the only point of view from which the question should be regarded, the wheat purchase, was entirely successful and fully attained the object in view, viz., the maintenance in power of the Brătianu Government. It must be remembered that Brătianu's fall would have involved the coming into power of a Government, at the least, benevolently disposed towards the Central Powers.

8. This danger having been averted, the negotiations between M. Brătianu and the Allied representatives were continued till the early summer of 1916. At this stage the Russian Government, anxious to obtain support for the Brusilov offensive, decided to address an ultimatum to Roumania calling upon her to take action immediately on the basis of the terms offered at that stage in the secret negotiations. Failing an immediate decision on the part of Roumania to join the Allies, these terms would no longer be accorded her. Meanwhile the battle of the Somme had commenced in July and was apparently developing in our favour. There appeared, indeed, some prospect of a rapid defeat of the Central Powers, especially if they were attacked in a vulnerable spot at so critical a moment. I am personally convinced that in M. Brătianu's opinion the end was now in sight. He was afraid that any further postponement of action on his part would result in his losing his market, and accordingly, after receiving some slight increase in his conditions, he decided to take the plunge.

Treaty of Alliance with the Entente Powers concluded

9. The agreement with the Allies was finally drawn up and signed on the 17th August.

10. By this agreement Roumania, in return for the conditions offered her, was to attack Austria on the 24th August. The Allies on their side agreed that the bulk of the Bulgarian Army should be contained by an Allied offensive at Salonica, and that the armies of General Brusilov

should occupy the enemy by a strong offensive movement on the Galician front.

Military Situation

11. It has frequently been argued that Roumania made a cardinal blunder in directing her forces against Austria rather than against Bulgaria. It is pointed out, with apparent reason, that had the Roumanians attacked Bulgaria with the forces available they could have overwhelmed her and joined hands with Sarraïl. The Roumanians were themselves of this opinion. Having acted as military attaché for some weeks early in 1916, I was able to ascertain the real reason for the Roumanian decision to attack Austria. Much as she desired to join hands with the Allies at Salonica, she was inspired with such deep-rooted distrust of Russia that she was convinced that she would never be allowed by the latter to retain the territory awarded her in Bukovina and Northern Transylvania, unless she was in actual military occupation of this territory when the war ended.

The Roumanian Campaign.

12. There is considerable divergence of opinion as to how far the Roumanian attack came as a surprise to the Central Powers. From the statements of Count Czernin, it would appear that he at least was fully aware of the course of events. But I cannot help thinking that he was wise after the event. In any case, the Roumanian attack was launched in most favourable circumstances, and found the Austrians apparently quite unprepared. A rapid advance was made by three converging columns directed through the principal passes into Transylvania, the objective of the main force being Cluj. It was only when the Roumanians were practically within sight of their objectives that the first serious resistance was met with; a sharp counter-offensive was then launched by a hastily-concentrated Austro-German force against the Roumanian centre near Sibiu. The Roumanians were thrown back in some disorder, lost a considerable number of men and guns, and were obliged to retreat towards the frontier passes. For some time it appeared that they would be able to bold the enemy. At length, however a strong German force penetrated the Jiu Valley, and advancing into the plain of Oltenia, threatened the communications of the Roumanian forces holding the Sinaia-Braşov Pass. Meanwhile, General Mac-kensen had succeeded in throwing a mixed force of Germans, Bulgarians and Turks across the Danube west of Giurgiu. This force advanced north-eastwards in the general enemy movement against Bucharest. Meanwhile, owing to the failure of the Russians to accord the promised support, the campaign in the Dobrudja had opened disastrously for the Roumanians. They had anticipated that Bulgaria would remain neutral, though it is difficult to see what grounds they had for this belief. Consequently, the Bulgarian attack upon Turtucaia came as a surprise, and resulted in the loss of that town, together with the annihilation of the important garrison charged with its defence. So serious a disaster at the very outset of the war produced a grave effect upon the *moral* of the Roumanians, who are temperamentally very emotional, and are easily brought from the heights

of ultra-confidence to the depths of despair. From this stage M. Bratiano showed himself to be entirely destitute of the qualities necessary for the Government of a country in a time of crisis. It is, in fact, not too much to say that he went completely to pieces. He practically withdrew from the direction of affairs, and seemed to model himself upon the behaviour of certain of the ancient prophets putting on sackcloth and ashes and indulging in loud lamentation. In order to lessen the panic in Government circles the general Staff were obliged to withdraw two divisions from Transylvania and attach them to the Southern army under the command of general Averesco, who enjoyed the entire confidence of the troops. It was this enforced weakening of the Roumanian armies in Transylvania that caused their failure to withstand the Austro-German counter-offensive at Sibiu. Unfortunately, the Chief of the General Staff, General Iliescu, proved himself utterly incompetent. As soon as a blow was delivered by the enemy in the south he would hurry down reinforcements taken from his forces in the north. Before they had arrived a blow in the north would provoke him to countermand his orders and recall the troops to the newly-threatened area. Consequently, large forces passed their time in moving backwards and forwards on the railway, at a crisis when their help was of vital importance.

13. A further illustration of this chopping and changing on the part of the General Staff is afforded by the progress of events in the counter-offensive against the Bulgarians, launched by General Averesco across the Danube east of Rustchuck with a view to cutting the communications of the enemy forces advancing northwards into Dobrudja. This plan was boldly thought out, and on the whole well carried out. The crossing of the Danube was easily effected, and the Roumanian forces practically succeeded in occupying the Shumla Pass, thus cutting off the Bulgarian communications. Had the initial success of this movement been consolidated, the enemy forces in the Dobrudja might very possibly have been annihilated and the whole course of the war changed. But the news of the enemy counter-offensive near Sibiu led General Iliescu to order the withdrawal of Averesco's forces across the Danube. The Bulgarians were consequently enabled to continue their victorious advance northwards against the Russo-Roumanian forces opposed to them. After sharp fighting, during which the Serbian division performed wonders of heroism, and was practically annihilated, Constantza was occupied by the enemy on the 28th October, and Russo-Roumanian line was withdrawn to the marshy Tulcea region.

14. Meanwhile, the Austro-German forces, which had penetrated the Jiul Valley, were advancing rapidly on Bucharest in conjunction with the north-easterly movement of Mackensen's combined Bulgaro-German-Turkish forces thrown across the Danube west of Giurgiu. In view of the disasters in the Dobrudja, the wisest course for the Roumanian armies at this stage would have been to abandon Wallachia and concentrate upon the defence of Moldavia. But it was thought that the surrender of Bucharest would exert a disastrous effect upon the *moral* of the army, and it was therefore decided to give battle before the capital. For a long time the issue remained in doubt, but the failure of the Russians to afford proper support led to

the eventual defeat of the Romanians, and the retreat became a rout. Bucharest fell on the 5th December, and the beaten Romanians were vigorously pursued until a defensive line was at length established on the Sireth River. During the retreat the Roumanians lost very heavily in prisoners, guns and material of war.

Destruction of the Oil-fields.

15. When it became necessary to contemplate the falling into enemy hands of the oil-fields in the Prahova Valley, the Roumanian Government were called upon by the Allied representatives to take measures to render them as far as possible useless to the enemy. The Roumanian Government were very loth to take any such measures, and the destruction of the oil-fields was finally carried out by Colonel Norton Griffiths, under an Allied guarantee of indemnity to Roumania. The work was most efficiently performed, with the result that little or no use could be made of the oil-fields by the enemy for at least six months.

Campaign of 1918.

16. Roumania entered the war with sixteen divisions which were soon raised to twenty-three. After the retreat behind the line of the Sireth there remained no more than four of these divisions. The army had therefore to be entirely reorganised. The whole front from Dorna Vatra to the Danube was held by some 500,000 Russians, with the exception of a small section occupied by the four remaining Romanian divisions under General Averesco.

17. The reorganisation of the Roumanian army was entrusted to the French Military Mission under General Berthelot. In spite of the terrible difficulties created by the appalling conditions of famine and pestilence prevalent in Moldavia, and the abnormally severe winter, General Berthelot and his officers carried out their task with remarkable success. The Roumanian army at the outbreak of war was insufficiently trained in modern war conditions, inadequately equipped, and badly officered. By the end of May twelve divisions had been properly organised and equipped and efficiently trained by their French instructors, one of whom was attached to each battalion. The incompetent and effeminate officers had been dismissed and replaced by younger men, who had given proof of courage and efficiency. Three additional divisions were formed as a reserve. The twelve divisions were divided into two armies, the first under General Averesco, the second under General Cristesco, while General Presan succeeded Ilesco as Chief of the Staff. King Ferdinand became titular generalissimo of the Russo-Roumanian forces on the Roumanian front, some 600,000 bayonets in all.

18. An offensive was planned for the end of June, and was in fact actually launched. A considerable initial success was achieved, and the Austro-German forces were obliged to retreat from their positions round Marasesti. Unfortunately the process of disintegration had already begun amongst the Russian forces, and the feats on the Galician front obliged Kerensky to order the immediate cessation of the Russo-Roumanian offen-

sive owing to the unreliability and disaffection of the Russian troops. General Mackensen at once decided to take advantage of this state of things, and attacked with eight German divisions the Russian positions near Marasesti. The Russians fled in disorder, but the situation was saved by the stout resistance of the Roumanian reinforcements hurried to the threatened zone. The battle lasted fourteen days, and ended in the complete failure of the German offensive. The Roumanian 1st Army, under General Grigoresco, who had replaced Cristesco, fought with desperate courage, and the battle of Marasesti is regarded with justice by the Roumanians as the most brilliant page in the annals of their military history.

19. Meanwhile the Austrian forces, under the Archduke Joseph, attacked the vital position of Târgul Ocna, but, though they obtained some initial success, were eventually checked and brought to a standstill. This was the last serious effort of the enemy to break through on the Roumanian front.

End of the Campaign.

20. After the fall of the Kerensky Governments the Russian Armies went to pieces. The troops deserted en masse, and bands of marauders roamed about the country, looting, pillaging and burning wherever they went. The Roumanian army was hard put to it to deal with these hordes of deserters, and could have no chance of resisting any further attack by the Central Powers. The Roumanian Government for some time contemplated a retirement with the Royal Family and the remainder of the Army into Russia, but it speedily became evident that the temper of the Russian population made such a project entirely out of the question.

Peace with Central Powers.

21. It was therefore reluctantly decided to abandon any further hope of resistance, and to make the best possible terms with the Central Powers. Bratiano resigned, and the task of making peace was entrusted to General Averesco. The German terms were of brutal severity, and the King finally decided to replace Averesco by Marghiloman, in the hope that his relations with the Central Powers would procure some mitigation of the terms.

22. The treaty was never actually ratified. Marghiloman, in describing to me the course of events during the period of his Government, stated that in July, 1918 he became convinced of the approaching break-down of Germany. He affirmed that he consequently did all in his power to defer the ratification of the treaty, putting forward the pretext that the signature of a military convention must be a preliminary condition to the full agreement. In this manner he was able to delay matters from day to day till the defeats of the enemy forces in October finally enabled him to throw off the mask. He alleges that he warned King Ferdinand that the time was coming when he should be replaced by a statesman enjoying the confidence of the *Entente*, and that the Roumanian army should be prepared for resuming action against the enemy. Meanwhile he urged that a *pro-Entente* statesman should be included in the Government, with a

view to negotiating with the Allies the re-entrance of Roumania into the war.

23. Such negotiations were in fact taken up, and the King got into communication with the Allied commanders in Bulgaria with a view to the resumption of hostilities by Roumania. Preparations were made with all possible speed, but the disorganisation of the railways carried out by the enemy, with the assistance of certain pro-German elements in Roumania, made it impossible for the Roumanian army to resume hostilities before the armistice of the 11th November became an accomplished fact. Immediately afterwards, however, the Roumanian forces, acting in conjunction with the Allied troops, who had arrived on the Danube under General Berthelot, reoccupied Wallachia and pursued Mackensen's retreating forces into Transylvania.

24. Upon the conclusion of the armistice with the enemy by General Franchet d'Esperey, to which the Roumanians were not a signatory party, hostilities were suspended, and the Roumanians remained in possession of the territory they were occupying in Transylvania, Bukovina and the Banat. /...../

ANNEX.

Personalities (see also p. 13).

The Prime Minister, General Averesco. — The great asset the Prime Minister is his extraordinary popularity in the country, especially with the peasant population and the army. He is looked upon as a being endowed with almost miraculous powers, and is regarded by the people as their champion against the corruption and extortion of the Bratianist régime. He is of somewhat humble origin and has to a certain extent the mind of a peasant. While he cannot be said to have any real statesmanlike qualities or broad grasp of affairs, yet he possesses considerable astuteness, and has a fund of common-sense. He has a gift for propaganda directed to the increase of his popularity. But his ignorance of statecraft and party organisation leave him entirely in the hands of his lieutenant, M. Argetoyano, whose knowledge of party tactics and electioneering methods is very great. General Averesco is personally honest and is above the corruption so prevalent in this country, but his inexperience of the art of government and his inability to master complicated economic questions debar him from exercising any firm control over his subordinates in this respect. He professes to be a strong Ententophil, but I would judge him to be, like so many of his compatriots, an opportunist, who is at present convinced of the necessity to remain with the Allies. He is reputed to be a fine soldier and is idolised by the army as the saviour of the country. He was certainly one of the few Roumanian generals who did not commit disastrous blunders in the war, but the opinion in Allied military circles is that his qualities as a general are very moderate. He is, however, to be commended for his efforts to induce better and more considerate relations between officers and men, as the treatment of the latter was apt to be characterised by great brutality.

M. Argetoyano, Minister of Interior, was Minister of Finance until the reconstitution of the Averesco Ministry after the recent elections. He has been a member of a former Cabinet and has a long experience of parliamentary procedure, electioneering tactics and party organisation. He is, moreover, skilled in the art of intrigue. With these qualities he has made himself so invaluable to General Averesco that the latter is almost entirely dependent on him in running the party organisation. He is clever but unscrupulous, and is credited with the responsibility for such flagrant jobs as the recent decree conferring a monopoly on the Industria Romana de Petrol Petroleum Company; he is an opportunist and would not hesitate to throw Roumania into the arms of Germany, if it suited his book to do so.

M. Take Jonesco is at present Minister for Foreign Affairs, but his position in the Government is very unstable. Through he has some capable followers, yet he has no real party in the country. Consequently he carries little weight with Averesco, who is merely using him on account of his popularity with the *Entente*. He has evidently incurred the enmity of Argetoyano by the strong attitude which he has taken up against the decree referred to above. Unless his position is consolidated by the achievement of some real success in his foreign policy, it seems unlikely that he can retain his position as Minister for Foreign Affairs for any length of time. *M. Take Jonesco* is too well known for it to be necessary to give a detailed appreciation of his character. It is enough to say that he is gifted with extraordinary eloquence and ready wit. He is brilliantly clever, though inclined to be superficial. His weak point is unreliability; in fact, he is called "the weathercock". At the same time, he is a convinced Ententophil, and is one of the few Roumanians who would under no circumstances turn to Germany. He is believed to be personally honest, though he is alleged to have permitted flagrant jobbery on the part of his adherents when he was in power. His presence in the Government is a great asset to us, as he is a bitter opponent of the unscrupulous xenophobia of the Bratianists and their supporters in the Cabinet. He is unusually energetic for a Romanian, and gets through an enormous quantity of work.

M. Marghiloman was forced by circumstances into the position of leader of the pro-Germans. The Conservative Party split apart on the question of intervention in the war. A section of the party under Filinesco and Take Jonesco were for immediate intervention on the side of the Allies. *M. Marghiloman* explained his views to me in the spring of 1915. He said that, if it was a question of choosing between Great Britain and France on the one side, and Germany on the other, he would unhesitatingly choose the former. But Romania had no such choice. If she entered the war on our side, she would be cut off from the Western Powers and have to rely on Russia. History had taught her what she could expect from the latter. Consequently, he was for neutrality. The adoption of this attitude aroused the violent hostility of the ardent Ententophils, and Bratiano, who feared him as a rival, took advantage of the situation to depict Marghiloman to the Allied representatives as a German agent. My opinion is that this was far from being the case, but the inevitable consequence was to force Marghiloman more and more into the hands of the German Party.

He remained in Bucharest during the German occupation, and after the Bolshevik betrayal of the Allies, and the consequent surrender of Roumania, formed a Government for the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with the Central Powers. The King assured me that M. Marghiloman's Government was in no sense unpatriotic, and that he had done all he could to mitigate the harshness of the German terms.

M. Marghiloman is, in my opinion, the only strong man in the public life of this country. He is scrupulously honest, and if ever he came into power would, I believe, devote himself to the suppression of the system of bribery and corruption which is rampant in Roumania. Unfortunately, Bratianist propaganda has persuaded the people at large of Marghiloman's subservience to Germany, and he is regarded by the uninformed as anti-patriotic and reactionary. I am convinced that neither charge is true. He is one of the few Roumanian public men who have the courage of their opinions, and is not afraid to affirm that Roumania must look to foreign assistance for the development of her industries. He loses no opportunity of countering the Anglophobe campaign in the Bratianist press, and openly advocates that Romania must look to Great Britain to assist her in the work of reconstruction. He is far less likely to turn to Germany than Bratiano.

As regards the charge of reaction, it is true that Marghiloman remains a Conservative; but he is a Conservative in the modern British sense. That is to say, that his present political programme would have been regarded ten years ago as that of an advanced Radical.

M. Bratiano was for so long practically dictator of this country, that he lost all sense of proportion. His behaviour at the Paris Conference was such as to earn him the detestation of practically all with whom he came in contact. He went there with the ideas of a megalomaniac, expecting to dictate as from Olympus to the Allied representatives his wishes regarding Roumania, and was shocked and mortified to discover that his opinion of himself and his claims was far from being shared by Armed statesmen. He returned with so violent a hatred of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour and M. Clemenceau that his whole political conduct since then has been influenced thereby. He is now a bitter Anglophobe, and to satisfy his spite against Great Britain — and in a lesser degree France — he would not hesitate to throw his country into the arms of Germany, or any combination directed against the Allies. His inflamed passions are further exploited by his brother Vintila, whose Anglophobia is material rather than sentimental, and is caused by the fear of seeing his own profits and commercial grip on the country dissipated by British co-operation in the development of its industries. Jean Bratiano is reputed to be a man of personal integrity, but he cannot be absolved from responsibility for the system of bribery and corruption which flourished so strongly under the aegis of his brother and Constantinesco.

Until quite recently he maintained so strong a hold over the King, that His Majesty was reduced practically to the position of a puppet. This hold has naturally been weakened as the result of Bratiano's fall from power, but most of his agents at Court have retained their posts, and M. Misu, who has become "*l'âme damnée de Bratiano*", is to succeed M. Henry Catargi as Grand Marshal. These Bratianist agents, of course, do their utmost to keep their master's influence paramount at Court.

To sum up, I consider M. Bratiano, in his present condition of blind hatred of Great Britain, a real danger to his country, and I fear that if he were returned to power his policy would be directed towards an understanding with Germany. It is significant that the one Allied representative with whom he is now on terms of close intimacy is the Italian Minister, M. Martin Franklin, an ardent and open advocate of an understanding between Italy, Germany, Bolshevik Russia and Roumania, together with any other anti-*Entente* elements which may attach themselves to this group.

Personally, M. Bratiano is a man of some charm, when he cares to exert it. He is a thorough Oriental in his general character. He is quick-witted, eloquent, plausible, ambitious, and not afraid of responsibility. On the other hand, he is lazy beyond belief. It is hardly possible to conceive of a Prime Minister who so entirely washes his hands of all detail and spade work, as was the case during his tenure of office. At the same time he knows his own mind, and exerts an iron control over his party, by whom he is universally feared and respected. He is, in fact, regarded by them as a great man in every sense. Although the Liberal Party has been brought to the ground by its insane foreign policy and atrocious corruption, yet it remains the best organised and disciplined party in the country. Its hold on the commerce and industry is very strong, so that it has a thousand underhand ways of pulling the strings in spite of its fall from power. Although, therefore, it would appear on the surface that there is no prospect of the Bratianists returning to power for some time to come, yet, in point of fact, such an event is by no means unlikely. Bratiano and his lieutenants are showing real astuteness in preparing the way for a return to power, by sowing discord and dissension between the other political groups in the country. He is, moreover, showing a disposition to ally himself to the Maniu-Vaida Transylvanian group, who are not clever enough to see that if Bratiano climbs back to power on their backs, they will end by finding themselves tramped out of existence under his feet.

M. Vaida showed himself as Prime Minister a man of some force of character, purposeful and sincere. Unfortunately, his inexperience of government prevented him from exerting sufficient control over the members of his Cabinet, with the result that Dr. Lupu got somewhat out of hand, and caused such alarm by his ultra-radical proposals that the King dismissed the Vaida Government. On the whole, however, Vaida was a success, especially in his dealings with foreign Governments, who were favourably impressed by his candour and sincerity after the experience of the tortuous methods of Bratiano. The National Transylvanian Party is now engaged under the leadership of Maniu and Vaida in a fierce struggle with the Government over their conduct of Transylvanian affairs. They have allied themselves to the Socialist and Peasants' Parties, under Lupu and Mihalache, and it is, as I have said above, possible that they will eventually be joined by the Bratianists.

Vaida is a doctor by profession, and once told me that Roumania interested him more in that capacity than as a statesman, as the upper and middle classes presented an absorbing study of nervous disorder and hysteria. He instanced the almost insane hatreds entertained by nearly all the party leaders for their rivals as an example of this hysteria.

M. Maniu has lost his opportunity. Had he come forward courageously at the time of the ultimatum from the conference and formed a National Government for the purpose of arriving at an agreement with the Allies, he would have had practically the whole country with him. He had at that time a great reputation for the wisdom, prudence and moderation he had shown as head of the Transylvanian Party. Unfortunately he appears to lack courage, and is not sufficiently sure of himself. By his doubts and hesitations he has now lost to a large extent the confidence of the people. In spite of the opportunities for enrichment afforded him by his position as head of the Provisional Council of Transylvania he remains a poor man, and his integrity is beyond question. He showed himself to be broadminded and just in endeavouring to secure equal treatment for all races and religions in Transylvania.

Dr. Lupu is the present leader of the Socialists. He is clever, and reputed to be honest, but lacks balance. Since his fall from office he has moved to the extreme left, and is now a violent opponent of the dynasty. He is an idealist, and is apt to think that what is good for England must be equally good for Roumania. As the former is in many ways hundreds of years more advanced in civilisation than the latter, this view is likely to be dangerous for this country.

M. Iorga has a great reputation as a professor of history and a man of letters. He is conceited to the verge of madness, violent in his language and actions, and incapable of seeing any point of view but his own. As president of the last Chamber he caused continued scenes by the intemperance of his language and his insulting behaviour towards the deputies. He is now allied to Lupu and Mihalache, and is filled with an intense hatred for the King and Queen, who showed some restiveness under his hectoring advice, and were unable to conceal their dislike of his methods.

M. Mihalache, head of the Peasants' Party, is a simple, honest man, with a fund of common-sense and native shrewdness. He would be a useful member of a Moderate Government, but the danger is that his associates may lead him to the extreme left.

M. Goga is the d'Annunzio of Transylvania. He is head of the section of the Transylvanian National Party, which separated from Maniu and Vaida and joined the present Government. He is not remarkable for his statesmanship, but has a certain weight in Transylvania on account of the undoubted services he rendered to the national cause by his writings.

M. Misu has become the jackal of M. Bratiano. He is, in my opinion, fully fitted for this post by his macchiavellian and sinuous methods. He shares his master's animosity towards England, though he conceals it, except on the frequent occasions when he loses control of his temper. He is undoubtedly able, and is probably in his own way loyal to the King.

Prince Stirbei was for some time known as the Roumanian Rasputin. Public opinion became so excited against him on account of his alleged backstairs influence at Court, that he was obliged early this year to take a prolonged trip abroad. He went to Italy, and came back an ardent Italophil. He still retains great influence with the King and Queen, to whom he is warmly attached. He assists M. Misu in keeping Bratiano's influence para-

mount at Court. He has not the brains of his colleague, but makes up for the deficiency by much cunning. He is, according to his lights, a sincere patriot, and his attitude is based on what he no doubt considers the only hope for his country, namely, the return to power of Brătianu. He would, in company with most Brătianuists, probably welcome an anti-*Entente* orientation of Roumanian policy.

M. Titulesco, the chief supporter of Take Ionescu, is now Minister of Finance, though he has not yet taken up his duties. He has not yet had much opportunity of showing what he is made of, but he is believed to be an extremely able statesman, especially in the region of finance. He is reported to be free from corruption. Unfortunately, his health has for some time past been very bad.

(Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Foreign Office*, 371/4705, ff. 18—21, 30—32).

R. W. SETON-WATSON, THE NEW EUROPE, AND THE ROMANIANS

BY

H. HANAK

"Vous qui nous connaissez mieux que tout autre dans le pays de langue anglaise, ne nous oubliez pas. Dites-le bien haut que nous n'avons pas failli, que les moyens seuls nous ont manqué, que l'homme Roumain a été le même que dans le passé, que nous ne regrettons rien de ce que nous avons donné, et que nous espérons tout ce que nous est dû".

Nicolae Iorga to Seton-Watson, 13 December 1916.

"La *New Europe* sera toujours ouverte au point de vue Roumain, et j'espère qu'il sera possible pour vous d'y écrire un jour. Nous savons que la Roumanie a fait plus que son possible, et elle restera pour nous une amie et une alliée, même en case qu'elle deviendra le victime de la force majeure, grâce à la lâcheté et décadence morale de certains éléments en Russie. Même dans ce cas-là je ne perdrai aucunement l'espoir dans l'émancipation des Roumains de leur tyrannie séculaire."

Seton-Watson to Iorga, 22 February 1918¹.

Alexander Orescu, later to become Chef de Cabinet to Ionel Brătianu may have been the first man to explain the problem of the Romanians to R. W. Seton-Watson when they became acquainted in Paris in 1904. Seton-Watson's knowledge of the issue became deeper when he studied the problem of nationalities in Vienna and in Hungary in 1905—1906. By the time he visited Transylvania in 1906 he had already read Aurel Popovici's book *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Grossösterreich*. When in Sibiu in 1906, some leading Saxons gave him an introduction to the historian Canon Augustin Bunea and to Dr. Iuliu Maniu. He met them in Blaj and asked them about Popovici's views. Bunea claimed that it represented the views of the majority of the Romanians of Transylvania while Maniu was more concerned with re-establishment of Transylvanian autonomy. From Blaj Seton-Watson went to Arad where he met among others, Dr. Vasile Goldiș, a leader of the Romanian National Party. Goldiș explained to Seton-Watson how the Nationality Law of 1868 was being perverted and falsified. "This proved a most useful lesson for Seton-Watson, who was later able to use the same method

¹ Quoted in Hugh and Cristopher Seton-Watson, *The Making of a New Europe, R. W. Seton-Watson and the last years of Austria-Hungary* (London, 1981) 190. Further information on the subject of this article may be found in H. Hanak, *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War* (London, 1962) and "The New Europe, 1916—1920", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, XXXIX, 93, June 1961, 369—399.

in his arguments with the Magyars"². When Seton-Watson returned to Scotland he wrote two articles on Hungary for the *Spectator* which were published on 29 September and 20 October 1906. The latter of these was reproduced in translation in the *Arad Tribuna*. Russu-Şirianu, the editor of that journal informed Seton-Watson that legal proceedings had been started against the journal as a result of the article.

In these he wrote that Hungarian nationality policy was "as perilous as it is shortsighted". The friendship between Budapest and Bucharest could never be realised until the Hungarians ceased to treat the nationalities as political helots. He went on to say that: "The days of supremacy of one race over another are past, at any rate for Europe; and the Magyars, instead of indulging in Oriental daydreams, must accommodate themselves to the hard logic of facts. Their mad policy of forcible assimilation aggravates the very evils which it is intended to remove, and no more certain way of propagating irredentist feeling in Transylvania could possibly be devised"³.

The Habsburg Empire had been created to protect Europe from the Turks. Its role, now that Turkish power had receded from Europe was to protect the small nations of Central Europe from Russia on the one hand and from Germany on the other: "...it is obvious that Vienna long formed the nucleus of resistance to Ottoman aggression, and that but for the rise of Austrian power, the Crescent might have penetrated much farther west than Buda. Indeed, ever since the Turks first gained a foothold in Europe, the march of events has conspired more and more with the natural laws which geography prescribes, to bring a Danubian Empire into being; and thus the study of history only serves to confirm the view that Austria-Hungary is not merely a diplomatic necessity in the Europe of today, but is also a naturally developed unit which has long since justified its existence"⁴.

On his second visit to Hungary Seton-Watson came into contact with those who placed their hopes in Archduke Franz Ferdinand. One of them was Alexandru Vaida-Voevod who rejected the concept of the fusion of Transylvania with Romania. Rather, he hoped that Romania might find a place as a *Bundesstaat* in a reformed Habsburg Empire. This may not have been Vaida's real opinion.

Seton-Watson's first visit to the Kingdom took place in June 1909. He saw George Moroianu, whom he had previously met in London where he was serving as commercial attaché in the embassy and Orescu. But he made many new contacts. He had a conversation with the prime minister Brătianu, with the historian Nicolae Iorga, with the politicians Take Ionescu and Marghiloman, with King Carol and Queen Elizabeth, and a number of exiles from Transylvania, among them Popovici. Apparently he found the political climate in the Kingdom confusing and this may well have been so given Romania's uncomfortable position wedged between Russia and Austria-

² *The Making...*, 38. In *Racial Problems in Hungary* (London, 1908) Seton-Watson pointed out that he went to Hungary predisposed to accept every word that fell from the lips of a Kossuthist as gospel "and it was only very slowly that the truth began to penetrate through the armour of suspicion which I donned whenever I met a non-Magyar"

³ *The Future of Austria-Hungary and the Attitude of the Great Powers* (London, 1927) 50. This was a reprint of the *Spectator* articles.

⁴ *Ibidem*, 36-7.

Hungary. From Bucharest Seton-Watson returned to Sibiu where he made the acquaintance of the poet Octavian Goga. His circle of Romanian friends was now complete and he wrote on 2 July to Moroianu. "En tout cas j'ai fait la connaissance de M. Goga, et c'est déjà grand chose, ça. Et j'ai parlé beaucoup avec M. Maniu, and got to know him better. Il est aussi un homme très sympathique"⁵.

Goga also explained to Seton-Watson the conflict in Transylvania which followed the elections of 1910. Goga and many of the younger generation looked for salvation to the creation of a great Romanian state, Vaida and the more cautious realists saw no possibility of this happening in the situation then existing. Their aim was rather to keep alive the flame of Romanian nationalism in Transylvania and hope for an improved political situation after the death of Franz Josef.

Seton-Watson's second journey to Austria-Hungary, as his first, followed by a book, *Racial Problems in Hungary* (1908). It was written as an answer to the Eighty Club's book, *Hungary, its People, Places and Politics* (1907). Its aim was to show that the national question of Hungary was not just an issue of Hungarian politics, or even of the politics of the Dual Monarchy, but an international problem on whose solution depended the survival of the Dual Monarchy and of the *status quo* in the Balkans. The abandonment of the principle of equal rights for all nationalities, which Seton-Watson regarded as the historic mission of the Habsburgs, would leave Russia supreme in the Balkans. On the other hand the separation of Hungary from the rest of the Monarchy would leave the Hungarians dangerously exposed in the face of both Russian, Serbian and Romanian expansion. In such a case Romania could hardly be blamed for attempting to conquer Transylvania⁶. He did not demand either the federalisation of the Monarchy as put forward by Popovici, nor the plans for cultural autonomy as put forward by Karl Renner: they were unacceptable to the Magyars. Rather he wanted a democratisation of the State. A democratic, universal and secret franchise, independence of the judiciary, the recognition of national diversity in schools, the liberty of the press would achieve all that was necessary⁷.

The publication in 1911 of Seton-Watson's *Corruption and Reform in Hungary*⁸ was of major importance because it gave an account of electoral malpractices in a number of constituencies. Six of these were constituencies which candidates representing the Romanian National Party contested. None of them were elected, thanks to the corruption and intimidation which Seton-Watson described.

A fuller treatment of the Romanian problem was not given by Seton-Watson till the war in a lecture which he gave in February 1915 to the Royal Scottish Geographical Society and which formed the basis of a book *Romania and the Great War*. This was not just a propaganda brochure but an historical treatment of Romanian society and politics. He made it clear that he fully supported the claims of the Romanians. He described the Hungarian aim to create a Magyar national state by forcible assimilation as

⁵ Vaida memoirs quoted in *The Making...* 74.

⁶ *Ibidem*, 405.

⁷ *Ibidem*, 409—412.

⁸ London 1911.

"a monstrous crime against nature, an attempt to fight the stars in their courses"⁹. He admitted that from "a national point of view the great war has come several years too soon for the Romanians and the Southern Slavs, but its catastrophic course has already transformed the situation". He had believed in the feasibility of the plans of Franz Ferdinand and his circle of advisers among the Slovaks, the Croats and Romanians. "He alone," so Seton-Watson wrote, "stood between us all and disaster, and many of us who had been fully conscious of his faults and limitations, and had yet regarded him as the man of destiny, were overwhelmed by the hideous news of Sarajevo as a sure prelude of world-wide disaster. ...For our present purpose it will suffice to point out that the murder of the Archduke has been to the Romanians and Slovaks of Hungary an annihilating blow, and that in destroying their main prospect of effective help from *within* the monarchy almost inevitably prepares the way for a transference of their allegiance to outward influences"¹⁰.

In the appendices to this short book Seton-Watson drew up statistical tables on the nationality position of Transylvania especially in the seven counties lying on the Magyar-Romanian linguistic frontier. On the basis of this he drew up a new Hungarian-Romanian frontier. He dissassociated himself, however, from the nationalist extremists who demanded the line of the river Tisza which would have included not only areas of Hungarian population in the new greater Romania but also the whole of the Banat up to Belgrade. Nor did he think that Arad or Oradea Mare should be included in the new state. At a time when Russia was an ally he made no proposals for Bessarabia although he stressed that the province had been "Romanian since time immemorial", and that Tsarist bureaucracy had both tried to eliminate the Romanian language and had been socially regressive¹¹. Finally the book explained the difficulties facing the Romanian government in its attitude to the belligerents, and the perils it would meet if it came into the war on the allied side.

II

In the early days of the war Seton-Watson took up the cause of all those peoples of Austria-Hungary whose English champion he had become in the decade before the war. He was at this time in close contact with the Foreign Office because Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey had forbidden his staff to have any contacts with *The Times* after the attacks which H. W. Stead, its foreign editor, had launched on him in relation to Turkey's entry into the war. Yet both *The Times* and the Foreign Office found such a severance of relations so inconvenient that they used Seton-Watson as a go-between for matters relating to Eastern Europe. British policy in the Balkans was to form an alliance of Romania, Bulgaria and Greece around Serbia as a means of attacking what a later generation would call the "soft underbelly" of the enemy. There was therefore official encouragement for the

⁹ London 1915, 44.

¹⁰ Ibidem, 54—56. See also Seton-Watson's letters to Funder, Redlich and others in British Academy and University of Zagreb, R. W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs (London/Zagreb 1976) Vol I, 165—177.

¹¹ Ibidem, 24.

trip which the historian G. M. Trevelyan planned to the Balkans. Seton-Watson joined him to report, among others on the work of the Serbian Relief Fund. After visiting Serbia and Bulgaria, Seton-Watson and Trevelyan arrived in Bucharest. Seton-Watson urged the Romanians to come into the war as soon as possible.

Seton-Watson elaborated his views in a memorandum on his return: the Balkan states could be got into an alliance against the Central Powers by a promise of the rearrangement of the map of the Balkans on the basis of national self-determination. This could only be achieved by the coordinated actions of the British, French and Russians. National unification would be the reward for their actions in fighting the common enemy¹².

It was in the summer of 1913 that Seton-Watson began to plan to publish a quarterly review to be called the "European Review". It was intended to cover political, social and economic problems. The intention was to represent in the Review the views, not just of the existing dominant nations like the Magyars and the Germans, but also those who were submerged like the Ukrainians, the Slovaks and others. In June 1914 he undertook a journey to Central Europe in order to win support for his quarterly. He was promised support in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. His chief Romanian contributors were to be Iorga, Stere and Sadoveanu.

When T. G. Masaryk arrived in England in April 1915 he demanded to know where *The Weekly* was, and on being told that it could not be established because of the war, answered that this was just the time when it was needed. Masaryk did not rest until he had persuaded Seton-Watson and his friends to start a weekly review. One of his reasons was that the London papers were "Execrable, wretchedly bad, all of them". In a letter to Seton-Watson he said: "I once told you that the *Round Table* men should have a critical weekly: I think that something of the kind is absolutely necessary to lead the public opinion and above all the Government and the Staff. *The New Statesman* is one of the better weeklies but not sufficient at all: it has a more narrow aim and is narrow in its political aspirations. What I would wish would be the embodiment of the English conscience and political and strategic thinking"¹³.

So determined was Masaryk to persuade his English friends to start "The Weekly" that he intended postponing his journey to Italy and Russia until after it had been launched. "I did not say it, but it is a matter of course", he wrote to Seton-Watson, "that I would work for you: my going to Rome and Petrograd has almost no sense if Great Britain should fail, and she will fail if an open, strong and able protesting movement will not be organised". He added further: "Just the whole tendency, the spirit of "The Weekly", I hope would be different, and truly new: it must teach people to think and to imagine, and it must be new; it must be the organ of literary revolution, if a political revolution is impossible"¹⁴.

Writing on the subject of peace terms in the *Edinburgh Review* for April 1916, Steed sketched the future development of the *New Europe*.

¹² R. W. Seton-Watson and the *Yugoslavs*, Vol I, 196.

¹³ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Masaryk in England* (Cambridge 1943) 76.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, 86.

"Groups of competent persons are now being formed in the principal Allied countries; these groups will endeavour to keep in close touch with each other so that their influence upon the public opinion and, through public opinion, their pressure upon the governments of their respective countries may be concordant and simultaneous"¹⁵.

Meanwhile projects for "The Weekly" had become involved with a more ambitious plan whose authors were Steed, Dr Elsie Inglis of the Serbian Relief Fund, and Seton-Watson. They had established contact with the Australian prime minister William Hughes who had arrived in England in March 1916 and who toured the country making speeches on the theme of "Wake Up, England". It was hoped that he would lead a new Imperial Democratic Party which would replace the government with one pledged to a determined prosecution of the war. If this new party came into existence Seton-Watson expected that "The Weekly" would become its organ of opinion. So on 6 May Seton-Watson wrote to Masaryk: "I am in entire agreement with your views upon the situation: only I go several stages farther and look upon the overthrow of this government as an essential preliminary to any such plans as we may have entertained hitherto... If a new party... comes into existence, the weekly which we have planned might become its organ"¹⁶.

Nothing came of this plan and the first number of *The New Europe* appeared on 19 October 1916. Its four founders were Seton-Watson, Steed, Ronald Burrows, principal of King's College, London, and a noted archeologist and philhellene, and A. F. Whyte, a Liberal member of parliament. For the four years of its existence *The New Europe* was largely financed by Seton-Watson with financial help and guarantees from Masaryk. The most frequent contributor to the journal, either under his own name, or under the pseudonym of "Rubicon", or anonymously was Seton-Watson himself. Whyte, Burrows, Steed, J. Headlam-Morley, Allan and Rex Leeper, Arnold Toynbee and Masaryk were all frequent contributors. The Journal also had a large number of international "collaborators" of whom Octavian Goga, Take Ionescu, and Nicolae Iorga represented the Romanians.

Six months after its foundation it seemed that *The New Europe* had received a fatal blow. In March 1917 Seton-Watson was mobilised into the Royal Army Medical Corps and sent to Blackpool. But he was soon to be back. On 16 April the War Cabinet took the decision that Private Seton-Watson should be brought back to London to work in the Information Department headed by the writer Colonel John Buchan¹⁷. Here he worked in the Intelligence Bureau headed by General Count Gleichen. There were six sections to this Bureau and the historian Lewis Namier together with Seton-Watson dealt with East and Central Europe, while Allen Leeper dealt with the Balkans¹⁸.

His work in the Intelligence Bureau did not affect Seton-Watson's work for *The New Europe* except that his articles appeared anonymously or under the pseudonym of "Rubicon". In fact as his reports for the Intelligence Bureau were largely drawn from the press of Austria-Hungary together

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 385.

¹⁶ *The Making...*, 172.

¹⁷ Public Record Office, Cab. 23/2 WC 119. Whyte took Seton-Watson's place as editor and remained as sole or joint editor with him for the whole period of its existence.

¹⁸ *The Making...*, 209.

with personal contacts there is a close relationship between some of the New Europe notes and the reports. Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson write in their biography of their father that many of *The New Europe's* notes on internal developments on the Dual Monarchy were almost identical with passages in his reports and were plainly based on the same material.

The New Europe was founded at a critical stage of the war. The hopes of speedy victory had expired in the mass slaughters of the battlefields. It was the time when, in the words of Lloyd George, "the highest political circles were sibilant with peace whispers". It was the last year of the old order and of the old aristocratic Europe. It was the eve of the two Russian revolutions and of the American entry into the war in April 1917 which was to shift permanently the balance of power across the Atlantic and to give the United States the primacy in the intellectual affairs of the western world. *The New Europe* may have been one of the few journals which sensed this revolutionary change. In the first issue of 1918 in an article entitled "The Passing of the *Status quo*", Seton-Watson voiced this fact. Had the war been short, he wrote, it was conceivable that, but for certain territorial adjustments, the old Europe may have survived. But the war had blown the *status quo* to pieces "as effectually as Ypres or Rheims". The whole of Russia was in turmoil. Poland, Finland, Lithuania, the Ukraine and the Caucasus were all stirring to life. "Those who know Romania and Serbia know only too well that the very foundations of their former existence have been undermined and that they have no choice save between the achievement of their national unity and final political absorption by those who have hitherto held their kinsmen enslaved. In a word, we have already reached a stage at which one half of Europe could not under any conceivable circumstances be restored to even a semblance of the *status quo*, while in the other half such a restoration would indeed be a semblance, but not a reality. Thus when we assert that the 'reorganisation of Europe' is the most essential of all war aims, we are not crying for something remote or unpractical: we are merely insisting that there should be a conscious and determined effort to complete a process which has already reached an advanced state"¹⁹.

The essential prerequisite for the reorganisation of Europe was the total defeat of Germany. Only thus could Austria-Hungary vanish and be replaced by new national states. *The New Europe* argued that the disruption of the Monarchy was implicit in a whole series of allied pledges made to Italy, to Serbia, to Russia and Romania, and to the yet unborn nations of Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Most important of all the dismemberment of the Monarchy was not to be regarded as the distribution of Territory by conquest, but as a necessary step towards the institution of a new era in Europe based on the principle of national self-determination²⁰.

III

Romania came into the war on 27 August 1916 and Seton-Watson chose to commemorate the event in the first number of *The New Europe* by an

¹⁹ 3 Jan 1918.

²⁰ Seton-Watson, "Wanted — a Foreign Policy", 14 Dec 1916.

article on "The Roumanians of Hungary". It was an account of the position of the Romanians of Transylvania and it expressed guarded fear about the military outcome of Romanian intervention: "Belgium we could not save, Serbia we would not save, Roumania we must save"²¹. Two weeks later Seton-Watson returned to the theme of Romania in peril: she could be saved only by an Anglo-French thrust from Salonica combined with a Russian offensive. Given the dangers to which Romania was exposed and given *The New Europe's* interest and involvement in Eastern Europe it was natural that it was an exponent of an "eastern" strategy, that is the belief that the Central powers could be defeated only by a concerted thrust both on the eastern and western fronts. He wrote: "Germany's success in Roumania represents the bankruptcy of the policy of placing all our eggs in one basket, and of assuming that nothing but 'killing Germans' counts. Today even the man in the street realises that six months of magnificent heroism on the Somme have not availed to prevent a most formidable concentration of German troops on the Lower Danube. We are left hammering at the front door while the enemy does what he pleases in the stables and farm buildings"²².

The agony of Romania was clearly documented in *The New Europe*. Both Take Ionescu and Madame Ionescu informed its readers that the ideals for which Romania had gone into the war had not been abandoned. N. Lupu, a deputy in the Romanian parliament expressed fears that the plans to dismember Austria-Hungary were being abandoned in the West²³. The most striking article however, appeared on 11 January 1917. It was written by Iorga and was printed together with an extract from the covering letter to Seton-Watson. Iorga stressed the uniqueness of the war and of the alliance of the nations fighting the Central Powers. This was not an alliance of an ephemeral character by which peoples who had little in common were brought together by political vicissitude. "Those who in the course of this unique war have suffered such unimaginable horrors will not easily forget the cause of their misfortune. The brotherhood established in the midst of such terrible danger will necessarily have a future". In this future peace-time alliance the Romanian people "united in their entirety (or very nearly united in their entirety)" will have an essential place²⁴. Iorga was voicing the authentic sentiments of *The New Europe*. On 20 June 1918 *The New Europe* published a protest against the Treaty of Bucharest by Romanians living in exile.

Seton-Watson, for his part, was at pains to point out that the internal changes brought about after the accession to the throne of the Emperor Karl were illusory in both parts of the Dual Monarchy. He sought to show that in the question of democratisation as in the question of national equality there had been no change in the Hungarian situation since the fall of Count Tisza. "It is but seldom that an oligarchy can be induced to reform itself, and that of Hungary has lived too long in an atmosphere of quite unusual

²¹ 19 Oct 1916.

²² "Strategy which ignores Politics", 2 Nov 1916.

²³ "The Greatest Danger", 17 May, "Roumania's Choice", 12 July, "Roumania Irredenta", 13 Dec 1917.

²⁴ "Roumania and the West." An extract from the covering letter is quoted on the title page. In January 1917 Romania allied to Russia could hardly hope for the union of all Romanians.

intolerance and corruption, and is, moreover, too conscious of its approaching bankruptcy, not to stake its all upon a gambler's last throw". In spite of the fact that at the beginning of 1917 Tisza had declaimed about the absolute loyalty and devotion of all Hungary's Romanian citizens, Count Apponyi, the Minister of Education, was now imposing restrictions on students in teacher training colleges of the Romanian Orthodox and Uniate Churches because of their behaviour during the Romanian advance into Transylvania²⁵.

The February Revolution and the American entry into the war had transformed the situation. In an article entitled "The Climax of the War" Seton-Watson argued that these two events had restored the idealism by which the allies had been inspired in the early days of the war. They had entwined themselves in a net of secret treaties and they had coquetted with the notion of a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. Romania too, had departed in some measure from the aims for which she had taken up arms. "The fact can no longer be hidden that the arrangements concluded with Roumania last year, after much bargaining, assigned to Roumania regions outside her ethnographical limits, to which she has no publicly defensible moral claim. For these arrangements the responsibility belongs chiefly to the pre-Revolutionary Government of Russia and to the Romanian Premier, Mr. Brătianu. While upholding to the full the claims of Romania to national unity, the Allied peoples cannot in conscience sanction the allotment to Roumania of districts in the Banat and the Central Hungarian plain, where the Rouman population is either non-existent or is vastly outnumbered by Serbs or Magyars"²⁶.

But Seton-Watson's views were not accepted by all contributors. On 26 July 1917 a contributor calling himself Alexander Severus wrote on "The Building of Greater Roumania". A Russian state which called for a peace without annexations and without reparations was bound to come into conflict with the national aims of the Romanians in the Kingdom and also in Transylvania and the Bukovina. The author quoted three Russian newspapers, the *Dien*, *Pravda* and *Delo Naroda*. These had published in May 1917 the territorial terms on which Romania had come into the war; the whole of the Banat, the Bukovina and Transylvania. The author agreed that such terms were now unacceptable and argued that it was easy to draw an ethnographic frontier to separate the Hungarians from the Romanians. The demand in the treaty of 1916 however, was justified in "a world obsessed by *Realpolitik*. Economic and strategical reasons were conventionally considered to outweigh strict considerations of justice and humanity... Probably, in the o'd spirit of Eastern (yes, and Western) diplomacy, she bargained for more than she actually expected to make good. In the changed world of the Russian Revolution values have altered". Yet, there was no doubt that Romania would accept an ethnographic Romanian state if it were offered her. "It does not follow Roumania was a criminal in asking for a little more a year ago".

The author also raised the question of Bessarabia. He noted the demands being made by the population for autonomy and for the use of the Romanian

²⁵ "The Hungarian Deadlock", 25 Oct 1917.

²⁶ 19 July 1917.

language in administration, and for economic aid to the peasantry. He hoped that the Russian government would accept such a programme.

The article was continued in the next issue. Severus sought to prove that Russian accusations that the Romanian government and society were reactionary were unfounded. Quite the contrary Romania was socially progressive especially in the peasant question²⁷.

Romania was forced to accept the terms imposed by the enemy on 7 May 1918. The terms were condemned by *The New Europe*²⁸ as a typical sign of German and Austro-Hungarian imperialism. Even Christian Rakovski found his words printed in *The New Europe*. On 7 March it reprinted an article of his which had appeared in a Swiss socialist newspaper. In it Rakovski condemned the indifference of the Dutch-Scandinavian socialists to the national oppression of the Romanians of Transylvania. Rakovski too gave voice to his belief that the Dobrudja was Romanian and should remain a part of the Romanian state. Seton-Watson had earlier written to Lloyd George's private secretary Philip Kerr: "I think you know how keenly I have always sympathised with Roumania and her aspirations, and what are my views on Integral Victory; so you will not, I am sure, look upon it as a sign of slackening on my part, when I assume it to be inevitable that Romania should enter into negotiations with the enemy (a step which can in present circumstances only lead to one result). I am alarmed by the attitude of the Allied representatives at Jassy, who — presumably acting on instructions from home — simply insist on the need for holding out at all costs and seem to infer that any other course would be equivalent to a betrayal of the Allied cause. As we are utterly unable to give Romania material help of any kind in the immediate future, such an attitude is merely exasperating, and (what is more important) cannot even avert the final catastrophe. Our only hope of retaining political and moral influence in Romania is to show her the fullest sympathy at this critical moment, to assure her that we do not regard her acceptance of the inevitable as an abandonment of the alliance..."²⁹.

Happily Romania's agony was brief. The collapse of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary gave it the opportunity to take up arms once more and the union of Transylvania with the Kingdom was proclaimed in Alba Iulia on 1 December 1918. Seton-Watson and *The New Europe* now found themselves in opposition to the extremist policy represented by Brătianu, and based on the secret treaty of August 1916. "I am in bad odour now," wrote Seton-Watson from Paris to his wife on 3 January 1919, "as the Roumanians are all raving about the Banat and quite impervious to reason, and I of course cannot follow them on this point"³⁰. Fortunately for Seton-Watson's relations with the Romanians most of his friends like Ionescu, Goga, Vaida, Moroianu and Tilea agreed with him. Indeed, *The New Europe* had always supported an ethnic Romania and always resisted plans for a Romania which would include non-Romanian populations, although it recognised that substantial minorities would remain in Romanian Transyl-

²⁷ 2 Aug 1917.

²⁸ Allan Leeper writing under the pseudonym of Belisarius, "The Roumanian Peace Treaty", 13 June 1918.

²⁹ 13 Feb 1918. Quoted in *The Making...*, 252.

³⁰ *The Making...*, 342.

vania and also in the Banat. Thus on 5 December 1918 it warned against those whose claims were based on the treaty of 1916, "a treaty which rests upon the same false and reactionary basis as that with Italy". The same argument was repeated in Seton-Watson's article on "The Question of the Banat" which sought to prove on the basis of nationality statistics that while the Romanians had a claim to a large part of the Banat, their insistence on the whole of it would turn the Romanians and the Yugoslavs for the first time in their history into active enemies³¹. Brătianu's ambitions also came under attack³². And when finally the frontiers of Hungary were settled by the Treaty of Trianon *The New Europe* published a special article devoted to this problem entitled *The New Frontiers of Hungary*³³.

But though some aspects of Brătianu's policy were condemned the new state was an integral part of that new Europe for which Seton-Watson and his friends had fought. Professor Iorga gave the Romanian view on the new regime for the Danube³⁴ and Professor George Herron praised the Romanians for the energetic action they had taken in marching on Budapest and ridding Hungary of the Bolshevik menace, an action which was, so Herron believed, a decisive step towards the saving of European civilization³⁵. To Seton-Watson the Romanian army provided the "whiff of grapeshot" that ended the Bela Kun terror³⁶. Other writers in *The New Europe* feared that Romania was seeking hegemony in the Balkans. Her successful operation had whetted her appetite. An alliance between Romania and the most reactionary elements of the old Hungary seemed possible. In the same issue, however, Iorga defended the claims of Romanian democracy³⁷.

Romania was not yet out of danger. The Bolshevik revolution was a threat to the whole concept of the new Europe. The Bolsheviks had gone against the ideals of the February revolution. They had imposed a censorship "such as Torquemada might envy". They had created a tyranny worse than that of the Tsars. Bolshevism was merely tsarism "multiplied to the *n*th degree"³⁸. Seton-Watson feared even that collusion between the Germans and the Bolsheviks could turn the Black Sea into a German sea by reducing Romania to "hopeless vassalage". With this control the Germans together with the Turks could gain control of the Middle East and thus threaten Britain's position as far away as India³⁹.

³¹ 13 Feb 1919.

³² "The New Roumania", 3 Apr 1919. See also 6 Nov, 11 Dec 1919.

³³ "The New Frontiers of Hungary", 15 Jan 1920.

³⁴ "The Problem of the Danube", 16 Sept 1920.

³⁵ "The New Roumania", 2 Oct 1919.

³⁶ "The Fall of Bela Kun", 14 Aug 1919.

³⁷ "Behind the Scenes in Hungary" and "Thoughts on Roumanian Policy", 16 Oct 1919.

³⁸ "In Search of a Russian Policy", 4 Mar 1920.

³⁹ "Have the Allies a Russian Policy?" 16 May 1918.

IV

Now in 1920 the days of *The New Europe* were numbered. Rising costs were forcing it out of the journal and newspaper market. Seton-Watson had lost £7,500 on the enterprise. The greatest blow was perhaps the departure of Whyte for India to take up the post of president of the All-India Legislative Assembly. Seton-Watson felt that he could not run the journal on his own and there were "probably not more than half a dozen men in this island capable of running it as I think it ought to be run"⁴⁰. In the last issue Seton-Watson wrote "A Farewell Survey". Inevitably it was sad. The great journalistic experiment had come to an end; many of the ideals of the war years had been perverted at the Paris peace conferences. But there was hope too. It was a triumph that the Habsburgs no longer ruled fifty million people; and that Tsarism had been destroyed; and that Turkish rule had been removed from most of its subject populations. Above all "we have witnessed the decline and fall of a world every whit as great and significant as the Roman Empire, and we are dimly aware that the destruction of the European system of the nineteenth century is both an effect and a cause. As effect, it is the result of forces created within that system itself; as cause, it is the fertile seed-bed of a harvest of which no man living will see the reaping"⁴¹.

What then was the influence of Seton-Watson and of *The New Europe*. That it was considerable cannot be doubted. Seton-Watson belonged to what the Socialist pioneer Beatrice Webb called "the public service families". Their wealth gave them independence. Some used this independence in the furtherance of charitable causes, others in the furtherance of cultural enterprises. Seton-Watson used it to fight for a new Europe. He acted not for gain or fame but out of conviction. His unique knowledge of Eastern Europe gave him a position of importance during the first world war. His contacts within the foreign office were close. In July 1917, when he worked for the Intelligence Bureau, George Clerk, his contact in the Foreign Office lamented that in the question of Polish politics there was no one from whom one could derive information "as for instance Dr. Seton-Watson has enabled us to do in the case of the Yugo-Slavs"⁴². His contacts with Masaryk, Supilo, Trumbic, Hinkovic and others made him an essential link between the foreign office and the representatives of these nationalities. Of course his work for Yugoslav independence and unity and his activity at the Paris peace conference were the most important of his political career. In Paris in 1919 he stayed together with Steed in a flat close to the Hotels Majestic and Astoria which were the headquarters of the British delegation. He certainly did not have the ear of the major delegates but he showed the same interests with such younger men of the delegation as Harold Nicolson, Leeper, and Headlam-Morely. He had contacts with Stephen Bonsal and Charles Seymour of the American delegation and also with the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak delega-

⁴⁰ *The Making...*, 409.

⁴¹ 28 Oct 1920.

⁴² *The Making...*, 209.

tions. His contacts with the Romanian delegation were not so close because Brătianu completely dominated the delegation.

Sometimes his influence could be used in ways contrary to which he had intended. On 9 July 1917 he wrote in the Intelligence Department a memorandum on "War Feelings in Austria" which showed the political and economic weakness of the Dual Monarchy. Seton-Watson argued that a military offensive against the Monarchy could under such circumstances be successful. Characteristically Lloyd George drew the conclusion from this that Austria-Hungary could be knocked out of war either by military pressure or could be brought out of the war by separate and secret negotiations with her⁴³.

It is equally difficult to measure the influence of *The New Europe*. Its circulation was hardly more than 4,000. Its importance may be judged by the praise heaped on it and by the attacks made on it: but it was read by interested people in England and in the allied countries. It is possible to argue that it was preaching to the converted, but if it did do that, it did at least give them accurate information about the international scene. In any case the policy which it pursued was finally and perhaps reluctantly accepted by the British and American governments.

When after the war Seton-Watson visited Romania in June 1920 the Chamber of deputies honoured him by speeches from the president of the Chamber, from Octavian Goga for the government, and from Vaida-Voevod in the name of the Transylvanians, after which the whole Chamber rose to their feet in acclamation⁴⁴.

APPENDIX

Praise and abuse for *The New Europe*

Punch, 28 February 1917

As it is not Mr Punch's habit to admit reviews of periodical publications, I ought to say that the case of *The New Europe* (Constable), whose first completed volume lies before me, is exceptional. In thirty years' experience of journalism I never remember a paper containing so much 'meat' — some of it pretty strong meat too — in proportion to its size. In hardly a single week since its first issue in October last have I failed to find between its tangerine coloured covers some article giving me information that I did not know before, or furnishing a fresh view of something with which I thought myself familiar. And I take it there are many other writers — and even, perhaps, some statesmen — who have enjoyed the same experience. Dr. Seton-Watson and the accomplished collaborators who march under his orange oriflamme may not always convince us (I am not sure, for example, that Austria est delenda may prove the only or the best prescription for bringing freedom to the Jugo-Slavs of South-Eastern Europe), but they always furnish the reader with the facts enabling him to test their conclusions; and that in these times is a great merit. My own feeling is that if they had begun their concerted labours a few years earlier the War might never have happened; or at least we should have gone into it with a much more accurate notion of the real aims of the Central Powers, and a much better chance of quickly defeating them. The tragedies of Serbia and Romania would almost certainly have been averted.

⁴³ Bodleian Library, Oxford, Milner papers, Box 125.

⁴⁴ "The Roumanian Parliament honours Scotus Viator", 15 Jul 1920.

The Morning Post, 23 April 1918

There are certain clever people in this country who are full of ideas and information on foreign politics. No plain Englishman must be bewildered by the very names which they have at their finger-ends. There is not a corner of Europe out of which they have not produced a new and hopeful, although hitherto unheard of, nationality. We had puzzled ourselves to discover whence all this knowledge was derived until we happened upon a weekly periodical called the *New Europe*, which we have now read industriously though we hesitate to say how many numbers. We confess that we have been vastly impressed and even bewildered: it is like wandering through an Ethnological Museum. There is only one thing we seem to miss. It may be churlish to think of it in face of such eloquence and such erudition. But we seem to miss a guiding principle. The interest of our own country in these fascinating questions seems to have been somehow overlooked. The Editor is said to be an Englishman, but his own race must have been crowded out of his heart or his head by all the racial sports and curiosities whose interest he has made his own. We are somehow reminded of some forlorn spinster, who, having no children of her own and being well provided with means, has adopted a whole menagerie of strange little pets, upon whom she lavishes all her love and care, so that a chipmunk or a mongoose has become more to her than children are to other people.

It seems almost as if this intense preoccupation with foreigners for their own sakes were accompanied by a distaste for the interests of our fellow countrymen. We had an example of it the other day when Dr Ronald Burrows, who besides being one of the leading lights of the *New Europe*, is also Principal of King's College, proclaimed himself thus: "Realists as well as idealists, Imperialist much more than Little Englander, should insist that whatever happens to Mesopotamia and Palestine, whatever is decided about the German colonies, one solution is barred out by deliberate renunciation. They must not be added to the British Empire". Here at least we have a negative principle emerging out of this Babel of tongues and races. Whatever is to be done for the cause of Balkan unity or the self-determination of Ruthenia, although we should go bankrupt in blood or money for the cut-throats of Eastern Europe, nothing but a proud consciousness of being the Dago's friend is to accrue to the benefit of the British Empire. Nay, this spirit of renunciation is even to extend to our Allies, for we seem to note a certain grudge against Italy for having designs upon the Eastern Adriatic. We note also that for a very long time the Bolsheviks were great pets of those who appear to direct the policy of the *New Europe*. Only in February last Principal Burrows was in tears because this country had "personally offended" Chicherin and Trotzky, and Mr A F Whyte, who is, by the way, a member of Parliament, was rebuking our Foreign Office for not embracing Leon Kamenev (whose real name is Rosenfeld). But our pet-collectors, we are interested to see, have at last realised that Bolsheviks bite. "Throughout its career", says an editorial of March 21 last, "the *New Europe* has endeavoured to interpret the mind of Russia to the British people. At first the task was comparatively simple, despite the blinding suddenness with which the revolution broke upon us. But... there were times when even the best informed were at fault... We have all known what it is to put our money on the wrong horse..."

Perhaps this is not the only case in which the *New Europe* has backed the wrong horse. From certain spiteful references we gather that the national party in Poland, which is recognized by the Western Powers as committed to their cause, has come under its displeasure, and we gather that an old national cause like that of Poland, which is understood by everybody is too common a thing for those racial curiosity hunters. We are not surprised that the *New Europe* is an enthusiast for the League of Nations, since that project, translated from grand into simple language, means handing over the control of our affairs to foreigners. One enthusiast for this idea, by the name of Seignobos cheerfully announces that "a League of Nations is a revolution comparable to the great political revolutions of the past, for it would signify the fall of Sovereignty". "That", he goes on, "is not, of course, a reason for renouncing the project: the very reverse! But it is a warning that we shall find vast obstacles in our path." We wonder if all the innocent enthusiasts who rejoice at the idea of a League of Nations would be so much in love with it if they realised that it was a cloak for revolution and the abolition of British Sovereignty. Yet it is logical that

we cannot have both a Sovereignty and a "supernational authority". Perhaps that may be the reason why the League of Nations idea was set afoot. The people who push it most are, we observe, just that sort of people who are caught most often when portmanteaus are opened at a frontier. To the International Jew a League of Nations is a most convenient idea: but it should not be quite so pleasing to those of us who have countries of our own and have some reason to value them. We suggest, then, that our British public should beware of some of these eloquent guides to foreign politics, and content themselves to test all these questions and aspirations by asking simply — How do they affect the interest of England? That is a simple rule which may guide us safely through the most tangled mazes. We should be the friend of our friends, and the enemy of our enemies. And we might also keep in mind the memorable remark of the great Admiral Blake on this question — "Our business is to keep foreigners from fooling us."

The New Europe's answer, 2 May 1918

On 23 April the *Morning Post* devoted a leading article to *The New Europe*, which we are informed is like "an Ethnological Museum", in which "a guiding principle" is missing. As for our Editor, he appears to have allowed British interests to be "crowded out of his heart or his head by all the racial sports and curiosities whose interest he has made his own. We are somehow reminded of some forlorn spinster, who, having no children of her own and being well provided with means, has adopted a whole menagerie of strange little pets, upon whom she lavishes all her love and care, so that a chipmunk or a mongoose has become more to her than children are to other people." This sort of criticism is never very effective, but least of all in a newspaper which recently asked the contemptuous question, "What is a Yugoslav?" but which today applauds the Italo-Yugoslav agreement of which *The New Europe* has from the first been an ardent champion.

The *Morning Post* is especially indignant with Dr Burrows for opposing the annexation of Palestine and Mesopotamia to the British Empire, as inconsistent with the repeated professions of disinterestedness made by British statesmen of all parties in the matter of war aims. Such an attitude is gracefully defined as "A proud consciousness of being the Dago's friend." The *Morning Post*, which presumably favours the rival policy of "Grab all you can lay your hands on," further attacks us for our advocacy of a League of Nations, because "that project, translated from grand into simple language, means handing over the control of our affairs to foreigners." Certainly President Wilson will be edified at the suggestion that the foremost advocates of the idea are "that sort of people who are caught most often when portmanteaus are opened at a frontier."

The sum of the *Morning Post's* wisdom lies in a quotation from Admiral Blake: "Our business is to keep foreigners from fooling us." It was with the object of supplying a remedy to this "fooling" by the spread of accurate information on foreign politics that *The New Europe* was founded, in the belief that this is a practical contribution towards that integral victory which was, and will remain, our motto. The *Morning Post* is a typical product of that state of insular ignorance and prejudice against which the foundation of *The New Europe* was a protest; and its displeasure is our justification. Incidentally the writer's acquaintance with the political world of letters is shown by his courteous reference to one of the most eminent of living French historians as "one enthusiast by the name of Seignobos." We can only admire the assurance with which Blake's motto is put forward by a newspaper which during the present war has been worse "fooled by foreigners" than any of its contemporaries. Without going further afield, we need only to refer to the notorious forgeries of their "Budapest correspondent," who was exposed a year ago in our own columns, and who is now, we understand, in a Manx internment camp.

ANGLO-ROMANIAN CULTURAL RELATIONS IN A PHASE OF TRANSITION

BY

ALEXANDRU DUȚU

In the first part of the 19-th century, Romanian culture was undergoing a profound transformation: intellectual activity was becoming highly diversified with belles-lettres assuming a more important position¹. Romanian writers were seeking to express what other European philosophers, historians or writers brought forward in their works, namely what Arthur Lovejoy calls "the abundance of differentness that there is, actually or potentially, in nature and human nature"². Thus, the sphere of intellectual values widened rather rapidly. Efforts aimed at creating original poetry, prose and drama were accompanied by active assimilation of foreign literary masterpieces. Thus, works of English writers of various periods were introduced into Romanian culture: in Romanian literary journals one may find Byron's elegies, in 1830, a scene from act one of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*, in the Transylvanian periodical "Foaie pentru minte", in 1840, or fragments from Bulwer Lytton, Daniel Defoe, Jonathan Swift or Walter Scott's works; in 1844, the first Romanian translation of Dickens's *The Drunkard's Death* appeared in the journal published in Braşov: „Foaie pentru minte“. It would not be wrong to say that what determined the choice of foreign works to be translated was their response to national and social aspirations and mainly to the general effort to raise Romanian culture to the level of that attained by other European nations, as protagonists of the Romanian Enlightenment had put it. The persistence of a Classicism based on moral values and a growing interest in Romanticism were characteristic of this stage of the history of Romanian culture.

A stage which depended upon a new type of intellectual communication prompted now by cultures fully aware of their national identity. In Romania, the improvement of the national cultural activity had as a natural corollary the adoption of cultural forms considered to be "advanced". Starting with the Age of Enlightenment, in the second half of the 18-th century, men of letters from Moldavia and Wallachia introduced Romanian readers to Pope's *Essay on Man*, to Young's and Ossian's version or to the good rules of the perfect gentleman as presented by Lord Chesterfield in a booklet

¹ More at length in my article *La mutation romantique: l'exemple roumain*, „Cahiers roumains d'études littéraires“, 1978, 2, 17—26.

² Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Harvard University Press, 1966), chapter: *Romanticism and the Principle of Plenitude*.

³ Details in my study, *Primele contacte literare anglo-române*, in my book, *Explorări în istoria literaturii române*, (Bucureşti, 1969).

called *The Oeconomy of Human Life*³. Transylvanian writers became more and more interested in the British parliamentary system and translated fragments from Addison's articles. In 1843, George Bariț wrote that "we all look upon Great Britain as the first state of Europe, so it is only natural that we should study it more closely from reasons that are obvious to everyone"⁴. This obviousness was rooted mainly in political reasons, since the Transylvanians were in search of forms which might modify the conditions imposed by the foreign aristocracy upon the Romanian peasants and middle class.

During this period, British diplomats and men of letters paid a growing attention to South East Europe. The best perceived people were the Greeks; no doubt, it was a consequence of British educational system based on the classics. Homer and Pericles protected with their shadows the inhabitants of the southern part of the Balkan peninsula. It is very characteristic of the prevailing image of the Greeks with the British what Reverend John Usko wrote, in 1805, in a letter in which he asked that books be sent to Smyrna after the dreadful fire of 1797 which had destroyed the Factory's library: "Greek authors or at least some classics are in my humble opinion necessary and very useful for a clergyman and some instructed traveller who comes to read them as it were on their native ground"⁵. In a similar way, what stirred the interest of British consuls or merchants in Romanians was that they were "colonised by Trajan and the succeeding emperors during the early part of the second century of the Christian era, whose ancestors intermarried with the Dacians aborigines", as E. L. Blutte put it in 1833⁶.

The presence of the British consuls in the Principalities contributed directly to the development of the dialogue between Romanians' European consciousness and the foreigners' interest in South East Europe. We may quote, in this sense, the books written by the Consul-General in Iași, William Wilkinson, who, for the first time, dedicated a whole book to the Romanian countries alone and not to South East Europe in general, as so many had done in the past. *An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia* came out in London, in 1820; it begins with the Dacians, the forefathers of the Romanian people and goes up to his time, when the despotic power of foreign rule is, as it seems to him, unparalleled. But he is wrong when he states that "stupor and apathy" make people bear the oppression, because only one year later, in 1821, the son of a peasant, Tudor Vladimirescu, raised the standard of revolt against the abuses and declined to co-operate with Alexandru Ypsilanti's movement for liberation which was not intended to break the Phanariot monopoly of power and profit in the Principalities. This revolt against the Phanariots and the boyards brought to light again the fact that the Romanian people with their Roman background and their attachment to the great Byzantine tradition had their own individuality and a firm desire to take their place in the new Europe of the nations⁷. Other

³ See Vasile Netea, *George Barițiu, Viața și activitatea sa*, (București, 1966), 170.

⁵ Richard Clogg, *The Library of the Levant Company's Factory in Smyrna (1805)*, in (Athens, 1930), 112—124.

⁶ See Nicolae Iorga, *A History of Anglo-Romanian Relations* (Bucharest, 1931).

⁷ "Although the Phanariots, because of their position in the Ottoman hierarchy and their patronage of the Orthodox Church, represented a Byzantine tradition, they had, nevertheless, become an anachronism in the Principalities. With the development of a Romanian

English travellers had spoken of the Latin origin of the Romanians, like Dr. Dallaway who in 1794 travelled across Transylvania and Wallachia and noticed that girls dressed in the same manner on both sides of the Carpathians and that "people of the lowest degree of education are able to read and probably to speak Latin, with a certain purity; but the peasant mixt it with Illyric"⁸. E. L. Blutte had the advantage of long conversations with the Romanians, so that he went deeper than those who only listened to their utterance; therefore he was able to understand that "these two brave peoples being brought into contact with one another and intermingling through the course of the centuries have come to make up and represent the Daco-Romanian people now numbering more than ten million and having two great and godly sacred claims on the country: the one a more than forty centuries old right of heredity, the other the right of colonisation and the preservation of the Daco-Romanian laws for seventeen centuries up to the present day through the weapons and the strength of their own public opinion".

Some years later, Max Müller published, in 1854, the first scientific account of the Romanian language in English, while two anthologies of Romanian literature offered to the English public an introduction to the rich oral tradition of a people now better perceived as a consequence of the Crimean War⁹. E. C. Grenville Murray and Henry Stanley in their anthologies benefitted from the work done by those who are now designated as the generation of 1848, the intellectuals who wished to modernize Romania and build a new unitary state. Pleading the cause of their people, men like Nicolae Bălcescu, Alexandru Golescu, Dimitrie Brătianu reached London and entered, perhaps, the beautiful house in Piccadilly, Lord Palmerston's home; others got the assistance of the British consuls, among whom Robert Gilmour Colquhoun, sympathized strongly with the Romanian cause and sustained it, enjoying the warm appreciation of his new friends. The progress in material prosperity made by the united Principalities, after 1859, and mostly the will to modernize Romania oriented the politicians and also the public opinion towards tighter relations with the nations which might be favourable to Romania's national goals.

Romanian intellectual life continued to be regarded upon, a long period afterwards, as a "young" culture simply because belles-lettres were at their very beginnings. Romanian culture was considered a "young" one whenever the observer was interested more in the adoption of Western forms and less in the many phases of its development. A rich oral tradition and a long range of monuments, each one with its own individuality, were characteristic of a cultural evolution nourished also by books, which were produced on the Romanian soil at a rather early moment, in 1508, and in the Romanian language by the end of the 16-th century. Thus, Romanian culture was never

national consciousness the Phanariots found themselves serving Greek interests that could not be identified with Romanian aspirations" — D. J. Deletant, *Some Aspects of the Byzantine Tradition in the Romanian Principalities*, "The Slavonic and East European Review", 1981, 1, 14.

⁸ See G. F. Cushing, *Dr. Dallaway's Itinerary*, "Revue des études sud-est européennes", 1970, 3, 461—480 and Trevor J. Hope, *The Travels of the Rev. James Dallaway in the Ottoman Empire: Some unpublished Correspondance with Robert Liston*, "Sussex Archaeological Collections", vol. CXII, 1974, 1—6.

⁹ Eric D. Tappe, *Romanian in Britain*, An Inaugural Lecture, (London, 1975).

torn up by the conflict between the spoken and the written language, as it happened with the Greeks. At the same time, the starting point of intellectual modernization of Romanian culture (which recent researches are inclined to assign to Constantin Brâncoveanu's reign, by the end of the 17-th century¹⁰) was not the consequence of a conflict between the spiritual and the temporal powers. Whenever the development of Romanian culture is carefully scrutinized, the profound transformation which took place in the first part of the 19-th century appears as a collision between tradition and innovation and not as a transition from a rudimentary cultural form to a superior one.

Another trend in South East European historiography hid the cultural diversity of this area. Interested mainly in linguistic aspects, historians put sometimes too strong an accent on the Slavonic and Greek phases which apparently dominated cultural life in this area. The role of Romanian cultural centres with their presses, schools and academies and mainly with their princely courts where men of letters from the Balkans could earn their living, find a milieu for intellectual discussions and very often financial help which enabled them to go the universities of Padova, Halle, Jena or Göttingen, has been simply ignored¹¹. Thus, the whole process of modernization was reduced to a very short period, to the moment when, at the beginning of the 19-th century, people switched their heads and looked towards Western Europe. In order to make this didactic scheme more palatable, historians would suggest that the Byzantine culture was continued by the Neo-Greek culture which opened the way to Western Europe to all Balkan cultures. It is a common-place to affirm that "European books were not generally available in the Balkans except in Greek translation"¹², although real facts suggest a more varied picture of intellectual connexions, mostly in Romania. It suffices to say that the first British literary works entered into Romanian language through different channels: Pope's *Essay on Man* was translated from French, Addison ideas came through Serbian, Shakespeare and Defoe were translated from French and German, while Chesterfield, it is true, from Greek. In 1848, the painter and writer Ion Negulici published *Gulliver Travels* translated from French, but, says he, the version was "collated with the original text by Mr. Em. Angelescu". By the middle of the 19-th century, French continued to be the best known foreign language in Romanian society and it is through this language that the great majority of translations was done. But learning of other languages made progress in the second half of the century: journals often published announcements given by private teachers ready to open new horizons to young people. For example, in 1848, „Pruncul român” made known that C. A. Rosetti's English-born wife, Maria, was willing to teach children English three times a week, each time an hour and a half, for 4 “galbeni”, golden coins; but already in 1838, a Leopold Krüger had in-

¹⁰ See the Concise Bibliography and the conclusions of my book *European Intellectual Movements and Modernization of Romanian Culture*, (București, 1981).

¹¹ On the Romanian centres in which different cultural trends were connected some data in the last chapter of my book, *Romanian Humanists and European Culture*, (București, 1977).

¹² Peter Mackridge, *The Greek Intelligentsia, 1780—1830: A Balkan Perspective in Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence*, edited by Richard Clogg, (MacMillan, 1981), 63—84.

vited young boyards to speak German, French and English by paying him a modest salary („Albina românească“, Iași). During these years, a taste for Romantic landscapes prompted boyards to arrange their gardens “à l'anglaise”, while ladies in fashion (like Anica Lătescu who was well-known for her Anglomania inspired by her sister's British nurse — the “miss”) began to speak English with their Gipsy servants and even to dress them like British postillons¹³.

A thorough analysis of intellectual trends, ways of life and cultural forms opens the path to a novel approach to this phenomenon of cultural transformation. By the beginning of the 19-th century, in all European societies is manifest a strong will to innovate and to eject traditional ideas and concepts: “revolution” got its contemporary meaning rather late, at the end of the 18-th century, as Karl Griewank has demonstrated¹⁴. But, concomitantly, the reconstitution of national traditions revived concepts and images which had been a common lot; the medieval tradition of each people brought to light common features which remade a universal form of civilization. Called “post-byzantine”, this universal form had its own mechanism of intellectual communication which explains, better than influences or imitations, why ideas and works circulated rather rapidly in South East Europe, while contacts with Western Europe were quite scarce. After the Renaissance, European intellectual movements worked upon mental attitudes and states of mind mainly in areas with a special political status which gave men the opportunity to establish new relations — like Dubrovnik, Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia — or with a special cultural position — like the Phanar in Istanbul¹⁵. But more than in other areas of the continent “the long-run trends” played in South East Europe a prominent role in the formation of new cultural models. To study the evolution of the post-byzantine form and its transformation into national cultural models is to grasp the polycentrism of Byzantine cultural life, the new intellectual scheme which was shaped in smaller political states and, in general, the dynamic of traditional societies. The long-run attitudes explain why the Baroque did not adopt here ostentatious forms, why the Enlightenment put a special stress on education and Romanticism on the patriotic feeling. At the beginning of the 19-th century, when a new universal form began to take shape — the commonwealth of national cultures —, a new type of intellectual dialogue came to the fore: it called for a better knowledge of literary works and of the specific mental

¹³ See Mircea Anghelescu, *Lectures et attitudes romantiques dans la société roumaine au début du XIX-e siècle*, “Synthesis”, II, 1975, 97—105.

¹⁴ Karl Griewank, *Der neuzeitliche Revolutionsbegriff*, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1969.

¹⁵ See Peter F. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354—1804*, (University of Washington Press, 1977), and Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, (Cambridge University Press, 1968).

trends of each culture. The many common traits which everyone discovers in the Greek and Romanian cultures of the 15-th to 18-th centuries and which build together a fragment of the universal form we call nowadays post-byzantine, all these traits offered a foundation to the national aspirations and national goals. Each culture began to seek out new intellectual relations¹⁶. At this very moment, Romanians discovered Chesterfield's sound morality, the world of blind forces and sweet mercy. But a keen observer may note that all along this century in search of a new world, the post-byzantine form continued to live on in South East Europe.

¹⁶ For details see my article, *Sources, Dynamics, Structures, Explanations of Change. (Les mentalités collectives)*, „Revue des études sud-est européennes”, 1980, 4, 557—572.

THE BUCKLEAN IMPACT ON ROMANIAN CULTURE

BY

ALEXANDRU ZUB

Familiar today to only a limited number of specialist, the name of the English historian Henry Thomas Buckle (1821—1862) enjoyed a peculiar fame around the eighteen-sixties. *History of the Civilization in England*¹, the work which brought him wide renown, was rapidly translated into several languages, causing most ardent polemic, indicative that the interest in the respective subject-matter was authentic. The explanation for this success on the European continent is to be found especially in the fact that Buckle had tried to respond to the need of more rigour in historiography even by pushing things to the limit, which determined E. Bernheim to call his theory "monstrous", and J. G. Droysen to criticize his basic principles and method². Since it was his desire to make history as exact a science as possible, Buckle took natural sciences as a model, from which he borrowed even the inductive method, considering these sciences the best propaedeutic for any history. Once in possession of the method, he defined thus the laws that govern the course of civilization: 1) The progress of civilization depends on the amount of scientific truths and their diffusion in society; 2) A sceptical attitude always precedes the new impulses of civilization; 3) The moral side always develops more slowly than the intellectual one; 4) The main impediment in the way of civilization was and remains the tutelar spirit. But *History of the Civilization in England* (I—II, 1857—1861) is in fact only the theoretical and methodological introduction to a vast synthesis which the author, who died in the prime of life, did not have time to complete. Translated immediately in Germany (1860), Russia (1862—1865), France (1865), it aroused both enthusiastic eulogies and bitter polemics, being one of the most controversial works in the positivist bibliography. Translating it into German Arnold Ruge did not conceal his great esteem for the author, whom he considered to be a personality of first magnitude in English thought. The French version, born out of the same impulse, recommended Buckle as a redoubtable historian, albeit controversial, and Etienne Louis commented on his work eulogizing it in *Revue des deux mondes* (1868). Two Russian translations, made at short intervals, are evidence of the especial interest which this work aroused in Eastern Europe, where the attempt to grant history a scientific character could not remain without an echo. On the contrary, as M. N.

¹ H. Th. Buckle, *History of civilisation in England*, I—II, (London, 1857, 1861).

² J. G. Droysen, *Erhebung der Geschichte zum Rang einer Wissenschaft in Historische Zeitschrift*, 1862 (study reproduced in *Grundriss d. Historik*, Leipzig, 1868). Apud N. Iorga, *Generalități cu privire la studiile istorice*, ed. III, București, 1944, 12 (infra: *Generalități*).

Petrov put it, it had had not long ago such a great succes, especially in our country, Russia”³.

For reasons which we are going to briefly present below, *History of the Civilization in England* had an even more powerful echo in the Romanian society, although A. D. Xenopol, he himself one of its commentators, thought that the absence of a translation in Romanian would indicate a lack of interest⁴. As a matter of fact, Buckle's book was received with vivid interest, circulating in all the known versions and determining partisan or critical attitudes. Especially in the *Junimea* circle, of a rationalist colouring, it gave rise to very heated debates in reports, conferences, analytical studies. It was Titu Maiorescu, the mentor of the society, who put it in circulation and who lectured to the general public, held a course at the University on the subject⁵. G. Panu, from whom we have taken this piece of information, the memoirist who declared himself “philosophical follower” of A. Comte, was captivated by the Bucklean positivism, which he associated with H. Spencer's doctrine and with the synthesis devoted by J. W. Draper to the spiritual evolution of Europe⁶. V. Pogor, the Voltairian sceptic, presented it rather flatly in *Gazeta de Iași*, then in *Convorbiri literare*⁷, where the respective lecture of the mentor of *Junimea* was also summed up: “Speaking about the historical value of the psychological factors, Mr. Maiorescu availed himself of the opportunity, the editor noted, to expound the theory of civilization, recently formulated by Buckle, and demonstrated why progress is made only through intelligence and not also through morals⁸. It is a remark which we come across in Eminescu as well. Commenting upon a conference in which it had been stated that civilization is opposed to corruption, the poet declared, based on Buckle, that civilization is corruptible, its essence being intellectual and not moral⁹. Buckle was for him a high spirit to be situated beside Darwin at the top of the pyramid¹⁰. V. Conta, author of a materialistic philosophical system based on “universal ondulation”, found in Buckle's book arguments from which one could derive the significance of the race as a factor in evolution¹¹, the determining role of geographic environment¹², the ascending character of progress¹³. I. C. Negruzzi recalled that the enthusiasm for Buckle was so great at *Junimea*, that “we had all of us procured the *History of the Civilization in England* (...) and were reading it quite diligently”¹⁴. Personally he had found the mentioned synthesis an essential reading¹⁵, worthy

³ M. N. Petrov, *Privire istorică asupra dezvoltării treptate a ideilor despre istorie*, in *Arhiva*, Iași, IV, 1893, nr. 3—4, 122.

⁴ A. D. Xenopol, [Introductory note to], M. N. Petrov, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

⁵ G. Panu, *Amintiri*, (București, 1971) 137.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ V. Pogor, *Istoriile civilizațiunii în Englitera, de H. T. Buckle*, in *Convorbiri literare*, Iași, I, 1867, nr. 5, 80—87 (infra: C.L.); *Evenimentul*, Iași, XIV, 1906, nr. 32—33.

⁸ E. Lovinescu, *Scieri*, VII, (București, 1978), 131.

⁹ M. Eminescu, *Scieri politice și literare*, I, (București, 1905) 233.

¹⁰ I. E. Toroușiu, *Studii și documente literare*, II, (București, 1932), XXI, (infra: SDL).

¹¹ V. Conta, *Opere filosofice*, (București, 1967) 100.

¹² *Ibidem*, 45.

¹³ *Ibidem*, 251, 249.

¹⁴ I. C. Negruzzi, *Amintiri din Junimea*, I, (București, 1970), 151.

¹⁵ Toroușiu, *op. cit.*, 366.

of the widest diffusion, for which reason he had asked A. D. Xenopol insistently to send for *Convorbiri literare* his critical observations¹⁶. His brother Gheorghe, still in Berlin, was also interested in the Bucklean synthesis, obviously under the influence of Xenopol¹⁷, to whom S. Bodnărescu sent congratulations for the criticism made¹⁸. G. Roiu, another member of *Junimea*, referred to Buckle in a lecture¹⁹, and N. Burghilea, a student in Berlin, discussed his system at some length, stimulating Xenopol in the direction of the mentioned criticism²⁰.

Recalling later his activity at *Junimea*, T. Maiorescu mentioned Buckle's *History* among the works which had aroused a greater interest, side by side with John Stuart Mill's book on liberty²¹. His attention seems to have been drawn to the latter by a volume of Bucklean essays which circulated in the German version of 1867²², as, besides a biographical sketch, the volume also comprised a study on *Mill and the idea of liberty* (with reference to *On Liberty*, 1859) and another one on *Women's influence on the progress in science*. These were discussions which eventually led to — Maiorescu said it himself — “an understanding of the principles by which to judge the literary and historical matter”, and besides this to “a more synthetical view of the questions discussed”²³. The gain was both in theory and in method. One should remember, in this context, the mentioning of Buckle's work as being among those which led to the formation of the characteristic spirit of the *Junimea* group. Its significance could not be well circumscribed without having in view the fact that the discussions about Buckle coincided with the moment in which Maiorescu started the campaign against the false forms in all the fields. Noticing the conflict between appearance and reality, between form and content in culture (*Against today's direction in Romanian culture*, 1868), Maiorescu gave expression to an attitude which defines his generation, accompanying as it did the very process of the country's modernization. The source of this critical attitude should naturally be sought in the English evolutionism, especially in Buckle's work, so insistently commented upon in the *Junimea* circle²⁴. Here is a fragment characteristic of this contamination. “Toute institution, telle qu'elle se comporte [...] est l'effet beaucoup plus que la cause de l'opinion publique”. Whence the conclusion that “il ne servira de rien d'attaquer l'institution si l'on commence par changer l'opinion”²⁵. Such reasoning appealed to *Junimea*, which saw itself supported in its refusal of any stormy, precipitated, revolutionary change. Thinking along the same lines, Maiorescu cast a critical look upon the phenomenon of regeneration, rejecting the image proposed by the liberal adversaries and denying the revo-

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, 44.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 45.

¹⁹ C. L., VIII, 1874, nr. 3, 132.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, 37.

²¹ T. Maiorescu, *Istoria contemporană a României* (București, 1925).

²² H. T. Buckle, *Essays*, aus dem Englischen übersetzt von David Ascher, Leipzig, Heidelberg, 1867.

²³ T. Maiorescu, *op. cit.*, 40.

²⁴ E. Lovinescu, *op. cit.*, 211.

²⁵ H. T. Buckle, *Histoire de la civilisation en Angleterre*, IV, (Paris, 1865) 265.

lutionaries of 1848 any real conception²⁶. By applying, however, the evolutionist conception to the circumstances in Romania, Maiorescu's criticism ended up by situating itself on the same rationalist ground which he had argued against. It based itself not so much on historical arguments (although Maiorescu explicitly referred to the "historical manner of judgment which prevailed among us")²⁷, but on arguments of reason, on a specific way of looking at society, at the relationship between its institutions and the level of mass culture²⁸.

Naturally, Buckle is not the only source of this idea, and this is not the place to examine the question, since in the formulation of the doctrine appeal was made to Hegel too, he being more of a presence in the fundamental texts of the *Junimea* society than Maiorescu would have liked to admit²⁹. What especially brought them close was the conviction that social progress is not conditioned by making laws. Expressing in the last analysis the selfhood of a people a constitution cannot be imported, Hegel observed, since "to want to give a priori to a people a constitution which, by its content, could be more or less rational, is to overlook the very moment through which a constitution is something more than a simple object of cogitation. Any people — Hegel concluded — have therefore the constitution which is suitable to them and which belongs to them"³⁰. Because the state is an organic product, in which "revolutionary anticipation and evolutionary progress are in a continual dialectical pressure". The Revolution and the Restauration are hypostases of a unique reality, which should be considered in motion, as M. Kogălniceanu also suggested when he remarked that "all things in the world have their epoch of action and reaction, of movement forward and backward"³¹. As Buckle's book excelled in a severe criticism of the French revolution, it appealed to the spirit of *Junimea*, which favoured a reaction to the spirit of 1848. It is to be noticed, however, that in Maiorescu we do not encounter that metaphysical finalism which characterizes the social philosophy of Hegel. For this reason it was said that his ideas, very much like Kogălniceanu's doctrine, should be related to K. Savigny's school of history rather than to Hegel's³². Probably the relation should be made with both sources since they communicate with and complete each other. It has already been remarked that "in Hegel one can find all the elements in favour of an organic explanation of law"³³. Side by side, however, with the dialectical explanation of the assimilation of alien forms, which was systematized by Ahrens³⁴. According to this dialectic, in a first phase the foreign element is taken over mechanically, in a second one it struggles with the native elements and in a third one it adapts itself to the realities of the place. Altogether refractory at the beginning, Maiorescu was to reach, however, after a long

²⁶ E. Lovinescu, *op. cit.*, 211.

²⁷ T. Maiorescu, *Discursuri parlamentare*, I, (București, 1897) 45.

²⁸ T. Vianu, *Opere*, II, (București, 1972) 136.

²⁹ E. Lovinescu, *op. cit.*, 212.

³⁰ Hegel, *Philosophie des Rehtes*. Apud E. Lovinescu, *op. cit.*, 212.

³¹ M. Kogălniceanu, *Apărarea Ministeriului...* (Iași, 1860) 103—105.

³² Mircea Florian, *Inceputurile filosofice ale lui T. Maiorescu*, in *CL*, 1937, nr. 1—5,

p. 152.

³³ E. Lovinescu, *op. cit.*, 213.

³⁴ Ahrens: *Juristische Encyclopädie*.

political experience, the Hegelian conclusion that forms can be fulfilled through the progressive growth of content³⁵. It was what Xenopol had recommended him from the beginning when he noted that to admit the theory of forms without content meant, in actual fact, to claim that we have from the beginning of the evolution what we can have only at its end³⁶. Evolutionism had triumphed in philosophy through Hegel and was gradually conquering the whole organic world through Spencer. From such a perspective, the results of *revolution* were to be consolidated through *evolution*, since only transposed into habits and mentalities could they become an enduring reality³⁷. Synchrony extends into diachrony³⁸, if it is not quite simultaneous with it, since just as there is no revolution without diachronic aspects neither can one conceive of social evolution without synchronic aspects. Junimism — Z. Ornea noted — made out of the evolutionist doctrine “a lever meant to correct the accelerated cadences (or in other words the revolutionary transformations)”³⁹ in order to ensure the victory of the content over form, the organic assimilation of the latter. An additional reason, of a geopolitical nature, determined this attitude. “We Junimists are not revolutionaries, declared Maiorescu. Not because revolution would not be one of the ways which, generally speaking, the history of the peoples was sometimes forced to go along towards progress. But for our country, a small country, inserted between two great invading powers, a revolution is always a calamity. The one who begins it knows why he does so, but he never knows for whose benefit he ends it”⁴⁰. Radicalism was therefore not advisable, the “burning of the stages” a deadly mistake⁴¹. “We are not allowed radical revolutions” declared in the same spirit P. P. Carp⁴² and a Junimist article in *Constituționalul* (1889) stated categorically that as soon as society has its normal means to regenerate its organism according to its current needs, the necessity of revolution disappears and progress is achieved by means of evolution⁴³. It is a perspective which characterizes the ideology of *Junimea*, and it relies, among other things on the Bucklean conclusion which was also invoked by V. Pogor when he insisted on the need of a slow organic progress⁴⁴. In the campaign against the forms without content, Junimism thus found a precious ally in Buckle, whose wide reputation in the circle of *Convorbiri literare* is more than significant. In this spirit, the adopting of some elements of foreign civilization is only justified through stringent needs and through their fundamental agreement with the

³⁵ E. Lovinescu, *op. cit.*, 213—214.

³⁶ Torouțiu, *op. cit.*, 26.

³⁷ E. Lovinescu, *op. cit.*, 219.

³⁸ Cf. Eva Kushner, *Diachrony and structure: thoughts on repels in the theory of literary history*, in *Synthesis*, (București, 1978), p. 50: “Synchronic and diachronic approaches will seem incompatible only if the historian places or rather misplaces his entire faith in a static phase of either, and disregards their dialectic within the history of the humanities”.

³⁹ Z. Ornea, *Junimea și junimismul* (București, 1978) 166, (infra: *Junimea*).

⁴⁰ T. Maiorescu, *Asupra discursului parlamentar al D-lui Alex. Djuvara*, in *România liberă*, București, 3 decembrie, 1887.

⁴¹ Idem, *Discursuri parlamentare*, IV, 1904, p. 525.

⁴² P. P. Carp, *Discursuri*, I, (București, 1907) 302.

⁴³ (Maiorescu?), *Reflecțiuni asupra vieții noastre politice*, IV, in *Constituționalul*, București, I, nr. 24/1899.

⁴⁴ CL, I, 1867, nr. 6, p. 80—87.

local civilization⁴⁵. On this question, the conservative *Junimea* met the liberal Kogălniceanu who, too, had advocated a gradual progress, capable of assimilating values organically, convinced as he was that each generation has its mission and that it cannot jump over the stages of evolution with impunity. "Do you want us to suddenly become grown-ups out of babies?"⁴⁶. A new age had begun under the sign of progress, it is true, but this did not allow, however, to adopt overnight the "mantle of the peers of Great Britain"⁴⁷. In this respect, conservatives like T. Maiorescu, T. Rosetti, P. P. Carp, were in agreement with libera's like M. Kogălniceanu or Al. Russo, thus founding a new organic conception of development, one which discovered in the Bucklean evolutionism a prestigious support, and which had previously caused the appearance of a newspaper with a paradoxical title: *Conservatorul progresist*. This is obviously a Moldavian liberalism, more temperate and more traditionalist than the Wallachian one⁴⁸. That is why there were references even to a *Pre-Junimism* in which M. Kogălniceanu, Al. Russo, V. Alecsandri would find their place as representatives of the Moldavian critical spirit⁴⁹. It was in this spirit that Kogălniceanu had asked that the fundamental law of the country should be "an indigenous plant, the expression of the customs and needs of a nation"⁵⁰. Modernization should be made, in his opinion, not by abolishing the old institutions but by their adaptation to the new exigences. Actually, the programme envisaged by Kogălniceanu was not less radical than that of the Wallachians, but it proved more sensitivity to expression and to the strategy of achievement. A more traditional language, a more insistent allusion to the evolutionist ideology and the appeal to the concepts of historicism bridges over the Moldavian 1848 movement and Junimism⁵¹.

This accounts for the fact that among the Junimists the one to appear more receptive to the needs of change in the social sphere, detaching himself from the conservative doctrine and trying to reconcile tradition with innovation, was also a historian, A. D. Xenopol. Having studied in Berlin at the time when H. Steinthal and M. Lazarus were consolidating the ethnopsychological direction of historiography (*Völkerpsychologie*) and when E. Dühring was lecturing on Buckle he undertook a critical analysis of the histories of civilization which had appeared in the last time, beginning with Fr. Guizot and H. Th. Buckle, and ending with L. Draper and W. E. H. Lecky. Attentive to what Guizot had called "la position philosophique de l'histoire", the young critic had made of this analysis a subject of a doctoral dissertation in philosophy at the University of Giessen, which naturally gave him the possibility of also confronting other opinions in the German world. But at the very centre of the debate was Buckle, with his attempt to introduce the methods of natural sciences in the study of history. Admitting the merits of

⁴⁵ Cf. Dan Mănuță, *Scriitori junimiști* (Iași, 1971) 157, 158.

⁴⁶ M. Kogălniceanu, *Cuvînt în contra adresei...* (București, 1863), 103—105.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, Cf. M. Eminescu, *Studii asupra situației*, I, in *Timpul*, V, 1, nr. 38: "To artificially age a child, to transplant a plant without its roots so that you may have the garden ready in two hours is not progress but devastation".

⁴⁸ Z. Ornea, *op. cit.*, 183.

⁴⁹ G. Ibrăileanu, *Spiritul critic în cultura românească* (Iași, 1909).

⁵⁰ M. Kogălniceanu, *Dorințele partidei naționale* (Cernăuți, 1848).

⁵¹ Cf. Z. Ornea, *op. cit.*, 185.

this attempt, Xenopol held that it is not cosmic environment and economic production that form the real basis of history but ethnic psychology. The distinction between the natural and the historical sciences, on which he would then found a whole system of thinking, was made. And as regards the role of science in the development of mankind along the road of progress, a role carried to the extreme by Buckle, he differed from him, proposing that other human ideals too should be taken into account⁵². In the name of an integralist vision, Xenopol reproached Buckle his lack of understanding for poetry, literature, the visual arts, law, language, religion, metaphysics, morals etc., all of which have their share in the progress of mankind and only together can they give an idea about the infinite complex world in which we live⁵³. Science alone cannot bring happiness; there is also a need of faith, and faith, he confided in a letter, could not be wrested by "all the Buckles in the world"⁵⁴. As for obscurantism, well-founded moral writings would eliminate it more easily "than Mr. Buckle's programme of natural sciences"⁵⁵. Because the world would sooner believe in personal example than in abstract truths⁵⁶. Dühring, whom Xenopol had heard speaking about Buckle's theories, did surprise him by the fact that he was interested more in originality than in truth⁵⁷. Doubtlessly, the causes of progress cannot be reduced to the knowledge of the laws of science and spirit⁵⁸. Pursuing them from a comparative perspective, Xenopol went beyond the subject-matter of the *History of the Civilization in England*⁵⁹, making critical distinction between what belongs to the century and what the English thinker had contributed in actual novelty, especially in the sphere of method. His reaction to Buckle's exaggerations was wholly negative. It was rather W. Draper's book on Europe's intellectual development that had effect on him and that he warmly recommended⁶⁰.

Neither can we insist here on the objections formulated by Xenopol regarding Buckle's system. They referred on the one hand to the one-sidedness and exclusivism of the conception, and on the other hand they attempted to put in their place an integral, all-inclusive vision, capable of unifying more fully the knowledge about man, nature and society. The fact is that this analysis, as he had himself put it, sharpened his critical thinking⁶¹, set him on the track of some ideas which would make up the groundwork of his own philosophical system. Three decades later, he found his demonstration in *Convorbiri literare* (1869) vigorous enough to be incorporated in the synthesis published in Paris⁶².

⁵² Cf. T. Vianu, *op. cit.*, 219—220.

⁵³ A. D. Xenopol, *Istoriile civilizațiunei*, în *CL*, III, 1869, nr. 7—1, 12—18.

⁵⁴ Torouțiu, *op. cit.*, 13.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, 39.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, 40.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, 62.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, 40.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, 42.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, 43—44.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, 45.

⁶² A. D. Xenopol, *Principes fondamentaux de l'histoire* (Paris, 1899) 72, 88, 91, 240—241. New Edition, *Théorie de l'histoire* (Paris, 1908).

The anti-Buckleian approach of Xenopol could not, however, be well understood without relating it to the great debate of the forms without content raised to an issue of the day by Maiorescu through the tempestuous article of 1868. "The whole article, responded Xenopol, stems from the deep conviction that our country is incapable of progress, that the apparent progress we boast of is untrue, as it does not originate in the people's impulse, but comes from external influences"⁶³. Xenopol's analysis led to the conclusion that the progress of the Romanian society was legitimate, the shortcomings and anomalies could therefore be removed. Since, the commentator added, "if mushrooms and mosses grow on the still green trunk, we should not draw the conclusion from this that the core is rotten"⁶⁴. A realistic and tonic observation, in glaring contradiction with Maiorescu's pleading against the direction in which Romanian society and culture found themselves. Xenopol's attitude was from the start in striking disagreement with that of *Junimea*, whose member he still remained. His dissidence is on matters of principle, and reveals a personality with a distinct profile, capable of leaving deep traces in the culture of his people.

In the Romanian cultural area, Buckle's name is therefore especially connected with the *Junimea* circle, made sensitive by H. Taine's work and by H. Spencer's philosophy in the direction of evolutionism and interested in making appeal to the arguments of authority in the struggle with the pseudomorphoses. Between Pogor, who simply summarized Buckle's conception for the use of the Junimists, and Xenopol, who subjected it to a rigorous scrutiny from a comparative viewpoint, there are other numerous and more or less accidental preoccupations: T. Maiorescu, whom we have referred to; P. P. Carp, who saw in Buckle the ideal condition of the historian⁶⁵; T. Rosetti, who invoked him in support of a conservative conception on progress⁶⁶; G. Panu, who placed him beside Carlyle, Macaulay and others among the great historians of a formative interest for his own youth⁶⁷; I. C. Negruzzi, who read "with great diligence" Buckle's synthesis⁶⁸ etc. One could surely add other Junimists too who have shown interest in this work, significant not so much in itself as by the great effort of comprising an extremely vast material and of perceiving its laws, at a moment when there was a keen necessity to make order in the social sciences as well, especially in history.

Outside the *Junimea* circle, we should mention first of all B. P. Hasdeu who, without having specially dwelt on Buckle's work, made remarks which indicate that it was not unfamiliar to him and that the lengthy criticism made by Xenopol of it annoyed him⁶⁹. I. Gr. Cernescu (1871) alluded to Buckle too when he recommended the *histories of civilization* to demonstrate that a civilization is sterile, if besides its political and social establishments it does

⁶³ *Idem, Serieri sociale și filozofice* (București, 1967) 147—148.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, 149.

⁶⁵ E. Lovinescu, P. P. Carp, *critic literar și literat*, (București, 1941) 35—48.

⁶⁶ T. Rosetti, *Despre direcțiunea progresului nostru*, in *CL*, 1874.

⁶⁷ G. Panu, *op. cit.*, 25.

⁶⁸ I. C. Negruzzi, *op. cit.*, 151.

⁶⁹ *Traian*, 1869, nr. 19, 17; nr. 34, 136; *Columna*, 1873, nr. 9, p. 168—172. Cf. Torouțiu, *op. cit.*, 45, 58.

not permit to be also nourished by religion⁷⁰. C. D. Gherea too referred to Buckle when he rejected an interpretation of history based on the intellect as a decisive factor, delimiting, among other things, evolutionism from the materialist conception of history and pointing to the insufficiency of the Bucklean system, especially as regards the theory of factors⁷¹. A coherent exposition of Buckle's theory, seen in connection with the current of contemporary ideas and scientific aspirations of the age, was made by Anghel Demetrescu (1873), but without the ambition of establishing its limits. Even in its controversial part, the exegete concluded, Buckle's work revealed an "extraordinary force", and deserved to be made known to the Romanian public⁷². Then it was from Buckle's principles that the economist A. C. Cuza started when seeking a reflex of historical evolution in the phenomenon of populating⁷³.

Finally, we should mention that the Bucklean conception on history provoked a quite severe criticism from Nicolae Iorga, his critiques being levelled not only at the ideas originating from the historian of British civilization, but also at the positivist context in which they were worked out. "Buckle's system is a thoughtless mixture of some good ideas taken from elsewhere with his fundamentally false ideas", the critic concluded, opposed as he was to the idea that history could be a nomothetic science, and offended by the simple-mindedness of a conception which reduced the historical phenomenology, from a causal point of view, to the tension between nature and spirit⁷⁴. A simplification like this recalls the distinction always made in the German philosophy (F. Tönnies, A. Weber) between *Geist* and *Natur*, within an all-inclusive framework, whose framework Iorga himself tried to sketch.

With such appreciations, revealing a remarkable critical detachment, and with some *aphorisms*⁷⁵ extracted from Buckle's writings the nineteenth century came to an end and so did the interest in the respective work which to some extent had marked it. Referring to this work from the viewpoint of Law, Vespasian Erbiceanu wrote, in 1900, by way of a definitive balance sheet: "Buckle's system, no matter how ingenious it might have appeared at the time or how much it might have alarmed the scientific world, is today completely abandoned and can only have an historical importance"⁷⁶. Indeed, it was no longer *en vogue*, and *History of the Civilization in England* was to be recalled no longer unless someone wanted to define the excesses of positivism in mid-nineteenth century⁷⁷. However, around the 1860's and 1870's Buckle's synthesis was of such a nature as to mobilize some of the most vigorous and significant spirits for the debates of ideas in the Romanian world. The frequency and the effects of these debates give us the right to speak about

⁷⁰ I. Gr. Cernescu, *Discurs asupra civilizațiunii în Europa orientală cu deosebită privire la români și la religiunea lor* (Iasi, 1871) 34.

⁷¹ C. D. Gherea, *Studii critice*, I, (București, 1956), 4—5, 8, 10, 12, 20.

⁷² Anghel Demetrescu, *Determinismul în istorie. Teoria lui H. Th. Buckle in Revista contemporană*, București, I, 1873, 851—871.

⁷³ A. C. Cuza, *Despre populație* (București, 1929), 136, 137, 169, 335, (ed. I, 1899).

⁷⁴ N. Iorga, *Generalități*, 14—15. Other references to Buckle, *ibidem*, 13—14, 16—17, 86, 240—243; *idem*, *Pagini de tinerețe*, II, (București, 1968) 88.

⁷⁵ H. T. Buckle, *Aforisme*, in *Independentul*, București, V, 1899, nr. 403.

⁷⁶ Vespasian Erbiceanu, *Școala pozitivistă-antropologică penală*, in *Arhiva*, XI, 1900, nr. 1—4, 144—145; *idem*, *Raporturile din istorie și științele naturale*, Iasi, 1894.

⁷⁷ Alban G. Widgery, *Les grandes doctrines de l'histoire* (Paris, 1965) 301—307.

an impact, so much the more as, having formulated at the limit the question of the influence of environment on historical development, Buckle touched upon a problem of great urgency for the Romanians, and thus participated in the polemic of the forms without content. *Junimea* was the first to perceive this question, being glad to have found an ally in its effort of ideological crystallization. One could even say that it was not the ideas themselves in Buckle's synthesis that really mattered but the angle at which they came into conjunction with Romanian realities. This angle, one could see, was variable enough, not only in our society considered as a whole, but also in the more restricted circle of *Junimea*, where the full acceptance could stand side by side with total rejection. Buckle, as E. Lovinescu has remarked, is, probably, "the thinker who had the greatest influence on the political formation of *Junimea*"⁷⁸. To speak of a Bucklean impact is not, therefore, exaggerated. It is in two directions, mainly, that the respective impact was produced: in the attempt to give history a scientific character, in accordance with the exigencies of positivism; in the resounding campaign against false forms. In the former direction Buckle's influence is combined with a series of topical ideas of mid-nineteenth century European historiography. In the latter, the evolutionist arguments extracted from Buckle in favour of a gradual development without convulsions should be put in connection with Spencer's influence, still active (Măiorescu also translated from him) and with that of the historical school of law (Savigny) felt some decades earlier and extremely fertile through the idea of organic development. In both directions the Bucklean impact was facilitated by faith in progress and by the prevailing rationalism of the *Junimist* group. The political debates in the last decades had prepared the Romanian intellectuality, by current references to the British realities for an *à fond* reception of such ideas. England began revealing itself not only the homeland of technical progress, as P. Poenaru, I. Codru-Drăgușanu and others saw her, but also as a cultural area, through her writers⁷⁹. Buckle is definitely one of the most popular ones, and his case recalls the speech of a disciple of his, G. G. Zeraffi, who declared at the Royal Historical Society in London that it is necessary for history to be rigorously subjected to the laws of causality, beyond any predestination, free will or chance⁸⁰. It was an eccentric directive, with many followers (G. Fererro, N. Marseli, P. Lacombe, G. B. Adams etc.)⁸¹ and not fewer adversaries, one which made J. Burckhardt speak almost concomitantly of the "mental paralysis" which derived from Buckle's synthesis⁸², and determined Droysen and Meinecke to express later their surprise at the frivolousness of this synthesis⁸³. The Bucklean reductionism found in this respect a redoubtable adversary in A. D. Xenopol, who offered an integralist vision of the factors of evolution and thus invited *Junimea* to a more

⁷⁸ E. Lovinescu, *op. cit.*, 489—490.

⁷⁹ Cf. Ileana Verzea, *Anglia văzută de români*, in *Secolul 20*, București, 10—12/1978, 59.

⁸⁰ Alban G. Widgery, *op. cit.*, 343.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, 301—307.

⁸² K. J. Weintraub, *Visions of Culture* (Chicago—London, 1969) 127.

⁸³ Droysen, *op. cit.*; F. Meinecke, *Zur Theorie und Philosophie der Geschichte*, 2. Aufl. (Stuttgart, 1965), 21.

profound understanding of historical phenomena. The wide echo enjoyed by Buckle's work in Romanian culture also points to an increased interest, which somehow characterized the epoch, in the history of civilization ("the book of mankind"), whose social interest was considered to be, in Xenopol's opinion, more important than that of philosophy⁸⁴. Naturally, we are not yet in a position to define quantitatively the circulation of his work in the Romanian culture. We know, however, the categories of readers who could have access to it and especially the central place which it held in the ideological crystallization of *Junimea*: enough for us to conclude that in our cultural area Buckle's synthesis has played an important role, that of a stimulating and structuring factor.

⁸⁴ A. D. Xenopol, *Scriseri sociale și filozofice*, 165.

ANGLO-ROMANIAN CONTACTS IN LITERATURE, 1848—1878

BY

ERIC TAPPE

Four wars have in turn given an impulse to the growth of British interest in the Romanian lands and in Romanian language and literature: the Crimean war, the war of 1877, the first and second world wars. In time of peace this interest has tended to stagnate. Stagnation is illustrated a little before 1848 by the publication of M. A. Bruce-Whyte's *Histoire des langues romanes et de leur littérature* in Paris in 1841. The author explains his reasons for having his work translated into French and published in France; partly because he was resident there and the book needed constant oversight, partly that the subject interested the French more than the English. If the English of that time were not interested where the more familiar Romance languages were concerned, how much less would they be interested in Romanian. Nevertheless if any English people did read Bruce-Whyte's chapter 'Analyse de la langue valaque', they would have found what is probably the first English version of any Romanian poem. Concerning its origin Bruce-Whyte made the following assertion: 'the poem really came from the mouth of a shepherd and is the most ancient that we could procure'. He had, he says, obtained it 'from the late Professor Vater'. In fact it is no ancient folk-poem; it is the well-known *Amărita turturea* of Enăchiță Văcărescu. Bruce-Whyte's first verse is as follows:

The female dove,
'Reft of her love,
When all alone
She makes her moan
And peering round perceives him not,
Like a sad widow wails her lot.

In this isolated translation Bruce-Whyte, by matching the tone of the original, set a high standard which has not often been attained again by translators of Romanian verse into English¹.

The date 1854 is a significant one. It took a war or at least a revolution to stimulate the British public's interest in S. E. Europe. With the revolutionary movements of 1848 and their repression, and more especially with the outbreak of the Crimean War, writers hastened to supply the public's demand for background information. Accounts of journeys made years before were

¹ Cf. C. Isopescu, "Sulla letteratura romena in Inghilterra", *Giornale Italiano de Filologia*, A. VI.3, Naples, 1953, 201.

swiftly printed. There was also an official initiative as regards languages. In March 1854 the philologist Max Müller, who was resident in England, received a letter from Sir Charles Trevelyan, assistant secretary to the Treasury. Trevelyan wrote that he had informed all young Commissariat officers under orders for the East that, besides perfecting themselves in French and Italian, they would be expected to learn at least one Eastern language, so that there might be among them men who would be able to communicate freely with the inhabitants of each province in their own language. He suggested that Max Müller should prepare a treatise on the languages of that part of the world, with recommendations of books for study.

Accordingly Max Müller wrote his book *The Languages of the East*, published in 1854 with a second edition in 1855. His account of the Romanian language (which he calls 'Wallachian') is the first scientific account in English. Most interesting is his proposal for modifying its alphabet. He bases his orthography on the so-called Missionary Alphabet which he had put forward for discussion at a conference in January 1854. Here is a sample of his innovations: for the sound Z he proposed a Z in Roman type, for zh a Z in Italic. We may congratulate ourselves that his orthography was never adopted; the mixture of Roman and Italic letters in one word would surely have been most unpleasing to the eye.

It was not only Romanian language that received some notice at the time of the Crimean War; Romanian literature also had its share, through the anthologies of E. C. Grenville Murray and Henry Stanley. Grenville Murray was an illegitimate son of the second Duke of Buckingham and Chandos. His insistence as a young attaché on combining freelance journalism with his diplomatic post more than once got him into trouble. In 1852 he was posted to Constantinople. He describes in the preface to his anthology how in the summer of 1853 he was convalescent on the island of Prinkipo and occupied himself with translating Romanian folk ballads. It was no doubt partly from Ion Ghica that Murray obtained his material, for Ghica had gone to Constantinople in 1848 as representative of the Provisional Government in Wallachia and had stayed on after the revolution had been repressed. But in his preface Murray acknowledges his indebtedness to another Wallachian exile, the poet Dimitrie Bolintineanu. The anthology is called *Doine, or the National Songs and Legends of Roumania*, and contains prose versions — paraphrases rather than exact translations — of thirty three poems. Eighteen of these are from the collection of folk poetry assembled by Vasile Alecsandri and published in 1852 and 1853, and three are original poems by Alecsandri. There are also twelve poems by Bolintineanu, and one which Professor Grimm ascribes to Bolintineanu without being able to find it among his works. So in fact the true folk ballads only just outnumber the non-folk poems. The book was published in 1854.

In Murray's book the only piece of Romanian text occurs in the notes, where he reproduces two stanzas of Alecsandri's *Tătarul*. But Henry Stanley's *Rouman Anthology* is a much more ambitious book. It contains the Romanian text of forty-five poems with sixteen English versions — printed as verse but nearly all in fact prose — one of which is of a poem not given in the Romanian. Only eight of the Romanian texts are folk-ballads from Alecsandri's collection; the rest are seventeen original poems by Alecsandri,

nine by Bolintineanu, four by Alexandrescu, four by Crețianu, one by Bolliac, and there is Eliade's version of Lamartine's *Souvenir*. The whole thing is a very fine piece of book production with vignettes and with ornamental borders based on Byzantine manuscript decoration. It was printed by Stephen Austin of Hertford, Bookseller to the East India College at Haileybury, whose beautiful productions in the oriental field had already attracted favourable notice. Stanley's father, the second Lord Stanley of Alderley, wrote to his wife: "I saw Henry's book at Lord Palmerston's; it is very well got up, but it is too dear and too little adapted for the general taste here to have much circulation". Certainly one must not make too much of the publication of Murray's and Stanley's anthologies; but at least after the Crimean War someone who was keen to find out something about Romanian literature could do so².

I pass now to something which I shall treat in more detail because it will, I think, be new to you. Some years ago my attention was drawn to the existence of an English poem based on the legend of Manole³. The poem is by W. M. W. Call, and it appeared in *The Cornhill Magazine* for September 1862, accompanied by a striking woodcut by Frederick Sandys, a well-known illustrator of the time. The woodcut shows Manole's wife clinging to him as he walls her up. The author of the poem, Wathen Mark Wilks Call (1817—1890) was ordained into the Church of England in 1843. He had experienced religious doubts in boyhood, especially when he read the work of Shelley. At Cambridge, he reverted to orthodox belief under the influence of various writers and particularly Coleridge. But the calm which he attained before ordination gradually deserted him, his chief difficulty being the doctrine of eternal punishment. He says that at one time the Positivist philosopher Comte had an almost tyrannous influence over his mind. Fourteen years after his ordination he quietly withdrew from the Church of England. Thereupon he married the widow of a rationalist writer, C. C. Hennell. Mrs. Hennell, now Mrs. Call, was an old friend of Mary Ann Evans, who is so much more familiar to us under her pen-name George Eliot. Mr. and Mrs. Call figure frequently in George Eliot's correspondence; in 1857 she wrote: "I was pleased with Mr. Call. He is a man one really cares to talk to — has thoughts, says what he means, and listens to what others say".

How did Call come to know the Manole legend? One's thoughts turn first to the anthologies of Murray and Stanley; but Murray's does not include that legend. Stanley's anthology contains an English prose translation of Bolliac's poem *Meșterul Manole*. But Call's poem contains elements which are in Alecsandri's *Monastirea Argeșului*, but not in Bolliac: e.g. Manole's dream, his prayers for flood and wind, his child being yet unborn. However, Call reprinted his *Manoli* in 1871 in a volume entitled *Golden Histories*, and there in a note — not to *Manoli*, but to another poem — he states that "the legend of *Manoli* was borrowed from a prose version of a Moldo-Wallachian legend given in a number of *The Spectator* Newspaper for 1856".

² E. D. Tappe, "The Rumanian Anthologies of E. C. Grenville Murray and Henry Stanley", *Revue de Littérature Comparée*, XXX, 3. Paris, 1956, 399—405.

³ These pages on Call's *Manoli* are abbreviated from an article due to be published in a forthcoming issue of *Folklore*.

Examination of *The Spectator* revealed no version of the Manole legend, and indeed such a piece would not have fitted into the journal. Presumably Call's memory was at fault. However, in *the Saturday Review* for 2 August 1856 there is a long critique of *Ballades et Chants Populaires de la Roumanie, recueillis et traduits par V. Alecsandri*, Paris, 1855.

This critique includes a précis of the first two sections of *Monastirea Argeşului* and then a translation of sections 3 & 4, i.e. from the point where Manole climbs the scaffolding and sees his wife approaching until the point where the wall now hides her and only her voice is heard. The fifth section is ignored. Only one thing suggests that Call may have had some other source as well; it is that the reviewer calls the Master mason 'Manol', whereas Call uses the form 'Manoli'. Now it happens that this form occurs in a prose piece entitled 'The Legend of Argis' published in *Household Words*, 12 January, 1856. *Household Words*, the periodical edited by Charles Dickens, had presented to its readers a considerable amount of material about the Principalities in the lively sketches by Grenville Murray, who used the pseudonym 'The Roving Englishman'. 'The Legend of Argis', however, is not his work. Some years ago I ascribed a similar article, 'The Legend of Bucharest' (*Household Words*, 23 July 1853) to Murray⁴. Both prove to be the work of Bayle St. John and are evidently taken from Stanislas Bellanger's book *Le Kéroutza*, published in Paris in 1846. Bayle St. John was the Paris correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph*.

What did Call make of this legend? There is a note on his life and work by Alex. H. Japp in vol 4 of *The Poets and the Poetry of the Nineteenth Century*, which appeared in 1905. Japp writes of Call: "Into every legend he reads a modern meaning... The beautiful poem of Manoli... illustrates the saddening idea that the collective welfare is too frequently purchased by the suffering of the individual either as martyr or victim; and that, as civilisation more and more brings its leaders under dominating ideas, so the penalty that comes in the rear of dominating ideas means suffering and death for many innocent and beautiful natures".

Let us now see how Call handles his theme. He does not use the first section of the Romanian ballad, which describes the search for the building site, but begins with the actual work in progress. In the ballad the first eight lines of the parallel passage (all with the same rhyme) describe the work very simply and practically:

Meşterii grăbia,
Sforile-ntindea,
Locul mesura
Şanţuri largi săpa,
Şi mereu lucra,
Zidul redica,
Dar ori ce lucra
Noaptea se surpa.

⁴ E. D. Tappe, "E. C. Grenville Murray and Rumania", *Revue de Littérature Comparée*, XXXIX, 3, Paris, 1965, 439—448.

Call elaborates :

All day they built, and wall and tower stood crown'd
Among the sunbeams. Here some column grew
To perfect shape, here some thin minaret
Soared to the clouds ; here dome or massy roof
Swel'd to completion, or ethereal arch
Sprang like a sudden rainbow into air,
A wonder and a joy, till all the work
Looked glorious and the angels called it good.

I will only quote two more passages, those passages which bear on the moral of the poem. When Manole's wife is seen struggling onward in spite of flood and wind, Call comments :

Meanwhile the master-masons saw her come, —
The lords of art, that, throned above all life,
Make thought and fancy blossom out of stone,
And live for them — them only. Far away
They saw her come, and as a sudden breeze
Creeps o'er still waters, shivering as it creeps,
So ran the sharp delight thro' every soul ;
For Hope rose glittering like some pilot star,
And the large lust of beauty that demands
All sacrifice of child, or wife, or self,
Looked now for ripe fulfilment.

These last lines evoke for me a speech which Bernard Shaw was later to put into the mouth of John Tanner in *Man and Superman*. "The true artist will let his wife starve, his children go barefoot, his mother drudge the race and wither a thousand women, if only the sacrifice of themenable him to act Hamlet better, to paint a finer picture, to write a deeper poem, a greater play, a profounder philosophy !"

After the building in of Manole's wife and her death, the final paragraph of the poem sums up the moral of the tale :

But they went building on, and stone on stone
Was reaserd, and the great fabric touched the sky,
As days clasped hands with days. Supreme it stood,
Majestic, massive, silent, beautiful ;
And men came there, and wondered while they gazed,
And thronged around the masters, as they told
Of the true, noble life that passed away,
To round their labour to full-sphered success : —
For always the great conquest of the world
Is won with blood. Twas so in older years,
The splendid yesterdays our fathers knew :
'Tis so in these pale fated years of ours ;
And when these busy hands and brains are still,

And mightier builders work with lordlier aims,
The same old doom will reign, and men will die,
To crown their age with beauty, and to bring
Imperial days while *they* go building on.

We can agree, I think, with Japp's analysis of the modern meaning which Call read into the legend of Manole.

So much for poetry. I will conclude with some mention of Romanian echoes of English novels of the period⁵. Thackeray's novel *The Newcomes*, published in 1854, describes an evening party given by Mrs. Hobson Newcome, the wife of a banker. It is this lady's aim to make up for an absence of rank, wealth and fashion among her guests by a show of the intellectual and exotic. (In parenthesis her parties sound very like the real-life parties of Mrs. Milner Gibson, wife of a Liberal M. P., where, we are told, "every foreigner possessing a grievance and an unhappy country was always made heartily welcome". It was at one of Mrs. Milner Gibson's parties in London on 12 January 1850 that Nicolae Bălcescu met Louis Blanc). To Mrs. Hobson Newcome's party comes Colonel Newcome, an officer of the Indian army newly returned to England, dressed in a rather old-fashioned coat with yellow buttons, wearing a handsome diamond in his shirt-frill. The other guests, not knowing who he is, suppose him to be "the Wallachian Boyar, whose arrival at Mivart's hotel the *Morning Post* had just announced". One young lady "wishes she knew a little Moldavian, not so much that she might speak it, but that she might be heard to speak it". This party is supposed to take place about 1833.

In Charlott Young's novel *Heartsease*, also published in 1854, an attaché at the British Embassy at Constantinople, announces his intention of returning to England by "an erratic course through Moldavia and some of those out of the way locations". Back home he says 'I have been talking Latin with the folks in Dacia'.

A novel directly inspired by participation in the Balkan theatre of war is *The Interpreter* by G. J. Whyte-Melville, published in 1858. Whyte-Melville, a retired Guards officer and a man of property, volunteered in 1854 and was appointed a major of Turkish irregular cavalry. In the novel the narrator, the interpreter, crosses the Danube with Turkish cavalry of Omar Pasha's army and is wounded on Wallachian soil. There is very little about Romania in the novel; a pity, because Whyte-Melville had published in *Fraser's Magazine* in August 1856 a lively article entitled *A Peep into the Principalities*.

Anthony Trollope's novel *The Bertrams*, written in 1858, contains a character who returns from Constantinople to London via Bucharest and Transylvania, and in another *Is he Popenjoy?*, written in 1875 there figures a Moldavian dance to which Trollope gives the unlikely name "Kappa-Kappa".

The novels which I have mentioned so far contain only incidental references to Romania. I finish with one in which Moldavia plays a considerable

⁵ E. D. Tappe, "Rumanian Echoes in 19-th Century English literature", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 1959, No. 37 (89), 477—487.

part. Ouida — that is the pen-name of Louise de la Rameé, daughter of an Englishwoman and a mysterious Frenchman who is believed to have been a Bonapartist agent — published in 1867 a novel entitled *Idalia*. The hero is an English diplomatic courier, Erceldoune, who carried despatches on horseback through Transylvania on his way to Jassy. "The Principality was in a ferment" writes Ouida. "Even Moldavia might be the match to a European conflagration and open up the scarce-healed Eastern Question; and an English envoy was then at Jassy, charged with a special mission, to whom the despatches which Erceldoune bore carried special instructions, touching on delicate matters of moment to the affairs of central and eastern Europe". Erceldoune is ambushed and left for dead. He is found by a woman, who sends her wolf-hound to fetch help, and on her instructions two Moldavian peasants carry Erceldoune to the convent of Monastica, where the nuns nurse him back to life. During his convalescence he paints from memory a portrait of the woman who came to his aid, and on his departure leaves it at the convent as an altar-piece. Then, one day, off the coast of Sicily, he glimpses the woman in a passing boat. He returns next year to Monastica, where the Abbess tells him that the woman whose portrait he painted has visited the convent and that her name is Idalia. He goes to find Idalia, and the book ceases to be concerned with Moldavia. The Moldavian section of this novel is clearly inspired by Laurence Oliphant's "Letters from the Principalities", published in *Blackwood's Magazine* in 1864. Monastica is based on his description of the convent of Agapia.

I believe that I have mentioned the majority of Anglo-Romanian literary contacts between 1848 and 1878. But it is possible that other pieces lie hidden in the pages of Victorian periodicals. The task of tracing them is being gradually eased as the contents of these periodicals are being analysed and the authorship of unsigned contributions established.

ENGLAND IN THE 19-TH CENTURY ROMANIAN MEMOIRS

BY

ȘTEFAN LEMNY

What memoirs offer to an exploration destined to restore the mental image that the Romanians have made about England in the 19-th century is not, at first sight, particularly spectacular. Even if we had in view the memoirs in a broader sense than the literary — the sense of documentary source by which Edouard de Goncourt aspired to reconstitute “the intellectual history” of an epoch¹ — the information wouldn’t be quite rich. It justified the impulse made at the beginning of this century by Titu Maiorescu to Panait Cerna and M. Beza — the first sent in Germany, the other in England — to notice “impressions particular” to rich a genre “near inexistent”². If we added the marked bias for the French to the weak development of the Romanian memoirs in the 19-th century, the area of our intervention would appear considerably restrained³. We say “it would appear”, because in reality, in spite of their restricted character, memoirs betray changes of attitudes which are essential for the way the British pattern was to be received by the Romanians⁴. Or, the ever greater “desire to travel”⁵ abroad — to which the memoirs are directly connected — inherently brought to attention the British Isle. The way of a new historical series was thus opened in the process of discovering this country, which continued the series before 1848 suggested by Al. Duțu⁶.

The point of view of the Romanian traveller, enriched considerably by the new horizons of the political interests, seems to represent a novelty in this rediscovery. Before that date, Zenovie Hagi Pop had travelled to the Island, driven by “studies and business”⁷; shortly after, he was followed by Petrache Poenaru who was attracted by public education and also by

¹ Cf. Silavian Iosifescu, *Literatura de frontieră* (București, 1969), 126, 130.

² M. Beza, *Din Anglia, Însemnările unui literat* (Iași, s.a.) 1.

³ E. Lovinescu, *Problematika memorialisticii la noi*, in *Scriseri*, II, ed. Eugen Simion (București, 1970) 209—210. For the complete image of England in the Romanian memoirs, we have not the impressions of some Romanians who had visited the Isle. They were lost (the case of the article *Douăzeci de zile în orașul Londra* by C. Rosenthal, cf. Marin Bucur, C. A. Rosetti, *Messianism și donquijotism*, București, 1970, 290) or they hadn’t arrived to be written (Paul Iorgovici, Th. Codrescu, N. Hagi Stoica ș.a.).

⁴ Alexandru Duțu, *Modele, imagini, privilegii. Incursiuni în cultura europeană modernă* (Cluj-Napoca, 1979) 69—96, 250—253.

⁵ *Vojaieri și primblări*, in *Propășirea*, nr. 18, 14 mai 1844, 144.

⁶ Al. Duțu, *Explorări în istoria literaturii române* (București, 1969) 88, 112.

⁷ Dum. Z. Furnică, *Călătoria lui Zenovie Hagi Constantin Pop... la Paris și Londra în anii 1826 și 1827* (București, 1931).

modern industry⁸, and then, by Ion Codru Drăgușanu, who was urged by the desire to wander and to enlarge his experience⁹, like the Moldavian anonymous who had strolled the Europe at the middle of the Century¹⁰.

The 1848 Revolution clearly called for the necessity to persuade the British political circles and public opinion of the justness of the Romanian aspirations. In this sense, the traditions are certainly older¹¹, without having managed to determine a general opinion as strong as then, able to break the continental prejudices and momentary dislikes. This is also proved by I. Ghica's intimate thoughts when he came to desire "pour l'honneur de l'humanité qu'une maladie détruise les Anglais jusqu'au dernier", apologizing for his dislikes in the same letter to D. Brătianu: "și tu savais ce que je ressens pour les Anglais, tu m'excuserais"¹². C. A. Rosetti felt reluctantly attracted by the Island, he who wasn't entitled to feel so by his kinship with the Grants. The notes concerning England, rather scarce in his intimate diary, betray the reluctance of the man forced to travel "where I don't like, that is in Englitera"¹³ and then, the enthusiasm of his return to France¹⁴.

But, in a Europe, where a British judgment carried weight, the dialogue with the Island had become imperative for the Romanians. It attracted all the militants for the Romanian cause who were abroad (A. G. Golescu, Chr. Tell, I. Heliade Rădulescu, D. Brătianu, Iancu Alecsandri, N. Bălcescu, and others) and who were ardently engaged to win the sympathy of the political factor and the public opinion. The visible lack of interest in the Romanian problem, reduced by the English to a problem of "humanity and political equilibrium" (N. Bălcescu)¹⁵, as well as the ignoring of the Romanians¹⁶ were distressing and required urgent changes. The feeling that they couldn't be accomplished "in a week" — as had been attempted before¹⁷ — made way to the idea to place in the capital of the English Empire some elements of permanence in this dialogue. The consequence of such a plan, should have been followed by the foundation of the philo-Romanian association, envisaged by D. Brătianu with a library and a permanent secretary¹⁸.

⁸ N. Iorga, *Contribuții la istoria literaturii române. II*, în *An. Acad. Rom.*, Seria II, Mem. Sec. Lit. t. 28, 250—259.

⁹ Ion Codru Drăgușanu, *Peregrinul transilvan*, ed. Romul Munteanu, (București, 1956) 164.

¹⁰ Gheorghe Potra, *Călătoria unui boier moldovean în Europa la mijlocul secolului al XIX-lea*, în *Revista istorică*, IX, nr. 1—3, ian.-mart. 1933, 126—139; Idem, *Statele Europei la 1846—1848 văzute de un boier moldovean*, în *Revista istorică română*, IX, 1939, 207—245.

¹¹ Ludovic Demény, Paul Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile politice ale Angliei cu Moldova, Țara Românească și Transilvania în secolele XVI—XVIII*, (București, 1974).

¹² Al. Cretzianu, *Din arhiva lui D. Brătianu. Acte și scrisori din perioada 1840—1870*, I (București, 1933) 105.

¹³ C. A. Rosetti, *Note intime. 1844—1859*, ed. Vintilă C. A. Rosetti, I (București, 1902) 120.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, II, 1916, 53, 56.

¹⁵ Al. Cretzianu, *op. cit.*, II, 1934, 194.

¹⁶ N. Iorga, *Histoire des relations anglo-romains* (Jassy, 1917) 165.

¹⁷ Al. Cretzianu, *op. cit.*, 189.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 122.

The Union and then the Independence were to amplify the relationships of the Romanians with England, without determining a general opinion, like that generated by the affinities for France.

Like in Torino or Paris, Alecsandri's stay in London unfolded under the sign of his political "mission", without the respite of the habitual delights of a journey. However, waiting a week for an audience to which he attached many hopes of diplomatic recognition of the Union, the poet walked "as a simple tourist through all the parts of the town"¹⁹, discovering a world which had been hidden for him by his Francophile partiality.

Jacob Negruzzi had also felt for a moment the attraction upon this "beautiful country"²⁰, but the voyage hadn't been materialized. He was acquainted with a lot of English, but not in their country, abroad, in Switzerland. Their temperament, with the "monopoly of originality" had provoked him to such an extent that he has decided to avenge against "the whole nation" accompanying his own behaviour with the principle "to oppose to English one English and half": "When I am with some English in a coach or in a carriage and I see their dumb and fixed look around me, I confer to my own face a dumber expression and for all the treasures of the world I shouldn't speak to one of them. When I see that one of them would like to begin a conversation with me, I turn disdainfully my cold shoulder on him. If two English talk slow or they sleep, I set up for the fast asleep and I snore hard, till I see them to endure the torture and I fell them to damn me dreadfully"²¹.

This appreciation hasn't incited immediate reactions. Not for another a quarter of a century, this time, a woman, Tereza Strătilescu, came to contest it²², after she had lived one of the most profitable experiences in England. Had the English the fame that they were "stiff", cold, proud, that they talked rarely? But characters like these can be found in any country and they don't confer the specific note to a people, so much the less to the English, who, on the contrary, "are very hospitable, very kind and always ready to show you not only what you want to see, but everything that they consider interesting for you"²³.

Thus, the 19-th century memoirs, in their totality, are characterized by their authors' affective mutations; their attitude evolves from hostility to reticence, from reticence to enthusiasm, in accordance with the profound changes at the level of the Romanian reception of the European world. From I. Codru Drăgușanu who stated that the Romanians "can have a pattern only from the French people"²⁴, to Al. Odobescu who was obliged to accept that England was "a great moral power"²⁵, indisputable changes took place

¹⁹ For the translation in English, see E. D. Tappe, *Alecsandri and the English*, in *Revue des Etudes Roumaines*, II, 1954, 153—168.

²⁰ Jacob Negruzzi, *Primblări*, in *Convorbiri literare*, II, nr. 4, 15 apr. 1868, 49.

²¹ *Ibidem*, 68 (nr. 5, 1 mai).

²² Tereza Strătilescu, *Scrisori din Anglia*, in *Convorbiri literare*, XVII, nr. 11—12, 1894, 963—972, 1073—1083; XVIII, nr. 1—7, 1894, 75—90, 179—189, etc.

²³ *Ibidem*, 11, 1 mart. 1894, 963.

²⁴ I. Codru Drăgușanu, *op. cit.*

²⁵ Alexandru Odobescu, *Călătorie din Paris la Londra*, in *Opere*, I. G. Plenescu (București, 1965) 180.

in the mentality of the Romanian traveller and memoirist. In this respect, the authors' impressions coincide through the duration of the stay and its geographical area were different.

One can notice first the equal interest of the Romanian traveller in the capital and in the province, when the others (like Hippolyte Taine) renounced the romantic temptation of the Ossianic North, realistically directing their steps towards London²⁶. This proves that the impulse to travel through the Island was pragmatically oriented from the beginning, either culturally, politically or economically.

I. Codru Drăgușanu remembered with nostalgia "the English surroundings, so different from ours, that imprinted deeply upon the memory"²⁷, recalling circumstances not so remote from the years when C. Hagi Pop or Petrache Poenaru had wandered through England to know the industrial centres that had had a visible impact on the world economic destiny. Pleasant remembrances from Scotland, Yorkshire and other places were expressed by Iancu Alecsandri²⁸ or Alexandru Odobescu. The latter observed with penetration the differences between the capital and the province, and also, between the centre and the suburbs of London, where he distinguished "the new England" of the trader prompted by material gains, and "the old England" of the people and of the nobility, both of them embodied "on an ancient oaken throne" by Queen Victoria, "the living symbol of England"²⁹.

In this Island, made up of a strange mixture of tradition and modernism, the authors of the memoirs discovered in time a lot of "curiosities" — the term is frequently suggested by their impressions which, put together, were to produce mutations in the manner of reception of the British society by the Romanians. They begin naturally from the daily fact level (of the famous "five o'clock" and of the British cuisine) and in recognizing the superiority of the political system of selfgovernment, of which "the English are proud"³⁰. But the most astonishing are the technical novelties of the modern civilization, able to transform London into a city "as big/as a country", which "presses the political barometer in the world according to its own interest"³¹.

Against the general background of such impressions, the memoirs are imbued with the tourist's emotions who discovers the famous monuments of London, Hyde Park, the rich parks and the boats of the Thames in the charming sight of the night of which Vasile Alecsandri thought that "he who sees it can't stop wishing to live and die in that quiet place, in the bosom of that smiling nature"³².

In the Romanian travellers' memory and memoirs in London, the impressions mentioned had effects that a study of mentalities should not avoid. The contact with the British pattern of civilization, prepared by a long cul-

²⁶ Marian Popa, *Călătoriile epocii romantice* (București, 1972) 130.

²⁷ I. Codru Drăgușanu, *op. cit.*, 141.

²⁸ Cornelia Bodea, *Cu Iancu Alecsandri în Anglia și Scoția la 1850*, în *Studii*, 24, nr. 2, 1971, 265—288.

²⁹ Al. Odobescu, *op. cit.*, 175.

³⁰ I. Codru Drăgușanu, *op. cit.*, 236—237.

³¹ *Ibidem*.

³² Vasile Alecsandri, *op. cit.*

tural assimilation was to defeat the prejudices presented at the beginning of these lines. The examples taken from I. Codru Drăgușanu and Al. Odobescu's thoughts are illustrative.

In I. Codru Drăgușanu's vision, England had undoubtedly won the first place in the rivalry with its neighbour on the continent. The direct contact with the realities of the two countries, the possibility to compare them, confirmed his belief: "At first, in France, all seemed to me in the best order, better than in Germany, but coming back from England, suddenly one seems to have gone out of the palace and to enter a hut"³³. However, his option is for the French. The still neutral role of British policy concerning the Romanians' political destiny and the unavoidable affinities issued from the common Latin substratum explain this statement, apparently paradoxical. We say "paradoxical", because, trying to define the phenomenon of the imitation in culture, the author of the *Transylvanian Pilgrim* imparted the idea according to which "in culture, as in nature, one imitates rather the neighbour than the remote and one can more easily be abreast with him who goes slow than with him who runs"³⁴. The statement was to direct the reader's mind to the Island which, in spite of its geographical remoteness, offered a model of stability and calm evolution. A profitable solution in the recovering of the Western experience results just from the uncertainties felt by the Romanian traveller before the option between the two powerful examples of the European civilization (the French and the English).

For I. Codru Drăgușanu, "the two nations harmonized their qualities, both being destined to lead the world and to decide for ever on other peoples' destiny"³⁵. The same torments were experienced by Al. Odobescu, who admired England, but didn't sympathise with it. "The English nation appeared to me as being full of nobleness and greatness — said he, — but lacking any feeling of attachment, any „glue“, as the Romanians say"³⁶.

The statement seems to be a suggestive rendering of a reality that announces a new series in the discovering of England by the Romanians. To the few people who crossed the Channel, it appeared, in all its splendour, worthy of admiration, but not capable of determining their affective vibration. It was necessary for the Romanians to accomplish the great aspiration of their hearts — the great Union — so that their vision about the world could acquire selfconfidence, so necessary for mature reception, uncorrupted by likes and dislikes. It was a view the Romanians were not only to contemplate, but also, to apprehend in a pragmatistical perspective, with the hope, declared by Tereza Strătilescu, "that we, the Romanians, could benefit by the prolonged experience of this people"³⁷. This is what the author was trying to undertake, revaluating the experience of the Isle in the domain of school; her undertaking had to serve also the modernization of the Romanian education. Thus, they tried to follow the urge of Petrache Poenaru who, after what he had seen in the Island, knew that "il ne m'attend pas un lit de roses, mais, un travail des plus épineux pour tâcher de rendre à la patrie

³³ I. Codru Drăgușanu, *op. cit.*, 143.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, 92.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, 131.

³⁶ Alexandru Odobescu, *op. cit.*, 180.

³⁷ Tereza Strătilescu, *op. cit.*, 463.

quelques services de reconnaissance", introducing "dans mon pays de ce que j'ai vu ailleurs d'utile au bien-être de la société" ³⁸.

How did these aspirations materialize in the development of Romanian society? How did they go beyond the mental level to reach the practical one? The questions deserve deeper analysis whose results can only be partly anticipated in the light of the memoirs presented above. Thus, one could better weigh the value that the contact with the Island had for the Romanians, the profile of the Romanian cultural conscience in European context being more clearly revealed.

³⁸ N. Iorga, *Contribuții la istoria literaturii române...* (cf. supra).

NICOLAE IORGA AND THE HISTORY OF ANGLO-ROMANIAN RELATIONS

BY

GH. BUZATU

Not only was Nicolae Iorga a historian and the author of the well-known syntheses devoted to Romanians or to the history of mankind but also an 'actor' on the stage of history, one of its *makers*. In this respect, we have in view his intensive public activity and, connected to the facts we will be dealing with, his contribution in the field of the propaganda of Romanians' cause and the knowledge about them abroad¹, for the enforcement of scientific and cultural relations and, through them, the political and economical relations of Romania with France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, the United States of America and, last but not least, with Great Britain². It is, therefore, no doubt that to treat this selected theme claims in the first place to reveal the private role of Nicolae Iorga in promoting British-Romanian intellectual contacts. In this respect Nicolae Iorga's visits to Great Britain — first in March, 1892, for researches in libraries and archives, then in March-April, 1913, as a participant at the International Congress of Historians held in London, in April-May, 1930, when the British scientists confirmed the Romanian historian's scientific merits by proclaiming him *Doctor Honoris Causa* of Oxford University, when he was named "Titus Livius of Roman Dacia" — proved to be extremely useful, some of them being landmarks for his life and activity. At the same time Iorga studied certain problems of the history of Great Britain in his general syntheses as well as in other papers and scientific communications. In 1890 and after that year he dwelt upon the English literary phenomenon³ and in 1907 he published in London one of his best known books in the field of Byzantinology entitled *The Byzantine Empire*. Randomly he was a contributor to the British Press ("The New Europe", in 1917 or "Manchester Guardian" in 1922), and during the difficult years of Romania's War for the state unity

¹ C. Michael Titus, *Nicolae Iorga and Anglo-Roumanian Relations*, in "Acta Historica", VIII, Romae, 1968, pp. 385—411; Alexandru Dușu, *Modele, imagini, priveliști. Incursiuni în cultura europeană modernă* (Cluj-Napoca, 1979) *passim*; E. D. Tappe, *Rumanian in Britain. An Inaugural Lecture* (London, 1975); Hugh Seton-Watson, *R. W. Seton-Watson and the Romanians*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", 1/1971, 25—41; Cornelia Bodea, *English Information Concerning Our Country*, in "Revista Arhivelor", 1/1969, 201—209; Valentina Costake, *Foreign Office Records Relating to Romania's History*, in "Revista Arhivelor", 2/1976, 182.

² N. Iorga, *Propaganda în străinătate, în Politica externă a României*, București, [1925], 259—276.

³ Idem, *Pagini din tinerețe, II* (București, 1968) 179—192; idem, *Ce datorim cărții engleze* (Văleni, 1938); idem, *Evocări din literatură universală* (București, 1972) *passim*.

(1916—1918), he edited in Iași, the then capital of the country, *The Histories* of our relations with the Great Allies to whom many future hopes were connected — a general one⁴ and some special ones, on the relations with France and Russia⁵. At the same time, the scientist and patriot wrote and published in French *Histoire des relations Anglo-Roumaines*⁶, re-edited 14 years later in English with a Preface written by the great friend of the Romanian's cause R. W. Seton-Watson⁷. In his autobiography⁸, in his memoirs⁹, travel notes¹⁰ and in the *Four Conferences on England's History*¹¹ Iorga left us numerous testimonies about his British travels and contacts. It is worth mentioning his good private relations with fruitful and reciprocal spiritual gains with R. W. Seton-Watson and Harold Temperley within the International Committee of historical sciences once assembled — as a result of the efforts of both parts — in Bucharest (April, 1936)¹². In 1925, the coming out in England of the study *A History of Roumania. Land. People. Civilization*¹³ meant an important moment in the British people reception of the Romanians' past, followed soon by another moment given by the appearance of Vasile Pârvan's *Dacia*, 1928.

Among all Iorga's papers, *A History of Anglo-Roumanian Relations* remains the only one that regards exclusively the domain under discussion here. Though not very large the volume is rich in information comprising keen considerations, most of them having been confirmed by recent researches of Romanian and British historians as Paul Cernovodeanu, Eric Tappe, Ludovic Demény, C. Michael Titus, Trevor J. Hope, Al. Dușu, Beatrice Marinescu a.o. Of all, C. Michael Titus published in 1968 a documented study entitled *N. Iorga and Anglo-Romanian Relations* based mainly on the conclusions drawn from the above mentioned book, conclusions systematized in four large chapters: 1. Iorga and the Romanian Cause as seen by R. W. Seton-Watson and an Austrian diplomat; 2. British travellers in the Principalities as seen by Iorga; 3. English publications about Romanians as seen by Iorga; 4. British official attitude towards Romanian problems as seen by Iorga.

It is known that the first chapter of *A History of Anglo-Roumanian Relations* had already appeared in 1913 in a volume of *Mélanges* dedicated to Charles Bémont the late professor of N. Iorga during the latter's studies in Paris who among the first offered him news on the Anglo-Romanian relations during the Middle Ages. Starting from those indications and going thoroughly in his researches Iorga wrote a paper entitled *The West Wanderings of a Romanian Claimant, Ioan Bogdan in the XVI century*, delivered in the meeting of the Romanian Academy on 30 March, 1928. In the same

⁴ Idem, *Relations des Roumains avec les Alliés* (Jassy, 1917).

⁵ Idem, *Histoire des relations entre la France et les Roumains* (Jassy, 1917); idem, *Histoire des relations Russo-Roumaines* (Jassy, 1917).

⁶ Jassy, Progresul, 1917, 173 pages.

⁷ N. Iorga, *A History of Anglo-Roumanian Relations* (Bucharest, 1931) 126 pages.

⁸ Idem, *Orizonturile mele. O viață de om așa cum a fost*, I (București, 1934) 223.

⁹ Idem, *Memorii*, 5 (București, 1932) *passim*.

¹⁰ Idem, *Note de drum* (Văleni, 1913) 37—67.

¹¹ See N. Iorga, Radu Rosetti, Michaela Catargi, Richard F. A. Hillard, *Anglia și poporul englez prezentat în conferințe* (București, 1928) 3—90.

¹² Barbu Theodorescu, *N. Iorga, 1871—1940, Biobibliografie* (București, 1976) 114.

¹³ London, 1925, XII-284 pages. Reprint: New York, AMS Press, Inc., 1970 XII-284 pages.

Academy Iorga held on 31 March 1933 the paper *An English Observer of the Romanians in Tudor Vladimirescu's Epoch* in which he dealt with V. Bargrave reports on Romanian Principality.

As it is not possible to enter details we only specify that news of a great interest on the evolution of the Anglo-Romanian political, economic and cultural relations may be found in the syntheses *The History of Romanians*, *The History of Romanian Commerce*, *The History of Romanians by Travellers* a.o.

On the basis of the information and appreciations made by N. Iorga in various papers a number of aspects concerning the Anglo-Romanian relations are imposed to our attention. For example, according to his opinion, the first contacts were *accidental*, the role of pioneers being usually of some British travellers in the places of our country, most of them being merchants¹⁴: in 1582, one of them crossed Transylvania¹⁵ and John Newberie who had left London four years earlier reached Dobrogea and Moldavia¹⁶. A short time before, William Harborne, an ex-agent of London in Constantinople, left for London through Moldavia travelling under the guise of a merchant and sending emissaries over the river Dniester¹⁷. He was to go back to the Porte as an ambassador and when he had to leave Constantinople for good in 1588 he chose the same way through Moldavia; it was an opportunity to obtain from Petru Schiopul, the voivode of the country, the first Romanian privilege for the English merchants¹⁸.

According to Iorga's opinions the 17th century and the first half of the 18th century belonged par excellence to *foreign travellers*, the British ones included, most of them coming to the Romanian Principalities with commercial aims¹⁹.

The direct connections were still lacking, the roads being rarely or accidentally established through our principalities²⁰ the epoch coincided with the 'considerable' decay of the British influence to the Porte²¹, in contrast with the interests of London as a great commercial power²². By 1750 a notable fact occurred according to N. Iorga: the first English goods in the Romanian principalities are mentioned in documents — a fact that seems surprising as compared with Moldavia's exports to England that had already been recorded to the end of the 16th century²³. N. Iorga underlines that, in 1760, England

¹⁴ See Paul Cernovodeanu, *The Remotest Anglo-Romanian Historical Contacts (14th—16th Centuries)*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", 2/1975, 315—326; Ludovic Demény, Paul Cernovodeanu, *Relațiile politice ale Angliei cu Moldova, Țara Românească și Transilvania în secolele XVI—XVIII*, București, 1974.

¹⁵ N. Iorga, *A History of Anglo-Romanian Relations*, 10.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 7—8.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, 9; idem, *Istoria comerțului românesc. Epoca veche* (București, 1937) 283—284.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 10. Ludovic Demény, Paul Cernovodeanu, *op cit.*, 21—22; S. A. Skilliter, *William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey 1578—1582. A Documentary Study of the First Anglo-Ottoman Relations* (London, 1977) 40, 43, 60.

¹⁹ N. Iorga, *A History...*, 23 and fol.; idem, *Istoria Românilor prin călători*, II (București, 1928) *passim*.

²⁰ Idem, *A History...*, 33.

²¹ *Ibidem*, 23.

²² *Ibidem*. Cf. Paul Cernovodeanu, *England's Trade Policy in the Levant and the Exchange of Goods with the Roumanian Countries under the Latter Stuarts (1660—1714)* (Bucharest, 1972).

²³ N. Iorga, *Istoria comerțului românesc. Epoca mai nouă* (București, 1925) 9, 45.

started to get interested again in the Danubian countries and, for a beginning, this interest had been of an 'accidental manner'²⁴. At the dawns of the last century tighter commercial relations are dated and were intensified after Tudor Vladimirescu's revolt²⁵. The second half of the 19th century²⁶ is characterized by a total extension — as compared with the previous epochs — of Anglo-Romanian economic relations, slightly surpassing the sphere of pure commercial relations by initiating financial contacts, participations or British creations of capitalist societies in Romania's industry²⁷. The last two decades of the 19th century recorded the consolidation of political relations first of all by the settlement of diplomatic relations at a level of legation between London and Bucharest in 1880²⁸. At that time, as well as in the first decades of our century the intellectual contacts were intensified, with a decisive role of R. W. Seton-Watson²⁹.

After a thorough examination of the historical facts and phenomena N. Iorga retains two essential conclusions: 1. the British economic activity in Romania was important though not at the level offered by the more than favourable conditions at the cross of the 19th and 20th centuries³⁰; 2. London's interests as we were concerned were dictated by "pure economic" reasons, especially for the same epoch³¹.

The conclusions drawn by the historian from the experiences of the past determined his political convictions. As a leader of the National-Democrat Party (founded in 1910) he implied himself directly in the 20-ies into the dispute between the political groups in Bucharest upon the theme of the admission of cooperation or the rejection of foreign banking capital for the development of the economy of the united Romania of 1918³². Iorga stood then for the strengthening of the general relations with the great Allies in the West and within this frame he recommended the achievement of an economic cooperation. Acting himself for the encouragement of "the economic initiatives of the friends" of Romania, Iorga — the political man definitely rejected the "tutelage" of the foreign interests, everything that "could mean monopolization"³³, "monopolizing purposes"³⁴ of economic essence and finally political one. The solution he offered was to recognize economically

²⁴ Idem, *A History...*, 34—35.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, 60 și urm.; idem, *Istoria comerțului românesc. Epoca mai nouă*, 141, 151, 153.

²⁶ Beatrice Marinescu, *Economic Relations Between the Roumanian Principalities and Great Britain (1848—1859)*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", 2/1969, 271—282; G. Cioriceanu, *La Roumanie économique et ses rapports avec l'Étranger de 1860 à 1915* (Paris, 1928).

²⁷ N. Iorga, *Istoria comerțului românesc. Epoca mai nouă*, 171, 175, 178—179, 180—181, 183, 184, 186.

²⁸ Idem, *A History...*, 100. Cf. Dan A. Lăzărescu, *Sir William White, le premier ministre plénipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne à Bucarest (1880—1885) et ses observations sur les Roumains*, in "Revue Roumaine d'Histoire", 4/1980, 653—668; Venera Teodorescu, *Londra, în Reprezentările diplomatice ale României, I, 1859—1917* (București, 1967) 316—322.

²⁹ N. Iorga, *A History...*, 100.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, 100—101.

³¹ *Ibidem*, 96.

³² Gh. Buzatu, *România și trusturile petroliere internaționale pînă la 1929* (Iași, 1981) 86—88.

³³ N. Iorga, *La situation politique de la Roumanie d'après sa Constitution*, in "L'Année politique française et étrangère", Paris, 1/1926, 44.

³⁴ See "Argus", Bucharest, March 19th, 1925, 5.

"the national existence" by the foreign capitalists³⁵. What was the significance of such an option? Undoubtedly, similarly to other great contemporaries with him, the historian understood that due to the role and the place of England and France in the policy of Europe it was Romania's interest to ensure their support. And all this because the *accentuation of the economic incentive* of the two powers in Romania would have created a strong basis for their support for the difficulties that got contours on the background of European policy³⁶. The later evolution of the facts confirmed as it is known Iorga's opinions: before, at the beginning or at the end of the Second World War the policy of Great Britain toward Romania did not depend in the first place on economic considerations³⁷.

By the solution he proposed N. Iorga approached mainly, we think, to N. Titulescu. Out of the numerous evidences one can bring about, we shall quote the following lines written to I. G. Duca, Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 15 November, 1924: "...Since the international political acts are not everyday ones, and since the commerce is an everyday act I think that a *quickenning of an incentive of foreign capitals with the Romanian ones* — of course with the respect for our sovereignty — *is today the most powerful treatise of alliance* — we can have with other peoples. Let London and Paris, and New York and Rome shriek when someone will touch Romania. This is the surest prelude of valid diplomatic conventions and the best guarantee of peace"³⁸.

In this way the approach between N. Iorga and N. Titulescu essentially between their conceptions appear as being natural to us as both adopted the same position concerning the promotion of Anglo-Romanian spiritual relations. Our affirmation is based on a recent research of N. Titulescu's private archives preserved at Hoover Institution within Stanford University (Palo Alto, California, U.S.A.). For our British colleagues is interesting to note that the archives of the Romanian diplomat — for many years our country's ministry in London, and the leader of the diplomacy in Bucharest — was between 1942 and 1945 under the care of the English Embassy in Lisbon and, after the end of the Second World War, it was carried over the Ocean to the United States where it was placed under the disposal of every specialist without any restriction³⁹. This offered us the possibility to research it integrally in February-March 1980, when I found among documents of a great value and historical significance a set of letters between N. Titulescu and N. Iorga in the third decade of our century regarding mainly the following aspects: the support given by the diplomat to the historian for printing in London the volume *A History of Roumania...*; the former's efforts to invite N. Iorga to Great Britain for a series of conferences on history; the dia-

³⁵ N. Iorga, *Introduction*, in M. Pizanty, *Le pétrole en Roumanie* (Bucarest, 1931) 5.

³⁶ C. Michael Titus, *Nicolae Iorga...*, 409–410.

³⁷ Paul D. Quinlan, *Clash over Romania. British and American Policies towards Romania: 1938–1947* (Los Angeles, 1977) *passim*; Elisabeth Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War* (London, 1976) 223–243.

³⁸ Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace (Palo Alto, Stanford University), Hoover Institution Archives, *N. Titulescu. Diary and Correspondence*, Box No. 2, copybook 31, files 25–26.

³⁹ See Walter M. Bacon, Jr., *Secret Papers on the Failure of Romanian-Soviet Negotiations, 1931–1932* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press/Stanford University, 1979).

logue N. Titulescu—N. Iorga—I. G. Duca concerning the foundation of some departments of Romanian civilization and the nomination of some lecturers within the famous British Universities in London, Oxford and Cambridge⁴⁰; the interventions of the diplomat for the celebration of N. Iorga in Oxford in 1930 — a fact known by the historian who did not delay to express his gratitude. The study of the letters attached to our paper will enrich the information already known concerning the role played by N. Iorga in the development of British-Romanian relations⁴¹. At the same time we are mentioning that the N. Iorga archives at the Library of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania have provided a wide information referring to the English edition of the *History of Roumania*⁴². In the above-mentioned archives the correspondence between the great historian and some of the members of Romania's Legacy in London, mainly N. Titulescu, Marcu Beza and D. N. Ciotori is predominant. Among the annexed letters we also include those the Romanian scholar received from Austen Chamberlain and E. Millington-Drake in 1924—1925.

APPENDIX

— I —

September 6th 1921

Dear Mr. Beza,

I cannot thank you enough for the care you show me for the good things I attempt to do[...] Insist, please, at Gleichern Enterprises so that the *History of Romanians* should appear sooner.

Receive, please, my best regards.

N. Iorga.

⁴⁰ See N. Titulescu to I. G. Duca, London, November 7th 1923 (Hoover Institution Archives, Box No. 1, copybook 8, files 36—38).

⁴¹ See *Politica externă a României*, 263—266.

⁴² Besides the letters in these archives which are annexed to our paper we also mention the other unpublished letters: N. Iorga to Ecaterina Iorga, July 12th 1920 (The Library of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Bucharest, vol. 318, files 224—225);

N. Iorga to M. Beza, September 28th 1921 (idem, Fund N. Iorga ^{S 26 (3)}CDLXXIX); N. Iorga to

M. Beza, November 1st 1921 (idem, Fund N. Iorga ^{S 26 (5)}CDLXXIX); N. Iorga to M. Beza,

January 23rd 1924 (idem, Fund N. Iorga ^{S 26 (12)}CDLXXIX); M. Beza to N. Iorga, March 20th 1924

(idem, *N. Iorga. Correspondence*, vol. 314, f. 35); N. Iorga to M. Beza, November 12th 1925

(idem, Fund N. Iorga ^{S 26 (16)}CDLXXIX); N. Iorga to M. Beza, April 23rd 1929 (idem, Fund

N. Iorga ^{S 26 (18)}CDLXXIX); D. N. Ciotori to N. Iorga, February 8th 1924 (idem, *N. Iorga.*

Correspondence, vol. 315, f. 504); D. N. Ciotori to N. Iorga, March 1st 1924 (*ibidem*, f. 526—527); D. N. Ciotori to N. Iorga, April 9th 1924 (idem, vol. 316, f. 387—388).

(The Library of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania,
S 26 (1)
Bucharest, Fund N. Iorga —————).
CDLXXIX

— II —

December 11th 1922

Dear Mr. Beza,

Please intercede for the publishing of the *History of Romanians* into English language. It would be a service made for our cause. It is really a pity that this manuscript remained unprinted for two years. As you made the connection with the directorship of the collection, you could be listened to much more than others.

Receive, please, the most friendly regards.

N. Iorga.

Romania's Minister could also intercede for it.

S 26 (6)
(Idem, Fund N. Iorga —————).
CDLXXIX

— III —

January 6th 1923

Dear Mr. Beza,

Please, don't let me now! What is to become to the *History of Romanians* in English language? I shouldn't like it to come out a century after my passing away. It would be superannuated... A diligence of the Minister would hurry things up[...]

Receive, please, my friendly regards.

N. Iorga.

S 26 (7)
(Idem, Fund N. Iorga —————).
CDLXXIX

— IV —

Dear Mr. Beza,

Vălenii de Munte, August 24th 1923

In despair I address to you for the *History of Romanians* given to Mr. Gleichern two or three years ago and yet unpublished. Mr. Titulescu would have a heavy word to say.

Seeing the way things go on I do not even think of the translation of my book into French [...]

Receive, please, my best regards.

N. Iorga.

S 26 (10)
(Idem, Fund N. Iorga —————).
CDLXXIX

— V —

February, 1, 1924

Dear Mr. Iorga,

Let me offer you *Cambridge Medieval History*, volume IV, which I heard you wanted so much.

Take it as a small token of my feelings of admiration and respect.

I allow myself to add a copy of our epopee with Hungary, at the League of Nations in 1923, about which you found in time words that moved me deeply. *This booklet is not public yet.* We expect the end of the Hungarian loan to be able to spread it. For the time being it is a simple communication from me to you (except you will not decide otherwise in the question of spreading the volume).

I have ill thoughts regarding you for the month of May. When I was just going to give them as you settled after conferences with the Rector of the King's College, Barker, his wife died.

And I have again to postpone my request.

With my respectful homage for Mrs. Iorga and my best feelings for you, N. Titulescu.

(Idem, *N. Iorga. Correspondence*, vol. 315, files 502—503).

— VI —

(Paris), February 5th 1924

Dear Mr. Titulescu,

As I have received no answer to the two letters I sent to Mr. Beza I am obliged to trouble you.

Referring to that short history of the Romanians which I handed three if not four years ago to an English editor who has already paid for it but hasn't published it yet, although its publication might be of some help to our propaganda — the latest news I have received by way of Mr. Beza, is that it will be issued in November. And we are now in February...

I also expressed my desire that the Legacy, as it has got money, should send me the fourth volume of the *Cambridge Mediaeval History* in which the Romanians are given some space — I was supposed to hand it over to a

library in our country. But for the price * [...] I should have bought myself one copy.

In this city, where I do what I can, I shall be living up to the end of the month.

Asking you to pay my respects to Mrs. Titulescu I assure you of the same friendship.

N. Iorga.

(Hoover Institution Archives N. Titulescu. *Diary and Correspondence*, Box No. 12, unpagged).

— VII —

(Paris), February 6th 1924

Dear Mr. Titulescu,

Mr. Beza has answered me but I've got to ask you to intercede for me which, coming from you, would weigh heavily.

It's been three years since I was asked to give some fifty-sixty pages referring to The Romanian past for the „Nations of To-day“ series edited by John Buchen with Hodder & Stoughton, London.

I gave a French text. I didn't see the translation. It must have been being in print. I had been told that this contribution of mine would be published together with the pages dealing with Yugoslavia up to the end of the last year. Nothing has been done. Mr. Beza, who had proposed that I should collaborate, for which I am grateful to him, is telling me that the paper is being in print and nobody knows for how long.

Text next publication, it is announced in the volume dedicated to *France* that he has sent me, will be Yugoslavia, Romania not being included. No measures have been taken for the cultural and economic chapters which are necessary. No good map, to say nothing of a couple of them, has been provided. I just fancy how incomplete and humble we shall be, in an unrevised translation, in the company of God knows what Bulgaria...

I don't think that a good propaganda is useless as far as a country with, unfortunately, such a bad press is concerned. What the Czechoslovakians and the Serbians are doing is a wonder. And they have no people like you, with your talent and authority.

I am positive that as soon as you have had your say on the matter the editors will cease neglecting us. I am ready to make the necessary corrections on the spot, to *write the three years' history which is missing* and thus warrant a compromise for which I am not responsible, far as I am and unable to be in touch with the editors.

Looking forward to receiving your answer I assure you of my friendly feelings for you.

N. Iorga.

(Hoover Institution Archives, Box no. 12, unpagged)

* unreadable in the original.

— VIII —

February 6th 1924

Dear Mr. Beza,

Thank you, but the untermmed delay does make me no good. Moreover we have in front of us Jugoslavia, and our poor Romania not. And in the volume about France there are so many complementary news which were not requested to me and which therefore will be absent, to say nothing that I shall see no proof sheet — and it would be so easy to have them there! — that I shall not know how the translation has been done, anyway full of nuances.

I shall write to Mr. Titulescu to ask him a favor for the editor.
Receive, please, my most friendly regards.

(Idem, Fund N. Iorga — S 26 (14) —————).
CDLXXIX

N. Iorga.
The Library of
the Academy,
Bucharest,

— IX —

February 6th 1924

Dear Mr. Iorga,

I have delayed with my answer for several days so that I might have news about the coming out of the volume. But the editor himself is not able to fix up the date; the book is in the course of being published. I send you the volume about France to see the way it appears.

As for the 4th volume of *Cambridge Medieval History* I spoke to Titulescu; he promised he would buy it. In case you don't have it until your return home, I would take a great pleasure to give my volume as a present. Some chapters seemed to me as having been well written. I heard you printed "Etudes Roumaines". II. Couldn't I get some copies for the people here?

Kiss Mrs. Iorga's hand for me,

Yours devoted,

M. Beza

(Idem, *N. Iorga. Correspondence*, vol. 315, file 512).

— X —

(Paris), February 22nd 1924

Dear Mr. Titulescu,

As my friends in Paris have informed me about your troubles I have hesitated to disturb you.

Your telegram is very encouraging and I thank you for the promise you make. The book hasn't arrived yet : it must have got lost somewhere but it is no hurry I shall not leave before the 29th of February or the 1st of March. And your personal efforts prevent Romania being the last country in the Gleichen series.

Asking you to pay my respects to Mrs. Titulescu I remain yours with all my heart.

N. Iorga.

(Hoover Institution Archives, Box No. 12, unpagéd).

— XI —

March 6th 1924

Dear Mr. Iorga,

[...] Anyway, a history of the Romanians, a definite work and a monument of complete durability, *must* be published by you in English. The scientific people here is expecting it.

With all my modest personality I should take the task to make the necessary arrangements to publish this work properly.

In some days I shall leave for Vienna where I was called by the conference with Russia. If you take any decision regarding the book, Mr. Titulescu will be home soon and I ask you to tell him what you decided.

With all honour and devotion, D. N. Ciotori.

The Library of the Academy, Bucharest, *N. Iorga. Correspondence*, vol. 316, files 298—299).

— XII —

Légation d'Angleterre, Bucarest,
le 21 Mars 1924

Monsieur le Professeur,

Étant nommé à l'Ambassade à Bruxelles, je pars de Bucarest le 27 courant. Je vous serais infiniment reconnaissant de bien vouloir revêtir de votre signature et, si cela est possible, d'une pensée sur la Roumanie, l'exemplaire ci-joint de votre livre *Histoire des Roumains*, que je tiens à conserver parmi les souvenirs de mon stage en Roumanie. Naturellement il me serait doublement précieux si vous vouliez bien donner suite à ma requête.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Professeur, l'assurance de mes sentiments les plus distingués.

E. Millington-Drake.

(Idem, *N. Iorga. Correspondence*, vol. 314, file 580)

— XIII —

Geneva, October 11th 1924

Dear Mr. Iorga,

Many things have happened to me since we didn't see each other: my mother's death, the Sovereigns' visit to London, the Conference in Prague, the Conference in London, The Assembly of the Society of Nations in Geneva.

All this may partly excuse my not having written to you ever since.

I am doing it today after an influenza, badly affecting me after so much tiredness, kept me to bed in Geneva 10 days longer than I ought to have been here.

I haven't forgotten about the translation in English of the *History of the Romanians*. I haven't been able to find the translator you have named. But I think that, in case I do not find him on my return to London, I may count on a young professor in Cambridge, whom you probably know, Evans. He has recently lived in Romania and has a fairly good command of Romanian. At all events, he is one of the Englishmen who are better acquainted to our country and, above all, he is my personal friend.

What I would like you to know is that I consider the translation of Your *History* as not only a work of greatest cultural and national interest but also an act of personal justice after all that happened to your editor.

It means that I shall do my best to attain this purpose and I shall do it with all my heart. I shall then resume my talks with Barker, the chancellor of the *King's College* concerning some future conferences you are supposed to deliver in Great Britain. As he told me last year, May is the most convenient month on such a purpose, in Great Britain. He was pleased at Your expected coming. His wife's sudden death did isolate him for months from the other human beings. I am now given to understand, reading the letters he has sent me referring to some other topics, that he has resumed his activity.

As for Dr. Rainer my telegram referred only to the exchange in the past which hadn't been paid to her at the time. In what concerns the rise in her scholarship it is up to the Ministry of Finance to do it. This young lady proved in Oxford to be a promising scientist. I shall support all her requests, in my official quality.

I shall be in London by November. As I haven't had a leave for several years and this flu has much weakened me, the doctors recommended that before I took a severe cure I should live for a little while in a mild climate so that I might be quite healthy when I entered the British fog. I do not know for sure where I shall go: in all probability, to a place in the South of France where I can find an open hotel.

If you think you must get in touch with me you may write to me at the address of the Legacy in Berne which will send me any letters to the place I am going to name.

My heartiest embraces to Mrs. Iorga and my due respect and also my loftiest feelings for you, dear Mr. Iorga.

Titulescu

(Hoover Institution archives, Box No. 2, copybook 28, files 46—47).

XIV

Cap Ferrat, November 18th 1924

Dear Mr. Iorga

Thank you for Your most amiable letter. Yes, looking after oneself is quite unpleasant. But, what else could I do? After two troubled years as you know, as a Minister of Finance, two equally hard years came, as a Minister in London. Few people understand how difficult a mission abroad is when you mean to do it conscientiously. The external apparatus of the diplomatic life even appears to them to be a privilege. As for as I am concerned it is a burden which I accept to be taking on my shoulders only because I think that Romania should be present everywhere. On the other hand the closer look at the birth of some future dangers, the fact that you are doomed to be a spectator in many cases for lack of means to annihilate them create a troubled state of mind and more often than not an even more troubled feeling of helplessness.

As for me, the fight for the country in the internal policy evokes the fight of the infantry in dugouts! The fight abroad, for the country, looks like the fight in the plane! Of course, you do not face in the latter the attrition of the former. But your elbows feel the neighbour in the former while in the latter you are on your own!

This is probably why the nervous strain the latter requires of you is greater.

I'll have to take better care of myself in the future and nothing will be wrong! You must have a rest once in a while and that's all.

In a few days I shall be in London, just before the opening of the Parliament.

I shall be watching closely the translation of your *History*. I have sent, as a gift, the books you need for the seminar. Will you kindly accept the offer, a token of my homage to You.

I have all instructions lest the incident that occurred last winter should be repeated! You, without the required volume and I, apologizing, the receipt in my hand as my only consolation!!

I shall also make efforts to arrange Your conferences which I so much want to take place, on behalf of our country.

I should like you to pay my due respects to Mrs Iorga and I should also like to assure you of my best feelings and my highest regard.

Titulescu

(Idem, Box No. 2, copybook 31, ff. 38—39).

— XV —

Paris, December 26th 1924

Dear Mr. Iorga

I should like to inform you about the translation of Your *History* and your conferences in England.

But why from Paris? I myself wonder why!

As I am working for the financial Conference on January 6th and have only four days left, if I take out the days off and the Sundays, I have solicited several political meetings in Paris. And some of them are supposed to take place on December 26th!

That is why I had my Christmas time on the train and also aboard the ship! On such a furious sea that I am now dizzy, 24 hours after the event. The happy age of diplomacy is now long forgotten history.

Referring to the translation of the *History of the Romanians* I have *l'embarras du choix* (will you excuse this French phrase which I don't know how has been put on page). I have an offer from an English book-shop that we talked with some time ago, and also from a young graduate from Oxford, a friend of Seton-Watson.

The principal problem is this: which is the final text and what shall I have translated: Do you have any changes and additions to make to the French volume? If not, the translation will be started right away. If the answer is "yes" will you kindly send me the final text as soon as possible? At all costs will you be so kind as to write to me in Paris, Hotel Chatam and let me know your decision?

As far as I am concerned, the issue of a history of the Romanians written by you and published in English is a most important event from the point of view of the national interest and also from the point of view of a personal justice, which cannot but gratify me after all I know about the editor made to You last year.

Concerning the conferences, I have talked to the Chancellor of The King's College, Barker. He is pleased to the idea. There is one and only trouble: the language you will speak. He says that no audience come unless the conferences are delivered in English.

This is his idea.

You may know that, after much trouble, I have succeeded in creating two lectureships at the University of London, one of Romanian literature whose courses are delivered by Beza, another on the political history of Central Europe with reference to Romania, which is being taught by Steed, the ex-director of the *Times*, the newspaperman who is well-known mainly for his fight against the dualist monarchy.

The province fails to follow the example of London, for the time being. At Oxford, we can only hope for a series of conferences on Romania. The principle has not been admitted yet. Barker, a former Oxford student, told me he thought he would be able to talk the University into it. If he is successful, his desire is that you should be the first lecturer at Oxford.

If he succeeds, you are supposed to hold four conferences at Oxford and, in any event, two of them at King's College. If his efforts with the Oxford University fail, the King's College will be honoured to attend your courses (under such circumstances you will have to deliver a greater number of courses in London). The University would like to invite you in both cases.

But the problem is the language. You should know that as many as 3—4 students attend a lecture in the West. Barker says: I'm sure to convince 50 to come for Mr. Iorga! What Romania's Minister is going to bring

will add up to this sum. But the professor should speak in English in order to attract a wider audience.

And if the courses in French are hard to attend at the London University, they have to be delivered in English at Oxford, although you are not very fond of speaking it.

Couldn't you read in English?

This is a question that I should much like you to answer before I resume with Barker, on my return to London, our talks concerning the conferences.

I wish You, and your family, a merry Christmas and a happy New Year and I should like to you to pay respects to Mrs. Iorga and accept my best feelings.

Titulescu

(Idem, Box No. 3, copybook 35, ff. 48—50)

XVI (Bucharest), January 4th 1925

Dear Mr. Titulescu

I am deeply thankful to you your concern, amidst so many troubles, about my humble work.

The *History* may be translated with no change, as far as I am concerned. I should like to check on the translation. I think I had better make some additions dealing with the History of literature, trade, church, army, press. (The) pictures seem to me to be compulsory.

I shouldn't like to go to England. I hardly speak English and I shouldn't like the idea of discrediting my country. French, German, Italian I speak fairly well. And then, without your hard work neither the King's College nor the Oxford University would have ever known that I existed.

I shall be in Paris on the 13th but I want to express my gratitude in due time.

Will you kindly receive my friendly greetings and pay my respects to Mrs. Titulescu.

N. Iorga

(Idem, Box no. 12, unpagged)

XVIII

February 18th 1925

Dear Mr. Iorga,

[...] The *History* will come out in conditions in which I hope you will be satisfied.

[...] Sincerely yours,

D. N. Ciotori.

(The Library of the Academy, Bucharest, *N. Iorga. Correspondence*, vol. 226, file 488).

XVIII

March, 10, 1925

Dear Mr. Iorga,

[...] Now, regarding the publishing of the *History of Roumanians* in English I shall request two things :

1) I should like that the volume should not contain illustrations which besides they cost very much the give the book the aspect of a paper written on a certain occasion. A serious paper like this one is regarded here some other way that on the Continent. If you consent that the illustrations should not be published, please let me know it immediately.

2) The book should absolutely be accompanied by an Index. The students of the school here* can make it in a month, I think. The editor insists to have this Index and I think that the book can not come out without it.

3) The book will contain a map which I shall borrow from Cambridge where they printed a book about Romania. This map was made at the Faculty of Science (The Department of Geography over there).

Please, let me know as soon as possible of your decisions.

Sincerely yours,

D. N. Ciotori.

(Idem, vol. 324, files 664—665).

XIX

British Delegation, League of Nations,
Hôtel des Bergues, Geneva, 12th March, 1925

Dear Mr. Iorga,

It is very good of you to send me your "Revue historique" and the beautifully illuminated work *L'Art Roumain*.

I shall not fail to scan the pages when I can find some relaxation from the busy moments which, as you can imagine, I am now passing through.

With renewed thanks, believe me, Yours very trully,

Austen Chamberlain.

(The Library of the Academy, Bucharest, *N. Iorga. Correspondence*, vol. 325, file 503).

* Fontenay-aux-Roses (Paris).

XX

London, May 23rd 1925

Dear Mr. Iorga

I have received your letter and I thank you for the feelings for me you express in it.

Once again, I have never doubted about them, I only wanted to convince You of two points: a) that the budgetary allocations [for] London had existed long before I was appointed a minister here; b) as they are, because of the extremely expensive life in England, they are far from keeping the life's daily troubles away from me. I have them and God knows how long I shall have them, to face all the obligations my position requires. What seems to be a surplus, if you change the salaries into *lei* or *francs*, disappears if you take into consideration the high exchange: gold!

But as far as You and I are concerned, it is not gold that glitters in the cellars of the Bank of England but what there is in man's mind and heart.

But let me come to more interesting things: Your book. The translation of your *History* is finished. Ciotori has seen it as it is in handwriting. It is now being typewritten. It will be in print in summer and, in winter... in bookshop.

We are lucky that the third lecture-ship I have created at the University of London will only come into being in autumn — I had given the money for it in 1920 when a treasurer. Thus we spared some money which has enabled us to translate the *History of the Romanians* in English.

Ciotori says that the translation is very good.

Professor Sir Bernard Pares intends to write, I wonder if he hasn't done it yet, a preface to the English version. I think that it is helpful for the British readers, though you need no preface.

What about you?

Sir Bernard Pares told Ciotori that he wanted to show his gratitude in this manner for everything you had been doing in Romania.

I should like you to receive my best feelings.

Titulescu

(Hoover Institution Archives, Box No. 3, Titulescu 43, ff. 20—21).

XXI

Bucharest, May 27th 1925

Dear Mr. Ciotori,

Once again, my warm gratitude.

If you like the translation, it means it is very good. All the same, I feel it necessary to see it I think of *the form of the proper names and the mistakes that must have slipped in it*.

I shall be having a table made in no time. As the Englishmen do not include all the names they might skip some of them.

The "monitor" must have arrived and my friend, Mr. Titulescu will have seen that I have only described him in the terms that my old friendship, the high respect and the gratitude we all owe to him thanks to the great services he has been making to our country.

I should like you to receive my friendly greetings.

N. Iorga

(Idem, Box no. 12, unpagéd)

XXII

Bucharest, June 3rd 1925

Dear Mr. Titulescu

I have just received your letter, warm-hearted as usual. I thank you with all my heart. There are times when such shows of sympathy get a higher value than they usually have.

I am glad we shall have an English description of our past and Mr. Pares's offer, whose visit I gladly remember, is extremely flattering for me.

Maybe in autumn, anyway: in January we shall be in Paris and we shall be able to talk about many things that are close to us both.

I should like you to accept my steady friendship.

N. Iorga

(Idem, Box no. 12, unpagéd)

XXIII

July, 28, 1925

Dear Mr. Iorga,

Here are the proofs at last. As it is seen from the enclosed letter of the editor it lacks the introduction which I think I shall receive in about a week since I think to renounce to the preface there was a talk about. One of the motives that determined me to renounce to the preface is that I got the impression that you are not very concerned about such a thing.

I hope you will be satisfied with the way they will edit the book. I want to add that I had many difficulties to meet, as you know that printings of such a type are quite expensive, possibly more expensive than elsewhere.

The book will have a map. The format is 8⁰⁰ and the paper is of a very good quality. I hope that the size of the letters is convenient for you. I couldn't use a bigger letter because the volume would have been too thick and we could not get more money.

Because of the same motives I should ask you to impose no more technical changes. Excuses; one could apply to me a little Rochefoucauld's words:

"Notre amour propre souffre plus impatiemment la condamnation de nos goûts que de nos opinions". One could find tastes with me, but material means...

Shall I add that I need the proofs ready as soon as possible? As far as I know him this printer knows how to torture someone...

Mr. Titulescu will be not here beginning with the 3rd of June. Being ill he had to leave for Geneva where we have some questions difficult enough to solve. After he stayed there for a month he went on a holiday to come back to Geneva in September.

Sincerely yours, D. N. Ciotori.

(The Library of the Academy, *N. Iorga Correspondence*, vol. 322, files 70—71).

XXIV

August 8th 1925

Dear Mr. Iorga,

I hurry up to answer to the letter I have just received now. All mistakes you will find will be corrected and a "guide" regarding the pronunciation of the sounds will be added. This will have been done anyway as McCabe had already drawn my attention.

I had a letter from that Miss Boyd and I think she is too pretentious. Professor McCabe is very well known and he has a great many publications. A translation made and signed by himself cannot be as Miss Boyd suggests. I know that the translators use to sap each other. Do not take her too much into account. After the letter she wrote me she did not make me a very good impression. Anyway, if there are not basic and translating mistakes then all the others will be easily corrected. Professor McCabe studied in France and has a doctorate there, so I think he knows French very well. He avoided — as he told me — to follow the text too closely being apparently frightened by you.

Anyway, I take great care as the work appear as good as possible. I hope you do not doubt this. I shall see McCabe and we shall arrange everything to your content.

Sincerely yours, D. N. Ciotori.

(Idem, vol. 322, files 67—69).

XXV

T. Fisher Unwin Ltd.
1, Adelphi Terrace, London W. C. 2
11 th August 1925

D. N. Ciotori, Esq.,
The Roumanian Legation,
4 Cromwell Place, S. W. 7

Dear Mr. Ciotori,

Let me acknowledge your letter of August 10th. We note the many changes in the proofs of *A History of Roumania*. No doubt you are aware this will mean extra charges by our printers, for corrections. If you wish to have the title changed, this can be done, but of course it means an alteration on every page from beginning to end of the book, and will be an added expense. We will not change the title at the moment, until we have got your definite instructions on the subject.

We are sending Mr. McCabe the proofs corrected by Professor Iorga. In due course they will go to our printers, and you shall see them again. If you wish to have further proofs you must advise us.

We have read Sir Bernard Pares's letter, which we now return. Certainly we regret the delay in the preface, and we hope to receive it as soon as possible. May we also remind you of the block of the map which you are to send us?

.

Faithfully yours,

T. Fisher Unwin.

(Idem, vol. 322, files 47—48).

XXVI

August, 12, 1925

Dear Mr. Iorga,

As you see, Fisher Unwin is frightened by the alterations in the text and announces me that it will increase the cost of printing. I do not know what to do. The translation is due to Prof. Joseph McCabe who studied in France and is very well known as an author and translator. He had been recommended to me — that is he was employed at my consent — by Fisher Unwin. The translation has been seen also by other Englishmen — among whom one is a professor — and it was found to be good. I repeat, I do not know at what extent can we count on Miss Boyd's opinion.

Please, believe me I am deeply sorry that beside I am bound and considered responsible, after signing the contract, for all the extra costs of the book. I had to make efforts in order to get what this book needed to be printed. Please, believe that here the print is the most expensive in the world, I think, and the book costs so far no less than 600 £. But I should like you not to talk about this.

I expect a word from you to know what to do. The translator's address is : Joseph McCabe, 49 Bridge Lane, Golders Green, London, N. W. 11.

Sincerely yours, D. N. Ciotori.

(Idem, vol. 322, file 49).

XXVII

August, 13, 1925

Dear Mr. Iorga,

The editor and his counsellors of all sorts argue that the title of the book should not be changed. "A History of the Roumanians" as you want—they said — does not draw the attention of the Anglo-Saxon who is a little ignorant. Further on, they also say that now Romania comprises all Romanians, not like before. Our public can understand a book with a title like "History of the Jews" or any other spread all over people but they can not associate the Romanians with Romania. These arguments are not so good for the scientists but I tend to say they are right as far as their public is concerned.

Could you admit their arguments and leave the title the way they want and it is already printed ?

Sincerely yours, D. N. Ciotori

(Idem, vol. 322, file 44).

XXVIII

September, 23, 1925

Dear Mr. Iorga,

Today I shall send you the sequence of the latest proof sheets. As I wrote yesterday, I need them as soon as possible. I hope you will be satisfied with the improvements done and with the fact that the *spirit* of the work has by no means been altered. This form belongs to McCabe who—as I said yesterday — is well known and appreciated by the scientific and printing world.

The book is to appear at the beginning of October and this is why the editor is very sorry because I keep them slow with the work and technic material and the workers without work.

I want to add that I tried to do my best so that the book should appear in English and if there are certain gaps, insignificant I hope, the work will make here a good impression.

Again, I add that the undertitle "land, people and civilization" will be printed as you wished.

Sincerely yours, D. N. Ciotori.

(Idem, vol. 322, file 190).

XXIX

December, 3rd, 1925

Dear Mr. Iorga,

[...] I made inquiries at Fisher Unwin about the *History*: it will be ready at the end of this week. I shall send you a copy as soon as it comes out.

I enclose here a piece of information about the History from "The Daily Telegraph".

Hand kisses to Mrs. Iorga, yours devoted, M. Beza.

(Idem, vol. 324, file 596).

XXX

Telegram, March 21st 1930

Titulesco. Roumania's Legacy. London.

I warmly thank you for the great distinction, you have presented me with it and you have worked for it. Iorga.

(Hoover Institution Archives, Box No. 12, unpagged).

INTERVENTION ON PROFESSOR R. CLOGG'S COMMUNICATION "THE VLACHS IN MACEDONIA : SOME BRITISH PERSPECTIVES"

BY

AL. ANDRONIC

I listened with a distinct interest the Romanian version of Professor Clogg's paper since the historical problems concerning public opinion as a major factor, more or less considered at the level of generalizing the consumed historical fact and recorded as such by the contemporary world represents nowadays an ever more concentrated preoccupation of outhorized historians in justifying certain political acts with powerful resonance for the relationship between states and peoples.

First of all I bear in my mind the positive fact that the English public opinion has been objectively informed with the facts regarding the national individuality of Wallachian Macedoneans whose Romanic dialect (Macedo-Romanic) settled them vithin the large group of the native eastern Romans on the territory inhabited by them until nowadays.

Of the bibliography Professor Clogg refered to I was impressed he had mainly been interested in the works that had appeared untill the First World War. Unfortunately, in this paper the information regarding Macedonia and the so-called Macedonean problem during the First World War, starting with 1914, information that might have helped to clarify the English public opinion — is absent.

It is useless to refer in detail on this problem in my intervention since the bibliography is distinctly rich and conclusive.

Further on I should like to draw the attention of the specialists upon some recent works concerning the history of Balkanian Wallachians in which there is the attempt to accredit a new public opinion highly important in this matter by means of scientific information and spreading of certain ideas.

Thus, the Institute for Slavian and Balkanian Matters of the Academy of Science of USSR published a series of papers regarding the ethnogenesis of the eastern Romanic population as the population of Roman origin in the Balkans is called, that is the Wallachians — speakers of the three dialects on the south — Danubian territory : Macedo-Romanian or Aromanian, Megleno-Romanian or Cutzo-Wallachian and Istro-Romanian. As to the Wallachians in Moravia and Slovachia the ones called Morlacs which form western a branch of North-Danubian Wallachians it is accredited the idea of Wallachian infiltration in Slavic millieu in a late mediaeval epoch, about 15th—16th centuries.

It is no wonder that, in this context, the Soviet historian V. D. Koroliuk, dealing with "Researches in the domain of Eastern Romans and Slavian Ethnogenesis" launched the very curious idea which contradicts the entire Russian historiography concerning the basic occupations of the Slavian populations. According to him Slavians' main occupation was grazing even since ancient times and, consequently the term "wallach", which for many philologists and ethnographers means shepherd, would refer a Slavian population rather than a Roman one. This idea was given in 1976 (see : "Voprosy

etnogeneza i etničkoj istorii slavjan i vostočnyh romančev", Moscova), and in 1978 the same author was to tackle the problem of "Slavian Pastorship in the 1st Millenium of Our Era and Their Movement To the Danube and Balkans regions. Slavians and Wollochs. (An Attempt to Reconstitution on the Basis of Written Sources)". He drew the conclusion that under the name of "Wlachs" one should understand the shepherds coming from various ethnic groups. According to Koroliuk, these Wlachs "came from the territories between Drava, Sava and Morava to the north and settled there and some other "Wlach" elements passed over the Danube and took for Transylvania (11—12th centuries); they reached the south limits of Poland and Russian Halich and later on they exceeded the Beshkid mountains reaching Moravian Wallachia and the north-west Slovakia. V. D. Koroliuk goes on stating that, assimilating the local population "Wallachians left their print on the material and spiritual culture a fact that makes the subject-matter of certain ethnographic investigations of some Chechoslovakian, Hungarian and Ukrainean scientists". As for Transylvania, Maramuresh and Moldavia the above quoted author serenely presents on Tomasek's conclusion in 1882 that the Wallachians had settled there during the 12th and 13th centuries. (see "Slavjano-volosskie avjazy. Sbornik statej, Kishinew").

Such statements — which are completely unscientific — do not solve positively the complex problems of the ethnogenesis of the peoples in the Balkans' areas and they pay a heavy tribute to the Roeslerian anti-Romanian conceptions, moving thus the Romanians from the South to the North of the Danube, rejecting the autohtony of the Daco-Romanians and Romanic population during the Migration epoch and even of the Romanian people as a stable follower of the Daco-Romanians.

In fact, from this standpoint it is significant the conclusion reached by the historians from Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic as to the problem of the ethnogenesis of the Moldavians in the respective republic. Thus, at the 8-th Conference of the Scientific Council devoted to "Slavian-Wallachian Relations and the Origins of Moldavian People" it has been drawn one of the most **curious and unscientific** conclusions that is the Dacians have been exterminated by the Romans, that the Wallachians cannot consider themselves as the inheritors of the Dacians, and that the Wollochs gave birth to the populations of the Areas of the Olt river, the Highlanders, Banat, Transylvania, Maramures, Romanian Moldavians and the Moldavians in MSSR (see The Bullerin of MSSR Academy of Science, Kishinew, 1979).

This is the way in which a new public opinion is accredited concerning the ethnic origin of the Wlachs, not only of those in the south of the Danube but also of the north Danube Wallachians i.e. of the Romanians, to say nothing of the tendency of the Bulgarian historians to consider the mediaeval Wlachs as taking part to the formation of the second Bulgarian Tzarat led by Petru and Asan brothers, of Slavian, Bulgarian origin.

Under such a circumstance we found it normal to draw the attention of the specialists upon some scientific inadvertencies of actual importance within these debates with an objective scientific character meant to create a new public opinion, for a highly significant problem of the origins of the Wlachs in Moldavia, competently debated and strongly brought into relief here by the much respected Professor Clogg whom I warmly congratulate for the elegance of his lecture.

ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE "CONVORBIRI LITERARE"

BY

SORIN PARVU

It would not be uninteresting to deal in more detail with the impact English literature exerted on the "Convorbiri literare". Such an approach is worth making for at least two most significant reasons: firstly, reviews are, on the whole, better barometres of the public taste than one individual writer; the "Convorbiri literare" is not some review but the most influential Romanian review in the 19th century, the 'spokesman', of the so-called *junimism*, a complex trend of (literary, ideological, cultural and political) ideas. And, fancy the *a-priori* prestige of a foreign writer for the simple motive he was being introduced to the public by a *magister* like Titu Maiorescu. Also fancy the comparatively large audience the review was speaking to. A foreign writer, if recommended by its editorial staff, had every chance to become a common name in the "literary conversations".

Given these circumstances, the first observation we feel compelled to make is that English literature did not benefit by privileged status in the pages of the "Convorbiri literare"; its sporadic entries are in no way comparable to the translations from and essays on German literature and French literature. And, we should not forget that the review was primarily interested in discovering and cultivating the original 'voices'. World literature was no concern in itself; whenever taken into consideration it served as a sort of starting point with reference to a certain (high) level a literature (young though it may be) is bound to aspire to, sooner or later. No program is explicit in this context but there must have been a consensus according to which the contributors were required to dwell on the values tested by history rather than the names *en vogue* at the moment. It is no wonder, then, that the English writers the reader could meet in the pages of the "Convorbiri literare" were not contemporary to himself. Here is the complete list: Shakespeare, Thomas Moore, Byron, Shelley, Keats, Lord Chesterfield, the Brontë Sisters, Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin. It is quite surprising that no mention was ever made of the Victorian novelists: Dickens, Thackeray, Meredith, who were in fashion at the time. And it is equally surprising to find two other names, leastways, which are sure to be remarkable but not so remarkable as to explain for their unexpected appeal. We are referring, first, to Thomas Moore, a minor poet, melodious rather than profound. The translator (Costache Negruzzi) is likely to have been attracted by the restrained rhetorical quality of the images, by the outspoken patriotic feelings, by the delicate melancholy:

Dar, vai sărmană patrie! fala ta a trecut; curagiul acela ce nu trebuie să se plece niciodată este abătut. Fii tăi numai într-ascuns suspină

asupra pustiirii tale ; căci e crimă a te iubi și moarte a te apăra ! Îi disprețuiești dacă nu știi trăda ; îi hărăzesc întunericului dacă nu ocărășc pe părinții lor ; torța care-i luminează în calea cinstelor se aprinde la focul unde patria moare !¹.

A comparison between the *Irish Melodies* and the *Cîntarea României* is compulsory in this respect. The tone is as much inflamed with passion, the verses are ordered according to a similar rhetoric : the ideal form for giving a pathetic expression to the self-consuming longing for the mother country (Mention should be made that the nine stanzas published by Jacob Negruzzi in 1868 had been translated by his father during his exile in 1838—1939, by way of the French version signed by Louise Swinton-Belloc. Eugenia Carcalechi worked on the other stanzas in 1905).

Even more surprising is the presence of Lord Chesterfield. The translation was made by Titu Maiorescu himself who must have found the English thinker to be a spirit congenial to his own (The aphorisms, the Romanian professor confessed, were "selected for my own benefit") :

Orice ai face, fă-o de vreme și cu cea mai mare îngrijire, niciodată ușuratic. Tot ce faci sau ce știi pe jumătate, nu e făcut și nu e știut. Ba e mai rău decît atît, fiindcă dă loc la greșeli.

or :

Știința e ca un diamant brut, pe care îl poți păstra în dulap drept curiozitate ; dar, dacă vrei să-l porți, trebuie să-l fățuiești ca să strălucească².

Shakespeare was always in high esteem. As early as 1868 P. P. Carp published several scenes of *Othello's* Act I, III, IV. Some fragments could hardly be recognized but, there are many others which are, as A. D. Xenopol says, 'wonderful'.

La mama mea în casă trăia o fetișoară ! / Maria o numeau-era amorezată / Și amorezu ei necredincios fugi : / Avea un cîntecel, un cîntec de răchită / Un lucru bătrînesc, dar ce se potrivea / Cu trista ei durere. Cîntîndu-l a murit / Nu-mi iese-n astă seară din minte acel cîntec / Și trebuie să mă țin ca nu cumva și eu, / Să plec cu lacrimi capul cîntînd ca Mărioara³.

In four 1896 issues, Haralamb C. Lecca "remade" Act I of the *Taming of the Shrew*. The original version is scarcely recognizable ; the general ideas are more or less the same but the style, probably considered to be too 'rough', is completely 'adapted'. The blank verse, e.g. is 'improved', changed as it is into fluent rhyme :

O, Padua ! O, leagăn al artei, salve ție ! / Sînt hotărît de-acuma să-mi văd de datorie ! / Voi da-ntr-o parte lenea, iar ținta mea va sta / În paginile cărții și-n grija de-a-nvăța⁴.

An adequate transposition was supplied by D. Nanu who published fragments from *Othello* along six issues in 1910, 1912, 1913. The content

¹ *Melodii irlandeze*, "Convorbiri literare", 1 noiembrie 1868, 269—274.

² *Aforisme*, "Convorbiri literare", 1910.

³ *Othello*, "Convorbiri literare", 15 martie 1868, 21—27.

⁴ *Femeia îndărătnică*, "Convorbiri literare", 1 decembrie 1896, 605—625.

was faithfully recorded but the initial solemnity was substituted for sing-song artifices :

Desdemona la o parte, ca școlarul nemișcat, / Asculta cu ochii țintă și cu trupu-nfrigorat, / Așa mult nu vrea să piardă șirul lungilor istorii, / Că de se-nîmpla pe-afară s-o mai cheme servitorii / Isprăvea cu ei degrabă și-napoi venea curînd / Ochi cu ochi sorbea cuvîntu-mi, cu nesațiu, tremurînd⁵.

The only match for Shakespeare in point of appeal (judging by the 'Convorbiri literare') was undoubtedly Byron. St. Vârgolici was the first to translate from him ; he published in turn *The Prisoner of Chillon* (1871), *Parisiana* (1876) and *The Siege of Corynth* (1876). At first, the language was common-of-place, lacking in suggestiveness. As time went by and the Romanian poet became more experienced the verses flew naturally, true in ideas and form to the original :

E ceasul în care din frunziș răsună / A privighetorii cîntec drăgostos / În care-amorezii șoptesc împreună / Vorbe de iubire încet și voios, / În care zefirul cu unda formează / Un glas ce urechea dulce desfătează. / Picurii de rouă pe flori strălucesc / Și stelele tainic pe cer rătăcesc ; / Pe valuri albastrul mai închis se pare, / Mai verde s-arată frunza la culoare ; / Umbra cu lumina pe cer se unește, / Formînd vâlul negru atît de curat, / Ce vedem cînd ziua se călătorește, / Cînd de lună-amurgul este alungat⁶.

Remarkable for its delicacy, for the faithful rendering of the original spirit is the translation of *Fill the Goblet Again* (1884) signed X and attributed to Titu Maiorescu :

Cînd trece junia și deșertăciunea, / Paharul ne șterge iar amărăciunea / Ș-atuncea aflăm — cine nu au aflat ? — / Că-n vin adevărul e încă păstrat⁷.

We shall find only one poem by Shelley : *To a Skylark* (1900). But, quite fortunately, St. O. Iosif's version is exceptional and is sure to have succeeded in offering the Romanian readers an idea of the English poet's genius :

Salut, zeiță a cîntării ! Căci pasere nu poți să fii / Tu, care, plină de simțire, / Prin versu-ți măiestrit din fire, / Reversi din boltile țării așa voioase melodii. / Întocmai unui nor de pară mai sus și tot mai sus te-avînți : / Și-n adîncimile albastre / Răsuni deasupra lumii noastre, / Și tot cîntînd te urci într-una, precum urcînd într-una cîntîi : [...] / Ce tainice simțiri te-nspiră, o ! pasăre sau heruvim ! / Cîntam noi vinul și iubirea, / Ci unde este fericirea / Dumnezeuiștilor avînturi ce ne cuprind, cînd te-auzim ? / Cîntările de biruință și corul nostru nupțial / Pe lîngă imnurile tale / Sunt scîncete pustii și goale : / Simțim în cîntecele noastre un nu-știu-ce lipsind fatal⁸.

⁵ *Othello*, "Convorbiri literare", 1 noiembrie 1912, 1221—1255.

⁶ *Parisina*, "Convorbiri literare", 1 ianuarie 1876, 395—402.

⁷ *Umpleți-mi paharul*, "Convorbiri literare", 1 ianuarie 1884, 124.

⁸ *La o ciocîrlie*, "Convorbiri literare", 15 mai 1900, 373—376.

Another great romantic poet, John Keats, was unfortunately ignored till 1921, when the review took the initiative of celebrating the poet's anniversary. An essay by P. P. Grimm giving a bird's eye view of the poet's universe, and a poem, translated by G. Vâlsan are of a nature to repair the injustice. The translation is really good :

Nu pierе niciodată a lumii frumusețe ! / Cînd arde miezul verii și păsă-
rile-n crîng / Subt umbra răcoroasă a pomilor se strîng, / Un dulce strigăt
vesel aleargă prin finețe. [...] / A lumii poezie nu pierе niciodată ! / Cînd
geru-n seri de iarnă cu moarte înveșmîntă / Întreaga fire, 'n-vatră un
greer tot mai cîntă⁹.

An excellent contribution to a critical *corpus* of Shakespeare is the *English Phenomenon* (1927), a pertinent essay by Dragoș Protopopescu.

Two conclusive statements might be made now :

1. in what concerns its popularity, English literature was far behind the ancient literatures and such modern literatures as : German, French, Italian and Russian ;

2. when tackling English matters the contributors of the "Convorbiri literare" did it with much responsibility and unfailing taste.

⁹ *Lăcusta și greerul*, "Convorbiri literare", februarie-martie 1921, 126.

RELATIONS FINANCIÈRES ANGLO-ROUMAINES

par

I. SAIZU

Après la réalisation de l'état national unitaire au 1-er décembre 1918, la Roumanie était intéressée à donner de nouvelles dimensions aux formes et à la nature de ses rapports avec la Grande Bretagne, dans le but de consolider ses frontières et de développer ses relations économiques et sociales-politiques, faisant avancer entre autres, la richesse des traditions de l'époque moderne. Dans la communication présentée, le professeur Gh. Dobre a insisté sur les changements qualitatifs dans le domaine commercial pendant les périodes moderne et contemporaine, distinguant trois grandes sous-périodes : 1875—1914 ; l'intervalle de temps d'entre les deux guerres ; les années d'après la seconde conflagration mondiale du siècle, jusqu'à nos jours.

Notre intervention vise les relations financières anglo-roumaines durant la décennie 1918—1928, précisant dès le début que, exactement comme en d'autres époques historiques, le contenu du processus investigué ne peut pas être recherché et compris sans tenir compte de la situation et de la conjoncture de l'économie mondiales, de la direction du mouvement des marchandises et des capitaux. Dans leur évolution sur le fond des conséquences de la première guerre mondiale, les relations économiques internationales furent marquées par les convulsions produites comme une conséquence du déséquilibre dans la production et dans le commerce mondial, dans le système des devises et du crédit, dans le changement de certaines routes commerciales et dans la modification de la position des différents états dans la division internationale du travail¹. En effet, l'humanité a traversé la première décennie d'entre les deux guerres dans un cadre international complexe. Les plaies de la guerre n'étaient pas encore guéries. Chaque état à-peu-près, préoccupé par son propre redressement et son propre développement, s'est entouré de barrières douanières, ce qui rendait les échanges plus difficiles. Un problème qui soulignait le caractère complexe de l'intervalle, c'étaient les obligations financières issues de la première conflagration. Leur organisation et la modalité de paiement formèrent l'objet de nombreuses conférences et accords internationaux, avec un déploiement d'intérêts variés. Ce problème mit son empreinte sur l'activité diplomatique toute entière, aussi bien que sur la politique extérieure des états impliqués². Un autre problème ayant de graves répercussions, fut la monnaie.

¹ C. Moisuc, *Tendințe ale evoluției economiei mondiale în perioada interbelică*, dans „Anale de istorie”, XVII, 1971, 4, 92—93.

² G. Lachapelle, *La vérité sur notre situation financière* (Paris, 1921), 90—98, 171—176 ; L. Marin, *Sur les dettes interalliées* (Paris, 1925) 19 ; G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, *Histoire des événements internationaux de 1920 à 1939* (Paris, 1946) 33—35 ; J.—B. Duroselle,

L'inflation, avantaguse au début pour la bourgeoisie, prit tellement de proportions, qu'elle menaçait la position même de la classe dominante. Le problème des devises avait un aire international bien large, étant donné que dans presque tous les états la cause primordiale de la dépréciation des devises fut l'inflation monétaire provoquée par la guerre. Les divers états recourent de manière différente aux solutions adéquates pour la stabilisation de leur monnaie. Le seul pays qui risqua la stabilisation de ses devises sur la voie de la revalorisation fut la Grande Bretagne³. À la suite de ces réformes, les gouvernements ne pouvant plus recouvrir leurs frais en appelant aux émissions sans couverture, ils augmentèrent les impôts et sollicitèrent des emprunts extérieurs.

Il est à retenir que, à l'encontre de la situation antérieure à l'année 1914, quand les monnaies de base de états européens avaient, à l'exception de la Grande Bretagne, aproximativement le même contenu en or, au début de l'année 1928, une fois la période de consolidation monétaire finie grâce aux stabilisations légales effectuées, aussi bien qu'à celes réelles précédant la stabilisation légale, le contenu en or des monnaies devînt très varié, ce qui a rendu difficiles les échanges internationaux⁴.

À mesure que le système monétaire et de crédit se consolidait, le redressement et l'essor des forces de production purent acquérir de nouvelles valences, en assurant le développement de la société capitaliste. On a ainsi réussi qu'en 1929, par rapport à 1925, année où, sur l'ensemble de l'économie mondiale, on a atteint le niveau d'avant guerre, la production industrielle augmente de 22%⁵. L'augmentation de la capacité de production et de crédit des E.U.A., la diminution pondérale de l'économie de la Grande Bretagne, le développement dans un rythme alerte des productions du Japon et de l'Allemagne, devaient aiguïser les contradictions du monde capitaliste.

À ce temps-là des mutations se sont produites en Roumanie dans le cadre de l'économie mondiale, mutations dues aux modifications survenues à l'occasion de la constitution de l'état national unitaire et au développement du complexe de production, de circulation et d'échanges. Sous le rapport matériel, la période respective fut caractérisée par le progrès des forces de production, fait qui stimula le capitalisme, illustré surtout par l'essor de l'industrie, à la suite d'importants investissements, par le niveau croissant de l'équipement technique des entreprises, par l'augmentation numérique de la force de travail, par la diversité de la production. La même période fut également caractérisée par l'accroissement du processus de centralisation du capital⁶, par „l'accentuation de l'opposition de la grande bourgeoisie autochtone contre le capital étranger, par l'affermissement de sa position dans une série des branches de l'industrie et de la circulation”⁷. En effet, en 1928, par rapport à l'année 1922,

L'Europe de 1815 à nos jours. Vie politique et relations internationales (Paris, 1964) p. 166 et suiv.; C. Murgescu, *Nicolae Titulescu, negociator al acordului financiar cu Anglia din 1925*, dans "Revista Română de studii internaționale", 1, (5), București 1969, 153.

³ A. Vișoli, *Sistemul bănesc în slujba claselor exploatatoare din România* (București, 1958) 192—193.

⁴ *Stabilizarea monetară în Europa și consecințele ei economice* (București, 1928) IX.

⁵ C. Moisuc, *op. cit.*, 93.

⁶ D. Leonties, *Die Industrialisierung Rumäniens bis zum zweiten Weltkrieg* (Monachii, 1971) 195—200.

⁷ N. Ceaușescu, *România pe drumul dezvoltării construcției socialiste*, I (București 1968) 355.

le nombre des entreprises augmenta de 35%, la force motrice de 25%, la force de travail de 62%, la valeur du combustible de 37%, la valeur des matières premières de 128% et finalement la valeur de la production de 146%⁸.

Basée sur cette évolution, la Roumanie chercha à modifier ses relations internationales d'une manière qui contribue à sa consolidation. Les efforts dans cette direction se déployèrent dans les conditions d'une considérable pression de la part des grandes puissances, dans l'intention que la grande bourgeoisie roumaine renonce à la devise „par nous-mêmes”, à la politique économique basée principalement sur le principe de l'encouragement du travail, sur l'initiative et les capitaux internes. Nous mentionnons ici quelques exemples et résultats de la pression extérieure. Parallèlement à la dépréciation du „leu” sur le plan interne, il fut également dévalué par rapport aux devises étrangères, surtout à l'égard des principales monnaies qui servaient à l'exécution des paiements. Comme une conséquence directe, il y eut une différence entre le cours légal et le cours réel dans l'acquisition des moyens de paiement sur le marché extérieur, ce qui détermina une influence négative sur la dynamique des échanges avec l'étranger. L'année 1928, elle seule, représenta une perte de 7,4 milliards de lei dans les échanges de devises⁹. La presse étrangère alimenta eile aussi l'idée que, à cause des refus des cercles dirigeants de Roumanie de collaborer avec le capital étranger, on est arrivé à la dépréciation monétaire¹⁰. Nous mentionnons également les tentatives d'amoindrir le cours du „leu” et des diverses valeurs roumaines à la bourse internationale, ou de les mettre à l'écart sur les marchés de Londres, Paris et New-York¹¹.

L'intérêt pour l'intensification des relations, surtout en ce qui concernait le pétrole, venait aussi de la part de la Grande Bretagne¹², heureuse de ne pas constater la moindre opposition parmi les cercles dirigeants roumains relativement à la collaboration loyale¹³. Le pas décisif ne pouvait pas s'effectuer sans l'extinction du passif. Tout d'abord la Roumanie procéda à la règlementation de la dette flottante particulière, qui englobait la somme de 1.401.026.186 lei en or. Par conséquent, peu de temps après la venue des libéraux au gouvernement, en janvier 1922, après avoir rejeté l'offre de la *Banque Zabaroff*, qui proposait à la Roumanie la consolidation des bons du trésor en échanges de certaines concessions pétrolières, le cabinet I. I. C. Bratianu procéda à la liquidation, en juin 1922, par l'intermède des banques de Londres *Hebert Wag et Co Ltd* et *British Overseas Bank Ltd*, d'une part de la dette externe de la Roumanie. Dans ce but, le 16 juin 1922 arrivèrent à Bucarest Drake et Jones, les délégués des institutions bancaires anglaises, qui parachevèrent les négociations qui avaient débuté un mois plus tôt¹⁴. Il en résulta

⁸ Fl. Em. Manoliu, *Politica preurilor în economia românească* (București, 1939) 31.

⁹ V. N. Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești după războiul mondial* (București, 1940) 304.

¹⁰ Th. I. Gălcă, *Politica economică și financiară a României* (București, 1926) 10.

¹¹ I. M. Oprea, *Nicolae Titulescu*, (București, 1966) 135.

¹² F. W. Deakin, *Anglo-French Policy in Relation to South-East Europe 1936—1939*, dans *Les relations franco-britanniques de 1935 à 1939*, (Paris, 1975) 65.

¹³ Percy R. Clark, *Relațiile anglo-române*, dans „Analele Industriei și Comerțului”, III, 1938, 2—3, 8.

¹⁴ Gh. M. Dobrovici, *Istoricul dezvoltării economice și financiare a României și împrumuturile contractate, 1821—1933* (București 1934) 450—452, 522—523; „Buletinul economic și financiar”, 16 iunie 1922, p. 1; „Economia națională”, XLVI, 1925, 8—9, 401;

que le 19 juin 1922 une loi fut votée, par laquelle le Ministère des Finances reçut l'autorisation de contracter un emprunt pour la consolidation des bons du trésor existants à l'étranger, jusqu'à la somme maximale de 35 000 000 livres sterlings, ainsi qu'un emprunt spécial de 2 500 000 livres sterlings pour la couverture des dépenses de conversion. Le premier emprunt fut contracté avec un pourcentage de 4% dans un délai de 40 ans, et le second avec le même pourcentage, mais pour une période réduite de moitié. L'un autant que l'autre, reçurent des garanties spéciales de restitution par la saisie-gagerie de toutes les devises provenant de l'encaissement des impôts pour l'importation et l'exportation en or et devises étrangères, et, pour le cas où celles-ci se seraient avérées insuffisantes, on avait prévu une garantie prioritaire sur tous les revenus de l'état. Les banques avec lesquelles on avait contracté l'emprunt ne respectèrent pas l'obligation de consolider complètement les bons du trésor de la dette flottante¹⁵. En 1924, le gouvernement roumain avait reconnu¹⁶ qu'un nombre important de bons du trésor n'avaient pas été consolidés à l'occasion de l'emprunt et que dans le même but on avait proposé des arrangements spéciaux¹⁷. Avec les 35 000 000 livres sterlings on n'avait pas consolidé que 17 000 000 et pourtant les banquiers étrangers encaissèrent des commissions énormes, comme s'ils avaient coopéré à la solution intégrale de l'opération financière. La consolidation des bons du trésor représentait pourtant — comme le dit clairement Gh. M. Dobrovici — le premier pas que la Roumanie faisait pour se tirer de l'état d'humiliation financière et de l'influence malheureuse exercée sur son économie¹⁸.

L'extinction des dettes externes était une nécessité impérieuse. La bourgeoisie roumaine enregistrait dans n'importe quel parti, justifia maintes fois la nécessité de contracter un emprunt dans ce but. Vintilă Brătianu lui-même, le plus acharné propagateur de la politique „par nous-mêmes“, luttait sur tous les fronts pour en obtenir un. Mais le capital étranger ne vivait pas en paix avec la législation économique élaborée par le gouvernement libéral et notamment avec la loi des mines de 1924¹⁹. Pour le même motif le gouverneur de la banque anglaise manifesta — ainsi que le remarquait N. Titulescu le 15 mai 1924 — une attitude réservée vis-à-vis des intérêts financiers de la Roumanie²⁰. Des documents inédits appartenant à l'archive personnelle du diplomate démontrent que par une lettre de Londres du 12 août 1924, adressée à Vintilă Brătianu, N. Titulescu relevait la nécessité d'entamer immédiatement des pourparlers en vue des investissements et notamment pour la création d'une machine de défense militaire nationale „à l'égard du péril que constitu-

Bibliothèque Centrale de l'État, fond St. Georges, Arch. général Iliescu, 1919—1939, paquet LXXXIX, dossier 7, f. 97—98.

¹⁵ *Contribuții la istoria capitalului străin în România de la sfârșitul primului război mondial până la ieșirea din criza economică din 1929—1933* (București, 1960) 364.

¹⁶ *Dezbaterile Adunării Deputaților*, 16 janvier 1924, p. 633.

¹⁷ En 1928, seulement la valeur de ces arrangements fut évaluée à une charge annuelle dans le budget de l'état qui montait à 883.682.940 lei, y compris les différences en cours (*Dezbaterile Adunării Deputaților*, 15 février 1928, p. 830). Le chiffre ci-dessus mentionné n'était pas complet, étant donné que les conditions de conversion des bons du trésor en rentes de consolidation ne furent pas acceptées par tous les possesseurs particuliers des titres de créances.

¹⁸ Gh. M. Dobrovici, *op. cit.*, 416—417.

¹⁹ Maurice Pearton, *Oil and Romanian State* (Oxford, 1971), 122—125.

²⁰ N. Titulescu, *Documente diplomatice*, (București, 1967), 136.

aient les ennemis et à l'amabilité inconsciente envers eux, des grands alliés"²¹. De là l'appréciation que la collaboration avec le capital étranger, conformément aux principes des nouvelles lois, représentait, en dehors de son aspect économique, „un moyen de sécurité nationale par la création d'une solidarité des intérêts de l'occident avec nous"²². Peu de temps après, c'est-à-dire le 15 novembre, N. Titulescu confessait à I. G. Duca sa conviction que „si on se hâta à coïncider les capitaux étrangers à ceux de la Roumanie — bien entendu en respectant notre souveraineté — c'était aujourd'hui le plus puissant traité d'alliance qu'on pouvait avoir avec les autres peuples. Ce serait le prélude le plus sûr pour des conventions diplomatiques viables et la meilleure garantie de la paix"²³. Le mois suivant N. Titulescu avait insisté non pas pour une collaboration quelconque, mais pour une collaboration „sur des principes nationaux“, appréciée comme la seule qui pouvait „concilier tous les intérêts et éviter toutes les crises“²⁴, insistant en même temps sur la nécessité d'examiner avec attention si les offres d'emprunt étaient compatibles avec les intérêts nationaux.

Les arguments du capital anglais, subordonnés à l'aspiration d'en faire accroître la pénétration, furent largement exposés pendant les négociations pour contracter l'emprunt demandé par la Roumanie. En effet, tandis qu'en mai 1924 I. G. Duca négociait à Londres avec plusieurs sociétés, parmi lesquelles le groupe industriel *Vickers*, un délégué de ce dernier s'est déplacé en Roumanie pour sonder si la situation interne offrait des garanties suffisantes et précises de remboursement et si la firme anglaise pouvait en obtenir les avantages économiques „appropriés“. Le même intérêt pour des échanges commerciaux manifestèrent également les grandes entreprises Beard Moon et Armstrong. De plus, les cercles financiers britanniques conditionnaient d'une part, qu'un éventuel emprunt ait l'accord de tous les partis, tandis que d'une autre, la législation „inéquitable“, considérée un obstacle pour cet engagement contractuel, soit abrogée. Dans ces circonstances, à la sollicitation du cabinet britannique, Vintilă Brătianu rédigea le mémoire *Considérations sur la situation actuelle de la Roumanie et son programme futur dans le cadre des nouvelles lois économiques*, où il présentait de manière détaillée le problème des finances publiques, les lois économiques, les dettes de guerre, la production. Le mémoire avait la mission de porter à la connaissance de la grande finance que la Roumanie avait besoin de capital externe pour son redressement ; on relevait aussi les possibilités de remboursement des sommes avancées et les perspectives qui s'ouvraient au capital respectif dans l'économie roumaine. Mais le mémoire ne réussit pas à convaincre les représentants du capital anglais.

Une nouvelle occasion pour des contrats directs en vue de l'engagement d'un emprunt se présenta en janvier 1925, à l'occasion de la conférence financière internationale, qui eut lieu à Paris. La délégation roumaine n'avait pourtant pas comme objectif central un tel problème, mais seulement la défense des droits de l'état dans le problème des réparations, qui n'était pas connexe au

²¹ Hoover Institution Archives, N. Titulescu, *Diary and Correspondance*, Box II, cahier 25, ff. 11—15.

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ Idem, Box II, cahier 31, f. 25—26.

²⁴ Idem, Box III, cahier 34, f. 14—21 ; voir dans le volume présent l'intervention de Gh. Buzatu.

problèmes des dettes, ce qui lui créa une situation extrêmement difficile sur le plan financier. La nécessité de la présence de la Roumanie à la conférence fut soulignée par le délégué français au délégué britannique en décembre 1924²⁵. L'injustice en ce qui concerne les réparations sera répétée à Londres devant W. Churchill et Austin Chamberlain. La délégation roumaine avait sur elle à Paris le texte de l'arrangement qu'elle avait l'intention de conclure avec les représentants de la Maison Baldwin, aussi bien que le projet de l'automatisation du transport ferroviaire, qui devait lui servir à Londres comme fondement dans la discussion pour l'obtention d'un emprunt pour les V.F.R.

Les tentatives pour contracter un grand emprunt, échouèrent. Les négociations entreprises avec MacKenna, Schroeder, Madge, Zaharoff et Vickers, n'avaient en vue qu'un crédit pour la reconstruction des voies ferrées²⁶. V. Brătianu avait reçu des offres pour la somme de 30 millions de livres sterlings de la part de la Banque Schroeder et Co., et de 10 millions de livres sterlings de la part de W. Long, le président du cartel pétrolier international O. P. Q., en échange de la concession des terrains contenant du pétrole brut, stipulation qui ne fut pas acceptée²⁷. Dans ces conditions le gouvernement roumain, dans son désir d'obtenir quand même un grand crédit externe, décida de créer dans ce but des prémisses favorables par la consolidation des dettes de guerre. La convention pour cette consolidation et la fixation des modalités de paiement furent conclues le 19 octobre 1925 avec la Grande Bretagne. La dette initiale établie à la somme de 18448200 livres sterlings devait s'accroître par le système du calcul des intérêts et des annuités jusqu'à la somme de 31295000 livres sterlings. Pour la période 1926—1928 les annuités furent fixées à 50000, 100000 et 150000 livres sterlings²⁸. L'accroissement des annuités des premières années, adopté en principe par toutes les conventions de consolidation des dettes de guerre s'est avéré faux, étant donné que les difficultés de la Roumanie en ce qui concernait les paiements externes au lieu de diminuer, s'accrurent.

Sous le gouvernement Averescu (1926—1927) le capital anglais chercha à obtenir des garanties précises pour l'éventualité de l'acceptation de l'emprunt. H. Dering, le ministre de la Grande Bretagne à Bucarest avait relevé dans ce sens que la Roumanie ne pouvait pas obtenir des capitaux britanniques en vue de la mise en valeur de ses richesses, que par des crédits „à garanties équivalentes”²⁹. De même l'économiste anglais George Paish, qui se trouvait en mission „secrète” à Bucarest, avait souligné que la Grande Bretagne „avait des capitaux pour la Roumanie aussi”, mais la confiance nécessaire pour l'y placer ne s'était pas encore formée³⁰. La revue „Manchester Guardian Commercial” était d'accord avec un emprunt, à condition qu'il soit administré par les étrangers³¹. Malgré la méfiance manifestée, un grand trust anglo-allemand ayant en tête la Banque Schroeder, offrit la chance de l'acceptation d'un crédit de 30 millions de livres sterlings, conditionné du gage

²⁵ N. Titulescu, *op. cit.*, 161.

²⁶ „La Roumanie Nouvelle”, II, 1926, 13, p. 12; „Adevărul”, 24 et 30 janvier 1925.

²⁷ *Dezbatările Adunării Deputaților*, 5 mars 1925, p. 1445; 17 décembre 1926, p. 215.

²⁸ *Contribuții la istoria capitalului străin în România...*, 389—390.

²⁹ „Societatea de mine”, Cluj, 28 mars 1926, 242.

³⁰ „Argus”, 13 juin 1926.

³¹ Apud „Adevărul”, 28 juillet 1926.

des redevances du pétrole, des revenus des V.F.R., ainsi que l'exercice du contrôle des émetteurs sur l'administration ferroviaire³². En même temps, Mac Kenna, le directeur de Midland Bank, offrit un emprunt en livres sterlings³³. Des propositions furent faites aussi par W. Drumont dans les conditions que V. Burileanu négociait à Londres. Pour l'engagement contractuel de l'emprunt, Al. Averescu et M. Manoilescu se sont rencontrés en novembre 1926 avec Robert Greg, lui déclarant que le gouvernement était „très impatient“ à obtenir un crédit de 12—20 millions livres sterlings sur le marché londonien pour servir à la consolidation des voies ferrées et à la stabilisation du „leu“³⁴.

Le problème de l'emprunt externe continua à se trouver également parmi les questions à l'ordre du jour au temps du gouvernement libéral, pendant les années 1927—1928. Le nouveau leader Vintilă Brătianu, dans le désir de l'en obtenir afin de stabiliser le cours du leu, qui était son but évident, essaya en vain de s'attirer l'adhésion de l'opposition gouvernementale, en particulier celle des national-paysans. Vintilă Brătianu une fois convaincu au cours de l'année 1927, de la nécessité de la stabilisation *légal*e, qui devait suivre à la stabilisation réelle, le gouvernement roumain commença, en décembre 1927, les négociations financières pour l'obtention de l'emprunt externe de la stabilisation. On en obtint l'adhésion des E.U.A. et de la France. Difficile était l'obtention de l'appui de la Banque de la Grande Bretagne, qui, bien qu'elle avait salué l'action de la stabilisation de la monnaie, elle conditionna sa participation en fonction de la reconnaissance de la valabilité d'une rente datant de 1913. Dès le premier moment de l'engagement des négociations il était clair que la participation des capitaux étrangers n'allait pas être obtenue si on n'admettait pas certaines concessions économiques, tout d'abord en matière de pétrole. „The Times“, „Daily Mail“ et „The Manchester Guardian Commercial“ insistèrent sur l'idée que les britanniques „évitent la couverture de l'emprunt sollicité par la Roumanie tant que celle-ci ne modifiait pas radicalement son attitude vis-à-vis des capitaux étrangers, tant que la législation économique libérale, surtout la loi de mines qui avait un caractère „contradictoire“, n'était pas révisée. Une solution réciproquement acceptable était considérée par les anglais la condition même pour le lancement de l'emprunt. À la suite des négociations de Londres qui eurent lieu entre 25—29 septembre 1928, les représentants du capital international, ayant des garanties que le gouvernement Brătianu révisera certaines spécifications de la loi des mines, se montrèrent disposés à soutenir la sollicitation d'emprunt de la Roumanie³⁵. Des événements de l'intérieur et de l'extérieur particulièrement précipités vers la fin de l'année 1928, empêchèrent le gouvernement libéral de signer le crédit externe et de légiférer la stabilisation du leu. Cet „honneur“ revint au gouvernement des national-paysans.

À cause de cette conjoncture, le volume du commerce n'a pas évolué proportionnellement au désir des partenaires. Retenons pourtant que la Gran-

³² „Argus“, 11 novembre 1926.

³³ Idem, 8 novembre 1926.

³⁴ Apud Gh. Buzatu, *România și trusturile petroliere internaționale pînă la 1929* (Iași, 1981) 211—212.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, 212—223.

de Bretagne faisait partie des meilleurs clients du bois roumain³⁶, et que, contrairement à la France, elle augmenta son chiffre d'affaires dans l'acquisition du pétrole³⁷. Mais la répartition géographique des échanges commerciaux roumains dénotait une puissante incompatibilité avec les exigences de l'assurance d'un équilibre stable dans la balance des paiements³⁸. D'après les données statistiques³⁹ la Grande Bretagne faisait partie du groupe des états industriels avec lesquels la balance commerciale était continuellement passive, situation explicable par la structure de l'économie de la Roumanie, qui l'obligeait à importer des semi-produits et produits finis, mais sans la possibilité de placer ses propres produits dans la même proportion. Le fait que les fournisseurs différaient radicalement de leurs clients, provoquait de graves conséquences en ce qui concerne les transactions commerciales. Les difficultés allaient en augmentant par l'action même de l'enregistrement des excédents en monnaie nationale dévalorisée, tandis que les paiements s'effectuaient en devises fortes.

Malgré cela la Roumanie, dans ses rapports avec la Grande Bretagne, chercha à défendre sans interruption ses intérêts et cultiver de manière suivie, comme un facteur de première importance, les traditions de collaboration et de relations pacifiques avec tous les peuples, en respectant les principes du droit international, les normes des relations inscrites dans le pacte de la Société des Nations.

³⁶ *Argus*, 25 octobre 1925.

³⁷ *Enciclopedia României*, IV, 492.

³⁸ V. N. Madgearu, *op. cit.*, 281.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

INTERMEDIATE "CHANNELS" OF INFORMATION ABOUT ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

BY

GRIGORE VEREȘ

The Romanian nineteenth century appears to us as an epoch of great changes in the economic and social as well as cultural life. The stock of ideas, beliefs, and habits which people had inherited from distant times underwent a profound transformation. Efforts were concentrated in two main directions: a) social and national emancipation and b) integration into the modern European world. The latter involved on a cultural plane a broad opening toward works of art, history and philosophy that conveyed generous ideals. After 1830 the activity of translating from the French, the German and then from the English acquired a permanent character.

In the process of developing and modernizing Romanian society cultural policy and translations policy were permanently adapted to suit local conditions and necessities, but the interest in other peoples, cultures never wavered or diminished throughout the nineteenth century. The translations which appeared in periodicals and in book form, and the commentaries on foreign literary phenomenon written by specialists can only indicate a preoccupation arising from a compulsive urge to know.

The steady flow of Western literature toward the Romanian Principalities — a notable feature of the 1830's and 1840's — continued after 1856, when the censorship imposed in the wake of the 1848 revolution was lifted. The second half of the century, which marks the birth of modern Romania, is characterized by the flourishing of the national literature, a determining factor in placing cultural relations with other countries in a new perspective.

Taken as a whole English literature enjoyed a growing attention in this country in the last century. There can be mentioned two obstacles on the way to a wider diffusion of this literature: one was the poor knowledge of English (for translation purposes) and the other was the lack of direct cultural exchanges with England until diplomatic relations were established in 1880. In what follows, I intend to show the important part played by intermediate channels of communication between our two cultures.

France and Germany were the main sources of information for the Romanian intellectuals in the nineteenth century about English literature. Because of the poor knowledge of English, most translations of writings in that language were made by using French and German intermediaries. At the same time, these "channels" provided certain categories of readers with a permanent supply of books by English authors. Consequently, it would be wrong to suppose that the date when a translation was published marks

the beginning of the Romanian readers' contact with the respective work. One should not overlook the part played by the presence of literary and diverse other writings in French, German or even in the original English version in many of our public and private libraries. The learning of foreign languages was a positive feature of our education in the nineteenth century, and the majority of our intellectuals (some of whom had also completed their education abroad) often read works by foreign authors in French, German, Italian or English when they were not available in Romanian.

English travellers who passed through Bucharest around the middle of the century discovered that among the intellectuals there were many who could read foreign languages, including English. We would like to quote the impressions of such a traveller :

"Almost every respectable Romanian living in Bucharest can make himself understood in both French and German. Among the upper orders of society these languages are thoroughly learnt and Italian and English are added to the course. Indeed every one belonging to the patrician class knows something of our language and there are many who read *The Times* daily, and whose acquaintance with our best authors would put not a few of our countrymen to shame" ¹.

The great representatives of our literary life repeatedly emphasized the need for Romanian intellectuals and men of letters to become familiar with the achievements of English culture and literature. Thus, for instance, Barițiu set forth not only a programme of struggle for national and cultural emancipation. He also pointed to the main directions along which Romanian intellectuals should work for discovering the most adequate means to develop national literature. In his writings we find an explicit statement of his preference for England over France. As early as 1843 he wrote :

"We all look upon Great Britain as the first state of Europe, so it is only natural that we should study it more closely for reasons that are obvious to everyone" ².

It is known that he made translations by means of which he wanted to spread knowledge about English history and literature. Some of the great writers of that country are mentioned in his study *Classical writers*, and he also refers to the peculiarities of "Anglo-Saxon — this frightening mixture of diverse languages".

The inadequate knowledge of English in Transylvania, for instance, was for a time a barrier on the road to closer contacts with the life and literature of England, but this was partially compensated by a good knowledge of German, which all educated people learnt in schools, and, with its help, English literature was no longer impenetrable. The first translations from Shakespeare and Dickens in Transylvania were made from German intermediaries.

When in 1861 Radu Ionescu recommended Thackeray and Dickens along with Balzac as models for our writers, he could only have knowledge of their novels' value from reading them in French. It was through the French translations, mainly in the Hachette collection that many generations

¹ J. W. Ozanne, *Three Years in Romania* (London, 1878), 150.

² Apud Vasile Netea, *George Barițiu. Viața și activitatea sa* (București, 1966) 170.

of Romanian readers came to know English literature. There is abundant evidence in this respect. Our great historian and man of letters Nicolae Iorga wrote :

“The generation of the 1890’s also came to know English literature through French translations [...]. Thus, as the people of my generation will remember, there appeared around 1890 those books in red covers with small letters printed carelessly at times in which the translations from English were offered. Dickens was translated, and so was Thackeray with two of his main works, then George Eliot and even Gaskell and others [...] I read the whole series when I was very young and [...] had not yet learnt English”³.

Statements to the same effect can be found in many diaries, memoirs, letters etc. Titu Maiorescu’s diary *Însemnări zilnice* is full of references to his reading of English authors in German and then in English after he learnt that language — George Eliot’s *Middlemarch* being the first English novel he read in the original. From English literature Maiorescu mentions three names — Shakespeare, Carlyle and Dickens — when in his *Diary* of 1901 he surveys the lasting influence of, and permanent affection for, the writers he found most congenial to him in English literature.

Our poet George Coșbuc read Dickens’ *A Child’s History of England* in a German translation — *Die Geschichte England* (Berlin, 1852) — as the many remarks entered by him on the page margins show. Some of the circumstances of England’s history suggested to Coșbuc parallels with our own history (pp. 41, 49); he wrote the remark “starea sub domn străin” (conditions under a foreign ruler) in connection with William the Conqueror’s first years of reign after Hastings (p. 80). There are some brief exclamatory remarks such as “frumos” (nice), “popii !” (the priests !), “bravo” or a more self-explanatory one : “A răbdat Anglia !” (Has England suffered !) (p. 262).

Dan, Alexandru Vlahuță’s eponymous hero, is described by the author as a reader of Dickens. At that time (1893) none of Dickens’ novels was available in Romanian translation. Vlahuță’s hero is a teacher of philosophy and Romanian literature and it is possible that Dan (and perhaps his creator too) read Dickens in French.

What has been said so far would point to the fact that there is always good knowledge about a foreign writer and his works among those who follow closely the literary life abroad. Thus a great foreign writer’s works may become a source of aesthetic enjoyment and moulders of taste while being read in foreign languages. On the other hand it is true that a foreign writer can exert his full influence upon the adoptive country’s literature only when his works have been translated into the language of that nation, and he speaks using the syntax and idiom in the national literature.

Translations from the great literatures of the world were encouraged throughout the nineteenth century by the most important representatives of our cultural and literary life. Although translations from English literature were not as numerous in the nineteenth century as, for example, those made from French and German literatures, it can be said that the English writers with a powerful echo on the continent came to be known through represen-

³ Nicolae Iorga, *Ce datorim cărții engleze* (Văleni, 1938) 9.

tative works. Translations were made from the works of great English writers of past centuries like Shakespeare, Milton, Pope, Defoe, Swift, Smollett, from the more recent ones like the Romantics — Byron, Shelley, Wordsworth, Scott, and also from contemporaries like Bulwer-Lytton, Dickens, Henry Arthur Jones.

England revealed to Europe and to the whole world through her great writers; without their works any knowledge about her, obtained through ordinary channels of information — travel notes historical and scholarly writings — would have had a much more limited echo. As the English spirit made itself known by the works of its representative writers, the image about the insular civilization acquired clearer and more precise outlines. The continental “mirror” played a very important part in creating an image about England and English literature in this country. Without French and German intermediaries the Romanians’ contact with English literature, and culture in general, would have been much delayed.

A LADY-NOVELIST AND A DIPLOMAT ON TRANSYLVANIA AND ITS PEOPLE (1888—1892)

BY

CORNELIA BODEA

Before approaching my subject, I feel obliged to explain why its title is not "Seton-Watson's relations with the Romanians before 1918", as was announced in the programme of the colloquium. The topic of my paper actually grew out of the "Introduction" to *R. W. Seton-Watson and the Romanians, 1906—1920*, a volume Professor Hugh Seton-Watson and I are preparing. A brief survey of R. W. Seton-Watson's British forerunners interested in Romanian matters revealed their number to be far larger than expected. I have elected to discuss two of them here: a Lady-novelist and a Diplomat. She is *Emily Gerard* or, by her husband's name, *Madame de Laszowska* (1849—1905). The diplomat is *Arthur Nicolson*, later on *First Lord Carnock* (1849—1928). Both were of the same age; both were contemporaries in observing the Transylvanian life and society which later drew the attention of R. W. Seton-Watson.

Biographical entries on *Emily Gerard*¹ mention her Scottish origin and the fact that from the age of fifteen she spent most of her time abroad; first with her parents in Venice, then at a convent in Tyrol, and then — after having married (1869) the Chevalier Mieceslas de Laszowsky, an officer in the Austrian army — in Galicia, Transylvania, and Vienna. As a writer, *Emily Gerard* asserted herself from 1880 onwards by recording her foreign experiences in the form of fiction, essays, narratives, and other accounts. She lived in Transylvania for two years (1883—1885) during her husband's term as the Habsburg Commander of the Cavalry brigade in the Province. She was attracted to the everyday life of the common people rather than by that of the shallow, flighty upper-classes (The characterisations are hers). Consequently she approached all the inhabitants of Transylvania with equal interest. She assiduously studied their manners and customs, religion and superstitions, character and folklore, without neglecting appropriate excursions on history and culture. She published the results of her observations in the *Contemporary Review*, *Blackwood's Magazine*, and the *Nineteenth Century*; she then reshaped them in two solid volumes entitled *The Land beyond the Forest*, issued concomitantly, in 1888, in New York, Edinburgh, and London².

¹ Cf. *The Compact Edition of Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 1975, vol. II, p. 2652.

² F. Gerard, *The Land beyond the Forest. Facts, Figures, and Fancies from Transylvania*. With Map and Illustrations. (Edinburgh and London, Blackwood and Sons. In two volumes, 1888; New York, Harper & Brothers. In one volume, 1888).

For her information Emily Gerard had consulted her predecessors' literature and knowledge with a critical eye, but as she confessed, she had tried to judge things according to her own lights. As rightly noted by one of her reviewers "Madame Gerard's sojourn in Transylvania was no mere flying visit, and her impressions had time to mature and correct themselves by much intercourse with people"³. This explains her ironic reaction to the gloomy colours and biased comments in Charles Boner's book⁴ on the Romanians. "If you care to study the country 'contrarywise' — Emily Gerard pointed out — and would know what the Roumanians are utterly unlike, read the description of them in the book of Mr. Boner"⁵.

In most cases, her ability and her power to penetrate phenomena and situations rose above those of a common narrator. The way she predicted the inevitable change of the existing balance of political forces in Transylvania through the rise of the Romanians is illustrative. "Briefly to sum up the representative merits of these races — E. Gerard wrote — it may be allowable to define them representing manhood in the past, present, and future tenses". Thus, according to her argumentation, the Romanians embodied the *future* a few generation thence :

"When they have learned to recognize their own value. There is a wealth of unraised treasure, of abilities in the raw block, of uncultured talent, lying dormant in this ignorant peasantry, who seem but lately to have begun to understand that they need not always bend their neck beneath the yoke of other masters, nor are necessarily born to slavery and humiliation. In face of their rapidly increasing population, of the thirst for knowledge and powerful spirit of progress which have arisen among them of late years, it is scarcely hazardous to prophesy that this people have a great future before them, and that a day will come when, other nations having degenerated and spent their strength, these descendants of the ancient Romans, rising phoenix-like from their ashes, will step forward with a whole fund of latent power and virgin material, to rule as masters where formerly they have crouched as slaves"⁶.

Emily Gerard also proved to be a subtle interpreter of the national and political aspirations of the Transylvanian Romanians, which she has perceived in various circumstances and in all social strata :

"There is no doubt — she maintained — that the bulk of Roumanians living to-day in Hungary and Transylvania consider themselves to be in bondage, and covertly gaze over the frontier for their real monarch ; and who can blame them for so doing ? In many Romanian hovels I have visited in Transylvania, I have frequently come across the portrait of King of Romania hung up in the place of honour, but never once of His Austrian Majesty. Old woodcuts representing Michel the Brave, the great hero of the Romanians, and of the rebel Hora, are also pretty sure to be found adorning the walls of many a hut.

³ "Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine", vol. CXLIII, Jan-June 1888 (*The Land beyond the Forest*), p. 539.

⁴ Charles Boner, *Transylvania. Its Products and its People*. London, Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1865.

⁵ E. Gerard, *Introductory...*

⁶ E. Gerard, London edition, vol. I, p. 212.

It is likewise by no means uncommon to see village taverns bearing such titles as "To the King of Romania", or "To the United Romanian Kingdom", etc. (p. 306—307).

As for the echo of Emily Gerard's book in the British opinion, one may say that its popularity was manifested on two distinct levels. The first was the interest shown by political men of the time in the book's general information on the state of mind and political relationship among the coinhabiting nationalities of Transylvania. The other was the impact the book had on the fantastic literature of the last years of the Victorian era. For the first case, we have the authoritative evidence of H. Sutherland Edwards' volume on Sir William White, the former representative of England at Bucharest and for six years ambassador at Constantinople. The extensive paragraphs taken from "the delightful book of the English lady, a much esteemed writer"⁷ are used by H. S. Edwards to testify to "the oppressed condition of the Roumanians in Transylvania" and the vigour of their aspirations for national unification with the free and independent Romania. (One of those passages is cited above).

On the other hand the folklore and ethnographic material she gathered on Transylvanian superstitions (of the Romanians, the Transylvanian Saxons and the Szeklers) became a primary source of inspiration for one of the most popular of all fantastic novels (and subsequently of horror films) — the famous *Dracula* created by Bram Stoker in 1897. It is perhaps necessary to add that unfortunately Bram Stoker's work offers a concocted image of a Transylvania wrapped in confusion, and full of Vampires...

In contrast to Emily Gerard, Arthur Nicolson is better known, owing primarily to his long diplomatic career as well as to the monograph written by his son, Harold Nicolson⁸, an expert diplomat himself.

Arthur Nicolson entered the Foreign Office in 1870 and left it in 1916, which meant almost half a century of diplomatic history and forty six years of individual experience. According to his biography, Nicolson's political journey fell into two distinct periods. First there was the period, from 1870 to 1900, when he believed in splendid isolation, viz. the mid-Victorian doctrine that the Continent did not matter very much. This was followed by the period, from 1900 to 1914, when he believed in German menace and hence in the necessity of making friends in Europe. His special interest in Romanian issues belongs to the first period, more precisely to 1888—1892, corresponding to his stage as Consul General at Budapest.

In point of effective international activity the four years in Budapest meant a term devoid of exceptional events, four years of boredom. However, the same could not be said about the domestic politics of the Eastern half of the Dual Monarchy, which was marked by the growing strain among the non-Magyar nationalities. In this direction, according to Harold Nicolson's laconic statement, "Arthur Nicolson's appointment proved of subsequent value. He devoted much time to the minority problem, and made an extended

⁷ H. Sutherland Edwards, *Sir William White... for six Years Ambassador at Constantinople. His Life and Correspondence*. London, John Murray, 1902, (Chapter XIII: *Roumanians in Transylvania*).

⁸ Harold Nicolson, *Sir Arthur Nicolson. Bart. First Lord Carnock. A Study in the Old Diplomacy*. London, Constable & Co Ltd, (Third printing, 1931).

tour in Croatia and Transylvania, studying the subject nationalities on the spot" (p. 79). Regretably no further details are provided, except for an addendum as follows: "He thus carried away from Hungary a deep distrust of Hungarian and indeed of Austro-Hungarian policy — an instinctive fear that the Habsburg Empire was an element not of stability but of disintegration and decay" (p. 80).

As a matter of fact Nicolson's extended tour consisted of *two* distinct parts. A first journey was made in Croatia, and this happened in September 1889. The second one, in Transylvania, occurred more than sixteen months later, in May 1891. There were, however, signs that during all this interlude Nicolson's attention was equally distributed to Transylvania⁹. Few days after the Croatian journey, for example, he wrote:

"There are two other important nationalities in Hungary, the Slovaks and the Wallachs, numbering together some 5,000,000 souls, and regarding whom I trust at some future date to be able to submit a report to Your Excellency. The Wallachs are, I am told, well worth a visit, as they are a numerous and compact population; and at present abstain from exercising their electoral right till certain alleged grievances are remedied. Moreover, their geographical situation renders them an important factor in certain possible eventualities"¹⁰.

His visit to Transylvania corresponded to a time when the Vienna and Berlin governments were in fact becoming anxious that those "certain possible eventualities" might already be imminent. A wave of manifest hostility to Austria-Hungary had arisen at that time in Romania as a result of the oppressive policy followed by the Magyar authorities towards the Romanians living within the Dual Monarchy. Its breaking out threatened to compromise the secret convention of 1883, at a moment when it was supposed to be renewed. The British Cabinet was acquainted with the representations being made by Berlin to calm down the tension in and over the Transylvanian area. In a report of 14 April 1891, Nicolson gave a detailed account of a discussion in which von Monts, the General Consul of Germany at Budapest, had tried to convince the Hungarian Justice minister, Szilágyi Dezső, about the necessity "to remove, as far as possible all causes for discontent among a population situated as were the Wallachs; and to endeavour to modify a policy which was not likely to prove successful; and which undoubtedly was irritating and exasperating to those to whom it was applied"¹¹. Such was the fermenting situation which determined the British diplomat to study the circumstances in person.

Arthur Nicolson's impressions and findings were described in a large, itemized report of over 50 handwritten pages, which was finished on 25 May 1891 and forwarded through the Embassy of Vienna to Marquis of Salisbury, the secretary of State¹². The report begins with an introductory

⁹ In many of his dispatches — some of them being enclosed in this paper — the "attitude of the Roumans in Transylvania" was closely heeded.

¹⁰ Public Record Office, London, F.O. 800/336 (A. Nicolson Papers): Sir A. Nicolson to Sir A. Paget, Budapest, October 11, 1889.

¹¹ (P.R.O., F.O., 7/1 177) see hereinafter *Appendix 1*.

¹² The full text of Nicolson's *Report on the political Situation of Transylvania* appears in Cornelia Bodea and Virgil Căndea, *Transylvania in the History of the Romanians* (East

section regarding the geographic position, the size of the territory, and the number of population by nationalities. The Romanians living in Transylvania and Hungary are referred to as "an important and solid factor in the future political development of the Hungarian Monarchy", (similar to Emily Gerard's inferences). Then a historical sketch of the centuries-old relations between the Transylvanian Principality and the Hungarian Kingdom follows, from earliest times up to date (i.e. 1891). With regard to the 19-th century national awakening and the revolution on Forty-Eight, Nicolson mentions that the Magyar Diet assembled in Cluj (Klausenburg) forced the passing of a declaration in favour of union with Hungary despite all other considerations from the public mind. He also sets forth the "bright interlude" prior to 1868 in the political existence of the Romanians, underlining its relevance in order to contrast it with what was to come after :

"Diets were called together in which for the first time the Roumans were recognized as having a political existence, and were allowed to send Deputies"... "During that period many Rouman schools were established, the Churches, both Greek Oriental and Greek Roman, were recognized as official creeds, and a great advance was made, which has been steadily maintained, in general enlightenment and education" (p. 142).

In 1868 — the report goes on — as a result of the insistence of the Hungarian government, the Vienna Court sanctioned the fusion of Transylvania into the newly-established Hungarian Monarchy inaugurating the period when the policy of what was popularly termed "Magyarising" the nationalities was gradually adopted.

The second and largest part of the report consists in a minute and systematic analysis of the situation under the Magyar rule.

The following general remarks head this second part :

"During the tour which I have made in Transylvania I found among all intelligent classes of Roumans a feeling of widespread discontent, grounded on more serious and specific grievances than those which exist among the Serb and Croat nationalities, and to which expression and form has been given well-organized system of opposition. Furthermore, and this is peculiar to the situation in Transylvania, there is not only openly expressed sympathy in Roumania with the grievances of their brethren, but means have of late been adopted in that country also towards assisting in their alleviation" (p. 144) ¹³.

Considering and comparing the situation before 1868 with the reality he met in 1891, his conclusion for each field apart was invariably the same : the provisions of the Law of Nationalities of 1868 remained practically a dead letter ; in religious matters, in education, in the press system, in judicial procedure, in the exercise of the right to vote, in executive and administrative work, etc. Nicolson found unanimity among both the Saxons and the Romanians that the various attacks on the schools, and the attempts to denationalize both the Saxons or the Romanians by obligatory instruction in Hungarian "have no other result than to incense the population". In the matter of press prosecutions he was unfavourably impressed by the frequency

European Monographs, CXVII, Boulder ; Distributed by Columbia Univ. Press. New York, 1982), p. 140—160.

¹³ See also hereinafter, *Appendix V*.

of the trials and penalties (prison, fines). In Transylvania, and only in Transylvania, he noted, such cases were judged according to the obsolete norms dating from the time of the Austrian absolutism (1852) which were "of a far more severe character than any law existing in Hungary". As regards the electoral law the report found that the census was high, higher than in Hungary; thus the electoral privileges of the Magyar nobility were settled so that their votes would represent 67 per cent of the total number of voters while the delimitations of electoral districts were continually reorganized and readjusted in order to prejudice the Romanian votes and facilitate the return of the Magyar representatives. In local and provincial administration the access of the Romanian element even to minor jobs and positions was minimal if not only accidental.

The final part of the report deals with the concrete steps taken by the Romanians against the difficulties they had to face. The report discusses both the "Programme of the Romanian National Party in Hungary and Transylvania" (1881) and the declaration of 1890 regarding the aim of the National Party and its policy to Austria-Hungary. As he did not know the language, Nicolson could not talk directly to the Romanian peasants, but he was assured by many sober-minded and impartial Saxons that the peasant will follow blindly the orders of his priest, or of his political leaders, his sympathy being doubtlessly with the representatives of the National Party. And the Romanian leaders relied confidently on the peasantry whenever need for support was felt.

Nicolson's conclusion drawn from what he had seen and heard was that he still gave credence to the Romanians who asserted their loyalty to the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy saying they were not contemplating a policy of union with Romania. Perhaps Emily Gerard would have expressed her views less diplomatically. But it is also true that in Nicolson's opinion, the Romanians' temper was too much tried by the Magyar government, and for this reason he did not exclude the eventuality of stronger reactions on the Romanians' part. Besides, their increasingly well organized relations with their brothers from beyond the Carpathians would likely not remain without influence and effect on a people who were more and more discontented with their lot within the Hungarian state. In their turn, the Magyar leaders declared to him that the Romanians aspired to aims much above the modest requests formulated in their public programmes. Certain Magyar leaders told him, Nicolson reported, that they had no intention to slacken the reins, although they admitted that their policy towards the non-Magyar nationalities was harsh and arbitrary. At the date when he wrote his report — May 1891 — Nicolson considered it presumptuous to anticipate the future, but felt obliged to note that :

"A large community of over 2,500,000 Roumans are in a condition of serious discontent, and inspired with bitter feelings against their actual rulers from whom they despair of obtaining any concessions unless extorted by the necessities of the moment; and that this community occupies, in compact masses, a portion of the Hungarian State, which, in possible eventualities, might prove a vulnerable point for hostile attacks".

As a result of the mutual exchange of information (Monts — Nicolson) and of the good relations which Germany entertained with Great Britain at the time, the report was, in part, brought also to the knowledge of the Cabinet in Berlin¹⁴. Yet, more relevant here appears to be the statement made by Szilágyi Dezső, the prominent member of the Hungarian Cabinet, to Nicolson, after the latter's Transylvanian tour¹⁵. The question brought in by Nicolson was "whether there was any likelihood of the Hungarian Government being disposed to remove the causes of the existing discontent" among the Romanians. The Hungarian Minister's answer was again negative; just like it had been in his previous talks with the German Consul General, von Monts, and similar to some of the answers Nicolson recorded during his journey. That meant: "There was no prospect at all of liberal programme for internal affairs in Transylvania". A clear-cut administrative and treatment discrimination was acknowledged to exist between Transylvania and Hungary; the Hungarian Government, however, admitted of not being disposed to meet any demands of the Romanians. When challenged by Nicolson, Szilágyi contended that Croatia could not make a term for comparison. According to Szilágyi, Croatia could have never been a cause of any serious uneasiness to Hungary, while an autonomy granted to Transylvania would have meant the very disruption of the Hungarian Monarchy. A movement would have inevitably followed for a share in that privilege to be extended to the Romanians in Hungary, viz. in those Hungary's districts in which the Romanians formed the majority. And thus a first step would have been made towards a political union of all Romanians, therefore of "some nine or ten millions of Roumans living in close juxtaposition". Consequently, the only magyar solution was an iron-handed policy¹⁶.

The Nicolson *Report* circulated as Confidential Print within the British Foreign Office, and for a long time it constituted the main source of reference in Transylvanian matters. Here is an appreciation by R. Milbanke, Nicolson's successor in Budapest: "The whole question regarding the political situation in Transylvania was so exhaustingly treated in Sir A. Nicolson's interesting report... that it is unnecessary for me to trouble you with a recapitulation of the causes which have led to the discontent felt by Rouman population of Hungary at the treatment they met with at the hands of the Magyar rulers"¹⁷. Milbanke noted this in his dispatch of 26 July 1893, on the Conference of the Romanian National Party which had just taken place in Sibiu; a report that stressed the fact that the Conference had expressed its thorough approval of the action of the Romanian Deputation in proceeding to Vienna (May-June, 1892) to present their *Memorandum* to the Emperor. In the same session it was stated the resolution of working hand in hand with all the non-Magyar nationalities of the Kingdom of Hungary. All this was foreseen by Emily Gerard and Arthur Nicolson.

The new Liberal Cabinet of 1892—1894, (the fourth ministry of W. E. Gladstone), seemed more interested in supporting national causes than the

¹⁴ Cf. T. Pavel, *O mărturie engleză inedită din 1891 despre mișcarea națională a românilor din Transilvania*, "Transilvania", 1976, No. 11.

¹⁵ See *Appendix II*.

¹⁶ See also *Appendix IV*.

¹⁷ P.R.O., F.O., 7/1 203: R. Milbanke to Barrington, Budapest, July 26, 1893.

previous Conservative Cabinet of the Marquis of Salisbury. This stands out from various sources and actions, some of them referred to also in Professor Pascu's paper. Special correspondents were sent to Transylvania, press items were written, meetings were organized to support the Romanians in their struggle. The strong voice, however, which could have stirred a much larger campaign in favour of the Romanians' *Memorandum*, and of its authors who were put on trial, was missing. The Grand Old Man, W. E. Gladstone, champion of so many an oppressed people, kept silent ...¹³. It would take more than a decade until the cause of the subject nationalities within the heterogenous Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was able to find its resolute and effective British voice — that of R. W. Seton-Watson (*Scotus Viator*), a voice that took up anew the insights of the lady-novelist and the diplomat on Transylvania and its people.

APPENDIX

— I —

Arthur Nicolson, the British Consul General at Budapest, to A. Paget, the British Ambassador in Austria, on a conversation of Count Monts, the German General Consul, with the Hungarian Minister, Szilágyi Dezső, on the policy of the Hungarian Government towards the subject nationalities.

No. 14
Confidential

Budapest, April 14, 1891

Sir,

My German colleague, Count Monts, told me today that he had conversed at great length with Mr Szilágyi on the general situation in Hungary; and had especially represented to His Excellency the dangerous consequences which, in certain eventualities, might ensue from the policy which the Hungarian Government were pursuing towards the subject nationalities. Count Monts had impressed on Mr Szilágyi the imprudence of unnecessarily exciting the animosity of the Wallachs in Transylvania, who were not Slavs, and could by a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Government be easily induced to become faithful and loyal portions of the Monarchy. Agitation, owing to recent measures of the Government, was busy among the Wallachs towards a closer organization for the representation of their grievances, and this movement was cordially supported by the members of their race across the frontiers. It would be wise on the part of the Government to remove, as far as possible, all causes for discontent among a population situated as were the Wallachs; and to endeavour to modify a policy which was not likely to prove successful; and which undoubtedly was irritating and exasperating to those to whom it was applied.

Mr Szilágyi, Count Monts said, was at first little disposed to lend a friendly ear to his admonitions; but eventually undertook to consider whether by encouraging the entrance into State employment of suitable Wallachs, and by other means, steps would be taken towards a relaxation of the present strained relations. Mr Szilágyi further remarked that in

¹³ A reason for this reticence of his was that — according to Ion Bălăceanu, the Romanian minister at London — Gladstone lately shifted towards Austria-Hungary. (*Ministerul de Externe, București, Arhiva istorică*, vol. 185 : Confidential letter dated London, 18 July, 1894).

case of trouble Austria-Hungary would find a valuable support in Bulgaria; but Count Monts had pointed out that little reliance could be placed on that Principality, who would probably await the turn of events, and range herself on the side which seemed most likely to be the winning one.

In short, my German colleague, who has but lately returned from Vienna, appears to have thought it necessary, whether under instructions or on his own initiative I am unable to say, to address a serious lecture to the member of the Cabinet whom he rightly considers as the most important; and there is no doubt that any hint, however indirect, which is conveyed from Berlin is likely to make a considerable impression on the Hungarian Government.

Count Monts has, on more than one occasion, expressed to me his opinion as to the dangerous course which the Hungarian Government is pursuing; and of the likelihood of it causing serious embarrassment to the Monarchy in the future; and it is well that he is now speaking openly to members of the Cabinet on the subject. It is clear to anyone who has studied the question from the standpoint of an impartial onlooker, that the attempt to crush out the national life of the several subject races of the country, and the endeavour to forcibly mould Slavs, Roumans and others into loyal Magyars must inevitably result in sharpening those distinctions and divisions, which, in the interests of internal concord, and indeed of national stability should be, if not obliterated, at least toned down and softened. Neither the moment nor the political situation is favourable for the experiment which is being so energetically attempted by six or seven millions Magyars not only to imprint on ten millions of other nationalities their language and their State policy, but in a measure to force them to renounce their racial traditions and sympathies. It is conceivable that the Hungarian policy might be eventually successful in a country separated by an ocean from all counteracting influences, and with a long period of time to permit of its undisturbed development; but in actual circumstances it is difficult to imagine any other result but failure and disappointment.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant

A. Nicolson

Public Record Office, London, F.O. 7/1 177.

— II —

Arthur Nicolson to A. Paget, on a conversation with the Hungarian Minister, Szilágyi Dezső, on impressions Nicolson had received during his tour in Transylvania.

Confidential

Budapest, July 9, 1891

Sir,

While dinning with Mr. Szilágyi last night, His Excellency asked me what impressions I had received during my tour in Transylvania in regard to the situation there; and I told him that, so far as I had been able to judge, the Roumans appeared to be greatly discontented with their present position; and I instanced several of the grievances, which I had the honour to bring to the notice of Your Excellency in my Report. There were, I said, one or two points on which I should be glad to be enlightened by His Excellency; and he would understand that I was merely desirous, out of curiosity, to learn whether the complaints formulated by the Roumans were well founded, and, if so, whether there was any likelihood of the Hungarian Government being disposed to remove the causes of the existing discontent.

Mr. Szilágyi replied that he would be very happy to state the case from the Hungarian point of view, especially as Englishmen were apt to imagine that every country was in a position to adopt a policy as liberal and as tolerant as that under which they had good fortune to live. It was quite true that although Transylvania had been fused into Hungary, and had ceased to exist as a distinct political unit, separate and different laws still governed in that part of the Monarchy; and it was equally the fact that the Hungarian Government

had not shown, and he might tell me did not intend to show, a disposition to meet any of the demands of the Roumans. He would explain why it was quite impossible to grant any concession to the Roumans. So far as he gathered from me, I was under the impression that if the modest requests enunciated by the Roumans in their published programme were satisfied, loyalty and contentment would prevail throughout Transylvania. This was a mistake. The Hungarian Government were well aware, that the aspirations of the Roumans went far beyond their openly expressed desires; and that they wished to achieve an autonomy similar to that enjoyed by Croatia. Now the two cases of Transylvania and Croatia were widely different. It may, or may not, have been prudent to have accorded autonomy to Croatia, but the step could be taken with far less danger than in the case of Transylvania. Croatia was isolated, surrounded by Serbs, who had little sympathy with the Croats; and, autonomous or not, Croatia could never be the cause of any serious uneasiness to Hungary. On the other hand, Transylvania, to the eastward, bordered on a country inhabited by Roumans; and to the west on Hungarian districts in which the Roumans formed the majority. There were, therefore, some nine or ten millions of Roumans living in close juxtaposition; and were autonomy granted to Transylvania, a movement would inevitably follow for a share in that privilege being extended to the Roumans in the Hungarian districts; and a first step would have been made towards a political union of all Roumans. It was quite impossible for the Hungarians to advance in that direction. It would mean the disruption of the Hungarian Monarchy. I must not be deceived by the plausible utterances of my Rouman informants; nor imagine that they merely desired a few crumbs to be thrown to them to be perfectly satisfied. They must be governed on the lines which had been followed since 1868, and when the Provincial Reform Bill was passed, and the Government was able to place its official in every provincial post, the reins would be drawn even tighter than they were at present.

I appeared to fear, His Excellency continued, that the disaffection in Transylvania would, in certain eventualities, be a danger. Hungary, was, and always would be, surrounded with dangers; and were the Russians to enter Roumania, or were the latter country to side with Russia in a war, no doubt a considerable effervescence would occur among the Roumans in Transylvania. He was well aware that all would depend on the issues of the early part of a campaign, as he told me on previous occasions; but no steps which the Government could now take could possibly avert or diminish the risks to be incurred. The situation would not be improved, it would rather be aggravated, were the Government to concede to the Roumans any of their demands. He personally regretted that such should be the case. Were it possible, he would gladly give free autonomy to all the subject races; but in Hungary this policy could not be pursued. He himself was an ardent Radical by conviction. As I knew he had no respect for the magnats; and little love for the priest; but the circumstances of the country compelled him to depart from his real principles. The Magyars, the Governing race, were in a minority; and governed as an oligarchy. The only existing middle classes were the Jews, on whom no reliance could be placed, and whose only object was money making. There were no elements in Hungary from which to form a liberal party; and consequently no prospect of a liberal programme for internal affairs. When to these disadvantages and anomalies were added the racial differences and animosities, it would be seen that principles of Government, which might work very well in more powerful and more homogeneous countries, were scarcely applicable to Hungary.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant

A. Nicolson

— III —

Arthur Nicolson to A. Paget, on the Deputation of Transylvanian Romanians at Vienna, and on the views of the Hungarian press; also on the "Rumänische Revue".

No. 22

Budapest, May 29, 1892

Sir,

The presence in Vienna of a deputation from the Roumans of Transylvania for the purpose of presenting a petition to His Majesty concerning their alleged grievances, has not passed without notice in the press of this Capital. The step which has been taken by the Roumans has either been ridiculed or severely condemned by the Hungarian Press; and the "Pester Lloyd" has been prominent in censuring what it terms the insolence of Hungarian subjects in complaining to the Austrian Emperor of the grievances which they pretend to have against the Government of the Hungarian King.

It seems to be little likely that the deputation will obtain audience of His Majesty and some Roumans even doubt whether the step which has been taken is a wise one. They consider that it can scarcely lead to any practical results, and may only exacerbate their relations with the Central Government at Budapest. On the other hand, the majority of the Roumans, although they anticipate no immediate or direct results, trust that their visit to Vienna will ventilate and proclaim their dissatisfaction with Hungarian policy, and that, thereby, some indirect influence will be brought to bear on the Hungarian Government. The indignation of the Hungarian Press at the journey to Vienna may perhaps lend some colour to this latter view.

The "Pester Lloyd" is especially annoyed at the reception which is being accorded to the Roumans by some members of the Hohenwart Club; and this morning its lectures, in a leading article, this conservative party for their strange aberrations in abetting revolutionary designs. The article terminates with a somewhat ill judged warning to Count Taaffe that public opinion in Hungary may be forced to concern itself with his relations with a party which appears to favour the opponent of the Hungarian State.

I may mention in connection of the Roumans, that in the "Rumänische Revue", an organ which is edited by a leading malcontent, an article has recently appeared dealing with the foreign policy of Roumania. The article is anonymous. The writer argues that the real and natural enemy of the Roumans is Russia, whose aims cannot possibly be realized without further injury being inflicted on Roumania and the Rouman cause; while the difficulties which exist between Hungary and a portion of the Roumans, though serious, are not of a permanent and are not so deep seated as to entail danger to the future of the Rouman race. The Roumans are always careful to disclaim any disloyal intentions; and it is probable that the article has been published at the present moment to emphasize this attitude.

I have etc.

A. Nicolson

Public Record Office, F.O. 7/1190 (1892).

— IV —

A. Nicolson to A. Paget, further information on the attitude of the Romanians in Transylvania; and Count Apponyi's statement.

No. 36

Budapest, October 13, 1892

Sir,

The attitude of the Rouman population in Transylvania is again engaging the attention of many members in the Hungarian Parliament, and it is probable that before very long a discussion will be raised on the subject in the Chamber of Deputies. The despatch of a

Rouman deputation to Vienna in May last, to present a petition to the Emperor, although it failed in its immediate object, was apparently considered successful by its promoters, in so far as it served to bring their cause prominently before the public. Since that incident the Rouman University students in Hungary have issued a fresh statement of their grievances. This statement is a reply to an answer made by the Hungarian students to the original memorandum drawn up by the members of the Bucharest University on behalf of their brethren in Transylvania. The polemic has been carried on nominally between University students, but it has doubtless been inspired by more potent authorities.

The counter case which has recently been made public by the Roumans is a lengthy document, but, although their indictment of Hungarian rule is more copiously illustrated with instances, I do not find that it brings forward any fresh gravamina beyond those to which sounded in the Report on the general situation in Transylvania which I had the honour to address to Your Excellency in May 1891. There is one point towards the conclusion of the Rouman statement which should perhaps be noted. The Roumans in response to a remark in the Hungarian reply, profess their extreme readiness to come to a friendly understanding; and in fact urge the political expediency of such a reconciliation, as both Magyars and Roumans are, they remark, but islets amidst an ocean of Slavs. The preliminary condition to such an understanding is, the Roumans state, free autonomy in administrative, judicial, and educational affairs; but there is little likelihood that this will be accorded by the Hungarian Government.

The alternative would therefore, seem to be that put forward in the Rouman counter case, and which is determined hostility to the Magyar rule till the present policy of the Hungarian Government towards the nationalities is abandoned.

Count Appony mentioned to me that he feared the Government were too lax in their treatment of the Rouman population: and the Extreme Left are continually urging that the malcontents should be drilled into obedience. A ready ear to their desires will be granted in a Parliament where the Roumans are not represented. I am told by some that the Rouman mouvement is one which is artificially fostered by few political agitators acting on an ignorant and backward peasantry; by others that it is a troublesome question, but that concessions would not calm the unrest, nor disarm the danger, and that the present policy of an iron hand is in reality the only possible one. I do not know which interpretation of this problem may be the correct one. Were the question so harmless as some assert, it would scarcely stir the political mind of Hungary in the degree to which it does. In any case, it seems hardly probable that the Hungarians will succeed in absorbing and assimilating a nationality of nearly three millions, of a different race, language, and religion; and who, so far as can be judged from the only articulate utterance which emanate from them, are determined to resist to the utmost all attempts to suppress and smother their local aspirations.

I have, etc.

A. Nicolson

P.R.O., F.O. 7/1190 (1892)

— V —

A. Nicolson to A. Paget, on the chief features of the general political situation in Hungary.

E
(No. 42)

Buda-Pesth, October 25, 1892

Sir,

Political affairs here have lately become so involved and so complicated that I would beg leave to review the chief features of the general political situation in this country.

Hungary, partly in consequence of the limited time which has elapsed since she gained her independent position, and partly on account of Vienna being the locality in which are

centred the various organs which deal with the foreign relations of the whole Monarchy, is generally overlooked as a mere appendage of Austria, enjoying a certain autonomy, and is regarded as a country, interesting and picturesque, but not as an important factor among European States. I need not inform your Excellency that Hungary is practically an independent country, with her own distinct laws and system of Government, marching side by side with Austria in matters of defence and foreign representation, but also absolutely separate from her in other respects. The same personage, it is true, rules over both countries; but the ceremony, procedure, and conditions by which, and under which, he wears the Crown of St. Stephen, are widely different from those attached to the Imperial dignity. It is also true that the two countries have a common customs frontier, but this arrangement is merely by a Treaty of limited duration, which may be denounced by either party should it be considered convenient to do so. Hungary is, both from her geographical situation, and from the character of the elements which form her body politic, a not unimportant member of the European States system.

In the first place it is necessary to deal shortly with the component parts of this heterogeneous country. Hungary comprises within her boundaries, inclosing a superficial area slightly more extensive than the United Kingdom, many diverse races, distinct in origin and language, who, from various causes, have settled down side by side, and who have, during the course of time, been grouped together into one State. To relate, even briefly, the events which gradually led to the present political formation, would far exceed the limits of any despatch with which I would venture to trouble your Excellency. I would wish simply to treat of the situation as it exists at present.

The total population of Hungary, is, roughly, 17,000,000. Of these, under 8,000,000 are Magyars, 3,000,000 Roumans, 2,225,000 Croats, 2,000,000 Slovaks, 1,000,000 Serbs, and the remainder Germans, Ruthenes, and other. Pre-eminent among these races are the Magyars. They are the dominant race; they alone, against the will of the other nationalities, wrung from Austria the recognition and establishment of the independence of Hungary; they rule absolutely the country which they freed; they are at once the legislators and the executive; their language is the State language; and, in short, in their hands are concentrated all the wealth, and the social and political power of the country. No more striking instance of the extent to which the Magyars have secured to themselves the hegemony of the country can be given than the fact that in the Parliament, which is supposed to be a representative body, not a Rouman, nor a Slovak, nor a Serb, nor a Ruthene has a seat. It may be that in the House of Magnates there are a few nobles of Rouman nationality, and a stray landed proprietor or two of non-Magyar race may be found in the Chamber of Deputies, but these have long since discarded any connection with their original race, and have become more Magyar than himself. I have in previous Reports explained the causes which have led to these peculiar results. I merely reiterate the fact that as instancing the political monopoly of the Magyar. The Croats send a handful of Delegates to the House of Magnates, and forty Deputies to the Lower House; but, owing to the ingenious and curious manipulation of electoral affairs in Croatia, these Delegates are merely Government nominees, as was explained in my Report on Croatia of 1889.

The nationality question, especially in the Rouman direction, is a harrassing and over wakeful one, which of late is again becoming active and restless. I would not venture once more to enter into any detail on that subject, but would merely call attention generally to the never-flagging determination of the Magyar to coerce, persuade, and tempt, but chiefly to coerce, the subject races into a complete absorption into the Magyar nationality. The religious sentiments, it is true, are respected, but no effort, direct or indirect, is omitted to compel the nationalities to abandon their language, racial habits, customs, affinities, and aspirations, and to transform themselves into real Magyars. The persistency of the Magyars is surprising, but what is more surprising still is that they should expect to meet with ultimate success. Casting aside the wise and prudent counsels of Déak, who desired that all nationalities should, as he expressed it, feel themselves at home in Hungary, the Magyars are adopting the policy which Joseph II and other Austrian Rulers, in more favouring circumstances, followed unsuccessfully towards themselves, and are, I venture to think, blindly and rashly pursuing a line of action which must end in failure. The most audible of the complainants are the Roumans; their grievances are perhaps more serious and more irritating than those of the others; and, moreover, their cause has been in a measure taken up by their brethren in Roumania. The Croats have a certain local autonomy, and the malcontents there are effectually muzzled by the rigour of the Ban, who permits of no open insubordination. The Slovaks are isolated and backward, though a few among them occasionally give utterance to their dissatisfaction, and signs are not wanting that there also discontent exists.

The Serbs, scattered in South Hungary proper and Croatia, appear, for the moment, unwilling to take any active measures to ventilate their complaints, and, moreover, many of the more intelligent among them migrate over Serbia. It cannot be denied that the subject races generally are dissatisfied, and strongly opposed to the Magyarizing policy which is being so ruthlessly pursued. Acute, immediate danger, there is none, but the condition is not a healthy one; the heroic remedies of the Magyars will not improve it, and the general organism will not have that vitality and vigour which, under a different treatment, it might have acquired. Moreover, the spread of education, increased facility of intercommunication, and, in the case of the Roumans and Serbs, the establishment of two independent States of a cognate race across the borders, necessarily render the nationalities more tenacious of their birthright, and more desirous of keeping in touch and sympathy with their brethren elsewhere.

With these few general remarks on the nationalities I would beg leave to turn to other questions.

The Chamber of Deputies, as I have mentioned above, is practically composed of Magyars alone. Leaving out of account the forty Croat Delegates, who do not vote on questions solely affecting Hungary proper, the number of Deputies is 413, of whom 103 belong to the Extreme Left, 62 to Count Apponyi's party — the National party, as it is now termed — and the remaining 248 to the Government party. Elections to Parliament are by open voting; there is but one polling booth in each electoral district, some of which are of great extent; the franchise is fairly high, and I am afraid that bribery and corruption are not uncommon. The Government having an army of employés of various descriptions under its control, and being the fountainhead of all official rewards, necessarily exercise a paramount influence. During the twenty-five years of the existence of Parliament the Government have always been victorious at the polls. There are signs, however, that a change is gradually coming over this electorate, and that more independence is being exhibited; the continued increase in the Members of the Opposition is a symptom in that direction. Secure as the Government are of their majority, of late years they have undoubtedly been losing control over Parliament. This may be, in some measure, due to individual failings of leaders, but I think the cause is rather to be found in the ever-growing aggressiveness of the Opposition, and the want of sufficiently stringent rules to keep debates within proper limits and moderate bounds. Every facility is open to the Opposition to protract debates and obstruct legislation, and they are able, and on many occasions with success, to weary out the Government into concessions or retreat. The active Magyarizing policy of the Government has had one consequence which perhaps they did not anticipate. Chauvinism or ultra-patriotism has developed with the luxuriance of a subtropical vegetation. The result is that the Government, and this in present circumstances, must apply to any Government at the head of affairs, who are obliged to maintain good and smooth relations with Austria, and have, therefore, to endeavour to moderate the exuberant aspirations of the patriotic native, come frequently into collision with the Opposition on questions, trivial perhaps in appearance, but which have deep roots and far-reaching consequences. The Magyars are intoxicated with their success, and having, as they imagine, placed their heel on the subject races, they are determined to assert for themselves an absolute parity of position with Austria. The Government see the imprudence of some over-hasty steps taken in that direction, but usually find themselves unable to stem the torrent. The Opposition have but raise a question of national sentiment, and the Government party offer but a timorous resistance. The latter know that such questions can with ease be fanned into serious agitation in the provinces, and they dare not run the risk of being scoffed at as "traitors" and "Austrians". The incident which has occurred so recently is an instance in point, and there have been many similar ones.

The danger, I submit, is whether the Dual system will for long stand these constant strains on the strength of its links. The Extreme Left are its determined opponents; the National party proclaim loudly that they are its warmest adherents, and yet in Parliament they invariably make common cause with the Extreme party. There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of thinking, reasonable men in Hungary are loyal supporters of the Dual system, which they know is a vital necessity to both portions of the Monarchy; and it may safely be assumed that during the reign of the present Sovereign no danger to its continuance need be seriously feared; but the gusts of popular passion which occasionally sweep with such passing fury around it do infinite mischief. There will be changes of Government and of leaders, and yet the same problem ever increasing in complexity will always remain how to satisfy the Extreme sections in Parliament, increasing as they are in number and louder and more exacting as they are becoming in their demands, and at the same time to preserve unimpaired those fundamental principles of State policy which are essential to

the due maintenance of the Dual system. There is one strong reason for hoping that, buffeted as the Dual system may be from various quarters in Hungary, it will yet continue to stand erect, and that reason is to be found in the fact that both portions of the Monarchy have a common danger to fear, and an identic foreign policy to pursue, and that divided from each other, they could neither execute the one nor successfully combat the other. This fact will necessarily cause even the most reckless to pause before trying to rend asunder the ties which bind together Austria and Hungary.

I would like before concluding this despatch, which I fear is of undue length, to recapitulate in a few words the position in Hungary. I would submit that her policy towards the subject race is impolitic, and will end in failure, after having caused much ill-feeling, and having sapped the loyalty of these races to the Hungarian State, that the increasing ultra-patriotism of the Magyars is to be deplored as rendering the relations with Austria delicate and strained; and that orderly, regular Government is becoming yearly more difficult owing to the procedure of the Opposition in Parliament; an Opposition, it should be noted, who, so long as they adhere to their present political principle, can never come into power without a disruption of the Monarchy. Hungary, in following the steps and counsels of their wisest statesman, Franz Déak, could have become a strong, compact State; she will, owing to her great natural resources, probably develop into a wealthy and materially prosperous country; but if her politicians continue to advance much further on the path on which they have now entered, she will, when critical moments arrive, have reason. I fear, to regret that she had not been more patient, more tolerant, and more moderate.

A. Nicolson

P.R.O., F.O. 7/1 190 (1892) : Eastern Europe Confidential Print 213.

A. CHAMBERLAIN AND N. TITULESCU

BY

D. ȘANDRU

In Romania, the expropriation and the land reform legislated in the summer of 1921 had been imposed by both the necessity of improving the standard way of life of the peasants and the objective requirement of removing the anachronistic relations of production in the country-side as a condition of social and economic progress. To ensure the fund of land necessary to the reform the legislator subjected the properties of the land owners all over the country to expropriation¹. Even in the period when the draft of the land reform was discussed the land owners of Hungarian nationality in Transylvania who had left the territory of Romania after the union of 1 December 1918 taking Hungarian citizenship contested the act of expropriation. Denying the legitimacy of the land reform they protested continuously starting in May 1921 directly or by means of the government in Budapest, in various international forums against the right of the Romanian state to expropriate their lands, maintaining on the agenda of the Nations' League, from March, 15, 1923 to January 20, 1930, an artificially created problem which was to end with Romania's gaining the day².

Due to the duration of the controversy of the so-called "question of optants" it was followed attentively by the diplomats of numerous countries, some of them being obliged, owing to their functions in the Nations' Society, to clarify their attitude regarding this dispute. For the official position of Great Britain the attention is kept by the actions of its Minister of Foreign Affairs and therefore of its representative in the Council of the Nations' League between 1927 and 1928, Austen Chamberlain, actions carried out in a period when certain political circles in London started to manifest an attitude favourable to support the Hungarian revisionist current. It must be mentioned the fact that Great Britain was the only country in which, after World War I, two foreign researchers concentrated upon the land reform of Romania, assuming an attitude by their published volumes³ against the Hungarian landowners' claims which they considered to be groundless. In 1927 the increase of the intensity of revisionist positions of the Hungarian diplomacy on the theme of optants and their attacks increasingly insistent against

¹ For details, see D. Șandru, *Reforma agrară din 1921 în România* (București, 1975), *passim*.

² Idem, *Procesul optanților, în Titulescu și strategia păcii* (in the press).

³ See Ifor L. Evans, *The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania* (Cambridge, 1924), 171 and fol.; David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania. The War and Agrarian Reform, 1917–21* (New Haven, 1930), 219.

the Society of Nations found a basis in the moral support attained by the government in Budapest from Lord Rothermere who, starting from that very year initiated in his newspaper "Daily Mail" a press campaign in favour of revising the Peace Treaty of Trianon; some British political personalities joined this campaign and they came to interpollate the Government in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords concerning its attitude towards Hungarian claims⁴.

In the atmosphere somewhat favourable to the revisionist current created in London by the adherents to the support of Hungary and under the conditions in which Romania's delegate to Geneva, Nicolae Titulescu contested the authority of the Mixt Arbitral tribunal in Paris in suing the land reform in September 1927, the official representative of Great Britain in the Council of the Society of Nations, Austen Chamberlain was appointed the chief of the Committee of the Three with the charge of establishing the extent in which the Council of this international forum had or had not the right to complete the tribunal to which the Hungarian optants had addressed then when the parties in dispute would not have obeyed the dispositions of the tribunal. The delegate of Great Britain knew both the history of the agrarian problem in Romania and the standpoint of the Government in Bucharest according to which the Romanian state would not accept to apply the foreigners another regime of expropriation than the citizens of its own country as the optants pretended, they had been wholly presented by Nicolae Titulescu at the beginning of April 1925 before leaving London where he was the chief of the Romanian delegation for Geneva to defend the cause of Romania in the problem of colonists⁵. The Committee of the Three recognized that the Romanian agrarian law did not constitute a measure of "liquidation" so long as it had a general character and did not create inequality of treatment between Hungarians and Romanians, neither by its texts, nor by its manner of application, and that Romania, as a suzerain state, was entitled to pass laws upon its own properties⁶. The agreement on this opinion was wholly due to the representative of Great Britain. Nicoale Titulescu showed in a telegram dated 20 September 1927 from Geneva sent to the Minister of Home Affairs, I. G. Duca, regarding Chamberlain's position that no one of the political people known by the Romanian diplomat would have had the courage he had to take the bull by the horns, as he did, mentioninè at the same time that the success obtained two days before during the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations had been determined by the support of the English delegate who ensured that the problem should be taken in the attention of the Council and its postponement for the Spring of the following year⁷. Four years later, after the optants' trial had ended the same Titulescu regarding retrospectively its

⁴ National Archives of the U.S.A., Washington, D.C., Record Group 59, Decimal File 1910—1929, 871.52 Hungarian Optants/30.

⁵ Hoover Institution Archives, *N. Titulescu. Diary and Correspondence*, Box No. III, copybook 43, ff. 10—15.

⁶ *Agrarian Reform in Roumania and the Case of the Hungarian Optants in Transylvania before the League of Nations* (Paris, 1927), 29—37; „Adevărul”, 10.10.1927; „Dîmîneța”, 27.9.1927.

⁷ Hoover Institution Archives, *N. Titulescu. Diary and Correspondence*, Box No. IV, copybook 101, ff. 20—24.

evolution qualified Chamberlain's report as *highly remarkable* and the only document of the Society of Nations that had directly attacked the problem itself⁸.

But, in spite of the support offered by the official representative of Great Britain to Romania, the Hungarian revisionism managed to find new adherents in England. The appeal in November 1927 made by the Government of Budapest to the public opinion of Great Britain concerning the Hungarian claims had an echo in the political circles favourable to the revision of the Peace Treatise⁹. In December 1927, some of the seven Lords who joined Rothermere's campaign sent to "Times" a communication showing "the gravity of the optants' question by which they supported the Hungarians' interest. Then during the 49th session of the Council of the Society of Nation from Geneva in which the optants' question was debated "Times" published on 10 March 1928 under the form of letters signed by lords Buckmister, Newton, Sydenham and Messrs. Gower, MacNaghten, Moore and Morris several notes in which they criticised the actions of the Council. Defending Romania's position R. W. Seton-Watson published a letter in "Times" on 12 March 1928 pleading for Romania's cause "on the basis of fairness and less on that of law". Lord Buckmister and his fellows answered Seton-Watson by another letter published in "Times" on 15 March 1928 and on 16 March by other two signed by Wickham and Mantuano¹⁰. The observation contained by the letter of Marffy Mantuano, a person obviously of Hungarian origin — as J. Butler Wright the American Minister in Budapest wrote on 19 March 1928 to the American Secretary of State — are an example of the complaint so often heard in this country that the agrarian law is not equally applied of the Hungarian and Romanian landowners in Transylvania¹¹.

In the meeting of 9 March of the 49 the session of the Council of the Society of Nations in Geneva Austen Chamberlain proposed to the parties on dispute to admit that the optants' question should be submitted to the Mixt Arbitral tribunal and Romania change its delegate who had been withdrawn from the trial. Nicolae Titulescu objected that he could not accept unconditioned the recommendations given by Chamberlain concerning the Mixt Arbitral tribunal since the opinion of the Romanian Government was that the tribunal had competence neither to interview the optants nor to judge this case¹². As a consequence, the Council pronounced itself for deleting the optants' affair from its agenda following Titulescu's rejection of the recommended solution. The Romanian delegate enjoyed again Chamberlain's support¹³. The decisive support of Austen Chamberlain was possibly due to the detailed memoir of the problem especially written for him by Titulescu and given in Geneva in March 1928¹⁴.

In contrast with the attitude of the British delegate at the League of Nations, in London the propagande in support of Budapest intensified. On

⁸ N. Titulescu, *Discursuri* (București, 1967), 288.

⁹ National Archives of the U.S.A. . . . 871.52 Hungarians Optants/12.

¹⁰ Idem 871.52/18; "The Times", 10. 3. 1928; 12. 3. 1928; 15. 3. 1928; 16. 3. 1928,

¹¹ National Archives of the U.S.A. . . . 871.52 Hungarians Optants/18.

¹² *Ibidem*; Constantin D. Cutcutache, *Un mare conflict internațional: optanții unguri ai Transilvaniei și reforma agrară din România* (București, 1931), 107.

¹³ Hoover Institution Archives, N. Titulescu, *Diary and Correspondence*, Box No. VIII, copybook let 134, ff. 16—19.

¹⁴ Idem, Box No. VII, booklet 119; Box No. VIII, copybooks 120—123.

20 July 1928, J. Butler Wright, communicating to the Secretary of State of the United States the stage of the Optants' question in a report of 16 pages, brought into relief the campaign of London's "Times" of Lord Rothermere in March, April, June and July, Lord Birkenhead's position of defence of Hungary as well as the fact that in the summer of the same year in the British press there had appeared the names of new supporters of the Hungarian cause. At the beginning of July, 1928, J. L. Garvin, editor-in-chief of London's newspaper "Observer" gave an interview to "Berliner Börsencourir" in which he declared: "The problem of revision must be treated carefully, the exclusive revision in favour of Hungary at a too much appropriate date would not be timely and difficult to be achieved but the time for a general revision is not too far". Similar positions have been adopted by Prof. Gilbert Murray, President of the British League of the Union of Nations, Harold Williams, a columnist for "Times", Lord Parmoor and Lord Sydenham, in the interviews issued in the same newspaper of Berlin. Butler Wright quoted numerous newspapers in Budapest which commented largely and favourably the articles of the English press and newspapers from other countries which considered the revision of the Treaty of Trianon a solution favourable to the Hungarians in the question of optants¹⁵. The Minister of Great Britain in Budapest commenting with his American homologue in the same country the attitude of London observed that, from time to time, England's position toward Hungary is a quite delicate balance between neutrality full of good-will and a paternal inclination on one hand and the clear will to dissociate herself from any propaganda determined by Rothermere's interests on the other hand, declaring at the same time that it seemed an unfortunate occasion for his government to be obliged to treat in a chivalrous manner such an important problem¹⁶.

At the same time, in Hungary, Austen Chamberlain was violently criticized for his position in the Council of the League of Nations. The increase of the criticist current against him found its ultimate expression — J. Butler Wright wrote — during a session of the High Chamber of the Parliament in Budapest, on 19 July 1928, when against Chamberlain spoke the Prime Minister Stefan Bethlen and Joseph Veszi member of the Chamber¹⁷.

The taking out of the optants' question from the agenda of the Council of the League of Nations obliged the governments of the two countries to come to direct negotiations which will begin in December 1928. Although they did not reach a final result, after the Conference of Oriental Reparations of January 1930, the solution was found in the spirit predicted by the Romanian government which had been well expressed and defended by Nicolae Titulescu who had been sincerely supported by Austen Chamberlain on behalf of british diplomacy.

The activity of the two brilliant diplomats for the adjustments of the problem I insisted upon is still another chapter of the history of the British-Romanian relations¹⁸.

¹⁵ National Archives of the U.S.A. ... 871.52 Hungarian Optants/30.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ For details, see D. Șandru, *Procesul optanților* (in the press).

ROMANIAN INSURRECTION OF AUGUST 1944 AND THE BRITISH PRESS

BY

GH. BUZATU and AL. PASCU

The research works of the last few years, especially the excellent volumes published by Elisabeth Barker¹, Sir Llewellyn Woodward² and Paul Quinlan³ and further investigation of Romanian, British and North American diplomatic archives are a basis able to offer real coordinates, the essential facts attesting the evolution of Anglo-Romanian relations during the epoch of the Second World War and, above all, London's policy regarding Romania. Our intervention aims at approaching only a *chapter* of the above mentioned problem, that is to insist on the attitude of the British Press of the time towards the Romanian Insurrection on 23rd—31st of August 1944. We specify that we have in view the famous London daily "The Times".

On 23rd August 1944, therefore on the eve of the news about the throwing down of Antonescian regime in Bucharest and the enrolment of Romania in the United Nations reaching London, "The Times" informed its readers on the "important" offensives launched on two fronts in the area Iași—Kishinev by the Red Army⁴ reproducing a communiqué of the High Soviet Headquarters released the preceding night⁵. The next day on the front page it has already been announced that Romania had requested the United Nations for the armistice⁶ and inside the newspaper details were offered regarding the events in Romania⁷: the formation of C. Sănătescu's Government, the conditions of the armistice, the situation of the German troops, the advance of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts a.s.o. The proclamation of King Mihai in the evening of 23rd August 1944 was entirely reprinted⁸. On 25-th August 1944 "The Times" published more pieces of information specifying from the very beginning that the new Romanian Government, having at its basis the "front" of the four more important political parties (Communist, Social-Democrat, National Peasants and National-Liberal), inaugurated the era of a regime of respecting public liberties and citizens' rights⁹, a

¹ Elisabeth Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War* (London, 1976), *passim*.

² Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, II—III (London, 1971), *passim*.

³ Dr. Paul D. Quinlan, *Clash over Romania. British and American Policies towards Romania: 1938—1947* (Los Angeles, 1977), *passim*.

⁴ *Double Russian Offensive in Romania* ("The Times" 23.8.1944, 4).

⁵ *Fall of Jassy* (*ibidem*).

⁶ *Romania Granted Armistice* (*idem*, 24.8.1944, 1).

⁷ *Idem*, 24.8.1944, 4.

⁸ *King Michael's Call to His People* (*ibidem*).

⁹ *People's Rights in Democratic Regime* (*idem*, 25.8.1944, 4).

program to be found in the Declaration of 24-th August 1944 which was entirely published¹⁰. A communiqué of "Reuter" Press Agency, based on an announcement of cast by Radio Bucharest, described the manifestation for the cause of the Insurrection which took place in Bucharest during the night of 23/24 August 1944 immediately after learning the news concerning the removal of Ion Antonescu¹¹. It was also brought into relief the fact that the new regime enjoyed a full "popular support"¹². The German reactions and the military situation were not ignored¹³. Of a great interest and significance was the unsigned, ample commentary entitled *Romania's Choice* which started with the specification that the acceptance of the armistice and the ceasing of all hostilities by Romania were "an event of the highest military and political importance"¹⁴.

"The Times" kept on informing the British and international public opinion with the events in Romania with its consistent promptitude and objectivity. Thus, the intervention of the war state between Romania and the 3rd Reich on 25-th August 1944 was not only commented¹⁵ but also "argued" by printing the proclamation of the Romanian Government in the respective problem and which made known that as a consequence of the aggressive and brutal actions of the *Wehrmacht* "which occurred simultaneously in various parts of the country, Germany has placed herself in a state of war with Romania"¹⁶. Simultaneously the liberation of Bucharest by the Romanian insurrectional forces without any support from the Allies was recorded by publishing a communiqué of Radio Bucharest and taken over by "Reuter"¹⁷. In the days to follow London's daily would come again on this remarkable episode of the Romanian Insurrection¹⁸. A correspondence from Moscow (25-th August 1944) insisted on the reaction of the Allied Great Powers as to Romania's decision. There it was expounded the position of England and the United States towards the problem of the imminent negotiations for the armistice with Romania¹⁹ and it was reminded the content of a declaration of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow in which it was re-affirmed the standpoint expressed by V. M. Molotov in April 1944 regarding the intention of the U.S.S.R. "to respect Romania's territorial integrity and to refrain from any interference on her internal affairs"²⁰. It was also mentioned a distinctly important fact for Romania: "The High Command [of the Red Army] is prepared to permit the Romanian Army to retain arms for the struggle against the Magyars for the liberation of Transylvania and to aid them in this task"²¹.

Another correspondent of "The Times" in Istanbul, sent on 27-th August 1944 details about the circumstances of the arrest of Ion Antonescu and his

¹⁰ "Masters of Our Destiny" (*ibidem*).

¹¹ *Peace Demonstration in Bucharest* (*ibidem*).

¹² *Popular Support for Government* (*ibidem*).

¹³ *Sweep Towards Galatz* (*ibidem*).

¹⁴ *Romania's Choice* (*ibidem*, 5).

¹⁵ *Enemy Violation of Solemn Assurances* (*idem*, 26.8.1944, 4).

¹⁶ *German Perfidy. Attacks on Civil Population* (*ibidem*).

¹⁷ *Bucharest Freed* (*ibidem*).

¹⁸ *All Resistance Over in Bucharest* (*idem*, 28.8.1944, 4).

¹⁹ *U.S. and Romania* (*idem*, 29.8.1944, 4).

²⁰ *Quick Response by Russia. Help in Fight for Freedom* (*idem*, 26.8.1944, 4).

²¹ *Ibidem*.

governmental team. It was noted that the information came from a British officer who had just arrived from Bucharest²² and who was but Colonel De Chastelain. We reprint the fragment from this article-document :

"Last Wednesday, at 4 p.m. Marshal Antonescu, on his return from an inspection of the front, was received by the King, and began to report on the military situation. The King, interrupting him impatiently, told him that the situation was much worse than Antonescu thought; he reminded the Marshal that since last February he (the King) had been entreating the Government to put an end to Romania's untenable position by coming to terms with the Allies. Finally he informed Antonescu that in his opinion not one moment should be lost to attain that object. Antonescu began arguing, but the King got up from his seat, pressed a bell on his desk, and, summoning his guards, ordered them to arrest Marshal Antonescu. Immediately summonses were sent to all the members of Antonescu's Cabinet, calling them to the royal palace, and on their arrival they were all arrested.

A new Government was formed at once under General Sanatescu, Marshal of the royal court..."

During the last days of August 1944, referring to the great successes obtained by the Red Army upon *Wehrmacht's* forces under the conditions of the Romanian insurrection, "The Times" — appealing usually to the communiqués of the Soviet High Command — predicted the consumption of the great economic drama for Germany, after the diplomatic and military ones; that was the loss of the oil region of Ploiești which covered at least 30% of the fuel needs of the Nazi Reich²³. On 31st August 1944 the British public could be announced that the oil region of Ploiești was no longer in the possession of Germany²⁴.

The last communiqués of the Soviet High Command were accompanied, like those during the first days after the break out of the insurrection, by maps showing the evolution of the military situation²⁵. The attention is arrested by the fact that the terminology sometimes used has not always reflected the real situation. We have in view the fact that they spoke of the "occupation" (capture) by the allied armies of certain places of Romania — larger or smaller — when, in fact, they had already been liberated by the singular efforts of the insurrectional Romanian forces.

We like to believe that the article significantly entitled *Satellites in Revolt*, expressed in the best way the significance and the consequences of Romania's decision of 23rd August 1944: the "disastrous adventure" of the Nazi Germany in the South-East of Europe — as "The Times" well groundedly considered — came to "its close"²⁶.

Out of our information, "The Times" was by no means the only British daily which insisted upon the events in Romania in the course of their

²² King Michael's *Statescraft* (idem, 28.8.1944, 3).

²³ *Russian Drive on Ploiești* (ibidem, 4); *More Gains in Romania* (idem, 29.8.1944, 4); *Threat to Ploiești* (ibidem).

²⁴ *Enemy's Lost Oil* (idem, 31.8.1944, 4).

²⁵ See *Constanza Falls to Russians* (idem, 30.8.1944, 4); *Russians Capture Ploiești* (idem, 31.8.1944, 4); *Russians in Bucharest* (idem, 1.9.1944, 4); *Gains on the Danube* (idem, 2.9.1944, 4).

²⁶ "The Times", 28.8.1944, 5.

occurring. The studies of some Romanian researchers²⁷ referred also to "Daily Telegraph", "Sunday Times" and "Manchester Guardian". A document²⁸ discovered by us in the National Archives in Washington, DC, proves the distinct interest manifested by the British press for the Romanian Insurrection of August 1944. It is about the report No. 6926 of 25-th August 1944, sent from London by John Winant, the American Ambassador in England to the Secretary of State Cordell Hull. We annex this document, as well as an extract of the article *Romania's Choice*, which we mentioned above, to our brief intervention.

APPENDIX

— I —

Despatch No. 6 926

London, 25.8.1944

John Winant to the Secretary of State (Cordell Hull).

Second day press comment on Romania's announcement of her wish to capitulate continues to stress military and political blow which it constitutes for Germany, but describes confusion which exists to true situation inside the country and uncertainty as to exact basis on which Romania is surrendering. Equal prominence is given to statement that Bulgarian Government has submitted peace proposals to Allies through British Ambassador in Ankara.

News concerning Bulgaria is given in items by diplomatic correspondents, all following lines of story by "DAILY TELEGRAPH" commentator: "The Bulgarian Government have submitted peace proposals to the British Ambassador in Ankara. Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, through their peace envoy Moushanov. Those proposals have been forwarded to London by Sir Hugh. There are now under close examination by both the British and United States Governments. Russia is being kept fully informed of the talks in the Turkish capital, although she is not at war with Bulgaria". "NEWS CHRONICLE" correspondent asserts that Romanian capitulation has undoubtedly given urgency to desire already expressed by Bulgarians to leave the German camp; he adds: "The fact that they have not already done so is probably due not to any difficulties between the Bulgarian Government and M. Moushanov, their envoy in Ankara, but to Anglo-American discussions as to the terms on which Bulgaria may be allowed to abandon belligerency".

Declaring that situation in Romania is highly confused, diplomatic correspondent of "TIMES" writes: "The new regime seems to be in control of the country as a whole, and unless the Germans are able to shake it by putting in more forces — which they can ill afford — it appears already to be strong enough in personnel and popular support to carry through its declared policy of getting the country out of Hitler's war. The timing of the coup came as a surprise for the Allies. Although the royal proclamation stated categorically 'Romania has accepted an armistice offered by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States', the facts are not quite what the words imply they are. The armistice terms

²⁷ See especially Gh. Matei, *L'insurrection nationale antifasciste d'Août 1944 de Roumanie et son écho en France*, "Revue Roumanie d'Histoire", 5/1966, 827; idem, „Reperarea sursei”, „Magazin istoric”, 8/1974, 48—49; Vasile Gherghescu, *Aprecieri străine asupra însemnătății insurecției poporului român*, in *Insurecția din August 1944 și semnificația ei istorică* (București, 1974), 307, 312.

²⁸ National Archives of the U.S.A., Washington, D.C., Record Group 59, 740.00119 European War/8 — 2544.

were offered to Romania as far back as April of this year. In March, it may be recalled, Prince Stirbey undertook a peace mission, and in the Middle East he met British, Russian and American representatives. Russia as the power primarily concerned and involved in military operations against the Romanians put forward for the approval of the British and American Governments her minimum terms, which were extremely moderate in view of the suffering and losses which the Romanians had assisted the Germans to inflict on the Russians. They have been described by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden as generous. It is believed that Moscow was already to recognize Romanian claims in Transylvania. These, it is assumed, are the armistice terms which the new government in Bucharest has now accepted. The Allies seem to have had no inkling that the overthrow of the Antonescu faction was contemplated at this moment".

"DAILY TELEGRAPH" correspondent refers to Romanian peace overture of last spring and absence of official statement from Moscow on a new move, and declares: "It seems possible that Bucharest's delay in arriving at a decision may have caused the Soviet Government to stiffen the terms. It is not clear, nor is it known in London, whether Romania made another approach to Russia during her months of silence". "MANCHESTER GUARDIAN" commentator however believes there is nothing to suggest "that new elements have been brought in by the Russians at the final stage of the negotiations". "DAILY MAIL" indicates that developments in Bucharest may represent a coup d'état by King Michael, and that his description of terms of capitulation may be subject to modification by Russians, in consultation with Britain and United States. "MANCHESTER GUARDIAN" editorial asserts that scramble for safety among Romanians, Bulgarians and Hungarians is so degrading that inclination exists "to lump the three satellites together as partners in ignominy", but that certain distractions must be made. It points out that Romania was one of Allied powers in last war, with no revisionist claims after the peace treaties. Recalling Russian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian annexation of Romanian territory in 1940, editorial says result was that country "found herself outside the Allies' power to help and betrayed by the Axis", and that it mood of folly and despair Government of Antonescu joined Hitler in attack on Russia. "GUARDIAN" continues: "But at least it can be said that then exists in the Peasant Party of Mr. Maniu, who has been included in the new government, a leader and a body of opinion that has always stood for moderation in foreign policy and for friendship with Britain and Russia. Hungary and Bulgaria are in a very different position. They were both revisionist states after the last war — that it to say, they were dissatisfied with the frontiers awarded to them by the peace treaties. They were the natural allies of Germany and Fascist Italy during the peace; in this war they have been the Balkan profiteers. The cases then are very different, and it is only justice that Romania should receive from the Allies terms slightly less harsh than 'unconditional surrender'. It will be a great deal harder for the other two, who must make up their minds to disgorge their gains before any consideration can be given to their plea. This applies especially to Bulgaria, whose leaders appear to think that friendship with Russia will enable them to eat their cake and have it. Whatever the final frontiers may be (and they should be drawn coldly and dispassionately after the war in the interests of European peace and nothing else) it would be monstrous if either Bulgaria or Hungary were granted an armistice without their first abandoning all claims to the territory they have annexed. But something else may be necessary, something which may already have taken place in Romania — and that is revolution. The absurd and dangerous ambitions of Balkan states have all too often been supported by the ruling classes in order to further their interests or to distract attention from the poverty of their own peasants". "GUARDIAN" says that agrarian reforms have been realized to a certain extent in Romania and Bulgaria, but that there will be little hope of Balkan unity after the war is there is not first a democratic revolution in Hungary.

Concerning Hungary, "TIMES" editorial — after declaring that Romania's withdrawal from war is bound to have excellent effect on Turkey, Greek, Yugoslav Partisans, and Bulgaria — states that it may, on another hand, impel Hungary "to draw closer to the protector tyrant". It asserts: "The Romanian proclamation announcing the new government's rejection of the Vienna award, by which Romania was deprived of more than half Transylvania, will inevitably arouse the wrath of the Magyar oligarchy who benefitted most by the transfer to Hungarian rule of territories inhabited by a majority of Romanians. This forced cession imposed by Ribbentrop and Ciano on a powerless Romania, a 'diktat' if ever there was one, has rankled ever since in every Romanian heart. Even Marshal Antonescu, for all his subservience to German military control and economic pressure, did not always conceal his distaste for the award; and other and far more representative Romanian leaders, among them Dr. Maniu, the respected and influential head of the National-Peasant Party, and Mr.

Bratiano, the Chief of the National Liberals, have outspokenly condemned its injustice. That the Romanian Government have received some promises of Allied support for their claim to an extensive rectification of their frontier with Hungary is probable; and this not doubts has been one of the factors that have determined them to take a bold of dangerous, but necessary decision".

"DAILY EXPRESS" declares that British people rejoice in fresh evidence which Romania's defection gives of Germany's collapsed prestige, but that they are "in no melting mood about Romania's changes of sides", which they regarded as the business move it is.

"DAILY HERALD" criticizes what it regards as apparent slowness of Britain and United States in answering Bulgarian request for armistice terms. Asserting that Foreign Office and State Department fail to prepare for such emergencies, "HERALD" says: "If they had done their jobs properly Bulgaria, as well as Romania, might already have broken away from the German alliance. But the Foreign Office and the State Department in those last crowded years have learned strangely little about the tactics and political warfare".

"NEWS CHRONICLE" editorial on Romanian action concludes: "One other reflection suggests itself. Romania's capitulation, though logical enough in itself, came on Wednesday as a bolt from the blue. The Nazi gang may, with a little warning, suddenly find that the German Army and people no longer respond to the spur; then Germany may physically collapse under the weight of Allied pressure".

WINANT

(National Archives of the U.S.A., Washington, D.C.,
Record Group 59/740.00119 European War/8.2544)

— II —

ROMANIA'S CHOICE

The decision of the Romanian King and Government to accept the Russian armistice terms and to cease all hostilities with the United Nations is an event of the highest military and political importance. Since Marshal Antonescu's disordered ambition and the threats and cajoleries of the Axis led him to associate his country in Hitler's attack on Soviet Russia, the military and economic resources of Romania have been of the utmost value to the predatory Reich. Even more than the powerful armies which the Romanian "Conducator" placed at the Führer's disposal to be wasted in fruitless campaigns from the Pruth to the Volga, the Romanian contribution of fuel and food has been a prime factor in the German war effort. Almost a third of the petroleum which is the lifeblood of the German *mechanized armies* and of the *Luftwaffe* is drawn from Romanian oilfields and refineries; last year one-sixth of the wheat that feeds the Germans home front and the German armies came from Rumanian fields.

The threat to the enemy's capacity to prolong the war for any length of time is so manifest that it may be taken for granted that Hitler and his lieutenants will make a supreme and desperate effort to prevent the loss of these resources. Yet, with the Russian armies pressing towards the Galatz gap, with the whole strength of the *Wehrmacht* on the eastern front locked in bitter defensive battles with the might of Russia, with German resistance in France fast breaking down under the hammer-blow of the western allies, it is hard to see what they can do to avert a disaster of the first magnitude. At the same time the statement issued by the German official News Agency that a "Romanian National Government" has been formed to combat the "cowardly" surrender of King Michael and "a Palace clique" leaves no doubt that the enemy will use every means in his power to divide and confuse the Romanian people while he gathers such forces as he can to delay, if he cannot avert, the collapse of his Danubian front. As the Italian precedent has shown, cool heads and stout hearts will be needed at Bucharest if these immediate perils are to be surmounted.

The political effect of the Romanian abandonment of the German alliance will, nevertheless, outweigh any local and temporary setbacks that may be caused by German military

violence or political intrigue. It will have a tonic effect in Turkey, which has severed diplomatic relations with the Reich and has watched the growth of Romanian hostility to German exploitation and tyranny with an interest and sympathy which date from the days of the Balkan Entente. It will give the Greek military organizations and parties the best of reasons for cooperating with M. Papandreou's National Government and with one another at a moment when the liberation of Hellas has been brought still nearer by events beyond the Danube. It will give still greater encouragement to Marshall Tito's valiant partisans. Last, but not least, it should impress the Bulgarian Government with the necessity of coming to terms with the necessity of coming to terms with the western allies without bargaining or delay. They may now be less tempted to hope that they will be permitted to retain some of the territories feloniously seized from their Greek and Yugoslav neighbours in 1941. If they still think that they can somehow escape from the consequences of a purely predatory policy they will be well advised to "think again".

Only one of Germany's satellites may be tempted by the change to draw closer to the protector-tyrant. The Romanian proclamation announcing the new Government's rejection of the Vienna Award of August 30, 1940, by which Romania was deprived of more than half Transylvania, will inevitably arouse the wrath of the Magyar oligarchy who benefited most by the transfer to Hungarian rule of territories inhabited by a majority of Romanians. This forced cession imposed by Ribbentrop and Ciano on a powerless Romania, a "Diktat" if ever there was one, has rankled even since in every Romanian heart. Even Marshal Antonescu, for all his subservience to German military control and economic pressure, did not always conceal his distaste for the award; and other and far more representative Romanian leaders, among them Dr. Maniu, the respected and influential head of the National-Peasant Party, and M. Bratianu, the chief of the National Liberals, have outspokenly condemned its injustice.

The passage in the Government's proclamation expressing the readiness of Romania to cross the present frontier with the Russian army and recover the lost Transylvanian regions may excite the fears and even the hostility of the ruling group in Hungary. But with German armies in retreat on every side, it is probable that this mood will be only temporary [...].

Great as the effect of the Romanian defection must be in eastern Europe its impact on the German mind may be even more momentous. Even were the German high command temporarily to recover Bucharest or set up a quisling administration in some Romanian province they would still be exposed to the flood of the oncoming Russian hosts swollen by the tributary stream of Romanian anger. They cannot hope for long to maintain their heads above water. Yet if they abandon Romania they doom their mechanized armies to make shift with a diminishing supply of petrol constantly lessened by allied air attack on refineries and synthetic oil plants, and they doom their troops and their civil population to the loss of two months' rations. Such is the danger that confronts the Third Reich — a danger that all the severities of the censorship, all the drugs and devices of the propagandist cannot hide from the armies or even from the credulous yet frightened mass of the German people.

("The Times". August 25, 1944, p. 5).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

After the Colloquies in 1975 (Căciulați-București) and 1978 (London) the Colloquy in Iași on 1—3 July 1981 represented the third reunion of British and Romanian Historians.

At the last scientific manifestation with the theme : **"The Anglo-Romanian Relations within International Context, 1821—1918"**, the British delegation was headed by Professor **Richard Clogg** from the King's College, London. The delegation was formed by eminent specialists, well-known for their studies devoted to international and Anglo-Romanian relations in general and especially to the history of Romania : **Eric Tappe, Maurice Pearton, Harry Hanak, Trevor J. Hope** and **David Turnock**. During the Colloquy in Iași was also present **Dennis Deletant**, from the School of Slavonic and East European Studies from London, and he presided one of the meetings of the Colloquy and also participated to the debates. **Mr. Bruce Nightingale**, the cultural Attaché of Great Britain in Bucharest was also present at the proceedings after the first day.

The Romanian delegation headed by Professor **Mircea Petrescu-Dîmbovița** from the University of Iași, the Director of the Institute for History and Archeology "A. D. Xenopol" of this University was formed of historians : **Cornelia Bodea, Acad. Ștefan Pascu, Dinu C. Giurescu, Gh. Platon, Vasile Cristian, Al. Duțu, Al. Zub, Paul Cernovodeanu, Gh. Dobre, Vasile Vesa, V. F. Dobrinescu, Ștefan Lemny, and Gh. Buzatu**. **Constantin Parasciv** the scientific secretary of the Section for History-Archeology of the Academy for Social and Political Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Romania participated at the proceedings of the Colloquy in Iași.

The Colloquy in Iași was sponsored by the Academy for Social and Political Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Romania and of the National British Council of the International Association of South-East European Studies.

The delegation of the British historians arrived at Bucharest on 29th June 1981.

On 30^{leth} June 1981 the British delegation and the historians from Bucharest belonging to the Romanian Delegation have been received by Professor **Mihnea Gheorghiu**, the President of the Academy for Social and Political Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Romania who offered a dinner with the occasion, in honour of the guests.

In the afternoon of 30^{leth} June 1981 the Delegation of the British historians and the members of the Romanian Delegation from Bucharest and

Cluj-Napoca arrived at Iași being received at the residence of the Institute for History and Archeology "A. D. Xenopol" by Professor M. Petrescu-Dîmbovița, Gh. Platon, V. Cristian, Al. Zub, D. Vitcu, L. Boicu, Steluța Mărieș, V. F. Dobrinescu, Ștefan Lemny, Ioan Caproșu, Ecaterina Negruți, Gabriel Bădărău, and Gh. Buzatu.

During the Colloquy held between 1 and 3 July 1981 there have been presented the reports and interventions of: M. Petrescu-Dîmbovița (inaugural speech), Ștefan Pascu, Richard Clogg, Trevor J. Hope, Gh. Platon, V. Cristian, Paul Cernovodeanu, David Turnock, Gh. Dobre, Cornelia Bodea, Maurice Pearton, Vasile Vesa, V. F. Dobrinescu, Al. Duțu, Al. Zub, Eric Tappe, Ștefan Lemny, and Gh. Buzatu. The initial program was modified: Professor Norman Stone could not come to Romania so that in his place Professor Harry Hanak delivered the report which is published in this volume. All the materials included in this volume have been given back to the authors at the end of the Colloquy for a last proofreading before printing. The last date for getting them was 10th April 1983. Paul Cernovodeanu's report is published in brief form.

On the basis of the reports and of the interventions, at the close of the meetings there have been ample debates with the participation of: Dinu C. Giurescu, Dennis Deletant, Paul Cernovodeanu, Al. Duțu, Al. Andronic, Richard Clogg, Maurice Pearton, Gh. Platon, Trevor J. Hope, Ștefan Pascu, Vasile Cristian, Cornelia Bodea, Grigore Vereș, Vasile Vesa, and Gh. Buzatu. At the secretariate of the Colloquy there were received materials concerning the evolution of Anglo-Romanian relations in 19th and 20th centuries signed by Sorin Pârvu, I. Saizu, D. Șandru, and Al. Pascu all being included in the present volume.

Professors Richard Clogg and Ștefan Pascu delivered the conclusions about the communications of the Colloquy.

The closing speech like the opening one belonged to Professor M. Petrescu-Dîmbovița, the Director of the Institute host of the Colloquy:

"Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the end of this fruitful dialogue of the distinguished English and Romanian historians, on behalf of the co-workers of the "A. D. Xenopol" Institute of History and Archeology and of the Faculty of History and Philosophy in Iași, I would like to thank all the authors of the papers and the participants in the discussions. We also appreciate the quality and the usefulness of the materials submitted, expressing the hope that just as in the case of the proceedings of the previous colloquies at Căciulati and in London, they will be published. At the same time we hope that the exchange of views in Iași will be continued in Romania or in England in the same spirit of cooperation and to the same end of strengthening the Anglo-Romanian scholarly relations in the service of an ever better mutual knowledge of the relations between our countries.

Thanking all those who have had the kindness to attend this colloquy, I declare the proceedings closed, and for the next two days our guests will visit some of the splendours of Romanian medieval art, which bear living testimony to the creative power of our people"

In Iași, the delegations of British and Romanian historians have been received on 1st of July in the Senate Hall of the University "Al. I. Cuza" by the leadership of the University — Professor **Viorel Barbu**, Rector of the University, Professors **Ionel Hagiu** and **Vasile Arvinte**, Prorectors, Professor **Vasile Cristian**, Dean of the Faculty of History and Philosophy of the University. In the evening of 3rd July 1981 the British and Romanian historians have been received by Teoctist, Metropolitan of Moldavia and Suceava.

During the breaks of the proceedings the members of the two delegations visited the main historical and artistical monuments of the town of Iași — the Palace of Culture, "Al. I. Cuza" University, "Mihai Eminescu" Central Library of the University, Metropolitan Cathedral, "Three Hierarchies" Church, "Golia" Church, "Cetățuia" Monastery, and Pogor's Memorial House.

During the discussions in the last day of the Colloquy, bearing in mind the points of view expressed by **Maurice Pearton**, **Vasile Vesa**, **Dinu C. Giurescu**, **Paul Cernovodeanu** and **Gh. Buzatu** regarding the international significance of some Anglo-Romanian contacts, Professor **Richard Clogg** proposed the subject matter of the next Anglo-Romanian Colloquy of history: "Anglo-Romanian Relations between 1914 and 1941" to be held in Edinburgh, 1984.

All participants expressed their gratitude and full admiration to Professor **Grigore Văreș** from the University of Iași for his excellent activity as an interpreter during the three days of the Colloquy.

After the end of the Colloquy the members of the two delegations of historians went — on 4th and 5th July 1981 — on a documentation journey to the North of Moldavia a good opportunity to establish a contact with contemporary realities to get acquainted or to meet again a series of localities and historical monuments of ample resonances for the Romanians' past: the City of Suceava and the Monasteries of Dragomirna, Voroneț, Moldovița, Putna, Sucevița, Arbure and the towns of Suceava, Rădăuți, Fălticeni, Marginea, Vama and Solca.

In Suceava the two Delegations have been received by the Rector of The Institute of High Studies, Professor **I. Bojoi**, accompanied by professors of the Faculty of History of the Institute **M. Iacobescu**, **N. Ursulescu** and **M. Lazăr**.

Back in Bucharest the British Delegation was received on 6th July 1981 by Professor **Ștefan Ștefănescu**, President of the Section of History-Archaeology of the Academy for Social and Political Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Romania, director of "N. Iorga" Institute of History, Dean of the Faculty of History and Philosophy of the University of Bucharest.

The same day, Mr. **Paul Cecil Holmer**, Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Bucharest, and Mr. **Bruce Nightingale**, the Cultural Attache offered a dinner in honour of the two delegations of English and Romanian historians.

In the afternoon of the same day the British Delegation had their flight for London.

For the printing of the proceedings of the 3rd Colloquy in Iași, The "A. D. Xenopol" Institute of History and Archeology and the Editorial Committee of the "Yearbook" of the Institute (Editor-in-chief **Leon Șiman-**

schi, scientific secretary Ștefan Gorovei) enjoyed the constant support of the University of Iași, and of its Rector, Professor Viorel Barbu.

Gh. Buzatu, the scientific secretary of the Scientific Council of the Institute dealt with gathering the materials of the Colloquy, their preparation for printing, supervision of printing and the final touches of this volume.

The proofreading of the materials and their preparation for the printing machine were carried out by Al. Pascu and Gh. Buzatu.

The general Index was prepared by I. Saizu, V. F. Dobrinescu and Gh. Buzatu.

We are indebted with all our gratitude to all those who, by their efforts have ensured the success of the Colloquy in Iași and made the coming out of this volume possible, a book which reunites materials consecrated to the evolution of Anglo-Romanian relations in the 19th and 20th centuries within international context.

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A list compiled by
I. Saiză and Gh. Buzatu

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SECȚIA DE ISTORIE ȘI ARHEOLOGIE
A ACADEMIEI DE ȘTIINȚE SOCIALE
ȘI POLITICE

COMITETUL NAȚIONAL BRITANIC
AL ASOCIAȚIEI INTERNAȚIONALE
DE STUDII SUD-EST EUROPENE

INSTITUTUL DE ISTORIE ȘI ARHEOLOGIE
"A.D.XENOPOL" IAȘI

PROGRAMUL

colocviului româno-englez de istorie pe tema :
"Relații româno-engleze între 1821 și 1918
în context internațional,,

IAȘI

1-4 iulie 1981

PROGRAM

Miercuri, 1 iulie

ora 9,30

Cuvînt de deschidere a lucrărilor colocviului:

- prof.dr.docent Mircea Petrescu-Dîmbovița
- prof. Richard Clogg

orele 10,00-13,00 Prezidează: prof. R.Clogg, dr.docent Cornelia Bodea

- "Opinia publică engleză și lupta românilor din Transilvania pentru drepturi politice" (referat)
acad. Stefan Pascu
- "O nouă Belgie sau o altă Grecia ? Puncte de vedere britanice privind Unirea Principatelor" (referat)
dr. Trevor Hope
- "Raporturile diplomatice româno-engleze în perioada regulamentară" (intervenție)
prof. Gheorghe Platon
- "Vlahii din Macedonia: puncte de vedere britanice" (intervenție)
prof. R. Clogg

X

orele 16,00-19,00 Prezidează: acad. St.Pascu, dr.Maurice Pearlon

- "Raporturi economice româno-engleze după 1821" (referat)
dr. Paul Cernovodeanu
- "Schimburi structural-calitative în relațiile comerciale româno-engleze în perioada modernă și contemporană. Analiză comparativă " (intervenție)
dr. Gheorghe Dobre
- D i s c u ţ i i

Joi, 2 iulie

- orele 9,00-13,00 Prezidează: prof.E.D.Tappe, prof.Gh.Platon
- "Charles Hartley și dezvoltarea navigației pe Dunărea de Jos" (referat)
dr. David Turnock
 - "Relații româno-engleze în timpul Congresului de la Berlin" (intervenție)
prof. Vasile Cristian
 - "Răscoala țăranilor români din 1907, în perspectivă europeană" (referat)
dr. Norman Stone
 - "Relații româno-engleze în perioada primului război mondial" (referat)
dr. Vasile Vesa, dr. Valeriu Dobrinescu


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- orele 16,00-19,00 Prezidează: prof. Dinu Giurescu, dr. Trevor Hope
- "Contribuții românești la teoria și practica neutralității, 1914-1916" (referat)
dr. M.Pearson
 - "Relațiile lui Seaton Watson cu oameni politici români până la 1918" (intervenție)
dr. docent Cornelia Bodea
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Vineri, 3 iulie

- orele 9,00-13,00 Prezidează: dr. Denis Deletant, dr. Al.Duțu
- "Interferențe și relații culturale româno-engleze în epoca modernă" (referat)
dr. Al. Duțu, dr. Al. Zub

- "Contacte literare anglo-române între 1848-1878"
(intervenție)
dr. E.D. Tappe
- "Nicolae Iorga - istoric al relațiilor româno-
engleze " (intervenție)
dr. Gheorghe Buzatu
- "Modelul englez în memorialistica românească din sec.
XIX" (intervenție)
dr. Stefan Lemny
- D i s c u ţ i i
- CONCLUZII FINALE
 - prof. R. Clogg
 - acad. Stefan Pascu



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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The presidium (Professors Dinu C. Ciurescu, Trevor J. Hope and Grigore Veres)



Professor Ștefan Lemny reports



Professor Mircea Petrescu-Dîmbovița, Director of the Institute of History and Archeology of Iassy, and Professors Constantin Paraschiv and V. F. Dobrinescu



Professor Gh. Buzatu reports



The reception at the "Al. I. Cuza" University of Jassy



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«A.D. XENOPOL»“ DIN IAȘI

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